Podcasts about yanfeng

Last time we spoke about the New Fourth Army Incident. Across the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP entered after the setbacks of the 1930s, seeking to become a national leader in resistance while remaining cautious toward the Nationalist government. The 1936 Xi'an Incident reshaped politics, and by August 1937 KMT–CCP agreements defined a working arrangement: the CCP acknowledged KMT leadership and integrated its forces, while still pursuing political space and autonomy. As the war progressed, the CCP focused on defining its relationship with the KMT and keeping operational independence during cooperation. Mao Zedong managed this alliance by promoting a united front against Japan, yet protecting CCP revolutionary goals and internal control. The establishment of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army marked this military reorganization. Throughout, the CCP feared that KMT collaboration with Japan could enable a peace settlement that would undermine communist legitimacy and restrict the party's future authority thereafter.   #202 The One Hundred Regiment Offensive Phase One Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Simultaneously with the friction between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Japanese were also working to take control of—and extract value from—most of the territory they had nominally conquered. Treating these two processes separately—"friction" on the one hand and "consolidation" on the other—does violence to the real difficulty of the CCP's dilemma: the Party often had to confront both problems at the same time. At certain moments, the CCP was effectively forced to wage a two-front struggle. Even so, if the worst of the KMT–CCP friction had already eased by 1941, the most serious and painful challenges posed by Japanese consolidation were still ahead. To recover anything close to reality, the two timelines have to be read together and placed on top of one another. The Japanese understood that consolidation could not be postponed, because much of the land behind the furthest reaches of their army was still only weakly under their actual control. In some places, order could be restored by relatively direct methods: rebuilding local administration and policy authority; repairing transportation and communications; enrolling Chinese personnel—usually, as it turned out, people of dubious reliability—as police or militia under puppet regimes; registering the local population; and requiring identity cards. In true old-style Chinese fashion, collective security practices were used widely. One form was the familiar bao-jia system, in one variant or another. Another was the so-called "railway-cherishing village": a village would be assigned a nearby stretch of track, and if residents failed to "cherish" it, they were held collectively responsible. Yet early Japanese weakness in northern China is vividly illustrated by an incident in the summer of 1938. Three young foreigners—vacationing from teaching in Peiping (Beijing)—were curious about events and about what people were doing. They loaded their bicycles on a southbound train, got off at Baoding, and rode west until they ran into Eighth Route Army detachments. In the early period of the war, commanders generally wanted to rely on more mobile forms of warfare. Mao, however, insisted on a strategy of de-escalation and dispersion: breaking the 8RA and New Fourth Army into small units as nuclei for combat, recruitment, political work, and base-area construction. Under this approach, few engagements could be truly dramatic in scale, and most were constrained by the need to survive. Each skirmish had to be carefully planned. The CCP would use local intelligence and the element of surprise so that a detachment could strike and withdraw before its limited ammunition ran out or before enemy reinforcements arrived. Small Japanese patrols and puppet units could be ambushed not only to seize weapons and other material, but also to inflict casualties. Active collaborators, or Japanese-sponsored administrative personnel, could be assassinated. Above all, Communist action aimed to disrupt transportation: mining roads; cutting down telegraph poles, stealing wire, and cutting rail lines; sabotaging rolling stock; and, at times, carrying off steel rails so that primitive arsenals could be supplied. Attempting derailments was also part of the effort. Destroying a bridge or a locomotive counted as a major achievement. Both the Communists and the Japanese understood that these tactics did not decisively shift the overall strategic balance. Still, they worked at other levels. For the Japanese, the result was a constant series of small wounds—painful, bleeding, and potentially infectious. Few areas in the countryside felt truly safe. Japanese field commanders documented growing frustration as they tried to eliminate resistance, restore administration, collect taxes, and prepare for more systematic and effective economic exploitation of conquered territory. Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese cannot be judged only in conventional battle terms—numbers of engagements, casualties, or territory occupied. It had to be evaluated politically and psychologically as well, exactly as Mao repeatedly emphasized. Since the CCP's wartime legitimacy depended on its patriotic claims, enough fighting had to be carried out to maintain credibility. Moreover, military success mattered for mobilizing the "basic masses," persuading wavering people to keep an open mind, and neutralizing opposition. As the logic put it, it was not that people always chose the side that was winning, but that few would ever join a side they believed was losing. One experienced cadre described the effect this way: Among the guerrilla units… there is a saying that "victory decides everything." No matter how hard it has been to recruit troops, supply the army, raise the masses' anti-Japanese fervor or win over the masses' sympathy, after a victory in battle the masses fall all over themselves to send us flour, steamed bread, meat, and vegetables. The masses' pessimistic and defeatist psychology is broken down, and many new guerrilla soldiers swarm in. But once the Japanese began to demand a heavy price for every engagement—whether the Communists won or not—this attitude began to change. In North and Central China, the Japanese earliest pacification sweeps created comparatively little trouble for the CCP. At first, the Japanese made few distinctions among Chinese forces. They simply tried to mop up or disperse them without regard to character. Over time, however, they realized that these sweeps actually made it easier for the CCP to expand. By the second half of 1939, Japanese methods became more discriminating. Chinese non-Communist forces would step aside while the Japanese hunted specifically for the 8RA, the N4A, and their local affiliates. The Japanese also made more direct appeals to non-Communist forces. According to Japanese army statistics, during the eighteen months from mid-1939 to late 1940, around 70,000 men from more or less regular Nationalist units in North China alone went over to the Japanese. The Japanese also reached informal "understandings" with several regional commanders whose forces together might have totaled as many as 300,000 men. This, of course, corresponded to what the CCP denounced as "crooked-line patriotism"—the "crooked-line" collaboration that preserved certain units so they could be used in future anti-Communist operations. When pacification efforts were intensified from late 1939 and throughout 1940, differences also appeared in the strategies Japanese armies used in North versus Central China. In North China, the approach relied heavily on military means, with political tactics limited largely to recruiting collaborators. In Central China, Japanese authorities did not hesitate to use military force, but they also attempted to supplement it with more comprehensive political and economic solutions by setting up tightly controlled "model peace zones." Although both approaches ultimately failed, they created enormous difficulties for Chinese Communists—until, in 1943, the Japanese were forced to ease off because the Pacific War against the United States became too burdensome. Careful reading of detailed intra-party documents suggests that repression also demobilized peasant support and terrorized populations into apathy, grudging acquiescence, or even active collaboration with the Japanese. In a locality already reduced from consolidated base status to guerrilla status, capacity and will were often too weak to administer complex reforms in systematic fashion. In other words, passive survival—defensive survival—was at least as important as what lay behind the heroic public images the Party projected. Systematic pacification in North China in late 1939 and 1940 radiated outward. It moved from areas held more or less firmly by the Japanese and their puppets into guerrilla and contested zones. The ultimate objective was to crush resistance or render it ineffective. The method was first to sweep the area clear of anti-Japanese elements, and then to establish a chain of interconnected strongpoints that could quickly reinforce one another. After that, puppet government would be expanded so it could take increasing responsibility for civil administration and "pacification maintenance," while Japanese forces repeated the initial steps further outward into contested territory. Violence was used selectively against individuals, groups, or villages accused of acts of resistance. This selective violence aimed to deter active participation in CCP-led programs, deprive Communist forces of a population willing to shelter them, and persuade informers to come forward. That was, at least, the theory of the strategy. In practice, the basic framework of the strategy depended on the main transport lines. Railways and roads—if properly fortified and protected—could separate resistance forces from one another and deny them one of their most effective weapons: mobility. These "cage" tactics (chiyu-lung, "jiu-lung") made it possible to enlarge pacified areas by "nibbling" outward, "as a silkworm feeds on mulberry leaves" (ts'an-shih). At the same time, the approach aimed to exploit North China's economy more effectively. To this end, the Japanese worked to improve and extend both railway and road networks. When the war began, in Shanxi the Cheng-Tai (Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan) and Tong-Pu (Datong–Tongguan) lines were metre-gauge, incompatible with the standard-gauge lines elsewhere in China—part of Yan Xishan's design to prevent deeper penetration into his province. By the end of 1939, the Japanese used forced labor to convert both lines to standard gauge. One benefit was the easier transportation of high-quality anthracite coal from the Qingxing mines (on the Cheng-Tai line) to industrial users in North China and Manchukuo. Of the newly constructed roads and railway lines, the most important was the Te-Shih line—from Dezhou in northeastern Shandong to Shijiazhuang. Construction began in June 1940 and finished in November, connecting the Tianjin–Pukou, Beiping–Hankou, and Cheng-Tai lines. This made it easier to move troops and transport raw cotton. Once the Te–Shih link was completed, the Japanese had direct connections between the point of their furthest advance at the elbow of the Yellow River and all major cities of North China, and beyond to Manchukuo. Communist sources began to speak of a "transportation war," noting with concern the moats and ditches, the blockhouses, and the frequent patrols protecting the lines. Both militarily and economically, these measures weighed heavily on forces led by the Communists in North China and on the populations under their control—especially the plains of central and eastern Hebei. One indicator of effectiveness was the rapid decline in "acts of sabotage" against North China railways in 1939 and the first half of 1940. A cadre in Jin-Cha-Ji reported in mid-1940: "The enemy has adopted a blockhouse policy, like that of the Jiangxi Soviet. They are spread like a constellation. In central Hebei alone, there are about 500, separated by one to three miles." Normal trading patterns were disrupted as Japanese or puppet occupiers took over administrative and commercial centers, and peasants found themselves caught between regulations imposed by the Communists on one side and those enforced by the other side. Finally, landlords, moneylenders, loafers, bandits—everyone who felt damaged by the new order inside base areas—could use pacification programs to try to recover influence or simply take revenge. Some became informers. After 8RA and local units were driven away, they could kill remaining cadres or activists and settle scores with the peasants who had supported them. Until the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was defeated, local elites and other disaffected elements might also seek support from Nationalists. It was even possible for an armed band to operate for several months inside consolidated regions of the CCP base, killing cadres as it went. Peng Dehuai later recalled this period in a way that underscored how pressure translated into wavering and collapse. Under the enemy's brutal pressure, in some districts the masses even hesitated or capitulated. From March to July 1940, large areas of the North China base were reduced to guerrilla regions. Before the "Cage-bursting battle",, they controlled only two county seats: Pingxun in the Taihang mountains and Pien-kuan in northwest Shanxi. Masses who previously had one set of obligations now had two—one toward the anti-Japanese regime and one toward the puppet regime. The situation in North China had not yet become a full crisis, but it was certainly serious. Action was needed to regain initiative. On 22 July 1940, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Dehuai Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Zuo Quan Deputy Chief of Staff jointly issued the Preliminary Battle Order, laying out the strategic goals for the coming operation. The order stated: "To respond to the enemy's 'prison cage policy,' obstruct its advance toward Xi'an, create favorable conditions in the North China theater, and strike at the national resistance initiative, we have decided to take advantage of the concealment provided by tall summer millet and the rainy season to carry out a large-scale sabotage operation on the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway (Zheng–Tai Line)." It required the participation of at least 22 regiments from the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, the 129th Division, and the 120th Division. The main objective was to "completely destroy key points along the Zheng–Tai Line" and to "cut the railway for a prolonged period." On 8 August, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army issued the Operational Battle Order, further clarifying how forces would be deployed. The Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region was assigned to attack the eastern section of the Zheng–Tai Railway (from Niangzi Pass to Shijiazhuang). The 129th Division was assigned the western section (from Niangzi Pass to Yuci). The 120th Division was tasked with targeting the northern segment of the Tongpu Railway and the Fen–Li Highway. The order also required all troops to begin combat operations on 20 August, and emphasized that "the success of the campaign should be assessed primarily by the extent of damage inflicted on the Zheng–Tai Line." The operation was prepared under strict secrecy. Various elements of the Eighth Route Army conducted thorough preparations before the campaign. Reconnaissance teams, hidden and protected with the help of local villagers, penetrated deep into areas near the Shijiazhuang–Taiyuan railway to carefully map Japanese strongholds, enemy troop dispositions, and local terrain. At the same time, both military and civilian communities mobilized to stockpile grain, ammunition, and tools needed for railway sabotage; blacksmiths were organized to manufacture crowbars, pickaxes, and other essential equipment. Specialized military training covered demolition methods and techniques for dismantling railways, including tactics such as heating and bending steel rails. Civilian mobilization played a crucial role: militia and support teams took on tasks such as transport, medical aid, and coordination with military units. In Central Shanxi alone, more than 10,000 militia members were mobilized. The Eighth Route Army headquarters repeatedly stressed the need for operational confidentiality, stating: "Before the battle begins, the plan must remain strictly classified; until preparations are completed, the campaign objective may be disclosed only to brigade-level commanders." With the cover of dense summer millet, troops secretly assembled within their designated operational areas. Before the battle, the Japanese North China Area Army estimated the strength of the communist regular forces at about 88,000 men in December 1939. Two years later, they revised the estimate to 140,000. On the eve of the battle, communist forces had grown to between 200,000 and 400,000 men, organized in 105 regiments. By 1940, the growth had become so significant that Zhu De ordered a coordinated offensive by most of the communist regular units—46 regiments from the 115th Division, 47 from the 129th, and 22 from the 120th—against Japanese-held cities and the railway lines that connected them. According to the Communist Party's official statement, the battle began on 20 August.  On August 20, 1940, the rain didn't stop the campaign—it changed the battlefield. It slowed movement, blurred distance, and turned rivers and muddy roads into obstacles that could just as easily trap your own men as your enemy's. Along the districts bordering the Zhengtai Railway, the Eighth Route Army still moved, slipping through valleys and river crossings, bypassing Japanese posts, and positioning forces on both sides of the line as night settled in. By dark, the plan became a coordinated strike meant to hit the enemy before they could properly react. Across the entire Zhengtai Railway, attacks went out with timing designed to disorient Japanese defenders—so that their "first realization" arrived only after the railway itself was already being attacked and the window to respond effectively had slipped away.   A key portion of that strike fell to the right column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, centered on the 5th and 19th Regiments, with the mission of sabotaging the Niangziguan to Luanliu section. At 20:00 on August 20, part of the 5th Regiment infiltrated Niangziguan Village for the first time, overwhelmed the puppet troops stationed there, and seized the village by dawn. After that opening cut, the main force moved in to cover the engineers, destroy enemy fortifications, and blow up the Guandong Railway Bridge. When the sabotage was done, they withdrew from Niangziguan on their own initiative, leaving the enemy to deal with the destruction rather than being pulled into a long, grinding engagement.   That same night, at Mohe Beach along the Zhengtai line, another action unfolded. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked the station and was immediately met with a counterattack by Japanese forces. By dawn on August 21, the company withdrew—an adjustment, not defeat—and then attacked again the same night after crossing the Mian River. This time the enemy retreated into barracks to resist more stubbornly, with nearly 1,000 Japanese troops holding Mohe Beach. Heavy rain had swollen the river and made foot crossing nearly impossible, but the attackers seized the village west of the station and held it. On August 22 afternoon, more than 400 Japanese troops counterattacked; the main force of the 5th Regiment hit from the north bank of the Mian River in a fire assault, killing more than 50 before withdrawing the 1st Company out of the fighting. The 19th Regiment, meanwhile, took Jucheng and Irrang stations, tightening the pressure on the railway corridor.   On August 23, 1940, the 5th Regiment recaptured Niangziguan and blew up the stone bridge east of the village, destroying the railway segment between Chengjialongdi and Mohetan. That night the 19th Regiment stormed Yirang Station and blew up the water tower and the railway, ensuring the disruption would not be temporary. From August 24 to 27, bridges near Yanhui—stone and wooden—were destroyed again and again. Under that continuous pressure, beginning on August 25, Japanese transportation along the Niangziguan to Luanliu section of the Zhengtai Road was cut off completely. Strongholds were left to fight more or less alone, unable to coordinate or move supplies the way they normally would.   While the right column worked the railway, other forces hit the system from different angles. The Central Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region—comprised of the 2nd, 3rd, and 16th Regiments—took responsibility for sabotaging the Zhengtai Road segment from Niangziguan to Weishui and for striking the Jingxing Coal Mine area. On the night of August 20, the 3rd Regiment launched coordinated attacks on the Gangtou old mine and the Dongwangshe new mine of Jingxing, and with miners assisting, the 1st Battalion quickly stormed the new mine and annihilated part of the enemy garrison. The rest withdrew into bunkers, resisting as best they could. By the afternoon of the next day, the entire enemy force had been wiped out. Afterward, major buildings in the mining area were destroyed and most materials were removed so that the mine could not resume production for more than six months. The 3rd Regiment also captured Jiazhuang, reinforcing the idea that sabotage here meant disabling not just lines of movement, but also the flow of resources.   Elsewhere, Japanese positions were disrupted in smaller, targeted strikes that still added up. After the Japanese stronghold at Nanzheng destroyed the railway between Nanzheng and Weishui, the 2nd Regiment took the eastern end fortress of the Faluling Railway Bridge, covered the engineers as they blew up a section of the bridge, and briefly occupied Caizhuang. The 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment attacked Beiyu on the night of August 20, annihilating most defenders, and on August 21 it covered the engineers to destroy the Beiyu Stone Bridge. Other units struck Didu and annihilated most defenders in Nanyu. By August 24, the Central Column had learned that more than 1,000 Japanese troops were stationed in Jingxing County, with additional reinforcements moving toward Nanyu and Didu. Their response was practical: detachments were assigned to watch and harass along the railway while the main force gathered in mobile positions—waiting for the next opening rather than charging blindly into concentrated strength.   Meanwhile, the left column of the Jin-Cha-Ji effort—from the 2nd Regiment of the Jizhong Garrison Brigade, the Military Region Special Service Regiment, and the Pingjinghuo Detachment—focused on sabotage from Weishui to Shijiazhuang. On the night of August 20, the Pingjinghuo Detachment attacked Yanfeng and blew up the railway. The Special Service Regiment moved with massed efforts as they destroyed power lines and highways from Yanfeng to Weizhou. On the night of August 22, the Special Service Regiment attacked Shang'an Station. On August 23, the 2nd Regiment stormed Touquan Station, captured two fortresses, then withdrew from the railway line; from August 25 to 27, they destroyed the highway connecting Pingshan, Huolu, Weishui, and Yanfeng.   While the main blow was falling along the Zhengtai Railway, the 129th Division was assigned raids on the western section. That area included the Japanese Independent Mixed Brigade No. 4 headquarters, a coal mine base at Yangquan, and support from Independent Mixed Brigade No. 9 from Yuci. These raids weren't only about destruction—they were meant to disorient, to create confusion over where the main pressure truly was. After the general offensive began at 20:00 on August 20, five companies of the 16th Regiment attacked Lujiazhuang Station and captured bunkers. Two guerrilla-operating companies in Yuci worked with engineers to destroy bridges between Lujiazhuang and Duanting. The 38th Regiment surprised Shanghu and Heshangzu stations, while the 25th Regiment captured Mashou Station and pushed Japanese troops toward Shouyang. The division's right-wing sabotage unit—28th and 30th Regiments of the newly formed 10th Brigade—took on sabotage on the Yangquan–Shouyang section, splitting routes on the night of August 20 to attack stations like Langyu, Zhangjing, Qinquan, and then striking additional positions with the 30th Regiment. Across that window, stations and strongholds such as Sangzhang, Yanzigou, Langyu, and Qinquan were taken, iron bridges were destroyed, and additional stations including Potou, Xinzhuang, Saiyu, Tielugou, Xiaozhuang, and Zhangzhuang were seized or disrupted.   As the western sabotage deepened, Japanese response hardened—but the ability to coordinate weakened. With the Zhengtai line sabotaged, the western section came under the 129th Division's control except for a few places such as Shouyang. Fierce assaults forced Japanese forces to lose contact with each other within days. Strongholds were attacked, besieged, and then annihilated as communication and coordination broke down. The 129th Division mobilized local people to destroy railway facilities, stations, and installations using demolition, burning, and flooding, moving materials so the railway and related infrastructure were effectively erased rather than merely damaged.   To cover these operations, the division occupied Shinaoshan with the 14th Regiment of the general reserve. Starting the morning of August 21, Japanese forces concentrated in Yangquan and attacked Shinaoshan daily. Enemy strength reportedly rose from more than 200 to more than 600, supported by bombing and strafing and the release of poison. The 14th Regiment held out until August 25, repelling repeated attacks, and by August 26 additional pressure came again as reinforcements increased. After six days and nights—and the annihilation of more than 400 enemy soldiers—the 14th Regiment withdrew from the main peak of Shinaoshan, continuing to contain the Japanese with smaller detachments while the main force shifted to another mission.   The first phase of sabotage had succeeded, but the campaign did not allow complacency. The Japanese strengthened their presence along the railway and launched frequent counterattacks, and Japanese divisions in southern Shanxi—including the 36th, 37th, and 41st—prepared to reinforce from the north. On August 26, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters issued instructions for a second phase: continue breaking through the road, concentrate superior forces, and annihilate Japanese units smaller than a battalion that were attacking or reinforcing. In line with that guidance, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the Jin-You Column to keep breaking through the road on August 27 for one or two days, while the 129th Division alternated daily in breaking through. Under sustained pressure, the western section of the Zhengtai Road was basically destroyed; transportation was effectively cut off except for a few towns such as Shouyang and Yangquan.   On September 2, orders were issued to conclude the Zhengtai Campaign starting from the 3rd and shift forces according to the second-step plan. As the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region launched the Mengbei Campaign, the 129th Division shifted toward attacking invading Japanese forces, while other tasks—such as attacking the He-Liao Highway and recovering cities of He and Liao—were left for later. Beginning September 2, the Military Region deployed the 2nd, 5th, 16th, and 19th Regiments toward areas north of Meng County and Shouyang to recapture enemy strongholds. With the railway sabotaged, the Japanese main force north of Meng County shifted south to reinforce, weakening garrisons and spreading panic among the strongholds. As fierce offensives intensified, garrison troops began to waver. By the afternoon of September 5, Japanese troops at Xiashe, supported by troops from Shangshe, retreated to Shangshe and fled toward Meng County overnight. That night, the 19th Regiment arrived near Shangshe and, together with the Special Service Battalion of the 2nd Military Sub-district, pursued. The 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced into Shenquan and Putian to cut off the retreat route. By 9:00 AM on September 6 the enemy was surrounded in Xingdao Village, and after five hours of intense fighting most forces were annihilated. Survivors fled east to Luolizhang Mountain, only to be surrounded again by the 19th, 5th, and 16th Regiments. By the night of September 9, most Japanese forces had been wiped out, though more than 40 men broke through in dense fog and escaped into Meng County.   The siege continued through bitter episodes involving attacks and withdrawals under poison, with both sides paying heavily for every moment of progress. Eventually, on September 11, Japanese troops in Xiyan escaped back to Meng County, helped by more than 200 Japanese already present there. Meanwhile, the Japanese attempted to counter the pressure: on September 4 they sent more than 2,000 troops to reinforce Meng County and began a counterattack. On September 10, the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region ordered the 19th and 5th Regiments to remain east and north of Meng County to coordinate with the 129th and 120th Divisions, while the rest prepared for new missions.   As fighting intensified around Zhengtai and Meng County, a parallel pressure campaign unfolded. To contain Eighth Route Army sabotage along Zhengtai, the Japanese assembled battalions from Independent Mixed 4th and 9th Brigades to strike the 129th Division. In response, the 120th Division began large-scale sabotage against the Tongpu Railway and major highways in northwestern Shanxi starting 20:00 on August 20. They captured enemy strongholds along rail and road lines, striking major bases such as Kangjiahui on the Xinjing Highway, where more than 50 Japanese and puppet troops were stationed, and also attacking other areas like Shishen, Lizhen, and Jingle. Ambushes were set to annihilate reinforcements arriving from different directions, and at 00:30 on August 21 the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment attacked Kangjiahui and annihilated the defenders by dawn. Reinforcements arriving in cars were destroyed, and subsequent actions continued to expand the disruption.   Over more than 180 battles in northwestern Shanxi, the 120th Division annihilated more than 800 Japanese and puppet troops and captured or destroyed stations and strongholds including Kangjiahui, Yangfangkou, Pingshe, and Longquan. By disrupting the Tongpu Railway and transportation along the Xinjing, Taifen, and Fenli highways, they tied down Japanese forces and made it harder to reinforce Zhengtai. In practical terms, this meant the first phase of the Hundred Regiments Offensive—lasting about three weeks—ended on September 10 with major railway lines and motor roads attacked repeatedly. Roadbeds, bridges, switching yards, and installations were hit heavily; at the Qingxing coal mines, facilities were destroyed and production was halted for nearly a year.   By the end of that first phase, the campaign's logic had become clearer: once the Japanese leaned more heavily on a "cage-and-strongpoint" defense system, the same transport network that had supported their defense became less secure. When rail and road were repeatedly disrupted, strongpoints became more vulnerable—especially if Japanese units pulled out nearby detachments to respond to sabotage. So the campaign shifted from breaking transportation to attacking blockhouses and other strongpoints in contested areas, aiming to force Japanese forces back into well-defended garrisons and leave the countryside again contested by Communist forces. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. From 20 August 1940, under secrecy and rain, units of the 8th Route Army infiltrated stations, captured villages, destroyed bridges, power lines, roads, mines, and stations across multiple columns. By early September the Zhengtai and related Tongpu transport routes were repeatedly severed, forcing Japanese troops to fight isolated strongpoints and hindering reinforcement. 

TOPIC: Car Tech PANEL: Jeff Stout, Yanfeng; Sam Abuelsamid, Telemetry Insights; Gary Vasilash, shinymetalboxes.net; John McElroy, Autoline.tv

TOPIC: Auto Industry Changes PANEL: Jeff Stout, Yanfeng; Paul Waatti, AutoPacific; Gary Vasilash, shinymetalboxes.net; John McElroy, Autoline.tv

- China EV Price War Picking Up Speed - Fisker On the Ropes - GM Cruise Loses Half Its Value - Car Dealers Don't Like Hyundai, Amazon Deal - Kia U.S. EV Sales Soar 65% - Fiat Panda Gets New Lease on Life as EV Sales Slow - Bugatti Dumps W16, Goes with PHEV V16 - Ford Developing 800V Battery System - Vertical Integration? Legacy OEMs Rely More on Suppliers

- China EV Price War Picking Up Speed - Fisker On the Ropes - GM Cruise Loses Half Its Value - Car Dealers Don't Like Hyundai, Amazon Deal - Kia U.S. EV Sales Soar 65% - Fiat Panda Gets New Lease on Life as EV Sales Slow - Bugatti Dumps W16, Goes with PHEV V16 - Ford Developing 800V Battery System - Vertical Integration? Legacy OEMs Rely More on Suppliers

- Italy Rolls Out Welcome Mat for BYD - XPeng Expands Sales Network in EU - Cadillac Needs New Markets - Tesla Conquests More New Buyers Than Anyone Else - Li Auto Charges 102 kWh Batter in Under 11 Minutes - Hyundai Group Tops Safety Awards - Yanfeng's Low-Cost Seat Module - Jeep Avenger Adds AWD in EU - Microlino Eyes U.S. Market - BYD Seagull: The EV Everyone Wants to Benchmark

- Italy Rolls Out Welcome Mat for BYD - XPeng Expands Sales Network in EU - Cadillac Needs New Markets - Tesla Conquests More New Buyers Than Anyone Else - Li Auto Charges 102 kWh Batter in Under 11 Minutes - Hyundai Group Tops Safety Awards - Yanfeng's Low-Cost Seat Module - Jeep Avenger Adds AWD in EU - Microlino Eyes U.S. Market - BYD Seagull: The EV Everyone Wants to Benchmark

- Yanfeng Faces More Cyber Threats - EV Sales Slow in China - GM, Ford Offset UAW Labor Costs with Cuts - Used EV Residuals Drop - Toyota Adds EVs To EU Lineup - BYD Offers Awards to Stop Smears - Xpeng Shows Off AV Tech - Will Rivian Sue Tesla? - Forecast: Cybertruck Will Only Sell 36,000/Year

- Yanfeng Faces More Cyber Threats - EV Sales Slow in China - GM, Ford Offset UAW Labor Costs with Cuts - Used EV Residuals Drop - Toyota Adds EVs To EU Lineup - BYD Offers Awards to Stop Smears - Xpeng Shows Off AV Tech - Will Rivian Sue Tesla? - Forecast: Cybertruck Will Only Sell 36,000/YearThis show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/3270299/advertisement

- Transplants Raise Wages to Block UAW - Small Supplier Goes Bankrupt, Impacts Stellantis - Big Supplier Hit by Cyber Attack - Fisker Slashes Production Forecast - Telsa Cozies Up with India - Mercedes Launches Mobile Car Repair - Renault and Peugeot Offer New E-Vans - Toyota Testing Bidirectional Charging - 1962 Ferrari GTO Sells for Record Price - Polestar 6 Won't Be Production Limited

- Transplants Raise Wages to Block UAW - Small Supplier Goes Bankrupt, Impacts Stellantis - Big Supplier Hit by Cyber Attack - Fisker Slashes Production Forecast - Telsa Cozies Up with India - Mercedes Launches Mobile Car Repair - Renault and Peugeot Offer New E-Vans - Toyota Testing Bidirectional Charging - 1962 Ferrari GTO Sells for Record Price - Polestar 6 Won't Be Production LimitedThis show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/3270299/advertisement

Today we are celebrating our 25th episode on the Elite Experts Conferences Technology Podcast. As we already announced last month we've prepared a little surprise for our audience. One of the guests on this new panel will look familiar to you. Yes, it's Gustav Tuschen from AVL, who was already on our panel with Andrea Hees from Yanfeng and Joerg Brandscheid from Polestar. Well, the panel was outstanding and there are so many more stories to be told. Here are three guests from AVL in a completely new constellation: 1. Gustav Tuschen, EVP Business Development Truck & Bus and Industrial & International Operations. 2. Mario Brunner, EVP Engineering & Technology 3. Matthias Dank, EVP Global Business Development, Sales and International Operations Instrumentation and Test Systems Which topics & questions were discussed? - Developments in the automotive industry over the last 15-20 years - Where we can expect the most dynamic transformations - Where is the biggest potential in digitalisation and data management - Decarbonisation: technology-wise feasible vs economically viable - Links to energy sector & why it's so important - Technology openness: risky path or incredibly smart? - How to choose ‘crazy & bold' projects - and listen if Dr. Ludmilla Derr was allowed to get a small insight there? - What can we learn from the motorsport industry - What value is generated by startup hub “Creators Expedition - an AVL initiative” - and many more In this episode like in every episode we stay true to our motto “educate, entertain and inspire” Tune in and enjoy!

The topic of our next premium panel within the Elite Experts Conferences' technology podcast is: "Innovation Scouting and Strategic Partnerships in Automotive Industry". We recommend this episode to every startup, every global player, every supplier, every OEM - in short, EVERYONE in the automotive industry who in some way works on tech innovations. Our outstanding guests this time are: 1. Jörg Brandscheid, CTO at Polestar; 2. Andrea Hees, Director Product & Program Management Global XBU Innovation at Yanfeng; 3. Gustav Tuschen, EVP at AVL for Industrial & International Operations and Business Development Truck & Bus The atmosphere of the discussion was so pleasant that an interesting exchange of knowledge and insights took place. As always according to our usual principle: "educate, entertain and inspire". There were very transparent answers about where the focus is at the moment, where the challenges are, how the topic of innovation and especially innovation scouting is approached in every company. Of course, the discussion was also about all possible facets of strategic partnerships, a few example stories were shared and the key learnings collected. And as in every episode, the guests answer not only the technical questions, but also a few questions about their personal path, outlook on life, etc. So if you want to know, for example, which book influenced the guests the most and why is that, stay tuned for the episode until the end. Tune in and enjoy!

Premiere. Zwei Gäste im Elektroauto-News.net Podcast. In diesem Fall Dr. Andreas Haslbeck, Manager, User Experience Research bei Yanfeng Technology (YFT) und und Andreas Deubzer, User Interface Global Design Director bei YFT. Zu dritt haben wir uns über das Yanfeng Konzeptfahrzeug XiM23 unterhalten, welches einen Blick darauf gewährt, wie der Automobilzulieferer die Zukunft der Mobilität sieht. So viel sei bereits verraten, Luxus spielt dabei eine große Rolle. Wie uns Dr. Haslbeck und Herr Deubzer zu verstehen geben, entwickelt der Zulieferer alle zwei Jahre ein Konzeptfahrzeug, welches einen Ausblick auf die Zukunft der Mobilität, aus Sicht von Yanfeng gewähren soll. Mit dem Konzeptfahrzeug „Experience in Motion 2023“ (XiM23) präsentiert das Unternehmen seine Vision eines ganzheitlichen Luxuserlebnisses nun greifbar in Form eines Elektroautos. Hierzu habe man  fünf global gültige Faktoren (Aspekte) identifiziert, mit denen Automobilhersteller bei der Ausstattung ihrer Fahrzeuge für ein ganzheitliches Luxuserlebnis sorgen können. Vier unterschiedliche Erlebnismodi: Calm-, Rich-, Rich+- und Immersive-Mode gestatten es dem Fahrer die Aspekte in unterschiedlicher Gewichtung/ Ausprägung zu erleben. Hierzu bereits jetzt der Verweis auf den Podcast, da Herr Deubzer das Ganze sehr gut darstellt und greifbar erläutert. Spannend für mich war in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Aussage von Herr Dr. Haslbeck, dass man sich mit den Entwicklern der Automobilhersteller ausgetauscht hat. Diese ähnliche Aspekte und Schwerpunkte ermitteln konnten und dementsprechend mit vergleichbaren Ansätzen in die Zukunft schreiten. Viel mehr als ein Technologieträger wird das XiM23 Konzept nicht werden. Zeigt aber ganz gut auf, welche „neue und überzeugende Erlebnisse für die Automobilindustrie und die zukünftige Mobilität“ geliefert werden.  Im Detail verstehen es die beiden Herren von Yanfeng den XiM23 und die Bedeutung für deren Unternehmen und die Automobilindustrie an sich besser einzuordnen. Daher gilt, einfach Mal reinhören in die aktuelle Folge.

Faça sua pré-inscrição no CURSO TdC de Pronto-atendimento e receba BÔNUS exclusivos: https://cursotdc.com.br/ João, Rapha e Joca discutem 7 armadilhas sobre Vitamina B12! 1. Nem toda anemia macrocítica é deficiência de B12 2. B12 pode causar manifestações além da anemia 3. Qual é o valor de corte normal de B12? 4. Não é apenas baixa ingestão de B12 que causa deficiência de B12 5. Como repor B12, via oral ou IM/EV? 6. Qual é a dose ideal de B12? 7. O que causa B12 alta? Referências: 1. Uptodate. Fevereiro 2022.Causes and pathophysiology of vitamin B12 and folate deficiencies. Robert T Means, Kathleen M Fairfield, Kathleen J Motil, Jennifer S Tirnauer. 2. UPTODATE Fev 2022. Macrocytosis/Macrocytic anemia. Robert A Brodsky, William C Mentzer, Jennifer S Tirnauer. 3. Uptodate Fev 2022. Clinical manifestations and diagnosis of vitamin B12 and folate deficiency. Robert T Means, Kathleen M Fairfield, William C Mentzer, Jennifer S Tirnauer, Lisa Kunins. 4. KAPTAN, Kürşad et al. Helicobacter pylori—is it a novel causative agent in vitamin B12 deficiency?. Archives of Internal Medicine, v. 160, n. 9, p. 1349-1353, 2000. 5. HU, Yanfeng et al. Vitamin B12 deficiency after gastrectomy for gastric cancer: an analysis of clinical patterns and risk factors. Annals of surgery, v. 258, n. 6, p. 970-975, 2013. 7. Devalia, V., Hamilton, M. S., & Molloy, A. M. (2014). Guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of cobalamin and folate disorders. British Journal of Haematology, 166(4), 496–513. 8. Parks NE. Metabolic and Toxic Myelopathies. Continuum (Minneap Minn). 2021 Feb 1;27(1):143-162.

PANEL: Jeff Stout, Global Innovation, Yanfeng; Craig Cole, Roadshow by CNET; Gary Vasilash, on Automotive; John McElroy, Autoline.tv

- VW CEO's Job Status Still Up in The Air - Tesla German Workers Plan to Form Works Council - Chrysler Accuses GM of Corporate Espionage - Ford Reveals All-New Global Ranger - Stellantis Updates EVs To Eke Out More Miles - BMW M Brand Nearly 50 Years Old - Yanfeng Unveils New Integrated Infotainment Screen - Tesla Racks Up Over 1.2 Million Cybertruck Reservations - Mercedes Reveals EQB Pricing in Europe

- VW CEO's Job Status Still Up in The Air- Tesla German Workers Plan to Form Works Council- Chrysler Accuses GM of Corporate Espionage- Ford Reveals All-New Global Ranger- Stellantis Updates EVs To Eke Out More Miles- BMW M Brand Nearly 50 Years Old- Yanfeng Unveils New Integrated Infotainment Screen- Tesla Racks Up Over 1.2 Million Cybertruck Reservations- Mercedes Reveals EQB Pricing in Europe

In this week's IpX True North Podcast episode we welcome Cindy Price, Director of Engineering Services, Yanfeng as she chats with IpX VP of Services Brandy Taylor. Brandy and Cindy highlight the importance of effective communication - both speaking and listening - to be a true change agent in an organization. Cindy shares:Her initial understanding of how to influence change began in high school when she was discouraged from an engineering career and learned the value of having stakeholders and advocates to support your initiativesAs a change agent, putting yourself in a position to listen to all positions and perspectives to encourage collaboration, gain trust, stay curious, and allow vulnerability to create an open space for sharing changing ideasUnderstanding what stakeholders can bring to the table and how to match their needs and yours for both sides to accomplish goalsChanging the perspective of the current shift of supply chain into an opportunity for companies to respond to change more effectively and more efficiently Contact Cindy at cynthia.price@yanfeng.com and visit the Yanfeng website for more information.Connect with IpX to hear more industry thought leaders. Learn how IpX can help you create your company's DNA and how our True North service model empowers your organization to bring the most innovative products to market with true sustainability and scalability through our process experts. https://ipxhq.com/

Han Hendriks is leading Yanfeng's work on the smart cabins that are poised to change the way we travel in the future. This major shift is one of the reasons why he calls this the industry's "most exciting decade" in a long time.

GUEST: Jeff Stout, Global Innovation, YanfengTOPICS:- Yes, Tesla is a money machine. But does 500K cars make it the real thing?- 2020 sales. From worse to just bad.- FCA-PSA. There is no “C” in Stellantis. Will there be?PANEL:Pete Bigelow, Automotive News; Gary Vasilash, Gardner Business Media; John McElroy, Autoline.tv

SPECIAL GUEST: Jeff Stout, Executive Director, Innovation and New Mobility, Yanfeng Automotive InteriorsTOPICS:- Doctor Data- FCA and Groupe Renault: Would It Work?- Now Aurora Buys a Lidar Company: What Doesn’t Elon Understand?PANEL:- Gary Vasilash, Automotive Design and Production- John McElroy, Autoline.tv

Rijden op waterstof: veelbelovend, maar de echte doorbraak lijkt nog ver weg. Verder: het auto-interieur van de toekomst. En Wouter Karssen test de Volkswagen Polo GTI.

Ironman and Filmmaker Yanfeng Zhang is our guest today. Yan has the distinction of being the first ever director of a feature-length documentary about the sport of triathlon and the Ironman race. His film is called "We Are Triathletes" and it follows six triathletes as they train and race in a full Ironman. Watch the trailer here and keep a lookout for it in 2019 as it gets a wide relese! We're happy to have Yan as our guest on the @7_Day_Warrior Podcast! #WeAreTriathletes #triathlonfilm @Velofix @itri4funn 

SPECIAL GUESTS:Andrew Lund, Chief Engineer, Toyota Motor North AmericaJeff Stout, Executive Director, Yanfeng Automotive InteriorsNEWS:01:30 - Toyota's Project Portal 2.0: A Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Semi19:15 - Introduction to Yanfeng21:35 - Doctor Data24:00 - Yanfeng: Designing Autonomous Interiors32:20 - Waymo, Ride-Sharing, and New Mobility42:30 - Purpose-Built Ride-Sharing VehiclesPANEL:- Gary Vasilash, Automotive Design and Production- John McElroy, Autoline.tv

Een uur lang alles over auto's en mobiliteit in De Nationale Autoshow.

- CARB Could Fight Trump Administration - VW Forms EV Joint Venture in China - Ford Says Big Shift Toward Electrics Coming - Dodge Demon to Drop 200 lbs. From Hellcat - Coker Reproduces Classic Muscle Car Tires - European Sales Hit 9-Year High - Yanfeng Develops Reconfigurable Interior for Autonomy

- CARB Could Fight Trump Administration- VW Forms EV Joint Venture in China- Ford Says Big Shift Toward Electrics Coming- Dodge Demon to Drop 200 lbs. From Hellcat- Coker Reproduces Classic Muscle Car Tires- European Sales Hit 9-Year High- Yanfeng Develops Reconfigurable Interior for Autonomy