Podcasts about international development dfid

In this episode, we're hearing David Nicholson of Mercy Corps and Thomas Beloe from the UNDP talk human centred climate action. David Nicholson is the first-ever Chief Climate Officer at Mercy Corps. David joins us from the climate COP29 in Baku to share where he thinks business and human centred climate action have gotten to. Whilst Thomas Beloe, the Acting Director, Sustainable Finance Hub, UNDP records his piece shortly after the climate COP is finished and shares his thoughts on how climate action needs to move forward for everyone. Both provide insider views on what it was like at the climate COP in Baku, how we can take action, and the role business and others can play in helping tackle climate change. Mercy Corps' climate-related programs have reached 5.9 million people in 2023, with ambitions to extend this impact to over 20 million by supporting high-impact climate startups and advancing their Climate: Possible campaign. With over a decade of experience at Mercy Corps, David's work spans continents and industries—from carbon finance projects in Uganda to green business program development in Colombia. He's a driving force behind AgriFin, a groundbreaking initiative delivering digital solutions to over 7 million smallholder farmers across Africa, empowering them with tools like mobile banking, insurance products, and climate-smart agricultural advice. Whilst Thomas has more than 25 years of experience in providing policy advice to governments across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Pacific. Tom Beloe leads UNDP's Sustainable Finance Hub. In addition to global and regional roles on sustainable finance, Tom has also worked on governance, climate finance and responsible business practices. Previous to UNDP, Tom worked for think tanks, NGOs and the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID). He has a master's degree in Anthropology from Cambridge University and a Master's in Social Policy and Planning from the London School of Economics. Links: Thomas, Beloe, UNDP: https://www.undp.org/authors/thomas-beloe David Nicholson, Mercy Corps: https://www.mercycorps.org/en-gb/who-we-are/our-team/david-nicholson Business Fights Poverty, Climate Justice: https://businessfightspoverty.org/climate-and-business

From its creation in 1997 to its merger with the Foreign Office in 2020, the Department for International Development (DfID) managed nearly £200 billion in total and played a global leadership role in reducing poverty. While DfID also had to deal with high-profile failures and public criticism, sustained political support from Labour, coalition and Conservative governments helped the department to achieve a record of delivery during its 23-year existence.   A new book, The Rise and Fall of the Department for International Development, will be published in October. Sir Mark Lowcock, the book's co-author with Ranil Dissanayake, joined an expert panel at the Institute for Government to discuss what we can learn from DfID's history, with a particular focus on building the institution, how to maintain civil service capability, targeting resources and developing ways to measure value for money – with essential lessons for the new Labour government and what other departments can learn from DfID's focus on delivery.   Joining Sir Mark Lowcock on the panel were:   Sarah Champion MP, Chair of the International Development Select Committee Andrew Mitchell MP, Shadow Foreign Secretary and former Secretary of State for International Development   The panel was chaired by Alex Thomas, Programme Director at the Institute for Government. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

From its creation in 1997 to its merger with the Foreign Office in 2020, the Department for International Development (DfID) managed nearly £200 billion in total and played a global leadership role in reducing poverty. While DfID also had to deal with high-profile failures and public criticism, sustained political support from Labour, coalition and Conservative governments helped the department to achieve a record of delivery during its 23-year existence. A new book, The Rise and Fall of the Department for International Development, will be published in October. Sir Mark Lowcock, the book's co-author with Ranil Dissanayake, joined an expert panel at the Institute for Government to discuss what we can learn from DfID's history, with a particular focus on building the institution, how to maintain civil service capability, targeting resources and developing ways to measure value for money – with essential lessons for the new Labour government and what other departments can learn from DfID's focus on delivery. Joining Sir Mark Lowcock on the panel were: - Sarah Champion MP, Chair of the International Development Select Committee - Andrew Mitchell MP, Shadow Foreign Secretary and former Secretary of State for International Development The panel was chaired by Alex Thomas, Programme Director at the Institute for Government.

Aron Cronin, Managing Director and Anthony Gardner, Principal Consultant at GIC Limited, join Mike Shanley to discuss the UK Aid Market and the impact of the elections.  RESOURCES Subscribe to the FCDO Supplier Portal, enabling you to receive its weekly supplier engagement newsletter free of charge here. BIOGRAPHIES Aron Cronin established GIC Limited in 1991 where he is the Managing Director responsible for the firm and its services. Previously he led the London international development practice at Touche Ross Management Consultants (now Deloitte Consulting). He is an established consultancy practitioner who brings over 40 years' experience of planning and management of studies and projects in advanced and emerging market countries, most recently in relation to economic diversification and growth, private sector development and increased access to finance. He is a widely recognised authority on the correct application of the financing, tendering and procurement procedures of DFID (where he held an interim Private Sector Development Adviser position), FCDO, the EBRD and other major donors He has wide training and mentoring experience in Proposals and Tender Dossiers preparation and Monitoring and Evaluation and has led numerous tailored in-house seminars and strategy development workshops internationally. He leads and now concentrates on the firm's Bid Management service line working with client organisations to strengthen their new business acquisition, bidding skills and capacities and has authored several official guides to effective business development and tendering processes. Tony Gardner spent over 40 years as a member of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) as a development and procurement professional. A longtime member of the Chartered Institute for Purchasing and Supply, he was the Head of the Procurement Department, leading a large department responsible for contracts worth over £1bn per annum. His last post with DFID was as deputy head of the Kenya office from 2014-17. He joined GIC Limited in January 2018 to work on the firm's Bid Management service line. As a consultant, he provides significant advice in contract tendering and management, notably value for money, risk management, due diligence, and capacity building. He has wide training and mentoring experience and leads tailored seminars and strategy development workshops. Aron and Tony are currently concentrating on developing training and support to the provider market to respond to the changes in UK LEARN MORE Thank you for tuning into this episode of the Aid Market Podcast. You can learn more about working with USAID by visiting our homepage: Konektid International and AidKonekt. To connect with our team directly, message the host Mike Shanley on LinkedIn.

In his speech, Dr David Nabarro reflects on local and national priorities regarding food systems transformation, an area where Ireland is an acknowledged leader. He also focuses on interconnected challenges such as climate action and sustainable development. Dr Nabarro presents his experience of the catalysing effect of systems thinking and adopting a people-centred approach when tackling inter-connected challenges, such as food systems transformation. He argues that such an approach must be adapted to the interests of people of the lowest incomes and with the least agency. Dr Nabarro concludes that this novel way of thinking and working together will have the greatest likelihood of long-term success. About the Speaker: Dr David Nabarro is Strategic Director of 4SD Foundation, Geneva; Professor of Global Health at Imperial College, London; and Special Envoy on COVID-19 for the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO). Dr Nabarro has served as Senior UN System Coordinator for Avian and Pandemic Influenza (2005-2014). He was Coordinator of the UN system's High-Level Task Force on the Food Security Crisis 2009-2014 and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition and Coordinator of the Scale-up Nutrition Movement (2010-2014). In his early career, he served as Director for Human Development in the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at Oxford University, where he also directs the Center for the Study of African Economics. The author of 5 books and many studies, Stefan has had a distinguished career as an academic and policy advisor on economic development. His accomplishments are many. To name just a few:  between 2011 and 2017, he was Chief Economist of the Department of International Development (DFID), the government department in charge with the UK's aid policy and spending; between 2020-2022, he was the Development Policy Advisor to successive Foreign Secretaries at the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Stefan is a virtuoso of development! His approach to our conversation was equal parts exciting and instructive, a style that also comes across in his writing, making his book very hard to put down. We start by learning about Stefan: his experience growing up in Belgium, being taught by Catholic priests about African socialism, Ujamaa and Julius Nyerere, and Marx and discovering his interest in economics as a means of pursuing development. His early career in Tanzania and Ethiopia highlighted the relationship between risk and poverty and the need to consider uncertainty when engaging in policy advice or research. We then shift to talking about the four propositions that compete as diagnoses of core problems of poverty and development that Stefan outlines in his book: poor initial endowments, market failures that trap the poor in poverty, market failures that are costly for poor countries, weak institutions. He gives us an overview and tells us why the propositions fall short on explaining the successes and failures of development. We also talk about the most important trends in development in recent decades: the dramatic decrease in poverty globally, the Africanization of poverty, and the increasing concentration of poverty in fragile states. The conversation then turns to the elites, what values drive them, and why would they gamble on a development bargain.  We talk about the role of natural resources, political systems, and how external actors can influence the emergence of development bargains. We also discuss the role of Western and Chinese elites in development bargains and what is good policy advice. ***** Stefan Dercon Website: https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/people/stefan-dercon X: https://twitter.com/gamblingondev LinkedIn: https://uk.linkedin.com/in/stefan-dercon-45927b104 ***** Mihaela Carstei, Paul M. Bisca, and Johan Bjurman Bergman co-host F-World: The Fragility Podcast.  X: https://twitter.com/fworldpodcast Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/fworldpodcast/ Website: https://f-world.org Music: "Tornado" by Wintergatan. This track can be downloaded for free at www.wintergatan.net. Video editing by: Alex Mitran - x.com/alexmmitran, linkedin.com/in/alexmmitran EPISODE RESOURCES Stefan Dercon, “Gambling on Development: Why some Countries Win and Others Lose,” Hurst, London, 2022. https://www.gamblingondevelopment.com TIMESTAMPS: 00:00:00 Intro 00:01:24 Stefan's background 00:02:49 Economics of poverty 00:04:16 Connection between risk & poverty 00:08:16 Brief overview of development thinking 00:14:57 Recent trends in development 00:19:55 The Africanization of poverty & What is fragility 00:25:39 The problem of fixed mental models of fragility 00:28:47 Who are the elites 00:41:11 The gambling in development bargains 00:47:24 What values drive the elites 00:54:25 Natural resource & political systems in dev. bargains 00:58:51 The role of Western & Chinese elites in dev. bargains 01:09:14 Are the elite bargains in the West still dev. bargains 01:19:09 Citizens' role in dev. bargains 01:29:22 External actors & the emergence of dev. bargains 01:41:28 “Peace is ugly” – can international institutions accept it 01:51:20 Development is 50% history & 50% agency 02:00:40 Private sector role in the dev. bargain 02:09:48 What is good policy advice 02:19:56 Wrap-up

Dr. Keith Sumption, Ph.D. is Chief Veterinary Officer and Leader of the Animal Health Program at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ( FAO - https://www.fao.org/home/en ) as well as their Director of the Joint Centre for Zoonoses and Anti-Microbial Resistance (CJWZ). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is an international organization that leads international efforts to defeat hunger and improve nutrition and food security. The FAO comprises 195 members and helps governments and development agencies coordinate their activities to improve and develop agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and land and water resources. It also conducts research, provides technical assistance to projects, operates educational and training programs, and collects agricultural output, production, and development data. Dr. Sumption has worked on disease ecology at the interaction of wildlife, domestic and the environment for more than 30 years. Dr. Sumption holds a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) from the University of Reading, gained following 3 years of field and molecular epidemiology research upon African Swine Fever in southern Africa, and veterinary medicine (Vet.MB) and Natural Sciences degrees from the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom. Dr. Sumption has served as Executive Secretary of European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (EuFMD), where he has been responsible for developing strategy, negotiating funding and managing implementation of the Commission's work programs, which now involve over 80 countries, and reports to the member states of the Commission and FAO Regional Conference and Department (AGD) for progress. Prior to FAO, Dr. Sumption was a research group leader and Master's program Coordinator at the Centre for Tropical Veterinary Medicine (CTVM), University of Edinburgh, managing projects on African high impact tick borne and contagious diseases including heartwater , theilerioses, mycoplasmoses (CBPP and CCPP), and viral Transboundary Animal Diseases TADS (rinderpest , PPR and sheep and goat pox) and as a seconded technical officer to the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), leading work to define demand and impact of research at the primary animal health care level in Kenya, for almost 2 years. Support the show

My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin

The State of Humanitarian Assistance with Sir Mark LowcockCrisis. Conflict. Emergency Management Podcast Join us for global perspectives and conversations about international crisis, preparedness, and how to build more resilient societies in a challenging and ever-changing world. As the world moves to reduce the risk of global threats, we need to recognize the vulnerabilities, connectivity, and perspectives that drive instability. Join us for international conversations addressing key challenges and risks that undermine our efforts to build more resilient societies. This podcast is brought to you by Capacity Building International (CBI) and sponsored by The International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS). In our next episode we are joined by Sir Mark Andrew Lowcock, a British economist and accountant who served as the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (the head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) between 2017 and 2021. Prior to his appointment in May 2017, he was the Permanent Secretary of the Department for International Development (DFID). He is currently a Visiting Professor in Practice at the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and a Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. He is also a Trustee/Director of The Howard Partnership Trust, a multi-academy trust of schools (including for children with learning disabilities) in Surrey. Sir Lowcock's new book "Relief Chief: A Manifesto for Saving Lives in Dire Times" can be found here: https://www.amazon.com/Relief-Chief-Manifesto-Saving-Lives/dp/194469109X Sir Lowcock's Twitter account: https://twitter.com/sirmarklowcock This podcast is brought to you in partnership between Capacity Building International (CBI) and The International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS). You can join TIEMS today at www.tiems.info and also sign up for the International Emergency Management newsletter by CBI at www.capacitybuildingint.com. Is there a topic you would like to hear about? Or are you a functional expert and want to be featured on our show? Reach out to us at info at capacitybuildingint.com and let us know!

Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and the Economics Department, and a Fellow of Jesus College. He is also Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. He combines his academic career with work as a policy advisor, providing strategic economic and development advice, and promoting the use of evidence in decision making. Between 2011 and 2017, he was Chief Economist of the Department of International Development (DFID), the government department in charge with the UK's aid policy and spending. Between 2020-2022, he was the Development Policy Advisor to successive Foreign Secretaries at the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. His research interests concern what keeps some people and countries poor: the failures of markets, governments and politics, mainly in Africa, and how to achieve change. His latest book, Gambling on Development: Why some countries win and others lose was published in May 2022. It draws on his academic research as well as his policy experience across three decades and 40-odd countries, exploring why some countries have managed to settle on elite bargains favouring growth and development, and others did not. Previously, Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make A Difference was published in 2016, and provides a blueprint for renewed application of science, improved decision making, better preparedness, and pre-arranged finance in the face of natural disasters.

In the latest episode of the GDI podcast Professor Stefan Dercon talks to Dr Sophie van Huellen. They discuss Stefan's new book, "Gambling on Development: why some countries win and others lose", his recent departure from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and his advice to academics wanting to work with civil servants and policy makers. Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at Oxford University. Between 2011 and 2017, he was Chief Economist of the Department of International Development (DFID), and from 20200- 2022, he was the Development Policy Advisor to successive Foreign Secretaries at the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Sophie van Huellen is a Lecturer in Development Economics at the Global Development Institute. Transcript and more information is available here: https://wp.me/p79faF-1Lc

The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) was created by the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DfID) in 2020. Since then, the department has implemented a substantial cut to the UK's aid budget, dealt with the foreign policy implications of Brexit, handled the UK's presidency of the G7 and the COP climate conference, and responded to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But has the merger of the FCO and DfID been a success? Are the prime minister's objectives being achieved by the FCDO? Does the department have good relations with the rest of government? And what lessons does the FCDO need to learn to ensure it can achieve the UK's global priorities? To discuss all this we were joined by: Sir Alan Duncan, former Minister of State at DfID and FCO Sarah Champion MP, Chair of the International Development Committee Lord McDonald, former Permanent Under Secretary at the FCO Stephanie Draper, Chief Executive Officer at Bond This event was chaired by Tim Durrant, Associate Director at the Institute for Government. #IfGFCDO

“You should never pick me for any job which is business as usual… I am my best or worst, depending on your point of view, when dealing with change.” From helping to establish the UK Department for International Development (DfID) after its separation from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to managing a prisons crisis as justice department permanent secretary, Suma Chakrabarti has never been afraid to take on big, complex challenges. Quite the opposite – the opportunity to create change is, he says, what energises him. In this episode, Suma reflects on his long career in the UK civil service – which also included stints in the Cabinet Office and Treasury – and his time as president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Discussing his decision to leave the civil service because he was at loggerheads with the minister, why he thinks the merger of DfID and the Foreign Office is a mistake, the future of work, his advice to ambitious civil servants, and much more besides, Suma reveals himself as a bold, astute, and empathetic leader with a truckload of lessons to share.

"We need global leadership in order to prevent starvation" wrote Masood Ahmed and former U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the Financial Times. COVID-19, and Russia's war in Ukraine have created massive disruptions to the world economy, and it will be world's poor who will pay the highest price. As the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank commence, Masood Ahmed provides a clarion call to world leaders to say that quick fixes and piecemeal policy will not fix our current global challenges. What is needed now, more than ever, is a commitment to building trust in global development be it between nations, among development partners, and with local communities. Masood Ahmed is president of the Center for Global Development. He joined the Center in January 2017, capping a 35-year career driving economic development policy initiatives relating to debt, aid effectiveness, trade, and global economic prospects at major international institutions including the IMF, World Bank, and DFID. Ahmed joined CGD from the IMF, where he served for eight years as director, Middle East and Central Asia Department, earning praise from Managing Director Christine Lagarde as a “visionary leader.” In that role, he oversaw the Fund's operations in 32 countries, and managed relationships with key national and regional policy makers and stakeholders. In previous years, he also served as the IMF's director of External Relations, and deputy director of the Policy Development and Review Department. From 2003-2006, Ahmed served as director general, Policy and International at the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID). In that role, he was responsible for advising UK ministers on development issues and overseeing the UK's relationship with international development institutions such as the World Bank. Ahmed also worked at the World Bank from 1979-2000 in various managerial and economist positions, rising to become Vice President, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management. In that role he led the HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) debt relief initiative, which has to- date brought relief from debt burdens to 36 of the world's poorest nations. Born and raised in Pakistan, Ahmed moved to London in 1971 to study at the LSE where he obtained a BSc Honors as well as an MSc Econ with distinction. Follow Dr. Bob on Twitter: @ProfessorHuish

Vincent Tang is an Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF, working on Public Financial Management, Gender Budgeting and macro-fiscal policy. He was previously Head of Fiscal Economics and Growth Economics at Her Majesty's Treasury in the UK. He has also worked at the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and Department for Education, and holds an MPhil in Economics and BA in Economics and Physics from the University of Cambridge.https://blogs.imf.org/bloggers/vincent-tang/

“You have to flex your leadership and you don't really know how to do that until you've really understood the culture of the organisation.” Minouche Shafik was the youngest ever vice president of the World Bank. In 2008, she became permanent secretary of the Department for International Development (Dfid), before moving to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as deputy managing director in 2011 only to find her new boss engulfed in scandal. From there, she became the deputy governor at the Bank of England and is currently director of the London School of Economics. Minouche draws on her vast experience to reflect on her own leadership style, her belief in servant leadership and her passion for promoting diversity. She also explores the challenges associated with leading decentralised organisations like Dfid, the beauty of an independent civil service and why a small gesture from Christine Lagarde has stuck with her for many years.

The second episode of the RISE Podcast features Dr Rachel Glennerster, Chief Economist at the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in conversation with Laura Savage (Deputy Head of Education Research at the UK's FCDO). During the episode, they discuss Rachel's reflections on how good interventions can work in poor performing education systems, why we need to go beyond evidence of what works to think about cost effectiveness, and how to build incentives to tackle systems issues at scale.  Links: Cost-Effective Approaches to Improve Global Learning : What Does Recent Evidence Tell Us Are “Smart Buys” for Improving Learning in Low and Middle Income Countries?: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/719211603835247448/pdf/Cost-Effective-Approaches-to-Improve-Global-Learning-What-Does-Recent-Evidence-Tell-Us-Are-Smart-Buys-for-Improving-Learning-in-Low-and-Middle-Income-Countries.pdf (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/719211603835247448/pdf/Cost-Effective-Approaches-to-Improve-Global-Learning-What-Does-Recent-Evidence-Tell-Us-Are-Smart-Buys-for-Improving-Learning-in-Low-and-Middle-Income-Countries.pdf) The Global Education Advisory Panel: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/teachingandlearning/brief/global-education-evidence-advisory-panel (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/teachingandlearning/brief/global-education-evidence-advisory-panel) DFID's Education Policy “Get Children Learning”: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/685536/DFID-Education-Policy-2018a.pdf (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/685536/DFID-Education-Policy-2018a.pdf) FCDO's 2021 Girls' Education Action Plan: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/986027/FCDO-Girls-Education-Action-Plan.pdf (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/986027/FCDO-Girls-Education-Action-Plan.pdf) Rukmini Banerji: https://riseprogramme.org/people/rukmini-banerji (https://riseprogramme.org/people/rukmini-banerji) and Pratham: https://www.pratham.org/ (https://www.pratham.org) Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) Africa: https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org/ (https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org) Guest biography  Dr Rachel Glennerster is the Chief Economist at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and a member of the FCDO Executive Committee. Prior to her appointment at the FCDO, she was the Chief Economist at the Department for International Development (DFID). From 2004 to 2017 she was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Economics Department research centre that seeks to reduce poverty by ensuring policy is informed by scientific evidence. Dr Glennerster's work has spanned reform of the international financial system, debt, promoting innovation, education, health, financial regulation, and women's empowerment in Russia, Africa and South East Asia. In addition to FCDO, DFID and MIT, Dr Glennerster has held positions at the International Monetary Fund, Her Majesty's Treasury and the Harvard Institute for International Development. More information at: https://www.gov.uk/government/people/rachel-glennerster (https://www.gov.uk/government/people/rachel-glennerster). More on Rachel's research: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Vq3KWOsAAAAJ&hl (https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Vq3KWOsAAAAJ&hl) Attribution RISE is funded by the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Programme is implemented...

Welcome to episode 2 of "How did I get here? Discover Economics" In this episode, we have Dr Rachel Glennerster. Rachel is the Chief Economist at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). Before that, she was the Chief Economist at the Department for International Development (DFID). From 2004 to 2017 she was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), an MIT Economics Department research centre that seeks to reduce poverty by ensuring policy is informed by scientific evidence.In the episode we mention the FCDO Next Generation Economics competition. Make sure you check it out: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/fcdo-next-generation-economics-competitionWrite about the biggest economic challenges facing your generation between 15 February and 21 May 2021 to enter our Next Generation Economics Competition. You could win £250.Welcome to Next Generation Economics, a Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) competition for anyone currently studying in years 10 to 13 (in England and Wales, or equivalent in Scotland and Northern Ireland) who is interested in economics. You do not need to have studied economics to take part. Next Generation Economics is your chance to write about the biggest economic challenges facing your generation in 2021.____________________________________________________________What are you going to be when you grow up? A doctor, an astronaut, an engineer, a footballer?Very few people have ever dreamt that one day they would be an economist. It's a profession on few young people's radars, is barely understood and, let's face it, has an image problem.Most people picture economists, if they think about them at all, as “men in suits who are crunching numbers, talking about interest rates and making money”.This series of podcasts aim to challenge – and change – your image of economists. A series of conversations with economists who are working in a variety of different organisations, the podcasts will explore their personal journeys. What inspired them to choose to study economics? How did they get to their current position? What are they currently working on and what are some of the things that they love about economics? ​

  An insightful conversation that delves into the UK Government’s changes to its foreign aid budget, the termination of the Department for International Development (DFID), and co-ordinating with UK and international organisations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Stephanie Draper has spent more than 20 years working to accelerate a just and sustainable future, with a focus on sustainable development. She brings extensive international experience of bringing sectors together to collaborate and shape a better future. For a full transcript of this conversation visit The Do One Better! Podcast website at Lidji.org, where you’ll also be able to download guest bios, useful links and 100+ episodes on philanthropy, sustainability and social entrepreneurship.  

Sandra Pepera is a career diplomat and international development professional. Before joining NDI as its director for Gender, Women and Democracy in 2014, she spent thirteen years as a senior officer at the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), including leading programs in the Caribbean, Rwanda-Burundi and Sudan. Prior to joining DFID, Sandra spent time in British domestic politics; lecturing in political science and international relations at the University of Ghana; and as a political analyst in the Political Affairs Division at the Commonwealth Secretariat. She has a portfolio of skills and experience which include strategy development, political and risk analysis, diplomacy, general management and corporate governance. Birgitta Ohlsson serves as the National Democratic Institute's director of political parties. She has over twenty years of experience as a leader at the national level in political parties, leadership, feminism, civil society and foreign policy She entered politics formally in 1999 when was elected president of Liberal Youth of Sweden. In 2002, she was elected for as a member of the Swedish Parliament, where she served until 2018, serving in numerous leadership roles, including in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and as her party's spokesperson. Between 2010 and 2014, she was the Swedish Minister for European Affairs and Democracy issues, serving as a strong international voice on gender equality, democracy and LGBTI-rights. She has also been the President of the women´s wing of the Liberal Party (2007-2010) and founded an independent Feminist Network, Felira, in 2003. Sandra Pepera and Birgitta Ohlsson of the National Democratic Institute talk about their work trying to get more women into the electoral process around the globe. We dish on: What it was actually like for Birgitta to be 'in power' as a Government Minister and Parliamentarian   How they are working with male politicians who have been in power for years to convince them to support getting more women into elected office    What women can do if their power frightens male politicians How they each got 'in their power' to do this world-changing work I hope you will find this episode as exciting and informative as I have. Sandra and Birgitta are leading the way for women in politics and analyzing how they can be strong in political power. Please let me know your thoughts!   Connect with Sandra Pepera Sandra on Twitter: https://twitter.com/sandrapepera? National Democratic Institute on Twitter: https://twitter.com/NDIWomen Connect with Dr. Sharon Melnick Website: https://www.sharonmelnick.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sharonmelnick/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/DrSharonMelnick Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Simon Cox is the Director of Blackpool Research School and in this episode will be discussing the best evidence on supporting students to learn remotely Blackpool Research School at St Mary’s Catholic Academy is an exciting development and part of the evidence-based journey that St Mary’s Catholic Academy has been on. We have supported schools at the forefront of making evidence-based practice the norm and Research School status is the natural next step for us. As the Research School for the Blackpool Opportunity Area, our aim is to develop an evidence-based profession, empowering teachers to use accessible tools based on research evidence to improve outcomes for all pupils. Our core purpose is to: Share and disseminate the very best of evidence-based practice to schools and teachers across Blackpool. Provide evidence-based training. Host conferences and events Support schools and work with Teaching Schools in the region Develop interventions and practices that help improve the life chances of pupils. The EEF's rapid evidence assessment examines the existing research (from 60 systematic reviews and meta-analyses) for approaches that schools could use, or are already using, to support the learning of pupils while schools are closed due to Covid-19. When implementing strategies to support pupils’ remote learning, or supporting parents to do this, key things to consider include: Teaching quality is more important than how lessons are delivered Ensuring access to technology is key, especially for disadvantaged pupils Peer interactions can provide motivation and improve learning outcomes Supporting pupils to work independently can improve learning outcomes Different approaches to remote learning suit different types of content and pupils This research was funded by The EdTech Hub – as part of the partnership between the EdTech Hub and the Education Endowment Foundation. It has been published as a global public good – to support the global response to the education impacts of COVID-19. The EdTech Hub is a Global Initiative led by the Department for International Development (DFID), The World Bank and The Gates Foundation.

3:31 - Motion 1: Last June 2020 PM Boris Johnson announced the merger of the Department for International Development (DfID) into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) forming a new department called Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). signaling the new direction that foreign policy will integrate development and diplomacy. THBT that the UKs decision to form the FCDO will do more harm than good for the developing world. 11:26 - Motion 2: Joe Biden recently won the US Elections in November 2020, despite this the incumbent Administration of Donald Trump isn't willing to accept the decision and has been threatening a resistance to transition. Trump is also widely believe to be concerned about future prosecution against him after he steps down as president. THBT the incoming Joe Biden - Kamala Harris administration should offer Donald Trump and his allies amnesty from future prosecution in exchange for a peaceful transition of power. 24:01 - Motion 3: Regional Peacekeeping Forces are military units organized by regional organizations to respond to a specific conflict in their neighboring regions. examples are ECOMOG a West African peacekeeping force from The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). NATO, African Union, etc. TH supports the shift from the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in favor of regional peacekeeping forces.

As the UK has been dealing with coronavirus pandemic this year, we have also been moving closer to the realities of our new relationship with the European Union, and the end of the Brexit transition period on January 1st, 2021. What does this mean for our future trading relationships with the EU and beyond? What happens if there is No Deal? Joining Paul this week is Professor L. Alan Winters, Professor of Economics and Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory in the University of Sussex, former Chief Economist of Department for International Development (DFID), and leading contributor to the debate on Brexit. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

A podcast by University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, DIE (German Development Institute), Center for Maghrebian Studies in Tunis. As the search for more reliable pathways for peace grows in our increasingly complex and polarised world, the social contract concept is drawing interest from policymakers and scholars focused on peacebuilding, as well as states and societies pursuing peaceful change. This podcast explores the role of social cohesion in social contracts, both as a driver and an indicator of their realisation. It investigates these issues through two Arab Spring countries – Tunisia and Yemen. While Arab Spring settings offered a wealth of possibilities for reimaging, reinventing and manifesting new and inclusive national social contracts, many are not on track to achieve anticipated outcomes desired by many within these societies. The discussion reflects upon the status of the social contract, the meaning of social cohesion, and the challenges and opportunities for the growth of social cohesion and forging or enriching inclusive and resilient social contracts in both contexts. Lessons for international cooperation are considered in this dynamic, rich discussion with specialists from the region and development aid community. Featuring:  Erin McCandless is an Associate Professor at the School of Governance at Witwatersrand University in South Africa, and directs a research and policy dialogue project on forging resilient social countries in countries transitioning from conflict and authoritarianism. A widely published scholar and policy advisor, she has over two decades of experience working on and in conflict affected settings, broadly on issues of peacebuilding, statebuilding, development and resilience - and their intersections. Her research currently is focused on forging resilient social contracts in countries affected by conflict, fragility and fraught transition. Professor McCandless is author of more than 100 publications, including three books, one entitled Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change, and several influential, policy-shifting United Nations reports. She is also co-founder and former Chief Editor of the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development.  www.erinmccandless.net, www.socialcontractsforpeace.org Bernhard Trautner is senior advisor to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development since 2005: As Deputy Head Middle East Department 2012-15 and at research & evaluation dep't since 11/2020; He serves as Adjunct Professor at Tübingen University/Institute for Political Science since 2014. Bernhard was seconded as senior researcher at the project on ‘stabilization and development in MENA' at the German Development Institute 2015-20 and is still an associate researcher there.. https://www.die-gdi.de/en/bernhard-trautner/ Recent co-authorships include: “Reconstituting social contracts in conflict-affected MENA countries: Whither Iraq and Libya?” (w. Mark Furness) DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105085;  “Le contrat social: un outil d'analyse pour les pays de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord (MENA), et au-delà” (w. Loewe, Markus & Zintl, T.) DOI: 10.23661/bp5.2020   Laryssa Chomiak is a political scientist, specializing on the comparative politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Director of the Centre d'Etudes Maghrebines a Tunis, and Associate Fellow at Chatham House in London.  She is the author of the forthcoming Archipelagos of Dissent: Protest and Politics in Tunisia.  Most recently, she was a visiting researcher at the German Development Institute's (DIE) Middle East Program in Bonn, has lectured at the University of Tunis, and worked on comparative African research programs on political violence, transitional justice and societal peace. Her work has appeared as book chapters and journal articles in Middle East Law and Governance, The Journal of North African Studies, Portal 9 and Middle East Report.   Dr. Chomiak has received research fellowships from the Fulbright Commission (Morocco), the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX/Ukraine) and The American Institute for Maghrib Studies (AIMS/Tunisia). She is a member of the advisory board of Middle East Law and Governance. Before her doctoral studies she worked at USAID's Bureau of Global Health in Washington, DC. Her opinion analyses and essays have appeared in the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor, as well as for Middle East Institute.  Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute. Before joining the Institute, Alasrar was a Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation in Washington DC, MENA Director for Cure Violence, Research Associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a Mason Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and an International Policy Fellow at the Open Society Foundation. From 2006-12, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC. Earlier in her career, Alasrar served as a program officer for the Department for International Development (DFID) in Yemen. Alasrar holds an MA in Public Administration from Harvard University, an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, and a BS in Architectural Engineering from Sanaa University in Yemen. Contributions to the Geneva Peace Week 2020 Digital Series do not necessarily represent the views of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, its partners, or the partners of Geneva Peace Week.

Studying the role of institutions and their evolution often helps us better understand political and economic development in countries all over the world. And one such key institution is the legislature, which plays a critical role in democratic consolidation by providing a stable system of horizontal accountability. Legislatures craft legislation, pass laws, exercise oversight of the executive branch and thereby provide the institutional mechanism which allows societies to perform representative governance on a daily basis. Individual legislators articulate competing interests and try to influence the policymaking process. They also perform an important function – that of constituency service, i.e. they may regularly visit their constituencies and meet their constituents and address local needs and may even be involved in providing various types of public goods to their constituents through development projects. The extent of legislative capacity and power, of course, varies greatly from country to country. In some countries, the legislature remains relatively weak despite multiparty politics, regular elections and even when ruling parties lose elections. But in other countries, the legislature has functioned effectively as a check on the executive branch of government as well as provided important contributions to the policymaking and policy implementation processes. But legislatures and legislative capacity in developing countries have not received the kind of scholarly attention that they deserve. This is indeed surprising. In his brilliant book, Legislative Development in Africa: Politics and Postcolonial Legacies, published in 2019 by Cambridge University Press, Ken explores how the adaptation of inherited colonial legislative institutional forms and practices continue to structure and influence contemporary politics and policy outcomes in Africa. He contrasts the records of legislative performance and discusses why the legislatures in some emerging democracies have enhanced their capacity and power while those in others have not. Ken finds that the introduction of competitive multiparty electoral institutions strengthened the Kenyan legislature but not the Zambian one. He also examines how and under what conditions democratic legislatures emerge in countries that have had strong autocratic foundations. Ken’s book thus makes a strong case for strengthening legislatures in emerging democracies. He argues that attempts to strengthen legislatures in emerging democracies should not just be limited to technical assistance and organizational capacity building but also include the political empowerment of legislators. Ken Ochieng’ Opalo is an Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His research interests include legislative politics, subnational administration and local government, electoral politics, and the political economy of development in Africa.  Ken’s current research projects include studies of the politics of service provision and accountability under devolved government in Kenya, education sector reforms in Tanzania, inter-state relations in Africa, and executive-legislative relations in Kenya. His works have been published in the British Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Democracy, the Journal of Eastern African Studies, and Governance. He is a member of EGAP (Evidence in Governance and Politics), gui2de (Georgetown University Initiative on Innovation, Development, and Evaluation) and a non-resident fellow at Brookings Institution and the Center for Global Development. His research has been funded by the Luminate Group, the Susan Ford Dorsey Fellowship, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). Ken earned his BA from Yale University and PhD from Stanford University. Resources:Follow Ken Opalo on TwitterFollow In Pursuit of Development on Twitter 

Rachel Glennerster is the Chief Economist for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which is the UK's ministry for international development cooperation. Previously, she was the Executive Director of J-PAL (the Jameel Poverty Action Lab) at MIT. This March, Prof. Glennerster gave the closing keynote remarks at the 2020 annual conference at Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance, where she touched on challenges of working in fragile states and the linkages between the macro- and micro-levels. The economic policy tools used in advanced economies either do not exist or are ineffective in poor, conflict-afflicted areas. Shifts in macro-level policies can have devastating effects at the household level, leading to hyperinflation, parallel exchange rates, or major debt crises. In this interview, we discuss some of the innovative policy and research tools in fragile states, especially RCT (randomized controlled trials). And we touch on various debates on foreign aid, non-profits, and what it’s like to work in Africa. Some of our questions include: - RCT is a new way of studying impacts of social programs or medicines through randomizing individuals into control groups so that we can assess the actual causality. What is the difference between RCT specifically and other methods that help us conduct careful policy impact evaluations? Is there still a tension between those who accept and not accept RCTs? What are some of the reasonable arguments against the further adoption of RCTs? What are some of the main advantages and disadvantages to the system of "community-driven development?" Is it better to hand control over development to locals even if this may not be the best way to motivate more systemic change that may have to come from outside communities? Or is this question posing a “straw man” to a non-existent dilemma? What is it like to advise the distribution of the U.K’s international aid? What is the philosophy behind how nations should give and receive aid? Should it be viewed as a moral obligation, or something that is in the national security or economic interests of the U.K., or both?

In Episode 8, Zoe Hamilton (Insights Manager at GSMA), Mark Kamau (Head User Experience Designer at BRCK) and Aline Alonso (Design Researcher at Butterfly Works) discuss methodologies for inclusivity in humanitarian assistance. Specifically, the panel discuss a Human-Centred Design project in Nairobi working with persons with disabilities, and the adaptations they had to make due to COVID-19 disruptions. Find out more about the project at: www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/HCDreport For more information on the methodology email: m4h@gsma.com Find out more about the M4H programme at: www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

Miguel Armaza is joined by Maelis Carraro, Director of Catalyst Fund and the Impact Ventures Practice at BFA Global. The Catalyst Fund is an inclusive fintech accelerator supporting early-stage inclusive startups with flexible capital, bespoke venture building support, and connections to investors and corporate innovators. Maelis Carraro is the Director of Catalyst Fund and the Impact Ventures Practice at BFA Global. She spent her career working alongside fintech startups, investors, banks and donors to pioneer tech and data-enabled solutions for underserved communities in emerging markets. She runs global accelerator-Catalyst Fund, supported by JP Morgan Chase & Co and the UK Department for International Development, and helped over 30 early-stage fintech startups create innovative and affordable solutions for underserved populations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Previously, Maelis worked at the International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group), advising financial institutions on digital innovation and responsible financial inclusion strategies across fragile and emerging markets, as well as the OECD and the Grameen Bank, where she researched micro financing schemes for climate adaptation in South Asia, and impact fund- Global Partnerships, where she designed impact investing strategies to support tech-enabled businesses across Africa. Maelis also co-founded RemitMas, an inclusive fintech startup focused on remittances for savings for Latino immigrants in the US. Maelis is a Fulbright Scholar and holds a dual MBA and Master in International Affairs from Columbia Business School and the School of International and Public Affairs. She received her B.A Cum Laude from University College London in Political Science and Development Economics. About BFA Global BFA is a global consulting firm striving to build inclusive economies for a sustainable and equitable world. Together with partners and clients, BFA works at the frontier of applied research and innovation using finance, data, technology and behavioral science to build solutions for underserved populations. About Catalyst Fund Catalyst Fund is BFA’s flagship inclusive fintech accelerator, supported by The UK Department for International Development (DFID), JPMorgan Chase & Co and previously the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Catalyst Fund accelerates early-stage inclusive fintech startups with flexible capital, bespoke venture building support and connections to investors and corporate innovators. It also accelerates the ecosystem by fostering networks of fintech investors, corporates and talent organizations, to spur more fintech innovation for the world’s 3 billion underserved.

PLEASE NOTE: Unfortunately we had some technical difficulties towards the end of the webinar which meant that the recording had to be cut off early. Since 2003, despite an abundance of resources and a more pluralistic political settlement, Iraq’s economic reform process has failed to take off. Alexander Hamilton's new paper explores the link between the evolution and consolidation of Iraq’s post-2003 political settlement and how this has impacted the incentives decision-makers face when implementing economic policy. Paradoxically, the fact that the settlement has accommodated more groups than its repressive predecessor has not resulted in more inclusive or long-term oriented economic decision-making. This is because the inclusion of more (elite) groups reflects the fact that more actors can now generate violence if they are not placated with state-generated rents. Transitioning away from policy-makers’ consequent short-termism will require patient economic reforms, slowly creating new pressures on political actors to support the delivery of public goods and a policy environment more conducive to private sector growth. Alexander Hamilton is an economic adviser for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) based in Baghdad and leading on DFID’s economic reform programme in Iraq. He completed his PhD in Political Economy at the University of Oxford and has previously worked for the World Bank. His area of expertise is the economics of fragile states. Specifically, he focuses on the application of political economy tools to better understand and support economic reforms in resource rich fragile state contexts.

Why is Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Sexual Harassment (SEAH) such a key issue in the aid sector, and what is being done to address it? Paul Nolan interviews Natalie Versteeg and Gwilym Jones from the Safeguarding Unit at the Department for International Development (DFID) to learn more about the importance of the Safeguarding Summit in 2018, why the Hub was established and what other safeguarding initiatives DFID is involved in. Nastasya Gecim talks to our National Associate in Ethiopia, Semhal Getachew, to look at how the Hub will work with civil society to tackle safeguarding issues in Ethiopia. The COVID-19 pandemic brings new challenges and risks for safeguarding and key messages on safeguarding in pandemics will be shared.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed the UN Secretary-General's call last month for warring parties in Yemen to immediately cease fighting and focus on reaching a peace agreement whilst countering the outbreak of the coronavirus. The coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, responded with a two week ceasefire which was renewed for another month. While the cross border hostilities de-escalated, the conflict fronts inside Yemen continued to boil. This event will reflect on the challenges and possibilities for a comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement in Yemen. The speakers will discuss lessons learned from previous peace talks and ceasefire initiatives. They will also shed light on the national and regional dynamics affecting the peace process in Yemen. This event is co-organised with the Peace Track Initiative, an organisation that works on localising and feminising the peace process by supporting inclusive peace processes. Their role in holding Track II consultations with women’s groups and the role of women peacemakers will also be explored. Fatima Al-Asrar is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute. Before joining the Institute, Al-Asrar was a Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation in Washington DC, MENA Director for Cure Violence, Research Associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a Mason Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and an International Policy Fellow at the Open Society Foundation. From 2006-12, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC. Earlier in her career, Al-Asrar served as a program officer for the Department for International Development (DFID) in Yemen. Rasha Jarhum is Co-Founder and Director of the Peace Track Initiative hosted at the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, at the University of Ottawa. Jarhum was invited by the UN Special Envoy to Yemen as one of seven women to support the peace talks held in Kuwait in 2016, and has briefed the UN Security Council on Yemen and Women’s Rights to push for peace. She is an affiliated scholar with the American University of Beirut. She has more than 15 years of experience working to advocate for women's, children's and refugee rights. Join the conversation on Twitter using #LSEYemen

Marwa Baabbad, Head of ORG's International Projects, is joined by the Middle East Institute's Nadwa Al-Dawsari and Fatima Abo Alasrar to debunk five popular myths about the conflict in Yemen. Music by Bensound About the discussants Marwa Baabbad is Head of International Projects with ORG’s Strategic Peacebuilding Programme. She manages the project Yemen: Rethinking the Peace Process, working with Yemenis engaged in regional strategic thinking groups in Hadramaut and Marib governorates. She joined ORG in July 2018. Fatima Abo Alasrar is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute. Before joining the Institute, Alasrar was a Senior Analyst at the Arabia Foundation in Washington DC, MENA Director for Cure Violence, Research Associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a Mason Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and an International Policy Fellow at the Open Society Foundation. From 2006-12, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC. Earlier in her career, Alasrar served as a program officer for the Department for International Development (DFID) in Yemen. Nadwa Al-Dawsari is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute. Before joining the institute, she was the Yemen Country Director for Center for Civilians in Conflict, a Senior Non-resident Fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy, and a founding Director of Partners Yemen, a local affiliate center of Partners Global. Earlier in her career, she worked as a senior program manager at the National Democratic Institute in Yemen, managing elections monitoring and tribal conflicts programs. Nadwa has over 20 years of field experience in Yemen. She conducted extensive research in Yemen, providing deeper insights into the internal dynamics of the conflict in the country. Her publications have been featured by the Middle East Institute, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Atlantic Council, Lawfare, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), the Washington Post, and the Center for Civilians in Conflict, among others.

In Episode 7, Jenny Caswell (Acting Research & Insights Director, at GSMA), Peter Batali (Executive Director at CTEN) and John Warnes (Innovation Officer on Connectivity for Refugees at UNHCR) reflect on the past two years of GSMA’s Mobile for Humanitarian Innovation and discuss what’s next for the programme. Find out more at www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

In Episode 6, Matthew Downer (Insights Manager, Monitoring & Evaluation at GSMA) and Lydia Tanner (Director at The Research People) discuss Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) in reference to digital innovations in the humanitarian space. Find out more at www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

In Episode 5, Yiannis Theodorou (Senior Policy and Advocacy Director at GSMA) and Nicholas Oakeshott (Senior Identity Management Officer at UNHCR) discuss the importance of digital identity in humanitarian contexts. Find out more at www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

In Episode 4, Rosie Afia (Market Engagement Manager at GSMA) and Francois Petousis (Head of Product and Director of Humanitarian Projects at Lumkani) discuss grantee learnings from the M4H Innovation Fund. Find out more at www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

In Episode 3, Maha Khan (Research and Insights Director at GSMA) and Rosa Akbari (Senior Advisor of Technology for Development at Mercy Corps) discuss digital cash transfers in humanitarian settings. Find out more at www.gsma.com/m4h This initiative is currently funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and supported by the GSMA and its members.

Fatima Alasrar is a Senior Analyst with the Arabia Foundation. Prior to joining the Arabia Foundation, Alasrar was the MENA director for Cure Violence, a research associate at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, a Mason fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, and an international policy fellow at the Open Society Foundations. From 2006-2012, she worked as an advisor for the Embassy of Yemen in Washington, DC and early in her career, served as a program officer for the Department for International Development (DFID) in Yemen. Nervana Mahmoud is a doctor and commentator on Middle East issues. Mahmoud started blogging and writing on Middle East issues after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, and has contributed to several outlets, including The Telegraph, Al-Monitor, Now Lebanon, Egypt’s Ahram and Daily News Egypt. In November 2013, she was featured as one of the BBC's 100 women of the year. She has also given several talks on Egypt, women’s rights and radicalism in various institutes, and has featured in many radio and TV interviews.

Despite significant increases in agricultural productivity in the past 50 years and falling food prices, hunger, malnutrition and poor health are persistent development challenges. According to the WHO, almost half a billion people are underweight, and 155 million children were chronically under-nourished in 2016. At the other extreme, excess food consumption has helped trigger global epidemics of overweight, obesity, and food-related chronic disease. It’s widely acknowledged that the agricultural and food systems can play a pivotal role in promoting more nutritious and sustainable diets for populations all over the world. As such, the agriculture, nutrition, and health sectors can work together to enhance human health and wellbeing. In this podcast, we will examine why it’s important to create links between agriculture, health and nutrition. We will also explore the work of Innovative Methods and Metrics for Agriculture and Nutrition Actions (IMMANA), a research initiative funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and coordinated by the Leverhulme Centre for Integrative Research on Agriculture and Health (LCIRAH). The speakers are Dr. Suneetha Kadiyala, Associate Professor in Nutrition-sensitive development, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Principal Investigator, IMMANA, and Elizabeth Hull, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Deputy Chair of the SOAS Food Studies Centre, SOAS.

Digital technology has radically transformed nearly every aspect of our lives. But can it help eradicate poverty?In this fifth installment of our Destination Digital podcast NetHope CEO, Lauren Woodman sat down for a conversation with Matthew Rycroft, the Permanent Secretary of the Department for International Development (DFID), the U.K.’s governmental body coordinating international aid and … Continued

This podcast examines why it's important to use innovative approaches to evaluate development programmes and evidence. In recent years, there’s been increased scrutiny of international development and particularly foreign aid. For example, the UK’s Department of International Development (DFID) regularly faces criticisms regarding the effectiveness of its aid programmes from publications such as the Daily Mail and Sunday Express. At the same time, the Sustainable Development Goals have helped create an ambitious and multi-layered development agenda. Development practitioners are increasingly required to plan and work systematically. They also have to manage in a chaotic and dynamic world. In this podcast, we explore why robust evaluation of development programmes is more important than ever. We also consider the work of the Centre of Excellence in Development Impact and Learning (CEDIL), which is administered through the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and hosted at the London International Development Centre (LIDC). The speakers are Marcella Vigneri, Research Fellow at CEDIL, and Dr. Matthew Jukes, Fellow and Senior Education Evaluation Specialist at RTI International.

In this episode, I cover foreign aid, online abuse, sexual harrassment and kids' suicide. A recent report by the Department for International Development (DFID) revealed serious implications for foreign aid. I talk about what foreign aid is used for that doesn't involve helping the people we're told it's there to help. A new report by the thinktank WebRoots Democracy published in parliament outlines measures to punish those who abuse politicians online with digital ASBO's (anti-social behaviour orders). I talk about the wider picture of this story. We have the appointment in Britain of the first Suicide Minister for kids. Every schoolchild in Britain is to receive a mental health check, British Prime Minister Theresa May has said. I talk about certain pressures kids are facing and why the approach to solving the problem is often all wrong. You've heard of the #MeToo movement but how about the #HimToo movement? This began after a mum posted a photo online of her son claiming men are afraid to go on dates because of 'feminists with an axe to grind'. I look at the wider picture of this story.

Stefan Dercon is professor of economic policy at the University of Oxford, and is the former chief economist at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK, where he was involved in political discussions about how to shape aid. This episode is a deep dive into the financing model of humanitarian response, and how insurance instruments could change that model, and potentially reshape how we respond to crises. Displaced is produced by the Vox Media Podcast Network in partnership with the International Rescue Committee.  Find our show notes here: https://www.rescue.org/displaced Email us at displaced@rescue.org Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

No conversation about social impact is complete without an understanding of randomized control trials, or RCTs. In this episode, we delve into what they are and how they measure impact with Rachel Glennerster, the new chief economist at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK. In an episode recorded in London, Glennerster gives her insights on the randomization movement, and also talks about the divide between academics and policy makers, and why it’s important that they find ways to work together better. Displaced is produced by the Vox Media Podcast Network in partnership with the International Rescue Committee. Find our show notes here: www.rescue.org/displaced. Rate and review the show, or email us at displaced@rescue.org. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

After Brexit, the UK will take back control of the £1.5 billion in overseas aid currently channelled through the EU and will be free to develop its bilateral relationships through trade and development as it sees fit. But the Government is already offering to stay involved in the EU’s development work, proposing an ongoing ‘strategic partnership’. At this event, Matthew Rycroft, Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development (DfID), set out his thinking about the future of UK aid and development after Brexit. To discuss, our panel included: Mikaela Gavas, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Global Development and Special Adviser to the House of Commons International Development Committee Kirsty McNeill, Executive Director of Policy, Advocacy and Campaigns at Save the Children The event was chaired by Jill Rutter, Brexit Programme Director at the Institute for Government.

Economic shocks and climate change increase the risk of conflict. If current trends continue, 80 percent of the world’s poorest people will live in fragile states by the year 2030. This means the work of development will increasingly be about how to prevent conflict and how to achieve positive change in post-conflict and fragile states. In this podcast, DfID’s chief economist Rachel Glennerster, says economists need to get better at understanding these risks and predicting conflict. Before joining the UK’s Department for International Development, Glennerster was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. She was invited to speak at the IMF where she once worked as an economist. Rachel Glennerster, Chief Economist of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development- DfID.

Mary Kaldor discussing her pioneering work on the concept of new wars and global civil society. Her work on the practical implementation of human security has directly influenced European and national politics. Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance, Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science and CEO of the Department for International Development (DFID) funded Conflict Research Programme. Her books include; The Baroque Arsenal, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Her most recent book is International Law and New Wars co-authored with Christine Chinkin. She was a founder and co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, a member of the International Independent Commission on Kosovo and convenor of the Human Security Study Group, which reported to Javier Solana and now to Federica Mogherini.

Mary Kaldor discussing her pioneering work on the concept of new wars and global civil society. Her work on the practical implementation of human security has directly influenced European and national politics. Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance, Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science and CEO of the Department for International Development (DFID) funded Conflict Research Programme. Her books include; The Baroque Arsenal, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Her most recent book is International Law and New Wars co-authored with Christine Chinkin. She was a founder and co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, a member of the International Independent Commission on Kosovo and convenor of the Human Security Study Group, which reported to Javier Solana and now to Federica Mogherini.

Despite the stereotype of the not-for-profit and government sectors being slow moving and mired in bureaucracy, innovation leaders at top UK research and aid agencies are taking pages from the private sector and running experiments that directly impact lives. The Department for International Development (DFID) and Cancer Research UK are two examples of organizations taking on Lean Impact tactics of testing and applying new technologies to development and fundraising issues. In this fireside chat with TriKro innovation coach Nick Noreña, members of DFID and Cancer Research UK share the strategies for and struggles around implementing Lean Startup in the Lean Impact sphere.

The IRC is leading a £5 million five-year global research consortium on ‘What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls in Conflict and Humanitarian Crises', funded by the UK Department for International Development (DfID). Listen now to learn more about it! http://www.whatworks.co.za/

Politician and writer Rory Stewart; Italian musician Zucchero; cellist Nina Plapp and SAS trainee recruit Efrem Brynin join Libby Purves. Nina Plapp is a cellist and winner of the Royal Geographical Society and BBC Journey of a Lifetime award. Together with her cello Cuthbert she sets off from the Isle of Wight to Romania and India in search of the roots of gypsy music. Along the way Nina and Cuthbert join a chorus on a train through the desert, get locked inside a cupboard with singing girls in a Rajasthani village and play with the gypsy musicians at a wedding. Her story is told in Journey of a Lifetime on BBC Radio 4. Rory Stewart OBE is MP for Penrith and The Border and Minister of State at the Department for International Development (DFID). After a period in the army, he joined the Foreign Office, serving in Indonesia and the Balkans and becoming deputy-governor of two provinces in Southern Iraq. His father Brian was a keen walker who accompanied his son on many of his journeys from Iran to Malaysia. Their final walk together takes them along the Marches - the frontier that divides their two countries - Scotland and England. The Marches by Rory Stewart is published by Jonathan Cape. Efrem Brynin is one of the recruits featured in the Channel 4 series SAS: Who Dares Wins in which team of ex-SAS instructors take 25 rookie soldiers deep into the Amazon rainforest. The men take part in a customised version of the jungle phase of SAS Selection which is designed to find a unique kind of soldier for an elite unit. Efrem's son James, a soldier who was killed in Afghanistan in 2013, was due to embark on SAS training before his death and Efrem's aim is to honour his son's ambitions. SAS: Who Dares Wins is broadcast on Channel 4. Zucchero is an Italian musician and songwriter. Born Adelmo Fornaciari, he was nicknamed Zucchero - meaning sugar - by his schoolteacher. In a career spanning three decades, he has achieved international success, not least through his collaborations with artists including Eric Clapton, Miles Davis, Ray Charles, B.B King, Sting, Jeff Beck and Andrea Bocelli. His new album Black Cat features contributions from Bono and Elvis Costello and the guitar work of Mark Knopfler. Black Cat is on Wrasse Records. Zucchero performs at the Royal Albert Hall, London. Producer: Paula McGinley.

On 8 September, PHAP hosted the first of four discussion and consultation events on practical dilemmas of principled humanitarian action. The event began with a lecture on the topic by Dr Hugo Slim, Head of Policy at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This was followed by a moderated discussion among a panel of experts, featuring Sir John Holmes, Director of the Ditchley Foundation and was previously the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator; Andy Hill, Civil-Military Adviser in the UK Department for International Development (DFID); and Karen Welsh, the founder and CEO of Blue Glass Development. The event provided the opportunity for participants to provide their perspectives on the topic discussed, through the live chat, through posing questions to the panelists, and through live pollsRead more at https://phap.org/8Sep2015

On 8 September, PHAP hosted the first of four discussion and consultation events on practical dilemmas of principled humanitarian action. The event began with a lecture on the topic by Dr Hugo Slim, Head of Policy at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This was followed by a moderated discussion among a panel of experts, featuring Sir John Holmes, Director of the Ditchley Foundation and was previously the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator; Andy Hill, Civil-Military Adviser in the UK Department for International Development (DFID); and Karen Welsh, the founder and CEO of Blue Glass Development. The event provided the opportunity for participants to provide their perspectives on the topic discussed, through the live chat, through posing questions to the panelists, and through live pollsRead more at https://phap.org/8Sep2015

How do we plan, campaign and work in development when we don’t know what is going to happen and we don’t know what solutions will work? Aid professionals know that real life has a way of ignoring our plans and procedures, but often we block out that knowledge in order to keep functioning. In this talk, Duncan Green asks what would we do differently, if we acknowledge and try to adapt to the messiness of reality. Dr Duncan Green is Senior Strategic Adviser at Oxfam GB, Honorary Professor of International Development at Cardiff University and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies. He was previously a Visiting Fellow at Notre Dame University, a Senior Policy Adviser on Trade and Development at the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), a Policy Analyst on trade and globalisation at the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) and Head of Research and Engagement at the Just Pensions project on socially responsible investment. He is author of From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States can Change the World (Oxfam International, June 2008) and has written several books on Latin America including Silent Revolution: The Rise and Crisis of Market Economics in Latin America (2003), Faces of Latin America (2006) and Hidden Lives: Voices of Children in Latin America and the Caribbean (1998). Presentation slides are available from the Devpolicy events page: https://devpolicy.crawford.anu.edu.au/event-extra/past

On 22 July 2014 Christian Aid joined the Girl Summit - a global movement to put an end to female genital mutilation (FGM) and child marriage – hosted by the UK Prime Minister and jointly organised by the Department for International Development (DfID) and UNICEF. Nyaradzayi Gumbozvanda, of Christian Aid’s partner organisation World Young Women’s Christian Association (World YWCA), was lucky enough to attend. Here she talks to Press Officer Melanie Hargreaves about her own experiences of child marriage, how World YWCA is tackling the issue, and what her hopes are following the Girl Summit.

Listen to the Software Process and Measurement Cast 286. SPaMCAST 286 features our interview with Brian Wernham, author of Agile Project Management for Government. Agile government does not have to be an oxymoron. Brian Wernham has more than 30 years of experience in adaptive change program leadership.  He is an independent consultant and works in both the public and private sector.  He has extensive international experience in the USA, UK, Canada, Hong Kong, Germany and offshore development in Bangalore. By the time that the term ‘Agile leadership’ was first coined, Brian had already been successfully leading iterative, adaptive projects for over 10 years on both sides of the Atlantic.  He works as a hands-on program director and has real-world implementation expertise together with a comprehensive understanding of the related international research.  He has consulted for major strategic international organizations such as Deloitte, PwC, Gartner Group, the National Audit Office in London and Seer Technologies in North Carolina. His comprehensive public sector experience includes the Department for International Development (DFID), the World Bank, the United Nations (Geneva), and local government authorities. Brian is a Fellow of the Association for Project Management, a Fellow of the BCS and has a MBA from Henley Management College.  He applies adaptive planning approaches as an offshore Yachtmaster and as a keen off-piste skier.  He is currently consulting for the UK Government in London. Read Brian’s blog, visit his website and of course buy the book! Get in touch with us anytime or leave a comment here on the blog. Help support the SPaMCAST by reviewing and rating it on iTunes. It helps people find the cast. Like us on Facebook while you’re at it. Next week we will feature our essay on Scrumban. Scrumban is the combination of agile (Scrum) and lean (Kanban) concepts that can be used to manage projects. Upcoming Events StarEast I will be speaking at the StarEast Conference May 4th – 9th in Orlando, Florida.  I will be presenting a talk titled, The Impact of Cognitive Biases on Test and Project Teams. Follow the link for more information on StarEast. An ITMPI Webinar! On June 3 I will be presenting the webinar titled “Rescuing a Troubled Project With Agile.” The webinar will demonstrate how Agile can be used to rescue troubled projects.  Your will learn how to recognize that a project is in trouble and how the discipline, focus, and transparency of Agile can promote recovery. Register now! Upcoming DCG Webinars: May 22 11:30 EDT – Agile User StoriesJune 19 11:30 EDT – How To Split User StoriesJuly 24 11:30 EDT - The Impact of Cognitive Bias On Teams Check these out at www.davidconsultinggroup.com I look forward to seeing or hearing all SPaMCAST readers and listeners at all of these great events!   The Software Process and Measurement Cast has a sponsor. As many you know I do at least one webinar for the IT Metrics and Productivity Institute (ITMPI) every year. The ITMPI provides a great service to the IT profession. ITMPI's mission is to pull together the expertise and educational efforts of the world's leading IT thought leaders and to create a single online destination where IT practitioners and executives can meet all of their educational and professional development needs. The ITMPI offers a premium membership that gives members unlimited free access to 400 PDU accredited webinar recordings, and waives the PDU processing fees on all live and recorded webinars. The Software Process and Measurement Cast some support if you sign up here. All the revenue our sponsorship generates goes for bandwidth, hosting and new cool equipment to create more and better content for you. Support the SPaMCAST and learn from the ITMPI.  Shameless Ad for my book! Mastering Software Project Management: Best Practices, Tools and Techniques co-authored by Murali Chematuri and myself and published by J. Ross Publishing. We have received unsolicited reviews like the following: "This book will prove that software projects should not be a tedious process, neither for you or your team." Support SPaMCAST by buying the book here. Available in English and Chinese. 

During and after emergencies, such as conflicts and natural disasters, women and girls are at the most risk of abuse. Lack of protection and provision for their needs leaves them vulnerable to sexual exploitation, violence, mental and physical illness and death. This week, the government’s Department for International Development (DFID) has organised a high-level event to ensure that the prevention of, and response to, violence against women and girls is prioritised in emergency situations.

In this IDS Sussex Development Lecture Laurie Lee talks about the different routes into working in international development, drawing on his own personal experiences. He also examined whether development is an inherently integrated process or can progress be made on one thing at a time? Laurie Lee is the Director of Africa Global Policy and Advocacy at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Prior to his role at the Gates Foundation, Laurie was a civil servant in the British Government, mainly in the Department for International Development (DFID), in which his last position was Deputy Director and Head of the International Trade Department. He also served as Deputy Director and Foreign Policy Adviser on Africa to Prime Minister Tony Blair.

LONDON—Despite the need for cost savings in the UK economy, the British government is committed to prioritising key strategies for fighting HIV/AIDS both at home and globally, according to Peter Colenso, Head of the Human Development Group in the UK Department for International Development (DFID). At the World AIDS Day symposium held at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine he explained to Derek Thorne just how the British effort is being undertaken.

New evidence on how to deliver health care for all — particularly in poor countries — was presented at a conference held in London. Kara Hanson of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine explained how improving the health systems which deliver care to ordinary people is needed if the health improvements made possible by new treatments and diagnostic tests are to be achieved. She discusses the findings of the research group she directs: the Consortium for Research on Equitable Health Systems (CREHS), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Carlton Evans of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine explains to Peter Goodwin how his research project, supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), has succeeded in reducing risk factors for TB in households living on less than a dollar a day in the Ventanilla district of Lima, Peru. A microfinance scheme—providing small loans to help people use their skills to earn a living—has resulted in big reductions of adverse factors associated with causing tuberculosis.