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Play Episode Listen Later Dec 24, 2024 46:02

Last time we spoke about the third arakan campaign. In December, General Bruce's forces advanced through Leyte, securing Ormoc and preparing for a decisive push toward Valencia.. The 305th and 306th Regiments steadily overcame enemy positions, while the 307th secured the airstrip. As Japanese forces began to retreat, the 12th Cavalry captured Kananga, opening Highway 2. Meanwhile, in Burma, General Slim devised Operation Extended Capital, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese and cut off their supply lines, setting the stage for a crucial battle. As Admiral Mountbatten pivoted from Operation Dracula to launch Operation Romulus in Arakan, General Christison devised a three-pronged assault on Akyab. Facing fierce Japanese resistance, Private Kweku Pong displayed extraordinary bravery amidst chaos, earning recognition for his valor. Meanwhile, the 28th Army struggled to defend its positions, ultimately retreating under pressure. Amidst strategic deceptions, the Allies advanced through challenging terrain, culminating in significant victories that shifted the tide in Burma, showcasing courage and tactical ingenuity in the face of adversity. This episode is the Victory at Leyte Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we last left off, General Krueger's forces had effectively secured the Ormoc Valley, prompting many Japanese units to begin a challenging retreat toward Palompon. From that point, the best General Suzuki's troops could manage was to hold their positions for as long as possible. The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight miles of the road to the north and east could be observed. Meanwhile, eager to deliver a decisive blow, Krueger organized his forces for a four-division assault along a wide front toward the west coast. General Bruce's 77th Division was tasked with advancing west along the Palompon road, while the three divisions of General Sibert's 10th Corps embarked on a difficult trek across the mountains to reach the northwest coast. The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests. Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. It was this road junction that the 10th and 24th Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many knife-edged crests. Such was the area into which the forces of the 6th Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army. To facilitate the capture of Palompon, Bruce planned to land the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment near the port, while the other two battalions advanced westward on the Palompon road. To support this operation, Admiral Kinkaid would provide amphibious vehicles, LCMs, and a PT escort. However, while preparations for the amphibious assault were underway, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment departed from Valencia on December 22, quickly crossing the Togbong and Pagsangahan Rivers without encountering any opposition, and eventually halting just beyond the Humaybunay barrio. The 302nd Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." The engineers worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2.5-ton truck traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. At the same time, patrols from the 128th Regiment successfully eliminated the last enemy strongholds in the Limon area, while the 127th Regiment advanced to Lonoy, where the 1st Cavalry Division was gearing up for its westward push. Finally, the 24th Division, now under Major General Roscoe Woodruff, dispatched the 34th Regiment to launch an attack toward Tuktuk. On December 23, as aircraft bombed Palompon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment resumed their advance. The Americans steadily progressed along the road, successfully forcing the Takahashi Detachment to retreat to the mountains northwest of Matag-ob, where they had to fend off a series of strong night counterattacks. That same morning, the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway, facing no resistance as they advanced west through the mountains. This initial day of marching established the pattern for the following days, with the cavalry regiments continuing to push forward through challenging terrain, encountering only sporadic resistance. Additionally, from December 23 to 26, the 34th Regiment conducted extensive patrols along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. Meanwhile, the advance echelon of the 1st Division successfully linked up with the 68th Brigade, reaching the Bagacay sector the next day. However, the main body of the division had to carve its way through dense jungle on its way to Bagacay. The 102nd Division was also advancing toward the area south of Matag-ob, but after failing to make contact with the 35th Army or the Takahashi Detachment, its units began to retreat to Villaba in the following days. On December 24, while the 1st Battalion was boarding at Ormoc, the remainder of the 305th Regiment launched another offensive. At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on December 23 to reconnoiter the terrain. At 08:00 on December 24 the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance. The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills encountered on December 24: “The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area.” The hills were less rugged from then on. Throughout the march both regiments also received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide scattering of supplies. On December 25, the 1st Battalion of the former unexpectedly came across the remnants of the 1st and 57th Regiments. The Japanese forces suffered significant casualties and were compelled to disperse, but they eventually managed to reach Bacacay later that night. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment made slow progress along the Palompon road against a well-entrenched enemy. However, the crucial development was that its 1st Battalion successfully landed at Buaya without facing any opposition. A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, 14th Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. Once again, Suzuki's plans were thoroughly disrupted. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba. The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations. He sent orders for his retreating units to gather there instead of in Palompon. Although Suzuki anticipated being able to support 15,000 men in this self-sufficient area, an assessment of the available resources revealed that they would only last for two weeks. Consequently, the Japanese began preparations for Operation Chi-Go, which involved the amphibious movement of several units, including the 35th Army headquarters and the majority of the 1st Division, to other islands in the Visayas. At the same time, on December 26, the 34th Regiment received orders to capture San Isidro. The next day, its 1st Battalion left Calubian and moved to the high ground overlooking the port, while Companies F and G conducted amphibious landings at Gigantangan Island and Taglawigan before securing Daha. The reinforced Company G then re-embarked on the landing craft and proceeded toward the San Isidro Bay area, where they encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and were ultimately forced to retreat. At the same time that the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment was being withdrawn for an overwater movement to Palompon, the 3rd Battalion continued its advance along the road, successfully covering over 1,000 yards by December 28. That day the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese. Additionally, the 34th Regiment launched a coordinated assault on San Isidro, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance and capturing the port. In the following days, the troops moved south along the coast, eliminating small, poorly equipped Japanese units. Looking south on December 29, the 128th Regiment reached the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays, while the 127th Regiment secured the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, completing the advance of the 32nd Division. Further south, the 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment continued its push along the Palompon road despite strong resistance, while Company B secured the barrio of San Miguel. At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others intact. Meanwhile, Company C conducted a reconnaissance in force and executed an amphibious landing at Abijao, advancing 1,300 yards north to establish contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division near Villaba. By this time, most of the Japanese forces had successfully regrouped in the Villaba-Mount Canguipot area. Consequently, on December 31, Suzuki launched four strong counterattacks against the forces at Villaba; however, enemy artillery disrupted most of these assaults before elements of the 77th Division arrived to relieve the cavalrymen. With the westward advance to the coast complete, General Eichelberger's 8th Army officially took command of all units on Leyte Island, following MacArthur's announcement that organized resistance had ceased. As a result, on January 1, the 77th Division was instructed to relieve the 32nd and 24th Divisions, while the divisions of the 10th Corps moved to staging areas in preparation for upcoming operations. The 8th Army also assumed control of operations on Samar Island, which had similarly been secured against enemy forces. Units from the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed through heavy resistance to reach the strategic Taft-Wright Highway that runs through central Samar. On December 8, the cavalry successfully captured Wright, the western end of the highway, and then moved east to connect with friendly guerrilla forces advancing from Taft on the opposite coast, thereby securing control of the highway. Meanwhile, following the successful invasion of Mindoro, American forces continued their efforts on Hill Drome and Ellmore Field, with General Dunckel's troops conducting extensive patrols to locate enemy stragglers while awaiting the arrival of the 21st Regiment. The only opposition faced came from the persistent assaults of the 4th Air Army and the 1st Combined Base Force. On December 21 and 22, the 1st Resupply Echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. About twenty kamikazes attacked the convoy, so damaging two LST's that they later had to be abandoned, and inflicting lesser damage on two destroyers and a Liberty ship. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, en route to Mindoro in this convoy lost 6 men killed and 32 wounded; U.S. Navy losses were about 70 men killed or wounded; the Japanese lost 7 planes in kamikaze attacks and 3 others to shipboard antiaircraft fire. Then, from December 28 to December 30, Task Unit 18.3.15 was also attacked by kamikazes. Meanwhile, Admiral Okawachi was getting Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force ready for a hit-and-run surface attack on enemy invasion ships near San Jose, known as Operation Rei-Go. However, a proposed counter-landing on Mindoro, which was supported by Marshal Terauchi, Admiral Fukudome, and General Tominaga, faced strong opposition from General Yamashita and his 14th Area Army. The Area Army staff adamantly maintained that it would be impossible to move any sizeable forces to Mindoro but agreed to dispatch a small raiding unit to hamper enemy development of airfields in the San Jose area. On or about 24 December, an order was issued to the 8th Division to organize a task unit for this mission as soon as possible. Ultimately, a reluctant compromise was reached, allowing a small raiding unit from the 8th Division to be sent to disrupt enemy airfield development in the San Jose region. The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. It assembled at Batangas and prepared to embark for Mindoro. While this unit was being organized, Shima's warships left Camranh Bay on December 24. However, as they approached Mindoro on December 26, a lone PBY reconnaissance plane spotted them. In response, 105 aircraft were sent to conduct low-level attacks on the Japanese force. At 19:40 the first wave of planes found the vessels just offshore. Before the wild engagement was over, the full wing strength had attacked every ship at least once. "When I saw a solid sheet of flame," reported one pilot in describing the AA, "I knew I was over the vessel." While wheeling away from the target, each pilot flashed on his running lights to avoid collision. Some planes landing in the Mindoro blackout for rearming, made as many as three strikes against the enemy vessels. Although PT boats, lurking close to shore, fired torpedoes at the silhouetted Japanese targets, only the destroyer Kiyoshimo went down, and the fleet persisted toward the beachhead, where at 22:40 it fired star shells which began an ineffective 40-minute bombardment. Only one Liberty ship, which had not sought refuge behind Ilin Island as directed, was sunk. Naval gunfire and simultaneous Japanese air attacks caused little damage at Hill, but made it difficult for the airmen aloft to land. With gasoline running short, most of the pilots made as many attacks as possible and then headed through the night and bad weather for Leyte, a flight more dangerous than the Japanese AA had been. When a full count was made, losses during the engagement totaled 26 aircraft. For the force engaged this was a heavy loss, but it was not in vain, for several Japanese survivors attributed the amazingly poor bombardment by their fleet to the aerial clawing which had demolished main batteries and killed a majority of the gun crews. Dunckel thought that without a doubt the airmen had saved the beachhead from serious losses: "The action of our Air Units on that night," he wrote, "will stand forever… as one of the most gallant deeds to be established in the traditions of American fighting men." On 26 December 1944, then with the San Jose bombardment force, Kiyoshimo was crippled by two direct bomb hits in attacks by U.S. Army bombers during the approach to Mindoro, Philippines. The ship was then finished off by a torpedo from U.S. PT-223, 145 miles south of Manila ; 82 were killed and 74 injured. The destroyer Asashimo rescued 169 survivors, including ComDesDiv 2, Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, and Lieutenant Commander Kajimoto; U.S. PT boats rescued five others.Despite this, Shima pressed on toward his target, entering the anchorage area at 23:00 to commence bombardment of San Jose. After approximately forty minutes of shelling, during which one auxiliary vessel and a PT boat were sunk, the Japanese ships withdrew northwest at high speed, still under fire from enemy planes. Although Shima's force ultimately managed to escape, the air attacks resulted in the sinking of the Kiyoshimo and damage to the Ashigara, the light cruiser Oyodo, and three destroyers, with a loss of 26 aircraft. The bombardment prevented landings at the Mindoro strips and many pilots, finding their planes running low on fuel, headed through the darkness and heavy weather toward Leyte fields only to crash on the way. Following this unsuccessful operation, on December 31, the raiding unit from the 8th Division finally crossed the Verde Island Passage by landing craft to reach Calapan in northeastern Mindoro, and then proceeded to Pinamalayan, arriving there on January 5. We must now depart from the Philippines and proceed to Bougainville to report on the preparations for a new Australian offensive. Previously, we observed that General Savige's 2nd Corps had successfully relieved the American troops stationed at the Cape Torokina perimeter. The Australians had now reached the conclusion that the Japanese had disbanded depleted units to reinforce others and were maintaining a well- disciplined and efficient force. They decided that, at the end of November, the force included the 38th Independent Mixed Brigade, built round the 81st Regiment, and the 6th Division with three depleted infantry regiments -13th, 23rd and 45th. Of these the 38th Brigade was believed to be chiefly concentrated at Numa Numa, with part of the 81st Regiment forward on the trail; most of the 13th Regiment was believed to be round the Jaba River-Gazelle Harbour area, with the 23rd farther south, and the 45th round Kieta on the east coast. The Allied Intelligence estimates of the whereabouts of the main Japanese forma- tions on Bougainville proved accurate. The main shortcoming was that the strength of the naval troops was underestimated. At the time of the arrival of the Aus- tralians there were about 11,000 naval men, including 3,500 civilian workers, on the island; the 87th Garrison Force, about 4,000 strong, was in the Buka area, and in the south were two strong forces of marines: the 6th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (about 2,000) and the 7th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (about 1,500). Indeed the naval forces were about as strong in fighting men as the 6th Division. The successful attack on Little George by the 9th Battalion on 29th November, six weeks before it was expected, surprised the enemy commanders and convinced them that the Australians were determined to open an offensive. Reinforcements numbering 450 were hurried into the central area (there were 2,000 troops deployed in or forward of Numa Numa) and Colonel Kaneko Atsushi of the 81st Regiment took command. A further 1,000 troops were sent from Kieta and the north to Numa Numa. Hyakutake was convinced that the attack on the Numa Numa trail would be accompanied by a landing at its eastern end with the object of severing his force. The quantity of artillery used in the attack on Little George and later Arty Hill convinced the Japanese that a determined thrust was being made. Arty Hill was defended by men of the 5th and 11th Companies of the 81st Regiment. Meanwhile the 13th Regiment was attacked on the Jaba River. Lieut-General Kanda of the 6th Division did not propose to contest the south bank of the river, considering that the crossing was merely a feint and the principal offensive would be made by sea; the main body of the defending force-1,500 men-was retained in the Mosigetta area. By January Kanda estimated that one Australian division, its name yet unknown, was south of the Jaba, with 25 guns. From 23rd to 26th November the 9th Battalion, with the 12th Field Battery and other detachments under command, took over this sector. The 9th Battalion's first task was actively to reconnoitre the Sisivie area with a view to attacking it later; and to secure ground from which such an attack could be launched. It had been believed that the main supply route from Numa Numa passed through Sisivie, but captured docu- ments and interrogation of prisoners revealed that Sisivie was merely an outpost and that the Piaterapaia area was the terminus of the enemy's line of communication; consequently the battalion's efforts were con- centrated in that direction. At 1.50 p.m. on the 24th one rifle shot was fired from Little George into the battalion's area the first shot in the Australian operations on Bougainville. On the 25th a small patrol moved stealthily to the rear of Little George and was fired on, two men being wounded. On the morning of the 29th the battery in the Doiabi Valley fired high-explosive and smoke shells on to Arty Hill, mortars fired smoke bombs on to Little George, and into the smoke a single platoon attacked. At the run the men reached the top of Little George before the Japanese emerged from shelter, opened fire with machine-guns and threw grenades. The attackers did not falter but worked their way forward in pairs, one man firing on a post while the other moved close and threw in grenades. Lieutenant Deacon, the commander, was 3 wounded but carried on. In about half an hour the position was gained. Two Australians had been killed and six wounded, of whom three remained on duty. Twenty Japanese dead lay on the hill, in- cluding a lieutenant and a sergeant. The expected enemy counter-attack was made in the evening by about 40 Japanese. It was a frontal thrust and gained no ground. Until dawn the enemy tried in vain to infiltrate. While these operations were in progress on the Numa Numa trail, the 2/8th Commando, next on the right, had taken over responsibility for the tangled mountain area rising to an altitude of 4,000 feet south and south-east of Mount Bagana, and known as the Hanemo sector. When the commando squadron took over from a company of the 164th American Regiment there had been no contact with the enemy for several weeks, and it was believed that only a handful of Japanese were in the neighbourhood. For five weeks from 24th November, when the relief was completed, a commando troop patrolled but met Japanese only twice, killing two and capturing another. By 27th December, when the 61st Battalion relieved the troop, it was considered that the area was clear and the flank of a force advancing down the coast would be safe. Additionally, Brigadier Raymond Monaghan's 29th Brigade was deployed to the southwestern edge of the perimeter, and a company from New Guinea was assigned to scout the Jaba River area. On December 3, Matthews sent a platoon to Sisivie, but the defenders were able to pin down the Australians with intense fire. After successfully repelling a strong enemy counterattack, the 9th Battalion advanced on Bawabu Ridge toward Pearl Ridge, with Matthews' C Company ordered to capture Arty Hill on December 18. Matthews planned an attack on Arty Hill by a full company. At 7 a.m. on 18th December Major Blanch's C Company formed up on the sheltered side of George and Little George, on top of which men of a supporting company were walk- ing about nonchalantly to mislead the enemy into thinking that it was to be another uneventful day. Twelve New Zealand Corsairs at- tacked the Japanese positions; the battery of the 4th Field Regiment opened fire from its positions in the Laruma River Valley; medium machine-guns fired from Mount Deacon and Bawabu Ridge that is, from each flank-on to the reverse slope of Arty Hill at ranges up to 1,000 yards. After thirteen minutes of bombardment, the attackers advanced through the smoke along the razor-back ridge which was the only means of approach to the bare hill. Months of intermittent shelling had destroyed the bush and so loosened the soil on the steep slopes that the men had difficulty in scrambling up them. By 8.10 the leading troops were near the crest of Banyan Knoll and were meeting sharp small arms fire from Japanese in covered weapon-pits. Grenades were hurled down on them. They pressed on. Sergeant Allan, commanding the right platoon, led the way to the top of Banyan Knoll, shot a Japanese machine-gunner and himself fell dead. His men carried on up the slopes of Arty Hill. As at Little George, the attackers worked in pairs, one man covering an enemy post with fire while the other attacked from a flank with grenades. After more than an hour of close fighting the position was won and the defenders were digging in and setting up wire in preparation for the probable counter-attack. There was none: a prisoner said that there were not enough men left to attack. Five Australians were killed and 12 wounded of whom 4 remained on duty. Twenty-five Japanese dead were counted, 2 Japanese were taken prisoner, and from 10 to 20 recently-buried bodies were found. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel John McKinna's 25th Battalion began to relieve the exhausted 9th Battalion and was immediately tasked with taking Pearl Ridge, although its initial probing attacks were met with fierce resistance from the determined defenders. Meanwhile, Monaghan had deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert McDonald's 15th Battalion to the Jaba River area, where they effectively cleared out enemy outposts. By the fourth week of December, the unofficial ceasefire on Bougainville had collapsed. Intense fighting erupted in two of the three main sectors, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Japanese soldiers, with their forward positions in each area being captured. The Australians were also bringing in additional reinforcements to sustain their offensive. According to Savige's strategy, Brigadier John Field's 7th Brigade was to be replaced by elements of Brigadier John Stevenson's 11th Brigade in the central sector, with orders to move south and join the rest of Major-General William Bridgeford's 3rd Division for an assault toward the Puriata River. Additionally, a strong contingent from the 11th Brigade was set to advance along the northwest coast of the island toward Soraken Harbour, aiming to push the northern enemy forces into the confined Bonis Peninsula. However, before these plans could be executed, McKinna was intent on capturing Pearl Ridge and aimed to launch one final attack with all his companies by the end of the month. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the few defenders in the area had recently received reinforcements in the form of a battalion under the direct command of Major-General Kijima Kesao, which significantly strengthened the ridge. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 30, aircraft bombarded the Japanese positions for about 40 minutes. At 08:00, the infantry advanced under the cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, with A Company facing heavy resistance just in front of Pear Hill that they could not overcome. Due to this setback on the right flank, McKinna ordered D Company to undertake a challenging climb along Pear Hill instead of the narrow spur where the attack had failed. Meanwhile, C Company made slow progress through dense brush but eventually managed to cut the enemy's track to the west. After repelling several enemy counterattacks during the night, the four companies renewed their assault on December 31. Although the march over Arty Hill and through thick underbrush was physically demanding, D Company managed to approach Pear Hill undetected. With A Company drawing enemy fire, D Company launched a powerful attack following an artillery bombardment that successfully pushed back the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, B Company captured Baker's Brow to the west, and C Company held its position along the western track. However, by nightfall, Kijima's troops began testing the defenses established by C Company. In the early morning, the Japanese launched a fierce counterattack from the south and southeast, managing to penetrate two forward Australian positions. After an hour of intense hand-to-hand combat, the assault was ultimately repelled with the help of artillery support, and Australian patrols later found that Pearl Ridge had been abandoned by the enemy. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, the Australians conducted mopping-up operations until the ridge was completely cleared. With control of Pearl Ridge secured, the Australians gained a strategic vantage point that allowed them to observe from one side of Bougainville to the other, aiding future operations. During the battle, the Australians suffered 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Japanese lost 34 killed and 1 captured. Shortly after taking Pearl Ridge, the 11th Brigade assumed control of the central sector as per Savige's orders, while the rest of the 7th Brigade began moving south. In conclusion, Major-General Percy Clarkson's 33rd Division began its deployment to Morotai in late December, with Colonel Ray Cavenee's 136th Regiment landing on the island's west coast on December 22. Four days later, the regiment advanced into Japanese-controlled territory to engage Colonel Kisou's 211th Regiment, receiving support from elements of the 130th Regiment moving overland from the Doroeba Plain and the 3rd Battalion of the 137th Regiment marching from Morotai's southern coast into the interior. This coordinated effort aimed to prevent the Japanese from dispersing into smaller groups in the island's mountainous regions. On January 3, the 136th Regiment located and attacked the 211th Regiment at Hill 40, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions advancing from the southwest while the 3rd Battalion approached from the north. After two days of intense combat, the Americans successfully captured Hill 40, inflicting significant casualties on the enemy, and then began pursuing the retreating Japanese forces to the north. Two thousand yards to the north, the 3d Battalion was settling down for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the beginning the battalion had been harried by the enemy. On the nights of December 26-27 and 27-28, its perimeter had been attacked viciously by an estimated enemy battalion. (The 3d Battalion of the Jap 211th Infantry. It had been detached from the 211th for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements from Halmahera. The five reinforcing barges were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT screen, and were destroyed along with fifty tons of food and supplies.) The battalion had experienced the hardest march of its history. The jungle was more difficult than that encountered by the Pilowo column. Moreover, to join the Hill 40 battle it had to abandon trails for cross-country movements. Although the battalion had marched and fought its way forward for ten days it was still in fighting trim. The number of Japs killed and found buried along the trail indicated terrible losses for the Japs. The battalion commander, Major Ralph Pate, attributed the lack of enemy resistance during the past two days to the withdrawal of the enemy. Actually, as he learned later, the 3d Battalion, Jap 211th Infantry Regiment, had been destroyed as a military force. By January 14, when the 136th Regiment was finally withdrawn to the main perimeter, the Americans reported having killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured 10, suffering 46 men killed and 127 wounded in the process. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces captured Palompon, disrupting Japanese plans, while American troops advanced through challenging terrain, overcoming resistance and securing key locations. Japanese forces planned a counter-landing on Mindoro, but faced fierce opposition. Meanwhile, Australians advanced on Bougainville, capturing strategic positions amid heavy fighting.

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- 139 - Pacific War -First Bombing Campaign against Japan, July 16-23,1944

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Play Episode Listen Later Jul 16, 2024 46:02

Last time we spoke about battle of Noemfoor. General MacArthur initiated a successful offensive on Noemfoor, with General Patrick's troops securing a beachhead. American forces encountered minimal resistance, occupying key positions. Despite initial skirmishes, American defenses held firm, inflicting heavy casualties. Meanwhile, in Aitape, ongoing clashes saw American forces repelling Japanese assaults. Despite setbacks, American defenses held, and preparations for a counteroffensive were underway. The Japanese breached American lines, occupying a 1300-yard gap but faced intense resistance. Martin ordered counterattacks and reorganization of forces along the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line. Despite some delays, American forces repelled Japanese assaults. In the Battle of Imphal, British-Indian troops repelled Japanese attacks, leading to their retreat. Operation Crimson saw successful naval and air assaults on Japanese positions, though with some setbacks. Admiral Somerville's diplomatic transfer followed, amidst reorganization of SEAC's higher officers due to internal conflicts. This episode is the First Bombing Campaign against Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Our week's story first takes us over to the China Theater. Last time we spoke about China, the 11th Army's progress was halted at Hengyang in early July due to the resilient defense led by General Fang and a severe shortage of ammunition. General Yokoyama had to pause the offensive until his artillery unit could arrive to bolster the siege. Meanwhile, the 64th Division was dispatched to Changsha to relieve garrison duties. Despite these setbacks, the 13th Division secured Leiyang by July 4, and the 40th Division took control of Yongfeng on the same day, followed by Zhajiang on July 6. Although Hengyang was nearly surrounded, the Japanese forces had to entrench due to lack of supplies, which were delayed and harassed by General Chennault's aircraft. Seizing this opportunity, General Xue Yue sent reinforcements and launched counterattacks against the besiegers. The 58th Army recaptured Liling on July 8 before being pushed back by the 27th Division two days later, while the Chinese forces began encircling Maoshizhen from the southwest by mid-July. By July 10, Yokoyama had received sufficient artillery and ammunition to resume the attack on Hengyang. Despite heavy air and artillery support, the 116th Division's assaults from the southwest failed to breach Fang's defenses once again. On July 15, the Japanese launched another assault, this time managing to displace the exhausted defenders from their outer positions and into the city itself. Two days later, the 13th Division also gained control of the airfield on the east bank of Hengyang and strategic points along the railway near the town. Despite these territorial gains, they were deemed insufficient considering the significant loss of life endured during the intense fighting of that week. Consequently, Yokoyama decided to pause the offensive once more on July 20, intending to concentrate his forces around Hengyang. The 40th and 58th Divisions were already en route to reinforce the front lines. However, during this period, two significant aerial operations occurred. Initially, following the bombing of Yawata, General Arnold ordered a subsequent night raid on Japan to underscore that Operation Matterhorn marked the beginning of a sustained bombing campaign, distinct from the isolated nature of the Doolittle raid. This was followed by a 100-plane attack on Manchuria and a 50-plane attack on Palembang. Two days after the Yawata show General Arnold informed Wolfe that, despite the depleted fuel stocks in China, it was “essential” to increase pressure against Japan. Immediate objectives were: a major daylight attack on Anshan, small harassing raids against the home islands, and a strike against Palembang from Ceylon. When Arnold asked for an estimate of the command's capabilities, Wolfe's reply was none too hopeful. With low storage tanks at Chengdu (only 5000 gallons) he could not with his own resources build up for an all-out mission to Anshan before August 10. Ceylon fields would not be ready before July 15, and either the Palembang mission or the night raids would delay the Anshan attack. In spite of Wolfe's cautious estimate, Arnold on June 27 issued a new target directive calling for a 15-plane night raid over Japan by July 10, a minimum of 100 planes against Anshan between by July 30, and a 50-plane mission to Palembang as soon as Ceylon airfields were ready. To meet this schedule, Wolfe was admonished to improve radically the operations of C-46s and B-29s on the Hump run. He outlined conditions necessary for fulfilling the directive: build-up of his B-29 force and a flat guarantee of ATC Hump tonnage. Even when it was decided that the command would get back its 1500 tons for July, Wolfe's operational plan set up the Anshan mission for 50 to 60 B-29s, not 100 as Arnold wanted. Arnold received this plan on July 1. On the 4th General Wolfe was ordered to proceed immediately to Washington to take over an “important command assignment” and two days later he departed. Thus General Wolfe was in reality sacked, leaving General Saunders to assume temporary leadership. Subsequently, on July 7, the requested night raid was carried out, involving 18 B-29s targeting the Sasebo Naval Base, with an additional six attacking other sites in Nagasaki, Omura, Yawata, and Tobata. Of the 24 bombers, 11 successfully bombed Sasebo using radar; individual planes struck Omura and Tobata, while the B-29 assigned to Yawata inadvertently bombed the secondary target at Laoyao harbor. Two other bombers, experiencing fuel-transfer issues, redirected to bomb Hankow, narrowly missing it by 20 miles. Despite witnessing explosions in all targeted areas, the damage inflicted on Japanese infrastructure was minimal. Only one bomber sustained damage, yet the successful attack heightened panic within the Home Islands. After the disastrous loss of Saipan, it was clear to many of Japan's elite that the war was all but lost. Now Japan needed to make peace before the kokutai and perhaps even the Chrysanthemum Throne itself was destroyed. Tojo had been thoroughly demonized by the United States during the war, thus for the American people, Tojo was clearly the face of Japanese militarism. It was thus inconceivable that the United States would make peace with a government headed by Tojo. British historian H. P. Willmott noted that a major problem for the "doves" was that: "Tojo was an embodiment of 'mainstream opinion' within the nation, the armed services and particularly the Army. Tojo had powerful support, and by Japanese standards, he was not extreme." Tojo was more of a follower than a leader, and he represented the mainstream opinion of the Army. This meant his removal from office would not end the political ambitions of the Army who were still fanatically committed to victory or death. The jushin, elder statesmen, had advised Emperor Hirohito that Tojo needed to be sacked after Saipan and further advised against partial changes in the cabinet, demanding that the entire Tojo cabinet resign. Tojo, well aware of the efforts to bring him down, sought the public approval of the Emperor Hirohito, which was denied. Hirohito sent him a message to the effect that the man responsible for the disaster of Saipan was not worthy of his approval. Tojo then suggested reorganizing his cabinet to retain his position, but was rebuffed again. Hirohito said the entire cabinet simply had to go. Once it became clear that Tojo no longer held the support of the Emperor, his enemies had little trouble bringing down his government.The politically powerful Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kōichi Kido spread the word that the Emperor no longer supported Tojo. Thus after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa and General Koiso Kuniaki were appointed by Hirohito to form a new government, with Koiso ultimately becoming Prime Minister as Tojo's replacement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Shimoyama Takuma's 5th Air Army discovered Chennault's aircraft and two Chinese squadrons concentrated at Guilin airfield on July 13. Seizing this opportunity, Shimoyama launched a daring raid that caught the Allies off guard, resulting in 80 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Despite this initial setback, Chennault's P-51 Mustangs maintained superiority over the Zero, downing 88 Japanese aircraft in the following weeks at the cost of 27 Allied planes. In Hengyang, preliminary artillery bombardment commenced on July 27 as Yokoyama's forces prepared for their final offensive. Despite minor attacks in the subsequent days, little progress was made while the Japanese awaited the arrival of the 58th Division. Concurrently, the 27th and 34th Divisions advanced towards Lianhua to eliminate the 58th Army, resulting in heavy casualties and their subsequent withdrawal. By August 1, Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, along with heavy artillery and mountain artillery pieces. In contrast, only 3,000 exhausted Chinese troops remained, valiantly resisting despite being cut off for over a month. Returning to Matterhorn, Arnold insisted on a meticulously planned daylight attack involving 100 planes to be executed in July. Saunders managed to fit in the Anshan strike at the month's end by delaying Palembang until mid-August. The primary target was the Showa Steel Works at Anshan in Manchuria–specifically, the company's Anshan Coke Plant, producing annually 3793000 metric tons of metallurgical coke, approximately ⅓ of the Empire's total. About half of this was used by Showa's own steel works, second in size only to Imperial's, and the rest for various industrial purposes in Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. The secondary target was Qinhuangdao harbor whence coking coal from the great Kailan mines was exported to Japan. Tertiary target was the Taku port near Tianjin, which handled coal, iron ore, and pig iron. And as a last resort, bombers were to hit the railroad yards at Zhengxian, a possible bottleneck along a Japanese supply route. Aiming point at Anshan, as at Yawata, was to be a battery of coke ovens and again the bomb load was set at eight soo-pound GPs per plane. Consequently, on July 25, 111 B-29s began staging to China, with 106 successfully arriving four days later. However, on July 29, only 72 B-29s managed to take off for the Anshan strike due to rain muddying the runway at Guanghan, preventing the 444th Group from launching. Mechanical issues further hindered eleven bombers from reaching Anshan, resulting in one bombing Qinhuangdao, two targeting Zhengxian, and four hitting other targets of opportunity. Despite these challenges, the sixty B-29s that reached Anshan maintained formation and bombed from altitudes close to the designated 25,000 feet under clear skies. However, the first wave mistakenly bombed a by-products plant adjacent to the aiming point, enveloping it in thick smoke. Anti-aircraft opposition was relatively light, with heavy flak damaging five B-29s and Japanese fighters downing only one bomber, whose crew escaped with the help of Chinese guerrillas. B-29 gunners claimed three probable hits and four damaged Japanese fighters. Chinese forces aided in rescuing a stranded bomber near Ankang. The plane was on the ground for five days while an engine, spare parts, tools, and mechanics came in by C-46 from Hsinching to effect an engine change and other repairs. Air cover was furnished by 14th Air Force fighters, who shot down a Lily bomber during a night attack. With full assistance from the Chinese and American garrisons at Ankang, the B-29 took off on August 3 and returned to Chiung-Lai. Another B-29 crash-landed in Vladivostok. Fortunately, on July 30, the wet strip at Kwanghan had dried sufficiently to launch 24 bombers of the 444th, albeit nearly five hours behind schedule. However, they were too late for Anshan, with 16 bombing the Taku port and three targeting Zhengxian instead. The day's efforts, though not flawlessly executed, brought encouragement to the command. American reconnaissance reported significant damage at Anshan, including hits and near misses on several coke-oven batteries, related installations, and the by-products plant. Taku and Zhengxian also showed substantial damage. The command gained valuable insights into conducting daylight missions, and despite the loss of five B-29s, it was deemed acceptable. That is all for now for the China theater as we now need to jump over to Burma. Meanwhile, in north Burma, General Wessels decided to resume the offensive on July 12. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, a coordinated attack was launched, supported by 39 B-25s and the 88th Fighter Squadron, which successfully dropped 754 tons of bombs on Myitkyina. However, approximately 40% of the bombs landed among American troops north of Sitapur, resulting in casualties and confusion. Consequently, the coordinated attack stalled, with minimal gains by the 88th and 89th Regiments. Subsequently, Wessels' forces reverted to patient day-by-day advances, pushing back Japanese forces gradually. The tightening grip around Myitkyina was evident, with previously separated units now in close contact, preventing Japanese movement. Further south, General Stilwell directed the weary Chindit brigades to converge on Sahmaw and eliminate the 18th and 53rd Divisions. West African troops fought for control of Hill 60 to the north, while the depleted 111th Brigade engaged in battles at Taungni and the heavily fortified Point 2171. Stilwell also ordered the 300-man 77th Brigade towards Myitkyina, but Brigadier Calvert opted to cut off radio communications and withdraw his men to Kamaing, eventually evacuating them to India. After returning back to Allied lines, Calvert and Lentaigne drove to Stilwell's headquarters, where they found the general at a table with his son and Boatner. Then, speaking with the same sort of blunt honesty that Stilwell prided himself on, Calvert went into a long monologue explaining that despite their crippling losses and lack of heavy weapons, his men had sacrificed so much at Mogaung that now they had nothing left to give. To order the survivors into combat now was to pass nothing more than a death sentence. Stilwell seemed stunned at Calvert's contained monologue. Then his shock turned to scathing anger towards his own staff. “Why wasn't I told?' he demanded. It quickly became obvious to Calvert that Stilwell had not realized the true tribulations his Chindits had gone through since the gliderborne invasion some months ago. As Calvert later wrote: “It became obvious from Stilwell's repeated ‘Why wasn't I told? Is this true?' that his sycophantic staff had kept the true nature of the battle from him.” Overcome with the truth of it all, Stilwell apologized. “You and your boys have done a great job, I congratulate you.” Calvert was then allowed to evacuate his brigade. Their campaign was finally over. The other brigades, nearing the edge of their endurance, didn't experience the same fortune and had to persist in battling against the determined Japanese defenders. With morale faltering, Major Masters' only opportunity for success came through a bold flank attack on July 9 led by Company C of the 3/9th Gurkhas. As the Gurkhas fell back in disarray, savaged by machine-guns firing straight down the ridge, the surviving men scattered, diving into the jungle. Major Gerald Blaker moved on alone, firing his M1 carbine, yelling: “Come on, C Company!” Seeing him, the Japanese threw grenades. Braving the blasts despite an arm savaged by shrapnel, he charged the Japanese. At the last moment, the enemy gunners found the range and a volley of seven bullets plunged into Blaker who fell against a tree, bleeding profusely. He turned his head to call on his men: “Come on, C Company, I'm going to die. Take the position.” The Gurkhas surged forward, bayonets glinting in the dull light, crying: “Ayo Gurkhali, the Gurkhas have come!” Point 2171 then fell into Allied hands. 50 Japanese dead were counted on the summit. Major Gerald Blaker sacrificed his life during the assault and earned a posthumous Victoria Cross. Shortly thereafter, the 14th Brigade relieved the exhausted 111th, which now counted only 119 fit men; and on July 17, Stilwell finally authorized the evacuation of Masters' men. Thankfully, the seasoned 36th Division under Major-General Francis Festing would arrive in the frontline area to replace the depleted Chindits by the end of July, enabling General Lentaigne's remaining forces to be brought back to India. The final to depart were the West Africans, who assisted the British in capturing Hill 60 on August 5, prompting the Japanese to withdraw towards Pinbow and Mawhun. Since the inception of Operation Thursday, the Chindits had suffered 5000 casualties, including killed, wounded, or missing, 3800 of them after Wingate's demise. Their unconventional warfare had effectively diverted numerous potential reinforcements away from Imphal and Myitkyina; severed the 18th Division's supply line, rendering its holding operation futile; and highlighted the importance of air supply as the sole means of sustenance during military campaigns, a lesson pivotal in the 14th Army's subsequent offensives. Shifting focus to Yunnan, by the beginning of July, General Wei's Y Force had successfully halted General Matsuyama's counteroffensive in the Longling region. In the interim, General Kawabe's Burma Area Army was formulating strategies to address the impending aftermath of Operation U-Go's unfavorable results. Following the completion of the 15th Army's retreat in central Burma, plans were set in motion for Operation Ban, a defensive maneuver aimed at countering anticipated Allied advancements along the Irrawaddy River. Concurrently, General Sakurai's 28th Army was organizing Operation Kan in anticipation of potential Allied incursions along the Bay of Bengal coastline. Additionally, General Honda's 33rd Army initiated preparations for Operation Dan, a synchronized offensive designed to repel the invading Chinese forces eastward across the Nujiang River and deep into Yunnan, thus thwarting the establishment of a land route between India and China by the Allies. Consequently, the 2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Okazaki Seisaburo was reassigned to the 33rd Army on July 19 to partake in the offensive, while Matsuyama's 56th Division was tasked with maintaining defensive positions in Yunnan. The 18th and 53rd Divisions were directed to safeguard the western flank against potential assaults originating from Myitkyina. Subsequently, Matsuyama opted to relocate his primary force from Longling to Mangshi, where he planned to rendezvous with Okazaki at a later date. To facilitate this relocation, Colonel Matsui's task force was dispatched on July 5 to dislodge the 76th Division from Mukang. Following a stealthy infiltration behind enemy lines on July 7, Matsui launched a surprise attack the following day, compelling the Chinese forces to retreat. With the route to Mangshi cleared, the 56th Division vacated Longling and began regrouping in the Mangshi vicinity, leaving a modest garrison of 2500 men to secure Longling. Throughout July, the city faced intense aerial and artillery bombardments, culminating in the capture of East Hill by the 87th Division on July 17. Fortunately, Y Force's efforts were now focused on the previously bypassed blocks at Tengchong, Lameng, and Pingda, as the Chinese prioritized securing the flow of supplies to the front lines. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige was compelled to abandon Feifeng Hill after his 3rd Battalion departed to join Matsui's task force, leaving him with just 2025 men. Facing him, Lieutenant-General Huo Kuizhang's five divisions spread out around Tengchong, occupying the surrounding heights. Despite attempts at medium-level bombing causing severe damage to the residential area, it only resulted in rubble piling around Japanese positions. Thus, entrenched in their dugouts, the Japanese remained steadfast and successfully repelled Chinese attacks, with the Chinese managing to take Kaoliang Hill only by July 9th. Meanwhile, from the south, the 2nd Reserve Division severed Tengchong from Longling and initiated unsuccessful assaults against Laifeng Hill. By mid-July, with the city completely encircled, Huo was poised to launch a coordinated assault, but heavy rains delayed the operation. Concurrently, with the arrival of the 8th Army at Lameng, General Song aimed to continue his attacks against Major Kanemitsu's garrison. Following a night-long artillery bombardment, the 1st and 39th Divisions fiercely assaulted Japanese positions on July 5th, successfully overrunning some of them and destroying Kanemitsu's main water reservoir. However, despite ammunition shortages, Japanese counterattacks pushed them back to their original positions by nightfall. In the second week of July, Song deployed the 82nd and 103rd Divisions for an attack against Kanemitsu's southwest defenses, initially achieving success but ultimately being repelled by Japanese counterattacks. In the meantime, the Pingda garrison, devastated by cholera, was reaching its breaking point. Consequently, the Matsui Force was dispatched to provide relief on July 11, successfully reaching their designated gathering point northwest of Pingda after a challenging two-day march. On July 13, Matsui's initial assaults only secured the forward positions of the 226th Regiment; however, the following day, they managed to breach the Chinese defenses, delivering much-needed supplies to the Pingda Garrison and evacuating its sick patients. Having performed its mission, the Matsui Task Force started its return trip on the morning of 15 July. The following evening, an enemy group was discovered near Chungchai and the Task Force prepared to attack. Just before the actual launching of the attack, Col. Matsui received a message from division headquarters stating that, "A powerful enemy force is advancing toward Mangshih. The Matsui Force will return as soon as possible." To the north, Song opted to halt the sporadic attacks and initiated a synchronized assault with his four divisions on July 23. Backed by intense artillery fire, the Chinese exerted significant pressure, eventually overrunning the Hondo Position by the end of July. Only the timely intervention of Japanese fighters halted the offensive. Further north, following the subsiding of the storms and a heavy air bombardment, Huo finally launched a general offensive on July 26, supported by artillery and mortars. Moving swiftly and with strength, the Chinese successfully demolished all fortifications on Laifeng Hill, compelling the Japanese, grappling with ammunition shortages and heavy casualties, to abandon their other outposts in the vicinity. The Chinese attack that followed revealed that previous experiences with Japanese positions had not been wasted. The Chinese infantry moved off quickly, on time, and as whole regiments rather than squads committed piecemeal. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down speedily on suspected Japanese positions, and the infantry took full advantage of it by advancing again the minute it lifted. Having taken one pillbox, the Chinese infantry kept right on going rather than stopping to loot and rest. At nightfall they were on top of the mountain and had taken a fortified temple on the summit. After mopping up the next day, the Chinese tallied about 400 Japanese dead. They themselves had lost 1200. Nevertheless, the speedy capture of Laifeng Hill was a brilliant feat of arms and dramatic evidence of the capabilities of Chinese troops when they applied proper tactics While the simultaneous attack on the southeast wall of Tengchong did not breach the massive wall, the Chinese now held a solid position in the sparse cluster of mud huts just outside the wall. Yet that will be all for today for the Burma-Yunnan front as we now are heading over to the Marianas. As we remember, Admiral Spruance devised a plan to initiate the invasions of Guam and Tinian following the capture of Saipan. Tinian's strategic significance stemmed from its close proximity to Saipan and its relatively flat terrain, making it more suitable for bomber airfields compared to its mountainous counterpart. However, its natural features also posed challenges for a seaside landing, with most of its coastline characterized by steep cliffs. Consequently, the American forces had limited options for landing: the well-defended beaches of Tinian Town, particularly the northeast Yellow Beach at Asiga Bay, or the less fortified but narrow White Beaches on the northwest coast. However, the latter option risked congestion and immobility due to the confined space. After assessing the landing beaches firsthand, they opted for the latter, anticipating lower resistance. General Smith's Northern Landing Forces were tasked with this operation, although there were some changes in the chain of command. Smith was appointed commander of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, overseeing all Marine Corps combat units in the region. General Schmidt assumed command of the 5th Amphibious Corps and the Northern Landing Forces, while Major-General Clifton Cates replaced him as commander of the 4th Marine Division. Additionally, Admiral Hill assumed command of a reorganized Northern Attack Force for the amphibious assault. The strategy outlined was for Cates' 24th and 25th Marines to land on the White Beaches on July 24, securing a beachhead line encompassing Faibus San Hilo Point, Mount Lasso, and Asiga Point. This offensive would receive heavy artillery support from Saipan, as well as backing from carrier-based aircraft, Aslito airfield-based planes, and naval gunfire. One of the main justifications for the final decision to land over the unlikely beaches on the northwestern shore of the island was the feasibility of full exploitation of artillery firing from Saipan. Consequently, all of the field pieces in the area except for the four battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers were turned over to 14th Corps Artillery during the preliminary and landing phase. General Harper arranged his 13 battalions, totaling 156 guns and howitzers, into three groupments, all emplaced on southern Saipan. Groupment A, commanded by Col. Raphael Griffin, USMC, consisted of five 105-mm. battalions, two each from the Marine divisions and one from V Amphibious Corps. It was to reinforce the fires of the 75-mm. pack howitzers and be ready to move to Tinian on order. Groupment B, under the 27th Division's artillery commander, General Kernan, was made up of all of that division's organic artillery except the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to reinforce the fires of Groupment A and also to be ready to displace to Tinian. Groupment C, commanded by General Harper himself, contained all the howitzers and guns of 24th Corps Artillery plus the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to support the attack with counterbattery, neutralization, and harassing fire before the day of the landing, deliver a half-hour preparation on the landing beaches immediately before the scheduled touchdown, and execute long-range counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction fire. Concurrently, General Watson's 2nd Marine Division would stage a feint near Tinian Town before landing behind the main assault force post-beachhead establishment. Meanwhile, General Griner's 27th Division would remain on standby in corps reserve, ready to embark on landing craft at short notice. A notable logistical innovation for Tinian involved a dual shuttle system to prevent congestion. Loaded trucks and Athey trailers shuttled between Saipan's base supply dumps and Tinian's division supply depots, while amphibious vehicles directly transported supplies from ship to shore to division dumps, aiming to minimize beachside handling of supplies. Additionally, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps, comprising the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, assisted by Admiral Conolly's Southern Attack Force, were tasked with capturing Guam. Due to formidable coastal defenses, Geiger's plan necessitated landings north and south of Apra Harbor on July 21, bypassing the heavily fortified Orote Peninsula. General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division was tasked with landing on the shores between Adelup Point and the Tatgua River mouth, proceeding southward to occupy the eastern area of Apra Harbor. Simultaneously, General Shepherd's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to land between Agat village and Bangi Point, then pivot northward towards the base of the Orote Peninsula. The establishment of a secure beachhead line from Adelup Point to Facpi Point was crucial before Geiger's forces could launch their assault on Orote Peninsula and subsequently secure the rest of the island. With the 27th Division committed elsewhere, Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division, slated to assemble at Eniwetok by July 18, was designated as the new reserve under Geiger's command. The 305th Regiment was assigned to land behind Shepherd's Marines to reinforce the beachhead line. To optimize support for the troops, Conolly divided his Southern Attack Force into two: his Northern Attack Group, backing the 3rd Marine Division's landing, and Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Southern Attack Group, aiding the 1st Provisional Brigade's landing. Coordination of pre-landing bombardments was planned between Conolly's ships and aircraft, synchronized with scheduled strikes by aircraft from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The time had finally come for the Japanese home islands to be subjected to the horrors of modern bombing campaigns. It would begin gradually, but would escalate to a literal horror show that starved the population of Japan into submission. Meanwhile Hideki Tojo was finally sacked, though by no means was he gone.

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How A Series C Company Achieves High Performance Remotely | Interview with RevenueCat Cofounders

Evergrowing

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 13, 2024 70:28

In this episode, Sabrina sits down with Miguel Carranza and Jacob Eiting, the co-founders of RevenueCat, a platform that helps businesses power in-app purchases, manage customer data, and grow revenue across iOS, Android, and the web. They discuss the unique challenges of managing a remote team across multiple time zones, the benefits of writing down your company values, and why termination is a necessary part of maintaining a high-performing team. Quotes: “Having a great co-founder is such a big cheat code. It's the cheapest 50% of the equity you'll ever give away.” - Jacob Eiting “The only thing worse than no co-founder is a bad cofounder.” - Jacob Eiting “Once you have product market fit and something that's growing, a lot of your time now goes to trying to keep up.” - Jacob Eiting “The first five to ten employees are the ones that define a company's culture.” - Miguel Carranza “Protect your culture. Give it space to evolve but make sure it evolves in the right way.” - Miguel Carranza “If you hire really well, the people management is not that much.” - Miguel Carranza “You will need to solve most people problems to ship, and shipping solves a lot of people problems.” - Jacob Eiting “It takes six months to hire an exec. Sometimes longer.” - Jacob Eiting “Performance and failure to perform are all downstream of the people that you've got in the seats.” - Jacob Eiting "When hiring, money helps. But not in all cases." - Jacob Eiting "Cultures tend to get worse if you don't tend to them. They're like gardens." - Miguel Carranza What You'll Learn: (00:00:00) Introduction (00:03:06) What is RevenueCat and What Makes It Special (00:04:14) Background and Their Journey as Co-Founders (00:06:03) From Colleagues to Friends to Co-Founders (00:11:40) Scaling RevenueCat and the Problems They Solve For Businesses (00:14:26) The Most Underrated Problem in Company Operations (00:17:46) Creative Ways to Onboard New Employees (00:21:31) How to Design the Perfect Company Culture (00:27:30) Always Be Open to Experimenting (00:31:30) How to Find the Right Leaders to Drive Your Culture (00:37:13) Ways to Hire the Right People For the Right Job (00:41:00) What Matters Most When Hiring Execs (00:43:59) How to Hire for Trust (00:49:26) What To Do When Employees Consistently Miss Deadlines (00:54:59) Navigate Performance Management and Termination (01:00:06) The Right Way to Fire Someone (01:02:22) The Easiest Way to Build High-Performing Teams (01:05:49) The Best Advice Jacob and Miguel Have Ever Gotten (01:09:10) Parting Thoughts Links and Resources: In-App Subscriptions Made Easy – RevenueCat Jacob on X Miguel on X Miguelcarranza.es Myevergrowth.com Sabrina's LinkedIn Sabrina on X About the Show Are you a leader of a fast-growing organization who wants to build a world-class team? Welcome to Evergrowing, where leaders like you learn to build high-performing teams. I believe when you sign up to be a leader, you sign up for a journey of constantly growing - Evergrowing. I'm Sabrina Wang, CEO of Evergrowth Coaching. I've been a coach to many top CEOs in the world who do 8-9 figures in revenue. I'm bringing to you the most common breakthroughs in coaching sessions. I was the former Head of Coaching to Matt Mochary, author of The Great CEO Within, and the CEO coach to leading tech companies like Coinbase, OpenAI, Reddit, and so on. Tune in each week to hear about strategies designed to help you turn the toughest business challenges into tangible success. Available on all podcasting platforms and YouTube, don't forget to tune in every week :)

Rants & rAVes Episode 1363: Lightware Is the Go-To USB-C Company; It Will Add Dante, AV-over-IP and Dual-Screen USB-C Too

Rants & rAVes

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 7, 2024

Episode 20 Inspector General (IG) The Resource For All Leaders with Guest COL Elizabeth Gum

Be All You Can Be MSC

Play Episode Listen Later May 19, 2024 57:37

In this enlightening episode, we dive deep into the role of the Inspector General (IG) - a pivotal resource for all leaders. Join us as our special guest, Colonel Elizabeth Gum, current IG and former Commander, shares invaluable insights into the IG's mission and its support for leaders. Don't miss out on her expert advice and personal experiences as a Commander. Learn how the IG in a resource every Commander has to leverage in their decision making. What's the process if you need the IG's help? We give you all this and more.COL Elizabeth R. Gum entered the United States Army from the University of Texas at Austin, commissioning as a Medical Service Corps Officer. Her assignments include Republic of Korea, Germany, Hawaii, Continental United States, and two combat tours: Iraq and Afghanistan. She served as the Medical Logistics Officer, United States Africa Command; Chief, Logistics Division and Chief, Materiel, Tripler Army Medical Center; Medical Logistics Officer, 15th Sustainment Brigade, 1st Armored Division; CENTCOM Materiel Recovery Element LNO to MEDCOM; Chief, Logistics Division and Chief, Materiel, William Beaumont Army Medical Center; S4/Chief, Logistics, 121 Combat Support Hospital/Brian Allgood Army Community Hospital; Contingency Command Post Surgeon, United States Army North; Commander, C Company 15th Forward Support Division; 1st Cavalry Division MEDLOG Officer; 1st Armored Division MEDLOG Officer; 123rd Main Support Battalion Division Medical Supply Officer and Evacuation Platoon Leader. She most recently served as the Commander, Army Health Clinic Baumholder, prior to assuming her current duties as Command Inspector General, Regional Health Command Europe.COL Gums's awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal (1 OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (2 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (4 OLC), Army Achievement Medal (1 OLC), NATO Medal (OEF), Combat Medic Badge, and Airborne Badge. She is also a Fellow, American College of Healthcare Executives; Demonstrated Master Logistician, the International Society of Logistics, and a member of the Order of Military Medical Merit. Additional skills include Arbinger Facilitator, craft ninja and party planner extraordinaire. For more information on the U.S. Army Inspector General: https://www.army.mil/ig#org-resourcesDisclaimer: The views expressed in this podcast are the guests and host's alone and do not reflect the official position of the Medical Service Corps, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. All information discussed is unclassified approved for public release and found on open cleared sources.For more episodes listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube @ Be All You Can Be MSC For more information, suggestions, or questions please contact: beallyoucanbemsc@gmail.com

Alfred Bari, USMC: The Italian Tank

Making Motivation with Dr. Drill

Play Episode Listen Later May 19, 2024 68:14

Alfred Bari is a former Marine infantryman and native of New Hampshire. Bari was a radioman in 3rd platoon, C Company, 1st Bn 6th Marines between 1993-1997. Following honorable discharge, Bari spent 20 years working as a butcher and loved it. He has also been a pro wrestling fan forever and once aspired to join Killer Kowalski's wrestling school but was sidelined by injuries. His wrestling handle was to be the Italian Tank! His finishing move would have been a bear hug. Alfred currently lives in New Hampshire with his wife and daughter. He is full of gratitude for his many experiences and the love of family and his Marine brothers. The Italian Tank's outlook on life is very refreshing, I love this guy.

italian marine new hampshire tank marines usmc killer kowalski c company

- 130 - Pacific War - Battle of Wakde, May 14-21, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later May 14, 2024 48:13

Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response. This episode is the Battle of Wakde Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe's 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions. It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized. As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe's troops if needed. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble's Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands. Admiral Crutchley's cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey's cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney's 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea's northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip. To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN's 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami's decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded. A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape. Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble's ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe's 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30. There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day's assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded. Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe's amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble's warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses. The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation. By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield. Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30 the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning. In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions. Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack. The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on. Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C. During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz' advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front. Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato's 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham's 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order. Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable. The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance. During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki's rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato's withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe's offensive is going. Last time we saw General Merrill's Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master's 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda's 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master's estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka. At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne's authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell's headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda's 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed. Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night's expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft's load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper's 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper's Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them. By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters' distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master's said “Very well. I don't want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn't. Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool, towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month's blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits. Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka's right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka's right flank was going to collapse. At this point, the 18th Division's daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division. In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka's lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang. Takeda's 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather. Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma. On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter's 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day. At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe's first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.

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- 129 - Pacific War - The Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima , May 7-14, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later May 7, 2024 46:02

Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution. Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina. This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th, forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards. Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back. On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive, Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out. Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926. Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam. At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May. On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later. Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions. On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect. Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC. The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers. The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed. Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th. On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.

united states america american china washington british french song chinese australian japanese kings army new zealand indian attack force hurricanes dutch avengers failing jail americas bali defeat roberts tank attacks vc lt persecution forces vengeance queen elizabeth ii radar allies burton bits milestone malta hq task force gpt western australia divisions capt trenches avenger brigades allied sniper dis gibraltar generals suffolk grover valiant cowan armies hump royal navy somerville battalion nationalists randle strait yamamoto saratoga pimples fremantle sato regiment marauders new guinea berkshires renown hellcat dauntless jocks jia surabaya illustrious richelieu bremerton xin ceylon opium wars fsd lombok pacific war infantry regiment hunan henan british indian gracey gurkha malacca hellcats pacific fleet kuomintang tojo yellow river lee grant okamura lamu corsairs yamauchi regiments armored division general macarthur gurkhas imperial japanese navy imperial japanese army truk mountainous imphal ijn hollandia kohima yoshimoto c company punjabis luoyang one british arakan loyang sakuma craig watson brigadiers army group those japanese worcesters myitkyina

- 124 - Pacific War - Battle of Kohima, April 2 - 9, 1944

The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics and Leadership.

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 2, 2024 40:28

Last time we spoke about General Douglas MacArthur's operations against western New Guinea Operation Desecrate One, and the death of Admiral Koga. MacArthur unleashed hell from the skies above against Hollandia and other key target in the Western parts of New Guinea. Accompanying this was Operation Desecrate One, a carrier raid against Palau followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Lastly the commander in chief of the IJN, Admiral Koga, like his predecessor, met his end at the hands of an aircraft crash. But the Japanese had not just lost their commander in chief, they also lost the Z Plan to the allies. The Z Plan documents were taken by Filipino guerillas and found their way to Nimitz who would put them to good use in the future battle of the Philippine sea. This episode is the Battle of Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We are back in the exciting Burma Front to start off this podcast. The Japanese attack against Imphal was being directed by the ambitious and to be frank, quite insane General Mutaguchi Renya. Mutaguchi sought to seize Imphal by a combination of guile, dislocation and surprise. Mutaguchi needed to destroy the British-Indian army at Imphal while also cutting off their rear escape at Kohima. Operation U-Go, was not Go-ing very well, yet I made a pun. The Indian troops were digging their heels in, providing much more resistance than expected. Added to this the Chindits unleashed Operation Thursday, delivering a dangerous thrust into the Japanese flank. Now last we left off, the Japanese 33rd and 15th divisions were launching their first attacks against Imphal, while General Sato's 31st division advanced northwest upon Kohima. Sato's intentions were to cut off the British-Indian defenders by taking Kohima and seizing the vast depots and stores of Dimapur. To defend Kohima and Dimapur, General Slim had given the task to Major-General Robert, whose HQ was at Dimapur. Robert had the Kohima Garrison at his disposal, roughly 2500-strong men led by Colonel Hugh Richards since March 22nd, built around the 1st Assam Regiment. The 1st Assam Regiment was led by Lt Colonel William Felix “Bruno” Brown, and they had orders to “fight to the last man” at the Jessami-Kharasom position. Now relief was going to be provided by Lt General Montagu Stopford whose 33rd corps, formed around the 5th and 7th indian divisions and British 2nd division arrived in early april. Stopford planned to concentrate his men at Jorhat, about 105km north-east of Dimapur, where they could be ready to launch a counterstroke against Dimapur. A single brigade would be dispatched as soon as it arrived to defend the Nichugard Pass, about 13km south-east of Kohima on the road to Dimapur. They would support the 161st Brigade already at Dimapur and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade of Brigadier Lancelot Perowne was going to reinforce Kohima by April 12th. Lancelot's group would disrupt and cut the Japanese lines of communication back to the Chindwin. Meanwhile, General Yamauchi's 15th division and General Sato's 33rd division were on their way towards the Imphal-Kohima road. South of them was the Honda Raiding Unit, built around the 3rd Battalion of the 67th Infantry Regiment. Their job was to cut off the road at the Kangpokpi Mission in the Ukhrul area. Luckily for Honda and his men, they were able to dodge the catastrophic battle at Sangshak. His unit would reach the road by the 28th, blowing up a bridge near Kangpokpi. There were other units performing similar roles, such as Colonel Matsumura Hiroshi's 60th regiment who were given the task of cutting off the road at Satarmaina. After the Battle of Sangshak, the Hiroshi's Unit advanced through Lamu, Tongou, Shongphel, Nungga and Angam cutting the Imphal-Kohima Road at Satarmaina by April 3rd. There was also Colonel Omoto Kisaso's 51st regiment, who advanced against Hill 4950 by March 31st encountering little to no resistance. After this they advanced further and took Hill 4192 on April 1st. Up in the north, the 3rd battalion, 138th regiment had advanced through Layshi without much opposition while the bulk of the division approached Jessami. On the 26th, Colonel Torikai Tsuneo's 138th regiment crashed into defensive positions held by the 1st Assam Regiment who held their enemy at bay for 5 days. General Slim watched over the developments at Sangshak and Jessami with great interest. Then a unit captured Japanese order from Sangshak confirmed his worst fears. “Within a week of the start of the Japanese offensive, it became clear that the situation in the Kohima area was likely to be even more dangerous than that at Imphal. Not only were the enemy columns closing in on Kohima at much greater speed than I had expected, but they were obviously in much greater strength.” Slim had expected a strike against Kohima by a Japanese regiment, but the entire 31st Division was on its way. “We were not prepared for so heavy a thrust. Kohima with its rather scratch garrison and, what was worse, Dimapur with no garrison at all, were in deadly peril.” Luckily, the rapid arrival of the 161st Brigade at Dimapur and the dispatch of the 33rd Corps to reinforce Kohima could give him a fighting chance. Both locations received attacks on the 26th, and over the next five days both units held their own. But they had lost communications with Kohima, and recall orders could not be issued. A American colonel flew a Piper Cub to airdrop orders, which Brown finally received on the 31st. Brown pulled back April 1st, but Lt Young never got the message. On his own ordered his men out. “I shall be the last man,” he declared, and with difficulty got his company moving toward Kohima. No one ever saw Young alive again, nor was his body identified. The 1st battalion, 58th regiment had also been dispatched from Ukhrul on the 24th and would cut the Imphal-Kohima road at Tuphema by March 30th. After the disastrous battle at Sangshak, General Miyazaki ordered a battalion to head over to Pulomi, while the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment advanced to Kohima via Chakhabama and the rest of his unit advanced to Kohima using the road. Sato planned to launch a two-pronged assault against Kohima, with Colonel Fukunaga Ten's 58th regiment from the south while the 138th regiment swung around Naga village to cut off the Dimapur road. This saw a race to feed units into Dimapur before the Japanese arrived. The first units of Major General Grover 2nd division arrived in piecemeal to Dimapur between April 1st and 11th. They came by small-gauge steam train arriving at Dimapur in a panic. The undefended base area expecting attack at any moment and riven with rumors of the impending arrival of the Japanese. Stopfords men were still several days away by the end of March, prompting Slim to order Brigadier Dermot Warren's 161st brigade to rush over to Kohima. By April 3rd, Stopford established his HQ at Jorhat, where he made a disastrous blunder. Stopford at this point was still under the belief the Japanese main objective was Dimapur. He had some false intelligence indicating Japanese units were at any moment in the process of outflanking Kohima. With this knowledge he ordered 161st to evacuate Kohima immediately. For the units currently at Kohima, they could not believe the order. Warren, Colonel Hugh Richards and the civilian Deputy Commissioner, Charles Pawsey - were aghast at, and vehemently protested the decision. When told that the Japanese were outflanking Kohima to the north Pawsey scoffed, retorting that if true, 'my Nagas would have told me'. Major General Ranking, believing that Stopford was making a mistake, went over the head of his new superior officer and called Slim directly by telephone to petition him to leave Warren at Kohima. General Slim, perhaps unwilling to overrule Stopford, and in any case as convinced as Stopford that Dimapur was the Japanese objective, confirmed Stopford's original order. Warren's 161st Brigade, which had been in the process of organizing the desperately needed defense of the ridge, left Kohima virtually undefended only one day before Japanese attacks began. Had Warren's men been allowed to remain where they were the trauma of the siege that followed would have been much reduced and the stranglehold that Sato was able to maintain on the vital road to Imphal for two long months would have been significantly weaker than it turned out to be. Thus reluctantly, Warren pulled his men back towards Nichugard Pass, leaving only Colonel Richards with the original garrison. Meanwhile Sato's unit were rapidly advancing through the mountainous terrain of the Naga Hills. Japanese and INA reconnaissance patrols were able to help the unit forage for food on the go, adding to their speed. Perhaps they took some time to eat turtle eggs like Wingate advised. Sorry just had to bring up that weird one, been stuck on my mind. On the morning of April 4th, the 58th regiment began assaulting the southern edge of Kohima at GPT ridge while Miyazaki's other units were advancing through the hills and valleys leading into Kohima from the east. Colonel Hugh Richard alerted Stopford of the Japanese assault, who immediately realized his grave error. Stopford desperately sent Warren's men back over to Kohima. Yet only 446 men of the 4th Royal West Kents would manage to get to Kohima in time to help her garrison. They dug in on Kohima Ridge, which is really a series of hills running north-south along the road to Imphal. Gently sloping saddles connect each feature. Since development as a supply base a year earlier, some of its various hills had become known by their function. From south to north, they were GPT “General Purpose Transport” Ridge, Jail Hill, DIS “Detail Issue Store”, FSD “Field Supply Depot”, Kuki Picquet, and Garrison Hill. A northwest extension of Garrison Hill housed a hospital and became known as IGH “Indian General Hospital” Spur. Thick woods, interspersed with the town's and base's structures, covered most of these hills. Garrison Hill was terraced and landscaped, and included the home, complete with clubhouse and tennis court of the deputy commissioner for the area, Charles Pawsey. The Imphal-Dimapur Road skirted the ridge to the east before turning west past Garrison Hill. Treasury Hill and a Naga Village settlement overlooked the ridge from the northeast; those heights also extended north to the hamlet of Merema. Southward loomed the imposing Pulebadze Mountain, whereas three miles to the west rose a knoll topped by the village of Jotsoma. Kohima Ridge thus was overlooked by surrounding heights: Pulebadze to the south, Jotsoma to the west, and the Naga Village/Merema to the east and northeast. The same night they dug in on the ride, Sato had just launched attacks against Garrison Hill. The remainder of the brigade were not able to get in and would remain on Jotsoma ridge to the west, where Warren had emplaced his mountain guns to support the defenders. On April the 5th, the action kicked up with Fukunaga's 58th regiment attacking from the south while a vanguard overcame the Shere Regiment's sentries on the Naga Hill to the north, successfully securing a place for their artillery at Naga village. 4 mountain guns would support Miyazaki's attack, also allowing the Japanese to seize the GPT ridge. In a surprise raid, elements of the 3rd battalion, 58th regiment were able to grab the old town part of Kohima and Treasury Hill. As a result of this, Miyazaki wrongly assumed the enemy had simply withdrawn from Kohima, so he ordered his men to begin an advance upon Cheswema. This in turn gave the defenders some time to reinforce their lines. Japanese pressure on the perimeter increased on the morning of April 6, with repeated attacks by the 58th Regiment on Jail Hill. Heavy artillery and mortar fire quickly denuded trees of their foliage, snapping branches and scattering jagged splinters to accompany the whine and hiss of exploding shrapnel. By 11am the surviving defenders were forced off Jail Hill and down into the steep valley through which ran the road, and then up into the relative safety of the trees on DIS Hill, where Major Shaw's C Company were desperately digging in. The Japanese attack was relentless and, although they secured Jail Hill dominating the south-eastern edge of the Kohima Ridge, they suffered extensive casualties, including Captain Nagaya, the commander of 3rd battalion, 58th Regiment, who was killed. Major Donald Easten was also ordered to retake Jail Hill with D Company, 4th Royal West Kents, but by now the Japanese had already dug deeply into the hillside and could not be ejected without considerable expenditure of life. Easten took his company and dug them in around FSD Hill. Since Jail Hill dominated the southern edge of the ridge defensive lines, the disappearing tree cover quickly became a problem for the defenders who were becoming more and more visible to the enemy. It got some bad, the defenders were soon forced to only move positions at night. A company of the 4/7th Rajputs were able to reinforce Kohima by the end of the night, yet overall now 2500 defenders were surrounded by over 15,000 Japanese. The lost of GPT and Jail Hill also meant the defenders had lost access to water, excluding a small spring on Garrison Hill. Richards was forced to limit the men to a single pint of water per day. On the night of the 6th, a company of the 2nd Battalion, 58th Regiment launched a frontal attack against DIS Hill screaming wildly. The fire from the awaiting Royal West Kents scythed into the attackers, as did bombs from Sergeant Victor King's mortars, landing within meters of the West Kent positions. Miyazaki kept sending more and more men, until some infiltrated the defenders positions ending in a confused hand to hand combat brawl. By dawn on the 7th, a counterattack from FSD Hill would be broken by the ferocious Japanese machine-gun and artillery fire. Sergeant-Major Haines led a spirited attack against these positions, dashing 37 meters up the hill with a mixed group of West Kents and Gurkhas, bayonets fixed and lobbing grenades amongst the bashas. Those Japanese who ran were cut down by waiting Bren guns; those who stayed put were burned alive as the thin structures caught fire. The bakery, whose large brick ovens in peacetime produced several thousand loaves of bread each day, was more impervious to these tactics, but combat engineers destroyed the doors with the help of large quantities of gun cotton. Instead of merely blowing in the doors the ensuing explosion destroyed the entire building, only the brick ovens inside withstanding the blast. Escaping Japanese were brought down by rifle fire. Unusually, two Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner, and although one died later of his wounds, the other provided details about the strength and dispositions of the attacking forces. Captain Shiro Sato, Nagaya's successor in charge of 3rd, 58th Regiment, was killed. Over 60 Japanese were killed in this struggle alone, leading the men to mutter among themselves that this was a worse ordeal than Sangshak. One of the problems now encountered by the men of C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents was the fact that hundreds of bodies lay littered across the position, some of friends but mostly of Japanese, attracting clouds of slow-moving bluebottles that feasted on the carpet of corpses covering the ground. Attempts were made to remove bodies where it was possible, but snipers and the sheer number meant that it was not possible to dispose of them all. As the days went by the effects of artillery bombardment dispersed some of the remains, with the result that DIS Hill became an unpleasant place to defend at best, and injurious to health at worst. The West Kents attempted to burn the bodies at night, but this had a poor effect on morale as the appalling smell of burning flesh drifted across the position. Where they could, the Japanese cremated their dead. Realizing his enemy was strongly entrenched, Miyazaki now decided to order his 3rd battalion to turn back. Meanwhile the bulk of Torikai's forces were just reaching the battlefront, so Miyazaki ordered his 1st battalion to reinforce their attack. Sato was under the belief they would be capturing the ridge at any moment, so he ordered Torikai to cut off the Kohima-Dimapur road, within the vicinity of Zubza. Sato also dispatched the reserved 124th regiment to Cheswema to get ready for an operation in the north. Torikai's 2nd battalion advanced into the Dzuzu valley, and their 6th company occupied Zubza, effectively cutting off Warren's base at Jotsoma. During that night the Japanese launched both real and 'jitter' attacks against the southern perimeter. During the next morning it was discovered, Japanese soldiers had infiltrated back onto DIS Hill during the confusion of the night, placing soldiers and a machine gun in a bunker on the top of the hill. Despite the Japanese machine guns posted on top of the hill, a hero would emerge to knock them out. A fearless 29-year-old Lance-Corporal John Harman demonstrated the type of behavior that was to lead within days to the award of a Victoria Cross, and his death. Realizing that the Japanese machine gun could cause untold damage if unchecked he crawled alone up the hill, standing up at the last minute to charge the Japanese-held bunker. Miraculously the enemy fire tore into the empty air above his head, and Harman reached the bunker door, coolly extracted the pin from a grenade, released the firing lever, counted to three, on a four-second fuse and lobbed it inside. The occupants were killed instantly and Harman returned triumphant with the captured machine gun down the hill to the cheers of his comrades. The Japanese would launch attacks through the day, gradually pushing the defenders up the hills towards Kohima. General Mutaguchi then personally ordered Sato to continue past Kohima and seize Dimapur. Now Sato and Mutaguchi did not get along well, but he reluctantly obeyed the command, sending his 3rd battalion, 138t regiment along the Merema track to Bokajan. Yet all of a sudden General Kawabe, countermanded the order and instead ordered Sato's battalion to rapidly be recalled. This was one of those famed “what if” moments. What if Sato had turned a Nelsonian blind eye to the counter order, or if he had delayed its official receipt for another 24 hours? Sato was apparently happy to obey Kawabe and withdraw to Kohima partly because his deep-seated animosity toward Mutaguchi led him to assume the army commander's demands were motivated solely by visions of military glory. Sato's hatred of Mutaguchi blinded him to the strategic possibilities offered by continuing his offensive through to Dimapur, and lost for the Japanese a crucial opportunity for victory in 1944. The failure to secure Dimapur while the British were in a state of confusion at the speed and scale of Mutaguchi's march on Delhi was indeed, as General Slim recognized, one of the great missed opportunities of the Burma war. It led directly to the failure of the Kohima thrust, and contributed to the collapse of the entire Operation. It was the consequence of Sato's lack of strategic imagination, framed by Kawabe's rejection of what he regarded as an attempt by Mutaguchi to secure for himself undying glory. What he and Sato for that matter failed entirely to see was that Mutaguchi was right. The capture of Dimapur might have been the decisive strategic movement of the campaign leading to a dramatic worsting of the British reminiscent of Malaya and Burma in 1942. Despite the megalomania and terrible planning on Mutaguchi's part for even initiating Operation U-GO, to not try and make it work was even more criminal. On the morning of the 9th, the Japanese once again managed to infiltrate the DIS Hill and again corporal Harman lept into action and mounted a solo attack to remove the threat. Covered by two Bren guns firing from his left and his right, Harman dashed up the hill. Frantically the Japanese returned fire but in their excitement fired wide. Harman reached the trench and, standing 4 meters to its front and firing his Lee Enfield from the hip, shot four Japanese dead, before jumping into the trench and bayoneting the fifth. He then stood up, triumphantly holding the captured enemy machine gun above his head, before throwing it to the ground. The cheers of his comrades reverberated around the hill. Harman then nonchalantly began to walk back down the slope. Unfortunately he had forgotten that with the denuded foliage he was in full view of the Japanese positions on Jail Hill. Unheeding of the shouted cries of his comrades to run, he leisurely made his way back down to his weapon pit, only to be struck by a burst of machine-gun fire in his back just as he reached safety. Donald Easten ran out into the Japanese fire, and dragged Harman into a trench. Within a few minutes, however, this extraordinarily brave man was dead. On that day, Warren dispatched the 1/1st Punjabs to break through towards Kohima, but they ran into a number of log-covered bunkers at Piquet Hill, held by the 6th Company, 138th Regiment. The Japanese fired upon them causing 25 casualties by the day's end. Upon the ridge the killing continued. Large numbers of fiercely brave Japanese from the 58th Regiment were killed by the remorseless chatter of the British Bren guns, as during the night three successive assaults were made on C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents, the Japanese being denied success by the interlocking fire of eight Bren guns, whose red-hot barrels had to be changed repeatedly. Casualties on both sides were high, the Japanese attempting to gain access to the hill from the road by use of ladders, seemingly unperturbed by their losses. On the northern side of Garrison Hill the 138th Regiment again launched attacks against A Company. The attack was held, Bren guns, bayonets and grenades in the darkness bloodily halting Japanese ambitions. Victor King's mortars fired in support, the bombs landing with superb accuracy in front of Maj. Tom Kenyon's positions. It had seemed for a while that sheer weight of numbers would overwhelm the much-reduced A Company, but the reliable Brens, considerable reserves of grenades, the accuracy of King's mortars and the determined courage of the Royal West Kents denied the penetration so desperately desired by the Japanese. Low on ammunition and suffering heavy casualties, the decision was made to abandon DIS and FSD Hill's on the night of the 10th. To make matters worse the monsoon rains had come early, and heavy, driving rain on 10th, together with the effects of battle and of sleep deprivation, had pushed men to the edge of exhaustion. Tea was rationed to half a mug per man. Fortunately, the rain somewhat made up for the acute lack of water within the perimeter, men lying back in their weapon pits and trenches to allow the rain to fall directly into parched, open mouths. It was found that a trickle of water was available from a pipe leading onto the road behind the ADS, behind the Japanese positions. Dangerous nightly journeys were made, through hundreds of wounded lying in the open, down the slope to the road, to fill hundreds of water bottles. The exhausted men made their way off the hills under Japanese sniper and mortar fire. On the 11th, A company over at Garrison Hill were still managing to hold strong against numerous assaults over the tennis court. During the night they were relieved by B company. Meanwhile Grover had finally assembled his 2nd division at Dimapur and dispatched the Cameron Highlanders and 2nd battalion, Durham light infantry with Lee-Grant tank support to open a road back up to Warren's HQ. The next day, while B company was repelling more assault, the 1st battalion, 58th regiment advanced upon Jotsoma from Pulomi, but could not penetrate through the defensive line. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion, 138th Regiment advanced to Khabvuma, though and was likewise unable to break through towards the Kohima-Dimapur Road. On the 13th, which would become known to the besieged British garrison as “black thirteenth”, B company continued to resist suicidal Japanese assaults across the tennis court, Japanese artillery managed to kill many men atop the IGH Spur. Casualties were mounting, the Royal West Kents had lost a total of 150 men by this point. 3 Dakotas had tried air supplying, but they accidentally dropped atop the Japanese position on Kohima Ridge. Over at FDS Hill, the situation was quite desperate as the Japanese were squeezing the British from the ridge and to prevent them from using the supplies raining from the sky. Captain Mitchell of the Rajputs was killed on the morning of 12th, and furious counterattacks against the Japanese who had infiltrated amongst C and D Companies of the Royal West Kents failed to remove the intruders; A Company, after their short rest on Kuki, now moved to support C and D Companies. That night the Japanese attempted to rush FSD Hill. The defenders were ordered to wait until they could see the whites of the Japanese eyes before opening fire. During a lull in the fighting Private Peacock from A Company dropped off, exhausted with fatigue. When he came round he discovered that he was sharing his trench with a Japanese officer who had assumed that Peacock was dead. Unable to find his rifle Peacock leapt at the officer and strangled him after a fierce struggle with his bare hands. Then, to make sure, he ran him through with the man's own sword By the 14th, the Assam Rifles relieved B company over at Garrison Hill, where Richards commemorated his remaining men for the bulwark defense. “By your efforts you have prevented the Japanese from attaining this objective. All attempts to overrun the garrison have been frustrated by your determination and devotion to duty…”. Meanwhile a patrol of the 4/7th Rajputs had advanced up the western valley. The patrol had the unfortunate result of raising some expectations of relief on the ridge. To the fighting men still desperately resisting every Japanese encroachment this made little difference to their lives. Instead, life and death continued their seemingly arbitrary, parallel journeys. The shattered hillside was now almost bare of foliage, the remaining trees standing forlornly, others leaning drunkenly where shells had smashed the trunk or branches. The ground was a churned morass of mud, which the defenders shared with rotting corpses, excrement and the inevitable detritus of war: scattered equipment, discarded helmets, broken weapons and unexploded shells. Yet the troops all knew that they had achieved a remarkable feat of endurance, and resistance. On the 15th the 1/1st Punjabs had finally broken through Piquet Hill and reopened the road to the garrisons perimeter. By the 16th, the 5th Brigade linked up with Warren's troops for the first time.The Japanese did not let up at all. On the 17th, they finally seized FSD Hill and stormed Kuki Piquet, overcoming some depleted defenders with their sheer weight of numbers. It seemed the exhausted Kohima Garrison were doomed, now crammed into a small area. Then B Company, 1/1st Punjab with Lee-Grant tanks arrived on the 18th, just in time to give the boys a fighting chance. Under heavy Japanese sniper and artillery fire, Warren and Grover's men advanced towards the besieged ridge positions. The 1st battalion, Royal Berkshire regiment made it to Kohima on the 20th to relieve Richards spent garrison. On 19 April, the day before the first of the relieving troops made their way onto the position, Hurribombers strafed the Japanese positions, Dakotas dropped ammunition, water and food accurately on the ridge and the 25-pdrs of the 2nd Division pounded away relentlessly, firing from Zubza. The relief took place in the nick of time. The men of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, could not believe their eyes or noses as they climbed up onto Summerhouse Hill on the morning of April 20. Warned by anxious defenders to keep their heads down, many gagged at the repulsive smell of death and excrement that hung like a repressive fog over the position, weighing the hill down with the stench of horror. As Japanese bullets and shells continued to fall the weary veterans of the siege made their way down the gulleys adjacent to the IGH spur, strewn with Japanese corpses, to waiting trucks, guarded by the Lee/Grants. The fresh relief troops on the road were astonished by what they saw when the red-eyed, unshaven survivors made their way quietly out of the trees, but were in no doubt that they were witnessing the end of the first phase of one of the grimmest struggles of the entire war. The Indian troops called out 'Shabash, Royal West Kents!' in warm acknowledgement of what all the defenders of the Kohima Ridge had achieved, congratulating the tired, bearded scarecrows even as shells fell among the convoy, injuring some of the wounded again and killing some, even as they were being lifted into the trucks. As the trucks crawled down the pitted road towards Jotsoma, and then Zubza, before making their slow way down through the green mountains into hot, steamy Dimapur, the exhausted survivors had long collapsed into deep, delicious sleep. Their ordeal was over. After 16 days of brutal siege, 278 men had been killed or wounded in a small stand, but one that would prove decisive for the CBI theater. Yet that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to hope over to the Admiralties. The campaign for the Admiralty islands was coming to an end, now General Swift's division just had to mop up the islands of Los Negros and Manus. Over on Los Negros, the 5th Cavalry at Papitalai had been pushing west towards the Papitalai Mission since March the 14th. They were still encountering heavy resistance, requiring support from heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. At 7:30am on the 15th, Troop A advanced after artillery and mortar concentrations, towards their third objective without any resistance. Troop A dug in there and Troop B sent out patrols 200 yards to the front. Yet still no opposition was encountered. Difficulties of supplying the troops over an extended supply line which consisted of 1 and a half miles of narrow, rutted, and slippery trail prevented further advance. Troop C, aided by a section furnished by the 82d Field Artillery Battalion, took 5 hours for a round trip. The 1st Squadron's last objective was the largest knob, Hill 260, on which it was now estimated were 100 well-entrenched Japanese. By the 17th, sufficient supplies had been brought up to enable Troop C, which had relieved Troop A, to push on toward this knob. After the usual artillery and mortar preparation, Troop C, protected in the rear by Troop B which was dug in on the third objective, advanced to within 50 yards of the hill crest before being stopped by machine-gun and rifle fire. Squadron commander Lt. Col. Charles E. Brady then dispatched Troop B north to envelop the enemy from his left flank. Although Troop B had to cut its way laboriously and noisily through the jungle, the envelopment was highly successful. The Japanese put up little resistance and both troops moved onto the hill and secured it by 1:10pm. About 40 or 50 dead Japanese were counted, although the total, which was impossible to determine in the jungle, was undoubtedly much higher. The 1st Squadron's losses in the day's attack were four killed and seven wounded. Meanwhile, patrols from the 12th cavalry had been going around inland in the region southwest of Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. They found more resistance than anticipated. After failing to connect the perimeters, Troops A and B were landed at Chaporowan Point on the 16th where more patrols advanced along the coast, also finding some resistance. Over on the Rossum Road, Troop F of the 7th cavalry were seeing their fare share of resistance at a position 800 yards down the road. Though the cavalrymen were able to push through to the northern edge of Old Rossum, the Japanese fought so hard, Troop F was forced to withdraw. Because of this action, the position was bombed on the 21st before a full assault was launched by the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry. This time the cavalrymen were able to secure the northern edge of Old Rossum with the support of artillery and tanks. On the 23rd, the squadron pressed their attack, gradually edging through Old Rossum. To gain 1000 yards here the Americans suffered 68 casualties, then on the 24th they yet again had to withdraw undering increasingly heavy Japanese fire. Finally on the 25th, the 1st Squadron, 8th cavalry relieved the battered men. After a heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the Japanese defenders were finally broken. That day saw the 8th cavalry suffered 7 dead, 29 wounded, for the Japanese it was close to 100. Overall the 2nd Brigade had suffered 36 deaths, 128 wounded in the week of fighting over the Rossum area, they estimated they had killed 200 Japanese. The 2nd Brigade would patrol inland for the next two months, penetrating deep jungles, swamps and high mountains. In the end they would count a total of 586 dead Japanese on Manus. Meanwhile General Chase ordered a brigade to complete the occupation of Los Negros on March 21st. The 1st Squadron, 5th cavalry and 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked southwest towards some highground, due west of Hill 260. Troop C of the 12th cavalry advanced towards Juarez Village, supported by Troop B who performed an encircling maneuver against the retreating enemy. The 2nd Squadron, 5th cavalry would manage to clear the southern portion of Los Negros with an assault against Palapi Hill. All of Chase's units were successful in their assaults, though they faced tough resistance. For the following days, the Japanese would fight back against the invaders and by the 25th, over 500 of them paid the price with their lives. Since February 19th, 1917 Japanese had died on Los Negros, while the 1st Brigade had suffered 143 killed and 408 wounded. There were also mop up operations against the outlying islands with the 1st Squadron, 7th cavalry landing on Pityilu island on the 30th; the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry assaulted Koruniat and Ndrilo islands on the 1st of april and the 2nd Squadron, 12th cavalry attacked Rambutyo on the 3rd. The 7th cavalry faced heavy resistance from a 60 man garrison on Pityilu, the 12th cavalry found no Japanese on Koruniat and Ndrilo and only a handful of Japanese were found on Rambutyo. On the 9th of april, the 1st Squadron, 12th cavalry landed on Pak island and with that the liberation of the Admiralty islands was complete. In total, General Krueger reported 326 killed, 1189 wounded and 4 missing while also counting a total of 3280 Japanese killed and 75 captured. General Krueger would go on to partially explain the heavy enemy losses in the Admiralties operation were due to, "Our troops were gaining superiority on the ground against an enemy whose tactical knowledge envisioned only the offensive." Allied tactics of guaranteeing naval, air, and artillery superiority to the troops in each operation were making the heavy proportion of Japanese casualties an expected result in the Pacific. In the Admiralties invasion, fire from destroyers kept the enemy under cover during the landing and the artillery gave the troopers an enormous advantage against an enemy who possessed only two 75-mm mountain guns and one 70-mm howitzer. Bad weather had greatly restricted air operations during the first week after the invasion, and the weather probably accounted in part for the weakness of enemy air defense throughout the campaign; but the constant pounding of Japanese air bases within range of the Admiralties was a more important factor. General MacArthur's decision to send a limited number of men and ships to take an enemy stronghold far in advance of Allied-held territory, and within striking distance of enemy planes, had proved worth the risks involved. At a small cost, the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng was completed; and from the new base in the Admiralties, Allied air and naval forces could now launch surprise attacks on the Dutch New Guinea coast and could threaten essential enemy sea lanes within a 1500-mile radius including the Marianas, the east coast of Mindanao, and the southern limits of the Celebes Sea. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Fate had rolled her dice yet again, and the Japanese had lost another decisive moment whereupon they could have perhaps changed the entire war in the India-Burma front. Likewise General Douglas MacArthur gambled by attacking the Admiralty Islands, but it would pay off heavily. It seems the allies were winning with every hand dealt to them.

american battle americans british young japanese kings western south indian dangerous large fate pacific operation col tea lt peacock covered durham filipino richards added slim corps honda ads difficulties hq gpt thick delhi unable brigades maj allied dis burma warned gently commander in chief generals miyazaki grover macarthur punjab pak battalion casualties squadron harman palau accompanying cavalry naga yap sato regiment manus cbi deputy commissioner new guinea dakotas unusually lancelot rossum wingate carolines douglas macarthur marianas hiroshi opium wars mindanao nimitz pacific war victoria cross infantry regiment british indian admiralty lee grant kuki lamu frantically nagas general macarthur gurkhas fukunaga imphal ijn igh hollandia kohima tom kenyon c company rabaul piper cub craig watson easten lee enfield jorhat field artillery battalion those japanese

111 - Friendly Fire on the Kokoda Track

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 28, 2024 33:18

This is Part 13 of our series looking at the Kokoda Campaign, focusing on the combat performance of the 53rd Battalion and how the militia were prepared for combat at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This episode looks at the tragic friendly fire incident that occured during the Battle of Isurava, where the 2/14th C Company attacked into the Battalion Headquarters. What were the factors in this and how could it have been avoided? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast.

battle battalion friendly fire kokoda track c company

- 118 - Pacific War - The battle of Eniwetok, February 20-27, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 20, 2024 42:15

Last time we spoke about Operation Hailstone, the continued drive upon Madang and the horrible massacre during the Indian Ocean Raid of 1944. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. The demoralized and understrength Japanese could not hope to contest the air strikes and naval bombardment. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and was relieved of his command. Over on New Guinea the Australians were continuing their drive to Madang, killing and taking prisoner all the Japanese they could along the way. Then over in the Indian Ocean, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro unleashed a raid against allied shipping, a rarity for the Japanese. Unfortunately the raid devolved into a singular attack against the British steamer Behar. A needless and cruel massacre was performed aboard the Tone, killing 65 to a possible 100 people. Such actions would only see justice after the war. This episode is the battle of Eniwetok Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Flintlock was a huge success, Kwajalien was seized incredibly fast and the invasion of Majuro saw no Japanese even on the atoll. Because of this the allied war planners had to shuffle the schedule and thus was born Operation Hailstone and the invasion of Eniwetok. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok. The operation was codenamed Catchpole and the war planners would only have 12 days to prepare. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were greens, not trained with the troops. General Watson reported “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Nevertheless, the forces available for the operation would be plentiful and well equipped. Having gone through the horribly bloody assault on Tarawa, Admiral Hill was relieved to have a large number of amtracs. The Army's 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion would sail with 119 LVTs, most of which were the heavily armored newer models. As Hill would remark later “At Eniwetok, I felt like a millionaire, but at Tarawa, I was a pauper.” Admiral Hill would have at his disposal 5 attack transports, 1 transport, 2 attack cargo ships, 1 cargo ship, 1 LSD, 2 APDs, 6 LCIs and 9 LSTs to carry General Watson's Tactical Group 1, consisting of the 22nd marines and 106th regiment led by Colonel John Walker. Further support came in the form of 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's task force 51.17; 3 escort carriers and 3 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Van Ragsdale task group 53.6; and Rear-Admiral Samuel Ginder's carrier task force 58.4. The plan was to first land two scout companies; the Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps, against Camellia and Canna Islands southeast of Engebi; and the scout company D, 4th Marine Tank Battalion against Zinnia Island northwest of Engebi to prevent any escape of the enemy from Engebi in that direction. The scout would secure Camellia and Canna allowing the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion with their 75-mm pack howitzers to deploy on Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery Battalion with their 105-mm. howitzers to deploy on Canna. The artillery would then be used to support the next day's attack against Engebi. The job of hitting Engebi was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines of Colonel John Walker. His 3rd Battalion would be kept in regimental reserve. The two battalions were to be supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. Lastly Colonel Russell Ayers' 106th Regiment would hit Eniwetok Island; and once it was captured, the infantry would take Parry Island along with the 22nd Marines. Defending against them would by General Nishida's 1st amphibious brigade; organized from the 3rd Independent Garrison Unit. It had 3 1,036-man mobile battalions, a 76-man machine-cannon unit with 6 20mm guns, 66-man tank unit with 9 Type 95 light tanks, a 243-man engineer unit, a 139-man signal unit, and 190-man medical unit. The mobile battalions had a 103-man 1st Company while the other 2 had 197 men, plus a 155-man mortar company, a 121-man artillery company with 3 75mm mountain guns, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, and a 66-man engineer platoon. These units had recently been brought over alongside his HQ. 250 IJN personnel and 1115 troops were deployed on Parry, about 692 soldiers, 500 IJN personnel and 61 men of the 61st Guard Unit would Engebi; and only 779 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hashida Masahiro, commander of the 1st Mobile Battalion would defend Eniwetok. In the 6 weeks following the Kwajalein assault, the Japanese had been constructing defenses on the lagoon side based on reports they received from the Kwajalein attack, yet there was not enough time to make much progress. The 3 defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll had no naval-manned defenses, other than two 120mm coast defense guns and two 13.2mm twin machine-guns on Engebi's north corner. 3 75mm and 28 20mm anti-aircraft guns had been delivered, but were not even emplaced. The 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived less than a month and a half before the American would land with barely any time to dig in. While significant construction materials had been delivered, there was not nearly enough time to make much progress. Defenses would be mainly dugouts, trenches, and foxholes. The brigade deployed its infantry weapons more or less equally. Engebi was expected to be the most heavily defended, but instead the most troops were actually on Parry. On February 15th, Hill's scout group sailed out from Kwajalein lagoon while Operation Hailstorm smashed Truk. Meanwhile Ginder's carriers proceeded directly to Eniwetok and on February 16th launched a series of preliminary strikes. The strike completely destroyed all the buildings upon the atoll, neutralized her airfield and destroyed 14 aircraft on the ground. Naval bombardment of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry and Japtan Islands began in the early morning hours of February 17, and was joined by more air strikes after dawn. Simultaneously, Hill's force arrived off Eniwetok's southeast coast. As the surface ship bombarded the islands, amtracs launched and landed by 1:30pm against Camellia and Canna. After securing Canna and Camellia by 2pm, the Reconnaissance Company landed, against no opposition, on the 3 islands northwest of Camellia and on 2 small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the artillery units against possible Japanese infiltration during the night. Hill then landed his 2 artillery battalion to support the invasion of Engebi. Engebi's total weapon strength came to 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dispatchers, 12 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 2 37-mm. guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 2 20-mm. cannons, 2 mountain guns, 3 light tanks, and 2 12-cm. coast defense guns. Colonel Yano predicted that a heavy bombardment would precede the amphibious landings, he accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon shore of this triangularly shaped island. The Japanese defenders were ordered to "...lure the enemy to the water's edge and then annihilate him with withering fire and continuous attacks." Most of the prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the center of the lagoon shore. The approach to this strong point was flanked by the fire of 2 75-mm. mountain guns on the northwest corner and 2 20-mm. machine cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as 2 37-mm. guns emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each mounting 37-mm. guns. Hill deployed UDT-1 frogmen to first clear obstacles and mines while D Company , 4th Tank Battalion secured Zinnia and 4 other islets west of Engebi in the early morning of February 18. At 6:55 Colorado and Louisville began shelling the northern and eastern part of Enegbi. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved at dawn to deliver close-range destructive fire against beach defenses from flanking positions on each side of the boat lanes. At 7:20 destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved into position as direct support ships, but because of the smoke and dust rising from the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just before 8:00 the naval guns ceased fire to allow a half-hour air strike to take place. This was completed ahead of schedule and naval fire was resumed at 8:11 and increased steadily in intensity until just before the first troops landed. Shortly after the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna and Camellia joined the naval guns and began to fire on the beaches at maximum rate until just after the first wave landed at 8:44, whereupon the artillery barrage was lifted inland to the center of the island for another five minutes. Thereafter, because of the smallness of the island, very few call missions were fired. All of the gunfire detonated the main ammunition dump on Engebi as Colonel Walker's amtracs made their way to the island covered by LCI gunboats. Many of the LCI rockets fell short forcing some amtracs off course, while quite a few would break down as they had been worn out by the attack on Kwajalein. Despite the technical difficulties, the first assault waves hit the beaches at 8:43. The 2nd Battalion hit Beach Blue 3 with G Company on the left, F Company in the center and e Company on the right; and the 1st Battalion hit Beach White 1 with B Company on the left, A Company in the center and C Company on the right. On the left, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance and quickly overran the airfield by 10:30. F Company managed to swing towards Weasel Point on the west corner with remarkable speed. On the right, the 1st Battalion quickly split up with A Company advancing north to New Point and C Company towards Skunk Point on the southeast corner. The Japanese put up a stiff fight against them, as their spider-hole defenses on the gap between the 2 companies were covered by the dense brush and palms. As a result, the 3rd Battalion would land at Beach White 1 at 09:55 and quickly advanced with tanks to clear the various tunnels and covered foxholes that resisted them. The Japanese were slowly forced northward along the island's eastern shore, eventually becoming isolated and cut down. By 1:10, Weasel and Newt Points had been cleared; and at 2:50, about 6 hours after the initial landing, General Watson declared the island secured. 6 minutes later, C Company captured Skunk Point; and by 6:30, the 1st Battalion secured their half of Engebi. The assault had been executed so fast that even the veteran IJA defenders were unable to offer any meaningful organized resistance. Bypassed Japanese troops and infiltrators did cause difficulties through the night, but mopping-up continued and Engebi was formally secured at 8:00 on February 19. American losses were 85 dead and missing and 521 wounded against the 1280 Japanese killed and 16 taken prisoner. For the assault against Eniwetok, new intelligence indicated that the island was more heavily defended than expected, so Watson would reinforce the 106th Regiment with Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion and some Marine tanks. What they would be facing on Eniwetok was a total of 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dischargers, 12 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 3 20-mm. cannons, and 3 light tanks. The Eniwetok garrison was divided into 5 forces, 3 on the lagoon shore, 1 placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern neck of the island, and 1 to be held in reserve. The 3 lagoon shore forces were to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of the lagoon. The force in the east was to protect the rear of the 3 lagoon shore forces from any American units landing on the northern tip of the island. The reserve force was placed to the rear of the forces on the lagoon shore, near the western tip of the island. The defenses of the island consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches, which were better constructed and better camouflaged than those at Parry. After the capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug additional foxholes. Land mines were also found on Eniwetok. Colonel Ayers' new plan was to land his two battalions abreast. 1st Battalion would land on the right on Yellow Beach 2 and was charged with making the main effort to the west to clear the lower end of the island. The 3rd Battalion would land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the island from the lagoon to the ocean shore. For the assault, the infantrymen lacked field artillery support; and although Eniwetok had also been subjected to naval bombardment on February 18, it had only received a fraction of the bombardment targeted against Engebi and Parry. A total of 1,179.7 tons of naval shells had been fired on Engebi, 944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, but Eniwetok received only 204.6 tons altogether. At 8:10am on the 19th, carrier planes began to bomb and strafe the beaches and LCI gunboats followed this up with a last-minute rocket attack against the landing areas. Meanwhile, although the arrival of the marine tanks was delayed by choppy seas and a 9-foot embankment just inland halted the amphibian tanks, but the Americans would manage to hit the Yellow beaches at 9:16. The 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Yellow 1 with L Company on the left, K Company on the right, and I Company following as reserve. Upon landing, L Company, followed by I Company pivoted east along the pier while K Company pushed across the island to reach the opposite coast at 10:30. On the right, however, the 1st Battalion encountered dense spider-hole defenses as C and B Companies attempted to push across the island while A Company attacked southwest along the coast. By noon, the front line of the 1st Battalion was in the shape of an S, extending from the lagoon to the ocean. The Japanese at this point made a bit of an unexpected move. As the Americans penetrated further inland, the Japanese began abandoning their positions and launched a 400 man counterattack. The Japanese managed to break through before getting completely cut down causing some havoc, but by 12:45 were beaten back. The American casualties were very high during the fight. Because of the strong resistance, Ayers ordered his 3rd battalion to attack east and for the reserves marines to land and relieve the left half of the 1st battalion's lion. The American attack to the west resumed with A Company on the right wing making slow progress through the enemy positions near the lagoon, but the mingled elements of C and B Companies even after being reorganized and supported by 3 Cannon Company guns, could not push through the line taken up by the enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese positions, the attacking force was unable to move forward. By 2:25, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines landed, passing through Ayers' 1st Battalion one hour later. Both battalions then launched a concerted attack towards the southwest end at 3:15, yet the Marines would soon lag behind, their advance delayed by the rugged terrain and the lack of adequate illumination and tank support. While the fight for Eniwetok was underway, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company occupied Japtan by nightfall after first securing 10 unoccupied islets on the atoll's eastern rim while the scout tank battalion secured eight islets on Eniwetok's eastern rim, successfully subduing the enemy resistance on Rigilli. This would allow Watson to have some much-needed artillery support for the attack against Parry. On Parry the Japanese were able to construct very few installations and gun positions above ground in the short time that the brigade was there. With very few exceptions, the defenses consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two categories, the old and the new. The old foxholes and trenches were located on the ocean side, were well constructed, and often lined with rocks or coconut logs. Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese had recently undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All entrenchments were well camouflaged. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large personnel shelter lined and covered with coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and a thick layer of sand were placed over the log roof. The center was surrounded by a circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart, mostly roofed over with corrugated iron. These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of the web were in turn joined by radial trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position. The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry was honeycombed with positions of this sort. Back to the action to deny the enemy an opportunity for the customary aggressive night tactics, Ayers ordered a night attack at 6:50. At 3:33 on February 20, Ayers' 1st Battalion therefore managed to reach the western end of the island, though the Marines were still 100 yards to their left rear. The Japanese, meanwhile, attempted to probe and infiltrate through the night, finally counterattacking at 09:10. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, found one of the main enemy defenses, manned by a strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A combined force of light and medium tanks, 5 guns from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the enemy during the day. The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, mopped up its zone. The next day, after the withdrawal of the Marines, the battalion ran a line across the island from the pier and mopped up to the western end. A Company , at the right, finished first and returned to the battalion area near the landing beach. B Company , in the center, reached the end of the island a little later and then went for a swim. C Company , on the ocean side, found 22 of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a firefight that sent some bullets over the heads of B Companies swimmers. B Company came out of the water, dressed, and rejoined the fight. The western end of Eniwetok Island was finally clear of Japanese. By 2:45, the stronghold was finally reduced and the western end of Eniwetok was at last secured. To the east, Ayers' 3rd Battalion also attempted to continue its attack during the night, but this proved futile as the troops lacked the confidence and experience for such a difficult task. As such, the battalion halted at 4:30, about a third of the way from the island's north end. They resumed their attack at 7:00 on the 21st, finally reached the north end at 4:30. The island was finally declared secure at 5:21, with the Americans losing 37 killed and 94 wounded against 800 Japanese killed and 23 taken prisoner. Because action had been bogged down at Eniwetok, the assault on Parry was delayed until the island was reduced and Walker's 3rd Battalion could re-embark as the regimental reserve. In the meantime, aerial, naval and artillery shells had pounded Parry for three days . Naval bombardment dropped on Parry totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery shells came to 245 tons, and aerial bombs added 99 tons more. Meanwhile while the rest of the 22nd Marines were brought from Engebi to southern Eniwetok. By this point the expedition was running low on ammunition and weapons. Naval and artillery shells were carefully apportioned. From all the ships, available grenades and demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500 percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip the 22nd Marines. In addition, the Marines had found the M1 carbine, with which many men had armed themselves, to be a less than effective combat weapon, and M1 rifles and Browning Automatic rifles were redistributed from 106th Infantry units to replace them. For the last assault of the operation Catchpole, Walker planned was to land two battalions abreast directly against the defenders' strongpoints; and after seizing the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to press forward to the ocean side of the island. Battleships Tennessee and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500 yards north of the landing area and not only mauled it with their big guns but also hit it with their 40-mm. automatic weapons batteries. From the other side of the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over the lagoon without masking the target for the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and for the landing craft that started ashore at 8:45. 3 LCI's that approached through the haze with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from Hailey, killing 13 and wounding 47. Some LVTs landed outside the designated beaches, thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell behind, so that the landing teams had difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches. While the tractors made their 15-minute run from the line of departure, two formations of planes bombed Parry in the last of 219 sorties made during the 6 days of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they only bombed the island, omitting strafing runs because of the type of defense trench systems on Parry Island.At 09:00, Walker's 1st battalion landed at 09.00hrs on Green 1 just north of the island's central portion, with Companies B, C, and A in line left to right. It was 200yds too far south, only landing on the extreme south edge of its assigned beach. The 2nd Battalions landed at 9.00 on Green 2 near Parry's northwest corner, but 200yds farther south than intended, with part of the battalion landing on about two-thirds of Green 3 to the south. Mines were encountered on the beach, causing some casualties. In the line were, from left to right, companies G, F, and E. The first troops struck Green Beaches 2 and 3 at 9:00, with a wave of tractors and one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire greeted the marines at the water's edge. As they tried to form an assault line, enfilading machine gun fire also struck them from a concealed position on the pier at the right. The machine guns were silenced by grenades and by shells from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in trenches and foxholes in the dune line on the beach, men who had survived the bombardment, were overcome in hand-to-hand fighting. Thankfully, shells from the amphibian tanks managed to silence the Japanese guns, which allowed the Americans to move inland and to land their medium tanks behind the battalions. The defense plans for Parry outlined that about one half of the troops were disposed at the water's edge, where they were to be grouped into strong points about 140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches was to be supported by mountain guns, 20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm's were to fire first. Light and heavy machine guns were to fire on landing craft before and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against the enemy at the beaches and were to cover the sectors between fortified areas and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the order called for fields of fire to be cleared through coconut groves. The order gave quite explicit instructions for measures against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when they are stopped by obstacles by means of hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades, close-in attack, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night, have a part of the force attack them." The order made it very clear that the brigade was not expected to survive an American assault once it had established a beachhead. Any troops remaining after the Americans had landed in force were to assemble in a central area. Then, the order continued, "...sick and wounded who cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others]... will reorganize, return to battle as a unit, and die fighting.” 3 dug-in Japanese light tanks decided to attack, rather than earlier when the infantry were vulnerable. Yet the Shermans immediately destroyed them before they inflicted any damage, so Walker's battalions would be allowed to push forward against the retreating enemy. While Companies G and F swung left to reach the north end by 1:30, E Company drove straight across to reach the ocean shore by 12:00. Then, as the Marines were consolidating, a group of 200 Japanese were discovered marching north and were wiped out within minutes. Over on the right, B Company reached the ocean coast at 11:55, while Companies C and A swung south and successfully reached Valentine Pier by 1:30. Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion landed at 10:00, immediately advancing south while clearing bypassed enemy pockets. After artillery bombardment, the attack south was launched at 1:30. Pressing through thick underbrush, both battalions achieved rapid progress as they overran a series of trench and foxhole defenses. The battalions were 450 yards from the island's southern tip when they halted for the night.Walker decided to declare the end of enemy resistance at 19:30, radioing Brigadier General Walker, "I present you with the island of Parry at 7.30." The Only slight enemy activity that existed anymore was occasional sniping, which would be swiftly cleared by 09:30 on February 23. For the capture of Parry, Marine casualties were 73 dead and missing and 261 wounded against 1300 Japanese killed, including General Nishida, and 66 captured. In total, American casualties during the Battle of Eniwetok came to 313 killed, 879 wounded and 77 missing. The Japanese had lost their entire garrison, with 3380 killed and 105 captured. Between March 7 and April 5, Walker would then conduct Operation Flintlock Jr., carrying 29 successful landings, securing 14 mostly unoccupied atolls and killing over 100 Japanese at the cost of two Marines killed. Other detachments would finally occupy the Erikub, Aur and Ujelang Atolls by the end of April, leaving only Mille, Maloelap, Jaluit and Wotje bypassed and unoccupied, in addition to the Japanese presence at Kosrae, Wake and Nauru. Over on Jaluit Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke commanded the 13,000 personnel and beginning on March 4th, the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Majuro, and the 7th Air Force commenced a concerted campaign to neutralize the Japanese garrisons, which continued until the war's end. Navy Aviation and Army Air Forces had previously destroyed most Japanese aircraft on these islands. The 13,000 tons of aerial-delivered ordnance, coupled with frequent naval shelling, killed 2,564 Japanese and 4,876 died of disease and starvation; the Marines sprayed oil over the garrisons' gardens. Fighter-bomber units deploying to the Pacific would first serve in this role, perfecting their bombing techniques before moving forward to support other operations as new units replaced them. The Japanese survivors would finally surrender on September 2, 1945. As the American commander took stock of what they had achieved in the Marshalls, their confidence and self-assurance rose to new heights. In less than 3 months' time, the tragic and costly lessons of Tarawa had been refined and integrated into amphibious planning and doctrine, and the results had been tremendous. To the extent that further improvement was needed, it was in the details of execution rather than any deficiency in the plans themselves. Holland Smith concluded in his final report, “In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in Flintlock.” Over in Tokyo there was shock and incomprehension at the speed and ‘low cost' of the US victory over the Marshall Islands. The implications for Japan's future were dire. As Ichiro Koyose, the permanent Director of Japan's Imperial Rule Association said in an address, “The Marshall Islands are the frontporch entrance to Tokyo … The enemy is probably finally thinking of some such thing as bombing Tokyo in deadly earnest …” Yet that is it for today on the Marshall Island front as we are going to be diving back into Burma. The Japanese had launched their main offensive on the Arakan at the start of February, successfully infiltrating through the British positions to cut off their rear. By cutting the Indians' supply lines off, the Japanese expected to force them back into disarray; but these were not the same men they had been fighting for years. The Indian troops were better trained and ready to put up a real fight. This was seen when they faced Japanese attack after attack, using their all-round defensive brigade boxes, also referred to as "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics. This baffled Japanese,and soon they would leave the invaders effectively encircled and running out of supplies, as they themselves depended on what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails. With increasing 'fanatical' desperation, the Japanese began to press home attacks seeking to secure vitally needed stockpiled supplies of food, arms and ammunition upon which their offensive depended. In the Sinzweya area, the 112th Regiment made a night attack on the 9th, successfully breaking through the southwest corner of the enemy's perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. Although the Regiment was successful in firing an ammunition dump and doing great damage, the enemy's employment of tanks forced it to draw back without further exploiting the breakthrough. On the morning of the 10th, Major General Sakurai met Colonel Tanabashi on Hill 315, due northeast of Sinzweya, and encouraged him to press the enemy more aggressively. The failure of the 112th to achieve a signal success appeared, however, to have so depressed morale that the Regiment was reluctant to repeat its attack. The 7th Indian Division, kept its morale high despite the intense fighting, rapidly mounting casualties and increasing exhaustion. They continued to fight on until the advanced Japanese units had exhausted their own food and ammunition. Whenever possible, the British-Indian troops also struck back against Japanese positions and harried their already tenuous supply lines. Furthermore, the massive firepower of the British mountain, field and medium artillery inflicted massive casualties on the attacking Japanese infantry. Firing from positions within each brigade box, carefully concerted artillery fire plans thus rained death upon Japanese troops scattered in the jungle throughout the divisional area. As such, the 71st Brigade would successfully recaptured Taung Bazaar on February 10, and was steadily advancing southwards towards the Ngakyedauk Pass. That same day, General Giffard realized that there was no possibility of 15th Corps being able to reach the Indin-Rathedaung line before the pre-monsoon swell made amphibious operations impossible, so he recommended canceling the Akyab assault. He placed the 36th Indian Division under the 14th Army, allotted the 50th Brigade to 4th Corps and ordered the 25th Indian Division towards Chittagong. General Slim, however, realized that the Japanese plans had miscarried, so he directed General Christison to resume the offensive against the Tunnels-Buthidaung position as soon as he had cleared the land communications to his forward divisions. Consequently, as the 29th Brigade of the36th division was arriving at Bawli, Christison sent the bulk of the 26th Indian Division to destroy the enemy in the Kalapanzin valley behind the 7th Division. By the13th, patrols from both divisions successfully linked up near Taung Bazar; but at the same time, the Japanese were bringing reinforcements for their attacks at Sinzweya. The Japanese offensive reached its climax on February 14 when General Sakurai called for an all-out attack that evening. The attack was courageous and managed to achieve some initial gains, but it was also uncoordinated, suicidal and unsuccessful, ending with the Indians reinforcing the Admin Box the following day. Meanwhile elements of the 5th Indian Division, regrouped and battered away against a heavily fortified Japanese roadblock at the summit of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Thus, the Japanese tactical and administrative position quickly went from bad to worse around Sinzweya, as pressure steadily mounted against its vastly outnumbered troops. After a few days of bitter fighting the Japanese finally abandoedn their positions at Kyaukyit and Pyinshe Kala and began occupying areas covering the routes back to their main positions. By the 20th, the strength of the Japanese striking force had shrunk to 400 men increasingly-debilitated by lack of sleep and shortages of food. On the 23th, after a short but sharp fight, a battalion of 89th Brigade from the east and 123rd Brigade from the west linked up at Ngakyedauk Pass and by evening had firmly secured it. The following day, as soon as the 500 casualties from Sinzweya had been evacuated, the pass was opened to normal traffic and air supply of the 7th Division ceased. As Geoffrey Evans later wrote with obvious pride: “For eighteen days the British and Indian troops, most of them belonging to the administrative services, had withstood the determined attacks of trained Japanese infantry supported by guns and air. It spoke volumes for the war in which the junior leaders had carried out their task and the stout-heartedness of their men.” At this point, General Hanaya recognized the inevitable and ordered the Ha-Go offensive to be abandoned. The shattered remnants of Sakurai's command subsequently withdrawing in small parties. The last attack on Sinzweya, made on the 22nd, ended in failure. On the following night, acting on his own responsibility, Colonel Tanabashi withdrew his main force to Kreingyaung, leaving the 8th Company of the 112th Infantry at Ngakyedauk Pass and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th on a small hill south of Sinzweya. Upon receiving a report of Tanabashi's withdrawal, Major General Sakurai was really pissed off but realized that the move was undoubtedly inevitable, being forced by lack of food and supplies. At the suggestion of General Sakurai, the Division commander determined to suspend the offensive and ordered the Sakurai Unit to withdraw to the line of the Buthidaung-Maungdaw Road. Moving units into the line to cover the withdrawal, the movement south began on the night of 24 February and was completed by 1 March. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Infantry, which had been holding positions in the vicinity of the road between Ngangyaung and Maunghnama since 6 February, left its positions on the night of the 25th and, after breaking through the enemy lines, returned safely on 3 March. Many units were trapped, however, between units of the 26th and 36th Divisions advancing from the north and 5th Division from the east through the Ngakyedauk Pass upon the anvil of the boxes. In the end, the Battle of Ngakyedauk Pass cost 15th Corps 3506 casualties, but it also marked the turning point in the Burma Front. The Japanese lost 3106 killed and 2229 wounded, in what would be the first time that they met well trained British-Indian formations in battle and the first time that their enveloping tactics, aimed at cutting their opponents' line of communications, failed to produce the results they expected. Not only had operation HA-GO been an abysmal failure, but it materially undermined the Japanese ability to resist further British attacks. By March 5th, the 15th Corps had completely recovered and resumed its own offensive against the now disorganized and weakened Japanese forces in Arakan. Although the Japanese staged a remarkable recovery and still offered dogged resistance, the 5th Division would capture Razabil on March 12th and the 7th Division would seize Buthidaung and later mop up the Letwedet Fortress in late March. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle in the Marshalls absolutely shocked the Japanese in its speed, efficiency and low cost for the American forces. Now the Japanese feared the Americans would soon be in range to hit the home islands with their dreaded bombers. In the Burma Front, the former Japanese super soldiers were now realizing the Indian Army could no longer be pushed around.

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- 116 - Pacific War - The Fall of Kwajalein , February 6-13, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 6, 2024 51:08

Last time we spoke about Operation Flintlock, the invasion of the Marshall islands. The allies brought overwhelming power against the Marshalls, unleashing the simultaneous invasions of numerous islands in an attempt to strike at the heart of the island chain at Kwajalein. The horror of the Gilbert Island campaign plagued the minds of the commanders who hoped to thwart such carnage. Airstrikes, naval bombardments and massive amounts of land based artillery smashed the Japanese defenders into submission before amphibious assaults were made. Countless islands such as Roi-Namur fell one by one as the Americans secured places to deploy further artillery to forces the ultimate submission of the defenses on Kwajalein. The casualties were light, but the fight for Kwajalein would soon descend into a bitter struggle, for the Japanese were not going to give up their stronghold without a good fight. This episode is The Fall of Kwajalein Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Flintlock went off with a bang, and was initially a grand success. Aerial bombing, followed by naval bombardment and then land based artillery was smashing the Japanese defenders into submission. One by one the islands were falling into the Americans hands. On the second day of the battle, Roi-Namur, the northern objective was seized. Yet the stronghold of Kwajalein would provide much more of a fight. Back on the morning of January 28th Admiral Frederick Sherman's Task Force 58.3 landed a knockout blow against Kwajalein's airfield. Dawn saw a Hellcat fighter sweep ensure the airfield would not be tossing any further action before the amphibious assault occurred. The next day Sherman's force hit Eniwetok with the same kind of treatment. Sherman's carriers would remain off Eniwetok for 3 days while his aircraft smashed its airfields and ground installations. On the third say not much was left, just heaps of rubble and a few scattered palm trees stripped of their foliage. Sherman's airmen reported “they could not find any targets on the ground or in the lagoon that seemed worth bombing, and the island looked like a desert waste.” The warships came in on the 31st just off Roi and at 6:51am, Admiral Conolly maneuvered Maryland 2000 yards away from the northern beaches before unleashing 16 inch guns. As Holland Smith put it “So close that his guns almost poked their muzzles into Japanese positions.” By 7:15am the naval guns went silent as carrier planes came swooping in. Then 127mm artillery from Roi began firing, alongside cruisers and destroyers. Return fire occurred, but for a very short amount of time as they were snuffed out. Admiral Truman Hedding recalled “We learned a lot about softening up these islands before we sent the Marines in. We really worked that place over. They developed a tactic called the ‘Spruance haircut.' We just knocked everything down; there wasn't even a palm tree left.” The Kwajalein atoll islands were hit with 15,000 tons of bombs and naval shells in 72hrs. Admiral Turner would make a Churchillian statement about the event “Never in the history of human conflict has so much been thrown by so many at so few.” Then transports carrying nearly 64,000 men of the 4th marine division and the 7th army division were launched at Ivan, Jacob, Allen, Andrew, Albert and Abraham islands. Once they were secured, the marines set up artillery batteries. The 7th infantry division was assigned the task of taking the banana shaped Kwajalein island as their colleagues set up 105mm and 155mm howitzers on nearby Roi-Namur. The 32nd and 184th regiments landed on the lagoon side at 9:30am on February 1st, first encountered only feeble and intermittent resistance. The eastern half of the island was secured in quick time, as the bombardments had certainly inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. The army moved slowly and methodically, advancing cautiously against the Japanese fixed positions. Soon they reached Carl Road, where they were met with an impressive defense system consisting of an anti-tank ditch on the south and a long rifle trench on the north. As February 2nd came on, so did another wide scale smashing of the Japanese. Artillery fire on Carlson Island and from the 32nd Regiments Cannon Company in the Wart Area coordinated with the tank and infantry movements. While the new assault units were moving up, the enemy in Corn Strong Point were kept under heavy artillery bombardment and were isolated from possible reinforcements by naval gunfire. Enemy guns that were still active in the northeastern end of the island were struck by dive bombers. The jump-off was ordered for 12:45. A series of delays deferred this crucial attack over an hour. To assemble the staff and coordinate the plans for employing tanks, artillery, and infantry while the 3d Battalion made its approach march, proved difficult to arrange. The time for the assault had passed before the planning difficulties were resolved. Then came notice of an air strike to be made at 1:15pm later postponed, on Admiral Turner's order, to 1:30, thus necessitating the suspension of all artillery fire. Since the attack on Corn Strong Point was to be immediately preceded by a heavy artillery barrage, the whole operation was postponed to 2:00. For the initial assault on the tank trap and Corn Strong Point, Colonel Logie's 32d Infantry's 3d Battalion was ordered to pass through its 2nd Battalion at Carl Road and to lead the attack. These fresh troops were to be supported by the tanks of A and D comapnies, 767th Tank Battalion and, from the left flank, by the tanks of B company, which would be temporarily detached from the 184th. The tanks of A company, 767th Tank Battalion, lined up along Carl Road to fire against the strong point, while those from B company took up positions almost at right angles to that road and prepared to strike the enemy from the left flank during the first stage of the attack. One of the batteries on Carlson continued to fire during the air strike, and the Cannon Company's howitzers also laid a preparation on the target area before the advance commenced at 2pm. Then, while the artillery lifted fire to ground northeast of the target, the tanks and infantry approached the tank trap in a 225-yard advance across open ground. The tanks poured machine gun fire into the area. Thirty yards behind them the troops came forward to the shelter of the tank ditch without receiving an enemy shot. The Japanese were pinned down. The assault initially saw the Americans pin down the Japanese. While the left wing of infantry troops started to push across the wide tank barrier, the tanks on their left momentarily broke off fire from the flank. A few tanks from A company, 767th Tank Battalion, moved toward the ocean to bypass the deep ditch, and the others after a brief hesitation laid a base of fire to cover the infantry's advance. The tanks hesitated to poke out along the flimsy wooden bridge by which Wallace Road cut through the angle of the tank trap. At this stage, a concentration of white phosphorus shells commenced to fall into the area in which I company, 32nd Infantry, was moving, and countless men were burned. After hesitating briefly the infantry moved steadily to the tank ditch. There the troops remained for some time because the medium tanks pulled back claiming they could not get over the ditch. The tanks finally broke through and began to make their way to the beach smashing pillboxes in the Corn strongpoint. An estimated 100 Japanese were killed in the area, the majority by demolition charges carried forward by engineer details while rifle and BAR men covered them. Little or no defense was put up against these tactics. The Japanese remained huddled in their shelters in spite of efforts made to coax them out to surrender. Only a single prisoner was taken in the whole area. Grenades were thrown into the shelters, and those who survived were then destroyed by demolition charges. Altogether, it took about 35 minutes to reduce Corn Strong Point once the American infantry got beyond the tank trap. Contact between the forward battalion of the 32nd Infantry and that of the 184th was temporarily lost during this fray, and K company, 32nd Infantry, moved through the left platoon of I company to establish contact firmly as soon as Corn Strong Point was taken. Advance to the Nora Road line seemed practicable within the time remaining before taking defensive positions for the night. To escape spending the night in an area too heavily wooded for security, the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, planned to advance northeast of the junction of Nora Road and Wallace Road, even though that would place its perimeter slightly forward of the 184th's front-line elements, which were resting just short of Nora Road itself. To the north, Colonel O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion began advancing at 12:45 without tank support. F Company was on the right while E Company on the left along the lagoon. For the first 45 minutes no serious resistance was met. There were no tank obstacles in the area and the enemy's positions along the lagoon shore were less formidable than had been expected. At 1:30, however, the 184th had to lend its medium tanks to the 32nd Infantry as the latter moved against Corn Strong Point. This left the infantry unprotected at a time when they began to meet their first serious resistance. Without the tank support the infantry became stalled. The 184th suffered over 60 casualties by the end of the day, including the loss of F Company's commanding officer. O'Sullivan was forced to organize night defenses just 100 yards northeast of Carl Road, which also forced Logie to pull back to the abandoned trenches of Corn for the night. Heavy casualties were suffered that day, with 11 dead and 241 wounded. Japanese prisoners reported only 200 to 300 defenders remained, so the Americans expected a banzai charge to occur during the night. General Corlett's headquarters warned, "Be alert for counterattack at anytime day or night, it's bound to come. The Jap makes his suicide counterattack at dawn on the day after his cause becomes hopeless. Watch out tomorrow morning.” Yet there was no attach, so General Corlett prepared his men for a new assault at 07:15am. For the next day's operations, General Corlett ordered the two assault regiments: "Organize vigorous attack 0715 tomorrow… Finish the job not later than 1500 3 February. The Northern Force [at Roi-Namur] has finished the job…". At this point the Americans on Kwajalein faced a narrow 2000 yards of island. After artillery rained down at 7am, O'Sullivans 1st battalion advanced. In the first 150 yard B Company, along the lagoon, and Company A, at the right, advanced through rubble and broken trees west of Nora Road without more than scattered rifle fire from Japanese riflemen and occasional light machine gun fire from pillboxes. Their momentum carried them on for another 75 yards with such rapidity that the prospects for swift advance seemed excellent. B Company cleaned out an air raid shelter with grenades and shot down fleeing Japanese wearing arm bands like those of the American troops. Both companies were advancing over ground that had been under American mortar fire just before the jumpoff. At 8:06 enemy opposition was reported to be weak. After 250 yards the Americans reached the Admiralty area, finding a group of shattered buildings along the lagoon shore where it was believed the Japanese HQ was. Among the ruins were several underground shelters, with great earthen mounds above them. There were also concrete blockhouses. Against strong resistance, B Company would not be able to advance further; A Company, meanwhile, pushed farther north and attempted to attack from the flank through the Admiralty area, but became quickly bogged down. At the same time, Logie sent forward his 3rd Battalion, with I Company rapidly advancing along the coast while K Company stopped to subdue a large concrete pillbox on the corner of the Admiralty area. By midday, I Company reached Noel Road and K Company successfully bypassed the Admiralty area. Yet behind them, there was a vertical gap including most of the Admiralty area between the two regiments. Thus, Corlett sent Logie's 1st Battalion to cover the gap and O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion to swing right and continue the advance north while his 1st Battalion contained and neutralized the Admiralty area. At 3:30, the new attack was launched, with Logie's 3rd Battalion rapidly smashing into the Nap strongpoint while O'Sullivan's 1st Battalion concentrated on the Admiralty area and his 2nd Battalion attacked north towards Nob Pier. E Company started its attack before those of either G Company or the 1st Battalion. At 2:40 E Company began moving northwest. Somewhat more than half an hour later E Company crossed Noel Road, with G Company on their right. 2 medium and 2 light tanks, taken over from the 1st Battalion, moved forward with each of the companies, and each had one squad of engineer troops with demolitions. Enemy rifle fire was heavy. The men broke up into small groups, proceeding unevenly in the general direction of Nob Pier. Between 6:30 and 7:00, Captain Peter Blaettler, commander of E Company was seriously wounded. Control from the battalion command post was lost seeing the men hugging the ground to avoid sharp fire from enemy riflemen. Colonel Aulich became separated from the main part of his battalion and was to remain so until the next morning, for all intensive purposes he lost command of his unit. The 2nd Battalion's attack was pushed along the eastern side of Will Road toward Nathan Road, but as sunset approached it became evident not only that Company E would not reach Nob Pier but also that across Will Road on the left flank there was an area with many strong enemy defense positions too powerful to be occupied in the 45 minutes before dark. Meanwhile, at 3:45 A Company 1st battalion was joined by 2 medium tanks and C Company by 2 mediums and 2 M10 tank destroyers. At 4:05 they assaulted the western edge of the built-up Admiralty area along a 300 yard front, with A Company's right wing somewhat south of Noel Road. 10 minutes later they advanced towards the lagoon. Will Road was crossed shortly after 4:30. The enemy was much more firmly established between the highway and the beach, in pillboxes, blockhouses, and strong shelters. Mortar fire kept the enemy down until the tanks and infantry approached. The coordinated effort of tanks, infantry, and demolition teams ran very smoothly, gradually destroying the pillboxes and blockhouses of the Admiralty area, successfully reaching the lagoon by 6pm. To the east, Logie's I Company rapidly reduced the weakly-defended Nap strongpoint and then pushed forward to the objective Nathan Road with haste while the other companies made slower progress against stronger defenses and would not be able to reach their objectives before nightfall. The Japanese in the areas south of the front line, were in greater numbers than on either of the preceding nights of the Kwajalein Island operation. They prowled in the forward area all night. Some incidents occurred as far to the rear as Corn Strong Point, more than a 1000 yards from the 32nd Infantry's advanced position. Japanese came out of shelters, screaming and yelling, throwing grenades, and charging at the men in their foxholes. They fired rifles and threw grenades from buildings that offered places of advantage. In a pocket northeast of the Admiralty area, they greatly harassed the companies near them. Attacks from the north and from the lagoon shore were also attempted by enemy troops at various times during the night. Just after sunset, a bugle could be heard sounding among the enemy shelters near the base of Nob Pier, and shortly afterward a headlong counterattack by screaming Japanese was made toward E and G Companies, 184th Regiment. As the Japanese tried to cross Will Road, they were cut down to the last man. 5 more attacks were broken up before they were actually in progress by barrages along the entire front from mortars and from the supporting batteries of artillery on Carlson Island; and more attacks followed after midnight. From various positions beyond Nathan Road, enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire was directed into the forward area at irregular intervals during the night, sometimes coinciding so closely with the fire from Carlson Island that Japanese monitoring of the artillery radio was suspected. Nonetheless, over 1000 yards had been gained, by February 3. The Americans estimated they had killed around 1300 Japanese, more than were expected to still be in the island, at the cost of 54 dead and 255 wounded. After sunset, several Japanese counterattacks and infiltration attempts were carried out against the steadfast Americans, all ending disastrously. Corlett expected to end the enemy resistance by February 4; but far too many small pockets remained in the rear and the reserve battalions were experiencing difficulties rooting them out. Corlett's final plan was for Logie's 1st Battalion to clear the remainder of the island, allowing Companies C, B and A to attack through O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion and Logie's 3rd Battalion. Unbeknownst to him, O'Sullivan also directed his 2nd Battalion to attack towards Nob Pier in order to complete the unfinished task of the previous day. At 7:15, Corlett unleashed his final attack, supported by tanks. On the east, Logie's Companies A and B ran into a full-scale battle with the Japanese who had been bypassed the day before and who now poured heavy fire on the companies as they advanced toward the line of departure. It was not until 10:00 that the 2 1st Battalion companies reached the lines held by the 3rd Battalion. Then, the Americans successfully managed to advance 200 yards past Nathan Road, where the advance was stopped pending relief. Meanwhile, to the west, the attack of O'Sullivan's 2nd Battalion, supported by B Company , prevented the advance of Logie's C Company until 11:00. The Americans managed to push towards Nob Pier by 1:00, where they found no enemy resistance. Behind them, the lagoon shore continued to be mopped up, showcasing a surprising number of Japanese and Koreans surrendering. All forward movement of the 1st Battalion had stopped, its line consisting of a series of small, exhausted groups in a dense confusion of debris. The ground was interlaced with innumerable trenches and foul with bodies of the enemy, many of them long dead. Some of the corpses had been mangled by maneuvering tanks, adding greatly to the nauseating stench that blighted the area. Finally, at 3:45, Logie's 2nd Battalion passed through the 1st to complete the assault along Kwajalein. These troops would successfully push to the island's northern tip, blasting through the remaining Japanese camouflaged dugouts and ruined concrete blockhouses. As in every other island battle, Japanese stragglers had infiltrated the American lines through tunnels and overlooked bunkers, and the assault troops quickly learned to watch their backs. Nisei interpreters broadcast surrender appeals through loudspeakers, but there were only a few dozen takers, and most of the men who gave themselves up were Korean laborers. At long last, G Company reached Nero Point at 3:15. At 4:10 Corlett radioed to Admiral Turner: "All organized resistance… has ceased. The troops have been organized for mopping up operations." yet F Company, would still have to methodically destroy the enemy positions until they finally secured Kwajalein's northern end at 7:20. Ken Dodson went ashore the next morning. Writing to his wife, he described a desolate landscape of “shell craters and hillocks of upturned coral. Some of the Japanese had been dead from the first bombardment, the day before we landed. Their bodies were seared and bloated, and the stench was sickening. I saw one half buried in a pillbox. You could not tell whether he had on any clothes or not. The skin was burned off his back and his head lay a few feet from his body. Another looked like a bronze statue in Golden Gate Park. He lay forward in a crouch, helmet still on, both hands holding on to a coconut log of his pillbox. There were many, many others. I lie in bed at night remembering how they looked, and that awful sweetish sickening stench of powder, and kerosene and decaying human flesh, and I wonder, after all, what war is all about. I feel sorry for those Japs in a way. They died courageously after a stubborn, last-ditch, hopeless fight. They fought for the things they had been taught to believe in, with their poor little bundles with pictures of their wives and kiddies tied to their belts. . . . They can't tell me war is a fine and noble thing.' Losses during the last day were 252 wounded, with 65 Japanese killed and over 100 captured. Thus, for the Battle of Kwajalein Island, the Americans suffered a total of 142 killed, 845 wounded and 2 missing, killing around 4300 Japanese and capturing another 166. During the week after Operation Flintlock, numerous high ranking visitors descended on the battle-scarred islands of Kwajalein Atoll. Admiral Nimitz flew out from Pearl Harbor with an entourage of officers. On February 5, when fires were still burning on Kwajalein Island, he toured the blackened wastes alongside Spruance, Turner, Smith, and several other major commanders of the fleet and Amphibious Corps. Three weeks earlier Nimitz had been the guest of honor at a huge “Texas Picnic” in a Honolulu park. Walking among 40,000 sailors, soldiers, and civilians. He had pitched horseshoes, posed for photographs, and signed autographs. Afterward, the park looked as if it had been hit by a hurricane—clean-up crews had to cart away more than 50 truckloads of garbage and debris. An estimated 120,000 beer bottles had been left strewn across the grass. Now, upon setting foot on the lagoon beach at Kwajalein, Nimitz was waylaid by a mob of correspondents. “What do you think of the island?” one asked. The admiral drew a cheerful laugh by replying, “Gentlemen, it's the worst scene of devastation I have ever witnessed—except for the Texas picnic.” The operation had been a model one in almost every respect. The attacking force had achieved strategic surprise; artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had successfully softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific War; the ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without too many hiccups; supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines relatively smoothly and without interruption; the infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes; and American casualties had been fairly light. Altogether, the battle for Kwajalein represented the ideal for all military operations. To complete the conquest of the southern Kwajalein islands, detachments of amphibian tanks had been landed on Buster and Byron back on February 3. Troops of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment landed on Burnet and Blakenship on February 4; the chain between Ashberry and Bennett was secured by February 5. On that same day, Clement, Clarence, and Clifford Islands were also secured, although on Clifton a force of 101 Japanese fought to the death. Beverly, Benson and Berlin were also secured on February 5, seeing 119 Japanese dead on the latter. Bennett fell against the 7th Reconnaissance Troop and O'Sullivan's 3rd Battalion with 94 Japanese killed. Most importantly, Colonel Zimmerman's 1st and 3rd Battalions landed on Burton's Beach Orange 4. The fortifications on Burton were much lighter than those on Kwajalein, mostly machine gun positions and rifle pits. These were organized at the beaches with a concentration of dual-purpose machine guns grouped around the seaplane base in the lagoon. At the base of the south seaplane ramp was a 20-mm. antiaircraft machine gun. Near it, and between the two seaplane ramps, were two 13-mm. single-mount machine guns, three 7.7-mm. machine guns, and a concrete pillbox. Two 8-cm. dual-purpose guns were located on the ocean shore. The large number of empty machine gun emplacements would seem to indicate that the defenses of the island had not been completed at the time of the invasion. The few pillboxes found in the vicinity of the seaplane base were small, reinforced concrete shelters, each with two firing ports facing seaward. Most of the fire trenches and rifle pits were on the ocean side at the center of the island and at the north and south ends of the island. On the morning of February 3 after a heavy artillery, air and naval bombardment, the 1st Battalion traversed the southern end of the island against weak resistance and began pushing north supported by tanks, ultimately getting stopped by strong enemy resistance at Bailey Pier. The following morning, the assault was resumed at 0730, the main enemy resistance had shifted to the eastern side of the island. The Japanese had reoccupied four pillboxes close to the American front line on the ocean side, and were able to hold up A Company, but with the aid of self-propelled mounts, the company took the positions. During the morning, a flight of five Navy bombers made two runs over targets that had been spotted with the aid of information from a prisoner. The planes dropped a total of two and three quarters tons on an ammunition dump, a shelter, and a heavy machine gun that had an excellent field of fire across the hangar apron. Direct hits on these targets apparently disheartened the enemy. Not a single shot was fired by them at any later time during the operation. They remained buried in their dugouts until forced out or until they killed themselves. By 1130, when the 3d Battalion passed through and took up the assault, B Company had moved about 350 yards to the southern edge of the concrete apron, and on the right A Company was fifty to 75 yards farther back. The 3rd Battalion continued the advance north against meager resistance, ultimately reaching Burton's northern tip by 12:10. After this, the last of the enemy were readily mopped up; and by 3:37, the island was fully secured. During this battle, the 17th Regiment suffered 7 killed and 82 wounded while reporting 450 Japanese dead. Meanwhile, to the north, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Samuel C. Cumming occupied some 55 islands in the northern part of the atoll between February 2-7, finding absolutely no enemy resistance. With Kwajalein Atoll finally secured, the next objective in the Marshalls for Admirals Nimitz and Spruance would be Eniwetok, where Major-General Nishida Yoshimi was preparing his men to fight to the last. Yet that's it for the Marshall islands today, as now we are traveling over to the CBI theater, where Generals Christison and Stilwell's offensives continued. Now last time we left off with the gang in Burma General Liao's 22nd division, Colonel Rothwell Brown's 1st provisional tank group, General Merrill's Galahad Unit alongside Chinese and American engineers were busy building the Ledo Road through the Hukawng valley. Location parties up ahead cleared a trace the width of a bulldozer and put in the center-line stakes. The final clearing averaged 150 feet. The route of the Ledo Road in some cases followed existing roads, a circumstance that did not greatly diminish the amount of clearing needed. Most clearing was by bulldozer. Combat trails and access roads were cleared to the necessary minimum that would permit heavy equipment to use them. In the valleys, the road was generally built on embankments in order to lift it above flood level. In mountainous regions, side-hill cuts were used. The road itself had about seven culverts to the mile in the mountains and five to the mile in the lowlands. These culverts were most necessary as the road was a barrier to the normal runoff of water. Surfacing was with stream-bed gravel in the valley sections and, so far as hauling permitted, natural gravel in the mountainous sections. Surfacing was about ten inches thick on the average, and from twenty to twenty-eight feet wide. Compaction was by the normal road traffic. Two regiments of Chinese engineers did pioneer construction work. There was also a combat road, a hasty improvement of the existing Kamaing Road plus the Kachin and Naga trails, that ran through Shingbwiyang, Yupbang Ga, and Taihpa Ga, then went south. The trace of the Ledo Road was moved to higher ground on the north. Forward construction units were rationed from combat supply points. Meanwhile Vinegar Joe sought to end the campaign with a single decisive victory. He planned to deploy the 1st Tank Battalion as an armored spearhead against Maingkwan, the 1st battalion, 66th regiment, the 113th was to follow down the road to take over successive positions, while the 114th would assemble at Taihpa in reserve and the 112th was to protect the flank east of the Tanai, advancing on Mashi Daru. He expected his men to hit the enemy across their rear areas. Now January had been a very rainy month, armored warfare does not do well in mud, so it was important the terrain was dry for the offensive. Stilwell would end up on February 4th decided to shift the bulk of the 22nd division to seize Yawngbang-Lakyen line while General Sun's 38th Division cleaned up the area south and east of the Tanai. Once this first phase was done, then General Liao's 2 regiments could support an armored advance south towards Walawbum. The bad weather, however, had also delayed road work and hampered their supply lines. Stilwell biding his time, building up a reserve at Shingbwiyang and Ningam, while the men progressed their work on the Ledo Road, and built an airfield at Taihpa before launching his second phase. This unfortunately also gave enough time for General Tanaka to prepare an orderly withdrawal towards Maingkwan. During early february, General Sun's 32nd division successfully accomplished their part of the mission, but to the southwest, the enveloping hook from the Taro Plain did not go as planned. By February 14th, the 66th regiment were beginning to arrive on the Taro Plain through heavy rain, but only the 3rd battalion of the 65th regiment managed to join them. The 66th regiment was forced to continue without the proper support until they diverted to Yawngbang Ga which they seized on the 16th. By the 18th, Stilwell and Liao personally went over to check on their regiment's location and found the entire force was within the neighborhood of the 66th command post. It seems the utter confusion during these movements saved the Japanese, as quoted by General Tanaka: "If the Chinese 65th and 66th Infantry Regiments operating in the vicinity of Yawngbang had been prompt in closing in on our left rear flank on the 15th or 16th, as predicted, the main force of the 18th Division would have faced a grave crisis." After sorting out the confusion, the Chinese advanced from Yawngbang Ga to Lakyen Ga. There they captured a Japanese document indicating they were withdrawing. Thus another chance to envelop the enemy had thus been lost. Meanwhile, to support Stilwell's offensive, the two Allied long-range penetration units, the Chindits and Merrill's Marauders, were preparing to embark on a new mission, codenamed Operation Thursday. It was to be the second Chindit expedition with the objective of mounting a long range penetration behind the Japanese who were opposing Stilwells forces in the Northern front. It was hoping the action would prevent the arrival of any reinforcements from the two Japanese divisions on the Central Front. General Hap Arnold wanted his airmen to take the Chindits behind Japanese lines, carry their supplies, evacuate their wounded and eventually fly them off, so he decided to create the 1st Air Commando Unit, under Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Cochram. The unit consisted of a squadron of P-51s; one of B-25s; 100 C4A Waco gliders; and a squadron of C-47s. Arnold spelled out the mission to Cochram and Lieutenant-Colonel John Alison, his deputy. "This man [Wingate] has really done some remarkable things. He has walked through the jungles. He has carried his supplies on mules. It takes him about six weeks to get his men through the jungle, across the rivers, and in behind the Japanese lines. The next time he goes in, I don't want him to walk. I want him to go by air. I want to make this an air operation completely independent of land transport. I want to demonstrate that you can use the air just like the navy uses the sea. You can land and maintain a force and support it in battle. I want you to go in there and take out General Wingate's wounded. We will make available the resources that you need. 'I not only want you to do that... but I want the USAAF to spearhead General Wingate's operations.' We gathered he wouldn't mind if we turned it into an air show." The mad onion lad Wingate also wanted to created strongholds within the Japanese controlled areas that could serve as bases to receive aircrafts of all types, store supplies, hold wounded until they could be extracted, and act as centers for locals resisting the enemy. The motto for the Stronghold, as he called it, was “No Surrender”. Meanwhile Stilwell ordered Merril to close in on Ledo by February 7th, and the last American unit would arrive to Margherita on February 9th. Merrill's Marauders were to assemble at Ningbyen by February 21st whereupon they would envelop the 18th divisions east flank and block the Kamaing road near Shaduzap with the support of Sun's 113th Regiment. Simultaneously Stilwell's other troops were preparing for their attack on Maingkwan. Further in the south General Christison's 15th Corps was in a lot of trouble. The Japanese had been bringing in a lot of reinforcements for their forthcoming Arakan counteroffensive from both within and outside the Burma theater throughout December and January. By early February, General Hanaya had assembled his men and was ready to launch the first phase of Operation Ha-Go. General Hanaya planned to destroy the 7th Indian Division in the region east of Mayu Range using a pincer movement launched simultaneously from the north and south. After that, he would shift the main weight of his 55th Division near Ngangyaung against the 5th Indian Division in the Maungdaw region west of the Mayu Range. From there, he hoped to advance along the Kaladan valley to perform the phase of Ha-Go, named the Kaladan Operation. For this the men would advance towards Chittagong to distract attention from around Imphal and to draw the British reserves into Arakan. On the night of February 3, Hanaya unleashed his offensive, with several columns, under the command of Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro, commander of the 55th Infantry Group. His force secretly infiltrated through the jungle under the cover of darkness, on the left bank of the Kalapanzin river near Buthidaung, through gaps between the 7th Division's widely separated brigades. The element of terrain and weather was paramount. Throughout the dry season a morning mist with heavy dew formed daily in the small hours and, unless cleared by rain and wind, normally persisted till well after sunrise; the noise made by the dew falling from the trees on to the dry undergrowth was loud enough to drown the sound of footsteps so that, in the jungle, movement in the early morning could be unheard as well as unseen. The tides were an important factor in planning, for at high tide many of the chaungs were unfordable. The knife-edge ridges into which the Japanese so often dug their defenses presented an unusual artillery problem. If guns were to bring effective fire to bear, they had to be sited on the line of the axis of a ridge, which was always difficult and sometimes impossible. Fire from any other angle meant that reverse slope defenses were untouched and accurate ranging was extremely difficult. The dense jungle covering the hilltops greatly restricted their use as observation points. Using the early morning mists, Hanaya's men shrouded their columns advance cutting deeply into the British defenses. At about 9 am the Gwalior Lancers reported to 7th Division by wireless that a column of Japanese about a hundred strong followed by another about eight hundred strong were approaching Taung Bazar. Major-General Frank Messervy immediately ordered his reserve brigade, the 89th to advance north to locate and destroy them and asked 15th Corps to speed up the arrival of the tanks. Christison ordered the 25th Dragoons to send a squadron to Sinzweya and 5th Division to send an infantry detachment to prevent infiltration over Goppe Pass. The 89th Brigade advanced north in two columns: the right column encountered the Japanese at about 4 pm near Ingyaung resulting in hand to hand fighting, and the left reached the bend of the Prein Chaung east of Preingyaung. The right column dug in at Ingyaung and Lin babi and the left over the Prein Chaung. Although the main force of the 1st Echelon was delayed by some confusion, the advance guard surprised the Taung Bazar garrison at 7am. Without delay, the Battalion crossed the Kalapanzin River south of Taung Bazar, using captured boats, and was followed closely by the 2nd Echelon and the 3rd Battalion of the 112th Infantry Regiment. The main body of the 1st Echelon crossed the river northwest of Taung Bazar on the morning of the 5th. By 9am Taung Bazar was overwhelmed as the Japanese forces crossed the Kalapanzin River to cut the Ngakyedauk Pass in order to isolate the 7th Division. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 213th Regiment headed towards Ngangyaung. The battalion advanced parallel to the Sakurai Column before moving towards Goppe Bazaar. It was held up short of its objective, however, by the leading elements of 26th Indian Division committed from army reserve on 5th February to bolster 15th Corps. Despite this local setback, the Japanese hauled their mountain guns and equipment over the Mayu Range, midway between Goppe and Ngakyedauk, before attacking administrative troops, bridges, dumps, ambushing convoys and building a roadblock on the main line of communications along the Bawli-Maungdaw road. It failed to prevent supplies reaching 5th Indian Division, however, whose ammunition, equipment and food was transported by sea to Maungdaw. Overnight the rear areas of 15th Corps were transformed into the front line with administrative troops bearing much of the burden of dealing with advancing Japanese troops. To the surprise of many officers, they displayed a determination and fighting spirit unknown a year before and took a heavy toll of the Japanese attackers bearing out Slim's direction that every man in the army should be a soldier first and a tradesman or specialist second. The bulk of the 112th regiment led by Colonel Tanahashi Shinsaku marched towards the pass as the 2nd battalion 143rd regiment and Sakurai's HQ advanced south. The quickly found enemy resistance near Ingyaung which delayed their advance for over 2 days. Failing to make contact with General Sakurai, the Battalion continued its advance southward, bypassing Awlanbyin. Major Gen. Sakurai and his headquarters also got involved in fighting off enemy counterattacks near Ingyaung on the 5th and 6th and due to failure of his communications, was unable to keep in touch with his units. To further support the offensive, Japanese fighters and bombers from the 5th Air Division's 7th Air Brigade launched a heavy offensive to gian air superiority over the battlefield, using 34 fighters and 10 bombers. Between the 4th and 14th their fighters flew 350 sorties, and bombers attacked the Bawli and Briasco bridges and Sinzweya. Spitfires intercepted them but had less success than before. Japanese losses were believed to be some 14 aircraft destroyed and a number damaged, while RAF losses during the same period were around 11 fighters. On february 5th, having made such quick progress, Hanaya ordered the 143rd regiment to advance north. The 3rd battalion, 143rd managed to infiltrate through the Indian brigades en route and joined Sakurai's men to hit the pass. Seeing the danger, General Slim decided to reinforce Christison with the 26th Indian division led by Under General Lomax. Christison in turn ordered Lomax to move it forward to Bawli Bazar as quickly as possible. Upon their arrival at Bawli North, the 71st Brigade was then ordered to relieve the detachment from 5th Division on Goppe Pass and then attack the Japanese operating in rear of 7th Division. Likewise the 36th Indian division of Major-General F. W. Festing sped up their advance towards Chittagong while C-46 Commandos and C-47 Dakotas air dropped ammunition, food and other supplies to the front units. On the morning of the 6th, the 112th Regiment reached the sector north of Sinzweya and overran the headquarters of the British-Indian 7th Division while the 1st Battalion cut the Ngakyedauk Pass. In a perfect position to envelop the enemy in Sinzweya, Colonel Tanahashi disregarded the vital necessity for speed and delayed for 24 hours, giving the British time to establish a perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. East of the range at about 5:00am, an enemy force, estimated at battalion strength, penetrated the widely separated posts held by the company of 24th Engineer Battalion defending 7th Division Headquarters, established machine-gun posts on tracks throughout the headquarters area and broke into the signal center. In hand-to-hand fighting the attackers were driven out, but not before all communications had been cut and ciphers compromised. Tanks from Sinzweya moved to the sound of the fighting as soon as it was light but the ground prevented them from reaching the headquarters area; rain which set in about 8:30 further hampered them and they had to withdraw. At about 10:00am, the signal center was finally overrun. Messervy, unable to exercise command any longer, sent orders to all branches of his headquarters to destroy papers and equipment of value and make their way in small parties to Sinzweya. Most of them succeeded in doing so during the following 24 hours. Major-General Frank Messervy and his staff would manage to successfully escape towards Sinzweya. Consequently, instead of ordering a general withdrawal like the Japanese expected, Christison directed the 9th Brigade to organize a defense of Sinzweya, which was the weakest link of the four isolated, self-contained all-round defensive boxes held by each brigade of the 7th Division. By the 7th, the defense of Sinzweya, also known as the Admin Box had been consolidated. The perimeter consisted of a series of small defended posts held, in the main, by administrative units, except at the south east and southwest corners where the roads entered the area. These were held by 4/8th Gurkhas and a company of 2nd West Yorkshire. There were insufficient troops to hold the whole of the Point 315 feature, and thus there was a deep reentrant between the southeast and northeast corners of the perimeter extending back to the southern end of Ammunition Hill. Most of the artillery was disposed on the southern face with attachments holding perimeter posts. The 25th Dragoons were in mobile reserve in two harbors held by a company of 3/4th Bombay Grenadiers, one each side of Ammunition Hill. The 2nd West Yorkshire constituted the infantry reserve and was located with divisional and garrison headquarters on the western side of Ammunition Hill. The main dressing station in the southwest corner was being moved to a more secure area. During the night, the Japanese launched an assault against Sinzweya, yet the tenacious defenders managed to hold on against the fierce enemy pressure. That night, the 33rd Brigade also managed to repulse an attack against Sinohbyin, though the arrival of these reinforcements would allow Sakurai to extricate himself from Ingyaung and head to Sinzweya to take command over the assault. On February 8, all British troops east of the Mayu range were receiving supplies by air, yet the strong presence of enemy fighters disrupted the first few attempts. Eventually, British air superiority would be restored. The No. 31 Squadron and 62 Squadron were reinforced on the 10th by 194 Squadron and on the 25th by 117 Squadron, recently arrived from the Middle East. Not only were 7th and 81st Divisions kept supplied with food and ammunition, but such amenities as cigarettes, rum, mail, razor blades and newspapers were delivered by air to the troops in increasing quantities as time went on, certainly a morale booster. Throughout the battle the Strategic Air Force and 224 Group gave constant close support to 15th Corps. In addition to providing escorts for transport squadrons, Hurricanes harried road, river and coastal transport on the Japanese lines of communication to Arakan that movement by day into the area virtually ceased. Tactical bombing of enemy positions was undertaken by two Vengeance squadrons which flew no less than 269 sorties in just over a week. The transports flew a total of 714 sorties in 5 weeks, successfully delivering nearly 2300 tons of supplies. From the night of February 8 onwards, the Admin and other boxes would also hold firm against repeated ferocious Japanese infantry night assaults, occasional air attacks and limited artillery bombardment from a handful of mountain and battalion guns by day and a medium gun firing from the nearby tunnels, thus showcasing the new spirit of the British-Indian troops. As quoted by Lieutenant-General Pownall: “We've learned how to fight where we stand and NOT to be frightened of the bogey of infiltration.” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Kwajalein has finally fallen, leaving the rest of the Marshalls at the mercy of the colossal allied air, land and sea forces. Within Burma, the Chinese, British, Indian and Americans were ferociously meeting the Japanese, showcasing their dominance in the theater was no longer as sure thing, now the Japanese faced a much stronger enemy.

american texas battle fall americans british chinese writing fire walking japanese kings berlin east indian maryland middle east sun enemy forward navy hurricanes finish roi bar korean failing combat location advance attacks vengeance corn marines thirty gentlemen losses northern jap burton slim corps organize sherman tactical hq overnight carlson task force pearl harbor troops divisions tanks admin honolulu buster brigades allied clement burma clifton generals aerial nap stronghold grenades unbeknownst battalion mortar squadron infantry naga airstrikes regiment commandos west yorkshire marauders cbi lomax artillery dakotas margherita no surrender hellcat marshalls liao echelon wingate sakurai surfacing opium wars logie golden gate park ledo nimitz pacific war infantry regiment british indian admiralty stilwell mayu spitfires nisei burnet merril battalions gurkhas compaction m10 kachin imphal chittagong dragoons churchillian tank battalion usaaf japs c company engineer battalion arakan craig watson kwajalein e company admiral nimitz tanai kwajalein atoll

- 113 - Pacific War - The Battle for Shaggy Ridge , January 16-23, 1944

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2024 40:17

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive. When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last." The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge. The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet. Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley. On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th. Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended. Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell. Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent. The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders, because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea. Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy. Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive. The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time. To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'. D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn. Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east. Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.” The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area. Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B. On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi. Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards.

united states american china washington americans british chinese australian fighting german japanese kings army chief indian facing sun singapore strategic option mainstream batteries marines indians brink jap firing slim sherman fraser tactical hq saddle us government pioneers tanks peanut gunn brigades boomerang british empire sel shaggy tunnels burma tortoise generals faria battalion platoon canning mitchells reconnaissance tanaka taro liberator kursk pimples assam farther regiment stalingrad new guinea artillery gali chilton liao sio opium wars chongqing pacific war new britain nakano stilwell finisterre mayu galahad lee grant lae ramu prothero vasey nakai imphal papuan subhas chandra bose war the battle chinese army c company katayama irrawaddy katagiri arakan craig watson indian national army tanai

- 110 - Pacific War - Landing at Cape Gloucester , December 26, 1943 - January 2,1944

SILENCED with Tommy Robinson

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 26, 2023 38:54

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the Arawe landing and the drive towards Sio. The Komori detachment did everything they could to bottle up the new American beachhead at Arawe. Meanwhile after the fall of Wareo, the Australians decided it was time to drive towards Sio. General Katagiri had just got his men to Sio, but would have little time to prepare defenses as the Australians were quick on their heels. Likewise the Australians were also expanding past Dumpu, seeing multiple patrols fan out, probing for where the Japanese were massing their forces. In Tokyo, Hideki Tojo invited Japan's allies for the east asian conference, reiterating Pan-Asia unity against the west. Yet for all the talk, in reality Japan sought to dominate its Asian allies, really as a means to an end. In Cairo the allies held a conference of their own, trying to keep Chiang Kai-Shek in the fold. This episode is Landings at Cape Gloucester Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General Douglas MacArthur faced daunting challenges during the Pacific War. One of these challenges was in the shape of Rabaul, one of Japan's strong points from which she exerted force in the region. To neutralize Rabaul, MacArthur sought to seize some airfields in Western New Britain, but to do this would also require securing control over the Vitiaz strait between New Britain and New Guinea. General HQ sought to use airfields at Cape Gloucester and on the south coast to help neutralize Rabaul. Thus Operation Dexterity was born. It was to be twin landings against originally Gasmata, but then for necessity changed to Arawe and Cape Gloucester. This was but a cog in the major plan within MacArthur's mind to return to the Philippines, one could argue within a greater plan for the white house. The landings at Arawe were largely successful and with that in hand General Krueger felt his Alamo Force could now launch operation backhander. The battle-hardened 1st Marine division was earmarked for the landings against Cape Gloucester. It was to be their first action after a prolonged period of rest and recuperation in South Australia following their heroic campaign on Guadalcanal. The 1st marines were now under the command of Major-General Rupertus. You probably could not ask for better men for the job, they were well refreshed physically, mentally and militarily. They had acquired an enormous amount of experience on Guadalcanal and with it a high degree of morale. The marines began training with the new types of landing crafts available to them, things they did not have during the Gaudalcanal days. Meanwhile Krueger carried out a programme of reconnaissance based on aerial photography, mosaics, older maps and some amphibious patrolling. There were 3 Australian officers who played key roles aiding in the effort. The first was Major John V. Mather, AIF, a former labor contractor in the Solomons who had been attached to the 1st Division for the Guadalcanal operation. He remained an integral component of the D-2 Section, where his proficiency with Pidgin English and grasp of native psychology proved most useful. The second was Sub-Lieutenant Andrew Kirkwall-Smith, RANVR, one of the versatile islanders who could turn his hand to nearly anything, and who had been a coastwatcher in the Cape Gloucester region at the time the Japanese first moved in. The third man and the one most more familiar with the ground and inhabitants was the Reverend William G. Wiedeman, who had operated the Anglican Mission at Sag Sag for several years prior to the war and, like Kirkwall-Smith, he was a commissioned Navy lieutenant to give military status to his present activities. A number of amphibious patrols was performed by the Alamo scouts. The first patrol was led by 1st Lieutenant John D. Bradbeer, who set out for New Britain's western coast by PT boat on September 24th. Around midnight, he cut the motors off on his PT boat around a mile off Grass Point, and his scouts paddled in from there in an inflated rubber boat, landing on a beach at the mouth of the second stream to the south at 0100 on the 25th. After hiding their craft with great care, they proceeded inland through dense secondary jungle growth up the western slopes of Mt. Tangi. There they found enemy defenses in the vicinity of Aisega. After this they turned northward heading through heavy foliage to the upper Gima River and there interrogated the inhabitants. The natives had been excluded from the airdrome area and the coast since the previous July, but they had some information to impart. There was a motor road connected Ongaia and the airdrome, and 12 to 14 Anti aircraft guns were emplaced between these two points; radio stations were located at Aisega, the airdrome, Sakar Island and Rooke Island; barge traffic was heavy on the Itni River and along the coast. Relations between the native population and the Japanese had deteriorated to a low level, although a few quislings still operated in the area. The natives related that the enemy expected an invasion of the Cape Gloucester region. Finally, they retraced their steps; and in the early morning hours of 6 October the Alamo Scouts climbed on board the waiting torpedo boat and returned to Goodenough Island to make their report. The next significant patrol was carried out on the night of 14 October by Captain W. A. Money, AIF, two other Australians, a Marine sergeant and six natives went ashore about one mile south of Higgins Point on Rooke and remained there until the early hours of 26 October. Captain Money reported there were few Japanese on the island, which doubtlessly influenced the later decision to defer a landing there. Shortly before midnight on November 20th two PT boats throttled down to a halt just south of Dorf Point on New Britain's west coast. Eleven men aboard had the general mission of reconnoitering the beach for an offensive landing, but more specifically they were to study beach approaches, beach conditions and inland terrain between Potni and Sumeru. They were commanded by Major Mather. With plans carefully laid the men stealthily made their way ashore, but luck under such conditions could not always hold up, and the Japanese became aware of the patrol's presence almost as soon as it reached the beach. Thirty minutes after leaving the PT boats, they were back on board, but in that time they had obtained enough information to declare the beach unfavorable for a landing operation. The significant patrol occurred on the night of 21 December, and was done to study two beaches at Tauali. Once again Major Mather acted as overall commander. Splitting the patrol into two seven-man groups, Bradbeer took the first on a reconnaissance of "South Beach" while First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier of the 1st Marines took the other for a look at "North Beach." The patrol recommended the latter as the more favorable of the two for a landing. It was duly labeled Green Beach, and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, made its D-Day amphibious operation there. Such amphibious patrolling helped Krueger figure out where not to land. Meanwhile the 7th fleet had just come under the command of Admiral Kinkaid and was assigned the naval responsibility for the Gloucester landing. Admiral Barbey would have at his disposal 12 destroyers, taking the USS Conyngham as his flagship, 3 minesweepers, 10 APDs, 16 LCIs and 24 LSTs for the main landings; with another two destroyers 14 LCMs, 12 LCTs and two rocket DUKWs for the secondary landing on Beach Green at Tauali. Covering them would by Admiral Crutchley's task force 74 consisting of 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers and two rocket LCI's. The 1st echelon carried by the APDs Stringham, Crosby, Kilty, Dent and Ward was the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines; and APDs Brooks, Gilmer, Sands, Humphreys and Noa would carry the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. The 2nd Echelon of six LCIs would carry the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; and four LCIs for the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The 3rd Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 500 troops of 1st Marines and 150 tons of supply, escorted by destroyers Drayton, Lamson, Mugford and Bagley. The 4th Echelon was seven LSTs, each carrying 480 troops of 1st and 7th Marines and 150 tons of supply The 5th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 240 troops of 12th Defense Battalion and 250 tons of supply. And the 6th Echelon was five LSTs, each carrying 250 Marine engineers and 250 tons of supply. For air support, General Kenney assigned Brigadier-General Frederic Smith's 1st Air Task Force (FATF). The FATF contained about ⅓ of all the squadrons in the allied air force. It had flown fighter and bomber missions for all ground operations excluding those in the Ramu valley. To support the coming offensive, between November 19th to December 13th, 1241 tons of bombs were dropped over Brogen Bay. For the next 11 days, daylight bombings were intensified with over 1207 bomber sorties being performed, dropping more than 2684 tons of bombs.Their favored point of attack was Target Hill because it was so easily discerned. Gun positions at the airstrip were also given attention, with eighty 2,000-lb. bombs being dropped on 17 December. A few direct hits were claimed on gun positions. Bunkers and supply dumps, protected from view by the lush jungle growth, were fairly safe from air attacks, but the lines of supply suffered heavily. Daylight runs were not all that was performed, simultaneously the allies introduced harassing night tactics as well, to keep the enemy under additional mental strain. You see the Japanese anti-aircraft teams and pilots tried to sleep at night, but the B-24's would continuously drop bombs, grenades and even beer bottles over bivouac areas simply to keep them dazed. On December 21st, a final rehearsal was carried out at Cape Sudest and 3 days later, Colonel Julian Frisbie's 7th marines boarded Barbey's vessels at Buna Harbor. On Christmas day at 6am the convoy was moving. At 4pm the convoy rendezvous with Colonel William Whaling's 1st marines at Cape Cretin while the 2nd battalion reinforced with H battery of the 11th marines proceeded to Beach Green in their own smaller convoy. However, as they made their way towards their objective, the main convoy was spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. The convoy would arrive at its destination unmolested. Commander of the southeast area fleet, Admiral Jinichi Kusaka had incorrectly assessed the convoy was bound for Arawe bearing reinforcements and as a result ordered a heavy air strike against the Arawe area instead of Cape Gloucester. At 6am on the 26th Crutchley's cruisers and destroyers began a naval bombardment followed up an hour later with Smith's B-24's, B-25's and A-20's. The 5th air force had tossed B-24's from Dobadura who dropped their payloads all the way from Target Hill to Cape Gloucester. The B-25 medium bombers followed this dropping their heavier loads and the A-20's focused on the landing areas making sure to strafe the beaches until the first wave would be just 500 yards away. For the next hour and a half the landing craft launched towards the beaches. Two LCI's outfitted with multiple rocket launchers led the first wave. A considerable amount of smoke screen was set over the area, hindering some of the landing craft from finding their marks. One group carrying elements of the 3rd battalion, 7th marines missed their beach altogether and hit the shore some 300 yards further west. The 3rd battalion led by Lt Colonel William Williams landed at Yellow at 7:46, with Lt Colonel John Weber's 1st battalion doing the same at Yellow 2. The men charged down the lowered ramps of their LCVP's seeing marines find unmanned trenches, abandoned guns and a handful of scared shipping engineers cowering in dugouts, too stunned by the naval and aerial bombardments to fight or flee. The allies had achieved tactical surprise as Matsuda was not expecting an invasion to come to these beaches. Major-General Iwao Matsuda's had deployed his 53rd regiment around the Tsurubu airdrome and Natamo Point. Storming forward, the 3rd battalion reached a region known as the “damp plat” which according to one Marine “was 'damp' up to your neck”. To the Japanese this was known as “swamp forest” and it held some of the most treacherous terrain, thus the Japanese did not expect the enemy to come by it. The forward momentum was beginning to peter out as men were wading through thick mud, with vines tearing at their bodies. A heavy congestion hit the beaches, greatly hamping the unloading process. As the men advanced, trees literally fell around them, rotten to the core from the bombing. The first marine casualty would actually be a result of a falling tree. Meanwhile the 1st battalion advanced towards Target Hill and Silimati Point. Company B seized their key elevation points by noon. Behind these men came the first echelon of LSTs bearing the 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel Odell Conoley. They beached their LCI's and drove straight inland some 900 yards through mud and water all the way up to the center of the new beachhead perimeter on a patch of dry ground. At 2:30 after the LST's were pulling out a force of 25 Vals and 63 Zeros emerged at low altitude who made a very fast bombing and strafe run against the beaches and shipping. The back and forth firing from the Japanese aircraft and allied forces was intense. A formation of FATF B-25s, coming in at treetop level, suddenly found themselves snarled up with the Japanese flight almost directly over the beach. In the excitement, two were shot down by friendly fire and two seriously damaged before the gunners aboard the LSTs could cool their trigger fingers. Possibly because they wanted to jettison their explosives, or possibly because they mistook their target, the B-25s then proceeded to bomb and strafe the Silimati point position occupied by 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, killing one officer and wounding 14 enlisted Marines. One correspondent had this to say "the most inexcusable small scale blunder of the war." The Japanese attacked Barbey's vessels covering the retreat of the first echelon of LSTs tangling with allied CAP. The destroyer Brownson was sunk, destroyers Lamson, Shaw and Mugford were damaged and two LSTs were driven off. 13 vals and 4 zeros were destroyed, for the allies it was 4 fighters and 3 B-25's. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion was still securing its right flank as Whaling's 1st Marines supported by Sherman tanks were coming up behind on LCI's. Their commander landed at 10:15 with the division command post in operation ashore within the hour as the 1st marines drove towards the airdrome. Lt Colonel Joseph Hankins 3rd battalion ran into one of Colonel Sumiya's roadblocks. It consisted of 4 fortified bunkers with machine guns and a system of rifle trenches manned by 1st, 2nd and 1st Machine-Gun Companies of the 53rd Regiment. The assault was quickly shattered. K company lost its commander and executive officer in a matter of minutes. Everything seemed to go wrong. Bazooka rockets did not explode in the soft earth covering the bunkers; flamethrowers malfunctioned and an LVT carrying ammunition got wedged between two trees. The Japanese defenders were so amped up seeing the chaos, they rushed out of their bunkers trying to swarm the trapped LVT. They managed to kill two men manning its machine guns, but the driver refused to lose his head and skillfully drove the vehicle right over the nearest bunker providing infantry to storm behind him with grenades. The daring LVT maneuver allowed the men to take the bunkers, stealing victory out of the chaos. Behind them was Whaling's 1st battalion led by Lt Colonel Walker Reaves who were bogged down in the damp flat. Whaling quickly changed his plan of advance as a result. He ordered his 3rd battalion to advance in a column along the narrow shelf of firm ground while the 1st battalion covered their left rear, speeding up the progress. Yet as the 3rd battalion moved out to expand their perimeter westwards, Sumiya's men began infiltrating unoccupied gaps, forcing Colonel Julian Frisbie to recall his Marines and wait for reserves to pull up. By nightfall Frisbies Marines had secured the beachhead. The landing was so well scheduled that the big LSTs began dropping their ramps on the beaches 40 minutes after the first assault waves had landed. By 1pm, they had unloaded and cleared the area to make way for the second echelon. However, close encroachment of the "damp flat" greatly curtailed the area available for dump dispersal and necessitated some hurried improvising by the Shore Party. According to an officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion: “The true cause of the traffic congestion can be attributed directly to Army personnel who manned 150 odd 6x6 trucks with preloaded cargo. These drivers had been scraped up from an artillery regiment in New Guinea and supplied with salvaged trucks into which had been loaded practically all the supplies. The trucks theoretically were to discharge their cargo at the dumps, return to the LSTs they had debarked from and return to New Guinea for the second load. The plan failed in one respect, as there were no immediate dump areas to unload the trucks in due to the "Damp Flat." It was decided to leave the cargo in the trucks until dump areas were established. This caused consternation in the ranks of the Army drivers, who consequently abandoned their trucks in an effort to get back on the LSTs… This naturally left 150 trucks stranded on the beach exits for quite a time. Eventually the trucks were unloaded by Marines and proved to be a big aid to transportation starved organizations.” Meanwhile Whalings battalions set up their own perimeter for the night with both flanks on the beach, a technique they repeated each evening until the airdrome was captured. Further to the west Lt Colonel James Masters 2nd battalion, 1st marines with H battery of the 11th marines codenamed STONEFACE group landed at Beach Green at 8:35. By 10am they had established a perimeter; E company held the left, G company the center and F company the right. The H battery unit was unable to emplace its 75mm pack howitzer satisfactorily on the rugged jungle terrain so they reorganized themselves into 3 platoons of infantry and took up a mobile reserve at the front line. Stoneface's task was to cut off the coastal road. When Masters men looked around they found the beach completely unoccupied, numerous positions had been abandoned with their weapons. Masters figured the defenders must have fled to the hills during the bombardment, so he ordered patrols to fan out. The only contact made that day was a small group roughly 1000 yards north of the beachhead near the village of Sumeru seeing a small firefight. Yet unbeknownst to Masters, Sumiya had sent a provisional unit consisting of elements of the 3rd and 4th companies, 53rd regiment with the 3rd battalion ,23rd field artillery regiment to drive out the marines via a secondary road east of Mount Talawe. The force was led by 1st Lt Takeda, and was thus called the Takeda Provisional battalion For Barbey the first day saw 13,000 troops and 7600 tons of materials landed on either side of the cape. However many men had landed in swamps so dense and deep that maneuvering out of such areas was quite difficult. General Matsuda was well aware of this and seized the opportunity. Matsuda ordered Colonel Katayama to leave token garrisons at Aisega, Nigol and Cape Bushing while he brought the bulk of his 141st regiment to Magairapua, this would take until December 30th to occur. Yet Matsuda had made one mistake, he thought he was facing just 2500 men. How the 65th brigade staff came to this conclusion is unknown. Perhaps it was became the smoke screen during the landings had made visual observation limited; perhaps the loss of Target Hill so fast also limited further observation of the enemy. The Marines had achieve tactical surprise by landing on undefended beaches, but other than that, they did not do all that much on the first day, perhaps the lack of activity also factored in Matsuda's head. The only real fight of the day had been a brief affair at the roadblock where the invaders, instead of throwing infantry frontally against powerful bunkers in the glorious banzai manner, had awaited supporting weapons to knock out the position. Perhaps to Matsuda this spelled weakness or timidity, or both. Regardless, like most Japanese commanders Matsuda was obsessed by the then-current Japanese doctrine of "annihilate-at-the-water's-edge," so he ordered his own major assault unit hurled in an all-out attack against the center of the invaders' perimeter. Thus instead of reinforcing Sumiyas forces at the airdrome, or withdrawing forces to more defensible areas like Borgen Bay, or even waiting for Katayam's troops to arrive, Matsuda decided to make a daring attack directly at the center of the marine perimeter with only his 2nd battalion, 52rd regiment. At 3am on December 27, the Japanese attacked the sector held by the 2nd battalion, 7th marines, during one of the worst monsoon storms the Americans had ever seen. Because of the storm, many of the Japanese failed to find gaps existing on each side of the battalions flanks. Thus instead the Japanese hurled themselves frontally against very well dug in positions. By 7am, the surviving Japanese finally began to pull out, Matsuda's men suffered 200 deaths with over 100 wounded. The Marines suffered 8 deaths and 45 wounded, added together for the day the total loss for the Americans was 28 deaths and 68 wounded. After Matsuda's terrible defeat, Whaling's battalions resumed their drive towards the airdrome. While they advanced in columns along the road, patrols were sent into the jungle to hunt down the enemy, but they encountered no resistance. The 1st marines were able to dig in for the night after advancing 5000 yards. To the east, Frisbie's 2nd battalion had expanded their perimeter towards the bank of Suicide Creek where they would continue to face short and sharp attacks by Matsuda's 2nd battalion. Despite the heavy punishment he was served, Matsuda continued to believe in the destroyer-at-the-water's edge tactics. His men began constructing defensive positions, bunkers, trenches, rifle pits and so forth, so close to the American lines the Americans could hear them doing it. Meanwhile the engineers of the 17th marines performed their own work, widening the Japanese coastal road to allow the movement of supplies. Despite their valiant work, the volume of traffic was immense, coupled with the storm made the narrow coastal road a logistical nightmare. The next morning the Marines expected to encounter some heavy resistance. The marine artillery crews increased their rate of fire and General Kenney's aircraft bombed Colonel Sumiya's strongpoints. With tank support, Whaling resumed his advance at 11am, with Company I finally hitting the first enemy positions about 12:15. They ran into a Japanese strong point consisting of a system of mutually supporting bunkers and rifle trenches, well armed with anti-tank guns and 75mm guns. The way forward was littered with land mines and barbed wire. The defenders enjoyed an added advantage in the heavy jungle lying a short distance inland which limited the tanks' field of maneuver to the comparatively narrow area directly to their front, facing the flank of the Japanese position which thus became, in effect, a defense in depth for the entire extent of its east-west length: approximately 300 yards. At 12:00, I Company was fired upon with small arms from the front, followed by 75mm shells along the road area. 15 minutes later the leading elements led by Captain Carl Conron began attacking the fortifications alongside the tanks. They were facing the 2nd Company, 53rd Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Company, 53rd Regiment and the strong point was quickly nicknamed Hell's Point. Later it would be renamed Terzi Point in honor of Company K's commanding officer who died on the landing day. Within the heavy rain, the tanks surged forward and smashed Sumiya's bunkers, while A company dashed to the left, emerging from kunai grass just 500 yards from the bunkers. Enjoying excellent cover, the defenders' fire successfully stopped the American advance, although the Marines themselves also easily broke up two Japanese frontal assaults and one attempt to turn their flank. Ammunition began to run low, forcing A company to withdraw at around 3:45. Yet K Company closer to the beach held enormous firepower in the form of Sherman tanks that obliterated 12 bunkers rather quickly. In the words of Company K's commander: “I was given three tanks (the other two were out of action, one with engine trouble and one with a jammed breech of its 75) to accomplish this mission. I put one squad of the Second Platoon behind each tank and deployed the Third Platoon to set up a skirmish line behind the tanks. We encountered twelve huge bunkers with a minimum of twenty Japs in each. The tanks would fire point blank into the bunkers, if the Japs stayed in the bunkers they were annihilated, if they escaped out the back entrance (actually the front as they were built to defend the beach) the infantry would swarm over the bunker and kill them with rifle fire and grenades. By the time we had knocked out twelve bunkers the Second Platoon . . . were out of ammunition and had been replaced by the Third Platoon and they too were out or down to a clip of ammunition per man. I called a halt and sent for the First Platoon. By the time the First Platoon arrived and ammunition was resupplied forty-five minutes had elapsed. We continued the attack and found two more bunkers but the enemy had in the meantime escaped.” The immense power of the tanks forced the defenders to retreat. During this action the 1st marines suffered 17 deaths and 52 wounded and claimed to have counted 300 Japanese corpses. The capture of Hell's Point enabled the Americans to establish a position at Blue Beach to reduce the distance for supplies. General Rupertus command post was also moved there by Deemer 28th. The next day the American advance was delayed until the arrival of Colonel John Seldens 5th marines. General Rupertus feared he might be outnumbered at the airdrome so he played it safe. During the fighting at Hell's Point, a curious misadventure befell Corporal Shigeto Kashida of the 1st Machine Gun Company. The trench in which he was defending suddenly caved in, burying him helpless up to the neck. An astonished Marine, observing Shigeto's apparently disembodied head blinking at him, paused to debate whether to shoot or shovel, which dilemma was resolved by the arrival of an intelligence officer who ordered the corporal disinterred and made prisoner. Shigeto painted a depressing picture of his battalion's situation, but he mentioned the original plan for the 2nd Battalion was to reinforce the 1st, something that might still be accomplished; he also mentioned the presence somewhere in the vicinity of the 141st and 142d Regiments, possibly within striking distance. Since Colonel Sumiya had conducted withdrawals following every action to date, it could be presumed that a good part of his force remained intact. Thus Rupertus was right in his belief the Japanese may have large numbers at the airdrome. The 1st Battalion under Major William H. Barba and the 2nd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis W. Walt got aboard 9 APD's at Cape Sudest and arrived off Cape Gloucester during the morning. However during the transit, there was a large storm that caused some confusion, leading some elements to land at Yellow 2 and others at Beach Blue. General Rupertus planned for the 1st Marines to continue their advance along the coastal road while the 5th Marines would perform a wide sweep on the left flank to attack airstrip No.2. At 3pm following the artillery and aerial bombardment, the Marines launched a fierce offensive. The 2nd battalion, 5th marines attacked simultaneously with the 1st Marines along the coast road and both ground immediately inland. Major William H. Barba's 1st Battalion was just struggling out of the swamp and jungle near the line of departure. The unexpected terrain difficulties, however, kept the plan from being carried out. Both battalions sent out patrols in an effort to establish contact, but a combination of darkness and unfamiliar territory prevented positive results. Supported by tanks, artillery, mortars and rocket launchers, Whaling's 1st Battalion successfully reached the eastern end of Strip No. 2 at 5:55 and immediately commenced setting up a defensive perimeter. The 3rd battalion followed behind and extended the perimeter to the left, with Selden's 2nd battalion arriving at 7:25pm extending the perimeter around airstrip No 1 towards the beach. It seemed Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. The Japanese had begun firing artillery and mortars into the airdrome. The Marines, somewhat astonished by such goings-on, called for mortar and artillery support of their own. They reported that, according to their best estimates, the enemy had reoccupied the defenses in at least full company strength. The marines were formulating a plan to deal with the menace and the Japanese took advantage of the lull time to launch a banzai charge that failed to gain any ground. The Japanese continued their harassment, until the Marines received some tank support to launch an offensive. Platoons from different units got together to perform a sweeping maneuver, advancing 300 yards from the defensive line. They ran into bunkers, foxholes and trenches manned by Japanese. The marines mopped them up with grenades and automatic weapons, then at 11:30 suddenly all the fighting ceased. No more enemy seemed to remain near the front. The marines had suffered 13 deaths and 19 wounded, but counted 150 dead Japanese. With more tanks on hand, the Marines gradually pushed the Japanese to flee back towards Razorback Hill. Meanwhile, because of the repeated attacks, Colonel Masters men had been patrolling, trying to pinpoint where the Japanese were concentrated. At 1:55am on December 30th, the 3rd and 4th companies of the 54th regiment had discovered an excellent approach towards the Marine perimeter. As was always the favored Japanese strategy, to concentrate force against a narrow sector, they chose to attack at this place called Coffin Corner, a natural causeway connected to ridges. The two companies attacked under the cover of a storm. The Japanese unleashed mortars and machine gun fire and quickly overran a machine gun position, but G company launched a counter attack pushing them back. The battle raged for nearly 5 hours, but by 7am it ceased. The marines had 6 deaths, 17 wounded and would count 89 Japanese dead with another 5 captured. Yet that concludes the action in Cape Gloucester for today, for now we need to jump back to New Guinea. Back on December 8th, General Nakai commenced an offensive against Kesawai, dispatching the Saito Volunteer unit for the task. The unit had the aid of native guides who gave them detailed information on the terrain, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate behind a forward Papuan platoon led by Lt C.E Bishop. They explode all of their booby-traps, allowing the 1st battalion, 78th regiment to advance behind them into Kesawai 2 without much difficult, annihilating the Papuan platoon and securing the eastern portion of the highland. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion crossed the Boku River and captured Koropa, cutting off the commandos at Isaria; the 2nd battalion, 239th regiment crossed the Boku river and assaulted the commando position at Ketoba, but the Australians resisted until nightfall before withdrawing towards Isariba. Nakai's enveloping maneuver was a success, forcing the commandos and Papuans to withdraw towards the Evapia River. On December 9th, Brigadier Eather ordered A and C companies of the 2/25th battalion to advance forward as the commands pulled back towards the Mene River. Meanwhile at 7:15am at Isariba, the Japanese had begun a series of attacks. The attacks were repelled with vicker guns, grenades and a quick air strike from 20 Kittyhawks and Boomerangs that bombed and strafed the attackers. The 2/25th companies arrived at Evapia and one of their patrols managed to ambush several Japanese parties over the next few days. On December 12th, Nakai arrived at Kesawai where he ordered his 1st and 3rd battalions, 78th regiment to attack the 2/25th positions by nightfall. C Company's machine gun fire managed to halt the enemy assault from the north, but another came from the south. A Company found itself surrounded as the Japanese managed to get between the two Australian companies, firing their Woodpeckers from multiple directions. It was a 5 hour battle until the Australians repelled the enemy who gradually pulled back west. At 5am on the 13th, the Australians were running low on ammunition and were forced to withdraw. The 2/25th advanced through think jungle and deep swamps, by 8am they had managed to get to safety after suffering 5 deaths and 14 wounded but killing an estimated 67 Japanese. The companies withdrew east of the Evapia River, rejoining the rest of their battalion. Nakai expected his enemy was attempting an offensive against Madang and ordered his men to return to their former defensive positions, leaving token garrisons at Koropa and Kesawai. Because of the heated attacked, General Vasey worried it was preliminary to something much bigger, so he ordered the 2/16th battalion to perform punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge and Eather's 2/33rd battalion would retake Kesawai. The 2/33rd Battalion advanced under the cover of darkness to the 5800 Feature to attack any Japanese there, and to move the Papuans across the Evapia to establish a patrol base for the Koben-Koropa-Solu River area . With three of his companies Colonel Cotton of the 2/33rd moved off an hour and a half after midnight on the 18th-19th December towards the summit of the 5800 Feature arriving just before dawn . At 2.10 p.m. a section made contact with the enemy about 700 yards south of the highest pinnacle on 5800. The patrol withdrew while the artillery fired 120 rounds. By 5 p.m. the enemy had had enough and withdrew enabling one company to occupy the pinnacle . Next day the battalion patrolled the whole area and found evidence of Japanese occupation and a hasty withdrawal. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies finally unleashed operation backhander, the amphibious assault of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines had a long rest after Guadalcanal and would now be the spearhead to reconquer New Britain. However the Japanese were not going to just roll over easily.

christmas american money japan hell americans masters australian japanese kings guns army asian tokyo navy mt philippines marine covering ward eleven cap landing yellow shaw feature relations marines thirty commander sherman d day cape south australia daylight splitting sands dent alamo storming south beach generals macarthur battalion krueger gloucester ammunition woodpeckers humphreys bagley regiment zeros bunkers new guinea landings bazooka boku vals echelon apd whaling lci solomons drayton stoneface sio douglas macarthur aif guadalcanal opium wars fatf lcms pacific war gilmer new britain boomerangs north beach rooke selden lvt lst matsuda brownson lamson company b ramu regiments chiang kai shek frisbie nakai shigeto papuan sumeru platoons japs pidgin english c company rabaul lcis papuans coffin corner komori kilty craig watson lsts hideki tojo company k anglican mission

Episode 18 - SILENCED with Tommy Robinson - Johnny 'Mad Dog' Adair

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 8, 2023 95:06

Support our work here - https://urbanscoop.news/supportus/Johnny Adair better known as Mad Dog Adair, was an Ulster loyalist and the former leader of the "C Company"of the Ulster Freedom Fighters.Johnny was born into an Ulster Protestant loyalist family and raised in Belfast.He grew up on the Old Lodge Road, a now mostly demolished road linking the lower Shankill Road to the lower Oldpark area, a site of many sectarian clashes and riots during the Troubles.Spending his teenage years on the streets fighting, he has served several prison sentences and has had attempts on his life. A past that has shaped the man I welcome onto my podcast today.

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Giorgia Goldini "La cosa dei figli"

il posto delle parole

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2023 9:22

Giorgia Goldini"La cosa dei figli"Teatro della Caduta, TorinoSabato 11 e domenica 12 novembre 2023, ore 18:00 Anteprima del nuovo lavoro dell'attrice torinese Giorgia Goldini una delle attrici storiche del Teatro della Caduta che collabora con il Teatro Regio e la Casa del Teatro Ragazzi di Torino e che in questa occasione svelerà al pubblico il risultato del suo periodo di residenza artistica.Inserito come primo appuntamento all'interno della programmazione di CONCENTRICA // Spettacoli in orbita STAGIONE 11, “La cosa dei figli" (titolo provvisorio) è uno spettacolo sulla maternità e sullo stravolgimento della vita che porta con sé la nascita di un figlio. Un mix di stand up comedy, tenerezza, fatica, germi provenienti dal nido, confusione, gioia, bellezza, paura, canzoncine, fame, futuro, lavoro, sensi di colpa, consigli non richiesti e amore. Il debutto ufficiale di "La cosa dei figli" è poi previsto nella stagione diffusa di Concentrica il 2 marzo 2024 a Casalborgone (TO), in collaborazione con Faber Teater, uno dei partner del network con cui la Caduta condivide progettualità. Concentrica infatti si avvale da sempre della collaborazione con partner che hanno un ruolo attivo nello sviluppo delle comunità locali e dei territori, permettendo agli artisti di portare i propri spettacoli in diverse piazze del Piemonte e della Liguria.Teatro della Caduta e le Residenze Artistiche Il Teatro della Caduta, come da tradizione, continua ad investire sulla crescita e in sostegno di nuovi talenti. Da sempre, il Teatro ha aperto le sue porte a compagnie emergenti e giovani artisti, come ORTIKA, Phonophobia, BALT e Cubo Teatro, offrendo loro l'opportunità di sperimentare, creare e perfezionare i propri lavori.Le residenze artistiche presso il Teatro della Caduta offrono agli artisti non solo uno spazio fisico, ma anche un sostegno tecnico e professionale, un tutoraggio e un riconoscimento economico, grazie al sostegno della città di Torino e del fondo di Torino Arti Performative. Questa iniziativa mira a promuovere la diversità e l'innovazione nel panorama artistico, fornendo un ambiente stimolante e favorevole alla realizzazione di progetti creativi unici.Concentrica si presenta come il motore di crescita e di promozione per la comunità artistica locale e nazionale, contribuendo al vibrante ecosistema culturale italiano. Negli anni alcune delle compagnie presenti sul territorio ligure e piemontese, ancora sconosciute al grande pubblico e che hanno iniziato il loro percorso artistico proprio in Concentrica, hanno avuto, infatti, l'occasione di essere riconosciute a livello nazionale. Alcuni dei nomi più importanti sono Andrea Cosentino, i Controcanto, la Carrozzeria Orfeo, Gli Omini, C&C Company, il Teatro dei Gordi, Federico Sacchi, ORTIKA, Piccola Compagnia Dammacco, Dimitri - Canessa, Niccolò Fettarappa Sandri e molti altri. Da quest'anno entra a far parte della rete anche Anomalia, giovane compagnia presente negli spazi di Via Verrès (Barriera di Milano, Torino), che ospiterà la residenza del Collettivo Lunazione, il quale lavorerà su “Incontro”, uno spettacolo che mette in scena i temi della legalità e dell'impegno civile, la cui restituzione è programmata in un incontro aperto al pubblico il 23 febbraio 2024. Giorgia GoldiniAttrice, autrice comica. 41 anni, è alta 1.52 e il suo colore preferito è il #a9d7de.Buddista, possibilista, quasi ottimista. Ha fatto degli studi e ha vinto persino dei premi. Appassionata di malinconia, precisa, severa, ordinata, ama fare elenchi puntati. Alcuni l'hanno definita nevrotica, ma nel complesso simpatica.Attualmente sta scrivendo un nuovo spettacolo di stand up comedy che parla di maternità.Collabora da diversi anni con il Teatro della Caduta, il Teatro Regio di Torino e la Casa del Teatro.In questo momento è impegnata in “Bugiardini” inserito all'interno di La cultura dietro l'angolo di Compagnia di San Paolo, con un progetto della Fondazione TRG in collaborazione con l'ospedale Koelliker. Un appuntamento di quartiere dove, tra domande serie e ironia, si parla di salute e prevenzione. Si parla di corpo, di alimentazione e movimento. INFOPer prenotare il proprio posto per le restituzioni della residenza artistica di Giorgia Goldini è necessario scrivere a prenota@rassegnaconcentrica.net o chiamare 011 0606079.IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarewww.ilpostodelleparole.itQuesto show fa parte del network Spreaker Prime. Se sei interessato a fare pubblicità in questo podcast, contattaci su https://www.spreaker.com/show/1487855/advertisement

The Battle of Maryang San Part 1

Australian Military History

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 17, 2023 27:23

In 1951 the combatant nations of the Korean War had finally come to the negotiating table, raising hopes that the Korean War would soon be over. But when negotiations broke down, the troops went back to fighting. General Van Fleet wanted the UN troops to advance and push the Chinese troops back. US troops pushed forward at Punchbowl, and shortly thereafter the 1st Commonwealth Division, including the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) launched its attack on the Maryang San complex.The first phase involved the attack on Hill 355 by the Kings Own Scottish Borderers and the Shropshire Light Infantry. 3RAR's role in this opening move was intended to be a supporting role, but when the Borderers and Shropshires were held up by heavy fire, C Company of 3RAR was sent in to help.https://www.australianmilitaryhistorypodcast.com/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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- 99 - Pacific War - On to Shaggy Ridge, October 10-17, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 10, 2023 43:18

Last time we spoke about the end to the battle over Vella Lavella, the continued offensive against Finschhafen and some special operations. The Naval battle of Vella Lavella saw the last fight over the island and another successful evacuation. Over on New Guinea the fight for the Finschhafen area continued to rage on, but ultimately was crashing to a bit of a halt for the allies as they moved cautiously and awaited further reinforcements before taking the the fight to places like sattelberg. Then we spoke about some special operations to explode mines against enemy ships at Singapore harbor, a new network of coastwatchers 2.0 and the Japanese finally cracking down on poor little Portuguese held Macau. Some ships were blown up, some unfortunate souls were captured in Aitape and the Japanese basically made Macau a protectorate. This episode is on to Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Japanese had once entered the Southwest Pacific as conquerors, rapidly grabbed forward bases in places like New Britain, New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands. Yet now in 1943, they were being pushed back, their resources were shrinking and their troops morale was crashing. With the allies becoming stronger with each passing day, General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka had very little hope of emerging victorious in the coming battles. All either man could do was prepare the best possible defenses they could and hope for a miracle to delay the allied advance. General Nakai's forces prepared to make a stand on the Finisterre range and General Katagiri prepared a counterattack against Finschhafen. Over in New Guinea, General Vasey's men were continuing their fight against Nakai in the Finisterre Range. Since their advance on October 9th, Colonel Bishop's 2/27th battalion had dug in on Trevor's ridge and John's Knoll. Just after dawn on October 10th, a small enemy force charged up Trevor's ridge. The small attack was beaten back, the battalions diarist wrote of the action “Tojo startled the early morning air with his usual heathen chorus, known to so many as a prelude to an attack; however, 13 Platoon showed him the error of his ways by killing two and wounding one of the six noisy intruders.” Meanwhile the bulk of the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment had pulled back to a place known as Shaggy Ridge which dominated the area around it. Shaggy Ridge stood 5600 feet tall with only a single track going along its ridge line. Lachlan Grant would describe the track "had places. . . only wide enough for one man to pass with sheer drops on either side". The Japanese had concentrated along the Faria river area seeking to unleash another counter attack. They just received reinforcements in the form of the 1st battalion, 78th regiment. Company 3 were sent to Gurumbu, Company 4 to Boganon, Companies 1 and 2 went to help out the 2nd battalion while one company began to attack Australian supply lines at Pallier's hill. During the afternoon two Japanese artillery pieces began to open fire from the Faria river area at very close range. The first shell passed close to the top of Trevor's Ridge, causing native carriers to freak out and disperse while the shell exploded thousands of yards father on. By 2pm Bombardier Leggo acting as F.O.O noticed the gun flash and launched a counter battery against it using a 25 pounder at a range of around 8000 yards. He successfully silence the mountains guns for awhile. The Japanese guns would fire later that afternoon at nearly point blank range, hitting the battalions area causing 8 casualties, but Leggo once again silence the guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Dougherty ordered his 2/14th to hold a position at Kumbarum to support Bishop's advance while Brigadier Eather ordered his 2/33rd battalion to mop up the Japanese out of the Boganon mountain area. The 2/3rd quickly advanced up a track going 4100 feet high into the Boganon mountains. At 5pm Kittyhawks strafed the Japanese positions at the crest of a ridge and a Boomerang dropped a message on the advancing men that told them the Japanese were in foxholes and trenches immediately over looking them. During the aerial attacks the Japanese tried to fire back using machine gun and rifles, but doing so apparently they did not see a forward company of the 2/33rd closing in on them. The 2/33rd crept up the ridge under the cover of darkness as the Japanese were unaware too busy during daylight hours focusing on the Kittyhawks. During the night the Australians surprise attacked the Japanese sending them into a flight, man men at first ran then got themselves together trying to fight but by that time the momentum was on the side of the Australians who soon seized the ridge. On October 10th, Vasey ordered his forces to patrol extensively. The 2/7th was patrolling the Kesawai area; the 2/2nd concentrating in the Faita area; the 2/16th went west of Bebei and the 2/27th patrolled around Trevor's ridge towards the faria river. The 2/27th skirmished with the enemy who were defending their artillery positions. To the east of the Faria and Uria Rivers the 2/33rd were patrolling past the feature they just captured. Their patrols ran into ambushes and were forced to pull back. On October 11th, Japanese raiding parties attacked a supply line going between the 2/14th and 2/27th battalions forcing the former to send a platoon to seize Palliers Hill. A platoon of the 2/14th led by Lt Pallier. The were only able to advance up the hill in a single fill as most of it was to steep. At around 5 pm men atop the nearby Kings Hill supported them with artillery, mortars and machine guns. The support was so strong, Palliers platoon made it up the first mound without opposition. Upon the mound Pallier deployed a Bren gun and 2 inch mortars. Palliers men were surprised at the lack of enemy fire and rapidly made their way up Pallier's Hill. As they got closer to the summit artillery stopped, leaving just mortars and machine gun fire support. The hill began even steeper and when they got within 20 yards of the Japanese their support fire ceased. The Japanese were about a company in strength and began firing everything they had. During the mayhem at a critical moment many Japanese raised their heads from their weapon pits and rolled grenades down on the Australians 20 feet below. Most of them rolled too far down doing no damage. The Australians began tossing their own grenades as they charged forward driving the enemy out. Lt Palliers platoon had attacked a Japanese company well entrenched in a seemingly impregnable position routing them it was outstanding. Despite the heavy support getting up the hill, the Japanese should have easily held their positions. Pallier lost 3 men dead and 5 wounded including himself while they killed an estimated 30 Japanese and captured vital ground to keep their supply line running. The capture of Palliers hill was of a great relief to Dougherty who watched the thing personally. Had the supply line been cut longer the 2/27th may have run out of ammunition and rations. Back over in the Finschhafen area, Brigadier Windeyer now realized he needed to seize Sattelberg in order to secure his gains. General Yamada continued his attacks against the most forward Australian position at Jivevaneng. At 6:15am on October the first the Japanese cut the telephone lines to the Australians forward positions and began probing their lines with attacks. The Japanese were driven off with 2 and 3 inch mortars while the Australians cautiously made their way up the Sattelberg road. They were about at quarter mile from their objective when the leading platoons leader, Lt Dost was shot dead. Lt Richardson took another platoon forward to investigate and was wounded by gunfire. By this point the defensive lines had repulsed numerous attacks. Both sides were taking heavy casualties, but the Japanese were failing to stop the advance. Still the 2/43rd were forced to dig in around 400 yards from their besieged company. After the technical fall of Finschhafen, Windeyer assigned most of his brigade to defend the southern portion of it while the 2/17th advance north to capture Kumawa. Windeyer was realizing the dual tasks were simply too much for his meager forces but luckily for him, Generals Herring and Wootten held a meeting at Lae on September 30th, where they decided to reinforce him with General Heavy's brigade. General Heavy's men would secure Finschhafen and then perform an offensive against Sio. On October 1st General Blamey decided the time had come to give Herring a rest, he appointed Lt General Leslie Morseheads 2nd corps to take over the New Guinea offensives. On October 7th, Morshead arrived at Dobodura, Herring departed for Port Moresby and then Australia, he would never return to the front lines. It was supposed to be General Iven Mackay that would relieve Herring, but he ran into squabbles with General douglas macarthur over reinforcements for Finschhafen. The junior officers felt Mackay should have forced the issue and enlisted Blamey for help, but ultimately both were set aside for Lt General Sir Leslie Morshead. Prior, Mackay had convinced Blamey, that Herring was becoming increasingly difficult to work with as a result of stress and fatigue which led to Herrings relief. Blamey maintained his faith in Herring who would retain command of the 1st corps on the Atherton Tableland, where he could train his men in amphibious warfare for the next operation, but Herring's period of active service was over. Herring had given able service in a high appointment through a year of fierce campaigning, he quite simply could use the rest. Herring assumed he would come back to relieve Morshead, but in February of 1944 he would be appointed Chief justice of the supreme court of Victoria instead. Back over at the front, the Australian commanders decided it was necessary to capture the Tami islands. The 2/32nd battalion departed Lae on October 2nd arriving off Wonam island. Major Mollard took command of the battalion and received another company called the “Denness Force” consisting of a rader detachment, pioneers, mortars, signals and a section of 6 .50 caliber machine guns, 2 LCMS and 14 LCV's from the 52nd EBSR. When the men landed on Wonam island, they were greeted by 4 friendly natives waving their arms. An interpreter spoke to the natives who told him there were no Japanese on the islands. Then the natives took a few of the men with some paddling canoes around Kalal and Wonam islands showing them no Japanese. The natives were then rounded up, 74 in all and asked to help establish a radar station on Kalal. The natives had very little food because of the terror of bombers and strafers in the area, they had actually been living in some caves and dug out coral instead of their huts. Apparently they were treated very well and helped the work effort. It's not said that often, but native populations made a huge difference in the pacific war. You keep hearing me say “native carriers” and such, war was literally thrust onto these people, most of whom were just going about their peaceful lives. The Japanese often showed brutality, its not as if it was 100%, but statistically the Americans or Australians in the Pacific were much more known to be favored by the natives, particularly in New Guinea. Now the following day, the 2/17th departed Kolem on a extremely difficult route ironically named Easy Street, haha thinking of Negan from walking dead. Easy street went towards Kiasawa and then Kumawa. David Dexter described it as "It was so steep and muddy that, on one occasion, two tractors were attached to one jeep but all were bogged." The Australians were surprised to see no enemy attacks against Jivevaneng at this time. The 2/43rd attempted an attack at 5:45 pm led by Lt Combe's company. The Australians tried desperately to attack well-dug in enemy positions along a route the enemy knew better than them. Soon the company became pinned down and casualties were mounting. Combe was wounded when his Owen was shot out of his hand, he assessed the situation, 17 casualties with 6 deaths, so he ordered the men to pull back. The 2/43rd by this point had a total of 47 casualties, with 14 deaths and 5 missing. The 2/43rd had failed to break again, thus the decision was made to have their forces evacuated. To the north, the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment had burst into the scene, advancing through Wareo and Gurika. Fearing the Japanese threat to Scarlet Beach, the 2/3rd pioneers and 2/2nd machine gun companies were sent to contain the threat. By this time the 2/17th battalion had just reached Easy Street junction. Windeyer wanted them to hit Kumawa as it seemed one of the most likely places the Japanese would have retreated to from Finschhafen. However he also knew the new threat required additional forces so he divided the 2/17th into two groups. Two companies led by Major Pike and Captain Sheldon detached and formed a separate HQ under Major Maclarn to stop the Japanese from attacking Scarlet Beach, while Colonel Simpson led the remainder to Kumawa. On October 4th, suddenly the enemy eased up on both fronts. The surrounded company of the 2/43rd took the opportunity to break out to the east. Patrols began reporting that the Japanese had also withdrawn, so the bulk of the 2/43rd gradually moved to reoccupy Jivevaneng. Meanwhile Maclarn's 2/17th detachment attempted their first attack against the enemy. Maclarn sent two platoons north of the Song River who quickly found themselves in a firefight with the enemy. They were forced to withdraw, then at 11:30am an LCV came over the Song drawing fire from the Japanese, allowing Maclarn to pinpoint exactly where the enemy was. At 2:15 Maclarn sent a platoon to make contact with the Japanese again, followed up at 5pm with Pike's company. The Japanese were hit with an artillery bombardment as Pike's company single file advanced to an assembly position around North Hill. The next day North Hill's area was seized and just as the Australians had managed to encircle the enemy's position, scouts reported they had abandoned it. It seemed to the Australians that the Japanese had withdrawn into the mountains again. In truth General Yamada was preparing a counterattack. As for General Katagiri by late September he had ordered his 2nd battalion, 79th regiment to advance through a native inland path avoiding the coastal roads over some western hills that led to Sattelberg. The battalion arrived at Boringboneng by October 7th, while the rest of the division got to Sattelberg by October 11th. With the reinforcements on hand, Katagiri planned a major counterattack aimed at Arndt point, due for mid October. Meanwhile on October 5th, the 2/17th successfully seized Kumawa after fighting a small engagement against an enemy post in the village. The 2/15th were quickly directed to relieve them at Kumawa, as the 2/17th began to see continuous counterattacks. Simpsons 2/17th were being hit from northeast, west and south. His position was too thin leading to a large danger of encirclement. The Japanese performed numerous infiltrating attacks, trying to break his lines of communications and to add to Simpsons misery, the supply of ammunition and rations being carried by natives along a track were being delayed heavily by torrential rain. The native carriers were likewise in danger of enemy fire, it seemed evident the Japanese were quite alarmed at losing Kumawa. On October the 6th, Yamada's 3rd battalion, 80th regiment successfully severed the communications between the company and her HQ by taking a position on a track between them. For 3 hours the Japanese made several assaults on Kumawa, until 1pm when the track was reopened and a telephone line was quickly relaid. The Japanese continued their harassment, but then the 2/15th arrived turned the tide against them. The men were low on supplies as the heavy rain made it impossible for jeeps to advance up the track to Kamawa. Since the 5th of october the 2/17th had been eating meager amounts, by the 8th they had nothing left. Windeyer felt because of the lack of supplies he had to halt the advance of the 2/17th and 2/15th. The 2/17th Battalion diarist, describing the defense of Kumawa, wrote: "The enemy caused us no trouble… but our stomachs did." Colonel Grace likewise turned down an offer by Windeyer to arrange an air drop because he believed that the Japanese did not yet know of his men's presence in Kumawa. This would lose him the chance of intercepting any belated parties moving towards Sattelberg along the track from Tirimoro. On October 9th, Maclarn decided to capture a vital feature in front of Jiveveneng known as the “knoll”, to improve his tactical position, I guess they just ran out of names or something. Maclarn opened up the attack with artillery, as Sheldon's company performing an encirclement maneuver led by Papuan scouts to sneak platoons 10 yards from the Japanese positions. Suddenly at 11:10am the forward platoons unleashed fire on the Japanese and charged their outposts. As the men charged the Knoll itself, only a single Japanese would be seen as countless had fled, leaving 9 dead. By 1pm Sheldon's company were digging in on the knoll where they had found 60 Japanese foxholes. The Japanese launched a counter attack, began with a bugle call and the usual screams as the charged within 5 yards of the Australians new defensive positions. Grenades were rolled down the knoll and automatic fire kept them at bay until the Japanese finally backed off. At 6:45 the Japanese attempted a second counter attack, this time as a full company, but they were likewise repulsed. The next day saw more Japanese counter attacks against the Knoll, the defending Australians reported hearing them scream “ya”, to which they screamed it back at them. Apparently they also screamed Ho, so the Australians screamed Ho back. The Japanese were also sending many patrols to search for viable approaches for the upcoming counteroffensive while they awaited reinforcements and supplies. The Australians noted the considerable enemy movement, believing a large number of Japanese reinforcements were due to arrive from the north. Back over at Lae, General Wootten's HQ and the 24th brigade had finally begun their departure for Finschhafen. When Wootten landed, he decided to reorganize his forces to gain control of the approaches to Wareo and Sattelberg, hoping to also provide an opening to launch an offensive against Sio. He divided the Finschhafen area into 3 sectors of responsibility. The 24th brigade would defend the Scarlet beach area; the 20th brigade would perform an offensive against Sattelberg and the 22nd battalion would defend the Dreger Harbor area. On October 11th, the 2/17th finally re-secured Jivevaneng and on the 12th, Wootten sent Captain Gore with C Company of the Papuan battalion to perform a large scale deep patrol looking into the Wareo-Sattelberg-Mararuo area. On the 13th, the 2/15th hit back at the Japanese west of Kumawa. At 9am they began a fire fight about 150 yards apart using machine guns mostly. Casualties were high for both sides, but Sergeant Else kept the forward platoons advancing, refusing to allow his forces t obe pinned down. The Japanese had 39 deaths before they began fleeing, the Australians suffered 5 deaths and 30 casualties. For the next two days things seemed to be relatively quiet, but it was to be the calm before the storm, as Katagiri earmarked October 16th for his counteroffensive. Wootten knew something was on its way and was greatly relieved to see the arrival of the 2/28th and 2/32nd battalions on October 15th. However he was also quite bitter about the lack of cooperation between the Australians and Americans which he believed prevented them from quickly reinforcing Finschhafen. By the 15th, Wootten had 2/rd of his division in the area and a signal from Morshead informed him that General HQ had ordered the 26th brigade from Lae to Finschhafen at 30 hours notice. It was heartening news, but it also contrasted strongly with the protracted negotiations allowing for the 2/43rd to go to Scarlet Beach by the end of September. It was also indicative of the gravity of the situation; various commanders had learnt brutal lessons. The Japanese were given a chance to seize the initiative. General Mackay would write to Blamey on October the 20th “Through not being able to reinforce quickly the enemy has been given time to recover and we have not been able to exploit our original success. Through the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements the momentum of the attack has not been maintained. As was proved in the Lae operations the provision of adequate forces at the right place and time is both the quickest and most economical course.” Windeyer received orders to coordinate the defense of the Langemak bay and "hold important ground at all costs". He was to perform a defense in depth, maintain a mobile reserve, organize coastwatching stations and beach defenses. Wootten went to work ordered forces to put up positions on track junctions in the Bonga area, North Hill, all of the high ground going two miles west of Scarlet Beach through Jivevaneng, Kumawa, Tirimoro, Butaweng, Logaweng and for the 532nd EBSR base at Dreger Harbour. The allies were preparing for a major storm. Over at the Finisterres, on October 11th, General Morshead had just flown in for the first time to Dumpu where he told Vasey that because of “administrative limitation” there could be no further advance into the mountains for the time being. The day morning, Colonel Bishop's 2/27th over at Trevors ridge were hit by Japanese mountain guns. At 10:45 the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment launched an assault against their position. The attack was supported by 5 Woodpeckers, those are being the Japanese type 92 heavy machine gun, alongside two mountain guns, mortars and light machine guns. Trevor's ridge and Johns knoll got the full bombardment treatment, then the Japanese charged tossing grenades with fixed bayonets overrunning the Australian positions on the lower early slope. However this lower slope could be hit hard from the crest above, so the Japanese soon found themselves in a mayhem of fire and were dislodged quickly. After the vicious attack, Bishop sent reinforcements to John's Knoll allowing the lost positions to be regained. 4 more attacks would be launched during the early afternoon at a great cost to the Japanese. Bishops men repulsed them all, but he began to worry about his ammunition situation. In the forward areas, he had only two Vickers guns and a 3 inch mortar. The Vickers were being used to counter the Japanese heavy machine gun fire, and the mortar only had 18 bombs left, placed up on Johns knoll. When the enemy had reached within 20 yards of the Australians positions during the first assault, Sergeant Eddy rushed forward to direct 12 mortar bombs upon the enemy causing absolute havoc, winning the day. With ammunition running low and no sign of an supply train coming, Bishop wondered if the next attack would beat them off their high ground. Bishops men went to work searching the dead Japanese. Teams were collecting ammunition from the dead enemy, from the HQ and from units of Trevor's ridge, rushing it all to Johns knoll. The positions on John's knoll was obviously dangerous and the men all knew they likely would have to pull out if no supply train came. To relieve the pressure on John's Knoll, Bishop sent two platoons to launch a counter attack against the enemys right and left flanks. Lt Paine's platoon took the right and Lt Trenerry the left. Paines men were climbing 20 yards up a razor back when the saw the enemy and began firing. Paine recalled "things got a bit sticky so we withdrew down the hill a little then made our way back to the end of the razor-back'. Pains men withdrew a bit, but continued to harass the enemy, who greeted them by rolling grenades down the razorback. To the left, Trennerys men cautiously moved around the rear of the Japanese forward troops attacking Johns Knoll and launched a 16 grenade attack killing many. In the confusion and terror the Japanese dispersed running straight into Australian gunfire. With just 5 men Trenerry had cleared a track to Johns koll while 5 other of his men cleared another track in the opposite direction. Trenerry would report "Both groups clearing the track ran backwards and forwards shooting at opportune targets,". Private Blacker had killed 5 Japanese shooting his Bren from the hip; Private May killed 4 Japanese before taking a hit himself and most of the men on average killed two Japanese each. Trennerry's men would come back to Johns knoll estimating they had killed 24 Japanese with small arms and a bunch with grenades. During the late afternoon, a company of the 2/27th also advanced northeast of John's Knolls who could hear the platoon counter attacks. At 5:30 upon hearing heavy fire from some high ground east of Johns knoll they launched an attack and quickly overran a woodpecker position. Lt Cook leading the company would write “I met Mac and he gave me all he knew so I pushed forward to contact the enemy. I handed 5 Platoon over to Sergeant Underwood, commonly known as "Underpants". The laps were expecting us for they opened up with their Woodpecker and did they whistle but the boys kept pushing on. I sent Sergeant Yandell round on the right flank while a section from B Company and Corporal Fitzgerald's went around on the left; well, Lum's [Yandell's] section on the right did a wonderful job and made it possible to wipe out the Woodpecker. The boys must have killed 20 or more Japs on the first knoll and by the way they bawled you would think they were killing a hundred of them. We continued on along the ridge for another 100 yards when 3 LMGs opened up on us and inflicted our first casualties, 2 killed, 4 wounded. One of the killed was Dean who had done a fine job killing several Japs while firing his Bren from the hip as he advanced. At about this time I found [a young soldier] of B Company alongside me so asked him what would win the Goodwood whereupon he told me not to be so bloody silly, it was no time to talk about races. Well, we had to shift these gunners so Lum kept moving his section forward on the right flank and two of the gunners got out while the other covered them. Then Lum volunteered to go over the top after the remaining one himself so I slipped up behind him to give him covering fire, but as Lum went over the top the Japs cleared off into the kunai”. By nightfall the enemy attacks ceased, the allies had not yielded an inch of ground. A supply train came at midnight to the great relief of the defenders. Hunkering down the way he did, Bishop had won a notable battle. The 2/27th lost 7 men dead and 28 wounded, but estimated they had killed 190 Japanese. More importantly the Australians refused to be pushed from their vantage points. The Japanese would continue their attacks on Trevor's ridge with their Woodpecker from a new position just above the plateau across the Faria. Thus the defenders hard work was not over, Brigadier Dougherty decided to relieve the exhausted 2/27th with the 2/16th. After the fierce fight at John's Knoll, the Japanese had pulled back to the Shaggy ridge line, that ran in front of the Kankirei saddle. It was here General Nakai was determined to make his last stand. Additionally, back on October the 9th, the first echelon of Admiral Mori's forces had at last reached Kiari. Men who performed the march recalled “the track deteriorated and was ‘only passable on bare feet without any heavy packs' and some simple scaffolding had been set up by the engineers to help the troops pass. The cold increased as the group climbed higher and the ‘Precipitous cliffs continued, one after another.' More men began to die from the cold and from losing their footing. This was at the head of the Sanem River valley where there was a sheer drop on one side of the track and a sheer rock face about 90 meters high on the other. The final climb to the summit was made over a muddy one-man track where the line came to a stop and the men sat with their legs dangling over the edge of the track”. The men took 4 days of rest before they would march onwards for Sio. For 10 days, General Nakano's forces continued their retreat to Kiari. Local natives had been enlisted to help carry the food and medical supplies that landed at Kairi up to the troops moving down the coast. Originally 20 landing craft were supposed to help move the food from Madang, but they were being used for troops transport following the Australian landing at Finschhafen. The Japanese began setting up a series of food caches in villages seeing tonnes of rice carried and placed in key positions. The 4th echelon reached Kiari on October 18th, 33 days after they had departed Lae. From the original 6600 IJA and 2050 IJN forces that left Lae, a total of 6544 men, 5001 IJA and 1543 IJN had survived the retreat across the Saruwaged range, arriving safely to the coast. It was clear, General Blamey's earlier assessment that “a few of the enemy remnants will escape the hardship of the mountain tracks” was very wrong. Now thats all we have for Green hell today, for we are going to be jumping back over to the CBI theater next. Now there had been considerable developments in the global war for the allies. The Japanese were gradually being pushed back in the southwest pacific; The Kingdom of Italy signed the armistice of Cassibile, as allied forces were occupying Sicily soon to hit Italy proper and Germany was about to lose Ukraine. The tide had distinctly turned against the Axis. In the China theater, the 7th war area of General Sun Lianzhong had dispersed into the fertile plains of Hunan province. The commander of the China expeditionary army, General Hta Shunroku deemed it necessary to perform a crushing blow against him. He ordered General Yokoyama to advance upon the Changde area, where Sun had his HQ.Yokoyama concentrated his 5 divisions, the 39th, 58th, 3rd, 116th and 68th divisions of the 11th army, along the Yangtze river area between Yichang and Yueyang by late October. Once his forces had concentrated enough on the left bank of the Yangtze, Yokoyama planned out an offensive set to launch on November 2nd. Defending the Changde area was the 6th war zones 10th, 26th, 29th, 33rd army groups as well as some riverine units and two other corps, making a total of 14 corps in all. It was going to be a brutal offensive aimed not at actually capturing the city of Chande, but rather tying up the NRA to reduce its combat ability in the immediate region and to thwart it from reinforcing the Burma theater. Over in Indie the horrible Bengal famine of 1943 had kicked off. Back in March of 1942, after the Japanese began their occupation of Rangoon, a major consequence was the severing of routine exports, such as Burmese rice to India and Ceylon. In June the Bengal government established price controls for rice and on July 1st fixed prices were at a level considerably lower than the prevailing market price. The fixed low prices thus made sellers reluctant to sell leading to stocks disappearing, getting stored or being sold on the black market. In mid October, south-west Bengal was hit by a series of natural disasters that destabilized the price more, causing another rushed scramble for rice, boosting the Calcutta black market. On March 11th, the provincial government rescinded its price controls, resulting in dramatic rises in the price of rice, due partly to speculations. This caused a massive period of inflation between March and May of 1943. May saw the first reports of death by starvation in Bengal. The government tried to re-establish public confidence by insisting that the crisis was all being caused by speculation and hoarding, but their propaganda failed to dispel the public's belief there was in fact a shortage of rice. The Bengal government never formally declared a state of famine, even though the “Famine Code” would have mandated a sizable increase in aid. The unrest gave fuel to the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose and many troops would have to be diverted from Burma to help maintain the order. Bose made his famous proclamation “give me blood! I will give you freedom!” as he assumed leadership over the reformed INA on July 4th of 1943. The new INA 1st division under Major General Mohammed Zaman Kiani had drawn many Indian POW's who had previously joined Mohan Singh's first INA. They also drew POW's who had not joined in 1942. Their new force consisted of the 2nd Guerrilla regiment known as “the Gandhi brigade” which consisted of two battalions under Colonel Inayat Kiani; the 3rd Guerrilla regiment known as “the Azad brigade” consisting of three battalions under Colonel Gulzara Singh and the 4th Guerrillas known as the “Nehru Brigade” lead by Lt Colonel Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon. The 1st Guerrilla regiment “Subhas brigade” was led by Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan and was an independent unit consisting of 3 infantry battalions. Special operations group “Bahadur group” were operating behind enemy lines. There was also a separate all female unit created under Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan. This unit was intended to have combat commitments. They were named Rani of Jhansi regiment after the legendary rebel Queen Lakshmibai of the 1857 rebellion. Their member swerve drawn from female civilian populations from Malaya and Burma. The reformed INA were reinvigorated and causing a lot of mayhem. The Indian government responded with a scorched earth policy to deny foodstuffs to the Japanese and Free Indian army who might try to invade India. They established a Foodstuffs scheme to manage the distribution of good, ensuring that those in high priority roles such as civil servants, police and the armed forces received top priority. A second “boat denial policy” was also implemented. Under this policy the army confiscated approximately 45,000 rural boats, severely disrupting riverbourne movement of labor, supplies and food. This cost the livelihoods of boatmen and fishermen. Leonard G. Pinnell, a British civil servant who headed the Bengal government's Department of Civil Supplies, told the Famine Commission that the policy "completely broke the economy of the fishing class". Transport was generally unavailable to carry seed and equipment to distant fields or rice to the market hubs. Artisans and other groups who relied on boat transport to carry goods to market were offered no recompense; neither were rice growers nor the network of migratory laborers. The large-scale removal or destruction of rural boats caused a near-complete breakdown of the existing transport and administration infrastructure and market system for movement of rice paddy. No steps were taken to provide for the maintenance or repair of the confiscated boats, and many fishermen were unable to return to their trade. The Army took no steps to distribute food rations to make up for the interruption of supplies. Meanwhile military build ups cause massive displacement of Bengalis from their homes and farmlands which were used to construct airstrips and camps. Nearly the entire output of India's cloth, leather, silk and wool industries were sold off to the military, leaving the rural population to suffer through a “cloth famine”. President of the Ramakrishna Mission in Bombay July 1943 would report "The robbing of graveyards for clothes, disrobing of men and women in out of way places for clothes ... and minor riotings here and there have been reported. Stray news has also come that women have committed suicide for want of cloth ... Thousands of men and women ... cannot go out to attend their usual work outside for want of a piece of cloth to wrap round their loins" The Bengali population suffered tremendously. With the arrival of 500,000 or more Burmese refugees, bringing hungry mouths, and diseases like dysentery, malaria, smallpox, cholera, needing food, clothes, medical aid and other resources, this stressed Bengali past its max. Despite all of this, Bengal continued to export rice to Ceylon for months, even after the famine was apparent. To make matters worse, local rice crops were becoming infected with brown spot disease and on October 16th, Bengal was hit by a massive cyclone. This resulted in the deaths of 14,500 and 190,000 cattle. The cyclone unleashed 3 Tsunami's which overwhelmed the sea walls and flooded 450 square miles adding more misery to 2.5 million people. Bose went to work exploiting the crisis, backed enthusiastically by the Japanese to established the Azad Hind Provisional Government of Free India at Singapore in October. The first INA was roughly 40,000 troops strong, the reformed 2nd INA would begin with 12,000 troops, and as a result of Boses dynamic appeal would peak to around 100,000 volunteers and combatants at around 50,000. Bose would say "Local civilians joined the INA, doubling its strength. They included barristers, traders and plantation workers, as well as Khudabadi Sindhi Swarankars who were working as shop keepers; many had no military experience." It is also estimated, 20,000 Malayan Indians and another 20,000 ex-Indian army member volunteered for the INA. In the end, an estimated 2.1-3.8 Bengalis died out of a population of 60.2 million. They died of starvation, malaria and diseases brought on from malnutrition, population displacement and lack of health care. In the man-made famines aftermath, millions would be left impoverished and the social fabric had been torn to shreds. Nearly 1.6 million families disintegrated, men sold their farms and left home to work or join the Indian army. Women and children became homeless, traveling to larger cities in search of relief. It was a vicious cycle of death that would help bolster the Indian independence movement. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Sattelberg was about to begin and so was the battle for Changde. Within India a horrible man made famine led to tremendous devastation and in turn this helped bolster Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army. Japan was given a rare chance to obtain a powerful ally.

women president australia china men japan americans british germany song kingdom green ukraine italy australian japanese kings local army chief indian sun companies singapore mac pacific thousands indie simpsons defending portuguese transport tsunamis johns hq gandhi nra axis pike naval fearing sheldon pains sicily stray pow boomerang shaggy burma generals calcutta bose mackay bishops bengal herring grenades faria battalion macau casualties platoon guerrilla burmese artisans bengali dougherty vickers paine woodpeckers combe cbi new guinea lum knoll negan arndt underpants goodwood leggo yamada azad sio ceylon opium wars lcms kolem pacific war patrols easy street hunan guerrillas new britain yangtze finisterre rangoon bonga port moresby jhansi tojo hunkering trevors precipitous lae foodstuffs herrings yokoyama bengalis vasey nakai lcv ijn papuan subhas chandra bose japs c company katagiri craig watson knolls southwest pacific paines north hill chande song river

- 95 - Pacific War - Fall of Lae-Salamaua, September 12-19, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2023 46:05

Last time we spoke about the unleashing of Operation Postern and the continued advance towards Salamaua. The landings at Lae and droppings at Nadzab went pretty uncontested. Red beach and yellow beach were secured with minimal Japanese aerial raids trying to hinder the movement of men and supplies. defensive perimeters were quickly established and units began their drive towards Lae and Nadzab. Meanwhile the offensive against Salamaua raged on while the Japanese commanders received the shocking news of the landings in the Lae area. General Adachi frantically ordered forces to withdraw from the salamaua area to rush over to Lae's defense. Meanwhile Shoge and Mukai took the little forces they had and prepared to mount a defense to the death to try and hold back the allies from claiming their ultimate prize. But in the end would it not result in the loss of both? This episode is Fall of Lae-Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So as we concluded last time, the landings were a success. The Australian 9th Division, transported by five destroyers, landed to the east of Lae on 4 September. Aside from a few air raids from Rabaul it all went unopposed. As Admiral Barbey noted “Unloading of LSTs, each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles and 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in 1 hour 42 minutes. Unloading of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.”By 10.30 a.m. 7,800 troops and 1,500 tons of stores were ashore. The 503rd parachute infantry regiment dropped at Nadzab pushing small amounts of Japanese forces. And at Salamaua, General Milfords forces held down the bulk of the Japanese troops, who now had to frantically rush over to Lae. General Milford's 5th division were applying an enormous amount of pressure upon the Salamaua defenses, trying to tie down the bulk of General Nakano's forces. Despite the frantic orders to withdraw over to Lae, the Salamaua defenders would continue to offer strong resistance against Milford's attacks as they still wanted to retain Salamaua. North of the francisco river, the Japanese had considerable artillery to support a defense and continued to fire upon the advancing attackers. In response at 5am on september 5th, Captain Dawsons 2/6th field regiment directed their artillery concentration upon Rough Hill and Arnold's Crest. A patrol of the 58/59th and 2/7th battalions tried to peak at both and were forced back under heavy fire. During the afternoon, the 12th platoon of Lt Albert Farley's B company attacked the pimple, a prominent feature near the middle of what was being called E ridge. It was a razorback that approached along the Lokanu ridge. It allowed no flanking maneuvers. The platoon was met with australian grenades, it seems the Japanese had stolen at some point. During the night, a detachment of SNLF marines performed a surprising counterattack. They began with a mortar attack before creeping within 10 meters of the Australian lines. According to Keith Ross, the Japanese did not even have bullets in their gun spouts, believing someone might prematurely fire a shot making the enemy aware of their presence. When they got within 10 meters they began to cock their weapons. Ross recalled ‘When they charged the magazines they made a hell of a racket and we realized they were there.'. The Japanese charged with fixed bayonets and were met by a wall of fire, forcing them to withdrew. Over on Charlie Hill Companies 1 and 3 of the 66th regiment led by Lt Usui Genkichi were trapped, so they set up ambush positions to try and cut off the supply lines of A and B companies of the 42nd battalion. As a ration train was moving around the western slopes of CHarlie Hill to supply Greer's B company, the Japanese fired upon them from a newly established position on a ledge. The next day another ration train was hit 100 yards down the ridge to the west. This prompted Davidson to have the ration trains bypass the ambush areas more widely. Usui then ordered his men to light fires that would burn towards the Australian positions. Using wind, Usui hoped to dislodge the Australians. On the 6th, the 12th platoon maneuvered to cut off the Japanese supply line, but at 5pm a kunai fire forced them out. The 10th platoon rushed over to retake the position but likewise was burned out. The following morning another platoon came over but the Japanese were already there digging in. This little fire trick protected the Japanese from being completely cut off. It was a surprising victory for Usui and worked to prevent the allied supplies from getting through, forcing the assault upon Charlie Hill to a halt. Meanwhile, on September 6th, General Nakano accompanied the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment with some SNLF marines as they debarked Salamaua aboard 73 barges enroute to Lae. Over at Lae General Shoge and Admiral Fujita were commanding the meager amount of combat forces they had alongside numerous inexperienced non-combatants to try and halt the allied advance. Nakano ordered his forces to commence their withdrawal towards Lae on September 8th. He began by deploying the 1st battalion, 115th regiment at Buang, near the coast north of Malolo to cover the retreat. His forces south of the Francisco river were to pull back across the river while 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment would hold the line connecting Yalu and Markham point. Against them, Brigadier Evan's had established a supply point at G Beach which was on the western mouth of the Burep River. There he had set up the 24th brigade's HQ and brought up two 25 pounder guns for support. This greatly lessened the supply line to the front. Meanwhile, Brigadier Whiteheads men were beginning to reach the east bank of the Busu river and General Woottens 2/24th and 2/28th were advancing towards Busu. When Lt Ed Shattock's platoon of the 2/24th battalion reached the Busu, Shattock was ordered not to cross it. He recalled ‘The Japs were not in position opposite me; we could have done it,'. In reality his force had reached a point on the Busu that held a extremely fast current. Perhaps his best swimmers may have been able to ford it without clothes or equipment, but it would have been dangerous as hell, especially if the Japanese caught them on the other side. Whitehead was eager to cross it, but knew the danger so he waited to bring bridging equipment over. He also ordered the 2/4th independent company over in Burep to advance west through some thick jungle to take a position east of the Busu. Over in the coastal area, Lt Colonel Colin Norman's 2/28th battalion reached the Busu in the afternoon. They noticed the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were assembling at the Busu river line, along with remnants of the 3rd battalion, 115th regiment led by Major Mukai. The river looked to be swollen from recent heavy rains, thus the Japanese likewise needed to build a bridge to get across. Back over at Nadzab, the 871st airborne engineers continued their labor, under terrible torrential rain allowing the 2/33rd battalion to arrive by September 9th. This was the same battalion that underwent the terrible accident when a B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. Thus the weakened battalion alongside the 2/25th would begin an advance down the Markham valley towards Lae. They were met with the traditional New Guinea welcome, torrential rain, most of Nadzab's airtrip was so flooded it delayed the arrival of the 2/31st battalion until September 12th, much to General Vasey's dismay. Back over at Charlie Hill, the isolated Japanese were taking advantage of the torrential rain. They began evacuating pill boxes upon the knolls between Charlie Hill and Lewis Knoll. During the night of september 8th the whole of the Charlie-Lewis-Breger hill area would be evacuated. At 9:30am the next day, a mortar barrage began as platoons crossed their start lines on the northern slopes of Charlie hill. 15 minutes later the first platoon managed to occupy the first part of the Japanese perimeter without opposition. The second platoon passed through them and occupied the rest of the perimeter, Charlie Hill was now in Australian hands. Wasting no time, Davidson ordered the B Company now under the command of Captain Ganter to pursue the fleeing Japanese towards Nuk Nuk, which I had to say 3 times before not laughing. God I love New Guinea. At the same time, the 47th battalion also found abandoned pillboxes facing them, so they began a pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Colonel MacKechnies men found the same situation over at Berger Hill. On September 9th the 15th battalion were carrying out a two pronged attack upon the crest of scout ridge. C company came from the Bamboos while D company performed a outflanking maneuver from the enemy's rear. Both forces had a limited approach area allowing only a platoon front. At 2:40pm the outflanking companies forward platoon reached the crest of Scout ridge finding no opposition. At 3:35 they reached the southwest edge of the Japanese position facing the Bamboo's and alongside the other companies platoons began an attack. The enemy fired green flares and withdrew upon seeing them leading to only a minor skirmish. Over on Lokanu ridge, Lt Turner was leading a platoon assault under artillery and mortar support. They attacked the last Japanese strongpoint on its eastern tip overlooking the sea. The Japanese had hastily evacuated the position fleeing into the jungle below, leaving many dead and abandoned a lot of equipment. Further patrols from the Bamboos completely what was becoming a relieving picture, the Pimple and Knoll on Lokanu ridge were abandoned. After a 10 day initiation in the battle area, Lt Colonel Jack Amies commander of the 15th battalion signaled Milford late on September 9th “the 15th now holds line of Lokanu ridge complete from sea at Lokanu to crest of scout ridge”. The brigadiers met on the 9th with Milford who ordered them to speed up the divisions advance so they could give the enemy no respite to reorganize and occupy new positions. Thus the race to Salamaua was on. Brigadiers Hammer and Monaghan began a competition to see who would reach Salamau first. Hammer would state that Monaghan and come in at the “death knock” and Monaghan replied “that Hammer could relax and leave the battle to the 29th brigade who would clean it up for you” Meanwhile General Wootten's men were preparing to cross the Busu. During the morning their patrols had gone across to find suitable crossing points, but finding none. Over at the coast, one patrol reached a large island, named Rooke's Island as Lt Rooke led the patrol. The island was in the center of the Busu's mouth, Colonel Norman ordered Captain Leo Lyon's A company to attempt a crossing. They sent one platoon across via a sandbank at the mouth, while the remainder of the company covered them with fire from Rook's island. Captain Leo Lyon watched as two leading scouts moved across the sandbar about 50 meters apart with their rifles over their heads. The lead scout got about 80 meters from the far bank when the Japanese began opening fire from near the mouth of the river on the west bank. Both men fall and were washed out to sea, but one was only wounded and fought his way back through the current to the allied side. Worried by the delays, Wootten ordered his brigadiers to seize some bridgeheads over the Busu. Norman assembled his battalion on the east bank near Rooke's island and crossed the last channel of the Busu in four extended lines by the late afternoon. After stealthily forded over to Rooke's island, the 2/28th egan crossing the channel under the cover of 25 pounder fire at 5:30pm. Each company moved to the startline one after another at two minute intervals. It was a very difficult crossing, many were swept off their feet by the fierce current. Many had their weapons snatched from them. As men began to be swept off, they tried grasped for anything on the western bank, like overhanging boughs and kunai. This shocked the Japanese, they had not considered it possible to cross. Most of the Japanese machine guns and grenade launchers were at the mouth point tip and thus when they began scrambling to hit the allies fording the channel it was too late. Norman's men lost apparently 25% of their weapons crossing and suffered 13 deaths, but they gained Wootten's desired bridgehead. On September 9th, at the height of the battle, Admiral Mori arrived at Lae via the I-174. He relieved Admiral Fujita, who would return to Rabaul on the same submarine. He soon discovered most of the navy's forces were allocated to support tasks while Nakano directed the IJA forces to man the main defenses of Lae. The 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment and the 25th machine cannon company were sent to Munum and Ngasawapum to keep the road open to Boana. Back over at Norman's bridgehead, some Japanese units crept through some kunai grass to surprise attack them using machine gun and mortar fire. But it was all for naught, as Norman's C company counterattacked with fixed bayonets charging into a waist deep swamp where the Japanese were hiding. B Company came to support them and gradually the Japanese scattered after 63 deaths while the Australians suffered 21 casualties. Feeling more confident, Evans had the 2/43rd battalion hand over their weapons to be ferried across over to the 2/28th. A LCVP was able to make 40 trips taking some 1200 troops and much supplies over to the west bank of the Busu. To the north, Whitehead's 26th brigade had been delayed 36 hours waiting for some rubber boats and suitable rope to get their men across. The 2/24th battalion began to work with the engineers to get across the Busu at a place where the river separated into 3 channels around 20, 30 and 14 meters wide. Their currents ran around 25 kms per hour with a depth of over 2 meters. With all the rain, it became apparent the crossing was going to be impossible with the materials on hand. None the less when there is a will there is a way. Warrant officer Bill McCallum and two engineers swam the river with signal wire and managed to drag a rope across, securing it to the west bank. However when they began hooking boats to the rope there soon became swamped, ruining the entire ordeal. Further north the 2/4th independent company managed to bridge and cross the Sankwep river which lay on a junction of the Busu. They soon established an ambush position on the east bank of the Busu near the Kunda bridge. It was at this point General Herring decided to reinforce Wootten with Brigadier Cedric Edgar's 4th brigade, consisting of the 22nd, 29/46th and 37/52nd battalions. They would take over the beachhead areas after landings were made. They departed Milne Bay in 6 LST's and 6 LCI's on September 9th, successfully landing at Red Beach by the night of the 10th. Meanwhile to the north the 2/25th battalion had reached Jensen's plantation when they were fired upon for the first time. The Australians had taken over 5 days from capturing Nadzab to contact Japanese positions west of Lae and the delay unnerved the Japanese commanders. General Yoshihara would write ‘The movement of the units which had dropped on Nadzab were very sluggish; if they had attacked with their vast strength, it would have been the hour of death of Lae in a matter of a few hours. It was a piece of good luck in the midst of misfortune', the Japanese command, although ‘unable to understand the reason', was given time to bring troops across from Lae and Salamaua to defend the western approaches of Lae.” Thus the Japanese had been given a minor window to retreat some of their forces from Salamaua to Lae. Back over at Salamaua, the heavy rains continued to mask the Japanese retreat across the francisco river, while simultaneously hindering the Australians from crossing it. Brigadier Monaghan's men managed to reach scout hill. The 15th battalion began their pursuit of the enemy going north east of scout ridge on the 10th. In their rapid advance they managed to kill a few stragglers and secured some high ground overlooking the mouth of the francisco river. Patrols south west of Nuk Nuk linked up with the 42nd battalion. North of the Francisco, Brigadier Hammer began testing enemy defenses at Rough Hill. Captain Jago's C company of the 58/59th tossed 3 platoons at Rough Hill, Bob Lanes 7th, Ted Griff's 8th and Arthur O'Rourkes 9th. Each made up up the hill around 50-100 yards before being fired upon and forced to pull out. After this Lewin's platoon from the 2/3rd independent company fought its way up Savige Spur were they too faced heavy fire and had to pull out. They gradually managed to capture the Savige Spur, leading to an encirclement of the position. Meanwhile the 2/7th battalion along with 3 other companies of the 58/59th and two independent company platoons moved up Sandy Creek. The Japanese launched a counterattack dislodging units from the outskirts of Rough Hill and Arnolds Crest, preparing for a final withdrawal that was set to begin the following night. Thus when the Australians launched their attack the next day they found an abandoned Rough Hill. To the south, C company of the 15th battalion crossed the overflowing francisco river near its mouth to dominate the isthmus. Davidson's B company crossed the francisco river in the morning and advanced northeast across the Salamaua airfield without opposition quickly captured Logui I. As the Australians entered Salamaua it appeared to them like a shell. The allied bombing campaigns against Salamaua had been devastating. Private Ted Griff would write “The isthmus was lined with bomb craters.” Private Peter Hemery wrote “not a building is left standing – just an occasional heap of scattered wreckage”. Private Jack Glynn wrote ‘Salamaua was a shambles; a building wasn't left standing, by the look of the place it was very good bombing.' The bombing had killed an estimated 200-300 Japanese in Salamaua, many were left unburied leaving a terrible nauseating stench in the air. A great quantity of supplies were discarded or destroyed. Two cargo ships laid offshore, and further down the beach were numerous wrecked barges. The aircraft hangers had roughly 40 damaged aircraft and it looked obvious the airfield had not been used since the 9th division had landed.To be blunt, most of the Japanese stationed there were relieved to depart it. In the end it was Monaghan who won the race. Over to the west, after crossing the river, the 47th battalion advanced unopposed and converged with Hammer's forces. They soon captured Arnold's crest, Edwards Spur and launched their first attacks against Kela ridge known as “the hand”. The Japanese had concentrated at Malolo where they were evacuating by barge towards Law on the night of september 11th. To cover them, General Nakano ordered units from the 80th and 238th regiments to defend a last line that ran from the Kela ridge all the way to Malolo. Wootten brought up 14 25 pounders to support the advance. Australian forces now past the Busu began to unleash hell with their artillery. The Japanese command at Lae believed the artillery spelt their doom. Meanwhile the 2/24th battalion had unsuccessfully tried to bridge the busu using some felled logs supported on stone pylons. The men tried to build the bridge placing the felled logs around the large stone pylons and were initially successful when it was just a 20 meter stream. However during the night the river rose and the logs went up with them. The current was so strong the logs that did not rise because they were stuck with the stone just snapped in two. The men had to abandon the attempt. Lt Evans was forced to strip the 2/43rd battalion of their weapons and ferried them over the Busu during the afternoon by rope. Eventually Evans managed to arrange a deal with some American boatmen to lend him an LCVP for a few trips which allowed for his 2/28th fully equipped to get over. Logistics logistics logistics. The 2/28th managed to create a bridgehead with a sigh of relief I imagine. To the north, the 25 pounders were gradually moving closer to hit Lae more accurately. The 2/25th battalion ran into 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment who had the unfortunate task of delaying them. The Japanese defensive positions were strung out back along the road behind Whittakers bridge and strongpoints north of Lae airfield known as Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens. 30 of them were killed outright as the withdrew past heaths plantation. The 2/33rd battalion and 2/2nd pioneer battalion advanced towards Markham point. C company of the 24th battalion launched and attack, beginning by lobbing 126 mortars and 8 rounds of smoke at a point called River Ambush. As the mortar fire ceased the leading platoons surged forward, but the Japanese defenders advanced past the smoke and quickly repulsed the incoming attackers. The next day, the 2/31st battalion arrived to the scene and joined the 2/25th battalion to clear Jenyn's plantation. They encountered some heavy resistance further down the road at a bridge near Whittakers plantation. The 24th battalion made another attempt against markham point on the 12th. Four platoons hit some southern pillboxes, but were repulsed quite quickly. Lt Richards went on the record to say "that a further ground attack without support will not be successful and application has again been made for a synchronized air and artillery attack." Over on the coast the 2/32nd and 2/43rd battalions had just arrived and Evans directed the 2/28th to continue the advance towards Malahang while the 2/43rd would hit New and Old Yanga. Captain Catchloves company patrolled towards New Yanga while Captain Gordon's company patrolled towards Old Yanga. During the morning both skirmished and dispersed enemy patrols then at 2:30pm it was reported that New Yanga looked abandoned. At 3:35 Catchlove was organizing an assault against the outskirts of New Yanga when suddenly heavy firing came out from the direction of a hut. The Australians were surprised by this but quickly called in some artillery support from the 14 25 pounders brought up from Red Beach alongside mortars. They hit New Yanga with 525 shells as the infantry tried to storm in but they were met with heavy casualties. They attempted a second assault during the afternoon, but again the Japanese held them back. Back over at the Salamaua area, the Japanese continued their frantic withdrawal as the 5th division began mop up operations. Patrols combed the peninsula finding two naval and two anti aircraft guns, large quantities of unused arms, medical supplies, some wireless transceivers and a portable generator. The Japanese HQ were some well furnished huts, allies found food still on the table, indicating it was a rushed withdrawal. The Japanese had built several camps on the waters edge and inside cave networks. Some patrols found female clothing, lipstick and powder indicating the presence of women, and you can imagine what that was. The 42nd Battalion would manage to occupy Kela Point; one of Major Warfe's patrols reached the coast half way between Kela Point and Mission Point; and the 2/7th Battalion would capture the now-abandoned Kidney Hill before continuing forward towards Malolo. The Japanese at Kela ridge continued to fire back upon the enemy performing a bitter fighting withdrawal, until their final evacuation by barge on September 13th. By the 13th the bulk of General Nakono's 51st division had reached Lae and were now preparing to withdraw even further to the Kiari-Sio area. Nakano had devised two plans to withdraw the Lae garrison; one plan was to go across the Saruwaged Range to the north coast, the other was to go over the foothills of the Finisterre ranges heading west parallel to the Markham valley. Engineering officer Kitamoto Masamichi who knew about both routes was asked to give his opinion and he recalled ‘It was a responsibility too heavy for just a Lieutenant to decide, I thought, but, well aware that Allied aircraft could easily interdict the route through the open kunai of the Markham Valley foothills. The second plan is impossible. The first plan is difficult but there is still some chance of success. I would choose plan one. However, the sacrifice will be great.We should ready our packs as we would retreat over the mountains from 10th to 15th of September,'' Nakano agreed and issued the withdrawal orders which went out to all units on september 8th. Beginning on the 12th, the 7th base force main units consisting of Admiral Mori's men began their withdrawal. The original plan called for them to cross the Busu river at the kunda bridge, then to travel via Gawan and Bungalumba to the summit of the Saruwaged Range. However the kunda bridge was blocked by Australian commandos, so they would need to find another way across the Busu then the Boana while fighting the enemy back. Engineers of the 51st and 30th engineer regiments were sent first to construct and repair the road to Mount Sarawaget. Colonel Araki commanded the second group coming over from Edwards plantation, consisting of the 51st divisional HQ, the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion 21st regiment; the 1st battalion, 80th regiment and the bulk of the 14th field artillery regiment. The last group who would act as a rearguard were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of 115th regiment coming from Malahang and Busu, the 15th independent engineer regiment and the 1st battalion of the 11th regiment coming from Whittaker, Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens plantations. Admiral Mori's men were ambushed from the start by and american patrol of the 1st battalion, 503rd parachute regiment due east of Nadzab. This forced them to divert into the jungle towards Yalu. Over at the Lae field hospital were patients who were unable to be evacuated via submarine nor was it possible for them to be carried across the mountains, so they volunteered to protect the divisions rears. Meanwhile Salamaua was now destined to become a large allied base. When General Herring arrived at Milfords HQ on september 14th, he took one look at the insanitary shell of what was Salamaua town, its poor airfield and near by swamp. He immediately wiped it as a base, it was to be discarded to ruin. Some Americans camped nearby it would call it "a filthy, rat-ridden, pestilential hole". Perhaps a lackluster jewel after fighting bitter months for it. The Salamaua campaign was over. The 15th battalion charged up the coast chasing after the Japanese catching some south of the Markham river. The campaign was a brutal one. The 17th brigade reported 135 killed, 354 wounded; the 15th Brigade reporting 124 killed and 346 wounded; the 162nd Regiment reporting 81 killed and 396 wounded; and the 29th Brigade reporting 76 killed and 155 wounded. Against them, Nakano's 51st Division suffered an estimated 2200 casualties since the end of July, for a total of over 8000 casualties, including 2722 killed, in the entire campaign. Back over at Lae, the evacuation saw standard infantry equipment being carried at 120 round of ammunition, 2 grenades and provisions for 10 days. Infantry had to carry their machine guns, small mortars, while artillery units had to carry their 75mm mountain guns and machine cannon company's their 20mm guns. With supplies no longer being sent to the Salamaua front, there were provisions available for the withdrawal. General Yoshihara would write later that the generally healthy men of the Lae based naval forces were able to carry enough provisions for 14-15 days, but the IJA units most of whom had been fighting for Salamaua for months, were in extreme exhaustion and only able to carry half the amount. Over to the east the 2/24th battalion on september 13th began constructing a box-girder bridge over the Busu. It was launched after midday under enemy fire. When it nearly got across the gap, it overbalanced and was swept away downstream. Later in the afternoon more box-girders were brought over. A 25 meter single box-girder bridge was assembled using 3 box and 2 hornbeam sections. 100 men picked up the bridge and carried it through water over a meter deep across the first 20 meter channel to a mid river island. However they had no beachhead thus on the far bank only a mortar barrage could keep the enemy at a distance. They began to doubt the crossing would ever be made, so Whitehead on the 13th asked Wootten permission to send 120 men over the Busu at its mouth to advance north to the other side where the 2/24th battalion were. An hour later, Lt Colonel Ainslie of the 2/48th brigade crossed and began advancing north, but the jungle proved difficult and communications were bad. Further north the 2/4th independent company tried to cross the river, but the Japanese held them back. The men were led by Lt Staples and as they forded the river he was wounded by a Japanese sniper. The remainder of his section were swept off their feat and scattered along the bank of the river. This prompted other men to try and use the kunda bridge. The Japanese employed a trick often used against them, they allowed a bunch to cross the bridge before unleashing their guns. 7 men were cut to ribbons, many other became marooned on the wrong side. In the desperate situation private Jaggar charged and attacked two enemy machine gun nests and a mortar post killing several Japanese and capturing a lot of equipment. Jagger then waited for darkness before swimming back. The platoon that had gotten over lost 7 men with several wounded. Along the coast the 2/43rd found New Yanga unoccupied while the 2/28th encountered stiff resistance at Malahang. Lt Connor's platoon were advancing at 11:20am when they ran into the enemy who were entrenched at a track junction 1000 yards east of Malahang anchorage. Connor went ahead with Corporal Torrent to charge 3 foxholes where 6 Japanese including an officer were killed. Connor was killed, so Torrent took command and he ordered an advance at 3:30pm where they found Japanese abandoned positions. The defenders were hitting the men as hard as they could. Artillery commander Lt COlonel Sukenobu Watanabe believed that the artillery troops were of no use ‘if they could not fire a shot on the battlefield'. Thus for his tired and weakened unit, ‘one cannon would be enough but they must also carry some shells'. His men sacrificed carrying sufficient food as he led them up the Saruwaged carrying mountain gun components weighing up to 50 kg's each. Meanwhile Hiromatsu Sato's anti-aircraft unit abandoned their guns in the Atzera Range in order to carry additional food. Sato and his men had enough food for 4 days and were told it could take 20 days to reach the northern coast. ‘We were stricken with apprehension, the effect of salt worked wondrously… those of us without salt became weakened… I used my salt sparingly and never drank unboiled water'. Back over to the west, Brigadier Eather ordered the 2/25th to put pressure on Whittakers plantation while the 2/33rd moved around south to establish a roadblock at Heath's plantation. Artillery and mortar fire began the advanced as Major Robertson's company of the 2/25th captured the bridge at Whittakers while Captain Gow and Captain Butler's Companies advanced towards heaths plantation. There was a fierce battle but a single platoon managed to overrun the enemy HQ on the northern sector of heaths plantation. Meanwhile two patrols advanced west and southwest converging towards Heaths plantation only to find it abandoned. Thus the 2/33rd occupied Heaths plantation without a fight. During the night, the Japanese had evacuated Whittakers and the second echelon of forces had successfully departed Lae to march north to the Butibum rivers and than towards Boana. At 5pm on the 14th, Eather learnt from divisional HQ that one of the documents captured by the 2/25th the previous day indicated the Japanese operation order dated september the 8th. It showcased the evacuation of Lae which was of great excitement for General Vasey when he found out. Now every member of the division sought to race the 9th division to Lae, also hoping to prevent as many of the enemy from escaping as possible. Vasey's staff concluded the Japanese were already withdrawing up the Busu. Thus Vasey believed that it would not be a good idea to weaken Eather's assault on what he now realized were stubborn Japanese rearguards, remembering how brutal the Japanese rearguards were in the Papuan campaigns. So he ordered the 25th brigade to push vigorously towards Lae. Eather elected to quickly seize Edwards plantation. On september 14th Eather's forces drove the Japanese from their positions at Lane's bridge and continued to pursue them in the direction of Edwards plantation. Over to the east, Whiteheads engineers were at last able to create a bridge over the third channel, allowing Captain McNamara's company of the 2/24th to get across. The Japanese were surprised by this and began to unleash as much fire as they could on the newly established bridgehead. But Whitehead quickly sent another company led by Captain Finlay to support the bridgehead successfully fighting the Japanese off after 4 hours of combat. The rest of the battalion crossed afterwords uncontested, then the 2/23rd and the 2/48th. Along the coast, Evans 24th brigade advanced against harsh Japanese resistance. Evan's received word the 2/43rd were approaching Wagan from the north so he sent the 2/32nd battalion to hit Wagan from the south. Lt Day was leading a platoon around the right flank when he began getting sniped from tree top Japanese. Day's platoon suffered heavy casualties and he himself took a shot through his spine. He was dragged away by Warrant officer Dalziel, but Dalziel was shot dead in the process. Day was then killed by a grenade, prompting Sergeant McCallum to take over, who advised the situation was quite warm and required some mortar support. The men backed up to give room for mortars to fire off and at 4:15, 12 3 inches and 10 2 inches began lobbing. This time a few platoons with machine gun crew support made a frontal attack with others hitting flanks. They met heavy fire back at 30 yards or so and suffered 6 more casualties. The Japanese began to waver as the platoons continued their assault and soon it became a full flight towards the village. As the platoons charged, many mopped up the snipers and apparently some fowls who would be destined for the nights dinner. The 2/32nd captured Wagan village by dusk while the 2/28th while the 2/28th advanced towards Malahang anchorage. The men began infiltrating a road behind a Japanese position. At 9;15am they unleashed an attack killing 12 Japanese without any loss and at 12:40pm killed another 14. A company found two abandoned 75 mm dual purpose guns north of the anchorage during the afternoon patrol. A few patrols went further north of the anchorage circling around establishing positions that would seal the anchorages fate. Wootten ordered the 2/24th to recross the river and reinforce the kunda bridge position while Vasey earmarked Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade to advance upon the Boana. On September 15th, Whitehead was finally able to launch his main offensive, tossing the 2/23rd battalion against Kamkamun and the 2/48th battalion at the Malahang airfield. A bit to the south the 2/32nd were capturing Malahang mission and the 2/43rd were just entering Wagan village. To the west, Eather's men were facing strong resistance from Japanese rearguards at Edwards plantation. The 2/33rd were performing a frontal assault trying to draw enemy attention while the 2/31st moved around the right flank to secure some high ground behind the Edwards Plantation. Despite their resilience, Edwards plantation was completely surrounded and by the late afternoon the Japanese were forced to make a break for it, heading north over Edwards bridge, thus completely abandoning Lae to its fate. As they fled, 64 Japanese would be cut down by machine gun fire, trying desperately to climb a spur, being pursued by Eather's men. Along the coast, the 2/28th were moving through Malahang anchorage with just a few skirmishes occurring. Both divisions raced to be the first to enter Lae. General Nakano's 8650 men, including 2500 naval personnel had managed to get out, heading north towards the Busu. Southeast of Yalu, Admiral Mori's first echelon were intercepted by the 3rd battalion, 503rd parachute regiment. The Paratroopers clashed with a vanguard of 34 men forcing the rest to head northwest across the Atzera Range. Despite being closer to Lae, Wootten's men halted their advance at the Bumbu river by midday on september 16th. Eather's however considered his advance was not speedy enough, therefore he urged the leading company to hasten. In the words of Captain Butler “Up at daylight and off again. "C" Company leading the Brigade this time. Men are a bit nervous again and went pretty steadily. Sick Japs along track kept holding things up and we expected to run into something at any moment. Then along the track and into the middle of us came a jeep crowded with Brigade HQ. Passed me and up to the leading platoon. The old Brig jumped out and started urging the troops to hurry along. The troops weren't very impressed as they thought the Jap was in front. Finally the Brigadier, armed with a pistol, acted as leading scout, and the troops followed in column of route behind… A brigadier is not an ideal section leader. The whole reason for his action was that he wanted the brigade to be first onto the beach. He managed it O.K. I had to send a patrol down the beach and back so we have that honour—doubtful one—as there were no Japs. Unfortunately we advanced too quickly—due to no opposition—and the Yanks came over and strafed us.” Eather's men took Jacobsen's plantation without opposition, then a patrol reached Lae's Voco Point at 11:30. Not knowing Vasey had won the race, Wootten launched a final attack preceded by an aerial strike and artillery barrage after midday. They actually mistook the 2/25th to be Japanese almost leading to calamity, but Wootten stopped his artillery quickly when it became apparent. Both divisions finally entered Lae, ending the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation Postern was a success, though they were unable to prevent the Japanese from evacuating Lae. The overriding failure on the allied side was due to an underestimation of the enemy. There had been an overriding assumption that the Japanese forces at Lae would fight to the death to hold it. Back on September 8th, General MacArthur, cause you know I have to say something don't you. Well he put out a triumphant communique, claiming they had enveloped 20,000 Japanese. Wootten's staff estimated there had been around 8240 Japanese at Lae and 6934 at Salamaua. Vasey's staff thought it was 6420 at Lae and 7041 at Salamaua. In truth Nakano had roughly 11,000 men and the majority got away, over 8000, a considerable feat. The Japanese had inflicted 150 deaths and 397 wounded on the 9th division and 38 deaths and 104 wounded upon the 7th division. Wootten wrote upon seeing Lae "It was in an indescribably filthy condition and had been very thoroughly wrecked", Vast dumps of stores and discarded weapons littered the area. The airfield had not been used since just before the landing, the hangars were wrecked and about forty damaged planes were mute witnesses to the power of the Allied air force. The typical nauseating stench of an area occupied by the Japanese army pervaded Lae as it had Salamaua six days before. Lae would become a major forward base of operations, as Buna had become earlier. Another stepping stone to Tokyo. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus ends the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The deceptive strategy to pressure Salamaua to entice the enemy to loosen its grip on Lae resulted in both bases being overrun in a dramatic fashion. Now the allies had a major forward base of operations to continue the push north.

american men law fall americans australian japanese kings north island tokyo companies engineering engineers hammer evans edwards worried norman jap passed logistics southeast davidson hq vast wasting warrants brigades allied lieutenant bamboo generals whitehead whittaker yanks battalion jacobsen brig crest rook markham milford infantry torrent monaghan pimples sato regiment lewin new guinea knoll artillery paratroopers lci buna brigadier opium wars kela unloading usui pacific war patrols nakano finisterre rooke lst kunda dalziel lae general macarthur vasey papuan japs c company yalu rabaul sandy creek craig watson heaths whittakers lsts keith ross busu malolo milne bay jaggar

- 94 - Pacific War - Operation Postern, September 5-12, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 9, 2023 38:15

Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn't come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back. This episode is Operation Postern Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence. Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion. Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten's request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST's would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST's by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars. So Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy's brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati. Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI's, 18 LCT's and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP's up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.' There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities. Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47's, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss's 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler's 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather's 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight. There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler's 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler's 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler's 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath's plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy's, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know. After all the planning was done Barbey's little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy's Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty's with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units. The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm's only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50. By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi's rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren't they, in fact, landing right here in Lae? ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.' Brigadier Windeyer's troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI's, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca'rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia's took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI's carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia's bombed two LCI's. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT's took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours. Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty's, 8 Val's and 61 Zero's. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid's report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero's while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty's one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty's while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST's from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey's would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies. After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer's combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin's 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace's 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson's 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions. The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson's men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan's 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI's over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day. A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47's were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They're my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you're right George We'll both go. They're my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20's ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47's carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17's loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24's and more B-17's who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath's plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae. Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47's began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don't believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey's 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather. C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child's 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong's 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford's 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day. Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland's 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland's men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew. Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter's A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt's 9th platoon took the left as Barnett's 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt's platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach's C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company. To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew's 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew's men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew's, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn't worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day. The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer's B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position. Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew. After the defeat at Arnold's Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold's Crest while Major Warfe's 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland's men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold's Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.' Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.' After two hours of waiting, Garland's men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out. Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh's A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano's withdrawal. Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge's attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines. Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten's men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV's and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it?

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Episode 4 Real Talk-We Spill the Beans on The Real AIM Marketplace Experience-Guest MAJ Zach Patterson

Be All You Can Be MSC

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 30, 2023 34:47

Ever wondered what it's like to navigate the AIM Marketplace? Well, Zach's been through the gauntlet and he's here to spill the beans. If you're aiming to conquer the market like Cobra Kai, you won't want to miss this episode. Zach shares some invaluable tips to ensure the odds are forever in your favor! MAJ Zach Patterson was a AIM Mover in the 24-02 Marketplace last year October. Zach was matched in his Marketplace from the top 5 jobs he ranked. MAJ Zachary Patterson was commissioned as a Medical Service Corps Officer through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in August 2010 and is a Distinguished Military Graduate. He has a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Jacksonville State University in Jacksonville, Alabama, a Masters in Supply Chain Management (M.S.C.M.) from Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, VA. and is a Certified Professional in Supply Management (CPSM) from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). His assignments include: Brigade Medical Supply Office OIC, 1BCT, 4ID, Fort Carson, CO; Medical Evacuation Platoon Leader, C Company, 4th Brigade Support Battalion, 1ABCT, 4ID, Fort Carson, CO; Support Operations - Medical Logistics Officer, 4BSB, 1SBCT, 4ID, Fort Carson, CO; Chief of Supply Chain Management, Dwight D. Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, GA; Company Commander, Alpha Company, Dwight D. Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, GA; Operations Officer – G3/5/7, Army Medical Logistics Command, Fort Detrick, MD; Deputy Director of the Business Support Office, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency, Fort Detrick, MD. MAJ Patterson's current assignment is as a Medical Logistics Planner for U.S. Army Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, SC. He also serves as the Deputy Medical Logistics Consultant to the Army Surgeon General for Strategic Communications & Outreach. MAJ Patterson's awards and decorations include: Meritorious Service Medal (1 OLC), Army Commendation Medal (1 OLC), Army Achievement Medal (2 OLC), National Defense Service Medal; Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Over Seas Service Ribbon, and Expert Field Medical Badge.Disclaimer: The views expressed in this podcast are the guests and host's alone and do not reflect the official position of the Medical Service Corps, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. All information discussed is unclassified approved for public release and found on open cleared sources.For more episodes listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube @ Be All You Can Be MSC For more information, suggestions, or questions please contact: beallyoucanbemsc@gmail.com

spotify science masters alabama bachelor chief institute defense md va ga richmond real talk jacksonville marketplace outreach beans patterson cobra kai deputy director criminal justice us government spill strategic communications virginia commonwealth university supply chain management meritorious service medals certified professional company commander army commendation medal jacksonville state university fort carson olc army achievement medal national defense service medal alpha company c company medical service corps distinguished military graduate global war on terrorism service medal army service ribbon shaw air force base supply management ism brigade support battalion

- 90 - Pacific War - Komiatum Offensive, August 8-15, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 21, 2023 35:58

Last time we spoke about the intense battle for Munda. The most important objective of the New Georgia campaign, the seizure of Munda had come at long last. The 43rd, 37th and 25th divisions all performed an envelopment offensive against Munda, but in their way were extremely formidable Japanese fortifications. It was a real slogfest seeing tremendous casualties for both sides of the conflict. However the Americans were able to breakthrough some of the Japanese bunkers, tunnels and pillboxes thanks largely to the use of flamethrowers which were becoming more and more popular on the battlefield of the Pacific. Munda was finally captured and now the Japanese had to withdraw to other areas like Vila to keep the fight alive. On the seas, commander Frederick Moosbrugger unleashed some improved mark 14 torpedoes at the IJN and scored a major victory sending 3 destroyed to their grave and countless sailors and soldiers. This episode is the Komiatum Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So last week we talked exclusively about the New Georgia campaign, so today as you guessed it we are diving back over to New Guinea. You know when it comes to the big and popular aspects of the war, Guadalcanal usually takes the leading role, but campaigns like New Guinea seem to always fall to the wayside as they say. Yet the battle for New Guinea was just as important, it took significant resources away from the Empire of Japan. We are soon to reach the climax of the Lae-Salamaua campaign, things are really starting to heat up. Now the last time we were over on Green Hell, Brigadier Moten had just ordered the 2/6th battalion to secure Bobdubi ridge, while the 2/5th assault Mount Tambu. By the end of July, the Coane Force was beginning to occupy Tambu Bay. The 3rd battalion, 162nd of Archibald Roosevelt were securing the Boisi area with two of their companies hitting slopes west of Tambu Bay, while the 2nd battalion assembled itself at Tambu Bay. By seizing Tambu Bay, the artillery could now take up a good position to better support the troops. Further north, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer was reorganizing his 15th brigade for a new attack against the Old Vickers position. On July 24th, he held an officers conference at Gwaibolom. Hammer laid out plans to employ the 58/59th battalion against Erskine Creek and Old Vickers. The commander of the 58/59th, Lt Colonel Patrick Starr received the order from Hammer, but also a letter directed at him. In the letter Hammer laid out a ton of criticisms against his unit, some of his officers and by implication Starr himself. The main criticisms were based largely on ineffective ground operations such as the unit lacking adequate knowledge of where their neighboring units were or that of the enemy. But as we know, this unit had not received proper training and it really was a baptism under fire kind of situation. But like they say about swimming, sometimes you gotta be thrown into the pool, and boy were they. Following some rather poorly planned and failed attacks back on June 30th, the 58/59th now adopted a more measure approach against the Old Vickers position. Hammer also helped with his reorganizing efforts. Hammer ordered Company A to head further north, while Major Warfe's commandos would take over the defenses for Gwaibolom; General Savige was assigned the 2/7th to help reinforce the 15th brigade; the 2/6th were ordered to advance along the Sugarcane Ridge to clear a way forward, but would run into a 100 Japanese strong position north off the ridge. On July 26th, the Australians concentrated their 25 pounders upon the ridge before launching a frontal assault. Meanwhile Brigadier General Ralph Coane renewed their attack against Roosevelt Ridge on July 27th. Coane ordered the still assembling 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment for the task. 100 men of E company advanced using a creek line parallel to the ridge, going through some thick jungle. They marched single file, hooking back towards a spur that led towards a small knoll on its crest, looking for a way to break the Japanese defenses. But once they reached the crest, they began taking heavy fire and although they established themselves firmly on a shoulder of ground below the ridge, they could advance no further. Meanwhile the 2/6th were lobbing 25 pounders accurately over the Old Vicker's position, forcing the Japanese to flee to the refugee of their underground shelters. It basically had become a routine of taking a bombardment and awaiting some screaming Australians or Americans afterwards for most of the Japanese defenders by this point. However no assault came. On July 28th another bombardment was on its way, but this one was directed on the Coconuts area. Starting at 2:45, two 25 pounders from Tambu Bay fired hundreds of rounds alongside some 3 inch mortars in an attempt to thwart the Japanese from sending reinforcement over to the Old Vickers position. During the final 5 minutes of what was a 15 minute bombardment, it turned into a creeping barrage allowing C Company of the 58/59th to advance. The bombardment made a ton of smoke aiding the men. Three platoons attacked the Old vickers position simultaneously. Platoon 7 of Butch Proby charged across some exposed ground at the center of the position; Platoon 13 of Lt Jack Evans attacked the left; while Platoon 15 of Sergeant Vic Hammond attacked from the right. The platoons managed to successfully overrun the Japanese forward bunkers and reached the crest just as the unsuspecting Japanese there were emerging from their dugouts. A heavy firefight broke out, but it was the defenders who began fleeing for their lives towards the Coconuts area. As the men consolidated the Old vickers position they found 17 dead Japanese, but also a large amount of abandoned booty. A 70mm gun with 300 shells, 4 light machine guns, 1 medium machine gun and 28 rifles which the Australians gladly grabbed. Hammer expected the Japanese to launch a vicious counterattack so he rapidly ordered the 2/7th battalion to send the fresh A Company of Captain Septimus Cramp over to relieve the exhausted C Company. Meanwhile B Company of the 2/6th were assaulting Sugarcane Ridge being supported by 3 inch mortars and 4 Vickers guns from the 2/6th field regiment along the Tambu Bay coast. Coming from Ambush Knoll, Platoon 10 led by Lt Clive Trethewie made a frontal assault, but machine gun fire from atop Sugarcane Ridge halted them quickly. Platoon 12 led by Sergeant Stan White and Platoon 11 of Lt Ted Exton were hooking around the ridge to attack the enemy's rear. The Japanese defenders had assumed the ridge was too steep in its rear position and were completely taken by surprise by the attack, seeing Extoons Platoon 11 overrun them. The Japanese were forced to flee for their lives. The Japanese attempted a dusk counterattack to reclaim the ridge, but it failed. On July 28th, with E Company stalled, F company was brought up to help out, taking up a position to E Company's left. They both tried to assault the ridge together, but gained little ground and were forced to dig in as the Japanese harassed them with counterattacks. The problem really was the Japanese were simply too well dug in. They held a steep narrow crest on the ridge, with the typical camouflaged pillboxes, mutually supporting machine gun nests, an intricate network of underground tunnels, lets call it the “Japanese special” haha, it will be seen quite often going forward into this war. The allied artillery and mortar bombardments could do little to actually hurt the Japanese, but it did cause them to take shelter within their tunnels, then there was the hope the assaulting forces got close enough before the Japanese stormed out again, which feels a lot like battles from WW1. In the meantime Major Roosevelt's battalion were working to cut off the Japanese supply routes to the ridge. He dispatched multiple patrols to take up positions along junctions and tracks between Scout ridge, Roosevelt Ridge and Mount Tambu. The men ran into skirmishes with Japanese supply efforts, greatly hindering them. But with the lack of progress by Coane's force concerned certain commanders like General Savige who began to criticize Coane for a lack of control and discipline over the men. Savige ordered him to push on immediately to capture Roosevelt Ridge, but in response Coane protested that he needed more reinforcements to seize the heavily fortified position. Likewise the lack of progress over at Mount Tambu was also annoying commanders. Taylor Force had just relieved the exhausted 2/5th battalion on the 28th. Several companies consisting of around 400 men from the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment coming over from Nassau Bay took up positions around Mount Tambu. Australian mortar crews and stretcher bearers remaining in the line to support their American comrades with one company of the 2/5th staying behind likewise. Moten planned for a new attack, slated for the 30th, to be followed with attacks against Goodview Junction and Orodubi by the 2/5th and 2/6th respectively. To open up the new attack, 8 105mm guns positioned at Buigap Creek Valley alongside 5 25 pounders position at Tambu Bay opened fire in the morning firing around 200 rounds per gun for an hour and a half. The Americans began their assault with Platoons 2 and 3 charging the ridge while Platoon 1 awaited in reserve. For 45 minutes the two leading platoons moved 150 meters across the Japanese front's right shoulder. They managed to knock out 6 out of 8 bunkers on the shoulder before attempting to advance further, but the defenders second tier line three meters higher up opened fire upon them and numerous grenades came rolling down the slope. The fire was too much, with the defenders using their tunnel and trench system to deadly effect taking up numerous positions to fire down on the Americans. The two platoons were halted dead in their tracks as the third platoon was brought up, but it made no difference. A legendary figure emerged from this action. For those of you from down unda, you probably already know the story, but for those of you who down, Corporal Leslie Bull Allen became a hero this day. Bull Allen was born in 1918, in Ballarant Victoria and when WW2 broke out he volunteered for service with the 2nd Australian imperial force. He served the 2/5th in Palestine where he became a stretcher bearer. He served in Libya and Syria where he received the nickname Bull for getting a reputation to having a cool head under fire. He was a fairly big boy, 5”11, laborer type build and he had a really deep laugh his comrades would remark “you could hear him a mile off! Bull was thus one of the battalion's most recognisable…and one of its most popular characters”. After facing the Italians, French and Germans, Bull was sent to New Guinea. He had served during the Wau battle where he received a Military medal for carrying out comrades under intense fire, his citation read “Private Allen's bearing and his untiring efforts in tending the wounded and helping with rations and stores were an inspiration”. On July the 30th when the Americans were storming Mount Tambu and got botched down, Allen was one of the stretcher bearers who came running up and by himself carried 12 American servicemen to safety. There's a famous photograph of Bull carrying an American soldier over his shoulders who had been knocked unconscious by a mortar, I do recommend googling it. And of course, I am a Sabaton fan and I would be remiss not to mention there is a song dedicated to Bull Allen, worth a listen. I got to sit down with Sabaton at a bar once in Montreal, the first time they came to north america, by the way, just gloating. Bull Allen received the Silver Star for his heroism from the United States. But as much as I'd like to end it there, I would also like to mention the reality of war. Bull put on a straight face and showed no fear as he saved the men, but as early as 1941 he was showing psychological issues. He had been admitted to a hospital in Libya, suffering from anxiety neurosis, again what we call acute combat stress or combat stress reaction. By the time he saved those boys on Mount Tambu his health was being taxed heavily. Towards the end of 1944, Bull would begin lashing out at superior officers and got himself court martialed and demoted to private. His psychological health, alongside a few bouts of malaria took a horrible toll on him creating numerous anxiety ridden episodes seeing him discharged from duty as he was not deemed medically fit. Bull found it difficult in the post war years suffering from post traumatic stress, and during one point he lost the ability to speak for 6 months. He spent his life after the war working as a laborer and then as a theater nurse at the Ballarat Base hospital. Bull became quite a popular fellow around Ballarant and would pass away on May 11th of 1982 from diabetes and other complications. He is a staple on Anzac Day and a famous image of the Australian war effort during the Pacific War. Mount Tambu was not taken that day, though the first line of bunkers were battered. Moten realized frontally attacking such fortifications was suicide, so he elected to cut off Mount Tambu instead. With the Americans failing, the 2/5th and 2/6th planned attacks changed to taking up positions to surround Mount Tambu. Back on the 29th, Major Warfe took his men to attack what was known as the Timbered knoll held by some Japanese. He sent A Platoon led by John Lewin south along its ridge. They were supported by artillery from Tambu Bay. At 4pm the artillery and mortars started blasting away for 15 minutes. The commandos assaulted the knoll from its northern side, but were quickly pinned down by machine gun fire. Around 10 men advanced along the Bench Cut track east of the Timbered Knoll and attacked it from the south, successfully surprising the defenders, forcing them to flee. Following the capture of the Timbered Knoll, Warfe wanted to press onwards to Orodubi, but Brigadier Hammer ordered his commandos to hold their position as he did not want to open up any gaps along the ridge. Also on the 29th, General Herring for the first time informed General Savige of the true offensive going on which was against Lae rather than Salamaua, indicating to him that the role of his 3rd division was to hold the enemy down in the Salamaua area. Likewise Moten had devised a new plan to drive the enemy from Mount Tambu. It turned out a patrol from the 2/6th had discovered a route going from Ambush Knoll to the Buirali Creek which would allow forces to cut off the Komiatum track, thus isolating the Mount Tambu and Goodview junction. The 2/6 sent 4 patrols out searching for how to ford the Buirali Creek going up to the Kiamatum ridge, some of which probed Japanese positions. To the north, Captain Edwin Griff's B Company of the 58/59th advanced to Buggert preparing to attack the Coconuts area. On the 30th as they began their attack, they were met with heavy fit around 80 yards south of the South Coconuts. Forced to dig in the Australians spent the night repelling 3 counterattacks with a handful of men receiving some nasty bayonet and knife wounds. By the morning of the 31st Griff was down to 38 effective men and at 7:20am a 4th Japanese counterattack consisting of a hundred or so men overwhelmed his position. Griff was forced to withdraw to a village west of the Old Vickers position. While this was going on, Hammer had sent companies over to cut the Komiatum and Bench tracks using his A company and C Company. Moten reinforced him with A company of the 2/7th in the hopes such actions would press the Japanese to move more units from Lae over the Salamaua area. It was a huge success as by the end of July the Salamaua area counted with more than 8000 troops. However with all of these troops at Salamaua also required the allies to boost up their commitment in the area, thus Brigadier Raymond Monaghan with the 29th brigade were landed at Nassau Bay for the task. They were assigned to reinforce the Coane force which was still struggling against Roosevelt ridge. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi decided to reinforce Lae's defenses. He deployed the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment who would be coming over from Finschhafen, however they would never make it to Lae as by the time they were going to depart they were forced to stay put because the Australians were threatening the region. Adachi also ordered the Shoge detachment of Major General Shoge Ryoichi to depart Wewak. His force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 238th regiment and a battalion of the 41st mountain artillery regiment. Elements of the 238th regiment began leaving Wewak traveling in groups of 3 motor landing crafts every two nights. Each MLC had 50 men and their supplies packed in like sardines. Soon small fishing boats were also carrying 20 men, by late July the 2nd battalion, 238th had all moved from Wewak to Alexishafen. From Alexishafen they traveled again by night and by MLC to Finschhafen and from there finally to Lae. However due to increased attacks and losses upon the MLCS countless men would be left at Finschhafen. Some were ordered to march overland to Lae, but it was a nightmare of a trip. On August 1st, the 1st battalion, 80th regiment had taken up positions along the side of the Old Vickers position and began firing upon its defenders. They were covered by mortars as they charged up the steep terrain in an enveloping movements towards Grassy Knoll. Captain Edwin Griff's B company harassed them from the west, and by the following morning the 2/7th battalion were able to push the Japanese back. To the north in the Coconuts, Pimple Knoll and the Sugarcane Knoll more Japanese attacks were occurring, but the defenders held the former Japanese fortifications giving them a distinct edge. By the afternoon the Japanese were sniping men in the Old Vickers and Sugarcane Knoll, trying to cover their assault units. By August 3rd, the Japanese unleashed another assault against the entire perimeter, seeing the fiercest fighting take place in an area in front of the 8th Platoon led by Corporal Alan Naismith. Alan ended up crawling forward with grenades in hand before tossing them down the steep slopes of Old Vickers killing many Japanese. Seeing the battle going nowhere, the Japanese unleashed a banzai charge at night as a last ditch effort to break through, but were ultimately forced to withdraw. Seeing three full days of frontal assaults fail, the Japanese then elected to advance further south along a ridge and dug in between the Old Vickers and Buggert. This threatened to encircle the 2/7th, so Griff's B Company were ordered to restore the line of communications to Old Vickers. Griff ordered a concentrated bombardment of 30 mortars before his company stormed the slope the Japanese dug in on. Two platoons quickly broke through towards Sugarcane Knoll and in the process forced the Japanese to withdraw back over to the Coconuts area. Griff then ordered his company to perform mop up operations as some Japanese had stayed in their foxholes. Yet the performance overall for the 58/59th had displeased Hammer who now decided to place them under Major Warfe's command. They would also be redeployed over to the Gwaibolom area, while the commandos would take over their Old Vickers position. For a few days the 2/7th performed patrols around the Coconuts area to prepare for a final attack against it. Over at Mount Tambu, on August 4th, Captain Cam Bennett's B Company and Walters A Company of the 2/5th successfully surprise attacked the defenders atop a small knoll known as Hodge's Knoll. However they were soon met with heavy counterattacks from three sides dislodging them in the late afternoon. The next day, Moten ordered the 2/6th battalion to advance along the Stephens Track, while its D company led by Captain Harold Laver would take an alternate path towards the Komiatum ridge heading north of Goodview. During the afternoon, a forward patrol of Company D found a route through the jungle to Komiatum village, but the route proved very difficult for the full company to traverse. Alongside this discovery, a patrol from Taylor Force found a small ridge north of Komiatum that was unoccupied named Davidson ridge. By August 6th, Moten and Savige concluded their plan to isolate and reduce Mount Tambu. The 2/6th would secure Komiatum ridge to the northwest; Coane Force would hit Roosevelt and Scout ridge; Lt Colonel Charlie Davidsons 42nd battalion would hit a key ridge to the north, Ie: the one that was to be called Davidson; the 2/5th would hit Goodview junction and the 15th brigade would contain assault the Coconuts area containing the enemy at Tambu knoll and Orodubi. General Herring liked the plan and urged General Savige to quote "drive Coane on to the capture of Roosevelt Ridge even if the cost is higher than he cares about". Herring also added that he could take Savige's requests to the higher authorities and upon stating that Savige immediately requested Coane and Major Roosevelt be relieved of their commands. Again a lot of the interpersonal and command issues were due to MacArthurs tampering with Alamo Force. Brigadier Coane was told by Fuller he was a separate command from MacKechnie and Colonel Roosevelt continuously refused to obey orders from MacKechnie stating he was not under Australian command. It took until July 19th, for Herring to clarify things that the Australians were in charge of operations in the Nassau Bay area. Combine this with the lack of progress and it was no surprise people were gunning to sack another. On August 7th the first units of Davidsons 42nd battalion landed at Nassau bay at 2am and Coane requested that Davidson immediately march north. Davidson refused to do so until his men got a hot meal and some sleep angering Coane. Then when Davidson and his men reach Duali he was informed Major Stephen Hodgman was waiting with orders from Moten that it was he who was taking operational command. Coane was only to have command over supply communications and rations. When Davidson reached Tambu Bay on the 8th he met with Coane who was greatly frustrated that he was unable to use Davidsons units to hit Roosevelt ridge. Coane told him “If I can't do as I want with you, I don't consider you under my command at all”. It was quite fortunate as MacArthur soon relieved Coane and Roosevelt of their commands. As General Savige would later write “MacArthur asked me for my views on Coane and Roosevelt and I gave them strongly…I had my bags packed but MacArthur supported me”. Thus MacArthur sides with Herring and Savige and as a result Colonel MacKechnie was given back command over the 162nd regiment which was taken away from the 41st division directly under Savige's command. So much sneaky maneuvering going on by MacArthur's team. On August the 9th Savige visited Motens HQ, then Hammers, then the 58/59th battalions and finally the 2/6th. He was making a tour of the front lines trying to raise morale for the Australians. The next day, the 42nd battalion finally got into position at Tambu Bay where they received confirmation of their orders to seize Davidson ridge. By the 11th the men were climbing the ridge, facing no opposition and it was fully occupied by the 12th. Also on the 12th, MacKechnie began his attack against Roosevelt ridge deploying his 2nd battalion on the right flank and the 3rd on the left. The 2nd battalion established a position on the ridge crest rappelling several counterattacks throughout the day. After a 1.5hr artillery barrage of over 2000 rounds the 2nd battalion charged the ridge and successfully breached the Japanese line in three points. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were fighting for their lives, but by nightfall two Australian companies were now occupying high knolls around 500 yards apart. The 3rd battalion, 238th regiment had just begun arriving to Salamaua and were quickly redirected to help out the men on Roosevelt ridge. It would all be for naught however as by the 14th, the Australians pushed the Japanese to the eastern end of the ridge. From a Historian who covered the 41st division “At about 13:15 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet white-capped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark a s it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75-mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20-mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine-guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score or more Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy.” By the late afternoon, Roosevelt Ridge was finally firmly in the hands of the allies. MacKechnie could not however advance any further as his lines were already overextended. The Japanese withdrew to the nearby Scout Ridge where the 238th regiment reinforcements also came to defend. While this was occurring the 2/7th were advancing upon the Coconuts area. Captain Andrew Rooke led the Bena platoon of Company A alongside Platoon 9 to hit the steep eastern approaches of the South coconuts; Captain Fred Barr's B company advanced upon the North Coconuts from the west. August the 14th began with a heavy airstrike made up of 22 B-24's and 7 B-17's. Starting at 9:30am as told to us by Axel Olsen observing from the Old Vickers “with a noise like the rushing of a great wind', the bombs passed over the heads of the waiting assault troops. ‘Trees, logs and other rubbish flew through the fall [sic] of dust which now cloaked the target.' The observers at Old Vickers observed, ‘It seemed that nothing could have lived in the midst of devastation loosed by the planes.” At 10:10 artillery began to bombard the area for an hour and half. As the artillery ceased, 3 inch mortars continued to fire covering the approach of the infantry who were using smoke bombs. As Axel Olsen wrote observing from the Old Vickers “came a terribly fierce raking with Vickers guns firing through the haze from smoke bombs”. The Australian assault battered the north coconuts position which was guarded by two pillboxes connected to weapon pits using crawl trenches. The area had suffered hard from the bombardments easily allowing the Australians to seize it. However the southern defenses of the south Coconuts found defenders resisting hard in their trenches. The center Coconuts position like the north had nearly been obliterated by the bombing allowing B company to make progress, but soon they were pulling back to the north coconuts position. During the night, allied platoons came across a Japanese communication line going over the Salamua-Bobdubi track, so they cut it to prevent reinforcements. For the next two days, patrols and mortar fire were harassing the south coconuts defenders gradually forcing them to evacuate. By August the 17th the Coconuts and northern end towards Bobdubi were firmly in Australian hands. With all of these gains in hand, Moten was finally ready to attack Komiatum. On August the 15th, Captain Edgar's A Company, Captain Laver's D Company of the 2/6th battalion took up a position due west of Laver's Knoll. Yes the future names of these knolls and ridges really does seem to give away what happens in the stories haha. Laver's Knoll was a key feature of the Komiatum ridge and taking it would allow the allies to apply more pressure upon the enemy. On the morning of the 16th, the 2/5th battalion performed a diversionary attack against Goodview, while A and B Companies advanced up the Komiatum ridge under a creeping barrage. The men were fortunate as the Japanese were forced to flee during the artillery fire, allowing Laver's knoll to be seized quite easily. The men dug in immediately allowing Lt Les Johnson's platoon 17 to capture, you guessed it Johnson's knoll. During WW2 if you really wanted something named after you, all you had to do was travel to Green Hell. Johnson and his men dug in on the knoll and soon Japanese fire was directed at them. Japanese counterattacks were lobbed from their south and west before nightfall, but they managed to hold on. During the night the 42nd battalion began using Vicker guns and mortars from Davidson ridge to help harass the enemy. Around dawn on the 17th, the Japanese unleashed another counter attack against Johnson knoll, this time the enemy got within just meters of the Australian defenders. After dusk even more counterattacks were made seeing 217 deaths, 380 wounded and 301 sick Japanese after all was said and done. The attacks were tossed back and soon Vickers machine guns were brought up to Laver's Knoll to add to the Japanese misery. Unable to break the allied push onto the Komiatum ridge, the Japanese began to become more and more desperate. Artillery and aerial bombardment on top of enveloping maneuvers by the Australians were taking a heavy toll. The Japanese had suffered over 900 casualties since July 23rd and with more and more men dying by the minute, General Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum to be carried out on the night of August 19th. Nakano was still under the illusion Salamaua was the main target. The next day the Taylor Force and 2/5th found Mount Tambu and Goodview suddenly unoccupied and finally seized their objectives. General Savige personally came over to congratulate the men who took Laver's knoll, but this was to be his last action in command of the 3rd division. Blamey decided to replace Savige with the commander of the 5th division General Edward Milford. Milford would later find out the reason for Savige's sacking was because General Herring was greatly annoyed that a supply line to the coast had not been opened, which was desperately needed to relieve supply aircraft for the upcoming attack on Lae. Herring told Milford that Savige had never visited the front line because he was too old, but as I just mentioned this was false, Savage had in fact visited Mubo and Komiatum. Major General Frank Berryman working in Blamey's HQ, who remained quite close to the man, who often sought out his advice believed General Herring was unjustified in his sacking of Savige. Berryman would point out “ Herring ‘not giving Savige a fair burl… Savige having to fight Herring as well as Japs. Savige had done well and we had misjudged him'.Savige bitterly handed over his command, greatly disappointed he would not get to see the final capture of Salamaua. But he did not depart unrewarded, as he received a Companion of the order of Bath for his services during the campaign with his citation reading; Maj-Gen. Savige had control of the Battle for Salamaua from 30 Jun. 43 till his relief on 26 Aug. 43. The battle was finally won on 11 Sep. 43—the credit for victory must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige during whose period of command, the back of the enemy's defence was broken. The nature of the country rendered great assistance to the defender, and careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem. Maj-Gen. Savige triumphed over all these difficulties, his men were kept supplied, they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and to overcome great difficulties of terrain. Maj-Gen. Savige's plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the Allied cause, and Maj-Gen. Savige by his fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the United nations. The victories won over the enemy at the battles for Mubo and Komiatum were due to his well conceived plans and energetic execution. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Salamaua and Lae was drawing ever closer. The boys down unda had seized control over vital positions forcing the Japanese into more and more desperate defensive measures taking horrifying casualties in the process.

Episode 3 Senior Rater Narrative on the Officer Evaluation Reports Guest LTC Chad Handley

Be All You Can Be MSC

Play Episode Play 36 sec Highlight Listen Later Aug 18, 2023 34:04

Guest LTC Chad Handley, discusses the components needed in the Senior Rater narrative of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). LTC Handley has a unique experience and exposure to reviewing OERs as a Deputy Consultant. We also discuss tips for earning the top block and managing your rating profile if you are a Rater or Senior Rater. LTC Chad Handley is the current commander of the 56th Multifunctional Medical Battalion. He is a native of Houston, Texas and served in the Texas Army National Guard from March 1997 – August 2002 as a Signal Support Systems Specialist. In May 2004, he was commissioned from the University of Houston ROTC program as a Medical Service Corps officer. LTC Handley's assignments include Brigade Medical Supply Office OIC, Treatment Platoon Leader, and Company Executive Officer XO, C Company, 526th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT)/101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Ft. Campbell, KY; Battalion Rear Detachment XO, 2nd BSB, 2d BCT/2d Infantry Division (ID), Ft. Carson, CO; Brigade Support Medical Company Commander and Battalion Operations Officer (Afghan Partnership), 704th BSB, 4th BCT/4ID; Ft. Carson, CO; Accountable Officer and Chief, Materiel Management Division, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center Europe, Pirmasens, Germany; Deputy Commander for Operations, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Center – Korea, Camp Carroll, Republic of Korea; Deputy 70K (Health Services Materiel Officer) Consultant, and Chief, Logistics Plans and Readiness Division (G-43), Office of The Surgeon General/ U.S. Army Medical Command, Falls Church, VA. LTC Handley deployed to Southern Baghdad in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07 from September 2005 – September 2006 and to Jalalabad, Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom X from June 2009 – June 2010. His military education includes the AMEDD Officer Basic Course; the Medical Logistics Officer Course; the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, where he was the Distinguished Honor Graduate of his class; the Air Assault Course; the Support Operations Phase II Course; the Joint Planners Course; the Command and General Staff Officer's Course; the HQDA Action Officer Indoctrination Course, and the Joint Medical Senior Leader's Course. His awards and badges include the Bronze Star Medal (1OLC), the Valorous Unit Award, the Meritorious Service Medal (4OLC), the Army Commendation Medal, the Joint Service Achievement Medal (1OLC), Army Achievement Medal (2OLC), the Afghanistan Campaign Medal (2CS), Iraq Campaign Medal (2CS), the Korean Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Service Medal, the Overseas Service Ribbon (with Numeral 4), NATO Medal, German Armed Forces Proficiency Badge (Gold), Air Assault Badge and Army Staff Identification Badge. LTC Handley is a recipient of the Order of Military Medical Merit. LTC Handley holds a BBA in Management Information Systems from the University of St. Thomas (2003) and an MBA from The Pennsylvania State University (2012). PPCS: P- Performance specifically enumeration and peer comparison P- Promotion Potential C- Command S- School specifically primary military education (PME) Army Regulation 623-3, Evaluation System Reporting https://armypubs.army.mil/Disclaimer: The views expressed in this podcast are the guests and host's alone and do not reflect the official position of the Medical Service Corps, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. All information discussed is unclassified approved for public release and found on open cleared sources.For more episodes listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube @ Be All You Can Be MSC For more information, suggestions, or questions please contact: beallyoucanbemsc@gmail.com

- 88 - Pacific War - The Mysterious Battle of the Pips, July 25 - 1 August, 1943

Cold War Conversations History Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 31, 2023 41:21

Last time we spoke about the allied drive to Munda and General Sasaki's major counter offensive. General Wing began the drive upon Munda Point, but General Sasaki predicted many of the routes the Americans would take and ordered his forces to create tedious roadblocks and defensive positions to foil their advances. The allied progress was brutally slow, despite having the enormous advantage in artillery, naval and aerial bombardment support. The Japanese pillboxes were proving to be devastating to the allied infantry, requiring tanks to be brought over to New Georgia. When things began to halt, suddenly General Sasaki performed a counter offensive seeing a daring attack directed at the headquarters of the 43rd division. The attack nearly broke the lines of communications, but luckily the Fijian commandos outperformed the japanese at their own game of night fighting. Lastly the IJN suffered terrible losses to allied aircraft collapsing their reinforcement efforts. This episode is the Mysterious Battle of the Pips Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The battles in New Guinea and New Georgia were particularly bloody, in all honesty things had begun to really escalate when you look at it from a numerical point of view. Over on Green Hell, General Savige had just seized Mubo, the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill taking them out of Japanese hands. The Japanese had withdrawn to Komiatum while simultaneously trying to defend the Bobdubi ridge area against Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade. General Savige, still unaware Salamaua was not the main target and in fact was being used as a deception to cover for Lae, continued his offensive, hoping to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River. Over on the other side, General Nakano's 1st battalion of the 80th regiment had managed to push Companies B and A off their ambush position on the Bench Cut Track. They were forced to withdraw towards Gwaibolom by July 10th. Meanwhile to the south Major Warfe launched an attack along Goodview junction. Captain Wally Meares of C platoon marched up Stephens Track while Captain John Winterflood's B platoon took Walpoles track. Lt Hugh Egan created a blocking position using just 7 men around 800 meters south of Goodview Junction. The platoons went to work advancing down the steep ridges dislodging Japanese from outposts. Captain Meares platoon were continuing along the Stephens track when they suddenly encountered strong resistance from some Japanese who took a position along the Tambu Saddle which is at a junction between Stephens track and the Mule track. After engaging the Japanese, the platoon was forced to bypass them moving along the Mule track towards the Komiatum track where they ran into more Japanese. Meares men killed 13 Japanese on the Mule track before deciding to withdraw back to the Stephens track and dug in. The Japanese had surprised Warfe's men. The forces they were running into were mainly the 1st and 2nd companies of the 66th battalion along with Araki's HQ staff who had been on the run from Mubo to Komiatum. The Japanese tried to press on with a counter attack aimed at Winterflood's B platoon. The Japanese tossed mortar and machine gun fire, but received terrible losses to the commandos, forced to pull back up Walpole track. The next day Warfe ordered Winterflood's platoon to make a frontal assault, but quickly found themselves pinned down by machine gun fire and during the night received a heavy counter attack that forced them to dig in. The Japanese continued to block the way, covering their withdrawal further east, but all the mayhem prompted General Savige to relieve the commandos by tossing up companies C and B of the 2/5th who adopted the name Bennett force as they were led by Captain Cam Bennett. The rest of the 2/5th marched up the Buigap. Meanwhile General Herring was dealing with a supply issue for the 3rd Australian division. The 3rd division was too far from the coast and thus had been relying on supply via airdrops, which we have seen during this series to not be particularly accurate and quite inadequate. The supply problems mounted more when the decision was made to target Lae as such a campaign required building up reserve dumps. Warfe's men were critically low on supplies; the 58/59th had nearly used up all the supplies they received, being brought up via the Missim Track and from airdrops. Getting further and further away from the source of supplies and with declining carrier capacity, Warfe's men were reaching starvation point. Further back, Companies A and C of the 2/6th battalion got drafted the job of moving the supplies from Mubo to Buigap creek. General Herring considered it extremely difficult, but not impossible to maintain further units in the Salamaua area, if they were closer to the coasts. To solve the problem General Herring designated Tambu Bay as a new coastal base for supplies and it would also help as an artillery position. And thus, the 3rd battalion, 162nd regiment of Major Archibald Roosevelt landed at Nassau Bay back on July 12th commencing with their coastal advance. They were accompanied by Brigadier General Ralph Coane's artillery that had landed prior to them. Yet their advance would begin in an extremely confused and chaotic manner. The question of command was at the core of the issue, General Fuller had decided to separate units such as Archibald Roosevelts from the MacKechnie Force, and thus they were now placed under the command of the Coane Force. General Herring was forced to intervene, placing the Coane Force under General Savige. At the same time, Colonel MacKechnie was relieved of his command because Fuller felt that he had favored the Australians over the Americans. To dig depper into this mess, what occurred was General Savige and Colonel MacKechnie were both unaware that two-thirds of the 162nd regiment had been allocated to the Coane Force when General Herring sent the a confusing message to try and clarify things “all units MACK force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div”. Troubles began at Moten ordered Major Roosevelt to advance north, but Roosevelt had also been told by General Fuller that he was not under Australian command. Thus Roosevelt bluntly replied to Moten “For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior”. Then MacKechnie tried to smooth things over with Moten when he was informed of Fuller's position. He apologized for Roosevelt's message, and tried to speak about how great all the Australian/American cooperation was going. Fuller and Herring then tried to clarify the situation by placing the Coane Force under General Savige, but Fuller also decided to dismiss MacKechnie, mostly because he had relinquished command of his men to the Australians and thus had failed to protect American interests. As I say on my personnel channel, often when talking about China's Warlords in the 1920's, this is some kindergarten bullshit. Back to the action at hand, the Coane Force was being aided by a Papuan company who were scouting ahead of the Americans. They managed to confirm that Tambu Bay and the Dot Inlet were occupied and fortified by the Japanese. A platoon of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were holding a position on Tambu Bay while the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were on a ridge overlooking the bay, which would later be named Roosevelt Ridge. On July 18th, Roosevelt led the troops with Companies L and I taking the lead, guided by two Papuan platoons. L Company with a Papuan company advanced along an inland track while K Company likewise did so along the coast. K Companies's Papuan guides hit a Japanese outpost south of Boisi on July 18th. On the morning of the 20th, the Papuan platoon managed to kill four Japanese before K Company helped destroy the outpost. By the 20th they seized Boisi and Roosevelt with the others approached the Tambu bay. Roosevelt had Coane's artillery support, they brought up four 25 pounders of the 2/6th Australian field regiment originally placed at Nassau Bay along with 2 batteries of the 218th American field artillery battalion, 8 75mm guns from north Salus, a battery of the 205th American field artillery battalion and 4 105mm guns. Under the cover the artillery they attacked the enemy, but they were met with heavy mortar fire coming from Roosevelt Ridge. Roosevelt Ridge extended westwards from the sea for nearly 2000 yards, forming kind of bulwark that shielded the northern end of Tambu Bay. Thus Tambu Bay could not be secured unless the ridge was taken first. The Australian broadcasting commission correspondent, Peter Hemery described the ridge like this “a piece of old style razer blade jutting into the sea”. According to some Japanese sources they had this to say of it “The area around Boisi had a lay of land most suitable to the arrest of the enemy advancing northward along the coast” General Nakano had also decided to reinforce the ridge with 250 men of the 1st battalion, 115th regiment, but of course this came at the coast of Salamaua's defense. By this point the bulk of the 102nd regiment was at the Malolo-buang coastal area and the bulk of the 115th regiment, the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, two companies of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 14th field artillery regiment were at Salamaua, around 150 men in total. On the other side, after the fall of Mubo Brigadier Moten had the men advance north. The Bennet Force took over Goodview Junction; Companies A and D of the 2/5th advanced to Mount Tambu. Mount Tambu was the highest feature along the route between Mubo and Salamaua. It consisted of a series of razorback ridges covered in dense jungle, ideal for camouflage pillboxes. Its area was defended by roughly 700 Japanese from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 66th regiment led by Lt Colonel Fukuzo Kimura and Major Sakai Sugiyama. On July 16th, Captain Mick Walter led 60 men of Company A up the steep track leading to the south crest of Mount Tambu. Walter led the men to storm the two forward knolls, taking the Japanese by complete surprise. The two knolls were captured, but during the night the Japanese counterattacked in force. The Japanese crawled up the knolls through some heavy undergrowth before they unleashed mortars and mountain gun fire. Walters men however had captured some Japanese pillboxes upon the two knolls and thus the turn tables. 8 counterattacks were tossed at Walters men, each repulsed with heavy losses, around 39 casualties for the Australians and 350 for the Japanese. The following day, D company came up to help the Australian defenders, bringing much needed mortars. They dug in on a knoll around 300 yards back on the track. Alongside D company also came much needed supplies and an additional platoon to reinforce his men who he deployed on his western flank. On July 18th, Walter ordered an advance going northwest in an attempt to secure the southern portion of Mount Tambu. The advance was spearheaded by Lance Corporal Jackson who alongside his comrades tossed grenades into a Japanese pillbox. Jackson then stormed inside killing 3 Japanese with this Tommy gun. Alongside Jackson, mortar and mountain gun fire aided Walters men to gain 80 additional yards, securing the southern portion of Mount Tambu. They could advance no further however as it became much more difficult from this position as the Japanese basically were encircling them upon razer back ridge to their north. Walter would write later on “we dug in on the new ground and shortened our perimeter to the narrowing plateau”. For this action the Australians paid with 6 lives, 13 wounded while the Japanese lost 82. At this point Walter had D company with one of his platoon holding the western flank; A company held the northern knoll and two platoons from D company held the eastern knolls. The Japanese had been devastated, losing hundreds of men and allied artillery was becoming a nightmare. Captain Newman's C Company of the 162nd battalion had come to a junction of the Buigap and Bui Eo. From there a reconnaissance patrol found suitable artillery positions northwest of the junction. With the help of native carriers and 80 men of the 2/6th battalion, two guns were hauled over the Buigap track and by July 17th another 4 guns of the American 218th battalion were hauled up from the southern arm of the Bitoi river to Green Hill. From these positions the allies could smash multiple Japanese defensive positions. General Nakano realized Mount Tambu was an essential component of General Muroya's defensive line so he sent the remainder of the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment to reinforce Colonel Araki's men. Then during the early hours of July 19th a large earth tremor startled the Australian defenders. It was the prelude to an assault led by Captain Kunizo Hatsugai's 9th company of the 66th regiment. They had crept up silently managing to get behind the southern knolls then suddenly charged up under the cover of darkness. But the defenders had their guard up and were not taken by surprise. A Bren gunner managed to knock out one of the Japanese raiders machine guns with a lucky hit in the dark. As the Japanese scrambled to try and recover it they were met with fire causing severe casualties. The Japanese surprise attack was a failure, forcing them to withdraw by first light, leaving 21 dead across the knoll. While this raid was occuring, Walters men were also repelling a series of attacks against the Northern Knoll. During these attacks, Walter was injured. Luckily for Walter and his company, they were relieved on the 19th by D Company. Another American unit, C Company of the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment led by Captain Delmar Newman also arrived to take up a position on the southern knolls. Until july 23rd, the Australians limited their actions to patrols. On the 20th, Bennet led a patrol making contact with a strong Japanese position on the Walpole track; Another company led by Morse found a Japanese position in the Goodview area dug within 100 yards of their own. Meanwhile the Japanese also limited their actions to a few patrols proding Mount Tambu for weaknesses. On July 23rd Moten ordered the 2/5th battalion to attack the remaining Japanese positions on the Tambu Knoll, but it was the most heavily fortified yet. Basically it was like a castle keep, complete with a ravine for a moat, near vertical walls and deep tunnels going through the knoll. Mount Tambu's peak held 10 log reinforce bunkers connected by the tunnels which could shelter half a battalion or so. They also had a chain of weapon pits set up on lower ledges. Later on when investigating the entire system, the allies found weapon pits to be around 4 logs thick, interconnected by crawl trenches. Many of these weapon puts had been carefully sited within the roots of large trees, making them impervious to allied artillery fire. The tunnel entrances were dug into the side of the peak directly behind the defensive positions, allowing the defenders to storm out from their shelters underground within seconds. It was these kind of ingenious defensive works that would be built upon later on in the war to create absolute nightmares for the allies. Moten had not carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese positions prior to ordering the attack and thus many of his subordinates elected to make a frontal assault instead of encircling them. D company took the center for the frontal attack while to the left were the 16th platoon led by Sergeant Alvin ‘Hungry' Williams and the 18th platoon led by Lt Bernard Leonads; and A company advanced along a Caffins track heading for the western flank of Mount Tambu to try and cut off the main Japanese supply route going back to Komiatum. 15 minutes before they charged, Australian and American artillery and mortars fired upon Mount Tambu. Two Australian mountain guns fired 90 rounds while the 4 75mm American guns fired 60 per gun from Green hill. D company began their attack around midday, trying to drive a wedge between two lines of pillboxes. Corporal John Smith laid cover fire as Captain Lin Cameron crept forward, getting within 15 yards of the pill boxes on the left side of the track. Cameron counted around 7 pill boxes in two lines of defense going across both sides of the track. The steep slopes on both sides gave little venues of approach, allowing around just a platoon at a time. There was also sharpened bamboo pickets on the left flank, leading Cameron to believe that an attack was expected there. The Japanese knowingly let two platoons reach their line of forward pillboxes before unleashing hell upon them. The casualties were terrible. As Cameron recounted, “we were within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers before all hell let loose”. One of the men in the forward sections was killed outright, Cameron was wounded, his right elbow was shattered by a machine gun bullet. As he saw his men hesitate, he screamed out “forward! Get stuck into them!” With his right arm now useless and his eyesight dimming, Cameron handed command over to Lt Martin. Despite the horror, the Australians pressed on. Corporal Carey led his depleted platoon forward in a great dash and swept the outer ring of the Japanese pillboxes. On his left were Leonards men who stormed two pillboxes before heavy enfilade fire pinned them down. Then the 17th platoon led by Corporal John Smith charged up Mount Tambu from behind with their bayonets fixed. Smith screamed out “follow me!” as he charged. 3 other men out of the 11 managed to keep up with Smith, but soon Japanese grenades began to rain down on them. The grenades caught them just as they passed a third line of pillboxes. Smith was hit, but he kept charging and when he reached the peak of Mount Tambu with his back to the enemy he screamed “come on boys! come on boys!”. Without additional support and with no indication A company were making progress over on the left flank, the 4 men on the peak were forced to withdraw. The gallant Smith had to be dragged down and would die from severe wounds two days later. Smith was decorated for bravery in Syria in 1941, when he cleared out 3 machine gun nests at a roadblock and despite being wounded during the battle of Wau he still had gas left in the tank for some more. Scouts had made their way towards the Tambu saddle track and spotted Japanese soldiers, around 125 of them a full company or so. The scouts quickly realized they were outnumbered, thus when the artillery began to open up and Walter's company moved in for the attack across the saddle, no sooner then they started the enemy halted them in their tracks. Walter had no choice but to withdraw around 500 yards south east as the Japanese were too strong. Walter's inability to make progress in the west ultimately ruined the entire attack. Despite the defeat, Companies A and D had done very well against such a heavily fortified position. Meanwhile, Warfe and his men were marching when they discovered Ambush Knoll had come back under the hands of some Japanese from the 2nd battalion, 66th regiment. On July 15th, Warfes commandos launched an attack, with C Platoon performing a frontal assault along the narrow ridge top track. There were 16 men in the attack and they found themselves face to face with well dug in Japanese. The Japanese were behind a bamboo barricade with some pillboxes scattered about. The platoon got within 50 feet of the main barricade, but the Japanese fire was too much and casualties were mounting quickly. Meanwhile B Platoon was maneuvering around the Japanese eastern flank. At 5:30 B Platoon began attacking the eastern side of the knoll. The men got behind an enemy pillbox covering the track from Orodubi, but the Japanese quickly saw the Australians and began tossing grenades at them. Despite the resistance, B Platoon managed cut off the Japanese supply line to Ambush Knoll. With their supply lines cut the Japanese were forced to withdraw With Ambush Knoll back under allied control, Brigadier Hammer ordered A company of the 58/59th battalion to depart Gwaibolom and attack Orodubi from its southern flank. Even with the help of the 58/59th company, the commando's yet again failed to dislodge the Japanese. On the night of July 19th, fresh troops of the 1st company, 80th battalion used the light of the full moon to come up the ridge. This became a staging point for them to attack Ambush Knoll, seeing artillery fire beginning in the morning to support their attack. Warfe's commandos were manning the trenches on Ambush Knoll, turning the tables on the Japanese and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. The Japanese were forced to retreat. The next day Warfe reinforced Ambush Knoll with two Vickers guns, which gave the Japanese a nasty surprise when they attacked again. On the 20th, the Japanese opened fire with mortars and artillery before charging the ridge. They managed to get as far as to cut the Australian lines of communication, but were ultimately repealed once again. Over 14 consecutive attacks would be made on the 20th, and even more on the 21st, but it all came to nothing, Warfe's commandos held their ground. Facing such pressure from the Japanese, Hammer still felt the greater weight of their attention was directed at Bobdubi and not towards Tambu, believing it to all be a consequence of Moton's lack of progress. General Savige decided to order Motens 2/6th battalion to take responsibility over Bobdubi ridge. The 2/6th then came across the Japanese rear near the slopes of Ambush Knoll and began harassing them. On the 22nd the Japanese tried yet again to attack Ambush Knoll, but were beaten back firmly, forcing them to finally withdraw to Sugarcane Ridge. By July 23rd, Warfes' exhausted commandos earned a relief by the 2/6th and were sent to relieve A company at Gwaibolom, while A company advanced north. The 2/6th likewise would advance north. But now we are moving away from the troubles of New Guinea and heading back up north to the frigid Aleutians. After the successful seizure of Attu, now Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner needed to plan the invasion of Kiska. Kiska was the last Japanese bulwark in the Aleutians and held an incredible underground city. There were miles of tunnels, buried ammunition dumps, barracks, 3 hospitals, dental clinics, mess halls, machine shops, warehouses, photo labs, telephone rooms, all shoved and shored with wood. Ventilation pipes connected the maze of caves and tunnels, with Japanese troops wearing great fur lined coats busy at work. The Americans had experienced hell, on Attu, over 2872 Japanese had been killed or committed suicide, just 28 men were captured and it cost 549 american lives, 1148 wounded and nearly another 2000 ill or battered by harsh climate. The American leadership expected Kiska to be another hellscape and did not want to come at it lightly. The 7th division led by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolrd, Buckner's 4th regiment, the 87th Mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade, consisting of the 6th Canadian division led by Major General George Pearkes, the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st battalion of Winnipeg grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain rangers regiment and e Regiment de Hull along with the 1st Special Service Force led by Colonel Robert Frederick were to be part of the invasion of Kiska, codenamed Operation Cottage. Unfortunately, the actual invasion will not be happening in this episode, you will actually have to wait weeks for that one, but I just so happened to have recently done a podcast with a Canadian Military Historian named Brad St.Croix from the Youtube channel OTD Military History, the same gentleman who I interviewed for this series about the battle of Hong Kong. The podcast we recently did was on the Canadian experience of the Pacific War and the battle of Kiska is 1/3rd of it, so if you are, impatient and want to learn some neat stuff about how Canadians had to change their entire military organization and use American equipment for the battle of Kiska, check out my Youtube channel, the Pacific War channel for the full episode. Now the last time we spoke about Kiska, the Japanese were forced to perform a bit of a miracle to evacuate their boys. After Attu had fallen, Rear Admiral Akiyama Monzo alongside 6000 men were ordered to evacuate Kiska. To try and do this, the Japanese began by sending 13 I-class submarines of the 1st submarine squadron of Rear Admiral Kouda Takeo. Despite these Type C submarines being enormous in size, they could only carry around 150 men per trip, thus it would have took 40 successful journey's to evacuate the entire Kiska garrison. With the US Navy fully decked out with sonar, this was not going to be a walk in the park. The efforts had begun on May 27th and by July, the submarines had managed to get 800 men safely back to Japan, but lost 300 due to american attacks. Meanwhile Admiral Giffen had a considerable armada to work with consisting of a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. He was ordered to bombard Kiska who already had been smashed with aerial attacks all throughout June and early July. On July 6th, Giffen steamed towards Kiska with 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers and bombarded the island for 22nd minutes causing a handful of casualties. It was not all that impressive, but it convinced Admiral Kawase that the Americans were about to invade Kiska at any moment.Admiral Kawase Shiro realized the futility of the submarine effort and was forced to come up with a new plan. Kawase came up with a bold plan, he was going to wait for a night when a thick fog was occurring and would take a surface fleet to sneak over into the Aleutians to assault enemy warships and evacuate all the remaining men on Kiska in a single go. To be blunt, it was a dumb idea. The American warships were equipped with radar that would pick up any surface ship with ease despite any type of fog, but what was about to occur can only be described as spectacular and bizarre. Rear Admiral Kimura, the victor of the battle of the bismarck sea, would lead the force and he had at his disposal Destroyer Squadron 1: consisting of Yugumo, Kazagumo, Asagumo, Akigumo, Usugumo, Hibiki (one of my favorite whiskeys), Shimakaze, Samidare, Naganami, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and light cruisers Abukuma and Kiso. In close support of these there was also a covering force consisting of heavy cruisers Nachi, Maya, light cruiser Tama and destroyers Nokaze and Namikaze. The large convoy force departed from Paramushiro on July 7th with Takeo's 1st submarine squadron performing reconnaissance. The covering force departed Paramushiro on July 10th and by July 12th the fleet was around 500 miles south of Kiska. When they took up this assembly position, the sailors were in despair to see the fog was quite low. While it did not matter for warships with radar, Kimura knew full well what allied aircraft could do to his forces if they were not better concealed. Thus he elected to wait until the fog reappaered to cover his force. But the weather did not change, the skies remained clear forcing him to head back on July 15th. Meanwhile on Kiska, Rear Admiral Monzo was frantically ordering his troops to lay out a road from the underground base to the harbor piers to help facilitate the impending evacuation. All of the Japanese on Kiska felt an impending doom placed upon them. If the Americans landed first, it was all but over for them. Luckily, Japanese weather stations reported a dense fog would emerge over Kiska by July 25th, and unlike here in Montreal Canada, I guess these weather reporters are accurate. Kimura once again departed Paramushiro on July 22nd, accompanied by Admiral Kawase aboard cruiser Tama. Yet a few days prior, on July 19th, Admiral Kinkaid had ordered Admiral Giffen to bombard Kiska again. This time Giffen took a two pronged naval attack force consisting of battleships Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Portland, Wichita, San Francisco, Louisville, Santa Fe and destroyers Abner Read, Farragut, Monaghan, Perry, Aylwin, Bache, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. Giffen's force reached Kiska on July 22nd and his ships smashed the island with 424000 lbs of high explosive shells. Just an hour later, a PBY suddenly detached with her radar 7 radar pips southwest of Attu. The PBY maintained contact for around 6 hours before low fuel forced her to return to base. These radar pips alarmed Admiral Kinkaid which was being reported in conjunction with a massive increase in Japanese radio activity on Kiska. Kinkaid believed a major Japanese fleet had just entered Aleutian waters, most likely a reinforcement convoy. Kinkaid immediately ordered Rear Admirals Giffen and Griffin to intercept the suspected enemy. However, by doing this he had also done something extremely favorable for the Japanese, he had left Kiska Harbor open and unguarded. Kinkaid dispatched a quartet of PT boats to try and provide a makeshift blockade, but the terrible weather forced the smaller vessels to return to port as trying to dash over to Kiska would probably see them all sunk. While this was occurring, Kimura's ships were traveling through the dense fog separately. The fog prevented the Americans from intercepting them initially, and having failed to make contact with the enemy, Kinkaid became nervous the Japanese might escape the blockade and ordered the force to return to Kiska at maximum speed on July 25th. The American ships dutifully turned back while Kinkaid sent the Oiler Pecos out to meet them for refueling. By dusk of the 25th, the American ships were around 90 miles from Kiska, when the fog had all but disappeared showing a cloudless sky. Kimura's vessels seeing their fog betray them, all reunited as a single force, now bearing 400 miles south of the American warships. At precisely 12:43am on July 26th the American warships picked up 7 strong radar pips around 15 miles northeast. It was Mississippi's SG radar that first picked them up, the American destroyers were actually unable to detect any pips on their radar due to the curvature of the ocean's surface at such a distance. The New Mexico, Portland, San Francisco and Wichita began picking up the same radar pips. The radar pips zigzagged across the sea surface, changing direction in much the same way ships attempting to evade detection might. The ships were being detected all at different angles, verifying to the Americans there were physical presences of some kind occupying definite points in space. On top of this, the immobile radar signature of Kiska's volcano at a range of 78 miles appeared clearly the entire time, verifying the validity of the pips moving with a fixed landmark. The radar pips converged 22,000 yards ahead of the Americans forcing them to spring into action. Admiral Giffen called for the entire fleet to turn left to intercept the pips on their southerly heading and in the hopes of foiling a possible torpedo attack. All of the American ships turned their guns to fire salvo's into the night. Great flame lances stabbed into the darkness as destroyers launched volleys of torpedoes and radar plotters frantically calculated salvo corrections. For 67 minutes the Americans tracked the 7 radar pips firing wildly at them. At 1:30am the Mississippi's log recorded zig-zags and a 20 degree course change, but not a single sailor saw an enemy ship. Cruisers San Francisco and Santa Fe registered shell splashes, but never an enemy target. 75 miles over on Kiska, the Japanese were watching a spectacle. From their point of view it was like a night-time light show over the horizon. By 2:22am the radar pips thinned, faded and vanished completely. During the morning surface ships and aircraft fanned out looking for wreckage, ships, floating papers, oil slick, anything to indicate something was even out there! The American warships reported no return fire, it was as if they faced ghosts. With a lack of fuel and ammunition, the US ships began refueling on the 28th and resumed their blockade of Kiska. What famously has become known as the battle of the Pips left the US Navy with a mystery that remains unsolved to this very day. The radar equipment was operating at times where there was a cloudless night with no fog, zero reasons for false radar echoes. An Aleutian crab fishing captain named Captain George Fulton may have solved the mystery in 1991 when he managed to duplicate the radar signatures observed during the battle by using his radar on a natural phenomenon common to the area. He presented his findings to the Alaska War Symposium in 1993 in a letter “I […] duplicated the Battle of the Pips using color radar. Sure enough there were blips on the tube and their density changed from red to orange to yellow and finally to black, providing an exact replication of the Battle of the Pips. What you described fits exactly the […] pattern of dense flocks of mutton birds or dusky shearwaters […] As mutton birds fly they veer left and right. This accounts for the zigzagging that was reported on the radar logs” Captain Fulton further went on to say how these huge flocks continue until they see large schools of fish, such as pollack. When the birds see them they begin landing on the sea surface then dive for their prey. This maneuver causes them to vanish from radar screens entirely. In the 1990s Aleutian fishing crews use this trait to locate large concentration of pollack, identifying the blips by their zigzagging motion and cast their nets accordingly. Were the Japanese saved by shearwater birds? Another answer came from the US Navy who officially stated that atmospheric echoes, a sort of phenomena caused the radar pips, that explanation has been highly contested. Its also been speculated that the American radar pips were 7 IJN submarines running reconnaissance. What we do know is Kimura made it to Kiska on the 28th undetected and unharmed while the US warships were enroute miles back. No American ships were anywhere near Kiska on the 28th. Admiral Kimura pulled the ships into Kiska anchorage and evacuated the entire remaining forces on the island, all 5183 men onto 8 vessels all within 55 minutes. The Japanese soldiers made sure to spend their last moments on the island setting up a plethora of booby traps. Four days later Kimura and Kawase were back in Paramushiro, successfully evacuating Kiska without firing a single shot. The Americans had no idea the evacuation occurred. In the words of one disgruntled American Colonel after the Kiska ordeal ““How I hate those bastards but I've got to give them credit for the most masterly evacuation by any army at any time and I'm not forgetting Dunkirk” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The drive to Lae and Salamaua rages on New Guinea as the American Navy in the frigid northern seas fought perhaps a ghost ship army. Or perhaps some pesky birds looking for tasty pollock saved the entire Japanese garrison on the island of Kiska.

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S3E14 Army BG (Ret) Chris Petty part 2

The Swearing In Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 27, 2023 70:42

This is Part 2 of my interview with Army Brigadier General (Ret) Chris Petty. After leaving the Active Duty Army in 1991, Gen Petty joined the Colorado Army National Guard and took command of C Company, 1/131st Aviation Regiment in Eagle, CO. That unit ran the High Altitude Aviation Training Site or HAATS. In 1994, he moved to Buckley Air National Guard Base and assumed command of A Company, 2/135th Aviation Battalion. After getting promoted to Major in 1996, he became the Battalion Assistant S3. After 18 months, he was reassigned to become the Deputy Commander of the Colorado Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Response Team, which was later renamed to the Civil Support Team (CST). After two years, he left to go back to the Guard and took over as the 2/135th Battalion S3. His next assignment was as the Headquarters Commandant of the Joint Force Headquarters of Colorado. Later, he assumed command of 2nd Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment and in 2006, he led the Battalion's deployment to Balad, Iraq, supporting Joint Special Operations Command.

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US Army tank platoon commander in 1980s Cold War Korea (301)

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 21, 2023 62:29

Tom Sullivan was a tank platoon commander in Korea in the early 1980s responsible for six tanks and their crew We hear why he joined the US Army, his training, and his first impressions of Korea in the Winter of 1982. He is assigned to Second Platoon, C Company, 1-72 Armor under the toughest Company Commander in the Brigade who had very high standards, no humour, and was a rigid disciplinarian with an uncompromising approach. Tom shares details of his fellow soldiers, including Vietnam veterans, the living conditions He explains the challenges of operating armour where the winter weather is brutal, and the majority of the terrain is hills, mountains, rice paddies, and dirt roads We discuss the threat the North Koreans posed and the scarce hope that reinforcements would arrive in sufficient time should the North Koreans decide to attack. The fight to preserve Cold War history continues and via a simple monthly donation, you will give me the ammunition to continue to preserve Cold War history. You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. Extra episode information https://coldwarconversations.com/episode301/ Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/store/ Support the project! https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/ Follow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod Facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/ Instagram https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/ Youtube https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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- 86 - Pacific War - Fall of Mubo & battle of Kolombangara, July 11-18, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 15, 2023 33:49

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults in New Georgia, New Guinea and the naval battle of Kula Gulf. The boys on New Guinea were edging ever closer to their objective of Lae while drawing the Japanese attention elsewhere. In the Solomons, Admiral Kusaka tossed as many aircraft as he could to thwart the multiple allied landings, but it was to no avail. Having depleted his airpower, now he turned to the navy to see if they could reinforce New Georgia before another Guadalcanal situation occurred. Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama was given the task of launching a Tokyo Express to New Georgia while also trying to give some fight to the enemy. Aboard his flagship the Niizuka, Akiyama did indeed give a fight to the Americans, showcasing a brand new type of radar and the ever trusty type 93 long lance torpedoes. The Japanese landed a few of their boys and now the real fight for New Georgia would begin. This episode is the Fall of Mubo & battle of Kolombangara Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So the past few weeks we have been chaotically juggling multiple events across the Solomons and New Guinea and this week it shall be no different. So let's first jump into New Guinea. General MacArthur's forces managed to pull off the Nassau Bay landing, getting General Savige some much needed reinforcements on his eastern flank and a new supply route. Now the landing at Nassau Bay was part of an ongoing operation codenamed Doublet, aimed at dislodging the Japanese from Bobdubi and Mubo. Taking these were necessary for the future push against Lae and Salamaua. Mubo held an airfield and its capture would greatly facilitate troop movements towards Salamaua. The movement in the interior towards Mubo was complicated by rough terrain. There were a series of ridges that could be defended sternly by the Japanese. As we have seen for weeks, Roosevelt ridge, the pimple, Green Hill, Observation hill, Lababia ridge and Bitoi ridge proved to be very heavily defended. For the Japanese headquarters, all of the allied offensives were confusing as to where exactly the main target was to be. General Nakano remained confident, Salamaua was the main target and he acted accordingly by beefing up the defense there. He ordered Major General Chuichi Muroya, the commander of the 51st infantry division to fortify and defend Salamaua. As part of this, he also ordered Muroya to dispatch around 1000 men to halt American forces trying to move up the coast towards Lake Salus. Now by July 2nd Brigadier Moten's plan was for the 2/6th and 2/5th battalions to take Mubo and Observation hill. While the new Taylor Force would capture Bitoi ridge and then the ridge between Bui Alang and Bui Kumbul Creeks. After this the forces would link up and the Japanese lines of communications along the Buigap Creek would be severed. While this was going on the 15th brigade who was working in conjunction with the newly landed troops, were performing an offensive directed at reducing the Japanese presence around Lae and Salamaua. Part of this offensive involved the inexperienced 58th/59th battalion who had a hell of a time facing the Japanese at Bobdubi ridge. The 58th/59th battalion were two previous militia battalions from Victoria. Initially they were a defensive force in Australia, not meant to go to places like New Guinea, but as they say times were tough. They got a taste of hand to hand combat in late june and while they did not make much progress, they still impacted the campaign, forcing General Muroya to request reinforcements so he could maintain a firm defense for the approaches to Salamaua. Nakano made it clear Bobdubi was of grave importance stating “this location is the last key point in the defense of Salamaua”. Muroya received Major Otoichi Jinno's 1st and 3rd companies of the 80th battalion. They marched through the Coconuts area to Bobdubi bringing with them 2 mountain guns of the 26th field artillery regiment. Meanwhile Colonel Araki his 1st battalion over to the Old Vickers position. By early July Muroya now held 5 infantry companies, around 500 men strong in all. But with all the activity hitting the north, Araki became worried and ultimately decided to move his regimental HQ and 1st battalion to Komiatum, leaving only his 2nd battalion to hold Mubo. On July 4th, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer took command of the 15th brigade. He was a veteran of the second battle of El Alamein, one of the most iconic battles of WW2, yours truly actually wrote quite a large episode for Kings and Generals on that one, and I think by the time this podcast comes out it should as well. Anyways Hammer had taken a German bullet right through both of his cheeks, but he did not lose a single tooth in the process, I guess lucky on that count. He earned a distinguished service order for his time in the middle east and in june of 1943 was promoted to Brigadier and given command of the 15th brigade. He was considered one of the most original and magnetic leaders of the Australian Infantry. “Hard as Nails” was said to be his motto, and “as you train, so you fight” his creed. When the 58/59th battalion stalled, he was tossed into the thick of it. Now do remember he was coming directly off the victory at Alamein, so he was I guess you can call it “desert minded” when he was tossed into the unforgivable jungles of New Guinea. He would have to deal with completely different terrain, different types of troops and a different enemy than the Italians and Germans. Another result of the delays at Bobdubi saw General Saviege dispatched Major Warfe's commands over to stop the Japanese from escaping Mubo. On July the 5th, General Savige ordered Hammer to send the company towards Tambu Saddle and Goodview Junction where they could cut off the Komiatum Track, thus preventing the Japanese from escaping Mubo to the north. Meanwhile B Company were on the Bench Cut Track carrying out ambush attacks. The two mountain guns brought up to the old vickers position were sporadically hitting Australian positions to their misery. C Company was performing a diversionary attack, while D Company was trying to capture the Coconuts and were successful at taking its northern region by nightfall on July 6th. The next day, the 80th regiment were pushing the 58/59th battalion back as air attacks from 6 Bostens hit the Old vickers allowing C Company to charge in with further support from D Company's mortars. The men charged up the steep ridge into Japanese machine gun nets and pillboxes. Likewise the 1st company of the 80th regiment with support of the 1st battalion, 66th regiment were launching counterattacks out of Komiatum. The Japanese managed to ambush some Australian supply lines inflicting casualties. On July 9th, the Australians tried to charge again into the Old Vickers, through a Sugarcane Knoll, but it went the exact same as last time, the machine gun nests and pillboxes were simply too much. Bobdubi ridge proved a tough nut to crack, but all of the activity was causing more and more Japanese units to move away from Mubo. By this point Mubo was being defended by 950 men and of those 770 were front line soldiers of the 66th regiment and the 14th field artillery regiment. And so the time was ripe to hit Mubo. Moten tossed Companies A and B from the 2/6th and C Company from the 2/5th towards Buiapal Creek; C Company of the 2/6th at Lababia ridge; D company of the 2/6th at the Saddle and the remainder of the 2/5th battalion into reserve. Warfe's commands went to work cutting off the escape route along the Komiatum track at Goodview Junction, but his forward units were spotted by Japanese patrols. As the commandos approached the area the Japanese came down from Orodubi ambushing them at Ambush Knoll…because of course its named that, silly Aussies, and this resulted in some lost supplies. Hammer was determined not to be thwarted by any delays so he ordered Warfe to launch a counterattack immediately. The Commandos were able to push the enemy back and reclaim their lost supplies, some of which were mortars and machine guns. On the night of the 6th, Warfe was ordered to leave a force to secure Wells junction while the rest of his men would proceed to cut off the escape route. During the morning of July 7ty, Moten's leading companies were wading through waste deep water in the Buiapal Creek due south of Observation Hill. The allied assault against Mubo was set to begin at 9:30am on the 7th, with Mitchell bombers coming in to strafe Kitchen Creek, Woody Island and Observation Hill. After this some Botsons and liberators would likewise bomb and strafe the same targets. The view from the ground was quite the spectacle for Moten's men. It looked like the entirety of the Mubo valley was being enveloped in thick black smoke and flames as the bombers dropped their payloads. Over 159 bombers and fighters dropped 109 tons of bombs over the Mubo area. Even if the bombs did not directly cause casualties among the Japanese in the area, it still caused chaos. Once the air attacks dissipated, the ground forces opened up their artillery and charged. A company of the 2/5th advanced without encountered any opposition, successfully climbing the northern slopes of Observation Hill. The southern slopes proved much more difficult with the Japanese putting up a fight against B company. B Company were forced to take a defensive position in a Kunai patch southwest of the slopes of Observation Hill. During this time, the Artillery over at the beaches of Nassau Bay were being moved further inland and would arrive at Napier by July 8th. This allowed Taylor Force to have the guns necessary to launch an assault of Bitoi ridge. Taylors men managed to get to the southern slopes of the ridge by 3pm while A Company touching its forward crest. B Company likewise broke through to the north and got to a point between Kitchen and Bui Savella Creek. A Company attempted another assault against Observation Hill but was repelled again, prompting Captain Dexter's D company to be sent to reinforce them. July 9th saw numerous patrol clashes as the Australians prodded deeper and deeper into the area. In the afternoon the Japanese sent a strong counterattack against the 2/5th companies seeing fierce fighting. As noted by Arthur Pearson of D company “In most cases we were firing blind, but sometimes we were abl to pick up the smoke from their rifles”. Pearson at one point jumped into a weapon pit, trying to draw the Japanese fire his way. A bullet came at him, piercing the stock butt of his rifle, before slamming into one of the soldiers beside him killing the man. Pearson had no idea where the bullet had come from and frantically fired into the jungle hoping to hit the Japanese sniper. The next day saw a lot of the same, more patrol clashed. On the 10th, B Company engaged the enemy around Kitchen Creek. Meanwhile US infantry had cut the main track north of Bui Alang Creek on the 9th. The Americans began advancing down to Buigap Creek, then south to the Komiatum Track by July 10th, before hitting Buigap where they drove off a bunch of Japanese. The Americans now guessed the Japanese on Mubo were using a route north east along the Buikumbul to withdraw to Mount Tambu. With the Australian and now Americans infiltrating the sector, General Nakano ordered the Mubo garrison to pull out on the 11th, back over to Komiatum. To mask their withdrawal the Japanese planned to begin moving after sundown. By July 13th, they made their way along the Saddle to Mount Tambu, but the Americans had spotted them and gave them hell using artillery. The Japanese got out, but suffered many casualties doing so. On July the 12th, with the Japanese leaving the area, the Australians seized the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill with little opposition. Thus the allies had finally driven the Japanese out of their positions near Mubo, but they had also allowed them to escape. It turned out to be quite the fiasco with General Savige and Herring both believing they controlled the US troops of the 162nd, but in truth General Fuller refused to relinquish command to either. This confusion helped the Japanese squeeze out, though they did suffer 313 deaths and 981 casualties. The Australians received around 300 casualties. Mubo had fallen, its airfield was captured, mop up operations would go on for sometime, but most of the Japanese outposts were cleared. The path to Salamaua and Lae was ever closer. But now we are heading east over to the Solomons. General Wing's 172nd and 169th regiments were assembling at Zanana by July 6th. Their task now was to advance along the Barike River towards Munda. Meanwhile on the northern coast of New Georgia Colonel Liversedge's men successfully landed at Rice Anchorage by July 5th. His force was the 1st Marine Raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry and Companies K and L from the 145th infantry. His men began their advance south towards what is known as the Dragons peninsula. At the same time, as a result of the battle of Kula Gulf, the Japanese were able to land some men of the 13th regiment over at Vila. Defending Vila were forces led by Colonel Tomonari Satoshi. With more men on hand, General Sasaki intended to move the troops via barge through Bairoko so they could reinforce Munda. Sasaki had already brought his 3rd battalion, 229th regiment from Vila using barges. He was lucky the first time but now he felt the Americans would try to attack the airfield directly, perhaps by setting up artillery on the nearby Hopei island. Roviana island likewise could be used as a staging area for amphibious tanks to charge over. Thus Sasaki brought over some 8cm dual purpose guns and 13mm anti aircraft machine guns to try and defend the beaches. He also ordered Major Sato's 2nd battalion of the 229th regiment to dig some anti-tank ditches along the beach with the intent to smash any enemy tanks at the waters edge. He received word of the landings made at Zanana on July 3rd, prompting him to quickly reinforce his eastern line that ran north from Ilangana point. By July 6th, he had the 3rd battalion, 229th regiment and Sato's 2nd battalion holding positions along the the Ilangana line with a roadblock position held by a company who were using felled trees and barbed wire in front of Barike. Sasaki also had at his disposal a company of the Kure 6th SNLF led by Commander Okumura Saburo at Bairoko with a small detachment of the 2nd battalion, 13th infantry led by Major Obashi Takeo. Meanwhile General Wing managed to get most of his 172nd regiment to the mouth of the Barike, but the 2nd battalion of the 169th remained on Rendova and the 1st and 3rd battalions were moving inland towards the Japanese roadblock. Unfortunately for the 3rd battalion, they had not found the roadblock by the night of july 6th and dug in just a bit east of it. They did not establish a good perimeter for their fox holes, there were no trip wires or barbed wires anywhere. Thus when the darkness came, so did the Japanese from the roadblock. The Japanese performed their classic infiltration tactics. The men in the foxholes began to hear random screaming, the odd firing of rifles all around them. The Japanese began to infiltrate their perimeter with one soldier reported that Japanese troops were approaching while calling out company code names in English. It was a brutal night to be sure. The shaken men of the 3rd battalion advanced with I company leading the way. They found themselves running into Japanese machine gun positions by 10:55pm around the Munda trail. They retaliated with mortars and machine guns, but could not properly see where the enemy was. Luckily B company from the 172nd showed up attacking the roadblock from the rear. In the carnage 3 platoon leaders were wounded, K Companies commander was killed, no progress was being made. Firing lanes were drawn out, the Americans were trying to find the enemy but their muzzle blasts were tiny. Some of the Americans tossed grenades, but they could not get close enough to effectively do it. By 3:30 the 3rd battalion withdrew from what they called “blood hill” to dig in for the night, but the Japanese continued to harass them. According to the 169th infantry “it was a sleepless night spend under continued harassment from enemy patrols speaking English, making horror noises, firing weapons, throwing hand grenades, swinging machetes and jumping into foxholes with knives” On the 8th, the roadblock was overrun costing the 3rd battalion, 169th regiment and B company of the 172nd 6 deaths and 13 wounded. The next day the 169th finally got to their assembly point at the Barike line, while Colonel Liversedge and his men were crossing the Tamaku river. Colonel Liversedge planned to send Colonel Griffiths 1st Raiders with 2 companies of the 145th regiment to swing around the west shore of the Enogai Inlet prior to assaulting Bairoko while the 3rd battalion, 148th regiment would advance over to the Munda-Bairoko trail to cut off Munda from reinforcements. Liversedge estimated taking the Enogai Inlet and cutting off the trail would be done by July 8th, and it was critical it was done speedily as his men only had 3 days rations on hand. In the late afternoon of the 7th, the 148th managed to reach the trail and created a roadblock the following day. Griffiths team and secured the villages of Triri and Maranusa, clashing with a few Japanese patrols along the way. After capturing the villages the men came across some Japanese documents showcasing the defense plan for Enogai. On the 8th, the Raiders moved out of Triri enroute to Enogai only to run into an impassable mangrove swamp. Meanwhile Major Obashi launched a counterattack against Triri which would be eventually repelled. Griffith got the men to resume the advance using another trail west of the swamp and found themselves around Leland Lagoon where they clashed with some Japanese. The morning of the 9th, saw General Wings main advance began. At 5am General Barkers 3 battalions of artillery positioned on both shores of the Honiavasa passage and some 155mms on Rendova opened fire on Munda. The artillery put several thousand rounds of 105mm and 155mm high explosives upon Munda. This was followed up by a naval bombardment by the USS Farenholt, Buchanan, McCalla and Ralph Talbot who were firing from the Blanche Channel, showering Munda with over 2000 5 inch shells. Then on top of all that 107 Dauntless and Avengers dropped 79 tons of bombs over Munda, Enogai and Bairoko harbor beginning at 8:30am. The Japanese recorded that the area was lit up as if it were daytime. The 172nd regiment forded the Barike, the 169th was unable to move because of the battle against the Japanese roadblock. On the night of July 6th, Admiral Samejima sent the rest of the troops that were supposed to be transported during the battle of Kula Gulf, the 2nd battalion of the 13th regiment, some 1200 men. They were aboard 4 destroyers, the Matsukaze, Yunagi, Mikazuki and Satsuki escorted by the cruisers Sendai and Chokai and 4 other destroyers the Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Tanikaze and Yugure. They only saw some harassment from a small strike force consisting of 5 PBY's as they made their way to Vila and safely returned. Admiral Kusaka requested some naval reinforcements from the Combined Fleet, so Admiral Kogo send Admiral Nishimura's Cruiser division 7, arriving on the 11th. Alongside this, Rear Admiral Izaki Shunji came over with light cruiser Jintsu and destroyer Kiyonami, taking command of the reinforcement unit. Back on land, the Kure 6th's batteries were firing upon Rice Anchorage prompting Griffith to begin the assault of the Enogai Inlet. Supported by mortars, B Company stormed the village of Baekineru. The Japanese began withdrawing from Enogai allowing the Americans to seize it by the 11th. This came just in time as the Raiders had run out of food and water. The raiders had paid heavily, suffering 47 deaths, 80 wounded and 4 men missing. The Kure 6th SNLF would report 81 deaths and a platoon of 50 men lost. The heavy losses forced Liversedge to request the 4th raiders be landed for the capture of Bairoko, but they would only arrive on the 18th. Meanwhile Colonel Tomonari brought forward his 1st and 3rd battalion to Bairoko to help reinforce Munda. At around 4pm, the 3rd battalion led by Colonel Takabayashi attacked the American roadblock, nearly dislodging them. By nightfall the Japanese took up a position on a ridge to the 148th's northern flank. There was a series of counterattacks until the next day saw a bit of a stalemate, then the morning after that the Japanese backed off. The 148th regiment would hold onto the roadblock for more than a week, but would quickly run low on food. It mattered not however as the Japanese just advanced along another trail further west, prompting Liversedge to order the roadblock abandoned on July 17th. Now Admiral Kusaka wanted to reinforce the important volcanic island of Kolombangara. Kolombangara was a perfectly round stratovolcanic cone soaring out of the sea to an altitude of 5800 feet. The Japanese had a garrison at Vila airfield on the islands southern shore. The island was often to put men and supplies upon barges that would make nighttime transits across the straits to Munda point. Kusaka sought to toss another 1200 troops, Major Yamada Tadaichi's 2nd battalion, 45th regiment and the 8th battery, 6th field artillery. Transporting them would be Matsukaze, Yunagi, Minazuki and Satsuki coming from Buin, escorted by Admiral Izaki's aboard the Jintsu alongside 5 destroyers Mikazuki, Yukikaze, Hamakaze, Kiyonami and Yugure coming from Rubaul. Unfortunately for the IJN, allied coastwatchers saw reported their movement and Admiral Halsey responded by ordered Admiral Ainsworth and task force 18 to intercept them. Ainsworth had light cruisers USS Honolulu, St Louis, the Royal New Zealand light cruisers HMNZS Leander; destroyers USS Nicholas, O'Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins, Radford, Ralph Talbot, Buchanan, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. Half of Ainsworth's forces came from Captain Ryan's Destroyer squadron 12 who were quite inexperienced. Ainsworths set up his force making his vanguard the Nicholas followed by O'Bannon, Taylor, Jenkins and Radford. Honolulu, Leander and St Louis followed in the center. Ainsworth specifically placed Leander in the middle because she held inferior radar, he preferred St Louis to take the lead out of the Cruisers. Ryan's destroyers would take up the rear with Ralph Talbot, followed by Buchanen, Maury, Woodworth and Gwin. By 5pm task force 18 was sailing once again for the Kula Gulf. Task Force 18 had left Tulagi at 5pm on July 12th under clear skies and calm seas. As they passed Savo Island, Ainsworth took a course along the west coast of Santa Isabel island hoping to use it to hide his force from Japan reconnaissance aircraft. At 12:35am a PBY reported the course and composition of Izaki's force, and Ainsworth heading in for the intercept. As the two forces were converging, Izaki dispatched his Destroyer transport through Vella Gulf to unload the troops but at 1am he was alerted of the approaching enemy. It was actually the Americans who established radar content first, but the Japanese gained visual contact by 1:08am As the two forces converged, Izaki sent his destroyer transports through Vella Gulf; yet by 01:00, the Americans detected his force. However it was actually the Japanese who detected the Americans first for almost 2 hours or so because of the electromagnetic impulses the American radar systems emitted. The Japanese crews had managed to gain a fairly accurate picture of Ainsworths disposition. At 1:08 the Japanese made visual contact and were the first to attack, launching 29 torpedoes by 1:14am. Ainsworth's vanguard increased speed to engage the Japanese with their torpedoes while the cruisers turned to deploy their main batters and engage to starboard. Ainsworth yet again ignorant of the type 93 long lance capabilities had no idea the fish were already in the water coming towards his force as they watched the Japanese destroyers turn away. The American destroyers tossed 19 Mark 15 torpedoes, but the Japanese were over 10,000 yards away and turning north thus completely wasted the volley. When the Japanese were 10,000 yards or so Ainsworth cruisers began opening fire, concentrating on the Jintsu. When the Japanese column closed to 10,000 yards at 01:12, Ainsworth ordered his cruisers to open fire, concentrating on the Jintsu which was leading. Honolulu and St Louis fired an incredible amount of shells for 18 minutes at 1100 and 1360 6 inch rounds joined by 350 5in rounds. The Leander fired 160 6 inch rounds. The Jintsu was hit first to her rudder, then her bridge killing Izaki, followed by 10 or more shells to her engineering spaces. She was a doomed burning ship, that came to a dead drift quickly. The Americans then launched another volley of torpedoes, 21 in all, but they would all fail to hit a mark. By this time, the Japanese torpedoes were finally arriving. Leander was hit at 1:22 forcing Ainsworth to detach Radford and Jenkins to help her limp away. The rest of Ainsworth forces managed to avoid the torpedoes. While this was occurring the destroyer transports had successfully unloaded the 1200 troops and were moving north to withdraw with Izaki's other destroyers. The Japanese were not running away however, they were getting to a safe position to reload torpedoes and re-engage. After finishing off the Jintsu at 1:45, Ainsworth ordered the force to pursue the enemy going northwest. They made radar contact again at 1:56, but Ainsworth doubted the blips to be the enemy, but rather his vanguard ships. Instead of opening fire, Ainsworth attempted making contact with the vanguard force and began firing starshells, this would prove to be a fatal error. The Japanese launched another volley of 31 torpedoes. At 2:08 the first to be hit was St Louis, it opened her bow, next Gwin was hit near her No 2 engine room; Honolulu was third receiving a hit to her starboard bow at 2:11, with another hitting her stern without exploding. Honolulu's rudder jammed and she nearly smashed into Gwin coming within 50 yards of her. That effectively ended the battle as Ainsworth ordered the task force to withdraw back to Tulagi. The Gwin had lost 61 men and was forced to be scuttled, Leander lost 28, the Jintsu 482 and another Japanese Admiral was dead. 21 survivors of the Jintsu were rescued later on by the I-180, a few others were picked up by American ships. The Japanese had won a tactical victory and demonstrated yet again their superior night fighting techniques. But it was a pyrrhic victory in many ways as well, the Americans could afford to lose ships, the Japanese could not. After the defeat, Admiral Nimitz decided to change tactics and not confine anymore cruisers to the Solomons as they could not hope to chase the IJN destroyers and their troublesome torpedoes were a major threat. Nimitz wrote a letter to Halsey suggesting that a well trained squadron of 2100 ton Fletcher class destroyers would be better suited to such waters rather than cruises. Halsey argued despite the Japanese having superior torpedoes, he believed Ainsworth's night battle plan A, that had employed SG radar with radar directed gunnery were still superior to anything the IJN had. He thought the solution “appears to be the greatest volume and weight of gunfire that can be incorporated into a highly maneuverable unit–and a unit that is certainly not appreciably weaker than the enemy unit.” Regardless Halsey went to work designating two squadrons of 2100 ton destroyers to take over New Georgia operations and would not risk anymore of his cruisers going up the Slot on any more missions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The New Guinea and New Georgia campaigns were seeing gradual progress for the allies, but the naval battles were much less to be desired. While the Japanese were earning some victories, they were rather pyrrhic in nature as American production was winning the day.

american australia english battle japan fall americans australian german japanese kings italian kitchen dragons avengers raiders hammer jenkins st louis firing hq ww2 pearson task force saddle roosevelt nails aboard destroyer vila observation honolulu griffith aussies buchanan halsey slot generals griffiths herring sg maury napier radford pimples coconuts sato commandos taylors new guinea cruiser artillery transporting ainsworth dauntless leander sasaki cruisers solomons brigadier guadalcanal opium wars woodworth greenhill nimitz pacific war sendai santa isabel nakano moten araki marine raiders el alamein munda lae kure double t general macarthur akiyama kunai gwin satsuki ijn c company captain ryan alamein buin craig watson admiral nimitz admiral halsey kusaka savo island yukikaze

- 85 - Pacific War - The battle of Kula Gulf, July 4-11, 1943

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Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2023 31:33

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults for Operations Chronicle and Toenails. General Douglas MacArthur finally performed his landings at Nassau Bay, Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. Woodlark and Kiriwina proved to be cake walks, while Nassau Bay proved a tougher nut to crack. Then over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey unleashed his landings at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Now the Japanese were more alert to the invasions and offered some resistance, although ultimately Sasaki would order many forces to simply withdraw from the invaders. Admiral Kusaka tossed a ton of airpower at the incoming allies only to lose a disastrous quarter of his air fleet, forcing him to ask his Army colleague Immamura for additional support. However with all of these landings came a large amount of allied warships to bring them, and such actions could only bring about one conclusion, another naval battle for the pacific war. This episode is the Battle of Kula Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Before we jump into the naval battle of Kula Gulf a lot was occurring in New Guinea and the Solomons. Over in the Bobdubi front, the Australian 15th brigade under the temporary command of Colonel Guinn were preparing for the main offensive, hoping to trap the Japanese defending Mubo. To support the Nassau Bay landing, Colonel Guinn ordered the untested 58/59th battalion to advance upon the Japanese high ground position at the Old Vicker's, Coconuts and Bobdubi area. They would be marching from Orodubi to the Coconuts while Major Warfe's commandos would raid Malolo and Kela. Company A and C of the 58/59th would make the initial attack seeing A attacking Gwaibolom and C the Old Vicker's position. Following close behind them was B company who were to advance across the ridge to gain control over the Bench Cut Track. D Company were to be held in reserve at the Kunda-vine. On June 26th, A company set off from Missim heading towards their forming up point at Namling. On the 28th, the other remaining companies made departed Meares Camp heading for the New Bobdubi kunda bridge. The next day 17 of Warfe's commandos were ambushed by 30 Japanese. They managed to escape, but were forced to abandon a Bren gun. By the night of June 29th, the 58th/59th crossed the Francisco River and began preparations for the launch of the main attack which would occur the next morning. The next morning saw lackluster allied air strikes against Gwaibolom, Salamua, Old Vickers and the Coconut area. Companies B and C left their start up point of Uliap Creek, seeing C attack Buggert village, just a bit south of the Old Vickers position being held at this time by a company of the 115th regiment led by Lt Ogawa Takeshi. They successfully outlanked the Japanese and captured the village, suffering only 2 casualties for their efforts. From there the Australians assaulted the Old Vickers position, but the Japanese defenders repealed them right back to Buggert village. The Japanese defenders had well established positions, hiding in dugouts 40 feet down from the top. The failure to seize the Old Vickers position, prevented B Company from reaching their objective, the Bench Cut Track and now they were being met with Mortar fire as they crossed the ridge. Meanwhile A Company began their assault on Orodubi, but anticipating booby-traps the men had left on the Bench Cut Track around 70 yards south of Orodubi, they chose to climb a 40 foot kunai slope to join the main track just 10 yards within the enemy. Around 80 men of Company 10 led by Lt Gunji Toshio saw the Australians doing this and promptly began tossing grenades at close range and fired down upon them. The Australians were forced to flee back to Namling as a result. The next day it was decided they would use a platoon to contain Orodubi while the others bypassed it to go onwards and capture Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, which they managed to do by July 2nd. While this was occurring, B Company was trying to find another way across the ridge, but were failing to do so. So on July 2nd, they were ordered to move across the ridge via the newly established positions at Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, and would reach the Komiatum Track / bench track junction where they would prepare an ambush by the 3rd. At around 5pm on the 3rd, B company managed to ambush a party of 20 Japanese trying to move towards Old Vickers and this quickly fell into hand to hand combat killing half the Japanese and one of their officers. Meanwhile Colonel MacKechnie's men were fighting to keep their beachhead alive at Nassau Bay. AA and C Companies had fought through the night against Japanese until their 300 yard perimeter was secured. At dawn on June 30th, C company began advancing south to find the Papuan infantry battalion who were around Cape Dinga. C Company made their way to a place just due west of Cape Dinga, following the Tabali River, while A Company was patrolling north and south of an arm of the Bitoi river where they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment. A Company backed by some other units attempted to hit the Japanese western flank, but they were overwhelmed and forced to turn back. It would actually be Amphibian engineers who would save the day, who came in at the last minute to help A company out just as the Japanese tossed a banzai charge at them. Upon receiving word of the Japanese attacks, C company rushed over to join A by 3pm. Yet unbeknownst to them, the Japanese were not actually trying to break through, they were trying to withdraw by crossing the Tabali river. General Nakano had ordered them to withdraw to a new position at Lake Salus when he heard word over 1000 men had landed at Nassau Bay. Nakano also had ordered the 3rd battalion of the 66th regiment to send 150 men to march south from Salamua to help out in the Nassau Bay area. These men were tasked with carrying out only limited attacks against the allied forces around Nassau Bay, such as delaying actions to help the Nassau Bay garrison withdraw towards Lake Salus. Nakano was also coordinating with Colonel Araki who was now operating out of an HQ in Mubo, he had likewise brought forces over to Mubo from Salamua. As for the Papuan infantry, they were marching north and they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment around Cape Dinga as well. They managed to attack their rear killing at least 26 Japanese who were holding out in a bunker. After this they continued their march to the Nassau Bay beachhead. At around 4:30pm C company began sending reports that they were seeing some Japanese crossing over the Tabali River just south of their position. They were ordered to return to the beachhead perimeter to take the southern flank, but before they were able the Japanese attacked their rear taking 5 men and a platoon commander. Around the beachhead a hastily prepared defensive line was established by an ad hoc force of Engineers, Australian infantry and Headquarters personnel. As the night fell on, C company reached the southern part of the perimeter, quickly taking up positions. The Japanese began a series of attacks throughout the entire night from all sides using machine guns, grenades, mortar and rifle fire. Smaller parties of Japanese were trying to infiltrate positions. It was a terrifying experience for the defenders who would dub it “guy fawkes night”. Many of the men had itchy fingers which led to tragic accidental casualties throughout the night. It was a pitch black night and the noises of the jungle and Japanese screaming stuff in english unnerved the allied forces. The Japanese had tossed a ton of stuff into the perimeter trying to get the allies to use up their own munitions in response. As a result the allied forces had 18 deaths and 27 wounded several of which were the result of friendly fire. The Japanese it seems to have around 50 deaths during the night. Back over in the north, on June 30th, Captain Dexter was leading forward a number of patrols in preparation for an assault upon Duali. However as they advanced they ran into a Japanese ambush along the Bitoi track, thus canceling their planned assault. The next day, Brigadier Moten ordered Dexter's exhausted men to move forward regardless. With some support of Beaufighters strafing the Japanese positions, the Australians charged straight through the enemy positions, and to their shock they found them abandoned. As Dexter recalled ‘We advanced through the Japanese position with fixed bayonets and searched the scrub on each side. Everywhere was evidence of a hasty evacuation, dropped equipment and personal rice bags, and evidence of extensive bomb damage. But of the Japs, no sign.' Thus Dexter and his men captured the mouth of the Bitoi by early afternoon. Shortly after the capture, Dexter made contact with MacKechnie who was busy expanding his perimeter northwards. By nightfall, PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins covered the landing of 11 landing craft full of reinforcements. The PT boats staffed nearby villages to cause a lot of ruckus, hoping to dissuade nearby Japanese from firing on the vulnerable landing craft. The reinforcements were mostly from B company who had failed to land during the third wave. On July 2nd, Moten began to pressure MacKechnie, stating he had to get his troops moving inland at once. Thus MacKechnie decided to leave C company to defend the perimeter while Lt Colonel Harold Taylor would lead the rest of the men towards Napier. Luckily for the men, 4 75mm pack howitzer m1 artillery guns had been unloaded that night with the reinforcements giving them ample firepower. The gun were positioned on the beach and immediately went to work shelling targets at the mouth of the Tabali River, Cape Dinga and the area between Duali and the Bito River's southern arm. On July the 3rd, the men now designated the Taylor Force accompanied by Dexter's company were marching for Napier, but their march was a slow one as the jungles were thick and they were carrying heavy equipment. While this was occurring the 3rd battalions of the 102nd and 66th regiments were consolidating around Lake Salus looking to create a defensive position. The coastal area however proved to be too difficult to fortify, so they moved over the Tambu where they joined a SNLF platoon of the 5th Sasebo to make a position there. At this point General Savige decided to send the Papuans north along the coast to keep pressuring the enemy's retreat. By the 4th, Taylor Force had taken a position at Napier and were now under the direct command of Moten's 17th brigade. Back over on the beaches at Nassau Bay a total of 1477 troops had been landed, thus securing the beachhead. Dexters company marched back over to Guadagasal taking a coastal route, getting themselves ready for a future assault against Mubo slated for July 7th. MacKechnie believed the loss of some of his landing craft had greatly delayed the entire operation, perhaps up to 3 weeks. He did not think he would be able to move artillery or large quantities of supplies further inland. He also did not think it was tactically sound to leave his base, as the Japanese proved to be quite a nuisance in the area. Orders from the top were demanding a artillery road be built, but his troops at the assembly area would probably run out of rations in a day or two and he had no native carriers on hand. In his words "To be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment. Troops had gone inland stripped to the bone. Without heavy weapons and mortar and machine-gun ammunition. "Therefore, these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food, ammunition and additional weapons up to them." In response to the situation, on July 6th, Moten ordered 1000 rations and 100 boy loads of ammunition…god you have to love the australians, boy-loads haha. Anyways this was to be dropped over Napier. Moving over to the Solomons, Admiral Halsey had successfully occupied Rendova, Segi point, Viru Harbor and Wickham anchorage forcing the smaller number of Japanese to withdraw to their main base at Munda. Admiral Kusaka tossed a series of air strikes against the invaders, suffering horrible losses whereupon he had to request General Immamura reinforce him with the 21st air flotilla at Saipan and from the 6th air division. For the battle of Munda, Admiral Halsey had assembled the largest air force ever assembled in the Solomon islands campaign. It was a force that was needed as the Japanese in Rabaul tossed every bomber that was available to try and thwart the US amphibious invasion. The June air battles had greatly depleted the Japanese air power, but they were not done. On July 1st the Japanese hit Kahili using 6 Vals and 34 Zeros. They were trying to knock out the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry who were unloading at Poko plantation on the west coast of Rendova. However they were met by 20 P-40's and F4Fs that ripped them to pieces taking down 3 Vals, 5 Zeros and losing 5 P-40's in the process. Although the allies were scoring massively high success against the Japanese in ratios, by this point it reached 7 to 1, they were still unable to sustain round the clock 32 fighter or more CAP. To do this required a total of 96 operational aircraft and after 10 days of fighting in the skies over New Georgia the pilots were also becoming increasingly exhausted. Colonel Merrill Twining requested more P-38 Lightnings, the aircraft that had become the most comfortable fighter to those in the south pacific by this point. But Hap's Arnold over in Washington was heavily committing forces for General Patton and Montgomery's invasion of Sicily at the time so he had to deny this request. As Arnold stated back “every trained unit must be thrown against the German until he is beaten”. Regardless, with Rendova secured, General Hester was landing the bulk of his forces for the final push against Munda. The unloading process had been heavily hampered by poor planning and a failure to allocate adequate personnel for beach control and unloading duties however. To clear the new beachhead and distribute the combat stores, infantrymen were detailed to carry out the work. When transports carrying the next echelon arrived, many of the boats grounded offshore and had to be unloaded manually by troops wading ashore. On July 2nd, Admiral Kusaka coordinating with General Itahana formed a combined strike led by Major Endo Misao consisting of 18 Ki-21 bombers, 23 Ki-43's and Ki-61s with 29 Zero escort. Unfortunately for the allies, Admiral Mitscher had recalled the Rendova patrol due to bad weather, so a total of 18 Ki-21 bombers came to the scene unmolested and hit the congested area around the harbor. The strike caused 200 or so casualties, mostly upon the 2nd battalion, 172nd, the 24th seabees, the 9th defense battalion and staff officers of various headquarters. The strike also knocked out a lot of equipment and supplies. With the failure of the June air battles to hold back the allied invasion, Admiral Koga turned to the Navy for the task of providing new supplies to the defenders at Munda Point. The Tokyo Express was back in business, a convoy of 10 destroyers were sent to New Gerogia led by Rear Teruo Akiyama aboard his flagship Niizuki. His force was ordered to attack Rendova and he had with him the old Yubari, Yunagi, Mikazuki who would operate south of the Treasuries as a diversion, while Niizuki, Amagiri, Hatsuyuki, Nagatsuki, Satsuki, Mikazuki and Mochizuki would hit the allied shipping and shell the harbor. The Japanese destroyers were spotted right away, but bad weather prevented 3 American strike forces consisting of PBY's and B-25's from hitting the incoming enemy. In the meantime, Akiyama closed in on the southern tip of Rendova. She circled the island and opened fire on a point due west of the harbor. The bombardment was quite ineffective, but some allied PT boats rushed in to attack her which caused a wild 10 minute mini battle seeing 2 of them running aground. On the ground, General Hester ordered the 1st battalion, 172nd regiment and A company of the 169th regiment now designated Southern Landing Group to land at Zanana beach. Led by General Wing on the afternoon of the 2nd they made a crossing over Blanche Channel using 16 landing crafts. With the support of Brigadier General Harold Barkers artillery they successfully formed a perimeter. Now the Japanese air and naval attacks were worrying Halsey. He expected the Japanese to launch a major counterlanding with substantial forces perhaps on the 3rd. Therefore he ordered Admiral Ainsworth to lay in wait off the west coast of Rendova for the enemy. However July the 3rd would not bring an enemy, this was because General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka agreed with the lack of air and naval forces on hand at this time they could not perform such a feat, to the disgust of General Sasaki who had assumed command over the defense for Munda on the 2nd. Sasaki was so adamant about landing reinforcements at around midnight on July 3rd he proposed violating orders to simply make a counter landing using the 13th regiment and Ota's barges. He had a crazy idea to simply bring the vessels in and mix them with the American landing craft who were making rountrips to the mainland through the Honiavasa passage. He thought even if half his forces perished, the attack would be worth it. Ota objected to this on the grounds the barges would be needed for other transports scheduled for July 4th and 5th, apparently this made Sasaki visibly upset, who adjourned the meeting and left the room. Ota pushed Sasaki to write his plans down and submit them to Rabaul, which he did, and Rabaul squashed it immediately. On July 3rd the Japanese performed an unsuccessful fighter sweep over Rendova and the next day reconnaissance reported the island was secured by the Americans who had heavily reinforced it with anti aircraft guns and radar. They also reported landings on Zanana and that it looked like Rice Anchorage would be next, thus cutting off Japanese reinforcements from coming down the Munda trail from Bairoko. Imamura and Kusaka had to wait for an accumulation of forces to bring reinforcements to New Georgia; they had no intention of losing it like Guadalcanal. 4000 soldiers of the 13th and 45th regiments were earmarked for departure. Kusaka ordered Itahana to launch another combined strike, this time aimed at Roviana island. However the Japanese were intercepted by 32 F4F's causing the loss of 6 Ki-21s, 3 Ki-43's and a zero without a single loss for the Americans. This would be the fateful end of the joint air operations as Itahana needed to take his forces to help the Salamaua area. Luckily for Kusaka he received reinforcements in the form of the 201st Kokutai from the 25th flotilla which would allow him to gradually rebuild his air strength by mid july. Meanwhile Admiral Turner had assigned 7 destroyer transports, 2 fast minesweepers and 4 Destroyers to carry the 1st raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 145th infantry regiment and the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry regiment of the 37th division led by Colonel Liversedge into the Kula Gulf. Their escort cover was Ainsworth task group 36.1 consisting of the Cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, Helena and destroyers Nicholas, O'Bannon, Strong and Chevalier. They were also tasked with bombarding Vila and Bairoko. On July 4th, Ainsworth led the group up the slot while the Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama's Tokyo Express were on their way to Vila carrying 1300 troops of the 13th regiment towards Vila. At around midnight Ainsworth entered Kula Gulf carefully avoiding the mindfield laid back in May. His force proceeded to shell Vila, but they failed to detect the Japanese who were heading south. The Japanese detected the Americans at 12:15 thanks to their brand new radar system; the 1-shiki 2-go radar which was outfitted on the Niizuki. The IJN were eager to test out the radar so they fastened it to the flagship of Destroyer squadron 3. Oh how the turn tables as they say. The radar indicated they were heavily outnumbered, so Akiyama decided to abort the mission, but before doing so he ordered 14 torpedoes to be launched at a range of 10 miles. The type 93 long lance torpedo remained the best weapons of the kind in the Pacific theater and one his destroyer Strong at 12:43 practically cutting her in two. Can't stress it enough what an immense advantage Japan had over the Americans in terms of torpedo power during the first half of the war, hell if any of you play World of Warships, you know Japanese DD is base as hell. When the torpedo hit, the Japanese were already heading back up the Slot and Ainsworth thought he was being attacked by IJN submarines. Thus while Liversedge's men were landing on the southside of the Pundokono River, Ainsworth dispatched destroyers O'Bannon and Chevalier to rescue the survivors of Strong. The Strong was settling fast off the Enogai inlet. When Chevalier and O'Bannon came to the scene picking up survivors a gun duel emerged between them and some batteries on Enogai. By 1:22am Chevalier had 239 men come aboard before her commander said it was time to go. His ship was getting battered by the batteries and he unfortunately was forced to ram the Strong to keep it from capsizing which ripped a 10 foot fash in Chevaliers bow. A near miss from one of Enogai's guns had opened her seams aft and another shell knocked out her NO 3 gun mount. When Chevalier was pulling away from the Strong, breaking her in two in the process, 3 of Strong's depth charges went off under Chevalier lifted the entire boat out of the water causing her to flood in forward sections, talk about bad luck. Over in Rice Anchorage, despite the terrible stormy weather and some gunfire from Enogai, Turner ordered the transport group to clear the Gulf by 7am so they could quickly unload their cargo. 300 men of the 148th regiment landed further north at Kobukobu inlet because of the terrible weather. It would take them until July 7th to meet up with the main body. Though the USS Strong had been sunk, the Tokyo Express failed her run, thus Akiyama elected to bring the bulk of his shipment to Vila the following night, but this time he brought 10 destroyers; Niizuki, Suzukaze, Tanikaze, Mocizuki, Mikazuki, Hamakaze, Amagiri, Hacujuki, Nagacuki and Sacuki. Halsey got advance word of this and ordered Ainsworth to return to Kula Gulf to wait for the Japanese to show up. Halsey also reinforced him with destroyers Jenkins and Radford. Ainsworth went into this with a simple but ultimately flawed plan. He overestimated the capabilities of radar guided 6 inch guns against fast moving targets. On top of that he seemed to be totally ignorant of the IJN's Type 93 Long Lance torpedo's capabilities. His plan was to wait passively until radar detected the enemy than he would toss his cruisers at the enemy using their 6 inch guns, hoping to fire over 8,000 yards or so. He believed that was the effective Japanese torpedo range, why he believed this I do not know. For his destroyers, they would launch torpedoes at the enemy. Akiyama's Tokyo Express departed Buin after sundown divided into a covering force of 3 destroyers in the front and the main bulk behind them. Around midnight on July 6th, Ainsworth's force were just northwest off New Georgia, entering the mouth of the Kula Gulf. The Japanese were also arriving to the Kula Gulf whereupon they detached the first transport unit to land 1600 troops. By 1:06am, Niizuki's radar detected Ainsworth's force, but this time Akiyama was prepared for a fight. Akiyama detached his second transport unit at 1:43am and 7 minutes later American radar picked up the Japanese. Ainsworth took his force in closer until the enemy was 7000 yards away. Then at 1:56am at around a range of 6800 yards the Americans Cruisers began to open fire. Akiyama quickly recalled the second transport unit before he engaged the enemy. Unluckily for Akiyama the Americans concentrated their fire upon the Niizuki which was pulverized quickly. She became a burning wreck before she was sunk by 6 inch shell fire taking Rear Admiral Akiyama's life alongside 300 sailors. Within 20 minutes the Americans would fire 612 shells, 6 of which smashed the Niizuki. Despite the loss of of their commander, the well drilled torpedo crews pulled off a salvo of 16 torpedoes at the American gun flashes. Ainsworth ignorant of the long lance range could do little to avoid it. The light cruiser USS Helena was the first to be struck, her bow was blown off virtually up to the number 2 turret, nearly cracking her in two as she sank taking 190 of her 1177 crew with her. St Louis was hit by a torpedo that fortunately did not detonate and another nearly missed Honolulu. The Japanese fled as fast as they could for Buin as Ainsworth directed his two remaining cruisers to shell the second transport unit. Of the four destroyers in this group, Amagiri escaped with minor damage, while Hatsuyuki was hit by 2 6inch shells, but luckily for her they were duds and she limped away. Nagatsuki was hit by a single 6 inch shell to her rear ship which would force her to run aground near Bambari Harbor. The next morning she would be destroyed by American aircraft. At 3:30am, Ainsworth ordered his forces to return to Tulagi as he dispatched the Radford and O'Bannon to pick up survivors while Nicholas chased the fleeing Japanese. The Japanese dispatched Amagiri to pick up their survivors and she would be intercepted by Nicholas taking 4 hits before she made her retreat. While this was going on the First transport unit completed unloading its 1600 troops and bolted through the Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf. The Japanese had managed to land their reinforcements and sunk the USS Strong and Helena, so they considered it a tactical victory, though the loss of the Niizuki and her commander was terrible. The battle for New Georgia was nowhere near done. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings and early offensives were well on their way on New Georgia and the drive upon Lae was closing in. The Battle of Kula Gulf gave the Americans a bloody nose and now the Japanese had more forces at their disposal to try and dislodge the Americans from New Georgia.

Stephen 'Top Gun' McKeag and the UDA's Roaring Ninties: Part One

The Troubles Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 11, 2023 35:14

This two-part episode focuses on Stephen 'Top Gun' McKeag, who was a prominant member of the Ulster Defence Association. He was also responsible for many killings of Catholics in Northern Ireland. This first episode will talk about how the UDA restructured in the early 90's and what led to the rise of C-Company.This episode was written by John Livingstone, and you can find more of his writing by searching @TheTroublesArchive on Instagram.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/4834164/advertisement

#152 Dennis Katolin on Information Maneuver

The Cognitive Crucible

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 13, 2023 69:55

The Cognitive Crucible is a forum that presents different perspectives and emerging thought leadership related to the information environment. The opinions expressed by guests are their own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of or endorsement by the Information Professionals Association. During this episode, Marine Corps LtCol Dennis Katolin, who is the Commanding Officer of Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (MWCS-28), discusses his squadron's Standard Operating Procedures for Information Maneuver. Our wide ranging conversation covers emerging talent and integration requirements, communications-related contributions to the outcomes of the information warfighting function, and early lessons learned related to the Ukraine War. Research Question: Dennis Katolin suggests an interested student; Power projection, cultural paradigms, and legal shifts that inhibit full appreciation and adaptation into the information space. Analogous to the cultural shift in the military at the dawning of flight. Resources: Cognitive Crucible Podcast Episodes Mentioned #38 Lori Reynolds on Operations in the Information Environment #95 LtGen Matthew Glavy on MCDP 8 Information #132 Brian Russell on OIE Truths #59 Mark Moffett on Societies, Identity, and Belonging LtCol Dennis Katolin The Nature of Information - Information is instantaneous by LtCol Dennis W. Katolin Information Defined – A Whole of Force Approach by LtCol Dennis W. Katolin Military Ethics by Dennis Katolin Link to full show notes and resources https://information-professionals.org/episode/cognitive-crucible-episode-152 Guest Bio: Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Katolin is the Commanding Officer of Marine Wing Control Squadron 28 (MWCS-28). Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Katolin graduated from Truman State University in 2002 and was commissioned that same year. Lieutenant Colonel Katolin reported to The Basic School in January 2003, and upon completion, attended the Communications and Information Systems Officer Course, graduating in 2003. In January 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin moved to MCAGCC 29 Palms and reported to 3rd LAR Battalion to serve as the S-6A until May 2004. He then became the S-6 for 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and was the Communications Platoon Commander. In September, 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin deployed with 1/7 to Al Qaim, Iraq (along the Iraq/Syrian border) and again in 2006. After returning from Iraq in October of 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin executed orders to Second Fleet Command in Norfolk, Virginia to serve as the Marine C4 Officer on the N-6 staff. He was also designated as the Joint C4 planner as Second Fleet was becoming a Joint Task Force (JTF SOUTH) for SOUTHCOM. In the summer of 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin reported to EWS and later attended the Advanced Communication Officers Course (ACOC) 2010. After EWS, he reported to 9th Communication Battalion where he assumed command of C Company and, in May, 2011, became the Commanding Officer of B Company which deployed to Afghanistan and facilitated communications for the I MEF (FWD) CE for RC(SW). Upon returning from Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin reported to I MEF G-6 as the Assistant Operations Officer, where he was the primary C4 planner for I MEB and supported Pacific Horizon 2012, Dawn Blitz 13.1 and 13.2, coordinating with the MEF staff as well as ESG-3. After serving on the MEB staff, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin received orders to serve as a Faculty Advisor at Expeditionary Warfare School from 2013 to 2016. He was the course director for the MCMAP program, ethics, amphibious C4, and Communications Occupational Field Exercise modules of instruction. He received the Elihu Rose Award for teaching excellence in 2016. In 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin was assigned to 9th Communication Battalion and served as the Operations Officer. He planned 5 Battalion level exercises in support of the I MEF Commanding General and also provided C4 detachments for MEB level exercises Pacific Horizons, Dawn Blitz, and Native Fury. He planned the reorganization of the Battalion in accordance with HQMC's Force Modernization 2025 as well as established the first Defensive Cyber Operations cadre organic to I MEF. In 2018-2019, Lieutenant Colonel Katolin attended the School of Advanced Warfighting. His last assignment was as the MAGTF Planner assigned to the Plans and Strategy Division for the Deputy Commandant for Information. Lieutenant Colonel Katolin is a 3rd Degree Black Belt Martial Arts Instructor Trainer in MCMAP and was a winner of the Commandant's Innovation Challenge in 2017 for writing a proposed doctrinal publication on ethics. Lieutenant Colonel Katolin's personal decorations include the Meritorious Services Medal w/gold star, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, the Navy Marine Corps Achievement Medal w/gold star, and the Combat Action Ribbon. About: The Information Professionals Association (IPA) is a non-profit organization dedicated to exploring the role of information activities, such as influence and cognitive security, within the national security sector and helping to bridge the divide between operations and research. Its goal is to increase interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars and practitioners and policymakers with an interest in this domain. For more information, please contact us at communications@information-professionals.org. Or, connect directly with The Cognitive Crucible podcast host, John Bicknell, on LinkedIn. Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate, 1) IPA earns from qualifying purchases, 2) IPA gets commissions for purchases made through links in this post.

012 S04 Ep 01 – Armor-Mech Team Lessons Learned from Team Cronos, 3-67 Armor BN (2nd ABCT, 3rd ID) w/MAJ Laplante & CPT Corino

The Crucible - The JRTC Experience Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 17, 2023 53:42

The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the twelfth episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience.' Hosted by the Commander of Ops Group (COG), COL Matthew Hardman. Today's guests are the division liaison officer from 3rd Infantry Division, MAJ Joe Laplante and the armor-mechanized team's commander, CPT James Corino. The armor-mech team that supported 1/82 ABN was Team Cronos, C Company, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. The 67th Armor Regiment has the honor of being one of the oldest armor units in the U.S. military as they were first formed in 1929 as the 2nd Tank Regiment (Heavy) and redesignated as the 67th Infantry Regiment (Medium Tanks) in 1932 and then became the 67th Armor in 1940. During WWII, they took part in the invasion and fierce fighting that followed for North Africa, Sicily, and then mainland Europe. Later they would take part in Operation Desert Storm followed by the various operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The company team has the Hollywood call-sign of “Cronos” while the BN's call-sign is the “Hounds of Hell” and the ABCT's call-sign is "Spartans." The ABCT's motto of “Send Me” while the BN's motto is “Ready for War.” For the rotation in question, Team Cronos supported the rotation by providing an armor-mech team to a light infantry brigade combat team in order to provide a highly lethal and mobile force, so as to facilitate winning engagements on any battlefield in any operational environment across the globe. Its effectiveness increases through the synergy of combined arms including M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks, M2A4 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, infantry, engineers, and support elements. In this episode they discuss they the various nuances of effectively employing an armor-mech team as part of a larger light infantry task force and the massive learning curve for honing the light-heavy paradigm. The U.S. Army has only recently began task organizing light infantry BCTs from XVIII Airborne Corps with armor-mech teams again and so the Army is having to re-learn some of the fundamentals once again. Sustainment, logistics, and maintenance cannot be over emphasized. Having a liaison from the armor-mech team's division to the supporting light infantry BCT is definitely an identified “Best Practice.” Part of S04 “Scouts Out” series. For additional information and insights from this episode, please checkout our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center. Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format. Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future. “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.

C Company Trains Tough

DVIDS Spotlight

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 23, 2023

Package of C Co. 38th Long Range Surveillance performing training on the 240B machine gun for their mission in Talil, Iraq. Produced by Pfc. Courtney Selig.

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Rodriguez graduates from training

Wilson County News

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2023 1:21

U.S. Army Pvt. First Class Xavier Lee Rodriguez of Floresville graduated from U.S. Army Infantry Basic Training on Nov. 3 2022, at Fort Jackson 3-60th Infantry Battalion, S.C. He completed 10 weeks of intense basic training in B Company, 3rd Platoon “Vipers.” While in basic training PFC Rodriguez received training in various weapons, hand combat, combat operation, tactics, physical fitness, first aid, map reading, land navigation, drill and ceremony, military justice, military courtesy, Army history, and Army values. Additionally, he attended Advance Individual Training at the 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 1-78th Battalion, C Company in Fort Sill, Okla., where he...Article Link

training army rodriguez graduates battalion okla fort jackson fort sill infantry battalion c company field artillery brigade

John Basilone's Hour of Glory-Henderson Field with special guest Dave Holland

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 3, 2023 100:49

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave. We've been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese. As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field. The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson's Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures. Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”. All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation. This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse. Talking Points: Preparations:The Japanese had been steadily sending troops and supplies, more troops than supplies, to Guadalcanal for several weeks in anticipation of this specific offensive. The IJN fully supported the operation in just about any way that they could. On October 14, two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, along with screening vessels shelled Henderson Field in what was easily, the worst bombardment of the entire campaign.For nearly an hour and a half the two battleships fired over 900 rounds of 14 inch ammunition into the Lunga perimeter to knock out both airfields and destroy the Cactus Air Force's aircraft.The shelling, known as “the Bombardment” by the Marines and soldiers ashore destroyed about half of the Cactus Air Force, and heavily damaged the two airfields, although one was back in operation in a few hours.This bombardment, as well as others in between, were all in conjunction with the large-scale offensive, all with plans to soften the defenses of the Americans. The Japanese had begun steadily moving troops into the attack area for many days, through the jungle (again), with the date of the main assault set for October 22, but would actually take place two days later. To distract the Americans attention from the main location of the attack, the Japanese set up a series of diversionary infantry assaults. The Japanese were under the assumption that only 10,000 Americans were ashore, when in actuality the number was over 23,000. The Americans, aware that a large scale assault was eventually coming, had been preparing their defensive perimeter for weeks.The addition of the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment gave Vandegrift a total of 13 infantry battalions to defend the perimeter in an almost continuous line. Prelude to the main event: The Japanese had been moving their main assault force through the jungle, along a trail blazed by their engineers, for days…completely undetected by American forces. At dusk on October 23, one of the diversion attacks under COL Nakaguma, alomng with 9 tanks, attacked Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matinikau river. The Japanese tanks advanced near the river under the cover of an artillery barrage, however, the Japanese tanks were either disabled or destroyed by Marine anti-tank weapons on the opposite side of the river. In response to the Japanese assault, and the Japanese artillery, 4 battalions of Marine artillery fired over 6,000 rounds at the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties and essentially stopping the assault at the river. In between the artillery detonations, Marines on the line could audibly hear Japanese screaming and moaning in pain. The artillery, yet again, was devastating.It should be mentioned that while this was happening, Vandegrift was in Noumea at the bidding of newly appointed head banana, Admiral Halsey. We'll get to Haley's installation as main man in another episode when we discuss the leadership, both good and bad, of the Guadalcanal campaign with buddy and friend of the show Jon Parshall. The Main Event October 24:At first light on October 24, Marines along the Matinikau caught sight of a long column of Japanese infantry on a ridge to the left rear of the American lines. COL Hanneken's 2/7 redeployed to the rear and loosely tied in with the Marines of 3/7, albeit with a gap in the line. With the departure of Hanneken's people, Chesty Puller was forced to stretch his single battalion over a regimental front.Only 700 men guarded an area designed for the protection from over 2,000.Puller, ever vigilant, personally walked the line inspecting each area, and each emplacement ordering improvements or movements as he saw fit in each area. As the Japanese under GEN Maruyama approached the area thought to be the correct position for attack, they began to get bogged down again by the jungle and now, also, heavy rain.The original kick off time for the attack, 1900, came and went as the Japanese continued to grope towards American lines. Finally, around 2200, elements of COL Shoji's people stumbled into the leading elements of puller's defenses.The fighting was short but fierce as Puller's men eventually drove off the attackers, making no progress and gaining no ground.Oddly enough, the Japanese sent a message back to 2nd Division HQ that stated that Japanese infantry were moving into the grassy area at the edge of the airfield, when in reality, they were nowhere near the airfield and had certainly not broken through any lines. COL Matsumoto called and stated that the airfield was now completely in Japanese hands. The 17th Army signaled “2300 Banzai-a little before 2300 the right wing captured the airfield.” This odd transmission is even stranger when one considers that the “right wing” had marginal, at best, participation in the event at all. Meanwhile, the left wing of the Japanese assault decidedly did attack.3rd Battalion 29th Infantry 11th Company under CAPT Katsumata reconned American lines in the area, found a soft spot between 2 MG emplacements and began a low crawl advance towards the American gap in the lines that was threaded with barbed wire. Japanese engineers began snipping the wire, unbeknownst to Americans, as the infantry low crawled through the grass to spring a surprise assault.Either due to delirium from the long march, fear, excitement or a combination of all 3, one lone Japanese let out a war cry that was soon picked up by many others alerting the Americans of their presence. Almost instantly American machine gun fire erupted as did mortars. The Japanese now knowing the surprise was gone, leapt up and charged. They began to get entangled in the barbed wire and were summarily annihilated by the Marines holding that area, which was Puller's A Company at about 0100. Shortly thereafter, Japanese of the 9th Company moved to the left in the wake of the now dead 11thCompany and prepared to attack.After giving a great Banzai, the men of the 9th Company charged Marine lines, running straight through the prepared machine gun position firing lanes of Puller's C Company. Within 5 minutes, the 9th Company was wiped out. John Basilone After the majority of the infantry were killed, American artillery began dropping, killing what was left of the Japanese. Puller was now aware that he was under attack from a large and well-seasoned Japanese force. He immediately fed 3 platoons from 3/164th into his lines to beef up the defenses.The National Guardsmen were led, sometimes by hand, through the torrential rain into the raging battle and fed piecemeal into the Marine lines, mixing with Marine units and holding their own in the fight. The only real success of the initial assaults came in the form of COL Furimaya's assault at dawn. Realizing he had little to work with, Furimaya assembled what he could and personally led an assault that partially pierced the American lines.About 100 Japanese broke through and held a salient in the Marine lines that was eradicated in the morning. The Main Event October 25:By mid-morning, it was obvious that the Japanese were not through with their assault. As a result, Marines and Army troops began to reshuffle their defenses and prepare for another night time assault. For over an hour after 2000, the Japanese fired artillery into the positions of Puller's 1/7 and LCOL Robert Hall's 164th IR. The majority of the assault fell on the soldiers of the 164th who held their ground again, all night long. With the main push coming through an artery between the 2nd and 3rd BTLN 164th. However, that artery was manned by a couple of Marine 37mm guns that were firing canister into the charging Japanese.A few Japanese parties broke the lines, but those were hunted down and killed by soldiers and Marines within hours. The return of Col Oka…His attacks concentrate on the area held by Hanneken's 2/7Just before midnight, the Japanese surged forward against the Marine positions, finally culminating in an all out assault at 0300.Company F bore the brunt of this assault…Mitch PaigeDespite Paige's heroics, Japanese scaled the slopes in front of F Company and ejected them from their positionsMAJ Odell Conoley led a group of Marines that counterattacked and eliminated the Japanese in the former positions of F Company. The Battle Over: Rough US casualties run about 90 KIA Japanese casualties are unknown in exact figures but estimates range in the neighborhood of 2,200 but probably more than that. The Japanese blamed the terrain, the march through the jungle, no air support, poor physical condition of the troops, inadequate supplies, faulty intel, etc, etc…all of which were accurate. While this isn't the last land battle on Guadalcanal, it certainly was the most crucial to the Japanese, and the most decisive for the Americans. For all intents and purposes, the land campaign, in terms of Japanese all-out assaults and large-scale operations, was over. While there were plans for yet another assault in November, as we shall see, this does not end well for the Japanese.

american americans japanese army field marine ir marines henderson mg battalion edson kongo infantry united states marines lunga banzai guadalcanal bombardment infantry regiment dave holland national guardsmen puller haruna ijn noumea c company company f john basilone admiral halsey henderson field

Sparring Along the Matinikau with special guest Dave Holland

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 20, 2022 90:01

This week we will be talking about the early actions that occurred along the Matinikau river. Now, as opposed to the land battles we have discussed before, Tenaru and Edson's Ridge which each only happened one time, the Matinikau actions occurred several times from September through November 1942. Today, we will be focusing on the September and October actions. Following the battle at Edson's Ridge, what remained of the Japanese force under General Kawaguchi, pulled back through the jungle and attempted to regroup, as well as refit, on the western side of the Matinikau river. Marine general Archer Vandegrift was aware that the Japanese had done this very thing and planned to eliminate whatever was left of the force that had slammed against the ridge on two consecutive nights in September. Vandegrift was determined to mop up what was left of the Japanese so as to deny them the opportunity to consolidate their forces and resume their offensive. Vandegrift chose his freshest troops for this action, the recently arrived 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines under a Lieutenant Colonel whose name was and still is synonymous with the Corps. Lewis B Chesty Puller. Talking Points: The 7th Marines Arrive:On September 18, the Marines on Guadalcanal finally received some much needed reinforcements, to the tune of 4157 men of the 7th Marine RegimentFresh from garrison duty in Samoa, these Marines were both fresh and eager to go.Their arrival allowed Vandegrift to finally establish a full defensive perimeter around the Lunga Point areaLearning from the lessons earlier in the campaign, the 7th Marines were disgorged on the beach early in the morning, and by 1800 that same day the cargo ships, now properly loaded, spit out a further 137 trucks4323 barrels of fuel60% of the tentage and equipment needed by the 7thThe remainder would be unloaded in short order Lewis B “Chesty” Puller 44 years old at this timeJoined the Marines in 1918By 42 he had served 24 years in the CorpsA veteran of Haiti, Nicaragua, better known as the banana wars, Puller had loads of combat experience before he ever got to the CanalDescribed as the prototypical Marine officer, Puller had a chin like “bulldozer blade”, a barrel chest and seemingly always had a pipe stuck in his teeth. Highly decorated for service in Haiti and Nicaragua and grounded in the fundamentals of infantry combat and what it took to both be an infantryman, and how to survive as an infantryman, his men absolutely adored him. Mission:Puller was to advance astride Mount Austen, cross the river and examine the area between Mount Austen and KokumbonaClearly just an exploratory mission 900 men under Puller moved out on September 23On the afternoon of the next day, the lead elements of Puller's force ran into a Japanese bivouac area on the NW slope of Mount AustenIn the ensuing fight, the Marines drove the Japanese off just before dark, but took significant casualties7 KIA 25 WIA The next day 2/5 was sent to reinforce Puller and allow his wounded to be brought to the rear At the same time, the Japanese had established a defensive area around the position known as “One Log Bridge” along the riverThe Japanese 12th Company, at the bridge, and Puller's units hit each repeatedly with neither side gaining, or losing, any ground Because of the defense at one log bridge, Puller continued downstream, headed towards the mouth of the river and attempted a crossing.He was met with fierce Japanese defensive fire and mortars that handily checked the Marine advance and forced them to hold on the friendly side of the river Vandegrift sent the 1st Raiders to join Puller and at this point, Edson took commandEdson and Puller devised a plan to have C Company of Puller's Battalion move up the east side of the river, cross one log bridge and attack Matinikau village from the south2/5 would hold the line near the mouth of the river to deny any attempt by the Japanese to flank Puller's group Attack:At first light on the 27th, the Raiders moved up to cross the one log bridgeAs they did so, they came under intense fire from well entrenched Japanese on the east bank of the riverThis was completely unexpected as far as the Marines were concernedWell placed Japanese mortar fire began to take effect on the RaidersKenneth Bailey, leading the attack is killed here After Bailey is killed, LCOL Griffith, who had been wounded in the fight, tried to slip 2 companies around the entrenched Japanese in order to flank them, but they too were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire Back at the mouth of the river, the Japanese 9th Company continuously hurled back 2/5's attacks across the river Pt Cruz: In an attempt to cut the Japanese off, Companies A, B and D of 1/7 landed near Point Cruz and began to push inland.It must be noted that the this action would not have occurred had it been known by Vandegrift that Puller's and the Raider's attack had not succeeded as yet.Garbled radio transmissions from Griffith did not make it clear that the action was successful Almost immediately, the Marines came under heavy fire as COL Oka deployed several units to attack the recently landed MarinesMortar rounds killed Major Rogers, and wounded another Company commander, leaving Captain Charles Kelly to assume command of the operationWithin a short amount of time, the Japanese had moved behind the marines (coast side) and cut them off from any route of escapeRealizing their predicament, Kelly ordered to radio for help…but no radios had been brought to the area by the Marines.Using t-shirts, the Marines spelled out HELP on the ground, a signal that was seen by an SBD pilot from VMSB231 named Dale Leslie.Leslie relayed the Marines' desperate message which was picked up by PullerMeanwhile, Edson's attack was still underway when he too received the message of distress from Kelly.Edson halted his attack despite Puller's heated argument that halting the attack would allow the Japanese to send more men to attack and eventually annihilate Kelly. Fearing for his men, Puller hauled ass back to Kukum where he boarded the destroyer USS Monssen Gathering landing craft, Puller, Monssen, and a flock of 10 landing craft headed towards Point Cruz in the area the Marines had initially landedOnce arriving, the landing craft were greeted by furious fire from the Japanese who had by this time, pushed the Marines back, cut them off and were preparing to mount an assault to destroy themPuller was able to establish comms with Kelly ashore by use of semaphore and directed him to make his way to the coast NOWAs the Marines attempted to fight their way out, the destroyer Monssen provided direct artillery support with every available weapon aboard ship for 30 minutes and helped blast a path for the withdrawing MarinesBy 1630, those who could, had made it to the beach as the landing craft were heading to rescue themRealizing the Marines were trying to escape, the Japanese poured fire into them and tried to reestablish the encirclement Douglas MunroMunro ordered his Higgins landing craft towards the shore as he and the other boats in his formation came under intense fire.Manning a Lewis machine gun, Munro returned fire at the Japanese and ordered for his boat to move closer to the beach so as to shield the Marines that were attempting to embark on the other landing craft.As his boat moved into position, Munro noticed a grounded landing craft, again moving his boat to shield the Marines attempting to free the craft, Munro purposely exposed himself and his boat to withering enemy fire. Holding station for several minutes, Munro poured fire back at the Japanese and eventually directed his boat to withdraw after the previously grounded landing craft had been freed and loaded with Marines. As Munro's craft withdrew he was struck by a Japanese bullet at the base of his skull.Rushing back to Lunga point, his best friend Raymond Evans cradled Munro in his arms. Munro regained consciousness, looked at Evans and asked, “Did they get off?” Evans replied in the affirmative, and Munro died.Munro was the first, and so far, the only Coast Guardsman to receive the MOHThe ill-fated Marine action resulted in 70 KIA and a further 100 WIA October 6-9 actionsOn October 3 LTGEN Maruyama was landed along with fresh troops. His mission was to set up artillery positions on the opposite side of the Matinkiau with which to shell Marine positions in preparation for the late October offensive that was on the horizonOver the next few days, the Japanese proceeded to do just that as well as set up further defensive postions along the banks of the river. Vandegrift, again aware that the Japanese were preparing positions as well as preparing for an offensive Daily Marine patrols ran into Japanese and confirmed both the arrival of fresh troops and the preparations for offensive As a result of this knowledge, Vandegrift once again planned an offensive against the Matinikau positions to eliminate the threat before it came to himHis plan was to strike and seize the area near Kokumbona to deny Japanese access to the trails that lead to the upper portion of the Lunga area.The 5th Marines, minus 1/5 would advance along the coast and force a crossing of the river.The Whaling Group, as well as the 7th Marines, would cross the river further south at one log bridge.Once across the Whaling Group and the 7th would attack down the ridges and hopefully trap a large number of Japanese in the process. The fighting:October 7 the attack kicked off, with 3/5 reaching the river and running into fierce resistance3/5 used 75mm artillery pieces mounted in half-tracks to pour direct fire into the Japanese positions. Slowly, the Japanese gave ground.By nightfall, the Marines held the mouth of the river and the Whaling Group and the 7th had crossed the river easily at one log bridge The following afternoon, H Company 5th Marines under Captain Rigaud mistakenly entered a valley between two Japanese units The enemy holding the high ground poured fire into H Company. Marines started to panic, and began to run. Rigaud stood up in the middle of the fight, challenged his men, shamed them, cajoled them and made them retake their positions and eventually withdrew in order.Fighting died down on the 7th and the assault waited until the following day to complete the encirclementOn the 8th, Vandegrift received intel that the Japanese were preparing an all out offensive to recapture the island. As a result, he cancelled the operation for the next day and ordered his units to return to the American perimeter to prepare a defense following this day's actions. The Whaling Group and 2/7 reached the beach as Puller's group topped a ridgeline to find an entire Japanese battalion in the ravine below him.Puller called in artillery and mortars and watched as the artillery did its work, calling them machines for extermination.The Japanese tried to escape by climbing up the ravine side and were taken under direct machine gun and rifle fire from Puller's men.Only after Puller's men had expended all of their mortar ammunition did he order cease fire, moving out to rejoin Whaling and Hanneken ahead of him.This concluded the second battle around the Matinikau which resulted in:65 KIA and 125 WIAThe Japanese lost around 700 men in the three day engagement Effects on the campaign:Because of the loss of the Matinikau, the Japanese were forced to eventually march their men through the jungle (again) before the major assault around Henderson Field in late October . This march, like Kawaguchi's the month before, exhausted the attackers to the point where their efficiency in the attack that came was severely diminished.

'Mad Dog' (Part 2): Bloody loyalist feuds and the banishment of Johnny Adair

The BelTel

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 13, 2022 26:44

Johnny ‘Mad Dog' Adair was behind the murder of many innocent Catholics during the Troubles but his lower Shankill mob, ‘C Company', was also behind two bloody feuds with fellow loyalists. The first with their rivals the UVF, the second with the rest of the UDA - that's when C-Company went too far. Ciarán Barnes tells the story of the fall of Johnny Adair and the banishment of his supporters and their families from west Belfast. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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'Mad Dog' (Part 1): The rise of Johnny ‘Mad Dog' Adair and the UDA's C-Company

The BelTel

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 11, 2022 23:52

Johnny Adair's name is well known, his face instantly recognizable, his voice familiar but he's not a famous actor or singer, he's a ‘celebrity terrorist'. He was the pumped-up skinhead hardman who led a bloody loyalist faction in carrying out over 40 murders – most of his victims were entirely innocent Catholics. The Sunday Life's Ciaran Barnes tells the story of how Adair rose to power in the lower Shankill. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

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Birthday Prank Call: Annoying The A/C Company

The Mo and Sally Morning Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 15, 2022 4:06

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S2 Ep 9: Normandy 1944 the 2/Royal Ulster Rifles and Platoon Commander Lt Cyril Rand's Experiences with Paul Woodadge - Part 2

WW2 Nation Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 23, 2022 52:57

In Season 2, Episode 9, we are diving right back into our conversation with Paul Woodadge looking at the experiences of his Great Uncle Lt. Cyril Rand leading the men of his Platoon in C Company 2/Royal Ulster Rifles during the fierce fighting in Normandy in July 1944. In this particular instalment, we shall be turning our attention to their experiences during Operation Charnwood with the assault on Hill 60, and the subsequent consequences for Cyril's platoon. We discuss their experiences on entering the ruined streets of Caen which had originally been an objective that Montgomery had hoped to capture on D-Day itself back on the 6th June, however now Caen lay in ruins, devastated by an air-raid by the Allied airforces in preparation for Operation Charnwood. We also discuss a few very lucky escapes, Cyril's interactions with some of those civilians who lived in Caen, the actions during the advance towards Troarn as part of Operation Goodwood, as well as much, much more… Support the Show (Patreon - WW2 Nation) Discover more about WW2 Nation. Music Featured: 1940S Newsreel Movie March (Nostalgia, Retro, Cinematic) by IkonikMusik (Pond5) *Please note this episode may contain some explicit language / content, parental guidance advised.*

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S2 Ep 8: Normandy 1944 the 2/Royal Ulster Rifles and Platoon Commander Lt Cyril Rand's Experiences with Paul Woodadge - Part 1

WW2 Nation Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 16, 2022 56:56

Today I am joined by Normandy battlefield guide, military historian, and presenter of WW2TV, Paul Woodadge, as we turn our attention to looking at the 2nd Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles and their experiences in Normandy during that summer of 1944. The Riflemen hold a rich history, with their origins dating back to the late 1700's, and seeing action during the Napoleonic wars and the First World War. In this episode, the first of 2 parts, we shall be following in the footsteps of Paul's Great Uncle, Lt. Cyril Rand who was a platoon commander with C Company. We will be looking at the training and the build-up to Operation Overlord, embarkation, and landing in Normandy on Sword Beach on D-Day, before turning our attention to those fierce early engagements that Cyril and his men experienced around Cambes-en-Plaine in those opening days of June 44. Support the Show (Patreon - WW2 Nation) Discover more about WW2 Nation. Music Featured: 1940S Newsreel Movie March (Nostalgia, Retro, Cinematic) by IkonikMusik (Pond5) *Please note this episode may contain some explicit language / content, parental guidance advised.*

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VRH 2.0 - Show 8 - The Rangers

VBN - Veterans Broadcast Network

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 31, 2021 68:06

Tonight, we present a program that was originally recorded on 5 January 2003 as part of Veterans' Radio Hour 1.0.In that program General Grange interviewed legendary Rangers about their unique exploits.And together the group discusses current events involving Rangers and the future of American Rangers.Philip Piazza, A member of the 5307th Composite Unit (Merrill's Marauders) President of the Merrill's Marauders Association. Merrill's Marauders provide lineage to the Ranger Regiment.Ralph Goranson, a WWII Ranger and former commander of C Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion and the first Ranger to land on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944 (D-Day).General (Retired) Wayne A. Downing, former commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Joint Special Operations Command, US Army Special Operations Command and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), The Third Colonel of the Regiment.Bob Wages, Vietnam Era Ranger, and colleague of Dave Grange's in college.Jim Grimshaw, Retired Ranger and President of the US Army Ranger AssociationRalph Puckett, Korean War Ranger. Recently awarded the Medal of Honor for actions in the Korean War.The Host, Brigadier General (Retired) Dave Grange, Former commander of C Company, First Ranger Battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 1st Infantry Division (The Big Red One), Seventh Colonel of the Regiment.

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Covid battle takes to the skies with flights featuring Māori Battalion

RNZ: Checkpoint

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 19, 2021 3:42

As Aotearoa wages a war against Covid, there's a new battle to get vaccine rates up on the East Coast. The descendants of the Māori Battalion are being invited to aerodromes on Saturday to get vaccinated and see light aircraft bearing the names of the C Company soldiers who fought in the Second World War. Nita Blake-Persen and Samuel Rillstone have the story.

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Descendants of Māori battalion encouraged to get vaccinated

RNZ: Afternoons with Jesse Mulligan

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 16, 2021 8:06

Aircraft bearing the names of the soldiers who fought in C Company from Te Tairawhiti in WWII will be on show.

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Episode 2121 – Marine Vietnam Vet Bill Taylor published new book – On Full Automatic

Vietnam Veteran News with Mack Payne

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 10, 2021 28:22

Recommended Reading BUY NOW Episode 2121 of the Vietnam Veteran News Podcast will feature an interview with William V. Taylor Jr. He recently published a book about his experiences in Vietnam as member of 1/3 Marines, C Company, 2nd Platoon. … Continue reading → The post Episode 2121 – Marine Vietnam Vet Bill Taylor published new book – On Full Automatic appeared first on .

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B.C. company believes it's found a solution to one problem of ‘electrification'

The Lynda Steele Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 2, 2021 6:28

The discovery of Nodules in the pacific ocean happened 50 years ago. But extracting these nodules has proven difficult, until now. A local BC company has approval from the UN to extract these Nodules from The Clarion Clipperton Zone in the pacific ocean. Eric Chapman tells us more

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R.I.P. Don Knapp, 102, Part 1

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Play Episode Listen Later Jun 16, 2021 61:44

Don Knapp passed away last week. He was 102 years old. "I was no hero," Don said when I interviewed him in 1994 at the Cincinnati reunion of the 712th Tank Battalion. More than a thousand people who posted reactions and comments in the Battle of the Bulge Facebook group on the notice of his passing would beg to differ. Incidentally, it was the second time Don went viral. The first was eight years earlier when he posted a picture of himself holding a sign that said "I went golfing on my 94th birthday and shot a hole in one. How many likes can I get for that?" Don is survived by his wife of more than 75 years, Evelyn, and a large and loving family. That 1994 interview touches on several of the major events in the history of C Company: the battles for Hill 122, which encompasses nine previous episodes of the podcast; and Pfaffenheck, which is told in three earlier episodes. In between he was involved in the Sept. 8, 1944 battle with the 106th Panzer Brigade at Mairy, France; the monthlong standoff in Maizieres les Metz, and the crossing of the Saar River at Dillingen, where my father was wounded. Along the way he gives insight into the character and personality of several of the men of C Company who appear from time to time in other episodes. If you'd like to know a bit more about your host -- moi -- I recently was interviewed by a pair of podcasts, The Journalism Salute, about my dual career in newspapers and oral history; and the Truckers Network Radio Show with host Shelley Johnson.

How To Become A "Sheepdog," Grappling With Weapons, Making Yourself Harder To Kill, Are There Fringe Navy SEAL Smart Drugs & Much More With Tim Kennedy.

Ben Greenfield Life

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2021 78:00

BenGreenfieldFitness.com/timkennedy My wife and I recently immersed ourselves in a three-day close quarter combat and firearm and personal defense training course called "Sheepdog-Response". We experienced hours upon hours of grappling, close quarter combat, situational awareness, firearm training and much more. We were feeling a bit sore and beat up at the end, but definitely more prepared for any “curveballs” life may throw at us. I think these types of skills, along with skills such as wilderness survival, plant foraging, hunting, etc. are really good ways to ensure that one is prepared for life in general. I was so impressed with the course, that I decided to get the founder of Sheepdog, Tim Kennedy, on the podcast to talk about it, and much, much more. If you haven't heard of Tim, then you definitely need to know about this guy. Tim is a retired American mixed martial artist and current soldier. A fighting professional from 2001 until 2016, he has fought in the UFC, Strikeforce, the WEC, ShoMMA, HDNet Fights, and represented the Chicago Red Bears in the IFL. Kennedy is one of the few fighters to simultaneously serve in the United States Army while also fighting professionally. He also is a television host, producer, and entrepreneur. Tim completed Basic Combat Training, Advanced Individual Training, Airborne School, Special Forces Assessment and Selection and the Special Forces Qualification Course. In 2007, he completed Ranger School and was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group, where he served on an Operational Detachments Alpha. During this time he was also a sniper, sniper instructor, and the principal combatives instructor for C Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. Kennedy deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom multiple times. In August 2009, Kennedy transitioned from active duty to the Texas Army National Guard's 19th Special Forces Group and served in the position of Special Forces Weapons Sergeant. Among Kennedy's multiple awards are the Army's Bronze Star Medal with V device, which was awarded for valor under fire. He is now an active, Ranger qualified, Green Beret, Special Forces Sniper with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other locations around the globe. He was host of the History Channel television series Hunting Hitler which explores alternative theories about Adolf Hitler's death. He also hosted the show on Discovery Channel Hard to Kill, which he attempted to explore a day in the life of the world's most dangerous occupations. He produced the TV documentary Not a War Story in 2017 and helped co-produce Warriors in 2014, and also produced and hosted Iron Dragon TV. He's made appearances on Deadliest Warrior and The Ultimate Soldier Challenge. During our discussion, you'll discover: -The inspiration behind Sheepdog Response training...12:40 -What to expect in the Sheepdog training course...23:35 -What a Sheepdog trained person might carry on them in public...28:45 -The importance of jiu jitsu in combat training...38:15-How real world experience makes Sheepdog training legit...43:55 -How Sheepdog Response vets attendees for the program...48:40 -Real life examples of Sheepdog attendees using their training...54:35 -Fringe smart drugs, supplements and secrets of the Sheepdog Response team...1:01:15 -The most dangerous and impressive occupation in filming "Hard To Kill"...1:07:10 -And much more... Episode sponsors: -Kion Refer a Friend -Organifi Green Juice -Paleo Valley Beef Sticks -Butcher Box Do you have questions, thoughts, or feedback for Tim Kennedy or me? Leave your comments below and one of us will reply!

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"So long kids, and if I never see you again, goodbye"

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Play Episode Listen Later May 26, 2021 44:27

While crossing the Atlantic on his way to join my father's 712th Tank Battalion as a replacement, Billy Wolfe wrote in a letter to his mother and sisters, "The ocean is so blue it looks like I could dip my pen and write with it." Those words have always stuck with me. Billy burned to death in a tank just two weeks after joining the battalion. He was 18 years old. Karnig Thomasian, a gunner on a B29 in the China-Burma-India theater, became a prisoner of the Japanese after his plane exploded on his third mission. In this episode, he remembers a promise he and a buddy made to the friend's father that they would take care of each other. My father, Lieutenant Maurice Elson, always said he replaced the first lieutenant in the battalion to be killed. That lieutenant was George Tarr. His company commander, Cliff Merrill, reminisces about the train ride from Fort Jackson to Camp Myles Standish and an assignment he gave to Lieutenant Tarr to keep him from worrying about his wife and newborn son as they prepared to go into combat. Erlyn Jensen's brother, Major Don McCoy, perished on the ill-fated Kassel Mission of Sept. 27, 1944. In this episode, Erlyn talks about how she and her sister got her mother to join a group of Gold Star mothers, and about a trip her mother took to see her son's grave at St. Avold. Malcolm McGregor, a survivor of the Kassel Mission and former prisoner of war, talks about a young bombardier who was full of confidence. George Collar, a bombardier and co-founder of the Kassel Mission Memorial Association, now the Kassel Mission Historical Society, talks about meeting the parents of a flier whose remains George recovered after the battle. Tim Dyas talks about visiting the father of a soldier who died in prison camp. Russell Loop, a gunner in C Company of the 712th Tank Battalion, remembers Jack Mantell, a buddy who was killed in the battle at Pfaffenheck, in the same battle where Billy Wolfe lost his life. Lou Putnoky, a Coast Guard veteran of the USS Bayfield, the flagship of the Utah Beach invasion fleet, recalls a sailor from his hometown who was washed overboard from the battleship Nevada. A death in combat reverberates throughout the lives of the living, often for generations. Some of the stories are told at greater length in other episodes of War As My Father's Tank Battalion Knew It, a podcast about the 712th Tank Battalion in particular and World War II in general. Speaking of World War II, I'll be exhibiting the podcast, my books and audio CDs at the Mid Atlantic Air Museum's World War II Weekend in Reading, Pennsylvania June 4-6. If you're among the thousands in attendance, I hope you'll stop by the hangar and say hello! The usual suspects: aaronelson.com War As My Father's Tank Battalion Knew It WW2 Oral History Audiobooks The Mathew Caruso Story

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C Company

Still-A-Frog

Play Episode Listen Later May 4, 2021 10:38

Army life can be tough, especially when you're husband is deployed. Will temptation get the better of this wife...

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The story of C Company: the Australians who were Japanese POW's during WWII

Nightlife

Play Episode Listen Later May 3, 2021 17:51

Over the course of world war two, over 22,000 Australians were taken by the Japanese as prisoners of war – and were scattered widely across south east Asia. C Company were 3800 Australians who were enslaved and sent all the way back to Japan.

CPT Ralph Goranson (C Co. 2nd Rangers) Charlie Sector, Omaha Beach 06JUN1944

War Stories by Preston Stewart

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2021 16:04

06JUN1944: Tasked with clearing German defenses in the Charlie Sector of Omaha Beach, CPT Ralph Goranson and C Company of the 2nd Ranger BN headed to shore. Told by LTC James Rudder that his was the toughest job on the whole beach, Goranson had a decision to make. If Dog Green was cleared, he would move up the Vierville draw and loop west to attack the German defenses before linking up with the Rangers at Point du hoc. If that sector wasn't cleared, he would be forced to scale the cliffs overlooking Charlie sector. With Dog Green still heavily contested, Goranson and his men took to the cliffs, reaching the beach at 0645. The two LCA's carried 68 Rangers and they came under fire as soon as they landed. His unit already reduced to about 30 fighting men, Goranson directed his men to climb the nearly 100 foot cliffs. As the first reached the top, they right away began their attack as more and more Rangers followed behind. Recognizing the damage WN 73 was causing on Omaha, Goranson made the decision to attack east rather than west towards his fellow Rangers. Goranson found a fortified house that was hammering the beach. He led his men in clearing the house and surrounding trenches. Eventually they were joined by men from the 29th Infantry Division who had come ashore at Dog Green. For his heroic actions that day in helping to open the Dog Green sector, CPT Ralph Goranson would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

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Interview With a Tank Driver: Tony D'Arpino Part 2

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 4, 2021 40:36

C Company veterans, from left, John Zimmer, Cecil Brock, Buck Hardee, Ralph Tambaro and Tony D'Arpino War As My Father's Tank Battalion Knew It is a podcast about the 712th Tank Battalion in particular and World War II in general, or maybe it's about General Patton in general and the Greatest Generation in particular. Whatever it's about, every episode is a piece in the ten thousand piece jigsaw of history, in the words and voices of the people who made it. In this and the previous episode, Tony D'Arpino of Milton, Massachusetts talks about driving a Sherman tank from Normandy to Czechoslovakia, seeing action in Normandy and Le Mans and Chambois and the Battle of the Bulge and the Siegfried Line. This interview is included in "The Tanker Tapes," available at eBay For more stories and interviews: aaronelson.com World War II Oral History Audiobooks The Mathew Caruso Story A tragic hero of the Korean War

Interview With a Tank Driver: Tony D'Arpino Part 1

Danny Lane's Music Museum

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 3, 2021 37:43

Tony D'Arpino War As My Father's Tank Battalion Knew It is at a crossroads, perhaps not as complex as the intersection between time and space, but rather the intersection between stagnation and growth. Please give it a comment or a review wherever you listen to podcasts, be it spotify, gaana, audible, itunes or its host, libsyn. That will help attract new listeners and help the podcast grow. Today's episode is excerpted from my interview with Tony D'Arpino. Tony was a tank driver in C Company, but he was way more than that. He was a husband, a father, a storyteller, and a fixture at reunions of the 712th. He is featured in my audiobook The Tanker Tapes, and also in Once Upon a Tank in the Battle of the Bulge. For more information: myfatherstankbattalion.com Aaron Elson's Author Page World War II Oral History Audiobooks Aaron's eBay store ebaystores.com/World-War-II-History

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The Vietnam War: The Music - S. 3 / E. 10 – Home Sweet Hooch

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 13, 2020 118:34

Our podcasts are called The Vietnam War: The Music. Our mission here at the Music Museum is to support all Vietnam Veterans and those who serve the United States, then and now. We thank you for your service. Early-on, in Vietnam, soldiers turned to music as a lifeline to the home front they promised to defend. Rock & roll (R&R) really became rest & relaxation (R&R) for the troops. It was this music that got you through another day, another day closer to going home. While in-country, music was a big part of a soldier’s down time that centered within the hooches of Vietnam. There are events you don’t want to remember, but then there are songs you really want to remember. Many of these songs will have a special meaning for you. A place, a brother, a time gone by. This program is for you, the Vietnam Vets, who will never forget. Our goal with The Vietnam War: The Music is to honor the fallen and the survivors with the music that got them through “just one more day”. **** Our shows are broadcast around the world. They say thank you & “welcome home” to all Vietnam Vets. There is no opinion offered on the War. It’s all about the music. *** Join the conversation on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008232395712 *** or by email at dannymemorylane@gmail.com **** For your service and your sacrifice, this is The Vietnam War: The Music. This episode is called “Home Sweet Hooch” You’ll hear: ***** Join the conversation on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008232395712 **** or by email at dannymemorylane@gmail.com **** In this episode you’ll hear: 1) Rock 'n' Rock Soul by Grand Funk Railroad 2) Welcome Home by Country Joe McDonald 3) Green, Green Grass Of Home by Porter Wagoner 4) Let's Spend The Night Together by The Rolling Stones 5) The Big Bright Green Pleasure Machine by Simon & Garfunkel 6) Mickey's Monkey by The Miracles (with Smokey Robinson) 7) Going Up The Country (Woodstock Version) by Canned Heat 8) Ring Of Fire by Johnny Cash 9) Molina by Creedence Clearwater Revival 10) Here I Sit by Saul Broudy 11) Come On, Let's Go by Ritchie Valens 12) Battle Hymn of Lt. Calley by C Company (w/ Terry Nelson) 13) Take Me Home, Country Roads by Toots & The Maytals 14) Sweet Home Alabama by Lynyrd Skynyrd 15) Jody's Got Your Girl And Gone by Johnnie Taylor 16) Half Moon by Janis Joplin 17) Adios Mexico by The Texas Tornados 18) Goodnight Saigon by Garth Brooks 19) Yellow Submarine by The Beatles 20) I Can't Turn You Loose by Otis Redding 21) Soldier by Straight No Chaser 22) Dream Weaver by Gary Wright 23) The Acid Queen by The Who 24) Unchained Melody by The Righteous Brothers (Bobby Hatfield, solo) 25) Stand By Your Man by Candi Staton 26) Echo Park by Keith Barbour 27) Tougher Than The Rest by Shawn Colvin 28) Soul Kitchen by The Doors 29) It's The Same Old Song by The Four Tops 30) Lord Don't Move The Mountain by Inez Andrews 31) Jet Airliner by The Steve Miller Band 32) Leaving On A Jet Plane by John Denver 33) Not So Distant Day by Jamie O'Neal & Michael McDonald 34) Once I Was by Gregg Allman 35) Heroes by David Bowie

[Brand Strategy Series] Setting Your Food Business Apart Step 3: Company Strategy

Real Food Brands Marketing Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 16, 2020 18:51

During this three-part Brand Strategy series, we’ve covered competitors and customers, so now it’s time to look at the final C: Company. This is where we put together all of our inputs and start to look at outputs. Get specific about these components of company strategy, and you’ll figure out how to really set your brand apart. Today on the Real Food Brands Marketing Podcast, host and Food & Beverage Brand Strategist Katie Mleziva finishes our series on Brand Strategy. In this episode, Katie breaks down how to synthesize your Competitor, Consumer, and Company info to determine what truly makes your brand stand out. In This Episode: Why it’s important to work through your brand strategy following a step by step process. How to identify your competitive advantages and key points of value. Why you need to understand the actual benefits of what you’re selling. How your brand pillars, positioning and personality help bring your brand to life. What to do when your strategic thinking changes over time. How to use your brand strategy (hint: this strategy will not just sit on the shelf!) How the new Food Brand WorkshopTM will help you get started on your brand strategy. Resources: Ep #64: [Brand Strategy Series] Setting Your Food Business Apart Step 1: The Competitive Snapshot Ep #65: [Brand Strategy Series] Setting Your Food Business Apart Step 2: Identifying Your Ideal Consumer Ep #49: 4 Common Brand Strategy Mistakes (and How to Fix Them) Ep #56: Meeting Consumer Needs – What Are You REALLY Selling? Real Food Brands Marketing Roundtable Facebook Group Real Food Brands website Food Brand WorkshopTM – NEW!

consumer competitors brand strategy food business c company

Family members of Māori Battalion asked to claim medals their relatives never recieved

RNZ: Morning Report

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 6, 2020 2:56

Seventy-five years after the end of World War II descendants of more than 130 members of the Māori Battalion's C Company are being asked to come forward and claim the war medals their family members should have got but never received. Lawyer David Stone has put the call out on social media. His project began a year and a half ago when he was doing research on his great uncle, Private Dooley Swann. He told RNZ reporter Te Aniwa Hurihanganui he knew his uncle could not have been the only soldier who did not receive his medal.

world war ii claim seventy family members relatives medals battalion rnz recieved te ao maori c company te aniwa hurihanganui

Tim Kennedy - Hard To Kill: How To Fight For Freedom & Not Become A Slave To The System

London Real

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 8, 2020 118:07

BUSINESS ACCELERATOR - Starting soon: https://londonreal.tv/biz/ 2021 SUMMIT TICKETS: https://londonreal.tv/summit/ NEW MASTERCLASS EACH WEEK: http://londonreal.tv/masterclass-yt LATEST EPISODE: https://londonreal.link/latest Timothy Kennedy grew up in San Luis Obispo, California. Kennedy’s father enrolled Tim and his brother in shooting schools, boxing lessons, wrestling teams, and jiu jitsu classes. Tim Kennedy attended Eagle Academy private high school, graduating in 1998. He then attended Columbia College of Missouri earning a BA in Criminal Justice in 2002. Kennedy began competing in sanctioned mixed martial arts fights while still in college, but after graduation he joined the United States Army, enlisting in the elite Special Forces in 2004. However, he continued to compete in MMA while serving as a Green Beret. When the Army instituted a service-wide Combatives (hand-to-hand fighting) tournament in 2005, Kennedy entered and won the tournament in the light heavyweight division. He achieved this goal three years in a row. In 2007, he completed Ranger School and was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group, where he served on Operational Detachment Alphas. During this time he was also a sniper, sniper instructor, the principal combatives instructor for C Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. Kennedy deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom multiple times. Among Kennedy’s multiple awards are the Army’s Bronze Star Medal with V device, which was awarded for valor under fire.

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The Connaught Rangers Mutiny—1920, 1970 & 2020

History Ireland

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 28, 2020 69:34

On 28 June 1920, five men from C Company of the 1st Battalion of the Connaught Rangers led a mutiny in Jalandhar, Punjab, in protest against martial law in Ireland. Following their surrender a few days later, 88 mutineers were court-martialled, of whom 77 were imprisoned; the leader, James Daly, was executed. The imprisoned mutineers were released in 1923; they returned to Ireland, and in 1936 were granted State pensions. In 1970 the remains of James Daly and two other mutineers were repatriated from India. Listen to Tommy Graham, editor of History Ireland, discuss the complex web of issues arising from these events and their commemoration both in 1970 and today with John Gibney, Cécile Gordon, Brian Hanley and Kate O'Malley.

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Paris, Illinois

battle illinois sherman bulge tank battalion c company sherman tanks

Play Episode Listen Later May 16, 2020 60:43

Russell Loop started out in the horse cavalry, became a driver in D Company of the 712th Tank Battalion and was transferred to C Company as a gunner in a medium Sherman tank just prior to the Battle of the Bulge. In this interview, he shares his experiences in 11 months of combat.

The Road to Falaise

tank gap normandy battalion czechoslovakia gifford infantry division falaise tank battalion c company

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 15, 2020 36:06

The independent 712th Tank Battalion spent 311 days in combat from Normandy to Czechoslovakia, and earned a reputation as the "armored fist" of the 90th Infantry Division. This episode of War As My Father's Tank Battalion Knew It follows Lieutenant Jim Gifford of C Company from his arrival as a replacement in Normandy to the Falaise Gap on August 18-19, 1944. Warning: This episode contains some graphic descriptions.

Episode 41: Bill Schafer Discusses His Candidacy for U.S. Congress in Iowa District 3

Live with Michael Bluemling Jr. Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 9, 2019 34:05

Bill Schafer was born to a career Army Soldier. His father per- formed his patriotic duty in many locations during his 20+ years in the Army. Bill and his four siblings were born in different locations (New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky, Germany). Floyd and his wife of 65+ years now reside in Maryland. Maryland is where Bill met Robin in 1981 and they married in 1984. Robin dedicated herself to taking care of soldiers and their families and raised their three outstanding children. Jacqueline, born in North Carolina, now lives in Atlanta, GA. She obtained her masters degree and now works in management. Krystalle, born in Germany, lives in San Antonio, TX and is a school teacher. Joseph, born in Arkansas, lives in Tucson, AZ and is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Arizona. Bill is a retired Colonel from the United States Army with over 32 years of uniformed service and 5 years of service as a Department of the Army Civilian. Bill retired from the Army in October 2014. He continued to work until 2019 as Director of Human Resources. He and his wife, Robin, chose to make Iowa their home and reside in Warren county. Bill graduated from East Stroudsburg University of Pennsyl- vania with a Bachelor of Science in Economics. A Distinguished Military Graduate, he was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant and was a perfect fit for the United States Army Infantry. Bill is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College and the Senior Service College. He earned a Master of Arts in Human Resources Management from Webster University of Missouri and a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces Lieutenant Schafer was first assigned to the 1st Battalion (Air- borne), 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Mortar Platoon Leader, Anti- Tank Platoon Leader and Company Executive Officer. He was then assigned to Kirchgoens, Germany serving as the Human Resource Officer. Later he deployed to combat during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as Commander of C Company of the 5th Bat- talion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armor Division. His other military assignments included Anti-tank Platoon Ob- server/Controller and Rifle Company Senior Observer/Controller for Joint Readiness Training Center; Small Group Instructor for the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment; Commander, E Company of the 4th Ranger Training Battalion and the Assistant Operations Officer of the Ranger Train- ing Brigade. After graduating from the Command & General Staff Officer College, Major Schafer served as the Human Resource Officer for the Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia; Executive Officer for the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment, Infantry Training Brigade; Operations Officer for the 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Ranger Training Brigade; Executive Officer for the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division; and Operations Officer for the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Schafer served overseas in Osan, Korea as the Operations Officer for the 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detach- ment of the 8th Armys Combined/Joint Operations Center. He was then deployed to Iraq as the Commander, 1st Battalion, 12th In- fantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division as part of Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom. After returning from Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Schafer transitioned the Infantry Battalion into 2nd Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment. He also served as a Senior Infantry Battalion Observer Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana and Chief, Joint Training Functional Capabilities Board, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, J7 at the Pentagon. While assigned to First Army, Colonel Schafer served as Commander, 5th Armored Brigade, Division West; Deputy Chief of Staff, for Operations (G3), and culminated his military career as the Chief of Staff. His recognitions include the Superior Civilian Service Award, Commanders Award for Civilian Service, Defense Superior Ser- vice Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Bronze Star with 2 awards of Valor, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritori- ous Service Metal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achieve- ment Medal, Valorous Unit Award, Southwest Asia Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary, Global War on Terrorism and Korea Defense Service Medals, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantry Badge, Master Parachute Badge, and the Ranger Tab.Bill Schafer served in the Department of the Army, First Army as the Senior Human Resource Director, Deputy Chief of Staff (G-1) for Headquarters from October 2014 through May 2019. He resigned from federal service in May 2019 in order to run for The United States Congress and continue his life of service as a representative for the Iowans of district 3. Website: schaferforcongress.com Email: contact@schaferforcongress.com Facebook: me/Billschaferiowacongress Twitter: @billschaferiowa

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The Thin Red Line

Hold Up

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 8, 2019 71:32

In 1998, World War 2 was presented on screen unlike any war movie that came before with Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line. As American forces move to take a key airfield on Guadalcanal, C Company moves in to reinforce the initial attack, which is successful despite heavy casualties and some dissension in the ranks. All of the action unfolds to some of the most beautiful scenery and music ever put on film thanks to Hans Zimmer and John Toll at their best. Many characters question life, death, and their purpose in the grand scheme of things, and through their actions, expressions, inner thoughts, and interactions, they share with the audience their realizations on whether a victory is actually possible. Receiving mostly positive critical acclaim, The Thin Red Line was challenged by Saving Private Ryan, with the latter receiving more awards and commercial success. Made for $52M, The Thin Red Line made $98M at the box office, forcing movie lovers to decide if they were willing to take a chance on a longer, high-minded movie of this kind. But does it hold up? Listen as Jon, Colin and Brent go back to philosophy class and sort through the cameos, poetry and art to see if the thoughts evoked are as fondly powerful as they are beautiful, or if the destruction on screen is too far removed from the beauty, resulting in an uneven war film that flew too close to the sun.

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Episode 21: Hill 122, Part 3: The motorcycle (kettenrad)

hell german flowers tank sherman motorcycle infantry 90th infantry division tank battalion c company

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 28, 2019 49:44

On July 10, 1944, four Sherman tanks of the first platoon, C Company, 712th Tank Battalion came to the rescue of a 90th Infantry Division battalion that was surrounded by German paratroopers. After breaking through the German lines and leading an infantry company off of Hill 122, the four tanks kept going. The infantry, having sustained heavy casualties, dug in at the base of the hill. Soon all four tanks were knocked out, three of them bursting into flames. In this episode, we hear from Lieutenant Jim Flowers, the platoon leader, and Sergeant Judd Wiley, a tank commander. For more about Hill 122, check out The Middle of Hell at aaronelson.com and "They Were All Young Kids" at amazon.

The Fourth of July, 1944

Personality Bingo with Tom Moran

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 4, 2019 6:59

July 4th came a day early in 1944 with a massive artillery barrage in preparation for an assault on the Haye du Puits sector of the Normandy campaign. The 712th Tank Battalion suffered numerous casualties on its first day of combat. Lt George Tarr became the first officer in A Company to be killed. Sgt. William Schmidt was the first member of C company to be killed. In this episode, Jim Rothschadl, a gunner in C Company, talks about the meaning of the Fourth of July, and Stanley Klapkowski describes the death of Sergeant Schmidt.

world war 4th of july combat tank sgt normandy battalion haye puits tank battalion c company

Kevin Olohan plays Personality Bingo with Tom Moran

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 13, 2019 78:26

**Support Personality Bingo and become a patron at [our Patreon here](https://www.patreon.com/personalitybingo?alert=2).** **If a contribution of a couple of Euro wouldn’t make a massive difference to your life, just know it makes a gigantic one in ours! ** **As Blindboy says, “it’s a model based off soundness”, so if you CAN support, please do on behalf of someone who can’t! ** ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Kevin performed his self-penned play CASSOWARY, directed by Aindrias de Staic at the Theatre Upstairs, Dublin. Kevin is also the host of Fireside, an Irish storytelling podcast on the Headstuff Podcast Network. He holds a Bachelor in Acting degree from The Lir Academy at Trinity College Dublin (in partnership with RADA). He has appeared in numerous theatre productions with The Lír including SCENES FROM THE BIG PICTURE directed by Nona Sheppard, MARY STUART directed by Conall Morrisson, TWELFTH NIGHT directed by Hilary Wood and ANTIGONE directed by Annabelle Comyn. Kevin also appeared in a short film with the Lír, HOME MADE directed by Mark Sheridan. Kevin's most recent credits include the role of Adolph in C Company's production of August Strindberg's CREDITORS directed by Aoife Spillane-Hinks with the New Theatre, Anú production's PALS: THE IRISH AT GALLIPOLI directed by Louise Lowe, Lee Coffey's PERUVIAN VOODOO at Theatre Upstairs, Illustrated production's CIRQUE DU REVES, directed by Jeda de Brí and the role of Moritz in Ill-Advised Theatre Company's SPRING AWAKENING, directed by James O' Connor, both at Smock Alley Theatre. He is based in Dublin.

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Stephen SONDHEIM Vol. 2

Love4musicals

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 23, 2018 149:59

Tal como prometimos aquí traemos la segunda playlist con temas instrumentales de Stephen Sondheim, para que veáis que a pesar de la importancia de las letras en sus canciones, la música por sí sola, sin ser una melodía pegadiza a la primera escucha, puede llegar a calar en tu memoria. Hemos hecho una selección de temas y suites en la que se mezclan diferentes estilos que van del sinfónico, al jazz o simplemente a piano solo, ya que a la música de Stephen Sondheim han recurrido todo tipo de músicos y cantantes. Debo confesar que aunque dijimos que sería un podcast instrumental, la voz de Nina en algún tema participa como un instrumento más, ya que no es un texto lo que ella canta y no me he resistido a terminar con el "Sunday" de "Sunday in the park with George", que si bien es muy coral, también tiene algunos diálogos de los intérpretes, pero me parecía una forma muy buena para despedir el podcast. 0h 00'00" Presentación 0h 01'07" Cabecera 0h 01'43" Comedy tonight (AFTHOTWTTF) 0h 04'18" A little night music Suite 0h 13'09" Follies Overture 0h 21'13" Sweeney Todd Suite 0h 34'19" Finishing the hat (SITPWG) 0h 37'54" No one is alone (ITW) 0h 41'50" Silly people (MMAL) 0h 50'13" Into the woods Suite 0h 58'34" Not a day goes by (MWRA) 1h 01'40" Sorry grateful (C) 1h 15'49" Losing my mind (F) 1h 19'22" Everyday a little death (ALNM) 1h 23'33" Barcelona (C) 1h 27'30" Multitude of Amish (C) 1h 31'33" Color and light (SITPWG) 1h 35'37" One more kiss (F) 1h 39'37" Send in the clowns (ALNM) 1h 44'00" Pretty lady (PO) 1h 47'07" Bang! (MMAL) 1h 54'38" Poems (PO) 2h 02'00" What can you loose (Dick Tracy) 2h 07'32" They ask me why I believe in you (para un episodio de televisión no emitido) 2h 13'20" Stavisky Main & Claridge's theme (Banda sonora de Stavisky) 2h 18'43" Take me to the world (para el musical televisivo Evening Primrose) 2h 21'32" Everybody ought to have a maid (AFTHOTWTTF) 2h 23'03" Side by side (C) 2h 25'28" Sunday (SITPWG) Como es habitual las mayúsculas entre paréntesis corresponden a las iniciales de los musicales para los que fueron escritos, así AFTHOTWTTF = A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, ALNM = A little night music; C = Company, EP = Evening primrose, F = Follies, ITW = Into the woods, MMAL = Marry me a little, MWRA = Merrily we roll along, PO = Pacific overtures, SITPWG = Sunday in the park with George......

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Las Playlist de L4M: STEPHEN SONDHEIM Vol. 2

Love4musicals

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 23, 2018 149:59

comedy losing color forum bang playlist finishing tal hemos silly presentaci banda debo multitude stephen sondheim dick tracy itw evening primrose c company stavisky barcelona c

Resilient Performance Podcast with Michael Lauria

Resilient Performance Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 1, 2018 63:40

Michael Lauria is currently completing his final semester at the Dartmouth Geisel School of Medicine. Outside of school, he works as a critical care flight paramedic and provides training to multiple emergency service organizations. Prior to medical school, Michael served in the U.S. Air Force as a Pararescueman at the 321st Special Tactics Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, UK, Air Force Special Operations Command. During this assignment he deployed to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM as part of a Combat Search and Rescue Team and in support of the C Company, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). In 2009, Michael was named Air Force Special Operations Command Outstanding Airman of the Year and Pararescue Airman of the Year. Topics Covered: How can civilian medicine and military medicine learn from one another The extent to which combat and medicine present similar systemic challenges in terms of interpersonal dynamics, leadership, and stress management How mental models to facilitate communication without oversimplifying complex phenomena What is cognitive bias and how can we better refine our models without falling prey to it Intuitive vs. analytical thinking- truly dichotomous or more of a spectrum? How to identify if a failed outcome in medicine is the result of poor individual skill or something more systemic Part/whole training The low hanging fruit in medical education Conflating selection with training Teaching practices that maximize retention of information

President Donald Trump Speech at The Celebrate Freedom Rally 2017

Old Guard Audio

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 3, 2017 33:21

President Donald Trump Speech at The Celebrate Freedom Rally Paying tribute to those who have proudly served our nation in uniform. On this my very first Independence Day celebration as President, there is no place I'd rather be than with you President Trump recognized and introduced Harry Miller who fought in the Battle of the Bulge And Captain Luis Avila https://youtu.be/HaQc1i7eYMw 0-00 thank you but thank you very much this 0-04 is some group some group nice to win 0-08 isn't it isn't it nice to wear Robert 0-12 thank you very much for that incredible 0-14 introduction and thank you to everyone 0-16 from First Baptist Dallas 0-19 Thank You pastor you and Amy have stood 0-25 with us since the very very beginning 0-27 and I will always stand with you I've 0-30 told you that and I mean that I will 0-32 always be with you I appreciate it thank 0-34 you and I'm honored to join you at the 0-42 first ever fourth of July freedom rally 0-46 taking place here at the Kennedy Center 0-48 as we pay tribute to those who have 0-51 proudly served our nation in uniform 0-54 thank you very much 0-56 [Applause] 1-05 tonight we have been inspired by music 1-08 that fills our heart stirs ourselves and 1-11 reminds us all of who we are one nation 1-14 under God 1-17 [Applause] 1-24 to First Baptist music director Doran 1-28 bug and to every musician and member of 1-32 the choir who has performed with such 1-35 incredible grace and skill and I heard 1-38 them backstage I said let me out there 1-41 that is the most beautiful music 1-49 I just want to say that your music 1-52 honors our heroes more eloquently than 1-55 words could ever do and I just want to 1-59 thank you that's real talent standing 2-01 behind me thank you folks 2-03 [Applause] 2-07 and let me say to the hundreds of 2-10 veterans with us tonight that for my 2-13 very first Independence Day celebration 2-16 as president there is no place I'd 2-19 rather be than with you 2-22 tell you that 2-24 [Applause] 2-31 and I promise you then you see it 2-34 happening day by day just the other day 2-37 we signed veterans accountability 2-40 they've been trying to do it for 40 2-42 years 2-43 [Applause] 2-52 for 40 years they've been trying you 2-55 couldn't fire somebody if they were 2-56 horrible doing a terrible job for the 2-58 veterans robbing stealing hurting people 3-02 you couldn't do anything it's called the 3-05 Veterans Accountability Act and now you 3-07 can say you're fired 3-27 thank you and I promise you that we will 3-31 always take care of our great veterans 3-35 always right Louie you better believe it 3-37 and Paula's up there 3-40 Paula White has been so helpful you've 3-43 thank you I love you too actually you've 3-50 shed your blood you've poured your love 3-52 and you've bared your soul in defense of 3-55 our country our people and our great 3-59 American flag your loyalty to our nation 4-03 is measured not merely in words but in 4-06 deeds you race through gunfire stare 4-09 down enemy forces and ran past the gates 4-12 of hell to fight and to win for America 4-18 and you won for America and we're going 4-20 to take care of it 4-21 [Applause] 4-34 the story of America's men and women in 4-36 uniform is the story of freedom and 4-39 overcoming oppression the strong 4-42 protecting the weak and the good 4-44 defeating evil there's a lot of evil out 4-48 there I want to tell you there's a lot 4-50 of evil I was left a mess the fact is 4-54 but we're cleaning it up 4-56 you watch cleaning it up cleaning it up 5-06 we are awed by your service and your 5-09 sacrifice and so to the veterans here 5-12 tonight of which there are many will you 5-15 please stand right now please stand 5-18 thank you 5-43 [Applause] 5-56 on behalf of our very grateful nation 5-59 thank you very much thank you very much 6-03 we will always always remember what you 6-07 did for us tonight we celebrate veterans 6-11 we also reflect on everything we cherish 6-15 as Americans we love our country we love 6-18 our families we love our freedom and we 6-22 love our God 6-24 [Applause] 6-36 since the signing of the Declaration of 6-39 Independence 241 years ago America 6-42 always affirmed that Liberty comes from 6-46 our Creator our our rights are given to 6-50 us by God and no earthly force can ever 6-54 take those rights away 6-57 [Applause] 7-06 that is why my administration is 7-08 transferring power out of Washington and 7-11 returning that power back to where it 7-15 belongs to the people to the people the 7-26 fake media is trying to silence us but 7-31 we will not let them because the people 7-36 know the truth 7-39 the fake media tried to stop us from 7-42 going to the White House but I'm 7-45 president and they're not 7-47 [Applause] 8-22 we won and they lost the fact is the 8-28 press has destroyed themselves because 8-32 they went too far 8-36 instead of being subtle and smart they 8-41 use the hatchet and the people saw it 8-44 right from the beginning 8-49 the dishonest media will never keep us 8-53 from accomplishing our objectives on 8-56 behalf of our great American people will 9-01 never happen their agenda is not your 9-09 agenda you've been saying it I will 9-11 never stop fighting for you I am 9-14 delivering on trade on the economy on 9-17 the Supreme Court on the Second 9-20 Amendment on our military for our 9-22 veteran and on our borders 9-27 where we are doing record record 9-31 stoppage 9-32 [Applause] 9-40 thank you 9-45 and we are supporting our incredible 9-50 police and law enforcement 10-05 [Applause] 10-08 we will save American lives protect 10-11 American sovereignty and we will ensure 10-15 the Forgotten men and women of our 10-18 country are never forgotten again for 10-28 too long 10-29 politicians have tried all have they 10-31 tried to centralize authority among the 10-35 hands of a small few in our nation's 10-39 capital I see them all the time 10-43 bureaucrats think they can run over your 10-45 lives overrule your values meddle in 10-49 your faith and tell you how to live what 10-53 to say and where to pray but we know 10-57 that parents not bureaucrats know best 11-01 how to raise their children and create a 11-05 thriving Society 11-07 [Applause] 11-19 and we know that families and churches 11-23 not government officials know best how 11-27 to create a strong and loving community 11-35 and above all else we know this in 11-39 America we don't worship government we 11-42 worship God 11-43 [Applause] 12-11 our religious liberty is enshrined in 12-15 the very first amendment in the Bill of 12-19 Rights the American founders invoked our 12-23 Creator four times in the Declaration of 12-27 Independence Benjamin Franklin reminded 12-31 his colleagues at the Constitutional 12-34 Convention to begin by bowing their 12-38 heads in prayer I remind you that we're 12-43 going to start saying Merry Christmas 12-46 again 12-59 hmm 13-03 inscribed on our currency are the words 13-07 In God We Trust but not only has God 13-15 bestowed on us the gift of freedom he's 13-18 also given us the gift of heroes willing 13-22 to give their lives to defend that 13-25 freedom you just stood in every struggle 13-32 against evil throughout our history as 13-34 America's service members have huddled 13-36 around campfires and sought refuge in 13-39 foxholes they've called on their Creator 13-43 for support in world war two when 13-46 General George Patton that was a real 13-49 general we got some patents today too I 13-58 found them Mad Dog matters 14-03 [Applause] 14-10 and he doesn't like doing a lot of 14-12 talking but I want to tell you Isis the 14-15 whole different ball game folks they're 14-22 going fast but when Patton ran into a 14-26 problem that he couldn't solve he knew 14-30 what to do he prayed frustrated by range 14-33 that were stalling the advance of his 14-36 third army across Europe in early 14-39 December 1944 horrible weather Patton 14-45 asked an army chaplain to come up with a 14-48 good prayer for the weather Patton then 14-53 had a quarter of a million copies of 14-55 that prayer printed and distributed to 14-57 the soldiers of the Third Army just 14-59 before the Battle of the Bulge that was 15-02 a big one did very well there 15-06 five hundred thousand American soldiers 15-09 fought that pivotal battle of the Second 15-12 World War one of those soldiers is here 15-16 with us tonight his name is Harry F 15-20 Miller where's Harry where's Harry Harry 15-26 stand up Harry 15-28 [Applause] 15-58 like many of the heroes of his 16-00 generation 16-01 Harry wasn't exactly straightforward 16-03 about his age when he enlisted in the 16-08 Army Reserves shame on you how he was 16-13 just 15 but he told them he was old 16-15 enough to join then he immediately asked 16-19 for a transfer to active duty six months 16-23 after he had listed private Miller was 16-26 on his way to Europe to fight for our 16-29 country 16-33 [Applause] 16-39 a couple of months after that he was in 16-41 the freezing cold how cold cold he said 16-46 really cold and driving range of Belgium 16-51 with the 740 of tank battalion attached 16-56 to the 82nd airborne as the Battle of 17-00 the Bulge began Harry got his orders to 17-03 go find tanks at a weapon storage 17-06 facility 17-07 when he arrived he says he and his 17-09 friends found nothing but tanks they 17-12 were all over the place right nothing 17-14 but tanks but they didn't let the tanks 17-18 stop them out of what spare parts they 17-23 could find and through sheer grit and 17-26 resolve they somehow managed to repair 17-29 three of those tanks and get them all 17-32 set for action and ready to fight and 17-35 before long those three tanks were nose 17-38 to nose with the lead elements of a 17-40 German SS Panzer Division and that was 17-43 tough stuff in a short time those tanks 17-47 had knocked out the first three tanks of 17-49 the enemy and the entire German division 17-52 retreated they left 18-00 that's good Harry 18-02 [Applause] 18-04 that's good Harry 18-09 [Applause] 18-40 Herry fought through the battle and the 18-43 rest of the war and he went on to serve 18-46 our armed forces for 22 years retiring 18-49 as a Senior Master Sergeant a lot of 18-52 guts 18-52 tomorrow Harry will be 89 tomorrow so on 19-04 behalf of this very large group in this 19-06 beautiful building senior master 19-09 sergeant Miller happy birthday thank you 19-11 for your lifetime of service and thank 19-14 you for helping out thank you very much 19-17 [Applause] 19-25 every veteran with us tonight from every 19-27 branch of the military Army Navy Marines 19-31 Air Force and Coast Guard I want you to 19-34 know that we will always keep our 19-36 promises to those who have kept us free 19-40 since my very first day in office we've 19-43 taken one action after another to make 19-45 sure that our veterans get the care they 19-48 so richly deserve 19-50 we've published wait times those wait 19-54 times were bad weren't they but boy are 19-57 they getting better and fast and we've 20-00 published them at every VA facility 20-03 delivered same day mental health 20-05 services at every VA Medical Center 20-09 nearly doubled 20-11 [Applause] 20-18 the number of veterans given approvals 20-21 to see the doctor of their choice and as 20-31 I said just signed brand-new legislation 20-35 went through the house went through the 20-38 Senate and I signed it so fast we didn't 20-42 want to take any chances right Harry to 20-46 ensure every VA worker is held 20-48 accountable for the quality of care they 20-51 provide to our veterans 20-54 [Applause] 20-59 tonight we are deeply honored to be 21-01 joined by a number of wounded warriors 21-04 from Walter Reed I was over there 21-07 recently these are incredible people the 21-09 enthusiasm and the spirit and some of 21-13 them were hurt really badly 21-15 they've got so much spirit and they love 21-17 this country so much these American 21-20 heroes risked everything so that you and 21-23 I can live in freedom they gave all they 21-26 had everything for their comrades their 21-31 country and for victory they liked 21-33 winning we like winning again don't we 21-36 [Applause] 21-42 you know the old days we used to win we 21-45 sort of just keep fighting and fighting 21-47 and fighting gonna win again folks 21-50 we applaud their strength their courage 21-54 and we really support that incredible 21-59 wind that they have the will the will is 22-03 so strong and that's what they want to 22-06 do is they want to win and they want to 22-07 win for you so thank you all very much 22-09 for being here that was great 22-11 [Applause] 22-16 one such hero is Captain Luis Avila 22-22 where is he 22-24 Luis Luis 22-27 [Applause] 22-30 we love you Louise 22-32 [Applause] 22-35 the ways Wow 22-36 [Applause] 22-55 Louisa's here tonight along with his 22-57 wife Claudia Thank You Claudia thank you 23-00 darling 23-01 thank you thank you Louise served in the 23-06 Army for 16 years he held many different 23-09 positions on five combat tours and he 23-13 was always a leader and everybody always 23-15 said I did some checking on you Louise 23-17 that you did a great job no matter where 23-20 you were no matter where you went on his 23-24 fifth deployment Louise bravely led his 23-27 company on a successful mission to 23-29 recover vital intelligence during this 23-33 critical mission his vehicle was struck 23-36 by explosives Louise was gravely wounded 23-40 and lost his leg he received a Purple 23-43 Heart for service and sacrifice to Lewis 23-47 and Claudia we will never forget the 23-50 courageous sacrifice that you made for 23-52 all of us in this room tonight and for 23-55 everyone in our country thank you thank 23-57 you 23-58 [Applause] 24-23 I want you all and all of our incredible 24-29 wounded warriors to know you have an 24-32 entire nation of more than 300 million 24-37 people behind you and our nations 24-39 getting strong again you notice getting 24-42 strong again our hearts and our prayers 24-47 are joined with yours 24-49 your legacy like our gratitude will live 24-54 forever and I want to thank you thank 24-56 you very much and Claudia thank you very 24-58 much thank you 25-05 I also want to speak to all of the 25-09 people see you thought I forgot in our 25-12 faith community who are here with us 25-15 tonight veterans and non-veterans alike 25-25 you're never gonna be forgotten you'll 25-28 never be forgotten my administration 25-32 will always support and defend your 25-35 religious liberty 25-37 [Applause] 25-43 we don't want to see God forced out of 25-45 the public square driven out of our 25-48 schools or pushed out of our civic life 25-52 we want to see prayers before football 25-55 games if they want to give prayers 26-17 we want all children to have the 26-19 opportunity to know the blessings of God 26-24 we will not allow the government to 26-27 censor sermons to restrict the free 26-32 speech of our pastors and our preachers 26-35 and the people that we most respect like 26-42 Robert 26-54 that is why just as I promised pastor 27-00 Jeffress and other faith leaders I just 27-04 signed an executive order following and 27-07 this is something that makes me very 27-08 happy and very proud following through 27-12 on my campaign pledge to stop the 27-16 Johnson amendment from interfering with 27-19 your First Amendment rights 27-37 as long as I am president no one is 27-41 going to stop you from practicing your 27-44 faith or from preaching what is in your 27-48 heart we want to hear him one of the 27-55 most grave and dire threats to religious 27-58 freedom in the world today is the threat 28-01 of terrorism and specifically it just 28-05 seems it's called radical Islamic 28-08 terrorism and we cannot allow this 28-15 terrorism and extremism to spread in our 28-19 country or to find sanctuary on our 28-23 shores or in our cities 28-33 we want to make sure that anyone who 28-36 seeks to join our country shares our 28-39 values and has the capacity to love our 28-44 people 28-45 [Applause] 29-01 thank you 29-04 together we will protect our families 29-07 our nations and our borders and yes by 29-11 the way for those that are curious we 29-13 will build the wall okay because we 29-19 understand that a country is more than 29-22 just its geography a nation is the sum 29-27 of its citizens their hopes their dreams 29-30 their aspirations America is a land rich 29-34 with history traditions and values and 29-36 as we have seen tonight what a group 29-40 this is tonight America is also a land 29-44 rich with heroes 29-47 [Applause] 29-55 and though we have many stories we all 29-59 share one home and one glorious destiny 30-05 a destiny that's getting better and 30-08 better every single day 30-15 and whether we are black or brown or 30-18 white and you've heard me say this 30-21 before we all bleed the same red blood 30-32 we all salute the same great American 30-38 flag and we are all made by the same 30-46 Almighty God 30-48 [Applause] 31-09 we face many challenges there are many 31-12 hills and mountains to climb but with 31-16 the strength and courage of the Patriots 31-19 assembled in this room tonight we will 31-23 scare I mean and you say it and you see 31-25 it all the time and we're doing it all 31-27 the time because we're scaling those 31-30 summits and we will get the job done we 31-41 will all prove worthy of this very 31-45 important moment in history and we will 31-48 prove worthy of the sacrifice that our 31-52 brave veterans have made as long as we 31-56 have pride in our beliefs courage in our 31-59 convictions and faith in our God we will 32-04 not fail 32-07 [Applause] 32-16 as long as our country remains true to 32-19 its values loyal to its heroes and 32-24 devoted to its creator then our best 32-28 days are yet to come because we will 32-32 make America great again 32-35 [Applause] 32-46 thank you 32-52 - my friend pastor Jeffers and dePaula 32-57 and to Louie into Harry and de lewis and 33-03 everybody in this room and everybody in 33-05 this country thank you for your great 33-09 support I appreciate it 33-12 I will not let you down - all of our 33-16 incredible veterans 33-17 - the people in the military and - 33-21 evangelical Christians who came out in 33-24 record record record numbers thank you 33-27 have a wonderful Independence Day god 33-31 bless you god bless our nation's 33-34 veterans 33-34 god bless the United States of America 33-39 thank you very much 33-44 you Army Veteran Harry Miller shares his story from Battle of the Bulge https://youtu.be/tDLcEomh474 On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched what is considered their last major offensive of World War II. Just shortly after the Allied force’s successfully invaded Normandy, France, the surprise attack from Hitler’s forces caught them off guard. The battle lasted until January 25, 1945. The United States suffered 19,000 fatalities and more than 89,000 casualties. In commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of this historic battle of courage and fortitude, we invite you to meet Army Veteran, Harry Miller. Harry served in the Army from 1944 – 1953 during World War II. He first served as a member of a tank crew, then transitioned to a messenger center clerk. He fought in the Battle of the Bulge. During the battle, the 1st Army Headquarters instructed the tank crews to go down to an ordnance depot and take whatever they needed for the tanks. “We had to take good parts off of one tank and put it on another. We finally got three tanks and a tank destroyer that would operate and run, and had a gun,” he said in an interview with VA. They took the three working tanks and sent them to their C Company. Those three tanks ended up taking out three German tanks, which ended up being members of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler being, Hitler’s old bodyguards. After World War II, Harry went on to serve in Korea and Vietnam and served enlistments in both the Army and the Air Force. Listen to the audio below for Harry’s full account of his service before, during, and shortly after the Battle of Bulge. nscript English 0-00 HARRY F. MILLER- Your life is dependent on everybody that's around you. 0-03 I mean, I know of cases where 0-06 a man would be talking to another man, 0-08 a round would come in and hit the one guy, 0-11 and the other guy not get a scratch, 0-13 and you depend on the guy next to you, 0-18 you depend on the people in back of you, and 0-21 you depend on everybody. 0-25 Everything was going fine until the 16th of 0-28 December, 1944 and the Germans broke 0-32 through, and at first nobody was too 0-35 concerned about it except for the fact 0-37 that we had only green divisions in the 0-39 Ardennes at that time. And so, they kept 0-44 pressing further and further. Well, 0-45 finally the first Army headquarters told 0-47 us to go down to this ordinance depot 0-51 and take anything we want. The only thing 0-54 that was there was old shot up tanks 0-56 and one with holes in them and worn-out 0-59 engines messed up. And we had to take 1-03 good parts of one tank and put it on another. 1-05 We finally got three tanks and a 1-07 tank destroyer that would operate, and 1-11 would run, and had a gun and it would fire. 1-14 So, we got those and they 1-17 gave them to our C-Company and they told them 1-20 to go down to the railroad station at 1-23 Stoumont, Belgium. To approach this train 1-26 station -- it sat here and there was a row 1-28 that came around a curve and right 1-31 down to the train station. 1-33 Well, our C-Company met them at this 1-36 curve, and the first American tank saw the 1-39 first German tank, and they fired at him 1-41 and the round -- 'course the guns and had not been 1-44 checked to see how accurate they were -- 1-46 but they fired and the round bounced, and 1-49 went into the German tank and knocked it out. 1-54 It was just ... just a lucky shot... knocked out the 1-57 first tank. Well, he reloaded -- the American 2-00 tank reloaded, and round got stuck so he 2-03 motioned for the next tank to come 2-04 around. When he came around the curve he 2-08 caught the second tank, and he fired on it, 2-10 and knocked it out. 2-11 Same thing happened on the next round. 2-14 The third tank was a tank destroyer which 2-16 has a 90 millimeter gun on rather than 2-18 75 or 76, so he hit this German tank and 2-22 knocked it out. Well, this was the First SS 2-25 Panzer Division, which was Hitler's old bodyguard. 2-29 And they were a tough bunch of so-and-sos. 2-33 And they were treated that way 2-35 for the rest of the war, by the way. By us.

Episode 9 – C-Company written by Steve Agee (New Girl, The Sarah Silverman program) & Rob Schrab (The Sarah Silverman Program)

Dead Pilots Society

Play Episode Listen Later May 4, 2017 56:42

C-Company stars Steve Agee as Steve Douglas, Paul F. Tompkins as Shade, Andy Richter as Paisley, Janet Varney as Tammy, Dave Foley as Major Schooley, Wyatt Cenac as Brock Fenton/Shorty Espejo, Matt Gourley as Murph, Joshua Malina as Fatty Espejo, Mark McConville as Dirt Face, Christian McCulloch as Aton/Ace Hunter, Tawny Newsome as Vasquez/Wembley/Cop, and Andrew Reich with stage directions. In this episode, Ben Blacker and Andrew Reich interview Steve Agee (New Girl, The Sarah Silverman program) and Rob Schrab (The Sarah Silverman Program) regarding their dead pilot, C-Company. You'll also listen to a never-before-heard live table read of C-Company (at SF Sketchfest 2017) performed by some of today's funniest comedic actors. For more Dead Pilot Society episodes, please subscribe to the podcast! Make sure to like us on Facebook, follow us on Instagram @deadpilotspod, on twitter @deadpilotspod, and visit our website at deadpilotssociety.com.

Battle of the Bulge Veteran Harry Miller shares his story

Borne the Battle

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 25, 2017 38:01

On December 16, 1944, the Germans launched what is considered their last major offensive of World War II. Just shortly after the Allied force's successfully invaded Normandy, France, the surprise attack from Hitler's forces caught the Allies off guard. The battle lasted until January 25, 1945. The United States suffered 19,000 fatalities and more than 89,000 casualties. In commemoration of the 72nd anniversary of this historic battle of courage and fortitude, we invite you to meet Army Veteran Harry Miller. During the Battle of the Bulge, the 1st Army Headquarters instructed the tank crews to go down to an ordnance depot and take whatever they needed for the tanks. “We had to take good parts off of one tank and put it on another. We finally got three tanks and a tank destroyer that would operate and run, and had a gun,” he said in an interview with VA. They took the three working tanks and sent them to their C Company. Those three tanks ended up taking out three German tanks, which ended up being members of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitlerbeing, Hitler’s old body guards.

Canadian Patrol Ambush

Military HD

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 26, 2015

Members of C Company 2nd Battalion Royal 22nd Regiment practice day and night combat patrol and ambush tactics against simulated enemy forces in Tancos, Portugal during JOINTEX 15 as part of NATO’s Exercise Trident Juncture 15 25 October 2015. Title: 20151025_Girard.Eric_Canadian_Patrol_Ambush Date Shot: 2015-10-25 Location: Tancos, Portugal Language: ENGLISH Duration: 2 minutes 25 seconds Journalist: Cpl Eric Girard Shot-list 00:00:00:00 Title Slate 00:00:04:00 (MS) Canadian infantry member put on camouflage on his face. 00:00:08:04 (MS) Canadian infantry member put on body armour. 00:00:14:12 (CS) Canadian infantry member prepare his ruck sack. 00:00:19:09 (MS) Canadian infantry member prepare his ruck sack. 00:00:23:24 (CS) Canadian infantry member cleans up his weapon. 00:00:28:05 (MS) Canadian infantry member cleans up his weapon. 00:00:34:00 (MS) Canadian infantry member put on his rucksack. 00:00:41:18 (WS) Canadian infantry members walk in single file during patrol. 00:00:46: 20 (WS) Canadian infantry members walk while others members a covering them. 00:00:52: 23 (MS) Canadian infantry members walk while others members a covering them. 00:01:00:05 (Tilt up) Canadian infantry members lay on ground watching possible enemy threat. 00:01:05:03 (MS) Canadian infantry members walk while others members a covering them. 00:01:10:05 (CS pull focus) Canadian infantry members lay on ground watching possible enemy threat. 00:01:15:20 (MS slider) Canadian infantry members lay on ground watching possible enemy threat. 00:01:21:29 (MS) Canadian infantry members shoot the enemy. 00:01:25:18 (CS) Canadian infantry member put on his gas mask. 00:01:32:07 (MS) Canadian infantry members put on his gas mask. 00:01:36:07 (CS) Canadian infantry members lay on ground covering other Canadian members. 00:01:41:03 (MS) Canadian infantry members are inside building covering other Canadian members. 00:01:45:08 (MS) Canadian infantry members are preparing a night ambush. 00:01:50:04 (MS) Canadian infantry members shoot enemy during night ambush. 00:01:56:26 (WS) Canadian infantry members discuss tactics while other keep firing at enemy during night ambush. 00:02:09:20 (EWS) Canadian infantry members organize tactic during night ambush. 00:02:14:00 (WS) Canadian infantry members walk back after night ambush is complete. # ENDS #

canada canadian ms portugal ends nato cs patrol tilt ambush girard otan infantry regiment night vision tancos c company trident juncture exercise trident juncture

The Gurkhas 200 Years of Service

NATO-TV

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 22, 2015

For 200 years now, men from Nepal have been serving as Gurkhas within the British army. Their numbers currently stand at around three and a half thousand. The 2nd Battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles are currently on exercise in Latvia. They’re taking part in Saber Strike which involves 6000 military personnel from 13 nations. The footage includes soundbites from Corporal Kusmal Raj Rai and Major Ed Oldfield, Officer Commanding, C Company. The GVs show the Gurkhas running through woods and across open land, firing weapons and carrying out reconnaissance. Also available in high definition.

service british nepal latvia gurkhas c company gvs saber strike

Moana Callaghan

history ww2 moana battalion callaghan gisborne te ao maori c company

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 7, 2014 3:00

Moana Callaghan and her whānau travelled from Maraenui to attend the three day commemorations at Te Poho o Rawiri pā, Gisborne as their father Wira Callaghan was a soldier in C Company of the 28th Māori Battalion. Following the powhiri at the pā on the Friday, Maraea Rakuraku joins her on the mahau (porch) of the whare tipuna as she reminisces about her fathers service and his post war life when he returned home.

Moana Callaghan

history ww2 moana battalion callaghan gisborne te ao maori c company

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 7, 2014 3:00

Parade from Te Poho o Rawiri to C Company Whare

history steven spielberg parade ww2 aotearoa gisborne poho whare te ao maori c company

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 7, 2014 20:39

Maraea Rakuraku meets with members of the Poutu whānau who just may be the Māori version of the story that inspired the the 1998 Steven Spielberg film Saving Private Ryan - but with a much happier ending. All five sons returned safely to Aotearoa and went on to have 100s of descendants. Maraea Rakuraku walks alongside whānau, war veterans of various military campaigns and a contingent of young Māori men representing soldiers of the Pioneer Battalion and hears their experiences of war that still resonates throughout the Tai Rawhiti community as they make their way from Te Poho o Rawiri pā to a purpose built whare, the C Company Memorial House that stands alongside Te Tairawhiti museum, Gisborne.

Parade from Te Poho o Rawiri to C Company Whare

history steven spielberg parade ww2 aotearoa gisborne poho whare te ao maori c company

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 7, 2014 20:39

1-7 Marines TOW Missile Range-001 (Long)

Science of War

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 18, 2014

C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines conducts a TOW Missile range at Tactical Base Dwyer. Lance Corporal Zachary Marquard, Missile Specialist, C Co., 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, explains how vital the TOW Missiles are to their mission and what it’s like to fire those high powered missiles.

marines range missile battalion helmand province c company camp leatherneck 1st battalion regional command southwest

Following in the steps of the 28 Māori Battalion

italy world war ii greece tunisia battalion c company

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 31, 2014 34:35

When your job involves caring for a website that memorialises the 28 Māori Battalion understandably your knowledge of military terminology and history is more than say, the average punter, Yet nothing beats the visceral knowledge gained when you actually return to the places where the soldiers fought and in some cases died. In May, Leanne Tamaki was part of a tour of largely C Company descendants who travelled to Tunisia, Italy and Greece and experienced first-hand how it must have been for the Māori men who were in the 28th Māori Battalion during the Second World War.

Following in the steps of the 28 Māori Battalion

italy world war ii greece tunisia battalion c company

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 31, 2014 34:35

The character of the 28th Māori Battalion as explained by Dr Monty Soutar

world war ii character citizenship ww2 monty battalion c company

Play Episode Listen Later May 18, 2014 3:43

It's widely acknowledged that the 28 Māori Battalion "punched above its weight" in the Second World War. In an archival interview from 2009, 28 Māori Battalion scholar and author of Nga Tama Toa: The Price of Citizenship, C Company 1939-1945 : Dr Monty Soutar provides a breakdown of each company that made up the Battalion and the nicknames they became known by, that spoke to their character. An archival recording from 2009.

The character of the 28th Māori Battalion as explained by Dr Monty Soutar