Podcasts about abiy

Au sommaire: (00:00:35) Les droits de douane de Donald Trump, c'est de la politique et pas de l'économie: interview Anne-Sophie Alsif (00:09:40) Ce que peuvent faire les Etats-Unis des minerais et terres rares de l'Ukraine (00:14:00) Le plus vieux conflit du monde à Abiyé

durée : 00:05:33 - Le Journal de l'éco - par : Anne-Laure Chouin - Le dirigeant éthiopien, Président du Parti de la prospérité, tente depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 2018 de libéraliser une économie restée jusque-là très fermée. L'Éthiopie étant la plus grande économie d'Afrique de l'Est, membre désormais du groupe des BRICS.

Una tragedia medioambiental ocurrida hace 18 años sigue conmocionando a Costa de Marfil. En 2006, la empresa Trafigura quiso deshacerse de 500 metros cúbicos de desechos tóxicos procedentes de la refinación de productos petrolíferos almacenados en su carguero Probo Koala. Tras cuatro meses en el mar y después de que tres países rechazaran el barco, este finalmente dejó su carga en Costa de Marfil. Con la aprobación de las autoridades, una empresa local se encargó de verter los residuos en los alrededores de la localidad de Abiyán, afectando al menos a 100.000 habitantes y causando varias muertes. Dieciocho años después, muchos siguen clamando justicia. Un informe de Julia Guggenheim, Damien Koffi, Flore Monteau, Tom Canetti y  Lauren Bain.

Tom Gardner – The ABIY Project...with TRE's Giles Brown

ABIY KILISINA MIS MEN EYUU

ABIY KILISINA MIS MEN EYUU

ABIY KILISINA MIS MEN EYU

ABIY KILISINA MIS MEN EYU

#ETHIOPIA: Civil war dominates: Amhara vs Abiy and the Tigrayans. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ethiopias-amhara-militia-says-resettlement-plan-beats-war-drum/ar-AA1o4zWk 1862 Ethiopia

Ocho años después de la implementación de la prohibición nacional de productos para aclarar la piel en Costa de Marfil, la tendencia continúa en aumento a pesar de los riesgos para la salud que conlleva. Se estima que la mitad de las mujeres en Abiyán se someten a procesos de despigmentación, los cuales pueden desencadenar problemas graves como diabetes e hipertensión. Las ONG denuncian lo que perciben como una falta de voluntad política por parte de las autoridades para abordar este problema.

#Ehtiopia: All against Abiy in Addis Abab. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs ,https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/imf-mission-visit-ethiopia-finance-ministry-official-2024-03-21/ 1868 Ethiopia death of Tewodros II

#ETHIOPIA: Are these last last days of PM Abiy? Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ethiopia-does-not-wish-harm-on-somalia-pm-abiy/ar-BB1hSlsU 1910 Ethiopia

#Ethiopia; Addis Ababa surrounded and PM Abiy on the eve of flight. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs https://apnews.com/article/egypt-somalia-ethiopia-dispute-somaliland-63d339c238b80c20bb09582d690b86a2s 1933 Empress of Ethiopia in Jerusalem

Ethiopia is one of the world's most populous countries, and yet the 2020-22 Tigray War and ongoing suffering in the region has been largely ignored by the world at large. Tom Stevenson joins the podcast to break down the history of the conflict, and explore why Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a Nobel laureate, has come to preside over such a brutal civil war. He also considers Abiy's future intentions, both within and beyond his country's borders.Find further reading on the episode page: lrb.me/tigraypod Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

#Ethiopia: PM Abiy faces the resistance of the Fanu and the turning away of Eritrea and Djibouti.. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs. https://news.yahoo.com/ethiopias-deal-somaliland-upends-regional-181131374.html 1868 Ethiopia

In this episode of The Horn, Alan is joined by Michael Woldemariam, associate professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy, to discuss the landscape in Ethiopia one year after the peace deal in Tigray. They explore how relations between Addis Ababa and Tigrayan leaders have evolved since the signing of a peace deal in Pretoria last year and the many challenges Tigray still faces today. They discuss how Abiy's wartime alliance with Eritrea and the Amhara elite broke down, leading to a new war in the Amhara region and rising tensions with Ethiopia. They also look at whether Addis Ababa's recent bid for access to the Red Sea could raise the risks of a regional escalation.For more in-depth analysis of the topics discussed in this episode, check out our briefing Ethiopia's Ominous New War in Amhara and our Ethiopia country page. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin

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Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #ClassicGregoryCopley: #Ethiopia: Nine months ago in Addis Ababa: Abiy rolls back the TPLF; & What is to be done? Gregory R Copley, @Gregory_Copley, editor and publisher of Defense & Foreign Affairs.   https://www.voanews.com/a/us-envoy-feltman-to-visit-ethiopia-thursday-meet-with-officials-/6382650.html

Abiy alikutana na kiongozi wa kijeshi wa Sudan Jenerali Abdel Fattah al-Burhan katika mji mkuu wa Nairobi pembeni ya mkutano wa IGAD ambao unaundwa na nchi wanachama wanane wa Pembe ya Afrika na mataifa jirani

The government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has expelled our correspondent. Abiy's proxies at home and abroad are helping a propaganda push that is silencing criticism. California's legal-marijuana market is enormous, but its growers are floundering under taxes and regulations; the industry is getting stubbed out. And a look at how companies that have withdrawn from Russia are faring.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

The government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has expelled our correspondent. Abiy's proxies at home and abroad are helping a propaganda push that is silencing criticism. California's legal-marijuana market is enormous, but its growers are floundering under taxes and regulations; the industry is getting stubbed out. And a look at how companies that have withdrawn from Russia are faring.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/05/23/traitors-enemies-must-know-that-army-which-ensures-existence-of-ethiopia-is-built-pm-abiy/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

Investigadores chilenos y franceses estudian la extraordinaria resistencia de las plantas que crecen en la zona más árida del mundo: el desierto de Atacama del norte de Chile. Una tierra inhóspita pero que resguarda misterios biológicos que podrían ser útiles para mejorar la resistencia de los cultivos agrícolas a la sequía. En el marco de la COP15 sobre la Desertificación, que tiene lugar este año Abiyán, Costa de Marfil, la comunidad internacional busca hacer frente al creciente empobrecimiento de los suelos debido al cambio climático. En paralelo, científicos chilenos, asociados con expertos del centro de investigación de agronomía francés INRAE, ponen la lupa en el desierto de Atacama. Pese a ser una de las regiones más inhóspita del mundo por su aridez, su radiación extrema y sus oscilaciones de temperaturas, el desierto de Atacama resguarda una flora que crece entre 2.500 y 4.600 metros. Rodrigo Gutiérrez, doctor en biología e investigador en la Universidad Católica de Chile, comparte con RFI los procesos de un prometedor estudio de la resistencia de las plantas a condiciones extremas. Los científicos esperan poder adaptar las técnicas de resistencia de las plantas desérticas a la agricultura. RFI: ¿Por qué estudiar las plantas del desierto? Rodrigo Gutiérrez: “En el escenario de cambio climático actual, debido al calentamiento global, las predicciones que se han hecho por los paneles internacionales indican que va a haber un aumento de la desertificación a nivel mundial. En particular las zonas de los subtrópicos van a ser las más afectadas. Y países como Argentina, Chile vivirán con más fuerza estos procesos de desertificación. Si uno piensa en entender cómo la vida puede soportar estas condiciones de aridez cada más frecuente, ir a un lugar donde los organismos han experimentado condiciones de aridez extrema por millones de años nos pareció que era una buena idea. Para usar como laboratorio natural el desierto más antiguo del planeta. Existe una diversidad vegetal que se ha estudiado muy poco. Se sabe de sus descripciones botánicas, pero más allá de eso, la gran mayoría de ellas no se han estudiado. Hay una mina de oro desde el punto de vista genético y biológico que está esperando que lo caractericemos. RFI: ¿De qué especies se trata? Rodrigo Gutiérrez: En esta década con un poquito más de estudios, hemos identificado cerca de 78 especies. De esas, hay 32 que son las más importantes desde el punto de vista ecológico por su abundancia y su distribución. La gran mayoría son angiosperma, plantas que florecen, y dependiendo a qué altura uno este, se cambia el paisaje. En la parte alta domina el pasto, la zona intermedia hay arbustos y la parte más baja, a medida que uno se acerca hacia el desierto absoluto donde no hay vida, está dominado por plantas anuales y suculentas. Entre los 2.400 y los 4.600 metros es donde se concentra la vida vegetal. RFI: ¿Cuál es el método empleado? Rodrigo Gutiérrez: Nos hemos enfocado en tratar de entender los mecanismos que les permiten a estas especies sobrevivir del punto de vista molecular y evolutivo. Lo que hemos caracterizado es qué genes tienen estas especies. Tratando de entender cómo los genes han evolucionado en estas especies confiriendo capacidad adaptativa. Entonces nuestro foco es, a partir de lo que pasa a nivel molecular, tratar de entender los procesos biológicos que contribuyen a la sobrevida de estas especies en las condiciones desérticas. También los suelos son muy pobres y la radiación solar es realmente muy alta. RFI: ¿Y cómo se adaptan concretamente estas plantas? Rodrigo Gutiérrez: La primera etapa fue la caracterización de la biodiversidad. En ambientes extremos no es tan simple. Tomó varios años entender realmente qué especies hay. Hicimos una reconstrucción de los últimos 30.000 años de la flor en Atacama utilizando los registros fósiles. La segunda parte tenía que ver con entender a nivel molecular cuáles eran los mecanismos involucrados. Y tenemos identificados procesos que tienen que ver con cambios en las secuencias de las proteínas que hacen trabajos de manera más eficientes que les permite a las plantas sobrevivir. Y la tercera etapa, en la que estamos ahora, es seleccionar algunos de estos procesos moleculares para tratar de entenderlos con más detalles y ver si es posible tomar lo que hemos aprendido y llevarlo a plantas de interés agronómico y ver si podemos mejorarlas de alguna manera. Hay otra parte del trabajo que estamos haciendo, que tiene que con rescatar algunas de estas especies por su valor propio. Muchas de estas especies eran utilizadas por los pueblos originarios, por ejemplo, como alimentos, y estas tradiciones están un poco olvidadas. Y creemos que hay mucho potencial en algunas de estas especies como la quínoa, el maqui o el calafate que son especies que eran propias de esta zona, consumidas por los pueblos originarios pero que se ha perdido un poco la historia.

In 2019, Ethiopia's young and dynamic prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to resolve the longstanding tensions between his country and Eritrea. His announcement of domestic political reforms were received well both abroad and at home, many Ethiopians had felt excluded by a political system seen as having been captured by the country's Tigrayan ethnic minority. Today, none of this enthusiasm is left. In late 2020, long-running tensions between the central government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, once the dominant ethnic party in the ruling coalition, escalated into a full-blown civil war. The conflict has been characterized by shocking atrocities and abuses on all sides. More than 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes, and political repression has increased in the wake of the war. On March 24, Abiy's government and Tigrayan forces declared an indefinite humanitarian truce in Tigray, and some humanitarian aid has since reached the area. But the conflict, which has shattered Ethiopia's image as an economic and political powerhouse in the region, is far from resolved. On this week's episode of Trend Lines, William Davison, the International Crisis Group's senior analyst for Ethiopia, joins Peter Dörrie to unpack the background of the conflict and the latest developments in Ethiopia. Relevant articles on World Politics Review: How Abiy's Effort to Redefine Ethiopia Led to War in Tigray  Tigray Is Being Deliberately Starved to Death  The U.S. Needs Sharper Tools to Stop the War in Ethiopia  Getting to a Sustainable Endgame in Ethiopia Will Be an Uphill Climb  Trend Lines is produced and edited by Peter Dörrie, a freelance journalist and analyst focusing on security and resource politics in Africa. You can follow him on Twitter at @peterdoerrie.   To send feedback or questions, email us at podcast@worldpoliticsreview.com

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/04/15/pm-abiy-hosts-iftar-dinner-for-ethiopian-returnees-from-saudi-arabia/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

Wiliam Davison of Crisis Group joined me to talk about GERD. It's a hugely informative episode about the hurdles developing countries face in scaling up the energy ladder. Read more about it here:Shock death intensifies dam debate: was Abiy pessimistic or realistic about GERD? https://medium.com/@wdavison10/shock-death-intensifies-dam-debate-was-abiy-pessimistic-or-realistic-about-gerd-d306a98686feNile Dam Talks: Unlocking a Dangerous Stalemate https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/nile-dam-talks-unlocking-dangerous-stalemateSubscribe to Grid Brief. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nuclearbarians.substack.com

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/03/22/pm-abiy-world-bank-officials-visit-irrigated-wheat-farms-in-oromia-region/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/03/21/pm-abiy-says-wheat-productivity-in-amhara-region-promising/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/03/21/pm-abiy-visits-summer-irrigation-farming-activities-gorgora-project-in-gondar-zone-of-amhara-region/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will address the country's federal parliament on the conflict between government forces and Tigrayan rebels in the north. Ethiopian federal forces have been fighting rebels loyal to the Tigray People's Liberation Front since November 2020. The country is also embroiled in a border row with Sudan and a dispute with Egypt and Khartoum over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile river. Mr Abiy announced the start of electricity generation from the controversial dam, prompting angry reactions from Egypt and Sudan.

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blogm/2022/02/03/pm-abiy-arrives-in-borena-zone-of-oromia-region-to-visit-drought-affected-areas/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelens.blog/2022/01/23/pm-abiy-says-great-ethiopian-run-promoting-unity-fraternity-among-ethiopians-2/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

Photo:  Trutovsky Bazaar #Ukraine: Better late than never. @AmbJohnBolton US entreats Abiy.  https://www.ft.com/content/833d3784-57cf-46a4-ade2-8d4ab2a3bae2

Photo:  Ethiopian Madonna #Ethiopia: The US goes to Abiy. Gregory Copley  @Gregory_Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/inside-biden-harris-white-house-africa-biden-officials-simon-ateba/

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelen.wordpress.com/2022/01/18/pm-abiy-extends-best-wishes-for-timket-festival/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

This episode is also available as a blog post: https://eagleeyelen.wordpress.com/2022/01/17/prime-minister-abiy-lauds-africans-for-deciding-to-hold-au-meeting-in-addis-ababa/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/eagleeyelens/message

On Conflicts of Interest #216, Kyle Anzalone breaks down the CIA program to train insurgents in Ukraine. While only few details of the program were revealed, since 2015, the CIA has hired a paramilitary to train Ukrainians in the US on insurgency tactics. While the program is presented as defensive, officials admit the program has been used to make battlefield gains inside Ukraine.  Kyle discusses the recent talks between Russia and NATO. Much like the meeting between the US and Russia, the dialog ended without agreement or much progress being made. However, Russia arrested several members of a hacking group at the request of the US - presenting an opening for more dialog.  Kyle updates the war in Ethiopia. With US drones and airstrikes, the Ethiopian government has turned back the Tigray People Liberation Front's advance. After halting the offensive, in a move that appears to be directed at ending the war, the Ethiopian government released several prisoners.. However, Ethiopia has not let up on its air war which, so far this year, has claimed the lives of over 100 Tigrayian civilians. Ethiopian leader Abiy spoke with Biden as Ethiopian drones targeted civilian camps.  Kyle explains the recent developments in the Yemen War. The UAE-backed Giants brigade made major gains against Houthi fighters in Maarib and Shabwah. However, the people of Yemen continue to flee to areas controlled by the Houthi as they are more stable and secure.  Kyle wraps up the show with a discussion of North Korea's recent missile tests. Since South Korea President Moon Jae-in announced a possible end to the Korean war, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has carried out three missile tests. The US reacted to the tests with new sanctions on North Korea.  Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify iHeart Radio Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD  

"If we have shortcomings, we are not afraid to have them pointed out and criticized because we serve the people. Anyone, no matter who may point out our shortcomings. If he is right, we will correct them. If what he proposes will benefit the people, we will act upon it."-MaoFEEDBACK These western leftists absolutely need to just keep it at imperialism and stay away from the internal politics of Ethiopia. Just being in pfdj promotes you to address the primary contradiction which is imperialism. But the lack of acknowledgement of secondary contradictions by pfdj leads to a lack of understanding of an analysis on how the ruling class exploits these secondary contradictions to further their agenda. These secondary contradictions are weaponized to exasperate the primary contradiction. How tplf is using the plight of the oppressed nationalities to mask their elitist ideology. Ppl like Simon dismiss the oppressed as just tribalists. And it stops there for them, offering no validity to the oppressed masses who instead fall for tplf rhetoric that appears to be more in line with the oppressed. This alienates them like you said, and that's a legitimate critique of the no more movement. This adds a lot of issues. This also gives legitimacy to Abiy, who on top of being even having more neoliberal policies than tplf, has denied historical grievances of folks in Ethiopia and even in America, and like you said you can oppose and fight against imperialism without totally endorsing the other side. It shouldn't stop at just primary contradiction.While EPRP*(Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party) was actively resisting derg, they still aligned with dergs decisions to oust western puppet entities from Ethiopia. An example of being principled and aligning on the right side w/o endorsing the other sideCRITICISMYou repeatedly state that Abiy started this war with TPLF, contrary to TPLF's own words in which they state they launched a "pre-emptive strike" against multiple northern command bases on Nov 4th.Just simply "having positions" doesn't really mean anything if it doesn't translate to material action. In my opinion, many on the left, save a few organizations, are failing to capture the moment of what is essentially a pan-African movement against neo-colonial designs.https://blackallianceforpeace.com/principles-of-unity What end is having a critique of the GOE while under attack by US backed forces supposed to contribute to the global movement? Should the left not unite with the #NoMore movement against imperialism or should it?Listening to this I hear a lot of strawmen. Nowhere in any of the breakthrough or black agenda report coverage of the war have I seen anyone praise Abiy as some kind of socialist anti-imperialist hero.Seems unfair to suggest that's their position when it isn't.Also like...what? "Take away the TPLF?" This isn't materialist at all, seeing as the TPLF is a heavily armed belligerent and player in the current conflict. This is an appeal to idealism in the middle of a war in which there will eventually be a victor and a vanquished.Just wondering exactly what the endgame is here? So people shouldn't be mobilizing against US supported regime change in Ethiopia because Abiy is a capitalist? Should we take a "neither x or y" approach while a fascist proxy group continues its onslaught across the country?POSITIONExamine why PFDJ or Eritrea are in alliance with Amhara region?is it right? The primacy of the class struggle over the national question is an issueAll-Ethiopia Socialist Movement(MEISON) vs EPRP*(Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party)However, there were some sticky political problems for both the TPLF and EPRP regarding Eritrea. While they recognized the struggle for the Eritrean independence as genuine, they had differences as to whether the case was a ‘colonial issue' or not. Without conducting the necessary study or having appropriate discussions, the TPLF held the view that the Eritrean case was a ‘colonial question.' as the EPLF wanted it to be. It was probably an opportunistic stand , designed to outflank the EPRP from the privileged position the EPLF offering it. Without understanding the consequences that were to haunt it in the discourse of Ethiopian political history, this position continued to be the stand of the TPLF for years to come.Another area of difference was over Eritrea and the guerrilla struggle for independence there. EPRP showed much greater sympathy for the guerrillas, particularly for the more radical Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF). Many early EPRP cadres were trained and armed by the EPLF, and the EPRP's armed wing used EPLF-held areas as a base when it commenced armed struggle in the north. MEISON accepted the right of self-determination for the nationalities, including the right of secession (which the EPRP was itself ambivalent on), but it denied the revolutionary validity of the Eritrean struggle in general and the EPLF in particular. The PMAC's opponents, especially those in the various ethnic liberation movements, charge that the PMAC has become in fact the prisoner of the Amhara nationality, the ruling group under Haile Selassie. Amharas make up some 75 percent of COPWE's central committee, reflecting the power structures of the military and civilian bureaucracy inherited from Haile Selassie. Amharas also hold approximately 60 percent of the appointments to the regional COPWE committees Promoting an agenda for lasting changes going far beyond those proposed since the revolution began in January, the Derg proclaimed Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First) as its guiding philosophy.Giving an assessment of #NoMore is similar to #BLM and how BAR/Bruce Dixon gave the same critical pushback as well via class analysis and other tools of socialismSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/horn-of-africa-leftists/donations

Important episode to consider what does principled anti-imperialist solidarity suppose to look like for the Horn of Africa with critical three points1. Let's examine the left content creators and journalist position as being too pro Abiy/PP due to the sourcing info from the Abyssinian (Amhara region)/PFDJ alliance that is led to the creation of the new diaspora based #NoMore movement and current development...Why did they do this? Maybe the motivating factor is for social media traction/audience metrics/donations etcYou take away the TPLF you can see why the people and advisors or allies of Abiys are neoliberal and reason why is in alliance with them is they all share common ideology views on neoliberalism and overall Abyssainid views on what is Ethiopia and its future..Including Berhanu Nega as education minister, in a speech to lawmakers on Wednesday. The others are Belete Molla, who comes in as innovation and technology minister and Kejela Merdassa as the head of the culture docket.The Ethiopia's far-right -ultra-unionist PM Dr Abiy Ahmed and his conspirator ally Professor Berhanu Nega's parties- namely Exclusive Prosperity Party (EPP) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ) are advocating Western liberal democracy and liberal economy as model capable of saving Ethiopia and its subjects.   Berhanu Nega wrote policy papers for the World Bank, which were later included in the Kinijit (CUDCoalition for Unity and Democracy) ManifestoThe Kinijit (CUD) Manifesto. Attached snippet calling for the implementation of free market liberal democracy “[Mr Abiy] is extremely interested to see a strong private sector that can generate jobs for the millions of youths that are currently unemployed,” said Mr Abebe, 38, who worked at the World Bank before Mr Abiy asked him to join the commission.“And I think that is consistent with the whole economic reform agenda. For so long economic growth has been fuelled by state investment and now the state should cede space to the private sector and play its natural arbiter role as a regulator,” he said. https://www.ft.com/content/38c9e736-7e49-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/15/suspicion-and-fear-linger-as-ethiopia-campus-wars-go-quietWed 15 Apr 2020 07.21 EDTThe government is now looking at alternative funding models, including student loans. “There should be some kind of co-financing from the private sector,” said Tassew Woldehanna, president of Addis Ababa University. “Students need to start paying.”In January, the Minister of Higher Education suggested that free tuition was partly to blame for conflicts because it made it harder for universities to maintain the quality of education and housing for the roughly 200,000 new students enrolling each year. In 2000, Ethiopia had just two universities; now there are 45. It is one of the fastest expansions in higher education in the world, but without a concomitant rise in standards.Abiy and Crrypto connectionCardano is not new to Ethiopia, in 2018 the government signed a deal with Cardano to incorporate blockchain technology to the agritech industry. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, since Ethiopia is a latecomer to: Jack Dorsey vocalized his support of Project Mano, a group of Ethiopia-based entrepreneurs who want to get the Ethiopian government to consider mining and storing BitcoinI would like to thank @IMF & my dear sister @KGeorgieva for IMF's extraordinary support of Ethiopia's Home Grown Economic Reform Program amounting to USD 2.9 billion. Building on our past success, we have embarked on a new journey to set Ethiopia on a path to prosperity.https://twitter.com/AbiyAhmedAli/status/1205152845818945536"Borrowing from IMF and WB, is like borrowing from [one's] mother"- PM Abiy speaking in a peace conference in Addis Ababa..... "Because after they give us a billion birr, they tell us to pay it in 20, 30 yrs with a 2, 3, 4 % interest rate. What has hurt Ethiopia is not borrowing from these institutions but from companies or other countries. ....https://twitter.com/Kal_KidanY/status/1208046969618337793He was invited to The Economist party https://amp.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/09/19/ethiopias-democratic-transition-is-in-peril?__twitter_impression=true‘My model is capitalism': Ethiopia's prime minister plans telecoms privatisationhttps://www.ft.com/content/433dfa88-36d0-11e9-bb0c-42459962a8122. There are voices on Twitter who pushes the TPLF line under the veneer of anti-imperialist positioning aswellTo answer the second point Under TPLF was SOE but corrupted and was making concession to the IMF and global finance to certain extentEthiopa 75%+ of its budget via aid financing, it basically is a USAID client state to an extent, and Abiy's agenda highly depends on WB + IMF financing, Ethiopia has privatized SOEs in phases 1994-98 /1999 - 2004. Impact analyses show that privatiz|n only benefited 2 large conglomerates. 1st -TPLF/ EPRDF's EFFORT, 2nd -MIDROC, with close tie with EPRDF. Both operate as duopoly hindering competitiveness That “reliant on donors” part hurt. All those years of “fast growth” and “10 %+ growth” and Ethiopia is still one of the most aid dependent countries on the continent? 3. Examining the #NoMore Movement the way forward and recognizing what's rightQuote by Wallelign Mekonnen Nov. 17, 196 was a Marxist student activist and militant active in the Ethiopian Student Movement https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ethiopia/nationalities.pdfSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/horn-of-africa-leftists/donations

In this episode, Ethiopia Insight Election Project's Tobias Hagmann asks Maya Misikir, a freelance journalist based in Addis Abeba based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to reflect on issues she raised in the EIEP's ‘Sidama's statehood quest, beyond recognition'.

In this episode, Ethiopia Insight Election Project's Tobias Hagmann asks Dawud Mohammed, a lecturer at Samara University and  independent researcher based in Samara in Afar region, to reflect on issues he raised in the EIEP's ‘Abiy's Prosperity yields few dividends for Ethiopia's Afar'.

In this episode, your hosts J/Maroo and J/Aangoo are joined by Girma Tadesse, co-chair of the Oromo Advocacy Alliance and former director of the Oromia Media Network, to speak about the heinous extrajudicial public execution of a teenage boy, Amanuel Wondimu. The circumstances of his execution, and the broader patterns of Ethiopian state terrorism under Abiy Ahmed are discussed, with particular attention to the many emerging parallels between Abiy's rule, and the Red Terror of the notorious Derg regime. Listen and let us know what you think at 430-755-0727 (voicemail or text), or reach us on our Instagram or Twitter @teamfreeOromia. Intro/outro song credit: "Rosamo" by Yasiin Bouba, OGE_R, and Adill Jamaal.

For this episode, we will discuss the latest development in Ethiopia and Tigray region by giving historical context and political background as there is a serious social media campaign being waged with a lot of emotions and strong narrative which can be confusing and alarming if you don't have proper analysis--before we start on the historical background on the conflict I want to make the following pointsAs I mentioned on the BAR interview Eritrea is being set up, TPLF is an agent of imperialism and Washington wants Ethiopia back to being a compliant client state despite Abiy being a willing client of Washington--The latest development is an ideological test for leftist and how discipline people are too strong emotional propaganda online as we have seen casualties of it already from the Bobi Wine situation in failure to recognize imperialism co-optations in which Bobi Bobi and the campaign around him as an opposition and power struggle----Just like Museveni and Bobi Wine --this is Abiy vs TPLF saying that its important to highlight that Abiy Ahmed no saint as he has pro-neoliberal beliefs and is an Abisyaini-zed Oromo which is hostile to non-Abyssinian nationalism in the south also the Eritrean revolution plus the Ethiopian Defense Force does not have a clean track record in other regions and just like Museveni he is a willing client leader but certain quarters in Washington have sympathy for the opposition in this current power struggleSecond, when examining western media coverage ..it's important to point to the issue of how the attention in the north vs the south why western media outlets amplify only the north and not the south actual history of genocide in which there were serious genocide in various regions the last 28 years under TPLF --what's happening in Tigray is serious and the people are caught in a situation of internal power struggle and the interests of Washington which certain circles in the white house have a personal relationship with the TPLF leadership coreAs a materialist, we must examine and emphasize the role of history through the economic lense and the role of the ruling class-- ---what is the role of colonialism and imperialism on the latest development and the past..--Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/horn-of-africa-leftists/donations

Welcome to the 20th episode of The Art of You Podcast, this is your host Jimmy Grant also known as RORSEDRiiVE I had the privilege of chatting with Abiy Girma, a 22 year old content creator, photographer and videographer based in Baltimore, MD. In this episode we learn about how about got into the content creation space, his first opportunities working with artists such as Pink Sweats, Wale, and Jon Bellion, how traveling sparks creativity and how his dream is to create a film accurately depicting Ethiopia. I hope you enjoy this episode. Abiy Girma online links: instagram.com/hiabiy https://twitter.com/iamabiy https://www.abiygirma.com The Art of You Podcast/ ROSEDRiiVE Social Links SUBSCRIBE on YouTube HERE ↓ https://www.youtube.com/c/ROSEDRiiVE? Subscribe to The Art of You Podcast on Apple ↓ https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-art-of-you/id1547157773 Follow The Art of You Podcast on Spotify ↓ https://open.spotify.com/show/1NkaMOjv4gm9Y9Nv7uH89t?si=5tHyuvoRRGqktJ0PQp42lg ROSEDRiiVE Music on Spotify ↓ https://open.spotify.com/artist/4NoqrtzPnShhuM0VDXStZL?si=jPy2UybdT2aUYHaB7IS0wQ ROSEDRiiVE Music on SOUNDCLOUD ↓ https://soundcloud.com/rosedriive ROSEDRiiVE on TWITTER ↓ https://www.twitter.com/rosedriive ROSEDRiiVE on INSTAGRAM ↓ https://www.instagram.com/rosedriive ROSEDRiiVE Hour Mixes on Soundcloud ↓ https://soundcloud.com/riidewithrosedriive

Your usual hosts discuss artists turning against their people and the Oromo struggle. Should they be canceled? Does cancel culture work? And what about the false choice of choosing between Abiy and TPLF? What do you think? We want to hear from you! Give us a call (voicemail) or text at 430-755-0727, and make sure to subscribe and rate this podcast! Intro/outro song credit: "Rosamo" by Yasiin Bouba, OGE_R, and Adill Jamaal. P.S. Check out our sabboonaa of the week, Soninaaf Aadam, on Youtube. Let's support Oromo artists who stand up for their people!

Not your typical episode . More an exploratory analysis of the current rulers psychology.

I had an ahuh moment today. So I've set out to discuss how Mr Abiy has been wrongfully quoted as the Nobel peace prize winner for Democracy. Instead he should have been given it for making Ethiopia a Presidential Republic. I am also discussing how Meles' vision for Ethiopia was one of the most unique political systems and ideologies we have seen in the 20th century.

I'm wondering. Is there a link between the second coming, the destruction of Ethiopian politics and the Pentay church. Locusts are destroying the farms, the people are dying, political opponents are jailed, Oromia is being infiltrated by Eritrean soldiers, all whilst Abiy entertains Isaias and rides on kids motorcycles. The shame. The departure of the Holy Spirit. God be with what is left of Ethiopia

1-Nobel per la pace 2019 al primo ministro dell'etiopia. Abiy hamed è stato premiato per i suoi sforzi per raggiungere la pace e la cooperazione internazionale...( Raffaele Masto) ..2-Rojava sotto attacco. Consiglio di sicurezza diviso sulla condanna della Turchia...In Esteri interviste, testimonianze e analisi...3-Ecuador: nove giorni di protesta contro le ricette del fondo monetario. Il governo di Lenin moreno risponde con una violenta repressione. (Martina Stefanoni) ..4-Michaele stipe si schiera con extinction rebellion. Il leader dei REM ha pubblicato un brano scaricabile dal suo sito con una donazione benefica alla causa ambientale. (Marcello Lorrai)..( Roberto Maggioni) ..5-Le aziende di idrocarburi hanno prodotto il 35% di tutte le emissioni di gas a effetto serra dal 1965 ad oggi. L'inchiesta del Guardian. (Luisa Nannipieri)