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4 episodes with Chris Blattman
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2 episodes with Chris Blattman
2 episodes with Chris Blattman
3 episodes with Chris Blattman
5 episodes with Chris Blattman
2 episodes with Chris Blattman
2 episodes with Chris Blattman
We listen back on more than a dozen guests from conversations across 2024. Guests (in order): Fabian Hinz, research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, and co-author of "God, Guns, and Sedition: Far-Right Terrorism in America"; Karolina Hird, analyst and Russia Deputy Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War; Elliot Ackerman, co-author of "2054: A Novel"; Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness; Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Chris Blattman, economist, political scientist, and Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago, and author of the 2022 book, "Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace"; Mick Ryan, retired Australian Army major general, strategist, and author of “White Sun War: The Campaign for Taiwan"; Dmitri Alperovitch, chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, a geopolitics think-tank in Washington, and author of “World on the Brink: How America Can Beat China in the Race for the Twenty-First Century"; Sam Skove, former Defense One staff writer; Mark Montgomery, a retired U.S. Navy rear admiral, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington and senior director of FDD's Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation; Peter Tamte, founder and CEO of Victura; And Brent Sadler, retired Navy captain and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
Guest: Chris Blattman, economist, political scientist, and Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago. Sources: “Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity,” published April 2024 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; “Back in Stock? The State of Russia's Defense Industry after Two Years of the War,” by Maria Snegovaya, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Samuel Bendett, published April 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; “Keeping Up with the Pacing Threat: Unveiling the True Size of Beijing's Military Spending,” by Mackenzie Eaglen, published April 2024 by the American Enterprise Institute; “Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Escalation Risks,” by Ankit Panda, published October 2023 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Missile Proliferation and Control in the Asia-Pacific Region,” from Jeffrey Lewis and Kolja Brockmann, published April 2024 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; And “Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace,” from Chris Blattman, published April 2022 by Penguin Random House.
Guest: Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. Source material: “Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity,” published April 2024 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; “Back in Stock? The State of Russia's Defense Industry after Two Years of the War,” by Maria Snegovaya, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Samuel Bendett, published April 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; “Keeping Up with the Pacing Threat: Unveiling the True Size of Beijing's Military Spending,” by Mackenzie Eaglen, published April 2024 by the American Enterprise Institute; “Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Escalation Risks,” by Ankit Panda, published October 2023 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Missile Proliferation and Control in the Asia-Pacific Region,” from Jeffrey Lewis and Kolja Brockmann, published April 2024 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; And “Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace,” from Chris Blattman, published April 2022 by Penguin Random House.
Guests: Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she works on defense strategy, defense budgets, and military readiness; And Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sources: “Global military spending surges amid war, rising tensions and insecurity,” published April 2024 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; “Back in Stock? The State of Russia's Defense Industry after Two Years of the War,” by Maria Snegovaya, Max Bergmann, Tina Dolbaia, Nick Fenton, and Samuel Bendett, published April 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; “Keeping Up with the Pacing Threat: Unveiling the True Size of Beijing's Military Spending,” by Mackenzie Eaglen, published April 2024 by the American Enterprise Institute; “Indo-Pacific Missile Arsenals: Avoiding Spirals and Mitigating Escalation Risks,” by Ankit Panda, published October 2023 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Missile Proliferation and Control in the Asia-Pacific Region,” from Jeffrey Lewis and Kolja Brockmann, published April 2024 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; And “Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace,” from Chris Blattman, published April 2022 by Penguin Random House.
Today's release is a reading of our Great power conflict problem profile, written and narrated by Stephen Clare.If you want to check out the links, footnotes and figures in today's article, you can find those here.And if you like this article, you might enjoy a couple of related episodes of this podcast:#128 – Chris Blattman on the five reasons wars happen#140 – Bear Braumoeller on the case that war isn't in declineAudio mastering and editing for this episode: Dominic ArmstrongAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellProducer: Keiran Harris
Just Shoot It: A Podcast about Filmmaking, Screenwriting and Directing
In this week's episode, Matt & Oren chat with Bonnie & Allison, the Bonabart directing duo! Matt's Endorsement: Elevenlabs.io, Adobe Podcast, & Chris Blattman's Professional AdviceOren's Endorsement:Bonabart's Endorsement: Matcha Lattes, Being A Boulder Pusher, Come As You Are, & Catch AirContribute to the Just Shoot It Patreon and help the show.Send feedback or questions to @justshootitpod or justshootitpod@gmail.com.Follow Matt on twitter and instagram.Follow Oren on twitter and instagram.Wanna be on the show? Call us with a question at (262) 6-SHOOT-1, and we'll air your voicemail on the show.Show your support: rate and review us on iTunes. apple.co/2fl9ojySee who our guests are a week early on our instagram @JustshootItPodMusic was provided by the free music archive and by Jahzzar.Each week on Just Shoot It we interview your directors, screenwriters, editors, cinematographers, and actors, and learn how they became successful, working content creators. We'll share tips and stories of how people in the entertainment industry forced their ways into sustainable careers. We're all about getting off your butt and making your own videos. Get bonus content on Patreon Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
In our 10th episode, we take a deep-dive into Malengo, an organization that facilitates international educational migration. Malengo helps students from low-income countries with admissions and financing for a bachelor's degree in a high-income country. We discuss why migration is an important lever for development, and how income-share agreements can make supporting it a worthwhile impact investment. Our guests bring in 3 different perspectives. Johannes Haushofer is a development economist who founded Malengo based on findings from his research. Richard Nerland is an economist with a passion for academic economics and international development. Convinced by Malengo's potential for impact, he invested USD 3.5 M into the organization. Along the way, he helped develop a tax-efficient financial model to make Malengo attractive for other investors to follow suit. Gladys Amule is a student from the first cohort of Malengo scholars. She shares her experience with the program and her motivation to pay it forward through Malengo's income-share agreement. Links · Malengo's website · Johannes' Twitter thread explaining the academic path that led him to found Malengo · Richard's Twitter thread explaining why the decided to become Malengo's inaugural investor, including his take-aways from academic literature Academic papers recommended by our guests · Johannes ‘ paper on general equilibrium effects for cash transfers Egger, D., J. Haushofer, E. Miguel, P. Niehaus, and M.Walker. 2022. “General Equilibrium Effects of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya” Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17945 · Michael Clemens economic argument that friction from migration restriction is enormous Clemens, Michael, A. 2011."Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (3): 83-106. DOI: 10.1257/jep.25.3.83 · Chris Blattman's paper on cash transfers wearing off: Blattman, C.,N. Fiala, N. and S. Martinez, 2019. “The Long Term Impacts of Grants on Poverty: 9-Year Evidence from Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program”. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223028 · On brain gain, evidence from nursing programs in the US: Abarcar, P., and C. Theoharides; C. 2021. “Medical Worker Migration and Origin-Country Human Capital: Evidence from U.S. Visa Policy”. The Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01131 · On brain gain and spill-over effects Khanna, G., E. Murathanoglu, C.B. Theoharides and D. Yang, 2022, “Abundance from Abroad: Migrant Income and Long-Run Economic Development”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 29862, DOI 10.3386/w29862 · Lant Pritchett on labor migration Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments Burchardi, K. Chaney, T. and Hassan, T. 2018, Migrants, Ancestors, and Foreign Investments, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 86, Issue 4, , Pages 1448–1486, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy044 Time stamps In some podcast players, you should be able to jump to the section by clicking: (00:01:56) – Johannes, Gladys and Richard introduce themselves (00:03:19) – Johannes explains what Malengo does and how his academic research inspired him to found an organization facilitating international educational migration (00:10:27) – Gladys shares why she applied to study with Malengo (00:14:19) – Richard shares why he decided to fund work related to international educational migration, inspired by reading academic papers on development economics (00:17:07) – Richard elaborates on how Johannes' academic credentials and track record as high agency person convinced him to support Malengo's work (00:19:47) Richard on giving vs impact investing – the investor's perspective (00:22:10) Richard on the process of jointly setting up a legal structure for impact investing with Johannes (00:25:36) Johannes on seeking donations vs seeking investments – the founder's perspective (00:27:23) Johannes on Richard providing more than just money: expertise and patience (00:28:31) A structure that can now be deployed at scale (00:30:37) Gladys on what she would have done if she hadn't studied with Malengo (00:31:20) Johannes on the expected impact on student's income and the independent research accompanying Malengo's work (00:34:08) Gladys on sending money back home (00:35:46) Johannes on the income-share agreements (00:39:15) Gladys on her motivation to pay it forward (00:40:22) Johannes on why he isn't worried about brain drain (00:43:28) Gladys on inspiring other students (00:44:43) Richard on the academic papers that influenced his thinking on what works and what doesn't in development economics (00:48:27) Richard on how “this one little thing that he's very good at”, “this little finance thing”, can empower others (00:50:27) Gladys on her role as a mentor for the next Malengo cohorts (00:52:19) Richard's deep dive into how he thinks about his investments into Malengo from a financial perspective (protection from inflation, assumptions for alpha outperformance, diversification from the rest of his portfolio from a market risk perspective) (00:59:36) Johannes on the impact evaluations embedded in Malengo's work and the endeavor to also uncover whether there are negative effects (01:03:06) Gladys on how leaving home felt for her (01:07:08) Johannes on the role of philanthropy, impact investing and effective altruism for Malengo (01:09:03) Richard on hoping to inspire other impact investors to follow suit (01:14:20) Johannes on how the political climate affects his plans to grow an organization facilitating migration (01:15:50) Gladys on interest from her peers to follow in her footsteps (01:16:45) Johannes on a mindset of cooperation towards other organizations in the same space (01:19:31) Johannes, Richard and Gladys on the best ways to support Malengo's mission
Christopher Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy, where he co-leads the Development Economics Center and the Obama Foundation Scholars Program. Chris also has affiliations with Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), MIT's Poverty Action Lab, the National Bureau for Economic Research, and the Center for Global Development. He has served as a consultant and adviser to the World Bank, the United Nations, and governments in Uganda, Liberia, Colombia, and the United States.This conversation was a lot of fun and we covered a lot of ground: from Sparta to Kiev, from the Peloponnesian War to the Iraq War, from Russia's attack on Ukraine to the prospects of war between China and Taiwan, and so much more! We start by talking about Chris's journey, from growing up in Ottawa to finding his way to international work and then eventually to conflict. We then shift to Chris's book, “Why We Fight”, and the concept of fragility. Chris highlights how fragility sets the stage upon which the five reasons why we fight push a society away from bargaining to using violence or as he puts it: “when killing an Archduke in some random Balkan city can send the world to war.” The five reasons for war that Chris identifies in his book are: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions. We discuss whether there is a potential hierarchy among then, how they are connected, which of the five reasons played a role in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as how intangible incentives can be seen in the Ukrainians' resolution to protect their country. Chris also sums up decades of research and practical insights into 10 general principles that can set the world on the path to peace. We talk about how leaders are tempted by grand visions, but in reality, change happens incrementally – too bad 3% better doesn't make for a good slogan! Listen to the episode for so many more insights from Chris Blattman! *****Dr. Christopher BlattmanWebsite: https://chrisblattman.comTwitter: https://twitter.com/cblattsLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrisblattman*****Mihaela Carstei, Paul M. Bisca, and Johan Bjurman Bergman co-host F-World: The Fragility Podcast. Twitter: https://twitter.com/fworldpodcastInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/fworldpodcast/Website: https://f-world.orgMusic: "Tornado" by Wintergatan. Many thanks to Wintergartan for allowing us to use their wonderful music! This track can be downloaded for free at www.wintergatan.net. Video editing by: Alex Mitran - find Alex on Facebook (facebook.com/alexmmitran), Twitter (twitter.com/alexmmitran), or LinkedIn (linkedin.com/in/alexmmitran)EPISODE RESOURCES:Blattman, Christopher (2022). Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. New York: Viking PressThe prospects for war with China: Why I see a serious chance of World War III in the next decadehttps://chrisblattman.com/blog/2022/10/26/the-prospects-for-war-with-china-why-i-see-a-serious-chance-of-world-war-iii-in-the-next-decade/TIMESTAMPS:00:00:00 Introduction00:00:55 Chris's background – people, places, ideas that charted his path00:02:56 How Chris approaches risk and how to think about career moves 00:05:08 How culture enables risk taking and the role of failure in progress00:07:17 A potential correlation between risk taking and creativity00:10:50 What is fragility? 00:12:57 Dividing the pie and fragility00:15:32 Why we don't write books about wars that didn't happen OR Why enemies prefer to loathe one another in peace00:18:29 When do we actually fight00:22:41 The five reasons for wars00:26:49 How to think about uncertainty vs. commitment problems00:30:46 How do intangible incentives that evolve change the nature of commitment problems00:33:07 What is the interplay between uncertainty and technology00:38:16 How interdependence failed to stop Russia's attack on Ukraine00:44:58 Is there a threshold of violence that we should accept in order to avoid war? 00:47:56 Why the West missed the Ukrainian people's resolve - Most oppressed people don't revolt00:53:12 Bad guys and good guys support propaganda00:56:52 Can you change people's and leaders' misperceptions?01:01:19 Which leaders take their country to war - Leaders that have military training, but no battle experience, take their country to war01:05:06 Wicked problems – what are they and how to tell the difference between a simple and a wicked problem01:07:44 When misperceptions are desirable, aka politics01:11:29 Chris's 10 commandments as the anti-bureaucracy commandments
Dr. Chris Blattman is a faculty member in The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts, Chris Blattman focuses on why some people and societies are poor, unequal and violent, and how to tackle these issues. His book, "Why We Fight", was released by Viking Press in April 2022. Most people think war is easy and peace is hard. Blattman synthesizes decades of social science and policymakers' practical experiences to argue the opposite: War is hard and finding peace is easier than you think. In his day-to-day research, Blattman works with governments and civil society to design and test approaches to reduce violence and poverty.
Chris Blattman and Kelsey Piper discuss a range of issues in this fireside chat, including Chris's new book, "Why We Fight"."Why We Fight" draws on decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions to synthesize the root causes and remedies for war. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, there are common dynamics across all these levels. Effective Altruism is a social movement dedicated to finding ways to do the most good possible, whether through charitable donations, career choices, or volunteer projects. EA Global conferences are gatherings for EAs to meet. You can also listen to this talk along with its accompanying video on YouTube.
In this episode, Chris Blattman from NYU shares his research on celom, Margate, and lathees in the context of arpents.
Political scientist Dr. Chris Blattman tells me how Putin and Russia miscalculated going to war with Ukraine, when World War III will happen, and the secrets behind geopolitics. WELCOME TO CAMP.Thanks to Morgan & Morgan for sponsoring today's episode!Mark Gagnon is our HostWill Schwartz is our Content Producer and Lead EditorAce Taylor provides Additional EditingKostis Zacho is our Clips Editor
Lexman and Chris discuss how antisocial tendencies can arise from living in a tribe or in environments with Krypton's prevailing radiation. They also discuss the meaning of the word "cowboy" and the mystical tetragrammaton.
While wars and other violent conflicts dominate the news, it is easy to overlook that the majority of conflicts are actually resolved peacefully. In his highly acclaimed book “Why We Fight The Roots of War and The Paths to Peace”, author Chris Blattman draws on his expertise in economics, political science, and history to explain the five reasons why conflicts (rarely) turn violent and how to interrupt that deadly process.Chris Blattman is an economist and political scientist who uses field work and statistics to study poverty, political engagement, the causes and consequences of violence, and policy in developing countries. He is a professor at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago.Greg and Chris discuss what can be learned from the commonalities and differences of conflicts of all levels, from interpersonal disputes to street gang violence to warring states and how peacemakers can avoid emotional and strategic mistakes to develop non-violent conflict solutions that last.Episode Quotes:There's no 10-step plan for peace48:11: There's no 10-step plan for peace. I think there is a pretty simple set of ideas that can help us diagnose better, but then it's like being a doctor... (49:03) When we are asking our leaders to solve problems of development, change our cities, solve racism, or solve conflict, which is much more complex, we have this different set of expectations. We kind of want them to come to us and promise that Tylenol and radiation therapy are the answer and all we need is more of them, and all situations are alike. Tylenol and radiation therapy worked for that country, or this city, or that people. So it must work for us. And I don't know why we have that, why we accept that, and why we're like that in these two different spheres of life. And I think we just have this amazing ability to forget how hard and complex a problem is in a lot of social change.What makes a good mediation?12:37: Everything that helps resolve conflict or keep us from not breaking out into violence, which we avoid most of the time, is something that helps us pay attention to the costs and not go down one of these paths that made us choose this—the costly worst option, which is to try to bargain through bloodshed.Show Links:Recommended Resources:The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas SchellingAmong the Thugs by Bill BufordGuest Profile:Faculty Profile at the University of ChicagoProfessional Profile on Center for Global DevelopmentChris Blattman's WebsiteChris Blatmman on LinkedInChris Blattman on FacebookHis Work:Chris Blattman on Google ScholarWhy We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: [Links post] Economists Chris Blattman and Noah Smith on China, Taiwan, and the likelihood of war, published by Stephen Clare on November 7, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Two prominent economists and writers, Chris Blattman and Noah Smith, both recently and independently published blog posts on the likelihood of war between China and the US over Taiwan. They are not optimistic. Both seem to think that war is relatively likely. Unfortunately, neither offers a quantitative forecast, but I think it's interesting and useful for serious researchers to write about their views on such important questions. Chris's post is called "The prospects for war with China: Why I see a serious chance of World War III in the next decade". Noah's is "Why I think an invasion of Taiwan probably means WW3". They complement each other well, with Chris's post arguing that war seems likely and Noah's post arguing that the US would probably get involved in the event of a war. Chris's post on why bargaining may break down Chris applies the bargaining framework he used throughout his book Why We Fight to show why war is becoming more likely as China continues to grow its economy and strengthen its military. Eventually, the status quo of de facto Taiwanese independence will slip outside of its "compromise range". When this happens, Chinese leaders may decide going to war to try to bring about a different outcome may be preferable, despite the costs. Still, war is risky and negative-sum. A negotiated settlement should, in principle, be preferable for all parties. Chris suggests that negotiations may fail because ideological principles (e.g. democracy vs autocracy) can be non-negotiable, China's crackdown on Hong Kong harmed its reputation for sticking to negotiated settlements, and Xi Jinping is increasingly unchecked and isolated in his leadership. Noah's post on why the US would probably get drawn into the war Noah also applies economic thinking to inform his geopolitical analysis, using game theory to predict which war scenarios seem more likely based on the interests of the actors involved. Noah considers about how important various factors, like national pride, reputation, and military costs, seem to Chinese and American leaders. He then tries to weigh up how important these costs and benefits seem relative to each other to work out the payoffs to each actor is in each of the four possible outcomes of the game. Then he assigns probabilities to work out expected payoffs, and figures out the equilibrium through backwards induction. Long story short, the equilibrium solution under these assumptions is for China to invade and attack the US to maximize its chances of victory, nearly assuring the outbreak of a major great power war. Of course, there are many ways this analysis could be wrong, and Noah touches on them at the end of the post. For example, given escalation risk, perhaps the payoffs in any "US fights" outcome are hugely negative for both parties, making it very unlikely that they would both choose to fight. Or, perhaps losing a fight over Taiwan would be so negative for China's leadership that it's just too risky (the expected payoff is negative) to undertake. Or, perhaps the leadership of each country is misinformed about the likelihood of each outcome, leading to miscalculation, bad decision-making, and a sub-optimal (i.e. very costly) outcome. Why they're worth reading Both posts analyze the US-China-Taiwan situation from a specific, economic framework. How insightful you find them will depend somewhat on how much resemblance you think this kind of rational analysis of weighing expected costs and benefits bears to actual foreign policy decision-making. But I think it's great to see serious thinkers trying to make progress on important questions like "Will World War III happen...
Subscribe to the IWI monthly newsletter by going to www.irregularwarfare.org! Is peace the natural order of things for the human race and war an aberration? Our guests on this episode, Dr. Chris Blattman and Mr. Teny Gross, argue that it is. They describe five theoretical mechanisms that cause breakdowns in societies and discuss why different groups end up resorting to violence. They then compare and contrast the characteristics of violence at the interpersonal, communal, and international levels. Finally, they end by discussing how third-party mediation at the local and transnational echelons can effectively employ peace-building mechanisms to bring an end to violence at all levels. Intro music: "Unsilenced" by Ketsa Outro music: "Launch" by Ketsa CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
While there are millions of hostile rivalries around the world, only a fraction of these erupt into violence. It is easy to overlook the underlying strategic forces of war and to see war mainly as a series of errors and accidents. It is also easy to forget that war shouldn't happen—and most of the time it doesn't. Chris Blattman is a Professor at the University of Chicago in the Harris School of Public Policy. He is an economist and political scientist who studies violence, crime, and underdevelopment. His most recent book is Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace, which shows that violence is actually not the norm; and that there are only five reasons why conflict wins over compromise. Twitter: @cblatts Host:Professor Dan Banik, University of Oslo, Twitter: @danbanik @GlobalDevPodApple Google Spotify YouTubehttps://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/
Chris Blattman discusses how to avoid disarrangement, how to define laboriousness and refuge, and how to make sure your work is manageable.
My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin
Lexman catches up with writer and futurist Chris Blattman to talk about the future of space exploration, including asteroids, space tourism, and more!
All of us want to feel safe in our daily lives. Yet when we think about crime, our first response is often a blanket approach: find the bad guys, and punish them. But what if there were another way? This week on the show, researchers Sara Heller and Chris Blattman explore how technology and psychology can be used to radically transform our approach to crime. Don't forget to check out the episodes in this year's You 2.0 series, including last week's conversation with Adam Grant about how to open your mind and question your own assumptions. And if you like our work, please consider supporting it! See how you can help at support.hiddenbrain.org.
Lexman is having a hard time pronouncing Chris' last name. Chris helps him out by telling him how to say it.
Join the Director of the Lowy Institute's International Security Program, Sam Roggeveen, as he talks with economist and political scientist Chris Blattman about his latest book, Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. Chis talks about the human propensity to violence, whether certain types of governments are more likely to go to war, and the unique perspective that an economist can bring to this subject.
Join the Director of the Lowy Institute's International Security Program, Sam Roggeveen, as he talks with economist and political scientist Chris Blattman about his latest book, Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. Chis talks about the human propensity to violence, whether certain types of governments are more likely to go to war, and the unique perspective that an economist can bring to this subject.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
In Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace (Viking, 2022), Chris Blattman explains the five reasons why conflict (rarely) blooms into war, and how to interrupt that deadly process. It's easy to overlook the underlying strategic forces of war, to see it solely as a series of errors, accidents, and emotions gone awry. It's also easy to forget that war shouldn't happen-and most of the time it doesn't. Around the world, there are millions of hostile rivalries, yet only a tiny fraction erupt into violence. Too many accounts of conflict forget this. With a counterintuitive approach, Blattman reminds us that most rivals loathe one another in peace. That's because war is too costly to fight. Enemies almost always find it better to split the pie than spoil it or struggle over thin slices. So, in those rare instances when fighting ensues, we should ask: what kept rivals from compromising? Why We Fight draws on decades of economics, political science, psychology, and real-world interventions to lay out the root causes and remedies for war, showing that violence is not the norm; that there are only five reasons why conflict wins over compromise; and how peacemakers turn the tides through tinkering, not transformation. From warring states to street gangs, ethnic groups and religious sects to political factions, there are common dynamics to heed and lessons to learn. Along the way, we meet vainglorious European monarchs, African dictators, Indian mobs, Nazi pilots, British football hooligans, ancient Greeks, and fanatical Americans. Realistic and optimistic, this is a book that lends new meaning to the old adage, "Give peace a chance." Javier Mejia is an economist teaching at Stanford University, whose work focuses on the intersection between social networks and economic history. His interests extend to topics on entrepreneurship and political economy with a geographical specialty in Latin America and the Middle East. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from Los Andes University. He has been a Postdoctoral Associate and Lecturer at New York University--Abu Dhabi and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Bordeaux. He is a regular contributor to different news outlets. Currently, he is Forbes Magazine op-ed columnist. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
La guerra es ruinosa y sale mucho más cara que la paz. Aún así, los estados siguen entrando en conflicto. Y el politólogo Chris Blattman se ha dedicado a investigar por qué. En esta entrevista cuenta sus conclusiones.
War is an unrelenting undercurrent of human civilization and has always been so. Today, economist and political scientist Chris Blattman, author of Why We Fight, offers an explanation as to the psychological and strategic forces that propel nations to opt for such ruinous violence. Bio: Chris Blattman is an economist and political scientist who uses field work and statistics to study poverty, political engagement, the causes and consequences of violence, and policy in developing countries. He is a professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. Background: Most of my current research is with armed groups, gangs, organized crime, and the people who join violent organizations. This work involves a blend of qualitative interviews, large-scale surveys, statistical analysis, and field experiments. I also want to bring big ideas and research to a general audience, which is why I wrote Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. I co-lead the Crime & Violence Initiative for MIT's Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) as well as the Peace and Recovery Program for the research NGO Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). I'm also a Research Affiliate at UChicago's Crime and Inclusive Economy Labs. Finally, I'm a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Website/Book - https://chrisblattman.com/why-we-fight/ Artwork by Phillip Thor - https://linktr.ee/Philipthor_art To watch the visuals with the trailer go to https://www.podcasttheway.com/trailers/ The Way Podcast - www.PodcastTheWay.com - Follow at Twitter / Instagram - @podcasttheway (Subscribe/Follow on streaming platforms and social media!) Thank you Don Grant for the Intro/Outro. Check out his podcast - https://threeinterestingthings.captivate.fm Intro guitar copied from Aiden Ayers at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7UiB9FMOP5s *The views demonstrated in this show are strictly those of The Way Podcast/Radio Show*
Chris Blattman is an economist and political scientist and author of several books, most recently *Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace*. This is another installment in my investigation for how to pursue social change. What I notice about insurance is that the institution is so deeply encoded in our society that we don't even realize how important it is. So deeply encoded that we actually kind of hate it, yet it persists because of how important it is. What are other ways of pursuing beneficial social change? Persistent beneficial social change? Violent conflict is a pretty big, nasty problem. But what are its roots and what are its causes? What might need to change about our world to reduce it? What is the relationship between peripheral and central societies and how is that related to violence? All that plus tons on James C Scott and more!youtube: https://youtu.be/H-bcj1LJy80show notes: https://notunreasonable.com?p=7498
When there is conflict, can outsiders help by creating informal ways for communities to resolve their disputes? Chris Blattman tells Tim Phillips about the long-term impact of a project to do exactly this in Liberia.
As promised a few episodes back, today we're taking a deep dive into the factors affecting the current American economy. To do this, Jay is joined by economist and political scientist Chris Blattman from the University of Chicago. Tune in to learn how drivers such as Ukraine, Covid, inflation and globalization are affecting our current economic landscape. Plus, find out why Chris is hopeful about the state of the US economy. Check out Chris's new book - Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Path to Peacehttps://www.amazon.com/Why-We-Fight-Roots-Paths/dp/1984881574/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=1654113762&sr=8-1 Washington Post review of Chris's book: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/27/an-incremental-way-peace-despite-putin-persistence-war/ Learn more about the Effective Altruism movement: https://www.effectivealtruism.org/
War is costly, deadly and destructive. So, why do we do it? In his new book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and The Paths to Peace, Prof. Chris Blattman of the University of Chicago lays out the five main reasons why countries go to war—and why building peace is actually a lot easier than we may think. Blattman is an economist and political scientist who studies global conflict, crime and poverty. As a seasoned peacebuilder, he has worked in a number of countries to help mitigate conflict between gang leaders, political enemies and ethnic villages. He argues that one of the keys to finding peace is using a tool called the bargaining range to give both sides a piece of what they want. In this episode, Blattman discusses how wars come to be, the incentives to stop them and what it will take for Putin to stop the fighting in Ukraine.
Chris Blattman is an economist and political scientist who studies global conflict, crime, and poverty. His life's work centers around the following questions: Why are some people and societies violent, oppressive, and poor? And what can we do about it? He works in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the United States. His new book, Why We Fight, explains the five reasons why conflict (rarely) blooms into war, and how to interrupt that deadly process.
David Eil talks with Chris Blattman about his book, "Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace." *** Probable Causation is part of Doleac Initiatives, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. If you enjoy the show, please consider making a tax-deductible contribution. Thank you for supporting our work!
In this episode, Morgan Wack speaks to Prof. Chris Blattman of the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, discussing the roots of war and paths to peace, which Blattman writes about in his recent book: "Why We Fight".
It's tempting to explain Russia's invasion of Ukraine with Putin's megalomania. Economist Chris Blattman of the University of Chicago talks about his book Why We Fight with EconTalk host Russ Roberts. Blattman explains why only a fraction of rivalries ever erupt into violence, the five main reasons adversaries can't arrive at compromise, and the problem with trying to get into Putin's head (and why it's not all about Putin. Really).
What causes war? Many scholars have spent their careers attempting to study the psychology of leaders to understand what incentivizes them to undertake the human and financial costs of conflict, but economist and political scientist Chris Blattman takes a different approach to understanding interstate violence. He returns for his second appearance on Conversations with Tyler to discuss his research into the political and institutional causes of conflict, the topic of his new book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and The Path to Peace. Chris and Tyler also cover why he doesn't think demographics are a good predictor of a country's willingness to go to war, the informal norms that restrain nations, the dangers of responding to cyberattacks, the breakdown of elite bargains in Ethiopia, the relationship between high state capacity and war, the greatest threats to peace in Ireland, why political speech isn't usually a reliable indicator of future action, Vladimir Putin's centralized motives for invading Ukraine, why he's long on Colombia democratically – but not economically, why more money won't necessarily help the Mexican government curb cartel violence, the single-mindedness necessary for bouldering, how Harold Innis's insights about commodities led Chris to start studying war, how the University of Chicago has maintained a culture of free inquiry, and more. Email: cowenconvos@mercatus.gmu.edu Follow us on Twitter Follow us on Instagram Follow Tyler on Twitter Follow Chris on Twitter Like us on Facebook Subscribe to our Newsletter: https://go.mercatus.org/l/278272/2017-09-19/g4ms
What makes conflict win out over compromise? In this episode, we speak with Dr. Chris Blattman, an acclaimed expert on violence and conflict. His recent book, “Why We Fight,” draws on economics, political science, and psychology to examine the root causes of war and the paths to peace.In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the other ongoing conflicts our world faces today, many of us are wondering, is resorting to violence the norm? Are the paths to war easier than the paths to peace? Examining real-world interventions, “Why We Fight” explores why violent conflict is rare in reality and how successful societies interrupt and end violence through peacebuilding.This podcast is produced in partnership with the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts. For more information, please visit their website at www.thepearsoninstitute.orgAccess the transcript here: https://thepearsoninstitute.org/news-and-media/podcastPodcast Production Credits:Interviewing: Deqa Aden and Ana Camila VasquezEditing: Aishwarya KumarProduction: Reema Saleh
In nature, animals roar and bare their teeth to intimidate adversaries - but one side usually backs down, and real fights are rare. The wisdom of evolution is that the risk of violence is just too great. Which might make one wonder: if war is so destructive, why does it happen? The question may sound na
Dylan Matthews interviews economist Chris Blattman (@cblatts) about his new book Why We Fight, which examines the root causes of war and what can be done to stop it. In a wide-ranging discussion that touches on conflict all over the world, Dylan and Chris discuss the role of the state, commonalities among historical conflicts, and the game theory of war. References: Chris Blattman's book, Why We Fight Chris's research work Research on how drug gangs govern in Colombia How therapy can reduce conflict Using summer vacations to study peace deal mediators The influence of royal mounties in the 19th century may make Canadian hockey less violent now Blattman on Ukraine before the war Civil war predictions in the US Hosts: Dylan Matthews (@dylanmatt), senior correspondent, Vox Credits: Sofi LaLonde, producer and engineer Libby Nelson, editorial adviser Amber Hall, deputy editorial director of talk podcasts Sign up for The Weeds newsletter each Friday: vox.com/weedsletter Want to support The Weeds? Please consider making a donation to Vox: bit.ly/givepodcasts Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Why do nations fight when it's clear how incredibly destructive war is? Economist and political scientist Chris Blattman joins the show to discuss his new book, Why We Fight. He discusses how the world is probably more peaceful than it gets credit for, the factors that cause peace to sometimes breaks down, and how we can build a world with less violence and less conflict. Further reading: Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? - https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/40/3/54/12120/Is-the-Taiwan-Strait-Still-a-Flash-Point 'How to Change the World' course syllabus - https://chrisblattman.com/files/2022/01/Syllabus_HowToChangeTheWorld_Fall_2021.pdf Books that development economists should read - https://chrisblattman.com/blog/2011/06/21/books-development-economists-and-aid-workers-seldom-read-but-should/ To make sure you hear every episode, join our Patreon at https://www.patreon.com/neoliberalproject. Patrons get access to exclusive bonus episodes, our sticker-of-the-month club, and our insider Slack. Become a supporter today! Got questions for the Neoliberal Podcast? Send them to mailbag@neoliberalproject.org Follow us at: https://twitter.com/ne0liberal https://www.instagram.com/neoliberalproject/ https://www.facebook.com/groups/1930401007051265/ Join a local chapter at https://neoliberalproject.org/join
Real Talk is on the road! Ryan hosts from the beautiful Fairmont Jasper Park Lodge in Jasper, AB, where he's speaking at the Community Leaders Camp: https://13waysinc.com/camp/ 5:55 | Doug Griffiths, former Progressive Conservative minister Doug Griffiths, founding CEO of 13 Ways, Inc., talks about the state of present-day conservatism in Alberta, Jason Kenney's leadership review, and 13 pathways to success (the follow-up to Doug's book, "13 Ways To Kill Your Community". https://13waysinc.com/ 28:34 | Why are we ignoring engineers when it comes to COVID mitigation strategies? Matthew Oliver, P.Eng. explains what led to his Twitter thread earlier this week, taking aim at medical doctors and researchers mocking his colleagues working in ventilation and filtration. Thread: https://twitter.com/sameo416/status/1518418260349177856?s=20&t=BXbC3tlPgzBno5qUrC2KkQ 43:14 | Author, economist, and political scientist Chris Blattman takes us into his new book, "Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace". The University of Chicago professor analyzes what's fuelling Putin's war in Ukraine, how to interrupt the evolution of conflict into war, and why NHL players' birth cities have a correlation to how violent they are on the ice. https://chrisblattman.com/why-we-fight/ 59:26 | In this week's The Leading Edge presented by Leading Edge Physio, we highlight an innovative new program at MacEwan University. The first of its kind in Canada, The Distinguished Visiting Artist in Country Music program aims to launch aspiring performers into a career in country music. https://www.macewan.ca/campus-life/news/2022/04/news-dvacm-launch-22/
The Ukraine-Russia conflict has dominated headlines over the past few months, with countless theories and hypotheses being touted to explain Russia's aggression. Join us as we talk to one of the world's leading experts on violence and politics, Professor Chris Blattman. We start the episode with an explanation of why Chris chose to write his latest book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace, and how he can apply the logic within to explain Putin's motivations and behavior. We learn why peace is a better driver for innovation and competition than war, and what Chris feels about the controversial observations made by John Mearsheimer about the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Tune in to learn what the George Washington example is, and the role of the COVID-19 pandemic in the rising levels of violence within the USA. We next move on to the role of CBT in reducing violence across the globe, with some insightful examples of Mr. Rogers-like personas across Africa who Chris has worked with. This episode is jam-packed with tons of fascinating insights into current affairs, how to best tackle poverty, theoretical debate and so much more. Join us today as we talk to a true role model and thought leader on another episode of the Charter Cities podcast. Key Points From This Episode: • An introduction to Chris Blattman, author, economist, political scientist, expert on violence, and seasoned peacebuilder. • The inspiration behind why Chris wrote Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. • Chris's response to John Mearsheimer's observations on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. • Why Chris is content that his book was published before Russia invaded Ukraine. • The five logics of war applied to the Ukraine-Russia conflict: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, uncertainty, commitment problems, and misperceptions. • Why Chris feels that peace drives competition and innovation better than war. • The George Washington example: what it means and how it can be applied to other situations. • Why Chris is interested in applying Machiavellian logic to his research and blogging. • How the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted levels of violence within the USA, and why. • Why the Mr. Rogers principle is so effective, and examples Chris has come across in other countries. • CBT and how it can be applied to reduce poverty. • The monetary values associated with CBT across different cultures. • Why oversimplifying complex problems is bad for the solution, and why including locals in the solution is key to success. • An example of one of Chris' RCTs that failed! • Why Chris feels that he might have had a larger impact on society if he had moved into consulting in Africa. • The factors that helped to make the Harris School the success it is today. • Why Chris thinks giving cash is more effective at reducing poverty than other interventions. • How decentralizing power will be the ultimate solution to poverty. • Chris's thoughts on the Charter Cities Institute and goals. • Where Chris is now, and the issues he will be researching in the next five years. Links Mentioned in Today's Episode: https://www.linkedin.com/in/chrisblattman/ (Chris Blattman on LinkedIn) https://chrisblattman.com/ (Chris Blattman) https://chrisblattman.com/why-we-fight/ (Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace) https://www.amazon.com/Better-Angels-Our-Nature-Violence/dp/0143122010 (The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined) https://www.linkedin.com/in/charles-tilley-obe-a242501b8/?originalSubdomain=uk (Charles Tilley on LinkedIn)...
The economist Chris Blattman is well known in academic and policy circles for his research and writing on peace, conflict and economic development. Chris Blattman is a professor at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago and he is out with a brand new book, Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace. The book boils down decades of social science around peace and conflict, using examples throughout history, to explain why groups resort to war. This book is a highly accessible way for the general public to understand what many academics know about war and peace. On May 3rd, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation will host a book event with Chris Blattman both virtually and in person in New York City. If you are interested in attending this event, you can register here.
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Happier Lives Institute: 2021 Annual Review & AMA, published by BarryGrimes on April 14, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. We're pleased to share our 2021 Annual Review with you. This post also doubles as an AMA, so feel free to ask us about our work to date, our future plans, or anything else. Michael, Barry, and Joy will be at EA Global: London this weekend and we plan to respond to your questions before and after the conference. You can also meet us in person at the career fair on Friday (4 pm-8 pm) and during our office hours on Saturday (11 am-12 pm). Before we get to the Annual Review, we'd like to make two announcements : We're currently hiring for a Senior Researcher, a Grants Strategist, and an Operations Manager. If you want to get a better feel for what it's like working at HLI, we think you'll enjoy these blog posts on life as a researcher and an operations manager by members of our team. We've updated our cost-effectiveness comparison of psychotherapy and cash transfers to include an estimate of the effects on other household members. We now estimate that StrongMinds is 9 times more cost-effective than GiveDirectly (a slight reduction from 12 times in our previous analysis). 1. Director's foreword by Michael Plant In 2021, we took a significant step forward with the publication of our first substantial piece of empirical work comparing the cost-effectiveness of cash transfers and psychotherapy in terms of subjective wellbeing. We analysed data from more than 140,000 participants across 80 studies to show that providing group psychotherapy to people with depression in low- and middle-income countries is around 10 times more cost-effective than providing cash transfers to people living in extreme poverty. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first two meta-analyses assessing the cost-effectiveness of any intervention in terms of subjective wellbeing. This is a surprising and important result. We've demonstrated that it's possible to compare seemingly incomparable outcomes by measuring their effects in terms of subjective wellbeing. By doing so, we found a new and outstanding funding opportunity for philanthropists and policymakers. This provides further evidence that we shouldn't rely on our intuitions about what makes people happier and should prioritise further research on the best ways to measure and increase global wellbeing. The cost-effectiveness analyses of cash transfers, psychotherapy, and StrongMinds consumed most of our research capacity in 2021. However, we also published an updated research agenda and a new problem area report on mental health, to accompany our previous report on pain. We were featured in Vox, The New Statesman, The Times, BBC Radio 4, and the Clearer Thinking podcast and our work was discussed on social media by prominent thinkers including Alexander Berger, Chris Blattman, Tim Ferriss, Geoff Mulgan, Duncan Green, and Justin Sandefur. I was delighted to welcome three new members to the team: Samuel Dupret (research), Joy Bitter (operations), and Barry Grimes (communications). Dr Caspair Kaiser joined our Board of Trustees and we said a fond farewell to our COO, Clare Donaldson, who joined the Lead Exposure Elimination Project. And for the first time, we were joined by a talented team of summer research fellows who explored a variety of applied and theoretical topics from our research agenda. Our search for the best ways to measure and improve global wellbeing continues in earnest in 2022. We have a pipeline of promising ‘micro'-interventions to evaluate, including deworming, cataract surgery, and providing cement floors. We are tentatively expanding our scope to look for funding opportunities that can absorb over $20 million of philanthropic funding or be scaled up by policymakers. We also continue to interrogate k...
Artificial Intelligence Podcast Podcast Notes Key Takeaways Long prolonged war is hardly ever positive-sum; the costs almost always outweigh the implied justice“Fighting is just politics by other means–inefficient, devastating, and costly means.” – Chris Blattman“War is the violence that doesn't make sense” – Chris BlattmanWar is a breakdown of reason – everybody loses something from war and there's usually a better and more efficient solutionWar is rare and history shows we're pretty successful at avoiding it–but that's not how history is taughtWe overemphasize the anecdotal and don't look at the objective data–usually to fuel the warmonger narrative, which is driven by one of the five root causes of war (below)Both Russia and Ukraine have incentives to bluff, which can result in many short-term conflicts but also affect long-term compromise/appeasement“If you bluff and lose, it's not because you miscalculated. You made an optimal choice given the uncertainty of the situation to take a gamble–that's a wiser thing for you to do than to not bluff.” – Chris BlattmanThis call and bluff dynamic could end up with Russia getting what they originally were asking for from Ukraine–but only after incurring unnecessary costs“There's a reason for every war and a war for every reason” – The five roots of war:Unchecked leaders: leaders do not bear the majority of costs or have a private incentive (Chris believes this is the fundamental cause of most violence in the world)Uncertainty: when the opposing group's strength or intentions are ambiguous, war seems like an appropriate risk to combat uncertaintyCommitment problems: some circumstances give one side an irresistible incentive to risk warIntangible incentives: intransigence for ideologies, choosing war rather than changing your viewMisperceptions: miscalculating the complexity of the enemy or yourselvesRead the full notes @ podcastnotes.orgChris Blattman is a professor at the University of Chicago studying the causes and consequences of violence and war. Please support this podcast by checking out our sponsors: – Truebill: https://truebill.com/lex – Mizzen+Main: https://mizzenandmain.com and use code LEX to get $35 off – Grammarly: https://grammarly.com/lex to get 20% off premium – Indeed: https://indeed.com/lex to get $75 credit – Eight Sleep: https://www.eightsleep.com/lex and use code LEX to get special savings EPISODE LINKS: Chris's Twitter: https://twitter.com/cblatts Chris's Website: https://chrisblattman.com Why We Fight (book): https://amzn.to/3702fjb PODCAST INFO: Podcast website: https://lexfridman.com/podcast Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/2lwqZIr Spotify: https://spoti.fi/2nEwCF8 RSS: https://lexfridman.com/feed/podcast/ YouTube Full Episodes: https://youtube.com/lexfridman YouTube Clips:
Chris Blattman is a professor at the University of Chicago studying the causes and consequences of violence and war. Please support this podcast by checking out our sponsors: – Truebill: https://truebill.com/lex – Mizzen+Main: https://mizzenandmain.com and use code LEX to get $35 off – Grammarly: https://grammarly.com/lex to get 20% off premium – Indeed: https://indeed.com/lex to get $75 credit – Eight Sleep: https://www.eightsleep.com/lex and use code LEX to get special savings EPISODE LINKS: Chris's Twitter: https://twitter.com/cblatts Chris's Website: https://chrisblattman.com Why We Fight (book): https://amzn.to/3702fjb PODCAST INFO: Podcast website: https://lexfridman.com/podcast Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/2lwqZIr Spotify: https://spoti.fi/2nEwCF8 RSS: https://lexfridman.com/feed/podcast/ YouTube Full Episodes: https://youtube.com/lexfridman YouTube Clips:
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Chris Blattman on the chaotic nature of running surveys, published by Aaron Gertler on February 20, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. On trying to learn about people in the context of "doing good in the developing world". Crossposting this because I found it funny, and because gratitude is healthy. (I'm grateful that I didn't become a development economist.) I have been running about pre-testing a new questionnaire–always a humbling and frustrating experience. Take an apparently simple question: “How many children do you have?” Respondent: Five.Surveyor: Do all of these children live with you?Respondent: Well, I have two other children who live with my brother.Surveyor: I see. So you have seven biological children?Respondent: No, three of my children belong to my sister who died last year.Surveyor: So you have four biological children, plus three children you have adopted.Respondent: Well, one of them lives with his father sometimes. I also take care of the children of my cousin, but he is away at school. Nothing is ever simple. It turns out that five or six questions are required to figure out the number of children accurately and consistently. And in Uganda the number of children is easy. In western Kenya, out of superstition people would deliberately overstate the number of children they have. What about something even less straightforward to measure, such as women's empowerment? Jeannie and I are working with an international humanitarian organization to evaluate the impact of providing small grants, business skills training, and business advice networks to the most extremely vulnerable women–those with no incomes, many children to support, low social support, little family assistance, health challenges, and so forth. How to measure this in a survey? Luckily we have the Demographic and Health Surveys — downloadable surveys and representative data on health, demographics, domestic violence, and women's status across dozens of countries, including Uganda. Perfect, right? Now not only do we have ready-made questions, we can have representative comparison data for our sample. Not so fast. Turns out that looking great on paper does not necessarily pre-test well. Take one question designed to understand financial independence: Q. Do you have any money of your own that you alone can decide how to use? Problem: the primary answer is “no, I don't usually have any money”. The question measures access to funds rather than decision-making power. A better option might be to first ask “when money is available.” It turns out, however, that the answer to this question is still, “it depends”. Most of all, it depends on whether the woman earned the money herself. We had similar problems with almost every other DHS question we adopted. Q: Are you permitted to go to the health center to buy things on your own, only if someone accompanies you, or not at all?A. What do you mean by permission? I usually consult my husband, especially if I have to pay money. Also, I can go for a short visit, but I need his permission to stayovernight. Q. Do you yourself control the money needed to buy clothes for yourself?A. What do you mean by control? You mean I keep it myself? How expensive are the clothes? Who earned the money? Virtually all of the DHS questions required clarification, additional specification, and narrowing. Usually the questions we ended up with in the end were still simple and straightforward, but much more locally appropriate and specific, and elicited much clearer and more consistent answers that actually captured empowerment. Part of the challenge is that there is a great deal of local variation. But I could not help feel that the same questions and challenges would have occurred in any context. It's not easy to tell how, where, when and by whom these questions were pre-te...
Chris Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago's Pearson Institute and Harris Public Policy. He is an economist and political scientist who studies poverty, violence and crime in developing countries. He has designed and evaluated strategies for tackling poverty, including cash transfers to the poorest. Much of his work is with the victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, testing the link between poverty and violence. His recent work looks at other sources of and solutions to violence. These solutions range from behavioral therapy to social norm change and local-level state building. He has worked mainly in Colombia, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chicago's South Side. Dr. Blattman was previously faculty at Columbia and Yale Universities, and holds a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and a Master's in Public Administration and International Development (MPA/ID) from the Harvard Kennedy School.
Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia, The Long-Term Impacts of Grants on Poverty: Nine-Year Evidence from Uganda’s Youth Opportunities Program, and Gang rule: Understanding and Countering Criminal Governance Prof. Chris Blattman is an economist and political scientist at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/scientificsense/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/scientificsense/support
I had a chat with Mark Lutter, founder and executive director of Charter Cities Institutes about the potential of charter cities to boost a nation’s prosperity and development. Our conversation touched on state capacity, why American institutions appear to be failing, and why Silicon Valley elites have no political influence.You can download or listen right in the player above - or from your favourite players and podcast providers here. You can rate us here, this helps others find the show. Reference guides by CCI for people new to the idea are here. You can also read my writings on cities (here and here). TranscriptTL: Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. Joining me is Mark Lutter. Mark Lutter is an economist and he is the founder and executive director of [the] Charter Cities Institute. You're welcome, Mark. ML: Thanks for having me on. TL: Yeah briefly, please. What are Charter Cities and what do they bring to economic development? ML: Sure, so Charter Cities are new cities with a special jurisdiction that allows them to have a more competitive business environment. And we believe they are important because, over the long run, they're a key determinant of economic performance, economic outcomes and […] governance. If you have good governance, a country will do relatively well and if you have poor governance, a country will do relatively poorly. The challenge can be that it's difficult to reform governance on a national level. There's a lot of special interests groups. There's a lot of politics that goes on that sometimes make the reforms quite difficult to implement. And, Charter Cities, because they're new cities, they can be built on Greenfield sites where there are fewer special interests and because they have a special jurisdiction, it can be politically feasible to implement deeper reforms than might be possible at the national level.So these deeper reforms are to improve the business environment combined with a new city allow for more economic development to occur than otherwise might take place. So if we look at the last 40, fifty, 60 years, we've seen cities like Shenzhen, Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai emerge from practically nothing to become global metropolises. And we believe that success is replicable. Particularly because there are a little under 80 million new urban residents annually, so urbanization is growing extremely rapidly across Africa and across Asia, and we believe it's quite important to make sure that we get things right now because it's much harder to change governance, It's much harder to change infrastructure once a city is already built. And so we believe that if we can help set up this sort of right institutions now, the right set up now, the right layout of new cities now, it can basically save a lot of headaches over the next fifty [to] hundred years, and help lift tens of millions of people out of poverty and make things better for economic development. TL: Yeah, so, obviously, I'm not new to this idea and we've talked a couple of times about it. Thinking about Charter Cities, it's a big project. So what do you think are the effective financing structures that make them feasible knowing the fiscal challenges that some poor countries face?ML: Sure, so the way we think about Charter Cities is as Public-Private Partnerships with the host country. So we're not asking the host country to build the city, we're asking the host country to help create a governance framework that can make the Charter City more competitive. And we think that this is especially important now in the post-COVID world where a lot of countries, particularly in emerging markets might be resource dependent on oil and like Nigeria. Or copper, like Zambia. And prices have rebounded somewhat over the last few months, but given that they're much lower than they were a year ago, I think there is a reasonable expectation that demand will continue to be relatively low, at least, until a vaccine is discovered. And so that means these countries have big holes in their budget and will need new financing mechanisms and we view Charter Cities as potentially one of those financing mechanisms. Charter Cities, because they're new cities, they can be built on Greenfield sites where there are fewer special interests and because they have a special jurisdiction, it can be politically feasible to implement deeper reforms than might be possible at the national level - ML The Charter City would have a revenue-sharing agreement with the central government. It will be able to attract a lot of foreign investment, create a lot of economic activities, create a lot of jobs and then some of that wealth that is being created would be transferred to the central government that might be able to help plug the hole that is currently being left by low commodity prices. Additionally, we just think if you build a successful city, it will generate a tremendous amount of wealth. We're still in the early Charter Cities phases and the specifics for financing Charter Cities haven't all been sort of worked out, but the general hypothesis is 'look, if you create a successful, functioning city, then there will be a lot of wealth that is created and you just need to capture some of that wealth that can pay for the initial infrastructure investment that can pay for the costs associated with setting up and building a city. So, that's at least the eye level overview of how we think about financing Charter Cities.TL: The question of financing is important here because some would argue, and I think, Chris Blattman has actually made this argument that given the risks involved that these investments may not pay off, it's actually an objection to not doing it. How do you react to that? What are the big payoffs for charter cities as opposed to other development interventions like cash transfers and other forms of aid?ML: Sure, so, it's definitely possible that for one or more charter cities the investments will not pay off. That's the nature of an investment, they're not necessarily secure and so there is always risks associated with investments. The risks associated with charter cities might be higher depending on where the charter city is being built, depending on what the local politics are, depending on the sort of skill of the developer. But I think, I would, I guess, sort of, differentiate as to what we're talking about in terms of investment. So if we're talking about cash transfers. Cash transfers are not an investment per se. Cash transfers are a transfer of wealth. They are basically a donation. It is comparable to charity. And most of the evidence on cash transfers is relatively good. You give people more money, they're able to spend the money to get better things. Recent studies have suggested that this does have relatively long-lasting impact on improving people's lives, so I support cash transfers. Charter Cities, at least, the way we at the Charter Cities Institute conceive of them are led by private developers who are building the physical infrastructure themselves. So this is an investment, not a donation. The expectation is if you raise 700 million dollars to build a power plant, to build roads, to build water, electricity, etc, then you expect a return on that capital investment that can justify the risks associated with that particular project. So this is a commercial venture, not a development venture per se. And we believe that Charter Cities can pass this sort of commercial venture test where, okay, if people who are humanitarians want to get involved, that is great, but as a mechanism for social change, I think the profit motive tends to be important and can allow for more social change in a shorter period of time than asking everybody to change their behaviour out of the goodness of their heart. That being said, there is space for, I think, donations in the Charter Cities space. The Charter Cities Institute, for example, is a 501C3. We rely on donations. We are trying to kind of incubate this Charter Cities space, trying to bootstrap it, creating a network of different city developers, developing a set of best practices, things like that. But we have done at least internal calculations that we have published on the research portion of our website, where we look at GiveWell which is a well-known charity evaluator. And we look at GiveWell and the cost-effectiveness of various charities that they evaluate and based on some assumptions that we make about our own effectiveness and these assumptions, I believe, are quite conservative. We are comparable to the most cost-effective charities in the world; if not more effective than them. TL: Charter Cities, at least, as an idea, in its current framing, is not new. Paul Romer kind of reintroduced the idea a while back. And with implementation - Honduras, Madagascar - they've run into some problems. What are you doing differently at CCI, and how does your model differ from that proposition? ML: Sure, and that's a good question. So Paul Romer obviously pioneered this space but didn't have as much success as I think he would have liked. And what we've tried to do is learn from his impact and see how we could try to have a bit more success this time around. So first let me talk about differences with Paul Romer's model and our model for charter cities. The similarities are: both of the models involve cities with a special jurisdiction that allow them to have a different institutional framework than the rest of the country, an institutional framework that is more conducive to economic development, and to growth. Those are the similarities. I think the differences are that Paul Romer advocated a high-income country, for example, Canada administers a Charter City in a low-income country for example, Honduras. So Canada would help create the administrative structure, they would be responsible for it, and that is the mechanism by which part of Honduras could have good governance. We have not pursued that model for, I think, two reasons. One, we're not sure it's feasible. There is a lot of blowbacks associated with charter cities, we're sometimes accused of being neocolonialists, and I think having a high-income country act as a guarantor in a low-income country brings up some of those unpleasant historical memories that might make getting political buy-in a little bit more difficult. The second reason we're not pursuing that model is we're not sure it's the best model, even if you, sort of, assume away the political challenges of it. So looking at, for example, the response of many countries in the West to COVID, the US has had a relatively poor response to COVID. Our institutional capacity as somewhat decayed, we aren't as vibrant, as effective as we were 50, 60 years ago, there's a general lethargy in our own institutions, and I think that that lethargy would likely translate to helping to build new institutions in emerging markets. And so there is a question of 'is the high-income country the best institutional entity to help administer a charter city?' And we believe it is not. So what we do is we partner with new city developers. There are by Journalist Wade Shepherd...he estimates there are over 200 mass or fenced cities being built around the world right now. So we try to partner with these new city developers, typically private entities, sometimes they're public but we prefer our partner with the private ones because they tend to be a little bit more effective to figure out okay, they're building a new city which might have a hundred thousand residents, which might have a million residents, so we partner with them to try to improve their governance system. And this might mean working with the government to improve the special economic zone framework. If there is a relatively advanced special economic zone framework in place, we might work with the city developer to figure out okay, what does it actually mean to create this new administrative structure from scratch. So that's the difference in approach.I guess before I go into why I think we'll be effective, I think, a few other points. One, Paul Romer was quite effective at generating attention and, sort of, starting the conversation and working with governments, at least, up to a point. We're taking a bit more of what might be described as, sort of, a systematic approach. We're somewhat worried about the ecosystem of charter cities being too dependent on a single person or on a single country. So we try to diversify risk by partnering with a lot of different organizations, by working in a lot of different countries, by really helping to spread the idea of charter cities as far as possible such that if one project goes under a hard time or fails, there are other projects that we can shift our attention to make sure the momentum for charter cities is not lost. As to, I think why we think that we will be successful where he was unsuccessful, I think we've learned a lot from him; and in addition, I think the last 10 years, there's been a bit of an increased interest in charter cities. And then second, we're just seeing it on the ground. We have engaged two projects where we are helping them create these legal structures, these administrative entities from scratch to governing these cities. The projects have a degree of political buy-in. We are regularly reached out to by new city developers who are interested in improving governance in those cities. We're basically at the beginning of a charter city's moment, and I think over the next year, the next two years, it will become clear to everybody who isn't paying attention now that the charter city's moment is here, that these projects are real, people are building them, people are moving dirt, people are moving in, money is being raised, etc. that it is no longer just [an] academic discussion, but it is a matter of sort of on the ground, things happening and executing.TL: I mean, hearing you speak, I thought of a question, which is - to a layperson, like, what exactly are the channels of improvement to income and livelihoods in building a new city, for example?ML: Sure, so, If we look at a city like Shenzhen, 40 years ago in 1980, Shenzhen was a number of small fishing villages, the total population in the area was about a 100,000 residents. The average income was about $500 a year. It was a very impoverished area and currently, Shenzhen is the manufacturing capital of the world. It has a total population of around 20 million people, they have a subway system that rivals New York. It is a sort of, shiny, gleaming metropolis that really transformed in just 40 years. So while China had several sort of specific conditions that mean that the success of Shenzhen is unlikely to replicate at that magnitude. For example, China had first basically prevented urbanisation from occurring, so there was a pent up demand for urbanisation. As well as China had very stringent regulations and laws which had precluded a lot of economic development. And while Africa, for example, many countries have bad regulations, I'm not sure they were as bad as China in the 1980s. But that being said, we believe that a degree of that success is still possible even if you get half of Shenzhen, that's a city of ten million people, that sees your income rise by like 10, 20X over a 40 year period. That is a huge change. If you look in a lot of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, what's occurring now is called urbanization without industrialization. And this means that people are moving to cities. And typically when people move to cities, they become more productive, they are able to make more money, they live better lives, they leave their kids better off, and it's this virtual circle. And now, unfortunately, in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa this is not occurring. People are moving into cities but their productivity is not increasing, they're not making more money, and their kids are going to stuck at the same sort of level in income and quality of life that they are today. And what we believe charter cities can help do is to, I guess, help change that to help create these opportunities for these people that are currently being left behind by the global economy and to create this positive dynamic, this positive feedback cycle that leads to people's incomes being increased by 5 percent per year, 10 percent per year. Which because of the power of compounding interest, if your income is increasing at 5 percent per year, that means, every 14 years, your income doubles. So 28 years later, your income will be four times what it was originally. Forty-two years later, which is about the total working life of an adult (about 42 years), your income will be 8 times what it was when you started. You've seen an 8 fold increase in income, [which] is just tremendous. So if we can help create that dynamic, if we can help generate this type of growth, I think that will lead toad to a big improvement in a lot of people's lives.TL: It's interesting you talked about Shenzhen before we move into the specifics of that. Shenzhen is usually described as a special economic zone. Is that different from Charter Cities, or is essentially the same thing? ML: Sure. So, Special Economic Zones. We consider Charter Cities to be a subset of Special Economic Zones. The special economic zone is just an area that says that the laws of the host country don't apply to this area, or like some subset of the laws. But typically, special economic zones tend to be relatively narrow in their focus. They might only encompass an industrial park, they might only be a few dozen or a few hundred acres. They have a relatively set degree of difference from the host country in terms of laws, so it might have lower taxes or it might have a one-stop-shop but they don't really have this deep regulatory reforms. They tend to focus on a single industry, so maybe textile, manufacturing or maybe electronics, they aren't broad-based. Very rarely do special economic zones have residential. And lastly, they tend to be too small to generate sustained economic growth. If you have an industrial park that might be successful, that might create a lot of jobs but that's not really going to create this dynamic positive feedback cycle like a city can. Shenzhen whilst frequently described as a special economic zone, at least, according to our definition, it is more like a charter city. The jurisdiction is 320 square kilometres, so that's the size of a city. It is multi-use. They have residential, they have commercial, they have industrial. They have the sort of full dynamics that you expect to see in a city with a lot of different economic parts moving. There was a lot of authority devolved from the central government to the city government. So while many special economic zones might only have like a tax incentive, basically in Shenzhen, with the exception of military and like Mail distribution, you can almost experiment with whatever you want you on the Shenzhen city level. And that allowed for a lot more autonomy than most special economic zones allow. So while Shenzhen is sort of colloquially referred to as a special economic zone, it fits our definition and our understanding of what a charter city is a little bit more closely than most special economic zones around the world which are quite different from Shenzhen and as such haven't had the same impact that Shenzhen has had.TL: Two-part Shenzhen question here. I agree with you, Shenzhen fits better with what you are describing. I mean, there was an industrial zone in Shekou, and of course, there was the whole area that was developed for all kinds of things, tourism and the rest. Now, the first question is that there was a lot of planning and execution in making Shenzhen work. How does the administrative capacity of the host country, how does it affect the execution of a Charter City?ML: Sure, and I think this is an important point. One of the increasing discussions in economics and international development has been focusing on state capacity in which the administrative capacity of a country or a government can be thought of as - are they able to execute on tasks in a timely and effective manner? So a country with this higher state capacity would be able to build a road cheaper and more quickly than a country with a lower state capacity. And in Shenzhen it was the local government that administered the city. China has had 3000 years [of] history of statehood. So they have a lot of experience in capacity with administrating cities and they just had to adapt it the circumstances at hand. And I think one of the challenges in some emerging markets is that there isn't that long history of statehood. There isn't that long history of administrative capacity, and so the current governments are not being very effective in administering the entire country. So if they start to administer a charter city, you would see a similar type of dysfunction. To solve this problem, we are advocating a special jurisdiction with a separate administration from the host country. And so the city would remain part of the host country, it would be governed by a separate bureaucratic apparatus, it would have different standards for hiring, different standards for firing, different standards for promotion, etc, which would allow it to develop a more effective administration than the host country. And so, to this end, we're engaged in [a] sort of early-stage discussion about helping to establish this administrative apparatuses and we're beginning to think about what it means to develop a pipeline of administrators for a Charter City that would help [to] work with educational establishment to create certificates, to create courses that might help teach you how to administer a charter city. 'Cause this is sort of a monumental challenge, there are so many moving parts and you don't really want to hire people from the host country because then they bring the bad culture of the host country government, they bring the sort of, I don't know… the sclerosis that often exists in host countries' bureaucracies that leads to the need for charter cities. But you don't want to transplant that bureaucratic dysfunction to the charter city, so you would have to basically create a new administrative system and a new education system to train those administrators. TL: Yeah, so with the special jurisdiction, what guarantees continuity? I'm imagining that the government of the host country would still have some form of authority over that jurisdiction however limited. And what guarantees that another administration does not come in and say, 'Oh, yeah, well, for political reasons or whatever, we're going to withdraw our support for this.' Or is there a specific framework that you've outlined which guarantees long-term autonomy?ML: Sure. I'm glad you asked that question, that is one of the challenges for charter cities. How do you ensure that there is administrative continuity in the charter city and the host country hasn't changed their mind and limit some of the authority that they had previously granted to the charter city? We are seeing that, for example, right now in Hong Kong, where the Chinese government is passing a national security law that many on Hong Kongers believe changed the sort of terms of the agreement in 1997 when Hong Kong was transferred from the British to the Beijing government. There is no silver bullet for preventing, right? You can't do a magic trick and say 'alright, there is no risk of expropriation of the charter city' but there are a number of strategies that can be developed to mitigate that risk, and in fact, we published an outline of these strategies on our website called the Risk Mitigation Guide. It is in the reference guides. And it should give an understanding of strategies that can be taken to mitigate that risk. So basically, they're business project, they need to be profitable while obviously they're political projects as well. They need to get buy-in from the host country and so there are several ways to do that. First, you need to make sure that the development of the charter city itself has an extensive stakeholder management engagement in the planning processes. So you need to work closely with the host country at the central government, you probably want to work closely with the local government, whether it's state or provincial to make sure that you acquire the land justly, to make sure there is buy-in. You could, for example, offer the state or the national government an equity stake in the charter city to align interests of the government with the charter city itself. Second, you probably want to involve business and community leaders in the charter city. Successful institutional change requires the allegiance of the ruling elite, so making sure that there is an incentive for those people who are particularly influential in the country to align with the success of the charter city is important. Third, you probably want to attract industries that create a lot of jobs. It is politically difficult to change something if a lot of jobs are being created, if a lot of investment is being had, things like this. So, make it more difficult for the politicians to take action against the charter city by creating a lot of jobs, by making it successful, etc. Third, most countries in the world are signatories to a variety of international treaties. So if you sign a contract with the host country and they expropriate you, depending on how you draft that language, you might be able to go and sue them in the international court, and if you win to confiscate their overseas assets. This is basically a last-ditch solution. If you get to this stage you've already lost. But it might help sort of as a bit of a deterrent against host country trying to confiscate your assets by demonstrating that there is some recourse to that action of expropriation. Another strategy is to list the city on the Stock Exchange. So after 10 or 15 years after the city is successful, maybe you put a listing on the local Stock Exchange for a certain percentage of the value of the developer who has built out the city. What does this mean? Well, this oftentimes, the pension funds and other sorts of financial managers will buy that stock and so pension funds and these financial managers tend to be relatively politically powerful and therefore if their future income streams are depending on the success of the charter city, then the host country might be less likely to take actions against the charter city. And Lastly, I think just to really emphasize the first point - it's very important to make sure charter cities are integrated with the local government, with the community - that the benefits of charter cities are being widespread. The best way, I think, to ensure that there's a minimum of risk of expropriation is just to make sure that it becomes very apparent that the charter city is being successful, it's creating jobs, that everybody is being engaged and participating in the upside of a charter city. TL: The second part question is that… I mean, I'm glad you talked about local governance. In building a charter city, I imagine there are allocative decisions that the government would have to make. I compare Shenzhen to maybe some other initiative like Gurgaon in India and one thing the Chinese government had with Shenzhen is that it still maintained control over the allocation of land. And, at least in my opinion, that allowed some kind of diverse development in terms of the industrial and residential developments that took place, and also in the building of public goods, in the provision of public goods generally. But what you see, at least, I wouldn't call them charter cities, with projects like Eko Atlantic City and others of such is that, yes, they are planned but, maybe for financial reasons, the allocative decisions are made solely for real estate developments. Maybe that helps in recouping some of the investment. So, I guess what I'm asking is, where should the allocative decisions lie to create the proper incentive for a truly income enhancing city to develop?ML: Sure, yeah, and I think that is an important question and looking at Shenzhen versus Gurgaon in India. Gurgaon is quite interesting, for the listeners who don't know, basically because of this sort of historical quirk, there was no government which allowed for no zoning and land use regulations and so a lot of tech companies and sort of large companies went and built offices there, advanced infrastructure there, so it has a lot of office buildings, things like that but because there is no governing structure, the public infrastructure tends to be quite poor. So if I remember correctly, there are basically no sewers, most of the buildings have to run on generators. It allows this freedom to build but it combines that with this lack of government. While Shenzhen, the government has been relatively effective in providing public goods, at creating an open space that allows for its success. And I think if we look at all the planned cities around the world being built today, Eko Atlantic being one example, I think you capture it well in saying that they are real estate, they're not really cities. So, real estate you tend to define everything very carefully, it's 'we build a thousand houses and we sell them each for this much money and this is what the margins are' etc, while a city is evolutionary, it's dynamic. The sort of level of planning of the city government tends to be much smaller. It's not saying we're going to build an apartment building here and we're going to build a commercial district here. It's trying to create the enabling conditions for growth and for success. And what we're trying to do is trying to kind of change the conversation with some of these new city developers to focus on more of an inclusive model where it's aimed at a broader set of residents. Where right now a lot of the new cities are aimed at sort of upper middle income or above, but how can you push the price point down? So one of the projects that we're working on is a document that is tentatively called a draft master plan. What this will do is it will be a master plan for a charter city. We're thinking about having it on 30,000 acres with 1 million residents, but we're explicitly targeting an income level of $1500 annually, which is a little under, I think, the per capita income of Nigeria. It's comparable to the per capita income of Zambia, of Kenya. We're explicitly trying to develop a model where it's accessible to this broad income segment, but we're not saying these are the types of houses that people would already build, we're just kind of thinking about okay, where is the infrastructure going to be? How do we attract an anchor tenant? How do we attract residents? How do we make it dynamic such that people's incomes increase over time? It's possible to build a sort of exclusive gated community where high-income people go and live and work and they end up being quite comfortable there, and I encourage people to do that. That's just not the model that we are particularly interested in. And I think it might be a good business venture but it has limited implications for [the] broader society and what we're interested in is how we can help effect social change to generate economic development and to lift people out of poverty, and I think to do that, it's important to help make sure charter cities are inclusive, allow for all segments of society experience the benefits of living in a fast-growing and dynamic city. TL: A bit of a curveball, so to speak, here. There's a lot of planning involved in charter cities. Do you think that that's a challenge to a free-market model of development?If you look in a lot of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, what's occurring now is called urbanization without industrialization. - MLML: In a way, I mean, I'm sure some market-oriented economist might not like what we are doing. I remember when I was doing my PhD at George Mason I was chatting about this with some people, they were like: well, how do you plan? But if we remember the Keynes versus Hayek rap video, the question is 'who plans for who?' So there always need to be some level of planning, right? We do it on an individual level. We do it on a corporate level, even government does it on some level. If you're just planning for, how many police, how many courts? What should the military do? Things like that. And so we might be taking a slightly more active role in planning than some free markets economists might advocate for in terms of thinking about what the anchor tenant should be, how to attract them, how to create these sort of supply linkages. In the draft master plan that we're developing, we are thinking about basically how to create a type of industrial policy because what we want is, okay, when it starts, maybe you focus on textile manufacturing or some relatively low skilled type of employment, but how do we make sure there is skill transfer over time such that the city can move its way up the value chain, can create more jobs and can have this positive dynamic to help lift people out of poverty rather than just being stuck at textile manufacturing now and then 30 years from now? TL: That's interesting. I spoke with Garett Jones, and one of the things he proposed that developing countries [should] try to do is to become an attractive destination for high skilled labour, you know, a labour quality argument of sorts. Do you think charter cities can be a channel for such attraction of high quality, high skilled labour to developing countries which obviously has benefits?ML: Yeah, I think it can. A charter city if developed correctly will probably be more safe than the host country because the place will be more effective. The charter city will be more dynamic. There will be more opportunities and so if there is a high skilled worker who are in their early career and want to do it abroad. Or maybe their ancestors are from a country and want to sort of return and kind of give back or maybe they are first-generation immigrant and want to give back, then I think a charter city would be a probably more attractive place to live than the rest of the host country because it would be more dynamic. There will be more opportunities. It would be a more exciting place to live. That being said, I think I disagree slightly with Garett Jones on the premise...you definitely want the higher-skilled workers for the knowledge transfer. It depends on exactly what he means by this, but Dubai, for example, was able to attract a lot of high skilled workers primarily from Europe, while Shenzhen developed without that many highly skilled workers. They had a lot of investment from Hong Kong. And they had a lot of managerial talent that could come from Hong Kong. So I think it's quite important to, I guess, create these linkages with different areas, different cities that can help the skills transfer process, and then you probably also want to help high skilled workers come in to fill senior administrative positions. But I think to make sure charter cities are scalable, the vast majority of the new urban residents over the next 30 years are not going to be highly skilled. They're going to be relatively impoverished coming from rural areas. We're not going to have sort of the skills that we typically associate with the modern economy, and I think what is important is to realize that and to create systems and processes to allow them to improve their skills, to allow them to get better, to allow them to, sort of, transform the city into somewhere that they would be proud to call home. TL: I'm curious. What exactly made you, Mark Lutter, interested in this problem? Why did you choose to work on this other than teaching at GMU or writing papers and other things you could have done as an academic?ML: Sure. Well, I'm not sure I could have done that much as an academic. I'm a pretty mediocre academic, I like getting my hands dirty a little bit more. LaughsWhat initially got me interested? I heard a talk where the speaker mentioned Michael [indistinct] and who tried to start a Freeport in Somaliland. And in fact, there is now a Freeport being built in Somaliland by Dubai Ports World in Berbera. And basically, what got me interested was I saw it as an Idea that has massive potential that not that many people were paying attention to and talking about and it got me really excited and so I stayed interested in it and sort of realized that I could have a meaningful contribution to making this, I think, really exciting idea take place. And that's why I've stayed interested in it. I like things that can have a big impact and to me, charter cities are one of the things that might be able to have the biggest impact in the 21st century and so it's quite exciting to be involved. TL: So how important is geography in the development of charter cities? I know proximity to ports is very important to facilitate trade. So, but how does it really feature in your own model?ML: Sure, so geography is obviously quite important because - are you on a trading route? Is there an urbanising population that you can draw from? What are the industries that in the area that you can sort of help supplement? We typically think about locating a charter city has being independent on several factors. You probably want to be within about 2 hours of an urban centre so you can piggyback back off their infrastructure because building an airport or a port is very expensive, but if you are within two hours of them you can acquire a large enough chunk of land to build the city because one of the challenges of building a charter city is actually getting enough land to build the city itself. But if you're 2 hours away, you might be able to acquire enough land but you're still close enough that you can access their airport, that you can kind of access their labour market, that you'll allow for a bit more trade than would take place if you were in the middle of nowhere.Like, you want to be on emerging trade routes. So for example, there's a lot of activities going on in East Africa right now. A lot of people are building ports there. That might be an opportunity for a charter city there. Thinking about how new technology might change sort of migration patterns. Maybe the Hyperloop comes, or maybe supersonic jets come, how does that change human sort of spatial organization? And then can you identify opportunities to locate cities because of that? There might be [an] opportunity for a charter city, for example, in Canada or maybe in Central Asia because Siberia and Northern Canada, with global warming, are going to open up and allow for more agriculture, for more natural resource extraction, things like that. So there will be a demand for people to live there and a new city might allow for it to become sort of a gateway to those respective regions. So basically looking at how human sort of trade and human migration patterns are occurring and then trying to identify those long-term trends and then build in a place that can take advantage of those trends to become a regional hub and provide services to the broader area.TL: The reason I asked that question is this. Someone like Paul Romer I think in his paper with Brandon Fuller would say - you need to build X amount of cities to take the addition we're going to see to the number urban dwellers by the middle of the century. I think their own calculation added about 3 billion additional people living in cities. But someone like Alain Bertaud will say you may not really have that much quality location to do what you want to do, at least, to have the kind of effect that you have in mind. So does geography, giving that land is fixed...does geography limit the potential of [a] charter city in a way? ML: Yeah it could, but this is a question that I think is dependent on data. Alain says that most of the good ports have already been taken. He's probably true (right) about that too a certain extent, because humans being, sort of, social, commerce-oriented mammals will tend to live in areas that are advantageous for that. So a lot of the natural ports already, probably have some degree of human settlement there. And so many of the good locations for cities have probably or even taken, have all of them been taken? Probably not. History is weird and people make decisions based on, sort of, contextual circumstances that might have left some potential city locations just untouched because of this weird set of historical events. So this is something that I'm certainly interested in exploring more. It's a project that I would like to undertake. It's basically hire some people, and identify 50 potential locations for charter cities. Just like lookout where trade is happening, where urbanization is happening, where it is possible to acquire large chunks of land and identify basically 50 of these potential charter city locations to see, okay is the land available? Is it good? How easy is it to acquire? To answer questions like that, if any of your listeners are interested in helping out, with some donations, we can actually start getting this sort of concrete answer to that question.TL: For the audience, I’m going to put up links to the reference guides from the Charter Cities Institute on the website and every other available resource. You wrote an article recently about America's foreign policy and how charter city can play a role in its geopolitical competition with China, specifically the belt and road initiative. Do you care to expatiate on that point?ML: Sure, so I think if we look at, um... the US in some way still has a positive image even with the recent sort of killing/murder of George Floyd. We saw a global outcry of that because I think people rightly hold America to a higher standard versus the outcry that we saw of the sort of Uighur, basically, a genocide in China where people have kind of ignored that because I guess they expected [the] Chinese to do it to a certain extent. But American engagement with the rest of the world has, I think, left a little something to be desired over the last 40 years. Iraq was a disaster, Afghanistan is a disaster, Libya is a disaster, so I think there's a need for rethinking American engagement. Combined with the fact that China is pretty aggressively now pursuing their image on the global stage in terms of building infrastructure with belt and road, in terms of wooing foreign politicians, foreign leaders, to get them to be China's friend. So my article was aimed at… particularly people in the, for example, the Development Finance Corporation in The United States to hopefully get them to see charter cities as a potential way to offer a positive influence on the world. And while specifically, I think what American engagement could look like is having Americans who can help with governance, having Americans who can provide financing options if you use American contractors to help build the city, to help develop governance norms, to basically provide the supporting infrastructure for charter cities which I think are important because right now when developing countries are looking around the world, they think 'okay, what policies do we adopt? Who do we want to be like?' All of them are thinking like let's be like China. China has had tremendous economic growth over the last 40 years. They've lifted tens of millions of people out of poverty which is a great thing. Unfortunately, at the same time that's been coupled with a sort of lack of respect of human rights, with no democracy, with no freedom of speech, these things that are inimical to human flourishing, and they think because America has developed so long ago, the possibility of following a similar pattern to America's development is just outside of people's minds. And so I think what charter cities can hopefully help demonstrate is this sort of we call them American values, but I think they are universal values of things like freedom of toleration of markets really can work for everybody and can provide an alternative development model to the one that China is currently claiming. TL: Sticking with the US, I know you write about it, others write about it, are the institutional (I want to say rot. I don't know maybe that's the right word), you know, are they as bad as some analysts say it is, especially in the light of COVID-19?ML: Yeah, I think it rot is probably an appropriate word. We basically have coasted the last kind of 40 years off of existing institutions. We haven't really been challenged. We haven't updated any of our systems. Everybody is complacent. If you think about it, part of the reason is that nobody has actually helped build an institution in the US. Rather, the most dynamic part of the economy is Silicon Valley because there are people there who are building new things. So people are required, to a certain extent, to have this like very broad set of managerial competencies that you don't need to have if you grow up... and I'm not just saying in government, in government you just develop these very specific set of skills, but also in a lot of large private corporations. How many new national banks have been invested in the last 30, 40 years? And so because of that, you grow up learning a very specific set of competencies which is OK in terms of like keeping the system going, but it means that anytime you're presented with an external shock, you just don't know how to react. And COVID was that shock, which I think exposed a lot of the existing inadequacies in the American system that people were unsure of, like unable to think outside the box. Our bureaucrats were quite skilled at figuring out how to pass the buck, how to not take responsibility for things. But they had no idea how to actually take responsibility and then how to actually enact change that will be beneficial. And we're seeing that continue today, you still can't buy N95 masks on Amazon, it's 3 months after the fact. This is a very solvable problem but our institutions are fundamentally broken and I think you can add that to the growing culture war where you have red states where a lot of people are refusing to wear masks because it's not a pandemic, it's a dempanic, this is a fake disease, really idiotic stuff like that. And then in blue states, you're seeing some of the elite institutions basically begin to eat themselves. The New York Times has basically been taken over by Social Justice Warriors staffers who sort of opposed an op-ed by Tom Cotton, the senator from, I think, Arkansas. And I didn't like that op-ed, it was a bad op-ed but he's a senator for goodness sakes. I mean, if you are the paper of record you should allow senators to publish sometimes even if you don't like their arguments. And so we're seeing this, sort of, I think deeply dysfunctional institutions combined with this deeply dysfunctional culture that will probably take decades or generation to really sort themselves out. There isn't a lot of sort of, I don't know, capacity left at the seams. Even the late 60s, '68 when we saw a similar social unrest, there was something solid. There was a core underneath and I think that core it's quite atrophied. I'm a little bit nervous about the future of the US. TL: And I mean it's interesting to me that you talked about Silicon Valley because, at least, from an outsider's perspective here, it amazes me how little political influence Silicon Valley has. LaughsAnd I have one analogy and I think I tweeted this though I got a lot of pushback here and there that I don't think, and I may be wrong about this... I don't think that the Koch Brothers, for example, would have struggled to build more housing in Silicon Valley. And we have people that are vastly richer than the Koch brothers in the Valley. I mean, what is going on? Why do they have so little political influence? They get railroaded even by the local government. ML: Yeah, I mean, I think that's a good question. One of my friends likes to joke that Silicon Valley thinks they're above politics, but in fact, they are below it. You've seen, I think, Apple pledged 2.5 billion dollars to affordable housing in the Bay Area. Microsoft, I think a billion to affordable housing in San Francisco, Mark Zuckerberg, I think, 500 million to affordable housing in the Bay Area. And like the problem is just that, okay, if you're spending half a billion dollars to put it crassly. Like just buy off the entire City Council and just tell them to legalise housing. And I think it's a sort of combination of historical circumstances. One is that because most of Silicon Valley is in the world of bits and not in atoms, they just haven't interacted with the government that much. So because of that, there was no need to really figure out how to work with government, it was like you ignore us, we ignore you. To use this sort of Chinese proverb - the emperor is far away, I'm on the other side of the country, and so they didn't really interact with the government that much, and because of that just saw it as kind of part of the ecosystem, not something that to pay attention to. I believe that is changing now.I think Mark Zuckerberg's congressional hearing like a year ago was a wake-up call where the congressmen were asking Mark Zuckerberg, how do you turn on the iPhone? And it's like, OK, well, when you have the political leaders who are that disconnected with what is actually going on, there is a serious challenge. That being said, it will take a number of years for Silicon Valley to actually figure or politics out. There is, I think, several challenges involved in that. One, I think Silicon Valley has a bias towards nonprofits, they figure if something is a good idea, you should be able to make money off it. But nonprofits are a kind of integral parts of influencing government. Second is Silicon Valley likes things that scale. Government necessarily doesn't really scale. At least it doesn't scale in the same manner that a technology startup does and so because of that you have to put all of these resources in, to help mobilize people, to help create a network, to help influence things and you're unable to tell whether it's actually working for a long period of time. So the technology startup, right, okay, you work for a year, you get product-market fit. After product-market fit, you grow at 10 per cent month over month for a period of like three years or something. So if you're growing 10 per cent month over month, you can see it's working, you can see something is happening. While with politics, you might pay activists on the ground, you might pay lobbyists, but it might take years before you actually see legislation that's even proposed, much less implemented. And most of Silicon Valley just doesn't really operate on those...they're not used to those time horizons and so they're unwilling to sort of put the resources necessary to actually engage them. Now I think a third reason is that Silicon Valley is very, I don't know...it has a very universal mindset. So New York, if you look at New York, all the high net worth people in New York, When they donate to charity, they typically donate to New York charities. So they donate to the Met, they donate to Central Park. They get status by paying for things in New York City, so you have all of these goods supported by basically the billionaire class in New York. In San Francisco, people get status by doing universal things. So the effect of altruist movement, for example, is quite popular in San Francisco. But these universal things, while I think they have a great impact on humanity because you don't get status by helping to improve housing in the city, there just isn't as much focus on the city itself, it's a little bit neglected and so there hasn't been this (the) same mobilization of Silicon Valley elite to coordinate to help fix the city as with New York where the elite do spend a lot more money on improving the city's quality of life. TL: That's interesting. I hope they wake up and they get it right.ML: Me too.TL: Final question, Mark. Ten years from now, if you're looking back at all these things you're working on, particularly charter cities, what do you hope to have achieved? ML: Yeah, in ten years I figure we probably [indistinct words] three dozens or so charter cities that are either up and running or are like in advanced planning stages. In ten years, probably a few million people living in charter cities and with the potential population to reach 10s of millions. I want charter cities to be sort of understood and discussed at every world forum, like the World Economic Forum. All these, like, sort of highfalutin events. I want them to be part of the language, like right now, for example, if we think about International Development there are some themes that come up all the time. I think gender equality and global warming kind of pervade every discussion, as well as randomized control trials, they all pervade every discussion about development, I want to charter cities to help pervade those discussions and not just pervade those discussions but actually be improving people's lives on the ground. TL. Yeah. That's a goal I can get behind. Thank you very much, Mark, and I wish you all the best. ML: Thank you for having me. This is a public episode. Get access to private episodes at www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe
Best of 2018 Part 1 Excerpts from the following episodes feature in this 'Best of 2018 Part1'. 170 Jim Rogers on opportunities in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and North Korea 139 Loretta Napoleoni North Korea growth prospects and how they can position themselves in the world economy 155 Lotta Moberg Refugee Cities and SEZs 167 James Kenneth Galbraith on the prospects for the Greek economy 150 Chris Blattman the economic and psychological effects of violence and war esp among children and in communities 169 Jennifer Murtazashvili democrarcy and governance in Afghanistan and the leadership role of women in communities in Uzbekistan 145 Marie Mora Under-represented minority women in economics and the plight of Puerto Ricans in the US 161 Tyler Cowen on art, culture, liberty and prospects of economic growth and welfare in the US, China and India 160 Arjo Klamer Culture (Japan) and Writing as a means to create personal value 153 Sarah and Steve Writing
Chris Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago’s Pearson Institute and Harris Public Policy. He is an economist and political scientist who studies poverty, violence and crime in developing countries. Chris has designed and evaluated strategies for tackling poverty, including cash transfers to the poorest. Much of his work is with the victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, testing the link between poverty and violence. His recent work looks at other sources of and solutions to violence. These solutions range from behavioral therapy to social norm change and local-level state building. He has worked mainly in Colombia, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chicago’s South Side. Dr. Blattman was previously a faculty member at Columbia and Yale Universities, and holds a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and a Master’s in Public Administration and International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School. He chairs the Peace & Recovery sector at Innovations for Poverty Action and the Crime, Violence and Conflict initiative at MIT’s Poverty Action Lab. Check out the show notes page for all the links, books and resources mentioned in this episode over at www.economicrockstar.com/chrisblattman Support the podcast for as little as $1 per month over at Patreon: www.patreon.com/economicrockstar
This week, CID Senior Research Fellow Thomas Abt interviews Daniel Mejia, Secretary of Security of Bogota, and Chris Blattman, Professor at University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. Daniel and Chris discuss how they used and generated evidence for policymaking with regard to security interventions in the city of Bogota. // www.cid.harvard.edu // Interview recorded on April 6th, 2018. About Daniel Mejia: Daniel is Secretary of Security of Bogota, Colombia, where he is in charge of leading security and justice policies in the city of Bogota. Before becoming the first Secretary of Security of Bogota, Daniel was Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and Director of the Research Center on Drugs and Security (CESED) at Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia, where he taught since 2006. He received a BA and MA in Economics from Universidad de los Andes and a MA and PhD in economics from Brown University. Prior to joining Universidad de los Andes he worked as a researcher at the Central Bank of Colombia and Fedesarrollo. Daniel he has been actively involved in a research agenda whose main objective is to provide independent economic evaluations of security and anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia. In 2008 he was awarded Fedesarrollos´s German Botero de los Ríosprize for economic research. Daniel has designed and evaluated different interventions aimed at reducing crime in cities such as Medellin, Bogota and Cali. Among these, Daniel designed (together with the National Police and the Ministry of Defense) a hotspots policing intervention in Medellin and carried out an independent evaluation of this intervention. Also, he has evaluated the effects of the installation of CCTV cameras on crime in Medellin and the effects of the restriction of alcohol sales on crime in Bogota. Daniel, together with Alejandro Gaviria, published in 2013 the book “Políticas antidroga en Colombia: éxitos, fracasos y extravíos” (Anti-drug policies in Colombia: successes, failures and lost opportunities) at Universidad de los Andes, in Bogota. Between 2011 and 2012, Daniel was a member of the Advisory Commission on Criminal Policy and more recently he was the President of the Colombian Government´s Drug Policy Advisory Commission. In March 2015 Daniel was awarded the Juan Luis Londoño prize, awarded every other year to the best Colombian economist under 40. About Chris Blattman: Chris Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago’s Pearson Institute and Harris Public Policy. He is an economist and political scientist who studies poverty, violence and crime in developing countries. He has designed and evaluated strategies for tackling poverty, including cash transfers to the poorest. Much of his work is with the victims and perpetrators of crime and violence, testing the link between poverty and violence. His recent work looks at other sources of and solutions to violence. These solutions range from behavioral therapy to social norm change and local-level state building. He has worked mainly in Colombia, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Chicago’s South Side. Dr. Blattman was previously faculty at Columbia and Yale Universities, and holds a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and a Master’s in Public Administration and International Development (MPA/ID) from the Harvard Kennedy School. He chairs the Peace & Recovery sector at Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and the Crime, Violence and Conflict initiative at MIT’s Poverty Action Lab (JPAL).
Chris Blattman’s made his career as a development economist by finding a place he likes and finding a reason to live there. Not a bad strategy considering the impact of the work he’s done in Liberia, Uganda, and most recently, Colombia. He joins Tyler to talk about what he’s learned from his work there, including the efficacy of cash transfers, the spread of violence and conflict, factory jobs as a social safety net, Botswana’s underappreciated growth miracle, Battlestar Galactica, standing desks, how to write papers with your spouse, and more. Transcript and links Follow Chris on Twitter Follow Tyler on Twitter More CWT goodness: Facebook Twitter Instagram Email
KONY2012 by Invisible Children propelled the story of Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army into the spotlight in 2012. Hosts Seth Daire and JJ Janflone explain the history of the LRA before diving into survey results from a study by Chris Blattman. Hear what field research has to say about Kony's abducted child soldiers. Sources: http://chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2008.DDR.pdf http://www.enoughproject.org/files/GuluDispatch.pdf https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/7d2430f8f3cc16b6c125767e00493668/$FILE/Ugandan+Amnesty+Act+2000.pdf https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc
Chris Blattman is a development economist who routinely conducts experiments to test ideas related to reducing poverty and improving the well being of people living in poorer countries. His latest experiment takes on the question of sweatshops--whether they are good for the poor, exploitative, or something else. Along with his colleague Stefan Dercon, Chris went to Ethiopia and — performed the first randomized trial of industrial employment on workers. They went to five factories and followed the 947 applicants who were and were not offered the job over a year, surveying them multiple times.They found that most people who got a job ended up quitting within a few months--and they did so for very good reasons. As Chris and Stefan wrote in an New York Times op-ed about their research, everything they thought they knew about sweatshops turned out to be wrong. . Regular listeners, of course, will recognize Chris' name from a profile episode we did a couple of years ago in which Chris describes how he became so interested in development economics and also some of his ground breaking research on unconditional cash transfers to extremely poor people in Uganda. Become a premium subscriber to unlock bonus episodes, earn other rewards, and support the show! Bonus episodes for premium subscribers include: #1: International Relations Theory, explained. #2: A Brief History of Nuclear Non-proliferation #3: A Brief History of NATO #4: The Syrian Civil War, explained. #5: Meet the Kim family of North Korea. #6: Better Know Vladimir Putin #7: How to Get a Job at the United Nations #8: How to Pick the Right International Relations Graduate School
Chris Blattman of the University of Chicago talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about whether it's better to give poor Africans cash or chickens and the role of experiments in helping us figure out the answer. Along the way he discusses the importance of growth vs. smaller interventions and the state of development economics.
One of my favorite things about data analysis is when trends emerge unexpectedly. So often, when sifting through data we find exactly what we’re looking for. But its those moments when we’re presented with something unusual that are the real special event. This holds for why I love the monitoring and evaluation process in the social sector. So often I start an assignment with a client with a “view” about what will result from the research, only to find that after weeks - or more often months - of living with the data, conversations and documentation, I see alternative views clearly displayed. The trend I’m pleased has revealed itself to spark this editorial is disruption of the social sector. Somehow the universe conspired to allow me to have our past two guests on the show (Paula Kravitz and Chris Blattman), both of whom have specific views on how we can evolve the sector. Today’s guest is, happily, another voice whose decades of experience have lead to our conversation about yet another aspect of our work that is overdue for a rethink: the ever present silos we find everyday in our work. Silos are everywhere - within organizations, across humanitarian responses, within countries accepting development assistance and even within our own minds about how our worldview and approaches to our work. This isn’t a new problem, and one I can personally attest is alive and well. So much so that the term “multi-sectoral initiative” is something donors are interested in hearing and a topic that was a key focus for a recent guest here on TOR - Patrick Fine, the CEO of FHI 360 as he talked about “integrated development.” My guest for the 151st episode of the Terms of Reference Podcast is Tim France, Managing Director of Inis Communication. Tim came to his passion for communicate through the health sector, in which he holds a PhD and has worked for the World Health Organization's Global Programme on AIDS and UNAIDS, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, the Foundation du Présent, and the founding of Health & Development Networks. I’m excited to bring you this conversation about a new tool developed by Inis, called SGD Insights, and how that becomes a platform for Tim and I to talk about the need for disrupting the social sector to break down our silos - and why this has never been more important
Professor Chris Blattman is the Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at The University of Chicago, at the Harris School of Public Policy, as well as a research associate at National Bureau of Economic Research, among many other things. He's a heavyweight in the world of understanding what works - and more importantly what doesn't - in aid and development. As you'll hear on the show, Chris thinks he's a professor because he was a failed development professional. This is actually a lucky turn for the rest of us because he is a critical voice in the R&D department of the development and aid sector. In our discussion, you'll hear us discuss how research finds its way into practice and how we learned that microfinance doesn’t work to alleviate poverty. We also discuss why you can’t test programs and programming, but rather you have to test the assumptions those programs are built on, in order to find out what works. We round out our discussion on what the future of the social sector could look like over the next five years.
This episode explores the economics and ethics of low-paying factories (which some might call "sweatshops") in Ethiopia. Do they make their workers better off, relative to those people's outside options? Professor Chris Blattman has run some well-designed randomized controlled trials exploring this question, and he discusses what surprised him and how he's updated his views from his research. Julia and Chris also discuss an innovative program to reduce crime in Liberia using cognitive behavioral therapy.
Rob Wiblin's top recommended EconTalk episodes v0.2 Feb 2020
If you were a poor person in a poor country, would you prefer steady work in a factory or to be your own boss, buying and selling in the local market? Economist Chris Blattman of the University of Chicago talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about experimental evidence on how poor people choose in the labor market and the consequences for their income, health, and satisfaction.
If you were a poor person in a poor country, would you prefer steady work in a factory or to be your own boss, buying and selling in the local market? Economist Chris Blattman of the University of Chicago talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about experimental evidence on how poor people choose in the labor market and the consequences for their income, health, and satisfaction.
Chris Blattman of Columbia University talks to EconTalk host Russ Roberts about a radical approach to fighting poverty in desperately poor countries: giving cash to aid recipients and allowing them to spend it as they please. Blattman shares his research and cautious optimism about giving cash and discusses how infusions of cash affect growth, educational outcomes, and political behavior (including violence). The conversation concludes with a discussion of the limits of aid and the some of the moral issues facing aid activists and researchers.
Chris Blattman of Columbia University talks to EconTalk host Russ Roberts about a radical approach to fighting poverty in desperately poor countries: giving cash to aid recipients and allowing them to spend it as they please. Blattman shares his research and cautious optimism about giving cash and discusses how infusions of cash affect growth, educational outcomes, and political behavior (including violence). The conversation concludes with a discussion of the limits of aid and the some of the moral issues facing aid activists and researchers.
In this conversation with Peter T. Coleman, Dr. Blattman explains how employment opportunities and plain old cash incentives can help high-risk men in Liberia avoid seeking out work as mercenary soldiers. To learn more about Dr. Blattman's work, check out his profile in AC4-Link: http://ac4link.ei.columbia.edu/profiles/detail/178 Release Date: May 2014.
President Obama spoke in Ghana on July 11, 2009 about US policy towards Africa. In this episode of Development Drums, Todd Moss and Chris Blattman join me to talk about the speech, and what it means for the US and Africa. President Obama’s speech Chris Blattman’s blog Comments on the speech from Bill Easterly Comments […]
President Obama spoke in Ghana on July 11, 2009 about US policy towards Africa. In this episode of Development Drums, Todd Moss and Chris Blattman join me to talk about the speech, and what it means for the US and Africa. President Obama’s speech Chris Blattman’s blog Comments on the speech from Bill Easterly Comments […]
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