Podcasts about Eichelberger

Last time we spoke about the fall of Shuri. In the unforgiving terrain of Okinawa during May 1945, American Marines confronted fierce resistance from entrenched Japanese forces. Amidst heavy rain and dwindling supplies, General Buckner's 10th Army battled uphill toward Shuri, a critical stronghold. With communication crumbling and morale wavering, the Americans pressed on, launching daring patrols. The situation reached a turning point when intelligence revealed the Japanese withdrawal plans. Buckner ordered continuous pressure, leading to the capture of significant strategic points like Shuri Castle, which was relentlessly bombarded prior to the Marine assault. On May 29, as the last remnants of Japanese forces fled south, American soldiers swept through Shuri, which lay in utter ruin, a testament to the devastating power of the campaign.  This episode is the Liberation of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we covered the fall of Shuri and today we continue the brutal brawl for Okinawa and the liberation of Mindanao. As we last saw, the Japanese retreat from the Shuri line opened the path for General Buckner's 10th Army to move southward, with only General Fujioka's 62nd Division and a few minor rearguards standing in their way. On June 3, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its offensive to the south. Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment successfully secured the area of Itokazu. Meanwhile, Colonel Green's 184th Regiment pushed toward the coast to completely cut off the Chinen Peninsula. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment was diverted into the rugged hills nearby to clean up any remaining resistance. To the west, despite persistent bad weather and challenging supply conditions, General Bradley's 96th Division also achieved success. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment secured the locations of Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. At the same time, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment advanced to seize the entire Inasomi area. Looking northwest, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division encountered stronger opposition. The bulk of the 5th Marines managed to push only as far as Tsukasa before being pinned down. In a strategic move, Colonel Griebel's 2nd Battalion executed a wide swing through May's rear area to capture the Gisushi region. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines made steady progress through the Kokuba Valley, facing small enemy blocking forces, in order to extend the line held by the 5th Marines. Meanwhile, at sea, Admiral Ugaki launched his 9th mass Kikisui attack. This operation, featuring just 50 kamikaze aircraft, faced heavy obstacles due to Typhoon Viper but still managed to damage 2 vessels. In another development, after successfully occupying Torishima Island on May 12, Colonel Clarence Wallace's 8th Marines landed on Iheyajima without encountering any opposition. In addition, preparations for the shore-to-shore assault of General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division were completed. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines were set to land on the Nishikoku beaches before securing the Oroku Peninsula and its airfield. Consequently, during the early hours of June 4, Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company successfully assaulted Ono-Yama Island, while Shapley's assault battalions began the shore-to-shore movement to Nishikoku under the cover of artillery and naval bombardment. Despite some mechanical failures on the LVTs, the Marines successfully landed at 06:00 under sporadic machine-gun fire and then pushed onto the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. After securing the initial foothold, the attack slowed against increasing resistance on the left flank. Because of this, the reserve 3rd Battalion was landed at 08:45 and subsequently advanced to the edge of the airdrome.  During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell" to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. This landing allowed Shepherd to bring in Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines by midday, which then secured the Kikibana area of Naha Bay, while the 4th Marines captured one-third of Naha's airfield. To the east, the Americans encountered less resistance than before, as the 62nd Division and other minor rearguards completed their withdrawal from the intermediate lines south of Shuri to a reserve area south of the new Kiyamu Peninsula lines. Recognizing this change, Buckner shifted the corps boundary to the west, assigning General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps the task of isolating the Oroku Peninsula and occupying the Itoman-Kunishi sector, while General Hodge's 24th Corps advanced toward the Yaeju Dake-Yuza Dake escarpment.  As a result, the 7th Marines were able to move south to seize Takanyuta and isolate Admiral Ota's forces on the Oroku Peninsula. The atrocious weather had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops, vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet. The 5th Marines managed to secure the Hill 107 area without opposition before being relieved by Colonel Mason's 1st Marines. However, the 1st Marines were unable to continue their push south toward Shindawaku Ridge due to a flooded stream. Meanwhile, Mason's 3rd Battalion attempted a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone but was quickly halted in front of Tera. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man. It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion." To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear. Further east, the 383rd Regiment advanced rapidly, engaging isolated but strong enemy delaying groups as they secured the outskirts of Iwa. Matching this progress, the 381st Regiment advanced all the way to the hills north of Aragusuku, facing steadily increasing resistance. Additionally, while the 17th Regiment established positions controlling the Minatoga-Meka road, the 184th Regiment advanced against patchy and ineffective resistance until the Minatoga area was secured. The following morning, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched strikes on Okinawa and Kyushu. Unfortunately, poor situational awareness from Admiral Halsey caused the 3rd Fleet to inadvertently enter Typhoon Viper. This storm inflicted varying degrees of damage to four carriers, two escort carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and one tanker, while also destroying 76 planes. Additionally, kamikaze attacks succeeded in damaging the battleship Mississippi and heavy cruiser Louisville. Back on Okinawa, Shepherd's attack on the Oroku Peninsula commenced and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance. The 4th Marines secured most of the airfield and the Toma high ground, while the 29th Marines fought laboriously to advance toward Mura and Oroku, gaining up to 1,000 yards. To the east, the 7th Marines advanced to positions just north of Hanja, while the 1st Marines bypassed the inundated area in front of them by swinging east and following their 3rd Battalion toward Iwa. In fact, Mason's 3rd Battalion launched another attack aimed at Shindawaku Ridge, advancing over 3,000 yards to the area west of Iwa. Despite muddy conditions and rainy weather, Hodge's infantrymen continued to penetrate the enemy outpost zone, developing the edges of the main Japanese battle position. The outpost line of Kiyamu Peninsula was fully manned on June 4. Japanese Army headquarters estimated that the strength of its now concentrated forces totaled 30000, distributed as follows: 24th Division and attached units, 12000; 62nd Division and attached units, 7000; 44th IMB and attached units, 3000; 5th Artillery Command and attached units, 3000; and units directly under 32nd Army command, 5000. The difference in total strength between the 50000-man estimate late in May and the 30000 left in Kiyamu Peninsula was attributed to "attrition during retirement operations." Only about 20% of the remaining troops were survivors of the original crack infantry-artillery units; the rest were untrained rear echelon personnel or Boeitai. Most senior commanders at battalion level and above were still alive, however, and capable of bolstering the fighting spirit of their motley collection of men. But the 32nd Army had suffered grievous losses in weapons and equipment since L-Day. Hand grenades and explosives were almost entirely expended. 4 out of every 5 machine guns had been destroyed, and the supply of heavy infantry cannon and mortars had been reduced to the vanishing point. Despite the fact that 2 150mm guns, 16 150mm howitzers, and 10 AAA guns had been successfully withdrawn to the Kiyamu battle position, artillery ammunition levels were insufficient for more than 10 days of sustained firing. General Ushijima's 32nd Army was in desperate straits, its destruction merely a question of time, but the tradition, discipline, and indoctrination of Japanese military forces promised only a violent, last-ditch, man-to-man struggle before the battle for Okinawa was ended. By June 6, the 7th Division reached the outskirts of Gushichan, and the 96th Division advanced toward Shindawaku and Tomui. To the west, the 1st Marines finally captured Shindawaku and cleared the bypassed area behind them. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines attacked toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before encountering stiff resistance and ultimately dug in around Dakiton. Additionally, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines arrived to contain the Oroku Peninsula in the Hill 103 sector. Although the 29th Marines and Shapley's 1st Battalion made little progress in the Oroku-Mura area due to strong enemy resistance. Meanwhile the terrain confronting the 3rd Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills." These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards. The remainder of the 4th Marines attacked Naha Airfield where counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered." The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon, whence they pushed south toward Gushi. At sea, kamikaze attacks crashed into and damaged two destroyer minesweepers, while also causing further damage to escort carrier Natoma Bay and destroyer Anthony on June 7. That day, Shepherd's Marines faced stiff resistance all along the front. The 4th Marines reduced Little Sugar Loaf where stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."Meanwhile the 29th Marines entered Oroku, and the 22nd Marines captured Hill 103 and the area south of Tamigusuki.  To the southeast, the 7th Marines overran Hanja and Hill 108, ultimately digging in just north of Zawa and linking up with the 1st Marines, which also advanced up to 1,200 yards as they secured Hill 75 and pushed toward Yuza. Further east, the primary offensive efforts of the 7th and 96th Divisions on June 7 and 8 were focused on probing enemy defenses and advancing assault battalions to more favorable positions for an attack. Additionally, by the afternoon of June 8, the 32nd Regiment successfully relieved the exhausted 184th in the Gushichan area. On that same day, the 1st Marines pressed forward to the high ground overlooking the Mukue River, while the 7th Marines moved through Zawa and began probing enemy positions in Itoman, encountering stiffened resistance. The first LVT's, supported by LVTa's, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two." Meanwhile, on Oroku, the 29th Marines made little progress as they stalled at a key ridgeline on the left. The 4th Marines committed all three of their battalions to the attack, successfully securing the areas of Hill 39 and Gushi Ridge. The 22nd Marines continued to pivot on their right, seizing Hill 55 and making good progress along the front toward Chiwa and Tomigusuki. On June 9, although the 22nd Marines managed to secure Hill 55 and push to Hill 28, little advancement was achieved to the north. Concurrently, the 4th Marines were able to slowly push to the outskirts of Chiwa and Uibaru, with patrols clearing out Chiwa and Whaling's 3rd Battalion extending the front to the north. The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days: “The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.” In the meantime, to the south, Del Valle sent strong patrols across the Mukue, which began to encounter significant enemy resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines were unable to push toward Tera and Itoman. Further east, Hodge finally launched a corps attack to the south. The 96th Division focused its efforts on softening the enemy positions on the escarpment in front of them, while the 7th Division carried out the offensive. The 32nd Regiment attempted to attack the eastern end of Hill 95 but was unsuccessful; however, they managed to locate and identify the most troublesome sources of enemy fire for destruction. On a more positive note, the 17th Regiment gained a precarious foothold on the southern end of Yaeju Dake, just north of Nakaza, where they would withstand several Japanese counterattacks throughout the night. The first and greatest obstacle confronting Wallace's attack was the open ground over which both assault companies had to move. Wallace used all available support and the men camouflaged themselves with grass and rice plants, but enemy fire began almost as soon as the leading platoons moved into the open. The infantrymen crawled through the slimy rice paddies on their stomachs. Within an hour Company I was strung from the line of departure to the base of the objective which two squads had reached. About this time the Japanese opened fire with another machine gun, separating the advance squads with a band of fire. This left one squad to continue the attack; the remainder of the company was unable to move, cut off by fire or strung across the rice paddies. Those men in the squad still free to operate lifted and pulled each other to the edge of the cliff and crawled quietly forward through the high grass on top. Pfc. Ignac A. Zeleski, a BAR man, moved so stealthily that he almost touched the heels of one Japanese. Zeleski killed him, and the other men killed eight more Japanese within the first ten minutes. Another squad reached the top of the escarpment about an hour later but was caught in cross and grazing fire from three machine guns, and the entire 8-man squad was killed. Gradually, however, a few more men reached the top, and by evening there were twenty men from Company I holding a small area at the escarpment rim. Company K had a similar experience. Accurate enemy fire killed one man, wounded two others, and halted the company when it was from 200 to 300 yards from its objective. For forty-five minutes the attack dragged on until S/Sgt. Lester L. Johnson and eight men maneuvered forward through enemy fire, gained the high ground, and concentrated their fire on the enemy machine gun that was firing on the remainder of the company. This did not silence the gun but did prevent the gunner from aiming well, and Johnson waved for the rest of the company to follow. By 1330 of 9 June Company K was consolidated on the southeastern tip of the Yaeju-Dake. That evening, three small but determined counterattacks, with sustained grenade fire between each attempt, hit the small force from Company I, which held off the attackers with a light machine gun and automatic rifles. Additionally, Wallace's 1st Battalion successfully landed unopposed on Aguni Island to establish air warning and fighter director installations.  However, it's now time to leave Okinawa and shift our focus to the Philippines to cover the continuation of General Eichelberger's Mindanao Campaign. As we last saw, by May 3, General Sibert's 10th Corps had successfully invaded the island and secured the key Kabacan road junction. General Woodruff's 24th Division occupied Digos and Davao, while General Martin's 31st Division advanced up the Sayre Highway toward Kibawe. Thanks to the arrival of the 162nd Regiment from Zamboanga, the 31st Division was now able to send another regiment, the 155th, to assist in the push north against General Morozumi's 30th Division. In response to the rapid advance of the 31st Division as far as Kibawe, Morozumi was assembling his units at Malaybalay in preparation for a retreat eastward to the Agusan Valley. He dispatched the 3rd Battalion of the 74th Regiment to the south to delay the Americans in the vicinity of Maramag, at least until May 10. Meanwhile, after capturing Davao, Woodruff's goal was to mop up the sector and destroy General Harada's 100th Division in the mountainous interior. The 100th Division located the southern anchor of its defenses at Catigan, 13 miles southwest of Davao, and the northern anchor in hills some twelve miles north of Davao. The Davao River, flowing generally south-southeast into Davao Gulf at Davao, divided the defensive forces into two groupments. The Right Sector Unit, west of the river, was composed of 5 infantry battalions, 3 regular and 2 provisional. The territory east of the river was the responsibility of the Left Sector Unit--2 regular infantry battalions, 2 provisional battalions, and the Air Force's Hosono Unit of ill-armed service personnel. The Right and Left Sector Units had a little artillery attached, for General Harada kept under his direct control most of the artillery as well as many engineer and service units. As a reserve Harada had about a battalion of regular infantry. The central and strongest portion of Harada's defenses rested its right on rising ground overlooking Libby Airdrome, two miles northwest of Talomo on the coast. From this point the central defenses, along which Harada initially deployed three battalions, extended eastward across the Talomo River and some rough hills to the west bank of the Davao River. The focal point of the central defenses was Mintal, four miles up Route 1-D from Talomo. Anticipating ultimate withdrawal into the mountains via Route 1-D, the southeastern section of the so-called Kibawe-Talomo trail, Harada had prepared defenses in depth along the highway and along ancillary roads paralleling it. Much of the region west of the Davao River from Talomo northwest twelve miles to Calinan was covered with overgrown abaca, or hemp, plantations. Resembling banana plants, and growing to a height of about 20 feet, the abaca plants had originally been planted in rows 10 feet apart, with 10 feet between plants. With harvesting slack during the war, the plantations had become thick with shoots, and older plants had grown to a foot or so in diameter. Plants of various sizes were, in April 1945, scarcely a foot apart. Visibility was virtually nil, and the heat at the hemp plantations was like that of an oven. With the 162nd Regiment taking control of Digos and the area stretching from Illana Bay's shores inland to Kabacan, Woodruff was now free to utilize his entire division to engage the enemy forces in the Davao area. At the start of May, the 21st Regiment had already launched an attack to clear Libby Airdrome, Route 1-D between Mintal and Talomo, and Mintal itself. They successfully reached Mintal by May 3, effectively forcing Harada to reinforce his defenses near the Talomo River. Although the airdrome was cleared two days later, subsequent efforts up Route 1-D toward Mintal were repelled by fiercely defending Japanese forces. Due to this resistance, elements of the 34th Regiment attempted to drive north along the high ground on the east bank of the Talomo River to bypass the Japanese defenses on Route 1-D. On May 8, the 21st Regiment finally crossed to the east side at Mintal; however, in the face of Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, they had to withdraw back to the west bank two days later. At the same time, the 19th Regiment was expanding its hold in the Davao area, striking into the high ground controlling the coast road immediately west of the Davao River on May 10. They also cleared scattered Japanese strongpoints on hills just north of Davao and on Samal Island. Two days later, the 21st Regiment again attacked northward along the east bank of the Talomo, successfully clearing out numerous positions from which the Japanese had directed fire on Route 1-D. By May 14, the highway all the way north to Mintal was finally secured. In the meantime, the 124th Regiment started north from Kibawe on May 6. However, the recently arrived Japanese defenders at Maramag managed to delay the occupation of this town until May 12, thus accomplishing their task more than adequately. Despite this success, Eichelberger had shrewdly sensed that Morozumi would attempt to make a last stand in the hills northwest of Davao. Therefore, he decided to land the 108th Regiment behind enemy lines in the Macajalar Bay area to expedite the conquest of Mindanao and open a new supply route to the 31st Division. Accordingly, on May 10, the 108th Regiment landed unopposed along the southeastern shore of Macajalar Bay, making contact almost immediately with guerrilla units operating in the region. This regiment then drove down the Sayre Highway to meet the 31st Division advancing from the south, encountering no significant resistance until May 13, when it faced strong Japanese defenses near Dalirig. With its rear protected by the recently landed 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment, the 108th proceeded to attack the enemy positions with great intensity, finally forcing the Japanese to retreat to the area east of Malaybalay by May 16. Concurrently, on May 13, the 155th Regiment passed through the 124th Regiment to continue the drive northward, meeting little opposition but facing supply problems. By May 20, the Americans finally reached the outskirts of Malaybalay, where fire from remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment halted their advance. Realizing that the regiment could not haul its weapons into the mountains east of Malaybalay, Morozumi had left the unit at Malaybalay to fight a rear-guard action, which was successful in keeping the 155th Infantry out of the town until late on 21 May. On 22 and 23 May the 155th continued up Sayre Highway, encountering elements of Morozumi's Northern Sector Unit that had not learned that American troops had reached Malaybalay and were still withdrawing southward to join the 30th Division's main body. Pressed by troops of the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, which had already landed at Macajalar Bay, the retreating forces gave the 155th Infantry little trouble and, about 1400 on 23 May, the 155th made contact with the 108th Infantry near Impalutao, twelve miles northwest of Malaybalay. Its share in the task of clearing Sayre Highway cost the 31st Division approximately 90 men killed and 250 wounded, while the 108th Infantry, 40th Division, lost roughly 15 men killed and 100 wounded. Together, the two units killed almost 1,000 Japanese during their operations along the highway, and captured nearly 25 more. Nevertheless, the 30th Division had managed to escape east this time to establish new positions near Silae. Back in Davao, on May 15, Woodruff directed the 21st and 34th Regiments to attack abreast to the north and northwest, targeting the Japanese center. Meanwhile, the 19th Regiment advanced north to clear the northeastern shores of Davao Gulf, link up with the guerrilla forces north of the gulf, and ultimately swing westward against the 100th Division's left flank forces. Surprised by the lack of enemy attacks against his flanks, Harada concluded that the American forces intended to neglect his flanks in favor of a frontal assault on his center. As a result, he weakened the defenses of the Left Sector Unit to reinforce the Mintal line, leaving only Admiral Doi's air-naval troops to defend his left flank. On May 17, Woodruff renewed his offensive. The 19th Regiment struck north to establish contact with the guerrilla 107th Division, while the 34th Regiment began clearing the coastal hills between the Talomo and Davao Rivers and attacked northwest toward Tugbok. The 21st Regiment also drove north toward Tugbok in the face of determined opposition. Progress in the following days was slow due to intense artillery, machine-gun, rocket, mortar, and rifle fire. However, by May 27, the 21st Regiment seized the Tugbok area, with the 34th Regiment arriving the next day to relieve them. As Harada's strongest defenses had been breached, he ordered a general withdrawal to a hastily established second line crossing Route 1-D in the vicinity of Ula. Furthermore, the 19th Regiment managed to establish contact with the guerrillas by May 24 as it secured Route 1 north of Davao. On May 29, the 19th Regiment struck westward toward Doi's Mandog defenses, closing in two days later to engage the naval troops in fierce combat. Concurrently, on May 30, the 34th Regiment attacked toward Ula, which fell easily the following day, though progress then slowed in the face of fanatic resistance. Reinforced by the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment on June 4, the 34th began to make headway beyond Ula on the secondary road, gaining one mile by June 6 before swinging east toward Mandog. The next day, having overrun Doi's outer defenses, the 19th Regiment advanced steadily into the main positions near Mandog, which ultimately fell by June 9, just as the 34th was reaching the area. Continuing northward, the 34th was almost three miles north of Ula along both roads and found few signs of organized Japanese resistance by June 11. However, the 19th Regiment would not clear the hills north of Mandog until June 15. In the meantime, the 21st Regiment struck north from Lamogan on May 31 along secondary roads west of Route 1-D, ultimately seizing Wangan on June 16 and forcing Harada's battered forces to commence a full retreat northward in disarray. After the fall of Culanan three days later, Harada finally decided to retreat to a new line near the Bannos River. Yet Woodruff's troops continued to pursue them, rapidly crossing the Tamogan River and inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating enemy until they reached the mountain barrio of Kibangay on June 26, where the pursuit was finally halted. Looking back to the north, with Sayre Highway cleared, the 124th Regiment began probing into the mountains to the east in late May, encountering heavy resistance, rough terrain, bad weather, and supply problems. Nevertheless, by June 5, Morozumi abandoned his plan to hold the Silae area for a month and slowly began moving his best troops eastward toward Waloe in the Agusan River valley, harassed by Filipino guerrillas along the way. In the end, Silae was finally occupied on June 9, with troops of the 108th Regiment pushing further to the Bobonawan River four days later. Additionally, the 155th Regiment arrived on the Pulangi River on June 12, while elements of the 162nd Regiment struck twenty miles into the mountains east from Maramag by June 26. On June 25, the 1st Battalion of the 155th Regiment successfully landed on Butuan Bay and managed to reach Waloe before the Japanese on June 27, dispersing the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Regiment that was holding the area. However, the Japanese retreat was so slow that Morozumi was still assembling his forces about seven miles up the Agusan from Waloe by the end of the war.  Far to the northwest, units of the 31st Division had been probing southeast along the upper section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail ever since early May, and on the 11th of that month a battalion combat team of the 167th Infantry launched the reconnaissance-in-force directed by General Sibert.  Japanese along this section of the trail, about 1,000 men in all, comprised a conglomerate mass of service troops with a small leavening of infantry. Control was vested in General Tomochika, chief of staff of the 35th Army, who had set up a small headquarters groupment near barrio Pinamola, about twenty miles southeast of Kibawe. The Japanese force had a defensive potential far greater than its strength and nature would indicate, for the terrain gave the Japanese every conceivable advantage. Bounded on both sides by dense jungle and thick rain forest, the trail as far as Pinamola ran up and down steep ridges and was scarcely jeep-wide. Rains of late May soon rendered all sections of the trail completely impassable to wheeled vehicles, and supplies had to come in by airdrop, supplemented when possible by hand-carrying parties and laden Carabaos. The mud was so deep that often troops had to pull, push, or even jack the Carabaos out of gooey holes. Delayed by the Japanese, the terrain, and the weather, the 167th Infantry's battalion did not reach the Pulangi River, thirteen miles southeast of Kibawe, until 29 May.  Then, although the Japanese from the trail could no longer offer any threat to the 31st Division, the battalion continued south toward Pinamola, aided considerably by guerrillas. The remnants of the 1st Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the South Sector Unit, 30th Division, which had been driven into the mountains along Highway 3 by the swift American advance in central Mindanao had meanwhile been attached to Tomochika's forces early in June. Troops of the 167th Infantry finally reached Pinamola on 30 June as the remaining Japanese were withdrawing southward another eight miles to the crossing of the Kuluman River. Progress as far as Pinamola had cost the 167th Infantry approximately 60 men killed and 180 wounded, while the Japanese had lost almost 400 killed along the same section of the trail. Elements of the 167th Infantry held along the northwestern section of the Kibawe-Talomo trail until the end of the war, and as of 15 August the regiment was preparing to send troops across the Kuluman River to continue the advance southeastward. On that date nearly 30 miles of Japanese-improved trail, only 19 air miles--still separated the 167th Infantry from guerrilla units operating in the vicinity of Kibangay. Organized remnants of Harada's 100th Division holed up until the end of the war in rugged terrain north of this 30-mile stretch of the trail. Finally, the 24th Reconnaissance Troop successfully landed on the southeastern shore of Sarangani Bay on July 4 to establish contact with the guerrilla 116th Regiment, subsequently clearing the bay's shores against negligible resistance. On July 12, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment landed on the northwest shore, just as two provisional battalions were arriving in the area from different directions. The three forces began to clear the area, successfully locating and destroying the only Japanese unit in the region by July 25. This concluded the campaign in Mindanao, during which the Americans suffered 820 men killed and 2,880 wounded. In turn, almost 10,540 Japanese were killed in eastern Mindanao by June 30, with the pursuing Filipino-American units killing another 2,325 Japanese by the war's end. Roughly 600 Japanese prisoners were captured, over 250 of whom were civilians, before August. After the war, about 22,250 Japanese troops and 11,900 civilians turned themselves in. It is also estimated that an additional 8,235 Japanese lost their lives due to starvation and disease between April and the war's end. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the spring of 1945, the fierce battle for Okinawa escalated as General Buckner's troops captured crucial strongholds, pushing the Japanese forces into retreat. Meanwhile the liberation of Mindanao was kicking up. American forces launched a rapid invasion, confronting Japanese defenders who were heavily fortified in the mountainous regions. Despite the stubborn resistance, American troops relentlessly battled, ultimately culminating in significant victories and paving the way for liberation.

Last time we spoke about the First Okinawa Counteroffensive. The US Marines launched a formidable assault on Okinawa, confronting the entrenched Japanese 32nd Army. This dramatic struggle culminated in Operation Ten-Ichi-Go, Japan's final counteroffensive, marked by the ill-fated mission of the battleship Yamato, which met its demise under relentless air attacks. As American forces advanced, they faced significant resistance, particularly at the Shuri fortified zone. Colonel Yahara voiced concerns over a night counterattack planned for April 12, predicting disaster and chaos for disoriented troops unfamiliar with the terrain. Despite his warnings, Japanese forces executed a counteroffensive that faced harsh setbacks. As the Americans consolidated their gains, pressures mounted on their adversaries. Nevertheless, the relentless nature of the battle highlighted the stark contrast between the courage of the soldiers and the emerging futility of their cause, underscoring the inevitable tide of defeat facing Japan at this pivotal moment in history. This episode is the Invasion of Mindanao Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By April 18, significant progress had been made in the offensive operations against Iejima and the Motobu Peninsula, as seen in Iwo Jima; most notably, General Hodge's 24th Corps was prepared to launch a full-scale offensive to the south with three divisions in line. On the morning of April 19, following the successful initial advance of the 106th Regiment, the largest artillery concentration ever used in the Pacific War heralded the dawn attack. Simultaneously, the campaign's most extensive airstrike was carried out, bolstered by the naval bombardment from Admiral Spruance's fleet. The assault teams moved forward, optimistic that the heavy barrage had either destroyed the enemy or left them too dazed to fight back. However, they soon faced disappointment; the Japanese forces, sheltered in their caves, had emerged largely unscathed and quickly took up their positions. To the east, General Arnold's 7th Division launched an attack with the 32nd and 184th Regiments, targeting Skyline Ridge, Ouki Hill, and Hill 178. While most of the 32nd Regiment engaged the entrenched enemy on Skyline Ridge with support from armored flamethrowers, Colonel Finn's 2nd Battalion and Colonel Greene's 2nd Battalion advanced about 500 yards unopposed towards Ouki Hill, only to be halted by a fierce barrage of Japanese fire. As efforts to progress stalled throughout the day, they had to retreat, which also compelled Finn's beleaguered 3rd Battalion to withdraw. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 184th Regiment attempted to advance through the coral formations of the Rocky Crags but was quickly pinned down by the determined defenders. Two medium tanks and three armored flame throwers rumbled southward from the 7th Division's lines on the coastal flats, passed through Ouki, and quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into the cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge. The long jets of orange flame probed all openings in the face of this part of Skyline, and dark, rolling masses of smoke billowed upward. This was a new spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strong points, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted fifteen minutes, and then, just after 0700, the infantry moved up. All the Japanese on the forward face of the tip had been killed by the flame, but there were others on the reverse side who denied any advance across the crest. The battle of the infantry quickly erupted and smoldered along the narrow knife-edge line of Skyline Ridge. American troops clung desperately to the forward slope through two Japanese counterattacks, in which the enemy crowded forward into his own mortar fire to hurl grenades and satchel charges. At the same time, General Bradley's 96th Division launched an assault with the 381st and 382nd Regiments advancing side by side, aiming for Nishibaru Ridge, Tombstone Ridge, and the Tanabaru Escarpment. The initial capture of several small hills west of Tombstone Ridge went smoothly, but the 382nd faced stiffer resistance on Tombstone itself, managing to maintain a fragile position along the northwest edge of the ridge and partway down its west slope by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 381st Regiment successfully took Kaniku while pushing toward Nishibaru Ridge. However, most of the assault was executed by the 3rd Battalion, which advanced under heavy fire over the ridge crest to the upper part of Nishibaru village, where it was ultimately halted and forced to retreat by resilient defenders. In General Griner's 27th Division sector, the 106th Regiment had already cleared Machinato Inlet and secured a position at the western end of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The 2nd Battalion attempted to push south following a successful night attack but encountered a series of caves, tombs, and tunnels west of Route 1, leading to a stalemate. This marked the beginning of what would later be termed the Item Pocket battle. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 105th Regiment conducted a frontal assault on Kakazu Ridge while Griner executed a sweeping tank maneuver around the east end of the ridge.  The only other 27th Division unit on the front line ready to join in the initial assault was the 1st Battalion of the 105th Infantry. This battalion was deployed along Kakazu Gorge, with Kakazu Ridge, immediately in front, its initial objective. Company C was on the left, next to the Ginowan-Shuri road; Companies B and A, in the order named, were to the west, the latter being initially in reserve. The attack of the 1st Battalion was planned to combine a frontal assault against the ridge with a sweeping tank attack around the east end of Kakazu Ridge. The two forces were to meet behind the ridge near the village of Kakazu and to join in a drive to the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment beyond. The Japanese had guessed that a tank-infantry attack would try to penetrate their lines between Nishibaru Ridge and Kakazu Ridge, and they had prepared carefully for it. Their plan was based on separating the infantry from the tanks. The 272d Independent Infantry Battalion alone devised a fire net of four machine guns, two antiaircraft guns, three regimental guns, and the 81-mm. mortars of the 2d Mortar Battalion to cover the saddle between the two ridges. The machine guns were sited at close range. In addition, two special squads of ten men each were sent forward to the saddle for close combat against the infantry. One group was almost entirely wiped out; the other had one noncommissioned officer wounded and three privates killed. The enemy defense also utilized the 47-mm. antitank guns of the 22d Independent Antitank Gun Battalion and close-quarters suicide assault squads. So thorough were these preparations that the Japanese boasted "Not an infantryman got through." It was here in the Kakazu-Urasoe-Mura Escarpment area that the most extensive reorganization of Japanese units had taken place just before the American attack. The remnants of badly shattered battalions were combined into a composite unit of about 1,400 men that consisted largely of members of the 272d Independent Infantry Battalion but also included elements of the 13th, 15th, and 23d Battalions. The 21st Independent Infantry Battalion stood ready to support the 272d. The 2d Light Machine Gun Battalion added its fire power. Although the infantry soon found themselves pinned down by intense Japanese fire, the tanks managed to reach Kakazu village, which was heavily damaged and set ablaze over the next three hours. Despite their efforts, the failure of the 1st Battalion eventually compelled the tanks to retreat, prompting the 2nd Battalion of the 105th Regiment to attempt an attack towards the eastern end of Kakazu Ridge without success. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion descended from Kakazu West, bypassed Kakazu village, and successfully reached the summit of the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. This unexpected achievement led Colonel Winn to decide to reposition the remainder of the 105th around the western end of Kakazu Ridge to join the 3rd Battalion on the escarpment, effectively abandoning the main enemy front. In other areas of the escarpment, the 106th Regiment was unable to advance southward but managed to extend its lines eastward to connect with Winn's 3rd Battalion. Consequently, the major offensive on April 19 failed to produce any significant breakthrough, resulting in 720 casualties. To the north, General Shepherd initiated a final push toward the north coast on the same day, with the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments advancing through complex networks of caves and trenches facing minimal resistance, but they halted at the elevated terrain around Hill 302. Additionally, patrols from the 22nd Marines moved south from Hedo Misaki and successfully captured Aha on the eastern coast. On Iejima, General Bruce also persisted with his main offensive against the Japanese strongholds on Bloody Ridge, as the 3rd Battalion of the 305th Regiment advanced eastward against the northern section of Ie, while Colonel Hamilton's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked northward. Backed by artillery and mortars, the infantry engaged in fierce skirmishes marked by hand-to-hand combat, moving from one stronghold to another. Following another preparatory bombardment, Colonel Smith initiated a second assault at 14:30, effectively capturing the slopes of the Pinnacle through a series of rushes despite intense machine-gun and mortar fire. Leading elements of the 306th came under intense mortar and small-arms fire as they left the line of departure 600 yards northeast of the base of Iegusugu. The Pinnacle loomed above them, its slopes covered with masses of torn and twisted vegetation. Describing the Pinnacle on the morning of the 20th, General Randle, assistant division commander of the 77th, stated: "It is a damned highly fortified position with caves three stories deep, each house concrete with machine guns in and under. Whole area of village and circumference of mountain a maze of machine gun, mortar, and gun positions little affected by artillery fire we have poured on. Even as this message was on its way to the 77th Division command post, the 306th was winning a hold on the formidable position. By the end of the day, Smith's 1st Battalion was positioned across the northern slopes of Iegusugu; the 3rd Battalion had advanced to within 400 yards of the peak on the eastern side; and the 2nd Battalion had pivoted south to keep pace with the other units of the 306th. Meanwhile, Hamilton's 2nd Battalion succeeded in securing the buildings on Government House Hill; Coolidge's 1st Battalion regained control of the hill from the east; Hamilton's 3rd Battalion established a line at the base of Iegusugu extending to the recently captured Bloody Ridge; and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion made limited progress as it moved slowly eastward. However, during the night, over 400 Japanese troops, including women armed with spears, launched a fierce counteroffensive against Bloody Ridge, nearly forcing the Americans off Government House Hill. By dawn on April 21, as the counterattack diminished, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion was dispatched to relieve the 2nd Battalion, starting the cleanup of the now-secured Bloody Ridge. Coolidge's 3rd Battalion also successfully repelled a strong counterattack from the north before resuming its advance eastward, destroying several enemy positions as it established a line extending south from a small lake at the southwest base of Iegusugu. In the meantime, the 306th Regiment strengthened its hold on Iegusugu throughout the morning, with the 3rd Battalion launching a successful assault on the eastern slopes, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions continued to clear caves and pillboxes on the northern and northwestern slopes. Shortly after noon, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion and Coolidge's 1st Battalion began advancing northward against light resistance to secure the southern slopes of Iegusugu. Simultaneously, Smith's 2nd Battalion and Coolidge's 3rd Battalion launched a coordinated assault to capture the southwest slopes, where they encountered stronger opposition. By mid-afternoon, all units at the Pinnacle were busy mopping up, systematically destroying and sealing the enemy's underground passages and strongholds over the next five days. By midafternoon of April 21 all units on the Pinnacle were engaged in mopping up. The exterior of the Pinnacle was secure, but Japanese still remained in subterranean passages and strongholds from which they made sallies against the troops. The openings were systematically blown out and sealed off. The 307th alone captured or destroyed during the day five 81-mm mortars, five knee mortars, one 75-mm howitzer, and two 47-mm anti-tank guns. These were some of the weapons that had held the Americans off Bloody Ridge for three days. For five days after Ie Shima was declared secure, elements of the 77th Division mopped up remaining groups of the enemy, sealed caves, destroyed pillboxes, marked or removed the thousands of mines that were still on the island, and buried the dead. During this period hundreds of Japanese were killed in and around the Pinnacle, in the town of Ie, and in caves along the coast line. Removal of mines on the airfield and on the roads feeding it was given priority in order to speed up airfield construction. The last noteworthy encounter on Iejima came during the night of April 22-23, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves on Iegusugu toward the lines of the 306th. They were all cut down without loss to American troops. Ultimately, during the six-day battle on Iejima, the Americans killed 4,706 Japanese soldiers and captured 149, suffering 172 killed, 902 wounded, and 46 missing. Meanwhile, on April 20, the 4th and 29th Marine Regiments reached the north coast after eliminating organized resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, resulting in over 2,000 Japanese fatalities, while Shepherd's Marines incurred 207 killed, 757 wounded, and six missing. The Fleet Marine Force Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion seized Yagachi Island on April 21 and occupied Sesoko Island on April 22, with the 6th Reconnaissance Company making the final landing on Kouri Island on April 23. Following a night reconnaissance in rubber boats, the battalion, transported by armored amphibians, seized Yagachi Shima on 21 April. A leper colony of some 800 adults and 50 children was located on this island, but no resistance was encountered. Because aerial reconnaissance had reported Sesoko Shima to be occupied and defended, it was decided to launch an attack on that island with one reinforced regiment. But preliminary to the attack, a native was captured during an amphibious reconnaissance of the objective who revealed that the island was probably not occupied. A successive physical reconnaissance confirmed his statements. Consequently, Major Jones' command was also assigned this mission, and the battalion occupied Sesoko Shima on 22 April. Although no opposition was met, the operation was interfered with by more than 100 civilians, moving by canoe from islands to the west where food was running low, and "considerable difficulty was involved in coralling and controlling" them. On 23 April the 6th Reconnaissance Company, also mounted on and supported by LVT(A)s, executed a daylight landing on Kouri Shima, likewise finding no resistance. Concurrently, while the 29th Marines remained on the Motobu Peninsula, the 4th Marines moved to their designated area in northern Okinawa to assist the 22nd Marines in mopping-up operations, searching the mountainous interior for remnants of the Udo Force and independent guerrilla groups. Finally, on April 28, Colonel Udo's final 200 surviving members were successfully intercepted and eliminated while attempting to flee to the east coast, effectively concluding the northern Okinawa operation. It's now time to leave Okinawa and return to the southern Philippines to oversee the continuation of General Eichelberger's operations. By the end of March, General Arnold's Americal Division had successfully taken control of Cebu City and Lahug Airfield, but was encountering stronger resistance in the northern hills. By the end of March the Americal Division had acquired a good idea of the nature and extent of General Manjome's principal defenses, and had learned that it had already overrun some of the strongpoints along the Japanese outpost line of resistance. On the other hand, the division had not been able to pinpoint the Japanese flanks. With the enemy firmly entrenched and having all the advantages of observation, General Arnold knew that the process of reducing Manjome's positions would be slow and costly no matter what type of maneuver the Americal Division employed. Lacking the strength required for wide envelopments and specific information about the Japanese flanks, Arnold hoped he might achieve decisive results with a single sledgehammer blow against the Japanese center. He therefore decided to use the bulk of his strength in a frontal assault into the hills due north of Cebu City. Consequently, on April 1, the 182nd Regiment, supported by Colonel Cushing's guerrillas, launched a direct assault on the Japanese center, while the 132nd Regiment advanced along the west bank of the Butuanoan River and then moved westward to flank General Manjome's left. Despite slow progress and heavy casualties, by April 11, the 182nd had diminished most of the significant defensive positions along the center of Manjome's second line, and the 132nd had managed to flank the Japanese left, reaching a crucial location on the far left of Manjome's final defensive positions. Additionally, the 164th Regiment had landed to bolster the offensive and was quickly advancing through the Mananga Valley to encircle the Japanese right and rear. By April 13, the 164th reached Babag Ridge, but its surprise attack was promptly repelled by the defenders. Meanwhile, the 132nd and 182nd Regiments resumed their assaults, with the latter capturing the last stronghold along the Japanese second line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Manjome had already concluded that further resistance was futile and ordered a general withdrawal northward to begin the night of April 16. In the days that followed, Arnold's three regiments engaged in a series of costly small unit attacks, gradually gaining ground, inch by inch. On April 17, organized resistance in the Japanese stronghold began to falter as defenders retreated, and by evening, the Americal Division had neutralized all of Manjome's significant fortifications. In response to the Japanese withdrawal, the Americal Division quickly initiated a pursuit operation, successfully cutting off the retreat route to the remaining forces of the 1st Division in northern Cebu by the end of the month. By the first week of May, the 132nd Regiment launched an offensive to dismantle General Kataoka's organized resistance, aided by guerrilla forces, and largely achieved its objective in a campaign that lasted until the month's end. The Americans and Filipinos then focused on mopping up the remnants of Manjome's forces, effectively eliminating the last pockets of Japanese resistance on Cebu by June 20. Meanwhile, on April 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on Bohol at beaches already secured by Major Ismael Ingeniero's guerrillas. Patrols soon located the Japanese garrison inland, leading to the battalion's assault on its main positions from April 17 to April 20, culminating in the overrunning of the last organized opposition by April 23. On April 26, the remaining elements of the 164th Regiment landed unopposed on southern Negros and moved inland to search for the Japanese garrison. By April 28, they discovered the 174th Independent Battalion, but their initial attacks were successfully thwarted by the defenders. Nonetheless, a coordinated offensive commenced on May 6, which successfully compelled the Japanese to retreat and disperse by the end of the month. The 164th then neutralized a final resistance pocket between June 7 and 12, effectively ending Japanese opposition on Negros and completing the 8th Army's campaign to reclaim the central Visayan Islands. Eichelberger's operations in the southern Philippines were far from over, as Major-General Franklin Sibert's 10th Corps, comprising the reinforced 24th and 31st Divisions, was preparing to launch the invasion of Mindanao, known as Operation Victor V. The initial strategy had Major-General Roscoe Woodruff's 24th Division landing on the shores of Illana Bay on April 17 to quickly secure the Malabang-Cotabato area, followed by Major-General Clarence Martin's 31st Division five days later for the final advance toward Davao.  Illana Bay lies nearly a hundred miles northwest of the main objective in eastern Mindanao, the Davao area, and only a poor road connects its beaches to Davao. Still, 8th Army had ample reason to select Illana Bay as the site of the initial assault. For one thing, the army knew that the Japanese had their main concentrations in the Davao region, where they seemed especially well prepared to repel an amphibious assault. It would be foolish to stick one's hand into a hornet's nest if there were no urgency for such action, and 8th Army could not, of course, avoid the long view that the eastern Mindanao operation was in essence a mopping-up campaign rather than an action of great strategic importance. Second, the Illana Bay area was relatively weakly defended--the 24th Division would have a much better chance to achieve tactical surprise there. Finally, 10th Corps would have to seize and rehabilitate an airstrip quickly so that land-based aircraft could provide proper support for subsequent operations in eastern Mindanao, other air bases being too distant. A reasonably good strip existed at Malabang, on the northwestern shore of Illana Bay. Given the estimate that the Japanese maintained a weak garrison at Illana Bay, Malabang seemed the spot for the main assault. However, by early April, Colonel Wendell Fertig's guerrilla forces had taken control of the entire Malabang region, forcing the Japanese garrison to retreat. Consequently, Sibert adjusted his plan, directing Rear-Admiral Albert Noble's Task Group 78.2 to deploy only one battalion at Malabang, with the remaining forces of the 24th Division landing near Parang. The Japanese forces in Mindanao numbered over 43,000, including troops from Lieutenant-General Morozumi Gyosaku's 30th Division, Lieutenant-General Harada Jiro's 100th Division, and Rear-Admiral Doi Naoji's 32nd Naval Special Base Force. General Suzuki of the 35th Army was in overall command of these troops, but he first needed to escape from Cebu to assert his authority. Thus, Suzuki and his staff departed northern Cebu on April 10, using five landing craft. Unfortunately, the boats became separated, leading to an emergency landing near Dumaguete before they could continue their journey on the night of April 16. Tragically, Suzuki's vessel was intercepted and destroyed by a PT boat off the southern tip of Cebu on April 17. Only his chief of staff, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, managed to reach Cagayan on the night of April 20 after several days adrift. Nominal command in Mindanao rested with General Morozumi, who became de jure commander of the 35th Army after General Suzuki's death during the latter's voyage from Cebu. But Morozumi chose not to exercise his authority except insofar as to largely ignore advice from General Tomochika, 35th Army chief of staff, who reached Mindanao in late April. Beset with formidable communications difficulties, and realizing that most inhospitable terrain separated the main bodies of the 30th and 100th Divisions, Morozumi believed he could render his best service by staying with the 30th, leaving General Harada and Admiral Doi more or less to their own devices. Neither Harada nor Morozumi had any offensive missions. Rather, in accordance with Yamashita's December 1944 plans, the Japanese on Mindanao were to direct their efforts to pinning down as many American units as possible in order to delay the progress of the war. Harada and Morozumi had little hope of conducting organized, major defensive operations for more than two months. Once American forces had overrun their prepared defenses, the two planned to retreat into largely unexplored mountains of east-central Mindanao, organizing a last-stand area like Yamashita's in the Asin Valley of northern Luzon. The 30th and 100th Divisions were not in good shape to conduct a delaying, defensive operation either. Hopelessly isolated, short of artillery, small arms ammunition, transportation, and communications equipment, they had no chance of obtaining supplies. They had some stocks of food, but their transportation shortage, coupled with the poor condition of eastern Mindanao roads would make it most difficult for the Japanese to move their food from central depots to the mountains. The Japanese commanders thus knew that once an invasion of eastern Mindanao began they would enter upon a battle they could not win, and they definitely had no relish for a defense to the death in place.  After an uneventful journey, Sibert's 10th Corps began landing on Mindanao on the morning of April 17. Troops from the 533rd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment went ashore on the small Ibus Island, while the 3rd Battalion of the 21st Regiment joined Fertig's guerrillas on the beach near Malabang. Company K secured Bongo Island without opposition. At 09:00, after an unnecessary two-hour bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, the 19th Regiment landed at Parang without encountering any resistance, followed by most of the 21st Regiment. That afternoon, the 19th Regiment secured the entire Parang area, and the 24th Reconnaissance Troop scouted the shores of Polloc Harbor and the northern entrance of the Mindanao River, finding them clear. On April 18, Sibert launched an assault towards Fort Pikit, with the 19th Regiment advancing along Route 1 and the 21st Regiment utilizing the Mindanao River. The 21st's advance was quicker, successfully reaching Paidu-Pulangi the next day. However, the 19th Regiment lagged due to poor road conditions and some enemy resistance, leading Woodruff to order the 21st to withdraw downstream for the night. On April 21, a battalion from the 34th Regiment arrived at Paidu-Pulangi, advancing both overland and along the river to reach Fort Pikit late in the afternoon. The isolated 166th Independent Battalion was ultimately destroyed, with the 19th finally arriving at Fort Pikit on April 23. Meanwhile, the 34th continued to push forward and secured the Kabacan junction of Route 1 and Sayre Highway. This quick capture of the junction effectively separated the 30th and 100th Divisions and opened two routes of attack: north along the Sayre and southeast towards Davao. Consequently, the newly arrived 31st Division was tasked with sending its 124th Regiment to assault the 30th Division's forces in northern Mindanao, while the 34th Regiment continued its advance along Route 1 towards Digos and Davao. In response, Morozumi dispatched reinforcements under Colonel Ouchi Koretake to block any enemy progress past Omonay, while fortifying the Malaybalay area. By this time, General Morozumi had swung into action in an attempt to stem the enemy advance before it moved north into central Mindanao. Colonel Ouchi, commander of the 30th Engineer Regiment, was ordered about April 22 to take command of operations along the southern approaches and to annihilate the enemy south of the east-west line running through Omonay. For this mission he was given command of the South Sector Unit, as well as his engineer units. On April 23, General Tomochika, Chief of Staff of 35th Army, arrived at the 30th Division command post at Impalutao from Agusan, where he had arrived on April 21 from Cebu. Tomochika immediately conferred with Morozumi regarding implementation of the Army policy of protracted resistance. As a result of this discussion, Morozumi concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the Malaybalay area. He therefore ordered the transfer of the 1st Battalion, 77th Regiment from the North Sector Unit to the Central Sector Unit and the movement of this battalion to new positions near Malaybalay. About the same date Morozumi ordered the Surigao Sector Unit to move from Ampayon to the Waloe area, where it was to assist in carrying out the division's self-sufficiency program. Although the 30th Division commander thus adopted measures to strengthen the area of final resistance, he still considered the landing near Parang a secondary invasion and estimated that the main enemy landing would soon be launched in the Macajalar Bay area. The preponderance of division strength was therefore retained in the north.  Led by the 24th Reconnaissance Troop, the 34th Regiment quickly departed from Kabacan on April 24. Although progress was hampered primarily by destroyed bridges and the poor condition of Route 1, the troops successfully arrived at the outskirts of Digos by April 27, where they faced approximately 3,350 enemy troops. The Japanese forces urgently prepared to defend against the 24th Division's assault but could only hold out until the early hours of April 28, when they retreated to the foothills of Mount Apo to the north. Elements of the 34th Regiment pursued the withdrawing Japanese, who maintained their position in the Mount Apo region until May 9, when they retreated north to regroup with the rest of the 100th Division. Meanwhile, other units of the 34th and the guerrilla 108th Division began patrolling the Davao Gulf coast, which they successfully cleared by May 12. Additionally, the 19th Regiment advanced from Kabacan to Digos, passed through the 34th, and started moving north towards Davao. Facing little resistance along Route 1, the 19th Regiment overwhelmed the last opposition in front of the city and successfully occupied Davao by May 3 with minimal opposition. Meanwhile, on the afternoon of April 27, the 124th Regiment departed from Kabacan and quickly confronted the 1st Battalion, 74th Regiment, causing it to retreat in disarray. The 124th then pressed on to the north, facing minimal resistance, and ultimately arrived in Kibawe by May 3. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The US invasion of Mindanao commenced under General Eichelberger. The initial assault targeted Illana Bay, with American forces quickly securing key areas. Japanese troops, suffering from low morale and inadequate supplies, struggled to mount an effective defense. The campaign marked a pivotal advance in the Pacific War, laying groundwork for further operations.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat.  The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages.  On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.

Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

Today we are joined by Commander Bob Eichelberger of the United States Navy, to talk about his career in the Navy and his commitment to protecting the marriages of the men under his command. Bob went to the Naval Academy and completed nuclear power and submarine training in 1976 and reported to his first submarine assignment aboard USS FLYING FISH (SSN 673) in Norfolk, Virginia. During this tour, the ship was overhauled and conducted three deployments including one extended period under the arctic ice pack to the North Pole. In June 1980, he commenced a two-year tour as 24th Company Officer at the Naval Academy.Commander Eichelberger made three deployments to the Western Pacific from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii while serving as Engineer Officer on USS SKATE (SSN 578) from July 1982 to November 1984, and then as Navigator and Operations Officer on USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN 695) until May 1986. He was then assigned to the staff of Chief of Naval Education and Training in Pensacola, Florida and served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Undersea Warfare Training.Commander Eichelberger returned to sea duty in July 1988 as Executive Officer of the newly commissioned USS OKLAHOMA CITY (SSN 723) and completed the post shakedown shipyard availability and a deployment to the Mediterranean. In July 1990, he reported to the staff of Commander Submarine Squadron SIX where he served as Chief Staff Officer until December 1991.Commander Eichelberger entered the Prospective Commanding Officer training pipeline in January 1992 and assumed command of USS KAMEHAMEHA (SSN 642) at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in August 1992.Commander Eichelberger is entitled to wear the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards), the Navy Commendation Medal (two awards), the Navy Achievement Medal (two awards), the Navy Expeditionary Medal, and the Battle Efficiency "E" Ribbon (three awards).

Former Pennsylvania State Senator Jim Eichelberger joins Marc & Kim to talk about how the public opinion on congressional term limits has begun to change and what the future response from politicians should and could be as the issue begins to get more notice.

Former Pennsylvania State Senator and Pennsylvania State Co-Chair of U.S. Term Limits John Eichelberger joins Bob and Chris on the Morning News Express to discuss term limits in Congress.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

John Eichelberger, Former Pennsylvania State Senator and Pennsylvania State Co-Chair for U.S. Term Limits. Was The Election A Turning Point For Term Limits

I had Maeve Eichelberger on today and I really like to call her just "Maeve." I think that's a good way to just brand her name, but maybe you'll hear that on the podcast. I don't remember if I talked about it in the podcast or if it was just in private, but that's the fun thing about podcast is you never know what's going to come out. Maeve and I talked about the new show she's having with Jordan K. Walker, Josh Gibson, and  Whitney Gardner which is the New Young Gun show. It was fun to just kind of catch up with her on what she's doing. We talked about her new studio and some of her relationships with individuals like Barbara Van Cleve and it's always unique to discuss art with individuals that see the world differently. Maeve really does see the world in her own way on so many levels, not only the way she makes her art, but the types of media that she uses as well.She uses acrylic for her saddles and now she's making clothing based sculptures which are really interesting and something I think will be sought after  when people find out what she's doing. I always have a great time talking to Maeve and I'm so happy she was able to take the time to come and do this podcast for our group exhibition, New Young Guns.

This week, Cam and Robert talk with Joey Eichelberger, a young entrepreneur about the watercraft he has designed called Bass Raft! All things Faith 'N Fish'N

Is being swallowed by a sea monster a form of rescue or danger? The book of the prophet Jonah is a perfect example of uncomfortable and often unwanted revelation breaking through an otherwise still life.  God, in his relationship to the world and to his creation often disrupts the safety and calm of our known world and bring us deeper into a revelation of who we are and should be. But a break through, in Jonah's case, requires that he be broken into. Under the calm surface of a silent sea, the book of Jonah shows us that disruption can bring us into the terrifying but wondrous depths of God.  The Copyright for all material on the podcast is held by L'Abri Fellowship. We ask that you respect this by not publishing the material in full or in part in any format or post it on a website without seeking prior permission from L'Abri Fellowship. Also, note that not all views expressed in the lectures or in the discussion time necessarily represent the views of L'Abri Fellowship. © Canadian L'Abri 2020

Richland County Land Bank being impacted by delays in state reimbursement:https://www.richlandsource.com/2024/09/11/richland-county-land-bank-being-impacted-by-delays-in-state-reimbursement/  Today - The Richland County Land Bank has been waiting for three months to receive nearly $755,000 from the Ohio Department of Development, money meant to cover the demolition of the former Denver Roof buildings in Mansfield.Support the show: https://richlandsource.com/membersSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Join Rachel Fishback as she visits Eichelberger Farms to chat with Andy Eichelberger about their involvement in the annual RAGBRAI event. Discover how Eichelberger Farms promotes pork to cyclists and visitors, emphasizing the importance of supporting local farmers and enjoying delicious pork products. Don't miss this insightful conversation about the intersection of community, agriculture, and fitness!

Last time we spoke about the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The battle of the philippine sea saw Admiral Ozawa toss numerous aircraft carrier attacks against US Task Force 58. The numerous strikes proved terribly ineffective, seeing most Japanese aircraft shot down and failing to return to their carriers. Ozawa's forces faced issues with uncorrected compass deviations and poor communication leading to misidentified targets and unsuccessful attacks. The American pilots managed to intercept and shoot down incredible numbers of Japanese aircraft, dealing Ozawa a terrifying defeat. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. This episode is the the Changsha-Hengyang Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are first jumping back into the fighting on Saipan, where General Holland Smith's forces were preparing for the start of the drive into the center of the island. General Holland Smith's strategy involved the 4th Marine Division advancing along the inland road to secure the area southeast of Mount Tapotchau and take Hill 600, which is just north of Magicienne Bay. Meanwhile, the 2nd Marine Division was tasked with capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau, while the 27th Division stood ready to support either Marine division if needed. On the morning of June 22, after a 10-minute artillery barrage, the offensive began. On General Schmidt's front, the 24th Marines moved along the shore, facing obstacles in the form of ravines but still reaching the O-4A Line by 13:30. The 25th Marines, advancing in battalions, secured three small ridgelines before being stopped at the fourth, gaining approximately 2000 yards. By noon, as the connection between the two regiments became weak, Schmidt had to send in the reserve 23rd Marines to bridge the gap and push toward Hill 600. Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the 23d Marines made slow progress. Only light enemy resistance from riflemen and machine gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around and through the rugged ground formations, limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased at a point about 200 yards south of objective O-4A, where the unit dug in. To the west, General Watson also made significant advances. The 6th Marines reached the summit of Mount Tipo Pale while the 8th Marines progressed closer to Mount Tapotchau. However, both units encountered obstacles due to enfilading fire from a Japanese stronghold on Tipo Pale, which remained undefeated for two days. Throughout the night, the 27th Division began relieving the worn-out 25th Marines. The 106th Regiment took position against the eastern slopes of Tapotchau, while the 165th faced off against Death Valley. Due to this shift, Holland Smith instructed the 105th Regiment to move north as the division's reserve, leaving just its 2nd Battalion to clear Nafutan Point. The following morning, the 27th Division's advance was delayed because its regiments struggled to assemble at the line of departure. Meanwhile, Generals Watson and Schmidt had already resumed their offensive, encountering more resistance than the day before. The 8th Marines initially encountered little resistance as they moved towards Tapotchau, but were stopped when the 106th Regiment had yet to advance. To the left, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion managed to advance about 400 yards, while the rest of the forces faced the Tipo Pale strongpoint. The 23rd Marines, attacking with battalions in column, Dillon's 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600. Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of the battalion commander, “It was all you could do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The number of Japanese defending the height was not great, but the area was admirably suited for defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of “hot potato.” Despite their struggle against gravity and an obstinate foe, Dillon's Marines seized the peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. From its newly-won position, Dillon's battalion had an unimpaired view of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been executed without benefit of contact with the 27th Division on the left; and, when it was apparent that the latter was still some distance to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d to hold up its advance until Army elements had tied in. Though the peak of the hill was securely in the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill's northern slope, cloaked in thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day and during the night the grenade pitching continued. In the afternoon, General Ralph Smith's forces began their assault, with the 106th encountering a strongpoint known as Hell's Pocket and the 165th being stopped by heavily fortified positions on Purple Heart Ridge. The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Division was to have an unusually vital bearing on the unit's operations for many days to come. This terrain is well described by the historian attached to the division at Saipan: “The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land, was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kagman Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt. Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor was named Death Valley by the men who fought there and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple Heart Ridge.” At d three divisions of Japanese troops and tanks were massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized at about 6:30, when Japanese tanks struck near the boundary between the 165th and 106th Regiments. The combined efforts of 37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the 2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a sixth escaped. This was not enough for the intruders. At about 7:30, in company with infantrymen, five more Japanese tanks struck the right center of the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion's Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion's lines. Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returning to its original positions after the lire had burned itself out. Holland Smith expressed displeasure over the 27th Division's failure to start its attack on time. He was even more upset when he found out that Colonel Bishop's 2nd Battalion had not made progress at Nafutan Point. As a result, Major-General Sanderson Jarman had to brief Ralph Smith, who committed to ensuring his regiments advanced on schedule the next day. On June 24, the 106th and 165th Regiments once again struggled to advance against strong resistance and difficult terrain. An attack toward Nafutan Point in the south also failed, prompting Holland Smith to remove Ralph Smith from command and temporarily appoint Jarman to lead the 27th Division. Colonel Geoffrey O'Connell was assigned to clear Nafutan. In contrast, the 2nd Marines made progress toward Garapan and reached Radio Road on the O-6 Line, where they repelled two strong enemy counterattacks. On the right of the 2nd Marine Division, the 8th Marines continued the fight over nightmarish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays' 1sl Battalion moved into the attack, the troublesome pocket, developed on the previous day, came alive again. Matted with undergrowth and trees, the irregular coral limestone formation was favorable for the type of defense the Japanese were employing. Improving the area's natural assets, they had developed a honeycomb of underground positions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most unspectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant task of sealing the caves and killing the occupants. The former chore proved the easier, since in most cases the Japanese had not neglected to plan routes and methods of escape. When the “cavemen" had done as much damage as possible from one position, they would retire to another from which to resume the fight. Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts of combat engineers armed with flame-throwers, bazookas and demolitions and riflemen showed results; the pocket was eliminated and contact with the 6th Marines again established. By late afternoon the battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night point of view. Since the next satisfactory site was 700 yards farther to the north, the unit halted and dug in. Major Larsen's 3d Battalion, advancing along the base of a cliff, made good progress, limited only by fairly difficult terrain and the necessity of maintaining contact with flank units. Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins' 1st Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was broken into a rough plateau dotted with smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward Mt Tapotcliau's crest. The undergrowth in this area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of which spread out three to eight feet above ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella, overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket of vines. On the battalion's right flank was a narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge, part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt. Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of the summit. Moving through this intricate snarl was like attempting to swim through a fishermen's net, and Tompkins' battalion became overextended. At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion to move in behind Tompkins' right to protect the open flank. As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after an advance of about 700 yards, it again became essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company to extend south along the ridge facing the hiatus between the 2nd and 27th Divisions. Schmidt's division also moved east on Kagman Peninsula, with the 23rd Marines reaching Chacha village and the 24th Marines making rapid coastal gains of around 1200 yards. The next day, while the 2nd Marines held their ground outside Garapan and the 6th Marines tackled the Tipo Pale strongpoint, Colonel Wallace's forces finally attacked Mount Tapotchau. However, the summit was secured by a bold patrol along a ridge line on the right flank, which had to fend off multiple Japanese counterattacks. The 27th Division, under new leadership, resumed its attack, with the 165th taking one-third of Purple Heart Ridge and the 106th making a small entry into Death Valley before withdrawing during the night under enemy pressure. Further south, O'Connell struggled to make headway at Nafutan Point, while on Kagman Peninsula, Schmidt's Marines faced minimal resistance and secured Kagman Hill and the Brown Beaches along the O-6 Line. Additionally, recognizing their desperate situation, Generals Igeta and Saito requested reinforcements from Tinian.  From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of Tinian, 11 personnel barges carrying a company of the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment moved out during darkness of 25-26 June bent upon reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was reported sunk, while the remainder scurried back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 2:25am, LCI(G)s 438 and 456 observed several barges moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan's west coast. Immediately opening fire, the LCI(G)s accounted for one sunk and a second damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag. Both LCI(G)s received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12 holes in her hull from one of the barges' 37mm guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only slight damage to her winch and refrigerator. The 438 suffered one man killed and two wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report from one of the LCIs that the Japanese barges had unleashed torpedoes during this action was later substantiated by a prisoner of war who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time. The Americans responded by initiating a systematic bombardment of Tinian on June 26.Air and naval gunfire alternated daily, working first in one half and then in the other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and Indianapolis, using both air and direct shipboard spot, were assigned to execute the naval gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would be provided by Carrier Support Groups One and Two. Meanwhile, Schmidt's Marines were clearing the Kagman Peninsula, and the 6th Marines bypassed the Tipo Pale strongpoint and secured the ridge linking it to Tapotchau.  In the 8th Marines zone the day's advances were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines. On the right the 2d Battalion's advance was restrained because of the lack of contact with 27th Division elements. In the 8th Marines' center, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, made only small gains. The attached 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the regiment during the greater portion of the day, Company E being used in the lines, while the remainder of the battalion was employed in mopping-up operations. As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th Marines to its left if it were to retain contact. The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy opposition, governed the rate of advance. One unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the craggy rocks along the route. This device showed originality but little else; no casualties were inflicted upon the Marines. Higher on Tapotehau's western slopes, the 3rd Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines' action report gives an indication of the problems in that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and 40 minute march over rough terrain.” At some points the Japanese threw or rolled grenades and demolition charges down upon the Marines as they struggled through the hilly thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The 3d Battalion's left flank kept pace with the 1st Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind. By nightfall the 3d Battalion's lines stretched almost north and south along the base of a steep slope. On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, less one company, had secured a foothold on the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on 26 June, then, for Company B to move up the mountain's western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotehau's crest. This patrol was repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be thoroughly battered before a successful effort could be made. In the meantime Company B reached the mountain to,. combing the area on the way. From the 2d Battalion position , the Marines observed men of the 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to move up on the division flank. By the close of the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2nd Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe with one company facing north, one east, and one south. To sum up, the most important developments in the 8th Marines' sector during the day were the straightening of several small bulges in the lines and consolidation of the dominating heights won on 25 June. The 106th Regiment, under Colonel Albert Stebbins, failed to launch its attack amid confusion. The 165th Regiment bypassed Death Valley and joined the 4th Marine Division. In the south, after heavy bombardment, O'Connell began making progress against Nafutan Point. Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese defenders on Nafutan Point. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume of fire was maintained by 40mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon, the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the 2nd Battalion, 105th Regiment. Movement on the point was rendered very difficult, and the shortage of food and water became acute. As a result, on June 26, Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and join other Japanese forces which he believed to be in the vicinity of Hill 500. This attack, though better planned than the average Japanese effort, achieved very little, and Sasaki's password “seven lives for one's country” remained only a slogan. However, during the night, the trapped Japanese forces managed to break through O'Connell's defenses. Moving undiscovered through the thinly spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sasaki's force headed for Aslito Airfield. The only indication that men of the 2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the move came at about 0200 when “an extremely large group” stumbled into the command post, about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines. After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27 Japanese were found in the immediate command post area. At about 0230 Sasaki's force struck Aslito Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one P-47 and damaging three others. Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the Commander, Air Defense Command, reported that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm guns were firing on Aslito Airfield. After causing confusion at the airfield, the force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters . At about 0520 there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki's men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines on Hill 500, and the second surprise was for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly recovered from the shock, however, and a lively small arms and hand grenade battle ensued. At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki's force. The brunt of this assault was borne by the 2nd Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army patrol scheduled to pass through the area at about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Total 14th Marines' casualties in the skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while 143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment's immediate area. With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort of the previous night. Total Japanese losses in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500, and in the 14th Marines' area, plus the 27 June mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some of whom wore United States uniforms and carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of water and rations. Yet that is all for Saipan for now, as we will be traveling over to China War. After the success of Operation Kogo, the Japanese planned for General Yokoyama's 11th Army to initiate a three-pronged assault in Hunan. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions would head straight for Changsha, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions provided coverage on the eastern flank by advancing towards Liling. Meanwhile, the 40th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 5th Independent Brigade secured the Dongting Lake region on the western flank. Additionally, the 70th Division in Jiangxi would launch a diversionary attack towards Hunan. On the night of May 27, following heavy artillery bombardment, Yokoyama initiated his offensive. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions crossed the Xinqiang River swiftly, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions moved south towards Liling. Furthermore, the 216th Regiment launched an amphibious operation towards Yingtianzhen and Xiangyin, catching the Chinese defenders off guard. The following day, the 40th Division and the 109th Regiment began their assault southwards, capturing Anxiang, Nan, Tianxingzhou, and the port of Sanxianhu by May 30. Simultaneously, the 5th and 17th Brigades advanced west towards the Songzizhong River to secure the northern shores of Dongting Lake. In the east, the Japanese forces encountered minimal resistance and advanced almost 100 kilometers, capturing Tongcheng, Nanjiangzhen, Pingjiang, and Changshouzhen by June 1. In the center, the main Japanese divisions breached the 20th Army's positions at Guanwang and Changlezhen and reached the Guluo River on June 3. With the enemy seemingly in full retreat, Yokoyama's forces continued southward, hindered only by a sudden downpour, and reached the Laodao River line by June 6, preparing to besiege Changsha. However, heavy rains delayed these preparations, allowing General Xue Yue time to gather his forces around the city. According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chongyang-Tongcheng-Pingjiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Xinqiang-Xinshizhen-Mianhuapo-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yueyang-Changsha road. In the meantime, the 40th Division crossed Dongting Lake to seize Yuanjiang, making contact with elements of the 58th Division at Qiaokou. On June 11, the 40th Division successfully took control of the Yiyang area, while the 34th Division bypassed the Tamoshan Range and launched an attack towards Yuelu Mountain and Fengshupu. The 68th and 116th Divisions bypassed Changsha and moved forward towards Guanqiao, Changlingxiang, and Yisuhe, and the 3rd and 13th Divisions advanced towards Liuyang, facing significant resistance in the region. Despite this, Liuyang fell on June 14, after which the 13th Division proceeded towards Liling. Finding himself completely surrounded, Xue Yue decided to leave Changsha and retreat towards Liling. In the earlier three battles of Changsha, the Chinese had managed to defend the city and counterattack from the flanks; however, both the western and eastern flanks had now fallen to the Japanese, leaving the defenders with no choice but to withdraw. Now I want to take a short detour. Since mid-1943, the Americans had been constructing airfields in India, Ceylon, and China to house 16 squadrons of B-29 Superfortress Very-Long-Range heavy bombers under Brigadier-General Kenneth Wolfe's 20th Bomber Command. As part of Operation Matterhorn, these bombers were assigned to target locations in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. A key target was the Japanese steel industry, which relied on a few coke plants situated in Kyushu, Manchuria, and Korea—within reach of the B-29s stationed in Chengdu. Before launching an attack on Japan, Wolfe decided to conduct a test combat mission against the Makkasan railway yard facilities in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 5, at 05:45, Brigadier-General LaVerne Saunders led 98 B-29s on a 2,261-mile round trip from India, marking the longest mission of the war up to that point.  Each bomber carried a fuel load of 6846 US gallons and 5 short tons of bombs; three groups carried 500-pound general-purpose bombs while the fourth carried M18 incendiary bombs. The XX Bomber Command wanted to test out the new M18 incendiary bombs and the large number of wooden buildings and freight cars and a small oil facility in the area offered good targets. The resulting 134000-pound takeoff weight was too heavy for the temporary field at Charra, so the 444th Bombardment Group had to stage from the other three fields. The attack was launched at 5:45 local time on 5 June 1944 to avoid high ground temperatures that were bad for the R-3350 engines and to allow the whole mission to be conducted in daylight. Wolfe had suggested a night-time raid, but Arnold insisted on daylight precision bombing. Only 77 bombers reached Bangkok, conducting a chaotic series of bombing runs between 10:52 and 12:32 due to cloud cover. The bomber's aim was to destroy the Memorial Bridge and a major power plant. They missed and instead knocked down tram lines and destroyed a Japanese military hospital as well as the headquarters of the Japanese secret police. No civilian buildings were damaged, a fact that aroused admiration among the Thai authorities. It was only in 1947 that the Thais discovered the American bombers had been aiming at the Memorial Bridge, almost two and-a-half kilometres away. Following the raid, schools and universities were closed in Bangkok and children moved out of the city for their safety. Upon returning to India, 42 B-29s had to land at alternative airfields due to low fuel, leading to the loss of five bombers and 15 aircrew fatalities. Despite the setbacks, the mission was deemed successful enough for Wolfe to plan a night attack on Japan for June 15. The B-29s began relocating to Chengdu on June 13 to prepare for the strike against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata, producing approximately 2,250,000 metric tons of steel annually, or 24% of Japan's steel output. On June 15 at 16:16, Saunders led 68 B-29s on a 3,182-mile round trip to Yawata. Although some bombers crashed during takeoff, 47 reached the city and attacked for nearly two hours starting at 12:28. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s launched hit the target area: one crashed en route, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and seven bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only 15 American aircraft visually aimed their bombs, as Yawata was obscured by darkness and smoke, with 32 others bombing via radar. Two more B-29s targeted Laoyao harbor, while five attacked other nearby targets. In total, 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid. While returning to Chengdu, three additional B-29 bombers were lost in China. In total, seven B-29s and 55 crew members were lost by the Americans, who managed only to inflict minor damage on Yawata. However, this marked the first attack on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, signaling the start of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This raid caused panic in Japanese society, prompting Tokyo to pressure Yokoyama to quickly conquer Changsha and then target the B-29 airfields in central China. As a result, on June 16, the 58th Division launched its assault on Changsha, with the 34th Division also attacking Yuelu and Fengshupu. Changsha fell two days later, leading to the collapse of Chinese resistance in the area. By June 22, Liling and Pingxiang were also captured, allowing the Japanese to gain control over the Jiangxi-Zhejiang railway. Upon hearing of the defeat at Changsha, the Allies worried about the role of Kuomintang forces during Operation Ichi-Go. President Roosevelt proposed placing the entire Nationalist Army under General Stilwell, a suggestion that infuriated Chiang Kai-Shek and was quickly rejected, “Due to our errors in Henan and Changsha, the prestige of our nation and our army, including that of the military command, has been questioned. The foreigners haven't respected neither our combatants nor our commanders. This offense is more intolerable than the Japanese occupation of our homeland by force of arms.” Meanwhile, Yokoyama's next target was Hengyang to the south, where he planned to encircle the city using the 116th and 68th Divisions while the 40th Division secured Xiangxiang to the west. To the east, the 3rd and 13th Divisions would advance beyond You to secure Leiyang, with support from the 27th Division. The 216th Regiment was set to move upstream along the Xiang Jiang to attack Hengyang from the northeast. Meanwhile, in Henan, General Uchiyama continued his offensive by capturing the Hotsin Airdrome on May 30 and occupying the towns of Lingbao and Wenxiang by June 11. However, the Chinese forces managed to regroup, ambush, and counterattack the Japanese troops, reclaiming the recently lost towns and ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat from Loyang and other towns by June 15. Nonetheless, the railway remained under Japanese control and was further reinforced with the capture of Runan and Shangcai on June 16. Back in Hunan, the second phase of Yokoyama's offensive got off to a strong start as the 40th secured Xiangxiang, trapping many retreating Chinese soldiers and compelling them to surrender. Meanwhile, the 68th and 116th moved quickly toward Hengyang, with the 68th occupying Hengyang airfield on June 26 and the 116th reaching the sector northwest of Hengyang the next day. On that day, the 68th also maneuvered around the city, crossing the Xiangjiang River to launch an attack on Hengyang from the southwest. Both divisions commenced their assault on Hengyang, but the strong Chinese fortifications held by the well-prepared defenders proved impenetrable. The attackers faced a shortage of ammunition and were further challenged by General Chennault's B-25s, P-40s and P-51s, who bombed and strafed the besiegers. As a result, Major-General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army repelled all Japanese assaults by the end of June. The heavy Japanese losses during these attacks, including severe injuries to Lieutenant-General Sakuma Tameto, compelled Yokoyama to suspend the attacks on July 2 until his artillery could support the siege. Yet that will be all for the China front for today as we are now heading over to Biak. After General Fuller was relieved on June 15th, General Eichelberger assumed command and decided to follow General Doe's plans for the June 16th attack. The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after 9:00. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100 yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100 yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward against slackening resistance. They cleared innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes, and bunkers, destroyed several machine guns of various calibers, and at 10:50 reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line gap was completed in less than two hours, many of the previous Japanese defenders apparently having withdrawn north into the West Caves the preceding night. The Americans also moved northeast but encountered heavy resistance from enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. After intense artillery support, the battalion regrouped and attacked again in the afternoon, reaching the western limits of the West Caves positions. However, concerned about a possible counterattack on his left flank, Doe decided to pull his forces back to the low ridge while Haney's 2nd Battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment could look back on the day's operations with a good deal of satisfaction. It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were located north of the enemy encampment area both along the main road and on ridges west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine-gun nests and rifle pits in the encampment area and many of those on high, forested ground near that bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese automatic weapons and rifles; and it had killed at least 65 Japanese. The battalion in turn lost 15 men killed and 35 wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward area during the day, for the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments had been kept in place by American artillery and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. On June 17, after identifying the western limits of the West Caves, Doe instructed Newman's 1st Battalion to advance northwest to high ground while Haney's 1st Battalion moved south and southwest towards the West Caves. Facing strong opposition, the 162nd Battalion, supported by tanks, managed to eliminate several pillboxes before being halted around midday. At the same time, the 186th Battalion approached the high ground from the east and joined forces with Haney's Company C, which had just cleared the final major enemy position on the hill. The Americans then continued their westward attack but made only modest progress by nightfall. With the high ground overlooking the West Caves secured, Doe planned to launch a coordinated attack on the strongpoint the following day. However, on June 18, Eichelberger changed his plans due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the operation. Instead, the 162nd and 186th Regiments reorganized for a coordinated attack, with Newman assigned to attack the rear of the West Caves position while the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment gathered near Hill 320 to block enemy reinforcements.  The main effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to attack from the southwest and west while the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The 162d Infantry would hold its positions. An egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge 1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's prospective line of advance was to be seized for flank security and as a line of departure for subsequent attacks north and northeast. On 18 June only local patrolling was undertaken, while the bulk of the troops rested or redeployed in preparation for the attack on the 19th. The egg-shaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along the low ridge in the area were mopped up. The regiment was to advance east from the egg-shaped protrusion of the low ridge with the 2nd Battalion leading, two companies abreast. The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 2nd, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had begun moving east. The attack, which was to begin at 6:30 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company. Furthermore, the 34th Regiment was deployed to relieve the 186th west of Mokmer Drome, prepared to take over Borokoe and Sorido Dromes as per Eichelberger's orders. On the morning of June 19, following intense artillery preparation, Eichelberger's offensive began, with Newman's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacking east and then northwest against light rifle fire and eventually reaching a rugged, heavily-forested coral ridge west of Hill 320 by midday. Around noon, Newman's 1st Battalion started clearing the southern extension of the coral ridge line, successfully advancing through the Japanese encampment area up the road to the 2nd Battalion's position by late afternoon. Facing minimal resistance, the 186th Regiment surrounded the rear of the Japanese in the West Caves, preventing reinforcement or escape. Eichelberger's plans for the next day involved the 186th continuing its operations in the Hill 320 area and the western ridges, while the 162nd attacked the West Caves and the 34th advanced towards the airdromes. On the morning of June 20, Haney's 1st Battalion, supported by two tanks, attacked the West Caves, facing lighter resistance initially but ultimately being halted by heavy Japanese fire. At the same time, Newman's troops extensively patrolled and discovered the Teardrop position, while the 34th Regiment quickly took control of the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido village, facing minimal opposition. During the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment again moved up to the West Caves on June 21 and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks north and northwest of the caves. The patrols, actually flamethrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their mission without much difficulty while the rest of the battalion, again covered by two tanks from the 603rd Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry and tanks concentrated on the most westerly of three large sinkholes comprising the West Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances; the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into holes and crevices within reach; and all Japanese observed were quickly killed by rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to force its way into the main entrance to the underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites. Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices or seepage points found on the surface of the ground. Flamethrowers then ignited the gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was believed that the West Caves were still strongly held, the battalion did not attempt to send any more men into the entrance. In the late afternoon the unit again pulled back to its bivouac area. The attacks during the night of June 21-22 had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume to acknowledge defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded by his staff, burned the colors of the 222nd Regiment and, according to some American reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever the cause and date of his death, on the night of June 21-22 Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West Caves to withdraw to the north and west. Many of the remaining troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 222nd Regiment, who had originally held the low ridge north of Mokmer Drome, had already been killed or had moved north, and most of the Japanese killed by the 186th Regiment during the night of June 21-22 were identified as members of the 221st Regiment, elements of which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day. At 4:00 am on June 22, the Japanese launched another attack, relying on stealth, hand grenades, and bayonets. Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed northwest up the road toward the lines of the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the American regiment. When the Japanese were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted, the Japanese made another break-through attempt about midnight, this time supported only by light mortars. Machine guns, both .50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's 60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time. This final assault was so fierce that the enemy reached the 186th's foxholes, resulting in hand-to-hand combat across the regiment's southern flank. Mortar fire eventually scattered the disorganized enemy, though small groups of Japanese soldiers continued to mount sporadic attacks until dawn. Haney's 1st Battalion continued to face enemy resistance at the West Caves; however, after dropping two 500-pound TNT charges into one of the cave entrances, the Americans initially reported the caves cleared. This assessment proved premature when another small group of Japanese attempted to breach the 186th Regiment's lines later that night.   On the following morning, Haney's 1st Battalion set up a permanent camp around the various caves and indentations, continuing their search through the area. Although the remaining Japanese troops were trapped in a hopeless situation, they managed to hold their ground. It wasn't until the afternoon of June 25 that any soldiers managed to access the caves, but without making any deep inroads. It wasn't until June 27 that patrols reached the innermost parts of the West Caves. The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area had apparently been used as an aid station and another possibly as a butcher shop for cannibalistically inclined survivors of the carnage since June 18. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day, and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced stage of decomposition of many of the dead, a complete count of Japanese bodies could not be made, but before overpowering odors drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more or less whole bodies were counted. This was considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs, or torsos and it was impossible to guess how many Japanese had been sealed in smaller caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves. With the suppression of Japanese cave positions near Mokmer airfield, the strip was finally operational, and P-40s and B-24s started using it from June 22. Between June 22 and 24, the 186th Regiment also took down some Japanese positions northwest of its perimeter. By June 25, Colonel Newman managed to subdue the Teardrop position. Despite lacking supplies and water, some Japanese managed to flee westward, where the 34th Regiment would eventually clean up the area by the end of June. Over at the East Caves from 7 through 10 June the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's cruising offshore added their fire, and on the latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against the East Caves. Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks, and destroyers continued from 11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE. Task Force the use of the coastal road during much of the period. In between artillery and naval gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more deeply into the Japanese positions from the north and northeast and located the north flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon on the 13th, the combination of American fire and infantry action had succeeded in silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that truck convoys could safely use the coastal road without interruptions for the first time. Infantry patrolling and all types of bombardment continued from 14 through 23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally harassed truck convoys along the coastal road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are contradictory) there was undertaken a series of aerial bombardment missions which are among the shortest on record. Fifth Air Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome, took off from that field to skip-bomb the East Caves. Although most of the bombs missed the main sump holes, the air missions did cause many explosions and started a number of fires in the East Caves. For a few days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was silenced. On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer, Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire from the East Caves impeded the latter work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and tanks had to be moved back into the area to shell the caves and protect the engineers. Within three days the mortars fired over 800 rounds into the caves. The engineer company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent patrols back into the area from the north. On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position near Mokmer village to place about 800 rounds of smoke and high explosive shells into the caves. Light harassing fire continued, however, and on 3 July elements of Company E, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved into the caves under cover of tank fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were killed, and two light machine guns were captured. Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer nor the infantry unit met as much resistance as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and 5th, and on the latter day a platoon of Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the larger sump holes, where were found many automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next day loudspeakers and interpreters were sent into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen in the area. The Japanese who had lived uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East Caves. The few Japanese left alive in the East Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force (elements of which were staging through Biak for operations farther west) were killed near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated bodies of Australian airmen were found and two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the determined and resourceful defenders of the Ibdi Pocket resisted repeated attacks from the 2nd Battalion, 163rd Regiment and ongoing artillery barrages. By the end of June, the Japanese had been pushed into a 600-yard-square area, with American patrols continuing the cleanup in July. Through the use of bazookas, flamethrowers, tanks, and artillery, the remaining Japanese were gradually confined to an even smaller area until the pocket was cleared on July 28. The American forces would then mop-up the remainder of the island up to August 20, accounting for a total of 4700 Japanese dead and 220 captured since the start of the battle. Total American casualties were an estimated 400 killed, 2000 wounded, 150 injured in action and 5 missing. Additionally, there were 7234 non-battle casualties due to sickness, many of whom were returned to duty. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Ichi-Go was continuing its horror show deeper into central China. B-29 Superfortresses are arriving to the scene, first from India and China, but as the Pacific Island hoping campaign makes more and more progress, soon they will be lifting off from airfields much closer to the Japanese home islands.

John Eichelberger, a former Pennsylvania State Senator and Pennsylvania State Co-Chair for U.S. Term Limits. A Sleeper Issue In 2024

In this episode of Freight Nation: A Trucking Podcast, host Brent Hutto is joined by Chad Eichelberger, President of Reliance Partners. Join them as they discuss Chad's journey through freight insurance, touching on how he managed the 2008 recession at Access America, helped to scale Reliance Partners, and what insurance agencies are looking at when working with freight brokers.

Join us for an insightful conversation with Miguel Eichelberger, a renowned communication consultant celebrated for his authenticity. In this episode, Miguel shares his journey from a multicultural upbringing to becoming an expert in effective communication through writing, particularly poetry.Key Highlights:Cultural Roots and Communication: Miguel discusses how his parents' linguistic abilities and immigrant heritage shaped his understanding of authentic communication.The Power of Personal Stories: Learn how Miguel uses personal narratives to simplify and convey complex scientific ideas.Leadership Critique: Miguel critiques traditional top-down leadership models, advocating for genuine listening and valuing employees' insights to build a positive organizational culture.Authenticity in Leadership: Hear inspiring stories of leaders who prioritize their people and culture over rigid strategies, emphasizing vulnerability and authenticity.Practical Advice: Discover practical tips for aspiring writers and communicators on how to start their journey and develop their unique voice.Connect with Miguel:INSTAGRAMLINKEDINDon't forget to like, comment, and subscribe for more inspiring conversations and insights!#Communication #Leadership #Authenticity #Storytelling #Writing #MiguelEichelberger #AOAP #PodcastFOLLOW ME

Today I'm joined by Joey Eichelberger from Wisconsin. Joey comes on to share some great deer and turkey stories. We hear an awesome story of how he shot his first compound buck on public land back deep in a swamp. He also shares about his new business called The Bass Raft. You can check it out at the link below: https://bassraft.com/

In Episode 142 of Ill Literacy, Tim Benson talks with John C. McManus, author ofTo the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945. Heartland's Tim Benson is joined by John C. McManus, Curators' Distinguished Professor of U.S. military history at Missouri University of Science and Technology, to discuss his new book, To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945. They chat about the Philippines campaign, Okinawa, and the increasingly fanatical zeal and suicidal determination of the Japanese imperial forces. They also discuss major characters like MacArthur, Kreuger, Eichelberger, and Buckner as well as the incredible logistical hoops entailed in fielding a major army in the far-flung reaches of the Pacific. Get the book here: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/702467/to-the-end-of-the-earth-by-john-c-mcmanus/Show Notes: Wall Street Journal: Jonathan W. Jordan – “‘To the End of the Earth' Review: Defeating Japan”https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-the-end-of-the-earth-review-defeating-japan-1df44c74

In Episode 142 of Ill Literacy, Tim Benson talks with John C. McManus, author ofTo the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945. Heartland's Tim Benson is joined by John C. McManus, Curators' Distinguished Professor of U.S. military history at Missouri University of Science and Technology, to discuss his new book, To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945. They chat about the Philippines campaign, Okinawa, and the increasingly fanatical zeal and suicidal determination of the Japanese imperial forces. They also discuss major characters like MacArthur, Kreuger, Eichelberger, and Buckner as well as the incredible logistical hoops entailed in fielding a major army in the far-flung reaches of the Pacific. Get the book here: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/702467/to-the-end-of-the-earth-by-john-c-mcmanus/Show Notes: Wall Street Journal: Jonathan W. Jordan – “‘To the End of the Earth' Review: Defeating Japan”https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-the-end-of-the-earth-review-defeating-japan-1df44c74

W tym odcinku "Czarnej Owcy wśród podcastów" Anna Bukowska rozmawia z autorami książki "Trudne związki" - Małgorzatą Szcześniak i Wojciechem Eichelbergerem. Dlaczego aż 99% związków to trudne związki? Czy trwały związek to szczęśliwy związek? Czym różni się uwikłanie i współuzależnienie od miłości? Czy dla wszystkich DOBRY ZWIĄZEK oznacza to samo? Zapraszamy do słuchania! Książka tutaj: https://bit.ly/4dD9r2z

Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened.  The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support  the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come.  Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there.  Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the  Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford  halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth.  Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way.  For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun. 

On Episode 201 of Jake's Happy Nostalgia Show, we interview puppeteer, actor and writer Jodi Eichelberger! For many years, Jodi acted with The Tapestry Theatre Company, before having a professional career as a puppeteer. His best-known puppeteering role was performing Stingy on the Nick Jr. and Sprout series LazyTown. He was also an additional puppeteer on the Sesame Street film The Adventures of Elmo in Grouchland and puppeteered on The Book of Pooh, It's a Big Big World and more!

The poem “The Lowest Room” by Christina Rossetti explores what it means to be in the lower place, the spot where you look up and see all the things that you want to be and should be and instead find yourself, discontentedly, on the lower rung. This Friday, we are taking a look at a life of comparison, the standards we set for ourselves and others, and what Christianity reveals about being in the lowest room. The Copyright for all material on the podcast is held by L'Abri Fellowship. We ask that you respect this by not publishing the material in full or in part in any format or post it on a website without seeking prior permission from L'Abri Fellowship. Also, note that not all views expressed in the lectures or in the discussion time necessarily represent the views of L'Abri Fellowship. © Canadian L'Abri 2020

How to take better care of your #1 Asset to ensure long term sustained success as told by Chip Eichelberger.

Chad Eichelberger is the President of Reliance Partners. Reliance Partners is one of the nation's fastest-growing commercial insurance agencies. The company leverages a unique go-to-market strategy focused exclusively on selling to the transportation and logistics industry. Reliance Partners ranks within the Top 100 largest insurance agencies in the US (The Hales Report, 2022). Make sure to connect with both of them on social media! To learn more about becoming a Freight Agent: https://spi3pl.com/ To learn more about Denim: https://www.denim.com/ To learn more about Tai Software: https://tai-software.com/request-demo/ Ditch your carrier packet, Drive more carrier sales and get better load coverage with seamless digital onboarding, TMS integration, and smart load coverage, visit: https://brokercarrier.com/

This couple is walking the talk on marine sustainability. Dirk Eichelberger is the CEO of Singapore Aquaculture Technologies; in other words, he runs a fish farm right here in Singapore. Lelya Eichelberger is launching Alghemy, a skincare product range that offers a proprietary ingredient while emphasizing clean, green, and blue beauty. We talk about the challenges and rewards of their entrepreneurial journeys, and how their goals and Singapore's imperatives converge. Dirk walks us through the financial, ethical, and ESG factors that drive his fish farm, while Lelya talks about health-related scientific advances with sustainability considerations at the core. As Dirk points out, from securing partnership with the government and other interested parties, to scaling up, as well as commercialising the knowhow through a franchise model, there are many things one can do to increase the production and distribution of sustainable products. The roadmap is there.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Rob interviews Eric Eichelberger about the Shock-A-Go-Go Film Festival,   Check out the Shock-A-Go-Go Website for more information: shockagogo.com/   Our theme song is by Benny and the No Goods.   Check out their awesome music right HERE Bennyandthenogoods.bandcamp.com One easy way to support this show is to rate and review Alley Chats wherever you listen to our podcast.  Those ratings really help us and help others find our show. Alley Chats is produced and edited by Rob Southgate for Southgate Media Group.  Follow this show on Facebook @alleychats Follow our parent network on Twitter at @SMGPods Make sure to follow SMG on Facebook too at @SouthgateMediaGroup Learn more, subscribe, or contact Southgate Media Group at www.southgatemediagroup.com.   Check out our webpage at southgatemediagroup.com If you're an artist or writer or creative type that would have a table at in artist alley and would like to be on Alley Chats, message us through the Facebook page or email us directly at rob@alleychatspodcast.com https://shockagogo.com/

Eric Eichelberger returns to tell us all about his new 2023 Shock-A-Go-Go film festival subtitled “5 Nights Of Sinematic Weirdness” which is being held at the Film Noir Cinema in New York City, on October 18th to the 22nd! Lots of great films will be presented including, Bloodsucking Freaks (1976), Terror Firmer (1999), Ghoul Scout Zombie Massacre (2018), among others, as well as several great guests including Larry Fessenden, Frank Henenlotter, Bill Hellfire and Scooter McCrae, as well as several others! Join us for a great conversation, and if you're able, get yourself to the film festival which will be held at the Film Noir Cinema in New York City! Eric and Shock-A-Go-Go can be found at: https://www.filmnoircinema.com/ https://shockagogo.com/ https://filmfreeway.com/ Facebook: https://fb.me/e/2VIbMXeiz Chris Esper can be found at: https://storiesmotion.com/ Re-Gor can be found at: http://www.havenpodcasts.com http://youtube.com/user/uncledeath1 https://twitter.com/HavenPodcasts https://www.instagram.com/havenpodcasts/

What does it mean to be a difference maker, a person who moves people to action? Get ready for this and much more in the very first episode of our Growth Podcast hosted by Belkins Co-Founder Michael Maximoff, featuring Chip Eichelberger - one of the top sales motivation speakers.Tune in now to:

On this episode, we have returning guest Eric Eichelberger, who was with us last year to promote the Shock-A-Go-Go Film Festival, and now he's back to promote this year's event! This interview is just under the wire as the show is today,Thursday, June 22, 2023 at 6pm at the Lumiere Cinema, 9036 Whilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, CA! They will be showing independent short films, as well as the features “Chopping Mall,” “THRUST!,” and “Blacula,” and also special guests Jim Wynorski, Linnea Quigley, and William Crane as well as other surprises! Check it out! Eric and Shock-A-Go-Go can be found at: https://shockagogo.com/ https://filmfreeway.com/Shock-A-Go-GoFilmFestival https://anxietyfilmsproductions.com/ Tickets: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/shock-a-go-go-film-festival-tickets-617251464747?aff=ebdshpsearchautocomplete Chris can be found at: http://storiesmotion.com/ Then Is Now can be found at: http://www.havenpodcasts.com – and check out our other great shows there! Email us at thenisnow42@gmail.com! FB Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/2159648674169261

Episode 39.) This week we had the opportunity to sit down with an absolute Foxbody legend, Todd Eichelberger (@boosted347). If his name doesn't ring a bell, I KNOW you know his car! It's the green Hatch with the full Makers line of goods and signature Weld wheels; arguably one of the top 3 hatches in our community.  It's clear from the beginning of our conversation, Todd is a humble guy and believes in building your car for yourself. Towards the end of the pod he really warmed up and started to open up. We get to know Todd, hear about how he got into the Foxbody and where he thinks things are going. Hope you all enjoy the episode.   The Social's:https://www.instagram.com/boosted347/That T-Shirt (available at Ford Take Over)https://www.instagram.com/p/CtIDZBoLIn_/

This episode is brought to you by OTR Solutions, your one-stop solution for freight brokerages & carriers. They offer comprehensive factoring solutions, expert accounting, efficient funding, and tech assistance, along with quick pay options and a dedicated team to streamline your invoicing, billing, and cash flow - reach out at https://otrsolutions.com/freight-caviar/ or call (770) 882-0124 to learn more.In the latest episode of The FreightCaviar Podcast, we had a great conversation with Chad Eichelberger, the President of Reliance Partners, delving into his journey in the trucking and logistics industry and discussing the current state of the industry.Starting his career with Access America Transport in 2005, Chad outlined the company's growth trajectory and eventual acquisition by Coyote in 2014, setting a precedent for other successful ventures in Chattanooga. These strides have notably uplifted the city's freight brokerage and trucking reputation, fueling its economy and drawing talent into the sector.Eichelberger discussed the tough times currently faced by trucking companies due to increased operating and insurance costs, particularly hitting small fleets and new entrants hard. He gave us an inside view of the insurance landscape, drawing attention to the common misconception held by many trucking companies that switching insurers would alleviate their struggles.Chad emphasized that safety measures, driver behavior, and even location greatly influence insurance rates. He provided insights into why states like Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and New York see elevated insurance rates, while others like Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin offer more favorable conditions.Lastly, Chad shared about Reliance Partners' growth, its investment in technology, and the vision for the future. His emphasis on continuous learning, relationship-building, and listening highlighted his advice for aspiring entrepreneurs. Support the show

“To The End of the Earth” is the last installment in Professor John McManus' trilogy about the US Army in the Pacific during World War II. This book chronicles the events beginning with the retaking of the Philippines and takes readers through the final capitulation of the Japanese empire. McManus is Curator's Distinguished Professor of military history at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is a prolific writer, with 15 published works and is often called upon by national media as a subject matter expert. He previously appeared on American Warrior Radio to discuss some of the more bizarre battles of World War II. He decided to write this series because even though the Army did most of the ground fighting in the Pacific, much of current literature has focused on the roles of the Navy and Marines. The lead actor for the Army in the Pacific was General Douglas MacArthur. McManus describes MacArthur as a complex figure. He was certainly vain glorious but also deeply insecure and loyal. We also discuss two other principal commanders who had distinctly different styles; General Walter Krueger and General Robert Eichelberger. Krueger was an immigrant who began his Army career as a private in the Spanish American War. He was very methodical, often frustrating MacArthur with the pace of his advances. Eichelberger was the exact opposite. A WestPoint classmate of George Patton, he was a “quick dash” commander often “leading from the front with a tommy gun in hand.” McManus' books are always excellently researched and “To the End of the Earth” is no exception.  He takes pride in the fact that he was able to represent the perspective of the average soldiers on both sides of the conflict. Readers will come to appreciate the tremendous logistical effort that was involved in supporting the island hopping campaign against Japan. The armada being assembled for the invasion of the Japanese homeland would have been the largest fleet ever assembled.

About the episode We are hosting the first-ever Liberty Bell Brawl in Philadelphia! And to tell us all about this really exciting event is Fight Manager Reid Eichelberger. Reid tells Todd and Julie about the reason he decided to sign in and fight, his influences, and his deep commitment to the cause. Tune in to this thrilling episode of Not Every Fight Ends At The Bell!JUMP STRAIGHT INTO:(01:03) - Round 1: Today's guest Reid Eichelberger tells us how he signed up for Haymakers - “I started immediately training, uh, with the end in mind, right? It becomes very real that you have to get in the ring in four months, you know?”(04:53) - Mike Tyson's influence on Reid - “I was a huge Mike Tyson fan. So, the head movement was. Honestly, I, at a certain point, Kevin Cobbs, who you know, who's in and out of everybody fights in the club, used to say, you have a gift and it's head movement.”(07:34) - Getting in the ring - “Like it's, you train for four months for, like you've said, usually six minutes and it goes by so fast. It's the longest and shortest six. Like it's a time warp. Completely.”(14:10) - Round two: Reid's commitment to the cause - “​​It's not a joke. This whole event, is intended to be, in some way, shape, or form a representation on a volunteer basis of the fight that people go through with it that they not volunteered for.”(17:17) - Round three: Becoming the Fight Manager for Philadelphia - “You should do it because you're gonna find, you're going to learn so much about yourself through the process. You know, almost comes back to like this internal motivation.”Not Every Fight Ends at the Bell is presented and produced by Haymakers for Hope, in partnership with StudioPod Media. Our producers are former fighters Jordan McMillan and Julian Lewis.Resource Links:Not Every Fight Ends at the Bell - Show PageHaymakers for Hope - HomepageHaymakers for Hope - InstagramStudioPod MediaConnect with Reid Eichelberger on LinkedInWatch Reid's fight on YouTubeView Reid's fundraising page Reid Eichelberger | Haymakers for HopeFollow Julie on InstagramFollow Todd on Instagram

Did you know most people will die from a preventable disease? 42% of the first symptom of heart disease is sudden death. How much time are you spending on your most valuable asset, yourself? Are you investing in the health of your employees? Everyone thinks they have an infinite amount of time until something happens. Recorded Live at the Institute Summit, Chip Eichelberger discusses actionable solutions to create a healthier lifestyle. It's never too late to make a small difference in your life.  Chip Eichelberger, formerly Tony Robbin's International point man, has "Switched On" over 1000 conventions for companies like Apple, Hyatt, Astra Zeneca, GM, Equitable, and RE/MAX. Show Notes Getswitchedon.com  Focus on all the great things you've done with your life and your marriage, and your relationship. Confronting neglect. Most people will die of a preventable disease.  The secret to raising smart kids or smart employees is to link it to the effort, grit, and ability to overcome adversity.  “If you're not sure how much money you want your shop to make this year, any amount will seem okay.” How can you go from uncertainty to certainty, and how do you stand, how do you breathe, how do you move?  Active heart rate is 180 minus your age to burn fat Motion is medicine-One of the biggest things killing people today is a sedentary lifestyle Few people have a dedicated exercise plan Hang around the right people, the right information, listen to the right podcast, watch the right stuff, read the right stuff- bad company will corrupt good character The 4% solution- 4% of 24 hours is one-hour a day. Invest in the number one asset, which is yourself Getting sick is expensive. Getting sick is stressful. Getting sick takes a lot of time and resources. Reversing something with a little bit better discipline than an  hour a day, you could have reversed A crisis is a powerful motivator of change 42% of the first symptom of heart disease is sudden death 43% of adults are obese We live in a magic pill society You can't out exercise a bad diet 15% of your employees are 85% of your health care spend- what can you do to engage your employees to take better care of themself? The number one source of calories in America is soda. One soda a day, 365 days times 140 calories is 51,100 calories, and that equivalent is 14.2 pounds of weight Watch your body fat percentage

Eichelberger's Farms present's the WACO Warriors Warriors Coach Kissell

In this episode, Wes and Todd sit down with Maeve Eichelberger. Maeve discusses the Coors Western Art Exhibit & Sale, the catalyst to start working in plexiglass, her Master of Fine Arts, saddles, her compulsion to create, exploring and incorporating materials, being fearless, routine, etching, drawing, sourcing materials, process, photography, fluorescent plexiglass, art education, being an adjunct professor, constructivism, golden spiral, her greatest support, perseverance, being a full-time Artist, selling art, gallery representation, pricing, voice, and advice she would give her younger self. Join us for a fun and fantastic conversation with Maeve Eichelberger.Check out Maeve's work at her website www.maeveeichelberger.comFollow Maeve Eichelberger on social media:On Instagram at www.instagram.com/maeveeichelbergerstudio/@maeveeichelbergerstudioOn Facebook at www.facebook.com/maeveeichelbergerstudioCatch Maeve's work in person January 7th – 22nd at the Coors Western Art Exhibit and Sale – www.coorswesternart.comSee Maeve's work in person in these current and upcoming exhibitions:Steamboat Art Museum – www.steamboatartmuseum.orgThe New West: The Rise of Contemporary Indigenous and Western ArtDecember 2, 2022 – April 15, 2023Mark Sublette – Medicine Man Gallery – www.medicinemangallery.comRodeo De Tucson Group Show – Opens February 3, 2023Vaughn Agency + Gallery – www.vaughn-art.comWestern Gallery: Pop-up – April 2023 – May 2023

I had such a fun podcast today with Maeve Eichelberger. I like to call her simply "Maeve" because it's just such an interesting, unique name and sometimes you have one of these iconic-sounding names where the entire thing can just be one-word. In my opinion, her name and her personality are equally interesting because she's so full of life and has an exciting presence.Maeve happens to be at an interesting point in her career. A point that is fun to watch as an art dealer.  She's in her mid-thirties and has really hit her stride. She works in a unique medium, which, as far as I know, nobody else does, which is acrylic sculpture.  Maeve's art consists of acrylic saddles, chaps, and other things too, but it's these examples of western imagery presented in a media that is not something you would expect in the Western art world. You have these unique acrylic sculptures in the shape of saddles that have etchings and photographs collaged on them that relate beautifully to what Western art is, while simultaneously embodying what it can be. I found Maeve on the internet when I was working on my Rodeo de Tucson show (which is coming up on February 3rd) and I thought, wow, this is great. Her art is a great example of unique contemporary art that fits exactly into what I see as 'Western'. Maeve grew up around horses while living on a ranch in Colorado. The 'West' is something that's second nature to her. I think you will really like this podcast. Especially those who are artists that are really trying to find their way. Maeve gives the story and how she found hers (and she's definitely found it). Art Dealer Diaries Podcast 225 with Maeve Eichelberger.

Special guest John McManus joins Al and Jim to talk about Robert L. Eichelberger, the US General who commanded the Eighth United States Army in the Southwest Pacific (with a few obligatory digressions along the way).A Goalhanger Films ProductionProduced by Vasco AndradeExec Producer: Tony PastorTwitter: #WeHaveWays @WeHaveWaysPodWebsite: wehavewayspod.comEmail: wehavewayspod@gmail.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The Rev. Gary and Kacey Eichelberger, from St. Andrew's in Greenville, SC, share their observations, learnings and challenges from the October 2022 E=H Vision team. Join Cameron Vivanco, E=H co-founder, and Jorge Luis Rodriguez, her Ecuadorian co-worker, as they dive into the Eichelbergers' stories and experience.

Today we're joined by the Rev. Gary Eichelberger, rector of St. Andrew's Episcopal Church in Greenville, S.C. We talk about high church worship, social justice, and how we read the Bible through the lens of Jesus. Questions for reflection this week: - How does scripture shape our approach to social justice? - What type of worship fills your soul? Links mentioned in today's episode: - The Rev. Gary Eichelberger (https://www.standrewsgreenville.org/clergy-staff) - St. Andrew's Episcopal Church, Greenville (https://www.standrewsgreenville.org/) - Gary's favorite Bible verse, 1 John 3:16-18 (https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+John+3%3A16-18&version=NRSVA) - Check us out on YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQt8M5fw3DImMNZKCHgBRNw)

Better Horses Radio NATIONAL featuring guests Steve Stafford, Dr. Warren Beard, John Darnell, Rick Piggot and Sandra Eichelberge.

April of 2022 is chock full of awesome events!! This week, we are going to release 3 episodes covering some of these events, because they are happening soon! First up, we have returning guest Eric Eichelberger who has been producing a documentary about Exploitation films called “Exploit This!” He not only gives us an update on that project, but also tells us about his upcoming “Shock-A-Go-Go Film Festival” in Long Beach, CA!! If you can attend, please do because it's going to be an amazing time!! Eric's Info: https://shockagogo.com http://filmfreeway.com Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/917297082270528 Chris Can be found at: http://www.storiesmotion.com Haven Podcasts: Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/ThenIsNowPodcast TeePublic: http://www.teepublic.com/stores/havenpodcasts Feedback: thenisnow42@gmail.com Join the conversation at our Facebook Group Twitter: @HavenPodcasts Website: havenpodcasts.com where you'll find our sister show, The East Meets the West, in which we discuss Shaw Brothers films and Spaghetti Western movies! Please SUBSCRIBE to our YouTube page, also! Don't forget to go to wherever you download your podcasts from and leave us a great review so more listeners can find us! You can find us on all the podcasting apps, especially the big 3: iTunes, Spotify, and Stitcher! Enjoy, Re-Gor

#skatestraight #skatepunk #drugaddiction Curt Eichelberger talks growing up a skate punk in Dallas, Texas, aka Hicksville and the growing suffering of kids who have grown up with Trauma and how it creates addiction. His own addictions with alcohol and violence led him on a destructive path that ultimately led him to start a recovery group for skateboarders called: Skate Straight. https://skatestraightrecovery.org Join Kasper, AN EX-GANG MEMBER AND FELON TURNED PUNK ROCK WANDERER, as he takes you on the journey of exploration, as he shares insights by interviewing people from all walks of life including ex-prisoners who have success in their own way and also spotlighting people who make a difference in the scenes he loves. From Skate Punks to Bank Robbers and everything in-between. Explore the lives of the miscreants, rebels, artist and people who continue to rise above. https://linktr.ee/screamingatawallpodcast available on all streaming platforms Instagram: @screamingatawallpodcast @stealyoursoul Website: www.stealyoursoul.com/screamingatawallpodcast Want to be on our show? Have you been to prison? Have you been successful in staying out? Do you have a story you would like to share? Send an email to info.screamingatawall@gmail.com You can support our channel by subscribing and sharing. You can also go to https://anchor.fm/screamingatawallpodcast sign up for a subscription or see all available platforms. Intro-Outro Music by Mr. Eds insta: @the_mr_eds

Christina Eichelberger Holding and I share a conversation about music and movies. Christina comes from a family of filmmakers / artists and supporters of the arts. We chat about the importance of understanding the balance between art and commerce and the insane amount of work it takes behind the scenes to make art / music commercial. --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/linsider/message

Chrissy & Craig welcome the fabulous Jade to talk musical theater, TikTok, unconditional love, Donna Summer, chaotic moments, living in South Carolina, trans representation, cultural appropriation, perfectionism, Dynasty, self-love and more! Get exclusive Bimbos Only bonus episodes, Bimbo Questions episodes, Bimbo News episodes, ad-free early ‘regular' episodes, and join Bimbo Cinema Club by heading to https://www.patreon.com/ChrissyAndCraig Jade's Linktree: https://linktr.ee/Jadelle Chrissy's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/chrissychlapecka Craig's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/craigandfriendspod Chrissy's Beacons Page: https://beacons.page/chrissychlapecka Craig & Friends on Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/craig-friends/id1361582513 Check out GoodKids MadCity, a terrific community organization in Chicago that focuses on youth engagement, community service, and building a better and brighter future. If their work resonates with you, share their page all over your socials! And if you're looking for merch, they have that too. https://www.gkmcenglewood.com We Da People is a coalition of activists and community organizers - check their initiatives, contribute and share! https://linktr.ee/Wedapeoplee Help End Anti-Asian Hate! https://caasf.org/stop-aapi-hate For ways to help fight the fascists and support Black Lives Matter & Black Trans Lives Matter: https://blacklivesmatters.carrd.co https://blacktranslivesmatter.carrd.co --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app