Podcasts about Lant Pritchett

She's an economist, an institution-builder, an ecosystem-nurturer and one of our finest thinkers. Shruti Rajagopalan joins Amit Varma in episode 410 of The Seen and the Unseen to talk about her life & times -- and her remarkable work. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Shruti Rajagopalan on Twitter, Substack, Instagram, her podcast, Ideas of India and her own website. 2. Emergent Ventures India. 3. The 1991 Project. 4. Life Lessons That Are Priceless -- Episodes 400 of The Seen and the Unseen. 5. Other episodes of The Seen and the Unseen w Shruti Rajagopalan, in reverse chronological order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. 6. The Day Ryan Started Masturbating -- Amit Varma's newsletter post explaining Shruti Rajagopalan's swimming pool analogy for social science research. 7. A Deep Dive Into Education -- Episode 54 of Everything is Everything. 8. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 9. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength -- Amit Varma. 10. Our Population Is Our Greatest Asset -- Episode 20 of Everything is Everything. 11. Where Has All the Education Gone? -- Lant Pritchett. 12. Lant Pritchett Is on Team Prosperity — Episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen. 13. The Theory of Moral Sentiments — Adam Smith. 14. The Wealth of Nations — Adam Smith. 15. Commanding Heights -- Daniel Yergin. 16. Capitalism and Freedom -- Milton Friedman. 17. Free to Choose -- Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman. 18. Economics in One Lesson -- Henry Hazlitt. 19. The Road to Serfdom -- Friedrich Hayek. 20. Four Papers That Changed the World -- Episode 41 of Everything is Everything. 21. The Use of Knowledge in Society -- Friedrich Hayek. 22. Individualism and Economic Order -- Friedrich Hayek. 23. Understanding the State -- Episode 25 of Everything is Everything.  24. Richard E Wagner at Mercatus and Amazon. 25. Larry White and the First Principles of Money -- Episode 397 of The Seen and the Unseen. 26. Fixing the Knowledge Society -- Episode 24 of Everything is Everything. 27. Marginal Revolution. 28. Paul Graham's essays. 29. Commands and controls: Planning for indian industrial development, 1951–1990 -- Rakesh Mohan and Vandana Aggarwal. 30. The Reformers -- Episode 28 of Everything is Everything. 31. India: Planning for Industrialization -- Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai. 32. Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration -- Bryan Caplan and Zach Weinersmith. 33. Cows on India Uncut. 34. Abdul Karim Khan on Spotify and YouTube. 35. The Surface Area of Serendipity -- Episode 39 of Everything is Everything. 36. Objects From Our Past -- Episode 77 of Everything is Everything. 37. Sriya Iyer on the Economics of Religion -- The Ideas of India Podcast. 38. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ramachandra Guha: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 39. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Pratap Bhanu Mehta: 1, 2. 40. Rohit Lamba Reimagines India's Economic Policy Emphasis -- The Ideas of India Podcast. 41. Rohit Lamba Will Never Be Bezubaan — Episode 378 of The Seen and the Unseen. 42. The Constitutional Law and Philosophy blog. 43. Cost and Choice -- James Buchanan. 44. Philip Wicksteed. 45. Pratap Bhanu Mehta on The Theory of Moral Sentiments -- The Ideas of India Podcast. 46. Conversation and Society — Episode 182 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Russ Roberts). 47. The Common Sense of Political Economy -- Philip Wicksteed. 48. Narendra Shenoy and Mr Narendra Shenoy — Episode 250 of The Seen and the Unseen. 49. Sudhir Sarnobat Works to Understand the World — Episode 350 of The Seen and the Unseen. 50. Manmohan Singh: India's Finest Talent Scout -- Shruti Rajagopalan. 51. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 52. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 53. The Forgotten Greatness of PV Narasimha Rao — Episode 283 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vinay Sitapati). 54. India's Massive Pensions Crisis — Episode 347 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah & Renuka Sane). 55. The Life and Times of KP Krishnan — Episode 355 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56. Breaking Through — Isher Judge Ahluwalia. 57. Breaking Out — Padma Desai. 58. Perestroika in Perspective -- Padma Desai. 59. Shephali Bhatt Is Searching for the Incredible — Episode 391 of The Seen and the Unseen. 60. Pics from the Seen-Unseen party. 61. Pramod Varma on India's Digital Empowerment -- Episode 50 of Brave New World. 59. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha Is the Impartial Spectator — Episode 388 of The Seen and the Unseen. 60. Our Parliament and Our Democracy — Episode 253 of The Seen and the Unseen (w MR Madhavan). 61. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Pranay Kotasthane: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. 62. The Overton Window. 63. When Ideas Have Sex -- Matt Ridley. 64. The Three Languages of Politics — Arnold Kling. 65. Arnold Kling and the Four Languages of Politics -- Episode 394 of The Seen and the Unseen. 66. The Double ‘Thank You' Moment — John Stossel. 67. Economic growth is enough and only economic growth is enough — Lant Pritchett with Addison Lewis. 68. What is Libertarianism? — Episode 117 of The Seen and the Unseen (w David Boaz). 69. What Does It Mean to Be Libertarian? — Episode 64 of The Seen and the Unseen. 70. The Libertarian Mind: A Manifesto for Freedom -- David Boaz. 71. Publish and Perish — Agnes Callard. 72. Classical Liberal Institute. 73. Shruti Rajagopalan's YouTube talk on constitutional amendments. 74. What I, as a development economist, have been actively “for” -- Lant Pritchett. 75. Can Economics Become More Reflexive? — Vijayendra Rao. 76. Premature Imitation and India's Flailing State — Shruti Rajagopalan & Alexander Tabarrok. 77. Elite Imitation in Public Policy — Episode 180 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Alex Tabarrok). 78. Invisible Infrastructure -- Episode 82 of Everything is Everything. 79. The Sundara Kanda. 80. Devdutt Pattanaik and the Stories That Shape Us -- Episode 404 of The Seen and the Unseen. 81. Y Combinator. 82. Space Fields. 83. Apoorwa Masuk, Onkar Singh Batra, Naman Pushp, Angad Daryani, Deepak VS and Srijon Sarkar. 84. Deepak VS and the Man Behind His Face — Episode 373 of The Seen and the Unseen. 85. You've Got To Hide Your Love Away -- The Beatles. 86. Caste, Capitalism and Chandra Bhan Prasad — Episode 296 of The Seen and the Unseen. 87. Data For India -- Rukmini S's startup. 88. Whole Numbers And Half Truths — Rukmini S. 89. The Moving Curve — Rukmini S's Covid podcast, also on all podcast apps. 90. The Importance of Data Journalism — Episode 196 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rukmini S). 91. Rukmini Sees India's Multitudes — Episode 261 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rukmini S). 92. Prosperiti. 93. This Be The Verse — Philip Larkin. 94. The Dilemma of an Indian Liberal -- Gurcharan Das. 95. Zakir: 1951-2024 -- Shruti Rajagopalan. 96. Dazzling Blue -- Paul Simon, featuring Karaikudi R Mani. 97. John Coltrane, Shakti, Zakir Hussain, Ali Akbar Khan, Pannalal Ghosh, Nikhil Banerjee, Vilayat Khan, Bismillah Khan, Ravi Shankar, Bhimsen Joshi, Bade Ghulam Ali Khan, Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, Esperanza Spalding, MS Subbulakshmi, Lalgudi Jayaraman, TN Krishnan, Sanjay Subrahmanyan, Ranjani-Gayatri and TM Krishna on Spotify. 98. James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Israel Kirzner, Mario Rizzo, Vernon Smith, Thomas Schelling and Ronald Coase. 99. The Calculus of Consent -- James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. 100. Tim Harford and Martin Wolf. 101. The Shawshank Redemption -- Frank Darabont. 102. The Marriage of Figaro in The Shawshank Redemption. 103. An Equal Music -- Vikram Seth. 104. Beethoven: Symphony No. 7 - Zubin Mehta and the Belgrade Philharmonic. 105. Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky's violin concertos. 106. Animal Farm -- George Orwell. 107. Down and Out in Paris and London -- George Orwell. 108. Gulliver's Travels -- Jonathan Swift. 109. Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass -- Lewis Carroll. 110. One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich -- Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. 111. The Gulag Archipelago -- Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. 112. Khosla Ka Ghosla -- Dibakar Banerjee. 113. Mr India -- Shekhar Kapur. 114. Chalti Ka Naam Gaadi -- Satyen Bose. 114. Finding Nemo -- Andrew Stanton. 115. Tom and Jerry and Bugs Bunny. 116. Michael Madana Kama Rajan -- Singeetam Srinivasa Rao. 117. The Music Box, with Laurel and Hardy. 118. The Disciple -- Chaitanya Tamhane. 119. Court -- Chaitanya Tamhane. 120. Dwarkesh Patel on YouTube. Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new course called Life Lessons, which aims to be a launchpad towards learning essential life skills all of you need. For more details, and to sign up, click here. Amit and Ajay also bring out a weekly YouTube show, Everything is Everything. Have you watched it yet? You must! And have you read Amit's newsletter? Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Also check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘Learn' by Simahina.

One of the most talked about policy experiments in India in recent memory is the reform of government schools in the city-state of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Under the leadership of the Aam Aadmi Party, the Delhi government has implemented an innovative program to equip students with foundational literacy and numeracy. But while these reforms are much discussed, they have been surprisingly under-studied. A new book by the scholar Yamini Aiyar tries to remedy this gap.Yamini's new book, Lessons in State Capacity from Delhi's Schools, draws on three years of ethnographic research where she and a team of colleagues were embedded in a cluster of schools across the national capital.Yamini is currently Visiting Senior Fellow at the Saxena Center for Contemporary South Asia and the Watson Institute at Brown University. Many of our listeners will know her from her work with the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, where she served as President from 2017 to 2024.To kick off season thirteen of Grand Tamasha, Yamini joins Milan on the show this week. They discuss Yamini's decade-long adventure studying India's public schools, the core elements of the Delhi education model, and the mysterious ways in which the India bureaucracy operates. Plus, they discuss whether the Delhi experiment can travel beyond the national capital.Episode notes:1. “How Bureaucracy Can Work for the Poor (with Akshay Mangla),” Grand Tamasha, March 29, 2023.2. Yamini Aiyar and Shrayana Bhattacharya, “The Post Office Paradox: A Case Study of the Block Level Education Bureaucracy,” Economic & Political Weekly 51, no. 11 (2016).3. Lant Pritchett, “Is India a Flailing State?: Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization,” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP09-013, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2009.4. Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Milan Vaishnav, Rethinking Public Institutions in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017).

He's lived a rich life as a journalist, a human rights activist, an author, a columnist -- and now he's written a great book on Gujaratis. Salil Tripathi joins Amit Varma in episode 409 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss his life, his learnings, these times we live in -- and the times that came before. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Salil Tripathi on Twitter, Instagram, Wikipedia, LinkedIn and Amazon. 2. The Gujaratis: A Portrait of a Community -- Salil Tripathi. 3. The Colonel Who Would Not Repent -- Salil Tripathi. 4. Offence – The Hindu Case -- Salil Tripathi. 5. Detours: Songs of the Open Road -- Salil Tripathi. 6. For, In Your Tongue, I Cannot Fit -- Edited by Shilpa Gupta and Salil Tripathi. 7. The Gita Press and Hindu Nationalism — Episode 139 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Akshaya Mukul). 8. Gita Press and the Making of Hindu India — Akshaya Mukul. 9. Saraswatichandra (Gujarati) (English) -- Govardhanram Tripathi. 10. Gujarat Ni Asmita -- KM Munshi. 11. I Follow the Mahatma -- KM Munshi. 12. Devdutt Pattanaik and the Stories That Shape Us — Episode 404 of The Seen and the Unseen. 13. Ahimsa: 100 Reflections on the Harappan Civilization — Devdutt Pattanaik. 14. Until the Lions -- Karthika Nair. 15. Gods, Guns and Missionaries: The Making of the Modern Hindu Identity — Manu Pillai. 16. The Forces That Shaped Hinduism -- Episode 405 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Manu Pillai). 17. Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain -- Fintan O'Toole. 18. Understanding Gandhi: Part 1: Mohandas — Episode 104 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 19. Understanding Gandhi: Part 2: Mahatma — Episode 105 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 20. Gandhi Before India -- Ramachandra Guha. 21. Objects From Our Past -- Episode 77 of Everything is Everything. 22. The Diary of Manu Gandhi (Part 1) (Part 2) -- Edited and Translated by Tridip Suhrud. 23. The Ferment of Our Founders — Episode 272 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Kapila). 24. Lessons from an Ankhon Dekhi Prime Minister — Amit Varma. 25. Akhil Katyal's poem on caste. 26. Midnight's Children -- Salman Rushdie. 27. Bare Feet – a Poem about MF Husain -- Salil Tripathi. 28. My Mother's Fault -- Salil Tripathi. 29. Jejuri -- Arun Kolatkar. 30. Yashwant Rao -- Arun Kolatkar. 31. The Patriot -- Nissim Ezekiel. 32. Goopy Gyne Bagha Byne -- Satyajit Ray. 33. You're Missing -- Bruce Springsteen. 34. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Salman Rushdie, Milan Kundera, Ved Mehta and John McPhee on Amazon. 35. All We Imagine as Light -- Payal Kapadia. 36. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha Is the Impartial Spectator — Episode 388 of The Seen and the Unseen. 37. On Tyranny -- Timothy Snyder. 38. Lant Pritchett Is on Team Prosperity — Episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen. 39. Saving Capitalism From The Capitalists -- Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales. 40. Check out Johan Norberg's great work. 41. The Life and Times of the Indian Economy — Episode 387 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rajeswari Sengupta). 42. India's Problem is Poverty, Not Inequality — Amit Varma. 43. Stay Away From Luxury Beliefs — Episode 46 of Everything is Everything. 44. On Inequality — Harry Frankfurt. 45. Economic growth is enough and only economic growth is enough — Lant Pritchett with Addison Lewis. 46. Sample SSR conspiracy theory: He's alive! 47. Amit Varma's 2022 piece on the mess-up at The Wire. 48. Television Price Controls — Episode 27 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashok Malik). 49. The Selfish Altruist -- Tony Vaux. 50. Sadanand Dhume's tweet on the hypocrisy around The Satanic Verses. 51. Bad Elements -- Ian Buruma. 52. Biju Rao Won't Bow to Conventional Wisdom — Episode 392 of The Seen and the Unseen. 53. Can Economics Become More Reflexive? — Vijayendra Rao. 54. The Life and Times of Teesta Setalvad — Episode 302 of The Seen and the Unseen. 55. Aakar Patel Is Full of Hope — Episode 270 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56. The Wal-Mart Effect -- Charles Fishman. 57. Modern South India -- Rajmohan Gandhi. 58. The Adda at the End of the Universe — Episode 309 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vikram Sathaye and Roshan Abbas). 59. Whatever happened To Ehsan Jafri on February 28, 2002? — Harsh Mander. 60. Jai Jai Garvi Gujarat -- Narmad. 61. The Populist Playbook -- Episode 42 of Everything is Everything. 62. Where the Green Ants Dream -- Werner Herzog. 63. People's Linguistic Survey of India -- GN Devy and others. 64. The Refreshing Audacity of Vinay Singhal — Episode 291 of The Seen and the Unseen. 65. Stage.in. 66. Reading Lolita in Tehran -- Azar Nafisi. 67. Two Concepts of Liberty — Isaiah Berlin. 68. Understanding the State -- Episode 25 of Everything is Everything. 69. The First Assault on Our Constitution — Episode 194 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Tripurdaman Singh). 70. Shruti Rajagopalan's talk on the many amendments in our constitution. 71. Caged Tiger: How Too Much Government Is Holding Indians Back — Subhashish Bhadra. 72. Subhashish Bhadra on Our Dysfunctional State — Episode 333 of The Seen and the Unseen. 73. Amitava Kumar Finds the Breath of Life — Episode 265 of The Seen and the Unseen. 74. Goodbye Solo — Ramin Bahrani. 75. The desire to help, and the desire not to be helped — Roger Ebert's review of Goodbye Solo. 76. Dalit Kitchens of Marathwada -- Shahu Patole. 77. Firaaq -- Nandita Das. 78. How the BJP Wins — Prashant Jha. 79. The BJP's Magic Formula — Episode 45 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Prashant Jha). 80. The Year of Living Dangerously -- Peter Weir. 81. Ingmar Bergman, Satyajit Ray, Francois Truffaut and Aparna Sen. 82. The New Yorker, Vanity Fair and London Review of Books. 83. Ravi Shankar, Zakir Hussain and Vilayat Khan on Spotify. 84. Nadine Gordiner, Fintan O'Toole, Ilya Kaminsky, Karthika Nair, Ruchir Joshi, Kiran Desai, Nilanjana Roy, Sunil Gavaskar and Mike Brearley. This episode is sponsored by CTQ Compounds. Check out The Daily Reader and FutureStack. Use the code UNSEEN for Rs 2500 off. Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new course called Life Lessons, which aims to be a launchpad towards learning essential life skills all of you need. For more details, and to sign up, click here. Amit and Ajay also bring out a weekly YouTube show, Everything is Everything. Have you watched it yet? You must! And have you read Amit's newsletter? Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Also check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘Asmita' by Simahina.

Many development economists would argue that the most important innovation of the last two decades has been a commitment to use only rigorous evidence for policy, and usually what they mean is evidence generated by RCTs. But are systematic reviews of the results a useful guide to policy? And should development economics continue to be focusing so much on the programmes that flow from RCT- driven research? Lant Pritchett of LSE talks to Tim Phillips about the nature of “rigorous” evidence in development economics, and the future of the discipline itself. Read the full show notes on VoxDev: https://voxdev.org/topic/macroeconomics-growth/rethinking-evidence-and-refocusing-growth-development-economics

Mass immigration is demographically essential but politically impossible – so argues Lant Pritchett, development economist and visiting professor at the London School of Economics. As populations age in the rich developed countries, immigrant workers will be needed to help with the burden of providing for the elderly. Removing the barriers might also be the quickest way to raise living standards for people in the developing world. But doing so would require swimming against a rising tide of anti-immigrant populism. Pritchett thinks he has a solution – allowing immigrants to come and work temporarily on strictly time-limited contracts. But does his idea stand up to scrutiny?Martin Wolf is chief economics commentator at the Financial Times. You can find his column hereSubscribe to The Economics Show on Apple, Spotify, Pocket Casts or wherever you listen.Read a transcript of this episode on FT.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

He's an economist who cares more about people than numbers -- and he thinks his field needs more sociology and anthropology in it. Vijayendra (Biju) Rao joins Amit Varma in episode 392 of The Seen and the Unseen to talk about what makes him angry and what brings him peace. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Vijayendra (Biju) Rao on Twitter, Google Scholar, The World Bank and his own website. 2. Biju Rao's blog at the World Bank. 3. Localizing Development: Does Participation Work? -- Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao. 4. Oral Democracy: Deliberation in Indian Village Assemblies -- Paromita Sanyal and Vijayendra Rao. 5. Can Economics Become More Reflexive? -- Vijayendra Rao. 6. Vamsha Vriksha -- Girish Karnad. 7. ‘I want absolute commitment to our gharana': A tribute to Rajshekhar Mansur and his music -- Vijayendra Rao. 8. The Life and Work of Ashwini Deshpande — Episode 298 of The Seen and the Unseen. 9. Two Hundred and Fifty-Thousand Democracies: A Review of Village Government in India -- Siddharth George, Vijaendra Rao and MR Sharan. 10. Last Among Equals : Power Caste And Politics In Bihar's Villages -- MR Sharan. 11. Lant Pritchett Is on Team Prosperity — Episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen. 12. National Development Delivers: And How! And How? — Lant Pritchett. 13. The Perils of Partial Attribution: Let's All Play for Team Development — Lant Pritchett. 14. The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural India -- Vijayendra Rao. 15. The Life and Times of Jerry Pinto — Episode 314 of The Seen and the Unseen. 16. Shephali Bhatt Is Searching for the Incredible -- Episode 391 of The Seen and the Unseen. 17. Jiddu Krishnamurti on Wikipedia, Britannica and Amazon. 18. Biju Rao listens to Jiddu Krishnamurthy. 19. Ben Hur -- William Wyler. 20. Trade, Institutions and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia -- Saumitra Jha. 21. Memories and Things — Episode 195 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Aanchal Malhotra). 22. Remnants of a Separation — Aanchal Malhotra. 23. Deliberative Democracy -- Jon Elster. 24. A Life in Indian Politics — Episode 149 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Jayaprakash Narayan). 25. Subhashish Bhadra on Our Dysfunctional State — Episode 333 of The Seen and the Unseen. 26. Caged Tiger: How Too Much Government Is Holding Indians Back — Subhashish Bhadra. 27. Urban Governance in India — Episode 31 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 28. Understanding Gandhi. Part 1: Mohandas — Episode 104 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 29. Understanding Gandhi. Part 2: Mahatma — Episode 105 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 30. Accelerating India's Development — Karthik Muralidharan. 31. The Added Value of Local Democracy -- Abhishek Arora, Siddharth George, Vijayendra Rao and MR Sharan. 32. Some memories of VKRV Rao -- Vijayendra Rao. 33. The Foundation Series — Isaac Asimov. 34. Lawrence of Arabia -- David Lean. 35. Gandhi -- Richard Attenborough. 36. The Story of My Experiments with Truth -- Mohandas Gandhi. 37. Bhagavad Gita on Wikipedia and Amazon. 38. KT Achaya on Amazon. 39. The Emergency: A Personal History — Coomi Kapoor. 40. My Varied Life in Management: A Short Memoir -- SL Rao. 41. The Incredible Curiosities of Mukulika Banerjee — Episode 276 of The Seen and the Unseen. 42. Ram Guha Writes a Letter to a Friend -- Episode 371 of The Seen and the Unseen. 43. Terror as a Bargaining Instrument : A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India -- Francis Bloch and Vijayendra Rao. 44. Domestic Violence and Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Rural India: An Exercise in Participatory Econometrics -- Vijayendra Rao. 45. Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative. 46. Narrative Economics -- Robert J Shiller. 47. Culture and Public Action -- Edited by Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton. 48. The Capacity to Aspire -- Arjun Appadurai. 49. Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming -- Agnes Callard. 50. Dominion: The Making of the Western Mind -- Tom Holland. 51. PV Sukhatme in EPW. 52. India Needs Decentralization -- Episode 47 of Everything if Everything. 53. Deliberative Inequality:  A Text-As-Data Study of India's Village Assemblies -- Ramya Parthasarathy, Vijayendra Rao and Nethra Palaniswamy. 54. A Method to Scale Up Interpretive Qualitative Analysis with An Application to Aspirations among Refugees and Hosts in Bangladesh -- Julian Ashwin, Vijayendra Rao, Monica Biradavolu, Aditya Chhabra, Afsana Khan, Arshia Haque and Nandini Krishnan. 55. Using Large-Language Models for Qualitative Analysis Can Introduce Serious Bias -- Julian Ashwin, Aditya Chhabra and Vijayendra Rao. 56. This Be The Verse — Philip Larkin. 57. Audacious Hope: An Archive of How Democracy is Being Saved in India -- Indrajit Roy. 58. Poverty and the Quest for Life -- Bhrigupati Singh. 59. Recasting Culture to Undo Gender: A Sociological Analysis of Jeevika in Rural Bihar, India -- Paromita Sanyal, Vijayendra Rao and Shruti Majumdar. 60. We Are Poor but So Many -- Ela Bhatt. 61. Premature Imitation and India's Flailing State — Shruti Rajagopalan & Alexander Tabarrok. 62. James Wolfensohn in Wikipedia and The World Bank. 63. Arati Kumar-Rao Took a One-Way Ticket -- Episode 383 of The Seen and the Unseen. 64. Marginlands: Indian Landscapes on the Brink — Arati Kumar-Rao. 65. Amitav Ghosh on Amazon. 66. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life -- Nicholas Phillipson. 67. Elinor Ostrom on Amazon, Britannica, Wikipedia and EconLib. 68. Jane Mansbridge on Amazon, Wikipedia, and Google Scholar. 69. Albert O Hirschman on Amazon and Wikipedia. 70. Mughal-e-Azam -- K Asif. 71. Samskara -- Pattabhirama Reddy. 72. The Wire -- David Simon. 73. Deadwood -- David Milch. 74. Biju Rao on Democracy, Deliberation, and Development -- the Ideas of India podcast with Shruti Rajagopalan. Biju Rao's Specially curated music recommendations: 1. The Senior Dagar Brothers (Moinuddin & Aminuddin Dagar) performing (Komal Rishab) Asavari and Kamboji. 2. Raghunath Panigrahi performing Ashtapadi from the Geeta Govinda and Lalita Lavanga. 3. Amir Khan performing Lalit and Jog. 4. Vilayat Khan performing Sanjh Saravali and Hameer. 5. Ravi Shankar performing Jaijaiwanti and Tilak Shyam (full concert) and Durga. 6. Faiyaz Khan performing Raga Darbari and Raga Des. 7. N Rajam performing a full concert with Gorakh Kalyan, Sawani Barwa, Hamir, Malkauns. 8. Kumar Gandharva performing Tulsidas – Ek Darshan and Surdas – Ek Darshan. 9. Bhimsen Joshi performing Ragas Chhaya and Chhaya Malhar & Jo Bhaje Hari Ko Sada – Bhajan in Raga Bhairavi (original recording from 1960). The Jaipur-Atrauli Gharana: 1. Mallikarjun Mansur in a guided Listening Session by Irfan Zuberi, and performing Basanti Kedar and Tilak Kamod. 2. Kesarbai Kerkar performing Lalit and Bhairavi. 3. Moghubai Kurdikar performing Kedar and Suddha Nat. 4. Kishori Amonkar performing Bhimpalas and Bhoop(ali). 5. Some performances by Rajshekhar Mansur are linked in Biju Rao's piece on him. Karnatic Music: 1. TM Krishna performing Krishna Nee Begane Baaro, Yamuna Kalyani (Yaman Kalyan) and Nalinakanthi (closest Hindustani equivalent is Tilak Kamod). 2. MD Ramanathan performing Bhavayami – Raga Malika and Samaja Vara Gamana – Ragam Hindolam (Malkauns). 3. Aruna Sairam performing a full concert. 4. Madurai Mani Iyer performing Taaye Yoshade. 5. MS Subbulakshmi performing a full Concert from 1966 and Bhaja Govindam (Ragamalika). 6. TR Mahalingam performing Swara Raga Sudha – Shankarabharanam. Jugalbandis: 1. Ali Akbar Khan and Vilayat Khan performing Marwa. 2. Ali Akbar Khan and Ravi Shankar performing Jaijaiwanti. 3. N Rajam with her brother TN Krishnan performing Raga Hamsadhwani. Amit's newsletter is active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘The Iconoclast' by Simahina.

He's an elder statesman in the worlds of journalism, policy and economics in India -- and he takes the long view. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha joins Amit Varma in episode 388 of The Seen and the Unseen to talk about his life and learnings. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha on Twitter, Mint and Artha Global. 2. The Rise of India -- NIranjan Rajadhyaksha. 3. Niranjan Rajadhyaksha interviewed in Marathi by Think Bank: Part 1. Part 2. 4. MV Rajadhyaksha and Vijaya Rajadhyaksha. 5. The Times of India obituary of MV Rajadhyaksha. 6. Adventures of a Bystander -- Peter F Drucker. 7. The Theory of Moral Sentiments -- Adam Smith's book that contains the concept of the impartial spectator. 8. The Impartial Spectator columns by Niranjan Rajadhyaksha and Shruti Rajagopalan. 9. Ratatouille -- Brad Bird. 10. The Overton Window. 11. John Maynard Keynes on Alfred Marshall. 12. The Rooted Cosmopolitanism of Sugata Srinivasaraju — Episode 277 of The Seen and the Unseen. 13. The Rise and Fall of the Bilingual Intellectual -- Ramachandra Guha. 14. Understanding India Through Its Languages — Episode 232 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Peggy Mohan). 15. Wanderers, Kings, Merchants: The Story of India through Its Languages — Peggy Mohan. 16. The Heckman Equation -- a website based on James Heckman's work. 17. Select episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Suyash Rai (1, 2) and Rahul Verma (1, 2). 18. Stri Purush Tulana by Tarabai Shinde on Amazon and Wikipedia. 19. Kalyanche Nishwas by Vibhavari Shirurkar (Malati Bedekar) on Amazon and Wikipedia. 20. Makers of Modern India -- Ramachandra Guha. 21. Simone de Beauvoir (Wikipedia, Britannica, Amazon) and Germaine Greer (Wikipedia, Britannica, Amazon). 22. Gopal Ganesh Agarkar's essay on education for girls. 23. The omnibus volume of BR Nanda's biographies of Gokhale, Gandhi and Nehru. 24. The Adda at the End of the Universe — Episode 309 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vikram Sathaye and Roshan Abbas). 25. This Be The Verse — Philip Larkin. 26. Rohit Lamba Will Never Be Bezubaan -- Episode 378 of The Seen and the Unseen. 27. Volga Se Ganga (Hindi) (English) -- Rahul Sankritayan. 28. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 29. Turning Over the Pebbles: A Life in Cricket and in the Mind -- Mike Brearley. 30. Slow Horses (book one of Slough House) -- Mick Herron. 31. Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 -- Tony Judt. 32. On Warne -- Gideon Haigh. 33. The Essential Keynes -- John Maynard Keynes. 34. The Age of Uncertainty — John Kenneth Galbraith. 35. Asian Drama -- Gunnar Myrdal. 36. Aneesh Pradhan on Spotify, Amazon, Instagram, Twitter and his own website. 37. Malini Goyal is the Curious One — Episode 377 of The Seen and the Unseen. 38. The UNIX Episode -- Episode 32 of Everything is Everything. 39. The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development -- Michael Kremer. 40. Why Abhijit Banerjee Had to Go Abroad to Achieve Glory -- Amit Varma. 41. Why Talent Comes in Clusters -- Episode 8 of Everything is Everything. 42. The Dark Knight Rises -- Christopher Nolan. 43. Thinking it Through -- The archives of Amit Varma's column for Mint. 44. Remembering Mr. Shawn's New Yorker -- Ved Mehta. 45. Videhi -- Vijaya Rajadhyaksha. 46. Select pieces on the relationship between Raymond Carver and Gordon Lish: 1, 2, 3, 4. 47. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy -- Joseph Schumpeter. 48. Maharashtra Politics Unscrambled — Episode 151 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Sujata Anandan). 49. Complaint Resolution Systems: Experimental Evidence from Rural India -- Chinmaya Kumar and MR Sharan. 50. Parkinson's Law — C Northcote Parkinson. 51. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 52. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 53. The Forgotten Greatness of PV Narasimha Rao — Episode 283 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vinay Sitapati). 54. The Life and Times of KP Krishnan — Episode 355 of The Seen and the Unseen. 55. Lant Pritchett Is on Team Prosperity — Episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56. The Reformers — Episode 28 of Everything is Everything. 57. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills — Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 58. Public Choice Theory Explains SO MUCH -- Episode 33 of Everything is Everything. 59. The Logic of Collective Action — Mancur Olson. 60. Ashutosh Salil and the Challenge of Change — Episode 312 of The Seen and the Unseen. 61. Rational Ignorance. 62. The State of Our Farmers — Ep 86 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Gunvant Patil, in Hindi). 63. India's Agriculture Crisis — Ep 140 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Barun Mitra & Kumar Anand). 64. The Indian State Is the Greatest Enemy of the Indian Farmer — Amit Varma. 65. The Worldly Philosophers --  Robert Heilbroner. 66. The Clash of Economic Ideas — Lawrence H White. 67. Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency -- Kenneth Arrow, Hollis Chenery, Bagicha Singh Minhas and Robert Solow. 68. Room 666 -- Wim Wenders. 69. Laapataa Ladies -- Kiran Rao. 70. The Brave New Future of Electricity -- Episode 40 of Everything is Everything. 71. What I, as a development economist, have been actively “for” — Lant Pritchett. 72. National Development Delivers: And How! And How? — Lant Pritchett. 73. Economic growth is enough and only economic growth is enough — Lant Pritchett with Addison Lewis. 74. Smoke and Ashes -- Amitav Ghosh. 75. Sata Uttarachi Kahani -- GP Pradhan. 76. Gopal Ganesh Agarkar and Bal Gangadhar Tilak. 77. Collections of VD Savarkar's Marathi essays: 1, 2. 78. Savarkar and the Making of Hindutva -- Janaki Bakhle. 79. Savarkar Te BJP -- SH Deshpande. 80. Sarvakarancha Buddhiwad Ani Hindutvawad -- Sheshrao More. 81. Swatantryaveer Savarkar Ek Rahasya -- DN Gokhale. 82. Shodh Savarkarancha -- YD Phadke. 83. The Taking of Pelham 123 -- Tony Scott. 84. Sriram Raghavan (IMDb) (Wikipedia) and Vijay Anand (IMDb) (Wikipedia). 85. Manorama Six Feet Under -- Navdeep Singh. 86. Agatha Christie and Frederick Forsyth on Amazon. 87. Salil Chowdhury and RD Burman on Spotify. 88. Haikyu -- Haruichi Furudate. 89. Pramit Bhattacharya Believes in Just One Ism — Episode 256 of The Seen and the Unseen. 90. Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister — Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay. 91. Dilip José Abreu: an elegant and creative economist — Rohit Lamba. Niranjan would like to inform listeners that Spontaneous Order would be translated to Marathi as उत्सफूर्त व्यवस्था. This episode is sponsored by CTQ Compounds. Check out The Daily Reader and FutureStack. Use the code UNSEEN for Rs 2500 off. Amit's newsletter is active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘The Impartial Spectator' by Simahina.

Our greatest moral imperative is to solve the problem of poverty -- and after over 75 years, we still have some distance to travel. Rajeswari Sengupta joins Amit Varma in episode 387 of The Seen and the Unseen for a deep dive into how we got here, where we went wrong, what we got right, and how we should look at the Indian economy going forward. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out:1. Rajeswari Sengupta's homepage. 2. Demystifying GDP — Episode 130 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rajeswari Sengupta). 3. Twelve Dream Reforms — Episode 138 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Sengupta & Vivek Kaul). 4. Two-and-a-Half Bengalis Have an Economics Adda -- Episode 274 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rajeswari Sengupta and Shrayana Bhattacharya). 5. Talks & Discussions on the Indian Economy featuring Rajeswari Sengupta. 6. Rajeswari Sengulta's writings on the Indian economy. 7. Rajeswari Sengupta's writing for Ideas for India. 8. Rajeswari Sengupta's writing on the Leap Blog. 9. Rajeswari Sengupta's pieces on GDP: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 10. Rajeswari Sengupta's pieces on fiscal policy: 1, 2, 3. 11. Rajeswari Sengupta's pieces on the banking crisis: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 12. Rajeswari Sengupta's pieces on the financial sector: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 13. Rajeswari Sengupta's pieces on Covid: 1, 2, 3, 4. 14. Getting the State out of Our Lives -- Rajeswari Sengupta's TEDx talk. 15. Why Freedom Matters -- Episode 10 of Everything is Everything. 16. The Reformers -- Episode 28 of Everything is Everything. 17. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 18. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 19. The Forgotten Greatness of PV Narasimha Rao — Episode 283 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vinay Sitapati). 20. India's Lost Decade — Episode 116 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Puja Mehra). 21. The Life and Times of KP Krishnan -- Episode 355 of The Seen and the Unseen. 22. Lant Pritchett Is on Team Prosperity -- Episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen. 23. Josh Felman Tries to Make Sense of the World — Episode 321 of The Seen and the Unseen. 24. Rohit Lamba Will Never Be Bezubaan -- Episode 378 of The Seen and the Unseen. 25. Yugank Goyal Is out of the Box — Episode 370 of The Seen and the Unseen. 26. The State of Our Farmers — Ep 86 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Gunvant Patil, in Hindi). 27. India's Agriculture Crisis — Ep 140 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Barun Mitra & Kumar Anand). 28. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills — Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 29. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah). 30. Two Economic Crises (2008 & 2019) — Episode 135 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Mohit Satynanand). 31. The Indian Economy in 2019 — Episode 153 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vivek Kaul). 32. Subhashish Bhadra on Our Dysfunctional State -- Episode 333 of The Seen and the Unseen. 33. The Importance of Data Journalism — Episode 196 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rukmini S). 34. Rukmini Sees India's Multitudes — Episode 261 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rukmini S). 35. Pramit Bhattacharya Believes in Just One Ism — Episode 256 of The Seen and the Unseen. 36. Understanding the State -- Episode 25 of Everything is Everything. 37. When Should the State Act? -- Episode 26 of Everything is Everything. 38. Public Choice Theory Explains SO MUCH -- Episode 33 of Everything is Everything. 39. Our Population Is Our Greatest Asset -- Episode 20 of Everything is Everything. 40. What's Wrong With Indian Agriculture? -- Episode 18 of Everything is Everything. 41. The Long Road to Change -- Episode 36 of Everything is Everything. 42. India Needs Decentralization -- Episode 47 of Everything is Everything. 43. Beware of These Five Fallacies! -- Episode 45 of Everything is Everything. 44. Stay Away From Luxury Beliefs -- Episode 46 of Everything is Everything. 45. Graduating to Globalisation -- Episode 48 of Everything is Everything (on I18N). 46. Ask Me ANYTHING! -- Episode 50 of Everything is Everything. 47. Four Papers That Changed the World -- Episode 41 of Everything is Everything. 48. The Populist Playbook -- Episode 42 of Everything is Everything. 49. The 1991 Project. 50. The quest for economic freedom in India — Shruti Rajagopalan. 51. What I, as a development economist, have been actively “for” — Lant Pritchett. 52. National Development Delivers: And How! And How? — Lant Pritchett. 53. Economic growth is enough and only economic growth is enough — Lant Pritchett with Addison Lewis. 54. Is India a Flailing State?: Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization — Lant Pritchett. 55. Is Your Impact Evaluation Asking Questions That Matter? A Four Part Smell Test — Lant Pritchett. 56. The Perils of Partial Attribution: Let's All Play for Team Development — Lant Pritchett. 57. Some episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on the state of the economy: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 58. Accelerating India's Development — Karthik Muralidharan. 59. Unshackling India -- Ajay Chhibber and Salman Soz. 60. India Grows At Night -- Gurcharan Das. 61. India's Problem is Poverty, Not Inequality -- Amit Varma. 62. Mohit Satyanand's newsletter post on the informal sector. 63. Pratap Bhanu Mehta's column on mission mode interventions. 64. The Hedonistic Treadmill. 65. 77% low-income households saw no income increase in the past 5 yrs -- Vasudha Mukherjee. 66. Pandit's Mind — The 1951 Time magazine cover story on Jawaharlal Nehru. 67. Economic Facts and Fallacies -- Thomas Sowell. 68. An Autobiography -- Jawaharlal Nehru. 69. The Double 'Thank You' Moment -- John Stossel. 70. Profit = Philanthropy — Amit Varma. 71. India After Gandhi -- Ramachandra Guha. 72. The China Dude Is in the House -- Episode 231 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Manoj Kewalramani). 73. The Dragon and the Elephant -- Episode 181 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Hamsini Hariharan and Shibani Mehta). 74. Caste, Capitalism and Chandra Bhan Prasad — Episode 296 of The Seen and the Unseen. 75. The Collected Writings and Speeches of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar. 76. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength -- Amit Varma. 77. How to assess the needs for aid? The answer: Don't ask -- William Easterly. 78. The White Man's Burden -- William Easterly. 79. The Elusive Quest for Growth -- William Easterly. 80. The Tyranny of Experts -- William Easterly. 81. Planners vs. Searchers in Foreign Aid — William Easterly. 82. Pandit's Mind — The 1951 Time magazine cover story on Jawaharlal Nehru. 83. 75 Years of India's Foreign Exchange Controls -- Bhargavi Zaveri Shah. 84. Breaking the Mould: Reimagining India's Economic Future — Raghuram Rajan and Rohit Lamba. 85. The History of the Planning Commission — Episode 306 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Nikhil Menon). 86. Adam Smith on The Man of System. 87. The Use of Knowledge in Society — Friedrich Hayek. 88. Price Controls Lead to Shortages and Harm the Poor -- Amit Varma. 89. The Great Redistribution -- Amit Varma. 90. Backstage: The Story behind India's High Growth Years -- Montek Singh Ahluwalia. 91. The Indian State Is the Greatest Enemy of the Indian Farmer -- Amit Varma piece, which contains the Sharad Joshi shair. 92. India's Massive Pensions Crisis — Episode 347 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah & Renuka Sane). 93. The Economic Legacies of Colonial Rule in India -- Tirthankar Roy. 94. The Semiconductor Wars — Episode 358 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane & Abhiram Manchi). 95. BR Shenoy on Wikipedia and Indian Liberals. 96. BR Shenoy: Stature and Impact -- Peter Bauer. 97. The Foreign Exchange Crisis and India's Second Five Year Plan -- VKRV Rao. 98. India's Water Crisis — Episode 60 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vishwanath S aka Zenrainman). 99. The Delhi Smog — Episode 44 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vivek Kaul). 100. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 101. Education in India — Episode 77 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Amit Chandra). 102. The Profit Motive in Education — Episode 9 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Parth Shah). 103. Our Unlucky Children (2008) — Amit Varma. 104. Where Has All the Education Gone? — Lant Pritchett. 105. Every Act of Government Is an Act of Violence -- Amit Varma. 106. Narendra Modi takes a Great Leap Backwards -- Amit Varma on DeMon & Mao killing sparrows. 107. The Emergency: A Personal History — Coomi Kapoor. 108. Coomi Kapoor Has the Inside Track — Episode 305 of The Seen and the Unseen. 109. Seven Stories That Should Be Films -- Episode 23 of Everything in Everything, in which Amit talks about the Emergency. 110. Milton Friedman on the minimum wage. 111. The Commanding Heights -- Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw. 112. Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist -- Bruce Yandle. 113. Raees: An Empty Shell of a Gangster Film — Amit Varma. 114. Josh Felman on Twitter, Project Syndicate, JH Consulting and The Marginal Economist. 115. Obituaries of SV Raju by Niranjan Rajadhyaksha and Samanth Subramanian. 116. Breaking Out -- Padma Desai. 117. Breaking Through -- Isher Judge Ahluwalia. 118. India's Far From Free Markets (2005) — Amit Varma in the Wall Street Journal. 119. Naushad Forbes Wants to Fix India — Episode 282 of The Seen and the Unseen. 120. The Struggle And The Promise — Naushad Forbes. 121. Half-Lion -- Vinay Sitapati's biography of PV Narasimha Rao. 122. A Game Theory Problem: Who Will Bell The Congress Cat? — Amit Varma. 123. India Transformed -- Rakesh Mohan. 124. Highway to Success: The Impact of the Golden Quadrilateral -- Ejaz Ghani, Arti Grover Goswami and William R Kerr. 125. The Cantillon Effect. 126. The Lost Decade -- Puja Mehra. 127. Modi's Domination – What We Often Overlook — Keshava Guha. 128. XKDR Forum. 129. Beware of the Useful Idiots — Amit Varma. 130. Some of Amit Varma's pieces and episodes against Demonetisation: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 131. Episode of The Seen and the Unseen on GST: 1, 2, 3. 132. Miniature episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on PSBs, NPAs and NBFCs. 133. The Bankable Wisdom of Harsh Vardhan -- Episode 352 of The Seen and the Unseen. 134. Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005 -- Atul Kohli. 135. The Economic Consequences of the Peace -- John Maynard Keynes. 136. India's GDP Mis-estimation: Likelihood, Magnitudes, Mechanisms, and Implications -- Arvind Subramanian. 137. What a Long Strange Trip It's Been -- Episode 188 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Arvind Subramanian). 138. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on Covid-19: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. 139. A Venture Capitalist Looks at the World -- Episode 213 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Sajith Pai). 140. The Indus Valley Playbook — Sajith Pai. 141. India's Trade Policy Is Working Great — for Vietnam -- Andy Mukherjee. 142. A Trade Deficit With a Babysitter -- Tim Harford. 143. The City & the City — China Miéville. 144. A Decade of Credit Collapse in India -- Harsh Vardhan. 145. The Low Productivity Trap of Collateralised Lending for MSMEs -- Harsh Vardhan. 146. Economic Learnings of India for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Bihar -- Episode 345 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Mohit Satyanand and Kumar Anand). 147. They Stole a Bridge. They Stole a Pond -- Amit Varma. 148. Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister -- Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay. 149. The Right to Property — Episode 26 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 150. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on agriculture: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 151. Some of Amit Varma's pieces on agriculture: 1, 2, 3. 152. The Crisis in Indian Agriculture — Brainstorm on Pragati. 153. Where are the Markets? — Kumar Anand. 154. Empower Women Farmers -- Mrinal Pande. 155. The Mystery of Capital — Hernando De Soto. 156. India Unbound -- Gurcharan Das. 157. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 158. We, The Citizens: Strengthening the Indian Republic — Khyati Pathak, Anupam Manur and Pranay Kotasthane. 159. Making Policy Fun with Khyati Pathak and Friends -- Episode 374 of The Seen and the Unseen. 160. Seeing Like a State — James C Scott. 161. Free To Choose — Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman. 162. Classical Liberalism- A Primer -- Eamonn Butler. 163. Friedrich Hayek: The ideas and influence of the libertarian economist -- Eamonn Butler. 164. Milton Friedman: A concise guide to the ideas and influence of the free-market economist -- Eamonn Butler. 165. Public Choice – A Primer -- Eamonn Butler. 166. Adam Smith – A Primer: Eamonn Butler. 167. The Clash of Economic Ideas -- Lawrence H White. 168. Just a Mercenary?: Notes from My Life and Career -- D Subbarao. 169. Who Moved My Interest Rate? -- D Subbarao. 170. Advice & Dissent: My Life in Public Service -- YV Reddy. 171. A Business History of India -- Tirthankar Roy. 172. Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath -- Ben Bernanke. 173. Whole Numbers And Half Truths -- Rukmini S. 174. Fragile by Design -- Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber. 175. Universal Man: The Seven Lives of John Maynard Keynes -- Richard Davenport-Hines. 176. A Life in Our Times -- John Kenneth Galbraith. 177. The Age of Uncertainty -- John Kenneth Galbraith. 178. Fixing the Knowledge Society -- Episode 24 of Everything is Everything. Amit's newsletter is active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘It's Complicated' by Simahina.

He's one of the great economists of our times, always focussed on the big questions, no matter how hard they are. Lant Pritchett joins Amit Varma in episode 379 of The Seen and the Unseen to talk about his life, his work and what he has learnt about the world. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Lant Pritchett on Google Scholar and his own website. 2. Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action -- Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock. 3. Deals and Development: The Political Dynamics of Growth Episodes -- Lant Pritchett, Kunal Sen and Eric Werker. 4. What I, as a development economist, have been actively “for” -- Lant Pritchett. 5. National Development Delivers: And How! And How? -- Lant Pritchett. 6. Economic growth is enough and only economic growth is enough -- Lant Pritchett with Addison Lewis. 7. Is India a Flailing State?: Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization -- Lant Pritchett. 8. Is Your Impact Evaluation Asking Questions That Matter? A Four Part Smell Test -- Lant Pritchett. 9. The Perils of Partial Attribution: Let's All Play for Team Development -- Lant Pritchett. 10. Where Has All the Education Gone? -- Lant Pritchett. 11. Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation -- Lant Pritchett. 12. Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capital in Rural Tanzania -- Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett. 13. Where Did Development Economics Go Wrong? -- Lant Pritchett speaks to Shruti Rajagopalan on Ideas of India. 14. Reforming Development Economics --  Lant Pritchett speaks to Shruti Rajagopalan on Ideas of India. 15. Suyash Rai Embraces India's Complexity — Episode 307 of The Seen and the Unseen. 16. Economics in One Lesson — Henry Hazlitt. 17. The Worldly Philosophers -- Robert L Heilbroner. 18. That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen — Frédéric Bastiat. 19. The Use of Knowledge in Society — Friedrich Hayek. 20. Four Papers That Changed the World -- Episode 41 of Everything is Everything (in which Amit talks about Hayek's essay). 21. The Great Wave off Kanagawa. 22. Deepak VS and the Man Behind His Face -- Episode 373 of The Seen and the Unseen. 23. How We Do the Small Things -- Amit Varma. 24. Fixing the Knowledge Society -- Episode 24 of Everything is Everything. 25. The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development — Michael Kremer. 26. Why Abhijit Banerjee Had to Go Abroad to Achieve Glory — Amit Varma. 27. Amadeus -- Milos Forman. 28. Why Talent Comes in Clusters -- Episode 8 of Everything is Everything. 29. Imagined Communities -- Benedict Anderson. 30. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 31. Accelerating India's Development -- Karthik Muralidharan. 32. An update in 2020 of the Big Stuck in State Capability -- Lant Pritchett. 33. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy -- Daniel Carpenter. 34. The Godfather -- Francis Ford Coppola. 35. Seeing Like a State -- James C Scott. 36. Dido and Aeneas -- Mark Morris Dance Group. Amit's newsletter is explosively active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘The Lighthouse' by Simahina.

To reform India, you must reform the Indian state. Karthik Muralidharan joins Amit Varma in episode 375 of The Seen and the Unseen to talk about his much-awaited new book that has finally released -- and the chapters on it that deal with our bureaucracy. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Karthik Muralidharan on Twitter, LinkedIn, Google Scholar, UCSD and CEGIS. 2. Accelerating India's Development -- Karthik Muralidharan.  3. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 4. Understanding Indian Healthcare — Episode 225 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 5. Karthik Muralidharan Examines the Indian State -- Episode 290 of The Seen and the Unseen. 6. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 7. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah). 8. Brave New World -- Vasant Dhar's podcast. 9. To Kill A Mockingbird -- Harper Lee. 10. Fixing the Knowledge Society -- Episode 24 of Everything is Everything. 11. The Elusive Quest for Growth -- William R Easterly. 12. The White Man's Burden -- William R Easterly. 13. The Tyranny of Experts -- William R Easterly. 14. Thomas Sargent's speech at Berkeley. 15. Front-line Courts As State Capacity: Evidence From India -- Manaswini Rao. 16. The Argumentative Indian -- Amartya Sen. 17. BR Ambedkar's speech to the constituent assembly in 1949. 18. State Building -- Francis Fukuyama. 19. Why Freedom Matters -- Episode 10 of Everything is Everything. 20. Understanding the State -- Episode 25 of Everything is Everything. 21. When Should the State Act? -- Episode 26 of Everything is Everything. 22. Public Choice Theory Explains SO MUCH -- Episode 33 of Everything is Everything. 23. The Life and Times of KP Krishnan — Episode 355 of The Seen and the Unseen. 24. The Reformers -- Episode 28 of Everything is Everything. 25. The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload -- Aditya Dasgupta and Devesh Kapur. 26. Red Tape -- Akhil Gupta. 27. Paper Tiger -- Nayanika Mathur. 28. Desperately Seeking Shah Rukh — Shrayana Bhattacharya. 29. The Loneliness of the Indian Woman — Episode 259 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shrayana Bhattacharya). 30. The Life and Work of Ashwini Deshpande -- Episode 298 of The Seen and the Unseen. 31. Annie Hall -- Woody Allen. 32. The withering trend of public employment in India -- CP Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh. 33. The Colonial Constitution — Arghya Sengupta. 34. Arghya Sengupta and the Engine Room of Law — Episode 366 of The Seen and the Unseen. 35. Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending -- Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat and Tommaso Valletti. 36. Lagaan -- Ashutosh Gowariker. 37. List of Soviet and Russian leaders by height. 38. Bureaucratic Indecision and Risk Aversion in India -- Sneha P, Neha Sinha, Avanti Durani and Ayush Patel. 39. A Theory of Misgovernance -- Abhijit Banerjee. 40. Premature load bearing: Doing too much too soon -- Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock. 41. Sense and Sensibility -- Jane Austen. 42. Pride and Prejudice -- Jane Austen. 43. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Montek Singh Ahluwalia). 44. India's Massive Pensions Crisis — Episode 347 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah & Renuka Sane). 45. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills — Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 46. How China Escaped the Poverty Trap -- Yuen Yuen Ang. 47. Pritika Hingorani Wants to Fix Our Cities -- Episode 361 of The Seen and the Unseen. 48. Gangaajal -- Prakash Jha. 49. Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India -- Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar. 50. Amitabh Bachchan on Twitter. 51. Nick Bloom at Stanford. 52. The Personnel Economics of the Developing State -- Frederico Finan, Benjamin Olken and Rohini Pande. 53. Double for Nothing? Experimental Evidence on an Unconditional Teacher Salary Increase in Indonesia -- Joppe de Ree, Karthik Muralidharan, Menno Pradhan and Halsey Rogers. 54. The Indian Labour Market through the Lens of Public Sector Recruitment -- Kunal Mangal. 55. Timepass: Youth, Class, and the Politics of Waiting in India -- Craig Jeffrey. 56. Karmayogi Bharat. 57. India Moving — Chinmay Tumbe. 58. India = Migration — Episode 128 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Chinmay Tumbe). 59. A new vision for legal education in India -- Abhishek Singhvi. 60. Womaning in India With Mahima Vashisht — Episode 293 of The Seen and the Unseen. 61. Zindagi Toh Bewafa Hai -- Song from Muqaddar Ka Sikandar. Amit's newsletter is explosively active again. Subscribe right away to The India Uncut Newsletter! It's free! Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. Episode art: ‘Magic and Files' by Simahina.

Over the last several decades, there have been monumental changes in the social, economic, and political lives of Dalits, who have historically been one of the most oppressed groups in all of South Asia.A new volume edited by three leading scholars of India—Dalits in the New Millennium—examines these changes, interrogates their impacts on Dalit lives, and traces the shift in Dalit politics from a focus on social justice—to a focus on development and socio-economic mobility.D. Shyam Babu, who along with Sudhai Pai and Rahul Verma, is one of the co-editors of this important new book joined Milan on the show this week to talk more about their findings. Shyam Babu is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. His research focuses on how economic changes in India have been shaping social change and transformation for the benefit of marginalized sections, especially Dalits.The two discuss Dalits' shift toward the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the decline of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) of Mayawati, and what “Ambedkarization” has done for the Dalit community. Plus, the two discuss the shortcomings Dalits experience in their “social citizenship” and the successes and challenges of Dalit capitalism.Episode notes:1. Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, and D. Shyam Babu, “Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era,” Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 35 (August 28-September 3, 2010): 39-49.2. Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, and D. Shyam Babu, Defying the Odds: The Rise of Dalit Entrepreneurs (New Delhi: Vintage, 2014).3. D. Shyam Babu, “From empowerment to disenfranchisement: Lower caste mobilisation appears to have run its course,” Times of India, August 28, 2019.4. Chandra Bhan Prasad, “Fellow Dalits, open your own bank: If no one else, Dalit middle class can fund Dalit capitalism to produce Dalit billionaires,” Times of India, November 25, 2019.5. Devesh Kapur, “Fraternity in the making of the Indian nation,” Seminar 701 (2017).

Lant Pritchett has described India as "flailing state", one where the limbs are not in sync with the head and the outcomes sought are not delivered. Sridhar Krishna talks to Bharat Reddy on how AI can be used to bridge the gap in state capacity and help Indians get the goods and services they desire from the government. Readings: Why does the Indian state both fail and succeed? By Devesh Kapur Is India a flailing state? By Lant Pritchett Breaking the Mould by Raghuraman Rajan and Rohit Lamba Do check out Takshashila's public policy courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/courses We are @‌IVMPodcasts on Facebook, Twitter, & Instagram. https://twitter.com/IVMPodcasts https://www.instagram.com/ivmpodcasts/?hl=en https://www.facebook.com/ivmpodcasts/ You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featured Follow the show across platforms: Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Gaana, Amazon Music Do share the word with your folks    See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

When Lant Pritchett worked as a development economist (many years at the World Bank), he noted the approach was very place centric. It was about how to develop Senegal, India, Nigeria etc. Mobility was not a big deal. “I realized gradually that the mobility of people across places could be at least as big a way for people to improve their well being as the efforts to improve places”, says Lant Pritchett. “The wage differentials, which are driven by productivity differentials, are so huge that the ability of people to move from low productivity to high productivity places is far and away the largest way to improve human well being.” Lant co-founded the advocacy and action group/think tank LaMP to promote labor mobility. The acronym stands for Labor Mobility Partnerships. The economic development models that were developed some decades ago got one thing completely wrong: productivity didn't converge. Education, health and even capital per worker converged, but productivity didn't. “Productivity isn't primarily about knowledge, it's about complex features that we now call institutional, political and social.” The a-ha insight is that the world has people in poor places, not poor people. “It's simply hard to make a person productive in rural Ethiopia, and there's no magic bullet.” To many people, the term migration brings up images of people moving permanently and acquiring new roots. But if the world could achieve well-organized and orderly temporary labor mobility on a scale that is an order of magnitude larger than today, this could bring tremendous benefits, according to Pritchett. Calculations show that the gains would be at least 20 times the size of the ODA in the world. In the migration discourse the elephant in the room is the fact that the labor force is shrinking rapidly in the rich parts of the world, relative to the aged population. How to deal with this demographic transition if you only talk about permanent migration and refugees? “You can't. The only way is to open a third question: who are we going to allow to live and work on our sovereign territory, without any expectation they are becoming citizens?” Is the temporary nature of this mobility meant to appease those who worry their national identity is being threatened? In a way, Lant says. “But appease is a stronger word than we need. It's not just a necessary appeasement objective, it's a legitimate objective to want to preserve a sense of 'spanishness' or 'englishness', even if those are socially constructed and imagined identities.” What about the risk of brain drain in the countries that provide the labor force? “Brain drain gets attention because it rhymes”, Lant says smilingly. “There is not much analytical foundation for the claim. If we used the rhyme cortex vortex, brains moving round in a circular way, we would have a more accurate and interesting picture of what is going on.” Isn't living where you want as basic a right as free speech or religious freedom? Are we primarily humans or are we primarily citizens? “Ah, there's the rub of it.” “I think the conversation on open borders versus closed borders is silly. Open borders is not politically how the world is going to be organized in the foreseeable future. And there is something unique, valuable and important about maintaining identities.” “But these identities can change over time, and they can be inclusive.” Lant's website Lant's scientific paper “The political acceptability of time-limited labor mobility: Five levers opening the Overton window” LaMP: Hein de Haas' book “How Migration Really Works”

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Economic Growth - Donation suggestions and ideas, published by DavidNash on January 8, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. There was a recent post about economic growth & effective altruism by Karthik Tadepalli. He pointed out that a lot of people agree that economic growth is important, but it hasn't really led to many suggestions for specific interventions. I thought it would be good to get the ball rolling[1] by asking a few people what they think are good donation opportunities in this area, or if not, do they think this area is neglected when you have governments, development banks, investors etc all focused on growth. I'm hoping there will be more in depth research into this in 2024 to see whether there are opportunities for smaller/medium funders, and how competitive it is with the best global health interventions. I have fleshed out a few of the shorter responses with more details on what the suggested organisation does. Shruti Rajagopalan (Mercatus Center): XKDR Forum - Founded by Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, it aims to advance India's growth journey through economic research, data analysis, and policy engagement, with a focus on core areas like macroeconomics, finance, and judiciary. Susan Thomas has a track record of running a fantastic research group at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research and Ajay Shah brings years of experience from fostering research groups at NIPFP and time as consultant to the Finance Ministry, Government of India. Both are excellent economists; their strengths include thinking about big questions from first principles, as well as a strong commitment to economic growth and freedom. They are also very good incubators of talent, and have some excellent young researchers working with them - e.g. Former Emergent Ventures winners Prosperiti -A non-profit organization dedicated to economic growth, greater economic freedom and job opportunities for Indians. It is the only all-female founded research think tank in India with cofounders Bhuvana Anand and Baishali Boman at the helm. Their key focus is on labor regulation, especially gendered regulation. They also work on state and local level regulation impacting businesses, pointing out restrictive labor regulations to state and local government partners. Their core strategy is to offer actionable research on state regulations, assist state governments with the detailed correction of laws and regulations, and also channels the findings to the Union government. Former Emergent Ventures winners Artha Global - Policy consulting organization that assists developing world governments in designing, implementing, and institutionalizing growth and prosperity-focused policy frameworks. Originally the IDFC Institute, Artha was re-founded under CEO Reuben Abraham after institutional changes to continue the team's work under a new banner. Artha places a strong emphasis on strengthening state capacity as a critical factor in translating intentions into real impact and unlocking India's growth potential. Instead of just focusing on technical inputs, Artha also focuses on coordinated policy implementation. Reuben Abraham's extensive global network identifies talented potential collaborators across government and private institutions. His and Artha's strength lies in bringing together disparate actors and backing them to find shared solutions. Former Emergent Ventures winners Growth Teams - Founded by Karthik Akhileshwaran and Jonathan Mazumdar, Growth Teams believes sustaining higher broad-based growth and job creation is imperative for alleviating Indian poverty. They are also advised by growth theorists and empiricists like Lant Pritchett. With federal reforms largely exhausted since the 1990s, the onus is now on states to pursue vital labor, land, capital, industrial, and environmental reform...

This episode is a recording of a panel conversation that took place at the University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government during the RISE Annual Conference in September 2023. For the purposes of clarity and length, this podcast is an edited version of the conversation.The panel featured Nompumelelo Mohohlwane from the Department of Basic Education in South Africa; Rachel Hinton from the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and former RISE Research Director, Lant Pritchett. This conversation was moderated by Laura Savage from the International Education Funders Group.The panel looks back at the questions that existed at the start of RISE and whether enough has been learnt ten years later. They reflect on the difference between the motivating questions for RISE and the What Works Hub for Global Education. They go on to debate what commitment to learning really means and what cultural shifts are needed for it to materialise, and connected to this, what implementation science really means. The conversation ends with a reflection on the meaning of the thematic shift from systems to implementation. LinksNompumelelo Mohohlwane (webpage)Rachel Hinton (webpage)Lant Pritchett (webpage)Laura Savage (webpage)Contract teachers – Why do they work in an NGO setting but not with government? (journal article) South Africa Department of Basic Education Research Agenda, 2019 – 2023 (report)South Africa's 5-year NDP “Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2019 – 2024” (report)South Africa's Presidential Youth Employment Initiative (report)Rewriting the Grammar of the Education System: Delhi's Education Reform (A Tale of Creative Resistance and Creative Disruption) (book)State of education research (slide in video)Smart Buys Report 2023 (report)The RISE Podcast: Denis Mizne on Transforming Brazil's Education System to Deliver Learning (podcast)World Development Report 2018 (report)Applying

The last publicly available nation-wide caste census in India was conducted in 1931. Now, a state-wide caste census has become available from the government of Bihar. Even though we know the Indian state collects data on a variety of markers and indicators, whether socioeconomic or health-related, there seems to be a reluctance when it comes to collecting data on caste. What is the reason for this? What are the complexities involved in capturing caste in India? How should we think about the categorization and sub-categorization of caste? What will the politics of caste look like going forward? What are the ways in which a caste census can be conducted more efficiently? What are the different aspects of the politics of social justice in India? What have been the successes and failures of social justice in India?In this episode of Interpreting India, D. Shyam Babu joins Suyash Rai to discuss these questions and more.Episode ContributorsD. Shyam Babu is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research. His current research interests include socioeconomic mobility among Dalits, liberalization and social justice, and the role of entrepreneurship in mobility. He has also collaborated with Devesh Kapur and Chandra Bhan Prasad to conduct socioeconomic surveys to map social change and its linkages with public policies and entrepreneurship among Dalits. Their 2014 co-authored book, Defying the Odds, has received critical acclaim.Suyash Rai is a deputy director and fellow at Carnegie India. His research focuses on the political economy of economic reforms and the performance of public institutions in India. His current research looks at the financial sector, the fiscal system, and the infrastructure sector.Additional ReadingsMandal's Original Sin, Surveyed by D. Shyam BabuRethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era by Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, and D. Shyam BabuDefying the Odds: The Rise of Dalit Entrepreneurs by Devesh Kapur, D. Shyam Babu, and Chandra Bhan Prasad Reimagining Merit in India: Cognition and Affirmative Action by D. Shyam Babu, Chandra Bhan Prasad, and Devesh KapurDalits in the New Millennium by Sudha Pai, D. Shyam Babu, and Rahul VermaKey Moments(00:00); Introduction(01:47); Chapter 1: Why Was There Hesitance in Conducting Caste Census?(10:43); Chapter 2: The Complexity of Caste and Its Relationship With the State(15:45); Chapter 3: Potential Purposes of Caste Census(20:49); Chapter 4: Scope of Improvement in Politics of Caste Census(23:29); Chapter 5: Ways to Mitigate the Negative Consequences of Caste(30:13); Chapter 6: Public System and Caste (35:35); Chapter 7: Consequences and Limitations of Economy on Social System(42:18); Chapter 8: Caste Issues and Public(44:28); Chapter 9: The Making of Citizens: Social Identity and Community (52:08); Chapter 10: Structural Incompetence of Caste on Social System(54:16); Chapter 11: Cultural Determinism and Nationalism(57:24); Chapter 12: Social Justice in Relation to Caste(58:25); Chapter 13: Recommended Books (59:10); Outro---From December 4–6, 2023, Carnegie India will convene the eighth Global Technology Summit, co-hosted with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. This year, we will discuss key technology policy issues concerning digital public infrastructure, artificial intelligence, critical and emerging technology, space, semiconductors, national security and technology, data protection, and more.  To register for the summit, visit gts2023.com. Make sure you follow our Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram accounts for more updates on the event.

In today's episode of Charter Cities, we're honored to welcome Lant Pritchett, a distinguished economist and a thought leader in development economics. Our deep-dive conversation will focus on the critical topic of growth diagnostics, exploring the complex challenges policymakers face in developing nations. Lant will illuminate the importance of identifying impactful actions for growth, emphasizing the need for rigorous debate and evidence-based decision-making. We'll also scrutinize the limitations of traditional development metrics like the "dollar a day" measure and consider alternative, more effective approaches. We'll also investigate innovative solutions like charter cities as a mechanism for fostering sustainable growth by addressing institutional challenges.Key Points From This Episode:Why overemphasis on low-bar goals lead to ineffective randomized control trials in developmentHow bright minds in development economics are missing the markPolicymakers in developing countries lack effective prioritization, not ideas, for fostering economic growthTony Blair's approach focuses on achievable priorities but could benefit from rigorous initial diagnostics for high-impact actionsDeveloping countries grow fast but collapse easily due to fragile "deals-based" governance, unlike OECD's robust rule-based systemsPrioritizing the prevention of growth decelerations; reforms can help but need better diagnosticsShifting focus from economic growth blamed on the end of the Cold War and structural adjustment failuresWeighing charter cities: positives include a focus on urbanization and productivity; challenges involve credibility and feasibility of implementing changeEmphasizing the need for experimentation and policy diversityHow migration from low to high TFP countries can yield 40x greater income gains than anti-poverty programsLabor mobility increasingly viable due to demographic shifts and political changeUrbanization requires new approaches to ensure inclusive, opportunity-driven growth in citiesLinks Mentioned in Today's Episode:RISEHarvard Kennedy SchoolCharter Cities InstituteCharter Cities Institute on FacebookCharter Cities Institute on Twitter

Should the state shape the composition of economic activity? What are some arguments in favour of and against the use of the Industrial Policy? Anupam Manur and Sarthak Pradhan analyse and discuss some recent literature and trends on Industrial Policy. This paper analyses some trends in industrial policy: The Who, What, When, and How of Industrial Policy: A Text-Based Approach This paper explores the rationale behind industrial policies: The New Economics of Industrial Policy Do check out Takshashila's public policy courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/courses We are @‌IVMPodcasts on Facebook, Twitter, & Instagram. https://twitter.com/IVMPodcasts https://www.instagram.com/ivmpodcasts/?hl=en https://www.facebook.com/ivmpodcasts/ You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featured Follow the show across platforms: Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Gaana, Amazon Music Do share the word with your folks!See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

She's one of our finest thinkers, and has devoted her life to public policy and building this country. Yamini Aiyar joins Amit Varma in episode 341 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss her life, her learnings and how the Indian state can be reformed. (FOR FULL LINKED SHOW NOTES, GO TO SEENUNSEEN.IN.) Also check out: 1. Yamini Aiyar at Twitter, Deccan Herald, Hindustan Times and Center for Policy Research. 2. The Curious Case of the Powerful yet Powerless Bureaucrat -- BSC Seminar with Yamini Aiyar. 3. Rules Vs. Responsiveness -- A talk by Yamini Aiyar at IIM-A. 4. The State of the State: Strengthening India's Governance Capabilities -- Panel discussion featuring Yamini Aiyar and moderated by Amit Varma. 5. The Looking-Glass Self. 6. Wanting — Luke Burgis. 7. René Girard on Amazon and Wikipedia. 8. Luke Burgis Sees the Deer at His Window -- Episode 337 of The Seen and the Unseen. 9. The Overton Window. 10. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 11. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 12. Understanding Indian Healthcare — Episode 225 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 13. Karthik Muralidharan Examines the Indian State — Episode 290 of The Seen and the Unseen. 14. Ashutosh Salil and the Challenge of Change — Episode 312 of The Seen and the Unseen. 15. India's Far From Free Markets (2005) — Amit Varma in the Wall Street Journal. 16.  Pure Magic -- Kumkum Chadha on Shankara Pillai Krishna Kumar. 17. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills — Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 18. India's Greatest Civil Servant — Episode 167 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Narayani Basu, on VP Menon). 19. Caged Tiger: How Too Much Government Is Holding Indians Back — Subhashish Bhadra. 20. Subhashish Bhadra on Our Dysfunctional State — Episode 333 of The Seen and the Unseen. 21. A Life in Indian Politics — Episode 149 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Jayaprakash Narayan). 22. Jayaprakash Narayan Wants to Mend Our Democracy — Episode 334 of The Seen and the Unseen. 23. The RISE Programme. 24. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength — Amit Varma. 25. Is the Singularity Near? -- Episode 2 of Everything is Everything. 26. My Hero, Oppenheimer -- Episode 5 of Everything is Everything. 27. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ramachandra Guha: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 28. What Have We Done With Our Independence? — Episode 186 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pratap Bhanu Mehta). 29. The Gentle Wisdom of Pratap Bhanu Mehta — Episode 300 of The Seen and the Unseen. 30. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 31. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen. 32. Missing In Action: Why You Should Care About Public Policy — Pranay Kotasthane and Raghu S Jaitley. 33. The Long Road From Neeyat to Neeti — Episode 313 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane and Raghu S Jaitley). 34. The Loneliness of the Indian Woman — Episode 259 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shrayana Bhattacharya). 35. Making Bureaucracy Work: Norms, Education and Public Service Delivery in Rural India -- Akshay Mangla. 36. Is India a Flailing State? — Lant Pritchett. 37. James Manor on Amazon. 38. The Hedgehog And The Fox — Isaiah Berlin. 39. Vajpayee: The Ascent of the Hindu Right, 1924–1977 -- Abhishek Choudhary. 40. Planning Democracy: How A Professor, An Institute, And An Idea Shaped India — Nikhil Menon. 41. The History of the Planning Commission -- Episode 306 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Nikhil Menon). 42. Nehru's India -- Taylor Sherman. 43. Hindutva and Violence -- Vinayak Chaturvedi. 44. The Thursday Murder Club -- Richard Osman. 45. Agatha Christie on Amazon. 46. Dahaad, Kohrra, Scoop and Crash Course in Romance. Amit Varma and Ajay Shah have launched a new video podcast. Check out Everything is Everything on YouTube. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! Episode art: ‘Build It' by Simahina.

In our 10th episode, we take a deep-dive into Malengo, an organization that facilitates international educational migration. Malengo helps students from low-income countries with admissions and financing for a bachelor's degree in a high-income country. We discuss why migration is an important lever for development, and how income-share agreements can make supporting it a worthwhile impact investment. Our guests bring in 3 different perspectives. Johannes Haushofer is a development economist who founded Malengo based on findings from his research. Richard Nerland is an economist with a passion for academic economics and international development. Convinced by Malengo's potential for impact, he invested USD 3.5 M into the organization. Along the way, he helped develop a tax-efficient financial model to make Malengo attractive for other investors to follow suit. Gladys Amule is a student from the first cohort of Malengo scholars. She shares her experience with the program and her motivation to pay it forward through Malengo's income-share agreement. Links ·       Malengo's website ·       Johannes' Twitter thread explaining the academic path that led him to found Malengo ·       Richard's Twitter thread explaining why the decided to become Malengo's inaugural investor, including his take-aways from academic literature   Academic papers recommended by our guests ·       Johannes ‘ paper on general equilibrium effects for cash transfers  Egger, D., J. Haushofer, E. Miguel, P. Niehaus, and M.Walker. 2022. “General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya” Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17945 ·       Michael Clemens economic argument that friction from migration restriction is enormous Clemens, Michael, A. 2011."Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (3): 83-106. DOI: 10.1257/jep.25.3.83 ·       Chris Blattman's paper on cash transfers wearing off: Blattman, C.,N. Fiala, N. and S. Martinez, 2019. “The Long Term Impacts of Grants on Poverty: 9-Year Evidence from Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program”. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223028  ·       On brain gain, evidence from nursing programs in the US: Abarcar, P., and C. Theoharides; C. 2021. “Medical Worker Migration and Origin-Country Human Capital: Evidence from U.S. Visa Policy”. The Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01131 ·       On brain gain and spill-over effects Khanna, G., E. Murathanoglu, C.B. Theoharides and D. Yang, 2022, “Abundance from Abroad: Migrant Income and Long-Run Economic Development”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 29862, DOI 10.3386/w29862 ·       Lant Pritchett on labor migration Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments Burchardi, K. Chaney, T. and Hassan, T. 2018, Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 86, Issue 4, , Pages 1448–1486, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy044 Time stamps In some podcast players, you should be able to jump to the section by clicking: (00:01:56) – Johannes, Gladys and Richard introduce themselves (00:03:19) – Johannes explains what Malengo does and how his academic research inspired him to found an organization facilitating international educational migration (00:10:27) – Gladys shares why she applied to study with Malengo (00:14:19) – Richard shares why he decided to fund work related to international educational migration, inspired by reading academic papers on development economics (00:17:07) – Richard elaborates on how Johannes' academic credentials and track record as high agency person convinced him to support Malengo's work (00:19:47) Richard on giving vs impact investing – the investor's perspective (00:22:10) Richard on the process of jointly setting up a legal structure for impact investing with Johannes (00:25:36) Johannes on seeking donations vs seeking investments – the founder's perspective (00:27:23) Johannes on Richard providing more than just money: expertise and patience (00:28:31) A structure that can now be deployed at scale (00:30:37) Gladys on what she would have done if she hadn't studied with Malengo (00:31:20) Johannes on the expected impact on student's income and the independent research accompanying Malengo's work (00:34:08) Gladys on sending money back home (00:35:46) Johannes on the income-share agreements (00:39:15) Gladys on her motivation to pay it forward (00:40:22) Johannes on why he isn't worried about brain drain (00:43:28) Gladys on inspiring other students (00:44:43) Richard on the academic papers that influenced his thinking on what works and what doesn't in development economics (00:48:27) Richard on how “this one little thing that he's very good at”, “this little finance thing”, can empower others (00:50:27) Gladys on her role as a mentor for the next Malengo cohorts (00:52:19) Richard's deep dive into how he thinks about his investments into Malengo from a financial perspective (protection from inflation, assumptions for alpha outperformance, diversification from the rest of his portfolio from a market risk perspective) (00:59:36) Johannes on the impact evaluations embedded in Malengo's work and the endeavor to also uncover whether there are negative effects (01:03:06) Gladys on how leaving home felt for her (01:07:08) Johannes on the role of philanthropy, impact investing and effective altruism for Malengo (01:09:03) Richard on hoping to inspire other impact investors to follow suit (01:14:20) Johannes on how the political climate affects his plans to grow an organization facilitating migration (01:15:50) Gladys on interest from her peers to follow in her footsteps (01:16:45) Johannes on a mindset of cooperation towards other organizations in the same space (01:19:31) Johannes, Richard and Gladys on the best ways to support Malengo's mission

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Are education interventions as cost effective as the top health interventions? Five separate lines of evidence for the income effects of better education [Founders Pledge], published by Vadim Albinsky on July 13, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. I would like to thank Lant Pritchett, David Roodman and Matt Lerner for their invaluable comments. You can follow these links to comments from Lant Pritchett and David Roodman. This post argues that if we look at a broad enough evidence base for the long term outcomes of education interventions we can conclude that the best ones are as cost effective as top GiveWell grants. I briefly present one such charity. A number of EA forum posts (1, 2) have pointed out that effective altruism has not been interested in education interventions, whether that is measured by funding from GiveWell or Open Philanthropy, or writing by 80,000 hours. Based on brief conversations with people who have explored education at EA organizations and reading GiveWell's report on the topic, I believe most of the reason for this comes down to two concerns about the existing evidence that drive very steep discounts to expected income effects of most interventions. The first of these is skepticism about the potential for years of schooling to drive income gains because the quasi-experimental evidence for these effects is not very robust. The second is the lack of RCT evidence linking specific interventions in low and middle income countries (LMICs) to income gains. I believe the first concern can be addressed by focusing on the evidence for the income gains from interventions that boost student achievement rather than the weaker evidence around interventions that increase years of schooling. The second concern can be addressed in the same way that GiveWell has addressed less-than-ideal evidence for income effects for their other interventions: looking broadly for evidence across the academic literature, and then applying a discount to the expected result based on the strength of the evidence. In this case that means including relevant studies outside of the LMIC context and those that examine country-level effects. I identify five separate lines of evidence that all find similar long-term income impacts of education interventions that boost test scores. None of these lines of evidence is strong on its own, with some suffering from weak evidence for causality, others from contexts different from those where the most cost-effective charities operate, and yet others from small sample sizes or the possibility of negative effects on non-program participants. However, by converging on similar estimates from a broader range of evidence than EA organizations have considered, the evidence becomes compelling. I will argue that the combined evidence for the income impacts of interventions that boost test scores is much stronger than the evidence GiveWell has used to value the income effects of fighting malaria, deworming, or making vaccines, vitamin A, and iodine more available. Even after applying very conservative discounts to expected effect sizes to account for the applicability of the evidence to potential funding opportunities, we find the best education interventions to be in the same range of cost-effectiveness as GiveWell's top charities.The argument proceeds as follows: I. There are five separate lines of academic literature all pointing to income gains that are surprisingly clustered around the average value of 19% per standard deviation (SD) increase in test scores. They come to these estimates using widely varying levels of analysis and techniques, and between them address all of the major alternative explanations. A. The most direct evidence for the likely impact of charities that boost learning comes from experimental and quasi-experimental studies...

I would like to thank Lant Pritchett, David Roodman and Matt Lerner for their invaluable comments.You can follow these links to comments from Lant Pritchett and David Roodman.A number of EA forum posts (1, 2) have pointed out that effective altruism has not been interested in education interventions, whether that is measured by funding from GiveWell or Open Philanthropy, or writing by 80,000 hours. Based on brief conversations with people who have explored education at EA organizations and reading GiveWell's report on the topic, I believe most of the reason for this comes down to two concerns about the existing evidence that drive very steep discounts to expected income effects of most interventions. The first of these is skepticism about the potential for years of schooling to drive income gains because the quasi-experimental evidence for these effects is not very robust. The second is the lack of RCT evidence linking specific interventions in low and middle income countries (LMICs) to income gains.I believe the first concern can be addressed by focusing on the evidence for the income gains from interventions that boost student achievement rather than the weaker evidence around interventions that increase years of schooling. The second concern can be addressed in the same way that GiveWell has addressed less-than-ideal evidence for income effects for their other interventions: looking broadly for evidence across the academic literature, and then applying a discount to the expected result based on the strength of the evidence. In this case that means including relevant studies outside of the LMIC context and those that examine country-level effects. I identify five separate lines of evidence that all find similar long-term income impacts of education interventions that boost test scores. None of these lines of evidence is strong on its own, with some suffering from weak evidence for causality, others from contexts different from those where the most cost-effective charities operate, and yet others from small sample sizes or the possibility of negative effects on non-program participants. However, by converging on similar estimates from a broader range of evidence than EA organizations have considered, the evidence becomes compelling. I will argue that the combined evidence for the income impacts of interventions that boost test scores is much stronger than the evidence GiveWell has used to value the income effects of fighting malaria, deworming, or making vaccines, vitamin A, and iodine more available. Even after applying very conservative discounts to expected effect sizes to account for the applicability of the evidence to potential funding opportunities, we find the best education interventions to be in the same range of cost-effectiveness as GiveWell's top charities.The argument proceeds as follows:I. There are five separate lines of academic literature all pointing to income gains that are surprisingly clustered around the average value of 19% per standard deviation (SD) increase in test scores. They come to these estimates using widely varying levels of analysis and techniques, and between them address all of the major alternative explanations.       A. The most direct evidence for the likely impact of charities that [...]The original text contained 17 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.--- First published: July 13th, 2023 Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/8qXrou57tMGz8cWCL/are-education-interventions-as-cost-effective-as-the-top --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO. Share feedback on this narration.

In the latest episode of the RISE Podcast, the Director of UNESCO's Global Education Monitoring (GEM) Report, Manos Antoninis, talks to RISE Research Fellow Jason Silberstein about the first report in the Spotlight Series. The Spotlight is a new initiative by the GEM Report and its partners to shine a spotlight on primary completion and the state of foundational learning in Africa. They discuss the report's original research and clear recommendations for how to improve learning, with a focus on what the Spotlight has to say about politics, measurement, supporting teachers, and balancing investment in student-level inputs with systems-level reform.LinksSpotlight on Basic Education Completion and Foundational Learning in Africapublished by UNESCO, under the direction of Manos Antoninis and prepared by the Global Education Monitoring Report team with the Association for the Development of Education in Africa, and African Union.Global Education Monitoring ReportAssociation for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA)UNESCO Institute for StatisticsNational SDG 4 BenchmarksThe Long-Run Decline of Education Quality in the Developing World by Alexis Le Nestour, Laura Moscoviz, and Justin Sandefur at the Center for Global DevelopmentFocus to Flourish: A Messaging Campaign on Five Actions to Accelerate Progress in Learning by the RISE ProgrammeFive Actions to Accelerate Progress in Learning by Lant Pritchett, Kirsty Newman and Jason SilbersteinGuest biographyManos AntoninisManos Antoninis is the Director of the Global Education Monitoring (GEM) Report since 2017. He was previously responsible for the monitoring section of the report. He coordinated the financing gap estimates for the 2030 education targets, the projections on the achievement of universal primary and secondary education completion, and the World Inequality Database on Education. He has been representing the report team in the Technical Cooperation Group on SDG 4 indicators, which he is currently co-chairing. Prior to joining the team he worked for 10 years on public finance, monitoring and evaluation projects in education including: a public expenditure tracking and service delivery survey of secondary education provision in Bangladesh; the evaluation of a basic education project in the western provinces of China; the mid-term evaluation of the Education For All Fast Track Initiative; the annual reporting of progress in the implementation of the Second Primary Education Development Project in Bangladesh; a basic education capacity building programme in six states in Nigeria; the evaluation of an in-service, cluster-based teacher training programme in Pakistan; and the...

Much of the demand for automation in richer countries - whether it be for self-checkout machines or driverless trucks - is driven by labor scarcity. And as populations in these countries age, this scarcity will become more acute.  Yet, as Lant Pritchett highlights in a recent Foreign Affairs article, globally, labor remains abundant. Rather than devoting vital high-level scientific and technological knowledge as well as entrepreneurship to address these shortages, a far more efficient solution is to simply allow greater immigration from labor-abundant countries, whose workers would welcome these employment opportunities. Lant discusses the broad economic arguments for, as well as the political and social concerns against, greater international labor mobility in this EconoFact Chats episode.  Lant is research director of the Labor Mobility Partnerships. He has worked at the World Bank and has taught at Harvard, Oxford, and the London School of Economics.

Much of the demand for automation in richer countries - whether it be for self-checkout machines or driverless trucks - is driven by labor scarcity. And as populations in these countries age, this scarcity will become more acute.  Yet, as Lant Pritchett highlights in a recent Foreign Affairs article, globally, labor remains abundant. Rather than devoting vital high-level scientific and technological knowledge as well as entrepreneurship to address these shortages, a far more efficient solution is to simply allow greater immigration from labor-abundant countries, whose workers would welcome these employment opportunities. Lant discusses the broad economic arguments for, as well as the political and social concerns against, greater international labor mobility in this EconoFact Chats episode.  Lant is research director of the Labor Mobility Partnerships. He has worked at the World Bank and has taught at Harvard, Oxford, and the London School of Economics.

Hello everyone, and you are listening to Ideas Untrapped podcast. This episode is a continuation of my two-part conversation with Lant Pritchett. It concludes the discussion on education with the five things Lant would recommend to a policymaker on education policy, how to balance the globalized demand for good governance with the design of state functionalities within a localized context - along with RCTs in development and charter cities. I also got an exclusive one of his infamous ‘‘Lant Rants''. I hope you find this as enjoyable as I did - and once again, many thanks to Lant Pritchett.TranscriptTobi;Yeah, I mean, that's a fine distinction. I love that, because you completely preempted where I was really going with that. Now, on a lighter note, there's this trope when I was in high school, so I sort of want us to put both side by side and try to learn more about them. There's this trope when I was in high school amongst my mates, that examination is not a true test of knowledge. Although it didn't help the people who were saying it, because they usually don't test well, so it sort of sounded like a self serving argument. But examination now, or should I say the examination industry, clearly, I mean, if I want to take Nigeria as an example, is not working. But it seemed to be the gold standard, if I want to use that phrase. It's as bad as so many firms now set up graduate training programs. Even after people have completed tertiary education, they still have to train them for industry and even sometimes on basic things. So what are the shortcomings of examination, the way you have distinguished both? And then, how can a system that truly assesses learning be designed?Lant;  Let me revert to an Indian discussion because I know more about India than Africa by far. There are prominent people, including the people around JPAL and Karthik Muralidharan, who say, look, India never really had an education system. It had a selection system. And the ethos was, look, we're just throwing kids into school with the hopes of identifying the few kids who were bright enough, capable enough, smart enough, however we say it, measured by their performance on this kind of high stakes examination who are going to then become the elite. So it was just a filter into the elite, and it really meant the whole system was never really in its heart of heart geared around a commitment to educating every kid. I've heard teachers literally say out loud when they give an exam and the kids don't master the material, they'll say, oh, those weren't the kind of kids who this material was meant for. And they leave them behind, right? There's a phrase “they teach to the front of the class.” You order the class by the kid's academic performance, and then the teachers are just teaching to the front of the class with the kind of like, nah, even by early grades. So the evils of the examination system are only if it's not combined with an education system. So essentially, an education system would be a system that was actually committed to expanding the learning and capabilities of all kids at all levels and getting everybody up to a threshold and then worried about the filter problem much later in the education process.So if they're part of an education system like they have been in East Asia, they're not terribly, terribly damaging. But if they're part of a selection system in which people perceive that the point is that there's only a tiny little fraction that are going to pass through these examinations anyway and what we're trying to do is maximize the pass rates of that, it distorts the whole system start to finish. My friend, Rukmini Banerjee, in India started this citizen based assessment where it was just a super simple assessment. You need assessment in order to have an effective education system, because without assessment, I don't know what you know or don't know, right? And if I don't know as a teacher or as a school what my kids actually know and don't know, how is anybody imagining that you're giving them an effective education? So I think the role of early assessment and the drive to integrate teaching with real time assessment, I think is hugely, hugely important. This is why I had the preemptive strike on the question of testing [which] is that I want radically more assessment earlier, integrated with teaching. And there are still some educationists that will push back against that. But if we put in a bundle, formative classroom assessment integrated with effective pedagogy and high-stakes examinations, then everybody's going to hate them both. So we have to really unbundle those two things.And the hallmark of an education system is that it really has targets that every kid can learn and believes every kid can learn, and builds a system around the premise and promise that every kid can learn. There's this example out there, Vietnam does it. And Vietnam did it and continues to do it at levels of income and social conditions that are very much like many African countries. So if I were a country, I'd kind of hate Vietnam as this goody goody, that, you know. You know how you always hated the kid in school who would really do well, and then the teacher would go, well, how come you're not like that kid? On education, Vietnam is that country. It's, like, out there producing OECD levels of learning with very little resources and starting at least in the 1980s, at very low levels of income. So they're proving that it's possible. They're the kid who, like, when everybody goes, oh, that exam was too hard, and like, Bob passed it, like, how hard can it be? Anyway? So I think radically different bases for assessment versus examinations. And to some extent, the only integrity that got preserved in the system wasn't the integrity of the classroom and teaching, it was the integrity of the examination as a filter.Tobi;I want to ask you a bit about the political economy of this a little bit. So if, say, you are talking to a policymaker who is actually serious about education, not in the superficial sense, but really about learning and says, okay, Lant, how do I go about this? How do I design an educational system that really does these things? I've written quite a number of reports here and there that rely so much on your accountability triangle. I would have sent you royalty checks, but it wasn't paid work. Sorry. So how exactly would you explain the political economy of designing a working educational system? I know people talk a lot about centralization versus decentralization, who gets empowered in that accountability triangle? Where should the levers to really push, where are they? So how exactly would you have that conversation?Lant;  So let me start with the accountability triangle and design issues. I think people mistake what the accountability triangle and design issues are about in the following sense. If I'm going to design a toaster, and the toaster is going to turn my untoasted bread into toasted bread, and it's going to be an electric toaster, there are certain fundamental things that have to happen, right? I have to have a current. I need to get that current running through something that heats up. I need that heat to be applied to the bread. I need it to stop when I've applied enough heat. Now, those fundamental principles of toaster design can lead to thousands of different actual designs of toasters. So I want people to get out of the notion that there's a single best toaster and that the accountability triangle or any other mode of analysis is to give you the best toaster and then everybody copies the best toaster. The principles are, design your own damn toaster, right? Because there's a gazillion ways to toast bread. Now, [for] all of them to work, [they] have to be compatible with the fundamental principles of electricity and current flow. You know, so I'm trying to get to one size doesn't fit all, but any old size doesn't necessarily fit everything either.You raise the question of decentralization, right? The thing is, if you look across countries that have roughly similar learning outcomes from PISA and other assessments, they're radically different designs. France is an entirely centralized system. Germany is a completely federalized system. The US is almost completely localized system. The Low Countries, Netherlands and Belgium have money follows the student system into the private sector. They have the highest private sector enrollment of any country in the world because they allow different pillars of education between the secular, the Catholic and the Protestant to coexist. So then if you ask is decentralization the best way to design your education system? It's like, no, no, no, you're missing the point. The point is, if you choose a centralized system, there are principles in how you design the flows of accountability that are going to produce success and those that are going to produce failure. If you choose a decentralized system, there are systems of the alignment of accountability that are going to produce success and failure. So the analytical framework doesn't determine the grand design, it determines the mechanics of the design. And I just want to get that straight up front.Second, as a result of the eight year research project of RISE, we have a policy brochure that has, kind of, here are the five kind of principles and here's the 15 minutes if I have five minutes with a minister or leader of a country, here are the five things I want to tell. And the first of those things is, commit. A lot of times we want to skip the most fundamental stage. And what I mean by commit is you actually need to create a broad social and political consensus that you're really going to do this and that you're committed to it. This big research project, RISE, which is based out of Oxford and I've been head of for eight years, we included Vietnam as one of our focused countries because it was a success case. Hence, we wanted our research team to partly do research about Vietnam and issues that were relevant in Vietnam. But we really wanted to answer the question, how did Vietnam do this? Why did they succeed? Right? And five years into the research effort, I was with the Vietnamese team and they had produced a bunch of empirical research of the econometric type. Is Vietnam success associated with this or that measurable input? Nothing really explains Vietnam at the approximate determinant input level. And finally, one of the researchers said to me, Lant, we're trying to get around the fundamental fact that Vietnam succeeded because they wanted to. And on one level it's like, my first response was, I can't go back and tell the British taxpayers that they spend a million dollars for a research project on Vietnam, and the conclusion to why Vietnam succeeded was because they wanted to.[Laughs]Tobi;  That's kind of on the nose, right? Lant; Yeah. On another level, it's a deep and ignored truth. The policymakers ignore it, the donors ignore it. Everybody wants to ignore it. Everybody wants to assume it's a technocratic issue, it's a design issue. I think the fundamental problem of these failing and dysfunctional education systems, it's a purpose problem. The purpose of education isn't clear, understood, widely accepted among all of the people from top to bottom responsible for achieving results. And once that leads to what I call norm erosion. Within the teachers, there's this norm erosion of what does it really mean to be a teacher? So again, the first and maybe only thing I would say if I had five minutes with a leader is, how are you going to produce a broad social, political and organizational commitment that you are really going to achieve specific, agreed-upon learning results? The technical design issues have to flow from that commitment rather than vice versa. And you could copy France's system, you could copy the Vietnamese system. I think you've heard the term from me and others, isomorphic mimicry. You can copy other people's systems and not have the same effect if it isn't driven by per purpose. Like, if you don't have the fundamental commitment and you don't have the fundamental agreed-upon purpose, the rest of the technical design is irrelevant.Tobi;It sort of leads me to my next theme. And that is the capability question in development.Lant; Yeah.Tobi;  First of all, I also want to make a quick distinction, because lately, well, when I say lately that's a little vague. State capacity is all the rage now in development.Lant;  Really? Is that true?Tobi; Yeah,Lant; I'm so happy to hear that. 3s I'm glad that you think so. And I hope that that's true, because it wasn't. It really wasn't on the agenda in a serious way. So, anyway …Tobi; But I also think there's also a bit of misunderstanding still, and usually, again, maybe I'm just moving with the wrong crowd. Who knows? People focus a lot more on the coercive instruments of the state and how much of it can be wielded to achieve certain programmatic results for state capacity. Revenue to GDP in Nigeria is low, how can the states collect more taxes? How much can the state squeeze out of people's bank accounts, out of companies, or the reverse. That, the reason why the state collects very little taxes is because state capacity is low. But, I mean, nobody really unpacks what they mean by that. They just rely on these measures like X to GDP ratio.Another recent example was, I think it was in 2020, when the pandemic sort of blew over and China built a hospital with 10,000 bed capacity in, I don't know, I forgot, maybe 20 days or…Lant;  Yeah. It was amazing.Tobi; A lot of people were like, oh, yeah, that's an example of state capacity. It's very much the same people now [who] are turning around and seeing China as an example of failure on how to respond to a pandemic. So I guess what I would ask you is, when you talk about the capability of the state, what exactly do we mean?Lant; In the work that were done and the book that we wrote, we adopt a very specific definition of capability, which is an organizational measure. Because there are all these aggregate country level measures and we use them in the book. But in the end, I think it's easier to define capability at the organizational level. And at the organizational level, I define [that] the capability of an organization is the ability to consistently induce its agents to take the policy actions in response to circumstances that advance the normative objective of the organization. And that's a long, complicated definition, but it basically means can the organization, from the frontline worker to the top of the organization, can it get people to do what they need to do to accomplish the purpose?And that's what I mean by the capability of an organization. And fortunately, unfortunately, like, militaries, I think, make for a good example. It's amazing that highfunctioning militaries have soldiers who will sacrifice their lives and die if needs be, to advance the purpose of the organization. Whereas you can have a million man army that's a paper tiger. No one is actually willing to do what it takes to carry out the purpose that the organization has been put to of fighting a particular conflict. And I think starting from that level makes it clear that, A, this is about purpose, B, it's about inducing the agents to take the actions that will lead to outcomes. And the reason why I'm super happy to hear that capability is being talked about is (you're doing a very good job as an interviewer drawing out connection between these various topics) the design of the curriculum is almost completely irrelevant to what's happening in schools. And so there's been way too much focus in my mind in development discourse on technocratic design and way too little on what's actually going to happen in practice. And so my definition of capability is, you measure an organization's capability of what actually happens in practice, what are the teachers actually going to do day to day? Right? And having been in development a long time, I often sit in these rooms where people are just, you know, I go out to the field and teachers aren't there at the school. Teachers are sitting in the office drinking their tea while the kids are running around on the playground, even during scheduled instructional time. And then I go back and hear discussions in the capital about higher order 21st century skills. You know, I wrote this article about India called Is India a Flailing State?Tobi;Yeah.Lant;And what I meant by flailing is there was no connection between what was happening in the cerebrum and what was being designed at the center. And what was actually happening when the actual fingers were touching the material and the nerves and sinews and muscles that connected the design to the practice were completely deteriorated. And therefore, capability was the issue, not design. So that's what I mean by capability. I mean, you use the example of tax. I think it's a great example. It's like, can you design a tax authority that actually collects taxes? And it's a hard, difficult question. And I think by starting from capability, I was really struck by your description of capability being linked to the coercive power of the state because that's exactly not how I would start it. I would start it with what are the key purposes for which the state is being deployed and for which one can really generate a sufficient integrated consensus that we need capability for this purpose.Tobi; Now, one of my favourite blogs of yours was how you described… I think it was how the US escaped the tyranny of experts, something like that. So I want to talk about that a bit versus what I'll call the cult of best practice…Lant; Hmm.Tobi;  Like, these institutions that are usually transplanted all over the world and things like independent central bank and this and that. And you described how a lot of decentralized institutions that exists in the United States, they were keenly contested, you know… Lant Yes.Tobi; Before the consensus sort of formed. So I'm sort of wondering, developing countries, how are they going about this wrong vis a vis the technical advice they are getting from development agencies? And the issue with that, if I would say, is, we now live in a world where the demand for good governance is globalized. Millions of Nigerians live on the internet every day and they see how life is in the industrial rich world and they want the same things. They want the same rights. They want governments that treat them the same way. Someone like me would even argue for an independent central bank because we've also experienced what life is otherwise.Lant; Right. Tobi; So how exactly to navigate this difficult terrain because the other way isn't also working. Because you can't say you have an independent central bank on paper that is not really independent and it's not working.Lant;  Your questions are such a brilliant articulation of the challenges that are being faced and the complex world we live in because we live now in an integrated world where people can see what's happening in other places. And that integrated world creates in and of itself positive pressures for performance, but also creates a lot of pressures for isomorphism, for deflecting the actual realities and what it will take to fix and make improvements with deflective copies of stuff that has no organic roots. I've written lots of things and even though you love all of your children, you might have favorites. One of my favorite blogs is a blog I wrote that is, I think, the most under cited blog of mine relative to what I think of it, which is about the M16 versus the AK-47.Tobi;Oh, yeah, I read that.Lant;It's an awkward analogy because no one wants to talk about guns.Tobi;Hmm.Lant;But I think it's a really great analogy because the M16 in terms of its proving ground performance is an unambiguously superior, more accurate rifle. The developing world adopts the AK-47. And that's because the Russian approach to weapon design was - design the weapon to the soldier. And the American approach is - train the soldier to the weapon. And what happens again and again across all kinds of phenomena in development is the people who are coming as part of the donour and development community to give advice to the world, all want them to adopt the M16 because it's the best gun, and they don't have the soldiers that can maintain the M16. And the M 16 has gotten better, but when it was first introduced, it was a notoriously unreliable weapon. And the one thing as a soldier, you don't want to happen is as you pull the trigger and the bullet doesn't come out at the end. That's what happens when you don't maintain an M16. So I think this isomorphism pressure confuses what best practice is with assuming there's this global best practice that can be adopted independently of the underlying capacity of the individuals and capabilities of the organizations. So I think huge problem.Second, I think there is a super important element of the history that the modes of doing things that now exist in the Western world and which we think of as being “modern,” I'm using scare quotes which doesn't help in a podcast, but we think of as being modern and best practice had to struggle their way into existence without the benefit of isomorphism. In the sense that when the United States in the early 20th century underwent a huge and quite conflicted and contested process of the consolidation of one room, kind of, locally operated schools into more professionalized school systems, that was politically contested and socially contested. And the only way the newer schools could justify themselves was by actually being better. There was no, oh, but this is how it has to be done, because this is how it has been done in these other places, and they have succeeded. And so there was no recourse to isomorphism, right. So in some sense, I think the world would be a radically better place for doing development if we just stopped allowing best practice to have any traction at all. If Nigerians just said, Screw it, we don't want to hear about it. Like, we want to do in Nigeria, what's going to work better in Nigeria? And telling me what Norway does and does not do, just no. Just no, we don't want to hear about it. Like, that doesn't help because it creates this vector of pressures that really deteriorate the necessary local contestation. My colleague Michael Wilcock, who is a sociologist, has characterized the development process as a series of good struggles. And in our work on state capability, we say you can't juggle without the struggle. Like, you can't transplant the ability to juggle. I can give you juggling lessons, I can show you juggling videos. But if you don't pick up the balls and do it and if you don't pick up the balls and do it with the understanding that unless you juggle, you haven't juggled, you can never learn to juggle. So I think if development were radically more about enabling goods, local struggles in which new policies, procedures, practices had to struggle their way into existence, justifying themselves on performance against purpose, we would be light years ahead of where we are. And that's what the debate about capability has to be.And I think to the extent the capability discourse gets deflected into another set of standards and more isomorphism, just this time about capability, I think we're going to lose something. Whereas if we start the state capability from discussion of what is it that we really want and need our government to get better at doing in terms of solving concrete, locally dominated problems, and then how are we going to come about creating the capability to do that in the Nigerian context, (I'm just using Nigeria, I could use Nepal, I could use any other country). That's the discussion that needs to happen. And the more the, kind of, global discourse and the global blessed practice gets frozen out completely, the sooner that happens, the better off we'll be.Tobi;  So I guess where I was going with that is…Lant; 78:25Yeah.Tobi; One of those also fantastic descriptions you guys used in the book is” crawling the design space” on capability. So now for me, as a Nigerian, I might say I do not necessarily want Nigeria to look like the United States. Because, It wouldn't work anyways. But at the same time, you don't want to experiment and end up like Venezuela or Zimbabwe. It may not work to design your central bank like the US Federal Reserve, but at the same time, you don't want 80% inflation like Turkey. So we're ate the midway, so to speak?Lant; I get this pushback when I rail on best practice. I often get the push back, well, why would we reinvent the wheel? And I've developed a PowerPoint slide that responds to that by showing the tiniest little gear that goes into a Swiss watch and a huge 20 foot large tire that goes on a piece of construction machinery. And then say they're both wheels. Nobody's talking about reinventing the wheel. There are fundamental principles of electricity that a toaster design has to be compatible with. So, again, there is a trade off. There are fundamental principles, but there's a gazillion instantiations of those principles. We don't want to start assuming that there's a single wheel, right? When people say, don't reinvent the wheel, it's like, nobody's reinventing the idea of a wheel. But every wheel that works is an adaptation of the idea of a wheel to the instantiation and purpose for which is being put. And if you said to me, oh, because we're not going to reinvent the wheel, we're going to take this tiny gear from a Swiss watch and put it on a construction machine and expect it to roll, it's like, no, that's just goofy, right? And what I've really tried to do in the course of my career is equip people with tools to think through their own circumstances.Tobi;Hmm.Lant;Coming back, the accountability triangle or the crawling the design space. What I'm not trying to do is tell somebody, here is what you should do in your circumstance, because my experience is what's actually doable and is going to lead to long-run progress is an unbelievably complicated and granular thing that involves the realities of the context. But what I do want to do is help people understand there are certain common principles here and some things are going to lead to, like, Venezuela like circumstances, and we've seen it happen again and again, but there are a variety of pathways that don't lead to that. And you need to choose a pathway that works for you. And the PDAA isn't a set of recommendations, it's a set of tools to help people think through their own circumstances, their own organization, their own nominated problems and make progress on them. The accountability triangle isn't a recommendation for the design of your system. It's a set of tools that equip people to have conversations about their own system. And I have to say, at one time was in some place in Indonesia and it was a discussion of PDAA being mediated by some organization that had adopted it and was teaching people how to do it in Indonesia. And I had the wonderful experience of having this Indonesian woman who was a district official working on health, describe in some detail how they were using PDAA to address the problem of maternal mortality with no idea who I was. And I was like, oh, just for me to hear her say, here is how I use the tool to address a problem I've never thought about in a context, in an organization I've never worked with. So I think equipping people with tools to enable them in their own local struggles is my real objective rather than the imagination that I somehow can come up with recommendations that are going to work in a specific context.So the don't reinvent the wheel is just complete total nonsense. It's like every wheel is adapted to its purpose and we're just giving you tools to adapt the idea of the wheel to your purpose. Adapting a square to the purpose just isn't going to work. So I agree. We want to start from the idea of things that work. And there are principles of wheel design that you can't violate. You can't come in and say, I have a participatory design of a water system that depends on water running uphill. No. Water runs downhill. That's a fundamental principle of water. But I think the principles are much broader and the potentiality for locally designed and organic, organically produced instantiations of common principles are much broader than the current discourse gives the possibility for.Tobi; 83:47 I can't let you go without getting your thoughts on just a few more questions. So indulge me. I've stayed largely away from RCTs because there's a bunch of podcasts where your thoughts can be fairly assessed on that issue, but it's not going away. Right? So for me, there's the ethical question, there's the methodological question, and there's the sort of philosophical question to it. I'm not qualified to have the methodological question, not at all. Maybe on the ethics, well, there's a lot of also biases that get, so I'm not going to go there. For me, when I think about RCTs, and I'm fairly close here in Nigeria with the effective altruism community, my wife is very active, and I have this debate with them a lot. Surprisingly, a lot of them are also debating Lant Pritchett, which is which is good, right now. The way I see it is. The whole thing seems too easy in the sense that, no disrespect to anybody working in this space at all… in the sense that it seems optimizing for what can be measured versus what works.So for me, the way I look at it is, it's very difficult to know the welfare effects for maybe a cohort of households. If you put a power station in my community, which has not had power for a while. So, but it's pretty easy if you have a fund and you distribute cash to households and you sort of divide them into a control group, and you know… which then makes it totally strange if you conclude from that that that is the best way to sort of intervene in the welfare and the well being of even that community or a people generally. I mean, where am I going wrong? How am I not getting it? Lant;  No, the people listening to the podcast can't see me on the camera trying to reach out and give you a big hug. I think you have it exactly right. I think we should go back and rerecord this podcast where I ask you questions and your questions are the answer. So I think you've got the answer exactly right. So first of all, by the way, the original rhetoric and practice of RCTs is going away, and roughly has gone away. Because the original rhetoric was Independent Impact Evaluation. All of the rhetoric out of JPAL and IPA and the other practitioners is now partnerships, which is not independent, but essentially everybody's adopted the Crawl the Design Space use of evidence for feedback loops in making organizations better. So they've all created their own words for it because they don't want to admit that they're just, again, borrowing other ideas. So to a large extent the whole community is moving in a very positive direction towards integrating, seeking out relevant evidence for partner organizations in how can they Crawl the Design Space and be effective. And they're just not admitting it because it's embarrassing how wrong they were first, but they've come to the right space. So I want to give them credit.When I gave a presentation at NYU called The Debate About RCTs Is Over And I won. It's not a very helpful approach, it's true, but it's not very helpful because I have to let them do what they're now doing, which is exactly what I said they should have been doing, and they are now doing. So, to some extent, asking people to say, yeah, we changed what we're doing is a big ask. And I'd rather they actually change what they're doing then they admit they did that. So to some extent it is going away. I think it's going away as it was originally designed, as this independent white coat guys, descend on some people and force them to carry out an impact evaluation to justify their existence. They're much more integrated, let's Crawl the Design Space in partnership with organizations, let's use randomization and more AB testing ways. And so I feel it's moving in a very positive direction with this weird rhetoric on top of it.Second, I think you're exactly right and I think it's slightly worse than you said. Because it's not just about what can be measured, but it's about attributability. It's not just what can be measured, but what can be attributed directly, causally to individual actions. And my big debate with the Effective Altruism community is I'm hugely, you know, big, big, big wins from the Effective Altruism movement attacking kind of virtue signaling, useless kind of philanthropic endeavors. I think every person should be happy for them. But if I were African, I would be sick of this philanthropic b******t that you guys are going to come and give us a cow or Bill Gates talking about…Tobi;Or chickens.Lant;Chickens. My wife doesn't do development at all. She's a music teacher. But when she heard Bill Gates talking about chickens, she think, does Bill Gates think chickens haven't been in Africa for hundreds of years? Like, what does he think he knows about chickens that Africans don't know about chickens? That's just such chicken s**t, right? But again, I'll promote a blog. I have a blog called let's All Play for Team Development. And I think what you're raising in your thing is that it's not just what we can measure, it's what we can measure and attribute to the actions of a specific actor. Because, you know, your example of not having power in a village, that we can measure. But all of the system things that we've talked about so far - migration, education, state capability - these aren't going to be solved by individualized interventions. They're going to be solved by systemic things. And with my team on education, we've had this big research project on education standards but I keep telling my team, look, if you're not part of a wave, you're a drop in the ocean. The only way for your efforts to not be a drop in the ocean is for you to be part of a wave [of] other people around you working on the same issue, pushing in the same direction, to build that. And that kind of thing gets undermined by attributability. So with my RISE project, I sometimes tell my funders, you can have success or you can have attributability, but you can't have both, right? Because if we're going to be successful at changing the global discourse in education, we're not going to do it by ourselves. We're going to be part of a team and a network. So, anyways…By the way, like early, early, early in the Effective Altruism movement, I had an interview with Cari Tuna and I think Holden Karnofsky, when they were thinking about what to do, and I made exactly this point. It's like, look, being effective at the individualized interventions that are happening is one thing, but don't ignore these huge systemic issues because you can't measure the direct causal effect between the philanthropic donation and the outcome. And that's your point, I think, which is, Nigeria is not going to get fixed by cash transfers.Tobi;No way.Lant; I mean, for heaven's sakes if Nigeria had the cash to transfer to everybody and fix it, well, then the national development struggle wouldn't be what it is. It's a systemic struggle across a number of fronts.Tobi;Why not just get Bill Gates to donate the money.Lant; But again, even Bill Gates, his fortune relative to the…you know, impact you could have through these programs, relative to what happens with national development, is just night and day. So to the extent that the adoption of a specific methodology precludes serious, evidence-based, hard struggle work on the big systemic issues, it's a net negative.Tobi;Again, to use your term, “kinky ideas in development.” Lant; Yeah.Tobi;I was reading a profile in the FT, a couple of days ago, all about charter cities, right?Lant;  About what?Tobi; Charter cities. It was an idea I was kind of into for a while, I mean, from Paul Roma's original presentation at TED. But you strongly argued against it at your CATO debate. So what is wrong with that idea? Because there are advocates, there are investors, who think charter cities are this new thing that is going to provide the space for the kind of organizational and policy experimentation. And China's SEZs are usually the go to examples, Shenzhen particularly. So, what do you have to say about that?Lant;I like discussing charter cities.Tobi;Okay.Lant;And the reason I like discussing charter cities is because they're not kinky. Right. My complaint about Kinky is that you've drawn this line in human welfare and you act as if development is only getting people over these very low-bar thresholds. So conditional cash transfers are an example of Kinky, and conditional cash transfers are just stupid, right? Charter cities are wrong.I mean, conditional cash transfers are just stupid in a trivial way.Charter cities are wrong in a very deep and sophisticated way. So I love talking about charter cities. The reason I love talking about charter cities is A, they have have the fundamental problem posed, right? The fundamental problem is countries and systems are trapped in a low level equilibrium and that low level equilibrium is actually a stable equilibrium and so you need to shock your way out of it. And the contest between me and Charter cities is I think there's good struggle paths out of low level equilibrium. So I'm a strategic incrementalist. I want to have a strategic vision, but I want incremental action. So I'm against the kinky, which is often incremental incremental, it doesn't really add up to a development agenda. So I like, yes, we need to have a way out of this low level equilibrium and state capability in the way education systems work, in the way economic policies keep countries from achieving high productivity, et cetera. But I'm a good struggle guy. And charter cities want Magic Bullet. Right.Now, the rationale for Magic Bullet is that good struggle is hard and hasn't necessarily proved successful. And these institutional features that lead to these low level traps just are resistant to good struggle methods out. And I think that's a really important debate to be having. But I think the right way to interpret China's experience and Yuen Yeun Ang's book on how China did it is, I think, a good illustration of this is China was Good Struggle. Using regional variations as a way of enabling good struggles. It's instructive that difficulty with Charter Cities always goes back. You keep going deeper and deeper of who's going to enforce this, who's going to enforce this, who's going to enforce this, you know. They're caught in their own catch 22 in my mind. So the first proposed, what appeared to be feasible Charter City in Honduras eventually got undermined by governance issues in which the major investor didn't want to actually be subject to rules based decision making. So, I love talking about charter cities. I think they're on the right set of issues of how do we get to the institutional conditions that can create a positive environment for high productivity firms and engagement and improved governance. And they have a coherent argument, which is good, that, it's a low level trap and there's no path out of the low level trap and so we need big shock to get out of it.But I don't think they're ultimately correct about the way in which you can establish the fundamentals. You can't just big jump your way to having reliable enforcement mechanisms and until you get to reliable enforcement mechanisms, the whole Charter City idea is still kind of up in the air. The next podcast I have scheduled to do is with the Charter Cities podcast, so that hopefully…Tobi;Oh. Interesting. Last question. We sort of have a tradition on the show where I ask the guest to discuss one new idea they would like to see spread everywhere. But I think more in line with your own brand, like you said earlier, I think I would like to ask for our own exclusive, Ideas Untrapped Exclusive Lant Rant, something you haven't talked about before or rarely. So you can go on for however long you wish. And that's the last question.Lant; I think if I had to pick something that if we could just get rid of it, it would be this fantasy that technology is going to solve problems. My basic point I make again and again and again is Moore's Law, which is the doubling of computer capacity every two years, has been chugging along, and it might have slowed down, but has been chugging along since 1965. So computing power has improved by a factor of ten to the 11th. And just as an illustration of just how big ten to the 11th is, the speed you drive on a freeway of 60 miles an hour is only ten to the 7th smaller than the speed of light. So ten to the 11th is an astronomically huge number in the sense that only astronomers have any use for numbers as big as ten to the 11th. Okay. My claim is anything that hasn't been fixed by a ten to the 11th change in computing power isn't going to get fixed by computing power. And I ask people sometimes in audiences, okay, particularly with older people, you look a little young for this question, but I ask them, okay, you older people that have been married for a long time, computing power has gone up ten to the 11th over the course of your marriage, has it made your marriage any better. And they're like, well, a little bit, sometimes when we're abroad, we can communicate over Skype easier, but on the other hand, it's made it worse because there's more distractions and more temptations to not pay attention to your spouse.So on net, ten to the 11th of computing power hasn't improved average marriage quality. And then I ask them, has it improved your access to pornography? And it's like, of course, night and day, like, more instantaneous access to pornography. And my concluding thing is a huge amount of what is being promoted in the name of tech is the pornography of X rather than the real deal. So people promoting tech in education are promoting the pornography of education rather than real education. People that are promoting tech in government are promoting the pornography of governance rather than true governance. And it's just like, no, these are deeper human issues, and there's all kinds of human issues that they're fundamentally technologically resilient. And expecting technology to solve human problems is just a myth. It enables salespeople to pound down people's doors, to sell government officials some new software that's going to do this or that. But without the purpose, without the commitment, without the fundamental human norms of behaviour, technology isn't going to solve anything and the pretence that it is is distracting a lot of people from getting to the serious work. So if we could just replace the technology of X with the pornography of X, I think we'd be better off in discussions of what its real potentialities are. How's that for [an] original?Tobi;Yeah, yeah.Lant;You asked for it.Tobi; Yeah, that's a lot to think about, yeah. Thank you so much for doing this.Lant;  Thanks for a great interview, Tobi. That was super fun. We could go back and record this with my asking questions and your questions being the answers. Because you're really sophisticated on all these issues. You're in exactly the right space.Tobi;Thank you very much.Lant;Great. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

“You betrayed us. I've just been a donkey my whole life and you told me my child's life would be different [if they went to school]. But now I've learned that he hasn't learned anything”.Join us in a thought-provoking conversation with Lant Pritchett, Visiting Scholar and Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government and Research Director of the RISE program (Research on Improving Systems of Education). We will discuss development, aid, RCTs, failing education systems and how to turn them around, and monkeys.Prof. Pritchett is a prominent scholar of development and a ******provocateur******, with years of experience in the practice and study of the practice of development, with passages at BSG, the Harvard Kennedy School, the World Bank, and more. He is the author of “Deals and Development: The Political Dynamics of Growth Episodes”, and “The Rebirth of Education: Schooling ain't Learning”, among others.Vitor Tomaz, a candidate for the Master of Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, hosts this episode. This episode was produced by Annelisse Escobar, Gloria Wawira, and Vitor Tomaz—edited by Paul Austin (Thanks, Paul!).To keep up with our latest episodes in conversation with public leaders, practitioners, and analysis, follow us on Instagram @oxfordpolicypod_.

Global Policy Watch: Bailout Pe Bailout Pe BailoutInsights on global policy issues relevant to India— RSJWhere do I start this week? Maybe with a spot of self-promotion. Pranay and I were guests on the popular Hindi podcast Puliyaabazi. I have been a long-time fan, so it was nice to be a guest there. Pranay usually co-hosts this with Saurabh and Khyati, but this time, he was on the other side. I felt a bit like Uday Chopra, who is only in the film because he is the producer's brother. Anyway, I think a good time was had by all as we covered a wide variety of topics - Enlightenment and why it didn't happen in India (short answer: there wasn't any need, really), why we write this newsletter (majboori) and the usual quota of Bastiat, Smith and Rorty (showing off). Do listen if you have time (of course, you do).Moving on. Here is a quick run-through of what's gone on since my last post. Another US regional bank, Signature Bank, stared into the abyss with depositors making a run to withdraw their money as analysts looked around for large unrealised losses sitting on banks' balance sheets. Fed officials spent their weekend hawking the other failed bank, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), to potential buyers. But who in their right mind will buy out a troubled bank in these times? More so after all the trouble that the likes of JP Morgan Chase had buying out such banks during the financial crisis of 2009. Running out of options, the Fed, the Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) announced an unprecedented bailout of all depositors of SVB and any other bank that will be in a similar hole in future. Simply put, FDIC will guarantee all deposits and not just those below $250,000 for which there's insurance. To be sure, the equity shareholders and those holding unsecured corporate bonds won't be bailed out. They will lose their shirts. So, this isn't a repeat of the 2009 bailouts. The Fed then went a step further to address the root cause of the problem. Banks are sitting on huge held-to-maturity (HTM) losses on the securities they hold because the interest rates have moved too far up too quickly. And they have a liquidity issue if there are continued withdrawals from the depositors. If they sell their securities today to meet their commitments to give depositors their money when they ask for it, they will have to sell them at a loss. This substantial loss will mean they will need to raise capital from shareholders to keep themselves solvent as per Fed requirements. But who will give them money in this market? Uninsured depositors who play out this game-theory scenario in their minds will therefore withdraw more of their money. Ideally, if they play the scenario right as a collective, they shouldn't. But as individuals, they will make a run on the bank. Soon, the bank will be in a death spiral, and this is what happened at SVB and Signature Banks. The last-minute solution devised by Fed was the creation of what's termed the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP). Here's how Fed sees BTFP:“The additional funding will be made available through the creation of a new Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP), offering loans of up to one year in length to banks, savings associations, credit unions, and other eligible depository institutions pledging U.S. Treasuries, agency debt and mortgage-backed securities, and other qualifying assets as collateral. These assets will be valued at par. The BTFP will be an additional source of liquidity against high-quality securities, eliminating an institution's need to quickly sell those securities in times of stress.With approval of the Treasury Secretary, the Department of the Treasury will make available up to $25 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund as a backstop for the BTFP. The Federal Reserve does not anticipate that it will be necessary to draw on these backstop funds.”If you didn't have any background to this situation and just read the above note from the Fed, you'd be forgiven if you thought here was a central bank of a developing world economy figuring out a short-term jugaad to solve a crisis at hand. But the Fed didn't just stop here. After all, like the Queen in Through The Looking Glass, it can believe in six impossible things before breakfast. Leaving their struggles to find a buyer for Signature Bank behind, they put together a unique Barjatya style “hum saath saath hain” deal and nudged a number of banks to do their bit to shore up confidence in the banking system: (as CNBC reports)“A group of financial institutions has agreed to deposit $30 billion in First Republic in what's meant to be a sign of confidence in the banking system, the banks announced Thursday afternoon.Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase will contribute about $5 billion apiece, while Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley will deposit around $2.5 billion, the banks said in a news release. Truist, PNC, U.S. Bancorp, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon will deposit about $1 billion each.“This action by America's largest banks reflects their confidence in First Republic and in banks of all sizes, and it demonstrates their overall commitment to helping banks serve their customers and communities,” the group said in a statement.“This show of support by a group of large banks is most welcome, and demonstrates the resilience of the banking system,” The Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency said in a joint statement.”Remind me now, sometime in the past, I have accused Indian policymakers of what's called isomorphic mimicry. It is a concept developed by Lant Pritchett et al to explain the tendency of governments to mimic other governments' successes, replicating processes, systems, and even products of the “best practice” examples without actually developing the functionality of the institutions they are imitating. Policymaking in developing countries often falls prey to this. A good example of this is imitating the green energy policies implemented in Sweden (a $60,000 per capita economy) in India (a $2000 per capita economy) which has neither the state capacity to implement nor the public readiness to accept such policies. Why am I bringing up isomorphic mimicry here? Well, because I never imagined a day shall dawn when the US policymakers take a leaf out of what India did when faced with a crisis. What the Fed did to save Signature Bank is isomorphic mimicry flowing the other way. To refresh your memory, here's a Business Standard report (Mar 13, 2020) on what the Finance Ministry and RBI did to save Yes Bank in 2020:“Hours after the Cabinet approved reconstruction scheme for YES Bank, private lenders ICICI Bank, HDFC, Kotak Mahindra Bank and Axis Bank came to the cash-strapped bank's rescue. While the SBI had earlier announced its decision to purchase 49 per cent shares, both ICICI Bank and HDFC are set to invest Rs 1000 crore each with Axis Bank pouring Rs 600 crore to pick up 60 crore shares of the troubled lender and Kotak Mahindra infusing an equity capital of Rs 500 crore under the RBI's bailout plan.The developments took place soon after Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said that other investors were also being invited.”I guess one way to look at this is if you let fiscal dominance become the central canon of how you manage your economic policy, you will eventually reach the same place as other economies (mostly developing) that have indulged in the same for years. The monetary authorities in the U.S. have been accommodating the fiscal profligacy of the treasury for years. This was accentuated during the pandemic. Trillions of dollars were pumped in to save the economy. I'm not sure how much the economy needed saving then. But that bill has come now. First in the shape of inflation, followed by rapid, unprecedented rate hikes and the inevitable accidents that are showing up now. Almost certainly, a recession will follow. Isomorphic mimicry of Latin American monetary policy indeed. Anyway, that was not the only bailout of the week. We also had Credit Suisse almost going under in a bad case of deja vu to those who have seen 2009. Here's CNBC on this:“Credit Suisse announced it will be borrowing up to 50 billion Swiss francs ($53.68 billion) from the Swiss National Bank under a covered loan facility and a short-term liquidity facility.The decision comes shortly after shares of the lender fell sharply Wednesday, hitting an all-time low for a second consecutive day after its top investor Saudi National Bank was quoted as saying it won't be able to provide further assistance. The latest steps will “support Credit Suisse's core businesses and clients as Credit Suisse takes the necessary steps to create a simpler and more focused bank built around client needs,” the company said in an announcement.In addition, the bank is making a cash tender offer in relation to ten U.S. dollar denominated senior debt securities for an aggregate consideration of up to $2.5 billion – as well as a separate offer to four Euro denominated senior debt securities for up to an aggregate 500 million euros, the company said.”What's that word that starts with C and was used a lot during the pandemic? Well, that C word is knocking at the doors of global finance right now. It is not a contagion yet. But the odds of it happening have significantly gone up in the past week.I will close this by covering the two discussion themes emerging from these events. First, what happens to the hawkish stance the Fed had taken a couple of weeks back on more rapid rate hikes in the light of inflation being sticky and inflation expectations being anchored? This, as I have written earlier, is of real interest to India and its policymaking stance. The Fed is in an absolute bind now before its meeting on Wednesday to take a call on rates. A rate hike in the current environment will make the weak banks look even more vulnerable despite the deposit backstop and the additional liquidity available from BTFP. And who knows what other accidents are lurking that will show up as the rates go higher? Does the Fed want to risk financial instability? On the other hand, inflation is real, and it is an election year. Runaway inflation will mean the eventual taming of it, and the recession that will follow will be hard and long. Who wants to preside over that? I see almost zero chance of a rate hike in this cycle. The Fed might wait till May to resume raising rates after it has weathered this risk of banking contagion and waiting for the April inflation data. But even then, the core problem remains. Further rate hikes will expose weak players, and that will mean we will have accidents. So long as they are small and contained, it is worth the risk of raising rates. But who can predict the nature of the accidents?Second, there's some kind of war that's broken out on social media on who is responsible for the collapse of SVB and Signature. There are those who believe it is the Fed whose actions over the past three years are solely responsible for the situation we are in now. The crux of the argument is that the Fed forecasts the interest rate and then it sets the rate. Banks take bets on long-term securities based on these forecasts. This is called duration risk. If the Fed then sets the rate that's so far removed from their own forecasts, what do poor treasury folks in Banks do? Plus, it is the Fed that has been making the rules since the GFC to direct a whole lot of bank liquidity into the purchase of long-term government bonds. The whole system is rigged by the Fed, and when things go wrong, it cannot pontificate on the risk management practices of banks. The counter to this is that the Fed only puts out an interest forecast based on the data (esp on inflation) that's available. When the incoming data changes, its forecast changes. This deviation is in a narrow band in usual times. In unusual times like what we've been through in the past two years, you may have a bigger variance. Banks have multiple ways to hedge duration risks. Instead of looking at the Fed to apportion blame, one should look at how conveniently the depositors of SVB - the VCs, startups and other cool people - jumped ship at the first sign of trouble when they know such a collective deposit withdrawal will make the situation worse. It is incredibly stupid of this deposit base that prides itself on its ability to see further, take long-term bets and dimension risks better than others, that it could not have the patience to stand by a bank that has served them well. The problem of SVB bank, according to this lot, is they were over-reliant on a lopsided deposit base, and that deposit base acted most stupidly. I think both these debates are going to rage on for some time. The Fed has slipped down the path where it has allowed fiscal dominance to overrule prudent policymaking. It is quite difficult to retrieve ground from there unless you have a Fed Chair with the intellectual heft and drive to restore balance. Equally, asset liability matching (ALM) is a core responsibility of banks. They are supposed to diversify their base of customers, monitor duration risks, and stress-test their balance sheet. All the strutting around as a cool disruptive bank or hanging out with your clients should not distract you from that fundamental truth. You take your eye off it, you veer off the road.    Advertisement: Admissions to Takshashila's Post-graduate Programme in Public Policy (PGP) are now open. This is a fantastic opportunity if you want to dive deep into public policy while pursuing your work responsibilities.India Policy Watch: Milking Consumers and Producers, All at OnceInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay KotasthaneWe harp on Hayek's paper, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in this newsletter. Price is a vital signal, a decentralised coordination mechanism between producers and consumers. And so, when governments prohibit its functioning, bizarre things happen. Let's analyse the consequences of price distortion using an ongoing situation — the milk shortage in Karnataka. A bit of background to set things up. Milk is an ‘essential' commodity. Its essentiality is not just a matter of fact or reason but also a carte blanche for Indian governments to regulate the production, supply, and distribution of any commodity that is classified as essential under the Essential Commodities Act (ECA), 1955. In practical terms, it means that the government fixes procurement prices, caps consumer prices, and often owns and runs everything that lies between these the producer and the consumer.So is the case with milk in most states, including Karnataka. The Karnataka Milk Federation (KMF) is a dairy cooperative under the Department of Cooperation, Government of Karnataka. It procures nearly 50 per cent of all the milk that is produced in the state. It sells products under the brand name Nandini. Nearly 50 per cent of its consumption happens in the capital, Bengaluru. Government ownership complicates and comicalises the situation in a way that can only be equalled by a Priyadarshan comic flick. See, for instance, what has happened due to a milk supply chain disruption over the last few weeks. As the summer began early this year, the demand for milk rose sharply. A glass of majjige (buttermilk) or lassi is a wonderful refresher in the heat. Simultaneously, the supply drops in the summer months. Natural adaptation dictates that animals produce less milk than usual in the heat. A bout of lumpy skin disease has further exacerbated the gap between demand and supply this year. For an ordinary product, a rise in prices would iron out this demand-supply gap quickly. With an increase in prices, consumers will rationalise consumption, while the producers will work harder to increase the supply. But when governments own the supply chain, price rises are defenestrated, and a chain of bizarre events emerges.First, electoral concerns circle over pricing decisions like vultures. In this particular case, the government will not touch the price caps with a barge pole because the Karnataka elections are due in May. So the government tries to increase prices in a roundabout way: increase the maximum retail price (MRP) but offer a reduced quantity of milk for the same packet price.Second, shortages abound. Since the administered price rises have not done enough to make the demand-supply gap go away, milk shortages have emerged. The rich can well afford to buy premium milk at higher prices from other suppliers. But for the poor, the milk packets disappear. Instead of paying a slightly higher price until the supply rises again, the less-privileged consumers are left only with an empty glass.Third, the government resorts to blaming private businesses. Someone has to be blamed, and as so often happens in India, businesses get the flak. See this report in The Hindu, which casually places the blame on private players who are now willing to offer higher prices to the dairies and farmers. The report says:“Private players purchasing milk from the retail market to sustain their businesses in milk products is said to be causing a disruption…“He also said private dairies were procuring milk directly from farmers in rural areas by offering a higher price, thus reducing the union's procurement.”We should have been celebrating private players that are offering a better deal to farmers, given the scarcity. Instead, they have become villains. And fourth, a quotidian issue becomes a front for inter-state tensions. The Karnataka government blames dairies in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu for offering higher prices to farmers within Karnataka, while the Tamil Nadu government is blaming private companies from Andhra Pradesh!Funny, the kinds of things that happen when the government enters and obstructs a control system called “prices”.Even as this satire unfolds, the root cause of the milk shortages isn't even being talked about. The Bangalore Milk Union president admitted that “many small milk producers have given up on rearing cows as it has become unsustainable”. Though he doesn't mention the underlying reason for this change, the bans on cow slaughter and recent attacks on people transporting cattle surely have reduced the incentives for farmers from stepping into this minefield called milk production. HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters* [Newsletter] Economic Forces is a must-read newsletter for all public policy enthusiasts.* [Paper] This paper on the effect of a landmark policyWTF called the Freight Equalisation Scheme explains how good intentions can sometimes produce terrible policies. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

Welcome to the Ideas Untrapped podcast - and my guest today is Development Economist Lant Pritchett. He is one of the most incisive and insightful scholars in the field, and his influence at the frontier of development research cannot be overstated. His research mostly focuses on economic growth, its contributing factors, and the development implications for peoples and countries. It was a privilege for me to talk to Lant, and I took the chance to ask him questions about some of the big themes of his research like Migration, Education, and State Capability. This is a two-part conversation. In this episode, we discussed Migration and Education. Lant provides insights into how the demographic transition in many rich countries has now pushed the migration debate to the forefront, as opposed to when he was writing about it two decades ago. How the Solow model might explain the absence of migration on the development agenda, and why he thinks the ‘‘brain drain'' is ‘‘mostly a myth''. He also explained to me how we ended up with the wrong dashboard in education policies and the distinction between assessment and examination in measuring learning. I want to thank Lant for talking to me, and thank you all for always listening. I hope you enjoy it.TranscriptTobi;My guest really needs no introduction. There's nowhere in the world of development, global development, and development economics, where Lant Pritchett is not a household name. So I'll like to say welcome, and it's a pleasure to talk to you.Lant;Thanks for inviting me.Tobi;On a light note, let's start on a very light note. What have you been working on recently?Lant;So recently I've been doing two things. I've been wrapping up a large research project on basic education in the developing world, sort of K to twelve, and that had been an eight year research project that's just wrapping up. But more recently, I'm trying to ramp up my engagement on labour mobility. The world is facing a real demographic transition point, with the rich industrial world, particularly workforce age populations, just in constant decline while their aging population is increasing. And at the same time we have this massive youth bulge in parts of, not all of, but in parts of the developing world. And, you know, I'm an economist, whenever you see huge differences, you think, well, here's an opportunity for exchange. So the world's biggest opportunity for exchange right now is the West, as we call it, desperately needs workers, Africans definitely need the hide productivity income and jobs. And it's a great opportunity for exchange, but it's blocked by laws and policies that just make migration next to impossible. And I'm working to break that gridlock and get some sensible ways in which we can put willing workers into needed jobs.Tobi;I think that's a good launchpad to start the conversation on migration, which you've worked quite a lot on. I read your book Let Their People Come a couple of years ago. As a general question, what do you think we have learned from the time you wrote that book and you were compiling that research and now? Because definitely to me, it doesn't feel like much has changed in terms of the debate. And like you said, migration is such a big issue with economic and political consequences on both sides of the Atlantic. So what have we learned? And if nothing, why is that so? Why is there such a resistance to thinking differently about migration?Lant;What have we learned is a great question. Let's start with the demography of this. That book was written in 2006. One thing about demography is you can predict it very far into the future, right? Everybody who's going to be a 30 year old worker in 20 years is ten years old today. And so it's really not that hard to know what the future, the 20-, 30-year future of the labour force is going to look like, because everybody gets a year older. So on one level, we've learned nothing. But on another level, I think there's a current ongoing night and day shift in the urgency of the issue, because things were easily forecastable when I wrote the book - what is it, 2006? 2023 - 17 years ago. 17 years ago, I was saying, look, there's going to be this demographic crisis in the West and you're going to need these workers, but it was far away. So when you ask has anything been learned, it's like, no, but all of the projections for what was going to happen 17 years ago are now 17 years closer. And now, all of a sudden, the Prime Minister of Japan, I don't know if you've seen this, but the Prime Minister of Japan gave a speech a couple of days ago saying, “for the demographic future of Japan, it's now or never.” And it's like, no, it's never. The opportunity you might have had to address your labour force crisis through fertility was 30 years ago. It's over now.Now the only issue is how are you going to get workers to work in the Japanese economy to fill the jobs that you need, given that you have the demographic crisis you have, which you now can't fix? I wish I had a good word for this or a clever way to put it, but it's sort of like when a child touches a hot stove, do you say they learned something? Well, yeah, kind of. They learned that the stove is hot. But people had been telling the kid, the stove was hot, don't touch it for years. So, you know, did they learn something? Well, kind of. They know it in a different, more intense way than they maybe knew it before, but they didn't learn anything new. So my first response is, I was just way premature with Let Their People Come in 2006 because the problem was still too far away for politicians and policymakers really to focus on it. But now it's like, boom, it's in your face. labour shortages in the West aren't like this hypothetical going to come thing. They're here, they're now. They're everything I do, everything I look at, I think it's here now. And now, like I said, the prime ministers of countries are going, “we really need to worry about this demographic thing.” So on one level, nothing learned. On another level, radical change and attention to the issue because what was easily predictable and was predicted is now happening in a way you can't ignore it.Tobi;But even with that, you still hear many of the standard objections to more migration, whether it's in the wages of domestic workers in the host countries and things around cultural integration. So, just do a quick recap for me why these objections are false or untenable at best. Because a lot of people are still susceptible to the same arguments even with copious evidence and years of research debunking them, you still hear these things. And in the age of social media, where information travels very very fast, you know, and it's also easy to appeal to people who might be affected by this and politically weaponize their disaffection. So the standard arguments to migration, whether we're talking about the work of Borjas and people who are built on the back of that, why are they untenable?Lant;I mean, we can talk about why they're untenable or many of the factual claims are false, but I think we want to start a step before that. I think the biggest problem with conversation about migration is fundamentally, and I'm talking mainly about the rich industrial West, which West includes Australia and West includes Japan, the rich industrial world. Okay. The problem is, since the early 20th century, these countries have forced two questions to have the same answer. And they're radically different questions. One question is, who are we as a sovereign entity that control a border? Who are we going to allow to be physically present on our territory and perform labour services? That's a clear question. It's a policy question. It's a legal question. It's a regulatory question. You can have an answer to that question. Then there's the separate question which is, who is the future of we? Who are we going to allow to come to our country and on the premise that they're going to become a citizen, become a future one of us and determine the future of who is us? Right? And I feel that forcing these two questions to be the same, you get a complete distorted discussion of the first question. So I think nearly everybody who's arguing about the impact of migration or labour mobility, which is by the way, I try and use two different words…I try and always use the words labour mobility because when I use the word labour mobility it's clear I'm talking about the first question [which is] who are you going to allow under what terms and conditions to be physically present on your territory and what kinds of work are you going to allow them? What kinds of contracts and labour are you going to allow them to engage in? That's a question we can debate and have independently, in my view, of the question - who are the future citizens of the country? Right? But when you force those questions to be the same, I think nearly all the discussion of wage impacts is complete subterfuge b******t. Because the problem is if you say, oh, I don't want people coming to my country because I just don't feel they're going to fit in with us, boy, that sounds racist. That sounds exactly why whites in America had restrictive covenants that wouldn't allow African Americans to move into their neighborhoods because they're not like us. They'll change the nature of our way of life. And so most intellectuals in the West are reluctant to actually deploy cultural-based arguments for migration, but it's much more politically acceptable to say, “oh, well, I'm not saying that I am racist and that I don't want people of different races or ethnicities in my country, but it would be terrible for our workers. And therefore, that's why we're not going to do it.” And I think for the most part that's just b******t. It's just subterfuge. It's just substituting an argument that's politically acceptable but false for an argument that's true but not politically acceptable.So, I think the reason why these false arguments, quite untenable arguments persist is exactly that. It's that these arguments are factually untenable, but it's easier to justify action in terms of those rather than deal with the concrete issue. And the way in which I'm proposing countries can deal with a concrete issue is start to think about separating these questions. So we have legal mechanisms for people to come and work in the country that perhaps have some path to citizenship, but you don't have to decide the citizenship question immediately when any work authorization is granted.Tobi;Of course, there are also people on the other side of these arguments who advocate for more migration and letting more people travel and be able to work. And like you said, they often mix up these two arguments as you have delineated them. So my question then is, is it time for advocates of more migration to maybe swallow some bitter pills, especially on questions of rights? Because I think that is where some of the hot buttons lie. What rights would people have? What are the benefits they are entitled to in their host country? And some of the fiscal implications of that, you know, even though some of you may be a cover to hide larger cultural or behavioral argument. So is it time for advocates of migration to, I dunno, maybe, embrace more pragmatic arrangements, so that we can move this issue forward a bit, you know? What do you think?Lant; Absolutely. I think that's a very perceptive question because I feel in the space of people that are debating and talking about migration, refugees and labour mobility, those three kind of different channels, the kind of if we use the word migration just to mean the intent that somebody is going to move permanently from one country to the other country and acquire different citizenship, then there's refugees, and then there's labour mobility. I think there's this tension between more and better. And I'm advocating that the path to better runs through more. Whereas a lot of people in this space want better, but it's not at all obvious that they aren't willing to sacrifice more for better. So I'm an economist, so I believe that if the price price of something is higher, people will do less of it. So I feel if you go to countries and you say every person who you allow into your country to do labour services of any kind automatically has to be entitled to the following long list of entitlements. They'll say, “gee, no, we're not going to do that then, we're going to have robots or we'll do without.” No one really should be talking about abrogating fundamental human rights. I mean, I've never say, oh, people should be expected to in any way, shape or form sacrifice fundamental human rights in order to move to another country. But there's a huge space in between. I like that you use the word entitlements versus rights. I feel a lot of human rights are negative rights. These are things that you can't have done to you. It's just immoral, illegitimate to ask you to sacrifice the privileges against these negative things being done to you. Suppressing your freedom of speech, suppressing your freedom of association, forcing you to change your religion, et cetera. But citizens of the West enjoy this huge amount of entitlements which they're entitled to legally as citizens. But migrants don't necessarily need to become endowed with the full panoply of entitlements that citizens have just because they're in the country. And we accept that for students. If you go to study in the United States, no one says, oh, because he's in the United State as a student, he's entitled to every social program available to any citizen in the United States or a tourist. I guess it's the lack of imagination here and I love the title of Ideas Untapped. I think there's a lack of imagination here because we're not making the right analogy.It's like, look, we allow people to be in countries for all kinds o f reasons, like tourism, for students, for passage, to do high level business deals, and we don't expect that to come with this huge array of the complete entitlements of the citizens of the country they happen to be in. And, you know, there's kind of a fetishism about work. Like, if you happen to go to another country and work for three months, that needn't come with the full entitlements of every entitlement every citizen of that country has. And then we just need to have an open and untapped conversation about what is the right line between, for sure protection of rights, for sure limitation of reneging on contracts, of abusing migrants because they're in a difficult legal situation of not being in their home country, but the array of entitlements is a hard question to answer, and countries need to take that on. Okay, if we're going to let people come to our country, what does that entitle them to and in what sequence and how? It's a hard question that countries need to deal with but I don't think it's impossible question. But it is often made impossible by the insistence of like, no, it has to be perfection immediately. Because if you say that, you act as if you're advocating for better, but I feel you're not advocating for more, and lots and lots of people would love more.And second, it's not obvious that there is a path to better that doesn't go through more because a lot of the abuse that people suffer is that they're being trafficked to reach these labour opportunities in illegal and informal and undocumented ways, which puts them at even more risk of abuse. So the analogy I use is prohibition in the United States. At one point in the United States, we passed a constitutional amendment, we banned the sale and production and import and everything of alcohol. But then what did we end up with? We ended up with a whole bunch of alcohol being marketed illegally and everybody marketing alcohol was, by definition, breaking the law. And so we ended up with a really, really crappy regulation of alcohol. And the only path to better regulated alcohol was to end prohibition and have it be legal. And I feel we're in this prohibition mode, vis a vis labour mobility, and it just isn't viable.Tobi; Sometimes the context within which these debates happen is also ideological, especially in America the right, the left. There's a tiny section of the right that I would like you to respond to their argument, or I should say their sentiments. Maybe I'll fit someone like Tyler Cowen in this category, who are pro immigration but who largely favors high performing technical talent from other countries and not people that can work in the jobs that you argue are actually badly in need of workers in the industrial world, what you call the hard non-tradables. Right? So how would you respond to that? What would you say to them who favour more immigration, but what they want is basically the stem talents of other countries? You know, let them come. Perhaps, they argue, that, productivity is stalling in the United States and to keep pushing the technological frontier, it has to be a large absorption of technological talent from other countries.Lant;My first response is that's exactly the inevitable consequence of bundling the two questions. If you bundle the question who are future citizens? And the question, who's going to be allowed to work in our country? It inevitably leads to we should allocate the few scarce slots we're willing to allocate, that inevitably leads to global war for talent kind of migration policies where you're going to attract the best and the brightest out of Nigeria, out of India, out of other places to come to America. And that makes economic sense. My point is there shouldn't be two categories. There should be three categories. Currently the debate happens as if there's two categories. There's migrants and there's refugees. Those are the two kinds of people that move. Whereas my point is we need a third category. In part, we need a third category because as you point out, and as I point out, and this is something that is, I think, completely absent from the debate in the West so far is that the change in occupational demand with respect to some measure of underlying skills in those occupations, it's U-shaped. There's actually been more increase in demand for the low skill, physical, non routine activities and an increase in demand for the super high skill. So if you look at change in wages or change in occupations in Europe, in the US, there's more demand for things that aren't easily amenable to technology and aren't repetitive, like, just to use a prosaic example, like cleaning a hotel room.Cleaning a hotel room is a very hard, it's not an easily automatable thing because it's different every time, you walk in, things are in different places. And so the result of the technological changes in the West is that everybody's complaining about the falling wages because the middle of the wage distribution has been hit hard by technological changes. But we have a whole bunch of jobs that are needed at the low end that the domestic citizens don't want to fill, and in the US, there's going to be something like a million more needed people in home health care. It's not a job that any American middle class family is, oh, you need to grow up and be a home health care aid. It's not a super attractive job to the emerging youth, and we just don't have any youth coming into the labour market, so we need to fill those jobs. But if you say to a country, oh, you should determine who you are as a people and who you are as a nation and who your future citizens are, in order to meet your needs for home health care, they're like, no, we want computer scientists, we want data engineers, we want doctors. So what I'm saying is, Tyler's argument is inevitable if you accept the premise that what we're talking about is immediate and expected path to citizenship, labour mobility and the only form of labour mobility is migration.If you look at what's happened with Canada and Australia, who adopted points systems for their immigration, that's exactly the way it went. You gave points for higher levels of education. You gave points for speaking the language. You gave points for things that were cultural match. Canada has massively benefited from global war for talent kind of recruiting through a points-based system. But there's a whole bunch of other jobs in Canada that you also need to fill. And Canada is dealing with this. It's like, okay, how do we deal with all of these existing [jobs] native born Canadians don't necessarily want and so you're not taking them away from anybody by having more people in here working on those, but on the same type, it's a very difficult political discussion to say, we are going to, in some sense, put the future of who we are as a people at the hostage of the immediate needs of the labour force. So Tyler's arguments make a ton of sense if you accept the premise there's no temporary mobility. Once you allow for rotational or temporary or time limited mobility, which can include path to citizenship, then the whole conversation changes. A fundamental principle of economics that is often ignored is instruments to targets. If you have two different targets, you need two different instruments. And so if we've have multiple needs for immigration, we need multiple pathways. And I think Tyler is right about one pathway. I'm a big advocate of the other pathway. Because I am a development economist, if I say what would really benefit Africa, it's not Tyler Cohen having aggressive American policy to take the best and brightest out of Africa, it's creating multiple pathways for Africans.Tobi;On Africa, I don't want to draw into any particular comments on that, but let's move the debate closer. Which is, we also worry about migration in Africa, especially… Lant; Oh, within…Tobi;Yeah. For example, in Nigeria, there is always a huge debate about the number of Nigerian doctors that leave for the UK every year. Canada is also a big competitor now. Another industry that is causing quite a bit of domestic disruption in Nigeria is software talents, which is a new and burgeoning industry with lots of investments but the talents are moving in droves, which inevitably brings up the issue of the brain drain. Right. I usually cite Sandefur and Clemens work on the Philippines, but I encounter some resistance to that argument that no, no, no, don't tell us about Filipino nurses. So now, is the brain drain, is it a myth or reality? I know that's a bit of a vague question, but… [Laughs]Lant;Well, like, it's mostly a myth, but at the same time, most myths have some grounding in some deep aspect of human reality. Myths that persist are capturing something deep and important. Right. So let's start with the way that it's not a myth. The way that it's not a myth is that if a country is not yet in the position in which there's really rewarding ways for the high talent workers to use their skills, then people are going to leave the country and not come back. And then brain drain is, I think, a significant problem because a lot of the pathway of the the education of the people to become the superstars in software and medicine, capable of moving to Canada, Germany, and the US, was publicly funded. So there is a legitimate concern. The whole premise is we'll educate our people because we'll recoup our investment through taxes when they become more productive people. But if that productivity happens in another place, then, yes, there's a serious problem there. But I think what we've learned from lots of experiences with India, where I live and have been working on and off for over 30 years, eventually there's another rhyming thing that's never going to become as popular as brain drain, and I call it cortex vortex. I think one reason brain drain gets so much attention is the two words rhyme, which is not a good reason for an argument to have credibility. But I'm afraid it's like people [go] “brain drain, oh, yeah. Brain drain, oh, yeah. Rhymes. It must be true.” So I want to contrast that with cortex vortex, your brains moving back and forth. There's a vortex of movement, and I think India undoubtedly has benefited from the fact that the early migration out of India into America was permanent. These people left India. But then, as India changed its economic policies, became a more dynamic place, the rotational mobility that there were trained Indians in both places that you could establish the connections, that you could create essentially huge software firms that were essentially US firms based in India. Meaning. All of the revenue was in the US. All of the work was in the US. But the work was being done in India. That was a consequence of the previous establishment of connections.So I think, on net, the benefits of vortex cortex, when countries become sensible and viable places to do business, exceed the risks of brain drain. So, not that there can never be a brain drain situation, but the brain drain situation is often a much deeper problem with the country. And when the country changes, you can move from brain drain risks to cortex vortex benefits. And I think that as a country, in Nigeria, I would be saying, well, look, we really should be thinking about why software engineers aren't setting up businesses in Nigeria much more than worry about losing Nigerians to the US. And moreover, the more Nigerians we have going and working in the US, eventually it is going to benefit Nigeria in the long run by creating the possibility of connections. The third issue. I realize I'm giving long answers, but the third issue is an issue that Michael Clemens has raised and has documented is if there were viable, again, time limited pathways, then the net effect of investment in training in these things can far exceed the drain and hence you actually get more skilled people from the possibility of migration. So if you look at the Philippines as an extreme example, like if brain drain were true, Philippines should be desperately short of nurses because there's Filipino nurses all over the world. Exactly the opposite, because Philippine nursing schools train a whole bunch of people with the promise and premise that some of them are going to go work and get jobs as nurses in other places. But the net number of nurses trained versus the net number that actually go abroad is very small. So the opportunities for Filipino nurses to work abroad have dramatically increased the supply. And so there's way more nurses, we need to think of the long-run endogeneity of the number.So again, people's ability for counterfactual is often very limited. They see a Filipino nurse working in the Gulf and think that nurse could have been working in the Philippines, so therefore it's created less nurses in the Philippines. And they have a very difficult time imagining the more complex counterfactual of well, that nurse actually created five or six additional trained nurses who are in the Philippines because they got trained as nurses and went abroad for a while and then came back and worked in the Philippines. Or never got the opportunity to work abroad. So the net brain creation is a huge driver to the extent that these very high returns to possibility of going abroad increase the total creation of supply often gets completely ignored in the brain drain discussion. So I'm sure a lot of Nigerians are investing in their software skills in the hopes of working abroad. And the net effect of software skills available in Nigeria may well be hugely positive, even though you can point to lots of individuals who leave.Tobi;One evidence that you're having a conversation with Lant Pritchett is if his answers always lead you to your next question. Speaking about the cortex vortex now. There are people who argue, and sometimes they toy with a very horrible idea of limiting emigration in African countries, especially emigration of highly educated, highly skilled people because of the fear of brain drain. And one argument that I've heard is that there is less incentive for national development if your brightest and the best leaves. The political incentive is for the ruling class to keep looting. They have no incentive to fix anything. I mean, citizens get educated, they grow up, they leave. Nothing about the political dynamics of the country changes. How would you respond to such people? How would you tell me to respond to such people?Lant; I have to say there's two levels to this. First kind of this is getting beyond my pay grade, so to speak. It's like the true dynamics of how countries come to do national development in this fourfold transformation that I talk about, of the politics, the society, the economy, and the administration, it's a huge, complicated historical transformation. And I'm not at all convinced forcing your best and brightest to stay in the country because they'll be really unhappy, and therefore, by being unhappy, they're going to play a positive role in the political dynamics is a plausible story to first order at all? I don't know. Maybe. But it's hard to point to the cases where by not allowing these people to migrate, they instead of becoming a Nigerian doctor working in Canada, they became this path-breaking political transformational figure. And a very striking counterexample is Gandhi in India. Came back to India when he was in his 40s, having spent a significant amount of time in the UK and a significant amount of time in South Africa. You could have said, oh, man, if we had just forced Gandhi to stay in India, things would have been so much better. And there are a number of significant examples of people who went abroad for a period and then came back and made a positive difference, too. So that first one, it's like, kind of on first order sounds plausible, but I don't know of any either historical, or social or political or economic solid evidence that it's true.Part of my brand is skepticism. Just because it sounds plausible doesn't mean it's true. First of all, yeah, that sounds plausible, but I'm not sure it's true. Had Gandhi not been allowed to go study law in the UK, would India have in the long run historical trajectory, be in a better place? I don't know. The actual historical thing was, and I feel embarrassed as someone who has lived in India for a long time, but I think he was 44 years old before he came back and became a prominent and effective political advocate in India. And who's to know that that experience of living broad didn't radically increase his productivity as a transformational political leader? So that's the first thing I'd say. Second thing I'd say is I have these fundamental liberal tendencies that forcing people, even if it's good for the country, forcing people to do it, makes me nervous.Tobi;Yeah.Lant;Even if I did accept that it were true, that it would be marginally better for Nigeria if these people didn't go off and work in other countries, putting that burden in a coercive way on the individual makes me nervous. Just makes me nervous. Because how did the burden of Nigeria's national development transformation fall on this person just because they happen to be a good programmer? That's not at all an obvious thing. And then the last point I want to make is, you know, I sometimes want to promote the analogy that human capital is a lot like physical capital, right? And on this, both sides have been completely hypocritical in the sense that when Westerners make this argument, I go, hey, until you guys start refusing to take Nigerians physical capital, when Nigerians want to invest in Swiss banks or British banks and say, no, this physical capital should be forced to remain in Nigeria to promote the national development of Nigeria and so we should ban Nigerians from being able to put money in Switzerland because it would be better used there than in Switzerland. Until you're willing to make that same argument, I'm pretty sceptical that your argument a Nigerian should be forced to remain in Nigeria is really a principled argument. Because analytically, it's exactly the same. And yet the West is like, oh, yeah, yeah, all of the money that wants to roll out of Africa into Swiss, and British and other banks [we're] super happy to take it, even though exactly the analytically same argument can be made as, oh, this money should be better invested and if we force people to invest their money in Nigeria, they'd be more aggressive about creating a better investment climate. But the West is fully complicit in taking all the money that wants to come out of Africa, and yet when it's people, all of a sudden they acquire principles. And then, secondly, the same thing for the country, it's like, look, if you're losing physical capital, you might want to look at why people don't want to invest in Nigeria and create a better investment climate.Tobi; My final question on migration, before we move on to another baby of yours - education. So as a development economist, and also you've written about this, why isn't migration so much on the “development agenda”? I don't know any development organization or any communique or report that is so big on migration as a development policy. Policy that radically increases the welfare and the incomes of the people, like you said. Because sometimes development is usually framed more as a country thing than the people. So why is it missing on the agenda?Lant; I think there are lots of reasons. And let me start with the one that is less, I think, discussed and deserves more consideration. And the answer is the Solo model.Tobi;Okay.Lant;So let's talk economics first, right? The Solo model, which I don't know how many of the listeners are actually into economics, but it was the dominant model of economic growth. And it said that economic growth is a combination of this thing called investable stuff. We'll call it capital. And that includes human capital and infrastructure and all kinds of physical stuff. I'm taking human capital as a physical stuff. So there's capital and then there's the productivity with which capital is used, which we'll call A. And that was kind of the dominant model of economic growth when development organizations in the 1950s and 60s came into being. Now, in the Solo model, and I had the privilege of actually being taught by Bob Solo, so I can speak with some authority about how Bob Solo talked about it. A, was regarded as blueprints. This total factor productivity that interacted with capital was ideas that were in the air. It was regarded as technical. Now, if you think about, therefore, how the dynamics of growth were going to work, is A, this technical blueprints of how to do stuff was going to diffuse very fast, right? Because after all, if I have a blueprint for how to build a power plant or build a dam or build a highway or run a coffee processing plant, that blueprints can transfer across countries really fast. So if you scratch what was the intellectual kind of environment in which the bones and DNA of places like the World Bank were built? They were built on a model that ideas were going to diffuse fast. Well, if ideas diffuse fast, then the productivity of factors in the places that now have high A but have low human capital and low physical capital was going to be super high. And so the whole problem was how do we invest in this super high productivity, physical and human capital in these places with high A and low K? That was the whole model of development. Right? Now, what we have learned and this we really have learned in the sense that we didn't know it and now we know it, is what we have learned from five decades of research on economic growth is that model isn't exactly wrong. Exactly wrong. A, is what hasn't converged. If you ask why hasn't Nigeria had the gross prospects that we would have hoped and anticipated for Nigeria, it's because A stayed low. Not because Nigeria and we'll get to this when we get to education in two minutes, but not because Nigeria has necessarily had radically underinvestment in human capital or radically possibility for investment in physical capital. It's that A didn't diffuse, and it turns out A isn't blueprints. A is much deeper things about how you can make factor productivity in a country which go way beyond do you have the blueprint to build a power plant? Right. So the first reason why development wasn't originally part of the development agenda is that in the Solo model, we should have had human capital flowing to Nigeria because the return to factors should have been super high, because A should have been super high relative to the level of K and HK. So before we get into more cynical, and hence probably more realistic and true positive models of why it's not on the agenda, I think there was an intellectual flaw about economics itself and how it thought about growth that I don't think we've pointed out strongly enough, how completely, totally wrong it is, and how it leads to radically different assumptions with how important migration is going to be. And in the Solo model, there was no need for migration. Like, once A was there, the returns to HK were going to be phenomenally high, not low.So we really have learned from constructing data sets and just decades and decades of growth research, that A doesn't converge. And that is a huge, huge puzzle. Right. Because if A were, as Bob Solo thought it was, a set of blueprints, it should have diffused very fast, and instead it's been not diffused. So that's an economic-based argument for why it wasn't on the development agenda. And the problem is, like I say, the DNA and bones of the World Bank were built because if you ask, why does the World Bank focus on moving money? Well, again, in this model that A has converged and we need K and HK to catch up, what these countries need is money. Right. Anyway, and it's very hard to change an organization's DNA. Then there are the obvious, and I just want to point out, I'm not being completely silly and naive… it's also the case that most of the development organizations have their intellectual agendas dominated by the rich donors, and the rich donors never really wanted it. Since they never really wanted it, it was always easy to push it off the agenda. Now, on the plus side, the World Development part of the World Bank, which is often a very flagship document, is this year on migration. So for the very first time, the World Bank is going to solidly bring development issues and migration issues side by side. This is another way in which I think the overall environment for discussing migration is going to change radically, I think, in the next ten years. And I think this is a harbinger of that.Tobi; I look forward to reading the document.Lant;  I've seen drafts of it, and it will be good.Tobi;  Okay, moving to education now. Yeah, so I'll start this way. It's one of those things that is super sexy to talk about politically. We are in [an] election season now in Nigeria, and every candidate is saying, I'm going to invest in education. We need to fix basic education. We need to make our education work. If we make it work, then this and this and X and Y will not happen. There will be no crime. People will no longer kidnap. They can, you know, a lot of things. The benefits of education seems intuitive.  But what frustrates me, whether you're talking to policymakers or investors or even my friends who talk about education, is, other than researchers like yourself who are working in the field, almost nobody stops to look at the evidence. Nobody. And then we've ended up with this, to use one of your phrases, we ended up with the wrong dashboard for education, where we are basically measuring schooling and not learning. How did this happen? You can't talk about human capital without talking about education. So how come we are still measuring the wrong things? How come countries are putting in money, and there's basically nothing to show for it? Lant; Wow, okay, well, that was a long set-up. So I'm writing, like, one of these efforts where a variety of people are getting together, writing about different topics, people are writing about infrastructure and other things, and I'm writing about education. And I start by saying I feel that the field of education is the field in which more false things get set than any other domain. Just completely, totally, obviously false things. Perfect people are perfectly happy to repeat them again and again, year after year, decade after decade. So let me start with the most positive possible spin on it. The most positive spin on what's happened with schooling and education is that if you go back again to the origins of decolonialisation and these newly independent national governments come in and they have control of policies for the first time, it was obvious to everyone and completely accepted that the education level and if now by education we mean mastery of certain capabilities. If we define education in some sense as a vertical axis of, we want them to have skills and capabilities and values and dispositions that are going to contribute to national development, how many years of schooling are going to do, right? There's two ways to increase the stock of, kind of, skills and capabilities. One is more kids in school. One is more learning per year. Well, in the 1960s, it was obvious more kids in school was an easily available, doable, and viable way to do that. You could just push more kids through school, and as long as you push them through at roughly the same level of skills per year, you've got more of it. Right? And every time either national leaders or global leaders or people raised the quality issue, the response is, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it. There was a lot of nervousness that a lot of the early pushback against excessive expansion in the education system was really elitist nonsense, right, that, oh, these people don't really need to be educated and we should reserve education for the elite. And so it was easy to create this debate where the people talking quality were hidebound traditionalists that were anti-egalitarian, and the only acceptable position was [to] expand schooling. And so to some extent, people kept saying, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it. We'll cross that bridge when we come to it. We'll cross that bridge when we come to it.So the reason for starting with this positive thing is, hey, we're now at the bridge. Like, around the world, nearly every kid goes to school. Like, something like 3% of children don't go to any school ever in their life. And most kids are going to school for a very long time now. And we haven't ever really come back to say, by the way, in the 1960s, it was obvious more kids in school and at constant learning per year was okay. In 1980s, there was still a lot of kids not in school, girls were out of school, et cetera, poor kids were out of school, et cetera. But in 2020, it's like, hey, we're at the bridge. The scope for increasing a country's stock of human capital or the stock of learning and skills and capabilities by expanding the years of school is over. It's just over. It's just over. The additional marginal gain from pushing out on the quantity of schooling access just doesn't hold any promise in most countries of the world. So to some extent, the discourse has to change because the facts have radically changed. Like, I don't want to go back and say people in 1960 were wrong to radically and rapidly expand education or that free primary education in 1970s was a mistake, because there were still lots of kids not with the opportunity or access to school. But that world is gone. That world is gone. And our views and attitudes and discourse hasn't changed nearly as much as the facts on the ground have changed. And so we just have to recognize that, look, the only real viable possibility for substantial, sustained improvements in the level of skills and capabilities of youth is now from more learning per year. We have to radically change that.Tobi;So I mean, pivoting to learning, I get that. But I want to talk a bit about testing. Right.Lant;About who?Tobi;Tests.Lant;Oh, okay, let's not talk about tests.[Laughs]I'm being quite serious, because there's two radically different things.Tobi;Okay.Lant;One is assessment and one is examinations.And then tests, I'm not quite sure what you mean. I'm preempting you here because I was just literally writing about this two days ago.Tobi;Okay.Lant;Most education systems relied radically too much on high-stakes for-the-student-late-in-the-cycle examinations. But they relied radically too little on assessment of learning. And so when you say testing, I want to be clear, are we talking about grade ten school leaving high stakes for the student examinations, or are we talking about assessments of, in third grade, can kids read and how do we use assessment of learning? Because within the education community there's this huge negative stigma around testing, which then I think leads in radically unproductive directions, because assessment gets thrown into the bundle with high-stakes examinations. And everybody hates high-stakes examinations, particularly because they're often unbelievably crappy examinations, meaning they're examinations of how much can you memorize? And hence we're allocating future opportunities to go to college on the basis of a really crappy assessment of learning. So everybody hates examinations, but I think everybody should love assessment. Sorry, so I've answered a question you haven't asked yet. This is a public episode. 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While some countries are seeing their populations decline and grow older, others are growing fast. That has economic implications. Could migration help?NPR's Emily Feng reports on the long term consequences of China's shrinking population.We also hear from Lant Pritchett, research director with the think tank Labor Mobility Partnerships, about the ways in which migration could help tackle population imbalances. In participating regions, you'll also hear a local news segment to help you make sense of what's going on in your community. Email us at considerthis@npr.org.

Public policy may seem arcane and complicated, a field only for geeks. But all our lives are shaped by it. Pranay Kotasthane and Raghu S Jaitley join Amit Varma in episode 313 of The Seen and the Unseen to describe their efforts to make policy great again. (For full linked show notes, go to SeenUnseen.in.) Also check out: 1. Missing In Action: Why You Should Care About Public Policy -- Pranay Kotasthane and Raghu S Jaitley. 2. Anticipating the Unintended — Pranay Kotasthane and Raghu Sanjaylal Jaitley's newsletter. 3. Puliyabaazi — Pranay Kotasthane's podcast (with Saurabh Chandra). 4. Raghu Sanjaylal Jaitley's Father's Scooter -- Episode 214 of The Seen and the Unseen. 5. Pranay Kotasthane Talks Public Policy -- Episode 233 of The Seen and the Unseen. 6. Foreign Policy is a Big Deal — Episode 170 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane & Manoj Kewalramani). 7. Older episodes of The Seen and the Unseen w Pranay Kotasthane: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 8. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah). 9. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 10. Angus Maddison's chart on GDP through the ages. 11. Caste, Capitalism and Chandra Bhan Prasad — Episode 296 of The Seen and the Unseen. 12. What Have We Done With Our Independence? — Episode 186 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pratap Bhanu Mehta). 13. The Gentle Wisdom of Pratap Bhanu Mehta — Episode 300 of The Seen and the Unseen. 14. Bhaktamal -- Nabha Dass. 15. The Three Languages of Politics — Arnold Kling. 16. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 17. The Forgotten Greatness of PV Narasimha Rao — Episode 283 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vinay Sitapati). 18. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia — Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 19. The Overton Window. 20. India's Problem is Poverty, Not Inequality — Amit Varma. 21. Where Did Development Economics Go Wrong? -- Shruti Rajagopalan speaks to Lant Pritchett on the Ideas of India podcast. 22. Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working -- Jonathan Rauch. 23. Public Opinion — Walter Lippmann. 24. Democracy in America — Alexis De Tocqueville. 25. Yeh Jo Public Hai Sab Janti Hai -- Song from Roti. 26. Price Controls Lead to Shortages and Harm the Poor -- Amit Varma. 27. Amit Varma's prescient 2017 tweet on the price caps on stents. 28. Varun Grover Is in the House — Episode 292 of The Seen and the Unseen. 29. Tu Kisi Rail Si — Lyrics by Varun Grover. 30. Gyan Prakash on the Emergency — Episode 103 of The Seen and the Unseen. 31. The Moral Arc: How Science Makes Us Better People -- Michael Shermer. 32. History of European Morals — WEH Lecky. 33. The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress — Peter Singer. 34. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century — Francis Fukuyama. 35. The Origins of Political Order — Francis Fukuyama. 36. Political Order and Political Decay — Francis Fukuyama. 37. The Right to Property -- Episode 26 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 38. The Baptist, the Bootlegger and the Dead Man Walking — Amit Varma. 39. Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist — Bruce Yandle. 40. Zanjeer (Prakash Mehra) and Gol Maal (Hrishikesh Mukherjee). 41. A People's Constitution— Rohit De. 42. Laws Against Victimless Crimes Should Be Scrapped -- Amit Varma. 43. We All Gamble. Make It Legal -- Devangshu Datta. 44. Yes We Cannabis! -- Devangshu Datta. 45. Prohibition doesn't work. Tax Alcohol Instead -- Devangshu Datta. 46. Legalise Prostitution to Fight Trafficking -- Amit Varma. 47. Sea of Poppies -- Amitav Ghosh. 48. Elite Imitation in Public Policy — Episode 180 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Alex Tabarrok). 49. Rent Control — Ep 14 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Alex Tabarrok). 50. A Theory of Justice — John Rawls. 51. Anarchy, State and Utopia — Robert Nozick. 52. Politics and Money -- Amit Varma's limerick. 53. The Great Redistribution — Amit Varma. 54. Power and Prosperity — Mancur Olson. 55. Swaminathan S Aiyar at Times of India, Amazon and his own website. 56. The Lost Decade — Puja Mehra. 57. India's Lost Decade — Episode 116 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Puja Mehra). 58. Episode of The Seen and the Unseen on GST: 1, 2, 3. 59. DeMon, Morality and the Predatory Indian State — Episode 85 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 60. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills — Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 61. A Game Theory Problem: Who Will Bell The Congress Cat? — Amit Varma. 62. Kashi Ka Assi — Kashinath Singh. 63. A Beast Called Government (2007) -- Amit Varma. 64. We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State -- Amit Varma. 65. Policy Paradox – The Art of Political Decision Making — Deborah Stone. 66. Bara -- UR Ananthamurthy 67. Sookha -- MS Sathyu's film based on Bara, 68. Russia, Ukraine, Foreign Policy -- Episode 268 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane and Nitin Pai). 69. Nuclear Power Can Save the World — Joshua S Goldstein, Staffan A Qvist and Steven Pinker. 70. The Third Pillar -- Raghuram Rajan. 71. Samaaj, Sarkaar, Bazaar : A citizen-first approach -- Rohini Nilekani. 72. The Double ‘Thank-You' Moment — John Stossel. 73. Every Act of Government Is an Act of Violence -- Amit Varma. 74. Frédéric Bastiat's writings at Bastiat.org and Amazon. 75. The Use of Knowledge in Society — Friedrich Hayek. 76. ये लिबरल आख़िर है कौन? — Episode 37 of Puliyabaazi (w Amit Varma, on Hayek). 77. Econ Talk — Russ Roberts's podcast. 78. Conversation and Society — Episode 182 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Russ Roberts). 79. The Economist as Scapegoat -- Russ Roberts. 80. Bollywood's New Capitalist Hero (2007) -- Amit Varma. 81. Mohan Joshi Hazir Ho! -- Saaed Mirza. 82. Scam 1992 -- Hansal Mehta. 83. Bharat Ane Nenu -- Koratal Siva. 84. Fixing Indian Education — Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 85. Education in India — Episode 77 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Amit Chandra). 86. Our Unlucky Children (2008) — Amit Varma. 87. Fund Schooling, Not Schools (2007) — Amit Varma. 88. Participatory Democracy — Episode 160 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 89. Cities and Citizens — Episode 198 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 90. Helping Others in the Fog of Pandemic — Episode 226 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 91. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength — Amit Varma. 92. Profit = Philanthropy — Amit Varma. 93. The Solution -- Bertolt Brecht. 94. Abby Philips Fights for Science and Medicine -- Episode 310 of The Seen and the Unseen. 95. Who Broke Our Republic? — Episode 163 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Kapil Komireddi). 96. The Multitudes of Our Maharajahs -- Episode 244 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Manu Pillai). 97. What is Libertarianism? — Episode 117 of The Seen and the Unseen (w David Boaz). 98. Sansar Se Bhage Phirte Ho -- Song from Chitralekha with lyrics by Sahir Ludhianvi. 99. Crimemaster Gogo in the house! Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! Episode art: ‘Graveyard of Good Intentions' by Simahina.

Indian society, the Indian state and the Indian economy are all complex beasts that defy simple narratives. Suyash Rai joins Amit Varma in episode 307 of The Seen and the Unseen to describe how he has tried to make sense of it all -- and how he tries to make a difference. (For full linked show notes, go to SeenUnseen.in.) Also check out: 1. Suyash Rai at Carnegie India, Twitter and The Print. 2. Ideas and Institutions -- The Carnegie India newsletter co-written by Suyash Rai. 3. Interpreting India -- The Carnegie India podcast sometimes hosted by Suyash Rai. 4. Carnegie India's YouTube Channel. 5. Demonetisation -- Episode 2 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Suyash Rai). 6. Religion and Ideology in Indian Society — Episode 124 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Suyash Rai). 7. Suyash Rai on GDP growth: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 8. Suyash Rai on public finance: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 9. Suyash Rai on the financial system: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 10. Suyash Rai on changes in state-capital relations in recent years: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 11. Suyash Rai on the judiciary: 1, 2. 12. Suyash Rai on utopian laws that do not work in practice: 1, 2, 3. 13. Suyash Rai on Demonetisation: 1, 2, 3, 4. 14. Paper Menagerie — Ken Liu. 15. Natasha Badhwar Lives the Examined Life -- Episode 301 of The Seen and the Unseen. 16. Conquest and Community: The Afterlife of Warrior Saint Ghazi Miyan -- Shahid Amin. 17. Understanding Gandhi. Part 1: Mohandas — Episode 104 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 18. Understanding Gandhi. Part 2: Mahatma — Episode 105 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ram Guha). 19. The Undiscovered Self: The Dilemma of the Individual in Modern Society -- CG Jung. 20. A Memoir of Mary Ann -- By Dominican Nuns (introduction by Flannery O'Connor). 21. Nathaniel Hawthorne on Amazon and Wikipedia. 22. Flannery O'Connor and “A Memoir of Mary Ann” -- Daniel J Sundahl. 23. GK Chesterton on Amazon and Wikipedia. 24. Alasdair MacIntyre on Amazon, Wikipedia and Britannica. 25. The Moral Animal -- Robert Wright. 26. Gimpel the Fool -- Isaac Bashevis Singer (translated by Saul Bellow). 27. George Orwell on Amazon and Wikipedia. 28. Frédéric Bastiat on Amazon and Wikipedia. 29. Reflections on Gandhi -- George Orwell. 30. Interview of Harshal Patel in Breakfast With Champions. 31. The Double ‘Thank-You' Moment — John Stossel. 32. The Facts Do Not Matter — Amit Varma. 33. The Hippocratic Oath. 34. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart -- Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M Todd and the ABC Research Group on 'fast and frugal heuristics'). 35. The Right to Property -- Episode 26 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 36. The World of Premchand: Selected Short Stories — Munshi Premchand (translated and with an introduction by David Rubin). 37. The Merry Adventures of Robin Hood -- Howard Pyle. 38. Ivanhoe -- Walter Scott. 39. The Swiss Family Robinson -- Johann David Wyss. 40. Treasure Island -- Robert Louis Stevenson. 41. One Hundred Years of Solitude — Gabriel Garcia Marquez. 42. Saul Bellow on Amazon and Wikipedia. 43. Dangling Man -- Saul Bellow. 44. Salman Rushdie, Philip Roth, Isaac Bashevis Singer and Bernard Malamud on Amazon. 45. Aristotle on Amazon, Britannica and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 46. Plato on Amazon, Britannica and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 47. Gorgias -- Plato. 48. The Dialogues of Plato. 49. Ramayana, Mahabharata and Amar Chitra Katha. 50. Nausea -- Jean-Paul Sartre. 51. The Gita Press and Hindu Nationalism — Episode 139 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Akshaya Mukul). 52. Political Ideology in India — Episode 131 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rahul Verma). 53. Against Sainte-Beuve and Other Essays -- Marcel Proust. 54. What Have We Done With Our Independence? — Episode 186 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pratap Bhanu Mehta). 55. The Gentle Wisdom of Pratap Bhanu Mehta — Episode 300 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56.  The Aristocratic Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville -- Suyash Rai.   57. Narendra Modi takes a Great Leap Backwards — Amit Varma. 58. Ronald Dworkin on Amazon and Wikipedia. 59. Immanuel Kant on Amazon, Britannica and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 60. Beware of the Useful Idiots — Amit Varma. 61. Don't Choose Tribalism Over Principles -- Amit Varma. 62. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ajay Shah: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 63. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It -- James Q Wilson. 64. The Moral Sense -- James Q Wilson. 65. Karthik Muralidharan Examines the Indian State -- Episode 290 of The Seen and the Unseen. 66. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century — Francis Fukuyama. 67. The Origins of Political Order — Francis Fukuyama. 68. Political Order and Political Decay — Francis Fukuyama. 69. Going from strong as in scary to strong as in capable -- Suyash Rai and Ajay Shah.   70. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia -- Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen. 71. Anna Karenina -- Leo Tolstoy. 72. Utilitarianism on Wikipedia, Britannica and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 73. Practical Ethics -- Peter Singer. 74. Reasons and Persons -- Derek Parfit. 75. The Repugnant Conclusion. 76. Governing the Commons -- Elinor Ostrom. 77. A Pragmatic Approach to Data Protection -- Suyash Rai. 78. Technology and the Lifeworld -- Don Ihde. 79. Postphenomenology -- Don Ihde. 80. Kashi Ka Assi — Kashinath Singh. 81. Looking at Lucas's Question After Seventy-five Years of India's Independence -- Suyash Rai. 82. India's Lost Decade — Episode 116 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Puja Mehra). 83. The Lost Decade — Puja Mehra. 84. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms — Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 85. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah). 86. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 87. Douglass North and Albert O Hirschman. 88. The Intellectual Odyssey of Albert Hirschman -- Suyash Rai. 89. India's Problem is Poverty, Not Inequality — Amit Varma. 90. Democracy in America -- Alexis De Tocqueville. 91. Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy -- Pierre Manent. 92. The Populist Century -- Pierre Rosanvallon. 93. The Theory of Populism According to Pierre Rosanvallon -- Suyash Rai. 94. After Virtue -- Alasdair MacIntyre. 95. Philosophy of Technology -- Don Ihde. 96. Technology and the Virtues -- Shannon Vallor. 97. Nihilism and Technology -- Nolen Gertz. 98. Lant Pritchett on Amazon, Google Scholar and his own website. 99. Harnessing Complexity -- Robert Axelrod and Michael D Cohen. 100. Mahabharata, Odyssey, Divine Comedy and Rashmirathi. 101. Kishore Kumar, Mohammed Rafi and Lata Mangeshkar on Spotify. 102. Andrei Rublev -- Andrei Tarkovsky. 103. Andrei Tarkovsky, Luis Buñuel, Akira Kurosawa and Satyajit Ray. 104. Mission Impossible, Bad News Bears and Anand. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! Episode art: ‘The Past and the Future' by Simahina.

We often speak of economic development as a phenomenon of sovereign national countries, but the process by which that happens is through what happens at individual firms in the economy. The decisions by firms to upgrade their products (services), export, and adopt new technology are the most important determinants of economic development. The incentives and conditions that shape these decisions are the subjects of my conversation with my guest on this episode. Eric Verhoogen is a professor of economics at Columbia University school of international and public affairs. He is one of the leading thinkers and researchers on industrial development.TRANSCRIPT (edited slightly for context and clarity)Tobi; Usually, in the development literature, I know things have changed quite a bit in the last few years. But there is a lot of emphasis on cross-country comparisons and looking at aggregate data, and a lot less focus, at least as represented in the popular media on firms. And we know that, really, the drivers of growth and employment and the source of prosperity usually are the firms. The firms in an economy, firms are the ones creating jobs, they are the ones investing in technology, and doing innovation. So firms are really important. One of the things you often hear a lot is that one of the reasons poor countries are poor is that the firms are not productive enough. So that's sort of my first question to you, how exactly do we define and also measure productivity, you know, for us to be able to distinguish why firms in the developed countries are more productive than the lower income countries?Eric; Yeah, this is a big important question. So I agree, in principle, that firm productivity is very key. So countries that are going to be doing well are countries that are populated by firms that are being very innovative, and their productivity is rising, they're learning how to do new stuff, they're producing new products, etc. And so there's a reason why people are very focused on this conversation about firm productivity. The sort of, I would say, dirty secret of economics is that it's very hard to measure productivity well, right? And so the productivity measures we have, I think, are very noisy, and most likely fairly biased. But basically, the way you estimate productivity is you run a regression of like sales on inputs, okay, so on how much you're spending on labour and how much you're spending on materials, and then the part that's left over, we call that productivity. So it's like unexplained sales, you know, sales that can't be explained by the fact that you're just purchasing inputs and purchasing workers. But that is actually a very noisy measure of productivity. And so I've been working on a review paper, and a separate research paper kind of pointing out some of the issues with productivity estimation. So in principle, it's exactly what we want to know; in practice, it's very hard to measure. So one argument I was making in that paper is we should go to things that we can actually directly observe. Okay, so sometimes like technology adoption, we can often directly observe whether the firm has adopted this particular new technology, or if they're producing new products, we can directly observe that. Sometimes we can observe the quality of products that can be measured. Now, the standard datasets that we have typically don't have those things. It is possible now, in many countries, to follow manufacturing firms or even other sorts of firms, [to] follow them over time, which is great, at a micro level. But those that have the technology, they don't have quality, they do it now increasingly have like what products they're producing, often they don't have the product people are producing and so it's harder, you have to go out and you have to talk to people, you have to access new sorts of data, there's a lot more work, a lot more shoe leather - we'd say you wear out your shoe is going to talk to people trying to get access to other datasets in order to have these measures that you can observe directly. But I think there's a big advantage to that. Just in terms of measurement. Like, can we measure these things, and record that technology quality and product innovation together? I'm not sure that's answering your question. But, you know, I mean, I totally agree that what firms are doing, that's crucial, right? So the big macro question is, why are some countries rich and some countries poor and how can we make poor ones richer? That's the big question. I think that's kind of too big to be able to say much about. The much more concrete thing, which we need to be focusing on is how can you make firms in countries more innovative and productive. That's the absolutely right question. But that's just hard. There are challenges and research about, you know, how you actually analyze that, and it has to do with these issues of measurement.Tobi; I understand the measurement problem, and of course, TFP, the residual, and so many things like that. But practically, I want to ask you, what can you say, maybe if you have a handy checklist or something? what distinguishes firms in rich countries from firms in poorer nations? Eric; Yeah. So let me say what I don't think first, and then I'll say what I think. So it's become increasingly common to say that firms in poor countries are just poorly managed. The firms in rich countries have better management, and the firms in poor countries have poor management, right? And partly that's coming from the influential paper by Nicholas - Nick Bloom - and others, and David McKenzie and John Roberts. You know, they had consultants go to some factories in India. In some they camped out for four months, some they were there for only one month, and the ones where they camped out for four months ended up doing better, right? And they say that that's because these consultants improve the management of the firms and management matters. And I do agree that sometimes these management practices matter, but I don't think... sort of, one kind of implication of that line of work is somehow, like, the firms in a developing country are just making mistakes. They haven't gone to business school in the United States, and so, therefore, they don't know what they're doing. And I think that's incorrect. I think that's incorrect. I think the problem is, firms in developing countries face many, many constraints that firms in rich countries don't face. Right. So often, for instance, gaining access to high-quality inputs can be very difficult, right? That you just don't have the supply chains domestically producing high-quality inputs. Often skilled workers are very expensive relative to unskilled workers, and even relative to the price that you might pay in rich countries. Having skilled workers, including skilled managers, is very expensive. In addition, you have all these frictions on trying to get your goods to market or trying to, you know, trying to access export markets, often there are, you know, their costs involved in that. In addition, being productive requires know-how and often firms lack that know-how, right and so the question is, how do you get that know-how, you know, like, the distinction I'm trying to make is, it's not that they're making mistakes, it's just that they're doing the best they can given know-how they have, and given the constraints that they face. And so in that sense, I would sort of point to those constraints, right, those constraints both in know-how and both in the input and output markets, rather than just failure of management. So now, one of the constraints I should say, actually, so is often, you know, legal and regulatory institutions are much weaker in many countries. It is true in Nigeria, and it's true in many places, right? And so then that does create a complicating factor also when you're trying to do business with somebody, but you don't have the legal recourse of going to court to enforce whatever contract you write down. And so that creates friction. So then you have to do things differently in part because of that. And so you're likely to be much more based on, like, networks of various types. It might be ethnic networks, or it might be people that you know or that you have long-term relationships with. But then that means you can't necessarily just find the best supplier of something, you actually have to find someone that you trust, and that can complicate your life, basically, if you're trying to do business and develop.Tobi; So one thing I want us to discuss is the issue of firm upgrading. I mean, one of the things that have helped me in reading your work and taking this firm-level view of development is that, okay, on the one hand, if you look at a country like Korea, we can say the average income, the income per capita for Korea 40 years ago versus now and compare with say Nigeria, but also we can look at Korean firms 40 years ago versus where they are today. Today, Korea have global firms that are at the very frontier of technology. Companies like Samsung are innovating and making chips and making electronics and making smartphones and you compare with firms in Nigeria who have not been able to upgrade their products over that same period. And now what I want to ask you is how important is a firm's ability to upgrade productivity. I take your point on the measurement but controlling for that, how important is a firm's ability to upgrade its output? Its products on its productivity?Eric; No, no, I think upgrading is crucial. And upgrading in various ways, you know, more specifically technology, producing higher quality products, producing new products, new innovative products, you know, you might be reducing costs, right, all those things. I do think that's crucial. I think that's crucial to the development process. I mean, much of the conversation in development economics has often been not about firms. It's about, you know, social policy, or it's about education. It's about human capital accumulation. But I'm with you on that, the firm-level upgrading is totally crucial. You know, the question of like, why isn't it happening? Or how could you promote upgrading? That's a very difficult question. There are lots of papers that are sort of speaking to that subject. And this review article I was trying to write was basically all about that. So Alexander Gerschenkron way back in 1962, is a historian writing about late industrialization had this phrase, not very politically correct phrase, but basically, advantages of backwardness. So in principle, if you're a developing country, you should benefit from the fact that technologies have been developed in rich countries, and you should be able to go and adopt them off the shelf. But for some reason, that's difficult, right? It's hard to do. Partly, it's difficult because of, you know, know-how reasons. So I'd say that often, much of the knowledge that you need in order to implement these technologies is not written down anywhere, it's not really in the manual, right? You have to kind of talk to people who know it, rather than just downloading the instruction sheet. That's one reason. It's also true that many times, machines or processes, actually, may be context specific. So like the picker machine, in a very humid environment, they operate differently than in a non-humid environment. And so, you know, there are things that you need to learn. So I'd say that kind of like gaining the know-how is an important kind of constraint on upgrading. And partly that happens through networks or through... there's a ... Juan Carlos Hallak, who's in Buenos Aires (who would be a good person for you to have on your show, actually, I think that he'd be an interesting person to interview) as a very interesting paper. It's basically on like Argentina, looking at industries that have done well, they've been able to upgrade essentially and looking at what was it about them that made it possible, and especially the leading firms, what were the leading firms doing? And what we're basically finding is that often the key person in the firm, like, had been embedded in markets in rich countries, maybe in the US or in Europe or someplace. So they understood very much how those markets work and what consumers want. So one was like making boats, sailboats, or motorboats right, that was one of the interesting things he focused on. But knowing sort of what the people who are buying those boats really want to see in their boats ended up being important for what they're doing. And so that's an important part of the know-how. It's like, yeah, understanding the customer understanding also how if there are firms that are producing there, understand what the competition is. And so that's know-how that often has to be sort of gained in person rather than, you know, just reading a book or talking to somebody on the phone. And so when I think about... I don't know Nigeria very well, but when I imagine, you know, Nigerian producers, I think, partly what might be holding back is, sort of, maybe not having the understanding of what are the requirements, what are the expectations of consumers in the export markets, right, in the rich countries that they may be selling to?We've talked about the barrier, we can talk about the driver of upgrading. So then, like, gaining know-how would be a driver. So that's one. I think, and part of a lot of my work has been about quality upgrading, you know, producing higher quality. And I think that's in part driven by who you're selling to, right? So Mexican firms, you know, if they're selling to Mexican consumers, they produce different products than if they're selling to us consumers, which is their main export market, right? And so, you know, and if you're selling to Mexican consumers who have a certain willingness to pay for quality, we would say, right, they have a certain level of, you know, demand for certain characteristics, the optimal thing to do is keep producing that kind of lower quality stuff, right, rather than producing the higher quality. So I had this famous example of a big Volkswagen factory in Puebla, Mexico, which for a long time, it stopped in 2003, but for a long time been producing the old beetle. The old beetle that had first been produced in 1940, or certainly the 1950s. But for a long time, in the Mexican market, that was the main car that people were buying, and they were happy with that because it was cheaper. It was like, you know, it's very reliable. But that same factory started producing the New Beetle, basically, for the US market, right, for the US and European market, which is much more sophisticated, but also much more expensive. So it depends a little bit on which market you're selling into and whether you're going to upgrade or not. And so accessing export market can, in some sense, like pull the upgrading process, you know, once they access these export markets, they'll start producing higher quality stuff for these consumers. And that I think, actually, generates some learning, and I can talk about one paper that shows that a bit. But it seems to be that by gaining access to markets and producing high quality, then firms learn how to do stuff better. And so that can be an important driver of upgrading. And conversely, not having access to export markets or having a hard time breaking into export [markets] can be a reason why firms failed to upgrade. Let me tell you about one paper that, you know, demand effects can drive learning. Tobi; Yeah. Go ahead.Eric; Okay. It's a paper by David Atkin, Amit Khandelwal and Adam Osman. It's in Egypt. Okay, it's an RCT experiment, a randomized controlled trial. And it's among rug producers, producing rugs. What they did is they randomly allocated initial export contracts, right? So if they work with an intermediary, like a buyer of rugs, you know, among several hundred rug producers, they say, Okay, some guys are gonna get an initial contract, and some guys not. And so that was a way, this is a way of investigating basically what's the effect of exporting on the decisions and in a very clean way, and they found a couple of things. So one is those guys who had the export contracts and started producing higher quality stuff. So that's sort of consistent with my Volkswagen story, too, right? So increasingly, export markets produce higher quality and they did lots of measures of, you know, how thickly packed the rugs were and how straight the edges were - the very dimensions of quality of rugs. That was one thing. And then the other thing that they found which is very interesting is that you know, these weavers of rugs got to be better at producing rugs, basically. So then, when they took them into a laboratory, and they say, okay, produce this identical rug to a whole bunch of producers, both in their treatment group, and in their control group to produce this identical rug, and they found that the guys who had gotten the export contracts were better at producing that rug, they produce sort of higher quality rugs than the other guys. This suggests that demand can drive upgrading, right, in the sense that it induces firms to produce higher quality, but there's also learning involved in that process. These Egyptian rug producers became more productive as a result of having access to these export countries. Tobi; Yeah, I mean, listening to you, I can think of a few things that click in place. When I look at, say, a country like Nigeria, I think about the way the central bank has been running the exchange rate policy, which is messing seriously with the way firms actually source inputs. Some firms actually don't have access to the foreign exchange quota to actually source quality inputs. I mean, from manufacturing firms to agribusinesses who want to buy high-quality seeds overseas, I see how that can be a constraint. But two things I want to get at. Also, if you look at Nigeria whose industrial policy is really about domestic self-sufficiency, you could see that there isn't really an incentive for upgrading, and therein lies my question. If we talk about upgrading and how important it is, even though it's not really discussed as it should, what role do you think industrial or state-directed policies can play in this? Why because industrial policy is back in fashion, you know, it's being discussed everywhere... but usually, at least in my experience and in my opinion, what most scholars and advocates are focused on are [things like] state investments, you know, how the state can put money in one sector or the other. There really isn't so much focus on this sort of micro-level detail and what happens at firms, which your work is about. So for practical purposes, do you see industrial policy as something that can really, really, play a role and incentivize domestic firms to upgrade? For example, something like export quotas, you know, for firms?Eric; I mean, in terms of your question, do I think industrial policy can be helpful? I do. I do think that industrial policy can be helpful. Basically, I think that learning generates spillovers that firms themselves can't fully capture. And so I think there is a role for government to promote learning, basically, in a way. To subsidise learning such that - the socially optimal, or - the best sort of amount of investment in learning for society is more than individual firms to do on their own. And so there's a role for industrial policy. But I agree that it's got to be smart industrial policy, it's not just any old industrial policy. And so many countries have this idea...it's a little bit of nostalgia for import substitute industrialization, or it's very much like inwardly focused industrial policy. We're going to try and guarantee a domestic market for our producers, something like that, right? I'm not a fan. I'm not a fan of imports substitute industrialization or these very inward-focused strategies because then you get to the point where there's just not a lot of pressure on domestic firms to be more productive. They become kind of in a comfortable situation where they have kind of protected markets, not very competitive, they have a lot of market power in that market, and so that is a recipe for stagnation over the long term. So I think the crucial thing is that the targets for industrial policy be export-oriented, you know, outwardly oriented. You want your firms to be successful in world markets, right? I think that should be the key, rather than domestic self-sufficiency. Or rather than just the government investing in well, okay, so I don't have a problem with the government investing in infrastructure, investing in things as long as the aim is always ''what's going to facilitate our firms being successful in world markets'', right, I think that's a good target. Because those world markets are competitive [and] for firms to be able to be successful there, they're going to have to up their game and be more productive and be more innovative, subject to the measurement constraints we talked about, right and to upgrade. And so I think that the smart industrial policies are going to be things that sort of push firms to learn and to be more innovative and to be successful as exporters. Now, the other thing we have to keep in mind in thinking about industrial policy, is that [for] the governments, it's just very hard to [know] in the future what are the sectors that are going to be successful. What are the activities that are likely to have a future? It's just very hard, it's very hard for people who are, you know, private equity firms embedded in the sector... it's very hard to know, it's gonna be even harder for a government official or someone making government policy to do that. So I think we need to think about policies that have this effect of promoting learning or subsidizing innovative activities, but that, you know, don't require too much knowledge and understanding of the future on the part of the people setting the policy. Right. So things like collaborations between universities and firms for, you know, how to train workers to have the skills that the higher tech firms in your country need. That's something that seems like a good idea that's probably going to promote upgrading without having to pick and say, I think this product or this sector is the future of the Nigerian economy and therefore we're going to subsidize that thing. And you also want policies that are somewhat flexible, right, so that if something happens... so I'm working on a project in Tunisia, where the Tunisian Government was trying to promote exports. But the issue that they've had, and it's a matching grant program where sort of half of the costs of exporting of a certain category of costs of exporting will be paid by the government. The problem with that program, though, has been that it was somewhat inflexible. So basically, if something happened, you know, there's a big shock, and in fact, COVID shock, you know, and that changes what firms want to do. And it's very hard for them to switch gears and say, now I want to spend money on something else, can you please subsidize this other thing, and there were a lot of frictions in the program. And so that's often the case for government programs. The government sets a policy and then the world changes, firms want to do something else, but the policy is still stuck, you know, in the old world. So we need to think about how to build in, you know, flexibility into the programs so that if firms decide, actually, the market is moving in this direction, rather than this direction that we were expecting, that the support that they receive could move in the same direction.Tobi; Yeah, I agree. And I don't mean export quotas as hard targets. So I'll give you an example. Nigeria has this policy that we've been running for about six to seven years now, where there are multiple exchange rate windows for different parts of the economy or sectors that the government deems should have priority, you know, to import. And I recall a paper where Korea had a similar arrangement, but it was focused on firms that export. Firms that export to world markets sort of get priorities so that they can source inputs at a very low cost and seamlessly, you know, but it's not just something that we really think about in Nigeria, because we are so focused on the domestic market and how large the population is not minding, you know, how much of that population is poor.Eric; Yes, no, absolutely. So, certainly, Korea did this. But the Korean model, a key part of it, and they definitely picked sectors in a way that, you know, it's, there's a little bit of tension with what I just said about, you know, the government officials are not going to be very knowledgeable, there they seem to have done a good job of picking sectors to advance. But the key part was it really was oriented towards success in export markets. And the industries that were not successful on the export markets, they pulled the plug, they removed the, you know, they removed the support, which is politically hard to do, you need a fairly insulated, like, secure government in order to be able to do that. Because, otherwise, you start providing support, and then the industry lobbies a lot to maintain that support, you know, and so then it becomes politically very difficult to remove it. But I think if the government is committed to ''if these industries are not successful, we're gonna pull the plug on the support'', then this can work. Right. But you're absolutely right, in the Korean model, the key thing is the export orientation rather than the import orientation. And what you mentioned about exchange rates, I didn't comment on that. But I think it is an issue, you know, especially for a resource-rich economy, that the exchange rate can be, you know, highly valued, arguably overvalued, which makes it hard to develop the domestic industry. And so I think that's a real issue that, you know, some countries seem to be able to handle that, you know, ''what do we do with the natural resource wealth a little better than others'', if you just let it accumulate and people are going to spend and that leads to devalues your currency to increase that's going to make it harder to achieve export success in export markets for manufacturing goods or other exporting services. And so that is something that needs to be a focus of thinking about how to upgrade.Tobi; Yeah, I want to talk about technology for a bit. You had this very, very, an interesting paper on the soccer ball, we call it football, the soccer ball producers in Pakistan. And in a bit, you're going to tell me some of the interesting things you learned about that study. But first, Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan had this interesting paper about industrialization in Africa, and how domestic manufacturing firms are now shifting more towards capital-intensive technology. So hence, manufacturing firms are not creating jobs as much as historical patterns should suggest, do you see this as sort of a problem? I know so many other people have this worry about automation and how this technology can be exported everywhere, which is really a concern for maybe a continent like Africa with a large, jobless, and young population. So do you see this as a trend that we should worry about, you know, more capital-intensive technologies, or are there opportunities?Eric; Yeah. So I do see it as a trend. I do think it is something to be worried about. You know, Dani Rodrik recently organized a panel with the International Economics Association I participated in, along with Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti and Francis Stewart from Oxford. And I sort of had two points there. One point was, yes, I think this diagnosis is correct. Basically, economists refer to it as appropriate technology. But the idea is that many technologies are developed in rich countries, you know, given factor proportions, we would say in those rich countries, so basically, skilled workers are more abundant, unskilled workers are less abundant, and so people develop machines that kind of conserve on unskilled workers. That's, in part, the background to the story that Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan are saying that in Africa, many firms are using this technology that's been developed in rich countries, that's very skill intensive, but it's not generating a lot of them. Right. So I think the diagnosis there is correct that that happens, right? And so the technology often is inappropriate for poor countries given, you know, their supply of unskilled labour, given how many workers they have that could use employment. On the other hand, the other question, though, was, what do you do about it? And so I was less convinced. So my worry about that. There are two versions of that concern about what you do about it. One is, given the set of existing technologies, you could try to encourage firms to use more labour-intensive technologies. Okay. But the problem is that you may encourage them to be less productive. Maybe they might generate more employment, but they'll be less productive, right? There was an interesting paper that I cited in Brazil by Gustavo D'Souza, which was sort of saying the Brazilian government basically put a tax on international technology licensing. And he shows that sure enough, firms were less likely to use International Technology. They're more like to use domestic technology. They actually generated employment, but they were less productive. Right, and they overall did worse. So there's a worry that you're gonna make firms less productive in an immediate sense. The other worry is that, like, if the Nigerian government starts encouraging Nigerian firms to develop new technologies, which are more labour intensitive, you know, then they'll generate more employment, the worries that you're gonna get sort of fall behind the world technology trajectory, I'll call it that. Like, you can think about the world frontiers moving in whatever, pick an industry, and the world frontier is moving at a particular place, and then, you know, firms are competing with each other and they're, you know, someone gets a patent, someone comes up with a new idea and sort of technology moves in a certain direction. And then Nigeria says, no, no, we want to be on a different trajectory that generates more employment, right? The problem is, you're going to be permanently behind where the technology curve is, right? Where the world frontier is. And I feel like that's worrisome, right, you're likely to have less learning, right, there's gonna be a gap between where the Nigerian firms are and where, you know, the world frontier is that it's gonna be hard for them to catch up afterwards. So in the short term, you might generate more employment, but you're gonna have a less dynamic industry as a result. And so I think, my own view, and this is, it's a feeling rather than something that's very research based at this point. But my own view is, even though it means that firms are not going to generate that much employment, they have to try and stick as close to the technology frontier as possible, or, you know, catch up as quickly as possible to where the world technology frontier is.Tobi; And so talk to me a bit about lessons from your walk with the Pakistani soccer ball manufacturers. What did you learn from that particular experiment, especially on the role of appropriate technology and technology use and the incentives that surround it for firms and investors? Eric; Yeah, so it was a study of technology adoption, what are the factors that encourage technology adoption? And what made it possible was that the football producers, I'll use that word football instead of the soccer ball, these football producers, there are a lot of producers using the same simple technology, right? And this football design is, you know, 85 or 90% are just these hexagons and pentagons. If you can imagine a, you know, a football, it's got hexagons and pentagons. And so the simple technology involves cutting out hexagons and pentagons and then stitching them together. And there were a lot of those and what made the project possible is we came up with a new improved technology, which is basically a way of cutting pentagons from these sheets. The main costs, you know, 50% of the cost are the sheets, they call it rexine. It's like artificial leather, that's the exterior of the ball. But they were cutting pentagons in a way that was wasting some material. Wasting more than they need to and so the new technology is a way of cutting these pentagons so that you can fit more into a given sheet so that you can get basically 8% more pentagons which ended up being about a 1% reduction in total costs. Which wasn't enormous but on the other hand, it's a pretty competitive industry, profit margins are about 8% so we felt like they shouldn't have been paying the 1%. And actually, when we started out, we thought we were gonna be studying technology diffusion, right, which is, you know, one person adopts, then is that their neighbours who adopt or is it their cousins? Or is it the, you know, people who share suppliers, and what are the channels of diffusion, right, and we're trying to keep everything secret, and we thought, okay, when we let it out, it's obviously the people we give it to who are gonna adopt right away, and then it's gonna spread. And so then we gave out this technology, for free, we gave it to 135 firms. And then, you know, we had a few firms adopt, and they started using it, and including one big firm that was producing - I can tell you the name later, but basically had like 2000 employees and is producing for Nike, and as a big producer adopted this technology, and, you know, is basically cutting all of its pentagons using our design and our die for cutting rather than the old one. So after, you know, 15 months, there were six total firms that had adopted. And that was puzzling and thought, you know, why is that? So then we started asking firms, we started talking to people and basically, it was revealed that the reason was that the guys doing the cutting... so the cutters are basically paid piece rates, they're paid per pentagon or per hexagon, or essentially per ball like, which is, you know, 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons they're paid. That was what their salaries were based on. And they didn't have the incentive to reduce waste, like, they weren't penalized if they wasted the material, right? And so they just wanted to go fast. And our die was slowing them down, right, made them go more slowly because they had to be more careful how they placed it and also, it was a different design, it was the design that they were used to. Now, it turns out that within about a month, they could get back up to speed, to the speed they were at before but they didn't know that, and in any case, for that month, their salaries would be way down, they'd just be slower and knowing that if the firm didn't change the contracts, their salaries would be lower. And the workers were figuring this out, the cutters are figuring this out, they said, this is not good for me, right, that my salary is gonna go down if I use this thing, I have no incentive to use this new technology. And so then they started telling their firms, you know, this is bad, bad technology, it doesn't work, it's dangerous, it has all these issues. Okay, so then we realized that this was happening and we said that we were going to do a second experiment. So, you know, half of the people we originally gave the technology to who hadn't yet adopted, we did a second experiment where we said to workers, we're gonna give you a month's bonus, which is not very much it is about $150 US dollar. So these guys are not paid very much we said ''a month's bonus if you can demonstrate to us and the owner of the factory that the technology works.'' And actually, that was enough. The workers were excited about that, you know, they got paid for doing this. Everybody who did it then subsequently passed the tests. So they demonstrated that the technology is working, and then a statistically significant share of the firms that they worked at ended up adopting the technology as a result. So those were the two experiments, those were the facts. What are we learning from that? I think we're learning that, basically, the lack of information flow from workers to their owners, to their managers, was what was getting in the way of technology adoption in this case. Like, the workers knew that the technology was working, but the owners didn't know because they sort of delegated the process of cutting the pentagons to the workers, and given the contracts, the workers didn't have the incentive to share the information. Right. So I think those sorts of, like, information flows or barriers to information flows are actually very important in the learning process. And kind of what our second experiment did when we did this bonus of a month's pay, which induced the workers to share the information and that was sufficient to make the technology be adopted. And so I think the punch line or the one-sentence version of this is, workers need to see that they're going to benefit from the adoption of new technology or from upgrading generally in order for the process to work well. They have to buy into the process. And they have to see that they have the incentive to do so. One recommendation coming out of that would be some sort of profit sharing, or some sort of gain sharing between workers and firms would actually be very useful. And will it help there be more innovation?Tobi; It brings me in a way to another very interesting paper of yours which [they] also had a summary essay about, I think, in VOX or something, which is about wages in poor countries. And I mean, thinking about the soccer ball story and the lesson. One issue and this has generated quite a number of debates between I think Rodrik and a bunch of other scholars who are thinking about Africa, is that the reason Africa is not really industrializing, or firms are not creating jobs is because wages are too high relative to the level of income. But what I learned from your paper, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, is that paying higher wages in poorer countries is not really a disincentive to creating employment and even generating productivity and profit. Tell me a little bit about how that works. Because, usually, we've gotten familiar with this logic that for you to be able to industrialize, if you think about China, and so many other countries, you need to have access to low-wage workers, you know, you need to be able to do very cheaply, and labour is where you can really cut a lot of your costs. And then it becomes a problem if your domestic wages are too high for the level of your income or what firms and investors are willing to pay. So tell me this high-wage, low-wage dynamics, especially... I remember the famous Paul Krugman was it article defending sweatshops in Bangladesh, where if you force firms who are outsourcing to pay higher wages or impose certain conditions, poor people in those countries will lose jobs, and they will lose their livelihoods. And so you should not mess with that process. What are your thoughts on these [issues]?Eric; Yeah, very interesting. So I think the article you were thinking of, it's related to the specific case of the football producers and seal coats. In Pakistan. Tobi; Yeah. Eric; There was a very interesting thing that happened. I mentioned that one firm adopted this new technology. And you know, one very large firm and it was producing for Nike, it's called Silver Star. The interesting thing about that firm is that because they're producing for Nike, which had had sweatshop scandals in the past, Nike required them to do a bunch of things, basically, so that Nike wouldn't be vulnerable to a further scandal, right? And among the things that they had to do was make sure they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan. And the only way this firm could guarantee that they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan, which many firms were violating basically, the only way they could is to say, we're not going to pay a piece rate, we're going to pay a fixed wage. Right. So this firm was paying a fixed wage rather than a piece rate. And actually, we talked to them about when they first won the Nike contract. They said their labour costs went up 20 to 30%. So they did a bunch of things. They had this fixed wage, there was a medical clinic on the factory grounds. They had sickness pay, they had some retirement benefits. So a bunch of things, they did raise wages. But the advantage of that was that the workers were much less likely to block the adoption of this new technology. Because in a specific way, they did not have a disincentive, you know, their wage was going to be their wage no matter what happened, rather than in other firms [where] what was happening is that the worker can see if they adopt this technology, their wage would go down. And so we believe, and I wrote this in an article that you saw in the Harvard Business Review, I think that's where it was, that those wages, you know, higher wage payments and fixed wage payments, which were imposed by Nike actually contributed to the process of innovation. The title of the article is how labour standards can be good for growth, and also in the process of upgrading. So that's an example of how having higher wages can actually be good for this upgrading process. Now, there are factors going in both directions, right? On the one hand, you know, the 20 or 30% higher labour costs, I think they did contribute to innovation. On the other hand, 20 or 30% higher labour costs may mean that firms will hire fewer workers or that the industry will be less competitive. So it's not that, you know, this innovation effect is all powerful and it's going to overwhelm anything that's about labour costs. But I think it is something that we need to take into account. And so, you know, labour market institutions that, you know, maybe promote profit sharing with workers, that promote longer-term employment so you have people who are around for longer, that have some job security, the sorts of things that often labour unions want to negotiate, can actually be good for this innovation process. And that's one factor that should be weighed against this issue of, you know, how higher labour costs and how competitive is the sector going to be. You often hear, like, the World Bank or the USAID, the development agencies will often say, you just have to be cheap. Like, you know, the competitive advantage of Nigeria is cheap labour and therefore, you should be focusing on having low wages and producing, you know, garments and textiles and toys and low-end manufacturing. But I think that's kind of a low-road model. You know, and I think that there are viable high road models, which would involve somewhat higher wages, some sort of gain sharing or profit sharing, and being more innovative at the same time. I can't tell you I have it all worked out exactly what that model would look like, I think it's going to vary by country. But I think we need to try to think about and push in that direction of where you can have, it may not be high wage, but it's gonna be higher wage than the market by itself maybe would bring about. So I am optimistic that that can happen. But again, the devil's in the details, you know. So Nigeria needs to think about what are we relatively good at doing right now and let's think about how can we be more innovative and move up to the quality ladder, the technology ladder in those industries. And then how can we get our workers on board to the process of moving up that ladder? And that will probably involve paying those workers more, rather than just trying to cut wages to the extent possible.Tobi; Before I let you go, let me... I know you're a relatively quiet person so let me draw you in a little bit... yeah, I know you're not active on Twitter or anything like that. Let me draw you into a little bit of professional controversy. And one of the things that I admire most about your work, I should confess, is that it's methodologically diverse. You know, you do structural econometrics, you do RCT, you do regular modelling and so many things. So there's this huge debate currently that I think, a lot of my colleagues may not think so but I think has important consequences for the policymaking process on development, which is that - is development research right now focused on the right things? You know, RCTs are like the standard tool for the investigation of development questions. Empirics have sort of taken over the field. But on the other hand, you have folks like Lant Pritchett who are constantly pushing back that this is encouraging researchers to think too small, they are researching cash transfers, and so many other key interventions, whereas we really should be focused on the big questions. And in my experience, these have real-life implications, especially in poor countries where they have budgetary constraints. We might say this is due to corruption, and that will be true, but sometimes they have a real balance of payment crisis, because a lot of these countries are resource-dependent, and it's often cyclical. So a policymaker may really want to know where to spend the most resources to have the maximum benefit for the citizen. So I find these questions very important. What do you think about this debate? As someone who transverses the field very often in your work, how have you been able to navigate this debate? And what do you think is the, maybe right is not the right word here...what do you think is the useful approach going forward?Eric; Yeah, good question. Yeah, in my own work, I've been very question driven rather than methods driven. Right. So I've always thought, you know, I'm interested in this question of from upgrading, what are the barriers to upgrading? What drives upgrading? How can we, you know, learn about that, and if we can learn about that using an experiment, that's great. If we're in about that using other methods, that's great, too. So I, sort of, don't have a dog in the hunt, as Bill Clinton would say about, you know, the methodology. And I'm kind of in the middle of the road, I think, in terms of this debate between, you know, J-PAL and Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee and Lant Pritchett or others on the other side. I think, you know, in situations where you can run an experiment, I think that is the most credible source of information. Okay, so I'd rather have a randomized experiment than do a correlation and put some causal interpretation on a correlation. At the same time, I do think that there are many questions, either that can't be answered with an experiment, or that are just very, very costly to answer with an experiment, right? And so it's very hard to run, you know, it's running experiments on firms. I've tried to do it, but it takes a long time. It can be very costly. You have to give much bigger shocks to firms to get them to react, etc. And so, I've heard Abhijit Banerjee articulate that, like, we should never do a policy that hasn't first been evaluated by random experiment, I think that's too strong. Because we're gonna be waiting years and years and years to get the experiments and with a huge investment of resources in order to get the experiments that would then inform the policy. So we're going to have to make policy and, you know, make decisions based on other sorts of information. And so there, I do think we need to be like small ''c'' Catholic, allow for lots of different types of methods, quasi-experimental methods, you know, even structural methods, and then also experiments. There's this famous joke about the drunk guy with a streetlight, you know, he's looking for his keys, and he's looking under the streetlight, because that's where the light is, maybe not where the keys have been lost. And so I take that point, like, maybe we really care about these big questions about, you know, what's going to drive growth, then in that sense, I'm sympathetic to the sort of the Lant Pritchett view. On the other hand, under the lamppost, we actually are learning stuff, right, I feel like we're more confident that we're making progress by looking under the lamppost. And so I think the, you know, the trick, the art here is to sort of stay near the edge of the lights and we're getting closer to the big questions, but in a way that's still credible, and that we're still, you know, we can believe the answers that we're actually given. To sort of counter the Lant Pritchett view, you can post these big questions, and you can, you know, think big thoughts. But at the end of the day, you have to be able to convince, you know, you have to show us the data, right, you have to show that this is really correct. And that's just very hard to do for many of these big questions. So we need to incrementally build up based on this work. That's why I kind of like this work on firms, we're getting towards these big questions about growth, but in a way that you can actually have some confidence that you understand what's going on.Tobi; In your experience doing this work, what are misconceptions that you have encountered in the field that either the professional development industry, so I'm talking about aid and the think-tank and all the other folks, or it may even be your academic colleagues, what are the common misconceptions that you have encountered? Eric; Yeah. I mean, so one big thought [is] I think that the of field development agencies, right, it's like, how are we going to spend aid dollars in a way that's going to have a positive effect? And I think there's value to that. All right. I'm all in favour of spending, you know, aid dollars, in the most effective way. But I think that you know, a set of questions does limit to some extent the impact of the field of development on the development process. So I actually think we could spend every aid dollar in an optimal way, and would it have a meaningful effect on the material standard of living of people in poor countries? I'm not sure. I mean, maybe a little bit, maybe marginal, right? I think what's really going to matter is, do these countries start getting industrialization happening? Are they getting upgrading? Are they growing? And so in that sense, I sometimes get a little bit frustrated with the development discussions, it's all about this, you know, how do we spend aid dollars, and let's do RCTs to figure out how to spend the aid dollars, rather than these bigger questions, which are going to have a longer-term effect on people's living standards. You know, that's changing a little bit. I'm encouraged. There are more and more people talking about firms, there are more and more people taking sort of industrial policy ideas seriously. They're talking about bigger-picture questions in a kind of micro-founded way. So there are some encouraging signs. But I think a lot of development is still about that issue of like, what's the right way to do social policy? What's the right way to do, you know, aid spending, rather than trying to understand deeply why is it that Korea was able to make this transition from a poor country to a rich country, essentially, in a generation? And why is it that many countries in Africa are not? What is it that's actually getting in the way? And for that, that's not really like how to spend aid dollars question that's more about how firms behave. What are the factors that constrain them? And those sorts of things.Tobi; This is a show about ideas. So I want to ask you, what's the one idea? Just one. One idea that you think everybody should think about and adopt, that you would like to see spread everywhere. What's that idea? It may be from your work, or it may be from other things that inspire you. What's that one idea?Eric; I think the one idea I would choose is, uh, workers have a brain. This goes back to the soccer ball study, that there's knowledge and information that, like, workers have or people who are lower down in the hierarchy have, which is not being taken advantage of. Right, the soccer ball thing was an example. The workers were understanding the technology, but because of the way they were paid, and because of the, you know, institutional arrangements, they didn't have the incentive to share that. And I think the world, including the economics profession, tends to undervalue the intelligence that people have. Even the people who are actually, you know, on the frontlines doing the work. And if we can figure out ways to harness that knowledge and give people incentives to share it and give people incentives to develop their own intellectual thinking about whatever it is they're doing, I think that'll have a big payoff. And so I'm interested in sort of investigating what are the sorts of arrangements, what are the sorts of policies that can lead that to happen more?Tobi; Yeah. Thank you so much, Eric. I mean, tell me a little bit about what you're working on right now.Eric; What am I working on right now? I mean, so one thing related to what we've been talking about that I'm excited about is, again, a paper on technology adoption. This is in Bangladesh, with an energy-efficient motor like sewing machines. They're different sorts of motors that the traditional ones they're kind of spinning all the time. And then people have the foot pedal they like to press the foot pedal and then the needle comes down and stitches right but they're actually wasting a lot of energy because these motors are spinning all the time. And so there's a new type of motor called a servo motor which spins Only when the needle is moving, right, so it's energy efficient, energy efficient motor, but it can just replace the old motor, you don't have to change anything else about the machine, you just put this new servo motor to replace the old clutch motor. And we're studying when new managers or when new owners, when do they make those decisions. And so we're trying to track we're giving them information in different intensities, like including installing the machines in their factory one is just showing a video when it's just providing information, but one is actually installing their machines. And we're seeing how they react to that information. So I think that's a big topic. It's like what's getting in the way of the adoption of energy-efficient technology? These are the people who are making mistakes, or they just don't have good information. Or that basically, maybe if they have the right information, they actually will adapt very quickly. So that's one thing I'm thinking about.Tobi; It's been fascinating talking to you, Eric. I enjoyed it so much.Eric; Thank you, Tobi. Good questions. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

Slouching Towards Utopia is the new book from Brad DeLong, Professor of Economics at University of California, Berkeley. Professor DeLong joins show host Gene Tunny to discuss the long twentieth century from 1870 to 2010. The conversation considers the three factors which came together to massively raise living standards post-1870, and how nonetheless we've struggled to achieve the Utopia that once appeared possible. The “neoliberal turn” beginning in the 1970s and 1980s is considered, and DeLong explains why he writes that “Hayek and his followers were not only Dr. Jekyll–side geniuses but also Mr. Hyde–side idiots.”You can buy Slouching Towards Utopia via this link:https://amzn.to/3TK4evmPlease get in touch with any questions, comments and suggestions by emailing us at contact@economicsexplored.com or sending a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. HighlightsThe big story after 1870: technological progress becomes rapid, the technological competence of the human race globally doubles every generation. [6:50]The importance of industrial research labs in the big story since 1870 [16:35]The role of the modern corporation [18:23]Globalization in the late nineteenth century and pre WWI [23:25]How bad governance can make a country very poor very quickly [29:09]The neoliberal turn [35:56]Prof. DeLong thinks the big lesson of history is that trying to maintain social and economic systems past their sell-by date doesn't work [58:28]About this episode's guest: Brad DeLongBrad DeLong is a professor of economics at U.C. Berkeley, a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a weblogger at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, and a fellow of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1982 and 1987. He joined UC Berkeley as an associate professor in 1993 and became a full professor in 1997.Professor DeLong also served in the U.S. government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy from 1993 to 1995. He worked on the Clinton Administration's 1993 budget, on the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on the North American Free Trade Agreement, on macroeconomic policy, and on the unsuccessful health care reform effort.Before joining the Treasury Department, Professor DeLong was Danziger Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at Harvard University. He has also been a John M. Olin Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, an Assistant Professor of Economics at Boston University, and a Lecturer in the Department of Economics at M.I.T.Links relevant to the conversationBrad DeLong's substack:https://braddelong.substack.com/DeLong on Hobsbawm's short 20th century (1914 to 1989) compared with his long 20th century:https://www.bradford-delong.com/2016/12/the-short-vs-the-long-twentieth-century.htmlRe. Yegor Gaidar's analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union:https://sites.dartmouth.edu/asamwick/2007/06/08/the-soviet-collapse-grain-and-oil/Lant Pritchett's book Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on Global Labor Mobility:https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/9781933286105-Pritchett-let-their-people-come.pdfCreditsThanks to Brad DeLong for a great conversation, Nicholas Gruen for connecting Gene with Prof. DeLong, and Josh Crotts for mixing the episode and to the show's sponsor, Gene's consultancy business www.adepteconomics.com.au. Please consider signing up to receive our email updates and to access our e-book Top Ten Insights from Economics at www.economicsexplored.com. 

My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin

The evil of caste will be solved not by deliverance from up top but empowerment from down below. Dalit scholar and writer Chandra Bhan Prasad joins Amit Varma in episode 296 of The Seen and the Unseen to explain why the cure for caste lies in capitalism -- and why his two great heroes are Babasaheb Ambedkar and Adam Smith. (For full linked show notes, go to SeenUnseen.in.) Also check out: 1. Chandra Bhan Prasad on Twitter, Amazon, Wikipedia. Mercatus, Times of India and Google Scholar. 2. Defying the Odds: The Rise of Dalit Entrepreneurs -- Devesh Kapur, D Shyam Babu and Chandra Bhan Prasad. 3. What is Ambedkarism? -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 4. Dalit Phobia: Why Do They Hate Us -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 5. When Adam Smith entered an Ambedkar village -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 6. In defence of suit, boot -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 7. How Piketty got it wrong -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 8. Who was the real Ambedkar? -- Chandra Bhan Prasad. 9. On Ambedkarism, Caste and Dalit Capitalism -- Chandra Bhan Prasad in conversation with Shruti Rajagopalan in the Ideas of India podcast. 10. 'Indian languages carry the legacy of caste' -- Chandra Bhan Prasad interviewed by Sheela Bhatt. 11. Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era -- Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett and D Shyam Babu. 12. The Collected Writings and Speeches of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar. 13. The Dalit Emancipation Manifesto of 1951 -- Babasaheb Ambedkar. 14. Select episodes of The Seen and the Unseen that discussed caste with TM Krishna, Shruti Rajagopalan and Manu Pillai. 15. Select episodes of The Seen and the Unseen that discussed the 1991 reforms with Shruti Rajagopalan+Ajay Shah, Vinay Sitapati and Montek Singh Ahluwalia. 16. Select episodes of The Seen and the Unseen that discussed gender with Shrayana Bhattacharya, Paromita Vohra, Kavita Krishnan, Urvashi Butalia, Namita Bhandare, Manjima Bhattacharjya and Mahima Vashisht. 17. Ramchandra Keh Gaye Siya Se -- Song from Gopi. 18. The Laws of Manu (Manu Smriti) -- The Penguin edition & the Buhler translation. 19. India's Problem is Poverty, Not Inequality — Amit Varma. 20. What Have We Done With Our Independence? — Episode 186 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pratap Bhanu Mehta). 21. Devesh Kapur at University of Pennsylvania. 22. Crusader Sees Wealth as Cure for Caste Bias -- The New York Times profile of Chandra Bhan Prasad by Somini Sengupta. 23. In an Indian Village, Signs of the Loosening Grip of Caste -- The Washington Post piece on Chandra Bhan Prasad by Emily Wax. 24. Small Holdings in India and Their Remedies -- Babasaheb Ambedkar. 25. Aims and Objects of the Republican Party of India -- Babasaheb Ambedkar. 26. Ambedkar's memorandum to the British (in Volume 10 of his collected works). This episode is sponsored by CTQ Compounds. Check out The Daily Reader and FutureStack. Use the code UNSEEN for Rs 2500 off. Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! Episode art by Simahina, in a homage to Gond painting.

In 1947, few people gave us 75 years. Bloody hell, here we are! And it is up to us now to make this country the best version of itself. Karthik Muralidharan joins Amit Varma in episode 290 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss one of our problem areas: the Indian state. Can we fix it? Yes we can! (For full linked show notes, go to SeenUnseen.in.) Also check out: 1. Karthik Muralidharan on Twitter, LinkedIn, Google Scholar and UCSD. 2. Centre for Effective Governance of Indian States (CEGIS) 3. Fixing Indian Education -- Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 4. Understanding Indian Healthcare -- Episode 225 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 5. General equilibrium effects of (improving) public employment programs: experimental evidence from India -- The paper on NREGA by Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar. 6. Kashmir and Article 370 -- Episode 134 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Srinath Raghavan). 7. The Citizenship Battles -- Episode 152 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Srinath Raghavan). 8. The Loneliness of the Indian Woman — Episode 259 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shrayana Bhattacharya). 9. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah. 10. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah). 11. Pramit Bhattacharya Believes in Just One Ism -- Episode 256 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pramit Bhattacharya). 12. The Paradox of Narendra Modi — Episode 102 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shashi Tharoor). 13. The Life and Times of Montek Singh Ahluwalia -- Episode 285 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Montek Singh Ahluwalia). 14. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on the creator ecosystem with Roshan Abbas, Varun Duggirala, Neelesh Misra, Snehal Pradhan, Chuck Gopal, Nishant Jain, Deepak Shenoy and Abhijit Bhaduri. 15. The Case Against Sugar — Gary Taubes. 16. The Big Fat Surprise — Nina Teicholz. 17. The Forgotten Greatness of PV Narasimha Rao -- Episode 283 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vinay Sitapati). 18. The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer -- N Gregory Mankiw. 19. The Gated Republic -- Shankkar Aiyar. 20. Despite the State — M Rajshekhar. 21. The Power Broker— Robert Caro. 22. The Death and Life of Great American Cities — Jane Jacobs. 23. India's Security State -- Episode 242 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Josy Joseph). 24. We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State -- Amit Varma. 25. India's Lost Decade — Episode 116 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Puja Mehra). 26. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms -- Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 27. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century — Francis Fukuyama. 28. The Origins of Political Order — Francis Fukuyama. 29. Political Order and Political Decay — Francis Fukuyama. 30. Computer Nahi Monitor -- Episode 5 of season 1 of Panchayat. 31. Naushad Forbes Wants to Fix India -- Episode 282 of The Seen and the Unseen. 32. Courts Redux: Micro-Evidence from India -- Manaswini Rao. 33.  The Checklist Manifesto -- Atul Gawande. 34. Annie Hall -- Woody Allen. 35. The Politics Limerick -- Amit Varma. 36. The Decline of the Congress -- Episode 248 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rahul Verma). 37. The Burden of Democracy -- Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 38. A Theory of Clientelistic Politics versus Programmatic Politics -- Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. 39. Power and Prosperity — Mancur Olson. 40. The Business of Winning Elections -- Episode 247 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shivam Shankar Singh). 41. Premature load bearing: Evidence, Analysis, Action -- Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock. 42. A Meditation on Form — Amit Varma. 43. Religion and Ideology in Indian Society -- Episode 124 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Suyash Rai). 44. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills -- Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 45. India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy -- Ramachandra Guha. 46. Participatory Democracy -- Episode 160 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 47. Cities and Citizens -- Episode 198 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 48. Helping Others in the Fog of Pandemic -- Episode 226 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 49. Aakar Patel Is Full of Hope -- Episode 270 of The Seen and the Unseen. 50. The Tamilian gentleman who took on the world -- Amit Varma on Viswanathan Anand. 51. Running to Stand Still -- U2. 52. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength -- Amit Varma. 53. India's Founding Moment — Madhav Khosla. 54. The Ideas of Our Constitution -- Episode 164 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Madhav Khosla). 55. The Life and Times of Urvashi Butalia -- Episode 287 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56. Pitfalls of Participatory Programs -- Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Stuti Khemani. 57. Our Parliament and Our Democracy -- Episode 253 of The Seen and the Unseen (w MR Madhavan). 58. Elite Imitation in Public Policy -- Episode 180 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Alex Tabarrok). 59. Urban Governance in India -- Episode 31 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 60. The Life and Times of Abhinandan Sekhri -- Episode 254 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Abhinandan Sekhri). 61. The Tiebout Model. 62. Every Act of Government Is an Act of Violence -- Amit Varma. 63. Taxes Should Be Used for Governance, Not Politics -- Amit Varma. 64. The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China -- Nancy Qian, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Monica Martinez-Bravo and Yang Yao. 65. Sneaky Artist Sees the World -- Episode 260 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Nishant Jain). 66. Science and Covid-19 -- Episode 221 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Anirban Mahapatra). 66. Centrally Sponsored Government Schemes -- Episode 17 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane.). 67. India's states can be laboratories for policy innovation and reform -- Karthik Muralidharan. 68. Clientelism in Indian Villages -- Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 69. Patching Development -- Rajesh Veeraraghavan. 70. Opportunity, Choice and the IPL (2008) — Amit Varma. 71. The IPL is Here and Here Are Six Reasons to Celebrate It (2019) — Amit Varma. 72. Climate Change and Our Power Sector -- Episode 278 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Akshay Jaitley and Ajay Shah). 73. The Delhi Smog -- Episode 44 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vivek Kaul). 74. The Life and Times of Nilanjana Roy -- Episode 284 of The Seen and the Unseen. 75. The Life and Times of Nirupama Rao -- Episode 269 of The Seen and the Unseen. 76. The Life and Times of Mrinal Pande -- Episode 263 of The Seen and the Unseen. 77. Objects Speak to Annapurna Garimella -- Episode 257 of The Seen and the Unseen. 78. Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers 1947-1963 -- Edited by Madhav Khosla. 79. To Raise a Fallen People -- Rahul Sagar. 80. The Progressive Maharaja -- Rahul Sagar. 81. India = Migration -- Episode 128 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Chinmay Tumbe). 82. India: A Sacred Geography -- Diana Eck. 83. Unlikely is Inevitable — Amit Varma. 84. The Law of Truly Large Numbers. 85. Political Ideology in India -- Episode 131 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rahul Verma). Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! The illustration for this episode is by Nishant Jain aka Sneaky Artist. Check out his podcast, Twitter, Instagram and Substack.

PolicyWTF: See No Evil, Read No Evil, Hear No EvilThis section looks at egregious public policies. Policies that make you go: WTF, Did that really happen?— Pranay KotasthaneEarlier this week, I stumbled on this headline in the Business Standard: "Remove price cap and channel bundling restrictions: Broadcasters tell TRAI”. For someone writing a weekly newsletter on Indian public policy, price controls are a gift that keeps on giving. Naturally, I went down this rabbit hole.For context, read this consultation paper. Under the New Regulatory Framework 2017, there are price caps on channel bundles, individual channels that are part of bundles, and the overall package of standard-definition channels. Once this 2017 order came into force, broadcasters smartly kept the popular sports channels out of the channel bundles. The aim was to price them high, thereby cross-subsidising other channels. Further, some providers included these sports channels in bundles at a discounted rate so that they could be packaged with other trashy channels. Not surprising. And now, TRAI wants to reduce the price cap on individual channels that can be part of a bundle to ₹12 from ₹19 per month. Mind-boggling, no?The consultation paper is quite well-written, to be honest. It makes me wonder the extent to which state capacity is applied to come up with price controls. This instance got me thinking about how government restrictions have shaped today’s media environment in India. Let’s have a look at the three major types: video, radio, and written media. How OTT (Over-the-top) became TOT (The-Only-Thing)The same TRAI consultation paper highlights that OTT platforms (SonyLiv, HotStar, etc.) are displacing traditional TV. Anecdotally too, this shift is quite obvious. So why is it that there’s good Indian content on OTT platforms, while the old news channels seem to be stuck in a rut? Government regulations are one big reason. There are no price caps on OTT platforms, allowing them to make investments, create niche content, and recover the investments at an appropriate price. In contrast, TV channel prices are controlled by the government since 2004. News channels, in particular, have degraded the most. Writing in Hindustan Times in 2017, Ashok Malik traced the cause to (surprise! surprise!) price caps again:“As per the TRAI tariff order of 2016, the price ceiling for a news channel is Rs 5 per month. In contrast the price ceiling for a general entertainment channel is Rs 12 per month.Consider what this means. In theory, the general entertainment channel could be re-running old soaps (cost of content: zero). The news channel would be required to constantly generate fresh content. Even so, the former is allowed to charge more than double what the latter is able to. Besides a general entertainment channel is always likely to get more subscribers. So it is a double hit for anybody seeking to build a serious news channel.Over time news channel owners have simply given up, and decided to take the route of reality TV. Today, with the sheer volume of free – occasionally dubious and sometimes outright fake – content available online, one wonders if the news business can ever be rescued in India.”Not that general entertainment channels have fared much better. Broadband internet has now made subscription easier, and the people have voted with their feet, remotes, and phones. At present, TRAI no longer caps the prices of individual channels, on the condition that they are not included in any bundle. But that’s hardly a respite when enough damage has already been done.Radio SilenceThe case of another broadcast medium, the FM radio, is also instructive. The kiss of death here is a ban on FM channels broadcasting news or current affairs. Observe how the government justified pre-censorship in the Supreme Court in 2017:“Broadcasting of news by these stations/channel may pose a possible security risk as there is no mechanism to monitor the contents of news bulletin of every such stations. As these stations/channels are run mainly by NGO/other small organisation and private operators, several anti-national/radical elements within the country can misuse it for propagating their own agenda.”Need I say more? This is the reason why all our FM radio channels play mind-numbing songs, spoofs, and call pranks on loop. While some niche content has moved to podcasts, a lot of current affairs content is now sought after on non-English YouTube channels. As for “radical elements within the country can misuse it for propagating their own agenda”, that has been turbocharged by one-to-many communication on Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook, etc. The Pen is Mightier than its SubscribersNow let’s come to the curious case of print and online media. There are no price caps on newspaper and magazine prices. Not that it wasn’t attempted. But in a 1961 Sakal Papers vs Union of India judgment, the Supreme Court, citing Article 19(1), declared unconstitutional a law that tried to connect prices to the number of pages published.And so, India has an amazingly high number of newspapers and magazines— nearly a lakh registered ones, increasing year on year. But that’s where the party ends. Print media is disproportionately dependent on advertisement revenue and not reader subscriptions. Newspapers are primarily pamphlets, with a bit of news and opinion thrown in.The reasons for this low equilibrium are not very clear. Raju Narisetti contends in a recent book Media Capture: How Money, Digital Platforms, and Governments Control the News (edited by Anya Schiffrin) that the ‘invitation pricing’ model introduced by the Bennett Coleman & Company Ltd. (BCCL) in 1994 created a de-facto price cap for other players. However, that still doesn’t explain the absence of niche, small, and subscription-fuelled newspapers. Magazines do slightly better. I suspect the low purchasing power of Indians when newspapers were all the rage, can explain to an extent the inertia to pay more for reading news. Whatever the reasons, it works well for India’s governments, for they are the biggest advertisers in newspapers. Mere threats of cancelling advertisement contracts become powerful means to exert influence on the content and tone of newspapers. Nevertheless, online media has shown that new revenue models are possible. In the pandemic, most newspapers took their online portals behind paywalls. There’re also many subscriber-only portals catering to special audiences. But how can you keep the government away? RBI’s new rules on auto-debit of recurring payments led to the cancellation of subscriptions and a decline in revenue. (Showing small mercies, the RBI this week decided to raise the e-mandate limit to ₹15,000 earlier this week.)All in all, if you want to ask why our media environment is the way it is, tracking government regulations is a good place to begin the search. TV and Radio, and to a lesser extent print media, are all victims of seemingly well-intentioned yet counter-productive government regulations. India Policy Watch: Inflation, Growth & StabilityInsights on burning policy issues in India- RSJWe are back to discussing macroeconomy here. This week, in its scheduled bi-monthly review, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously to increase the repo rate by 50 bps (100 bps = 1 percentage point) to 4.90 per cent. It also stayed firm on withdrawing its accommodative policy stance to tame inflation going forward. From the Governor’s press release:“Let me now explain the MPC’s rationale for its decisions on the policy rate and the stance. The protracted war in Europe and the accompanying sanctions have kept global commodity prices elevated across the board. This is exerting sustained upward pressure on consumer price inflation, well beyond the targets in many economies. The ongoing war is also turning out to be a dampener for global trade and growth. The faster pace of monetary policy normalisation undertaken by systemic advanced economies (AEs) is leading to heightened volatility in global financial markets. This is reflected in sharp corrections in major equity markets, sizeable swings in sovereign bond yields, US dollar appreciation, capital outflows from EMEs and even from some AEs. The EMEs are also witnessing depreciation of their currencies. Globally, stagflation concerns are growing and are amplifying the volatility in global financial markets. This is feeding back into the real economy and further clouding the outlook.”To put this in context, we have had an almost 100 bps increase in repo rate in about a month. Short-term rates in the market have already moved up by about 200 bps in the last six months. The impact of these will begin to pinch. And yet, inflation remains above 7 per cent and is likely to stay there for a while. There’s been a coordinated response between the government and the central bank in the recent past including a reduction in excise duties on fuel. Some external factors like the lifting of the palm oil exports by Indonesia and a likely good monsoon also might help moderate inflation during the year. But the 6 per cent upper limit of the inflation target range will be breached for most of the year. The Ukraine war and its repercussions on supply chains and commodities have kept prices elevated. The speed of monetary policy normalisation by the developed world has meant the dollar has appreciated sharply, equity markets have fallen across and capital has flown out of emerging markets. The statement by the Governor acknowledged these issues and summarised its priorities (italicised by me below):“Experience teaches us that preserving price stability is the best guarantee to ensure lasting growth and prosperity. Our actions today will impart further credibility to our medium-term inflation target, which is the central tenet of a flexible inflation targeting framework. India’s recovery is proceeding apace, offering us space for an orderly policy shift. While we will continuously assess the evolving situation to tailor our responses, our actions must demonstrate the commitment to keep inflation and inflationary expectations under check. Therefore, monitoring and assessing inflation pressures and balancing risks to growth will be crucial for judging the appropriate policy path as we move ahead. ……Given the elevated uncertainties of the current period, we have remained dynamic and pragmatic rather than being bound by stereotypes and conventions. As the Reserve Bank works tirelessly in its pursuit of macro-financial stability, I am reminded of what Mahatma Gandhi said long ago: If we want to overtake the storm that is about to burst, we must make the boldest effort to sail full steam ahead.”Nothing new there on priorities. For any central bank, they remain to manage the interplay between - price volatility, growth and macro-financial stability. This is an equilibrium hard to locate in normal, calmer weather. In uncertain times like today, it is a gigantic headache. We will dig a bit deeper to understand the variables that RBI will have to deal with in handling these three priorities during the year. First, let’s take inflation. As I mentioned above, the global risks to inflation will remain elevated with high crude oil and commodity prices and continuing supply bottlenecks for the next couple of quarters. The more interesting point here is that the input cost spikes haven’t yet been passed on to consumers in India. You can take a look at the declared results of the Jan-Apr quarter for listed companies to draw this conclusion. As this gets passed through eventually, inflation will keep pushing upwards. The opening up of the high contact services sector is almost complete now, notwithstanding the recent spike in Covid cases in parts of India. So, there is still the impact of services inflation to show up. Globally, central banks have made an about-turn on their earlier views of this inflation being transient. India is no different. The inflation expectations now show a secular upward trend and this is reflected in various surveys like PMI and BIES. Like always, the lower-income bands are starting to voice their concern about prices because it materially affects their lives. Price rise in India is a politically sensitive topic and as much as this government is politically dominant with the opposition nowhere in sight, it is difficult to see how it will remain unfazed by it. An important point to also consider here is the unique K-shaped recovery that’s happened in India post-pandemic. We have spoken about it a few times earlier. This has meant there is further concentration of total consumption among the top 10-15 per cent of India. The problem with this is that it leads to stickiness in prices and wages. This creamy layer of consumers has a low marginal propensity to consume and that combined with the large cushion of savings with them means there isn’t a quick demand-side response to the rising prices in India. Also, a useful question to ask is what is the impact on growth because of a change in real interest rate in India? Is there any historical evidence to find a relation between the two? A rough rule of thumb is that a 100 bps change in real interest rate could lead to a 20 bps drop in expected growth rate ( a summary of a 2013 paper by RBI that concludes this is at the end of this article). This suggests RBI won’t be worried about growth slowdown anytime soon as it raises rates. The government won’t be worried too. Why? Because there is a global slowdown and it can always point to China struggling with its own lockdowns. In any case, we have seen a 4 per cent growth rate just before the pandemic and that had no impact on the popularity of the government. The government will be willing to trade growth for lower inflation. So, the front-loading of interest rate hikes, as seen in the last month, will continue. My guess is, cumulatively, we will have another 100 bps rate hike by the end of this year.  Second, let’s look at growth. The FY23 growth forecast has moderated from 9+ per cent about two quarters back to about 7-7.5 per cent range in most estimates. However, so far the high-frequency indicators of growth are holding up well suggesting robust economic activity. On almost every indicator - from fuel consumption, cement and sale production, exports, IIP, e-way bills or GST - we are up by a significant margin from the pre-pandemic levels (20-30 per cent in most cases). Credit offtake has also been strong in the retail loans segment so far. The recent rate hikes and the correction in the equity market will have an impact on this but we will have to wait and see how soon the slowdown in consumption will show up in numbers. My guess is it will take some time because of the nature of the consumption pyramid in India. There is also spillover effect of the US Fed's action on rate hikes on India. Will India be forced to mirror Fed’s moves? The inflation in the US is at a historic 40-year high and the economy is running at almost full employment. So supply disruptions apart, there are strong demand factors impacting inflation there. In India, there is some overheating in the labour market, especially in the technology space but we are far from any kind of tightening. It will be useful to bring in Taylor’s rule here to understand the likely monetary policy response. From Investopedia:“Taylor's rule is essentially a forecasting model used to determine what interest rates should be in order to shift the economy toward stable prices and full employment. The Taylor rule was invented and published from 1992 to 1993 by John Taylor, a Stanford economist, who outlined the rule in his precedent-setting 1993 study "Discretion vs. Policy Rules in Practice."Taylor's equation looks like:r = p + 0.5y + 0.5(p - 2) + 2Where:r = nominal fed funds ratep = the rate of inflationy = the percent deviation between current real GDP and the long-term linear trend in GDP In simpler terms, this equation says that the Fed will adjust its fed funds rate target by an equally weighted average of the gap between actual inflation and the Fed's desired rate of inflation (assumed to be 2%) and the gap between observed real GDP and a hypothetical target GDP at a constant linear growth rate (calculated by Taylor at 2.2% from approximately 1984 to 1992). This means that the Fed will raise its target fed funds rate when inflation rises above 2% or real GDP growth rises above 2.2%, and lower the target rate when either of these falls below their respective targets.”The current weights for India are 1.2 for inflation and 0.5 for growth while the growth weight for the US might be close to zero. Also, remember we didn’t use the fiscal tools as liberally as the US during the pandemic. The US treasury balance sheet expanded by more than a quarter on the back of the stimulus to prop up the economy in the last two years. We have a very different reality. Of course, there will be some defence of the Rupee that will be needed as the actions of the central banks of the developed markets strengthens the US Dollar. But beyond those temporary shocks of investors looking for a safe haven and creating currency volatility, there should be no real reasons why the MPC should follow the lead of the Fed's response to inflation in the US.Lastly, how will this expedited, front-loaded rate hike actions impact the macroeconomic stability especially of the financial sector? As we have already seen, the transmission of interest rate hikes has happened with speed. Most banks have lost no time in resetting their rates. Also, remember the majority of small business loans to the MSME sector and mortgage loans in India are now linked to repo rates (or some external benchmarks like 30-day T-bills). If the global growth slows and exports weaken and if the large corporations pass on their input cost burden to the customers or their vendors, we might see stress building up in the system among smaller borrowers. This is a lead indicator to be watched although the repo rates after the latest round of hikes are still about 150 bps below where they were in 2018-19. This isn’t a scenario like in the US or UK where the interest rates are at multi-decadal highs. Some prudence on part of borrowers and a bit of flexibility in restructuring loans by Banks aided by the RBI should help the system see through this phase. On the balance, I see the CPI settling at about 5 per cent in four quarters from now. The “neutral” real interest rate should be about 1.5 per cent which would mean a repo rate of about 6.5 per cent. My estimate is that’s where we will end up from the current 4.9 per cent level in about 12 months. That’s when any option of moving back to an accommodative stance will start looking viable. The RBI will be walking on eggshells managing the multiple trade-offs between growth, inflation and macroeconomic stability during this time. Through a happy coming together of circumstances, India is placed relatively better than most economies at this moment. We should avoid any misadventures at this time, political or economic. That’s not a lot to ask for, I hope. Postscript: Here’s the paper from the RBI website - “Real Interest Rate Impact on Investment and Growth – What the Empirical Evidence for India Suggests?”. It is a good empirical study about how much growth sacrifice should be needed to tame inflationary pressure. From its abstract: “Monetary policy is often expected to adopt a pro-growth stance in a phase of prolonged slowdown in growth and sluggish investment activities. Sacrificing inflation, i.e. lowering nominal policy rate even when inflation persists at a high level, is a convenient means to lower real interest rates, which in turn could be seen as a pro-growth stance of monetary policy. This paper, using both firm-level and macroeconomic data, and alternative methodologies - such as panel regression, VAR, Quantile regression and simple OLS – finds that for 100 bps increase in real interest rate, investment rate may decline by about 50 bps and GDP growth may moderate by about 20 bps. The empirically estimated sensitivity of investment and growth to changes in real interest rate suggests that if the RBI can lower real lending rates, it can also stimulate growth. Review of literature highlights that a central bank can lower real interest rates either through financial repression or by not responding aggressively to inflation while raising the nominal policy rates in response to inflation. Empirical estimates for India indicate that RBI’s monetary policy response to inflation has not been aggressive, and as a result the Fisher effect –i.e. one for one response of interest rate to inflation that could leave the real rate constant – does not hold. Thus, even when a high nominal interest rate may often signal that monetary policy stance is tight, because of higher inflation and absence of Fisher effect, lower real interest rate may actually be growth supportive. In India, real lending rates in recent years have been generally lower than the levels seen during the high growth phase before the global crisis. But lower real rates in the post-crisis period have coincided with sluggish investment and GDP growth. This is due to the fact that while real rates are lower, marginal productivity of capital, or expected return on new investment has also declined, which has dampened the expected positive impact of lower real rates on investment. In such a scenario, one policy option could be to lower real rates even more, by raising inflation tolerance, i.e. lowering nominal policy interest rate even when high inflation persists or inflation expectations remain high. This paper, however, provides robust empirical justification against any policy of lowering policy interest rates when inflation persists above a threshold level of 6 per cent. The beneficial impact of lower real rates on growth that may be achieved through higher inflation tolerance is more than offset by the harmful effect of high inflation, particularly when it exceeds a threshold level of 6 per cent.”Matsyanyaaya: Dictatorship and Democracy in Israel and PakistanBig fish eating small fish = Foreign Policy in action— Pranay KotasthaneNews reports suggest that Pakistan’s military dictator-turned-president-turned-politician Pervez Musharraf is in a critical medical condition. While I have no good things to say about the man, I was reminded of a post I’d written in 2017 which asked: despite their similarities, why has Pakistan had bouts of military dictatorship rule, while Israel has steadfastly retained electoral democracy?The two religious States — Israel and Pakistan—were both created for the explicit purpose of securing a homeland for religious minorities. Given their preoccupation with security, the military-security establishment occupied a key position in the politics of the two States. Yet, what can explain this fundamental difference: while Pakistan has had long periods of rule by a military dictatorship, Israel has steadfastly retained electoral democracy?The similarities between Israel and Pakistan are well documented. Faisal Devji’s 2013 book Muslim Zion argues thatLike Israel, Pakistan came into being through the migration of a minority population, inhabiting a vast subcontinent, who abandoned old lands in which they feared persecution to settle in a new homeland. Just as Israel is the world’s sole Jewish state, Pakistan is the only country to be established in the name of Islam.In this regard, the military dictator Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s remarks made in an interview to The Economist in 1981 are also instructive:Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.So, what explains the difference?My hypothesis to explain the difference is this: the mediating variable between democracy and dictatorship is the status of civil-military relations in the formative years.The basis of this hypothesis is an argument developed in Steven Wilkinson’s excellent book Army and Nation. The book tries to explore why the armies in India and Pakistan—although cut from the same cloth—became such markedly different domestic political actors in their respective democracies. My case is that the arguments mentioned in the book apply equally to the Israel—Pakistan comparison. Here’s how.Wilkinson lists three factors for the difference between the armies of independent India and Pakistan:India’s socio-economic, strategic and military inheritance in 1947 was much better than that of Pakistan. Among other things, Partition worsened the ethnic balance in the Pakistan army while improving it somewhat in the Indian army.The Congress party — unlike the Muslim League in Pakistan — was strongly institutionalised and had a political reach and presence that was difficult to replicate, let alone dislodge.During the first decade of independence, the Indian government took specific “coup proofing” measures: new command and control structures, careful attention to promotions, tenures, and balancing ethnic groups at the top of the military, and attention to top generals’ career pathways after retirement.Now, if these exact factors related to civil-military relations in the formative years are applied to the Israel-Pakistan case, one can see that points (2) and (3) were exactly what David Ben-Gurion and his political forces managed to accomplish in Israel. And hence while Israel managed to retain civilian superiority over its military forces, Pakistan kept having episodic military dictatorships.The follow-up question would then be: was Jinnah’s death immediately after Pakistan’s formation a big reason for the path it took, while India and Israel had the benefit of dominant, long-standing civilian leaders in the formative years?I don’t think so. If Jinnah would have lived longer after Partition, it is likely that he would have put specific “coup proofing” measures in place [point (3) in Wilkinson’s schema]. However, the worsening ethnic balance of the army and a weakly institutionalised Muslim League [points (1) and (2)] would’ve still remained intractable. The paths that Israel and Pakistan are now on have a lot to do with what happened in the formative years of the two democracies.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Article] The EU has agreed to make “One Europe, One Charger” a reality in 2024. In October 2021, we had written why this move is a PolicyWTF. The decision is also a useful case study for policymaking. It demonstrates that we should be wary of intuitive solutions to policy problems.[Book] Media Capture: How Money, Digital Platforms, and Governments Control the News (edited by Anya Schiffrin).[Podcast] Ashok Malik speaking about TV price controls on The Seen and the Unseen[Podcast] Shruti Rajagopalan and Lant Pritchett have released another blockbuster Ideas of India episode. A must-listen for all public policy enthusiasts. If you are short on time, jump to Pritchett’s criticism of the poverty line. It’s superb. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

In this episode, Shruti speaks with Lant Pritchett for a second time. They discuss internal and external migration, the concept of open borders, definitions of poverty, the flaws of randomized controlled trials and much more. Pritchett is a development economist from Idaho. He is currently affiliated with Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government as the research director of the RISE Programme, is the Research Director at LaMP (Labor Mobility Partnerships) and is a fellow at the London School of Economics. He previously worked with the World Bank from 1988 to 2007, living in Indonesia 1998-2000 and India 2004-2007. His publications span a wide range of development topics including economic growth, state capability, education, labor mobility and development assistance. Full transcript of this episode Follow us on Twitter Follow Shruti on Twitter Click here for the latest Ideas of India episodes sent straight to your inbox! 

India Policy Watch: The Indispensability of Economic GrowthInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay KotasthaneShruti Rajagopalan and Lant Pritchett's of India conversation is full of insights for all public policy students. From that conversation, there was one particular claim that I want to discuss this week: economic growth is not just necessary, but also a sufficient condition for reasonably high levels of human wellbeing.Over the last few years, many people have grown sceptical about the very idea of economic growth. There is a whole cottage industry of experts and non-experts ready to diss economic growth in pursuit of other ‘worthier’ goals such as sustainability or inequality. This thinking is morally problematic given that economic growth is the only mechanism to reduce large-scale poverty in India. Anecdotally, it is tougher to convince Indians born after 1991 in economically well-off families—and connected to the global conversation on development—about the centrality of economic growth.Sometimes, the pushback against growth is not along the lines of "but, this is not the right way to achieve economic growth". Such pushback would've been desirable. Instead, some people firmly believe that India doesn't need economic growth anymore; it's had that enough. They argue that governments should now focus on redistribution to reduce inequality and directly tackle social progress indicators, moving beyond income progress indicators.Even though we keep highlighting how every percentage of growth brings roughly two million Indians out of poverty, this policy narrative seems to have become stale. Instead, the counter-argument often is: if Bhutan is focusing on ‘providing’ happiness, why shouldn't we?The confusion about the importance of economic growth is not just a non-academic one. Economists themselves have pushed this line that programmatic changes to specific schemes can bring significant changes to human wellbeing. Even those who advocate growth feel it necessary to qualify it as "inclusive" or "sustainable".It is in this context that the paper National development delivers: And how! And how? by Lant Pritchett is an absolute must-read. Here's the abstract:National development is empirically necessary and sufficient for high levels of human wellbeing. Measures of three elements of national development: productive economy, capable administration, and responsive state, explain (essentially) all of the cross-national variation in the Social Progress Index (SPI), an omnibus indicator built from 58 non-economic indicators of human wellbeing. How national development delivers on human wellbeing varies, in three ways. One, economic growth is much more important for achieving wellbeing at low versus high levels of income. Two, economic growth matters more for “basic needs” than for other dimensions of wellbeing (like social inclusiveness or environmental quality). Three, state capability matters more for wellbeing outcomes dependent on public production. These findings highlight the key role of national development—and particularly economic growth—as instrumental to increased human wellbeing, which is increasingly challenged in favor of “small” programmatic and project design which is, at best, of third order of importance.Let's discuss these important meta-claims, which have a bearing on any field of public policy.Claim #1: Redistribution isn't the answer; economic growth is.Most of the world's inequality is between countries, not within countries. So inequality reduction is overwhelmingly a national task. And you cannot do redistribution if your income levels are low as the size of the economic pie is too small to create a difference meaningfully. Rich country governments spend up to 40% of GDP precisely because it is possible to collect higher revenues from a more affluent population, even at low tax rates.Claim #2: Wellbeing is the outcome; national development is the outputThe three indicators of National development —GDP per capita, state capability, and democracy- explain all the Social Progress Index (SPI) variations, a non-economic index comprising 58 indicators. There are no countries with high levels of national development and low levels of social progress. Similarly, no countries have managed high levels of social progress at low levels of national development. In other words, wellbeing is the outcome, and national development is the output.Here’s the striking chart in the paper which explains this relationship.Claim #3: Economic growth is much more important at low levels of incomeThere can be no one global pathway to social progress. Priorities of richer countries will be different from the priorities of the developing countries. The 58 indicators of SPI can be clubbed into three main categories —Basic Human Needs (e.g. water and sanitation, safety, nourishment), Foundations of Wellbeing (environmental quality), and Opportunity (personal freedom and choice). The paper empirically shows that economic growth matters immensely for fulfilling basic human needs. As long as we agree that basic human needs such as water and sanitation, safety, and nutrition are essential to social progress, economic growth is indispensable.I think this paper deserves more attention, especially in the Indian context. We tried to discuss this idea on Puliyabaazi as well. Global Policy Watch: Information Age Politics vs Full Spectrum WarfareIndian perspectives on global events— Pranay KotasthaneThe economic and technology sanctions have understandably generated much global debate ever since the Russia-Ukraine war began. These sanctions are intended to expressly hurt Russia’s financial and trade systems, and cut its access to cutting-edge technology. We have earlier discussed how to think about the direct sanctions imposed by the US and EU from an Indian perspective. While these measures were expressly aimed at Russian political and economic elites, the effects have spilled over into the ordinary lives of ordinary Russians. That’s because several tech companies have also entered the fray. Google Pay and Apple Pay suspended billing, Amazon suspended shipping of all retail products, and Microsoft suspended all sales. As of March 26th, more than 450 companies had joined the bandwagon. Some have shut down their Russia operations completely, some have suspended operations temporarily, some others are scaling back operations, while others have put new investments on hold. These seemingly synchronised actions by Western governments and companies have set the alarm bells ringing in India. For those who believe that the ultimate goal of economic policy is to reduce import dependence, these measures act as tailwinds. From their perspective, these instances prove that Western companies and governments are all joined at the hip. The separation between the state and markets is a lie. To them, all these withdrawals are coordinated to achieve a strategic objective—they are a part of a planned package to achieve control over Russia in all dimensions of the battlespace. In other words, they are a display of the West’s full spectrum dominance. Framed in these prominently military terms, the logic of self-sufficiency becomes a logical response. All foreign companies start appearing like attack ‘weapons’ in the hands of an adversary, while national champions—however inefficient—in all sectors of the economy become a matter of self-defence. Imports become evil, exports go down in priority, and joint development between private actors start getting scrutinised by government officials. As you can gather from my tone, this full-spectrum warfare is an inaccurate and counter-productive way to frame the ongoing events. Instead of being weapons in the hands of the West, I argue that these actions can be framed better as now ubiquitous instruments of Information Age politics. Seen from this perspective, the spate of withdrawals by Western companies is not a part of a well-laid-out, coordinated plan by Western governments. Rather, it is a result of uncoordinated actions by companies which have willy-nilly become political actors in the Information Age. In that sense, these actions are not very different from some Indians breaking China-made TVs during the Ladakh standoff, or a NBA team manager showing support for pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Even in the current case, there are several explanations apart from the ‘weaponised interdependence argument’ for why companies have withdrawn from Russia. One, it’ll just become too difficult to do business in Russia given the sharply falling rouble, and major financial uncertanties. Two, some companies have been booted out by Russian government on the grounds of ‘false propaganda’. Finally, there’s also a significant pressure from employees and customers, who are witnessing this war daily on their twitter feeds, and want to play their part in whatever way possible. This explains why even some open source software libraries have been modified to either cutoff Russian customers or delete files on Russian computers. Seeing these actions not as full spectrum warfare but as a specific instance of a generalised phenomenon of Information Age politics is vital for India’s interests. The latter framing acknowledges that multi-national companies are geopolitical actors, but also leaves room for negotiations and bargaining, like all politics does. This lens permits taking the long view that technology collaboration with the West is necerssary for Indian companies to build their own complementary strengths. In an interdependent tech world that is here to stay much beyond the current war, this approach has a higher chance of success rather than national champions motivated by the outdated logic of reducing import dependence. Advertisement: If you enjoy the themes we discuss in this newsletter, consider taking up the Graduate Certificate in Public Policy course. Intake for the next cohort is open. 12-weeks, fully online, designed with working professionals in mind, and most importantly, guaranteed fun and learning. Do not miss.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Article] This excellent Bloomberg article cautions that the second great age of globalisation might be coming to a close, unless the leaders act differently. [Article] In context of the International Women's Day, I went back to a question that has perplexed me for a long time: what explains the electoral insignificance of political parties by women and dedicated primarily to the issues that affect women? The linked article by Louise Perry is a good place to start the search for some answers. [Article] Another article on the tough road ahead for globalisation. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

ये हमारी नई कोशिश "एक सवाल, कई जवाब" का एक अंक है। इस बार का सवाल है - "क्या आर्थिक वृद्धि खुशहाली के लिए ज़रूरी है?"1. 'Ideas of India' podcast - Shruti Rajagopalan in conversation with Lant Pritchett (https://www.discoursemagazine.com/economics/2022/03/17/ideas-of-india-where-did-development-economics-go-wrong/amp/)2. Lant Pritchett's paper on national development (https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/publications/national-development-delivers-and-how-and-how)3. Puliyabaazi on growth and inequality relationship (https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/show/puliyabaazi-hindi-podcast-RVMQzw21nxWhcCOM/episode/kyaa-smptti-kr-aarthik-asmaantaa-se-nijaat-dilaa-sktaa-hai-b04v-IN3XuszS1vhdLhgJ?startTime=0)Puliyabaazi is on these platforms:Twitter: https://twitter.com/puliyabaaziInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/puliyabaazi/Subscribe & listen to the podcast on iTunes, Google Podcasts, Castbox, AudioBoom, YouTube, Spotify, or any other podcast app.You can listen to this show and other awesome shows on the IVM Podcasts app on Android: https://ivm.today/android or iOS: https://ivm.today/ios, or any other podcast app.You can check out our website at http://www.ivmpodcasts.com/

Check out Conversations with Tyler  Subscribe to Conversations with Tyler on your favorite podcast app. In this episode, Shruti speaks with Lant Pritchett about economic convergence, academic skepticism about growth, flawed methodologies in development economics, the shortcomings of India's educational system and much more. Pritchett is a development economist from Idaho. He is currently affiliated with Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government as the research director of the RISE Programme, is the Research Director at LaMP (Labor Mobility Partnerships) and is a fellow at the London School of Economics. He previously worked with the World Bank from 1988 to 2007, living in Indonesia 1998-2000 and India 2004-2007. His publications span a wide range of development topics including economic growth, state capability, education, labor mobility and development assistance. Follow Shruti on Twitter For a full transcript of this conversation with helpful links visit DiscourseMagazine.com. 

Over the last 75 years of India's independence, there has been no dearth of ideas and policies targeting progress. Yet policy progress is dependent on policy implementation. In this episode, Aarushi Kataria talks to Pranay Kotasthane about the gap that exists between policies on paper and what they actually achieve. They talk about the Right to Information Act 2005 and the 2020 Farm Bills in light of that discussion.Follow Aarushi on Twitter: https://twitter.com/aarushi_katariaFollow Pranay on Twitter: https://twitter.com/pranaykotasReading List:1.Policy failure and the policy-implementation gap: can policy support programs help? by Bob Hudson et al.2. Solutions When the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development by Lant Pritchett and Michael Woodcock3. Capturing Institutional Change: Case of Right to Information Act in India by Himanshu Jha4.The Nature of Policy Change and Implementation: A Review of Different Theoretical Approaches by Lucie Cerna5. 70 Policies That Shaped India by Gautam ChikermaneCheck out Takshashila's courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/You can listen to this show and other awesome shows on the new and improved IVM Podcast App on Android: https://ivm.today/android or iOS: https://ivm.today/iosYou can check out our website at https://www.ivmpodcasts.com

The first RISE Podcast episode of 2022 features Denis Mizne, who is CEO of the Lemann Foundation and leads its efforts to transform Brazil's education system so that schools deliver learning for all children. In conversation with RISE Research Fellow Jason Silberstein, he explains why foundational skills are a political winner; the Lemann Foundation's work on Brazil's Learning Standards; how to balance accountability with support for teachers; what we can learn from Sobral, Brazil's famous success story; “status quoism”; Lord Voldemort; and much more. Links: The Lemann Foundation: https://fundacaolemann.org.br/en (https://fundacaolemann.org.br/en) ‘Systems Implications for Core Instructional Support Lessons from Sobral (Brazil), Puebla (Mexico), and Kenya' by Crouch: https://riseprogramme.org/publications/systems-implications-core-instructional-support-lessons-sobral-brazil-puebla-mexico (https://riseprogramme.org/publications/systems-implications-core-instructional-support-lessons-sobral-brazil-puebla-mexico) ‘Teacher Agency Matters More Than Ever: What Can We Practically Do About It?' (Blog) by McIntosh and Pereira: https://riseprogramme.org/blog/teacher-agency-matters (https://riseprogramme.org/blog/teacher-agency-matters) ‘Building on Solid Foundations: Prioritising Universal, Early, Conceptual and Procedural Mastery of Foundational Skills' (Insight Note) by Belafi, Hwa and Kaffenberger: https://riseprogramme.org/publications/building-solid-foundations-prioritising-universal-early-conceptual-and-procedural (https://riseprogramme.org/publications/building-solid-foundations-prioritising-universal-early-conceptual-and-procedural) ‘Teacher Careers in Education Systems That Are Coherent for Learning: Choose and Curate Toward Commitment to Capable and Committed Teachers (5Cs)' by Hwa and Pritchett: https://riseprogramme.org/publications/teacher-careers-education-systems-are-coherent-learning-choose-and-curate-toward (https://riseprogramme.org/publications/teacher-careers-education-systems-are-coherent-learning-choose-and-curate-toward) ‘The Rebirth of Education: Schooling Ain't Learning' by Lant Pritchett: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/9781933286778-rebirth-education-schooling-aint-learning (https://www.cgdev.org/publication/9781933286778-rebirth-education-schooling-aint-learning) The RISE Community of Practice: https://riseprogramme.org/rise-community-of-practice (https://riseprogramme.org/rise-community-of-practice) Guest biography: Denis Mizne is the CEO of the Lemann Foundation.  A graduate of University of São Paulo Law School, Mizne was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University Center for the Study of Human Rights, a Yale World Fellow at Yale University and completed the Owner/President Management Progam at Harvard Business School.  While at Law School, Mizne led the first disarmament campaign in Brazil. The Sou da Paz - I am for Peace - movement was instrumental in approving the Disarmament Statute, one of the most modern pieces of legislation controlling civilian gun possession. The law directly contributed to the reduction in homicides in the country.  In 1999, Mizne joined Brazil's Ministry of Justice as special advisor to the Minister and later Chief of Staff. After one year in Government, he came back to São Paulo to create the Sou da Paz Institute, where he stayed as executive director until 2010.  In 2011, Denis Mizne became CEO of the Lemann Foundation. In the ten years he has been in this position, the Foundation grew to become one of Brazil's leading philanthropies, focusing on improving public education and fostering a generation of talented leaders who will contribute to solving the country's most pressing social issues. Among its achievements, the Lemann Foundation lead the civil society process to have National Learning Standards - approved in 2017, built a large scale intervention to support student learning reaching 2.5

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Hits-based development: funding developing-country economists, published by Michael Wiebe on January 1, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. So far, the effective altruist strategy for global poverty has followed a high-certainty, low-reward approach. GiveWell mostly looks at charities with a strong evidence base, such as bednets and cash transfers. But there's also a low-certainty, high-reward approach: promote catch-up economic growth. Poverty is strongly correlated with economic development (urbanization, industrialization, etc), so encouraging development would have large effects on poverty. Whereas cash transfers have a large probability of a small effect, promoting growth has a small probability of a large effect. (In general, we should diversify across high- and low-risk strategies.) In short, can we do “hits-based development”?[1] How can we affect growth? Tractability is the main problem for hits-based development, since GDP growth rates are notoriously difficult to change. However, there are a few promising options. One specific mechanism is to train developing-country economists, who then work in government and influence policy in a pro-growth direction, ultimately increasing the probability of a growth episode. The key is that local experts have local knowledge of culture, politics, and law, which allows them to understand the impediments to growth in a way that foreign World Bank consultants cannot.[2] The goal is not to find the specific interventions that will boost growth in a specific country, but rather to find the experts who will be most capable of finding those interventions. For example, Lant Pritchett mentions a think tank in India that influenced its liberalizing reforms, which preceded a large growth episode.[3] One way to think of the mechanism is having an economist "in the room" at a key moment to prevent the president from enacting a policy that would lead to hyperinflation (say). Since such an action is highly consequential, but also unlikely, it plausibly has high expected value.[4] A different angle is that local experts will improve the quality of solutions to important problems (urbanization, industrialization, health care, etc). This translates into a concrete goal: increase the number of local experts in developing countries, to increase the chance of a growth episode. In terms of crowdedness, there are, for example, very few Africans doing economics PhDs in the US. Some developing countries (like China) already have many economists, and do not need to be targeted. One feature of this proposal is that, in principle, it has a clear stopping point: train developing-country economists until you reach N per country. There are many ways that extra funding could relax budget constraints: GRE fees; PhD application fees; scholarships for undergrads, masters, and PhD students; research projects; thesis prizes; subsidizing RAships; TA buyouts; conference fees and travel; think tanks; translating textbooks; bootcamps/workshops/conferences; sabbaticals/research visits; and so on. From initial conversations, it seems that the key constraint is the number of well-trained students who can get accepted into top PhD programs. Hence, funding should be targeted to training undergrads and Master's students, as the African School of Economics is doing.[5] Hence, one option is to fund ASE and its satellite campuses. Donations need not be restricted to scholarships, for two reasons. First, because of the fungibility problem, such restrictions are difficult to guarantee. Second, ASE's values are consistent with EA values. This matches GiveWell's advice to "find an organization whose existing priorities you are comfortable with – and give unrestricted." Footnotes: [1] See recent discussions on the forum here and here.[2] Wantchekon says that his knowledge...

This week, we conclude Season Six of Grand Tamasha with a bang. Before Milan was a podcast host, he was a podcast consumer. And two of his favorite India podcasts are “The Seen and the Unseen” with Amit Varma and “Ideas of India” with Shruti Rajagopalan. So, what better way to end our season than with a massive mash-up of three leading India podcasts. Amit and Shruti join Milan on the show this week to discuss the relevance of Lant Pritchett's popular characterization of India as a “flailing state” and whether there is such a thing as the “Modi economic doctrine” eight years into his prime ministership. Plus, the three discuss the art and science of podcasting. Grand Tamasha will be taking a little holiday break, but we will be back in late January with a new season of insightful conversations on Indian politics and policy. Stay tuned for more information about our new season! Lant Pritchett, “Is India a Flailing State?: Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization,” Harvard Kennedy School.Shruti Rajagopalan and Alex Tabarrok, “Premature Imitation and India's Flailing State,” The Independent Review.Keshava Guha, “In Farmers vs Modi, A Big Lesson For Congress,” NDTV.com.Amit Varma, “Narendra Modi Takes a Great Leap Backwards,” Times of India.Amit Varma, “#9: Why Are My Episodes so Long?” The India Uncut Newsletter.Emergent Ventures, Mercatus Center at George Mason University.“The Seen and The Unseen” book project.Amit Varma, “We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State,” Times of India.Amit Varma, “Lessons from an Ankhon Dekhi Prime Minister,” Times of India.W.S. Merwin, “Separation.”   

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Economic policy in poor countries, published by John G. Halstead on the effective altruism forum. When funding policy advocacy in the rich world, Open Philanthropy Project aims to only fund projects that at least meet the '100x bar', which means that the things they fund need to increase incomes for average Americans by $100 for every $1 spent to get as much benefit as giving $1 to GiveDirectly recipients in Africa. The reason for this is that (1) there is roughly a 100:1 ratio between the consumption of Americans to GiveDirectly cash transfer recipients, and (2) the returns of money to welfare are logarithmic. A logarithmic utility function implies that $1 for someone with 100x less consumption is worth 100x as much. Since GiveWell's top charities are 10x better than GiveDirectly, the standard set by GiveWell's top charities is a '1,000x bar'. Since 2015, Open Phil has made roughly 300 grants totalling almost $200 million in their near-termist, human-centric focus areas of criminal justice reform, immigration policy, land use reform, macroeconomic stabilisation policy, and scientific research. In 'GiveWell's Top Charities Are (Increasingly) Hard to Beat', Alex Berger argues that much of Open Phil's US policy work probably passes the 100x bar, but relatively little passes the 1,000x bar. The reason that Open Phil's policy work is able to meet the 100x bar is that it is leveraged. Although trying to change planning law in California has a low chance of success, the economic payoffs are so large that the expected value of these grants is high. So, even though it is a lot harder to increase welfare in the US, because the policy work has so much leverage, the expected benefits are high enough to 100x the $ benefits. This raises the question: if all of this true, wouldn't advocating for improved economic policy in poor countries be much better than GiveWell's top charities? If policy in the US has high expected benefits because it is leveraged, then policy in Kenya must also have high expected benefits because it is leveraged. We should expect many projects improving economic policy in Kenya to produce 100x the welfare benefits of GiveDirectly, and we should expect a handful to produce 1,000x the welfare benefits of GiveDirectly. This is an argument for funding work to improve economic policy in the world's poorest countries. Lant Pritchett has been arguing for this position for at least 7 years without any published response from the EA community. Hauke Hillebrandt and I summarise his arguments here. My former colleagues from Founders Pledge, Stephen Clare and Aidan Goth, discuss the arguments in more depth here. Updated addendum: At present, according to GiveWell, the best way to improve the economic outcomes of very poor people is to deworm them. This is on the basis of one very controversial RCT conducted in 2004. I don't think this is a tenable position. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

In this episode of the RISE Podcast, RISE Research Director Lant Pritchett speaks to Asyia Kazmi. During the episode, they walk through Asyia's wide-ranging experiences spanning her 25-year career in education—as a teacher, mentor, advisor, and educationalist—and they reflect on the legacy of Girin Beeharry, the inaugural Director of Global Education at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They also discuss the critical importance of getting kids literate and numerate, as well as the need to build systems that champion quality teaching and restore children's confidence in their ability to succeed.  Links: The Girls Education Challenge: https://girlseducationchallenge.org/ (https://girlseducationchallenge.org/) The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation: https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ (https://www.gatesfoundation.org/) A Symposium on Girin Beeharry's Manifesto for Global Education: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/symposium-girin-beeharrys-manifesto-global-education (https://www.cgdev.org/blog/symposium-girin-beeharrys-manifesto-global-education) The Pathway to Progress on SDG 4 Requires the Global Education Architecture to Focus on Foundational Learning and to Hold Ourselves Accountable For Achieving It, by Girindre Beeharry: https://www.cgdev.org/reader/pathway-progress-sdg4-symposium?page=1 (https://www.cgdev.org/reader/pathway-progress-sdg4-symposium?page=1) Sleeping Soundly in the Procrustean Bed of Accounting-Based Accountability by Lant Pritchett: https://www.cgdev.org/reader/pathway-progress-sdg4-symposium?page=16 (https://www.cgdev.org/reader/pathway-progress-sdg4-symposium?page=16) Building on Solid Foundations: Prioritising Universal, Early, Conceptual and Procedural Mastery of Foundational Skills: https://riseprogramme.org/publications/building-solid-foundations-prioritising-universal-early-conceptual-and-procedural (https://riseprogramme.org/publications/building-solid-foundations-prioritising-universal-early-conceptual-and-procedural) Quality Education for Every Girl for 12 Years: Insights from RISE Programme Research: https://riseprogramme.org/publications/quality-education-every-girl-12-years-insights-rise-programme-research (https://riseprogramme.org/publications/quality-education-every-girl-12-years-insights-rise-programme-research) Andy Hargreaves: http://www.andyhargreaves.com (http://www.andyhargreaves.com) Guest biography: Dr Asyia Kazmi is the Global Education Policy Lead at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with a focus on effective instructional practices, education advocacy and edtech. Nearly half of Asyia's 25-year career in education was spent as a mathematics teacher and teacher coach. Before joining the Gates Foundation, Asyia was a management consultant in PwC leading the Girls' Education Challenge, a $1bn fund set up by the UK to support the education of 1.5 million girls in 17 countries. Asyia has worked in three UK Government departments: as a senior education adviser in DFID, a project director in the Department for Education, and a senior Her Majesty's Inspector in Ofsted, where she inspected schools, local authorities, initial teacher education and trained inspectors. Her areas of expertise include teaching, learning and formative assessment; school improvement; and large-scale programme management. Asyia has a Masters in Applied Mathematics from Imperial College London and a Doctorate in Education on teaching and learning mathematics from the Institute of Education, University College London. She has a PGCE in Leadership development and educational consulting, and a PGCE in mathematics teaching. Attribution: RISE is funded by the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Programme is implemented through a partnership between Oxford Policy Management and the Blavatnik School of Government at...

Public policy may seem like a dull subject fit only for wonks, but it matters: our lives are deeply affected by what our governments do. Pranay Kotasthane joins Amit Varma in episode 233 of The Seen and the Unseen to chat about his intellectual journey, his private beach and why public policy can be so stimulating. He also answers racy questions from the Twitterverse. If you share Pranay's interest in public policy, you should check out Takshashila's Graduate Certificate in Public Policy (GCPP). Also check out: 1. Anticipating the Unintended -- Pranay Kotasthane's newsletter (with RSJ). 2. Puliyabaazi -- Pranay Kotasthane's podcast (with Saurabh Chandra). 3. Foreign Policy is a Big Deal -- Episode 170 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane & Manoj Kewalramani). 4. Radically Networked Societies -- Episode 158 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane). 5. Older episodes of The Seen and the Unseen w Pranay Kotasthane: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 6. Raghu Sanjaylal Jaitley's Father's Scooter -- Episode 214 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Raghu Sanjaylal Jaitley). 7. ये लिबरल आख़िर है कौन? -- Episode 37 of Puliyabaazi (w Amit Varma). 8. Amit Varma's tweet thread soliciting questions for this episode. 9. Examples of Pranay Kotasthane's Mind Maps of books: 1, 2, 3. 10. Coggle. 11. The Lessons of History -- Will Durant. 12. Raj Comics. 13. The China Dude Is in the House -- Episode 231 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Manoj Kewalramani). 14. A Case For Societism -- Pranay Kotasthane. 15. Pranay Kotasthane's Manthan talk on societism. 16. The Indian Dream Podcast episode with Amit Varma. 17. 8 things to unlearn before learning public policy -- Pranay Kotasthane. 18. The Double 'Thank-You' Moment -- John Stossel. 19.  Opportunity Cost Neglect in Public Policy -- Emil Persson and Gustav Tinghög. 20. Whose Money is it Anyway? -- Amit Varma. 21. The 4 Ways to Spend Money -- Milton Friedman. 22. Discover Your Inner Economist -- Tyler Cowen. 23. In Service of the Republic — Vijay Kelkar & Ajay Shah. 24. The Art and Science of Economic Policy -- Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah). 25. Amit Varma's prescient 2017 tweet on the price caps on stents. 26. Episodes of the Seen and the Unseen on GST with Devangshu Datta, Vivek Kaul and Shruti Rajagopalan. 26. Most of Amit Varma's writing on DeMon, collected in one Twitter thread. 27. Narendra Modi Takes a Great Leap Backwards — Amit Varma 28. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on Demonetisation with Suyash Rai and Shruti Rajagopalan. 29. The Delhi Smog -- Episode 44 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vivek Kaul). 30. Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist -- Bruce Yandle. 31. Pigs Don't Fly: The Economic Way of Thinking about Politics -- Russell Roberts. 32. Raees: An Empty Shell of a Gangster Film -- Amit Varma. 33. Shubhra Gupta's review about which Tapsee Pannu kicked up such a fuss. 34. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills -- Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 35. Wilson's Interest Group Matrix -- Charles Cameron from The Political Analyst's Toolkit. 36. Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working -- Jonathan Rauch. 37. The Great Redistribution -- Amit Varma. 38. Behave -- Robert Sapolsky. 39. Robert Sapolsky's lectures on YouTube. 40. Elite Imitation in Public Policy -- Episode 180 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan & Alex Tabarrok). 41. Taxes Should Be Used for Governance, Not Politics -- Amit Varma. 42. Every Act of Government Is an Act of Violence -- Amit Varma. 43. The First Assault on Our Constitution -- Episode 194 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Tripurdaman Singh). 44. The Emergency -- Episode 103 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Gyan Prakash). 45. How the BJP Wins -- Prashant Jha. 46. The BJP's Magic Formula -- Episode 45 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Prashant Jha). 47. Participatory Democracy — Episode 160 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 48. Other episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ashwin Mahesh: 1, 2. 49. Understanding India Through Its Languages -- Episode 232 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Peggy Mohan). 50. The Indianness of Indian Food — Episode 95 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vikram Doctor). 51. Governing the Commons -- Elinor Ostrom. 52. Public Choice Theory -- Episode 121 of The Seen and the Unseen. 53. Fixing Indian Education -- Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 54. Education in India -- Episode 77 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Amit Chandra). 55. The Economics and Politics of Vaccines -- Episode 223 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 56. The Indian Conservative -- Episode 145 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Jaithirth Rao). 57. How to Build an Economic Model in Your Spare Time -- Hal Varian. 58. A Scientist in the Kitchen -- Episode 204 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Krish Ashok). 59. Modeling Covid-19 -- Episode 224 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Gautam Menon). 60. Narratives on Exchange Rates in India -- Pranay Kotasthane. 61. Taking Stock of Our Economy -- Episode 227 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ila Patnaik). 62. The Power Broker -- Robert Caro. 63. The Death and Life of Great American Cities -- Jane Jacobs. 64. Lessons from an Ankhon Dekhi Prime Minister -- Amit Varma (on the importance of reading). 65. Selling Solutions vs Solving Problems -- Lant Pritchett. 66. Policy Paradox -- Deborah Stone. 67. The Mahatma and the Poet -- The Tagore-Gandhi debates. 68. Factfulness -- Hans Rosling. 69. Humankind: A Hopeful History -- Rutger Bregman. 70. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis -- Eugene Bardach. 71. Essence of Decision -- Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. 72. Banishing Bureaucracy -- David Osborne. This episode is sponsored by CTQ Compounds. Check out The Daily Reader, FutureStack and The Social Capital Compound. Use the code UNSEEN for Rs 2500 off. Please subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! And check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing.

In an excellent book on how aid agencies manage foreign aid projects, Dan Honig argues that tight top-down controls and a focus on target-setting and metrics often lead aid projects astray. If one navigates from the top, one may achieve more management control, more oversight, and more standardized behavior. But this may be at the cost of flexibility and adaptability. By contrast, if one empowers those closest to the ground, and focuses on what field agents can see and learn, we may apply so-called “soft information” that will in turn allow for more flexibility. Managing large organizations is not easy. And most politicians and bureaucrats struggle to find the right balance between when to control and when to let go. In the book Navigation by Judgment: Why and When Top-Down Control of Foreign Aid Doesn't Work, Dan Honig argues that a misplaced sense of what it means to “succeed” encourages many aid agencies to get the balance wrong.Dan Honig is an assistant professor of international development at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is currently a visiting fellow at Leiden University’s Institute of Political Science, and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development. He was previously special assistant, then advisor, to successive Ministers of Finance in Liberia and ran a local nonprofit in East Timor focused on helping post-conflict youth realize the power of their own ideas.Dan is busy completing his next book on “Mission-Driven Bureaucrats”, which explores the relationship between motivation, management practice, organizational mission, and performance in the public service.   Actually Navigating byJudgment: Towards aNew Paradigm of DonorAccountability Where theCurrent System Doesn’t Work (policy paper, Centre for Global Development)Managing Better: What All of Us Can Do to Encourage AidSuccess (CGD Brief, Center for Global Development)"Making Good On Donors' Desire to Do Development Differently", Third World Quarterly 39:1, 68-84 (Honig & Gulrajani, 2018)."Information, Power, & Location:  World Bank Staff Decentralization and Aid Project Success”, Governance 33:4, 749-769. (2020)The Limits of Accounting-Based Accountability in Education (and Far Beyond): Why More Accounting Will Rarely Solve Accountability Problems (Honig & Pritchett, working paper, Center for Global Development)Dan Honig on TwitterDan Banik and In Pursuit of Development on Twitterhttps://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/ 

The second wave in India could have been avoided. We should not have been suffering like this. Vaccines were the answer. Ajay Shah joins Amit Varma in episode 223 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss how our thinking about vaccines was fundamentally flawed -- and what we should do now. Also discussed: why Indian healthcare is in such a mess. Also check out: 1. Indian Health Policy in Light of COVID-19 -- Ajay Shah's paper from July 14, 2020.  2. How the Vaccine Story Will Play Out -- Ajay Shah (Nov 30, 2020). 3. SARS-Cov-2 Vaccines for India -- Ajay Shah's presentation from December 29, 2020. 4. Price Controls for Vaccines? -- Ajay Shah (March 8, 2021). 5. Responding to the Second Wave -- Ajay Shah (April 5, 2021). 6. An Important Change of Course by Policy in Indian Covid-19 Vaccination -- Amrita Agarwal & Ajay Shah. 7. Vaccination in India: How Will Demand Change When Persons Above Age 18 Are Eligible? -- Renuka Sane & Ajay Shah. 8. The Best Way to Vaccinate Most Indians in the Least Time -- Shruti Rajagopalan (Sep 14, 2020). 9. Vaccinating India: What Next? -- Naushad Forbes (March 16, 2021). 10. India’s Covid Crisis Has a Familiar Culprit -- Mihir Sharma (April 13, 2021). 11. Biden Admin Remakes Vaccine Strategy -- Erin Banco (March 29, 2021). 12. NYT Covid Vaccinations Tracker. 13. Previous episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on Covid-19: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 14. In Service of the Republic -- Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah. 15. The Art and Science of Economic Policy — Episode 154 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah)   16. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills -- Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 17. Other episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ajay Shah: 1, 2, 3. 18. We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State -- Amit Varma. 19. Capital -- Rana Dasgupta. 20. Fixing Indian Education -- Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan).  21. Other episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on Education: 1, 2, 3. 22. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen on Agriculture: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 23. The Geopolitics of the Bangladesh War -- Episode 113 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Srinath Raghavan).  24. Building State Capability -- Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock. 25. Taxes Should Be Used for Governance, Not Politics -- Amit Varma.  26. The Man of System -- From Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 27. The Fatal Conceit -- Friedrich Hayek. 28: How the BJP Wins -- Prashant Jha. 29. The BJP’s Magic Formula -- Episode 45 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Prashant Jha). 30. The First Assault on Our Constitution -- Episode 194 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Tripurdaman Singh). 31. Price Controls Lead to Shortages and Harm the Poor -- Amit Varma. Please subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It’s free! And check out Amit’s online course, The Art of Clear Writing.

Learn more about Dan Honig's research and contributions to the field of international  development, and stay tuned for his forthcoming book titled 'Mission-Driven Bureaucrats'. Read  Patchwork Leviathan: Pockets of Bureaucratic Effectiveness in Developing States by Erin Metz McDonnell.Read South Sudan's Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation by Greg Larson, Peter Biar Ajak, and Lant Pritchett. Read The Limits of Accounting-Based Accountability in Education (and Far Beyond): Why More Accounting Will Rarely Solve Accountability Problems by Dan Honig and Lant Pritchett.Read Account-based accountability and Aid Effectiveness by Lant Pritchett.Read The Effect of Increased Autonomy vs. Performance Pay on Procurement Officers’ Performance in Pakistan by Oriana Bandiera, Michael Best, Adnan Khan, and Andrea Prat. 

In this episode, political scientist and economic historian Rohit Chandra (@rohitreads) gives an account of business-state relations in India over the last two decades. In this wide-ranging conversation, we discuss trends of market concentration since 2014, the state of public sector units, small businesses, and the state of banking among other things. Rohit, together with Rahul Verma (@rahul_tverma), has curated the Seminar Magazine Symposium for October 2020 on the topic A delicate balance: a symposium on untangling business-state relations in India.भारत में सरकार और बिज़नेस के रिश्ते कैसे बदले है पिछले दो दशकों में, यही है विषय इस पुलियाबाज़ी का | क्यों भारत में बिज़नेस केन्द्रीभूत हो रहे है? भारत के छोटे उद्योग छोटे ही क्यों रह जाते है? “सूट-बूट की सरकार” टिप्पणी को क्या इस सरकार ने दिल से लगा लिया? ऐसे ही कुछ सवालों पर चर्चा की हमने आईआईटी दिल्ली की स्कूल ऑफ़ पब्लिक पॉलिसी में असिस्टेंट प्रोफेसर रोहित चंद्र से, जो इस विषय के आर्थिक इतिहास पर काफ़ी वर्षों से अध्ययन कर रहे है |For more:Seminar Magazine Symposium for October 2020: A delicate balance: a symposium on untangling business-state relations in India, edited by Rohit Chandra and Rahul VermaDoing business in a deals World, by Sabyasachi Kar, Lant Pritchett, Spandan Roy, and Kunal SenBad Money by Vivek Kaul, Overdraft by Urjit Patel, Bloom in the Desert by D V Kapur, In Service of the Republic by Ajay Shah and Vijay KelkarThe Seen and the Unseen ep 186, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Amit VarmaPuliyabaazi is on these platforms:Twitter: https://twitter.com/puliyabaaziFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/puliyabaaziInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/puliyabaazi/Subscribe & listen to the podcast on iTunes, Google Podcasts, Castbox, AudioBoom, YouTube, Spotify or any other podcast app.

As our cities are growing, our citizens are growing apathetic. Can we reassert our rights and reform our governance? Ashwin Mahesh joins Amit Varma in episode 198 of The Seen and the Unseen for a wide-ranging conversation on urban governance, citizenship, education and much more. Also check out: 1. Participatory Democracy -- Episode 160 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 2. Ashwin Mahesh's website. 3. A New, Urban India -- Ashwin Mahesh. 4. The Publicly Managed City -- Ashwin Mahesh. 5. The tweets by Sabyasachi Kar and Naval Ravikant. 6. Tiago Forte's Second Brain, & videos on Roam Research by Thomas Frank & Ali Abdaal. 7. Fixing Indian Education -- Episode 185 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Karthik Muralidharan). 8. Our Unlucky Children (2008) -- Amit Varma. 9. The Element -- Ken Robinson. 10. Urban Governance in India -- Episode 31 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 11. Reforming Urban Governance -- Episode 48 of The Seen and the Unseen (w V Ravichandar). 12. Is India a Flailing State? -- Lant Pritchett. 13. We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State -- Amit Varma. 14. Prisoners of Geography -- Tim Marshall. 15. The Importance of Cities -- Episode 108 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Reuben Abraham & Pritika Hingorani.) 16. The Power Broker -- Robert Caro. 17. The Death and Life of Great American Cities -- Jane Jacobs. 18. A Life in Indian Politics -- Episode 149 of The Seen and the Unseen (w JP Narayan). 19. What a Long Strange Trip It’s Been -- Episode 188 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Arvind Subramanian). And do check out Amit’s online courses, The Art of Clear Writing and The Art of Podcasting.