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13 episodes with Adachi
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2 episodes with Adachi
2 episodes with Adachi
2 episodes with Adachi
2 episodes with Adachi
7 episodes with Adachi
2 episodes with Adachi
2 episodes with Adachi
In this lively and irreverent episode of The Middle of Culture, Peter and Eden build a tier list ranking 29 DC movies, from the highs of Christopher Reeve's iconic Superman to the lows of Black Adam, which earns a new category all its own: "F*** You Forever." Along the way, they debate the merits of Nolan's Batman trilogy, praise Margot Robbie while trashing her material, and wax poetic about Michelle Pfeiffer's Catwoman and the ridiculous joy of Catwoman (2004). The episode also dives into recent reads, including the emotionally devastating Adachi and Shimamura 99.9, with Eden delivering an impassioned recounting that might just wreck you. Add in some heat-dome weather talk, tech-death music recs, and plenty of hot takes, and you've got one of the most entertaining episodes yet.Episode Notes:Welcome BackEden shares weather misery and emotional tales of crying over Adachi and ShimamuraPeter updates on his son's relentless swim meet schedule and praises the dedication of teen athletesWhat We're IntoEden continues to love The Apothecary Diaries, now reading it aloud with CassiDeep emotional dive into Adachi and Shimamura 99.9, including:Cozy slice-of-life momentsPost-apocalyptic existentialismA bittersweet afterlife reunion that left Eden in tearsPeter shares his current reading on behavior change and playing Mario Kart with the kidsMetal music recs from Peter:Fallujah and Exocrine (tech-death highlights)Sigh's re-recording of Hangman's Hymn (2007 → 2025 edition)The Tier List Begins29 DC movies ranked from S-tier to a newly invented bottom tierImmediate praise for Superman: The Movie -- the only true S-tier filmBatman Begins and The Batman hold strong in A-tierThe Dark Knight lands at a controversial B, Dark Knight Rises flops to DSurprising affection for Catwoman bumps it up to C, while Suicide Squad, Justice League, and Black Adam are rightfully trashedEden passionately defends the joyfully chaotic Batman & Robin, despite its executionZack Snyder's Justice League makes it to B solely for its absurdityLego Batman wins hearts, even from Eden who has a Lego movie vendettaNew Tier Created: "F*** You Forever"Reserved exclusively for Black Adam, a film so despised that Peter stopped watching anything with The Rock afterwardWrap-UpOne clear conclusion: 1978's Superman stands unmatchedRichard Donner hailed as the god-tier director James Gunn can't touchGentle roast of MCU's decline vs DC's chaotic legacyCall to action: listeners encouraged to weigh in via feedback@themiddleofculture.com
Show Notes:Life Updates & Pencil Parties- Eden recounts a surreal Minneapolis trip to witness the "sharpening" of a 20-foot neighborhood pencil statue.- Attendees included 1,500+ people, costumes, DJs, and a fake giant pencil sharpener hoisted into place.- Cassi already has cosplay plans for next year.Dollhouses, Gundams & DIY Projects- Eden builds a full miniature room box to pose model kits like Gundams in.- Explores the satisfying craft process of assembling furniture, windows, and baseboards in a modular design.Music Corner- New Katatonia album: promising with fresh energy, but Peter reserves judgment.- Rivers of Nihil: cool influence from Black Crown Initiate, but repeated saxophone use is a dealbreaker for Peter.- Vildhjarta: heavy, adventurous, and rewards deep listening.Gaming Talk- Peter's impressions of the Switch 2: improved Mario Kart experience with 24-player chaos, but still not a travel must-have.- Thoughts on the cult of Nintendo vs. more versatile handheld platforms like the Steam Deck.- Eden's attempt to play Synduality: Echo of Ada ends in a refund due to game-breaking texture issues.Cult & Camp Cinema- Eden attends a VHS screening of the awful-but-fun 1970s exploitation film White Fire with a themed drinking game.- Peter is tempted by the trailer but is firmly advised: "Don't watch White Fire."Reading Recommendations- Eden finishes all 11 published volumes of Adachi and Shimomura, including volume 99.9 (sci-fi time-jump bonus stories).- Enthusiastic recommendation of The Apothecary Diaries, a mystery series set in a fictionalized ancient China full of intrigue and clever deduction.What We're Watching- Peter enjoys Taskmaster Season 19 with Jason Mantzoukas, calling it chaotic, hilarious, and worth the YouTube binge.Main Topic: The Taking of Pelham One Two Three (1974)- Eden loved it: tense, stylish, electric; Peter found it frustratingly flat in tension and offensively dated.- Discussion touches on 70s NYC despair, racism and misogyny in period pieces, Walter Matthau's charisma, and how modern remakes miss the gritty charm of the original.- Fun fact: Robert Shaw (Mr. Blue) also played Quint in Jaws.- Finale: Walter Matthau's "Gesundheit" stare is iconic.
Episode Notes:- The episode opens with Eden reading a Tumblr post that hilariously and bleakly explains modern burnout as a result of living in a crumbling world. Peter and Eden relate strongly, setting the tone for a cathartic conversation.- Eden checks in with the ongoing Adachi and Shimamura manga journey. Volume 8 features a flash-forward to adulthood and two momentous forehead kisses.- Gaming fatigue takes center stage as Eden recounts failed attempts to get into Sunhaven, Paradise Killer, and even the stylish-but-demanding Shenmue. Nothing sticks.- Eden shares a new afternoon ritual: practicing Gong Fu tea ceremonies. A color-changing fox teapet becomes a symbol of small joys amid burnout.- Music talk includes Pelican's new album, which fell flat in comparison to a recent live show from Russian Circles, with Pelican being described as "bargain-basement Russian Circles."- Peter introduces Bleed's debut album, which feels like a time capsule from the early 2000s alt-rock scene. It's not groundbreaking, but the nostalgia hits just right.- Avowed patch 1.4 discussion highlights fun new features: spiders replaced with spheres, better loot drops, and the return of everyone's favorite character, the raunchy and hilarious Yatzli.- Main topic: What Remains of Edith Finch. Peter and Eden break down their impressions of the game: - It's emotionally heavy, occasionally to a fault. - Some vignettes (like Lewis's cannery sequence and Barbara's horror comic) are standout. - Others, like Molly's transformation or Gregory's bathtub scene, fall flat or feel manipulative. - Both hosts agree it's visually and structurally ambitious, but uneven. - Eden calls it the "death knell" of the walking simulator genre.- Final thoughts reflect on the evolution of indie storytelling and how walking sims have largely given way to more interactive, mechanic-rich narratives.- The episode wraps with a discussion of the flawed 7-to-9 scoring scale used in video game reviews and how many games get overhyped despite major issues.
Show Notes:- Spiritbox concert recap: Peter attended a standout show in Salt Lake City, noting the energy, mixed-gender crowd, and explosive live performance that solidifies Spiritbox's rising status in metal.- Graduation celebrations: Aubrey graduated from the University of Utah; Peter recounts the efficient ceremony and celebratory Rodizio Grill outing.- TTRPG return: Peter is back to GMing, running Keys from the Golden Vault for his old group, reflecting on the prep and joy of returning to the table.Reading updates:- Peter: The Artist's Way to rekindle creative energy.- Eden: Finished volume 6 of Adachi and Shimamura, started reading Late Bloomer (romantic, flower-farm drama with "sexy conflict").Other updates:- Free Comic Book Day: Eden helped run the busiest, most successful FCBD at the comic shop yet, featuring coffee, custom buttons, and signings by Phil Hester and Eric Gapster.- Infinity Nikki patch 1.5 chaos: Eden breaks down the game's disastrous update—retcons, glitches, co-op flops, disappearing currency, and a literal girlcott.- Girls Frontline 2: Exilium: Eden praises the writing in this tactical gacha game while lamenting its horny robot girl aesthetic.Marvel's Thunderbolts* (spoiler-free and spoiler-filled discussion):- Florence Pugh carries the film with emotional depth.- Emphasis on connection and community over brute force.- The ending subverts typical MCU punch-fests.- Surprises and smart character arcs elevate it above recent Marvel fare.2003's Hulk retrospective:- Hulk as a metaphor for trauma and abuse—possibly the most emotionally resonant portrayal of the character.- Praise for Jennifer Connelly and Sam Elliott.- Visual style mixing comic book panels and split screens—ambitious if inconsistent.- Talbot's goofy subplot and memorable death scene.- Mixed feelings on the CGI Hulk's look but appreciation for its bold emotional scope.Pop Culture Quick Hits:- Jeremy Renner's lowball pay offer and the uncertain future of Hawkeye Season 2.- Reactions to the Murderbot trailer and miscasting concerns.- Hype (and tempered expectations) for Fantastic Four and the future of the MCU.Join us in another two weeks for more great pop-culture discussion and exploration. Reach out at feedback@themiddleofculture.com and we'll see you then!
*最後の音が切れていたので再アップしました！YouTubeはこちら https://youtu.be/Ticg0nKgIJUゲストのAdachiさんのX: https://x.com/adachi_tomoki3Futaba X: https://x.com/FutabaOmnikinjo: https://x.com/illshinMiyata: https://x.com/miyata_17_AKINDO: https://x.com/akindo_io1.自己紹介-直近はAIをどう仕事に取り入れているか-普段どのようなプロジェクトをリサーチしているか2.Intentとは何か？-Intentの思想と基本概念-Intentのユースケース-Intentのアーキテクチャと現状の課題3.Futabaにおける取り組み-解決する課題-プロジェクトのフェーズ-技術的なチャレンジ4.DeFAIについて-代表プロジェクトについて-DeFAIにおけるIntentの未来参考プロジェクトCortex Protocol: https://x.com/cortex_protocolCowSwap: https://swap.cow.fi/#/1/swap/WETH/0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB481inch Fusion+: https://1inch.io/ja/fusion/UniswapX https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/uniswapx/overviewAcross: https://across.to/debridge https://debridge.finance/stargate : https://stargate.finance/
Nezapomeň, že nás najdeš také ve všech dobrých podcastových aplikacích a na Spotify, kde nás můžeš podpořit zakoupením předplatného https://creators.spotify.com/pod/show/easycast/subscribe
Good Morrow Libration Nation! This week we are LIVING in Henry VIII's court, delving deeply into Hilary Mantel's historical novel, Wolf Hall Exploring the complex character of Thomas Cromwell, the historical context of Henry VIII's reign, and Mantel's meticulous attention to historical accuracy.My guest this week is Valerie Adachi. Valerie is a self-proclaimed bookworm who even enjoyed reading cereal boxes as a kid, she reminisces over the tactile joy of spreading the New York Times across her kitchen table.Recently completing a second master's degree out of sheer curiosity, she embodies a passion for continuous learning and personal growth. Her love for finding and trying new recipes has even inspired her son to become a skilled cook and baker. Adventure always seems to be around the corner for her, often appearing spontaneous but rooted in long-percolating ideas—like the decision to add a new puppy to her already bustling pack, turning her quiet life topsy-turvy.Beyond her love for dogs, she thrives on live music, good food and drink shared with family and friends, and the thrill of knowing that adventure is always nearby, maybe we a cozy reading spot.We paired the book with a Whiskey Neat, we drank Oak & Eden Toasted Oak Bourbon & Spire Whiskey - absolutely delicious and pair perfectly with the moodiness of the story.In this EpisodeNew York Time's List of the 100 best books of the 21st centuryVirago Spirits (Richmond gin distillery Valerie mentions)Beacon MercantileA Man for All Seasons
Last time we spoke about the fall of Myitkyina. By late July 1944, the Japanese at Myitkyina in northern Burma were facing severe challenges. Despite holding out through a long siege, they were cut off from supplies and suffering heavy casualties. A leadership conflict between Colonel Maruyama and General Minakami further complicated things. Maruyama defended the city intensely, while Minakami aimed to deny Allied access to strategic roads. With depleted forces, including wounded troops trying to escape via the Irrawaddy River, the Japanese defense weakened. Allied forces, reinforced and ready, made significant gains, shrinking Japanese-held areas. On August 1, Minakami agreed to withdraw, and the remaining Japanese began escaping across the river. The Allies launched a final attack, securing Myitkyina on August 3. The 10 week siege resulted in substantial casualties on both sides. This victory allowed the Allies to improve logistical routes and marked a critical point in the Burma campaign. This episode is the Battle of the Driniumor River Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we were seeing action kick up at the Driniumor River. While the Japanese offensive had initially been successful, General Hall's forces managed to halt the enemy advance and reform their river line by July 15, despite a 1500-yard gap in the center. The Japanese were aware of this weakness in the American lines and exploited it, especially during the night. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion patrolled this area and occasionally engaged the enemy, killing 135 Japanese on the night of July 14. Despite this, General Cunningham claimed that his South Force had extended its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its assigned sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously reported and ordered his units to adjust their lines southward and extend their defenses up the Driniumor towards Cunningham's Troop E. The following morning, Starr's 3rd Battalion began moving south to close the gap. As they reached the area by nightfall, Troop E was attacked by two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. While the cavalrymen sought cover, Starr's 3rd Battalion was also attacked by Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had turned south after its defeat at the Paup villages. This split the American forces in two, with Companies L and M pushing south through increasing opposition to reach South Force lines, while Companies I and K dug in for the night in their current positions. Despite the intense fighting, several Japanese were killed, and the gap was reduced to 500 yards. In the course of the day's fighting the Coastal Attack Force had lost all its artillery and had suffered heavy casualties. Additional losses were sustained on succeeding days, but Major Hoshino and his men were not completely removed as an irritant until the night of 16-17 July. During that night remnants of the Coastal Attack Force, about thirty-five men strong, attacked North Force and 124th Infantry command post installations at Anamo. At 23:00 the group charged out of the jungle southwest of the Anamo perimeter. Repulsed by machine gun fire, the enemy temporarily disappeared, only to reappear at 03:00 on 17 July moving west against Anamo along the beach. Machine gun fire from the American positions broke up this second attack, but about ten minutes later the Japanese tried again, this time moving on Anamo from the north by wading in from the sea. Once ashore, Major Hoshino's men broke up into small groups, attempting to destroy mechanized equipment, automatic weapons positions, and communications installations. The Coastal Attack Force remnants had apparently scouted well, for they were reported to have moved purposefully toward the most important installations and they easily found their way about in terrain they had vacated only four days previously. Whatever Major Hoshino's plans were, they were not realized. About forty of his men were killed and the rest dispersed. Behind them, Hall dispatched Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions to clear the remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor River. Over two days of complex and sometimes uncoordinated company actions, the Americans successfully overran Nara's stragglers in the area. Further south, as Japanese troops were seen crossing the Driniumor at a fording point about 2,500 yards south of Afua, Cunningham sent Troop A south to high ground behind the Driniumor to halt the Japanese movements westwards. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, under Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were assembling for a renewed offensive. Adachi's new plan involved Miyake striking Afua from the south while the 239th Regiment prepared to move against the Kawanaka Shima area. Additionally, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment were ordered south to join future attacks by the 20th Division, though they wouldn't arrive until July 25. As the Miyake Force maneuvered into position to the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr struggled to close the gap in the center, which was eventually sealed on the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake launched an attack with two battalions on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them 250 yards to the northeast. Early in the afternoon of 19 July fresh Japanese units began to surround the Troop A position, moving in from the north, northwest, west, and southwest. The 1st Squadron commander called for artillery fire to break up this enemy maneuver. Upon cessation of the fire, Troop A attacked to the south and west for a second time. Driving at least a company of Japanese before it, the troop pushed 600 yards southwest of its original positions astride the Afua-Palauru trail and temporarily disrupted enemy plans to seize the position. About 140 Japanese had been killed during the two days' operation around Troop A. South Force, at the same time, lost 8 men killed and 29 wounded, all from the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry. There were strong indications that more attacks might occur in the 1st Squadron area, but Troop A was not destined to take part in any of these actions. It was replaced on the 21st by Troop C. Following this victory on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A, Howe's battalions successfully set up a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek, and Starr's 2nd Battalion moved to Palauru to provide additional outer security southwest of the airfield. On July 19, the first elements of General Wing's 43rd Division began landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently taking over about 1,000 yards of the river line on the right of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi ordered the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to attack Afua from the north and west while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor and attacked from the south. On the evening of July 21, Miyake launched his attack on Troop C's position, successfully cutting it off from the rest of South Force. While the cavalrymen resisted heavy Japanese attacks, Miyake's units also repelled Cunningham's attempts to relieve the beleaguered troop over the next few days. Not knowing what other plans the Japanese might have in mind, General Cunningham was unwilling to pull any more troops away from the river defenses. Moreover, he now considered the position of his right flank untenable. He therefore withdrew Troop B north of Afua about 1,000 yards and used the unit to form a new defense line which ran westward about 500 yards from Troop A's right flank, anchored on the Driniumor. South Force's right flank was now refused and additional protection had been secured for medical, supply, and command post installations at the dropping ground banana patch. Troop C was left isolated behind Japanese lines, and Afua was again released to the enemy. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. The 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment made further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing. By July 25, Adachi decided to send the 41st Division south to assist in the southern effort. After the fall of Afua, Hall ordered Howe's battalions to leave their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, arriving at the new line by July 23. With these reinforcements, Cunningham decided early in the afternoon to send Troops A and B to attack west toward Troop C while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast toward the isolated troop. Despite being uncoordinated, the infantry successfully moved into Troop C's perimeter from the northwest and helped repel a heavy Japanese attack from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reoccupied Afua and established new defensive positions. However, American attempts to break out on July 24 were unsuccessful due to the Japanese defending all tracks, trails, and ridgelines in the heavily jungled ground northeast of the perimeter. On July 25, Howe's Companies E and B unexpectedly established contact about 500 yards north of the besieged forces against light resistance, allowing the battered Troop C to withdraw. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued to attack south and west towards the Afua-Palauru trail, successfully pushing the Japanese into the Torricelli Mountains. Many Japanese troops remained positioned in a triangular area bounded by the dropping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, where they continued to harass Cunningham's forces. Rifle fire, intensifying as darkness approached, harassed the rear and right flank of the two battalions, and the Japanese began intermittently to drop light artillery or mortar shells into the banana patch area, where the command posts of South Force, the 112th Cavalry, and the 127th Infantry were now located. Finally, Japanese patrols, coming in from the west, had scouted the banana patch area during the day, action which seemed to presage an enemy attack during the night. To get out of range of the enemy fire and danger of enemy attack, General Cunningham moved the command post installations 500 yards to the north before dark. Additionally, 127th Infantry patrols had found a Japanese map which indicated that the 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was concentrating in the Kwamagnirk area. Indeed, the 66th Infantry, which, with attached units, was at least 1,000 men strong, had crossed the Driniumor on or about 24 July. Bypassing the right flank of South Force, the regiment had moved into the heavily jungled high ground west of the banana patch and dropping ground. In addition, the remnants of the 237th Infantry, probably about 300 men strong, had finally arrived in the Afua area on 25 July and had passed to the control of the Miyake Force. Rear elements of the 20th Division, including additional men from the 26th Field Artillery and engineer units, had also crossed the Driniumor south of Afua. The number of Japanese troops in the South Force area by nightfall on the 26th of July was at least 2,500 and may have been over 3,000. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack, but ongoing Japanese movements to the west eventually necessitated an American withdrawal, despite other units under Cunningham managing to repel enemy advances. The following day, Cunningham consolidated his positions to bolster defenses in anticipation of potential large-scale Japanese assaults. However, on July 29, efforts by the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion to attack south and west into the Triangle were thwarted by determined Japanese defenders led by Adachi. As a result, only localized patrol actions were conducted on July 30 and 31, as Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. By the end of July, with the arrival of most of the 41st Division, Adachi believed he had amassed enough reinforcements near Afua to launch a final offensive. The 238th Regiment, the 41st Mountain Artillery, and the 8th Independent Engineers were across the river in time by the 30th but the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 239th Regiment, had missed the crossing point on the Driniumor and were lost. Fortunately for the 18th Army, the South Force withdrawals on July 29 and 30 gave the 20th and 41st Divisions time to complete their organization. New orders were issued for the attack to start on August 1, with the 20th Division on the west and the 41st Division on the east. The strength that the 20th Division could muster for the attack was a little over 2000 men. Most of these troops had been without food for some time. They were suffering from starvation, malaria, and skin diseases, and morale was cracking. They were short of both ammunition and weapons. The 41st Division and its attached units, totaling nearly 1750 men by the morning of August 1, were in equally bad shape. Nevertheless, General Adachi was determined to make one last attack with the nearly 4000 troops now available to him in the Afua area. Despite sensing minimal Japanese resistance to the north, Hall was eager to mount a robust counteroffensive against the 18th Army. The 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, which had been patrolling in the Palauru-Chinapelli area, was relieved from that duty by the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, and on the 30th joined its regiment at the Driniumor. The 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, was already at the river. Tactical control of the counteroffensive was vested in Col. Edward M. Starr, commanding officer of the 124th Infantry, whose counterattack organization was to be known as TED Force. The 1st Battalion, 124th Infantry, was commanded by Maj. Ralph D. Burns; the 2d Battalion by Lt. Col. Robert M. Fowler; the 3d Battalion by Lt. Col. George D. Williams; and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, by Maj. William F. Lewis. To avoid confusion, the four battalions were referred to by the last names of their commanders rather than by their number designations. Fowler's battalion, attacking along the coast, was to be supplied by ration trains moving along the coastal trail from Anamo. The rest of TED Force, pushing through trackless, dense jungle, was to be supplied by airdrop. The 149th Field Artillery Battalion, augmented by the Cannon Company, 124th Infantry, was responsible for artillery support, but when necessary the 129th Field Artillery was to add its fire to that of the 149th. All the artillery units were emplaced on the beach west of the Driniumor's mouth. The positions which the 124th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, left vacant on the Driniumor were to be occupied by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 128th Infantry. Colonel Starr had succeeded General Stark as commander of North Force on 18 July when the arrival of elements of the 43d Division at Aitape made it necessary for General Stark, the assistant division commander, to move back to BLUE Beach for administrative duties. General Stark apparently also reassumed command of the Western Sector, in place of General Hutchinson, Assistant Division Commander, 31st Division, who had rejoined his division when it, less the 124th Infantry, moved to a new operational area in western New Guinea. When TED Force was organized, North Force as such apparently ceased to exist, and the 128th Infantry took over the defensive functions previously assigned to North Force on the Driniumor. The name TED Force originated from the diminutive for Colonel Starr's first name. There were always so many units from different divisions and regiments operating along the Driniumor that the task force usually found it more convenient to use names rather than numbers for unit designations. The names, usually derived from the commanding officers, served not only to lessen confusion but also did double duty as code names. The attack was to be carried out with three battalions abreast along a front of 3,000 yards, and the fourth in reserve and in position to protect the right flank of the advancing force. The four battalions were to move east to the line of Niumen Creek, destroying all enemy found between that stream and the Driniumor within the 3,000-yard-wide zone of responsibility. Upon their arrival on the Niumen the battalions were to reorganize and prepare for further advances either east or south upon orders from General Hall. All three battalions of the 124th Infantry began crossing the Driniumor on schedule at 0800, 31 July, moving into terrain concerning which only incomplete and sometimes inaccurate information was available. The 1st Battalion faced delays from enemy delaying actions but eventually reached the creek by August 1, while the remaining battalions advanced inland, also reaching Niumen successfully. The 1st Battalion's advance company had been held up about 800 yards east of the Driniumor by elements of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, which had been left along the river when the rest of that Japanese regiment had moved south to Afua on 26 July. Burns' men continued to encounter strong opposition from 239th Infantry elements throughout the day and did not break off contact until 1730, when the battalion bivouacked for the night still 800 yards west of Niumen Creek. Company A had become separated during the day and remained some 550 yards northwest of the main body for the night. Both sections of the battalion were out of touch with the rest of TED Force. The 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry (Williams), crossed the Driniumor at a point about 3,000 yards inland and reached the Niumen about 1400, having encountered only scattered rifle fire. Lewis' 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, which followed Williams' command, made no contact with the enemy and bivouacked for the night about 500 yards west of Williams. All battalions spent the next day, 1 August, consolidating and patrolling along Neumen Creek, and Burns' unit moved up into line with the others. Meanwhile, Cunningham planned his own offensive aimed at dismantling the Triangle position following a reconnaissance mission along the Afua-Palauru trail. However, preliminary actions were disrupted when two companies launched a surprise attack from the southwest against Troop C's lines at 06:20 on August 1. General Cunningham immediately canceled the planned reconnaissance in force into the triangle area and turned his attention to this new threat. The first Japanese assault units were quickly reinforced, and the enemy moved forward against Troop C in massed waves along a narrow front. A bloody battle ensued as the enemy, apparently determined to commit suicide, continued his mass attacks. South Force called for artillery support, which was quickly forthcoming and which greatly helped Troop C to throw back the enemy assaults. By 0800 the Japanese had withdrawn and the battle area had become strangely quiet. Patrols were sent out from the cavalry perimeter to reconnoiter. These parties counted 180 dead Japanese in front of Troop C's lines, and it was considered probable that the enemy had carried off many more dead and wounded. Troop C, on the other hand, had lost but 5 men killed and 6 wounded. Examination of the enemy dead disclosed that elements of both the 80th and 238th Infantry Regiments had participated in the attacks. Thirty minutes later, Cunningham proceeded with his reconnaissance mission, encountering minimal resistance before returning in the afternoon. Despite capturing documents indicating an impending major assault, Cunningham deployed the 2nd Squadron as a mobile reserve at his command post. Although the movement of the 2d Squadron had apparently been well advised, the Japanese did not attack the command post area. Instead, at 1900, elements of the 41st Division struck the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, at its lines south of the dropping ground. This attack was preceded by fire from a 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery piece which the Japanese had managed to sneak into the area within 150 yards of Company B, 127th Infantry. Following a few rounds from this weapon, Japanese infantry charged forward in four separate waves, employing perhaps 300 men on a very narrow front. Few of the enemy got near Company B's positions, for the attack was thrown back with artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, which caused heavy losses among the enemy forces. By 2030, action in the dropping ground area stopped for the night. During the early hours of the next morning, 3 August, the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, again heard enemy activity to its front, and about 0730 a small Japanese party struck between Companies A and C. This attack was quickly repulsed, principally by mortar fire from 1st Battalion units. By noon all activity in the 1st Battalion area had ceased, and the Japanese had withdrawn to the southwest. Concurrently, Cunningham's 1st Squadron faced attacks from Nakai's 20th Division, but their suicidal charges were also turned back by resilient defenders. The 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry, on the left rear of the 1st Battalion, was attacked by another group of Japanese at 1945. This action was probably meant to have been coordinated with the attack on Company B, but, if this were the enemy's intention, something had gone wrong. Apparently there had also been some mix-up in unit dispositions, for both enemy efforts had entailed the use of elements of the 78th, 80th, and 238th Infantry Regiments. After the day's action was finished, the combined effective strength of the first two units was probably not more than 250 men, and the 2d Battalion, 238th Infantry, was practically wiped out. The desperate attacks during the day had been carried out with a complete disregard for self-preservation, and had probably cost the Japanese 300 men killed and at least twice that number wounded. TED Force was subsequently directed to advance south along Niumen Creek toward the Torricelli Mountains foothills to disrupt Adachi's supply lines and flank the 18th Army. Supply challenges and dense jungle terrain initially delayed Starr's southern movement, with his northern battalions only linking up with the southern ones by day's end. The next morning, Starr launched a southward offensive, immediately encountering fierce resistance from the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, which held a stubborn defense throughout the day. In response, Starr ordered his 1st Battalion to bypass the engagement and move southwest, advancing unopposed for up to 1000 yards. August 3rd proved relatively calm for Cunningham, as the 1st Battalion, 169th Regiment arrived to bolster the South Force perimeter. However, vigilance remained high in anticipation of Mano's impending final assault. On 1 August General Adachi learned that American forces were active in the Yakamul area. It was erroneously reported to him that this was an amphibious operation, a maneuver which the 18th Army commander had feared for some time (actually, the report referred to patrolling by the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry, along the coast from the mouth of Niumen Creek). He therefore ordered the remaining elements of the 237th Infantry to extricate themselves from the operations in the Afua area and hurry back to Yakamul to reinforce service units in that vicinity. Events moved so rapidly that the remnants of the 237th Infantry never got to Yakamul. Instead, the advance of TED Force made it necessary for General Adachi to change his plans and accelerate a general withdrawal. Communications within forward units of the 18th Army had so broken down that it was not until 3 August that General Adachi learned of the TED Force movement across the Driniumor, although the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, had been in contact with TED Force since 31 July. When General Adachi did hear of the American movement, he grossly underestimated the strength of TED Force. Thinking that the American operation was being carried out by only 400 troops, General Adachi merely changed the orders of the 237th Infantry and instructed that regiment to hold the 18th Army's crossing point on the upper Niumen Creek. On the same day, 3 August, General Adachi issued detailed plans for the withdrawal of all 18th Army units to the east side of the Driniumor, a withdrawal which was to begin on 4 or 5 August. The 66th Infantry, 51st Division, was to protect the 20th and 41st Division units as they crossed the Driniumor. The continued advance of TED Force on 3 August prompted General Adachi to change his plans and early on the 4th he ordered the 20th Division to start retreating at noon that day and the 41st Division to break contact on the 5th. The following morning, elements of the 238th and 239th Regiments emerged from the jungle southwest of the 1st Squadron in a final, desperate charge. Violent action continued in front of the 1st Squadron for about two hours, during which time nearly 200 Japanese were killed at the very edge of the squadron perimeter, principally by machine gun and rifle fire. How many more of the enemy were killed by artillery and mortar fire during the period cannot be estimated, but the banzai tactics undoubtedly cost the Japanese more than the 200 dead counted in front of the 1st Squadron which, in the same two hours, lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. By 0900 the last enemy attacks had ceased and the remaining Japanese had withdrawn generally to the south. Following the enemy withdrawal, Troop E pursued the retreating Japanese southward, encountering sporadic rifle fire as they eliminated remaining stragglers. The terrain encountered on August 4 and subsequent days during the operations of the TED Force east of the Driniumor proved next to impassable. Dense jungle undergrowth covered the ground; the area was thick with heavy rain forest; low but knifelike ridges, separated from each other by deep gullies, were encountered; and swampy spots were plentiful. To add to the difficulties, rain fell during the day--a downpour which turned much of the ground into a quagmire and flooded many dry stream beds. A few new, rough trails, recently cut by the Japanese, were found, but mud made them nearly useless as routes of advance. Low clouds coming in from the Torricelli Mountains to the south prevented ration and ammunition drops and increased communication difficulties. Battalions ran low on drinking water, for weather conditions prevented resupply of water purification tablets and the assault companies had neither time nor equipment to clean water by other means. Radio communication between battalions, from battalions to TED Force headquarters, and from the latter to higher echelons was nearly nonexistent, for the heavy jungle and the damp weather cut down the efficiency of all radio equipment. It had been hoped that the advance on the 4th would carry TED Force south to the main Japanese supply route, but the trail reached by Burns', Lewis', and Williams' battalions was another route which had not been used by military traffic for some time. Possibly, it was a section of the native trail to Afua and, as such, purposely avoided by the Japanese inasmuch as parts of it could be seen from the air. In any case, the track cut on the 4th lay about 1,200 yards north of the east-west trail which most of the Japanese forces moving to and from the Afua area had been using. Colonel Starr, realizing that the main Japanese supply route had not yet been severed, ordered his units to continue southward on the 5th, on which day the advance was resumed about 0800 hours with Williams leading and Lewis' battalion about 400 yards to the rear. Pushing south along now precipitous and mountainous banks of the upper Niumen, Williams' unit was opposed by only scattered rifle fire until 1100, when it was decisively halted by a strong Japanese force conducting a stubborn defense. On August 5, learning that TED Force was approaching the point at which the 18th Army's main line of communications crossed the upper reaches of Niumen Creek, General Adachi had also ordered the 8th Independent Engineers to aid the remnants of the 237th Infantry in holding the crossing point. It was this combined 237th Infantry-8th Engineers force that Williams' 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, had encountered about 1100 on 5 August. The composite Japanese unit was dug in along a 1,000-foot high ridge across Williams' line of advance and threatened to outflank the battalion by occupying other high ground nearby. Despite artillery and mortar support, Williams' men were unable to advance. Colonel Starr ordered Lewis' unit to bypass the fight and continue south to locate and cut the Japanese main supply route. Fighting at Williams' front continued through most of the afternoon, and Colonel Starr realized that the Japanese force could not be dislodged that day. Fowlers' battalion was brought up to the rear of Williams' and late in the afternoon set up a new perimeter with the regimental command post. Before dark, Williams' men withdrew slightly from their most forward positions so that artillery concentrations could be placed along the front. Lewis' unit, which had moved off to the southeast to bypass Williams' fight, made little progress in very rough terrain and was cut off from the rest of TED Force before it could swing westward. Meanwhile, another battalion to the west encountered minimal resistance as it intercepted the main enemy trail east of the Driniumor, linking up with patrols from Cunningham's 2nd Squadron. Action on the 6th started earlier than TED Force expected. About 0300 approximately 400 Japanese attacked Williams' perimeter. This enemy force comprised elements of the 41st Division, supported by men of the 26th Field Artillery of the 20th Division and some remnants of the 8th Independent Engineers. Attacking under cover of fire from machine guns, mortars, and 75-mm. mountain guns, the Japanese force was attempting to secure fords over the upper reaches of Niumen Creek and protect the withdrawal of other elements of 18th Army units from Afua. Though surprised, Williams' men held back the initial onslaught. Reportedly, Japanese riflemen then climbed trees surrounding Williams' perimeter to pin down the American troops while other Japanese continued to attack on the ground. Fowler's unit, under orders to bypass Williams' fight and move around the enemy left, started moving about 0800 hours but soon found the terrain made it impossible to avoid contact with the Japanese opposing Williams. The Japanese, having control of most commanding ground in the area, stopped Fowler's leading company. Action was not rapid. The terrain made all movements slow and laborious, and much time had to be taken to co-ordinate artillery support fire properly. Under cover of artillery fire, another company of Fowler's battalion, creeping slowly through ravines and up an almost vertical cliff, worked around to unoccupied high ground on the Japanese left. The rest of the battalion was successfully disengaged to secure more commanding terrain in the same area. The Japanese, finding themselves outflanked and subjected to increasingly heavy artillery and mortar fire, began to withdraw southward in midafternoon, relieving the pressure on Williams' front. Fowler's battalion, in enveloping the Japanese left, had moved north and then westward and the maneuver had carried the unit by dark to a point just north of the main trail about 750 yards east of Burns' battalion. Williams' men withdrew to reorganize, after disengaging from the enemy forces late in the afternoon; at dark, having resumed the march westward, they secured high ground north of the trail. The ground covered during the day by Williams' battalion was little more than 500 yards west of the position it had occupied the previous night. The unit probably could have moved farther, but Colonel Starr halted it so as not to increase the distance from Lewis' battalion which was, in effect, lost. The unit had laboriously struggled over extremely rough and trackless ground during the day, fighting in the afternoon against a number of Japanese who had withdrawn from Williams' front. For the night, Lewis' men set up a perimeter about 800 yards south-southeast of the scene of Williams' fighting. With Adachi's escape route blocked, Starr's battalions advanced southwestward, achieving notable success by killing around 500 Japanese soldiers between August 6 and 7. In the interim, Cunningham's South Force completed operations in their sector, achieving a successful attack led by Howe that ousted the remaining disorganized Japanese presence from Afua on August 6. Two days later, the 124th Regiment advanced to the Driniumor, claiming to have eliminated approximately 1800 Japanese soldiers since the start of their counteroffensive, at the cost of 50 men killed and 80 wounded. With the rest of Adachi's 18th Army retreating towards Wewak, General Gill declared Afua secure by the evening of August 9. Following the conclusion of the Battle of the Driniumor River, the fatigued units of the 32nd Division, including the 124th Regiment and 112th Cavalry Regiment, were relieved by units from Wing's 43rd Division. From August 16 to 25, Wing's regiments conducted final combat missions in the Aitape region, encountering minimal Japanese resistance east of the Driniumor, except for delaying actions near the mouth of the Dandriwad River by patrols of the 103rd Regiment. Consequently, General Krueger declared the Aitape operation concluded on August 25, confident that the 18th Army posed no further threat to the Tadji airstrips. Adachi's forces had indeed suffered a decisive and costly defeat, rendering them incapable of posing a significant threat to Allied forces anywhere in New Guinea. The campaign to secure the Aitape area and defeat the 18th Army resulted in approximately 440 Allied soldiers killed, 2550 wounded, and 10 missing, while inflicting losses of around 8821 Japanese killed and 98 captured, including 2669 killed and 34 taken prisoner from August 2 to 9 alone. Adachi himself reported losing 9000 men and virtually annihilating seven regiments. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The American forces under Hall and Cunningham repelled multiple fierce Japanese offensives, inflicting heavy casualties. Despite a lot of setbacks and logistical challenges, TED Force advanced southward, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing their withdrawal by early August. Casualties were significant on both sides, underscoring the fierce nature of fighting on Green Hell.
Neste episódio, nós discutimos sobre Heart no Ace de Adachi, Mitsuru, um dos primeiros manga do mesmo, foi um bom início? ou ele não sabia o que estava fazendo? Venha descobrir escutando o podcast. Obs: este programa tem Spoilers, então, por favor, leia o mangá antes de ouvir o episódio! Você foi avisado!
Last time we spoke about fall of Tinian and battle of Sansapor. Following the capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies advanced to the Vogelkop Peninsula, constructing vital airbases. MacArthur initially focused on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island, but operations accelerated, making Klamono oilfields non-viable, and oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies were prioritized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur planned reconnaissance in the Mar-Sansapor area. The 6th Division launched Operation Typhoon, and Task Force 77 executed landings on July 30, 1944. Airfields were built, and patrols eliminated Japanese forces. Meanwhile, Tinian saw intense fighting, with Marines securing key objectives by July 31. Following massive bombardments, Marines continued advancing, encountering heavy resistance but eventually declaring Tinian secure on August 1. Guam operations saw similar advances with coordinated attacks overcoming Japanese defenses. This episode is the Fall of Guam Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This weeks podcast brings us back into the intense action in Guam. As we previously observed in Guam, General Shepherd's Marine brigade had effectively captured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division had reached the designated beachhead line, pushing back a weakened Japanese force retreating northward. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division maintained control of the southern beachhead line, preparing for a general eastward assault. An engineer battalion began constructing a supply road towards Yona, a project that ultimately failed to support the infantry's advance. On July 30, Turnage's Marines and the infantrymen sent patrols to gauge the strength of the Japanese forces, but dense foliage obscured enemy movements. Geiger eventually concluded that defensive positions were likely near the Agaña-Pago Bay Road. He planned an initial advance toward the general line of Agaña-Famja-Pago Bay, followed by a northeastward attack. Turnage's Marines were assigned to capture the capital, Agaña, and the strategic Tiyan Airfield on the left, while Bruce's infantry aimed to secure the Pago Bay area on the right. Following two days of intense artillery and naval bombardment, Geiger's offensive commenced at 06:30 on July 31. On the left, Turnage's units encountered minimal resistance. The 3rd Marines, now led by Colonel James Stuart, quickly occupied the ruins of the abandoned Agaña and moved beyond the O-1 Line to secure the main northbound roads. The 21st Marines advanced through dense underbrush, reaching O-1 after neutralizing an enemy pillbox near Famja. When Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis 3rd battalion, 21st marines brought his command post forward, a curious incident occurred which illustrated the confusion of the Japanese. Someone in the battalion command group sighted one of the bypassed enemy groups, estimated to be about 15-20, led by an officer, moving toward the new CP area. The Marines held their fire, and when the small unit got to within 150 yards of the waiting men, an interpreter called to the Nipponese to surrender. Apparently thinking they had finally reached friendly lines, they started forward, then stopped to hold a hurried conference. The chattering was interrupted by the interpreter urging them forward, but by this time the aggregation had decided they were in unfriendly territory. They broke and ran in all directions; the Marines opened fire, killing and wounding about half of the intruders. Those still alive escaped into the protecting foliage. The 9th Marines destroyed a delaying detachment at Ordot and two tanks during their successful push to O-1. Colonel Hamilton's 1st and 3rd Battalions, along with Colonel Tanzola's 3rd Battalion, advanced to the right, moving through steep slopes and narrow gorges in columns. They successfully reached Yona and the Pago River without encountering any opposition. With the Reconnaissance Troop protecting the south flank, General Bruce's 77th Infantry Division started toward the east coast of Guam at 7:00, 31 July. Elements of the 307th, with 3/305 attached, led the way in a column of battalions. Lack of enemy resistance permitted battalions to move with companies in column; even so, the march proved most difficult. The troops initially scaled steep slopes, slid down into narrow gorges, and followed along the foothills southwest of the central mountain range of Guam. For a time, vehicles followed, but soon the terrain became so rough that even jeeps could not traverse it. As one infantryman later wrote: “The distance across the island is not far, as the crow flies, but unluckily we can't fly. The nearest I came to flying was while descending the slippery side of a mountain in a sitting position. . . . After advancing a few yards you find that the [bolt] handle of the machine gun on your shoulder, your pack and shovel, canteens, knife, and machete all stick out at right angles and are as tenacious in their grip on the surrounding underbrush as a dozen grappling hooks. . . . The flies and mosquitos have discovered your route of march and have called up all the reinforcements including the underfed and undernourished who regard us as nothing but walking blood banks. We continue to push on. . . .” During this movement, Hamilton's Company L liberated 2,000 Guamanians from a concentration camp near Asinan. Soldiers willingly gave their rations and cigarettes to the undernourished men and women who were almost overcome with joy at once again seeing Americans. Men of the 77th Division soon forgot the long, tiresome cross-island march as the full realization of the expression, "liberation of enslaved peoples," came to the troops. Following the Orote operations, Shepherd's brigade was ordered to take over the southern half of the beachhead line from Inalas to Magpo Point, relieving the 305th and 306th Regiments. On August 1, Geiger's northward push continued, with the 305th moving to the Yona area and the 306th heading to Pago Bay. The 305th and 307th Regiments advanced slowly through rough terrain without opposition, reaching the O-2 Line by nightfall. On the left, Turnage began his advance with three regiments abreast, but the 3rd and 9th Marines eventually pinched out the 21st upon reaching the intermediate D-2A Line. At 15:00, these two regiments resumed their advance against slight resistance and reached O-2 by nightfall. The main challenge during this period was moving supplies forward, as both divisions relied on the same coastal road, heavily mined by the Japanese. With the rapid advance came the necessity to move supply distribution points closer to the front. Trucks began to roll over the already crowded coast highway to establish an advanced division dump in the Agaña Central Plaza area. Artillery units started to displace forward so that continuous direct support would be available to the assault units. This added traffic, plus the fact that the 77th Division would have to move supplies over the same road, presented a problem to the engineers. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the 25th Naval Construction Battalion and the 19th Marines put all available men to work improving existing roads and trails. Yet despite these efforts, by August 1, the problem of getting supplies forward was becoming more serious. The main coast road –and only one that ran from west to east on northern Guam– over which all traffic had to move had been heavily mined. The Japanese had placed aerial bombs and single-horned mines at road junctions and intersections in and around Agaña. In addition to being mined and heavily congested, the two-lane, hard-surfaced Agaña-Pago Bay Road was overused, poorly maintained and, with frequent rain, soon deteriorated badly. In the end, the engineers could not properly maintain the road and still allow the essential supply convoys through. On the morning of August 2, artillery and warships bombed the new positions General Obata was trying to establish around Mount Santa Rosa. Meanwhile, the Marines and infantrymen continued their pursuit northwards, aiming to reach the O-3 Line behind Japanese delaying positions at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. On the left, the 9th Marines swiftly captured Tiyan Airfield, but their advance was hampered by dense jungle. Despite this, they managed to gain 1800 yards while the 21st Marines cleared the Saupon Point-Ypao Point area of small enemy groups. On the right, the 77th Division's advance was initially covered by a 14-tank patrol conducting reconnaissance in the Barrigada area, where they faced heavy resistance. The 307th Regiment quickly secured Price Road, but Tanzola's 3rd Battalion was halted by concealed machine-gun positions near Barrigada Well. Subsequently, the 307th, now led by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Manuel, was also stopped near the village, with Manuel's 1st and 3rd Battalions becoming mixed up just as an enemy tank broke through their lines. After numerous failed attempts to dislodge the enemy, Companies G and E managed to penetrate the Japanese lines in the afternoon, although Company G had to be evacuated by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 305th moved up and consolidated its lines with the 307th. Since Bruce's infantrymen failed to link up with the Marines, Colonel Butler's 2nd Battalion was sent to fill the gap between the divisions. Following a reorganization, the 305th and 307th Regiments attacked again the next morning, encountering surprisingly little resistance as they moved through Barrigada and secured the vital well. The 77th Division had a special reason for wanting to reach Barrigada quickly. The reservoir and pump, located 100 yards northwest of Road Junction 306, could supply 20000 gallons of water daily to the troops. Until now, the men of the division had quenched their thirst by getting water from streams and creeks. But in the northern part of Guam there were no streams, and the reservoir would be the only source of supply. With tanks leading the way, Manuel's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly and reached the summit of Mount Barrigada, although the 2nd Battalion lagged behind. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment engaged in several isolated skirmishes but still managed to link up with the 307th. To the left, Turnage had also resumed his advance toward O-3. Although the 3rd Marines encountered little resistance and reached their objective successfully, Colonel Craig's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire near Finegayan after destroying a Japanese stronghold. That night, the Marines faced mortar and tank attacks, but these assaults made little progress. Meanwhile, as the 22nd Marines patrolled southern Guam, the 4th Regiment was held in reserve at Toto. On August 4, the remainder of Shepherd's brigade began moving to Toto, leaving only Colonel Schneider's 1st Battalion and the 6th Defense Battalion behind. Following Turnage's orders, the 21st Marines were positioned between the other two regiments to reach O-3 near Dededo. At the same time, Craig's 1st Battalion made minimal gains toward Finegayan, while the rest of the 9th Marines advanced to O-3 and successfully severed the Finegayan-Barrigada Road. To the right, Bruce's infantrymen, following an artillery barrage, advanced to O-3, overcoming terrain difficulties and securing the objective line by nightfall. On August 5, Turnage's three regiments continued their advance, pushing past O-3. The 3rd Marines reached Amantes Point, and Craig's 1st Battalion finally overran the remaining Japanese positions at Finegayan. Behind them, Shepherd's brigade moved to Dededo, preparing to take over the left flank for the final push. Meanwhile, as the 306th Regiment relieved the exhausted 307th, Tanzola's men continued to fight through the dense jungle, with his 2nd Battalion reaching the O-4 Line by nightfall. During a nighttime raid, the 1st Battalion was targeted, resulting in 48 casualties. Following this, the 2nd Battalion encountered the tanks the next morning, eventually neutralizing them but suffering an additional 46 casualties. Bruce's regiments gathered at O-4 to prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Rosa, where Obata had concentrated his forces. Turnage's regiments also resumed their attack, advancing with minimal resistance. Geiger initiated the final push on August 7, with Turnage's Marines facing minor obstacles due to jungle terrain. Despite this, the 3rd Marine Division reached the O-5 Line by nightfall. Shepherd's brigade swiftly progressed along the coast, joining forces with the 3rd Marines. Meanwhile, the 306th and 307th Regiments prepared for a coordinated attack. Bruce's strategy involved the 306th securing ground north of the Japanese defensive lines, the 307th leading a tank-infantry assault on Yigo, and the 305th closing in on Mount Santa Rosa. Once each objective was secured, Santa Rosa would be encircled from Anao to Lumuna Point, leaving the enemy with no escape route except into the sea. By midday, despite facing delays from the narrow road and enemy sniper activity, Manuel's tanks surged ahead of the infantry, veering right to swiftly eliminate several Japanese machine-gun positions at the road's edge. However, their advance was halted by heavy Japanese fire from the left rear as they crested a slight elevation. In a wedge formation, commanded by Captain Seger from his tank at the right rear, the light tanks swept rapidly over the slight crest. As they pushed on there was an explosion to the left of the tanks directly in front of Seger. He radioed to Colonel Stokes: "There's a burst in front of me; could be mine or antitank gun. Call for the mediums." Just before the mediums came up more explosions sounded from the left. The tankers could not locate the source of the fire because of the dense woods to the left and the absence of flash and smoke. When the mediums reached the open area, their crews could tell that the light tanks were in trouble but they could not see where the fire was coming from. Only when they advanced up the slight rise and began themselves to have steel shrapnel and bullets smash on the left of their hulls and turrets did they turn and pour fire back into the woods at the left rear. Fifty yards behind the stricken tanks the infantrymen struggled to push through the positions by the road that the tanks had overrun. Japanese still fired from a pillbox that had been blasted by the medium tanks as they raced ahead. The troops put rifle and machine-gun fire into it. They threw six grenades before one landed inside the position. The enemy continued to fire from it. A flame-thrower man maneuvered cautiously up to the position and put the searing flame in through an opening. The heat was too much for the defenders; one of them scurried out and fell before the American guns. The enemy position, so skillfully concealed from the front but vulnerable from the rear, was built around two light tanks. Two antitank guns, two 20mm guns, six light and two heavy machine guns, plus about a makeshift battalion of infantry added their fire to make the Yigo defense formidable. One medium was hit in its gas tank. Flames shot out of the bottom and quickly enveloped the sides. The crew hastily clambered out of it just before the ammunition inside began exploding. Another tank stalled under the heavy fire. As bullets hit the vehicle, the tankers dashed for a shell hole. Some of the mediums moved on out of the area. One of them tried to sweep around to the right below the line of enemy fire and promptly threw a track. As more tanks came up, they swung their cannons and machine guns around for brief fire on the enemy positions to the left and then passed on to the objective ahead. The leading light tank had similarly been destroyed and another was destroyed shortly afterwards. The American armor suffered losses against this well-concealed enemy position. Fortunately, Colonel Smith's 3rd Battalion, encountering minimal resistance in the jungle, directed Company K to flank the Japanese from the rear, catching them off guard and eliminating them without casualties. This enabled the 307th to secure the Yigo area and the elevated terrain to the northeast in readiness for the Santa Rosa assault. Meanwhile, the 306th consolidated west and north of Yigo, while the 305th advanced to the Lumuna Point line. The day also witnessed the inaugural combat flights of Marine planes from the newly completed Orote airfield over Guam. By nightfall, Obata dispatched his remaining tanks on a futile infantry-tank raid against the 306th, which repelled the attack successfully. On August 8, as the 305th and 307th Regiments closed in on Santa Rosa, Smith's forces continued north towards Lulog to complete the encirclement. Although the 306th captured Lulog, the 307th encountered minimal resistance in capturing Santa Rosa. Consequently, Bruce instructed Smith to push north towards Salisbury, but progress was limited by day's end. On the left flank, Shepherd's brigade and Turnage's division continued their advance. The 22nd Marines progressed to Ritidian Point, establishing three roadblocks. The 4th Marines secured O-5 and advanced to RJ 462. The 21st Marines patrolled the Chaguian area, while the 3rd Marines fought through dense jungle to defeat a Japanese roadblock and reach the Salisbury-Tarague Road. Patrols returned late in the afternoon and reported few enemy contacts, but one such unit from 3/21 had discovered a Japanese truck containing the bodies of 30 native men who had been beheaded. According to the official account of the incident, the Guamanians, found near Chaguian, had not been dead more than 24 hours. The next morning another patrol found an additional 21 bodies in the jungle near the same village. The 9th Marines faced heavy resistance as they dug in around Salisbury, close to Obata's headquarters. A tank-infantry counterattack targeted Stuart's 2nd Battalion at night, dispersing the enemy but necessitating retreat due to the threat of Obata's remaining tanks. Stuart's 3rd Battalion and Butler's 1st Battalion attacked the next morning but found no sign of the tanks. Meanwhile, the 77th Division patrolled the Yigo-Salisbury area, and the 9th Marines advanced rapidly towards the northeastern coast before redirecting patrols to Savana Grande, where 3000 Japanese were suspected to be hiding. Following artillery bombardment, the Marines occupied Savana Grande and Pati Point but found little evidence of Japanese presence. Patrols from the 4th and 22nd Marines also reached the northern beaches, leading Shepherd to declare an end to organized resistance in the brigade zone. The last known resistance persisted in the 3rd Marines' sector, where Obata's tanks were last observed. Accordingly, on August 10th, Stuart's 2nd Battalion initiated an attack to the east, establishing contact with two tanks on the road. Swiftly disabling these tanks, the Marines pressed forward, swiftly overpowering the Japanese positions and successfully seizing a total of seven abandoned tanks. By 11:30, Geiger declared an end to organized resistance on Guam. American casualties up to this point totaled 1214 killed, 5704 wounded, and 329 missing, with 10971 Japanese reported dead. Despite this announcement, Obata persisted at Mount Mataguac, fending off Bruce's infantry patrols since August 8th. Finally, on August 11th, Smith's 1st Battalion launched a meticulously planned attack supported by tanks and mortar barrages, stunning the defenders and enabling soldiers to destroy cave entrances. When the caves were reopened four days later, more than 60 bodies, including General Obata's, were found inside the well-fortified command post. Following the battle, Major-General Henry Larsen's garrison forces maintained intensive patrols on Guam throughout the remainder of the year under close scrutiny from Island Command. Island Command, Guam under General Larsen, had taken command of Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island on August 2 to begin base development, namely the airfield and seaport. It then assumed formal command of Guam on August 15. Island Command grew rapidly as it took over all logistics, construction, and civil affairs tasks in stages. It included the 5th Naval Construction Brigade with the 27-29th Seabee Regiments with 12 Seabee, four Army, and one Marine engineer battalions plus "Lion 6", a Navy advance base force responsible for building and operating Naval Operating Base, Guam. Island Command was also responsible for the care of 21000 Guamanian civilians and built replacement housing for 15000. Both the 3rd and 77th Divisions maintained an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion in the north to deal with diehards. Up to 80 Japanese were killed each day during the first two weeks after Guam was declared secure. The nightmare would continue for the Japanese for some time to come. The 3rd Marine Division took over sole responsibility for island defense under Island Command on August 22. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade then departed for Guadalcanal on August 31, where it would be expanded into the 6th Marine Division to fight on Okinawa. The 3rd Marine Division finally remained on the island to train for Iwo Jima, as did the 77th for Leyte and later Okinawa.An estimated 8500 Japanese soldiers remained scattered in the jungles of the north and the mountains of the south, engaging in guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. However, most were either killed or captured before then. The final tally for Guam by August 1945 included 18377 Japanese killed and 1250 captured, with American losses totaling 1407 killed, 6010 wounded, and 376 missing. By the conclusion of the Marianas Campaign, the Japanese suffered casualties exceeding 50,000, while the Americans solidified their control by positioning themselves strategically along the inner ring of Imperial defenses. This positioning enabled them to cut off the flow of supply ships and submarines that had previously supported remote enemy garrisons. Additionally, the Americans established a naval base with the capacity to support one-third of the Pacific Fleet, set up extensive forward supply depots, which posed a threat of swifter assaults on the Japanese home islands, and constructed several B-29 airfields. These airfields facilitated the unleashing of devastating aerial bombardments on Japan, bringing the full force of total war to its people through a relentless barrage of explosives and fire. That finishes up the story of the Marianas, now we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Despite the initial success of the Japanese offensive, General Hall's forces successfully halted the enemy advance and reorganized their river line by July 15th, although there remained a 1500-yard gap in the center. Aware of this vulnerability in the American defenses, the Japanese exploited it, particularly under the cover of darkness. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion actively patrolled this area and occasionally engaged with the enemy, such as the night of July 14th when they eliminated 135 Japanese soldiers. Nonetheless, General Cunningham reported that his South Force had expanded its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its designated sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15th, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously thought, prompting him to order his units to adjust their positions southward and fortify their defenses along the Driniumor River towards Cunningham's Troop E location. The next morning, the 3rd Battalion began its journey southward to close the gap. However, upon reaching the area by nightfall, Troop E came under attack from two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. As the cavalrymen sought cover from this assault, Starr's 3rd Battalion also faced fire from Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had redirected southward following its defeat at the Paup villages. This division split the American force, with Companies L and M encountering increasing resistance as they pressed southward towards South Force lines, while Companies I and K fortified their positions for the night. Despite the engagement resulting in the death of several Japanese soldiers and the narrowing of the gap to 500 yards, nightfall on the coast witnessed General Adachi's Coastal Attack Force launching suicide banzai charges towards Anamo, only to be swiftly repelled by the defenders' lethal machine-gun fire, resulting in the complete annihilation of the force. In the rear, Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions were dispatched by Hall to eliminate remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor. Over the course of two days, in a series of complex and occasionally disjointed company maneuvers, the Americans successfully subdued Colonel Nara's remaining troops in the area. Meanwhile, further south, Japanese groups were spotted crossing the Driniumor at a fording point approximately 2500 yards south of Afua, prompting Cunningham to deploy Troop A to strategic high ground behind the river to halt westward Japanese movements. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, led by Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were gathering in preparation for a fresh offensive. Adachi devised a fresh strategy, envisioning Miyake's forces striking Afua from the southern front, while the 239th Regiment prepared to advance against the Kawanaka Shima area. Furthermore, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment received orders to head south to reinforce future assaults by the 20th Division, although they wouldn't reach the destination until July 25. Meanwhile, as the Miyake Force gradually maneuvered into position on the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr faced ongoing challenges in filling the gap in the center, eventually managing to close it by the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake finally dispatched two battalions to launch an assault on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them back 250 yards to the northeast. However, swift reinforcements enabled Cunningham to recapture the lost ground the following morning, prompting the enemy to retreat northwest into the jungles. By afternoon, fresh Japanese units had once again encircled the Troop A position; yet, after an effective artillery barrage, the cavalrymen thwarted Adachi's plans by pushing 600 yards to the southwest. Following this triumph, on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A; Howe's battalions successfully established a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek; and Starr's 2nd Battalion relocated to Palauru to enhance outer security southwest of the airfield. Concurrently, on July 19, the initial units of General Wing's 43rd Division commenced landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently assuming control of approximately 1000 yards of the river line on the right flank of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi instructed the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to launch another assault on Afua from the north and west, while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor River to strike from the south. On July 21, in the evening, Miyake initiated an attack on Troop C's position, effectively isolating it from the remainder of South Force. Despite the cavalry's resistance against the intense Japanese onslaughts, Miyake's units successfully thwarted Cunningham's efforts to relieve the besieged troop in the subsequent days. Faced with the threat to his command post and reluctant to divert more forces from the river defenses, Cunningham ultimately opted to establish a new defensive line 1000 yards north of Afua, consequently abandoning the town and leaving Troop C stranded. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. Despite further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing by the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, Adachi eventually decided on July 25 to dispatch the 41st Division south to reinforce the southern front. Following the fall of Afua, Hall directed Howe's battalions to depart from their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, successfully arriving at the new defensive line by July 23. With these reinforcements in place, Cunningham early in the afternoon of the same day decided to deploy Troops A and B to advance westward toward Troop C, while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast to support the isolated troop. Despite the lack of coordination in the attack, infantrymen managed to infiltrate Troop C's perimeter from the northwest, aiding in repelling a fierce Japanese assault from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reclaimed Afua and established new defensive positions. Despite an initial triumph, American efforts to advance on July 24 were thwarted by the resolute defense of the Japanese, who fiercely guarded all paths, trails, and ridges in the densely forested terrain northeast of the perimeter. However, on July 25, Companies E and B under Howe surprisingly made contact roughly 500 yards north of the besieged forces, encountering minimal resistance, which allowed the beleaguered Troop C to retreat. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued their assault southward and westward toward the Afua-Palauru trail, driving the Japanese forces into the Torricelli Mountains. Nonetheless, a significant number of Japanese troops remained within a triangular area delineated by the sloping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, persistently harassing Cunningham's forces. Throughout the night, additional Japanese reinforcements, including the 66th Regiment, maneuvered behind Howe's 2nd Battalion, securing control over trails leading southeast through dense jungle from the banana patch to a point on the Afua-Palauru trail near the 2nd Battalion's command post. Consequently, on July 26, Howe's 1st Battalion was withdrawn toward the sloping ground, with the 2nd Battalion expanding its positions to the east to cover the vacated area. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack; however, menacing Japanese movements to the west compelled the American forces to withdraw, despite other units under Cunningham also repelling enemy advances. Subsequently, Cunningham reorganized his lines on July 28 to strengthen defenses, anticipating imminent large-scale Japanese assaults. Nonetheless, on July 29, the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion renewed their offensive toward the south and west into the Triangle, yet this time Adachi's determined defenders successfully rebuffed them. Therefore, local patrol activity was the primary focus on July 30 and 31 while Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. With the capture of Guam, the Marianas campaign had finally come to an end. Yet it seemed apparent to the frontline commanders, the closer the island hopping got to the Japanese home islands, casualties were exponentially mounting. How much American blood was it going to take to end the Pacific War?
"Who you are" makes the world a better place「世界に自分軸を輝かせよう」by Sayuri Sense
Welcome back! I have been inviting a special guest from Trade Investment Queensland! Mr Adachi has been the commissioner there for 20 years and has shared so many ideas and tips about successful global communication so far! On this last interview epi...
"Who you are" makes the world a better place「世界に自分軸を輝かせよう」by Sayuri Sense
Hello everyone! Welcome to the show! My name is Sayuri! Today's episode is very special! I've invited a special guest who I truly admire and I've known him for many years. His name is Mr Tak Adachi who has been the commissioner for ...
Last time we spoke about the fall of Saipan. General Smith's coordinated attacks on June 27th led to significant progress, with the 4th Marine Division notably advancing. The 27th Division encountered resistance, and casualties rose. By early July, Americans gained ground, pushing toward Marpi Point. Japanese resistance remained fierce, but American forces steadily advanced, capturing strategic positions. The assault on Petosukara was swiftly countered, but intense action unfolded in the Makunsha region. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines faced a fierce enemy thrust, with over 200 attackers killed. Facing defeat, General Saito ordered a suicidal assault, resulting in a chaotic and desperate charge. Despite heavy losses, American forces repelled the onslaught. The battle lasted until midday on July 7, with sporadic skirmishes continuing. Efforts to persuade cave occupants to surrender intensified, yet many civilians chose mass suicide. Saipan was declared secured after extensive casualties on both sides. This episode is the battle of Noemfoor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. General MacArthur unleashed a new offensive, seeing General Patrick's troops successfully landed on Noemfoor with little opposition, securing a beachhead. While the 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Regiment was being airdropped on July 4, Colonel Sandlin's 3rd Battalion continued eastward through scattered minefields toward Kornasoren Drome, meeting no resistance. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion crossed the Kamiri River and occupied Kamiri village without encountering any opposition. Moving out of Kamiri, the American forces followed a southeastern road to a sizable Japanese garden area, where they faced resistance on Hill 201. The Japanese garden area was about 600 yards long, east and west, and 350 yards across, north to south. The ground was devoid of large trees except for a few atop Hill 201, but thick, secondary jungle growth covered the eastern and southern slopes of the hill, while the rest of the garden area was overgrown with partially cultivated papaya, taro, and cassava, all averaging about eight feet in height. The trail from Kamiri village passed over the southern slope of Hill 201, and 300 yards away, near the eastern edge of the gardens, joined the main road from Kamiri Drome to Namber Drome, located about six miles to the south. Another trail ran along the eastern side of the hill, branching to the north and northwest at the northeastern corner of the low terrain feature. To counter this, a double envelopment tactic was initiated, with Company C seizing Hill 180 to the north while Company B pushed the Japanese southeast over Mission Hill, a lower terrain feature situated southeast of Hill 201. By 15:15, the battalion secured the ground on both flanks of Hill 201 and consolidated around the hilltop for the night, establishing a tight defensive perimeter. At 05:20 on July 5, the Japanese launched an attack along the southern and southeastern sides of the perimeter with mortar support. The American forces responded with a deadly barrage of mortar and artillery fire, driving the enemy back and neutralizing their machine-gun positions. Some Japanese managed to get through the mortar and artillery barrages and continued up the sides of the trail from the south through fire from Company D's machine guns. The enemy found cover behind a low, 150-yard-long log fence which led from the southeast toward the center of the 1st Battalion's defenses. While the fence afforded some protection, the attacking infantrymen were silhouetted as they tried to clamber over the top. The main body of the attacking force therefore kept down behind the fence, trying to crawl along it to the top of the hill. Advancing cautiously, the attackers encountered sustained machine-gun and rifle fire from the defenders atop the hill, as the fence did not extend beyond the outer defenses of the 1st Battalion. The assault quickly deteriorated into a sequence of small suicide charges carried out by groups of three to six Japanese soldiers. The 1st Battalion now sent patrols out over the battlefield. From prisoners it was determined that the attacking force had consisted of 350 to 400 men--the 10th and 12th Companies, 219th Infantry, reinforced by approximately 150 armed Formosan laborers. During the morning over 200 dead Japanese were counted around the 1st Battalion's perimeter, and the number of enemy dead found or enemy wounded captured on subsequent days along trails leading south from the hill indicated that virtually the entire original attacking force had been annihilated. By 06:30, the skirmish had concluded, with over 200 Japanese casualties tallied. Following this engagement, operations on Noemfoor transitioned into a series of patrol activities as Allied forces extended their dominance over the island and rapidly expanded the airfield facilities. On the morning of July 6, Sandlin's 2nd Battalion executed an amphibious landing on the deserted Namber Drome following a brief naval bombardment. By July 10, intensive patrolling had only encountered small Japanese groups, leading Patrick to conclude that no significant organized enemy presence remained on Noemfoor. To eradicate the remaining opposition, the 503rd Parachute Regiment was dispatched to the island's southern sector while the 158th addressed the northern half. By the end of August, Sandlin's efforts had resulted in the death of 611 Japanese soldiers, the capture of 179, the loss of 6 American lives with 41 wounded, and the liberation of 209 slave laborers. The Japanese had never brought the Melanesians of Noemfoor entirely under their control, for the natives had either offered a passive resistance or had faded into the interior to live off the land. A few were impressed into service by the Japanese, while others who were captured but still refused to cooperate were executed. The natives greeted the Allied landings with great enthusiasm and came out of hideaways in the hills carrying Dutch flags which they had concealed from the Japanese. Under the direction of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, the natives were gradually resettled in their old villages. Late in July the village chiefs gathered in formal council and officially declared war on the Japanese. Thereafter, native cooperation increased. Up to August 31 the natives had captured and brought to Allied outposts more than 50 Japanese and had killed another 50. One tale of horror concerns the Javanese on Noemfoor. According to information gathered by the NICA Detachment, over 3000 Indonesians were shipped to Noemfoor in late 1943, mostly from Soerabaja and other large cities on Java. The shipment included many women and children. The Japanese, without regard to age or sex, put the Javanese to work constructing roads and airfields almost entirely by hand. Little or no clothing, shoes, bedding, or shelter was provided, and the Javanese had to supplement their very inadequate allowance of rations by shifting for themselves. Driven by hunger, many attempted to steal Japanese rations but for their pains were beheaded or hung by their hands or feet until dead. Starvation and disease took a steadily increasing toll. The dead were periodically collected for mass burial, and survivors alleged that many of the sick were buried alive. It was considered probable that not more than 10 or 15 Javanese were killed accidentally by Allied forces. Yet only 403 of the 3000-odd brought from Java were found alive on Noemfoor by August 31. Meanwhile, Colonel Jones pursued the remnants of Colonel Shimizu's Noemfoor Detachment to Hill 670 in the south. From July 13 to 16, both sides engaged in fierce combat for control of the hill, with the Japanese ultimately managing to evade capture. Contact was reestablished on July 23 near Inasi, but Shimizu eluded capture once more. The primary Japanese force was finally located on August 10 near Hill 380, prompting Jones' 1st and 3rd Battalions to converge in an attempt to trap the enemy. However, on August 15, Shimizu once again evaded capture, slipping away towards Pakriki. Although the Japanese forces were either captured or eliminated by August 17, Shimizu evaded capture or death and remained at large by the operation's conclusion. Jones' forces endured 57 fatalities and 302 injuries, but managed to neutralize over 1100 Japanese soldiers and apprehend approximately 560 individuals, while liberating an additional 194 enslaved laborers. This brings the total casualties for the Battle of Noemfoor to 1730 Japanese casualties, with 740 taken prisoner, and 63 American fatalities, 343 wounded, and 3 missing, alongside the liberation of 403 slave laborers. Transitioning to the developments on the Aitape front post-Operation Persecution, significant changes occurred under General Gill's command starting May 4. The defensive setup in the Aitape region was revamped, and Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment bolstered its eastern positions, with the Nyaparake Force extending patrols to the Danmap River. However, General Nakai's advance forces arrived in early May. Shortly after 2:00am on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mortars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weapons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Captain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight-man outpost reported that many small parties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeastern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mortar fire, but at 5:00am they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. About 7:30am on the 14th, elements of Company A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Platoon of Company C and the 81-mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. General Martin took charge of the East Sector on the same day, relocating all troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from BLUE Beach or by native ration trains moving along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, experiments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2200 yards north of Afua soon became the principal source of supply for troops in the Afua area. Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out principally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the principal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment accidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter. Despite this adjustment, Nakai escalated pressure, advancing beyond Yakamul by month's end. In response, Gill replaced the Nyaparake Force with the 1st Battalion, 126th Regiment, which swiftly recaptured Yakamul and Parakovio. Despite initial success, Nakai's forces launched a heavy counterattack in early June, reclaiming Yakamul by June 5. In the meantime, additional Japanese units had been conducting exploratory missions inland against Afua since the beginning of the month. However, Howe's 1st Battalion ultimately succeeded in repelling them. This allowed Martin's forces to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. From there, they continued forward patrols toward the Japanese lines. While the 41st and 51st Divisions struggled to move personnel and supplies to the forward assembly area, Nakai efficiently organized a counter-reconnaissance screen along Niumen Creek to prevent East Sector troops from gathering intelligence about deployments farther east. On June 20, due to the increasingly dire situation in Western New Guinea, the 18th Army was suddenly transferred from 2nd Area Army control to the direct command of the Southern Army. Although General Terauchi's directive was to execute a "delaying action at strategic positions," General Adachi opted to adhere to his original plans for a westward offensive. He was determined to maximize the effectiveness of his forces while they still possessed fighting capability, aiming to divert as much enemy strength as possible away from the Western New Guinea battlefront. Sensing an imminent heavy enemy assault, Generals Krueger and MacArthur decided to reinforce Aitape with General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, arriving on June 27, and Colonel Edward “Ted” Starr's 124th Regiment, expected to arrive in early July. They also expedited the shipment of the 43rd Division from its New Zealand staging area to Aitape, necessitating the establishment of Major-General Charles Hall's 11th Corps. Upon assuming command of the task force on June 29, Hall reorganized his forces and implemented several troop redeployments in preparation for the looming enemy attack. By June 30th, Adachi had completed concentrating his forces in the assembly area. Consequently, he swiftly initiated preparations for launching an attack against the Driniumor River line on July 10th. His strategy involved Colonel Nara Masahiko's 237th Regiment crossing the river and launching an assault westward towards Koronal Creek, and northwest to clear Anamo and other Paup villages. Meanwhile, the 78th and 80th Regiments were tasked with clearing the Afua area and advancing all the way to Chinapelli. Success in this endeavor would pave the way for Japanese units to advance towards the Tadji airstrips. Furthermore, a Coastal Attack Force was designated to carry out a diversionary maneuver along the coast, aiming to engage the enemy and constrain them with artillery fire. In early July, as the Japanese finalized their preparations, Hall and Martin made the decision to dispatch robust patrols east of the Driniumor to the Harech River. However, these patrols were only able to advance as far as Yakamul, where they encountered only the enemy's forward units. Consequently, on July 10th, Hall and Martin ordered the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment, and the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance mission across the Driniumor. Subsequently, the infantry faced significant resistance as they pushed towards Yakamul, while the cavalry's progress was limited to about a mile due to the dense jungle terrain. Despite these efforts yielding disappointing results, a captured Japanese soldier disclosed that their attack was imminent that night. However, this critical piece of information was mistakenly disregarded by the American command, leaving Adachi and Nakai poised to launch their counteroffensive. Around midnight, the assault commenced with the 1st Battalion, 78th Regiment charging across the Driniumor River, facing Company G of the 128th Regiment along a narrow front. The Japanese attacked in two or three screaming waves, broadening the front after the first assault by throwing in the rest of the 78th Infantry and possibly elements of the 80th Infantry. Japanese reconnaissance had been good--the attackers knew the locations of company and battalion command posts all along the American defenses but not quite good enough. The enemy did not know that Company G had been reinforced during the afternoon of 10 July nor, apparently, had he discovered that the company's front was protected by low barbed wire. The attacks of the 78th Infantry were thrown back with heavy losses. Machine gun and mortar fire from the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, accounted for many Japanese, numbers of whom were caught as they tried to cross the barbed wire in front of Company G. According to Japanese sources, the results of American artillery fire were even more disastrous. As soon as the enemy attack had begun, the 120th and 129th Field Artillery Battalions had started firing previously prepared concentrations along the bed and east bank of the Driniumor. The Japanese units in or near the impact areas suffered heavy casualties. The 1st Battalion. 78th Infantry, was quickly reduced from 400 to 30 men, principally as a result of the American artillery fire, which also destroyed large numbers of artillery weapons, machine guns, and mortars. Despite this, the Americans, skillfully backed by artillery support, ultimately repelled them with significant casualties. Following this initial repulse, Martin concluded that a reconnaissance in force was unnecessary and ordered the units involved to retreat behind the Driniumor River. Confusion among many Japanese units, arriving late, had delayed the commencement of the 80th Regiment's attack, which was directed at Company E and was similarly pushed back. But a second wave of attackers, probably comprising the 237th Infantry and heretofore uncommitted elements of the Right Flank Unit, began pouring across the Driniumor toward Company E at approximately 0200. The new attackers overran the company command post and surrounded most of the unit's widely separated strong points. Fighting continued in the company sector for a little while, but the unit could not long withstand the overwhelming enemy pressure. Company organization and communications broke down. Worse still, the troops began to run out of ammunition. A general withdrawal commenced. By 03:00, the Japanese had breached a gap approximately 1300 yards wide in the American lines, physically occupying that territory. Fortunately, the following hours remained relatively calm as the 78th and 80th Regiments regrouped to the south to resume the offensive. This lull enabled Martin to dispatch the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to counterattack along the Anamo-Afua trail, aiming to reinforce the 2nd Battalion's positions. Initially encountering no resistance for the first 1500 yards, the Americans were eventually halted by intense enemy fire at 10:30, compelling them to retreat back to Tiver. This fierce opposition convinced Martin that the enemy could advance directly westward with minimal hindrance towards the Tadji strips unless he abandoned the Driniumor River line. He decided to reorganize his forces along the secondary delaying position at the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line, preparing for further counterattacks against the Japanese. Accordingly, while Company F maintained their position along the coast, the 128th Regiment began to fall back towards the creek. Further south, Cunningham opted to withdraw his cavalrymen in two stages, successfully reaching X-ray by midnight. However, communication issues delayed Howe's 3rd Battalion, with most of the unit arriving at the river the following day. A small contingent had to engage in combat with Japanese forces and couldn't reach X-ray until July 13. Despite this, Krueger and Hall disagreed with the decision to abandon the Driniumor, promptly deploying the 124th Regiment for a potential counterattack. Martin, who was instructed to hold his position, was replaced by Gill, assuming direct command of the divided covering force, now split into North and South Forces. However, before the American counterattack could commence, Nara's infantry launched an assault towards Tiver and Koronal Creek on July 12. The 128th Regiment successfully repelled them after a fierce confrontation. Meanwhile, Adachi dispatched the main body of the 41st Division and the reserve 66th Regiment towards the Driniumor, augmenting pressure on the Paup coast. To the south, Nakai's units gathered across the river near Afua and Kwamrgnirk, preparing for a final northward push. Finally, at 07:30 on July 13, the American counteroffensive commenced as the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment swiftly moved from Tiver to Chakila, only to be ambushed by Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, precise artillery counterfire silenced most of the enemy artillery, enabling the Americans to advance eastward toward the mouth of the Driniumor. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment under Starr's command advanced southward along the Anamo-Afua trail, facing strong opposition from the 237th Regiment. Despite encountering resistance, they managed to reach the river, although still positioned considerably north of their designated centerline. Cunningham's South Force began its eastward movement from the X-ray River at 10:00, successfully overcoming enemy positions along several stream crossings to reach the Driniumor near Afua. Consequently, all original crossing points on the Driniumor fell to the Allied forces, isolating the 20th Division and the 237th Regiment several miles west of the river's bank. By nightfall, Nara had regrouped his 237th Regiment for another assault on the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment. Company E demonstrated its combat effectiveness by holding firm and repelling the Japanese forces, with the rest of the battalion successfully defending against subsequent small-scale attacks, marking the conclusion of Nara's offensive actions. The following morning, Gill's forces consolidated their defensive positions along the reformed river line, albeit with a 1500-yard gap remaining in the center. Yet this all for today with Noemfoor as we now need to head over to the India-Burma theater. The final phase was coming for the Battle of Imphal. By the start of July, the reopening of the Imphal–Kohima Road facilitated the resupply of the 4th Corps, enabling them to launch an offensive against the fatigued and under-resourced troops under General Mutaguchi's command. Additionally, three brigades from General Stopford's 33rd Corps advanced from the north, swiftly joining General Gracey's 20th Division in an endeavor to reopen the Ukhrul Road. Under intense pressure, General Yamauchi's battered 15th Division units hastily abandoned Tongou and Sokpao, leading to the 80th Brigade occupying Lamu by July 2. The next day, the ailing general, who had long fallen out of favor with Mutaguchi, was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher and later died in a hospital at Maymyo. Lieutenant-General Shibata Uichi replaced him and promptly prepared the 51st and 67th Regiments to retreat. To cover their withdrawal, the newly arrived and utterly exhausted 60th Regiment was tasked with attacking towards Lamu, while General Miyazaki's troops assembled behind Ukhrul. However, the 60th Regiment was so weakened that its attacks were easily repelled, and the 67th Regiment retreated in disorder, leaving the 51st encircled. On July 8, Colonel Omoto's troops fiercely broke through the encirclement in three columns, allowing Stopford's brigades to finally overcome Japanese resistance at Ukhrul and capture the town. This forced Shibata to regroup his forces along a new line from Lungshong through Sangshak to Sakok, ultimately enabling the British-Indian forces to reopen the Ukhrul Road by July 10. With both supply roads reopened, the arrival of Stopford's brigades from the north, and the Japanese forces nearly routed, General Slim decided it was time to go on the offensive. Slim's plan involved the 33rd Corps taking over the Shenam Saddle and the Tamu–Palel Road while the 4th Corps cleared the Japanese from the Silchar Track and the Tiddim Road. On the other hand, Mutaguchi was still planning a combined attack on the Palel area involving the 15th Division, remnants of the 31st Division, and some units from the 33rd Division. Although he issued an attack order, the divisions were too battered to comply. The overall situation of the 15th Army went from bad to worse and the only hope remaining was to rally the 31st at Humine, give the troops a few days rest and then, after a reorganization, to dispatch them to the northern flank of the Yamamoto Detachment to capture Palel. In early July the 31st Division was concentrated in the area east of Myothit but discipline had disintegrated to the point that the Division could scarcely be termed a combat force. The Torikai Unit was organized with the 138th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion); the 2d Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment and one artillery battalion to reinforce the Yamamoto Detachment. At the same time,the 15th Army ordered the 33rd Division to attack Palel from the south with the 214th Infantry Regiment. The newly formed Torikai' Unit, however, failed to join the Yamamoto Detachment and the order for the 33rd to attack Palel was never carried out. Consequently, on July 9, General Kawabe had no choice but to order preparations for a withdrawal to a line connecting the Zibyu Mountains, Mawlaik, Kalewa, and Gangaw. Mutaguchi intended to begin the retreat on July 16, directing the 15th Division towards Sittaung, the 31st Division to Thaungdut, and the 33rd Division to Tiddim, while the Yamamoto Detachment would hold the Shenam Saddle until July 24 and then retreat to the Kuntaung-Moreh line to cover the main Army's withdrawal from the Kabaw Valley. On the southwest front, General Tanaka's forces had already started retreating from the Bishenpur area, leaving a small covering force at Ningthoukhong to prevent a pursuit by the 17th Division. As a result, General Cowan's brigades made limited progress against the stubborn rearguard, ultimately securing Ningthoukhong on July 16 after heavy bombardment, coinciding with Mutaguchi's general withdrawal. By the middle of July, Japanese resistance centered on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. A small hamlet about 300 meters wide and 500 meters long, it lay to the immediate south of Ningthoukhong. Despite probing attacks by the 48th Indian Brigade's infantry and artillery firing on their defenses, the Japanese held on. Finally, in the early hours of 16 July, this small space was subjected to what some describe as one of the heaviest artillery concentrations yet in the Burma Campaign; in the space of an hour, approximately 9,000 shells were fired on Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou. Fortunately for the Japanese, they had withdrawn from the village just before the shelling began. By the time it ended, the village had been completely flattened and was pockmarked with waterlogged craters. And so the last Japanese stronghold in the Imphal Valley was taken. The 63rd Indian Brigade also reached and occupied the Laimanai area around the same time. The 5th Indian Division, the other division in the reconstituted IV Corps, now took over and commenced the chase of the Japanese 33rd Division down the road towards Tiddim. The 5th Division, now led by Major-General Geoffrey Evans, continued the pursuit while Stopford's brigades harassed the disordered retreat of the 15th and 31st Divisions. Despite their efforts, the 15th and 31st Divisions reached Thaungdut by early August, and the 33rd Division managed to assemble around Chikha by mid-August, under significant pressure and the serious threat of having their withdrawal route cut off. The 33rd Division distinguished itself by displaying almost superhuman fighting power and repeatedly launched counterattacks against the pursuing British-Indian 5th Division. The Yamamoto Detachment, however, had failed to cover the Yazagyo area and, in mid-August the 33rd Division found itself the vicinity of Chikha facing the serious threat of having its route of withdrawal cut by the enemy which was infiltrating into the Yazagyo area from Moreh and Shuganu through the Kabaw Valley. On the south-eastern approach to Imphal, the two armies continued to face each other on the Shenam Saddle. Yamamoto Force remained in place on these heights and the front line was still on Scraggy. It was in the second half of July that a final, concerted effort was made to evict Yamamoto Force and push it down the Tamu–Palel Road towards the India–Burma frontier. Led by the 23rd Indian Division , the operation involved five brigades in a three-pronged attack. The central thrust was by the 37th Indian Brigade on the Shenam Saddle, with the support of all available artillery and tanks; the 5th British Brigade was deployed behind it and readied to provide assistance. D-day was to be 24 July. The 1st Indian Brigade was sent through the hills on the right, to arrive behind the saddle. The two were to push the Japanese back on the road. It was hoped their withdrawal route would be cut by the 49th Indian Brigade, which would arrive on the road after looping in from the far left; the 268th Indian Brigade would be to its left, protecting its flank. Before the Japanese could retreat, the 49th Brigade had cut off General Yamamoto's withdrawal route by looping in from the far left. However, Mutaguchi had sent Colonel Sato Genpachi's reserve 61st Regiment to Tamu, which quickly counterattacked and reopened the route. Consequently, Yamamoto withdrew to Moreh, allowing Roberts to swiftly capture Nippon Hill and Scraggy. Within two days, the 23rd Division advanced down the road, forcing the Yamamoto Detachment to retreat toward Mawlaik on July 30. This marked the end of the Battle of Imphal and Operation U-Go, the Japanese Army's largest land defeat. Estimates vary, but about 30,000 Japanese soldiers died and 23,000 were injured during the operation, including 6,000 killed at Kohima and 16,000 at Imphal. Additionally, the INA lost about 2,000 dead and 2,000 wounded. On the other hand, the British-Indians suffered 16,000 casualties, with over 12,000 at Imphal. Though Mutaguchi's plan was initially effective and nearly succeeded in capturing Imphal, he underestimated the enemy's ability to resist his troops and quickly bring reinforcements. Slim's overall strategy for Imphal succeeded, as the Japanese overextended themselves from the Chindwin River to the Imphal Valley, just as he had predicted. A crucial factor in the British-Indian success was the air support, which kept the 14th Army supplied despite the road to Kohima being cut off. Ultimately, in an attempt to thwart a potential British-Indian advance into Burma, Mutaguchi's 15th Army was utterly decimated by the failed attempt to capture Imphal. This failure allowed Slim to seize the moment and launch a rapid offensive into Burma, countering the Japanese U-Go plan. The Allies thus gained the upper hand, marking the beginning of the end for Japanese control over Burma. As a final note for this week by late July, Admiral Somerville executed Operation Crimson, a coordinated naval and air assault on Japanese airfields in Sabang, Lhoknga, and Kutaraja. Departing Trincomalee on July 22, Somerville's Task Force 62, comprising two carriers and four battleships, arrived off Sabang on the morning of July 25, ready to commence the bombardment. On 5th July 1944 the carriers Victorious and Indomitable arrived in Colombo. The former sailed with Illustrious on 22 July for Operation ‘Crimson', a bombardment of Sabang by the battleships over which the carrier-borne aircraft were to provide cover and take photographs of the damage. Illustrious embarked the same aircraft as before with Victorious for a total of thirty-nine Corsairs; together they comprised 47 Naval Fighter Wing commanded by Lieutenant Commander Turnbull. The force assembled for the operation was designated TF 62 and the carriers were supported by Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Richelieu, Nigeria, Kenya, Gambia, Ceylon, Cumberland, Phoebe, Tromp, Relentless, Rotherham, Racehorse, Raider, Roebuck, Rocket, Rapid, Quilliam, Quality and Quickmatch. The submarines Templar and Tantalus were deployed to ASR positions. The carriers operated only thirty-five miles north of Sabang, not far from the battleships, which approached their bombardment positions at 06:40. The initial launch was planned for thirty-three minutes before sunrise but this proved to be too early as the morning was exceptionally dark and the launch was delayed for five minutes. Even then it was too early and the form-up was clumsy and slow, delaying departure. The fighters were briefed to attack Sabang, Lho Nga and Kotaraja airfields but 1838 NAS made a bad landfall since maps lacked detail and no photographs were available. When the target airfields were found it was still too dark for accurate strafing but the enemy was alert and opened fire as soon as aircraft came within range. To aircrew accustomed to the excellent intelligence material by then available in the Home Fleet, this caused concern and it had to be accepted that it was difficult to obtain good targets without losing the element of surprise. At very low level on a dark morning, flying at 400 knots with flashes from antiaircraft gunfire all around, camouflaged aircraft in revetments were inconspicuous and the strafing runs were not a success. One Corsair was shot down but the pilot was rescued. Concurrently, the battleships targeted harbor facilities and military barracks at Sabang, while cruisers and destroyers shelled radar and wireless stations and engaged enemy shore batteries. After the main bombardment, the destroyers Tromp, Quality, Quickmatch, and Quilliam entered Sabang harbor, attacking Japanese positions and launching torpedoes, sustaining light damage from return fire. On the return journey, two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were intercepted and shot down by fighters. Additionally, ten Zeros attacked Somerville's convoy but were intercepted by 13 Corsairs, leading to two Zeros being shot down and another two damageFollowing this engagement, British pilots noted that the Japanese airmen were not as proficient as they had been in 1942. Although Operation Crimson's outcomes were not spectacular, Somerville's final offensive was still deemed successful enough. Due to health concerns, he was subsequently transferred to diplomatic duties at Admiral Mountbatten's request. Currently, Admiral Mountbatten was moving toward a complete rearrangement of the higher officers in SEAC. From the time of his arrival in the Far East, he had had trouble with his three commanders in chief. When the Imphal crisis arose, Mountbatten was dissatisfied with General Giffard's conduct of operations, and when he later found Giffard taking what Mountbatten considered a highly negative approach toward an aggressive conduct of operations he resolved to ask for Giffard's relief. Mountbatten's relations with Admiral Somerville had been equally difficult. Somerville had refused to treat him as a Supreme Commander and in Mountbatten's opinion tried to make him simply the chairman of a commanders-in-chief committee. As for the RAF commander, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, Mountbatten was not seeking his relief because he did not wish to change all of his principal subordinates simultaneously. After his relief, Somerville was placed in charge of the British naval delegation in Washington DC in October 1944 where he managed—to the surprise of almost everyone—to get on very well with the notoriously abrasive and anti-British Admiral Ernest King, the United States' Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of Noemfoor was just getting started, seeing General Douglas MacArthur not giving the Japanese a moment to catch their breath. Meanwhile the battle for Imphal was finally coming to a bitter end as Mutaguchi's megalomaniac operation was clearly a disaster.
Welcome to the Social-Engineer Podcast: The Doctor Is In Series – where we will discuss understandings and developments in the field of psychology. In today's episode, Chris and Abbie are discussing Psychological Myths. They will talk about some of the most pervasive myths in our society and how you can separate fact from fiction. [July 1, 2024] 00:00 - Intro 00:17 - Dr. Abbie Maroño Intro 00:41 - Intro Links - Social-Engineer.com - http://www.social-engineer.com/ - Managed Voice Phishing - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/vishing-service/ - Managed Email Phishing - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/se-phishing-service/ - Adversarial Simulations - https://www.social-engineer.com/services/social-engineering-penetration-test/ - Social-Engineer channel on SLACK - https://social-engineering-hq.slack.com/ssb - CLUTCH - http://www.pro-rock.com/ - innocentlivesfoundation.org - http://www.innocentlivesfoundation.org/ 03:54 - The Topic of the Day: Psychological Myths 05:05 - Consider the Source 06:45 - Too Good To Be True? 09:43 - Myth 1: Reading Minds 11:45 - Myth 2: 10% 14:36 - Myth 3: Left vs Right Brained 18:11 - Myth 4: Venting Anger for Calmness 23:02 - Myth 5: Hypnosis Unlimited 31:05 - Myth 6: Perfect Memory 37:12 - Question Everything 39:02 - Next Month: Self-Sabotage 39:47 - Wrap Up & Outro - Work in Progress - Dr. Abbie Maroño - www.social-engineer.com - www.innocentlivesfoundation.org Find us online: - Twitter: @DrAbbieofficial - LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/dr-abbie-maroño-phd - Instagram: @DoctorAbbieofficial - Twitter: @humanhacker - LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/christopherhadnagy References: Beyerstein, B. L. (1999). Whence cometh the myth that we only use 10% of our brains? In S. Della Sala (Ed.), Mind Myths: Exploring Popular Assumptions About the Mind and Brain (pp. 3-24). John Wiley & Sons. Bushman, B. J. (2002). Does venting anger feed or extinguish the flame? Catharsis, rumination, distraction, anger, and aggressive responding. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(6), 724-731. This study found that venting anger actually increases aggressive behavior and does not diminish anger. Derbyshire, S. W., Whalley, M. G., & Oakley, D. A. (2009). Fibromyalgia pain and its modulation by hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion: An fMRI analysis. European Journal of Pain, 13(5), 542-550. Horton, J. E., Crawford, H. J., Harrington, G., & Downs, J. H. (2004). Increased anterior corpus callosum size associated positively with hypnotizability and the ability to control pain. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 127(Pt 8), 1741-1747. Jensen, M. P., Adachi, T., & Hakimian, S. (2015). Brain Oscillations, Hypnosis, and Hypnotizability. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 57(3), 230-253. Kirsch, I. (1997). Suggestibility or Hypnosis: What Do Our Scales Really Measure? The International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 45(3), 212-225. Lilienfeld, S. O., Lynn, S. J., Ruscio, J., & Beyerstein, B. L. (2010). 50 Great Myths of Popular Psychology: Shattering Widespread Misconceptions about Human Behavior. Wiley-Blackwell. Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13(5), 585-589. doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(74)80011-3 Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720-725. doi:10.3928/0048-5713-19951201-07 Lohr, J. M., Olatunji, B. O., Baumeister, R. F., & Bushman, B. J. (2007). The psychology of anger venting and empirically supported alternatives that do no harm. Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice, 5(1), 53-64. This review challenges the catharsis hypothesis, providing evidence that venting may be harmful and not helpful. McGeown, W. J., Mazzoni, G., Venneri, A., & Kirsch, I. (2009). Hypnotic induction decreases anterior default mode activity. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(4), 848-855. Nielsen, J. A., Zielinski, B. A., Ferguson, M. A., Lainhart, J. E., & Anderson, J. S. (2013). An evaluation of the left-brain vs. right-brain hypothesis with resting state functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging. PLOS ONE, 8(8), e71275. Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2017). Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(6), 406-416. Raij, T. T., Numminen, J., Narvanen, S., Hiltunen, J., & Hari, R. (2005). Brain correlates of subjective reality of physically and psychologically induced pain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(6), 2147-2151. Schacter, D. L. (1996). Searching for memory: The brain, the mind, and the past. New York, NY: Basic Books. Schacter, D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and remembers. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Tavris, C. (1989). Anger: The misunderstood emotion. New York: Simon and Schuster. Tavris' work discusses the misconceptions surrounding anger, including the myth of cathartic expression.
In the first Pride Month episode, Rachael and Ruth discuss Cherry Magic, the BL phenomenon! When Adachi is still a virgin aged thirty, he discovers he can read minds - and his gorgeous colleague Kurosawa is in love with him. If that's not enough, Adachi's bestie Tsuge also has the power, and falls for his cute delivery boy. Will our wizards work it out? Contains chest infections, tangents and excessive Welshisms.
Usagi recounts the battle that cost Lord Mifune his life and, for the first time, reveals how he got the scar over his left eye. Nakamura Koji is on his warrior pilgrimage, honing his skill for the day that he can avenge himself on the one who bested him in a duel many years before. But he will never make it to that day unless he can defeat the Surudoi school of swordsmanship, who have ambushed him on this journey. In this fight, however, Koji will not be alone -- he is joined by Usagi Yojimbo --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/usagi-podjimbo/message
Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle. This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea. Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful. By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing. The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost. Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle. It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June. Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps. On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines. Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong. On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep” which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina. On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions. As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry. Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline. After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory.
Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Ichi-Go, the war in the Burma front and the war in New Guinea. Hundreds of thousands of IJA troops stormed countless areas in China. Chiang Kai-Shek was caught somewhat with his pants down, his best men were in Burma, there was little his defenders could do against such raw power. Xuchang fell and soon the Japanese were marching upon Luoyang. Over in Burma the British, Indian, American and Chinese alliance was continuing to both attack and defend. In the north Stilwell led the offensive, while Slim led the defensive in the south. The Chindits fought like lions to defend White City, but ultimately would give up strongholds to seek out new ones. Over in New Guinea the Japanese continued their frantic retreat under heavy pressure from the Australians. As bad as the situation was, the Japanese were in for another nasty surprise in Green Hell. This episode is the invasion of Western New Guinea Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we saw the effective conclusion of the Eastern New Guinea Campaign. It was a colossal campaign beginning with the Australian defense along the Kokoda Track, then the blood battle of Buna-Gona, the drive upon Lae-Salamaua, the march north upon the Huon Peninsula and Finisterres, and after taking Madang it was finally over. Yet while the book was closing upon Eastern New Guinea, the book on Western New Guinea was just about to be opened. The pace of the offensive against the Japanese in New Guinea accelerated greatly in the first half of 1944. This was primarily because General MacArthur feared unless he made quick progress he would lose the reins over where the allies would drive upon the Japanese home islands. MacArthur of course sought to advance upon the Philippines, while the Joint Chiefs favored the Navy's central thrust more so. Despite MacArthur's continuous war against his colleagues and superiors and his continuous complaining he lacked support, he had been provided the means to carry out numerous amphibious assaults that could lead to his ultimate goal. MacArthur's operations against New Britain, Saidor, Los Negros and Manus clearly indicated allied superiority over the Japanese in terms of men, ships and airpower. By April of 1944, MacArthur had nearly 750,000 men under his command. His major components were 6 US infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 3 separate regiment combat teams and 3 special brigades. The Australians were gradually being relegated into a secondary role, but could still provide 5 additional divisions and enough separate brigades to form another 2 divisions. General Kenney's air force had grown so large, they could now mount 200 aircraft raids against a variety of targets with little fear of Japanese retaliation. What MacArthur needed was more and more forward airfields so he could hurl fighters and bombers deeper into the Japanese inner perimeter. In a lot of respects, the Japanese position in New Guinea was all but hopeless. Although they still had more than 350,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific area, many were isolated with little chance of receiving reinforcements or supplies. There was also an enormous amount of confusion amongst the various commands, made difficult by enormous distance and the lack of effective naval power. Overall command of Japanese forces as far as Wewak was technically under Lt General Fusataro Tshima, whose HQ was at Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula. It was Tshima who ordered General Adachi to withdraw his 18th Army over to the Hollandia area. Fortunately for MacArthur, Adachi procrastinated heavily, believing a landing would be made at Hansa Bay. All of the heavy bombing by the 5th air force against the coast near Wewak supported his beliefs. Not too long ago we spoke about Operations Reckless and Persecution, the invasion of Hollandia and Aitape. Admiral Barbey had already departed the staging points and rendezvous northwest of Manus Island by April 20th. The large convoys sailed west from the Admiralty Islands until dusk, whence they turned southwest towards Hollandia. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 was providing escort while also launching strikes against Wakde, Sarmi and Sentani airfields on April 21st. Over the next three days the carrier aircraft neutralized the remaining airpower in the Wakde-Sarmi area. Early on the 22nd, the two task forces separated, with the Persecution Task Force heading southeast towards Aitape and the rest, designated Reckless Task Force, proceeded to a point 20 miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bay. Now the allied troops were ready to hit the beaches, but awaiting them was a large concentration of Japanese…however it was mostly a concentration of Japanese personnel rather than combat troops. While initial attention was focussed on the Geelvink Bay area, the 2nd Area Army command was also concerned over the weak condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which lay just east of the 140th meridian in the 8th Area Army zone of responsibility. An order to dispatch an element of the 36th Division to that sector was issued but was quickly revoked on the ground that it would weaken the defenses of Geelvink Bay without appreciably strengthening Hollandia. A large section of the New Guinea coast between Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically undefended. General Anami promptly dispatched a staff mission to 8th Area Army headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforcement of the Hollandia area, and a similar recommendation was communicated to Imperial General Headquarters during December. Two battalions of the 6th South Seas Detachment, temporarily stationed on Palau, were dispatched by the High Command. This force arrived in Hollandia on March 4, but numbered only 240 men, since approximately 1000 men, including the detachment commander, had been lost en route to submarine attacks. No other action was taken, however, since both 8th Area Army and 18th Army, after the loss of Finschhafen, were more immediately concerned with checking further enemy penetration of the Dampier Strait region. Thus roughly 10,000 IJA and 1000 IJN personnel were at Hollandia, most support units led by Major-General Kitazono Toyozo and aviation units from General Inada's 6th air division. When Tsihima ordered Adachi over to the Hollandia area and he procrastinated, this prompted the leader of the 2nd Area Army, General Korechika Anami over at Davao to become concerned. Anami sent his chief of staff over to Wewak to convince Adachi to pull out, but when Adachi finally began withdrawing, he only had two regiment on the trail by the time of the American landings against Hollandia and Aitape. Major General Toyozo Kitazono only arrived in the area 10 days before the invasion and for an unexplained reason never officially took command. This is why Tshima's appointed air officers, Inada ended up being thrown the command. Inada only really had 500 effective combat troops, mostly from the 6th South Seas Detachment. These units belonged to General Anami Korechika's 2nd Area Army, which had been transferred recently from Manchuria to oversee the defense of the eastern Dutch East Indies and western New Guinea, and for the projected and later canceled invasion of northern Australia. Random note, I recently made a Youtube short mocking that canceled australian invasion on my youtube channel, it was a wild idea. Thus Anami's command was now formally around the 2nd, 18th and 19th armies. Lt General Kitano Kenzo's 19th Army had been garrisoning Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumbawa, the Banda Sea Islands and some key points in Northwestern New Guinea with their HQ located at Ambon. Lt General Tshima Fusutaro's 2nd Army as I had mentioned was assigned overall defense of Western New Guinea, with Lt General Tagami Hachiro's 36th Division landing at Sarmi and Biak in early March and Lt General Ikeda Shunkichi's 35th Division preparing to come to Manokwari. The 14th Division originally part of the 2nd Army was diverted to defender Palau. Furthermore, to further support the 2nd Area Army was Vice-Admiral Endo Yoshikazu's 9th Fleet, three southern expeditionary fleets, and the 7th Air Division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. At Hollandia, the headquarters of Admiral Endo and Generals Kitazono and Inada had arrived at the same time by mid April. Though General Adachi had placed Kitazono in formal command of all units there, the transport commander had no time, as to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, thus as I previously mentioned, command really fell onto Inada and Endo. The Japanese would be woefully unprepared for what was to come. Over at Aitape, meanwhile, there were only a handful of replacements from the 20th Division, along with some naval and support personnel, so the situation looked even wrose for the 1000-man garrison. Preceding the amphibious assaults, Admiral Crutchley's surface fleet was going shell the Tanahmerah Bay area while Admiral Mitscher's carrier planes bombed the waters off the Tanahmerah beaches to explode possible mines, also finishing off the Hollandia airstrips and the remaining aircraft there. Crutchley's warships picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 6sm the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Australian destroyers. The fire continued until 6:45, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. As for the aerial strikes, despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were therefore canceled. Meeting little opposition, LCVP's carrying the first wave of the 19th and 21st Regiment approached Red Beach 2. As the leading wave of LCVP's, approached RED Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft,, of the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. Thus tactical surprise was achieved in Tanahmerah Bay, as the Japanese had only a few lookouts in the sector. General Irving's 24th Division successfully landed and the 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3rd ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3rd Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2nd ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Dépapré. Simultaneously, LVT's carrying Lt Colonel Thomas Cliffords 1st battalion, 21st Regiment crossed coral barrier reefs on their way to Red Beach 1. Cliffords men landed completely unopposed and would spend an hour trying to locate the road leading to Lake Sentani and her airfields. Clifford left A Company at the beach while the rest trekked it over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail at 8:37am, still encountering no enemy opposition whatsoever.Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had recently evacuated the village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford halted his men. Since radio communication with the division command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to push on. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantomé about noon. When Irving arrived to Red Beach 2 at 9;30am, he found a major logistical problem had formed at his main beachhead. Behind the narrow beach, a wide, impassable swamp was discover, it covered most of the area that the men had planned to use for the bivouac and supply dump area. Thus supplies soon began to pile up on the beach. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and supplies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was discontinued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D-Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immediately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D-Day. Additionally, a limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Eventually Irvings men found some dry flat dispersal areas behind the beach, allowing the supply shuttles to continue their work uncongested. Colonel Cliffords battalion would make the main thrust for the division while the remainder of Colonel Charles Lyman's 21st Regiment moved over to Red Beach 1. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. It was a fortunate decision, as around midnight elements of the 22nd Airfield Battalion had advanced overland around his 1st battalions outposts, striking at their left flank. Meanwhile, General Heavey's landing craft carrying the leading waves of the 162nd and 186th Regiments, supported by rocket fire and by Rear-Admiral Russell Berkey's cruisers, likewise met no Japanese resistance as they landed General Fuller's troops on the White Beaches. Company A of Colonel Harold Haney's 162nd Regiment rapidly secured Cape Pie while Company I of Colonel Oliver Newman's 186th Regiment secured Cape Tjeweri. With Jautefa Bay in hand, Newman's 3rd Battalion was then landed on White Beach 4 in preparation for an advance towards Leimok Hill and Pim. The first objective, Leimok Hill, lay 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3rd Battalion then established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. Over at White Beach 1, Haney's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly to take Pancake Hill at around 8am, only meeting sporadic rifle fire. After taking the hill, they began pushing up the shores of Humboldt Bay, encountering no resistance as they advanced upon Jarremoh Hill. It seemed clear to the Americans, the Japanese had been taken by complete surprise, not expecting an amphibious assault against Hollandia so quickly, so they had pulled back to the Sentani Lake Airfield sector. Now further south, Haney's 2nd Battalion were advancing to a track that connected Hollandia with Pim, trying to make contact with the 3rd Battalion over at Jarremoh Hill. Meanwhile Newman's 1st Batallion was advancing upon Leimok Hill. Though the men wanted to keep pushing towards Hollandia during the late afternoon, Fuller decided to dig in for the night while warships and artillery softened up the city. When General Anami over at his HQ in Manado heard of the invasion he immediately ordered the 23rd Air Flotilla of Rear-Admiral Ito Yoshiaki to toss whatever he could against the allied surface ships and force along the beaches. He also ordered the 18th army to break through Aitape to rush over and help the Hollandia garrison and for General Tshima to dispatch a regiment force as well to Hollandia. Thus General Tagami got his 224th regiment together for the advance to Hollandia, expecting to get there for early May, while General Nakai's 20th Division continued to close in on Aitape. Anami also wanted to send the main part of the 36th Division to perform a counterattack in Hollandia's direction as he thought it vitally important to delay the enemy as much as possible so a better defense of Western New Guinea could be organized. Yet General Terauchi Hisaichi of the Southern Army declined his request to do so on the basis a counteroffensive would simply denude the already weakened defenses of Western New Guinea. Meanwhile General Doe's Persecution Task Force was carrying out their landing against Aitape. The landings would be preceded by naval gunfire from Captain Albert Noble's Destroyer force, aerial bombardment from escort carriers of Rear Admiral Ralph Davisons Task Force 78 and from General Kenney's air force. Meeting zero resistance and under the cover of a rocket barrage, the LCPR's landed the men of Colonel Francis Mason's 163rd Regiment by 6:45. Despite the lack of resistance, an immense amount of smoke and poor visibility prevented the troops from landing at Beach Blue, and instead they came ashore at Wapil. Just like at Hollandia, they had achieved tactical surprise at Aitape as the Japanese fled in a panic under naval gunfire. Mason's got his 2nd Battalion to swing west and quickly seize the Waitanan Creek while the 1st battalion was being landed. Then the 2nd Battalion formed a defensive position at the Pro Mission while the 3rd Battalion sent patrols east to establish an outpost near the mouth of the Nigia River. Back over at the beaches, General Doe landed some Australian engineers who began repairing the Tadji Fighter airstrip. The No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1:00pm. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese opposition and the urgency of the task prompting General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D+1, terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 9:00 on April 24th before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 4:30pm, 25 P-40s of No. 78 Wing, RAAF, landed on the field, and the balance of the wing arrived the next day. The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until April 28th, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously. The works wing then moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 872nd and 875th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale of the RAAF, who, besides commanding the works wing, was Persecution Task Force Engineer. Extensive repairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until May 27th and for bombers until early July. While the engineers worked, Colonel Merle Howe's 127th Regiment also landed, while Mason's man expanded the perimeter further west, securing the incomplete Tadji west airstrip and the mouth of the Raihu River by the end of the day. Simultaneously, Colonel Cliffords men continued their advance from Kantomé to Sabron, whereupon, Fuller finally decided to launch his assault on Hollandia, with Colonel Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions rapidly moving down the ridge to seize the abandoned town by 11:15am. To the south, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion pursue the fleeing enemy, and in the process rapidly secured Brinkman's Plantation and then repelled a very uncoordinated Japanese counterattackby the 6th South Seas Detachment and General Kitazono's 42nd independent motor car battalion. At 8:00am on the23rd the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3rd Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 9am the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail southwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream-branching during the night of 23-24 of April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentani trail. Meanwhile General Inada's aviation personnel already at the Sentani airfield alongside those currently retreating there were cut off from their ration and ammunition supplies which happened to be stored near the coast. Facing the hopeless situation of having to conduct a proper defense of the airfields with less than a week's worth of rations, little small arms and machine gun ammunition, no artillery at all and with two different enemy forces converging upon them, General Inada seized full command and led the weak garrison to retreat towards Genjem. Their rear guard was proved by General Kitazono's troops. During that same afternoon, two platoons of Cliffords Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed a small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. In response to this, Irvings artillery and Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft began to bomb and strafe the area, but Cliffords B Company was nonetheless unable to break through. An artillery duel emerged during the night keeping the men of the 1st Battalion wide awake. They were also being supplies with great difficulty via hand-carry over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inland would be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Regiment had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by engineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. Because of the logistical issues, General Eichelberger decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing site, allowing the 41st division to drive further inland. On the 24th, Newman's 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st and seized the Koejaboe area, only stopping there until the 2nd battalion came over to reinforce the continued advance. During this action however, most of the Japanese continued their retreat towards Genjem unmolested. Over in the west, Irving ordered Clifford to consolidate his forward positions around Sabron and Dazai as he now realized the continued rapid advance inland was no long possible as a result of their hand-carry logistics scheme and the weather was taking quite a turn for the worse hampering air drops. Back over at Aitape, Mason's troops crossed the Raihu and by midday the 2nd Battalion secured the town. However General Doe was dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163rd's commander, Mason be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander remained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163rd Infantry began loading for another operation. For the next few days, the 163rd patrolled further inland and would fall into a heavy engagement at Kamti on the 29th. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the Raihu, elements of the 3rd Battalion encountered the only signs of organized Japanese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages, Kamti, some outpost troops of the 3rd Battalion were surrounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29th. These skirmishes cost the battalion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On the 25th, Colonel Lymann's two forward battalion resumed their march, heading through some dense jungle being met by sporadic enemy small arm fire. They eventually dug in around the vicinity of Julianadorp. Meanwhile Colonel Newman had his 3rd battalion advancing west along the main road to Nefaar while some LVT's transported his 1st battalion over Lake Sentani to a point on the western shore of Nefaar. Neither force faced much opposition and together would perform some patrolling of the Cyclops Drome during the afternoon. Back over at Aitape, Colonel Howe's 127th Regiment finished their occupation of Tumleo, Seleo and the Ali Islands and now were beginning to send patrols east towards Afua. On the 26th, Colonel Newman had his 1st Battalion seize the Cyclops Drome while his 2nd Battalion took some LVTS to capture the Sentani Drome. Shortly after midday both Battalions rapidly secured the airdromes under light enemy resistance. Despite a serious supply situation, Lyman's 1st and 3rd Battalion resumed the advance, only encountering one enemy bunker at Ebeli Plantation. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on April 25 and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were now knee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quickly improved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager supplies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. By the afternoon of the 26th, the Hollandia Drome was secured after a successful airdrop at Dazai. After this the objectives of Reckless had been achieved. Mop up operation would continue up until June 6th, as Fuller's 41st Division cleared out Cape Soedja and the Cyclops Mountain. They would end up flushing out Japanese on Hill 1000 and Irving's 24th Division sent out patrols west towards Marneda, Demta Bay and Gemjem. By 6 June the they had all killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japanese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. During the same time period, Eichelberger's task force would develop Hollandia into a major base from which future operations would be support. In the end casualties for Operation Reckless amounted to 124 deaths, 1057 wounded and 28 missing for the Americans. The Japanese suffered 3300 deaths, 661 captured. On April 30th, 7220 Japanese from Hollandia's garrison would assemble at Genjem where General Inada began a gradual withdrawal in 11 echelons towards Sarmi. By May 7th, all echelons departed Genjem for a very long march through some of the worst terrain in New Guinea. Two-thirds of the garrison reached the Tor River by June. It's estimated 93% of their strength would succumb to the deadly jungles, lack of provisions and rampant cases of malaria. Meanwhile to secure the Tadji airstrips against Japanese attacks from the direction of Wewak, Colonel Howe sent Company C by boat to Nyaparake on April 28th where they set up outposts further inland around Charov and Jalup. By May 4th, further patrolling by the 127th regiment had discovered no trace of organized enemy units, thus Operation Persecution was successfully completed. During the operation 525 Japanese were killed, 25 were captured while the Americans suffered 19 deaths and 40 wounded. That is all for the New Guinea front as we are now traveling over to New Britain. After the Battle of Talasea and the area was secured, Colonel Smith reached the conclusion that the enemy was withdrawing as rapidly as possible to Cape Hoskins. He decided to send patrols to Numundo Plantation. A reconnaissance patrol on March 10th found enemy positions at Bola and Santa Monica Plantation evacuated, but came upon entrenched enemy at Garilli. On 11th Captain Andrew Haldane's Company K left Bitokara with orders to proceed to Numundo on a three-day patrol, a time estimate that was to prove too optimistic. Company K reached Garilli to find it empty of the enemy, but just north of Patanga encountered Japanese small-arms, automatic-weapons and mortar fire. For four days the Marine patrol made slow progress, fighting an enemy who made a stand in the heavy vegetation approximately every 200 yards and then withdrew effectively before the advance guard flankers could close in. On the evening of the 16th the company entered Kilu where the Japanese made their final stand. While the two forces battled, a Marine landing craft appeared offshore and as it approached the beach the enemy diverted what apparently was a 75mm field gun from the ground action to the "naval force". In the boat was Lieutenant Colonel Deakin who had obtained permission from Colonel Smith to transport a section of 81mm mortars to Captain Haldane's assistance. Although the Japanese bracketed the craft, they failed to hit it and the weapons were landed without casualties. Shortly after the heavy mortars began lobbing shells toward the enemy, the Japanese broke contact and the Marines reached Numundo 48 hours later without finding the Terunuma Detachment again. The 1st Battalion also set up an ambush at Garu which was productive of enemy dead and prisoners for awhile. Company I replaced Company K at Numundo and in turn was replaced on 25 March by the 2nd Battalion. Inasmuch as the enemy continued to straggle eastward singly and in small groups with little or no communications, patrols were kept busy returning over and over again to the same villages and plantations in hopes of catching unwary Japanese. Such hopes frequently paid off. On the 30th the 2nd Battalion moved southeast from Numundo to San Remo Plantation, described by one Marine as "a very pleasant place." From that point patrols probed westward to the Kulu River and eastward into the Cape Hoskins area as far as Buluma. Overall the patrols saw 3 men killed with 8 wounded while accounting for 151 Japanese killed and 68 taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Matsuda, Komori and Terunuma;s Detachments all were performing withdrawals. Komori dispatched his force to the rendezvous point in successive echelons. He himself left Didmop with the rear guard, back on February 28th, reaching Augitni via Vakan on March 1st. The following morning he started his hospital patients along the evacuation route and sent a detail of 250 men to Bulawatni to help transport provisions. Yet the Marines at Iboki were becoming increasingly troublesome, though quite unaware that they faced anything more than starving stragglers. When Company A, 1st Marines entered Talawaga on the 5th, Colonel Sato felt the hot breath of pursuit on his neck and moved to the trail fork where he assumed command of the combined force. The next morning the Komori Group resumed its withdrawal in a northwesterly direction along the right prong of the trail fork, while Sato prepared to follow with his command on the 7th. At this point the ways of these two officers parted, and thenceforth each pursued his individual course toward the destiny that awaited him. On the 6th the Komori Group, with Major Tobuse's 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry in the lead, covered 16 km's on the trail running northeast from the fork toward the coast to reach what the Japanese called the "North Road." After the first day on the trail, Komori's progress becomes difficult to follow, owing to his use of place names occurring in no other reports or maps. It was slow and difficult at best, because of rain and mud, and the necessity for wide detours to find fords through deep streams and safe passages through or around extensive swamps. His immediate force numbered about 200, and on March 8th he recorded the Tobuse Battalion a half-day's march ahead. He sighted occasional enemy reconnaissance planes, and on the 12th U.S. landing craft fired upon his men as they attempted to cross the Kuhu River, obliging them to take to the jungle and swamps. The broad Via River stopped his force on the 14th. When improvised rafts refused to float, the major and 15 others swam across. The rest, through weakness or timidity, declined to follow this excellent example, and it took two days and a wide detour inland to get the whole group to the right bank. Then, on the 17th, provisions ran out. Thus the weakening men came by painful stages to Kometto (Eleanora Bay) and the welcome coconuts of Linga Linga Plantation on the 21st. But the wide Kapuluk River posed a formidable obstacle to further progress. They tried first to swim the Kapuluk near its mouth, but 18 men of the 2nd Company were swept away and 12 of them drowned, only the captain reaching the far bank safely. A patrol far upstream failed to find any fording point, so the troops spent the rest of the day building rafts. These managed to stay afloat, but broke apart so frequently that another two days were required for the passage. Then came the real heartbreaker on the 24th: they reached Kou only to find the provisioning post evacuated. On the 25th an officer patrol encountered a U.S. patrol, and once more the group had to detour. On the 26th Komori hired a native to guide him to Numundo Plantation, at the eastern base of the Willaumez Peninsula. But evidently the man had a change of heart, for the major recorded next day that, lacking a guide, "we advanced using a compass." They now entered a region of extensive swamps, intersected by another major obstacle: the two-pronged Kulu river. The column got across this stream on the 27th, but lost five more men in the swift current. The survivors emerged from the swamps on the 29th and followed the river southward. On the 31st Komori made his final diary entry, eloquent in its stark simplicity: "We are very tired and without food." Apparently at this point malaria laid the major low. Ordering his men to continue toward Cape Hoskins, he took refuge in a native village, accompanied only by his executive officer, his orderly and a corporal attached to his headquarters. For lack of further diary entries, obscurity shrouds the last week of his life. Most of the Japanese forces reached Malalia by the end of March, but Marine patrols were becoming increasingly troublesome. On the 11th, elements of the 1st Marines landed at Linga Linga, patrolling further inland. Company E landed at the Kulu River mouth at the base of Willaumez Peninsula. There the Marines encountered 4 enemy stragglers, killing three and taking one prisoner. Then they moved westward to Kandoka, where they were joined by two platoons of Company F, brought over by boat. There they established a roadblock, just in time to catch Sato's rear echelon. Second Lieutenant Richard B. Watkins was in command of the trail block. At 9am Watkins led his group inland from the village over some faint trails which he hoped the Japanese main body might be using. The Marines had proceeded about a mile and a half and were about to cross a stream in a sparsely wooded area when they sighted two Japanese standing with slung rifles, apparently resting. Watkins had about decided to dispose of these when they moved off in a northeasterly direction, followed almost immediately by a large body of their compatriots. Lying where the Japanese could easily have spotted them, the Marines counted the 73 enemy soldiers and noted the equipment cited above. Conspicuous among them was a tall, burly officer being carried on a litter. The Japanese were cutting fresh trail through the jungle, and fortunately were too intent on their work to discover the patrol. They made excruciatingly slow progress, however, and Watkins did not dare to move until the last man had disappeared. He then returned with all speed to Kandoka, sending a runner ahead with his report. At the village he met Major Brush who had come over from Yaluiai with one squad on what he had intended as merely a routine inspection. He promptly radioed his command post to send a rifle platoon and a 60mm mortar section to the scene and ordered Watkins to hold the trail block with one rifle squad, one machine-gun squad and two mortar squads while he himself set off with the rest of the troops available in an effort to overtake the Japanese from the rear. Before his own departure that morning, Watkins had sent a six-man patrol under Sergeant Frank Chliek to an inland village some two miles south of Kandoka, right where the Japanese appeared to be heading. The lieutenant promptly dispatched a native messenger there with a warning; then, when firing broke out in that direction, he surmised, correctly, that Chliek had become engaged and took the remaining rifle squad and hurried to his assistance. He arrived to find the sergeant and his men crouched on high ground by the east-west trail with dead Japanese all around them. The volume of fire was intense, the pattern not at all clear. As it turned out, Chliek had stumbled upon the column somewhere near its head and, taking advantage of his superior position, immediately opened fire. Major Brush's force, which had been closing rapidly, was on the opposite side of the valley at this time; hence, at sound of the first shots, had hastened to the scene and struck the Japanese column's other flank. In order to avoid becoming involved in a fire fight with that group, Watkins ordered Chliek's patrol back to Kandoka and followed with his own squad at a slower pace. Brush caught up with him shortly, whereat a counting of heads showed that, miraculously, the Marines had not sustained a single casualty. Here is the aftermath as Watkins recalls it: “On the following morning I took a 20 man patrol through the battle area. We counted 55 dead including 3 officers. It was quite easy to believe that perhaps 20 more died in scattered positions throughout the dense underbrush. The dead were all within a 100 yard stretch of trail. We encountered 2 more Japanese who had evidently just come upon the scene who were sitting side by side staring dazedly at the destruction and did not even turn their heads when we approached.” The burly officer previously observed on a litter proved to be Colonel Sato. Evidently Sergeant Chliek's patrol had struck the enemy column at precisely the point where he was being carried, for the colonel had only had time to leap to his feet and draw his sword to fight back before the Marines' fire riddled him. Seeing their leader fall, those Japanese farther forward took off in mad flight, while those behind were cut off by the converging of the two patrols. Thus perished one of the few Japanese to deserve much credit for the performance of the 65th Brigade on New Britain. Although the rear echelon attacked by the two patrols comprised less than half of Sato's total force, the group, as such, ceased to exist with the death of the leader who alone had held it together. Units split into components, these into smaller parties, straggling eastward over a variety of trails, often hacking their own way by compass azimuth. Throughout April, the 17th Division continued their retreat towards Rabaul, managed to repel multiple marine patrol attacks around Cape Hoskins. General Sakai's survivors finally got to Rabaul between April 16th and May 15th, erecting the last bulwark of defense for the South Pacific. On April 6th, the journey of another Japanese commander came to an end. The body of the already deceased Major Komori was captured at the San Remo Plantation by the 2nd Battalion, 5th marines. They came upon the outpost, suddenly face to face with a group of four bedraggled Japanese. It was one of those abrupt encounters that allow little time for reflection or deliberation. The flurry of fire that followed killed three of the enemy and wounded the fourth, who promptly surrendered. Komori had apparently died of malaria along the way. For the 5th Marines, too, was nearing its journey's end, so far as New Britain was concerned. With promotion of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buse took over on an acting basis, and General Smith returned to Cape Gloucester to relieve General Shepherd as Assistant Division Commander. Units attached to the regiment followed, and representatives of the Army's 185th Infantry arrived to inspect positions preparatory to replacing the 5th, just as other 40th Infantry Division elements were doing in the Cape Gloucester area with a view toward relieving the entire 1st Marine Division. Last clash of the campaign occurred onthe 22nd of April, when a 2/5 patrol intercepted a party of Japanese, killing 20, including two officers, and suffering the regiment's last fatality on New Britain. Three days later the whole 185th RCT moved into Talasea and San Remo, and at 1530 command of the area formally passed to the Army. LCM's carrying the 1st and 3rd Battalions back to Borgen Bay cleared Talasea at 1630, followed by those carrying 2/5 from San Remo at 2000. The movement was reported complete at 1930 on the 26th, and men of the 5th learned that the 1st Marines had departed this island of evil memory the previous day and that they would follow as ships became available. Soon they would be relieved by Major-General Isaac Rapp Brush's 40th Division, which took responsibility for Cape Gloucester, Arawe and Talasea by the end of April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus Operation Reckless and Persecution were both successful. Now MacArthur had a strong foothold in Western New Guinea seeing the Japanese continued their frantic retreat wherever allied forces seemed to pop up. Over in New Britain, the Japanese were losing formidable commanders as they too were on the retreat, things were simply disastrous for the empire of the rising sun.
Last time we spoke about the defense of India. General Mutaguchi's megalomaniac dream of invading India was tossed into motion. Battles were raging over countless features and against formidable allied boxes such as the Lion Box. Yet Mutaguchi had relied far too heavily on seizing the allied supply depots while promising his subordinate commanders they would have ample supplies for their tasks. Those like General Sato became so angry with their superior they pretty much were acting insubordinate. The effort to take Kohima fully and thrust into India was falling apart battle by battle. Meanwhile within China, General Chennault's 14th air force was causing major problems for the Japanese, forcing them into action. Operation Ichi-Go was formed, a colossal offensive to neutralize airfields and perhaps end the China Problem once and for all. Meanwhile the Royal Navy received some breathing room in the mediterranean sea and were now moving into the Pacific Theater. This episode is Operation Ichi-Go Unleashed Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Imperial Japanese Army, largely because of the losses incurred by the Imperial Japanese Navy and logistical constraints, was virtually powerless to stop the allied advance in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Imperial HQ predicted further losses in early 1944 and General Douglas MacArthur was expecting to sweep up the northern New Guinea coast so he could retake the Philippines. New Guinea was thus seen as a holding operation to delay the allied advance. With its shorter supply line, the Philippines was now being regarded as a good location to block MacArthur's advance towards the home islands. Everyone of course was still waiting for the decisive naval battle. But back on the mainland, the IJA were not dependent on the IJN, their logistical constraints were not the same at all. Hence suddenly in 1944, the IJA decided to unleash incredibly large and bold offensives in Burma, Northern India and of course in China. On New Years day of 1944, Chiang Kai-Shek cabled President FDR warning him that the strategy they and Stalin had agreed on at the Tehran Conference in November of 1943, fully emphasizing the European Front was leaving China open to a major attack. “Before long Japan will launch an all-out offensive against China.” Yet western intelligence disagreed with Chiang Kai-Shek's sentiment. While General Stilwell was completely focused on recapturing Burma, Chiang Kai-Sheks fears were about to be proven correct. In April of 1944, Operation Ichi-Go was launched. It was the largest military operation in Japanese history, it was also a last ditch effort to finally solve the so-called China Problem. It was obvious to the IJA, the IJN were losing the maritime war in the Pacific, thus they were determined to toss the dice in China. If they were successful, overland supply lines from Burma to Korea could be secured. In addition it would be a hell of a bargaining chip when negotiating with the Americans. If they could finally end Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang government, America would be facing the extremely formidable task of having to invade and reconquer China. Of course the immediate war aims were to knock out General Chennault's air force some he would not be able to bomb Formosa or the home islands. Emperor Hirohito recalled in his Dokuhaku Roku, post-war testament “One shred of hope remained—to bash them at Yunnan in conjunction with operations in Burma. If we did that we could deal a telling blow to Britain and America …” By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses. This would turn into 150,000 troops, and believe it or not that was the advance guard of a campaign that would eventually involve 500,000 troops. They would be supplied with enough ammunition for two years. The IJA air force amassed 200 bombers with enough fuel for 8 months to support them. Over the next 9 months, battles would be fought over 3 regions, Henan in central China to the east of Nanjing; Hunan and Guangxi in south China east of Hong Kong and Guangdong province and south of the Yangtze River. While Ichi-Go was unleashed, Chiang Kai-Sheks crack troops, the Y-Force based out of Yunan province, alongside Merrill's marauders were busy fighting alongside Stilwell in northern Burma. In spite of the efforts to keep Ichi-Go secret, during early 1944, the Chinese began fortifying their defenses and redeployed troops on a large scale to strengthen their frontlines. Chiang Kai-Shek knew something was coming, but his commanders believed a large-scale Japanese offensive in China was impossible by this point of the war. The Japanese began carrying out a heavy bombardment campaign, targeting Henyang, Guilin, Chongqing and against the heavy concentration of Chinese troops advancing in the Yangtze river area. The aerial attacks greatly hampered the KMT's logistical lines. The Chinese reacted by unleashing their frontline artillery, destroying the Bawangcheng bridge on March 25th. The Japanese hastily went to work repairing the bridge as Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro's 12th army would need to cross as pertaining to Operation Kogo. Kogo was the first phase of the battle aimed at opening the Pinghan Railway that ran from Beijing to northern Wuhan. South of Beijing is the Yellow River, that runs southwest to east. Uchiyama's plan was initially to cross the Yellow River and secure the Zhengzhou area before driving south towards the Luohe area, where the Japanese would ultimately prepare for a drive towards Luoyang. On the night of April 17th, the main part of the 37th division crossed the Yellow River and advanced towards Zhongmu. The Japanese rapidly penetrated the defenders positions, taking them by surprise. Three KM's in front of Zhongmu, they waited for the 7th independent Mixed Brigade to follow up behind them. The 7th Independent Mixed Brigade had crossed the Yellow River at the same time as the 37th Division, attacking the flank of the enemy facing the crossing point of the main body of the Brigade. Shortly after dawn the main body of the Brigade began crossing the river at a point near the left flank of the 37th Division. On the 19th, part of the 37th Division attacked Zhangzhou, completely routing the Chinese defenders while the bulk of the Division advanced towards Lihezhen. Meanwhile the 110th Division advanced upon Bawangcheng with the 62nd Division and 9th Independent Brigade following behind them. The 62nd Division was accompanied by the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade, setting out for Luohe with their tank support. The 110th División continued their advance towards Micunzhen, capturing the town by the 24th. On that same day the 9th Independent Brigade seized Sishuizhen, but would be unable to break through the 177th Division's defenses. After a breakthrough was made at Zhengzhou, the 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigades tanks advanced past the infantry to puncture the Chinese formations, forcing a quick rout. Meanwhile the 62nd Division, 37th Division and 7th Brigade reached the east-west line of Lihezhen and prepared for an assault on Xuchang. The Chinese simply were unable to respond to this. Chiang Kai-Shek and his commanders assumed this was a punitive expedition and that the Japanese would sooner or later turn back as they had always done in the past. As such, only the 15th and 29th Armies were sent to reinforce Xuchang to contain the Japanese offensive. Yet on the other hand, Uchiyama had also decided to divert his tanks and cavalry northwest, preparing for the future attack on Luoyang. On the 30th, Uchiyama's forces began attacking Xuchang, shattering the Chinese defenses at extreme speed and fully occupying the city by May 1st. The 62nd Division encountered the 15th and 29th Armies at Yingqiaozhen, battering them so heavily, the Chinese were unable to reinforce the vital railway. Two infantry battalions and one field artillery battalion of the 37th Division and the 27th Division departed Xuchang to continue marching south in order to re-open the Beijing-Hankou railway. The North China Area Army estimated that Tang Enbo would assemble his main force near Yehhsien, planning to advance to Yencheng and then wheel to the northwest in order to capture this force. However, the main force of the 31st Army Group of General Tang Enbo turned its advance to the north. The Area Army, therefore, changed its plan and decided to turn toward Loyang directly after the capture of xuchang, rather than to wait until Yencheng was captured. Yet we will have to wait until next week to find out what happens to General Tang Enbo's forces as we are now traveling over to Burma. Don't worry Operation Ichi-Go is just starting. After the capture of Walawbum in early March, General Stilwell ordered Merrill's Marauders to perform a wide envelopment, to cut the Kamaing Road behind General Tanaka's 18th Division while the 22nd Division with tank support drove down the Kamaing Road from the north. Two Marauder battalions led by Lt Colonel Charles Hunter set out on March 12th, reaching Janpan 4 days later. Once there they received new orders from Stilwell to head south through the hills along the Warong trail, then make their way to Kamaian to block the road at Inkangahtawng. Meanwhile Merrills 1st battalion and their Chinese allies were facing strong enemy resistance. From bivouac areas in the hills northeast of Shaduzup, on the Kamaing Road, the 1st Battalion of the 5307th, followed by the 113th Regiment, moved out on the morning of 13 March to put the northern clamp across the Kamaing Road just south of the Jambu Bum, in the vicinity of Shaduzup. I & R Platoons followed some fresh footprints into an enemy bivouac and stirred up a hornet's nest of Japanese. There was brisk skirmishing, and though the Americans managed to cross the Numpyek Hka just beyond, the Japanese had been alerted and proceeded to delay them expertly. Lieutenant-Colonel William Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, decided to cut a fresh trail around the Japanese. This was painfully slow business, and waiting for an airdrop took another day. On 22 March, when Colonel Hunter to the south was one day's march from his goal, aggressive patrolling by Red Combat Team revealed that the Japanese had blocked every trail in the area through which Osborne had to pass, so again Osborne elected to make his own trail, this time over ground so rough that the mules had to be unloaded. The maneuver succeeded, and no Japanese were seen on 23 or 24 March. Osborne's march would have been greatly aided had he known Tilly's Kachin Rangers were in the same general area. By March 22nd they reached Hpouchye. Additionally the 22nd Division and Colonel Browns tanks had been halling it through the Jambu Bum, making slow progress against heavy enemy resistance because of a lack of tank-infantry coordination. It was difficult to coordinate infantry and tank action, because the tankers found it hard to distinguish their countrymen from the Japanese. A few such cases of mistaken identity and the 22nd's men were understandably reluctant to get too close to the tanks. I remember a circumstance in WW1, when the IJA were laying siege to the German concession of Tsingtao. There was a small British force sent to aid the Japanese and so much friendly firing occurred, the IJA forced the Brits to wear their greatcoats to distinguish them from the Germans. So you know, it happens. By March 20th, Stilwell's forces crossed the ridge, reaching Hkawnglaw Hka, but yet again the lack of tank-infantry coordination led them to pull back. Once over the Jambu Bum, the 22nd found the road down to be mined and blocked with fallen trees. Two days were lost in clearing the road, and then three battalions made a frontal attack, guiding on the road. Next day they tried a co-ordinated tank-infantry attack and the leading tank platoon reached the Hkawnglaw Hka about four miles south of Jambu Bum, destroying a few machine guns and taking four antitank pieces. But the infantry would not follow the tanks and dug in two miles short of the stream. The tanks patrolled till dark, then fell back to their own lines. Over in the east, Hunter's men departed Janpan and reached Inkangahtawng on March 23rd, setting up two road blocks. Hunter sent out patrols and quickly discovered Kamaing was wide open, yet the delay of Stilwell's others units would force General Merril to deny any attempts to attack south. Tanaka's reaction to the roads blocks were pretty intense. Beginning on he 24th, vigorous Japanese counterattack followed on another. The Morita Unit, about two companies strong were a hastily assembled force drawn from a battalion gun platoon, an engineer company, a medical company, and division headquarters; they were given two 75-mm. guns, placed under command of the 18th Division's senior adjutant, and rushed south to Inkangahtawng. Tanaka also ordered the 2nd battalion, 114th Regiment over at Kamaing to attack north along the Kumon Range. The attacks were so intense, Hunter's men were forced to pull back to the Manpin Area by March 24th. Meanwhile, Merrill's 1st Battalion advanced to Chengun Hka, placing them really close to Tanaka's headquarters at Shaduzup. To the north, the 64th and 66th Regiments managed to link up, but the relentless Chinese assaults continued to fail against the tenacious defenders costing the attackers many tanks and lives. It was the 2nd battalion, 66th's turn to lead on 21 March. Again the tanks got well ahead of the infantry. A combination of ambush and counterattack by the Japanese cost five tanks, and then the Japanese came on up the road, almost overrunning the battalion headquarters, which was saved by the courage of two engineer platoons that had been clearing the road. That night the 1st battalion, 64th, which had been making the enveloping move, came in from the east and cut the Kamaing Road, right in the segment held by the Japanese. A tank attack on the 23rd found Japanese antitank guns just south of a small stream north of the Hkawnglaw Hka that prevented the tanks from outflanking the position. The guns knocked out the three lead tanks in quick succession, blocking the road. After heavy fighting at the stream crossing, the tanks finally had to withdraw, leaving the derelicts. In the afternoon the two flanking battalions made their way up the road and joined the 66th. Unfortunately, the meeting of the 64th and 66th Regiments did not signal the end of Japanese resistance. Japanese and Chinese positions on the road were thoroughly intermingled, making movement in the immediate area extremely hazardous. An attempt to break the deadlock with the tanks failed when the device chosen to identify the Chinese infantry backfired. Both the Chinese and the Japanese waved white cloths at the tanks. The armor moved blithely on into a nest of Japanese antitank men, who destroyed five tanks with magnetic mines, effectively blocking the road. General Liao, the 22nd Division's commander, now cut a bypass road for the tanks around his west right flank. A tank platoon tried it, could not cross a ravine improperly prepared for tank crossing, came under artillery fire, and had to be withdrawn. General Liao then committed his 65th Regiment to the main attack, applying immense pressure, prompting Tanaka to order his frontline regiments to withdraw 10 kilometers. On March 28th, Merrill's 1st Battalion established themselves along the Nam Kawng Chaung on the Japanese rear, from where they would be able to attack Tanaka's headquarters. Surprised, the Japanese chose to bypass the roadblock and evacuated their position via a track to the west. This resulted in Japanese resistance softening up, allowing the 65th Regiment to secure Shaduzup by March 29. At the same time, Hunter's encircled Marauders were fiercely resisting the enemy attacks at Nhpum Ga, with his 3rd Battalion subsequently taking up positions at the Hsamshingyang airstrip to the north. The men were extremely fatigued, facing constant marches, dysentery, malaria and malnutrition. They fought on for 5 days under constant attack, successfully pushing back the relentless Japanese assaults. On its hilltop the garrison, though suffering no shortage of food or ammunition, aside from the monotony of diet which was itself a hardship, suffered from an acute shortage of water. There were no plaster casts for the wounded, and they took their sulfadiazine dry. The pack animals could not be protected from the Japanese fire. When dead, their carcasses could not be buried, and the stench and the carrion flies added more miseries to the battle. Sergeant Matsumoto, who had played an important part at Walawbum, was a pillar of strength to the garrison, constantly scouting between the lines, overhearing Japanese conversations, and informing Colonel McGee accordingly. On one occasion, when Matsumoto learned of plans to surprise a small salient at dawn, the Americans drew back their lines, booby-trapping the abandoned foxholes. Punctually the Japanese attacked, straight into the massed fire of the waiting Americans. Throwing themselves into the foxholes for cover, they set off the booby traps. Matsumoto completed the debacle by screaming "Charge!" in Japanese, causing a supporting platoon to throw itself on the American guns. An ailing General Merrill would be evacuated to Ledo, leaving Colonel Hunter to assume formal command of the Galahad Unit. He then sent his 3rd Battalion to counterattack, unsuccessfully attempting to clear the trail as the Japanese repelled all his assaults. Finally on April 4th, Hunter got a breakthrough. The Japanese were believed to be moving ever more troops up the Tanai and it was believed that the 1st Battalion, which had been ordered to aid, would not arrive for four more days at least. Hunter's reaction was to attack on the 4th with everyone but the sick and the mule skinners, with his large patrols called in and Kachins used to replace them. A fake fight, using carbines, which sounded like the Arisaka rifle, was staged to deceive the Japanese, and the air support made three passes at them. The first two were genuine, the last a feint which made the Japanese take cover, only to come out and find the American infantry on them. Hunter's force gained that day and came within 1,000 yards of the besieged. About this same time Capt. John B. George and a small party, sent north by Hunter to find the Chinese regiment which Hunter understood would support him in this area, met the 1st battalion, 112th regiment at Tanaiyang, about eight miles northeast. After an interval, presumably used to obtain permission to do so, its commander moved toward Hsamshingyang. His first element arrived at the airfield on 4 April and was used to guard a trail junction. Despite this increasing pressure the Japanese made a very heavy attack on the Nhpum Ga garrison, actually reaching the foxholes at one point, and being driven out by two soldiers using hand grenades. Over the next few days, the Marauders were reinforced by the 112th regiment and Merrill's 1st battalion, allowing Hunters men to crawl closer and closer to Nhpum Ga. By Easter Sunday, the Japanese vanished, leaving cooking fires and equipment. There was no pursuit, as Stilwell wanted no movement beyond Nhpum Ga as they were facing large supply issues at this time. The battalion of the 114th made its way to Myitkyina, where General Tanaka, anxious about the town, added it to the garrison. The 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, however, withdrew towards the vicinity of Warong. The Marauders had suffered 59 deaths and 314 wounded during the Inkangahtawn roadblock engagement and the siege of Nhpum Ga. The Galahad Unit and 114th regiment suffered so heavily from exhaustion, the men would be very weakened for future engagements. Further to the south, Stilwell was concerned about the recently offensives aimed at Imphal and Kohima, but he was relieved somewhat, when at the Jorhat conference of April 3, attended by Slim, Lentaigne, Stilwell and Mountbatten, he was told the situation was under control and for him to continue his northern offensive. During the conference, Slim also notified the others he had decided to divert the Chindits 14th and 111th Brigades, further south to help out his 4th Corps. However Brigadiers Fergusson and Calvert argued strongly against it, not wanting to get tangled up in the battle for Imphal. Calvert instead wanted to preserve White City and Broadway whilst Fergusson wanted another attempt at Indaw. The Chindits were still formally under the command of Stilwell in May and he wanted them to hold firm at Indaw to prevent the flow of Japanese reinforcements going north. It was estimated the Chindists could endure roughly 90 days of this action and would need to pull out my mid-June. This estimation did not sit well with Stilwell. General Lentaigne wanted to abandon the strongholds around Indaw and move north closer to Stilwell's forces. Therefore, Calvert's brigade would be prepared to open the drive to the town of Mogaung by attacking Mohnyin. Before this could occur, General Hayashi would initiated a general attack against White City on the night of April 6. The attack began with a three hour artillery bombardment, then the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Regiment; and 3rd battalion, 114th Regiment stormed Calvert's defenses. When the shelling died away, Hayashi's three infantry battalions attempting to punch a hole along the southeast perimeter of the stronghold, defended by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Gurkhas, and other West Africans of the 6th Nigerian Regiment. Secure behind a row of machine guns with a line of mortars behind them, the defenders opened fire. Bullets and projectiles whipped through the air, the bright flashes of tracers lending an ethereal air to the proceedings. Rounds poured into the attacking Japanese who began to suffer heavy casualties. Determined bands of Japanese brought up Bangalore torpedoes to destroy the wire, but all malfunctioned. The battle went on for most of the night. The Chindits fought like lions throughout the night and managed to toss back numerous enemy attacks. Then to their dismay 27 IJA medium bombers appeared, blowing holes in the wire. The Bofors engaged them, shot down six and claimed six probables. Desperate efforts were made to repair the defenses before the next attack came in. White City received over 100,000 yards of barbed wire and 600 50ft coils of Dannert wire. The wire was 20 yards thick in places and festooned with mines and booby-traps. Dakotas continued to pour reinforcements into White City. The transport planes were relegated to flights during dawn and dusk times, but they kept coming, concentrating reinforcements at White City. Fresh companies of troops materialized to take up station, until in the words of Lt. Norman Durant of the South Staffords, the place was a “complete babel, for it contained British troops, West Africans, Chinese, Burmans, a New Zealand RAF officer, Indians, and an American Neisei who acted as interpreter, or better said interrogator of prisoners. Large groups of West Africans from the 7th and 12th Nigerians landed, filling out the columns and battalions already at White City. As the planes continued to bring in reinforcements, Calvert managed to muster roughly seven battalions in and around “White City” against Hayashi. Over the next few nights, Calvert's defenders continued to repel Hayashi's attacks, until he was finally relieved by Brigadier Abdy Rickett's 3rd West African Brigade on April 10th. This allowed Calvert to lead a strike force against Hayashi's HQ at Mawlu from the south. While the Japanese continued their onslaught of White City, Calvert's strike force advanced to Thayaung, before effortlessly seizing Sepein on the 13th. Then the 7th Nigerians fell upon Mawlu, prompting the HQ staff to flee south in a rout. With Mawlu now in their hands, the Nigerians soon found themselves under heavy fire, pinned down for the next four hours under relentless Japanese firing and dive-bombing by Japanese aircraft that put in a surprise appearance. Soon, the Gurkhas at Sepein also reported that they were under fire from the main Japanese positions at the edge of the village, hidden under mounds of flowering lantana scrubs. The sight was inordinately beautiful and lethal, concealing hordes of Japanese infantry, whose gunfire twinkled through the red, yellow, purple and green of the scrub. Three Gurkha ground attacks failed to dislodge the defenders and the men were becoming dispirited. Calvert decided to withdraw. As dusk settled at Mawlu, Vaughn began to pull his troops out of Mawlu and under the cover of a mortar barrage, taking with him a large collection of vital documents and an even larger trove of Japanese ceremonial swords and military equipment, which would serve as presents for Air Commando and RAF aircrews at White City. While this was going on, Brigadier Brodies 14th Brigade were advancing to the Wuntho-Indaw railway where they managed to successfully attack the main bridge close to the Bonchaung Station, interdicting the 15th Division's lines of communication. To the northeast, Morris Force captured Myothit on April 9 and then continued to set up ambushes on the Bhamo-Lashio Road. Back at White City, Calvert decided to try and get behind the enemy from the flanks and hit them from the rear, pinning them against the stronghold's wire. On the night of April 16, the Nigerians prepared an ambush on the Mawlu-Henu road, subsequently killing 42 Japanese. Yet realizing his strike force had trapped 2000 Japanese, Calvert ordered his men to infiltrate forward while the West Africans at White City launched an attack. This was met by a vicious and chaotic Japanese response as Hayashi's men tried to break free. During these actions its estimated the Japanese suffered 700 casualties while Calvert suffered 70 men dead with 150 wounded. The last Japanese attack against White City occurred on April 17th. After this Calvert felt he could hold White City indefinitely, but Lentaigne was concerned with the looming monsoon season, so he ordered White City and Broadway to be abandoned on May 3rd in favor of a new stronghold codenamed Blackpool. The site chosen for Blackpool originally codenamed “Clydeside” was a stretch of hilly ground by the railway, near the village of Namkwin, some 32 km southwest of Mogaung. There was water and suitable places to build an airstrip and deploy the 25-pdr artillery guns when they got them. Beyond a large tract of paddy was a hill, which the troops christened “Blackpool Hill” which curved like the sharp-spined back of a wild boar, with the head down, fore-arms and legs extended sideways. The Blackpool position effectively blocked the railway and main road at Hopin, drawing closer to Stilwells forces. The 11th Brigade had already been dispatched to the north to establish Blackpool. The now rested 16th Brigade managed to capture the Indaw West airfield by April 27th, facing no opposition. Ferguson noted, “This second approach to Indaw was an anti-climax, and for two reasons. First, just before we went in we were told that even if we captured the airfield of Indaw West, no troops, no divisions would be available from India for flying in: all hands and the cook, it seemed, were tied up in the great battle for Manipur. We were to capture the field for two or three days and then to abandon it…. Secondly, it was early apparent that the birds had flown. The Queen's got right on to the airfield without a shot being fired.” Lentaigne also decided to abandon the Aberdeen stronghold, evacuating Ferguson's men along with other units. Meanwhile, by the end of April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also decided that capture of Myitkyina was of vital importance to increase the Hump tonnage. This of course was heavily influenced by the new opportunity for land-based bombers in Chinese airfields to bomb Formosa, the Ryukyu islands, the philippines and the eastern Chinese coast. Now to capture the Moguang-Myitkyina area, Stilwell would receive the Ramgarh-trained 30th Division,the 50th and 14th Divisions, all of which were airlifted over the Hump in April. Stilwell's plan was to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. The final directive on the 23rd, was for the 22nd Division to attack, rather than hold, and to swing the 64th and 65th Regiments around General Tanaka's left flank, while the 66th Regiment fought down the road. Once again the 112th was told to block off Kamaing from the south. The orders directed the "22nd and 38th to be in Pakhren and Lawa areas by April 27. As Stillwell would remark in his diary “Now I've shot my wad,". Meanwhile the Marauder-Chinese force, now codenamed End Run would sneak east over the Kumon Range to attack Myitkyina directly. Tanaka's mission at this point was to hold Kamaing with all his strength until the rainy season while the 53rd Division, led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro moved to reinforce him. Elements of the 53rd Division began to sprinkle into the Indaw Area, but the Japanese HQ for northern Burma, from the newly activated 33rd Army led by Lt General Honda Masaki could not decide to commit them towards either Kamaiang or Myitkyina. Thus Tanaka's hopes for a counterattack were lost. Tanaka received two understrength regiments, the 146th and 4th in April and May, both of whom had suffered terrible losses against the Chindits the previous month. By mid-April General Sun's 38th Division was assembling in front of Tingring with the 114th regiment locked down in a fight with Tanaka's 55th regiment. After a visit to the Sun's command post on April 11th, Stilwell wrote in his diary: "At least it looks like a start! The piled-up inertia is terrible. . . ." On the next day the 114th Regiment relieved the 113th on the line of three villages all named Tingring. This move placed the 114th and 112th in line, the 112th to the east forming with its lines a small salient about Nhpum Ga. The 114th Regiment was operating in rugged terrain which was almost as much an obstacle as the delaying positions directly about Kamaing defended so skillfully by the Japanese. On at least one occasion the 114th lost its way and had to be located by aerial reconnaissance. The battle raged so heavily, it forced the 55th regiment to pull back, while the 114th regiment fought a Japanese rearguard from Hill 1725. By April 20th, they finally secured Tingring and quickly began a march south. On April 23, Stilwell ordered Liao to commence the drive south from Warazup, with the 22nd Division trying to make their way along Tanaka's extreme left flank. The Chinese forces were advancing slowly however, very apprehensive because Chiang Kai-Shek had ordered Generals Sun and Liao to be as cautious as possible. And that is all for today on the Burma front as we now need to jump over to New Guinea. The last time we were talking about New Guinea, General Shoge's 239th regiment at Madang were getting ready to cover the continued Japanese retreat to Hansa and Wewak. On the other side, General Vasey's men were in hot pursuit. To the east, the 58th/59th battalion and Shoge's 3rd Battalion were patrolling extensively in the Bonggu-Melamu area, playing a sort of game of hide and seek. Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun, Rereo and Redu areas. There were also several clashes. For instance, on March 26, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the main trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north. Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brush was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage. Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for about five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen, in the leading section, was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head with the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probably being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than what was inside it. This would all last until April 11th, when the Japanese had finally withdrawn back to Madang. To the west, the 57/60th Battalion departed from Kwato on April 5 to rapidly secure Aiyau. From there they immediately sending patrols towards the Bogadjim Plantation. At this point, however, General Morshead had finally decided that it was time for Vasey's 7th Division to get some rest, so General Boase's 11th Division would assume responsibility for all units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres on April 8. Over at Atherton, General Herring had also retired in February, so General Savige had been appointed to command his 1st Corps. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarney had written to the Minister for the Army: “Two officers have been considered for this vacancy, Major-General S. G. Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey. Both have been very successful in command in New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommendations to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement to higher responsibilities. Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recommend that Major-General S. G. Savige be appointed.” The significance of Blameys final sentence is a matter for speculation. It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in command was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recently become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. Alongside this Blamey also decided to do a changeover of corps HQ, seeing Savige take over 2nd Corps in the New Guinea front On April 10, the 57/60th then managed to break through the Japanese bridge positions to the high ground beyond at Bau-ak while patrols reconnoitered Bwai on the Gori River. The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two step heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down the road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remainder of the company encircled the enemy position to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men killed and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's platoon in the lead clambered into position and , later in the day, clashed with the enemy in a garden area on one of the spurs. For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting with machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there were no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6 only bloody bandages and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, the last high ground overlooking Bogadjim. Two days later, Brigadier Hammer sent strong patrols forward to Bogadjim and Erima, which found no enemy resistance in front and managed to secure both important hubs by April 15. At this point, while the 18th Brigade began to be evacuated back to Australia, Brigadier Hammer decided to withdraw the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Commando Squadron, as the 57/60th would be the only one to continue the advance to Madang. On April 17, however, General MacArthur instructed Savige that a brigade from General Ramsay's 5th Division should relieve the 32nd Division at Saidor in preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape operation's, so the 8th Brigade and portions of the 30th Battalion would be flown to Saidor five days later. Thus the 300 odd troops were carried over to Bogadjim as Savige ordered the 15th BRigade to rest up and for the 30th battalion to take Madang. Hammer was anxious to get there first, so he had immediately dispatched patrols to Amele and Madang on April 20th. Shoge was able to fully evacuate Madang and join his comrades as they fled for Hansa. Amele was secured by the 24th, but the Australians would find it very difficult to cross the Gogol River afterwards. After this the 30th battalion and Hammer's patrols landed at Ort and resumed their advance. Both units cleared the Japanese from the Huon Peninsula, before entering an abandoned Madang. During the Australian advance an enemy mountain gun fired a dozen shells, and there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenade explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea. In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the 18th Army as it left its great base of Madang which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly some demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese. The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable; the harbor was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbor. The Australian advance through the Markham, Ramu and Faria Valleys was a tremendous ordeal. The 7th division suffered between September 18, 1943 and April 8, 1944 204 killed and 464 wounded while it was estimated the Japanese suffered 800 killed, 400 wounded and 800 died from disease. The occupation of Madang ended the Huon Peninsula and Ramu Valley campaigns. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 5th Division assembled at the Madang-Bogadjim area, fanning out patrols to the west and sending small detachment of the 30th Battalion to land on small islands off the coast, preparing a future advance against Alexishafen. Shoge's detachment rejoined its parent division, the the 41st Division over at the Hansa area, allowing General Katagiri's 20th Division to continue their advance to Wewak. The 51st Division who had already arrived at Wewak got to watch the allied airshow as Hansa and Wewak we bombed without mercy, seeing countless barges destroyed. This would hamper Katagiri's efforts to cross the Ramu and Sepik Rivers. Meanwhile General Nakai came across an alternative route in late April known as the Wangan-Garun–Uru-Kluk-Bien-Marienburg-Kaup route. This allowed the 20th Division to resume their march to Wewak. On April the 29th a barge carrying Katagiri was intercepted by a PT boat. General Katagiri was killed in the engagement, leaving Nakai to assume formal command of the Division. After May 1, the 41st Division then began to follow Nakai's route across the river, with all Japanese units leaving Hansa by May 15th and finally arriving at Wewak at the end of May after a 20-day movement. Meanwhile General Adachi's plan for the coming weeks of April was for the 20th Division to immediately head towards Aitape, while the 51st Division would reinforce Hollandia once the 41st Division had reached Wewak. As such, a force was created around the 66th regiment led by Major-General Kawakubo. They were dispatched on April 19th, but would fail to arrive on time and would have to turn back to defend Wewak. Additionally, Adachi personally sent a part of his units under direct command to reinforce Hollandia. Now after the neutralization of Hollandia and the Palaus, General Teramoto's remaining air units would have to move over to Manado and Genjem on April 15th, leaving only 25 serviceable aircraft from Major-General Inada Masazumi's 6th Air Division at Hollandia. After April 3rd, although plagued by bad weather, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. There would be only one resurgence of air opposition, on April 11th. The Japanese 14th Air Brigade staged a small fighter force to Wewak which, despite the loss of a Tony to the 8th Fighter Squadron, shot down three P-47s of the 311th Fighter Squadron, a new organization that had lately arrived from the United States and had only begun operations at Saidor on April 7. The enemy force perhaps had withdrawn to Hollandia by the next day, because some twenty enemy fighters pounced on a straggling B-24 there and shot it down. Aerial gunners of the 403rd Bombardment Squadron claimed destruction of one of the interceptors, and the 80th Fighter Squadron claimed eight others destroyed. In this action, Captain Richard I. Bong scored his twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh aerial victories, thus topping the score of twenty-six victories established by Rickenbacker in World War I. Promoted the same day to major, Bong was taken out of combat and returned to the United States on temporary duty at the suggestion of General Arnold, who feared adverse reaction among younger pilots if Bong were to be lost in combat after establishing such a record. Three were also small night attacks, combining 5th Air Force Liberators with Navy PB4Y's and Catalinas, made against Wakde Island during the early morning hours of 6, 13, and 16 April. These attacks seem to have been more profitable than similar missions against the Sentani airfields, probably because Wakde was only a small island easily identified by radar and so jammed with military objectives that a hit anywhere would be damaging. A captured Japanese diary recorded that the 6 April raid killed eleven men, destroyed a barracks, cratered the runway in five places, and destroyed or severely damaged ten planes. A daylight attack against Wakde by seven squadrons of Liberators was scheduled for 6 April, but weather forced its cancellation. The 24th and 41st Divisions were also carrying out their last rehearsals for Operation Reckless. Allied ground and amphibious forces had been engaged in final preparations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incomplete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea. The Final loading began on April 10th, with the LCIs leaving their loading points six days later in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admiralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, and eating. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force, meanwhile, moved out of the Finschhafen area on April 18 and on the same day rendezvoused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division towards the Admiralties. All convoys under Admiral Barbey then moved north around the eastern side of the Admiralties and, at 7:00 on April 20th, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Thus, all seemed ready for the beginning of another amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Imperial Japanese Army tossed a final hail mary attempt to improve the war situation with the grand Ichi-Go offensive. If they could manage to seize their objectives, this would perhaps give them a better hand at the negotiating table. Because the allies certainly would not be keen on having to liberate most of China, it was a very bold strategy.
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Join us in this week's episode of the Empower LEP Collaborative Podcast, where hosts Jana Parker and Bethany Zoeller welcome Laurie Adachi, a distinguished educational psychologist with over 27 years of experience. Laurie shares her journey from school psychology to establishing her thriving practice, Compassionate Solutions, where she specializes in assessments and counseling for a diverse age group, from preschoolers to adults.Laurie's practice is particularly noted for its focus on clients with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), behavior issues, and anxiety, including PTSD. Compassionate Solutions offers a comprehensive range of services above and beyond educational assessments with specialists in marriage and family therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and psychological counseling as well. With the practice continuing to grow, Laurie's recent expansion includes the addition of two more Licensed Educational Psychologists (LEPs) and an imminent addition of a Speech Therapist, broadening the scope and impact of her practice.Laurie shares her experiences and strategies for building a successful private practice, emphasizing the importance of networking, effective online presence, and continuous learning and adaptation in the ever-evolving field of educational psychology.We know listeners will appreciate Laurie's wealth of knowledge and find inspiration as your own LEP story unfolds. Join us for more episodes that aim to empower, educate, and unite the LEP community.Connect with Laurie AdachiCompassionate Solutions Website: compassionatesolutionsscv.comFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/laurieadachitherapyInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/laurie_edupsych/Jana Parkerhttps://empowerlep.comInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/EMPOWERLEPFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/EmpowerLEPand the Empower LEP Facebook GroupBethany Zoeller https://lepcollaborative.comand the LEP Collaborative Facebook GroupThe website for this show is https://empowerlepcollaborative.com
This week, we are joined by poker player and broadcaster Jeff Platt. We also welcome up and coming Irish phenom Simon Wilson. For strategy, we've got Kyna England breaking down a hand of hers from the Game of Gold final table. Shimpei Adachi stops by to discuss poker in Japan. Plus, Barry Carter casts his sartorial eye over the latest news.
You can find our social media pages on Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/JayNbaypodcast/Twitter: @JayNBaypodcastInstagram: jayandbayneighborgamers
In this episode of The Unfinished Print, I speak with Henry Smith, Professor Emeritus in the Dept. of East Asian Languages & Cultures at Columbia University. Together we delve into the scientific aspects of Meiji woodblock prints, exploring the trajectory of Nishiki-e during the late Edo and Meiji eras. Additionally, we examine the significance of cochineal and naphthol dyes, and scrutinize particle sizes. Henry's scholarly contributions include groundbreaking articles on subjects such as Hokusai and the Blue Revolution, with the introduction of Prussian Blue to the Japanese woodblock aesthetic during the mid to late Edo Period. Join me in discovering how Henry's passion drew him into the enchanting world of Meiji woodblock prints, as we navigate the influence of Western collectors in Meiji Japan, exemplified by figures like English s urgeon William Anderson. Henry helps me in understanding the rich palette and the science behind Meiji prints, shaped by the infusion of imported dyes and pigments. Please follow The Unfinished Print and my own mokuhanga work on Instagram @andrezadoroznyprints or email me at theunfinishedprint@gmail.com Notes: may contain a hyperlink. Simply click on the highlighted word or phrase. Artists works follow after the note if available. Pieces are mokuhanga unless otherwise noted. Dimensions are given if known. Publishers are given if known. The funeral procession of Meiji Emperor at Nijubashi designed by Yasuda Hanpo (1889-1947) Columbia Academic Commons Professor Henry Smith's article on the Japanese Student movement, here. Peter Gluck - is an American architect who has won multiple awards and has designed buildings all over the world. He is the principal of GLUCK+, an architecture firm based in New York City. Professor Carol Gluck - is a Special Research Scholar and George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Department of History at Columbia University. She has written multiple books and articles on Japanese history. Jane Jacobs (1916-2006) - an American-Canadian journalist, activist who had written extensively on the life and death of North American cities such as New York City, and Toronto. Her book The Death And Life Of Great American Cities, is considered a classic in urban planning for the modern city and its subsequent decline. Robert Venturi (1925-2018) - was an American architect and theorist known for his contributions to postmodern architecture. He, along with his partner and wife Denise Scott Brown, played a key role in shaping architectural discourse in the late 20th century. Venturi challenged the modernist principles that dominated architecture at the time, advocating for a more inclusive and eclectic approach. His book, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966) was where he critiqued the rigidity of modernist architecture and championed a more diverse and contextual approach to architecture. Metabolism (Japan) - The Metabolism movement was characterized by a group of young Japanese architects and designers who sought to address the challenges of rapid urbanization and rebuilding after World War II. Key principles and concepts of Metabolism in Japanese architecture are megastructures, prefabrication and modularity, biology and organic growth, and technological innovation. One special notable example of Metabolist architecture was the now demolished Kisho Kurokawa's Nakagin Capsule Tower in Tōkyō. Shinjuku: The Phenomenal City - was the exhibition Henry Smith discussed in this episode. It was exhibited December 16, 1975 to March 7, 1976 at the Museum of Modern Art, New York City. More info, here. a+u magazine - also known as architecture and urbanism magazine, is a Japanese/English architecture magazine first published in 1971. More info, here. Kōji Taki (1928-2011) - was a Japanese author, architectural critic, editor, and key figure in the Metabolist movement. He played a significant role in shaping the discourse of contemporary architecture in Japan and was instrumental in promoting the ideas of the Metabolists. Kappabashi - located in Tōkyō's Asakusa district, is a renowned destination for kitchenware and restaurant supplies. The street is lined with stores offering a diverse range of products, including traditional Japanese knives, sushi-making equipment, and unique culinary gadgets. Kappabashi is especially popular for its sampuru shops, where visitors can buy realistic food replicas commonly displayed outside restaurants. The area features a mix of large retailers and specialty stores, creating a charming atmosphere with its traditional Japanese architecture. It's easily accessible from Tawaramachi Station on the Tokyo Metro Ginza Line. fūkei hanga - are landscape images. These paintings and prints represent the natural world such as mountains, rivers, waterfalls. You can find these types of prints from the golden age of nishiki-e to shin-hanga, to today. Sunset at Tomonotsu (1940, 9"x14") by Tsuchiya Koitsu (1879-1942) and published by Watanabe. Mitaka - is a city located in the western part of Tōkyō, Japan. A very pretty and quiet part of the city it is famous for the Ghibli Museum, and Inokashira Park. 100 Views of Edo (名所江戸百景) - is a series of nishiki-e prints designed by Utagawa Hiroshige (1797-1858). It was published between 1856 and 1859 and consists of 118 or 119 prints, each depicting various scenes of Edo (Tōkyō). The prints show the beauty, diversity, and everyday life of Edo, capturing different seasons, landscapes, landmarks, and activities. Hiroshige's use of color, composition, and atmospheric effects contributes to the series' enduring popularity. The scenes range from bustling urban areas and landscapes to rural views, often incorporating elements of nature and traditional Japanese culture. Suruga-chō (1885) Thirty Six Views of Mount Fuji - one of Hokusai's most iconic series, known for its various depictions of Mount Fuji in different seasons, weather conditions, and different vantage points. The series includes "The Great Wave off Kanagawa." Published between 1830-1832 the series portrays Mount Fuji in different perspectives, everyday life, as well as the special importance of Mount Fuji in Edo culture. The series had a large impact on Western artists and thinkers, including the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists. Umezawa Hamlet-fields in Sagami Province (1830-31) Santa Barbara Museum of Art - is an art museum located in Santa Barbara, California, USA. Its collection contains art works from all over the world, focusing on paintings, sculpture, and paper works. More info, here. Kobayashi Kiyochika (1847-1915) - was a painter and woodblock print designer famous for his war prints on the First Sino-Japanese War (July 25, 1894- April 17, 1895). Kiyochika captured the transitional period in Japanese history as the country underwent rapid modernization and Westernization during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Onoguchi Tokuji Destroying The Gate at Jinzhoucheng (1895 14 3/4" x 28 9/16") published by Daikokuya. Utagawa School - was a school of print designers starting with Utagawa Toyoharu (1735-1814). He employed one point perspective (vanishing point) in his print designs, being influenced by Western perspective. The influence of the Utagawa school goes far in Japanese print history and one of its most successful. This schools print designs of kabuki portraits, beautiful women (bijin-ga), and landscapes are excellent. Some famous names attributed to the Utagawa school are Utamaro (1753-1806), Utagawa Kunisada (1786-1865), and Ando Hiroshige (1797-1858). A fine description of this school can be found, here at Artelino. Newly Published Picture of the Battle of Jiuzan-shan in China (9 3/16" x 13 1/8") attributed to Utagawa Toyoharu Okumura Masanobu (1686-1784) - was a Japanese nishiki-e artist and print designer who lived during the Edo period. He is credited with pioneering the use of full-color printing and is considered one of the early masters of the art form. Okumura Masanobu was known for his contributions to bijin-ga and yakusha-e (actor prints). He played a role in the development of nishiki-e as a popular art form. More information can be found at Viewing Japanese Prints, here. Large Perspective Picture of Evening Cool by Ryōgoku Bridge (ca. 1748) hand coloured Sumida River - is a major river that flows through Tōkyō, Japan. It plays a significant role in the history, culture, and landscape of the city. The Sumida River flows for approximately 27 kilometers (about 17 miles) through Tokyo, originating from Kita City and flowing into Tōkyō Bay. It passes through several wards, including Kita, Adachi, Sumida, Taito, Koto, and Chuo. The river has been portrayed in nishiki-e prints for generations, along with its bridges. Kobayashi Kiyochika the Sumida River at Night (9.76"x14" - est. 1881) Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798-1861) - is considered one of the last “masters” of the ukiyo-e genre of Japanese woodblock printmaking. His designs range from landscapes, samurai and Chinese military heroes, as well as using various formats for his designs such as diptychs and triptychs. Yamayoshi Genba no jō Chikafusa (14 5/16" x 9 15/16" - 1848/49) published by Sumiyoshiya Ike no Taiga (1723-1776) - was a Japanese painter of the mid-Edo period, known for his skill in the Nanga style, which was influenced by Chinese literati painting. He is best remembered for his role in promoting a cross-cultural exchange of ideas between Japan and China in the realm of art and aesthetics during the Edo Period. Landscape with Pavilion (1750) Akita ranga painting - a style of Japanese painting that emerged in the late Edo period, particularly during the 19th century, in the region of Akita in northern Japan. The term "ranga" literally translates to "Dutch painting" and reflects the influence of European painting styles, particularly Dutch and Western techniques, which were introduced to Japan through trade with the Dutch during the Edo Period. More info, here. Satake Shozan (1748-1785) - Pine Tree and Parakeet (68.11" x 22.83") est 1700's, painting. Shinobazu Pond - is a large pond located within Ueno Park in Tōkyō, Japan. Ueno Park is a spacious public park that is home to several museums, a zoo, temples, and beautiful green spaces. Shinobazu Pond is one of the central features of Ueno Park, and it is renowned for its scenic beauty and historical significance. hanmoto system - is the Edo Period (1603-1868) collaboration system of making woodblock prints in Japan. The system was about using, carvers, printers, and craftsmen by various print publishers in order to produce woodblock prints. The system consisted of the following professions; publisher, artist, carver, and printer. William Anderson (1842–1900) was an English surgeon and collector with a significant impact on the appreciation and understanding of Japanese art in the late 19th century. Anderson became a passionate collector of Japanese art, amassing a vast and diverse collection that included nishiki-e, ceramics, textiles, and other traditional artworks. His collection grew to be one of the most significant and comprehensive of its time. His bequest laid the foundation for the development of Japanese art studies in the West, influencing subsequent generations of scholars, collectors, and enthusiasts. ezōshiya - is a type of Japanese bookstore that specializes in selling "ehon" or picture books. Ehon are valued not only for their storytelling but also for the quality of illustrations. These books played a role in promoting visual literacy and appreciation of art in Japan. Nishiki-e had been sold at these book stores during the Edo Period. Utagawa Kunisada (1786-1865) is widely regarded as one of the most significant woodblock print designers in Japanese history. His diverse portfolio includes prints ranging from landscapes and books to erotica and sumo. Kunisada worked during the vibrant era of nishiki-e alongside notable artists such as Andō Hiroshige (1797-1858), Katsushika Hokusai (1760-1849), and the aforementioned Kuniyoshi. This period represents a rich and abundant chapter in Japanese woodblock print history. Ichikawa Danjurō VIII as Hanzaemon published by Tamaya Sōsuke (1852) 13 9/16" x 9 3/16" cochineal - known as yōko in Japanese, is a red dye taken from the dried bodies of female cochineal insects. These insects are native to Central and South America, where they feed on the sap of prickly pear cacti. Cochineal has been used for centuries as a natural dye, valued for its vibrant red color. An article about synthetic pigments and cochineal in Japanese woodblock prints and co-written by Henry Smith can be found, here. William Sturgis Bigelow (1850-1926) - was an avid collector of Japanese art. His extensive travels to Japan from 1882 to 1889, coupled with a close friendship with Ernest Fenollosa, enabled him to amass a remarkable collection. Bigelow's acquisitions played a pivotal role in promoting Japanese art in the Western world. World Of The Meiji Print - is a book published by Weatherhill in 1991 and written by Julia Meech-Pekarik. It describes how nishiki-e developed and evolved during the Meiji period. Roger Keyes (1942-2020) - was a distinguished scholar of Japanese woodblock prints. His expertise was showcased in his 1982 dissertation, a comprehensive study of Tsukioka Yoshitoshi (1839-1892). Additionally, Keyes authored the book 'Ehon: The Artists and the Book in Japan' in 2006, further solidifying his significant contributions to the understanding of Japanese printmaking. Amy Reigle Newland - is a Japanese print scholar who has written various articles and books upon the subject. One of my favourite books by Newland is her book about Toyohara Kunichika, Time Present and Past: Images of A Forgotten Master (1999). Bruce Coats - is Professor of Art History and the Humanities at Scripps College, Claremont, California. He has contributed to several books on Japanese woodblock prints, one of my favourites is Chikanobu: Modernity and Nostalgia in Japanese Prints (2006). James A Michener (1907-1997) - was a Pulitzer Prize-winning writer, scholar, and esteemed academic known for his extensive contributions to various literary genres. Beyond his celebrated literary achievements, Michener also delved into the world of Japanese prints, demonstrating a multifaceted curiosity and intellectual versatility. His exploration of Japanese prints added another layer to his diverse body of work, reflecting a deep appreciation for Japanese art and culture. Honolulu Academy of Arts - founded in 1922 by Anna Rice Cooke, evolved into the Honolulu Museum of Art (HoMA) in 2012. Rice-Cooke's vision for a multicultural art space led to its creation, with an endowment and land donated by the Cooke family. The museum's architectural style blends Hawaiian, Chinese, and Spanish influences. Over the years, HoMA expanded, adding educational wings, a cafe, and more, while its permanent collection grew to over 50,000 pieces. In 2011, The Contemporary Museum merged with HoMA, unifying as the Honolulu Museum of Art. More info, here. shinbun nishiki-e - the Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked a pivotal moment in Japan's history, prompting significant societal upheavals. Tōkyō, formerly Edo, became the new centre of Imperial Japan, and by 1871, the traditional feudal class system had been abolished, accompanied by compulsory education laws. This era of profound change spurred creative responses to economic challenges. Starting in the summer of 1874, innovative individuals introduced shimbun nishikie, vibrant single-sheet woodblock prints that served as colorful souvenirs. These prints, produced until 1876, were not just visually striking but also narratively engaging, recounting news articles in a format ideal for oral storytelling. Renowned artists like Ochiai Yoshiiku and Tsukioka Yoshitoshi, both students of the celebrated Utagawa Kuniyoshi, played a key role in illustrating these captivating snapshots of an evolving Japan. An excellent article on shinbun nishiki-e can be found here, from All About Japan. Fighting Off A Wolf by Sadanobu II (1848-1940) from the Nichinichi Shinbun (9 1/2" x 6 3/4") Satsuma Rebellion - occurring in 1877, was a last stand against the modernization policies of the Meiji government by disaffected samurai from the Satsuma domain. Led by Saigō Takamori (1828-1877), a key figure in the Meiji Restoration. The rebellion sought to restore imperial power and resist the centralization efforts of the government. The conflict ended in a decisive government victory at the Battle of Shiroyama, where Saigō met his end, marking one of the final samurai-led uprisings in Japan's history. Suzuki Harunobu (1725-1770) -pioneered the art of nishiki-e, becoming the first to craft multi-color woodblock prints. Renowned for his exquisite designs, Harunobu's subjects often revolved around the portrayal of beautiful women, shunga (erotic art), and classical poetry. His innovative techniques and thematic choices significantly influenced the genre during the Edo period in Japan. Lovers Walking In The Snow (1764-1772) (11 1/4"x8 1/8") Emperor Meiji born Mutsuhito (1852 – 1912), was the 122nd Emperor of Japan, reigning from 1867 until his death in 1912. His reign, known as the Meiji Era, marked a transformative period in Japanese history. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 saw the end of the Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of imperial rule, with Emperor Meiji playing a central role in Japan's modernization and westernization efforts. During his era, Japan underwent significant political, social, and economic reforms, propelling the country into the ranks of major world powers. Emperor Meiji's reign is often associated with Japan's rapid modernization and emergence onto the global stage. sōsaku-hanga - also known as creative prints, is a printmaking style primarily, though not exclusively, characterized by prints created by a single artist. Originating in early twentieth-century Japan, alongside the shin-hanga movement, this style emphasizes the artist's direct involvement in the entire printmaking process — from design and carving to printing. While the designs, especially in the early stages, may appear rudimentary, the concept of artists producing their own prints marked a significant departure from the traditional model where a select group of carvers, printers, and publishers collaborated in the creation of woodblock prints. shin hanga - is a style of Japanese woodblock printmaking that emerged in the early 20th century, marking the end of the nishiki-e period. Originating around 1915 under the direction of Watanabe Shōzaburō (1885-1962), the art form responded to the foreign demand for "traditional" Japanese imagery. Shin hanga artists focused on motifs like castles, bridges, famous landscapes, and bamboo forests. The style was initiated when Watanabe discovered Austrian artist Fritz Capelari (1884-1950) and commissioned him to design prints for Watanabe's budding printing house. This collaboration led to the evolution of shin hanga into a distinctive new style of Japanese woodblock printing. The shin hanga movement thrived until its inevitable decline after the Second World War (1939-1945). fan print (uchiwa-e) - are crafted in the form of flat, oval fans using materials such as rice paper or silk. These prints are designed to be functional fans, allowing for practical use while showcasing artistic designs. Amy Poster - is the curator emerita of Asian Art at the Brooklyn Museum. aizuri-e - are woodblock prints made entirely with shades of blue. This style gained popularity during the Edo Period. Keisai Eisen (1790-1848) - was a nishiki-e print designer and author during the Edo Period. His print designs are famous for beautiful women and large head prints (ōkubi-e). surimono (date unknown - Edo Period) Hiraga Gennai (1729-1779/80) - was a versatile Japanese polymath and rōnin during the Edo period. His diverse talents spanned pharmacology, rangaku (Dutch learning), medicine, literature, painting, and invention. Notable creations include the erekiteru (electrostatic generator), kankanpu (asbestos cloth). Gennai authored satirical works such as Fūryū Shidōken den (1763) and Nenashigusa (1763), along with essays like On Farting and A Lousy Journey of Love. He also wrote guidebooks on male prostitutes, including the Kiku no en (1764) and San no asa (1768). Employing various pen names like Kyūkei and Fūrai Sanjin, he is most recognized by the name Hiraga Gennai. Yokohama-e -refers to a genre of Japanese woodblock prints depicting scenes from Yokohama, a pivotal port city during the late Edo and Meiji periods. These prints showcase the influx of international influences, featuring foreign ships, traders, and cultural exchanges. Yokohama-e captures the dynamic transformation of Japan as it opened to the world, portraying a vivid visual narrative of the city's bustling trade and encounters between Japanese and Western cultures. View of Foreigners' Houses on the Beach Street Seen From Yokohama Port (ca. 1873) by Hiroshige III (1842-1894) Sadahide Utagawa (1807-1878/79) - was a designer of nishiki-e during the late Edo and early Meiji Periods. He trained under Utagawa Kunisada and depicted medieval Japanese scenes, collaborating on the 53 Stations of the Tōkaidō, and prints related to Yokohama-e. Battle of Ōei (ca.1848) Sir William Henry Perkin (1838–1907) was a British chemist who is renowned for his accidental discovery of the first synthetic dye, known as mauveine or mauve. This significant breakthrough occurred in 1856 when Perkin was attempting to synthesize quinine, a treatment for malaria, from coal tar derivatives. Instead, he obtained a purple-colored substance while working with aniline, leading to the creation of the vibrant purple dye. napthols - are special dyes used in making colourful fabrics on handlooms. They get their name from a specific part in their makeup called an azo group. These dyes are known for making colors really bright and long-lasting on fabrics. They help create fabrics in lots of different colors, like orange, brown, yellow, scarlet, golden yellow, black, red, violet, and more. orpiment - sekiō in Japanese, is a bright yellow to orange-yellow mineral composed of arsenic trisulfide (As2S3). It has been historically used as a pigment in painting and for other decorative purposes due to its vibrant color. Often found in association with realgar, another arsenic sulfide mineral, orpiment has also been employed in traditional medicine and alchemy. However, its toxic nature limits such applications, and it's crucial to note that handling orpiment, especially in powdered form, poses health risks due to the presence of arsenic. Marco Leona PhD - is the David H. Koch Scientist at Large at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. He has written several articles on Spectroscopy and art. Estée Lauder (1906-2004) - was a pioneering American businesswoman and the co-founder of the renowned cosmetics company Estée Lauder Companies. Alongside her husband Joseph Lauder, she established the company in 1946, starting with a few skincare products she developed herself. Estée Lauder's hands-on approach to marketing and emphasis on quality turned her brand into a symbol of luxury. Initially selling to friends, she built a global beauty empire with a diverse product line including skincare, makeup, and fragrances. Today, the Estée Lauder Companies remain influential in the beauty industry, with a portfolio of well-known brands. Estée Lauder's legacy is marked by her significant contributions to the cosmetics world and her establishment of an enduring and iconic beauty brand. The Adachi Institute of Woodblock Prints - is a print studio located in Tōkyō. Established in 1994 in order to promote and preserve the colour woodblock print of Japan. More information, in English and in Japanese. The 47 Rōnin of Akō - were a group of samurai who sought revenge for the unjust death of their master, Lord Asano Naganori, in 1701. After Asano was forced to commit seppuku (a form of ritual suicide), his loyal retainers, the 47 Ronin, meticulously planned and executed the revenge, successfully avenging their lord's honor. The story is a celebrated example of bushido (samurai code) and loyalty in Japanese history and folklore. smalt - is a deep blue pigment that has been historically used in art and ceramics. It is composed of finely powdered glass, often colored with cobalt oxide to achieve its distinctive blue hue. Smalt was popular during the Renaissance and Baroque periods as a substitute for expensive blue pigments like lapis lazuli. Artists would mix smalt with binders to create blue paint for their artworks. Smalt has some drawbacks, including a tendency to fade over time and a vulnerability to darkening when exposed to certain environmental conditions. Keiji Shinohara - is a Japanese mokuhanga printmaker who apprenticed under Uesugi Keiichiro in Ōsaka. He is the artist-in-residence at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. More info about Keiji can be found here, and here. Yamado-ike from the series Eight Views of Hirakata (2006) 11"x15": gum arabic - is a sap from two types of Acacia tree. In art it is used as a binder for pigments which creates viscosity (depending on how much or little is applied to your pigments) for your watercolours and oils. Rachel Levitas has a fine description on how she uses gum arabic in her work, here. Bakumatsu Period - refers to the final years of the Edo period, specifically from the mid-19th century to the early 1860s. The term "Bakumatsu" can be translated as "end of the shogunate." This era was characterized by significant political, social, and economic changes that eventually led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of imperial rule in the Meiji period. Bunsei Period - was a period in Japanese history which lasted from April 1818 - December 1830 CE © Popular Wheat Productions opening and closing musical credit - The Shadow of Your Smile by Dominic Farinacci, G@ Records (2023) logo designed and produced by Douglas Batchelor and André Zadorozny Disclaimer: Please do not reproduce or use anything from this podcast without shooting me an email and getting my express written or verbal consent. I'm friendly :) Слава Українi If you find any issue with something in the show notes please let me know. ***The opinions expressed by guests in The Unfinished Print podcast are not necessarily those of André Zadorozny and of Popular Wheat Productions.***
Last time we spoke about Operation Backhander, the landings at Cape Gloucester. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed another cog in the machine that was his drive back to the Philippines. The 1st Marines under General Rupertus were back in the action, spearheading the landings at Cape Gloucester. The landings were successful and multiple allied units began advancing towards the airdrome. Colonel Sumiya realized the futility of attempting a defense upon the open ground against American armor, so he pulled his units away towards Razorback Hill from which they could launch harassment maneuvers against the new American perimeter. Over on New Guinea the Australians continued their drive towards Sio, pushing the Japanese even further north in the process. The Japanese were being attacked in multiple places without the ability to contest them everywhere. What would the Japanese commanders do to establish a proper defense? This episode is Landing at Saidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last week we left off with General Nakai unleashing a counteroffensive against Kesawai. The counteroffensive was successful at pushing the Australian commando's out of the area to prevent them from encroaching upon Madang. These actions worried General Vasey who thought the Japanese might follow them up with an offensive against Dumpu. Vasey elected to carry out a punitive attack along Shaggy Ridge. Perhaps a refresher as I think I did once describe it, but Shaggy Ridge is located six miles north of Dumpu. The razorback ridge has one elevation of more than 5,000 feet, running roughly southeast to northwest. The highest point on the ridge is known as the Kankirei Saddle. There are also three high elevations along the ridge that the Australians named the Pimple, the Intermediate Snipers' Pimple, and the Green Sniper's Pimple. The Japanese had constructed four miles of defenses along the northern part of the ridge. These positions dominated the trail along which the Australians would eventually have to cross. The trail was narrow, only two to three feet wide, and there were drops on either side of 300 to 500 feet. The Japanese had also constructed a rough road on the coast side to a point between the Mindjim and Faria Rivers, making supply to the defenders much easier. The Pimples were the strong points, and the Japanese had built fortified posts with machine guns and deep trenches on each. Vasey's punitive force consisted of the 2/16th battalion under the temporary command of Major Garth Symington. Patrols had been sent to figure out decent approaches for an attack against the Pimple, but everything indicated there was only a narrow path to perform a frontal assault from. Thus Symington planned to assault the Pimple and exploit for about 400 yards along the ridge with Captain Christian's B Company while Captain Anderson's D Company maneuvered behind to consolidate the ground gained. Fortunately Symington would be receiving aerial support from the American 41st Squadron and Australian No. 4 Squadron, artillery support from the 8th battery and 54th battery and back up from the 2/27th battalion who would launch a diversionary attack against the Japanese along the Faria River and Mainstream area. During the morning of December 27th, the assault began with 16 Kittyhawks and two Boomerangs bombing the Pimple followed by artillery. Dive bombing, strafing and artillery fire was intense causing reverberation and roars that could be heard up and down the Ramu Valley. An hour later, B Company's leading platoon departed their startline under the foliage of the rainforest to scale the rock face leading to the pimple. Although the bombardment was stunning, the dazed Japanese defenders quickly responded to the invaders by tossing grenades from the well sited pillboxes atop the pimple. The Australians dashed forward and wiped out the forward pillbox, securing their toehold on the ridge. With the artillery firing further forward the Australians were soon able to capture the second pimple feature just 100 yards ahead, successfully clearing the Japanese from their entrenchments. However at this point, B company came across a strong rock bunker. They first allowed the artillery to smash it, then they tossed grenades while trying to outflank the defenders. A Japanese defender refusing to surrender, covered the entrance to his pillbox with a groundsheet and for about two hours flicked away the grenades thrown at him before they could explode. Eventually he was blasted out when a grenade was tied to the end of a bamboo pole which was poked into the pit, the pin being pulled out by a length of string. More than 100 grenades were thrown during the day at the rock bunker in front of the second pimple. As hard as they tried it was impossible to outflank as the sides of the razorback guarding the bunker were almost perpendicular. Christian was forced to pull B company back and dig in on the second pimple. Meanwhile, D company came up to relieve the exhausted men of B company. To deal with the bunker menace, Australian Pioneers chiseled a track along the cliff face towards it and designed a special bomb consisting of a grenade placed in a chemical and sealed in a field ration tin. During the morning of the 28th, D company advanced over their newly cut track and hurled the new bombs successfully blowing up the enemy bunker. While this was occurring, Lt Scott's 18th Platoon was advancing down the eastern slope of Shaggy Ridge attempting a encircling maneuver against the third pimple. At 10.50 a.m Scott reported being at the base of the third pimple and a quarter of an hour later the artillery and mortars began firing smoke to cover his Platoon's advance. At the foot of the objective Scott ordered his platoon sergeant, Longman, to take a small party of Owen gunners up the third pimple. Under heavy enemy machine-gun fire Longman and three men charged an enemy machine-gun post near the top. Two of his men were wounded but Longman and the other man continued to advance upon the enemy post and eventually silenced it with Owen-gun fire. To reach the enemy post they had to pull themselves up a steep slope with one hand and fire their Owens with the other. Still under heavy fire from other enemy posts the two men covered the evacuation of the two wounded and neutralized the fire of another enemy post 40 yards away which was opposing the advance of the rest of the platoon, led by the wounded Scott, up the cliff face. Nine minutes after Longman led the first assault, Scott was in possession of the third pimple and was covering the advance of Lieutenant McCaughey's 16 Platoon to the fourth and highest pimple, later named McCaughey's Knoll, farther along the ridge. The two platoons then dug in on the newly-won ground. During the afternoon, the battered Japanese attempted a counterattack but were easily repelled, suffering a total of 28 dead during the battle against Symington's three killed and eight wounded. After the pimples were captured, the fighting fell into a series of artillery duels and patrol skirmishes. With the Pimples in hand the Australians could observe Madang. Vasey at this time acquired further support from General MacArthur who relieved his exhausted brigades with the 18th and 15th brigades. Meanwhile General Adachi sensed key points in the Madang area were not defended well enough, so he ordered the bulk of the 41st division to advance from Wewak to Madang. In early december, the 2nd battalion, 237th regiment and 2nd mountain artillery battalion of the 41st group were deployed at Karkar island. However the movement of the rest of the division was sent to the Gogol area and was heavily delayed by storms that caused numerous rivers to overflow. But now we are shifting gears and heading over to the Huon Peninsula where a new allied landing was about to occur. In early December, General MacArthur finally decided to act upon a suggestion put forward by his assistant chief of staff Lt General Stephen Chamberlain. Chamberlain argued Saidor on the south side of the Huon Peninsula should be occupied in order to construct an advanced air and naval base. MacArthur waited until two days before the Arawe expedition, before giving orders to Krueger to prepare plans for a landing against Saidor. Because of limited landing craft the landings would need to be pushed until January 2nd. The operation was code named Michelmas and initially it was thought the 503rd parachute infantry could be airdropped over Saidor, but a limited number of aircraft killed this one in the crib. Thus the 32nd division who had been earmarked for the canceled Gasmata landings were chosen for the task. The general outline for the operation was discussed at a conference held on Goodenough island on December 20th attended to be Barbey, Major General William Gill, Whitehead commanding the 32nd division, Colonel Clarence Martin commanding the 126th regiment and other staff officers. Allied intelligence reports indicated the Japanese had few forces in the Saidor region. Nevertheless, the plans called for landings in force on three beaches codenamed Red, White and Blue on the west shore of Dekay's bay. If the Americans could successfully seize Saidor, this would cut the Japanese retreat from Finschhafen and therefore would trap another Japanese division at Sio. Krueger selected the 126th Regiment for the task after they were rebuilt following the Battle of Buna-Gona and retrained in amphibious warfare. Brigadier-General Clarence Martin would act as the commander of the new Michaelmas task force. MacArthur did not have much time to carry out ground reconnaissance, thus the 3 beaches selected were chosen primarily from aerial photograph data. They would prove to be quite narrow, rocky and exposed to heavy seas. Because the allied intelligence indicated few Japanese forces in the area, MacArthur elected not to perform a preliminary aerial bombardment. Admiral Barbey's amphibious force were now well experienced veterans with amphibious landings, so the last minute notice did not hinder them too much. On January the 1st, Martin's men were tossed onto 9 APD's, 17 LCI's and two LST's supported by 9 of Barbey's Destroyers and Admiral Crutchley's Cruiser force, hoping to intercept some IJN forces. Yet Crutchley would be disappointed as Admiral Koga had his hands full with something cooking up at Rabaul and Kavieng and could not afford to dispense units to Saidor. What could hinder the landings was air forces from the IJA at Wewak, though they were considerably weakened with just 39 fighters, 17 light bombers and 7 heavy bombers available after so many allied air strikes. The landings went off smoothly. The beaches were hit by more than 2000 shells within 20 minutes prior to the first LCV landings at around 7am. Two battalions of the 126th landed abreast without opposition and quickly established a perimeter. Soon a 3rd battalion passed through and extended the perimeter further left upon high ground, just southwest of an unserviceable airfield. Captain Meredith Muggins, who played a key role in the capture of Sanananda, recalled his impressions of this seemingly uneventful landing: “When we landed at Saidor it was an amazing sight. There were dozens of warships bombarding the coast. The sound was like a rolling thunder and the smoke hung along the ground. As we approached the beach, air attacks began. Heavy bombers dropped their load of high explosive from a few thousand feet. Then came in the B-25 strafers shooting everything in sight, clobbering positions. Behind them came fighters to give the Japs a final working over. There was very little opposition when we landed. We found a few wandering around in shell shock. What a contrast from the days at Buna and Sanananda, only a year before, when we were fighting with rifles, grenades, and rocks!” Thus 8000 troops were landed ashore by the end of the day. The only real resistance came in the form of some air raids from Wewak beginning at 4pm. 9 Japanese Nakajima Ki-49 (Helen) aircraft, escorted by up to 20 Zeros and Kawasaki Ki-61 (Tony) fighters bombed the beach area at 4:30pm. There were three more air raids during the night, and 49 over the course of the month, but most were quite small. Thus on Januaruy the 3rd MacArthur triumphantly stated “We have seized Saidor on the north coast of New Guinea. In a combined operation of ground, sea and air forces, elements of the Sixth Army landed at three beaches under cover of heavy air and naval bombardment. The enemy was surprised both strategically and tactically and the landings were accomplished without loss. The harbour and airfields are in our firm grasp. Enemy forces on the north coast between Sixth Army and the advancing Australians are trapped with no source of supply and face disintegration and destruction.” The Saidor area and her landing strip were in allied hands and further men and supplies would be brought over without enemy interference. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi had the understrength and exhausted 51st division garrisoning Sio while the 20th division was retreating from the Finschhafen area. On December 30th, Adachi arrived to Kiari where he ordered the 51st to advance to Bogia, once the 20th had arrived at Sio. Since mid December, some units, such as the bulk of the 66th regiment had already made it to Bogia, where they could be rehabilitated, leaving just the 3rd composite battalion of the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion HQ, the 10th company and one machine gun company to garrison Gali under the leadership of General Muroya. Just as Adachi was preparing to depart on January 2nd, he received word of the allied landing at Saidor which effectively opened up a new and important threat against his isolated forces. Adachi believed it was now useless to hold on to Sio and the Vitiaz Strait, since enemy troops were also landed on New Britain. Furthermore his main base at Madang was now vulnerable. Thus Adachi placed General Nakano in command of both divisions now designated the Nakano force and ordered him to advance the forces to Gali by submarine to try and secure the new key supply point while the Shoge detachment would delay the Australian advance to Sio. Nakano would therefore have to break through or bypass Saidor overland to arrive safely at Madang. Additionally the 41st division was ordered to depart Wewak immediately and advance overland towards Madang. General Nakai was given orders to advance his detachment towards Saidor to try and contain the American advance as long as possible and this would only leave the 2nd battalion, 78th regiment under Colonel Matsumoto Matsujiro on the Kankirei Saddle-Shaggy Ridge area. On January 3rd, Lt General Goro Mano was flown directly to Alexishafen to assume command of all units in the Madang region, including the Matsumoto detachment. Back over in Saidor, the Americans began to send patrols and an outpost was setup at Sel on January the 5th while the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment skirmished with other American patrols at Teterei and Biliau. General Muroya managed to secure Gali without much difficulty. Meanwhile, upon receiving the news of the Saidor landing, Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade continued their advance, expecting the march to be a lot easier. After fording the Sanga River on January 3rd, the 2/17th battalion advanced to the Sazomu river while fighting off elements of Colonel Miyake's rearguard. At this point General Katagiri's forces were in a full retreat towards Kiari, only performing some rearguard against around Kelanoa. Thus the 2/17th advance went pretty much undisturbed as they reached the Dallman River on January 6th. Kelanoa offered more defensible positions, so Windeyer cautiously sent some patrols to scout the area out, trying to avoid unnecessary casualties. At 8 a.m. on the 8th the 2/17th resumed their advance and half an hour later their leading company was met with some fire from a track junction. There seemed to be about 40 determined Japanese with four machine-guns holding the area. The Australians killed 8 Japanese and lost 2 in the process with another 2 wounded. As the company could make no headway without further casualties they withdrew to a kunai patch south-east of the track junction so that artillery mortars and machine-guns could hit the Japanese. The position was hit with mortar heavily causing the Japanese to withdraw during the night. The next day at 9:30am the Australian battalion advanced through the position finding abandoned pill boxes, foxholes and several dead Japanese. Later during the day, a group of 30 heavily armed Japanese fire upon the battalion 1500 yards from the Buri River. The Australians unleashed artillery, mortars and machine guns upon them until 4pm when some tanks arrived forcing the Japanese to flee. Meanwhile the Japanese were able to repair 12 barges which were quickly used to evacuate wounded towards Gali. Unfortunately, allied PT boats were lurking in the area like sharks. The PT boats unsuccessfully attacked Adachi's submarine that was bringing him back over to Madang but managed to destroy one barge carrying 100 wounded near Herwath Point and damaged others. Most of the wounded would reach Gali by the 10th and 20th division advanced past Kiari on the 9th and were drawing closer to Gali. The 2/17th crossed the Buri River on the 10th and reached the Kapugara river the next day without opposition. General Nakano departed Kiari with his division heading for Gali. It was now only the Shoge detachment that stood in the path of the Australians. The Shoge detachment received orders on January 13th to withdraw towards Sio using an exhausting inland route going from Nambariwa to Nokopo. The Australians would soon enter the ruins of Nambariwa finding the Japanese had destroyed numerous large dumps. Nambariwa had been the principal Japanese supply base for the Finschhafen area, both banks of its river had been barge loading points. There were numerous facilities such as barge workshops, engineer store dumps, hospital areas and bivouac areas. By January 15th the Australian forces would occupy Sio uncontested. General Wootten's 9th division had completed its mission and it would be their last action in New Guinea. Wootten had received word in early January that the 8th Brigade led by Brigadier Claude Cameron was being brought over to Finschhafen to relieve the 24th Brigade. Now with the fall of Sio, General Berryman ordered the 5th division now under the command of Major General Alan Ramsay to take over the forward area. Mop up operations would continue for a week, until the 4th battalion, 8th brigade and 5th division officially took over Sio. The advance from Fortification Point to Sio saw the 20th Brigade suffer 3 deaths, 13 wounded and 958 sick from malaria, mosquitoes remaining a larger foe than the Japanese as usual. The 20th brigade had marched 50 miles in 24 days and counted a total of 303 dead Japanese and captured 22. Within the 4 months campaign going back to September 22nd, Wootten's 9th division had suffered 283 deaths and 744 wounded, but estimated they killed 3099 Japanese, captured 39 and inflicted around 4644 wounded. Now we are heading back to the boys on New Britain. With the airdrome secured and a strong defensive perimeter surrounding it, General Rupertus radioed the commander of the 6th Army “First Marine Division presents to you as an early New Year gift the complete airdome of Cape Gloucester. Situation well in hand due to fighting spirit of troops, the usual Marine luck and the help of God…” General Krueger expressed himself as "delighted." At his advance headquarters at Port Moresby General Douglas MacArthur, presented the airdrome to the people of the United States with his compliments and sent Rupertus the following dispatch: “I extend my heartiest congratulations to your officers and men. I am filled with pride and gratitude by their resourceful determination in capturing Cape Gloucester. Your gallant Division has maintained the immortal record of the Marine Corps and covered itself with glory.” General Rupertus raised the US flag on an improvised staff above the main strip with simple ceremonies on December 31. Soon American engineers were being brought over to repair the airfield as the Japanese sent nightly air raids to hamper these efforts. The Japanese still held several operational airfields within range, but their efforts to bomb the Americans positions were hampered by terrible weather. They also never massed air forces to attack in great strength, thus the damage was always minor and easily repairable. To the east, assistant commander of the 1st Marines, Brigadier General Lemuel Shepherd assumed command of the forces within the Yellow Beach perimeter. Due to the lack of Japanese resistance around the airdrome, the Marine commanders were convinced General Matsuda was retaining the bulk of his strength in the Borgen Bay area, thus leaving Colonel Sumiya out to dry. Shepherd elected to take his force and use them to clear up the Borgen Bay area. On January 1st he proposed to hold fast on the left and center of the Yellow Beach perimeter, while his right line consisting of the 3rd battalions of the 7th and 5th Marines would advance southeast. On the other side, Colonel Katayama had just arrived at Magairapua with his 2nd battalion on January 1st. It seems at this point Matsuda made an error. Perhaps its because he was essentially a transportation expert rather than a combat leader, perhaps it was due to his failed initial attacks, but he decided to place Katayama in command of all the forces in the Brogen Bay area. Now designated the Katayama detachment, these forces were the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd and 3rd battalions 141st regiment.There would also soon be Major Tatsumi Asaschichi's 3rd Battalion who were still en route from Nigol and Cape Bushing. Katayama first tackled his command by underestimating his enemy's strength. Katayama ordered an offensive in force against Target Hill to be led by Captain Mukai Toyoji's 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Major Takabe Shinichi's 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, would attack the center of the marine perimeter to confuse the Americans and prevent them from reinforcing the hill. At this time Target Hill was being defended by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, more particularly their A Company . This unit was deployed with its 1st Platoon defending the area on the left between the beach and swamp, the 2nd Platoon holding a series of strong points on such dry ground as could be found in the swamp itself, and only the 3rd Platoon on the hill proper. Unbeknownst to Katayama, Shepherd had begun his offensive at 10:00am on the 2nd. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, under the temporary command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Puller and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marinesunder the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David S. MacDougal were advancing abreast southeast towards Suicide Creek. The terrain they were traversing was particularly brutal. The 3rd battalion had to hack their way through the jungle going some 300 yards where they would come across well prepared Japanese positions. The 5th battalion had a longer distance to travel, but would encounter less resistance at the early phase. The 5th battalion attempted an encircling movement from the west, the assault troops soon encountered the face of the same Japanese pocket that was holding up the 3rd battalion and were halted in turn. As a result, the attacking lines on the night of 2 January, and throughout 3 January, resembled a huge letter "U", with the enemy strong point contained on three sides. Recognizing Suicide Creek was a major obstacle, the Japanese had sited their positions skillfully to cover it. Time after time Marines attempted crossings, only to be fired upon from invisible positions. The Japanese had become experts at field fortifications. The jungle curtailed both their attackers' freedom of movement and enhanced their own concealment: Marines would need get within just a few feet of the emplacements in order to locate them, by which time few were left alive to spot them for others. Even their lack of fortification materials--cement and steel reinforcing--reacted in favor of the Japanese, for the earth-and-log bunkers which they improvised were too soft-surfaced to detonate bazooka rockets, the heaviest weapons the infantry was capable of bringing to the point of contact. To support these bunkers, they had dug deep foxholes between and under the flaring buttress roots of the giant trees characteristic of the region, camouflaging them with foliage and cutting cunningly interlocking fire lanes. Artillery and mortar shells and air bombs were all but useless in reaching these positions, owing to the fantastically high forest cover that usually caused tree bursts, to which the deeply dug-in enemy was virtually invulnerable. The marines gradually surrounded the well prepared positions of the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment during the night, but they could do little else as each attack brought failure. Under the cover of darkness and Marine mortar fire, Katayama's assault troops and engineers hacked their way to the lower slopes of Target Hill. They did their best not to make any noise as they attempted scaling it, but the Marine defenders heard them. On January 3rd they launched their attack, unleashing artillery, mortar and 20mm machine cannon fire from below the hill. However most of the artillery missed the hill altogether, and the 20mm cannon fire was not causing much damage. Company D's mortars replied from their positions behind the hill, but the high angle of fire precluded effective damage to the advance enemy elements which had actually worked their way to positions about 20 feet from the Marines' front emplacements by then. Katayama's 5th company leading the assault fought bravely and with great determination, but against the steep terrain and inadequate support, against a very alert enemy proved too much for them. By dawn the attack had died down and the 5th company was virtually annihilated. Further to the west, the 53rd regiments secondary attack had achieved little more and suffered heavily for it. The Japanese were now trying to resist Shepherds attacks along the Suicide Creek while engineers of the 17th Marines were building a corduroy causeway across the coastal swamp to enable tanks to come into the action. By the morning of the 4th, following a 15 minute artillery bombardment, the first Sherman wallowed through the shallow water and mounted itself on the opposite bank. Soon the other Shermans followed and their 75mm guns began to absolutely devastate the Japanese emplacements from point blank range. Shepherd's assault battalions surged forward across their whole front, encountering no further opposition. Encouraged by the victory and the apparent death or withdrawal of all Japanese in contact to the immediate front, General Shepherd ordered the advance to continue, changing direction to south-southeast. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, pinched out by the successful sweep of its former front and the tying-in of 3rd battalion and 1st battalion on their left, executed a wide swing inland, made contact with the right of 3rd battalion, 5th marines extending the line westward. By the nightfall, Shepherd held a 4 battalion strong front against Katayama's positions at Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Michaelmas, the landings at Saidor were a great success, forcing General Adachi to shift numerous units around, scrambling to remedy the situation. Yet with so many Japanese units trapped, isolated and continuing to retreat north, would they ever be able to halt the allied advance?
In this episode of the Award-winning PRS Journal Club Podcast, 2023 Resident Ambassadors to the PRS Editorial Board – Rami Kantar, Yoshi Toyoda, and Ronnie Shammas- and special guest Jeffrey B. Friedrich, MD, MC, discuss the following articles from the December 2023 issue: “Vascularized Origami Medial Femoral Condyle Flap for Finger Joint Reconstruction” by Hachisuka, Ishibashi, Shimose, and Adachi. Read the article for FREE: https://bit.ly/OrigamiFlapFingerJoint Special guest Jeffrey B. Friedrich, MD, MC, who is a Professor of Plastic Surgery and Orthopedic Surgery and is a member of the Combined Hand Surgery Service at the University of Washington. He has completed plastic surgery training at the University of Washington followed by a hand and microvascular surgery fellowship at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. He is also the Director of the University Washington Plastic Surgery Residency program. READ the articles discussed in this podcast as well as free related content: https://bit.ly/JCDec23Collection
Last time we spoke about the learning process after the success, a very bloody one at that, of Operation galvanic, the continued operations in New Guinea, Bougainville and the naval battle of Cape St George. Galvanic was an extremely bloody experiment, one that would teach the allies bitter lessons of what to expect from the new phenomenon of “island hoping warfare” against the Japanese. On Bougainville, Japanese roadblocks were crushed and the Americans were extending their perimeters and advancing further inland. The IJN sought to help the IJA bolster Buka and this led to an absolutely disastrous engagement against Captain Burkes destroyer squadron. Burke won a near flawless victory. Then over on New Guinea, after the seizure of Sattelberg, the Australians were now beginning a new offensive heading north along the eastern coast. The Australians were in hot pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. This episode is Fall of Wareo Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. After their latest defeat at the battle of Sattelberg, Lt General Shigeru Katagiri had his men begin the long retreat towards Madang. In response General Wootten launched a two pronged offensive aimed at Wareo and Gusika. By the end of November they captured Gusika with ease effectively cutting off the Japanese supply route to Wareo. “All that remained of the 20th Division in this area consisted of abandoned foxholes, entrenchments, ammunition and ration dumps, equipment, weapons, camps, medical aid posts and graves.” The advance continued, on December 1st, the 2/43rd's tanks were blasting through Horace's Ears. The tanks blasted out the light opposition and soon the 2/43rd were occupying Horace's Jaws, Nose and Western Ear. Meanwhile the 2/15th attacked Nongora, but were unable to defeat its defenders and had to pull back. A company of the 2/23rd smashed the last line of opposition south of Kunako village allowing for its seizure. Over at the Kalueng river, after a artillery bombardment, the 2/28th sent Lt Rooke's with a patrol to check out the Lagoon who advanced without any opposition. Later in the afternoon the Australian scouts pushed south around 600 yards and began to hear the sounds of digging and chopping. They killed a Japanese and wounded another advancing further southwest to avoid what was assumed to be an enemy position. Towards dusk a strong Japanese patrol ran into them causing a small firefight. Rooke had his men dig in for the night while he climbed up a tree to observe the Japanese northeast of them. Rook then sent two volunteers, Privates Hutton and Wadel to try and slip back to the battalion HQ to get help, both men were killed trying. At 8pm Rooke's patrol snuck out under the cover of rain and darkness to dig in closer to Kalueng. On December 2nd, while the 2/43rd consolidated all of Horace, they also began advancing towards the Lakes against slight opposition. Then some of the tanks were attacked by Japanese 75mm guns from atop some high ground to the north of a lake at around 200 yards. The 2/15th would find Nongora abandoned on the 2nd and seized what was once the 79th's regimental HQ. At Kuanko, patrols of the 2/23rd would find the Japanese held a formidable position along a ridge near Peak Hill. At 8:30am the Japanese began firing machines guns upon the Kuanko area, only to be replied with Australian mortar and artillery. At dusk the Japanese suddenly charged using bombs made of gelignite that caused large blasts, but did little damage. The Japanese charge had surprised the forward Australian units who pulled back, thus the Japanese were able to seize ground north of Kuanko. It was a serious situation, so the Australians decided to launch a night attack. The leading platoons lost several men while charging the Japanese throwing grenades and explosives. The men of the 80th regiment however held their ground and repealed the Australian assault inflicting heavy casualties upon them. For the past two days, Brigadier Edgars three battalions had been receiving training from AIF battalions about jungle fighting. Wootten then decided to attach AIF experienced jungle fighting units to Edgar's battalions in an advisory role. Now the 20th, 24th and 26th brigades would each supply the 29th/46th, 37th/52nd and 22nd battalions with teams consisting of 3 officers, 9 NCO's, 9 Privates all capable of leading sections. These men would be advancing up the coast towards Fortification Point, with the 20th brigade held back in reserve. To support this advance a new beachhead was required at the mouth of the Kalueng to supply them by sea. Men went to work removing all the underwater and hardwood obstacles, so a bridge could be built over the Kalueng to allow the tanks and jeeps to cross. Edgar sent the 22nd battalion on the 3rd to capture some high ground north and west of Gusika to secure the new beachhead. At 10:15am, Captain McFadden, Guild and Martin led companies across the Kalueng to assault some features held by Japanese. They were held back by heavy machine gun fire and quickly called in artillery support that blasted the Japanese positions until 12:45pm. After that the companies continued their attack, but without success. Then Guild's company seized a knoll around a mile northwest of Gusika while Martins company pushed frontally and McFadden's formed a circle around the Japanese. By 5pm the companies and artillery managed to dislodge the Japanese allowing the 22nd battalion to establish their bridgehead. However the following day for the 22nd battalion would not be an idle one. A mixed force consisting of the 238th battalion, 33rd independent engineer regiment and 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery led by Major Tashiro had orders stating "the force, while avoiding any decisive engagement, will carry out successive resistance to try to delay enemy advance". The 22nd battalion had fought hard to clear the enemy positions south of the Lagoon, but their successes were few. Patrols discovered the enemy had dug in near a creek half way from Kalueng to the Lagoon. At 12pm, one of McFaddens platoons found a mine field along a track before being attacked. McFadden requested artillery support, but it failed to hit the mark. Lt Holdworths leading platoon 5 found themselves fighting hand to hand combat with some Japanese near the same track. Soon multiple platoons converged into the area forming an incoherent skirmish, while the Japanese enjoyed well established dug-in positions to face off against the multiple Australian groups. Because of the disorganizations, none of the Australian units managed to penetrate the Japanese positions. Over along the track to Wareo, Brigadier Porter worried his 2/43rd battalion was too worn and torn, so he ordered two companies of the 2/32nd led by Colonel Scott to head up to bolster their strength. By the 3rd of december, Colonel Scott's men began arriving to cover the 2/43rd, who were engaged in battle with multiple disabled tanks. By midday the Japanese could no longer withstand the Australian attacks and were forced to pull back 100 yards. Now Colonel Scott took command over the Lakes area, deploying his men and those of the 2/43rd up the main track half way between the Lakes and Christmas Hills. Back at Kuanko, the 2/23rd battalion were clinging on to their unfavourable position, being battered by the Japanese all the while. They were suffering from a lack of supplies, which were painstakingly being brought to them all the way from Palanko by men of the 2/24th battalion. Kuanko was seeing a firing duel involving numerous Japanese snipers, prompting Brigadier Whitehead to reinforce the position with Captain Denny's company of the 2/24th. On the 4th, Colonel Scott resumed the attack against the Lakes area with both his 2/32nd and 2/43rd companies becoming “exhausted and culled of semi-sick personnel”. Beginning at 7am the 4th and 24th batteries bombarded the Japanese positions along the track, an hour later this was followed up by 3 inch mortars. The Australian companies advanced parallel to the track over rough terrain, some managed to get 800 yards behind the Japanese where they began digging in. Despite being cut off the Japanese continued to resist until the cover of night allowed them to withdraw. To the west the 2/15th advanced north against Christmas Hills, but the terrain was so bad they eventually had to pull back to Nongora. At Kuanko, the 2/23rd discovered that elements of the 80th regiment had hooked around their rear during the night and were most likely trying to cut off their communications. Whitehead ordered the 2/24th company to clear the track. The 2/24th company advanced cautiously, going 75 yards south of the 2/23rds position near the main track. They began to dig in as patrols fanned out who quickly found the enemy occupying a track between Kuanko and the 2/23rd. They left the enemy unmolested for the moment as other patrols were sent to cut the Wareo-Kuanko track around Peak Hill linking up with the 2/23rd. The next day with enough supplies carried forward, Whitehead sent the rest of the 2/24th to reinforce the flanking maneuver going west of the track between Kuanko and Peak Hill. Colonel Scott had his 2/43rd and 2/32nd advance towards Christmas Hills who only found dead men of the 79th and 80th regiment as they had pulled out during the night. There was a ton of abandoned equipment, rifles, anti-tank ditch and dumps of 81mm mortars. The men quickly dug in as some men were sent forward to try and outflank the Japanese who were just 50 yards or so beyond their new positions. The Australians found the Japanese had dug in on another ridge close to the track. On that same day, the bridge over the Kalueng was finally finished allowing the 4th brigade to advance to Fortification point, with Lt Colonel Kenneth Cusworths 29th/46th taking the vanguard. With three matildas in the front the vanguard advanced at a good pace through sporadic Japanese fire. At 10am the leading tank was disabled by a landmine south of the creek with its tracks blown off. The other two tanks were unable to cross the creek without engineering aid leaving the vanguard force to advance unsupported. Several abandoned positions were passed before they ran into significant enemy fire. Cusworth's men were held up at the line of the first creek where the terrain turned into a large kunai field then jungle. By the afternoon the tanks were repaired and helped cross the creek, successfully brushing aside the enemy resistance allowing the Australians to advance halfway to the Lagoon. But the 238th regiment's companies regrouped and began attacking the advancing columns using sniper fire. This eventually caused Cusworth to order his men to pull back 60 yards to dig in near the creek. Though the tanks were essential at pushing away the enemy, they also were causing significant delayed as they continued to run into tank ditches and mines. On December 6th, Cusworth resumed his advance along two tracks leading to the inland side of the Lagoon. Woodpecker and light machine guns pelted the Australian columns inflicting heavy casualties. On the left track the Australians fought a Japanese position upon Bald Hill near the northern end of the Lagoon. The leading platoons had to charge through artillery and machine gun posts, but they managed to dislodge the Japanese who were hastily fleeing. The Japanese fought like lions, but there was little they could do against superior artillery and tank supported infantry. The best the Japanese could hope for was to continuously fight delaying actions while trying to avoid decisive engagements. General Katagiri lacked manpower, supplies even physical strength to fight the advancing Australians off. His units in the mountain and coastal areas were essentially cut off from the frontlines. The were relying heavily on Submarines and barges to move the meagre supplies that came from sea, and these were at the mercy of PT boat patrols. Overland the Japanese were failing to recruit native carriers because the Allies were extremely successful at bringing them to their side. Katagiri had no choice he ordered a gradual withdrawal from Wareo, lest it become a massacre. The 79th regiment began pulling back towards Lakona to reinforce the coastal area. Colonel Scott ordered an artillery bombardment to kick off December 6th before sending his men to assault Christmas Hills. His men were able to easily seize the eastern slope near the top, but now faced Japanese defensive lines on the western slopes less than 100 yards away. Colonel Hayashia received orders to abandon the positions during the night and as was becoming a routine, Scotts men found them abandoned the next morning. Meanwhile the 2/23rd discovered the enemy in front of them had likewise pulled out during the night. The 2/24th began cutting the track between Kaunko-Kwatingkoo and Kuanko-Wareo. During the afternoon the 2/23rd and 2/24th coordinated an assault to take Peak Hill. The 2/23rd performed a diversionary attack at 5pm using 25 pounders as the 2/24th stormed Peak Hills western slopes. By 6:45 the 2/24th were digging in on the western slopes and when darkness fell the 80th regiment began withdrawing from Peak Hill, allowing the Australians to seize the feature entirely by the morning. At this point the 2/23rd passed through the 2/24th position to hit the last Japanese defensive positions located 600 yards away from Wareo. Along the way the 2/24th discovered that Kwatingkoo was still held strongly by the enemy. The village still had at least 4 machine gun posts and mortars. The Japanese were only performing delaying actions as by December 8th the mountain area was finally abandoned altogether. The 2/24th occupied Kwatingkoo and the 2/23rd Wareo, quickly hoisted the Australian flag on the high ridge in the area. The fighting had cost the Japanese 451 dead, with 1 captured. For the Australians, they suffered 47 dead and 322 wounded. Knowing the Japanese were just going to take up more defensive positions, the 2/24th were ordered to pursue them as quickly as possible towards Bazuluo and east of the Christmas Hills area. The acting Japanese rearguard, units of the 2nd battalion, 79th regiment took up a position at a 2200 feature ambushing the Australians at every point possible. The Japanese rearguard would perform a delaying action against the 2/24th and 2/32nd battalions until December 12th, gradually pushed northwards. Their efforts earned them severe losses, but also valuable time for Katagiri to pull the forces back and assemble new positions. On December 7th, Cusworths men were held up by heavy fire coming out of an enemy position halfway between the lagoon and Tunom River. Cusworth men had advanced far past their tank support who were continuously being bogged down by mines and tank ditches. Regardless, the Australians still enjoyed superior artillery support and continued their pursuit of the Japanese until they reached the Tunom by nightfall and dug in. The next morning, Cusworth ordered the forces to cross the river, but the 238th regiment had companies take up positions to hit them as they did. Well concealed Woodpecker guns unleashed havoc from the jungles upon the advancing Australians causing heavy casualties. The Japanese were desperate to delay the advance as much as they could to give their men a fighting chance to withdraw. Sniper fire and Woodpeckers were all they could toss back, but the Australian artillery was able to pinpoint and annihilate their positions systematically. Along the Australian left flank, the 37th/52nd were fighting their way towards Tunom, with one company managing to get across the river against fierce resistance. During the night the Tunom defenders pull out allowing Cusworth to advance towards the mouth of Tunom by November 9th. The next day saw the 37/52nd in a very dangerous position. They were under heavy fire including artillery and it was likely the Japanese would perform a hook to cut them off. Brigadier Edgar decided to toss his 22nd battalion into the center line. The 22nd battalions advanced to a creek junction and unleashed a large mortar bombardment and upon advancing further only found dead Japanese. Along the rest of the advancing line the men were facing less and less resistance, as most of the 79th regiment were nearing Lakona. Cusworths men accompanied by the 29th/46th and some tanks advanced further and reached the Sowi river by 1:40pm. With heavy artillery and tank support they continued on until 3pm when they found Kilingia recently abandoned. The Engineer special brigade amphibious scouts rolled up to the Kiligia area and went to work forming a new beach head. This led to a new group constituting of AASC, medical and ESB detachments being brought up by landing crafts who constructed jeep tracks to help the infantry come over and to alleviate native carriers. The Australians did not rest however, the next day saw them continue the advance, with one company of the 22nd crossing the Sowi before digging in for the night. On December 12th, the rest of the 22nd crossed the Sowi with their tank support dispersing meager Japanese resistance. The 22nd advanced over numerous creeks where Japanese took up positions. By the 14th, the 22nd managed to force the Japanese back away from the 5th creek they came across. At this point the remnants of the 238th regiment withdrew to Lakona joining a garrison forming there and sent 50 infantry towards the Masaweng River to help Hayashidas rearguard. The 37th/52nd advancing on the left flank were meeting stiff resistance, but the Japanese rearguard could do nothing against their artillery and mortars. Now the 22nd were approaching a creek near lakona and began clashing with the growing garrison in the area. The Japanese had dug in forming a strong position, but a company of the 22nd led by Howieson hooked around a cliff trying to block the Japanese escape route. While this was going on the 37th/52nd were pushing back the rearguard forces towards the fringes of Cape Sibida. The 50 Japanese there found themselves surrounded because of Howieson's men and had no choice but to fight to the last man. Howiesons men from the cliff position tossed grenades down upon them to horrifying effect. At 5:30 on december 16th, 5 matildas rolled in towards the Cape Sibida pocket finding the doomed Japanese with their backs to the sea. At a range of 150 yards they began to fire upon the Japanese and with 8 minutes reached the cliff where they mopped them up to the last man. After further investigation it would turn out many Japanese had leapt off the cliffs around Cape Sibidia rather than die to the enemy. For the next day several stragglers were shot, including a few men who tried to swim out to sea heading for Sanga. 47 dead Japanese would be counted by the end of the 17th, though it was likely there were 70 or more. On the 17th, 14 more Japanese would be killed sheltering in some caves below Cape Sibida, it is theorised this was the area men had lept to the deaths. It was a decisive day, the Japanese had fought fanatically, but had lost Lakona, the pivot to their escape route. The next day the 29th/46th advanced along the coast and crossed the Sanga under a heavy artillery bombardment. The resistance from here on seemed only half hearted all the way until the Masaweng river. Once at the Masaweng, remnants of the 238th regiment launched a counterattack forcing the Australians to dig in for the day. It seems it was the last ditch effort to delay the advance of the 4th brigade as both the 29th/46th and 37th/52nd battalions were able to reach the Masaweng unopposed on the 18th. On the 18th, Katagiri received orders from Generals Imamura and Adachi to officially cancel further operations to take back Finschhafen and to withdraw towards Sio, the very last key position on the west coast of the Vitiaz strait. For the new task at hand, Katagiri sent the 80th regiment to occupy the Ago-Kanomi area and guard the coastal area to allow the rest of the division to withdraw towards Kalasa and Sio. The rearguard would be provided by Colonel Hayashida's 79th regiment. The 19th brought an intense artillery barrage as Cusworth's men were hitting Hayashida's main line. The Australians were met with a strong rain of fire and were unable to break through. Only the matildas were able to make some progress, but they were quickly held back by a steep ravine. On the left flank the 37th/52nd crossed the Masaweng unopposed during the day and marched to the southern slopes of FOrtification Hill by nightfall. This action forced Hayashia to withdraw during the night, the unpleasant routine his men had endured for days at this point. Facing no further resistance the 29th/46th and 37/52nd battalions occupied Fortification Hill. The 4th brigade had suffered 65 deaths and 146 wounded during their pursuit. For the Japanese it was a staggering 420 deaths, 6 prisoners and another 136 bodies would be found later having died of disease, malnutrition and suicide. However now we need to take a little detour over to the boys on Bougainville. Last time we were talking about Bougainville, General Geiger had expanded his perimeter. The army troops on the left flank had reached their final inland line back on November 25th. The line was adjusted at this point. In the front were the 21st marines taking up various positions on high grounds, though a lot of the terrain was swampy. Artillery units were moved forward into better positions to support the frontline positions better. Every avenue of approach to the defensive perimeter was covered in length. Meanwhile daily patrols from platoon to company strength, fanned out of the perimeter scouring the area for Japanese outposts to the east and north. They would find countless abandoned outposts. An order was issued on November 28th that no further movements were to be carried out until December. The line was now anchored in the north by Hill 1000 and extended southward paralleling the Torokina River to Hills 600 and 500. This denied the Japanese access to any high ground that would allow them to use artillery against the airfields and beachhead. To protect their general advance from any Japanese surprise attacks against their right flank, Geiger planned to launch a raid against the village of Koiari to the south. Geiger selected the 1st parachute battalion of Major Richard Fagan, reinforced with M Company of the 3rd Raiders. Their task was to launch a surprise attack against a Japanese position near Koiari, blow up any supply dumps they found, disrupt communications and harass the enemy as far into the interior as the East-West trail. A landing reconnaissance was carried out on November 27th, reporting no enemy anywhere near the target area, however these reports were unfortunately wrong. The paratroopers got aboard some LCM's and LCVP's at 4am on the 29th and would find themselves tossed nearly in the center of a Japanese supply dump. Major Fagan had estimated they would be opposed by at least 1200 Japanese, most likely the Japanese 6th transport regiment and elements of the 23rd infantry regiment. Luckily for Fagans men, the Japanese were just as surprised as them. Fagans men quickly overran the dump and established a perimeter extending 200 yards inland. The Japanese then responded by tossing mortar, machine gun and rifle fire at the marine beachhead. Artillery from Torokina began to help the marines as they were met with a series of enemy charges through the night. The second landing party landed further south to meet up with the main party, but in the process would suffer 13 casualties. Fagan sent word to HQ that things were getting very hot and they needed to pull out quickly. He estimated 1200 Japanese would be storming his beachhead. Geiger fearing his mens annihilation quickly formed a rescue operation, though communications broke with Fagan. The Japanese continued to toss attacks at the beachhead, but were kept at bay by gunfire from 155mm guns of the 3rd defense battalion. Meanwhile the craft used to get the paratroopers over were sent to rescue them, but they were hindered by Japanese artillery. This prompted Geiger to send an LCI gunboat and the destroyers Fullam, Lradner and Landsdowne which had just come back from convoy duties. During the night the Japanese began surrounding the beachhead firing into their perimeter. The 155mm “long toms” continued to offer a shield for the marines, barely managing to keep the Japanese pinned down. The paratroopers were running out of ammunition when just in the nick of time the boats arrived to the scene and all the boys were picked up by 8:40pm. In the end the raid was a complete failure, the Americans suffered 15 deaths, 99 wounded and 7 were missing out of a force of 614 that went over. They estimated they had caused 291 casualties upon the enemies, but there was no way to really gauge this. Nearly all the damage dealt to the enemy was done via artillery and naval bombardment, pretty much making the raid a complete waste of time. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Over on Green Hell, the Japanese yet again found themselves on the run with the Australians biting at their heels. Wareo had fallen, now all that remained was Sio, but the Japanese would be no means make it a walk in the park for the allies. Over on Bougainville, the Americans proved once in awhile they could mess up to.
Last time we spoke about the ongoing operations around Finschhafen. The Japanese had technically lost Finschhafen in a rather quick fashion when the allies landed, but they had not given it up. General Katagiri was preparing a massive counter offensive against the allies while a large defensive effort was made at Sattelberg. Meanwhile the Australians and Americans had underestimated what it would take to secure the region and required time to reinforce themselves. Some ground was still gained and much patrolling was done, but the real battle for Finschhafen was just about to be let loose. We also spoke about the terrible situation in Bengal where a man made famine was not only hurting the people of Bengal but also bolstering the Free India Movement, led by Subhas Chandra Bose. Today we are going to continue these stories and more! This episode is the defense of Finschhafen Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Episode 100, oh my god how time flies by! Just wanted to say a huge thanks from myself and KNG for continuing to listen to me ramble on, you guys are awesome. We are going back to Finschhafen, which was described by Australian Historian Garth Pratten "to be one of the largest bases in the Southwest Pacific Area". Its certainly a true statement, Finschhafen would act as an enormous staging camp with a divisional capacity, a wharf for LSTs, several airfields and fuel dumps. General Wootten's 9th division had finally arrived to help bolster Brigadier Windeyer's 20th Brigade, just in time to meet the increasing Japanese attacks. Simultaneously General Katagiri managed to bring the bulk of his 20th division to Sattelberg and was now ready to unleash his strong counteroffensive. Katagiri's officials orders read "After dusk on X Oct, the main strength of 79th Infantry Regiment will attack the enemy in Arndt Point area from the north side. The assault boat Butai will penetrate through the north coast of Arndt Point on the night of X-day. Instructions to this "Boat Penetration Tai" were that "ammunition dumps, artillery positions, tanks, enemy H.Q., moored boats, barracks, etc. should be selected as objectives". "X-day," will be decided on X-minus-1-day at 2200 hrs and a fire will be seen for 20 minutes on the Sattelberg heights. When the fire is seen answer back at a suitable spot (by fires)." Katagiri's plan was for the Yamada detachment to perform a surprise attack against Jivevaneng while the 79th regiment led by Colonel Hayashida Kaneki would attack in the direction of Katika with three companies of the 2nd battalion and another company of the 3rd battalion kept in reserve, while the rest attacked Scarlet beach in the northern part of Arndt Point. Additionally the 2nd battalion, 26th field artillery regiment and two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment would perform a diversionary attack north of the Song river against Bonga, and the 10th company of the 79th regiment would join a detachment of engineers with explosive and demolition charges to make a seaborne attack against Scarlet Beach. This unit was called the "Boat Penetration Force", under Lieutenant Sugino, the commander of 10 Company. The counteroffensive was set to kick off on October 16th with the signal being a large fire lit at sattelberg. Now Wootten was aware there was something big coming, but he was unsure the direction of the offensive. Australian intelligence believed the enemy would counterattack towards Finschhafen airfield, Langemak bay or perhaps both. So Windeyer was ordered to coordinate the defense of Langemak Bay while Brigadier Evans would command the defenses of scarlet beach. On October 15th, a patrol of the 2/28th managed to capture a Japanese officer's satchel in the wareo-Gusika area, containing a copy of Katagiri's operation order for the offensive. The document was readily translated and reported back to Wootten. The Australian eyes were thus all turned west towards Sattelberg. Wootten instructed everyone "All units whose location permits will establish lookouts to report immediately… the lighting of any fires at night on Sattelberg heights and any answering fires.” Wotten believed that October 16th had to be X day and wondered why there was no sign yet of the diversion attack from the north. Wootten reaffirmed his orders to Evans to hold the site at Wareo at all costs as he believed the enemy would be advancing through there. Unbeknownst to Wootten, the bulk of the 79th regiment had already begun infiltrating the Katika track and the Yamada detachment were in position to hit Jivevaneng. Just before dawn on the 16th, the Japanese counteroffensive kicked off, as 3 companies of the 3rd battalion, 80th regiment launched their attack against the 2/17th battalions positions. The 2/17th were taken completely by surprise as many Japanese had crawled within 20 yards of their battalions HQ sitting on the eastern edge of Jivevaneng. Most of the attacks wre beaten back by components of Major Maclarns HQ company as well as the battalion HQ staff. For 2 hours after 7:30am the main track and positions occupied by a platoon of machine gunners and one mortar crew were subjected to sever shelling from a 70mm and 75 mm gun. The day would see 4 major attacks against the defensive positions, but all would be repulsed. At 3:15pm the battalion HQ was heavily damaged by mortar fire and grenades from cup dischargers. They suffered 19 casualties including 5 deaths. Yamada had also sent a small decoy unit of 150 men who raised cooking smoke in front of Kumawa trying to ruse the enemy over and prevent reinforcements going to Jivevaneng. Meanwhile the 79th regiment infiltrated the widely dispersed companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer battalion and the 155 man Boat Penetration force of Lt Sugino departed Nambariwa at dusk in four barges, successfully repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way. General Adachu wrote of these actions in great detail "The above units, having received orders to prepare to attack the enemy's rear by boat in connection with the division's operations to annihilate the force which has landed north of Finschhafen, undertook intensive training for about 20 days under command of company commander 1st-Lieutenant Sugino at Nambariwa base. The men all awaited the appointed day firm in their belief of certain victory. On 16th October 1943, at the time of the attack by the division's main strength to annihilate the enemy north of Katika, the unit received orders to penetrate the shore south of the mouth of the Song River. After drinking the sake graciously presented to the divisional commander by the Emperor, the unit vowed anew its determination to do or die and departed from the base boldly at dusk on the same day. Repulsing the interference of enemy PT boats on the way, the unit arrived at the designated point at 0230 hours on the 17th.” As night time came, so did torrential rain. The Australians anxiously watched sattelberg for the signal fire to emerge. It seemed impossible for a large fire to be lit with such rain, but a company of the 22nd battalion over at Logaweng reported seeing a large fire emerge on Sattelberg's crest at around 8:30pm. Unfortunately this report failed to reach the divisional HQ. None the less the Australians expected a seaborne attack at any minute. At 3:15 am on October 17th a heavy Japanese bombing raid hit Heldsbach and Arndt point. 66 bombs were dropped over the course of two hours, producing little damage and few casualties. At 3:55am Australian coastwatcher Captain D. C Siekmann at Gusika reported seeing 4 Japanese barges heading south. Nearly an hour later another 3 barges hiding in rain squalls approached Scarlet beach. Evans prepared his 2/43rd and 2/28th battalions for battle. At 4:10am the barges were approaching the north end of Scarlet Beach as companies A and D of the 2/28th, Captain Harris's 10th light anti-aircraft battery, a detachment of the 2/28th anti-tank platoon and a detachment of the 532nd EBSR were sitting on Bofor guns, two pounders, 37mm and Browning .50 caliber waiting for them. When the barge were 50 yards from the shore the Bofors were the first to light them up followed by the rest. However the Bofors were aimed to high to effectively fire on the barges allowing 2 barges to hit the beach. The 37mm, small arms and .50 Brownings fired upon the Sugino's raiders. Meanwhile Private Nahan Van Noy withheld two flamethrower units to wait for the enemy to approach. The Japanese came surging out of their barges tossing grenades and as they closed in, Van Noys flamethrowers jumped up and fired upon them. The flamethrowers stopped the Japanese charge in its tracks as the Brownings cut them to pieces. Van Noy's legs were nearly blown off by multiple grenade hits. Sugino's raiders were pinned downed in the mayhem but they continued to lob grenades in the cover of darkness. The grenade onslaught destroyed 3 anti aircraft guns, 4 fields guns, two ammunition deports, two machine guns and two pom-pom automatic cannons and numerous small arms. As light began to emerge the Japanese were becoming more and more exposed so Sugino ordered the men to crawl north along the split across the Song. 40 Japanese dead littered the beaches out of an estimated 100 who landed. 60 managed to escape north, but 24 of them would be killed by hunters of the 2/43rd battalion later. The raiders had not been able to disable the allied guns, but much akin to how pilots exaggerate their kills, so to did the raiders. General Adachi wrote in his report “Defying fierce artillery crossfire, the troops landed from the boats immediately. Taking up positions indicated beforehand the three platoons advanced in columns in different directions. The infantry and engineers advanced as one body creeping through the jungle. They annihilated the panic-stricken enemy everywhere, and achieved glorious and distinguished success. They killed more than 430 of the enemy, destroyed seven AA guns, five machine-cannons and MG's and five ammunition and supply dumps. Moreover they blew up the enemy headquarters and bivouac tents, thus destroying the center of command [these were in fact the tents of the casualty clearing station]. Raiding the area at will and with raging fury, they surprised and overwhelmed the enemy. By disrupting his command organization they established the foundation for the victory of the division's main strength. With the company commander as the nucleus, the entire group put forth a united effort and demonstrated the unique and peerless spiritual superiority of the Imperial Army… All those who fell severely wounded committed suicide by using hand grenades, and, of the total of 186 men, all except 58 became guardian spirits of their country.” By the late morning, the Japanese had assembled around one mile west of Katika just behind the three Pioneer battalions, finally unleashing their attack directed at Lt Colonel Alfred Gallasch's HQ. The Australians fought like lions, repelling 3 consecutive attacks before the enemy managed to capture a steep hill overlooking their entire position by nightfall. In the end the Pioneers HQ laden with the bulk of reserve ammunition and rations had to withdraw back towards Katika proper, leaving its dispersed companies behind enemy lines without a secure supply route. But Gallasch's men's determined efforts had gained valuable time for Brigadier Evans to redispose his forces and for General Morshead to call in the urgent movement of the 26th brigade to Finschhafen. Evans was forced to abandon the Bonga area so he could reinforce the Song river mouths area. Meanwhile Admiral barbey provided 14 LCI's and 6 LST's to carry the urgent reinforcements. Colonel Norman's 2/28th were ordered to recapture the Pioneer HQ position in order to re-establish communications and a supply route to the now isolated companies. The next morning, the Australians prepared their counterattack, but they were met with an attack against Katika and around the Siki creek. The Australians managed to repel the initial assaults thanks to artillery of the 2/12th regiment which Katagiri had no answer for as the Sugino raiders were supposed to have taken them out. However the Japanese soon gained momentum as Evans tried to strengthen Scarlet Beachs defenses by arranged a semicircle of infantry companies between the Song and Siki. By midday an Australian platoon led by Lt Wedgewood gained a position north of the Katika track who reported killing 33 Japanese and suffering 11 casualties in the process. Norman ordered Wedgewood to get his men out of there, but the platoon commander asked permission hold the position which he thought was critical. It seems Wedgewood was correct in his assessment, as his platoons little position on the track caused Hayashida to pause his attack. Meanwhile Katagiri launched his diversionary attack north of the Song at 3:30pm. This effectively held up the 2/43rd battalion over at North Hill. Simultaneously Hayashia ordered some troops to advance south of Siki Creek to try and outflank the 2/28th's position and they remarkably made it all the way to Siki Cove doing so. This breakthrough threatened the entire Australian defensive position, effectively creating a wedge between the 24th and 20th brigades. Wootten ordered Evans to hold his lines at all cost, including at North Hill and between Scarlet beach to Siki Creek. The Japanese now threaten Scarlet beach from both the west and south, forcing Evans to order a withdrawal of the 2/28th from Katika. It was a controversial decision that would anger Wootten. Norman bitterly pulled out of his dominating position at Katika and likewise the gallant Wedgewood platoon were forced to depart their isolated forward position to maintain a tighter defensive perimeter around scarlet beach. Wootten then ordered half of the 2/13th to defend Heldsbach plantation and protect the supply area at Launch Jetty. To make sure to contain the threat, Wootten placed this unit directly under Windeyer and ordered him to move into the south bank of the Siki. Hayashida's men found Katika abandoned by dusk and proceeded south of it to hit Heldsbach and then Finschhafen. Yet just in the nick of time, Windeyeres troops arrived to prevent the 79th regiment from crossing the creek during the night. Meanwhile the 80th regiment continued their assault against Jivevaneng. The assault was that of a static fight along the Sattelberg road and Kumawa track. Some infantrymen who fought there wrote this in their diaries "I eat potatoes and live in a hole, and cannot speak in a loud voice. I live the life of a mud rat or some similar creature.” Another diary read “What shall I eat to live? What has happened to the general attack… the enemy patrol is always wandering around day and night." A third diary read "Heard that [79th Regiment] has forced the enemy in the sector of Arndt Point to retreat. This is the first good news I have heard since I left for the front." The 2/17th were completely surrounded, the 80th regiment had effectively raised a siege of Jivevaneng. On the 18th the 2/17th's diarist wrote this "this morning revealed that the enemy had cut the main Sattelberg Road to our east and was sitting astride the track". Japanese sniper rounds, mortars and grenades from cup discharges reigned hell upon the trapped defenders. With the enemy advancing along the Sattelberg road, Windeyer ordered the isolated Pioneer companies to hold the road in front of Zag. With so many allied units isolated behind enemy lines, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown by pilots of the No. 4 Squadron. On October 19th after repelling an enemy attack against Scarlet Beach, Colonel Norman moved in to hit back at Katika surprising the Japanese. aT 3:50pm Coppocks company of the 2/28th followed by two platoons charged Katika under artillery support. The Japanese defender were taken by complete surprise when the Australians hit them from the north, so quickly after losing the position. The battalion diaristwrote "Enemy… appear slightly peeved and evidently had not appreciated the possibility of our reoccupation of these positions.” The Japanese bitterly gave up the vital area and this was couple with a sudden unexpected Australian presence south of Siki. Hayashia in response had to reorganise his units. By nightfall Brigadier Whitehead's 26th brigade reinforce with a tank squadron landed at Langemak Bay by midnight thanks to admiral barbey. The next morning, Norman ordered a company to dislodge the Japanese at Siki cove. At 8:38 am on the 20th, two platoons charged the cove and were met with japanese fire from a razorback to the south. By 9:26am the platoons became pinned down. Lt Wedgewoods platoon attempted an encirclement maneuver but was also pinned down. The Australians took too many casualties forcing Norman to withdraw them. Although the assault on Siki cove was unsuccessful, the Japanese machine gun positions were now located, so at 2:30pm some Vickers were placed forward to hit the cove. The 2/28th diaries wrote "This caused considerable retaliation by the enemy, and terrific fire-fight ensued causing mild panic amongst beach defense personnel who thought enemy were breaking through." Eventually the Japanese machine-guns were silenced, mainly by 3-inch mortar fire. Throughout the rest of the day the Australians repulsed a number of attacks on Katika and the Sattelberg road. After days of resisting tooth and nail, the isolated Pioneer companies along the Katika Track were forced to pull back towards the beach. At 9:15am a Boomerang dropped a message on the Pioneers stating "You will rejoin main body North Hill, Scarlet Beach or Zag. Suggest route crossing Song River moving along it to North Hill." Nearly an hour later another plan dropped 3 canister of ammunition, though the men had hoped for rations. The men buried their surplus ammunition and began marching single file north. The Pioneers had borne the brunt of the main attack, and their mere presence had caused concern for the advancing enemy. The Japanese counter attack halted just when Wootten received his 3rd brigade. He therefor believed the time was ripe to steal the initiative and issued orders to Whitehead and Evans to drive the enemy from Siki Creek, while the entire 2/13th would advance up the Sattelberg road to support the 2/17th. On October 21st, Hayashida's battered forces prepared to abandon Siki cove retreating westwards. The 79th regiment had sustained huge losses, the men were exhausted, food was running low leaving many to live on a few potatoes. On the 22nd, reports came in that the Japanese could be seen withdrawing, prompting Norman to push further west of Katika while one of his other companies hit Siki Cove. During the afternoon, the Japanese launched a surprising counter attack against Katika, but were repulsed. Despite fighting them off, the Australians would be unable to advance further for the day. Katagiri then decided to reinforce Hayashia with two companies of the 1st battalion, 79th regiment trying to break the allies hold over Katika. On October 23rd, Evans men finally got some breathing space so they could reorganise the forces. The 2/43rd were ordered to hold the area from the coast through north Hill to the Song river while the 2/28th would hold the area from the Song going south 1000 yards and the 2/32nd would hold the Katika and Siki areas At this point the 79th regiment had suffered so many losses, Katagiri began to seriously consider calling off the counteroffensive. On the Katika front, the Australians reported numerous piles of Japanese dead, the 2/28th estimated 308 corpses were on the north side of the track alone. Hayashida continued his resolve and ordered attacks during the night, but none held any significant success. Morshead preparing to bring the 4th brigade over to Finschhafen and the American 808th engineer battalion would also land at Langemak bay. A constant stream of American units, vehicles and stores began to pour unto Dreger Harbour to construct new airfields. On the 24th, the Japanese would launch their last attacks west of Katika. While the Australians continue their advance. Wootten and Morshead visited the 24th brigade HQ and began lambasting Evans for his decision to abandon Katika. Evans was sure had had done the right thing pulling back to the perimeter around Scarlet Beach, but Wootten and Morsehead felt he had sacrifice vital ground for no reason. They argued the enemy had concentrated most of its attack on a continuous line which did not include Katika. Evans had neglected to keep up an adequate reserve, which could have been used to punch any Japanese force breaking through around Scarlet Beach. In the end it was Woottens prerogative as divisional commander to determine tactical objects and Evans duty to conform. It was not the first time Evans used his own judgement. For this Evans would be sacked by November 1st and replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter. Finally on October 25th, Katagiri ordered his battered men to concentrate at Sattelberg and reorganise for future counter offensive. For the next three days, the 24th and 26th brigades pushed forward their defensive perimeters, giving a depth of over 1200 yard inland from Scarlet beach and Katika. The Sattelberg road situation remained unchanged, with each side exerting pressure, but unable to shift the other. Katagiri's counteroffensive had failed. The Australians estimated 679 Japanese had died, with many more killed by artillery and mortar fire. Wootten's staff estimated the overall casualties for the Japanese to be around 1500. The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. On October 28th, Wootten received the 4th brigade at Finschhafen and prepared a offensive against Sattelberg and Wareo yet again. This time Windeyers forces would regain full control over the Sattelberg road up to Jiveveaneng. The 2/13th advanced to Coconut Grove by October 29th in an effort to support the 2/17th as they attacked east of Jivevaneng. For the next few days the Australians pressed upon Jivevaneng with a series of assaults, but Yamada's men held on tenaciously. By the end of the month, the 2/17th were suffering from sniping attacks, sickness and a precarious supply line. The battalions diarist wrote this “The battalion at present is rather uncomfortable owing to the almost incessant rain over the past 48 hours. This afternoon mist obscured the whole area and seriously hampered vision. Everyone presents rather sorry spectacle as we are now reduced to one set of clothing. A relief will be welcome when it arrives. The main Sattelberg Road has been cut now for 13 days but it is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the very near future.” On November 1st, the 2/17th and 2/13th resumed their attacks against the Japanese pocket, but were repelled each time suffering terrible casualties. On November 2nd, pandemonium broke out when the 2/13th fired all of their weapons for 15 minutes in a grand diversionary demonstration as the 2/17th successfully launched an attack taking a position north of the road, around 150 yards from the 2/13th. The enemy was now firmly wedged between them. Also on November 2nd, it was expected the 20th and 26th brigades plus their tank squadron would relieve them. Wootten ordered WIndeyere to reopen the Sattelberg road so another fierce attack could occur. Just as this was about to happen, the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their pocket. Finally on November 3rd, after abandoning their positions, the road was opened and the vanguard of the 26th began to arrive and Windeyers battered men began to pull back. Meanwhile Whitehead assembled his forces along the Sattelberg road preparing for the new offensive. Wootten's intention was for the 26th brigade to capture the high ground of Sattelberg-Palanko and to subsequently advance to the Gusika-Wareo line. He had 18 tanks to toss up the Sattelberg road and he stressed to all his men to conceal them until the attack occurred. He also sent advance patrols who discovered a number of the enemy had posts west of Jivevaneng, such as a prominent feature called Steeple Tree Hill. Brigadier Porter's 24th brigade patrols would also find Japanese defending Bonga and Pino Hill. General Adachi visited the frontlines in late October where he found most of Katagiri's units had been reduced to below half strength and the division was suffering from supply difficulties. Despite this, Katagiri was confident his men could pull through and planned to gradually annihilate the enemy via a series of smaller limited attacks. Thus the 80th regiment would secure Sattelberg heights and the 79th would secure Nongora just in front of Wareo. Adachi also visited Kirai where the 51st division had just arrived. There he ordered Nakano to deploy his forces along the coast between Madang and Sio. The Japanese were going to make the road to sattelberg a road to hell. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and Americans managed to thwart General Katagiri's large counteroffensive against Finschhafen. It was some brutal fighting that greatly hurt the Japanese, now they were again on the defensive and the road to sattelberg would soon be covered in more blood.
THG sat down with Maha Adachi, a Mooresville-based poet, spoken word artist, and integrative pest management specialist (Hope's Love Garden) at The Honeycomb Experience's Back to School event in Gastonia, NC on August 27, 2023. Shout out to Reasons Brown and The Honeycomb Experience for their work in the community and allowing us to highlight those involved in the amazing event! Make sure to subscribe to us on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, and Google Podcasts. Also follow us on Instagram and Facebook @hilltopglove. Sponsored by: BOPs, Red Rooster Sports Bar & Grill, Lynx Recording Studios, Mid Carolina Service Co., and TruBrilliance Ent.
This week on Krewe of Japan Podcast... in light of Japan Society of New Orleans's upcoming 2024 Sister City Exchange Program, the Krewe sits down with Nicholas McCullough, Coordinator of International Relations for the International Tourism Division in Matsue. Nicholas takes us through some of the must-see, must-do, must-eat options that Matsue has to offer inbound visitors! Stay tuned at the end for some information on how to participate in the New Orleans-Matsue Sister City Exchange Program in 2024!------ About the Krewe ------The Krewe of Japan Podcast is a weekly episodic podcast sponsored by the Japan Society of New Orleans. Check them out every Friday afternoon around noon CST on Apple, Google, Spotify, Amazon, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts. Want to share your experiences with the Krewe? Or perhaps you have ideas for episodes, feedback, comments, or questions? Let the Krewe know by e-mail at kreweofjapanpodcast@gmail.com or on social media (Twitter: @kreweofjapan, Instagram: @kreweofjapanpodcast, Facebook: Krewe of Japan Podcast Page, TikTok: @kreweofjapanpodcast, LinkedIn: Krewe of Japan LinkedIn Page & the Krewe of Japan Youtube Channel). Until next time, enjoy!------ About Nicholas & Matsue ------In Matsue Facebook PageImages in Matsue Instagram Page------ About New Orleans-Matsue Sister City Exchange Program ------JSNO Page about Exchange ProgramsBecome a Member of Japan Society of New Orleans
Last time we spoke about the mop up operations on New Georgia and the continued drive upon Salamaua and Lae. Munda had fallen, New Georgia was certainly a lost cause, but that did not mean there wasn't come cleaning up to do. The Americans were stuck mopping up places like Arundel and Baanga seeing fierce Japanese resistance. Sasaki ordered his men to fight as hard as they possibly could while others made their way to evacuation points. Over on Green Hell, the Australian and American forces had just taken Mubo and Lababia ridge, prompting General Nakano to create a last line of defense in front of Salamaua. Now the allies had to cross the francisco river and face multiple hills, ridges and knolls. Forward units forded the francisco river and grabbed a few knolls catching a glimpse finally of Salamaua, but a glimpse was all they were going to get as the Japanese fought tooth and nail to push them back. This episode is Operation Postern Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The time has come at last. For months, we have seen the Australian and American forces fight for each hill, ridge and knoll, cross over ravines, rivers, swamps, a green hell of a landscape filled with more horror than just the Japanese. From the Jungles of Way to the rugged mountains of bobdubi and Komiatum, through the endless rain, mud and death. Operation Postern was to finally be unleashed, landings at Lae and Nadzab would commence. Now back in August, Admiral Barbey and General Wooten were forced to postpone D-day for September 4. For Lae the plan called for two battalions of Brigadir Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade to land on Red Beach; the 2/15th battalion would hit the eastern flank and the 2/17th to western flank closer to Lae. The 2/13th would hit Yellow beach; the 2/23rd battalion with a company of engineers, a field ambulance, a force of artillery and light anti-aircraft section would join the landing phase; the 26th brigade would follow up the initial landings and move right through the beachhead. The planners were concerned with possible Japanese naval action against their beachheads at night, as this had occurred at Guadalcanal and Milne Bay, so the defense of Red Beach would be coordinated with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion. Red Beach was selected as it was close to Lae, just a bit due east, but out of range of her large gun batteries. Yellow beach was further east and selected as an additional landing area to protect the eastern flank of the main beachhead that would be at red beach. The allies could not provide continuous air cover thus Brigadier Victor Windeyer's 20th brigade would have to land and unload quick as all hell. The initial plans called for a time of landing known as “h hour” to be between 3am and 4am in line with Wooten's request that it occur two hours during moonlight before dawn. They estimated they would need 9-10 hours for the unloading phase, the LST's would then retract at around 1pm. However, when the landing date was postponed for September 4th, this changed everything. Now there would be no morning moon, thus H hour could not be scheduled until after sunrise to allow time for the allied navy to identify the correct beach on a coast that was covered by a low-lying swampy jungle terrain, there was no prominent landmarks it would be difficult. This delayed the landing until 6:30am, resulting in the loss of around 3 hours of unloading time. Alongside that came the decision to retract the LST's by 11am as the allied air cover could not be guaranteed after 11am. This the unloading time was now reduced to 4.5 hours, that a hell of a lot less than they needed. It was also expected that the troops would take at least 1 to 1.5 hours to disembark leaving just 3 hours to unload supplies. Again logistics are not sexy, but this is the kind of problems needed to be overcome to win wars. So Brigadier David Whitehead's 26th brigade was going to follow up the initial landings, moving straight through the beachhead with the 2/2nd machine gun battalion who were earmarked to guard red beach. Furthermore General Heavy's brigade would dispatch some amphibian scouts with the 532nd engineer boat and shore regiment to go in on the first wave to establish red and yellow markers for the two beaches. To make things even more confusing, there was this enormous fringing reef along the thousand mile coastline with a few breaks. One break in the reef line near a village called Tauali was going to be marked Green beach as a back up landing area. The one and half mile of good narrow beach was to be Yellow beach 1, and yes there was a yellow beach 2, closer to Silimati. Admiral Barbey was going to employ every vessel he had; 4 Destroyer transports, the Gilmer, Humphreys, Brooks and Sands; 20 LCI's, 18 LCT's and 13 LSTs. From August 20-22nd Barbey had a full-scale landing rehearsal carried out at beaches on the south coast of Normanby island. The men learnt a few things from this experience. The first was that the surfacing of tracks with steel mesh was too slow to allow the vehicles to clear the beach. They decided that more stores would be loaded as bulk cargo and more labor would be provided to clear the landing crafts. Thus on August 29th, the 2/13th battalion was taken to Normanby island on destroyer transports were the men were disembarking from the LCVP's up to their necks in water. There were major differences as you can imagine for the conditions in Australia vs New Guinea. As Patrick Bourke remarked ‘the country fringing the beach was the worst we had been in. Almost impenetrable jungle grew in waist deep swamps, crisscrossed by much deeper creeks.' There was also a pre-emptive naval bombardment of Finschhafen as reports began to come in indicating enemy troops and supplies were being moved down the coast from Finschhafen by night. Vice Admiral Carpender ordered Captain Jesse Carter, commander of destroyer squadron 5 to sweep the Huan Gulf by night and hit Finschhafen. One of Carpenders staff noted ‘It will be worthwhile to prove the Navy is willing to pitch in, even if we get nothing but coconuts,”. On August 22nd, destroyers Perkins, Smith, Conyngham and Mahan departed Milne bay enroute for the Huon Gulf. This was the furthest allied vessels larger than PT boats had ventured along the New Guinea coast since the beginning of the pacific war. Early on August 22rd, they opened fire on Finschhafen, firing 540 rounds of 5 inch shells within 10 minutes before hauling ass out of there. It was the first naval bombardment of Japanese forces in New Guinea. As for the battle for the skies, General Kenney was preparing to launch a series of air raids against Lae to support Operation postern. On the day before the landing, 21 allies bombers would hit Lae Airfield to try and knock out their aerial capabilities. Now all of that was just for the Lae landing, we got an entire other operation to hit Nadzab, designated as Z-day which because of the postponement was changed to September 5th. 96 C-47's, 82 carrying the regiments, 5 carrying artillery and 9 for supplies would be employed by Colonel Paul Prentiss's 54th troop carrier wing to transport Colonel Kenneth Kinsler's 503rd parachute regiment. Alongside this, Brigadier Eather's 25th brigade were earmarked to be the first flown in after the initial landings. On August 31st tossed 3 battalion commanders, their operations and communications officers with supplies using a Flying fortress at a very low altitude over the drop zone. They were acting as a sort of reconnaissance and they would uncover vital information to ensure safe location markers for accurate future drops. Hell they even performed meteorological analysis to figure out the wind conditions for jump areas. Meanwhile they keep saying everyday here in montreal its gonna be sunny and its rained for 5 days straight. There would be rehearsals for the parachuting forces before September 3rd when the final plan was issued. Kinsler's 1st battalion led by Major John Britten would hit field B with the task of securing the Nadzab airfield site before establishing a defensive perimeter and beginning work on the airfield. Meanwhile the Australian 2/2nd pioneer battalion led by Lt Colonel J.T Lang would cross the Markham to help construct a new airfield. Alongside this Kinsler's 2nd battalion led by Lt Colonel George Jones was going to hit field A to capture the Gabsonkek area which would prevent the Japanese from advancing from the north or northwest. Kinsler's 3rd battalion led by Lt COlonel John Tolson would hit field c to capture Gabmatzung and prevent the Japanese from advancing from the east. Furthermore Prentiss would drop 22 dummy paratroopers in the forests south of Yalu right where Japanese forces occupying Heath's plantation would be able to see them. It was hoped this deception would delay advances towards Nadzab. By the way I took the time to educate myself a bit more on what is known as Paradummy's, because honestly until writing this episode I had no idea it was a thing. These were burlap cases filled with straw and plant waste, they kind of look like sackboy to be honest. As you can imagine from ground level looking fairly high up they do look like real paratroopers and they often were dropped alongside real paratroopers to give them a fighting chance against enemy bullets. The more you know. After all the planning was done Barbey's little armada departed Milne Bay on the morning of September 3rd. Their journey was uneventful as they disembarked at Buna for a short break before re-embarking in the afternoon. After this point Heavy's Morobe base was hit by 9 Rabaul based Betty's with 27 Zeros for escort which tried to high altitude bomb them, doing little damage. Because of the deceptive campaign against Salamaua, termed the Salamaua magnet, very few IJA forces were left guarding Lae. At Lae were Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment to the right bank of the Markham; Company 6 of the 238th regiment at Markham point; the 2 machine gun company of the 238th regiment were spread between the Bunga river and Bulu River; the 15th independent engineer regiment, 2nd company of the 5th battalion of heavy field artillery, the 25th, 29th and 30th machine cannon companies would all be at Lae proper. Aside from the few IJA troops, Rear Admiral Fujita Ruitaro had the 7th base force, formed around the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 82nd naval garrisons anti-aircraft and coastal defense units. The Japanese were having a hell of a difficult time supplying their forces at Lae. To supply the near 10,000 or so men present within the Lae-Salamaua area each month required, 150 barges carrying 1500 cubic meters of supplies. Only large type barges could manage to get through the Dampier straits rather rough sea, smaller barges were too dangerous for the task. After each passing month, the naval ships used for transports were decreasing and by May the supplies were being carried by 6 submarines, cutting the volume in half the following month. After that supplies began to be carried overland from Wewak and Madang and a new barge route was established through Sio and Finschhafen. Regardless the Japanese were barely able to keep Lae and Salamaua supplied. This saw barely 300 fit men left to guard Lae with 2650 troops, malnourished, sick, wounded or suffering tropical ailments. The Japanese did have some big guns however, 28 75mm, 4 105mm and two 155mm for the coastal defenses, but their ammunition supply was quite limited. The 155mm's only had 30 shells a piece, while the 105mm had 50. By late July, General Adachi decided to place Major General Shoge Ryoichi in command of the defenses at Lae, talk about a shitty promotion haha. Ryoichi's rd battalion, 238th regiment was sent first to Salamaua, then Company 6th and the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment managed to reach Lae, but by the time things cooked up the rest would be stuck in Finschhafen. Therefore Rear Admiral Mori Kunizo was sent to grab command of the 7th base force in the meantime while Fujita would lead all the IJN and IJA units currently at Lae. By nightfall on September 3rd, the final voyage began. The allied vessels got to the assembly area unhindered and undetected and by 5:50am on the 4th identified the beach markers. The destroyer transports lowered the landing craft carrying the first wave while performing a 6 minute bombardment. The first landing craft hit the beach at 6:30am and at his guard post at the Japanese anti-aircraft positions overlooking the Lae airfield, private Wada Kiichi heard the sound and saw the flashes of a naval bombardment out in the Guon Gulf. He wrote this ‘Suddenly, there was a booming sound from the sea, and in a split second, I sighted red and yellow tracers come flying on a half moon ballistic arc. Where would the huge fleet land?‘Aren't they, in fact, landing right here in Lae? ‘If I must die, I will fight with courage and die like an imperial navy man without shame.' Brigadier Windeyer's troops began to land at Red and Yellow beach, only meeting 30 members of the 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment who they brushed off around the Bulu plantation. General Kenney unleashed air raids against the Japanese airbases. At 7:45am 13 RAAF bombers, 10 Beauforts and 3 A-20 Bostons hit Gasmata; at 9am 24 Liberators hit Lae; at 9:30am 9 Mitchells hit Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester and 3 Bostons returned to hit Gasmata again in the afternoon. As the 22nd squadron War diary noted of the Gasmata raid “the strip is considered unserviceable”. The second wave approached the beach in the larger LCI's, managing to unload 6 companies without any opposition other than some very annoying reefs near the shore. Thus two waves hit the ground uncontested, but danger did lurk in the skies above. 6 Ki-43 Osca'rs and 3 Ki-51 Sonia's took off from Lae at 7am and 4 minutes later the Oscars began strafing 7 LCI's carrying the 2/23rd battalion and its division HQ while the Sonia's bombed two LCI's. One of the bombs crashed through the main deck of LCI 339 just forward of its pilot house setting the ship on fire before it began listing to port taking on water. The LCI ran ashore and was abandoned by the crew, 10 of which were wounded. Another bomb narrowly missed LCI 341 exploding near the bottom of the vessel, blowing a large hole amidships on her port side flooding two compartments. The list to port was corrected and the LCI managed to run ashore and would be salvaged later. 9 men were killed with 45 wounded during the attack. 8 Boomerangs and 2 Wirraways came over from Tsili Tsili to aid the next echelons as they began to unload units. The LSTs began clearing the landing area by 11am. The LCT's took a lot longer to unload than expected, they had arrived at 8am but only cleared the area over the course of 6 hours. Meanwhile, General Imamura frantically launched a strong air raid towards Law consisting of 12 Betty's, 8 Val's and 61 Zero's. The 81 aircraft strong party departed Rabaul, but was soon discovered by destroyer USS Reid lingering off Cape Cretin at around 1pm. Reid's report gave enough time for the allies to toss a counter air wave to intercept them consisting of 40 Lightnings and 20 Thunderbolts. A few vals tried to bomb Reid in the meantime, resulting in all misses. The interception saw the loss of 23 Japanese aircraft, mostly Zero's while only two lightnings were shutdown. However many Japanese aircraft continued towards Morobe where they descended upon the 6th echelons LSTs just off Cape Ward Hunt at around 2pm. These were carrying the Australian 2/4th independent company and the 2/2nd machine gun battalion, just 33 kms east of Morobe heading for Lae. 6 Vals managed to land two bomb hits on LST-473 and the Betty's one torpedo hit against LST-471. This killed 51, wounded 67 mostly from the 2/4th independent company. The Japanese lost an additional 4 Zeros and 3 betty's while 15 other aircraft were badly damaged. The remaining LSTs continued on towards Red beach, while some were ordered to divert course to assist the damaged LST's from the aerial attacks. Destroyer Humphrey's would grab the wounded and bring them back to Buna. Everything arrived on schedule by 23:00. Thus Admiral Barbey had managed to land 7800 personnel, of which 3780 were combat troops, alongside 3300 tons of supplies. After the landings, engineers at Red and Yellow beach got to work constructing roads while Windeyer's combat troops began to extend their perimeter. By nightfall the 2/17th battalion had crossed the Buso river and by 7:30am the 2/7th field company had built a single-girder bridge across it. To defend against further aerial raids upon the beachheads, a battery of the 2/4th light anti-aircraft regiment landed two detachments at Red and yellow beach. By mid afternoon the 2/13th had extended the yellow beach perimeter around 3000 meters inland and 2000 meters east to west. Lt Colonel Colvin's 2 companies of the 2/13th advanced inland towards the Bulu plantation sending the 30 Japanese who tried to contest them earlier further north towards some hills. Aside from them there were no signs of other enemy, by 2pm patrols of the 2/13th and 2/15th were forded the Suez river between Bulu river and Red beach. Colonel Grace's 2/15th battalion were given the task of protected the beachhead, while Lt Colonel Simpson's 2/17th began to advance towards the Buso river at 9am. Two companies of Major broadbent advanced northwest across the Buso going another 4 miles finding no enemy. Two companies of the 2/13th would also advance east along a track going towards Hopoi where opposition was expected. General Wootten wanted to speed up the advance towards Lae to prevent the Japanese from any time to organize a defense east of the Busu river. Wootten gave Brigadier Whiteheads 2/17th battalion the task of passing through the 20th brigade and continued the advance towards Buso river. Over on the other side Admiral Fujita began deploying his forces in a defensive perimeter between the Markham and Busu Rivers, with most of his naval units taking up positions on the right bank of the Busu while Companies 10 and 11 of the 115th regiment, around 127 men were sent to hold Singaua point. General Shoge rushed over as quickly as he could to take command at Lae, while General Nakano sent Major Mukai Masatake to assume command of the frontline actions. The next day the Australian advance going east and west continued still with no opposition. Simpson's men went west, advancing through some horrible wet and boggy terrain. To simpsons north was Broadbents men who got lost for a little while fording rivers until they made it to the Singaua plantation. Meanwhile the 2/23rd and 2/24th battalions followed behind them led by Lt Colonel Gillespie and Major McRae. They bivoucked south of Apo where Whitehead placed his HQ. During the morning hours, Brigadier Bernard Evan's 24th brigade embarked on 20 LCI's over at Buna and began to land at Red Beach by nightfall. As the Lae operation was moving along full swing, it was now time for Z-day. A B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. It was a horrible disaster and a bad omen. The armada of C-47's were being escorted by 48 Lightnings, 12 Airacobras and 48 Thunderbolts a very intimidating force. Generals Kenney, Vasey and MacArthur accompanied the armada aboard some flying fortresses. Kenney said to MacArthur “They're my kids and I want to see them do their stuff”, apparently MacArthur hesitated for a moment before replying “you're right George We'll both go. They're my kids too”. Kenney worried about the consequences of both of them being killed by “some five dollar a month Jap aviator”. MacArthur only worried about becoming airsick and throwing up in front of his colleagues. General Vasey who had witnessed German paratroops in action over Crete back in 1941, watched the drop from above and would write to his wife “I wanted to see paratroops land from the top rather than the bottom as in Crete”. Over 302 aircraft crossed the Owen Stanley range. Heading the armada at 1000 feet were B-25 strafers carrying 8 .50 caliber gun in their noses and 60 frag bombs in their bomb bays. Behind that at about 500 feet were A-20's ready to lay smoke as frag bombs exploded. At around 2000 feet behind them were 96 C-47's carrying the paratroops, supplies and artillery. To all their sides were the fights sitting at around 7000 feet. Following this were B-17's loaded up with 300 lb parachute bombs to be drop ordered by paratroopers. Then even further behind that were B-24's and more B-17's who were going to hit Japanese defensive positions at Heath's plantation and other points between Nadzab and Lae. Air attacks against the defenses would be followed up with smokescreens. At 10:22am the C-47's began to drop their paratroopers over their target zones. Each C-47 dropped its men in less than 10 seconds and the whole regiment was unloaded in 4 and a half minutes. The whole of the Nadzab area was landed upon and taken uncontested. Watching it unfold Kenney was impressed going on the record to say “the operation really was a magnificent spectacle. I truly don't believe that another air force in the world could have put this over as perfectly as the 5th Air Force did.” By 2pm, the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion crossed Markham arriving at Nadzab during the night. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion began hacking and burning kunai grass off the airstrip to clear it up before successfully extending it from 1500 feet to 3300 feet. This would allow the 871st airborne engineer battalion to land so they could construct two additional airstrips. On September 7th, Vasey's 7th division began to land at Nadzab, only facing some challenging weather. C Company of the 24th battalion led by Captain Arthur Duell departed Deep creek on the 4th to attack Markham point acting as a diversion. Lt Fred Child's 14th platoon performed the initial attack from the southwest followed up by Lt Maurie Yong's 13th platoon who advanced down a ridge near the river. Two other platoons covered them as they all blasted mortars over the Japanese camp and unleashed 2 vickers guns on Labu island. 100 men of the 6th company, 238th regiment were taken by surprise. They had dug in behind some barbed wire for several months astride a razorback ridge along the Markham river. Their surprise wore off quickly as they unleashed heavy fire killing 12 men and wounding 6. The allies were forced to pull back after killing 18 Japanese. Further to the south, General Nakano was facing some pressure from General Milford's 5th division. During late August the Japanese had been fighting tooth and nail to hold their last defensive line in front of Salamaua. The Japanese forward positions had been hit by heavy artillery for a long time, but their defenders were hunkering down. Brigadier Monaghan elected to send a company to cross the western slopes of Charlie Hill and occupy a position on its northern portion, thus isolating the Japanese. This was the same strategy that had been employed against Mount Tambu. However Milford instead elected to toss a frontal assault, believing his artillery support would win the day. Zero hour for the assault was to be 3:20pm, from 11:30am until then artillery smashed the Japanese positions with 2000 shells, 450 mortar bombs and 6000 rounds of machine gun fire. When zero hour hit, D company of the 42nd battalion began their climb. Lt Garland's 17th platoon led the way, immediately receiving enemy first after the first 100 yards. Two other platoons crossed around to the left and right only getting a few yards further. The approach to Charlie Hill from the west was a very steep thickly clad razorback. Garland's men had not even seen the enemy and 5 of them were hit. Two hours after the attack had begun, platoon leaders signaled down the slope that no progress could be made, it was simply too steep. Up above there were 4 well camouflaged machine gun nests unleashing havoc. The assault was canceled and the men withdrew. Over to the west, the 47th battalion launched two attacks against the Kunai spur. Captain Aubrey McWatter's A company began their attack at dusk on august 28th. Sergeant George Pitt's 9th platoon took the left as Barnett's 7th platoon to the right. The assault fell into hand to hand combat quickly, Barnett was twice wounded and his men were forced back. Pitt's platoon ran into heavy machine gun fire from a well dug in log bunker and were forced back having two deaths and two wounded. On the 30th, Major Idris Leach's C company made their attack but were forced back by heavy fire. Major Idris Leach and Sergeant Bill Eisenmenger lost their lives in that attack. On that same day, there was a request to increase artillery fire. 200 shells were lobbed upon the enemy the next day, then on september 1st after 5 hours of shelling, two platoons attacked again. They were supported by vickers guns as men scrambled to climb the ridge to its crest. The artillery softened up the enemy somewhat. Platoon leader Lt Ernest Anzac Walters died leading his men in the bloody carnage. They achieved the objective by the late afternoon sending many Japanese fleeing from their positions. Owen guns and grenades broke them. Around 60 dead Japanese were found on the Kunai spur, around 40 of them had been killed by artillery fire, some pillboxes took direct hits. The Kunai Spur was renamed Lewis Knoll after Captain Eric Lewis of B Company. To the east, after seizing Lokanu ridge, Milford ordered Lt Colonel Jack Amies 15th battalion to head right of the Americans and penetrate the Japanese defensive line at all cost without delay. At first light on the 31st, Lt Doug Matthew's 18th platoon of D company, reached a junction between Lokanu ridge and a razorback. The Japanese hit Matthew's men with mortar and machine gun fire. Despite the heavy fire, Matthew and his men crept up 75 yards, but at 12:50pm were met with a shower of grenades from enemies on a crest above them. Matthew decided to wait for reinforcements and artillery support before attacking up Scout ridge. Lt George Matthew's, brother Lt doug Matthews arrived with the 14th platoon after 1pm and organized a company attack, despite still not having artillery support nor mortars. Lt Doug led the 18th platoon forward, leading to 11 men becoming wounded, Doug likewise received a shot to the leg. George helped his brother get down the ridge and Doug told him before being carried off for care “About six weeks, I think”. George would later recall “I didn't worry too much about it. I thought on of the family has got out of it”. Lt Doug Matthew died the next day. The 15th battalion forces kept up the pressure sending C company, but they were repulsed likewise. On September 1st, Colonel Davidson sent B company around the west side of Charlie Hill intending to cut off the Japanese supply lines. Captain Frank Greer's B Company crossed a creek during the night and advanced 300 meters from the crest of Charlie Hill. They set up an ambush position, unknowingly 30 yards below the enemy perimeter on Charlie Hill. The Japanese tossed multiple counterattacks while A Company managed to establish their own ambush position nearby in some thick undergrowth on the eastern side of Charlie Hill. On September 4th, A Company joined up with B Company to the west, completely sealing off the enemy position. Meanwhile Captain Yates C company was advancing northwards from Lewis Knoll. Their patrols ran into Japanese losing many men in the process. At 7:15am the next morning they came across a razorback running towards a strongly held enemy position on Twin Smiths. Captain Yates led an attack upon the Twin Smiths, but the enemy fire was too much, forcing him to withdrew. After the defeat at Arnold's Crest, Brigadier Hammer had resorted to harassing actions against the enemy. The 2/7th were hitting Arnold's Crest while Major Warfe's 58/59th and 2/3rd independent company were hitting rough hill. Hammer sent Lt Garland's men from C Platoon to infiltrate the Japanese rear and to carry out a diversionary ambush. On September 3rd, Lt Garland ordered Arnold's Crest to be shelled, so that the noise would cover his men as they began their infiltration. They departed at 9am, moving along the Buiris Creek between the Japanese positions. They ambushed a supply track at 11am, just when the shelling stopped. Garland recalled ‘My men made their way forward through the jungle canopy like deadly green ghosts. I never heard a sound as they moved forward and adopted their ambush positions.' Garland positioned his men on the southern side of the track with around ten meters between them, covering more than a thousand meters of track, watching while hiding; a difficult balance. Garland noted ‘You soon learn to look through the jungle, by slightly moving your head from side to side, whilst preserving your concealment.' After two hours of waiting, Garland's men killed 8 Japanese in an ambush, after this they pulled out. Finally, Scout Ridge was devastated with artillery and mortar bombardment, allowing Lt George Matthews men to gain its crest where his brother had died. On September 3rd, detachments of the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines counterattacked and forced the australians off. While this was occurring, Lt Tom Cavenagh's A company of the 15th battalion seized the unoccupied Lokanu knoll. They crept up the knoll under artillery support to find freshly dug trenches, weapon-pits and foxholes all recently abandoned. By nightfall the SNLF marines attempted to reoccupy the positions but were forced to dig in on the northern side of Lokanu Knoll. On the night of september 4th, General Adachi learnt of the Lae landings and immediately ordered General Nakano to withdrew from Salamaua and to assemble at Lae by september 20th. Japanese forces were going to withdrew towards Kaiapit or Sio through Salawaket. Adachi sent the main body of the 20th division to defend Finschhafen, resulting in the suspension of the construction of the Madang-Lae road. The Nakai detachment of Major General Nakai Masutaro currently at Bogadjim was ordered to defend Kaiapit and hold back the allied advance to help Nakano's withdrawal. Nakano ordered the 5th Sasebo and 2nd Maizuru SNLF to cover the movement by barge of the 3rd battalion 102nd regiment towards Law, departing on september 6th. Meanwhile the 51st division prepared a fighting withdrawal and at Lae, General Shoge and Major Mukai just arrived to grab command of the IJA forces. Shoge's attitude was considered to be the ideal representative of a commander. He often went a day or two without opening his mouth, he was a fighting man who did not display signs of joy or sorrow, nor pleasure or pain. Holding the enemy back to the east and west, even within close range, he remained cool. He never lost his composure and he was a large influence upon his officers and men. Shoge concentrated the whole strength of the Lae garrison to block the superior allied forces while Mukai personally led platoons and companies to direct the fighting at the frontlines. Meanwhile on september 6th, Wootten's men continued their advance. The 2/13th battalion reached the Buhem river and captured the overgrown Hopoi airfield. The 2/23rd battalion moved past the 2/17th arriving to the left bank of the Buiem river. From there they pushed back some Japanese to the Singaua plantation. By the late afternoon the Japanese were being hit from the east and north, forcing them to retreat. Ever since D-day, the Japanese had been tossing air raids against Red Beach, the Aluki track and the amphibian craft plying between the beaches, but they were unable to hinder the movement of men and supplies. At midnight on the 6th, 5 LCV's and 3 LCMS landed supplies from Red Beach to Apo village alleviating the severe ration and ammunition shortage for the forward troops and shortening supply lines. New plans were formed. On September 7th, the 24th brigade would takeover the costal advance while Whiteheads 26th brigade would advance further inland up the Burep River. The climax for the Lae-Salamaua campaign was nearly at hand. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Postern finally kicked off and the amphibious invasion seems to be a resounding success. The Japanese were completely bamboozled and now frantically tried to get men in the Salamaua area over to defend Lae, but would they lose both as a result of it?
Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign. This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons. Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey's naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet's new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year. There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO. Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King's demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur. The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall's insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy's communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic. Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland. The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey's 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten's 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy's units who would help further train them at Morobe. Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division's amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige's forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target. Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy's attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili's airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura's 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru's 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro's 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae's airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly's escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47's of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47's scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak. To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney's air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells. Kenney's plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O'Neill's 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall's 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff. The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell's reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli's plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st. The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney's airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.
Last time we spoke about the intense battle for Munda. The most important objective of the New Georgia campaign, the seizure of Munda had come at long last. The 43rd, 37th and 25th divisions all performed an envelopment offensive against Munda, but in their way were extremely formidable Japanese fortifications. It was a real slogfest seeing tremendous casualties for both sides of the conflict. However the Americans were able to breakthrough some of the Japanese bunkers, tunnels and pillboxes thanks largely to the use of flamethrowers which were becoming more and more popular on the battlefield of the Pacific. Munda was finally captured and now the Japanese had to withdraw to other areas like Vila to keep the fight alive. On the seas, commander Frederick Moosbrugger unleashed some improved mark 14 torpedoes at the IJN and scored a major victory sending 3 destroyed to their grave and countless sailors and soldiers. This episode is the Komiatum Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So last week we talked exclusively about the New Georgia campaign, so today as you guessed it we are diving back over to New Guinea. You know when it comes to the big and popular aspects of the war, Guadalcanal usually takes the leading role, but campaigns like New Guinea seem to always fall to the wayside as they say. Yet the battle for New Guinea was just as important, it took significant resources away from the Empire of Japan. We are soon to reach the climax of the Lae-Salamaua campaign, things are really starting to heat up. Now the last time we were over on Green Hell, Brigadier Moten had just ordered the 2/6th battalion to secure Bobdubi ridge, while the 2/5th assault Mount Tambu. By the end of July, the Coane Force was beginning to occupy Tambu Bay. The 3rd battalion, 162nd of Archibald Roosevelt were securing the Boisi area with two of their companies hitting slopes west of Tambu Bay, while the 2nd battalion assembled itself at Tambu Bay. By seizing Tambu Bay, the artillery could now take up a good position to better support the troops. Further north, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer was reorganizing his 15th brigade for a new attack against the Old Vickers position. On July 24th, he held an officers conference at Gwaibolom. Hammer laid out plans to employ the 58/59th battalion against Erskine Creek and Old Vickers. The commander of the 58/59th, Lt Colonel Patrick Starr received the order from Hammer, but also a letter directed at him. In the letter Hammer laid out a ton of criticisms against his unit, some of his officers and by implication Starr himself. The main criticisms were based largely on ineffective ground operations such as the unit lacking adequate knowledge of where their neighboring units were or that of the enemy. But as we know, this unit had not received proper training and it really was a baptism under fire kind of situation. But like they say about swimming, sometimes you gotta be thrown into the pool, and boy were they. Following some rather poorly planned and failed attacks back on June 30th, the 58/59th now adopted a more measure approach against the Old Vickers position. Hammer also helped with his reorganizing efforts. Hammer ordered Company A to head further north, while Major Warfe's commandos would take over the defenses for Gwaibolom; General Savige was assigned the 2/7th to help reinforce the 15th brigade; the 2/6th were ordered to advance along the Sugarcane Ridge to clear a way forward, but would run into a 100 Japanese strong position north off the ridge. On July 26th, the Australians concentrated their 25 pounders upon the ridge before launching a frontal assault. Meanwhile Brigadier General Ralph Coane renewed their attack against Roosevelt Ridge on July 27th. Coane ordered the still assembling 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment for the task. 100 men of E company advanced using a creek line parallel to the ridge, going through some thick jungle. They marched single file, hooking back towards a spur that led towards a small knoll on its crest, looking for a way to break the Japanese defenses. But once they reached the crest, they began taking heavy fire and although they established themselves firmly on a shoulder of ground below the ridge, they could advance no further. Meanwhile the 2/6th were lobbing 25 pounders accurately over the Old Vicker's position, forcing the Japanese to flee to the refugee of their underground shelters. It basically had become a routine of taking a bombardment and awaiting some screaming Australians or Americans afterwards for most of the Japanese defenders by this point. However no assault came. On July 28th another bombardment was on its way, but this one was directed on the Coconuts area. Starting at 2:45, two 25 pounders from Tambu Bay fired hundreds of rounds alongside some 3 inch mortars in an attempt to thwart the Japanese from sending reinforcement over to the Old Vickers position. During the final 5 minutes of what was a 15 minute bombardment, it turned into a creeping barrage allowing C Company of the 58/59th to advance. The bombardment made a ton of smoke aiding the men. Three platoons attacked the Old vickers position simultaneously. Platoon 7 of Butch Proby charged across some exposed ground at the center of the position; Platoon 13 of Lt Jack Evans attacked the left; while Platoon 15 of Sergeant Vic Hammond attacked from the right. The platoons managed to successfully overrun the Japanese forward bunkers and reached the crest just as the unsuspecting Japanese there were emerging from their dugouts. A heavy firefight broke out, but it was the defenders who began fleeing for their lives towards the Coconuts area. As the men consolidated the Old vickers position they found 17 dead Japanese, but also a large amount of abandoned booty. A 70mm gun with 300 shells, 4 light machine guns, 1 medium machine gun and 28 rifles which the Australians gladly grabbed. Hammer expected the Japanese to launch a vicious counterattack so he rapidly ordered the 2/7th battalion to send the fresh A Company of Captain Septimus Cramp over to relieve the exhausted C Company. Meanwhile B Company of the 2/6th were assaulting Sugarcane Ridge being supported by 3 inch mortars and 4 Vickers guns from the 2/6th field regiment along the Tambu Bay coast. Coming from Ambush Knoll, Platoon 10 led by Lt Clive Trethewie made a frontal assault, but machine gun fire from atop Sugarcane Ridge halted them quickly. Platoon 12 led by Sergeant Stan White and Platoon 11 of Lt Ted Exton were hooking around the ridge to attack the enemy's rear. The Japanese defenders had assumed the ridge was too steep in its rear position and were completely taken by surprise by the attack, seeing Extoons Platoon 11 overrun them. The Japanese were forced to flee for their lives. The Japanese attempted a dusk counterattack to reclaim the ridge, but it failed. On July 28th, with E Company stalled, F company was brought up to help out, taking up a position to E Company's left. They both tried to assault the ridge together, but gained little ground and were forced to dig in as the Japanese harassed them with counterattacks. The problem really was the Japanese were simply too well dug in. They held a steep narrow crest on the ridge, with the typical camouflaged pillboxes, mutually supporting machine gun nests, an intricate network of underground tunnels, lets call it the “Japanese special” haha, it will be seen quite often going forward into this war. The allied artillery and mortar bombardments could do little to actually hurt the Japanese, but it did cause them to take shelter within their tunnels, then there was the hope the assaulting forces got close enough before the Japanese stormed out again, which feels a lot like battles from WW1. In the meantime Major Roosevelt's battalion were working to cut off the Japanese supply routes to the ridge. He dispatched multiple patrols to take up positions along junctions and tracks between Scout ridge, Roosevelt Ridge and Mount Tambu. The men ran into skirmishes with Japanese supply efforts, greatly hindering them. But with the lack of progress by Coane's force concerned certain commanders like General Savige who began to criticize Coane for a lack of control and discipline over the men. Savige ordered him to push on immediately to capture Roosevelt Ridge, but in response Coane protested that he needed more reinforcements to seize the heavily fortified position. Likewise the lack of progress over at Mount Tambu was also annoying commanders. Taylor Force had just relieved the exhausted 2/5th battalion on the 28th. Several companies consisting of around 400 men from the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment coming over from Nassau Bay took up positions around Mount Tambu. Australian mortar crews and stretcher bearers remaining in the line to support their American comrades with one company of the 2/5th staying behind likewise. Moten planned for a new attack, slated for the 30th, to be followed with attacks against Goodview Junction and Orodubi by the 2/5th and 2/6th respectively. To open up the new attack, 8 105mm guns positioned at Buigap Creek Valley alongside 5 25 pounders position at Tambu Bay opened fire in the morning firing around 200 rounds per gun for an hour and a half. The Americans began their assault with Platoons 2 and 3 charging the ridge while Platoon 1 awaited in reserve. For 45 minutes the two leading platoons moved 150 meters across the Japanese front's right shoulder. They managed to knock out 6 out of 8 bunkers on the shoulder before attempting to advance further, but the defenders second tier line three meters higher up opened fire upon them and numerous grenades came rolling down the slope. The fire was too much, with the defenders using their tunnel and trench system to deadly effect taking up numerous positions to fire down on the Americans. The two platoons were halted dead in their tracks as the third platoon was brought up, but it made no difference. A legendary figure emerged from this action. For those of you from down unda, you probably already know the story, but for those of you who down, Corporal Leslie Bull Allen became a hero this day. Bull Allen was born in 1918, in Ballarant Victoria and when WW2 broke out he volunteered for service with the 2nd Australian imperial force. He served the 2/5th in Palestine where he became a stretcher bearer. He served in Libya and Syria where he received the nickname Bull for getting a reputation to having a cool head under fire. He was a fairly big boy, 5”11, laborer type build and he had a really deep laugh his comrades would remark “you could hear him a mile off! Bull was thus one of the battalion's most recognisable…and one of its most popular characters”. After facing the Italians, French and Germans, Bull was sent to New Guinea. He had served during the Wau battle where he received a Military medal for carrying out comrades under intense fire, his citation read “Private Allen's bearing and his untiring efforts in tending the wounded and helping with rations and stores were an inspiration”. On July the 30th when the Americans were storming Mount Tambu and got botched down, Allen was one of the stretcher bearers who came running up and by himself carried 12 American servicemen to safety. There's a famous photograph of Bull carrying an American soldier over his shoulders who had been knocked unconscious by a mortar, I do recommend googling it. And of course, I am a Sabaton fan and I would be remiss not to mention there is a song dedicated to Bull Allen, worth a listen. I got to sit down with Sabaton at a bar once in Montreal, the first time they came to north america, by the way, just gloating. Bull Allen received the Silver Star for his heroism from the United States. But as much as I'd like to end it there, I would also like to mention the reality of war. Bull put on a straight face and showed no fear as he saved the men, but as early as 1941 he was showing psychological issues. He had been admitted to a hospital in Libya, suffering from anxiety neurosis, again what we call acute combat stress or combat stress reaction. By the time he saved those boys on Mount Tambu his health was being taxed heavily. Towards the end of 1944, Bull would begin lashing out at superior officers and got himself court martialed and demoted to private. His psychological health, alongside a few bouts of malaria took a horrible toll on him creating numerous anxiety ridden episodes seeing him discharged from duty as he was not deemed medically fit. Bull found it difficult in the post war years suffering from post traumatic stress, and during one point he lost the ability to speak for 6 months. He spent his life after the war working as a laborer and then as a theater nurse at the Ballarat Base hospital. Bull became quite a popular fellow around Ballarant and would pass away on May 11th of 1982 from diabetes and other complications. He is a staple on Anzac Day and a famous image of the Australian war effort during the Pacific War. Mount Tambu was not taken that day, though the first line of bunkers were battered. Moten realized frontally attacking such fortifications was suicide, so he elected to cut off Mount Tambu instead. With the Americans failing, the 2/5th and 2/6th planned attacks changed to taking up positions to surround Mount Tambu. Back on the 29th, Major Warfe took his men to attack what was known as the Timbered knoll held by some Japanese. He sent A Platoon led by John Lewin south along its ridge. They were supported by artillery from Tambu Bay. At 4pm the artillery and mortars started blasting away for 15 minutes. The commandos assaulted the knoll from its northern side, but were quickly pinned down by machine gun fire. Around 10 men advanced along the Bench Cut track east of the Timbered Knoll and attacked it from the south, successfully surprising the defenders, forcing them to flee. Following the capture of the Timbered Knoll, Warfe wanted to press onwards to Orodubi, but Brigadier Hammer ordered his commandos to hold their position as he did not want to open up any gaps along the ridge. Also on the 29th, General Herring for the first time informed General Savige of the true offensive going on which was against Lae rather than Salamaua, indicating to him that the role of his 3rd division was to hold the enemy down in the Salamaua area. Likewise Moten had devised a new plan to drive the enemy from Mount Tambu. It turned out a patrol from the 2/6th had discovered a route going from Ambush Knoll to the Buirali Creek which would allow forces to cut off the Komiatum track, thus isolating the Mount Tambu and Goodview junction. The 2/6 sent 4 patrols out searching for how to ford the Buirali Creek going up to the Kiamatum ridge, some of which probed Japanese positions. To the north, Captain Edwin Griff's B Company of the 58/59th advanced to Buggert preparing to attack the Coconuts area. On the 30th as they began their attack, they were met with heavy fit around 80 yards south of the South Coconuts. Forced to dig in the Australians spent the night repelling 3 counterattacks with a handful of men receiving some nasty bayonet and knife wounds. By the morning of the 31st Griff was down to 38 effective men and at 7:20am a 4th Japanese counterattack consisting of a hundred or so men overwhelmed his position. Griff was forced to withdraw to a village west of the Old Vickers position. While this was going on, Hammer had sent companies over to cut the Komiatum and Bench tracks using his A company and C Company. Moten reinforced him with A company of the 2/7th in the hopes such actions would press the Japanese to move more units from Lae over the Salamaua area. It was a huge success as by the end of July the Salamaua area counted with more than 8000 troops. However with all of these troops at Salamaua also required the allies to boost up their commitment in the area, thus Brigadier Raymond Monaghan with the 29th brigade were landed at Nassau Bay for the task. They were assigned to reinforce the Coane force which was still struggling against Roosevelt ridge. Over on the Japanese side, General Adachi decided to reinforce Lae's defenses. He deployed the 2nd battalion, 80th regiment who would be coming over from Finschhafen, however they would never make it to Lae as by the time they were going to depart they were forced to stay put because the Australians were threatening the region. Adachi also ordered the Shoge detachment of Major General Shoge Ryoichi to depart Wewak. His force consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 238th regiment and a battalion of the 41st mountain artillery regiment. Elements of the 238th regiment began leaving Wewak traveling in groups of 3 motor landing crafts every two nights. Each MLC had 50 men and their supplies packed in like sardines. Soon small fishing boats were also carrying 20 men, by late July the 2nd battalion, 238th had all moved from Wewak to Alexishafen. From Alexishafen they traveled again by night and by MLC to Finschhafen and from there finally to Lae. However due to increased attacks and losses upon the MLCS countless men would be left at Finschhafen. Some were ordered to march overland to Lae, but it was a nightmare of a trip. On August 1st, the 1st battalion, 80th regiment had taken up positions along the side of the Old Vickers position and began firing upon its defenders. They were covered by mortars as they charged up the steep terrain in an enveloping movements towards Grassy Knoll. Captain Edwin Griff's B company harassed them from the west, and by the following morning the 2/7th battalion were able to push the Japanese back. To the north in the Coconuts, Pimple Knoll and the Sugarcane Knoll more Japanese attacks were occurring, but the defenders held the former Japanese fortifications giving them a distinct edge. By the afternoon the Japanese were sniping men in the Old Vickers and Sugarcane Knoll, trying to cover their assault units. By August 3rd, the Japanese unleashed another assault against the entire perimeter, seeing the fiercest fighting take place in an area in front of the 8th Platoon led by Corporal Alan Naismith. Alan ended up crawling forward with grenades in hand before tossing them down the steep slopes of Old Vickers killing many Japanese. Seeing the battle going nowhere, the Japanese unleashed a banzai charge at night as a last ditch effort to break through, but were ultimately forced to withdraw. Seeing three full days of frontal assaults fail, the Japanese then elected to advance further south along a ridge and dug in between the Old Vickers and Buggert. This threatened to encircle the 2/7th, so Griff's B Company were ordered to restore the line of communications to Old Vickers. Griff ordered a concentrated bombardment of 30 mortars before his company stormed the slope the Japanese dug in on. Two platoons quickly broke through towards Sugarcane Knoll and in the process forced the Japanese to withdraw back over to the Coconuts area. Griff then ordered his company to perform mop up operations as some Japanese had stayed in their foxholes. Yet the performance overall for the 58/59th had displeased Hammer who now decided to place them under Major Warfe's command. They would also be redeployed over to the Gwaibolom area, while the commandos would take over their Old Vickers position. For a few days the 2/7th performed patrols around the Coconuts area to prepare for a final attack against it. Over at Mount Tambu, on August 4th, Captain Cam Bennett's B Company and Walters A Company of the 2/5th successfully surprise attacked the defenders atop a small knoll known as Hodge's Knoll. However they were soon met with heavy counterattacks from three sides dislodging them in the late afternoon. The next day, Moten ordered the 2/6th battalion to advance along the Stephens Track, while its D company led by Captain Harold Laver would take an alternate path towards the Komiatum ridge heading north of Goodview. During the afternoon, a forward patrol of Company D found a route through the jungle to Komiatum village, but the route proved very difficult for the full company to traverse. Alongside this discovery, a patrol from Taylor Force found a small ridge north of Komiatum that was unoccupied named Davidson ridge. By August 6th, Moten and Savige concluded their plan to isolate and reduce Mount Tambu. The 2/6th would secure Komiatum ridge to the northwest; Coane Force would hit Roosevelt and Scout ridge; Lt Colonel Charlie Davidsons 42nd battalion would hit a key ridge to the north, Ie: the one that was to be called Davidson; the 2/5th would hit Goodview junction and the 15th brigade would contain assault the Coconuts area containing the enemy at Tambu knoll and Orodubi. General Herring liked the plan and urged General Savige to quote "drive Coane on to the capture of Roosevelt Ridge even if the cost is higher than he cares about". Herring also added that he could take Savige's requests to the higher authorities and upon stating that Savige immediately requested Coane and Major Roosevelt be relieved of their commands. Again a lot of the interpersonal and command issues were due to MacArthurs tampering with Alamo Force. Brigadier Coane was told by Fuller he was a separate command from MacKechnie and Colonel Roosevelt continuously refused to obey orders from MacKechnie stating he was not under Australian command. It took until July 19th, for Herring to clarify things that the Australians were in charge of operations in the Nassau Bay area. Combine this with the lack of progress and it was no surprise people were gunning to sack another. On August 7th the first units of Davidsons 42nd battalion landed at Nassau bay at 2am and Coane requested that Davidson immediately march north. Davidson refused to do so until his men got a hot meal and some sleep angering Coane. Then when Davidson and his men reach Duali he was informed Major Stephen Hodgman was waiting with orders from Moten that it was he who was taking operational command. Coane was only to have command over supply communications and rations. When Davidson reached Tambu Bay on the 8th he met with Coane who was greatly frustrated that he was unable to use Davidsons units to hit Roosevelt ridge. Coane told him “If I can't do as I want with you, I don't consider you under my command at all”. It was quite fortunate as MacArthur soon relieved Coane and Roosevelt of their commands. As General Savige would later write “MacArthur asked me for my views on Coane and Roosevelt and I gave them strongly…I had my bags packed but MacArthur supported me”. Thus MacArthur sides with Herring and Savige and as a result Colonel MacKechnie was given back command over the 162nd regiment which was taken away from the 41st division directly under Savige's command. So much sneaky maneuvering going on by MacArthur's team. On August the 9th Savige visited Motens HQ, then Hammers, then the 58/59th battalions and finally the 2/6th. He was making a tour of the front lines trying to raise morale for the Australians. The next day, the 42nd battalion finally got into position at Tambu Bay where they received confirmation of their orders to seize Davidson ridge. By the 11th the men were climbing the ridge, facing no opposition and it was fully occupied by the 12th. Also on the 12th, MacKechnie began his attack against Roosevelt ridge deploying his 2nd battalion on the right flank and the 3rd on the left. The 2nd battalion established a position on the ridge crest rappelling several counterattacks throughout the day. After a 1.5hr artillery barrage of over 2000 rounds the 2nd battalion charged the ridge and successfully breached the Japanese line in three points. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were fighting for their lives, but by nightfall two Australian companies were now occupying high knolls around 500 yards apart. The 3rd battalion, 238th regiment had just begun arriving to Salamaua and were quickly redirected to help out the men on Roosevelt ridge. It would all be for naught however as by the 14th, the Australians pushed the Japanese to the eastern end of the ridge. From a Historian who covered the 41st division “At about 13:15 the jungles north, south and west of Roosevelt Ridge shook and shivered to the sustained blast. The mountains and ridges threw the echo back and forth, down and out, and the quiet white-capped sea to the east, ringing the outer third of Roosevelt Ridge, grew dark a s it received the eruption of earth and steel on that stricken shoulder of land. Scores of guns—75-mm howitzers, Aussie 25-pounders, 20-mms, Bofors, light and heavy machine-guns, even small arms—had opened up simultaneously on the enemy-held ridge. A score or more Allied fighters and bombers had swooped low to strafe its dome and tons of bombs released from the B-24s and B-25s fell straight and true, to detonate, shatter, rip and tear and to deliver certain death at that moment on an August afternoon. Those who watched from the beach saw the top fourth of the ridge lift perceptibly into the air and then fall into the waiting sea. In a scant twenty minutes all that remained of the objective was a denuded, redly scarred hill over which infantrymen already were clambering, destroying what remained of a battered and stunned enemy.” By the late afternoon, Roosevelt Ridge was finally firmly in the hands of the allies. MacKechnie could not however advance any further as his lines were already overextended. The Japanese withdrew to the nearby Scout Ridge where the 238th regiment reinforcements also came to defend. While this was occurring the 2/7th were advancing upon the Coconuts area. Captain Andrew Rooke led the Bena platoon of Company A alongside Platoon 9 to hit the steep eastern approaches of the South coconuts; Captain Fred Barr's B company advanced upon the North Coconuts from the west. August the 14th began with a heavy airstrike made up of 22 B-24's and 7 B-17's. Starting at 9:30am as told to us by Axel Olsen observing from the Old Vickers “with a noise like the rushing of a great wind', the bombs passed over the heads of the waiting assault troops. ‘Trees, logs and other rubbish flew through the fall [sic] of dust which now cloaked the target.' The observers at Old Vickers observed, ‘It seemed that nothing could have lived in the midst of devastation loosed by the planes.” At 10:10 artillery began to bombard the area for an hour and half. As the artillery ceased, 3 inch mortars continued to fire covering the approach of the infantry who were using smoke bombs. As Axel Olsen wrote observing from the Old Vickers “came a terribly fierce raking with Vickers guns firing through the haze from smoke bombs”. The Australian assault battered the north coconuts position which was guarded by two pillboxes connected to weapon pits using crawl trenches. The area had suffered hard from the bombardments easily allowing the Australians to seize it. However the southern defenses of the south Coconuts found defenders resisting hard in their trenches. The center Coconuts position like the north had nearly been obliterated by the bombing allowing B company to make progress, but soon they were pulling back to the north coconuts position. During the night, allied platoons came across a Japanese communication line going over the Salamua-Bobdubi track, so they cut it to prevent reinforcements. For the next two days, patrols and mortar fire were harassing the south coconuts defenders gradually forcing them to evacuate. By August the 17th the Coconuts and northern end towards Bobdubi were firmly in Australian hands. With all of these gains in hand, Moten was finally ready to attack Komiatum. On August the 15th, Captain Edgar's A Company, Captain Laver's D Company of the 2/6th battalion took up a position due west of Laver's Knoll. Yes the future names of these knolls and ridges really does seem to give away what happens in the stories haha. Laver's Knoll was a key feature of the Komiatum ridge and taking it would allow the allies to apply more pressure upon the enemy. On the morning of the 16th, the 2/5th battalion performed a diversionary attack against Goodview, while A and B Companies advanced up the Komiatum ridge under a creeping barrage. The men were fortunate as the Japanese were forced to flee during the artillery fire, allowing Laver's knoll to be seized quite easily. The men dug in immediately allowing Lt Les Johnson's platoon 17 to capture, you guessed it Johnson's knoll. During WW2 if you really wanted something named after you, all you had to do was travel to Green Hell. Johnson and his men dug in on the knoll and soon Japanese fire was directed at them. Japanese counterattacks were lobbed from their south and west before nightfall, but they managed to hold on. During the night the 42nd battalion began using Vicker guns and mortars from Davidson ridge to help harass the enemy. Around dawn on the 17th, the Japanese unleashed another counter attack against Johnson knoll, this time the enemy got within just meters of the Australian defenders. After dusk even more counterattacks were made seeing 217 deaths, 380 wounded and 301 sick Japanese after all was said and done. The attacks were tossed back and soon Vickers machine guns were brought up to Laver's Knoll to add to the Japanese misery. Unable to break the allied push onto the Komiatum ridge, the Japanese began to become more and more desperate. Artillery and aerial bombardment on top of enveloping maneuvers by the Australians were taking a heavy toll. The Japanese had suffered over 900 casualties since July 23rd and with more and more men dying by the minute, General Nakano ordered a withdrawal from Komiatum to be carried out on the night of August 19th. Nakano was still under the illusion Salamaua was the main target. The next day the Taylor Force and 2/5th found Mount Tambu and Goodview suddenly unoccupied and finally seized their objectives. General Savige personally came over to congratulate the men who took Laver's knoll, but this was to be his last action in command of the 3rd division. Blamey decided to replace Savige with the commander of the 5th division General Edward Milford. Milford would later find out the reason for Savige's sacking was because General Herring was greatly annoyed that a supply line to the coast had not been opened, which was desperately needed to relieve supply aircraft for the upcoming attack on Lae. Herring told Milford that Savige had never visited the front line because he was too old, but as I just mentioned this was false, Savage had in fact visited Mubo and Komiatum. Major General Frank Berryman working in Blamey's HQ, who remained quite close to the man, who often sought out his advice believed General Herring was unjustified in his sacking of Savige. Berryman would point out “ Herring ‘not giving Savige a fair burl… Savige having to fight Herring as well as Japs. Savige had done well and we had misjudged him'.Savige bitterly handed over his command, greatly disappointed he would not get to see the final capture of Salamaua. But he did not depart unrewarded, as he received a Companion of the order of Bath for his services during the campaign with his citation reading; Maj-Gen. Savige had control of the Battle for Salamaua from 30 Jun. 43 till his relief on 26 Aug. 43. The battle was finally won on 11 Sep. 43—the credit for victory must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige during whose period of command, the back of the enemy's defence was broken. The nature of the country rendered great assistance to the defender, and careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem. Maj-Gen. Savige triumphed over all these difficulties, his men were kept supplied, they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and to overcome great difficulties of terrain. Maj-Gen. Savige's plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the Allied cause, and Maj-Gen. Savige by his fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the United nations. The victories won over the enemy at the battles for Mubo and Komiatum were due to his well conceived plans and energetic execution. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Salamaua and Lae was drawing ever closer. The boys down unda had seized control over vital positions forcing the Japanese into more and more desperate defensive measures taking horrifying casualties in the process.
Adachi and Kurosawa geeking out about manga is Adam and RJ quoting Golden Girls Help Support The Ampliverse! https://ko-fi.com/theampliverse Learn more about The Ampliverse: http://theampliverse.com Follow us on social media to learn more about upcoming shows and exciting new content! Instagram: http://Instagram.com/theampliverse Threads: https://www.threads.net/@theampliverse Twitter: https://twitter.com/boysloveblove
This week, Shaun derails himself with penguin... activities as he prepares Remington to watch 5 episodes of Adachi and Shimamura. Meanwhile, Love Doctor Remington is back in the house. If you'd like to give us feedback, ask a question, or correct a mistake, send an email to AnimeOutOfContext@gmail.com or tweet at us @AnimeConPod. Visit our Patreon at patreon.com/AnimeoutofContext if you would like to contribute to the show and get bonus content ranging from clips from our pre-episode banter, bonus episodes (including the 12 days of April Fools), our prototype Episode 0, to even getting shoutouts in the show! Intro and Outro are trimmed from "Remiga Impulse" by Jens Kiilstofte, licensed by MachinimaSound to Anime Out of Context under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 which the licensor has modified for the licensee to allow reproduction and sharing of the Adapted Material for Commercial purposes
For the final episode of AniMay, Josh and Graham are joined by Mike from Bonsai Pop to deep dive into Mitsuru Adachi's baseball series Cross Game / Kurosu Gēmu. Join them as the discuss the series, characters, Adachi's other works, baseball, anime, if you should read the manga, and much more. Be sure and check out Bonsai Pop's YouTube review on Cross Game. Follow Bonsai Pop: Instagram @bonsai_pop Twitter @Bonsai_Pop YouTube @BonsaiPop Special Thanks to this week's sponsor Wild Bill's Soda! Enjoy crisp unique olde fashioned soda flavors anytime with Wild Bill's. Head over to drinkwildbills.com and use code FANDOM10 to get 10% off your purchase! Do you have suggestions for the show? Do have specific voice actor or creator that you would like us to interview? We would love to hear from you! Feel free to shoot us an email HERE. Be sure to head over to our website AnimationStationPodcast.com to check out both What's Up, Fandom & Animation Station Podcast episodes. If you enjoy the show, please rate and review! Follow the show on: Instagram @WhatsUpFandom Twitter @WhatsUpFandomPC YouTube What's Up, Fandom Podcast Follow the Anime Book Club on: Instagram @Anime_Book_Club Twitter @AnimeBookClubPC Follow Josh @JoshLCain Follow Astra Nyx @AstraNyx Follow Luke @tatted_triceratops Follow Graham @GrrrAHamT Tags: podcast, podcasts, movies, tv, comics, popculture, fandom, anime, animay, cross game, mitsuru adachi, touch, baseball, trigun, gundam, manga
Get your baseball mitts ready, because this week the crew sits down to discuss season 1 of Mitsuru Adachi's baseball anime MIX. Join them as the deep dive into the series, its predecessor Touch, what Adachi works Graham and Josh would recommend, and much more. Next week, we will have a filler episode going over the current Spring 2023 shows. Our new review will be over the duel movies To Every You I've Loved Before & To Me, The One Who Loved You on 5/22. Do you have suggestions for the show? Do have specific voice actor or creator that you would like us to interview? We would love to hear from you! Feel free to shoot us an email HERE. Be sure to head over to our website AnimationStationPodcast.com to check out the Anime Book Club, What's Up Fandom, & Animation Station Podcast episodes. If you enjoy the show, please rate and review! Follow the Anime Book Club on: Instagram @Anime_Book_Club Twitter @AnimeBookClubPC Follow Whats Up Fandom on: Instagram @WhatsUpFandom Twitter @WhatsUpFandomPC YouTube What's Up, Fandom Podcast Follow Graham @GrrrAHamT Follow Josh @JoshLCain Follow Astra Nyx @AstraNyx Follow Luke @tatted_triceratops Tags: podcast, podcasts, movies, tv, comics, popculture, fandom, anime, Mix, mitsur adachi, touch, cross game, baseball, miyuki
It's time to make history!This week, we're revisiting one of our favorites: Persona 4 Golden. After all, with the new release on modern consoles and Wes' glowing review for us at RPGFan, it seemed like the perfect opportunity to revisit some of our old friends.But there's an even better reason we're revisiting this classic! We're also joined by special guest, and friend of the podcast, Alex from Backlog Battle, to talk about everything that makes the game special to them, too.Does the game still hold up? Is Kanji still the best character? Listen in to find out!Featuring: Michael Sollosi, Wes Iliff, Alex from Backlog Battle; Edited by Michael SollosiOpening and ending music by Miles MorkriGet in Touch:RPGFan.comRPGFan ShopEmail us: retro@rpgfan.comTwitter: @rpgfancomInstagram: @rpgfancomFacebook: rpgfancomTwitch: rpgfancomRelated Links:Persona 4 Golden on RPGFanThe Backlog Battle YouTube channel
If you've been listening to this show even intermittently over the past several years, you're probably already aware that starting a sake brewery from scratch in Japan is, and has been for decades, a gargantuan task. However, in recent years, the number of young entrepreneurs navigating regulatory loopholes in order craft sake themselves in a manner that fulfills a dream and mission of cultivating a more inspiring and sustainable culture (and business model) for the next generation are beginning to pop up here-and-there across the country.The latest challenger pushing the envelope is Yuji “Yoshi” Adachi, founder, head brewer, and farmer at Adachi Noujo, a new craft sake brewery scheduled to open in earnest in Osaka before the end of summer 2023. An increasingly popular bit of vocabulary being adopted by a growing number of sake breweries looking to summarize their dedication to agriculture and commitment to brewing, “Noujo” is a made-up word that mashes together the characters of “farming” and “brewing”. With his own single plot of koshihikari that he spent the past couple of years restoring, for the foreseeable future, it's a one-man operation where Yoshi is handling...everything.But Yoshi's foray into sake was by no means preordained. Having spent his early 20s in Texas pursuing a lifelong ambition to become an Olympic swimmer, followed by a stint helping his father establish and run a Japanese food restaurant in the longhorn state, his return to Japan and a stint at a popular sake bar in Kobe sent him spiraling down the an unintended sake path. Being so young it seems like this new brewery popped up out of nowhere, but after 3.5 years at Hachinohe Sake Brewery (makers of Mutsu Hassen, not to mention the most awarded sake brewery of 2021) and two years at Nishiyama Shuzojo in Hyogo both brewing and farming, he's been laying the groundwork for his vision through his first original label, Koyoi, and is now on the cusp of bringing a new sake brewery to his home city of Osaka for the first time in a long, long time.For this episode, Yoshi shares his story, plans, and ambitions (including the establishment of a sake brewery in Switzerland!) with regular host Justin Potts. If you're looking for a source of inspiration this week, look no further. At the same time, if you're looking for updates @sakeonair, you can follow us on Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook. Don't hesitate to also share any other sake or shochu-related thoughts or questions with the hosts at questions@sakeonair.com and rate us on the podcast service of your choice while you're at it.We'll be back very soon with plenty more Sake On Air.Until then, kampai! Sake On Air is made possible with the generous support of the Japan Sake & Shochu Makers Association and is broadcast from the Japan Sake & Shochu Information Center in Tokyo. The show is brought to you by Potts.K Productions with audio production by Frank Walter. Our theme, “Younger Today Than Tomorrow” was composed by forSomethingNew for Sake On Air.
Gals, Pals, I think I can see where this is going... We watch a Lesbian romance that is unfortunately also a Sci-Fi with Adachi to Shimamura! Have an anime series you want us to watch? email your recommendations to us at areweebthereyet@gmail.com! Find Are Weeb There Yet on Social Media: Twitter Instagram Facebook Thank you: Camille Ruley for our Artwork Louie Zong for our Themesong "stories" https://louiezong.bandcamp.com Find out more at http://areweebthereyet.com
Narodila se ve Frýdlantě a vyrůstala v Liberci, ale je rozkročená mezi Česko a Japonsko. Jestli se Naomi Adachi považuje víc za Češku, nebo Japonku, vám neřekne, ani když ji budete nutit. Miluje pestrost a rozmanitost, a tomu odpovídá i její kariéra. Na veřejnoprávní televizi moderuje pořady o videohrách, na soukromé televizi účinkovala v reality show Love Island. Jako modelka chodila na molu na pražském Fashion Weeku.Na osmadvacetiletou mladou ženu je to celkem slušná kariéra, byť jak říká, v Japonsku se svobodným ženám v tomto věku říká poněkud nezdvořile “zbylá rýže”. Nebo možná spíš říkalo. Dnešní Japonsko patří mezi vyspělými zeměmi mezi ty, kde je nejvíc stárnoucí populace a zároveň vysoké procento lidí, kteří žijí sami. Mimo jiné o tom jsme se v podcastu bavili. Zajímalo mě, proč jí česká maminka a japonský tatínek dali jméno hebrejského původu, a dozvěděl jsem se mimochodem i to, že na tradiční vánoční večeři se v Tokiu chodí do KFC. A taky to, že pro svůj život čerpá Naomi Adachi z obou vlivů, japonského i českého. Z toho japonského si snaží brát přístup k práci, zodpovědnost a lásku k dokonalosti. Na tom českém ji baví naopak chaos a kreativita.Naomi Adachi měla být hvězdou českého zpravodajství z olympiády v Tokiu v roce 2020, ale nakonec to kvůli covidu dopadlo trochu jinak. Olympiáda se konala s ročním zpožděním a v atmosféře, ve které rekordy nepadaly ani tak na sportovištích, jako spíš v protipandemických opatřeních a omezeních. Jak na to po skoro dvou letech vzpomíná? Poslouchejte.A konečně jsem chtěl vědět i to, jestli a případně jak moc váhala Naomi Adachi nad účastí v reality show Love Island, a proč se bála, jestli jí “pobíhání v plavkách na pláži” odpustí její fanoušci na sociálních sítích. Kdo ji nakonec přesvědčil, že se nemusí bát? A komu na dobu reality show svěřila správu svého Instagramu a Facebooku? Možná se budete divit.Přeju příjemný poslech.
Last time we spoke about the landing at Amchitka and the invasion of the Russell Islands. The Aleutian island campaign saw a lot of action when the allies decided to investigate whether Amchitka island would be suitable for a new airfield and what the Japanese intentions were with it. A race began between the two, but it would be the Americans who would seize the island and begin the process of building up an airfield upon it. Then over in the south Pacific, the Japanese had finished up Operation KE and with it had used and abandoned the Russell Islands. The allies quickly launched an invasion of the islands prompting the Japanese to send some air raids, but all for naught. Now with the Russells in hand, the Americans had a launching point to attack New Georgia. Yet today we are going to jump into one of the major naval battles of 1943. This episode is the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last time we were in New Guinea the forces of Brigadier Moten had arrived in the nick of time to save Wau from the main Japanese thrust.The Australians were pouring reinforcements and supplies via transport aircraft daily. On January 31st 35 aircraft had made 71 trips, the next day 40 aircraft made 53 trips. This allowed the Kanga force to increase to 3000 men and receive heavy equipment necessary to smash the Japanese. Facing larger numbers and possible encirclement, Major General Toru Okabe had to order his men to withdraw. With that order came the lost hope of capturing Wau it seemed. By February the 1st, Moten had 201 officers and 2965 soldiers of all ranks at his disposal. He began sending patrols across the Black Cat trail and the Jap trail. He quickly surmised the Japanese threat was strongest in the Crystal Creek area where they had established a headquarters The Australians neutralized the crystal Creek area and began pushing the Japanese towards Mubo. By late February the Australians controlled the area from Waipali to Buibaining and a large part of the Mubo valley. Nerve wrecking patrols set off multiple ambushes and skirmishes for countless days. The Australian high command could only authorize such limited activity as they did not yet possess sufficient numbers to undertake further major offensive operations. Moten was awarded a bar to his distinguished service order for “his high order of leadership and control at Wau”. While the Australians were tossing all they could via aerial transport, the Japanese attempted to thwart this. Aerial strikes were sent to hit the airstrip at Wau, but the typically terrible New Guinea weather hampered the Japanese. Aircraft dispatch from Rabaul were unable to locate Wau through the torrential weather and would return back without any success. Then on February 6th, 8 P-39's of the 40th fighter Squadron were escorting 5 Dakota transports incoming to Wau when they sighted 24 Japanese aircraft. Captain Thomas Winburn led the P-39s to engage the enemy claiming to have downed 11 Zeros and a Sally. Simultaneously 8 P-40's of the 7th fighter squadron were escorts other Dakota's inbound for Wau when they sighed 12 Japanese bombers attempted to bomb the airstrip. The Dakota's were turned back at the last second as the P-40's engaged the bombers claiming to have downed 7 aircraft. On the ground at the airstrip in Wau were 4 Dakota's while 5 circled its skies hoping to land after the combat was over. Second Lt Robert Schwensen was circling around in his Dakota and was shot down by a Japanese bomber, he alongside 4 other crew died. Another grounded Dakota was damaged and a CAC Wirraway was destroyed by a bomber. The increased aerial pressure prompted Major General Ennis Whitehead over in Port Moresby to order 3 squadrons to join the battle for Wau's skies. P-38's of the 39th and 9th fighter squadrons and P-40's of the 41st fighter Squadron intercepted a Japanese fighters and bombers claiming to have shot down over 23 aircraft. The Japanese were decisively losing the war of the skies, showcasing the limitations of their offensive capabilities in the area. Now while the Japanese surprise attack against Wau had failed and they had been pushed back heavily, all was not lost for the Japanese. They still held some high ground around Waipali and Guadagasal. Yet in order to turn things around, Major General Toru Okabe would require significant reinforcements to defeat Moten's 17th Brigade. Things were extremely chaotic at this time for the Japanese high command. The battle for guadalcanal collapsed, leading to Operation KE which involved a major shuffling of troops all over the place. They first ordered Lt General Jusei Aoki's 20th division to depart Korea for Guadalcanal and for Lt General Heisuke Abe's 41st division to depart China for Rabaul. Lt General Hitoshi Imamura commander of the Japanese 8th area army at Rabaul ordered Lt General Hatazo Adachi's 18th army to secure Wewak, Tuluvu and Madang in New Guinea. Adachi was the one who ordered Major General Toru Okabe, commander of the 51st division and the 102nd infantry regiment to capture Wau in order to further secure Lae and Salamaua. However with the conclusion of Operation KE, the focus was reshifted from the Solomons to New Guinea. General Imamura and Vice admiral Gunichi Mikawa, the commander of the south east area fleet developed a plan to move the 18th army HQ and the rest of the main body of the 51st division from Rabaul to Lae. They would also follow this up by moving the remaining forces of the 20th division to Madang. The first movement was set for the 3rd of march and the second for march 10th. It was to be a very risky plan, as the allies held aerial supremacy. The 18th army held some war games indicated the operation would lose around 4 out of 10 transports and upto 40 aircraft. They believed the operation stood a 50/50 chance of success and there were limited alternatives. If they tried to land all the forces simply at Madang, the men would have to march over 230 km's over swamplands, mountains and jungle terrain. It seems the Japanese were beginning to acknowledge their lack of success at logistics as this course of action was deemed impossible. Over on the Australian side, General MacKay sent word to Blamey that he feared the Japanese would make a second attempt to capture Wau. He reasoned that even with the projected arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 4th and 15th brigades, they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese held around 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area while they held onto their position in the Mubo region. Because of this, he had restricted activity to patrolling to not allow for any gaps allowing an opening against Wau so that more men could be brought over for its defense. Despite the enormous success in transporting men to the area, supply continued to be a major issue. There was a major increase in the number of aircraft at the Dobodura airfields thanks to the capture of Buna allowing for men and materials to be tossed to Wau, but in early February General Whiteheads confided to MacKay that 2 of his squadrons of 18 aircraft were pressed to their limits and the bad weather was greatly reducing their ability to deliver the men and supplies. Whitehead predicted, correctly that the bad weather would continue for the next 6 weeks, which left typically 2 hour windows for the deliveries per day. Attempting to improve the situation General Blamey had begun the construction of a Jeep trail all the way back in January from Bulldog to Way. But during the process the surveyors quickly discovered the terrain was extremely formidable and the job would take many months. Native carriers performed the lionshare of work as the 68 mile trail would end up taking 4 months to complete. Now during the campaign for Buna-Gona, the allies owed much of their success largely due to their control of the air, and this as we can see at Wau continued to be a vital factor. The Japanese of course held their large air and naval base at Rabaul and since the early days of the war remained an ongoing threat to air and sea supremacy in the region. Blanche Bay in Rabaul provided the Japanese with one of the best natural harbors in the south pacific. It is encircled by hills, is around 6 miles long and 2 and one half miles wide. It alongside 3 other harbors provided an anchorage for a large body of ships, as many as 60 by some accounts. The Japanese had built up the harbors and their defenses to more than 300 antiaircraft guns. By the fall of 1943 the Japanese had almost 100,000 men stationed at Rabaul, the vast majority being army troopers. The Southern fleet force had around 21,000 men under the command of Vice admiral Jinichi Kusaka. Air strength at Rabaul depending on reinforcements provided by the combined fleet, but in early 1943 they held a significant enough number to pose a major threat to the allied operations, if utilized properly. General MacArthur was deeply concerned about Rabaul, despite having the number in theory to negate its threat. MacArthur consistently pushed for an invasion of eastern New Britain in early 1943 and disagreed on using airpower to negate Rebaul. Then during the bloody campaign against Buna-Gona he declared the decision to bypass Rabaul would “go down in history as one of times greatest military mistakes”. THEN later on he would agree that bypassing Rabaul was a good strategy and that it had largely been done because of his advisement. Basically what I am saying is MacArthur is full of shit and more worried about his autobiographies that actual decisions. Regardless of that, MacArthurs early suggestions indicated Rabaul was vitally important and needed to be neutralized. This is sort of a no brainer as you can imagine, it was one of Japan's largest naval air force bases covering all major operations in the eastern and central solomons. Fortunately for the allies there was no unified command at Rabaul. As we all know the IJA and IJN did not get along very well and Rabaul's operations is a great example of it. The IJA had fewer aircraft based regularly at Rabaul although its responsibility was to cover New Guinea. Throughout 1943 the IJN's air forces were primarily concerning themselves with the Solomons, which would eventually see them losing nearly 400 aircraft and irreplaceable pilots for all their efforts. Because of the catastrophe of the Guadalcanal campaign, Rabaul was largely neutralized by US bombers from the solomons. By mid February Imamura and Kusaka recognized the need to reinforce Lae. They had sent a 3 ship convoy on the 19th which went unmolested to Wewak and this emboldened them to brave the allied aerial supremacy. Thus on February 28th a convoy of 16 ships commanded by Rear Admiral Masatomi Kamura departed Rabaul. 6 transports, a oil tanker and their destroyer escorts would be combat loaded so that supplies and the men could be off loaded quickly to minimize turnaround time. Almost 7000 men, mostly from the 115th regiment of the 51st division and some SNLF were crowded onto the transports guarded by an escort force of 8 destroyers. Lt General Hatazo Adachi and his staff were on board accompanied by Lt General Hidemitsu Nakano and his staff. The planned route was to go along the northern coast of New Britain through the Bismarck Sea, to Cape Gloucester and then through the Vitiaz strait to the Huon Gulf. The Japanese commanders believed their movement would be masked by the terrible weather. Allied command began detecting signs of a major convoy operation in early february. On february 14th aerial photographs taken over Rabaul indicating over 79 vessels at port, including 45 merchant ships and 6 transports. It was clear to allied command a convoy was going to be dispatched, but its destination was unknown. Two days later naval codebreakers at FRUMEL in Melbourne and Washington DC decyphered some coded messages revealing the Japanese were going to send the convoy to Wewak, Madany and Lae. Other intercepted coded messages from the Japanese 11th air fleet to the convoy indicated they would reach Lae by March the 5th or by latest 12th. Another aerial reconnaissance over Rabaul on the 22nd indicated 59 merchant vessels were at harbor. Kenney read the Ultra intelligence to General MacArthur on the 25th and the prospect of 7000 Japanese being landed at Lae certainly disturbed him. Kenney then sent word to Whitehead of the proposed convoy date and warned him the Japanese would most likely perform a pre-convoy aerial strike. Kenney urged he cut back on the transport hours so the aircraft could be made ready the moment the convoy appeared. Kenney would fly over to Port Moresby on the 26th to speak to Whitehead personally and the two generals concluded the Japanese convoy was going to go through the Vitiaz strait. Now in the south west pacific conventional strategic bombing was not really on the menu as industrial targets in Japan were obviously too far away. Thus since the early days of the way, the primary mission of the allied bomber force in the region was to intercept Japanese supply lines, particularly their sea lanes. Some 416 sorties were flown in January of 1943, resulting in only 2 ships sunk and 3 ships damaged, clearly the allied tactics needed revamping. Captain Bill Garing of the RAAF, part of Kenney's staff, held considerable experience in air to sea operations and he began to recommend that Japanese convoys should be met with simultaneous attacks from different altitudes and directions. This led allied air force brains to come up with some innovative tactics. In February of 1942 the RAAF began experimenting with “skip bombing”. Skip bombing was an anti-ship technique used primarily by the British and Germans in the atlantic. It involved flying ones aircraft just a dozen feet above the sea level towards a target whereupon bombers would release their bombs, which ideally would ricochet across the surface of the water to hit the sides of the ships or explode overhead, IE “skipping”. If you play world of warships, you know exactly what I am talking about, nasty stuff. Another similar technique involved bombs taking a low altitude between 200-500 feet and dropping around mast height, approximately 10-15 feet and 600 yards from their target, IE “Mast height bombing”. This when performed well would see the bombs smash into the sides of a ship. These two techniques paired with slow fuse bombs would see considerable use in an event we are about to jump into. Now Kimura envisioned, by taking the route along the northern coast, that this would put enough distance between the convoy and allied reconnaissance aircraft until they reached Vitiaz strait. Kimura took the destroyer Shirayuki as his flagship to command the operation. Destroyer Tokitsukaze would carry General Adachi and destroyer Yukikaze would carry General Nakano. The idea was that upon arrival at Lae the ships would anchor 600 or so meters apart along the shoreline due west of the airfield around the mouth of the Busu river. They would use a smoke screen to cover the anchorage to make their unloading activity to hinder aerial attacks as well. A escort of 40 IJN and 6 IJA aircraft would provide aerial protection for the convoy from 5am to 6pm each day it operated. General Blamey wrote “every effort will be made by our own air force to deal with the enemy as he approaches”. Thus Generals Blamey and MacArthur tossed the job to General Kenney, the commander of allied air forces. Kenney had at his disposal the RAAF under air vice marshall William Bostock and the 5th air force led by Brigadier general Ennis Whitehead. In total 154 fighters, 34 light bombers, 41 medium bombers and 39 heavy bombers available for combat operations in New Guinea. The 5th air force was subdivided into two commands: the V fighter command led by Brigadier General Paul Wurtsmith consisting of 95 fighters, some P-39's, P-38's and P-40s. Then there was V bomber command led by Brigadier General Howard Ramey which had 28 worn out B-26's, 27 B-25's, 55 B-17's and 60 B-24's. Alongside this Kenney and Whitehead had at their disposal the 3rd attack groups of light bombers, nicknamed the Grim Reapers which included a squadron of A-20 Bostons equipped with 4 .50 caliber guns and long range fuel tanks. You see the A-20 Bostons usually were equipped with .30 caliber machine guns and could not fly across the Owen stanley range from Port Moresby, but Kenney was very keen on the “attack aviation” concept which focused on using low-level strafing and bombing methods. Alongside the grim reapers was 2 squadrons of B-25's that had been modified by Major Paul Pappy Gunn, the same man who had altered the Grim reapers. The B-25's had their lower turrets and tail guns removed and instead had 4 .50 caliber machine guns installed in the nose and another 4 in the forward firing chin blisters. With the top turret firing its guns forward, the aircraft boasted an extraordinary strafing firepower and on top of that still carried 6 100 pound bombs and 60 23 pound fragmentation bombs. The fragmentation bombs were outfitted with small parachutes so they could be used for low-level bombing of airfield without damaging the aircraft trying to drop them. Honestly try to imagine this goliath beast firing those .50 cals, would have been like torrential rain of lead. All of these modifications would allow aircraft like the B-25 to be much more capable of pulling off the masthead bombing technique without the need for a bombardier, which ironically was in opposition to their original role of carrying out bombardier assisted missions from altitude. The Australians could also count on the support of the No. 9 Group led by Captain William Garing consisting of 59 fighters, 26 light medium bombers and 2 heavy bombers; the no 73 wing of Hudson bombers, P-40 Kittyhawks and Beaufort bombers operating at Port Moresby and the no 71 Wing of Wirraways, A-20's and Beaufighters operating out of Milne Bay. So needless to say a lot of allied airpower was on hand. Now as I had mentioned prior, allied attempts to hit Japanese shipping, particularly that coming out of Rabaul had not shown much results in the past. So in order to increase the success of hitting this convoy, Garing persuaded Whitehead to rehearse a plan for the attacks, integrating all available aircraft. This specifically included performing the bomb skipping a masthead bombing techniques. Garing's idea was to get all the aircraft to gather over Cape Ward Hunt at 9:30am so they could get themselves over the enemy convoy by 10am all at once to completely overwhelm the enemy escorting aircraft and anti-aircraft defenses. Two rehearsals were carried out, with the 2nd one turning out to be “damn good”. On March the first at 2am the Convoy departed Rabaul. The convoy slowly made its way across the Bismarck Sea undetected as for the past two days major tropical storms had been occurring since February the 27th. However on March the 1st there was a clearing and a crew of patrolling B-24 Liberators managed to spot the convoy. They reported the sighting, prompting a dispatch of 8 B-17 to be sent to the location, but they failed to relocate the convoy. The Destroyer Tokitsukaze then intercepted an allied message stating their convoy had been spotted. This prompted Kimura to put the forces on full alert. General Adachi who was onboard the Tokitsukaze was uncensored by the report stating it was all part of the plan. His reasoning was that the allies were always going to find them, but with the terrible weather it would be unlikely they could manage to perform a decent attack. At dawn on march the 2nd, a force of 6 RAAF A-20 Bostons coming out of Ward's Strip at Port Moresby performed an air strike against Lae to hinder its use to the fighter escorts for the convoy. At 10am another B-24 liberator found the convoy, prompting another order for 8 B-17's to be sent to attack. They would soon be followed up an hour later by a group of 20 B-17's. The B-17's planned to rendezvous with some P-38's of the 9th fighter squadron, but they arrived too early to the convoy's location and thus had to face the Japanese escort fighters on their own until the P-38's eventually arrived to the scene. The first group of 8 B-17's made their runs at the convoys through anti-aircraft fire and Zero fighters. They dropped 1000 lb bombs from 5000 feet claiming 5 critical bomb hits and sinking 3 merchant ships. The Kyokusei Maru was hit and sunk carrying 1200 IJA troops. The second group of B-17's then showed up and luckily for them, 12 P-38's had managed to haul it quickly enough to escort them in the nick of time to make their bombing runs. The B-17's claimed to have sunk 4 enemy ships, but in reality only damaged two transports, the Teiyo Maru and Nojima. 8 Japanese fighters were shot down with 13 others damaged at the cost of 9 B-17's damaged in return. While the Kyokusei Maru was sinking, the destroyers Asagumo and Yukikaze managed to rescue 950 troops out of the water alongside 2 mountain guns. Because destroyers are fast, the two ships opted detach from the convoy and haul it over to Lae to drop off the survivors before trying to regroup to reperform their escort duties. The survivors and General Nakano would be brought to Lae by the end of the day and the two destroyers turned around to rejoin the convoy by daybreak. Throughout the rest of the day the convoy would be subjected to multiple heavy bomber attacks. 11 B-18s made an evening strike inflicting minor damage to another transport. The days efforts saw the convoy zigzagging to save its life from high level bombing and this led it to be stretched out for 20km. Rather bizarrely, the Japanese fighter escorts showed little aggression towards the American heavy bombers and departed rather early from the days action. During the night PBY Catalina's from the No 11 RAAF squadron began shadowing the convoy. One PBY flown by Flight Lt Terry Duigan received a message from HQ to shadow the convoy in order to guide a strike of torpedo bombers, which did not make sense, so he discarded it. However the message as he would later find out, was not necessarily for him, but rather to trick the enemy. The allied intelligence officers back at HQ were certain the Japanese were listening in on their radio traffic so they began sending false messages. Early the next day, Admiral Kimura made what would be a disastrous decision, ordering his ships to mark the time and circle in the dark. This process cost the convoy 2 hours of night cover and the reasons behind the decision are quite unknown. It is theorized Kimura was trying to make sure his convoy would appear to the destination at the same time their fighter escort would show up for the daily activity. In any case, Kimura's convoy would not see their escort nor stormy weather at sunrise to their dismay. Sunrise on march the 3rd saw a beautiful sunny day, a terrible omen. The convoy was now within striking distance of Milne Bay and 8 Bristol Beaufort Torpedo bombers of the No 100 RAAF squadron took off at 4am. Only 2 Beauforts would make it to the convoy and fail to cause any damage. The Japanese commanders however were now alerted by the presence of torpedo bombers, so they began maneuvers, turning the beam of their ships to the enemy aircraft, exposing the full length of their ships to strafing. At 5:10am, 4 Australian A-20's performed an airstrike against Lae, catching several grounded planes that were needed to escort the convoy. At 8:30am, a striking force of 90 aircraft consisting of a squadron of B-17's, 4 squadrons of B-25's including some grim reapers, a squadron of Beaufighters, a squadron of A-20's and 2 squadrons of P-38 lightnings. The striking group departed Port Moresby and headed for Cape Ward Hunt while 22 A-20 Bostons of No 22 RAAF squadron attacked Lae to reduce the convoys air cover. The striking group took up their practiced formation with the B-17's leading the echelon at 7000 feet, the B-25's behind them at 4000 feet, the Beaufighters at 500 feet, some other B-25's designated to perform low level bombing at around 700 feet and the P-38 lightings hanging above at 12,000 feet. At 10am, 13 B-17s reached the convoy first and began bombing them from 7000 feet causing the convoy to zigzag, dispersing their formation and reducing the concentration of their anti-aircraft fire considerably. The B-17's attracted the Zero fighter escort, but were quickly pounced upon by the P-38 lightnings. One B-17 was shot apart by a Zero and its crew took to parachuting. The parachuting men were fired upon by Zero fighters and when they hit the water some Zero's continued to strafe them. Although the B-17's inflicted no damage, 7 Zero's would be shot down by the P-38s reducing the convoy's protection. Meanwhile the Beaufighters were coming in just above the waves making it look like they were Beaufort torpedo bombers. Admiral Kimura ordered his ships to maneuver so their beams were towards the enemy expecting torpedo runs and this exposed his ships to the Beaufighters strafing runs. The Australian pilots began to open up with their 6 .303 machine guns and 4 20mm Hispano cannons. The combination unleashed a carnage seeing rivers of fire erupt across the lengths of the ships. Some vessels were stopped dead in the water as a result of their officers being cut down to pieces across their bridges. Much of the convoys anti-aircraft positions were destroyed by the strafing. After the first strafing run, B-17's and B-25s began to make their bombing runs rather unexpectedly, leaving the BEaufighters scrambling to flying as the bombs were literally falling down around them. Out of 37 bombs dropped by the 90th attack Squadron Grim reapers, 17 were claimed as direct hits. 12 A-20 bostons from the 89th bomb squadron claim while performing low level bombing that 11 out of 20 bombs made hits. The B-25's of the 405th bomb squadron dropped 35 500 lb bombs from low level and claimed 4 direct hits, these bombs had 5 second delay fuses. The bombing runs caused massive chaos amongst the convoy, so much so that pilots claimed to have seen 2 japanese vessel collide into another. The modified grim reappears strafed the convoy during all of the runs. A squadron leader named Brian Blackjack Waler recalled this “I was observing it from the side and all these ships - honestly, I've never seen anything like it. Dozens of planes all going in at zero feet. In fact, I could see a Beaufighter and a B-25 both going in at the same target and I thought, get out one of you!” The assortment of differing aircraft were coming in at all sorts of angles and all sorts of altitudes, many low. Garrett Middlebrook, a co-pilot in one of the B-25s, described the ferocity of the strafing attacks: “They went in and hit this troop ship. What I saw looked like little sticks, maybe a foot long or something like that, or splinters flying up off the deck of ship; they'd fly all around ... and twist crazily in the air and fall out in the water. Then I realized what I was watching were human beings. I was watching hundreds of those Japanese just blown off the deck by those machine guns. They just splintered around the air like sticks in a whirlwind and they'd fall in the water.” The Shirayuki was the first ship to be hit, by a combination of strafing and bombing attacks. Just about all of the men on her bridge were strafed, including Kimura who was wounded. She received a bomb hit that stated a magazine explosion breaking her stern off and causing her to sink. Her crew transferred to the Shikinami as the Shirayuki was scuttled. The Tokitsukaze was hit fatally and her crew had to abandon her. The Arashio was strafed violently causing her to collide with the transport Nojima disabling both ships. Both ships would be abandoned as the allies strafed and bombed them sinking Nojima eventually. The remaining destroyers struggled to save survivors in the water. By 10:15, all 7 of the transports had been hit and we're sinking 100km's southeast of Finschhafen. After midway a second series of attacks were made by B-17's and A-20's who strafed and bombed the Asashio while she was trying to rescue survivors. The 4 remaining destroyers withdrew up the Vitiaz strait and were joined by the destroyer Hatsuyuki coming from Long Island. The Hatsuyuki and Uranami brought 2700 survivors back to Rabaul while the 3 other destroyers continued picking up survivors and would eventually bring them to Kavieng by march 5th. During the night of march 3rd, a force of 10 PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins made an attempt to finish off the convoy alongside some B-17's and Beaufighters. 2 of the PT boats hit submerged debris and were turned back, but the other 8 continued and arrived off Lae in the early hours of March 4th. Atkins spotted a fire that turned out to be the transport Oigawa Maru. Pt-143 and PT-150 fired torpedoes at it, further crippling and eventually sinking the transport. The Asashio was hit by a B-17 with a 500 bomb bomb as she was grabbing survivors and sunk. Amongst the 4 surviving destroyers it would only be the Yikikaze that went undamaged. The PT boats and allied aircraft attacked the Japanese rescue vessels and survivors clinging to rafts or floating in the sea. The decision to attack the survivors was highly unpopular amongst the pilots and sailors but was deemed necessary on the grounds the rescued Japanese were most likely going to be landed for military duty if not attacked. One Japanese survivor wrote in his diary of the ordeal “The Boeing B-17 is most terrifying. We are repeating the failure of Guadalcanal. Most regrettable!” Many allied pilots were sicked by these actions. One pilot recalled "as per instructions, we flew around to see if some ships were still afloat. Some were sinking and burning--we san a lifeboat with about 20 people. I thought these poor guys. But we had a job to do because if they got to shore, they were going to kill our guys. So I came around and strafed them. One of the cruel things of war which had to be done" Another pilot recounted this “At the briefing, Australian officer had told us we must not permit a single enemy to reach the shores of New Guinea. They explained the suffering, agony, and loss by our troops in having to hunt down and kill a suicidal Jap”. It is estimated around 352 Japanese troops were killed during these attacks adding to the 2890 casualties suffered during the battle. Another 224 survivors in the water would be rescued by the I-17 and I-26 shuffled over to various nearby islands such as Goodenough island. Of the 116 Japanese that would be landed on Goodenough island, 72 would be killed with 42 captured and 2 missing. Officials at the Advanced air echelon at Port Moresby went through the claims of their pilots and sailors and believed a great number of ships had been destroyed. Their conclusion was that 12 transports, 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers had been sunk, which MacArthur readily believed, although a report would later come out to claim the number was actually 4 destroyers and 8 transports. Later the Japanese would admit that 3000 soldiers had been killed during the battle, but this did not count the hundreds of sailors lost on the ships, nor the pilots in the aircraft. MacArthur would make a commendation on march the 4th for all the air force units in New Guinea stating “it cannot fail to go down in history as one of the most complete and annihilating combats of all time. My pride and satisfaction in you is boundless” Kenney added to it stating “tell the whole gang that I am so proud of them I am about to blow a fuse”. MacArthur would also at the offset claim they had caused 15,000 enemy casualties describing the battle as a decisive aerial engagement for the southwest pacific theater. And it certainly was a decisive victory, it was a devastating loss for Japan that showcased Japan was no longer capable of being on the offensive. I will finish off the tale of the battle of the Bismarck sea with a account from Reiji Masuda, a crewman aboard the destroyer Arashio, as it leaves a vivid and harrowing account of the attack. They would come in on you at low altitude, and they'd skip bombs across the water like you'd throw a stone. That's how they bombed us. All seven of the remaining transports were enveloped in flames. Their masts tumbled down, their bridges flew to pieces, the ammunition they were carrying was hit, and whole ships blew up. . . . They hit us amidships. B-17s, fighters, skip-bombers, and torpedo bombers. On our side, we were madly firing, but we had no chance to beat them off. Our bridge was hit by two five-hundred-pound bombs. Nobody could have survived. The captain, the chief navigator, the gunnery and torpedo chiefs, and the chief medical officer were all killed in action. The chief navigator's blackened body was hanging there, all alone. Then a second air attack came in. We were hit by thirty shells from port to starboard. The ship shook violently. Bullet fragments and shrapnel made it look like a beehive. All the steam pipes burst. The ship became boiling hot. We tried to abandon ship, but planes flying almost as low as the masts sprayed us with machine-guns. Hands were shot off, stomachs blown open. Most of the crew were murdered or wounded there. Hundreds were swimming in the ocean. Nobody was there to rescue them. They were wiped out, carried away by a strong current running at roughly four or five knots. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle of the Bismarck sea proved the Japanese were indeed incapable of being on the offensive, the allies were now in the driving seat. It also showcased war produces wild innovations that can prove quite deadly.
In her fantastic new book, The Lazy Genius Kitchen, Kendra Adachi lays out a system for creating a kitchen that has and does everything you need. The lazy genius kitchen isn't really a book about remodeling. Nor is it explicitly a cookbook or an organizing book or a lifestyle guide. It's some of all of those things. And, perhaps, it's better than any of them could be on their own. Adachi's advice is to think about the way you want to live in your home. And if you know me at all, you know this is absolutely where I believe every project in architecture should begin. So, let's talk about how you can be a lazy genius about your kitchen update. And create the kitchen that's perfect for YOU. Get the full show notes with all the trimmings at www.midmod-midwest.com/1101And sign up RIGHT NOW for the Mid-Century Kitchen Clinic to get the early bird price on the live, two hour workshop happening January 14th at 2pm central!
With growing geopolitical tensions, economic relations with China are increasingly challenging. The term “economic coercion” is heard more often recently in connection with EU-China relations, as China relies on economic pressure to push for strategic goals. A prominent example of this is China's souring relations with Lithuania over the renaming of the Taiwan representative office, with companies operating in Lithuania caught in Beijing's crosshairs. In this podcast, MERICS Analysts Aya Adachi and Alexander Brown discuss how China's utilization of economic pressure is changing and describe the risks for companies with business in China. Read their new Monitor “Fasten your seatbelts: How to manage China's economic coercion” on the topic here.
Review các phim vừa ra rạp từ ngày 15/07/2022 QUYẾT TÂM CHIA TAY C16 Đạo diễn: Park Chan Wook Diễn viên: Tang Wei, Park Hae Il Thể loại: Hồi hộp, Tình cảm Một thanh tra cảnh sát rơi vào lưới tình với goá phụ trẻ - nghi phạm giết người trong vụ án mà anh ta đang điều tra. THOÁT KHỎI MOGADISHU C16 Đạo diễn: Ryoo Seung-wan Diễn viên: Kim Yoon-Seok, Jo In-Sung, Huh Joon-Ho,... Thể loại: Hành Động, Hồi hộp, Tâm Lý Dựa trên một sự kiện lịch sử khó tin nhưng có thật, bộ phim tái hiện lại lần hợp tác gay cấn, chưa từng có tiền lệ giữa các nhà ngoại giao Nam và Bắc Hàn nhằm giải thoát công dân của họ khỏi cuộc binh biến tại Somalia vào năm 1991. CHERRY MAGIC: 30 TUỔI VẪN CÒN “ZIN” SẼ BIẾN THÀNH PHÙ THỦY C16 Đạo diễn: Hiroki Kazama Diễn viên: Eiji Akaso, Keita Machida , Kodai Asaka, Yutaro, Takuya Kusakawa (Super Tokkyu), Rei Sato, Suzunosuke Thể loại: Tình cảm Bản phim điện ảnh lãng mạn, ấm áp của hiện tượng gây sốt châu Á “CHERRY MAGIC: 30 TUỔI VẪN CÒN “ZIN” SẼ BIẾN THÀNH PHÙ THỦY”. Adachi là một nhân viên văn phòng, bước sang tuổi 30 và vẫn còn "zin". Vào sinh nhật thứ 30 của mình, anh chàng được ban tặng phép thuật kỳ lạ. Adachi có thể đọc được suy nghĩ của những người anh ta chạm vào. Kurosawa là người yêu của Adachi tại nơi làm việc, nổi tiếng và thành đạt. Họ yêu nhau bí mật tại chốn công sở. Một ngày nọ, Adachi nhận được một cơ hội việc làm mới. Adachi sẽ được làm việc mình thích nhưng địa điểm mới lại ở Nagasaki, cách Kurosawa tận 1.200 km. Trải qua những khó khăn và thử thách khi yêu xa khiến họ phải suy nghĩ lại về mối quan hệ và tương lai của mình. Mối quan hệ của họ sẽ ra sao? KAREM: VẬT CHỨA TỬ THẦN C18 Đạo diễn: Henry Bedwell Diễn viên: Rachel Rodriguez, Daniel Martínez, Dominika Paleta Thể loại: Kinh Dị Karem (Raquel Rodríguez), cô con út của gia đình Briseno bị một thế lực quỷ dữ vô cùng tàn ác đeo bám. Nhờ quyền năng của quỷ, cô bé có thể thao túng người khác. Lợi dụng sức mạnh đó, Karem lên kế hoạch trả đũa tất cả những ai từng bắt nạt mình. Nhưng chơi dao có ngày đứt tay, Karem không thể ngờ rằng cái bắt tay của cô bé và con quỷ lại dẫn tới hàng loạt bi kịch thảm khốc. PORORO: CUỘC PHIÊU LƯU ĐẾN ĐẢO KHỦNG LONG Đạo diễn: Kim Hyunho, Yoon Jewan Thể loại: Hoạt Hình Pororo và những người bạn tìm thấy chú khủng long nhỏ Alo đang ngủ say trong chiếc phi thuyền hình quả trứng. Alo không nhớ gì ngoài tên của mình. Khi Pororo và bạn bè giúp Alo sửa phi thuyền thì phi thuyền vụt sáng và biến mất cùng Alo và người bạn của Pororo là Crong. Pororo đuổi theo chiếc phi thuyền đến Đảo Khủng Long và chạm trán với Mr.Y, kẻ chuyên bắt cóc khủng long để bán cho người ngoài hành tinh. Để giải cứu bạn của mình, Pororo phải vượt qua nỗi sợ khủng long để chiến đấu với người ngoài hành tinh và đội quân người máy của Mr.Y. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/kim-thanh-duong/support
Food does more than just provide the chemicals we need to survive. It feeds our spirit, imagination and relationships. It connects us to the land, our history, our culture and each other. Perhaps most importantly, food also gives us the power to heal our relationships, systems and society. But to do that, we first have to start to explore, understand and ultimately shift the dominant narratives that define our relationship to food. And that's exactly what Shizue Roche Adachi and the team at Real Food, Real Stories are trying to do through story-driven events and strategies with food culture workers. In this conversation, Shizue helps us unpack the power of food to nourish and heal a struggling society. She also shares examples of the ways in which stories can not only reveal harmful narratives but also create opportunities to shape the future. Find out more about upcoming events at Real Food, Real Stories here, and check out their recent piece in the Non-Profit Quarterly here.
Barbara Adachi and became the first minority and female partner to lead the national human capital consulting business at Deloitte. Barbara's passion is advancing women's leadership and is as a champion of diversity and inclusion. She served as National Managing Principal for Deloitte's award- winning Women's Initiative (WIN) for the entire U.S. firm from 2007-2011, achieving a significant milestone of 1,000 women partners, principals and directors. Named one of the “100 Most Influential Women in Business” by the San Francisco Business Times for 10 consecutive years from 2003 through 2012, Barbara was then endowed as Forever Influential. Shes also been honored as part of the Working Mother's Hall of Fame. In 2020, Barbara received the CEDAW Women's Human Rights Award for International Comity. The accolades and achievements go on and on—needless to say she is force for advancing women leaders in the workforce.
If a peanut butter and marshmallow fluff sandwich on white bread with the crusts cut off were a BL, it would be Cherry Magic. The sweetest Japanese BL ever made is this week's Series Sunday focus and we'll never get over Adachi and Kurosawa. That's a promise. Want to win a super sold-out, super limited edition XIW shirt? The giveaway is open through November 30, 2021: https://bit.ly/LTBLSummerdaze As always, you can also watch on YouTube: https://youtu.be/XoCh8hnlKic FOLLOW US FOR MOUNTAIN MAKEOUT UPDATES IG: @letstalkBL Twitter: @letstalkBL TikTok: @letstalkBL
About: Journey through The Legend of Zelda with these songs from 2D Zelda games, ordered in such a way that is reminiscent of experiencing a traditional Legend of Zelda story from beginning to end. > [Music by K. Kondo, M. Adachi, K. Sada, M. Hamano, K. Ishikawa, K. Totaka, T. Minegishi, M. Tominaga, A. Ohta, A. Nakatsuka, R. Nagamatsu, M. Takano, K. Nagata] > 00:00 - Intro [The Legend of Zelda] > 01:28 - Intro (Maku Tree) [Oracle of A/S] > 01:39 - Main Theme [Link's Awakening] > 02:09 - File Select [Spirit Tracks] > 03:01 - Prologue [Spirit Tracks] > 04:25 - Secrets Of The Oracles [Oracle of A/S] > 04:52 - Village [Zelda II] > 07:03 - House [FS Adventures] > 08:28 - Overworld (Unarmed) [Link's Awakening] > 09:41 - Angler's Tunnel Revealed [Link's Awakening 2019] > 09:50 - Sanctuary Dungeon [A Link to the Past] > 12:25 - Battle Theme 2 [Zelda II] > 13:27 - The Wise Owl [Link's Awakening 2019] > 14:30 - Overworld [The Legend of Zelda] > 15:46 - Hyrule Castle [Spirit Tracks] > 17:23 - Woodlands (Normal) [Tri Force Heroes] > 18:52 - Level 1 (Tail Cave) [Link's Awakening 2019] > 20:57 - Boss BGM [A Link to the Past] > 21:25 - Palace Clear [Zelda II] > 21:30 - Overworld Adventure [Spirit Tracks] > 24:51 - Hyrule Town [The Minish Cap] > 26:14 - Indoors Melody [Phantom Hourglass] > 27:33 - Cave [Link's Awakening] > 28:06 - Zora Village [Oracle of Ages] > 28:58 - Song of Light (Short) [Spirit Tracks] > 29:02 - Discovery Fanfare [Phantom Hourglass] > 29:06 - Level 6 (Mermaid's Cave) [Oracle of Ages] > 30:10 - Versus Bellum [Phantom Hourglass] > 32:12 - Dungeon Complete [Oracle of A/S] > 32:20 - Overworld (Past) [Oracle of Ages] > 33:27 - Byrne Awakens [Spirit Tracks] > 36:27 - Master Sword Demo [A Link to the Past] > 36:41 - Lake Hylia [FS Adventures] > 38:44 - Lynna Village [Oracle of Ages] > 39:38 - Scaling Death Mountain [A Link Between Worlds] > 41:53 - Song of Healing (Short) [Spirit Tracks] > 41:56 - Sky Realm [Tri Force Heroes] > 43:42 - Level 4 (Skull Dungeon) [Oracle of Ages] > 44:59 - Ganon's Message [A Link to the Past] > 45:34 - Skeldritch [Spirit Tracks] > 47:16 - Element Obtained [The Minish Cap] > 47:25 - Nayru's Song [Oracle of Ages] > 47:54 - Full Moon Cello [Link's Awakening 2019] > 48:05 - Dark World [A Link to the Past] > 50:15 - Level 8 (Turtle Rock) [Link's Awakening 2019] > 51:40 - Enter Ganon [A Link Between Worlds] > 52:48 - Battle With Ganon [A Link to the Past] > 54:04 - Battle With Nightmare [Link's Awakening] > 55:37 - Final Battle ~ Malladus (with Duet) [Spirit Tracks] > 01:00:51 - Triforce Chamber [A Link to the Past] > 01:01:50 - Credits [Link's Awakening 2019] > www.pixelbeatpod.com > pixelbeatpod@icloud.com >
S moderátorkou Naomi Adachi se bavíme o tom, jaké to je být "Japonkou v Česku a Češkou v Japonsku", zda ji tohle téma už neleze krkem a zda je pro ni její původ a vzhled výhodou nebo brzdou. Bavíme se také o influencerství, o televizi i o právu navazovat placené spolupráce, ale zároveň mít rád něco i zadarmo.
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