Podcasts about tigrayans

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Content warning for discussion of genocide, torture, mutilation, rape, and slavery Hey, Hi, Hello, this is the History Wizard and welcome back for Day 15 of Have a Day w/ The History Wizard. Thank you to everyone who tuned in for Day 14 last week, and especially thank you to everyone who rated and/or reviewed the podcast. I hope you all learned something last week and I hope the same for this week. This week marks the 6th part of our mini series of currently ongoing genocides and humanitarian crises. Episode 2 was on Palestine, Episode 11 was on Congo, episode 12 was on Sudan, episode 13 was on Xinjiang, episode 14 was on Rakhine State, and today's episode will cover the genocide that is ongoing in Tigray in Ethiopia. Let's see what the Alchemist's Table has in store for us this time. Today's libation is called Memories of Summer. Muddle some mint and strawberries in the bottom of your shaker, add .5 oz of simple syrup, 2 oz of gunpowder gin, stir well for about 30 seconds before double straining over ice and topping with lemonade. Garnish with a sprig of fresh mint and enjoy. Now it's time for everyone's favorite part, it's time for the historical context. Tigray is both the northernmost regional state in Ethiopia, as well as an ethnicity. Tigray is known as the birthplace of Ethiopian civilization and their motto is “There is no mountain we would not climb.” That's fucking badass. When the Scramble for Africa began at the end of the 19th century CE barely 10% of africa was under EUropean colonial control, and by the time World War 1 broke out more than 90% of the country had been colonized, with only Liberia and Ethiopia remaining free states. While Ethiopia remained under its own sovereign control, this was in large part because they willingly allied themselves with Great Britain. In fact many Ethiopian troops fought on the side of Britain during the Mahdist War in Sudan that we discussed on Day 12. Part of Ethiopia's independence also came from their alliances with Italy. King Menelik II of Ethiopia signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Italy in 1889. This treaty guaranteed Ethiopian sovereignty as long as Italy could control areas north of Ethiopia's currently held territory (in areas that are now the nation of Eritrea) and in return Ethiopia would receive arms and munitions and Menelik would have Italian support as emperor. Menelik would remain emperor from 1889 until his death in 1913. Though, it is worth noting that Etiopia was only able to maintain its sovereignty because of their victory during the Italo-Ethiopian War that ran from January 1895 until October 1896. The beginning of Menelik's rule was marked by severe tragedy though as it coincided with the 1890s African rinderpest epizootic. Which is a very fancy way of saying that disease killed 90% of Ethiopia's cattle and that this, combined with a drought caused by reduced rainfall killed about 1/3rd of the country's population. The virus, known as Rinderpest, is potentially thought to have been introduced into Eritrea in 1887 by Indian cattle brought by the Italians for their campaign against Somalia. Lack of rainfall from as early as 16 November 1888 led to famine in all but southernmost provinces; locusts and caterpillar infestations destroy crops in Akele Guzay, Begemder, Shewa, and around Harar. Conditions worsened with a typhus epidemic, a major smallpox epidemic (1889–90), and cholera outbreaks (1889–92). Making the beginning of Melenik's rule really fucking bad. Near the end of his life Melenik was filled with with concern over issues of succession. He hadn't yet picked an heir and if he died without one his nation would descend into civil war and would become ripe for the picking for European colonial powers. He would eventually settle on one of his grandchildren Lij Iyasu, as his heir. Iyasu would only reign for about 3 years before being deposed on charges of converting to Islam. Ethiopia had been a Christian kingdom since King Ezana of the Aksumite Empire adopted Christianity as the official religion in the 4th century CE. There's no definitive proof that Iyasu converted to Islam at any point in his life, but there was enough “proof” that everyone felt comfortable stipping him of authority and giving it to Haile Selassie. He served as the Regent for Empress Zedwditu from 1916 until her death in 1930, and after her death served as Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930 until he was deposed in 1974 by the Derg following the 1973 oil crisis. Derg or Dergue is Amharic (a Semitic language descended from Ge'ez, which is the liturgical language of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. It translates as committee or council. Now, Ethiopia would fall under partial Italian control during the 1930s as part of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War between Fascist Italy and Ethiopia, and while Italy would have some successes during this war, they'd never attain full control over Ethiopia, making Ethiopia the only African nation to not ever fall under colonial control. Some would argue that Liberia would fall under that umbrella as well, but considering that Liberia, as a nation, was artificially created by the US as a place for freed slaves to return to, I don't think it qualifies. Haile Selassie as the emperor of Ethiopia would be one of the founding members of the United Nations. Haile Selassie's rule ended on 12 September 1974, when he was deposed by the Derg, a committee made up of military and police officers. After the execution of 60 former government and military officials, the new Provisional Military Administrative Council abolished the monarchy in March 1975 and established Ethiopia as a Marxist-Leninist state. The abolition of feudalism, increased literacy, nationalization, and sweeping land reform including the resettlement and villagization from the Ethiopian Highlands became priorities. Mengistu Haile Mariam would become the ruler of Ethiopia following the fall of Haile Selassie until in May 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) forces advanced on Addis Ababa from all sides, and Mengistu fled the country with 50 family and Derg members. He was granted asylum in Zimbabwe as an official guest of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Now the period of Derg rule is also known as the Ethiopian Civil War. It lasted from 1974 until 1991. The Derg in its attempt to introduce full-fledged socialist ideals, fulfilled its main slogan of "Land to the Tiller", by redistributing land in Ethiopia that once belonged to landlords to the peasants tilling the land. Although this was made to seem like a fair and just redistribution, the mismanagement, corruption, and general hostility to the Derg's violent and harsh rule coupled with the draining effects of constant warfare, separatist guerrilla movements in Eritrea and Tigray, resulted in a drastic decline in general productivity of food and cash crops. Although Ethiopia is often prone to chronic droughts, no one was prepared for the scale of drought and the 1983–1985 famine that struck the country in the mid-1980s, in which 400,000–590,000 people are estimated to have died.  Hundreds of thousands fled economic misery, conscription and political repression, and went to live in neighboring countries and all over the Western world, creating an Ethiopian diaspora community for the first time in its history. Insurrections against the Derg's rule sprang up with ferocity, particularly in the northern regions of Tigray and Eritrea which sought independence and in some regions in the Ogaden. The Ethiopian Civil War left at least 1.4 million people dead, with 1 million related to famine and the remainder from violence and conflicts, which is one third of population.  In July 1991, the EPRDF convened a National Conference to establish the Transitional Government of Ethiopia composed of an 87-member Council of Representatives and guided by a national charter that functioned as a transitional constitution. In 1994, a new constitution was written that established a parliamentary republic with a bicameral legislature and a judicial system. Mengistu's authoritarian military regime faced organized opposition for all of its fourteen years of rule. Opposition groups including the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), a rival Marxist–Leninist group, and the Tigray-based Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, a coalition of ethnic democratic forces, led armed resistance to the Derg in a conflict known as the Ethiopian Civil War. The Derg used violence, commonly enacted through military campaigns, to suppress dissidents. In 1976, the Derg instigated the Qey Shibir (Ethiopian Red Terror), a violent political repression campaign targeting the EPRP.  Under Mengistu's leadership, the Derg did not only rely on state personnel to carry out the Qey Shibir; it also armed militias and civilian supporters and granted "genuine revolutionaries and patriots" impunity, further localizing state violence.  The Qey Shibir resulted in 50,000 fatalities.  In addition, many victims of the Qey Shibir were subjected to torture, exile, and sexual assault. The Qey Shibir and the 1983-1985 famine, an event partly created and exacerbated by the government's military policies, increased popular support for the EPRDF, which successfully overthrew Mengistu's regime in 1991. As we entered the 21st century ethnic tensions began to increase between the people of northern Ethiopia, specifically in the Tigray region and the rest of the nation.  Data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project were used by Charles E. Riddle to study the degrees of discrimination by the dominant Amharas against the non-dominant ethnic groups in Ethiopia from 1950 to 1992, during the later reign of Emperor Haile Selassie and that of Mengistu Haile Mariam of the Derg. Amharas dominated during the Haile Selassie epoch.  Systematic discrimination against Afars occurred throughout the period. Tigrayans were initially culturally assimilated with the Amharas, speaking Amharic, and suffered little discrimination. Under the Haile Selassie government, the Oromo language was legally banned from education, public speaking and use in administration. During the Haile Selassie regime, the Harari people were persecuted. The imperial forces ordered the confiscation of Harari property and mass arrests of Harari men, as a result an estimated 10,000 Hararis fled their homeland in 1948. The Derg culturally rejected the Tigrayans, who decreased their usage of Amharic, reverting to Tigrinya, and discrimination against the Tigrayans became strong. Eritreans, treated by MAR and Riddle as an ethnic group, and Somalis were strongly discriminated against throughout the period. The Oromos were initially strongly discriminated against, but adopted Amharic as their official language when the Derg came to power, and discrimination against them dropped. Both the Haile Selassie and the Derg governments relocated numerous Amharas into southern Ethiopia where they served in government administration, courts, church and even in school, where Oromo texts were eliminated and replaced by Amharic. In the aftermath of the Ogaden War during the 70s, Hararis, Somalis and Oromo Muslims were targeted by the Derg Government. This leads us to needing to talk about the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. The Tigray People's Liberation Front, also called the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, is a left-wing ethnic nationalist, paramilitary group, and the former ruling party of Ethiopia. The TPLF was in charge of Ethiopia from the time the Derg was overthrown in 1991 until 2018. Now it's finally time to get to the beginnings of the Tigray Wart and the Tigray genocide. To do that we need to discuss the 2020 Tigray regional election. As we stated previously, Tigray is a regional state of Ethiopia, and in 2020 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia postponed the 2020 general election over concerns of COVID 19. Tigray decided to hold their elections anyway, regardless of the proclamation made by Ahmed. Their election was considered illegal by the Ethiopian federal government. The TPLF won 98.2 percent of the vote. After years of increased tensions and hostilities between the TPLF and the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, fighting began when TPLF forces attacked the Northern Command headquarters of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), alongside a number of other bases in Tigray. The ENDF counterattacked from the south – while Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) began launching attacks from the north – which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described as a "law enforcement operation". The war officially ended in November 2022. On 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leaders signed a peace accord, with the African Union as a mediator, and agreed on "orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament". The agreement was made effective the next day on 3 November, marking the two-year anniversary of the war. As part of this process, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed TPLF's Getachew Reda as head of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray, and the Ethiopian parliament removed the TPLF from its terrorism list. But where does the Tigray Genocide come into play? Why are we talking about this civil war in this podcast? Let's get into it. Issued on Tuesday, June 4th  by the United States-based New Lines Institute, aa 120-page draft quotes multiple, widespread and credible independent reports that Ethiopian forces and their allies carried out “acts constituting the crime of genocide” during the conflict, which ran between 2020-22. The authors call for Ethiopia to be brought before the International Court of Justice. In a report issued in September 2023, the United Nations said war crimes and crimes against humanity were still being committed nearly a year after government and Tigrayan regional forces agreed to end the fighting. It says the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), alongside the allied Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) and assorted regional militia “possessed the intent to destroy Tigrayans as an ethnic group”. At least four acts constituting the crime of genocide are noted in the report: killing Tigrayans, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life upon Tigrayans calculated to bring about their destruction, and imposing measures intended to prevent births among Tigrayans. Additionally, the finger is pointed at social media posts made by “certain individuals” that constitute public incitement to genocide. Ethiopia, which has been accused of seeking to prevent international scrutiny, has repeatedly denied that its forces carried out war crimes during the conflict. Eritrea has claimed such accusations against it are defamatory. However, the new report, which took two years to compile and features the contribution of dozens of legal experts, backs up the findings of the UN by stating that there is “reasonable basis to believe” that the countries are responsible for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. In conclusion, the authors call on the international community to put pressure on Ethiopia via bilateral relations, as well as bringing the country before the ICJ. The war had a devastating impact on the healthcare system of Tigray; of the 853 health facilities in the region, 86% were at least partially damaged; 232 of them were left "completely unusable", and 28 were destroyed entirely. It also led to a higher rate of maternal and infant mortality in the Tigray Region. In a study funded by UNFPA Ethiopia and UNICEF Ethiopia, it was estimated that maternal mortality rates had increased from 186 deaths per 100,000 people pre-war to 840 deaths per 100,000 people post-war. According to Tigrayan health official Tsegay Gidey, 81% of mothers in the Seharti Samre woreda had birth defects, and 32 newborn infants had died between January–June 2023. Although the war largely came to a halt after the peace agreement was signed, Eritrea continues to occupy parts of Tigray as of mid-2023. The EDF has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of people in northern Ethiopia since November 2022; from 17 to 25 November alone, Eritrea was reported to have destroyed 241 houses and killed at least 111 people. by 30 December, it was estimated that Eritrean and Amhara forces killed 3,700 since the signing of the peace deal. The Tigray Health Bureau noted that 852 cases of rape and sexual assault were reported between November and December 2022; according to aid workers and interviews with survivors, most of these were committed by Eritrean forces. As of January 2023, over half of Irob district was occupied by Eritrea. Irob advocacy groups and former residents have described it as a "de-facto annexation" of the area. A religious Irob leader told The Guardian in August 2023 that Eritrea was blocking off international aid to the area, and lamented that "there has been no improvement for us since the peace."  In January 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that authorities and regional forces were still forcibly expelling Tigrayans from their homes in the Western Tigray Zone, which is largely inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. Additionally, nearly 40% of the Tigrayan population is suffering from extreme food shortages, a situation made worse by the World Food Program's suspension of aid deliveries in May 2023. All the available evidence points to a continued genocide against the Tigray people from the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea as they as systematically denied food, water and access to medical care.  The Tigray Genocide is often described as “The War The World Forgot”, and based on the West's general attitude towards Africa this feels right. Especially when I account for the fact that I, a genocide studies scholar didn't even know about the Tigray Genocide until 2024. I account this a failure on my part, but also on the part of the global mainstream media that this never even came across any of the news websites I frequent, nor the social media websites I, more often, get reputable news from. That's it for this week folks. No new reviews, so let's get right into the outro. Have a Day! w/ The History Wizard is brought to you by me, The History Wizard. If you want to see/hear more of me you can find me on Tiktok @thehistorywizard or on Instagram @the_history_wizard. Please remember to rate, review, and subscribe to Have a Day! On your pod catcher of choice. The more you do, the more people will be able to listen and learn along with you. Thank you  for sticking around until the end and, as always, Have a Day, and Free Tigray.          

#ETHIOPIA: Civil war dominates: Amhara vs Abiy and the Tigrayans. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ethiopias-amhara-militia-says-resettlement-plan-beats-war-drum/ar-AA1o4zWk 1862 Ethiopia

The outlook on lasting peace in Ethiopia has been grim since the cessation of active hostilities in November of last year. A peace agreement between the Tigray's People Liberation Front, or the TPLF, and the Federal Government in Ethiopia has led to significant political concessions from the Tigrayans but ultimately falls short of resolving the underlying tensions. In this episode we explain how the mode of transactional politics has come to dominate the dynamics inside Ethiopia under the current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. We contrast the current political crisis with previous episodes of social unrest and violent change such as the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974. We argue that the ongoing marketisation of political institutions undermines not only the legitimacy of the peace agreement, but the overall monopoly on violence of the state. Featuring Alex de Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation (WPF) and Research Director at the Conflict Research Programme at the LSE, and M

Amnesty International has accused social media giant Facebook of contributing to human rights abuses against Tigrayans during the two-year war in Ethiopia. As Nigeria begins vaccinating girls to prevent cervical cancer, we look at the picture across Africa. And we look at how masquerade in Nigeria is both an art form and act of resistance.

*) Rafah crossing to Egypt opens for the first time since war began Scores of foreign passport holders trapped in Gaza started leaving the war-torn territory as the Rafah crossing to Egypt opened for the first time since the Israeli war on Gaza began on October 7, AFP correspondents reported. Convoys of desperately needed aid have passed between Egypt and Gaza but no people have been allowed to cross. Some 400 foreigners and dual nationals along with some 90 sick and wounded were expected to leave. *) One year on: Despite peace holding on, many Tigrayans struggle to find their feet One year after Ethiopia signed a peace deal with the Tigray People's Liberation Front, ending a brutal conflict that killed hundreds of thousands by some estimates, life in the northern region is slowly limping back to normal. But many Tigrayans say that they were struggling to find their feet after the November 2022 peace agreement, some losing their homes and livelihoods to the war, others grieving family members killed in the conflict. A million people remain displaced across the region, according to the International Organization for Migration, with around 234,000 in Tigray's capital Mekele. *) Bolivia severs ties with Israel as Colombia, Chile recall envoys over Gaza Bolivia has said it had broken diplomatic ties with Israel because of its attacks on Gaza, while neighbours Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors to the Middle Eastern country for consultations. The three countries called for a ceasefire, with Bolivia and Chile pushing for the passage of humanitarian aid into the zone and accusing Israel of violating international law. In response, Israel slammed Bolivia's decision to cut diplomatic ties over its war in Gaza after a deadly Hamas attack as a capitulation to "terror". Other Latin American countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, have also called for a ceasefire. *) Live blog: Ukraine reports most extensive Russian shelling this year Ukraine has said that Russia had shelled more than 100 settlements over the last 24 hours - more than in any single day so far this year. Moscow has fired millions of shells on cities, towns and villages along the frontlines since it launched its offensive last February, reducing several across the eastern part of the country to rubble. "Over the last 24 hours, the enemy shelled 118 settlements in 10 regions. This is the highest number of cities and villages that have come under attack since the start of the year," Ukrainian Interior Minister Igor Klymenko said in a post on social media. And finally… *) Saudi ready for summer or winter World Cup in 2034: FA chief Saudi Arabia is prepared to host the 2034 World Cup in summer or winter, its football chief said, after the oil giant became the sole bidder for the tournament. "Of course, we are ready for all possibilities," Saudi Arabian Football Federation president Yasser al Misehal said late on Tuesday at the Asian Football Confederation awards in Doha. Saudi Arabia's successful bid, just 27 days after announcing it, comes less than a year after neighbouring Qatar held the first winter World Cup, a decision that forced a pause to league competitions in Europe.

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/african-studies

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/genocide-studies

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I talked to Martin Plaut and Sarah Vaughan about their new book Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War (Oxford UP, 2023) The ongoing war and consequent famine in the Ethiopian province of Tigray are increasingly critical. International journalists are not being allowed to travel to the region, which is almost completely sealed off from the outside world. This is a deliberate strategy by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments prosecuting the war: their aim is to crush the Tigrayans at almost any cost. This differentiates the current crisis from the famine of 1984-5, when 400,000 died of starvation primarily as the result of a prolonged drought, exacerbated by war and government inaction.  Today's famine is a direct result of supplies to the region being cut off. Hatred of Tigrayans has been stoked by senior advisers to Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed: they have called Tigrayans "weeds" who must be uprooted, their place in history extinguished. This language is reminiscent of the statements that preceded the genocide in Rwanda. The present situation has been orchestrated since 2018 by Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki, who wields considerable influence over Ethiopian affairs. His troops are deep inside Ethiopia, his security agents in its towns and cities. For both the Eritrean President and the Ethiopian Prime Minister, this appears to be a fight to the finish. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

How does a country go from its leader winning the Nobel Peace Prize to all-out war in just one year? That's the question surrounding Ethiopia, which has become embroiled in one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century. The U.S. has called it an ethnic cleansing campaign against Tigrayans, a minority group in the country; some human rights organizations have called it a genocide. But many people outside Ethiopia and its diaspora had no idea it was happening. In U.S. media, it's hardly discussed, even as violence has intensified throughout the country. In this episode, we tell the story of Ethiopia — the oldest independent country in Africa — and the political, cultural and religious factors that led to this war.

Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki has said that the United States supported the Tigray People's Liberation Front or TPLF in its 2-year war with the Government in Addis. In a long interview, he claimed the US pressed the peace deal to prevent the Tigrayans being defeated. Also, Ghanaian pensioners protest outside the Ministry of Finance offices, saying the Government shouldn't make them destitute. Plus, we hear why countries on the continent are now THE destination for African tourists who prefer the attractions closer to home than elsewhere. Those stories and more in this podcast with Bola Mosuro.

In Nigeria, 30 train passengers have been abducted in Edo state, with police hunting for the perpetrators. Insecurity is a huge problem in many parts of the country, and a key concern for voters ahead of next month's general elections. Plus, after a peace deal ended the civil war and as essential services begin to be restored, young Tigrayans say they're being blocked from flying to Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa. And we have a special report from Namibia, where the government decriminalised baby abandonment three years ago, and now wants to relaunch the campaign.

https://thecommunists.org/2022/12/11/news/ethiopia-peace-talks-tigrayan-tplf-setbacks/

Today we're bringing you a bonus episode on Ethiopia from Crisis Group's Global Podcast Hold Your Fire!.On 2 November, the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan forces reached an agreement to cease hostilities and end almost two years of bloody war in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region. The truce came after the Ethiopian army, together with Eritrean troops and forces from the Amhara region, which borders Tigray, made rapid advances into Tigray over recent weeks. It raises hopes that peace in Tigray might be within reach and that the region's humanitarian crisis – amplified by a federal blockade on aid throughout much of the war – can finally be addressed. However, peace talks did not include Eritrea, despite its involvement in the war, and the deal includes no provisions about what will happen to the Eritrean forces in Tigray. It does involve other major concessions for the Tigrayans, who agreed to fully disarm within a month. In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood is joined by Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group's Africa director, to talk about the cessation of hostilities and its implications. They talk about the events leading to the truce, Ethiopia's recent offensive in the Tigray region, Eritrea's involvement in the conflict and how all sides are likely to view and respond to the agreement. They address the role of the African Union and its envoy, former Nigerian President Olesugun Obasanjo, in brokering the agreement. They also talk about the influence of external actors in Ethiopia and how the support of countries like the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye for the Ethiopian government shaped battlefield dynamics. They ask what went wrong with a transition in Ethiopia that had generated enormous optimism in its early years, and what the coming years might bring for politics in the Horn of Africa at a moment of considerable flux. For more on the situation in Ethiopia, check out Crisis Group's extensive analysis on our Ethiopia country page. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

On 2 November, the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan forces reached an agreement to cease hostilities and end almost two years of bloody war in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region. The truce came after the Ethiopian army, together with Eritrean troops and forces from the Amhara region, which borders Tigray, made rapid advances into Tigray over recent weeks. It raises hopes that peace in Tigray might be within reach and that the region's humanitarian crisis – amplified by a federal blockade on aid throughout much of the war – can finally be addressed. However, peace talks did not include Eritrea, despite its involvement in the war, and the deal includes no provisions about what will happen to the Eritrean forces in Tigray. It does involve other major concessions for the Tigrayans, who agreed to fully disarm within a month. In this episode of Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood is joined by Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group's Africa director, to talk about the cessation of hostilities and its implications. They talk about the events leading to the truce, Ethiopia's recent offensive in the Tigray region, Eritrea's involvement in the conflict and how all sides are likely to view and respond to the agreement. They address the role of the African Union and its envoy, former Nigerian President Olesugun Obasanjo, in brokering the agreement. They also talk about the influence of external actors in Ethiopia and how the support of countries like the United Arab Emirates and Türkiye for the Ethiopian government shaped battlefield dynamics. They ask what went wrong with a transition in Ethiopia that had generated enormous optimism in its early years, and what the coming years might bring for politics in the Horn of Africa at a moment of considerable flux. For more on the situation in Ethiopia, check out Crisis Group's extensive analysis on our Ethiopia country page. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

After two years of civil war - and eight days of AU-mediated talks in South Africa - the Ethiopian federal government and Tigrayan authorities have signed a cessation of hostilities agreement. But what's in the deal, and will this be the end of the war, which also - notoriously - includes Eritrea? Also in the programme: the world's largest tropical peatlands in the Congo Basin may be approaching a tipping point where they flip from being a major carbon store to a major carbon emitter; and how could the new far right element in Benjamin Netanyahu's expected next coalition affect Israel's policies at home - and the country's standing abroad? (Photo: Ethiopian government representative Redwan Hussien and Tigraany delegate Getachew Reda pass documents during the signing of the AU-led negotiations to resolve the conflict in northern Ethiopia, in Pretoria , South Africa, November 2, 2022 / Credit: REUTERS / Siphiwe Sibeko)

My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin

Isaias Afwerki, usually known as Isaias, is Eritrea's only ever President, having served in the role since 1993. After rising through the ranks of Eritrea's liberation movement during a thirty-year war for independence against Ethiopia, Isaias has instituted a colossal centralisation of power around himself; Eritrea has no free newspapers, no constitution, no parliament; it doesn't even have a formal budget. The country also has one of the strictest systems of conscription in the world.  Though this state of affairs is very unpleasant to the ordinary Eritreans wo have to live  with it every day, the international community would probably be happy leaving Isaias be if he left the world alone. But this isn't what Isaias has done. Since 1993, Isaias has involved Eritrea in wars in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and most significantly Ethiopia, where, since 2020, the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments have been waging war against the Tigrayans. This war is the deadliest war the world has seen this decade so far, and Isaias, who hates the Tigrayans, is largely to blame for it. Never more than Isaias has my guest and I discussed a single person so singularly to blame for so much harm. My guest today is Martin Plaut. Martin is a journalist specialising in the Horn of Africa region, he worked as a BBC news journalist for nearly thirty years and currently works for Chatham House. Along with Sarah Vaughan, he is the lead author on an upcoming book, Understanding Ethiopia's Tigray War, due to be released in February 2023. As well as the War in Tigray, we discuss Eritrea's colonial history, the country's long struggle for independence, and the implications of being governed not just by one group of people for thirty years, but by a single individual. 

For two years, Ethiopia has been caught in the grip of a war between government forces and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), who control the country's northernmost state. As the power struggle polarized the country along ethnic lines, the number of mass killings and other atrocities led one Ethiopian general to dub it a “very dirty war.” An agreement in March led to a truce, but after five months, fighting was reignited on Aug. 24. Yet hope for a lasting peace may not yet be lost. “Initially, the Tigrayans insisted that they were not going to be part of the peace process,” Dr. Adeoye Akinola tells New Lines' Kwangu Liwewe. But thanks to the diplomatic efforts of the African Union (AU), both the federal government and the TPLF have agreed to allow the international organization to mediate negotiations between the warring factions. As the United Nations convenes in New York, Ethiopians are watching closely in the hope that diplomacy can triumph. “We cannot hide from this,” says Tedla Asfaw. “We have to face it.” But with neighboring Eritrea, a government ally, launching a new offensive into Tigray, the conflict looks as if it may descend once more into total war. “Whether it's the AU or the United Nations,” says analyst Chris Maroleng, “It's quite clear that what is actually required is a reformation of not just the institutions, but the manner in which politics is carried out in Ethiopia.” Produced by Joshua Martin

Since November 2020, the ongoing tensions between the Ethiopian federal government and the leadership of the northern Tigray region have been manifesting as open conflict. The violence has resulted in both humanitarian and political crises, with reports of possible ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans and mass displacement and migration of Ethiopians. With Ethiopia serving as a long-standing provider of security in the region and a prominent voice for African interests, the conflict may also result in a security vacuum, affecting the stability of neighboring Somalia and South Sudan. Join us for a discussion on the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict and its ongoing humanitarian situation and impact on the Horn of Africa. We are joined by Professor Alex de Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, Research Professor at Tufts University, and Professorial Fellow at the London School of Economics as well as Ambassador David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor of African affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.---This Virtual Briefing Series event was originally hosted on  June 17th, 2021.Music by Joseph McDade.Upcoming events: https://network2020.org/upcoming-events/Follow us at:Twitter: @Network2020LinkedIn: Network 20/20Facebook: @network2020Instagram: @network_2020Follow us at:Network2020.orgTwitter: @Network2020LinkedIn: Network 20/20Facebook: @network2020Instagram: @network_2020

The Ethiopian government-appointed human rights watchdog has called for the immediate release of thousands of Tigrayans who are being held in two detention camps in the north-eastern region of Afar. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission described their detention as illegal. It says around 9,000 Tigrayans have been held there since December last year. They were from areas bordering Tigray where there has been a civil war. The Addis Ababa government says the detainees were being held for their own safety and also to allow screening to find criminals including people linked to the fighting.

The US has called for the release of thousands of ethnic Tigrayans who reportedly remain detained arbitrarily in Ethiopia, and wants access to be granted to international monitors. A joint report by rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had earlier accused Amhara forces of waging a campaign of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Tigrayans in disputed areas. The two rights groups also claimed that the federal government have approved or possibly participated in the alleged atrocities. The US expressed concern over what it called ethnically-motivated atrocities against Tigrayans in western Tigray. Ethiopia has called the humanitarian report unhelpful but pledged to examine the allegations.

Today we're bringing you a bonus episode on Ethiopia from Crisis Group's global podcast Hold Your Fire!. After almost seventeen months of devastating civil war in Ethiopia, the federal government on 24 March announced what it called a humanitarian truce. The offer would ostensibly allow aid into Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, which has, in effect, been under a blockade for months and where millions face what the UN describes as a serious lack of food. The government's unilateral truce declaration comes after its offensive in late 2021 pushed back Tigrayan forces, who had advanced to within striking distance of the capital Addis Ababa – the latest about-face in a war that has seen the balance of force between federal troops and Tigrayan rebels swing back and forth. It also comes alongside other signals that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may have tempered his initial goal of crushing Tigray's leadership. This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood, Naz Modirzadeh and William Davison, Crisis Group's senior analyst for Ethiopia, discuss the causes and significance of the government's proposal. They map out the military dynamics on the ground and the evolving calculations of Tigrayan leaders, Prime Minister Abiy, other Ethiopian protagonists in the conflict and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, whose forces were also fighting alongside the federal troops against the Tigrayans. They talk about the role of foreign powers in supporting President Abiy Ahmed and in pushing for peace and break down how regional relations are shaping the conflict. They ask how optimistic we should be that the truce eases Tigray's humanitarian disaster or even serves as a foundation for peace talks and how such talks might surmount the thorniest obstacles – notably resolving a territorial dispute in Western Tigray – to a political settlement. For more information, explore Crisis Group's analysis on our Ethiopia page. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

After almost seventeen months of devastating civil war in Ethiopia, the federal government on 24 March announced what it called a humanitarian truce. The offer would ostensibly allow aid into Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, which has, in effect, been under a blockade for months and where millions face what the UN describes as a serious lack of food. The government's unilateral truce declaration comes after its offensive in late 2021 pushed back Tigrayan forces, who had advanced to within striking distance of the capital Addis Ababa – the latest about-face in a war that has seen the balance of force between federal troops and Tigrayan rebels swing back and forth. It also comes alongside other signals that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed may have tempered his initial goal of crushing Tigray's leadership. This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard Atwood, Naz Modirzadeh and William Davison, Crisis Group's senior analyst for Ethiopia, discuss the causes and significance of the government's proposal. They map out the military dynamics on the ground and the evolving calculations of Tigrayan leaders, Prime Minister Abiy, other Ethiopian protagonists in the conflict and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, whose forces were also fighting alongside the federal troops against the Tigrayans. They talk about the role of foreign powers in supporting President Abiy Ahmed and in pushing for peace and break down how regional relations are shaping the conflict. They ask how optimistic we should be that the truce eases Tigray's humanitarian disaster or even serves as a foundation for peace talks and how such talks might surmount the thorniest obstacles – notably resolving a territorial dispute in Western Tigray – to a political settlement. For more information, explore Crisis Group's analysis on our Ethiopia page. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In last week's episode, I bemoaned the fratricidal wars still raging between Russians and Ukrainians in Europe and Ethiopians and Tigrayans in Africa, respectively. But the latest battle in America's culture war, which erupted this week between woke academics and museum curators in New York over the fate of a statue of former president Theodore Roosevelt, is a worthy diversion. Contact: ipinionsj@gmail.com Length: 16 min 10 sec 

Pan-African lawyers have told the AU to prioritise Ethiopia's civil war, accusing the Government of atrocities against Tigrayans and calling for dialogue; 13 million people across Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia are at risk of famine due to pervasive drought; Mauritius sends a research boat to the disputed Chagos Islands, also known as Africa's last British colony; And we take a look at how the technology behind some Covid-19 vaccines is being replicated in South Africa and how it could help find a jab against HIV.

Your hosts embark on a journey to Northern Norway to meet an expert on none other than the Tigray region of Ethiopia, Teklehaymanot Weldemichel. Though a more somber subject than what we usually touch on, the war on Tigray deserves much more attention and international action. Teklehaymanot describes to us the atrocities witnessed around Tigray, from inhumane war crimes to the burning of entire villages. We discuss the recent history of the region, Tigray's position within Ethiopia, and the events leading up to the war. Teklehaymanot himself is a victim of this war, even if he resides away from it, as much of his family and friends must endure and survive in a region without internet or telecommunication.   Although we could have talked for hours more on the subject, our conversation touches on a wide variety of questions related to Tigray and the war such as why the international community has failed, discourses in Western and Ethiopian media surrounding the Tigrayans, as well as the fact that the events of the last two years do in fact cover all of the criteria for there being a Genocide in Tigray. Teklehaymanot's own published work argues that the ongoing, devastating, famine is a product of human design by the belligerents of this war.   We ask that comments to this episode remain kind-hearted and human as they always are, and thank Teklehaymanot for his courage in telling his story and that of his compatriots abroad.   You can find Teklehaymanot on Twitter - @TeklehaymanotG   Let us know your thoughts at risingwiththetide@gmail.com as well as what you'd like us to talk about next!   Links to all streaming platforms and socials: linktr.ee/risingwiththetide   Or head to our website! www.risingwiththetide.org   Song for the episode: "Lomi Ayney Berhe" by Eyasu Berhe

Join us for this discussion about how to make sense of the current crisis in Ethiopia. How should progressives make sense of the government of Ethiopia, alongside the Amhara regional militia, launching a genocidal attack on the country's northern Tigray region — even going as far as inviting neighboring Eritrea to join in on the atrocities? NGOs have documented some of the torture, sexual assault, starvation and state violence uniquely directed at Tigray — including Eritrean refugees who lived there prior to the war — but without providing broader analysis of the historical and contemporary political forces driving the conflict. The panelists in this forum will juxtapose the Tigray genocide with the #OromoProtests movement — which ousted the previous regime — seeking to rectify legacies of conquest and enslavement in an Ethiopian empire best described as a “prison house of nations”. The mainstream media and humanitarian organizations count casualties from the standpoint of nowhere, and some claiming to represent the international left, like the ANSWER Coalition and the Black Alliance for Peace, which co-organized the November 21 coordinated rallies, approach the war through a US-centric prism and defend the Abiy government. In contrast, a grounded political analysis that rejects US imperialism and genocide is possible if we ask a different set of questions. How should we understand the #TigrayGenocide in relation to conscription in Oromia by the federal government and reports of the Tigrayan Defense Force committing atrocities in Amhara, Afar and against Eritrean refugees? What do the Qimant, Somali or those of the 83+ nationalities forcibly incorporated into Ethiopia tell us about how state formation got us here and what's politically possible to get us out? Speakers: J. Khadijah Abdurahman is founder and Director of We Be Imagining at Columbia University's INCITE Center and the American Assembly's Democracy and Trust Program. They are also a Tech Impact Network Research Fellow at NYU's AI Now Institute in partnership with UCLA's C2I2 and UWA Law School. Their research focus is on predictive analytics in the New York City child welfare system and the role of tech in mass atrocities in the Horn of Africa. Maebel Gebremedhin is the founder and president of Tigray Action Committee, a nonprofit committed to helping end the suffering of millions of Tigrayans due to the #TigrayGenocide. Ayantu Tibeso is a scholar focusing on transnational Indigenous Oromo knowledge production and archival erasure in the construction of Ethiopian national narratives. She is a Cota-Robles Fellow and doctoral student in Information Studies at UCLA. Recent article by Ayantu Tibeso & J. Khadijah Abdurahman: “Tigray, Oromia, and The Ethiopian Empire”: https://thefunambulist.net/magazine/against-genocide/tigray-oromia-and-the-ethiopian-empire Recent from Maebel Gebremedhin: "Will My Tigrayan Family Ever Really Be Free?": https://www.thecut.com/2021/10/my-tigrayan-family.html Moderator: Promise Li is an activist and writer from Hong Kong and Los Angeles. He organizes international solidarity work with Internationalism from Below and Lausan Collective. This event is sponsored by Haymarket Books, Internationalism From Below, Africa Is A Country, and Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE). Watch the live event recording: https://youtu.be/sMTdgtzoiro Buy books from Haymarket: www.haymarketbooks.org Follow us on Soundcloud: soundcloud.com/haymarketbooks

Recent weeks have seen yet another major turn of events in Ethiopia's civil war. Only a month ago, the momentum was firmly on the Tigray side after an advance toward the capital. In response, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed exhorted citizens to enlist and vowed to lead a counteroffensive from the frontlines. Foreign governments also swooped in with support, especially drones, which altered the conflict's dynamics. Federal and allied regional forces have thus pushed back the Tigray forces, turning momentum once again and staving off any assault on Addis Ababa. Still, there are few reasons to expect a swift resolution: the Tigrayans have since had their own resurgence and there is little political appetite for dialogue.This week, Alan talks to William Davison, Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Ethiopia, to make sense of where the current political and military dynamics now stand, following the dizzying twists and turns in the war. They take stock of the current balance of military power between the different sides, discuss the counteroffensive's success, the impact of government drone strikes and Abiy's relationship with foreign actors ranging from the Gulf states to China and the U.S. They also talk about the prospects for an elusive resolution to the conflict and what could prevent the civil war from grinding on for many more months and possibly years.For more information, explore Crisis Group's analysis on our Ethiopia page. Make sure to take a look at Crisis Group's recent statement ‘Time to End Ethiopia's Unwinnable War'. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Have you been following the situation in Ethiopia?Of course you haven't.No one has the time or mental fortitude to endure the unending amount of conflict that happens between human beings on planet earth.The only reason I keep up with Ethiopia is that's where my wife grew up.Briefly: Colonialists left Africa in a terrible state, in which various tribes were smashed together into single nations, while others sought to grab new territory in the wake of colonial retrenchment.Ethiopia is one of those latter places (but also was kinda-sorta colonized by Italy, which is why it still has such great pasta. It's complicated.)Home to five official languages and eighty different ethnic groups, Ethiopia is a powder keg for conflict with a growing population and depleting resources. One people group has already managed to splinter off: Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia came at the high price of 250,000 people dead.Now, essentially two tribes in Ethiopia — Tigray in the north, Oromo in the south — are trying to destroy each other. The Tigrayans are an ancient Spartan-style warrior tribe, and they're so desperate for self-rule that they've started killing Ethiopian citizens. Things have gotten so bad that the Prime Minister of Ethiopia has ordered all military to protect the capital from falling, and is sending in Turkish combat drones. In twenty years, we might look back on the conflict and call it the next Rwanda.It makes you wonder:Maybe Ethiopia would be better off as two, ten, or even eighty smaller nations.It's the same all over the world:Spain's arcane monarchy oppresses several distinct cultures including Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Basque Country, Castile, Catalonia, Galicia, León, Navarre, Valencia, and Aran Valley.Anglophone Canada just celebrated its 150th anniversary a few years ago, but it rules over a French-speaking nation that's 400 years old.A certain 1.45 billion-person Eastern nation that cannot be named rules over at least four other countries with brutal authoritarian force.Want peace in the Middle East? Try a nine-state solution.The United Kingdom is a laughable misnomer. The Welsh hate the English. The Scottish hate the English. The Cornish hate the English. Half the Northern Irish just call themselves Irish. The United Kingdom contains at least five countries, and all are essentially colonies of the City of London Corporation. [Update: English people, stop saying this isn't true. I live in Wales and it's front-and-center every single day.]There are more than five thousand Indigenous nations across the globe, totaling nearly half a billion people.The gig is upYoung people are waking up to an obvious fact that many older folks (especially those who murdered people who carried a different team flag) simply cannot fathom:Nations are legal fictions.Just bits of paper and a bunch of people who agree to play by the paper's rules.Yes, there are some benefits to nationalism.There are also heavy costs.People are rightly starting to question the value of nation-states as they are currently arranged.What is the purpose of a nation?To preserve a unique culture?To express a political ideology?To propagate a religion?To organize an economy?At the end of the day, I believe every nation is just an experiment in what it means to live well.And currently, almost every nation on earth is on a downward trajectory, if not failing miserably.The end of big countriesLarge nations are unwieldy.The bureaucracy it takes to run a 300+ million person nation proves economically inefficient in the extreme.Democracy crumbles because it's hard to get real representation at scale.And there are so many disparate opinions that disagreements become intractable.When working together inevitably fails, one party dominates through coercion, violence, or worse.In a nuclear age where going to war will destroy everyone and everything, there's no longer a need to have a vast population to defend your borders.We just don't need big countries anymore.An introduction to Tinyism“Tinyism is a political philosophy that believes current empires and nations should be fractured, shattered, and dissolved into thousands of independent micro-states and city-states. This action would vastly improve democracy and enhance economies — recent statistics indicate small nations are usually the happiest, wealthiest, and most peaceful.” — Hank PellissierHere's my prediction:Within one hundred years, there will be at least one hundred new nations on planet earth.But there could be plenty more.After all, there are 650 major ethnic groups, about 9,800 cultural-ethno-linguistic groups, and up to 24,000 unimax groups.(Plus there are 108,000 publicly-listed corporations, all of which will be chomping for a private domain in the years ahead… though not one should get it.)Why shouldn't ethnic groups have the right to self-sovereignty, especially for the hundreds who've had their sovereignty stolen? Isn't it inherently racist for one ethnicity to impose its will on another ethnic group?After a major disruptive event — a colossal economic depression, a cyberwar or solar flare that knocks out the grid for a year or more, or a supervolcano that causes years of winter — we could see the emergence of tens of thousands of new sovereignties.And that would be a very good thing.In praise of tinyWhen you have a smaller population, you can have a smaller bureaucracy.When you have a smaller population, you can have more representation and democracy.When you have a smaller population, you can avoid getting pushed around by groups that don't share your values.When you have a smaller population, you can better preserve unique cultures, races, religions, economic systems, histories, societal structures, and experiments in what it means to live well.When you have a smaller population, you can have fewer rules, fewer laws, and more freedom.And if you don't like your tiny country, you now have far more other options to choose from.“But what about national defense?!”It's a legitimate fear, but it's worth noting that small nations are some of the safest nations on earth.And luckily, returns to violence are drastically decreasing in the digital economy. There's just less stuff to steal and fewer resources to exploit.Quite paradoxically, being more “vulnerable” makes you learn to get along. New sovereignties will do well to form an alliance with hundreds of other city-states. Like NATO, attacking one would be like attacking all. Plus, new sovereignties will move swiftly to ink trade deals with hundreds of other nations to further increase the cost of war and the value of peace.Pretty soon, everyone will get along because there's no other choice.The return of the city-stateThe world is urbanizing and power is accruing to cities. Already in America, we're seeing mayors defy state and national mandates in order to protect and defend their citizens (or just rebel for political reasons, depending on your point of view.)There's no reason to think that many cities won't eventually just become laws unto themselves.I'm excited for this to happen. After all, some of the most beautiful places on earth started out as tiny little cities, and their historic urban cores are still beautiful all these centuries later:Paris was 25 acres.Athens was 35 acres.Lille was 60 acres.Vatican City is 109 acres.Oxford was 115 acres.Old Jerusalem is 225 acres.The City of London is 330 acres.Monaco is 499 acres.Rome was 608 acres.The walls of Avila, one of the most gorgeous sights on earth, surround just 77 acres.What will become of America?Nearly half of all Americans want to secede from the union in one direction or another.And that's perfectly within their rights as human beings.Others protest loudly that the union must be preserved at all costs. But they never seem to answer the all-important question:What are we actually trying to preserve?Our lack of shared values? The sham of democracy? McDonald's and apple pie and baseball?Think long and hard about this question — no matter what conclusion you reach, you'll find that it simply doesn't resonate with the majority of Americans.And what's preferable: A few dozen independent countries, or another civil war?(31% of Americans think a civil war is likely within the next five years, with Democrats thinking it's more likely.)So why not take the bloated carcass that is the American corporatocracy and carve it up into a handful of actual democracies?With any luck, we could see some pretty amazing things come out of the USA:Washington and Oregon will become Cascadia and rebuild the rainforest.Utah will rename itself Deseret and grab a chunk of Nevada.New England will be the world's purveyor of blueberries, maple syrup, and winter skiing adventures.32% of Californians already support Calexit, which will make it the fifth-biggest economy in the world (ahead of the UK, France, Italy, India, and hundreds more.)The Plains Nation will continue to feed the world as a giant agrarian commune, likely swarmed with bitcoin-loving libertarian “sovereign individuals.”Texas (or rather, the Hispanic-majority República de Tejas) will have the eleventh largest military on earth, the tenth-largest economy, its own power grid, and enough solar and wind power to be a net clean energy exporter.Las Vegas will obviously become the American Amsterdam.Minorities will pour out of Dixie, plunging the Deep South into social chaos and economic depression — and perhaps the Confederacy will finally learn the lessons they were supposed to learn from the Civil War. (Or maybe it becomes New Afrika and all the whites head for Florida.)New York City CorpTM (12th-largest economy) will become the first city-state with skyscrapers to be fully underwater due to rising sea levels.(I'm not saying this is exactly what the American continent could look like in fifty years. It's far more likely that corporate-controlled “sovereign cities” will emerge first, in places like Nevada and Texas.)What's compelling about Tinyism is that the more experiments we run, the more we'll discover what works and doesn't work. Clearly, Sweden is better than North Korea. But is the Texan way better than the California way? With Tinyism, we'll know pretty quickly. In that sense, Tinyism is almost free-market, with the political “market” being democracy itself.Tinyism is inevitableHave you noticed that society is fracturing?Do you think that extreme left wokies are ever going to find common ground with ultra-right Q-Anoners?It's just not going to happen.There will come a day when the USA falls apart. Will it be a massive economic depression? The Yellowstone Caldera finally erupting?Donald Trump becoming President whether he's elected or not?Even without a mega-event, there's an unstoppable tide that all but guarantees a breakdown of these united states: Individualism.Individualism, by its very nature, is an anti-culture.As Russ Linton put it:“Decentralization and blockchain tech will ensure this happens. Fiat currencies will be worthless and with that, the power of a nation-state largely evaporates. DAO communities, both digitally and geographically-bound, are what the future holds.”We in the rich West have enjoyed a lifetime of unlimited selection, and this atomization mentality will eventually seep its way into politics. As the speed of change escalates, it could happen far sooner than we think.And that's okay.I believe in the unconditional right of cultural and communal (but not corporate) sovereignty, and support all independence efforts toward Tinyism, so long as the leaving party takes their fair portion of the national debt and repays all federal infrastructure investment.The key will be to have some kind of pre-agreed-upon sorting/transition process, like a peaceful version of the Hindustan breakup into India and Pakistan, followed by hopefully-less-dysfunctional EU (but without a shared currency) so the states all get along as the founding fathers intended.Will this happen?It depends.Tinyism in America may likely only work once Tinyism sets in everywhere — especially in Ch!na. We need a huge drop in returns to violence before unique cultures can become sovereign nations. Only then will smaller countries be allowed to flourish. And do you know what? It's going to seem impossible until the very moment it seems obvious. Change is a long time coming and then it happens overnight.On one hand, some corporate predator elites have a vested interest in keeping America together so they can wield its collective might overseas.On the other hand, there are hundreds of corporations with larger market caps than many countries, and corporatists are itching to free themselves from any sort of democratic governance. That's why I think Tinyism is inevitable.Corporate countries aside, Tinyism could create a great leap forward in human innovation, creativity, and culture-making, as real democracies create real diversity, reversing our long and boring descent into multinational sameness.I'm cheering for a twenty-nation America and a 10,000-nation earth.It's either that, or we become a corporate-controlled one-nation earth where everyone conforms or gets crushed.And no one wants that. Get full access to Surviving Tomorrow at www.surviving-tomorrow.com/subscribe

In this episode, we discuss the current conflicts in Ethiopia with Professor Kjetil Tronvoll, Director of Oslo Analytica, and Professor and Research Director of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Oslo New University collegeThe Ethiopian central government has been at war with Tigrayan forces since November 2020. Tigray is a region in the North of Ethiopia whose main group, Tigrayans, make up 6.1% of Ethiopia's population. This war has not only destabilized Ethiopia, it has also created a humanitarian crisis.Note: The views expressed by the guest experts do not necessarily reflect my personal views - the intent of Geopolitical Perspectives is to provide listeners with an informed perspective on a conflict/issue and to be presented with different points of view. 

Western powers have called on the Ethiopian government to stop detaining people based on their ethnicity. The US, UK and others cited reports by human rights groups that many Tigrayans were being rounded up, including priests, the elderly and mothers with their children. They said people were being held without charge in inhumane conditions. The government denies it is targeting any ethnic group. It says individuals who are suspected of supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front and its ally the Oromo Liberation Army have been arrested. The government says it has made significant gains against Tigrayan forces in recent days.

Western powers have called on the Ethiopian government to stop detaining people based on their ethnicity. The US, UK and others cited reports by human rights groups that many Tigrayans were being rounded up, including priests, the elderly and mothers with their children. They said people were being held without charge in inhumane conditions. The government denies it is targeting any ethnic group. It says individuals who are suspected of supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front and its ally the Oromo Liberation Army have been arrested. The government says it has made significant gains against Tigrayan forces in recent days.

Western powers have called on the Ethiopian government to stop detaining people based on their ethnicity. The US, UK and others cited reports by human rights groups that many Tigrayans were being rounded up, including priests, the elderly and mothers with their children. They said people were being held without charge in inhumane conditions. The government denies it is targeting any ethnic group. It says individuals who are suspected of supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front and its ally the Oromo Liberation Army have been arrested. The government says it has made significant gains against Tigrayan forces in recent days.

Fighting continues in Ethiopia, where rebel groups are advancing on the capital Addis Ababa. While much has been said about the northern front, where the army is at war with the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), another armed group – allied to Tigrayans – is fighting from the south and west of the country. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) now controls a large swathe of territory. Together, the TDF and OLA plan to topple the government and take over the capital. The government accuses these rebel groups of committing crimes against civilians, including several massacres. Our regional correspondent reports.

My fellow Africans, let us remember all TPLF are Tigrayan but not all Tigrayan are TPLF. Kindly let's give each other's a chance and strive for One Africa.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken starts his Africa tour +++ Thousands of Tigrayans in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, have already been detained +++ Sudan's escalating political climate +++ The challenges of a Boda Boda riders in Kampala +++ Among Maasai nomadic pastoralists, cases of female genital mutilation have become more prevalent

Ethiopia: mass arbitrary arrests target Tigrayans, says UN rights office  UNITAID deal seals COVID-19 antiviral boost for one in two people globally Tobacco use falling, but ‘unscrupulous' companies luring new users

The African Union's special envoy to Ethiopia, Olusegun Obasanjo, has warned that dialogue cannot deliver peace to Ethiopia while the war continues to intensify. Mr Obasanjo says he remained hopeful about possible talks but that all sides needed to stop fighting and find some common ground. The Tigrayans say there can be no dialogue until the federal authorities allow aid into Tigray, where tens of thousands are on the brink of famine. The government says the Tigrayans must recognise its legitimacy and withdraw from the regions of Amhara and Afar.

The African Union's special envoy to Ethiopia, Olusegun Obasanjo, has warned that dialogue cannot deliver peace to Ethiopia while the war continues to intensify. Mr Obasanjo says he remained hopeful about possible talks but that all sides needed to stop fighting and find some common ground. The Tigrayans say there can be no dialogue until the federal authorities allow aid into Tigray, where tens of thousands are on the brink of famine. The government says the Tigrayans must recognise its legitimacy and withdraw from the regions of Amhara and Afar.

The African Union's special envoy to Ethiopia, Olusegun Obasanjo, has warned that dialogue cannot deliver peace to Ethiopia while the war continues to intensify. Mr Obasanjo says he remained hopeful about possible talks but that all sides needed to stop fighting and find some common ground. The Tigrayans say there can be no dialogue until the federal authorities allow aid into Tigray, where tens of thousands are on the brink of famine. The government says the Tigrayans must recognise its legitimacy and withdraw from the regions of Amhara and Afar.

What's been happening in Ethiopia? Who are the Tigrayans? Who are the O.L.A.? Who should you root for? We dont know Email us: askthesitdowns@gmail.com Twitter, Instagram, all that stuff: https://linktr.ee/TheSitDowns  

Few imagined when Ethiopia's civil war began a year ago that the capital, Addis Ababa, would come under threat from Tigrayan rebels. We explain why the tide has turned. At this time of year, India's deadliest environmental problem—its toxic air—is at its worst. And the Chinese Comminust Party is cracking down on burning gifts for the dead.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Few imagined when Ethiopia's civil war began a year ago that the capital, Addis Ababa, would come under threat from Tigrayan rebels. We explain why the tide has turned. At this time of year, India's deadliest environmental problem—its toxic air—is at its worst. And the Chinese Comminust Party is cracking down on burning gifts for the dead.For full access to print, digital and audio editions of The Economist, subscribe here www.economist.com/intelligenceoffer See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Tigrayan forces have warned they could march on the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa to prevent what they call a "genocide" against Tigrayans. A journalist there tells Newshour people are worried. Also in the programme: the world's first anti-viral pill to treat Covid has been approved for use in Britain, but when will it be available elsewhere? And as the UN climate conference discusses the end of coal power, we'll hear about the impact of floods in Germany and mega-fires in Greece. (Photo: An emotional ceremony has been held in Ethiopia to mark the first anniversary of the war. Credit: EPA)

Tigrayan expats in St. Louis and Kansas City discuss the violence and turmoil in their home country of Ethiopia and share how a local support group has helped them come to terms with it.

*) HRW reports 'war crimes' attacks on Eritrean refugees in Tigray Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia's Tigray have suffered abuses ranging from executions to rape in what amount to "clear war crimes", Human Rights Watch says. The rights watchdog says the Tigrayans distrusted them as they were the same nationality as occupying Eritrean soldiers, who in turn doubted the refugees' loyalty. HRW said it had received credible reports that Eritrean troops killed 31 people in Hitsats, one of the two camps in Tigray where abuses were documented. *) Google, Apple remove Navalny app from stores as Russian elections begin Google and Apple have removed jailed Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny's tactical voting app from their stores, after Russia accused the tech giants of interference. Russians are voting to elect a new parliament in a three-day vote starting on Friday. The ruling United Russia party is expected to win despite a rating slump after the biggest crackdown on the Kremlin's critics in years. Allies of Navalny, President Putin's fiercest opponent, planned to use the app to help voters find and support candidates to deal a blow to United Russia. *) US defends nuclear sub deal with Australia The US has defended its decision to share nuclear-powered submarine technology with Australia, rejecting criticism from both China and France. China claims the new alliance, referred to as Aukus, damages regional stability, and jeopardises efforts to halt nuclear weapon proliferation. But White House spokesperson Jen Psaki said the agreement is not aimed at China, although the US has mounting concerns about Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region. *) Austria hears first lawsuit over virus outbreak in ski resort The first civil lawsuit begins in a court in Vienna over a notorious outbreak of Covid-19 at the ski resort of Ischgl in March 2020, where thousands of people from 45 countries became infected. The case is the first of 15 lawsuits filed by plaintiffs from Austria and Germany, accusing authorities of not responding quickly enough to Covid-19 outbreaks in Austrian resorts. It is being brought on behalf of the family of a 72-year-old who died after contracting the virus in Ischgl. *) New Van Gogh drawing discovered, set to go on display A Vincent van Gogh drawing that has been hidden in a private collection for more than a century has gone on display for the first time at an Amsterdam museum. The work titled "Study for 'Worn Out" depicts an old man sitting in a chair and was sketched by Van Gogh in November 1882 when he was just starting his career. The owners of the drawing, a Dutch family which bought it in around 1910, asked the Van Gogh museum to authenticate it and experts confirmed that it was indeed a "new work" by Van Gogh.

Ethiopian officials have accused Tigrayan forces of killing more than 120 people in the neighboring Amhara region.It's the latest sign of how the 10-month conflict has extended far beyond Tigray, with deadly consequences.Related: Tigrayan forces take Ethiopian town known for its ancient churches“In the case of atrocities against civilians, it has been happening in Tigray since the beginning of the conflict in November last year."Saviano Abreu, spokesperson, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs“In the case of atrocities against civilians, it has been happening in Tigray since the beginning of the conflict in November last year,” said Saviano Abreu, a spokesperson with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. “We condemn any type of atrocities,” he said.This latest atrocity, according to Reuters, took place in the village of Chenna Kebele, near Gondar city in the Amhara region.Related: A 'sick joke': Tigrayan forces reject ceasefire in EthiopiaIn a statement, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said a large number of bodies had been discovered in the area. Residents and local authorities told the commission the victims were killed during a two-day period last week, by retreating Tigrayan forces.The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has denied what they called a “fabricated allegation" by the Amhara regional government, and rejected claims that Tigrayan forces had killed civilians.Over the course of the conflict, gruesome human rights violations have been recorded by all parties. But repeated offers and attempts at mediation have so-far failed.Related: Tigrayans say food is being used as a 'weapon of war' “The Ethiopian government has not responded positively to proposals for negotiations. Instead, it has publicly called for the mobilization of militia."Richard Mills, US Deputy Representative to the United Nations“The Ethiopian government has not responded positively to proposals for negotiations. Instead, it has publicly called for the mobilization of militia,” said Richard Mills, US Deputy Representative to the United Nations, during a UN security council meeting last month.“The TPLF, meanwhile, has expanded its own military campaign into the Afar and Amhara regions,” he added.In recent months, the ongoing fighting between Ethiopian federal defense troops, TPLF, and armed ethnic militias has displaced hundreds of people in Afar and Amhara.Related: Rising anger as youth get caught up in Tigray war “The number of people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance in these two regions, in addition to Tigray, is rising daily,” Abreu said.  The World Food Program has warned that more than 1.7 million people in Afar and Amhara are at risk of hunger. “This has just come to compound an already bad situation, so already, people are food-insecure, but this makes things completely worse,” said Christine Hakonze, head of WFP's Semera sub-office, in a video posted on social media this week from inside the Afar region.On top of that, the UN continues to warn of a looming hunger crisis inside the northern Tigray region, which has been mostly cut off from the rest of the country for nearly a year.Over the weekend, a humanitarian convoy of 150 trucks was able to enter Tigray. Now there are concerns about how the expansion of violence will further limit access to Tigray, as overland humanitarian access to the region is currently limited to a single ground route through the Afar region.“The spillover of the conflict is also complicating our operations inside Tigray, humanitarian access into Tigray,” Abreu said. 

Ethiopia entered a new age in 2018 with the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. No longer run by the former Tigray dominated Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Abiy Ahmed ushered in a change to Ethiopia's ethno-federalist structure and in doing so replaced the privileged minority Tigrayans with a new political elite consisting of the majority Oromo and Amharic peoples. In doing so, this move unleashed resentment among the former Tigrayan elite of Ethiopia which possibly lies at the heart of what seems to be a growing civil war between the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Addis Ababa. Join John as he discusses Ethiopia and its ethnic complexities and challenges with the Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Dr. Yonas Adaye Adeto. For more information on this from both sides of the story please watch - the BBC's Hard Talk: https://www.youtube.com/embed/ncW2V_Y4jMw https://www.youtube.com/embed/JtmXRE5kepk This Podcast is Produced by Tim Whiffen of Whimsy Productions for Co-host David Olney, and John Bruni, Director of SAGE International Australia. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Ethiopia entered a new age in 2018 with the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. No longer run by the former Tigray dominated Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Abiy Ahmed ushered in a change to Ethiopia's ethno-federalist structure and in doing so replaced the privileged minority Tigrayans with a new political elite consisting of the majority Oromo and Amharic peoples. In doing so, this move unleashed resentment among the former Tigrayan elite of Ethiopia which possibly lies at the heart of what seems to be a growing civil war between the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Addis Ababa. Join John as he discusses Ethiopia and its ethnic complexities and challenges with the Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Dr. Yonas Adaye Adeto. For more information on this from both sides of the story please watch - the BBC's Hard Talk: https://www.youtube.com/embed/ncW2V_Y4jMw https://www.youtube.com/embed/JtmXRE5kepk This Podcast is Produced by Tim Whiffen of Whimsy Productions for Co-host David Olney, and John Bruni, Director of SAGE International Australia. Support the show: https://www.sageinternational.org.au/strategikon-merch/ See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Join host Zuher in the seventh episode of season two as she discusses updates on the #TigrayGenocide (Listen to "What's the #TigrayGenocide?" - If you haven't already), and what allies can do to support Tigrayans around the world in their fight to end the #TigrayGenocide. Ways to get involved: Leaked Audio from UN: https://twitter.com/OmnaTigray/status/1426549091153190916?s=20 Petition to Label the Atrocities in Tigray a Genocide: https://www.change.org/p/president-of-the-united-states-the-united-states-must-label-the-atrocities-in-tigray-a-genocide-68de29b2-5965-4f1d-8a8a-f5c7a49e353d Amnesty International: "I Don't Know If They Realized I Was A Person" Rape and Other Sexual Violence In the Conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia Report - https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2545692021ENGLISH.PDF https://tigrayactioncommittee.com/ (@TigrayAct on Twitter/Instagram) https://omnatigray.org/ (@OmnaTigray on Twitter/Instagram) Attend a protest near you - find more information about a local event: @TegaruEvents (Twitter/Instagram) Heal Tigray - Verified Charities to Donate Money for the people of Tigray: https://healtigray.com/

IPhones to hunt child-porn and Tigrayans seize UNESCO site  See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

A version of this essay was published by swarajyamag.com at https://swarajyamag.com/world/lessons-for-india-from-south-africa-beware-of-those-bearing-gifts. Please listen to the podcast (click the ‘play’ button above), and give me feedback. It takes a lot of work to put the podcast together, and I would like to hear what you guys think of it, and your suggestions on how it can be improved. As I write this, there are riots in South Africa over a court order to jail former President Jacob Zuma on corruption charges. It may escalate to a quasi-civil war. It was startling to hear that model-minority Indian-origin South Africans are facing threats to their lives and livelihoods, and that some of them are defending themselves with firearms. As a teenager I read several novels by the Afrikaner author Laurens van der Post about the days of apartheid, and I was struck by the trisanku nature of the Indians there: disrespected by both blacks and whites, living a tenuous and uncertain existence. We saw what happened to Indians in Idi Amin’s Uganda, and we saw how the Chettiars were ejected from Burma. A big reason for the assaults is the certainty that Indians are soft targets: that they do not fight back and they often have assets because they are diligent and save whatever they can. Indian businesses are being torched, and their very lives are in jeopardy.It is important to pay attention to this because India’s future is entwined with the Indian Ocean Rim, and with the fast-growing (at least till the pandemic struck) economies of that huge and relatively empty continent. The Chinese have made massive inroads there, but there is also a backlash. India needs to have an Africa strategy. India, meanwhile, merely gets second-hand information about Africa from the Anglosphere. This has to change. There are serious commercial opportunities. For example, Indian digitization and payment options may be attractive to African nations: UPI, RuPay, Aadhar, Cowin, India Stack etc., along with a bridge between UPI and Kenya’s mPESA. More to the point, there are lessons for us from the African encounter with the West. The net result has been the impoverishment and suffering of the African, including arbitrary lines drawn across the continent tearing apart traditional ethnic identities, leading to endless wars and displacement and ethnic cleansing. That must sound familiar to subcontinentals: the legacy of European empire.I shall confine myself to three examples: Rwanda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. RwandaThere are two ethnic groups in Rwanda, the ‘tall, fair’ Tutsis and the ‘short, dark’ Hutus. Well, that’s the theory, but to the impartial observer, they seem identical: they are very close genetically, and they had generally lived peacefully with each other for centuries. Christian missionaries arriving in Rwanda ‘discovered’ that the minority Tutsi were lording it over the Hutu. I don’t remember if they ‘discovered’ that the Tutsi were also migrants who had defeated and now oppressed the Hutus. In any case, under the missionaries, cleavages in society were manufactured or at least dramatically magnified. In the end, there was a horrific genocide. The Hutus attempted to wipe out the Tutsis, with the collusion of the church. If you get away from the gruesome killings, this might sound vaguely familiar to Indians: yes, it is the ‘Aryan’ Invasion Fairytale in a slightly different form. But the intent was the same: divide et impera. The goal was to maintain white control by fomenting fratricide and civil war.It was the late N S Rajaram who had the insight that what happened in Rwanda was the template for the ‘Aryan’-‘Dravidian’ divide that missionaries created in India. One Bishop Caldwell, and later, his ideological descendants such as EV Ramaswamy Naicker, created exactly the same kind of unscientific and unsubstantiated division between the allegedly ‘Aryan’ Tamil Brahmins and the allegedly ‘Dravidian’ middle castes.We have to assume that the intent in India was also (in addition to divide and rule) continuous fratricidal warfare, bhedam, and thus easy pickings for the imperialists. The funny thing is that Tamil Brahmins are genetically identical to the allegedly ‘Dravidian’ middle castes, but then, there is no reason to let science stand in the way of a good narrative. The fact that this whole thing didn’t lead to genocide in India, a la Rwanda, is miraculous, because it could easily have done so. Perhaps some vestige of civilizational tolerance meant only exile, not physical liquidation.In Rwanda, after the horrific genocide, Tutsis led by Robert Kagame, who had honed fighting skills in neighboring countries, came to power. They have maintained the peace, and led to some level of development, although there are murmurs about autocracy. Interestingly enough, a deep dive into Kagame’s Rwanda brings up a lot of not-so-flattering comparisons to everybody’s poster-child du jour, Bangladesh, but that’s a story for another time. EthiopiaThis is an ancient Christian country with roots going back to the days around the Council of Nicae, 325 CE, that codified Christian dogma. Some seafaring European adventurers who ended up in India were looking for the fabled lost kingdom of ‘Prester John’, supposedly the king of Ethiopia. That didn’t save the country from going through a brutal civil war in the 20th century. The province of Eritrea rebelled, and after a 20-year-long war, which took the lives of an estimated 100,000 people on both sides put together, Eritrea formally became a new nation. In the past year, another rebellion in the province of Tigray has become a serious military problem. It appears as though the Tigrayans, whose fighters had earlier allied with different factions in the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, are now on the verge of defeating combined Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, and are now threatening to take the war into neighboring states. Just like Yugoslavia a while ago, Ethiopia has fallen apart.Why is this relevant to India? Because the West is pushing for the balkanization of India, under the new and sexy name of “sub-national diplomacy”. Thanks to Abhinav Agarwal for pointing out the following article and a pithy quote from it: “Subnational diplomacy should be a crucial tool of Biden’s India strategy... "And, putting their money where their mouth is, Americans are following up by ‘canceling’ the word ‘India’. It is either ‘South Asia’ (which, to quote that war-criminal Churchill, is “about as tangible as the equator”), or it is sub-national. It appears the West is reaching out to West Bengal and also to Tamil Nadu (see the ecstasy with which they received the appointment of Esther Duflo and Jean Dreze to an economic affairs panel there).So it’s never “Indian-American”, but “Bengali-American”, or “South Asian American”, as far as US communiques are concerned. It took them 48 hours, and a lot of noise on social media, to issue a half-hearted retraction to the following. The funny thing is that Samir Banerjee’s father is not even Bengali, he’s Assamese! But hey, anything in the cause of bhedam. Chanakya, I am sure, would approve. Creating divisions where they don’t exist: now where have we seen this before?South SudanThis country was created exactly ten years ago, as a refuge for Christians who, it seems, were being oppressed by North Sudan’s Muslim majority. That is also a story we have heard elsewhere: partition on ideological or especially on religious grounds, courtesy the West. East Timor, for instance. Intriguingly, though, when a European country was divided (Germany) it was quickly reunited. I doubt the same will be true for other countries divided by the West. In 2011, there were hopeful predictions about an egalitarian and prosperous South Sudan, especially because it has oil. But the reality is far from it: the country is desperately poor, and there are accusations of gross human rights violations and oppression based on ethnicity. Child marriage is rife, child soldiers are common, and rape is used widely as a war tactic.The creation of South Sudan has not led to any great improvement in the lives of the people.Of the various ‘splittist’ (to use Chinese vocabulary for a minute) groups in India, the most virulent are the ‘Dravidian’ parties of Tamil Nadu, which nurse fond hopes for something they call ‘United States of South India’. India has also seen that widespread Christian conversion leads to secession and demands for separate homelands: as in much of the Northeast. As conversion increases in Andhra, Telangana and Tamil Nadu (there are already substantial numbers in Kerala), the urge to secede will likely increase. South Sudan’s case is salutary: creating a new nation based on religion is not exactly the most sensible course of action. Fortunately, in India’s case, apart from a few hard-core Tamils, most people in South India have no particular interest in anything ‘Dravidian’. But the ‘subnational diplomacy’ specialists from the Biden administration will likely create trouble. As an example, the closure of the Sterlite copper plant -- precisely when copper prices and demand are set to go through the roof -- must rank as one of the most brain-dead, malicious acts of recent times. It is quite likely that the famed sub-national diplomacy spoken of by CSIS is being applied to the cause of ‘Dravida Nadu’. In this, there will be other eager partners: Pakistan, China and various busybodies such as the Scandinavians who like to fish in troubled waters.African LessonsInterestingly, I have been seeing at least on social media that ordinary Africans are far more cognizant of the malfeasance of ex-colonials than Indians are. Their leaders are aware, too. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who died recently, was one. So was whoever it is who said, pithily, “When the missionaries came, they had the book and we had the land. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened our eyes, they had the land, and we had the book”. Indians, and our leaders, are still bedazzled, and mouth platitudes such as vasudhaiva kutumbakam and athithi devo bhava out of context. It is time we learned something from the Africans. 1600 words, 14 Jul 2021 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com

Tigrayan forces remain in control of much of the region including the capital Mekelle after retaking control on Monday. But what do Tigrayans want now - and what is possible - after eight months of civil war? Also in the programme: how Sudanese volunteers are helping to untangle the corruption of the previous regime; and the former number three at the Vatican and a cardinal of the Catholic Church is to face trial on corruption charges. (Image: the mountains of Tigray are well known to the fighters of the TPLF / Credit: Getty Images)

The United States says Ethiopia's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in the Tigray region could be a positive step if it results in moves to end the conflict.The State Department urged all parties to allow humanitarian access and speed up the delivery of food assistance.United Nations officials say the rebels entered the town of Shire on Tuesday, after seizing the regional capital Mekelle the day before.The United States also called for the immediate, verifiable withdrawal of Eritrean troops, who've been supporting Ethiopian federal forces.The Tigrayans have said they will not stop fighting until they have degraded the capabilities of their enemies.

On this episode of Fault Lines, host Jamarl Thomas talked with guests about American politicians' absolute inability to address American needs, the further breakdown of the case against Assange, Tigrayans retaking their largest city in Ethiopia, and the prospect of a new X-Files department.Guests:Ted Rall - Political Cartoonist, Syndicated Columnist. & Author | Biden's Infrastructure Plan & Political FearMisty Winston - Political Activist & Organizer | Assange Case Breaks Down FurtherTeodrose Fikre - Co-Founder and Former Editor of Ghion Journal | Tigrayans Retake Regional Capital, Ethiopian Gov RetreatsSteve Grumbine - Political, Economic and Social Justice Activist | Medicare for All, State by StateMichael Maloof - Former Senior Security Policy Analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense | New UFO Report Calls for an X-Files DepartmentIn our first hour we were joined by Ted Rall to talk about politicians' absolute inability to respond meaningfully to COVID-19, failing to make the major changes Americans need economically as tens of millions reel out of balance.In our second hour we were joined first by Misty Winston to talk about the Assange case breaking down ever further as a major witness against Assange says that his critical testimony was faked to gain immunity against prosecution. After we were joined by Teddy Fikre to talk about the Ethiopian government retreating from Mekele as the powerful Tigrayan People's Liberation Front retook the city. Last we were joined by Steve Grumbine to talk about individual states pushing for medicare for all.In our third hour we were joined by Mike Maloof to talk about the possibility of a new and more prominent X-Files-style department following the release of a UFO report last Friday that calls for funding for a new initiative to study unidentified aerial phenomena.

World News in 7 minutes. Wednesday 30th June 2021.Transcript at: send7.org/transcripts Today: Ethiopia Tigrayans retake capital. Nigeria separatist arrested. Eswatini protests. India Serum Institute calls on EU. Canada flood warnings. France fertility law. Greece paintings found. Latvia pandemic origin discovered.Send your opinion or experience by email to podcast@send7.org or send an audio message on speakpipe for us to broadcast. With Stephen Devincenzi and Namitha Ragunath.SEND7 (Simple English News Daily in 7 minutes) tells news in intermediate English. Every day, listen to the most important stories in the world in slow, clear English. This easy English news podcast is perfect for English learners, people with English as a second language, and people who want to hear a fast news update from around the world. Learn English through hard topics, but simple grammar. SEND7 covers all news including politics, business, natural events and human rights. For more information visit send7.org/contact

On Monday, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) announced it had recaptured the Tigray capital of Mekelle from Ethiopia's federal government.It signals a major turning point in a conflict that has lasted more than six months, displaced millions of people and racked up an estimated death toll in the thousands.Related: Tigray region faces deteriorating crisis 3 months into conflict“We want to congratulate that our capital city Mekelle is under full control of our forces, and the elected regional government is reinstated,” said Liya Kassa, a spokesperson for the regional Tigray government that was dissolved when the conflict broke out.The latest development is a striking turnabout — six months ago, Ethiopia's federal troops launched a major offensive on the city, chased the Tigray forces out and installed an interim government in the city.Related: Rising anger as youth get caught up in Tigray warOn Monday, the federal government announced a ceasefire for humanitarian reasons, following a request from Tigray's interim administration.“During the summer, we need the farmers to give a break to cultivate using what they have. Second, until now, we have enough food aid to those in need.”Dr. Abraham Belay, head of the interim Tigray government“During the summer, we need the farmers to give a break to cultivate using what they have. Second, until now, we have enough food aid to those in need,” Dr. Abraham Belay, head of the interim Tigray government, said on state media.He said that many of the “destructive” Tigray forces have been defeated, but claimed there are some who are open to discussions with the federal government.The situation on the ground remains unclear and communications are down across Tigray. But in a recent statement, the TPLF said they would continue fighting their enemies. They didn't say whether they would accept the ceasefire announced by the federal government.Support for the TPLF remains high in and out of Ethiopia.On Sunday, around 200 Tigrayans living in neighboring Sudan came together for a TPLF-sponsored, fundraising event for refugees. Since the conflict, more than 60,000 Ethiopians have fled to neighboring Sudan and now live in refugee camps.Related: From Sudan, Ethiopian refugees tell their storiesThe atmosphere was energetic — Tigrayans young and old danced to patriotic music, and wore T-shirts supporting the Tigray defense forces. Women sat around a table, counting cash donations.Solomon Gebremedhin, a TPLF leader in Khartoum, said Tigray forces have been making gains and taking back areas in Tigray. Their resolve is high, he said, especially after seeing the atrocities committed during the conflict.All parties, including TPLF forces, have been accused of human rights violations.“In [the] Orthodox church, there is no doctrine that order[s] you to kill people. But rather [it] advises you to solve differences under a table.”Rev. Kasai Alam, Orthodox priest, Medhanialem church, Khartoum“In [the] Orthodox church, there is no doctrine that order[s] you to kill people. But rather [it] advises you to solve differences under a table,” said Rev. Kasai Alam, an Orthodox priest at the Medhanialem church in Khartoum.Alam comes from the area around Axum, where religious buildings have reportedly been destroyed during the conflict.Related: Amnesty report describes Axum massacre in Ethiopia's TigrayAs the night waned, attendees stopped in front of Kasai to be blessed by the wooden Orthodox cross that he held. Even for him, the conflict has taken a toll.“I used to travel to Tigray to visit my family. However, after this conflict, I couldn't travel and see them,” he said.Six months later, he still hasn't heard from or seen his family.The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said he spoke with Ethiopia's prime minister, Abiy Ahmed.Guterres said he hoped that hostilities would end in Tigray to allow humanitarian aid — which has been restricted since the conflict began — to reach those in need and pave the way for a political solution to the conflict.

Zambia opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema blames the Police for the weekend shooting on his convoy. Claims the Police denies; The UN calls for urgent action to prevent millions of Tigrayans from dying of hunger. Also, we take a look at the impact of the Twitter ban on Nigerian businesses. And we discuss the economic and social impact that the pandemic has had on African countries with Sudanese champion of good governance Mo Ibrahim.

Join host Zuher (where's Ali?) in their first episode of season two as she discusses the #TigrayGenocide, her family back in Tigray, what advocacy work she has done, and what allies can do to support Tigrayans around the world in their fight to end the #TigrayGenocide.  Ways to get involved:  https://tigrayactioncommittee.com/ (@TigrayAct on Twitter/Instagram)  https://omnatigray.org/ (@OmnaTigray on Twitter/Instagram) Attend a protest near you - find more information about a local event: @TegaruEvents (Twitter/Instagram)  Heal Tigray - Verified Charities to Donate Money for the people of Tigray: https://healtigray.com/

Yesterday, the U.S., Canada, and a number of European countries called for a ceasefire in Ethiopia, where government forces have targeted an ethnic group called Tigrayans with horrific attacks that have been described with elements of a "genocide." Reports have suggested that millions of people have been displaced with an unknown number killed. We spoke with Nima Elbagir, a senior international correspondent at CNN, about the ongoing crisis in the country. And in headlines: opposition leaders agreed to form a coalition to lead Israel, a cargo ship burns and sinks in Sri Lanka, and NASA will send spaceships to Venus. Show Notes: CNN: Nima Elbagir's coverage of Ethiopia – https://www.cnn.com/profiles/nima-elbagir How to help those in Ethiopia: International Rescue Committee – https://www.rescue.org/country/ethiopia The UN Refugee Agency – https://bit.ly/3uIC2eZ Doctors Without Borders – https://bit.ly/3uLaQfJ For a transcript of this episode, please visit crooked.com/whataday. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Ethiopia, a landlocked country with dozens of unique ethnic groups, is nestled in the complex topography of the Horn of Africa and the East African Rift. Tigray, a small region of Ethiopia, borders Eritrea and is home to most of Ethiopia’s estimated 7 million ethnic Tigrayans. In November 2020, Tigray’s regional government launched a full-scale … Continue reading Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict

In this third episode of the Alliance for Peacebuilding's (AfP) new podcast, Peace: We Build It!, genocide scholars Gregory Stanton, Founding President and Chairman of Genocide Watch, and Maxim A. Pensky, Co-Director of the Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (I-GMAP), sit down with our host Tanya Domi to discuss the crime of genocide, exploring past genocides from Armenia to Darfur, as well as ongoing genocides against the Uyghur ethnic minority in Xinjiang and the Tigrayans in Ethiopia. The episode also explores President Biden's decision to recognize the Armenian Genocide on its 106th Anniversary and the U.S. government's responsibility to prevent, address, and recognize crimes of genocide. In honor of Genocide Awareness Month, the episode frames an important conversation around genocide prevention and awareness.Support the show (https://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/donate)

War in Ethiopia's Tigray region continues, with millions fleeing for refugee camps and some observers calling the unfolding events a genocide. Dr. Tefera Tedros, a Tigrayan refugee currently living in a refugee camp in Sudan, describes the violence he's seen; and we learn about how the conflict arose with Haileselassie Medhin, an Ethiopian researcher focused on policy and economic development.

This week, we spoke with Anner, an Ethiopian member of Horn Anarchists, an anarchist group based in east Africa, particularly in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian diaspora. The group has been around for about a year and hopes to organize and spread anarchist ideas and organizing in the horn of Africa. Horn anarchists is a newer group planning to do work with refugees and introduce anarchist ideas to east Africa. For the hour, Anner talks about the group, the history of post-Junta Ethiopa, the context of the ongoing armed conflict in Tigray, the fighting factions and the displacement and violence suffered by residents of the region as well as the ethnic hatred against Tigrayans by the government of Abi Ahmed and his Prosperity Party. You can hear more perspectives from Horn Anarchists by checking out @HornAnarchists on twitter or visiting their website, HornAnarchists.NoBlogs.Org, which is mostly in Amharic and Tigrayan but readable in English via online translation services. *** There is a content warning from 48:58 until 51:01 of discussion of sexual violence in the conflict. *** Transcript PDF (Unimposed) Zine (Imposed PDF) Links from Anner: tghat.com is a good source of news from Tigray as well Dengelat Massacre https://twitter.com/katie_polglase/status/1365442094790279170 Axum Massacre: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/ethiopia-eritrean-troops-massacre-of-hundreds-of-axum-civilians-may-amount-to-crime-against-humanity/ Ethnic Cleansing: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/world/middleeast/ethiopia-tigray-ethnic-cleansing.html Ethiopia Map on Twitter: https://twitter.com/MapEthiopia . ... . .. Featured Tracks: Tium Zena by Solomon Bayre, a Tigrigna song Askari by Awate (a song about African conscripts fighting for colonial powers)

32 long dark days since the devastating war is began in Tigray on November 4, 2020. Complete internet and telecommunication services blackout... Thousands have been killed, over 50 thousand Tigrayans have fled to Sudan from their homes. Around one million people have internally displaced. There is no humanitarian aid for millions of Tigrayans for 32 days. Hunger is spreading. No food, no water and no medical services. On top of all these horrific events armed militants are committing Crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes.

The crisis in the Tigray region of Ethiopia has continued to intensify, but what are the repercussions for ordinary Tigrayans? Hana Zeratsyon of BBC Tigrinya tells us how the conflict is affecting her friends and family back home. And where did the tensions begin? The BBC's Emmanuel Igunza, who was based in Addis Ababa for many years, explains. Keeping a precious text alive La Galigo is an ancient text which tells the creation story of the Bugis people of South Sulawesi in Indonesia, and is described by UNESCO as the most voluminous literary work in the world. Very few people understand the archaic language it's written in. Callistasia Wiyaya of BBC Indonesian has been hearing about efforts to keep La Galigo alive. Image: Ethiopian refugees who fled fighting in Tigray province Credit: ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP via Getty Images

Tigrinya speakers in Eritrea and Ethiopia are Tigrayans, but for political and historical reasons they've been separated, says linguist Dr. Weldu Weldeyesus.    Photo: Emperor Yohannes IV (left) with his son and heir, Ras Araya Selassie Johannes, and General Ras Alula Engida (right). Historians credit the emperor and his general--both of whom were Tigrayans--with defending Ethiopian territory and Eritrea from Italian occupation.   Read the transcript here.      

Tigrayans are often targeted in Ethiopian politics because of the popular perception that they benefit more from the political system than other ethnic groups. In episode seven, we discuss economic conditions in Tigray and the effects of this perception on ordinary Tigrayans.    People in this episode:   Dr. Edmond Keller Professor at University of California, Los Angeles Long-time commentator and observer of Ethiopian history and politics Dr. Ezekiel Gebissa Professor of History and African Studies at Kettering University Ethnicity: Oromo Dr. Asebe Regassa Debelo Assistant professor of development studies at Dilla University, Ethiopia Ethnicity: Oromo Dr. Paulos Milkias Political science instructor at Concordia University Ethnicity: Oromo Dr. Asebe Regassa Debelo Assistant professor of development studies at Dilla University, Ethiopia Ethnicity: Oromo Dr. Yohannes Gedamu Lecturer of political science at Georgia Gwinnett College Born in Gonder in the Amhara region Dr. Weldu Weldeyesus Language instructor at the Community College of Denver Ethnicity: Tigrayan   Deacon Yoseph Tafari   Deacon under the Archdiocese of the exiled Ethiopian Orthodox Holy Synod Chariman of the Ethiopian American Civic Council