Podcasts about statutory interpretation

This week's episode covers the cases of FDA v. Doctor's for Hippocratic Medicine and Cargill v. Garland, which deal with big legal issues in small legal ways.  The podcast starts by also discussing Big Sam Alito's recently foibles with judicial ethics and ends with a discussion on dance recital season.  The law basically starts from the beginning if you'll indulge a small anecdote.

Join host Nick on today's episode of LawIn4. As a law student himself, he and his team embark on an exploration of a critical concept: Statutory Interpretation. Key knowledge that every law student must understand. The Law In 4 Podcast is your go-to podcast for law school study help in 4 minutes or less. If you'd like to see a topic covered contact us via our website for your suggestions. For more information on the Australian Law student, visit our website at ⁠⁠⁠⁠theauslawstudent.com⁠⁠⁠⁠ Disclaimer: The Lawin4 is produced by law students, for law students. It is not, nor is it intended to constitute legal advice. If you require legal assistance, you should contact your local law society, who can direct you appropriately.

Embark on an intellectual journey into the world of textualism and the canons of interpretation in this insightful video. We delve into the principles of textualism, its application in legal analysis, and how the canons of interpretation play a crucial role in understanding statutory and constitutional texts. Through expert interviews and case studies, gain a deeper appreciation of this legal philosophy and its impact on the interpretation of laws. Join us for a thought-provoking exploration of textualism and its significance in the legal system. #Textualism #LegalInterpretation #ConstitutionalLaw #StatutoryInterpretation #LegalPhilosophyRumble: https://rumble.com/c/c-5882193 YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqs_hlmHECejgCAvQCa-r5Q X: https://twitter.com/zeus02377 Telegram: The BigSib Chat

Dive into the judicial philosophy of Justice Antonin Scalia as we explore the Canons of Construction, a set of principles that played a pivotal role in his legal reasoning. Understand how these canons guide judges in interpreting statutes and the Constitution, and see how Scalia's approach has influenced modern legal thought. Whether you're a law student, legal professional, or just curious about the inner workings of the judiciary, this video is your gateway to understanding one of the most influential legal minds of our time. Subscribe for more insightful legal analyses!Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/c-5882193 YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCqs_hlmHECejgCAvQCa-r5Q X: https://twitter.com/zeus02377 Telegram: The BigSib Chat

Join Boozy and the Certified Legal Layman, Alkali, for a discussion of cases where the government decided to seize someone's animals - or animal shaped things - based on a reading of the law that ended up being somewhat incorrect.  In this episode the pair look at how the placement of a word, or the definition of a term, can greatly impact the application of the law it creates in Episode 36 - Foxes and CocksesLegal Funhouse Theme by Status Ferret. Check out his stuff here!Support the showSupport Boozy over on Patreon, or maybe watch him at Twitch You can tip him at Paypal of Send him a Ko-Fi as well! If you want to support Alkali, you can do that at Alkali & Xanni's Twitch channel or on their Patreon!

Hasan-Nayem v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 21-12402 (11th Cir. Dec. 7, 2022)·       credibility; inconsistencies; omissions, demeanor; memorizing testimony; evasiveness; asylum; Liberal Democratic Party; Awami League; Bangladesh Matter of Mariscal-Hernandez, 28 I&N Dec. 666 (BIA Dec. 9, 2022)·       suppression; Fourth Amendment; egregious violation; Matter of Barcenas; termination; Pereira; I-213; probative evidence; INA § 287; 8 C.F.R. § 287 Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland, No. 13-73719 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022) (en banc)·       Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a); crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment; INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i); categorical approach; statutory interpretation; agency deference; Chevron.*Sponsors and friends of the podcast!Kurzban Kurzban Tetzeli and Pratt P.A.Immigration, serious injury, and business lawyers serving clients in Florida, California, and all over the world for over 40 years.Docketwise"Modern immigration software & case management"Capital Good Fund"A social change organization that uses financial services to tackle poverty in America."Want to become a patron?Click here to check out our Patreon Page!CONTACT INFORMATIONEmail: kgregg@kktplaw.comFacebook: @immigrationreviewInstagram: @immigrationreviewTwitter: @immreviewAbout your host!More episodes!Case notes!Top 15 immigration podcast in the U.S.!Featured in San Diego Voyager!DISCLAIMER:Immigration Review® is a podcast made available for educational purposes only. It does not provide legal advice. Rather, it offers general information and insights from publicly available immigration cases. By accessing and listening to the podcast, you understand that there is no attorney-client relationship between you and the host. The podcast should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed attorney in your state.MUSIC CREDITS:"Loopster," "Bass Vibes," "Chill Wave," and "Funk Game Loop" Kevin MacLeod - Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0Support the show

**This episode contains some external audio sounds that were outside of our control, to include a fire alarm in the recording studio towards the end. Despite this, I hope you will listen to the whole thing as I think you'll find it very valuable***We talk this week to return guest, Professor Eric Berger who is a constitutional scholar from the Nebraska College of Law, and knows a thing or two about Roe v. Wade. For 49 years a woman has had the right to an abortion in the United States because of this ruling, but within the past year this constitutional right has been significantly restricted at the state level. With the Supreme Court set to offer an opinion on Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Orgnanization, which is a Mississippi law banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age, proponents and opponents of the law are cautiously waiting to see how this might affect the future of abortions in the country. We discuss the law, implications and the likelihood that Roe v. Wade could be overturned in this episode!Here are some useful links that were discussed during the show:Tracking new action on abortion legislation across the states: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2022/abortion-rights-protections-restrictions-tracker/An Overview of Abortion Laws: https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/abortion-bans-cases-sex-or-race-selection-or-genetic-anomalyTwo Nebraska towns have approved local abortion bans. Does it matter?: https://theindependent.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/two-nebraska-towns-have-approved-local-abortion-bans-does-it-matter/article_e52b2580-69b5-539e-b4ac-d753743f3e8d.html?fr=operanewsGuest Bio:Professor Eric Berger joined the faculty in 2007. He received his B.A. with Honors in History from Brown University, and his J.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was a Kent Scholar and an Articles Editor on the Columbia Law Review. After law school, Professor Berger clerked for the Honorable Merrick B. Garland on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He then practiced in Jenner & Block's Washington, D.C. office, where he worked on litigation in several state and federal trial and appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court. Professor Berger's matters there included cases involving lethal injection, same-sex marriage, the detention of foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay, and internet obscenity. Professor Berger teaches Constitutional Law I (structure), Constitutional Law II (rights), Constitutional History, Federal Courts, First Amendment, and Statutory Interpretation. He also teaches a class for undergraduates on Legislation and Regulation. He has been voted Professor of the Year by the upperclass law students six times. He has also received the College Distinguished Teaching Award (in 2010), the Law Alumni Council Distinguished Faculty Award (in 2018), and the John H. Binning Award for Excellence (in 2019). Support the show (https://www.buymeacoffee.com/faithpolitics)

Today, I will talk about the case of Apex Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 221, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia discussed the Doctrine or the Rule of Implied Prohibition.To know more about the present post, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2022/03/what-is-doctrine-or-rule-of-implied.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

If a law is something that we have to abide by as a citizen, how do people find ways to manipulate it to work in their favor? One word: loopholes. In this episode, we take a look into how statutory interpretation works, and look at some real-world examples of people using the law to their advantage. Here are links to websites that give some information on the content discussed: Statutory Interpretation: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45153.html Interpreting Statutes Guide: https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf Common Rules of Statutory Construction: https://leg.colorado.gov/agencies/office-legislative-legal-services/commonly-applied-rules-statutory-construction Canons of Construction: https://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/adjunct/dstevenson/2018Spring/CANONS%20OF%20CONSTRUCTION.pdf https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Canons+of+Construction Fox11 Article: https://fox11online.com/news/local/can-people-under-21-really-drink-with-a-parent-in-wisconsin Tags: #temple #tempeuniversity #templelaw #templelawlibrarypodcast #podcast #law #lawpodcast #taylorswift #loopholes #statutes #statutoryinterpretation

Today, I will talk about a very important principle of law, the principle of stare decisis. I will discuss the same with a jurisprudential perspective to provide conceptual clarity in relation to the doctrine of stare decisis.To know more about the present post, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/12/basics-of-doctrine-of-stare-decisis.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

Today, I will talk about the case of Manmohan Nanda v. United India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 8386/2015, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia discussed the Doctrine of Contra Proferentem in the field of statutory interpretation and Insurance Contracts.To know more about Insurance Contracts, please visit my earlier show the link for which is https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/12/what-are-rules-for-drafting-and-filling.htmlTo know more about the present post, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/12/doctrine-of-contra-proferentem-and-its.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

Today, I will talk about the case of Arvind Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1099, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the Latin Maxim “Falsus in Uno-Falsus in Omnibus” which is a rule of caution in Indian Criminal Jurisprudence.To know more about it, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/11/meaning-of-falsus-in-uno-falsus-in.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

Today, I will talk about the case of Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1081, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the rule of ejusdem generis in the field of statutory interpretation.To know more about it, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/11/ejusdem-generis-interpretation-and.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

Vaccine mandates, love them or hate them, they are most likely affecting you in some shape and form. But what exactly does the constitution have to say about mandates? On this episode, your political host, Will Wright, talks with Constitutional Professor Eric Berger about the constitutionality of vaccine mandates. Then they discuss a Supreme Court case that is often cited to justify mandates, Jacobson v. Massachusets, and lastly Will finally gets his chance to flex his knowledge of OSHA to the professor! Guest Bio:Professor Berger clerked for the Honorable Merrick B. Garland on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He then practiced in Jenner & Block's Washington, D.C. office, where he worked on litigation in several state and federal trial and appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court. Professor Berger's matters there included cases involving lethal injection, same-sex marriage, the detention of foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay, and internet obscenity. Professor Berger teaches Constitutional Law I (structure), Constitutional Law II (rights), Constitutional History, Federal Courts, First Amendment, and Statutory Interpretation. He also teaches a class for undergraduates on Legislation and Regulation. He has been voted Professor of the Year by the upperclass law students six times. He has also received the College Distinguished Teaching Award (in 2010), the Law Alumni Council Distinguished Faculty Award (in 2018), and the John H. Binning Award for Excellence (in 2019). Professor Berger's scholarship focuses on constitutional law.  Much of his work explores judicial decision making in constitutional cases, with special attention to deference, fact finding, rhetorical strategies, and other under-theorized factors that help shape judicial opinions in constitutional cases.  His article Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029 (2011), was named the 2011 winner of the American Constitution Society's Richard D. Cudahy Writing Competition on Regulatory and Administrative Law.  Professor Berger has also written extensively about lethal injection litigation.   Professor Berger has testified in the Nebraska legislature about a variety of constitutional issues, including free speech, lethal injection, and the process for amending the U.S. Constitution.  He is also the faculty advisor to the Law College's chapter of the American Constitution Society and to the Community Legal Education Project, which sends law students into Lincoln public schools to teach about the Constitution.Professor Berger served as Associate Dean for Faculty from 2016 to 2020.Support the show (https://www.buymeacoffee.com/faithpolitics)

On today's show, we will discuss the case of Sanjay Ramdas Patil v. Sanjay & Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 650, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction. To know more about it, please visit https://www.desikanoon.co.in/2021/09/harmonious-construction-justice-gavai-.htmlTelegram: https://t.me/Legal_Talks_by_DesiKanoonYouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMmVCFV7-Kfo_6S42kPhz2wApple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/legal-talks-by-desikanoon/id1510617120Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3KdnziPc4I73VfEcFJa59X?si=vYgrOEraQD-NjcoXA2a7Lg&dl_branch=1&nd=1Google Podcasts: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5zaW1wbGVjYXN0LmNvbS84ZTZTcGREcw?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiuz4ifzpLxAhVklGMGHb4HAdwQ9sEGegQIARADAmazon Music: https://music.amazon.com/podcasts/4b89fb71-1836-414e-86f6-1116324dd7bc/Legal-Talks-by-Desikanoon Please subscribe and follow us on YouTube, Instagram, iTunes, Twitter, LinkedIn, Discord, Telegram and Facebook. Credits: Music by Wataboi from Pixabay Thank you for listening!

On August 26, 2021, the United States Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that invalidated the federal tenant eviction moratorium issued by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).    This ruling should end the CDC's tenant eviction moratorium unless Congress steps in.  In Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services, the high court upheld the district court's ruling that that CDC lacks statutory authority for its tenant eviction moratorium.  The high court noted that the CDC “has imposed a nationwide moratorium on evictions in reliance on a decades-old statute that authorizes it to implement measures like fumigation and pest extermination.”  The per curiam opinion allows to go forward the district court order invalidating the moratorium, which ruling had been stayed by a ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.   The court found the CDC has power to prevent the interstate spread of disease by “identifying, isolating and destroying the disease itself,” and that the “downstream connection between eviction and the interstate spread of disease is markedly different from the direct targeting of the disease that characterizes measures identified in the statute.”  The court correctly noted that a reading to permit an eviction moratorium would make it “hard to see what measures this interpretation would place outside CDC's reach.”  The court then offered several specific examples such as free grocery delivery for the sick and free computers for stay-at-home schooling.Justice Breyer's dissent raised a number of criticisms.   One was that “the CDC's current order is substantially more tailored than its prior eviction moratorium. . . .”  Justice Breyer seems to want to treat this like some kind of constitutional review of narrow tailoring, but this is about statutory interpretation.  Better tailoring says nothing about how to read the statute.    The dissent also notes a history of health officials containing the spread of disease by preventing the movement of people.  It cites a New York Times article from 1920, more than twenty years before the statute in question was enacted.  This detour from the subject at hand involved police powers of states, which is entirely different from federal power, which is enumerated and limited.  The dissent does, however, cite legislative history of the federal statute under review, but legislative history is not the will of the body that enacted the law and should not resolve questions like this.  Finally, Justice Breyer notes the emergency of the delta variant and that COVID-19 cases have spiked in recent weeks.  I for one have found interesting courts' willingness to introduce new evidence not on the record when it protects the government, but not in support of a challenger.  For example, one who demonstrates that masks and lockdown orders do no good will not be heard.Something important is missing from this opinion, which I discuss in my book, COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1Specifically, there is no discussion anywhere of nondelegation problems.  If the court were to adopt Justice Breyer's statutory reading, there is a serious nondelegation problem.   The majority opinion gets to this in a way by warning of the endless and open-ended powers the CDC wou

This Epilogue discusses the United States Supreme Court's August 12, 2021 order that enjoined enforcement of a New York eviction moratorium.  You can find further discussion of this topic in COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This Epilogue evaluates the Illinois Governor's school mask order.If you found this Epilogue helpful, you may be interested in COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This Epilogue discusses the challenge to Indiana University's student COVID-19 vaccination requirement.Further discussion can be found in COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This Epilogue discusses the CDC's renewed residential eviction moratorium, issued without statutory authority and in defiance of the United States Supreme Court.If you found this Epilogue helpful, you may be interested in COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode presents the conclusions of my research and, save for a possible epilogue, completes the discussion of that research. This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1 

This episode explains how courts shirk their constitutional duties when they fail to perform a searching analysis to find statutory meaning. This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode explains how to modify the level of judicial scrutiny to address judicial missteps in matters of business closures, stay at home orders and remote learning requirements. This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast critiques courts' handling of pandemic-related challenges to business closure orders.This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1 

This podcast critiques courts' handling of pandemic-related challenges to restraints on in-person schooling. This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode discusses how stay-at-home orders may violate the constitutional right to travel and how courts have handled right-to-travel assertions in pandemic litigation.This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode explains why courts must take seriously nondelegation concerns in adjudicating pandemic orders of the executive branch.This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode critiques modern courts' reflexive following of Jacobson v. Massachusetts in resolving COVID-19 pandemic disputes.This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This episode discusses how courts have handled COVID-19 pandemic litigation when two emergency laws conflict or when an emergency law does not reference pandemics or disease. This is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast addresses how courts have handled pandemic executive orders when statutes would appear to show they have expired.  Does the governor have authority to renew the order, or must he or she obtain approval of the state legislature?This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast discusses challenges to COVID-19 pandemic orders arising under theories of substantive due process.   Please note some case references are made to those discussed in previous podcasts concerning COVID-19 pandemic litigation.  This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1 

This podcast discusses procedural due process challenges to COVID-19 pandemic orders.  This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast discusses cases that challenge COVID-19 pandemic regulations as regulatory takings.This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast identifies, analyzes and critiques pandemic-related equal protection claims brought by businesses against states.This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This podcast discusses COVID-19 litigation involving challenges to pandemic orders arising under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This second in a series of podcasts concerning COVID-19 pandemic litigation will discuss how courts have applied the nondelegation doctrine to COVID-19 disputes.This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

This first part of a series discusses governmental authority to close schools, require masks, require citizens to shelter in place and to close businesses.  It discusses how states vary in their approaches to executive emergency power.  At the federal level, this first part explores federalism issues and  analyzes statutes that authorize executive action. This podcast is an excerpt from COVID-19 Litigation: A Discourse on Nondelegation, Constitutional Rights and Statutory Interpretation.  This first-of-its-kind analysis of pandemic litigation  is available on Amazon at: https://www.amazon.com/COVID-19-Pandemic-Litigation-Constitutional-Interpretation/dp/B09733DTVT/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=COVID-19+pandemic+litigation&qid=1624303183&s=books&sr=1-1

Brief Background In the present case, a Notification dated 15.11.2019 issued by the Central Government was challenged. Vide this Notification, certain provisions of the IBC were brought into force only as far as they relate to personal guarantors of corporate debtors, under the exercise of powers under Section 1 (3) of the IBC. Section 1 (3) states that: - “It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint: Provided that different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Code and any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Code shall be construed a reference the commencement of that provision.” The impugned Notification provided for as follows: - “NOTIFICATIONNew Delhi. the 15th November, 2019S.O. 4126(E).- ln exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section I of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 2016 (31 of 2016). the Central Government hereby appoints the 1st day of December, 2019 as the date on which the following provisions of the said Code only in so far as they relate to personal guarantors to corporate debtors. shall come into force:(1) clause (e) of section 2;(2) section 78 (except with regard to fresh start process) and section 79;(3) sections 94 to 187 (both inclusive);(4) clause (g) to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 239;(5) clause (m) to clause (zc) of sub-section (2) of section 239;(6) clause (zn) to clause (zs) of' sub-section (2) of section 240; and(7) Section 249.[F. No. 30/21/2018-Insolvency Section]GYANESHWAR KUMAR SINGH, Jt. Secy.” Important Grounds of the Petitioners It was pleaded that the impugned Notification suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and bringing into force certain provisions only in relation to personal guarantors is ultra vires the powers granted to the Central Government. It was also contended that the power delegated under S. 1 (3) is with respect to the points in time when different provisions of the IBC can be brought into effect and there is no power to the Government to notify parts of provisions of the Code or to limit the application of the provisions to certain categories of persons. Basically, certain provisions of Part III of the IBC and other parts were made applicable to personal guarantors of corporate debtors only. The heading of Part III of the IBC is “INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION AND BANKRUPTCY FOR INDIVIDUALS AND PARTNERSHIP FIRMS.” It was contended that: - “There is no intelligible differentia or rational basis on which personal guarantors to corporate debtors have been singled out for being covered by the impugned provisions, particularly when the provisions of the Code do not separately apply to one sub-category of individuals, i.e., personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Rather, Part III of the Code does not apply to personal guarantors to corporate debtors at all.” It was further argued that Section 1 (3) merely empowers the Central Government to bring into force the provisions of the IBC on such date by a Notification in the Official Gazette and the Proviso specifically provides that different dates may be appointed for bringing different provisions into force. There is no scope for amending any provision or curtailing the powers of any provision under Section 1 (3). The only function assigned to the Central Government under S. 1 (3) is to bring the law into operation at such as it might decide. Exercise of power in any other manner would mean unconstitutional delegation of power. Another argument was that by applying the provisions only to personal guarantors to corporate debtors, the impugned Notification has the effect of modifying the text of the actual provisions of the IBC. Various landmark case-laws such as Delhi Laws Act, 1912, In re v. Part ‘C' States (Laws) Act, 1950, 1951 SCR 747, Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, (1960) 2 SCR 671, State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabhai, (1951) 2 SCR 51 etc., were cited to buttress the above-stated submissions. Important Grounds of the Respondents The Central Government argued that the IBC was amended in the year 2018 wherein the class of personal guarantors to corporate debtors was introduced. The purpose was to distinguish personal guarantors to corporate debtors from others and “the result of the amendment is that when a corporate debtor faces insolvency proceedings, insolvency of its corporate guarantor too can be triggered. Likewise, a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor, facing insolvency, can be subjected to insolvency proceedings.” The Respondents also relied upon the meaning of the expression “provision” as provided in the case of Chettian Veettil Amman v. Taluk Land Board, (1980) 1 SCC 499: - “A provision is therefore a distinct rule or principle of law in a statute which governs the situation covered by it. So an incomplete idea, even though stated in the form of a section of a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompleteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned. A provision of law cannot therefore be said to exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing.” According to the Respondents, the provisions of the IBC brought into force were complete in itself and therefore, they were brought into force. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation was also relied upon to explain that the executive has the power to bring into force any one provision of a statute at different times for different purposes. It was also argued that there needs to be a purposive construction of Section 1 (3) of the IBC to determine the scope of the power conferred on the Central Government. Observations of the Court Apart from other things, the Court discussed the background in which the IBC was enacted by the Parliament. The Court also discussed its scheme. While discussing the scheme, the Court observed that Section 5 (22) of the IBC defines personal guarantor as: - “an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.” Various provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, relating to ‘Surety' were also cited in the Judgment. It was also discussed as to how guarantors cannot escape their liability. Further, Section 234 (2) of the IBC was also cited: - “234 (2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the application of provisions of this Code in relation to assets or property of corporate debtor or debtor, including a personal guarantor of a corporate debtor, as the case may be, situated at any place in a country outside India with which reciprocal arrangements have been made, shall be subject to such conditions as may be specified.” Based on the above and other reasons, the Court opined that the “parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors different from other categories of individuals.” Thus, according to the Court, “the intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of two separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the Adjudicating authority was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee.” Thus, according to the Court, personal guarantors stand on a different footing and their case cannot be equated with other classes of individuals or persons. Held by the Court Hence, upon cumulative consideration of all the arguments and circumstances, it was held by the Court that the impugned Notification is valid and there is no legislative exercise carried out by the Central Government holding their exercise of power in issuing the impugned Notification under Section 1 (3) of the IBC not to be ultra vires. It was also observed by the Court that: - “There is no compulsion in the Code that it should, at the same time, be made applicable to all individuals, (including personal guarantors) or not at all. There is sufficient indication in the Code-by Section 2(e), Section 5(22), Section 60 and Section 179 indicating that personal guarantors, though forming part of the larger grouping of individuals, were to be, in view of their intrinsic connection with corporate debtors, dealt with differently, through the same adjudicatory process and by the same forum (though not insolvency provisions) as such corporate debtors.” There were other IBC related issues dealt with in the case but the same are not relevant for our discussion and hence, are not being discussed here. Concluding Remarks To be honest, I find this Judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to be a strange one. I have many reasons for saying so. S. 1 (3) of the IBC seems quite clear in its purport. It unequivocally states that “different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this code.” Now, how hard could it be to ascertain the meaning of this Proviso? As far as I know, when the literal meaning of a text is plain and simple, then that meaning is to be resorted to and only when the literal meaning is leading to absurdity, can the other modes of construction such as the rule of purposive construction could be resorted to. It is not a matter of convenience that sometimes the rule of literal interpretation would be used and sometimes the rule of purposive construction. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Highways Authority of India v. Pandarinathan Govindarajulu and Another, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 28, had held that: - “9. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that where there is no ambiguity in the words, literal meaning has to be applied, which is the golden rule of interpretation. The words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.” In my humble opinion, as rightly pointed out by the Court, a provision could include the parts of a section of a clause as well and under S. 1 (3), such parts of various sections of the IBC could be notified at different dates. I also find it reasonable that the personal guarantors have been put at a different footing in the IBC. But what seems odd is the observation of the Hon'ble Court in Para 124 and others that certain provisions indicate that the personal guarantors were to be dealt with differently and this indication is sufficient to supplement the wordings of S. 1 (3) to mean that provisions could be notified exclusively for personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Even S. 234 of the IBC that was cited by the Court is limited in its application to any place outside India. Thus, I find it quite troubling that when the bare provisions of the statute are not intended to be made applicable to only to the personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Simply because personal guarantors are treated differently under the IBC should not ipso facto mean that the provisions of the IBC could be selectively made applicable on them depending upon the whims and fancies of the Executive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon a Report of the Working Group in relation to the IBC. But when the wordings of a statute are crystal clear then is there a need to look into the Reports to ascribe meaning to a text? I most humbly and respectfully state that I have divergent views in relation to the interpretative process that needs to be carried out in relation to Section 1 (3) of the IBC and that its meaning is plain and clear leaving no scope for any purposive interpretation.

[2:53] Niz-Chavez v. Garland, No. 19-863 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2021)non-LPR cancellation of removal; stop-time rule; implication of the indefinite article “a”; statutory interpretation; Dictionary Act; motion to reopen; claims processing rule [15:20] Tetteh v. Garland, No. 19-2357 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 2021) pardons; INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi); Georgia First Offender Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-60; former INA § 212(c); definition of conviction   [22:16] Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Garland, No. 19-2467 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) U-visa; waivers; Chenrey doctrine; IJ authority; INA § 212(d)(3)(A)(ii); regulatory interpretation; limits of expressio unius canon [29:54] USA v. Figueroa-Beltran, No. 16-10388 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2021)Nevada Revised Statute § 453.337; 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); divisibility; drug trafficking; sentence enhancement*Sponsors and friends of the podcast!Kurzban Kurzban Tetzeli and Pratt P.A.www.kktplaw.com/Immigration, serious injury, and business lawyers serving clients in Florida, California, and all over the world for over 40 years.Docketwisewww.docketwise.com/immigration-review"Modern immigration software & case management"*Want to become a patron of Immigration Review? Check out our Patreon page at https://www.patreon.com/immigrationreview *CONTACT INFORMATIONEmail: kgregg@kktplaw.comFacebook: "Immigration Review Podcast" or @immigrationreviewInstagram: @immigrationreviewTwitter: @immreview*About your host: https://www.kktplaw.com/attorney/gregg-kevin-a/*More episodes at: https://www.kktplaw.com/immigration-review-podcast/*Featured in the top 15 of Immigration Podcast in the U.S.! https://blog.feedspot.com/immigration_podcasts/DISCLAIMER: Immigration Review® is a podcast made available for educational purposes only. It does not provide specific legal advice. Rather, the Immigration Review® podcast offers general information and insights regarding recent immigration cases from publicly available sources. By accessing and listening to the podcast, you understand that there is no attorney-client relationship between you and the podcast host. The Immigration Review® podcast should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed professional attorney in your state. MUSIC CREDITS: "Loopster," "Bass Vibes," "Chill Wave," and "Funk Game Loop" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/immigrationreview)

[2:13] Hylton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 19-14825 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2021)aggravated felony; INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii); statutory interpretation; denaturalization; Chevron and Brand-X deference; rule of lenity; prior-construction canon [9:47] Matter of Al Sabsabi, 28 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 2021) CIMT; impairing government functions; conspiracy, underlying offense; 18 U.S.C. § 371; selling counterfeit currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 473; divisibility  [14:56] Matter of Vucetic, 28 I&N Dec. 276 (BIA 2021) CIMT; DUI; unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in violation of New York Vehicle & Traffic Law § 511(3)(a)(i); mens rea; recklessness; realistic probability test [21:48] Cruz Rodriguez v. Garland, No. 19-60456 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2021) res judicata; Texas robbery; nucleus of operative facts [27:53] Meza-Vazquez v. Garland, No. 15-72672 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2021)Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); substantially justified; asylum; LGBT; Mexico  [32:30] Silva v. Garland, No. 16-70130 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2021)CIMT; petty theft; Cal. Pen Code § 484(a); categorical approach; changed country condition motions to reopen; Philippines; retroactivity; Matter of Diaz Lizzaraga*Sponsors and friends of the podcast!Kurzban Kurzban Tetzeli and Pratt P.A.www.kktplaw.com/Immigration, serious injury, and business lawyers serving clients in Florida, California, and all over the world for over 40 years.Docketwisewww.docketwise.com/immigration-review"Modern immigration software & case management"*Want to become a patron of Immigration Review? Check out our Patreon page at https://www.patreon.com/immigrationreview *CONTACT INFORMATIONEmail: kgregg@kktplaw.comFacebook: "Immigration Review Podcast" or @immigrationreviewInstagram: @immigrationreviewTwitter: @immreview*About your host: https://www.kktplaw.com/attorney/gregg-kevin-a/*More episodes at: https://www.kktplaw.com/immigration-review-podcast/*Featured in the top 15 of Immigration Podcast in the U.S.! https://blog.feedspot.com/immigration_podcasts/DISCLAIMER: Immigration Review® is a podcast made available for educational purposes only. It does not provide specific legal advice. Rather, the Immigration Review® podcast offers general information and insights regarding recent immigration cases from publicly available sources. By accessing and listening to the podcast, you understand that there is no attorney-client relationship between you and the podcast host. The Immigration Review® podcast should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a licensed professional attorney in your state. MUSIC CREDITS: "Loopster," "Bass Vibes," "Chill Wave," and "Funk Game Loop" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/immigrationreview)

Julian R Murphy discusses the modern approach to statutory interpretation with a particular focus on how courts interpret criminal statutes. The presentation covers general principles as well as specific presumptions of interpretation, including the principle of legality and the principle requiring that criminal statutes are interpreted strictly.

 Introduction First of all, farewell to the yester year and with the beginning of this new year, let us remember the people who lost their lives protecting us and fighting for us. Let us also hope that this year brings hope and prosperity to the oppressed and the marginalized sections of society and that their dignity and honour remains intact. A happy new year to all of you. In the present post, we shall discuss a latest judicial pronouncement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1023, wherein the scheme of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short, “Senior Citizens Act”) and how the same has to be construed qua other enactments, was discussed by the Court. Facts In the present case, an Application was filed by the parents of a person who sought to evict his estranged wife and children from a residential house belonging to the parents (mother). Such Application was allowed by the Courts below and thereafter the matter traversed to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Chief Contentions of the Appellant/Estranged Wife 1. The Appellant/Estranged Wife is residing in her matrimonial home, which is a shared household, as a lawfully wedded spouse of the son of the parents who moved the Application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, and she cannot be evicted in view of the protection offered by Section 17 (Right to reside in a shared household) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short, “Domestic Violence Act”). 2. The Appellant/Estranged Wife has no other place to live except the suit premises and relied upon Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act urging that the Senior Citizens Act cannot be invoked to evict her. Chief Contentions of the Parents/Respondent 1. Parents/Respondents are Senior Citizens, and the suit premises was constructed by their ancestors. 2. There are concurrent findings by all the Courts below who have directed for eviction of the Appellant and restoration of their possession. Observations by the Court Brief Scheme of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007ProvisionCruxSection 2 (b)“Maintenance” includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment.Section 2 (f)“Property” means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property.Section 3It provides that this Act shall have an overriding effect on the other enactments/Acts.Section 4It recognises an entitlement of maintenance to inhere in parents and senior citizens.Section 5It lays down the procedure by which an application for maintenance can be made.Section 6It elucidates provisions governing jurisdiction and procedure.Section 7It contains stipulations for the constitution of a Maintenance Tribunal.Section 8It envisages a summary procedure for making an inquiry.Section 9Monthly allowance can be fixed by the Tribunal for the maintenance of the senior citizen.Section 10The above-stated monthly allowance can be altered upon a change in circumstance.Section 11It provides for the enforcement of an order of maintenance.Section 23If a senior citizen gifts any property to any person subject to the condition that such person shall take care of the basic needs of the senior citizen and when such person does not provide for and take care of the basic needs of the senior citizen, then the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence and can be declared void by the Tribunal.It further provides that where a Senior Citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of a property if the transferee has notice of the right and the transfer of such property is without consideration. ‘Means and Includes' Approach and the Interpretative Process This is relevant for enactments wherein a definition has been provided that involves usage of means and includes. ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh observes as under: - “The Legislature has the power to define a word even artificially. So the definition of a word in the definitions section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the same. When a word is defined to ‘mean' such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive.” “Whereas, where the word defined is declared to ‘include' such and such, the definition is prime facie extensive. When by an amending Act, the word ‘includes' was substituted for the word ‘means' in a definitions section, it was held that the intention was to make it more extensive…..” This ‘means and includes' approach has been discussed in plethora of cases earlier and in Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 997, it was observed as under: - “Further, a definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes', where again the definition is exhaustive.” A Woman's Right of Residence Section 2 (s) of the Domestic Violence Act defines ‘shared household' as under: - “‘shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;” Thus, by taking recourse to the ‘means and includes' approach, it was observed by the Court that the definition of ‘shared household' cannot be read to mean only that household which belongs to the husband or of which the husband is a member and can even include the household belonging to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived. Harmonizing the Senior Citizens Act and the Domestic Violence Act Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, the Domestic Violence is in addition to other remedies and does not displace or override them. However, Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act is unequivocal in its approach that the Senior Citizens Act shall have an overriding effect over all the other enactments. The Court observed that both the Senior Citizens and the Domestic Violence Act are welfare legislations and there is a need to harmoniously construe them. It was further observed that a shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the woman/wife had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property does not vest with the husband or that the estranged spouse is living separately, is no ground to deprive the wife/woman of the protection that was envisaged under the Domestic Violence Act. Held The Court finally held that whether the suit premises constitutes a ‘shared household' within the meaning of the Domestic Violence or not would have to be determined by the appropriate forum and such a claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant/wife in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007. Even the parents/Respondents were given the liberty to move a subsequent Application under the Senior Citizens Act. Finally, exercising the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court concluded by holding that the Appellant/wife shall not be forcibly dispossessed from the suit premises for a period of one year, to enable the Appellant/wife to pursue her remedies in accordance with law. Concluding Remarks I have my own reservations with the reasoning of the judgment. The Court made a substantial effort to balance the rights of the wife and the in-laws/senior citizen and left the question open for the appropriate forums to decide. The Hon'ble Court did acknowledge in Para 36 of the judgment that though Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act is not a non-obstante clause yet the same has to be construed harmoniously with Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act. I think that it is a settled principle of law that the principle of harmonious construction or looking into the purpose of the legislation becomes relevant only when there is ambiguity in the text of the legislations or when the same is leading to any manifest absurdity. In the present case, the texts of the legislations i.e., Section 36 of the Domestic Violence Act and Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, are amply clear and there seems to be no ambiguity arising out of a bare textual reading of these two provisions. Senior Citizens Act is a subsequent legislation and its Section 3 clearly provides for an overriding effect. The entire purpose of enacting Section 3 would be defeated if the overriding effect that it seeks to have is not given effect to. Whether there exists a manifest absurdity exists in the reading and construction of the above-stated provisions is something that requires further scrutiny in my humble opinion. I hope that further clarity emerges in this aspect in the times to come.

The California Lawyers Association is the bar association for all California attorneys. Our mission is to promote excellence, diversity and inclusion in the legal profession and fairness in the administration of justice and the rule of law. In this episode, I’ll be talking to Erica Bristol. Erica is an intellectual property attorney and commercial mediator specializing in intellectual property disputes. She’s also actively involved in the IP Law Section. Erica and I discuss her background (including her love of heavy metal music and motorcycles), how she got into mediation, and her thoughts about why lawyers need to learn more about statutory interpretation. The Annual IP Institute has been canceled for 2020. Our flagship program will return to the California coast on October 28-30, 2021 at the Laguna Cliffs Resort & Spa. We have several MCLE webinars coming up soon, including one on When is a Generic Term Not Generic: What Did the Supreme Court Unleash in Booking.com? For information about the webinars and other events, you can go to our website, http://calawyers.org/IPEvents If you’re interested in joining the Intellectual Property Law Section of the California Lawyers Association, visit calawyers.org/joinip Finally, if you want to send us an email about the show, you can send it to IPPodcast@CALawyers.org – we look forward to hearing from you. I’m looking forward to speaking with you next time on Intangible Assets.

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/ This entry provides an audio source for iTunes.

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/ This entry provides an audio source for iTunes.

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/

A discussion held at the University of Cambridge on 18 November 2019, with Sir Patrick Elias, Professor Mark Elliott, and Professor Alison Young. The event was hosted by the Centre for Public Law. In R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, the Supreme Court, by 4 judgments to 3, concluded that a clause removing judicial review of the court over decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), including those as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction, could not remove judicial review by the court for legal errors made by the IPT when determining its jurisdiction. The legislation could be interpreted so as not to remove review over purported decisions as to whether the IPT had jurisdiction – in other words those decisions tainted by a legal error. The individual judgments provide an array of arguments which have an impact on how courts interpret ouster clauses and legislation more generally, the foundations of judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This lecture explains the judgments and evaluates their implications. For more information see: https://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk/

In this episode…Professor Michael Morley, Assistant Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law explains with precision how to interpret a statute using one of the three methods employed by members of the court depending on their own interpretive bent; textualism, intentionalism and purposivism. Some key takeaways are: Textualists uses semantics and canons of construction to identify the meaning of the text of the statute.Inentionalists consider what those adopting the statute intended to the statute to meanPurposivists look to the purpose of the statute. About our guest…Professor Michael Morley joined FSU Law in 2018, and teaches and writes in the areas of election law, constitutional law, remedies and the federal courts. Before joining FSU Law, Professor Morley was an associate professor at Barry University School of Law. Prior to his experience in academia, he held numerous positions in both private practice and government, including as special assistant at the Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Army, at the Pentagon, clerk for Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and as an associate at Winston & Strawn, LLP, in Washington, D.C. Professor Morley earned his J.D. from Yale Law School in 2003, where he was a senior editor on the Yale Law Journal, served on the moot court board and received the Thurman Arnold Prize for Best Oralist in the Morris Tyler Moot Court of Appeals. As always, if you have and suggestions for an episode topic, please let us know! You can email us at leslie@lawtofact.com or tweet to @lawtofact. Don’t forget to follow us on Twitter and Instagram (@lawtofact) and to like us on FaceBook! And finally, your ratings and reviews matter! Please leave us a review on iTunes. Want to stay updated on all things Law to Fact? Join our mailing list by visiting us at www.lawtofact.com.

Fast on the heels of her last appearance, Carissa Hessick joins us to talk about corpus linguistics, which means... well, we debate this, but, generally, the use of computer-based methods to draw inferences from large databases of texts. What is this enterprise? How can and should it be used to answer legal questions? What does it mean to mean something? These questions, thunder, sense, nonsense, and a continued delving into Joe's pscyhe all feature in this episode. Carissa Hessick’s faculty profile (http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/hessickcarissabyrne/) and writing (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=445060) Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3031987) Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Corpus Linguistics (https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/10/legal-theory-lexicon-corpus-linguistics.html) James Phillips, Daniel Ortner, and Thomas Lee, Corpus Linguistics and Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical (https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corpus-linguistics-original-public-meaning) Special Guest: Carissa Hessick.

On October 19, 2018, the Federalist Society's Pennsylvania chapters hosted the 2018 Pennsylvania Chapters Conference in Philadelphia. The first panel discussed their different approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation.Hon. Anne E. Covey, Pennsylvania Commonwealth CourtProf. Michael Moreland, University Professor of Law and Religion, Villanova University, Charles Widger School of Law and Director, Eleanor H. McCullen Center for Law, Religion and Public Policy, Villanova University Charles Widger School of LawHon. David N. Wecht, Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaModerator: David R. Osborne, President and General Counsel, The Fairness Center

On October 19, 2018, the Federalist Society's Pennsylvania chapters hosted the 2018 Pennsylvania Chapters Conference in Philadelphia. The first panel discussed their different approaches to constitutional and statutory interpretation.Hon. Anne E. Covey, Pennsylvania Commonwealth CourtProf. Michael Moreland, University Professor of Law and Religion, Villanova University, Charles Widger School of Law and Director, Eleanor H. McCullen Center for Law, Religion and Public Policy, Villanova University Charles Widger School of LawHon. David N. Wecht, Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaModerator: David R. Osborne, President and General Counsel, The Fairness Center

In this episode we look again at how courts interpret legislation. This time we're looking at two specific things: 1) rules of language 2) presumptions We also cover new legal vocabulary and a few Latin phrases so that you can speak like you're Harry Potter. HELPFUL LINKS: For more legal English practice head over to: https://studylegalenglish.com/episode29 Sign up for a free trial of Podcast Pro Membership and access online learning materials to help you become fluent in Legal English: https://studylegalenglish.com/register/podcast-pro-membership/ LEGAL ENGLISH CLASSES: Get $10 USD in italki credits to study languages online with your first lesson purchase: http://go.italki.com/studylegalenglish *(affiliate link). Love the Podcast? Help keep it free by supporting us: https://studylegalenglish.com/give SOCIAL MEDIA: Follow on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/legalenglisher Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/legalenglisher Follow on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/studylegalenglish Follow on Instagram: @legalenglisher LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/louisekulbicki/ iTunes: https://itunes.apple.com/by/podcast/the-study-legal-english-podcast/id1286739331?mt=2 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6l3hxQmindsyPtPhw24E1X

In today's episode we're looking at how courts interpret legislation. First, we'll look at why courts must interpret legislation, and then go on to look at the different rules of construction and interpretation as well as looking at aids to interpretation. We learn specifically about: The literal rule; The golden rule; The mischief rule; The purposive approach; The impact of Human Rights legislation on interpretation; Internal and external aids to interpretation. HELPFUL LINKS: For more legal English practice head over to: https://studylegalenglish.com/episode28 Sign up for a free trial of Podcast Pro Membership and access online learning materials to help you become fluent in Legal English: https://studylegalenglish.com/register/podcast-pro-membership/ LEGAL ENGLISH CLASSES: Get $10 USD in italki credits to study languages online with your first lesson purchase: http://go.italki.com/studylegalenglish *(affiliate link). Love the Podcast? Help keep it free by supporting us: https://studylegalenglish.com/give SOCIAL MEDIA: Follow on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/legalenglisher Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/legalenglisher Follow on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/studylegalenglish Follow on Instagram: @legalenglisher LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/louisekulbicki/ iTunes: https://itunes.apple.com/by/podcast/the-study-legal-english-podcast/id1286739331?mt=2 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6l3hxQmindsyPtPhw24E1X

Justice Scalia also greatly influenced the law of statutory interpretation. By eliminating legislative history as a source of statutory meaning, Justice Scalia forced Congress to say what it meant in the text of the laws it adopted rather than hiding the ball in a forest of contradictory legislative history. Justice Scalia construed statutes by looking at the plain meaning of their texts. He revived the canons of statutory interpretations, which had fallen into disuse since the Legal Realist movement of the 1930's and 1940's. He even wrote a treatise on statutory interpretation, which no justice other than Justice Joseph Story in the early Nineteenth Century had done. In the Warren Court era, statutory cases rarely quoted the text of the statutes being interpreted and focused instead exclusively on the legislative history. Justice Scalia helped change that. Courts today always begin with the text of statutes and rarely look at the legislative history. Justice Scalia also played the key role in developing the doctrine of Chevron deference in Administrative Law, moving the interpretation of ambiguous delegations of legislative power to elected executive branch officials and away from courts. While it is clear why Justice Scalia expressed these views, he was also expressing, in the last years, great concern about how Chevron deference was working in practice. -- This panel was held on November 19, 2016, during the 2016 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, DC. -- Featuring: Prof. William Eskridge, Jr., John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School; Prof. Abbe R. Gluck, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, The Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy, Yale Law School; Prof. Gary S. Lawson, Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; and Prof. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Moderator: Hon. Diane S. Sykes, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Introduction: Mr. Dean A. Reuter, Vice President & Director of Practice Groups, The Federalist Society.

Justice Scalia believed that the rule of law required a law of rules rather than of balancing tests. He favored rules (like the requirement the President be at least 35 years old) over standards (a requirement that the president be “a mature individual") because they lend themselves more to principled judicial enforcement. As a result, Justice Scalia revolutionized the caselaw he inherited from the Burger Court by eliminating as many balancing tests as possible and replacing them with rules. An example is his favoring of a rule of viewpoint neutrality in freedom of expression cases over separate treatment of various categories of speech. He believed that rules over standards promote the rule of law because they guarantee that judges will decide like cases alike rather than deciding each case on its facts using a totality of the circumstances test. Justice Scalia was so committed to rules over standards that he refused to enforce the non-delegation doctrine because to do so he would have had to employ a balancing test standard, however, in his last year on the bench, there were signs that Justice Scalia was moving away from this position. Justice Scalia also favored rules over standards because they limit lower federal and state court discretion in applying Supreme Court precedents as compared to balancing tests. The reemergence of rules over standards in Supreme Court opinions is another of Justice Scalia's legacies. -- This panel was held on November 18, 2016, during the 2016 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, DC. -- Featuring: Prof. Akhil Reed Amar, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University; Hon. Frank Easterbrook, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit; Prof. John C. Harrison, James Madison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; and Prof. Victoria Nourse, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Moderator: Hon. William Francis Kuntz II, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York. Introduction: Mr. Dean A. Reuter, Vice President & Director of Practice Groups, The Federalist Society.

When interpretations and rules depend on what’s true about the world (so, all the time), judges have to reach conclusions about those truths. But courts are not exactly like administrative agencies or legislatures, and they depend on adversarial parties to contest the truth. The Supreme Court, in particular, has come to rely on an elite bar to organize and present facts and studies. Having been through our usual vetting process of successfully appearing on the Colbert Report, Alli Larsen is ready for the big time and joins us to discuss how courts deal with the problem of factiness (which is the ivory tower version of truthiness). Alli’s appearance on the Colbert Report (01:02). The pronunciation of “amicus” (05:24). The main topic (10:36). This show’s links: Alli Larsen’s faculty profile and writing Alli on the Colbert Report discussing amicus briefs and factfinding Before you write in, yes, the Dan Quayle story is false, but is that really the point? Oral Argument 74: Minimum Curiosity (guest Amanda Frost) Rowe v. Gibson Alli Orr Lasen, The Amicus Machine Alli Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts Alli Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy Brianne Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding Glossip v. Gross (death penalty) Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (violent video games) About the Brandeis Brief Gonzales v. Carhart Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court William Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation Special Guest: Alli Larsen.

We start with developments in an area at the core of expertise: speed traps. We continue with policing and, mainly, more on the Obamacare II case. We also have been told to expect an emolument. This show’s links: Michelle Wirth, Bill To Reduce ‘Speed Traps’ Gains Senate Approval DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department; AG Holder’s prepared remarks on the report Oral Argument 52: Nihilism The SCOTUSblog page for King v. Burwell, containing the briefs, commentary, and links to the argument David Ziff, Halbig and the “Isolationist” Theory of Statutory Interpretation David Ziff, Halbig and the Problem of Creeping Constitutionalism Simon Maloy, GOP’s George Costanza Moment: The “Moops” Doctrine and the War on Obamacare coffeegeek.com’s review of the Gene Cafe Roaster

Last year’s cert denials in various same-sex marriage cases led to renewed discussion concerning the counterintuitive (to Christian, at least) notion but conventional wisdom that state courts are not bound to follow lower federal courts’ interpretations of federal law. While we discussed and debated this last fall, Amanda Frost was putting the finishing touches on an article reviewing, challenging, and otherwise completely examining this curious doctrine. Was Michael Dorf’s Hammer Blow, as we named the episode with him, the final blow or might some of Christian’s naive doubts be rehabilitated by Prof. Frost’s exhaustive analysis? Yep, that kind of cliffhanger is how we roll around here. Also, North Dakota and the permissibility of “funny business” in our email address. This show’s links: Amanda Frost’s faculty profile and writing A helpful list of North Dakota landmarks 2 Hidden Ways to Get More from Your Gmail Address The Georgia Law Summer Program in China, where you can be misinformed by Christian in person and in China Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law? Our trilogy of prior episodes on this issue: with Anthony Kreis, with Michael Dorf, and with Steve Vladeck The series of blog posts coinciding with those episodes: from Michael Dorf here and here, Steve Vladeck, and Christian Turner Michael Dorf, Even More Thoughts on State Court (Non)Obligation to Follow Federal Appeals Court Precedents (Wherein I Respond to Professor Frost) Amanda Frost, The “Inferior” Federal Courts Chief Justice Roy Moore’s Administrative Order Eric Eckholm, Supreme Court Undercuts Alabama Chief Justice’s Argument to Delay Same-Sex Marriages Lockhart v. Fretwell, in which Justice Thomas concurred and briefly argued that the “Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation” Cooper v. Aaron Martin v. Hunter’ Lessee Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins; see also our episode all about Erie About the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine James Pfander, One Supreme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the Judicial Power of the United States (see also this very brief book review) Dice v. Akron, Canton and Youngstown Railroad Co. Bush v. Gore (Rehnquist’s concurring opinion arguing that state courts may not interfere, even through state constitutional judgments, with certain legislatively enacted election laws that interact in advantageous ways with federal law) About Chevron deference Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation United States Telecom Association v. FCC Peter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action Special Guest: Amanda Frost.

The Honorable Justice Susan Glazebrook, Supreme Court of New Zealand, delivers this talk on some issues in statutory interpretation in the 21st century. Justice Glazebrook discusses a number of topics including legislation, modern statutes, the purpose of text in legislation, and interpretation. 13 August 2014

The Honorable Justice Susan Glazebrook, Supreme Court of New Zealand, delivers this talk on some issues in statutory interpretation in the 21st century. Justice Glazebrook discusses a number of topics including legislation, modern statutes, the purpose of text in legislation, and interpretation. 13 August 2014

The Honorable Justice Susan Glazebrook, Supreme Court of New Zealand, delivers this talk on some issues in statutory interpretation in the 21st century. Justice Glazebrook discusses a number of topics including legislation, modern statutes, the purpose of text in legislation, and interpretation. 13 August 2014