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56 episodes with justices kennedy
This Day in Legal History: Sandra Birth-Day O'ConnorOn this day in legal history, March 26, 1930, Sandra Day O'Connor was born in El Paso, Texas. Raised on a remote Arizona ranch, O'Connor would go on to become the first woman appointed to the United States Supreme Court. After graduating near the top of her class at Stanford Law School in 1952, she struggled to find legal work due to widespread gender discrimination, eventually beginning her career in public service and Arizona state politics. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan nominated her to the Supreme Court, fulfilling a campaign promise to appoint a woman to the bench. Her unanimous confirmation by the Senate marked a historic shift in the Court's composition.O'Connor quickly established herself as a pragmatic and often pivotal swing vote, particularly in cases involving reproductive rights, federalism, and affirmative action. Her opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), co-authored with Justices Kennedy and Souter, preserved the core of Roe v. Wade while allowing for more state regulation—an outcome that satisfied neither side of the debate. Critics argued that her incremental, case-by-case approach often lacked a firm constitutional foundation, leading to legal uncertainty and doctrinal ambiguity.Supporters, however, praised her moderate jurisprudence as a stabilizing force in a deeply divided Court. O'Connor was also a staunch defender of judicial independence and civics education. She retired in 2006 to care for her husband, who had Alzheimer's disease, and remained active in public life for years afterward. While her legacy is marked by both trailblazing achievement and contentious rulings, O'Connor's presence on the Court undeniably reshaped the public's perception of who belongs in the nation's highest judicial institution.President Trump signed a new executive order on Tuesday targeting the prominent law firm Jenner & Block, escalating his pattern of actions against firms involved in litigation against his administration. The order restricts the firm's access to federal contracts, security clearances, and government facilities—mirroring similar actions taken against Perkins Coie and Paul Weiss. Trump justified the move by pointing to Jenner & Block's former employment of Andrew Weissmann, who worked on the Mueller investigation into Trump's 2016 campaign. The White House accused the firm of politicizing the legal system, while Jenner & Block denounced the order as unconstitutional and pledged to fight it.This is the fourth such order Trump has issued since returning to office in January. Jenner & Block has been active in challenging his administration in court, including blocking enforcement of a policy denying federal funds to providers of gender-affirming care for minors, and opposing efforts to restrict asylum rights. The firm also represents an environmental group suing the EPA over frozen grant funds. Many of Jenner's attorneys have ties to previous Democratic administrations and the January 6 congressional investigation.Trump's broader campaign includes a recent directive to the Justice Department to target law firms that have sued the government in recent years. Legal experts and bar associations have warned that these executive orders risk undermining the independence of the legal profession.Trump targets Jenner & Block in latest executive order aimed at law firms | ReutersThe U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments Wednesday on the constitutionality of how the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds its Universal Service Fund—a program that supports broadband and phone access for underserved communities. Critics argue the FCC's funding structure violates the Constitution by improperly delegating Congress's legislative authority, a concept known as the non-delegation doctrine. They also raise concerns under the private non-delegation doctrine, claiming the FCC unlawfully transferred power to a private entity—the Universal Service Administrative Company—to manage and determine contributions to the fund.The fund, created under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, collects about $9 billion annually from telecommunications providers, who often pass these costs on to consumers. A divided ruling by the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found this setup unconstitutional, citing Congress's broad delegation of authority to the FCC and the FCC's subsequent subdelegation to a private company. The court did not specifically rule on either non-delegation theory but found the overall structure breached the Constitution's assignment of legislative powers to Congress.The FCC, backed by telecom firms and public interest groups, argues that Congress provided sufficient guidance and oversight in the law and that the agency has acted within legal bounds. The Supreme Court, which has a conservative majority, has recently scaled back the reach of federal agencies in other contexts but has yet to rule directly on a major non-delegation case in decades. A decision is expected by June.US Supreme Court to scrutinize Federal Communications Commission fund's legality | ReutersA high-stakes race for a Wisconsin Supreme Court seat is shaping up to be a major political flashpoint, testing the strength of Trump's support in a swing state and attracting record-breaking spending—much of it tied to Elon Musk. The April 1 election will determine the ideological balance of the state's top court, which is poised to rule on pivotal issues like abortion access, redistricting, labor rights, and election laws ahead of the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential election. Conservative candidate Brad Schimel, backed by Trump and major outside funding, is facing off against liberal candidate Susan Crawford.Over $81 million has been poured into the race, far surpassing the previous record of $55 million in 2023. Schimel and his supporters have spent about $46 million, including $17.5 million from Musk-affiliated super PACs. Musk also personally donated $2 million to the state GOP, which quickly funneled funds to Schimel's campaign. Musk has openly warned that a liberal court majority could redraw congressional districts and shift the balance of power nationally.Crawford accused Musk and Trump of trying to install a compliant judiciary, while Schimel insisted he's made no promises to any backers. Meanwhile, Democrats criticized Musk for a potential conflict of interest, citing a Tesla lawsuit in Wisconsin that may end up before the state court. Republicans countered by pointing to liberal billionaires supporting Crawford. With the court expected to rule on abortion rights, labor laws, and future election cases, this judicial race could have national implications.Wisconsin court race tests Trump's approval as Musk pours millions into campaign | ReutersA piece I wrote for Forbes this week explores why it's time to move beyond gas taxes and adopt a kilowatt-hour (kWh) tax to fund road infrastructure. As electric vehicle (EV) adoption increases, gas tax revenues are falling—undermining the traditional funding model for maintaining and expanding roads. Meanwhile, construction costs are rising, and the federal gas tax hasn't been adjusted since 1993, leaving states with a growing fiscal gap.I argue that instead of hiking gas taxes on a shrinking pool of internal combustion drivers or cutting infrastructure budgets, states should issue bonds to build out public EV charging networks. These investments could be repaid through a kWh tax on public charging—a fee that would be closely tied to actual road usage. This approach would be more proportional and transparent than flat EV registration fees or invasive mileage-tracking programs.Unlike a gas tax, which is loosely connected to how much someone drives, a kWh tax—especially if tiered by charging speed—would more accurately reflect miles traveled and wear on the roads. It also avoids privacy issues and technological complexity. Drivers charging at home could remain exempt, just as today's drivers can choose where to fuel up.Ultimately, I propose this as a modern, fair way to ensure EV drivers contribute to the roads they use, while giving states the tools to build the infrastructure needed for a successful transition.It's Time To Replace Gas Taxes With A Kilowatt Tax This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or strongly disagree with many positions the union takes in collective bargaining. Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year. Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or strongly disagree with many positions the union takes in collective bargaining. Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year. Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.
On this week's episode, I am talking about Justices Kennedy's retirement and what to do next. Plus break down the exciting newcomer to the democratic party and it's Thursday so there is a speech of the week in the end. Make sure to subscribe in Itunes and Stitcher to keep up with the change
On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.
On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided McCoy v. Louisiana, a case considering whether defense counsel may--against the defendant’s express wishes--concede his client’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty.In 2008, Robert McCoy was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife. McCoy pleaded not guilty, maintaining that he was out of state at the time of the murder. In 2010, his relationship with the court-appointed public defender broke down, and in March 2010 Larry English became McCoy’s defense attorney. English concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and told McCoy that he would concede McCoy’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty; McCoy adamantly opposed English’s strategy. At trial, English nevertheless indicated repeatedly to the jury that McCoy had caused the victims’ deaths and pleaded for mercy. McCoy protested unsuccessfully to the trial judge and was permitted to testify to his innocence, but was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority to concede guilt over McCoy’s objection as a strategy to avoid a death sentence. In light of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. By a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the fundamental objective of his defense and insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Jay Schweikert, Policy Analyst with the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided McCoy v. Louisiana, a case considering whether defense counsel may--against the defendant’s express wishes--concede his client’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty.In 2008, Robert McCoy was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife. McCoy pleaded not guilty, maintaining that he was out of state at the time of the murder. In 2010, his relationship with the court-appointed public defender broke down, and in March 2010 Larry English became McCoy’s defense attorney. English concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and told McCoy that he would concede McCoy’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty; McCoy adamantly opposed English’s strategy. At trial, English nevertheless indicated repeatedly to the jury that McCoy had caused the victims’ deaths and pleaded for mercy. McCoy protested unsuccessfully to the trial judge and was permitted to testify to his innocence, but was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority to concede guilt over McCoy’s objection as a strategy to avoid a death sentence. In light of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. By a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the fundamental objective of his defense and insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Jay Schweikert, Policy Analyst with the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v. NCAA, a case involving a conflict between state-authorized sports gambling and a federal statute: the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA). PASPA prohibits state-sanctioned gambling with respect to amateur and professional sporting events. Among other things, the statute allows sports leagues whose events are the subject of betting schemes to bring an action to enjoin any gambling. PASPA did except certain states from its prohibitions, including New Jersey--but only if New Jersey established its sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and in fact prohibited sports gambling until a 2011 referendum amended the state constitution to allow it.Thereafter, New Jersey enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act, which created a government-regulated sports betting scheme. Invoking PASPA, five sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 law. New Jersey countered that PASPA was unconstitutional under the federal anti-commandeering doctrine. The District Court deemed PASPA constitutional and enjoined implementation of the wagering law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. In 2014, New Jersey enacted a new gambling law which repealed certain restrictions on “the placements and acceptance of wagers” on sporting events so long as those events did not involve New Jersey collegiate teams (or other in-state collegiate sporting events). New Jersey contended that this law was admissible under PASPA because it did not actively authorize sports-betting. Once again sports leagues sued to enjoin the law as a violation of PASPA, and prevailed in federal district court. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, again affirmed, holding that PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey in a way that ran afoul of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of the states. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the provisions of PAPSA that prohibit state authorization and licensing of sports gambling schemes violate the Constitution’s anticommandeering rule, and cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute, which collapses as a result.Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer joined to all except as to Part VI-B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined in part. To discuss the case, we have Elbert Lin, Partner at Hunton & Williams, LLP.
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v. NCAA, a case involving a conflict between state-authorized sports gambling and a federal statute: the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA). PASPA prohibits state-sanctioned gambling with respect to amateur and professional sporting events. Among other things, the statute allows sports leagues whose events are the subject of betting schemes to bring an action to enjoin any gambling. PASPA did except certain states from its prohibitions, including New Jersey--but only if New Jersey established its sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment. New Jersey did not do so, and in fact prohibited sports gambling until a 2011 referendum amended the state constitution to allow it.Thereafter, New Jersey enacted the 2012 Sports Wagering Act, which created a government-regulated sports betting scheme. Invoking PASPA, five sports leagues sued to enjoin the 2012 law. New Jersey countered that PASPA was unconstitutional under the federal anti-commandeering doctrine. The District Court deemed PASPA constitutional and enjoined implementation of the wagering law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. In 2014, New Jersey enacted a new gambling law which repealed certain restrictions on “the placements and acceptance of wagers” on sporting events so long as those events did not involve New Jersey collegiate teams (or other in-state collegiate sporting events). New Jersey contended that this law was admissible under PASPA because it did not actively authorize sports-betting. Once again sports leagues sued to enjoin the law as a violation of PASPA, and prevailed in federal district court. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, again affirmed, holding that PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey in a way that ran afoul of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeers the regulatory power of the states. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the provisions of PAPSA that prohibit state authorization and licensing of sports gambling schemes violate the Constitution’s anticommandeering rule, and cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute, which collapses as a result.Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer joined to all except as to Part VI-B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined in part. To discuss the case, we have Elbert Lin, Partner at Hunton & Williams, LLP.
On April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Sellers, a case involving the standard federal courts should use to analyze a state appellate court’s summary denial of habeas relief when applying federal habeas law. In 1996, Marion Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and both his conviction and sentence were confirmed on direct appeal. Wilson then sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in investigating mitigation evidence for purposes of sentencing. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that any new evidence was cumulative of evidence presented at triall as well as inadmissible, and likely would not have changed the outcome. In a one-sentence order the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which also denied relief. Even assuming Wilson’s counsel had been deficient, the court deferred to the state habeas court’s conclusion that these deficiencies did not ultimately cause prejudice to Wilson. On appeal a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that--rather than “looking through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial to the reasoning of the lower state habeas court--the district court should have considered what reasons “could have supported” the state supreme court’s summary decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether federal habeas law employs a “look through” presumption. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that a federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning; the state may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General for the State of Arkansas.
On April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Sellers, a case involving the standard federal courts should use to analyze a state appellate court’s summary denial of habeas relief when applying federal habeas law. In 1996, Marion Wilson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and both his conviction and sentence were confirmed on direct appeal. Wilson then sought habeas relief in state superior court, claiming that his trial counsel offered ineffective assistance in investigating mitigation evidence for purposes of sentencing. The superior court denied habeas relief, concluding that any new evidence was cumulative of evidence presented at triall as well as inadmissible, and likely would not have changed the outcome. In a one-sentence order the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Wilson’s subsequent application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Wilson then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which also denied relief. Even assuming Wilson’s counsel had been deficient, the court deferred to the state habeas court’s conclusion that these deficiencies did not ultimately cause prejudice to Wilson. On appeal a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that--rather than “looking through” the Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial to the reasoning of the lower state habeas court--the district court should have considered what reasons “could have supported” the state supreme court’s summary decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the resulting split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether federal habeas law employs a “look through” presumption. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that a federal habeas court reviewing an unexplained state-court decision on the merits should “look through” that decision to the last related state-court decision that provides a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning; the state may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained decision most likely relied on different grounds than the reasoned decision below. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Lee Rudofsky, Solicitor General for the State of Arkansas.
On March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court decided U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, a case involving how appellate courts should review a lower court’s determination that a person related in some way to a bankruptcy debtor is an “insider”--and therefore subject to special restrictions that the federal Bankruptcy Code imposes on insiders. In 2011, the Village at Lakeridge (“Lakeridge”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which seeks to facilitate a reorganization that allows the debtor to maintain viability while restructuring debts. At the time, Lakeridge owed millions of dollars to its owner MBP Equity Partners (“MBP”), as well as to U.S. Bank. Lakeridge’s proposed reorganization plan placed both creditors in separate classes and would have impaired their interests. U.S. Bank objected, which precluded a consensual plan, but under the Code MBP’s status as an “insider”--being the owner of Lakeridge--meant that MBP could not provide the requisite consent to force a “cramdown” of the plan over U.S. Bank’s objections. Lakeridge was therefore faced with liquidation unless MBP could transfer its claim against Lakeridge to a non-insider who would agree to the reorganization plan. Kathleen Bartlett, a member of MBP’s board, persuaded retired surgeon Robert Rabkin--with whom she was romantically involved--to purchase MBP’s multimillion-dollar claim for $5,000. Rabkin then consented to the reorganization plan. U.S. Bank again objected, arguing that the transaction was not truly at arm’s length due to the romantic relationship between Bartlett and Rabkin; Rabkin was essentially a “non-statutory” insider. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, deeming Rabkin’s purchase a “speculative investment,” and noting that Rabkin and Bartlett lived separately and managed their own affairs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, concluding that it could not reverse unless the lower court had committed a “clear error.” The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the proper standard of review.By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held unanimously that the Ninth Circuit acted properly in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of non-statutory insider status for clear error rather than undertaking de novo review.Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Tom Plank, Professor of Law, at the University of Tennessee School of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
On March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court decided U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, a case involving how appellate courts should review a lower court’s determination that a person related in some way to a bankruptcy debtor is an “insider”--and therefore subject to special restrictions that the federal Bankruptcy Code imposes on insiders. In 2011, the Village at Lakeridge (“Lakeridge”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which seeks to facilitate a reorganization that allows the debtor to maintain viability while restructuring debts. At the time, Lakeridge owed millions of dollars to its owner MBP Equity Partners (“MBP”), as well as to U.S. Bank. Lakeridge’s proposed reorganization plan placed both creditors in separate classes and would have impaired their interests. U.S. Bank objected, which precluded a consensual plan, but under the Code MBP’s status as an “insider”--being the owner of Lakeridge--meant that MBP could not provide the requisite consent to force a “cramdown” of the plan over U.S. Bank’s objections. Lakeridge was therefore faced with liquidation unless MBP could transfer its claim against Lakeridge to a non-insider who would agree to the reorganization plan. Kathleen Bartlett, a member of MBP’s board, persuaded retired surgeon Robert Rabkin--with whom she was romantically involved--to purchase MBP’s multimillion-dollar claim for $5,000. Rabkin then consented to the reorganization plan. U.S. Bank again objected, arguing that the transaction was not truly at arm’s length due to the romantic relationship between Bartlett and Rabkin; Rabkin was essentially a “non-statutory” insider. The Bankruptcy Court rejected this argument, deeming Rabkin’s purchase a “speculative investment,” and noting that Rabkin and Bartlett lived separately and managed their own affairs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, concluding that it could not reverse unless the lower court had committed a “clear error.” The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address the proper standard of review.By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held unanimously that the Ninth Circuit acted properly in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of non-statutory insider status for clear error rather than undertaking de novo review.Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Tom Plank, Professor of Law, at the University of Tennessee School of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
On April 2, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, a case on its second trip to the high court regarding a dispute over the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s overtime-pay requirements and whether it exempts service advisors at car dealerships.Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….” Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective and remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation. On remand, the Ninth Circuit, using the distributive canon of statutory interpretation, held that the FLSA exemption did not encompass service advisors. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “service advisors are exempt from the overtime-pay requirement of the FLSA because they are ‘salesm[e]n...primarily engaged in...servicing automobiles.’ §213(b)(10)(A)." Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
On April 2, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, a case on its second trip to the high court regarding a dispute over the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s overtime-pay requirements and whether it exempts service advisors at car dealerships.Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to “protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” and it requires overtime pay for employees covered under the Act who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The FLSA exempts from this requirement, however, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers….” Hector Navarro and other service advisors filed suit against their employer Encino Motorcars, alleging that it violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime wages. Encino countered that as service advisors, Navarro and the other plaintiffs fell within the FLSA exemption. The district court ruled in favor of Encino, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying upon a 2011 regulation issued by the Department of Labor (DOL) and indicating that service advisors were not covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court, however, thereafter vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, determining that the regulation at issue was procedurally defective and remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider without “placing controlling weight” on the DOL regulation. On remand, the Ninth Circuit, using the distributive canon of statutory interpretation, held that the FLSA exemption did not encompass service advisors. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that “service advisors are exempt from the overtime-pay requirement of the FLSA because they are ‘salesm[e]n...primarily engaged in...servicing automobiles.’ §213(b)(10)(A)." Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. To discuss the case, we have Tammy McCutchen, Principal at Littler Mendelson, PC. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Artis v. District of Columbia, a case concerning the scope of the tolling language contained in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). When a federal court dismisses the only claim serving as the basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, it ordinarily also dismisses (without resolving) any related non-federal claims that were part of the same case or controversy. Should the plaintiff wish to refile and pursue those claims in state court, questions may arise as to how any applicable statutes of limitations would apply. The language of § 1367(d) provides that such statutes of limitations “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” In 2011, Stephanie Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court alleging unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. The district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim under Title VII in 2014. Fifty-nine days later, Artis refiled those claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 1367(d). The Superior Court agreed and the DC Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, concluding that § 1367(d) does not “stop the clock” on state statutes of limitations from the time of an unsuccessful federal filing until 30 days after dismissal, but rather merely creates a 30-day “grace period” for a claimant to refile his or her claims elsewhere.The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted Artis’s petition for certiorari to resolve a split among state supreme courts regarding the proper interpretation of § 1367(d). By a vote of 5-4 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the DC Court of Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected the “grace period” reading and held that §1367(d)’s instruction to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
We're back!! In Season 3, we want to share our space with amazing guests who we respect and admire. Look out for interviews, co-host episodes, and much more!We're kicking off the season with a crossover episode featuring Kamille + Christina, aka the Unfriendly Black Hotties! In Life in the Law, we chat about Tyrone Hankerson and allegedly embezzled Howard University coins [1:25]. We then learn about the horoscopes of Justices Kennedy and Thomas in Know Thy Enemy: SCOTUS Edition [12:50]. In the Political, we break down the Kisela v. Hughes case and its implications for police misconduct [26:50]. In the Petty, we speculate on the question everyone wants to answer: WHO BIT BEYONCE?![38:10].Follow the teams on social media! @theblackhotties | @thatblasiangirl | @c_gracet @HarvardBLSA | @negroesquire | @lovexbriana
On January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Artis v. District of Columbia, a case concerning the scope of the tolling language contained in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). When a federal court dismisses the only claim serving as the basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, it ordinarily also dismisses (without resolving) any related non-federal claims that were part of the same case or controversy. Should the plaintiff wish to refile and pursue those claims in state court, questions may arise as to how any applicable statutes of limitations would apply. The language of § 1367(d) provides that such statutes of limitations “shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” In 2011, Stephanie Artis filed suit against DC in federal district court alleging unlawful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with various other claims arising under DC statutes and the common law. The district court granted DC judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim under Title VII in 2014. Fifty-nine days later, Artis refiled those claims in DC Superior Court. DC responded with a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the claims were time-barred based on the relevant statutes of limitations plus 1367(d). The Superior Court agreed and the DC Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, concluding that § 1367(d) does not “stop the clock” on state statutes of limitations from the time of an unsuccessful federal filing until 30 days after dismissal, but rather merely creates a 30-day “grace period” for a claimant to refile his or her claims elsewhere.The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted Artis’s petition for certiorari to resolve a split among state supreme courts regarding the proper interpretation of § 1367(d). By a vote of 5-4 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the DC Court of Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected the “grace period” reading and held that §1367(d)’s instruction to “toll” a state limitations period means to hold it in abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General of Wisconsin. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.
On February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Digital Realty Trust v. Somers. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) endeavors to protect “whistleblowers,” who are defined as persons who provide “information relating to a violation of the securities to the [U.S. Securities and Exchange] Commission.” Employers are liable for discharging, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a whistleblower “because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” with respect to (1) “providing information to the Commission in accordance with [securities laws],” (2) “initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or … action of the Commission based upon” information provided to the Commission in accordance with securities laws, or (3) “making disclosures that are required or protected under” various statutes and regulations.In 2014, then-Vice President of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. Paul Somers reported to his senior management that he suspected securities-law violations by the company. He was subsequently terminated. Prior to his termination, Somers had expressed his concerns internally only and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He sued Digital Realty Trust in federal district court, alleging unlawful whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Somers did not qualify as a whistleblower because he had not reported his suspicions to the Commission. The district court rejected that argument and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that whistleblower protection can extend to persons who have not actually reported suspected violations to the Commission. This decision aggravated a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation whistleblower protection does not extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of securities laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Todd Braunstein, Global Head of Legal Investigations at Willis Towers Watson.
On February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Digital Realty Trust v. Somers. Among other things, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) endeavors to protect “whistleblowers,” who are defined as persons who provide “information relating to a violation of the securities to the [U.S. Securities and Exchange] Commission.” Employers are liable for discharging, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a whistleblower “because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower” with respect to (1) “providing information to the Commission in accordance with [securities laws],” (2) “initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or … action of the Commission based upon” information provided to the Commission in accordance with securities laws, or (3) “making disclosures that are required or protected under” various statutes and regulations.In 2014, then-Vice President of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. Paul Somers reported to his senior management that he suspected securities-law violations by the company. He was subsequently terminated. Prior to his termination, Somers had expressed his concerns internally only and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission. He sued Digital Realty Trust in federal district court, alleging unlawful whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Somers did not qualify as a whistleblower because he had not reported his suspicions to the Commission. The district court rejected that argument and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that whistleblower protection can extend to persons who have not actually reported suspected violations to the Commission. This decision aggravated a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.By a vote of 9-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation whistleblower protection does not extend to an individual who has not reported a violation of securities laws to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Todd Braunstein, Global Head of Legal Investigations at Willis Towers Watson.
On March 28, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. Texas, a habeas corpus dispute regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of a mentally disabled person would violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a sales clerk during a failed robbery attempt. Finding Moore to be intellectually disabled under current medical diagnostic standards set forth in the latest editions of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) manual and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and invoking Atkins, a state court recommended granting Moore habeas relief in the form of life imprisonment or a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected that recommendation based on its 2004 decision in Ex Parte Briseno, which relied on standards set forth in a predecessor manual to the AAIDD and a series of evidentiary factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Moore had failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and denied relief. By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents. By rejecting the habeas court’s application of contemporary medical guidance and clinging to the outdated and nonclinical factors set forth in Briseno, the Supreme Court indicated, the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s diagnostic framework as required by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hall v. Florida. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Joanmarie Davoli.
On March 28, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. Texas, a habeas corpus dispute regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia that the execution of a mentally disabled person would violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for fatally shooting a sales clerk during a failed robbery attempt. Finding Moore to be intellectually disabled under current medical diagnostic standards set forth in the latest editions of the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) manual and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and invoking Atkins, a state court recommended granting Moore habeas relief in the form of life imprisonment or a new trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected that recommendation based on its 2004 decision in Ex Parte Briseno, which relied on standards set forth in a predecessor manual to the AAIDD and a series of evidentiary factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Moore had failed to establish significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and denied relief. By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents. By rejecting the habeas court’s application of contemporary medical guidance and clinging to the outdated and nonclinical factors set forth in Briseno, the Supreme Court indicated, the Court of Criminal Appeals had failed adequately to inform itself of the medical community’s diagnostic framework as required by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Hall v. Florida. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. To discuss the case, we have Joanmarie Davoli.
On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, a dispute involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which in exchange for federal funding requires that states provide a “free appropriate public education” to children with certain disabilities. E.F., a child who has a severe form of cerebral palsy, was assisted in various daily activities by her service dog Wonder. Officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School, however, refused to allow Wonder to join E.F. in kindergarten, so her parents (the Frys) proceeded to homeschool her instead. They also filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR), alleging that the exclusion of E.F.’s service dog violated federal disabilities laws, including Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. OCR sided with the Frys and Ezra Eby relented. Concerned about possible resentment from Ezra Eby officials, however, the Frys instead enrolled E.F. in a different elementary school that had welcomed Wonder. The Frys also filed suit against Ezra Eby’s local and regional school districts (and principal) in federal district court, seeking declaratory and monetary relief for the alleged violations of Title II and section 504. The District Court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Frys had failed first to exhaust administrative procedures available under the IDEA, as required by section 1415(l) of that law. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement applies whenever the plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in nature. -- The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari to address confusion in the courts of appeals as to the scope of section 1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement. By a vote of 8-0, the Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that exhaustion of the administrative procedures established by the IDEA is unnecessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee of a “free appropriate public education.” The Court then remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for application of that standard to the Frys’ complaint in the first instance: is their complaint fundamentally about denial of a free appropriate public education, or about something else? Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Daniel Woodring, principal at Woodring Law Firm.
In June 2017, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions and/or sentences: Davila v. Davis and McWilliams v. Dunn. -- The petition in Davila v. Davis involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Erick Davila was convicted in a Texas court of capital murder. Although his trial attorney had objected to one of the court’s jury instructions on intent, the court had overruled the objection. On direct appeal his appellate counsel raised various claims, but did not challenge the jury instruction ruling. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state’s highest criminal court, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. Davila then initiated a collateral attack on his conviction: he sought habeas relief in state court, but his attorney challenged neither the jury instruction ruling nor the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the alleged instructional error on direct appeal. Texas’ highest criminal court ultimately denied relief and the U.S. Supreme Court again denied cert. Davila next raised a habeas claim in federal court, alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the allegedly erroneous jury instruction on direct appeal. Although his failure to have raised that claim in his state habeas petition ordinarily constituted a fatal procedural default, Davila argued for an exception on the grounds that the failure was itself the result of ineffective assistance by his state habeas counsel. The federal district court denied Davila’s petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability for further review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, to consider whether the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel provided cause to excuse the procedural default. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not provide cause to excuse the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. -- The petition in McWilliams v. Dunn involved the scope of a state’s duty, identified by the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, to provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense, and independent from the prosecution, to effectively “assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” In 1986, James McWilliams, Jr. was convicted by an Alabama jury of capital murder. Although a state commission, convened after McWilliams’s counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation, found that he was competent to stand trial and had not been suffering from mental illness at the time of his alleged crime, his counsel had also asked for neurological and neuropsychological testing while the parties awaited sentencing. The examining doctor concluded that McWilliams had some genuine neuropsychological problems, and his attorney also received various updated mental health records just before the sentencing hearing convened. Although the attorney sought a continuance and the assistance of someone with psychological expertise to evaluate this new material, the trial court denied those requests and sentenced McWilliams to death. Alabama’s appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and his effort to obtain state postconviction relief also failed. On federal habeas review, the district court found that the requirements described in Ake had been satisfied and denied McWilliams relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that McWilliams got all the assistance to which Ake entitled him was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under the federal habeas statute. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court indicated that “Alabama’s provision of mental health assistance fell [] dramatically short of what Ake requires” and therefore concluded that the Alabama court decision affirming McWilliams’s conviction and sentence was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Although the Eleventh Circuit had alternatively held that any error by the Alabama courts lacked the “substantial and injurious effect or influence” required to warrant a grant of habeas relief, the Supreme Court indicated that the Eleventh Circuit should reconsider on remand “whether access to the type of meaningful assistance in evaluating, preparing, and presenting the defense that Ake requires would have mattered” to the outcome of McWilliams’s case. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. -- And now, to discuss the cases, we have Joseph Tartakovsy, Deputy Solicitor General for the State of Nevada.
On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.
On June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Maslenjak v. United States. At the close of the Bosnian civil war, Divna Maslenjak sought refugee status for herself and her family in the U.S. due to fear of persecution regarding their Serbian identity in modern-day Bosnia and the threat of reprisal against her husband, who she claimed had evaded military conscription in the Bosnian Serb militia. After the family was granted refugee status and Maslenjak became a U.S. citizen, a U.S. court convicted Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, on two counts of falsifying claims regarding Serbian military service on U.S. government documents, since Ratko had in fact served in the Serbian military. When Ratko applied for asylum to avoid deportation, Divna Maslenjak admitted to lying about her husband’s military service and was charged with two counts of naturalization fraud. At her trial, jurors were told that a naturalization fraud conviction could be carried out for false claims in Maslenjak’s application process, even if the claims did not affect whether she was approved. Convicted on both counts, Divna Maslenjack was stripped of her citizenship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that (1) the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) -- which prohibits "procur[ing], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person" -- makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the federal government must establish that the defendant's illegal act played a role in her acquisition of citizenship; (2) when the underlying illegality alleged in a Section 1425(a) prosecution is a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process as to have influenced an award of citizenship; and (3) measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case were in error, and the government's assertion that any instructional error was harmless if left for resolution on remand. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Vikrant P. Reddy, who is Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer. The Learning Center is a licensed preschool and daycare that is operated by Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc (Trinity Lutheran). Though it incorporates religious instruction into its curriculum, the school is open to all children. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants to organizations that qualify for resurfacing of playgrounds. Trinity Lutheran’s application for such a grant was denied under Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, which reads “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity Lutheran sued, arguing that DNR’s denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court dismissed the suit and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause did not compel the State to disregard the broader anti-establishment principle reflected in its own constitution. -- By a vote of 7-2, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the DNR’s policy violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying the Church an otherwise available public benefit on account of its religious status. -- Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice’s majority opinion in full, and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to footnote 3. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have David A. Cortman, who was lead counsel in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley and is Senior Counsel and Vice President of U.S. Litigation, Alliance Defending Freedom.
On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) alleging that, during gameplay on the Xbox 360 video game console, discs would come loose and get scratched by the internal components of the console, sustaining damage that then rendered them unplayable. The district court, deferring to an earlier denial of class certification entered by another district court dealing with a similar putative class, entered a stipulated dismissal and order striking class allegations. Despite the dismissal being the product of a stipulation--that is, an agreement by the parties--the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the parties remained sufficiently adverse for the dismissal to constitute a final appealable order. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded it had appellate jurisdiction over the case. Reaching the merits, that Court held that the district court had abused its discretion, and therefore reversed the stipulated dismissal and order striking class allegations, and remanded the case. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that Federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1291 to review an order denying class certification (or, as in this case, an order striking class allegations) after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Theodore H. Frank, who is Senior Attorney and Director of the Center for Class Action Fairness at the Competitive Enterprise Institute.
On May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark), which owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges, allows customers to buy its cartridges through a “Return Program,” which is administered under a combination single-use patent and contract license. Customers purchasing cartridges through the Return Program are given a discount in exchange for agreeing to use each cartridge once before returning it to Lexmark. All of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue here and some of those sold abroad were subject to the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired some Lexmark cartridges abroad--after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable their re-use--in order to resell them in the United States. Lexmark then sued, alleging that Impression had infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression contended that its resale of the cartridges was not an infringement because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges but denied it as to the foreign-sold cartridges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as to the domestically sold cartridges but affirmed dismissal regarding the cartridges sold abroad. -- There were two questions before the Supreme Court: (1) whether a “conditional sale” that transfers title to the patented item while specifying post-sale restrictions on the article's use or resale avoids application of the patent-exhaustion doctrine and therefore permits the enforcement of such post-sale restrictions through the patent law’s infringement remedy; and (2) whether, in light of this court’s holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. that the common-law doctrine barring restraints on alienation that is the basis of exhaustion doctrine “makes no geographical distinctions,” a sale of a patented article – authorized by the U.S. patentee – that takes place outside the United States exhausts the U.S. patent rights in that article. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that (1) Lexmark exhausted its patent rights in toner cartridges sold in the United States through its "Return Program"; and (2) Lexmark cannot sue Impression Products for patent infringement with respect to cartridges Lexmark sold abroad, which Impression Products acquired from purchasers and imported into the United States, because an authorized sale outside the United States, just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the Patent Act. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, who is Professor of Law and Co-Director of Academic Programs and Senior Scholar of CPIP, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam. Simon Tam of The Slants, an Asian American rock band, applied to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office, but the application was denied. The Office claimed that the name would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent,” citing the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed to a board within the Office but was again denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, ultimately held en banc that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment on its face. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Parts I, II, and III-A of Justice Alito’s majority opinion were joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas joined except for Part II. Parts III-B, III-C, and IV of Justice Alito’s majority opinion were joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Huston, who is Associate Attorney at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.
On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation. Jevic Transportation, Inc., a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey, was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners in 2006. In 2008 Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, at which that point it owed about $73 million to various creditors. Jevic’s former truck drivers then sued it for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts, by failing to provide the requisite 60 days’ notice before a layoff. Separately, unsecured creditors filed a fraudulent conveyance action. In March 2012, representatives of all the major parties met to negotiate a settlement of the fraudulent conveyance suit. The representatives--except for the drivers’ representative--agreed to a settlement that would provide for payment of legal and administrative fees, a schedule for the payment of various creditors (though not the drivers), and ultimately a “structured dismissal” of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy. -- The drivers and US Trustee objected, arguing that the settlement would improperly distribute estate property to creditors with lower priority than the drivers, in violation of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court rejected these objections and approved the proposed settlement. The U.S. District Court and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had not abused its discretion in approving a structured dismissal that did not adhere strictly to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. -- By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court held that (1) the drivers have Article III standing to bring the present litigation; and (2) bankruptcy courts may not approve structured dismissals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases that provide for asset distributions which do not follow ordinary priority rules established by the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of affected creditors. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Thomas Plank, who is the Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
On May 1, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, which was consolidated with Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami. In this case, the city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), arguing that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, thus denying the city expected property and tax revenues. -- The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect and therefore lacked standing under the statute. The court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks’ conduct was the proximate cause of the harms the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that FHA standing extends as broadly as Article III of the Constitution permits, that Miami had established Article III standing here, and that it had sufficiently alleged proximate causation. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court held that (1) the city of Miami was an "aggrieved person" authorized to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act; and (2) the Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that the city's complaints met the FHA's proximate-cause requirement based solely on the finding that the city's alleged financial injuries were a foreseeable results of the banks' misconduct; proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”; the lower courts should define, in the first instance, the contours of proximate cause under the FHA and decide on remand how that standard applies to the city's claims for lost property-tax revenue and increased municipal expenses. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Kennedy and Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. -- To discuss the case, we have Thaya Brook Knight, who is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute.
On March 21, 2017, the Supreme Court decided National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc. SW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. A union had negotiated longevity pay for SW General’s emergency medical technicians, nurses, and firefighters. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, but SW General contended that the NLRB complaint was invalid because the Acting General Counsel of the NLRB at the time, Lafe Solomon, had been serving in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). President Barack Obama had nominated Solomon--who had then been serving as Acting General Counsel after the General Counsel had resigned--to serve as General Counsel, but the Senate had not acted on the nomination. The president had ultimately withdrawn the nomination and replaced it with that of Richard Griffin, who was confirmed. In the intervening period--including when the NLRB complaint had issued against SW General--Solomon had continued to serve as Acting General Counsel. SW General argued that under the FVRA, Solomon became ineligible to hold the Acting position once nominated by the president to the General Counsel position. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed and vacated the NLRB’s enforcement order. The NLRB then obtained a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. -- By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that (1) subsection (b)(1) of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, which prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant office requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA and is not limited to first assistants performing acting service under Subsection (a)(1); and (2) Subsection (b)(1) prohibited Lafe Solomon from continuing his service as acting general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board once the president nominated him to fill the position permanently. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Kristin Hickman, who is the Distinguished McKnight University Professor, Harlan Albert Rogers Professor of Law, and Associate Director, Corporate Institute at the University of Minnesota Law School.
On April 25, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Clarke. Petitioners Brian and Michelle Lewis were driving on a Connecticut interstate when they were struck from behind by a vehicle driven by respondent William Clarke, a Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority employee, who was transporting Mohegan Sun Casino patrons. The Lewises sued Clarke in his individual capacity in state court. Clarke moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that because he was an employee of the Gaming Authority—an arm of the Mohegan Tribe entitled to sovereign immunity—and was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, he was similarly entitled to sovereign immunity against suit. He also argued, in the alternative, that he should prevail because the Gaming Authority was bound by tribal law to indemnify him. The trial court denied Clarke’s motion, but the Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit because Clarke was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. It did not consider whether Clarke should be entitled to sovereign immunity based on the indemnification statute. -- By a vote of 8-0, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that (1) in a suit brought against a tribal employee in his individual capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest and the tribe's sovereign immunity is not implicated; and (2) an indemnification provision cannot, as a matter of law, extend sovereign immunity to individual employees who would otherwise not be protected. Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Zachary Price, who is Associate Professor at University of California Hastings College of Law.
On April 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Nelson v. Colorado, along with Madden v. Colorado. In both cases, petitioners had collectively paid several thousand dollars to the state of Colorado in costs, fees, and restitution payments following their respective convictions for several offenses. Petitioners’ convictions were thereafter invalidated for various reasons. Nelson was retried but acquitted; the State elected not to appeal or retry in Madden’s cases. Both petitioners sought a return of the funds the State had required them to pay. Nelson’s trial court denied her motion outright, and Madden’s postconviction court allowed a refund of costs and fees, but not restitution. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that both petitioners were entitled to seek refunds of all they had paid, but the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that Colorado’s Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons statute (Exoneration Act) provided the exclusive authority for refunds and, because neither Nelson nor Madden had filed a claim under that Act, the courts lacked authority to order refunds. The court also held that there was no due process problem with the Act, which permits Colorado to retain conviction-related assessments unless and until the prevailing defendant institutes a discrete civil proceeding and proves her innocence by clear and convincing evidence. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado and remanded the case. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that Colorado’s Exoneration Act scheme deprived petitioners of the due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment: “[Petitioners’] interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration Act is unacceptable, and the State has shown no countervailing interests in retaining the amounts in question. To comport with due process, a State may not impose anything more than minimal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a conviction subsequently invalidated.” Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Ethan Blevins, who is Staff Attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation.
On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had various felony convictions, was subsequently found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As a result he was subject to an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which deemed him a “career offender” whose firearm possession offense constituted a “crime of violence.” Applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Beckles to 360 months’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Beckles then sought habeas relief from his enhanced sentence, arguing that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was not a “crime of violence,” and that therefore he did not qualify as a “career offender” under the Guidelines. The district court denied his petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed. -- Beckles then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and while his petition was pending the Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the residual clause part of the “crime of violence” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act--the very same language that was applied to Beckles via the Sentencing Guidelines--was unconstitutionally vague. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment in Beckles’ case and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the Johnson decision. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed Beckles’ enhanced sentence, reasoning that Johnson simply did not address the Sentencing Guidelines or related commentary. The Supreme Court then again granted certiorari, to “resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to the residual clause in [the Guidelines.]” -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that [the Guidelines’] residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Carissa Hessick, who is the Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
On February 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. Promega Corporation owned four patents for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing and was the exclusive licensee of a fifth patent. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for allegedly infringing on these patents. A jury found in favor of Promega but the district court nevertheless ruled for LifeTech, concluding that Promega had failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the favorable jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed that judgment, holding that the four Promega patents were ultimately invalid but agreeing that LifeTech had infringed the fifth patent and remanding to the district court for a determination of damages. In the course of its ruling, the Federal Circuit concluded that LifeTech’s supplying of a single, commodity component of a mulit-component invention had exposed LifeTech under federal law to damages liability on worldwide sales. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States exposes a manufacturer to liability for worldwide sales. -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention for manufacture abroad does not give rise to liability under Section 271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which prohibits the supply from the United States of "all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention" for combination abroad. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justices Thomas and Alito joined the majority opinion as to all but Part II-C. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Chief Justice Roberts was recused. -- To discuss the case, we have Howard J. Klein who is Attorney at Law at Klein, O’Neill & Singh, LLP.
On June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. Sanchez Valle was charged by Puerto Rico prosecutors with the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition without a license in violation of Puerto Rico law. While that charge was pending, he was indicted by a federal grand jury for the same offense, based on the same facts, under federal law. He pled guilty to the federal indictment but sought dismissal of the Puerto Rico charges on Double Jeopardy grounds, arguing that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico agreed but the Commonwealth appealed. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the federal government are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. -- By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars Puerto Rico and the United States from successively prosecuting a single person for the same conduct under equivalent criminal laws. The majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Alito. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Lance Sorenson, who is the Olin-Searle Fellow in Constitutional Law at Stanford University.
On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Voisine v. United States. Stephen Voisine was convicted in 2003 of assaulting a woman with whom he was in a domestic relationship--a misdemeanor violation of a Maine statute. In 2009 Voisine turned a rifle over to federal officials who were investigating him for a separate alleged crime. When investigators discovered Voisine’s 2003 misdemeanor assault, they charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which makes it a federal crime for a person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to “possess in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition.” In turn, a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is defined in § 921(a)(33)(A) as an offense that (1) is a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, and (2) “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force … committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim” or by a person in a similar domestic relationship with the victim. -- Voisine challenged the § 922(g)(9) charge, arguing that under his Maine conviction offensive physical contact, as opposed to one causing bodily injury, was not a “use of physical force” and thus not a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(A). The district court rejected this argument and Voisine pled guilty on condition that he be able to appeal the court’s ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, but the Supreme Court subsequently granted Voisine’s petition for certiorari, vacated the First Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening 2014 Supreme Court decision United States v. Castleman. That decision held the requirement of “physical force” satisfied, for purposes of § 922(g)(9), by the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction--but it did not resolve whether a conviction with the mens rea of reckless--as under the Maine statute--would qualify. On remand, the First Circuit again rejected Voisine’s challenge and held that his Maine conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” -- The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, and affirmed the judgment of the First Circuit by a vote of 6-2. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" that prohibits firearms possession by convicted felons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I and II. -- To discuss the case, we have David Kopel, who is Adjunct Professor at University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who also has three prior state or federal convictions “for a violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion.” To determine whether a prior conviction is for one of those listed crimes, courts apply a “categorical approach”—they ask whether the elements of the offense forming the basis for the conviction sufficiently match the elements of the generic (or commonly understood) version of the enumerated crime. -- Here, petitioner Richard Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because he had five prior Iowa burglary convictions, the Government argued for the 15-year minimum. Generic burglary requires unlawful entry into a “building or other structure.” The Iowa statute under which Mathis was convicted, however, also extended to “any... land, water, or air vehicle.” The District Court determined based on the case record that Mathis had burgled structures and imposed the 15-year ACCA minimum. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that because the elements of Iowa’s burglary law – which applies to “any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle” – were broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis’ prior convictions under the Iowa burglary law could not give rise to an ACCA sentence. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard E. Myers II, who is Henry Brandis Distinguished Professor of Law at University of North Carolina School of Law.
On June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Ross v. Blake. While being moved to a prison’s segregation unit, Maryland inmate Shaidon Blake was assaulted by James Madigan, one of two guards moving him. Blake subsequently sued Madigan and fellow guard Michael Ross, alleging excessive force and failure to take protective action. A jury found Madigan liable, but Ross objected that Blake had failed to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before filing suit, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). The district court agreed with Ross and dismissed the suit against him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that “special circumstances” can excuse a failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements—particularly where the inmate reasonably, even though mistakenly, believed he had sufficiently exhausted his remedies. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that the Fourth Circuit’s unwritten “special circumstances” exception was inconsistent with the text and history of the PLRA—though the Court left open on remand the question whether an administrative remedy was in fact “available” to Blake. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part.
On June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff. A police officer detained Edward Strieff after seeing him leave a residence that the officer believed, based on an anonymous tip and his own surveillance, was a base for drug dealing. A relay of Strieff’s identification to a police dispatcher revealed an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. The officer then arrested Strieff and searched him, discovering methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff ultimately persuaded the Utah Supreme Court to order that evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop. -- By a vote of 5-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident to arrest was admissible because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Orin S. Kerr, who is Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School.
On June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee. In 2011, the America Invents Act created an expedited procedure, known as inter partes review, to provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation for resolving certain challenges to patent validity. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board, contained within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), hears these disputes rather than a federal district court. When construing patent claims, the Board applies a “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard rather than the “plain and ordinary meaning” standard typically applied by federal courts. -- Here, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns a speed limit indicator patent. Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Board for inter partes review (IPR) of claims regarding the patent. The Board found that certain claims were unpatentable and denied Cuozzo’s request to replace those claims with several others. Cuozzo appealed the Board’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which (1) held that it lacked authority to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR, and (2) affirmed the Board’s final determination, finding no error in its application of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. -- There were two questions before the Supreme Court: (1) Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that the Board may, in IPR proceedings, construe claims according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning; and (2) whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that, even if the Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the decision to institute the IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable. -- By a vote of 8-0 and 6-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the underlying statute precluded judicial review of the kind of claim at issue here, involving the PTO’s decision to institute IPR. The Court further concluded that the PTO was authorized to issue the regulation, setting forth the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. -- A unanimous Court joined Justice Breyer’s opinion with respect to Parts I and III. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan joined the opinion with respect to Part II. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Gregory Dolin, who is Assistant Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Medicine and Law at University of Baltimore School of Law.
On June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that RJR conducted a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of several laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a federal statute. The alleged RICO enterprise involved the importation of illegal drugs into European countries by Colombian and Russian criminal organizations, with RJR helping to launder their drug money through a cigarette import-purchase scheme. Applying a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law, the district court dismissed The European Community’s civil RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that judgment and reinstated the RICO claim, however, concluding that various alleged predicates for RICO liability had been intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially, and that other offenses asserted sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO’s coverage. RJR subsequently obtained a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court on the following question: whether, or to what extent, RICO applies extraterritorially. -- By a vote of 4-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, which determined that the question of RICO’s extraterritorial application really divides into two questions: (1) Do RICO’s substantive prohibitions, contained in §1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries? (2) Does RICO’s private right of action, contained in §1964(c), apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries? On the first question, the Court held that under the facts asserted in this case, RICO’s prohibitions did apply extraterritorially. On the second question, however, the Court held that §1964(c)’s private right of action did not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus a private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury. Because in this case an earlier stipulation had resulted in waiver and dismissal of respondents’ domestic claims, the Court explained, their remaining RICO damages claims rest entirely on injury suffered abroad and must be dismissed. -- Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined in full by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and as to Parts I, II, and III by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Cory L. Andrews, who is senior litigation counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation.
On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, which was consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer. Both of these cases involved claims of patent infringement relating to the sale or marketing of various inventions. Both also involved a determination by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that an award of enhanced damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 was not appropriate, after applying the Circuit’s two-part objective/subjective test for willful or bad-faith infringement set forth in In re Seagate Tech., LLC. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Circuit’s refusal to allow enhanced damages absent a finding of willfulness under its two-part test was inconsistent with § 284, which provides that in a case of infringement, courts “may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that the Federal Circuit’s Seagate test unduly confined the ability of district courts to exercise the discretion conferred on them by § 284. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Kennedy and Alito joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Gregory Dolin who is Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Medicine and Law at University of Baltimore School of Law.
On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt. Whole Woman’s Health and other Texas abortion providers sued Texas officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a state law requiring that physicians who perform abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the location where the abortion is performed, and requiring that abortion facilities satisfy the standards set for ambulatory surgical centers (“ASC”s). The district court enjoined enforcement of both requirements “as applied to all women seeking a previability abortion,” and as applied to abortion facilities in McAllen and El Paso, but dismissed claims that the law violated equal protection and effected an unlawful delegation. -- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the equal protection and unlawful delegation claims, and affirmed but modified the injunction of the ASC and admitting privileges requirements as applied to the McAllen facility. The Court vacated the district court’s injunction of the admitting privileges requirement as applied to “all women seeking a previability abortion,” however, and reversed the injunction of the ASC requirement on its face (and in the context of medication abortion), as well as the injunction of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements as applied to the El Paso facility. As a result, the Texas law was to remain in effect statewide--except for the ASC requirement as applied to the Whole Woman’s Health abortion facility in McAllen, and the admitting privileges requirement as applied to a particular doctor when working at the McAllen facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, stayed issuance of the mandate on the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, ultimately reversing that judgment by a vote of 5-3 and remanding the case. -- Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that petitioners’ constitutional claims were not barred by res judicata, and that both the admitting-privileges and the ambulatory surgical-center requirements placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion, constituted an undue burden on abortion access, and violated the Constitution. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Roger Severino, who is Director, DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society at The Heritage Foundation.
On May 31, 2016, the Supreme Court decided United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. Hawkes Co. (Hawkes) applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a Clean Water Act permit to begin extracting peat from wetlands in northern Minnesota it was preparing to purchase. After attempting to discourage the purchase, and initiating various administrative processes, the Corps ultimately issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (Approved JD) asserting that the wetland contained waters of the United States, thereby creating a substantial barrier to development by Hawkes. Hawkes filed suit in federal district court to challenge the Approved JD, arguing that it conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Approved JD was not a “final agency action” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore not yet subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that judgment and remanded the case, holding that an Approved JD did constitute final agency action ripe for judicial review. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that the property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean Water Act, constitutes “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," and is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that an Approved JD is a final agency action judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Kagan also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark Miller, who is Managing Attorney, Atlantic Center, Pacific Legal Foundation.
On June 13, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (consolidated with its companion case, Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust). Concerned that its public utilities were on the verge of insolvency but could not obtain Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief under federal law, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico attempted to circumvent this obstacle by passing its own municipal bankruptcy law. This law, the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act expressly provides different protections for creditors than those in federal Chapter 9. -- Investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico’s public utilities worried that it might seek relief under the new Puerto Rico law and sued in federal court, challenging the law’s validity and seeking injunctive relief. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the new law and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico sought certiorari. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code preempts the Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for the Commonwealth’s public utilities to restructure their debts. -- By a vote of 5-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the First Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that in excluding Puerto Rico from the definition of a “state” for purposes of defining who may be a Chapter 9 debtor, Congress prevented Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief. But because Puerto Rico remains a “state” for other purposes of Chapter 9, the Court indicated, Chapter 9’s preemption provision still bars Puerto Rico from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure the debt of its insolvent public utilities companies. -- Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. -- To discuss the case, we have David Skeel, who is the S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and who submitted an amicus brief in support of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz. Between 2003 and 2007 Husky International Electronics sold and delivered electronic device components worth more than $160,000 to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. Chrysalis, then under the financial control of Daniel Ritz, failed to pay for the goods and Ritz encouraged the transfer of funds from Chrysalis to various other companies. Ritz held substantial ownership stakes in these companies, which had not given reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Chrysalis funds. -- In May 2009, Husky sued Ritz in federal district court, seeking to hold him personally liable for Chrysalis’s debt. Ritz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and Husky then filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging actual fraud, to preclude a discharge of Ritz’s debts. The bankruptcy court ruled that Husky had failed to prove actual fraud, however, and the district court affirmed that decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise affirmed the lower court judgments, finding no record evidence of a false representation by the debtor, which the Fifth Circuit deemed a necessary predicate to establish actual fraud. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether the “actual fraud” bar to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the term "actual fraud" in Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation. The majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Zvi Rosen, who is a visiting scholar at Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of Law.
On April 26, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Heffernan v. City of Paterson. Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. Although Heffernan disclaimed any political motives and said he was merely picking the sign up for his mother, his supervisor demoted him. Heffernan sued Paterson claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights, but lost on the grounds that, his supervisor’s erroneous belief notwithstanding, the fact that Heffernan was not actually engaged in political activity doomed his claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the First Amendment bars the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor's perception that the employee supports a political candidate. -- By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and Section 1983 even if the employer's actions are based on a factual mistake about the employee's behavior. Justice Breyer was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Adele Keim, who is counsel at The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.
On May 2, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Ocasio v. United States. Former police officer Samuel Ocasio challenged his conviction under the Hobbs Act for conspiracy to commit extortion, which arose from an alleged kickback scheme under which police officers funneled wrecked automobiles to a particular repair shop in exchange for monetary payments. He was charged with obtaining money from the shop owners under color of official right and of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act. The District Court rejected Ocasio’s argument that a Hobbs Act conspiracy requires proof that the alleged conspirators agreed to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. He was convicted on all counts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a conspiracy to commit extortion requires that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he reached an agreement with the owner of the property in question to obtain that property under color of official right. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Timothy O’Toole, who is a Lawyer at Miller & Chevalier.
On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Evenwel v. Abbott. As required by the Texas Constitution, the Texas legislature reapportioned its senate districts after the publication of the 2010 census, formally adopting an interim plan that had been put in place for the 2012 primaries. Plaintiffs, who are registered Texas voters, sued the Texas governor and secretary of state, asserting that the redistricting plan violated the one-person, one-vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, by failing to apportion districts to equalize both total population and voter population. A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the state officials. -- On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the three-judge district court correctly held that the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause allows States to use total population, and does not require States to use voter population when apportioning state legislative districts. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the three-judge district court. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that constitutional history, precedent, and longstanding practice demonstrate that a state may draw its legislative districts based on total population. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice GInsburg’s opinion for the Court. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Thomas joined except as to Part III-B. -- To discuss the case, we have Andrew Grossman, who is Partner at Baker & Hostetler, LLP.
On April 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Bank Markazi v. Peterson. The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 makes a designated set of assets available to satisfy the judgments gained in separate actions by victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran. Section 8772(a)(2) of the statute requires a court, before allowing execution against these assets, to determine, inter alia, “whether Iran holds equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets.” Respondents—more than 1,000 victims of Iran-sponsored acts of terrorism, their estate representatives, and surviving family members—hold judgments against Iran and moved for turnover of about $1.75 billion in bond assets held in a New York bank account allegedly owned by Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. When respondents invoked §8772, Bank Markazi argued that the statute was unconstitutional, contending that Congress had usurped the judicial role by directing a particular result in a pending enforcement proceeding and thereby violating the separation of powers. The District Court disagreed and upheld the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and Bank Markazi took its objection to the U.S. Supreme Court. -- By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that Section 8772 does not violate the separation of powers. Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in all but Part II-C. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Erik Zimmerman, who is an attorney at Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, PA.
On April 19, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing and several consolidated companion cases. The Court considered whether Maryland encroached on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) rate-setting power when directing its local electricity distribution companies, via a “Generation Order,” to enter into a fixed-rate contract with an energy provider selected through a bidding process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s Generation Order was preempted by federal law because it effectively set the rates the producer would receive for sales resulting from a regional auction overseen by FERC, and in effect also extended a three-year fixed price period set under the Federal Power Act to twenty years. The questions before the Supreme Court were: (1) Whether, when a seller offers to build generation and sell wholesale power on a fixed-rate contract basis, the Federal Power Act field-preempts a state order directing retail utilities to enter into the contract; and (2) whether FERC’s acceptance of an annual regional capacity auction preempts states from requiring retail utilities to contract at fixed rates with sellers who are willing to commit to sell into the auction on a long-term basis. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Maryland's regulatory program--which disregards an interstate wholesale rate set by FERC--is preempted by the Federal Power Act, which vests in FERC exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity rates. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. -- To discuss the case, we have James Coleman, who is Assistant Professor at University of Calgary Law School.
On March 1, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v. United States. Petitioner Avondale Lockhart pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography. Because Lockhart had a prior state-court conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult girlfriend, his presentence report concluded that he was subject to a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement, which is triggered by prior state convictions for crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Lockhart argued that the limiting phrase “involving a minor or ward” applied to all three state crimes, so his prior conviction did not trigger the enhancement. Disagreeing, the District Court applied the mandatory minimum. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 6-2, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” in §2252(b)(2) modifies only “abusive sexual conduct.” Thus, Lockhart’s prior conviction for sexual abuse of an adult was encompassed by §2252(b)(2) and the 10-year mandatory minimum applied. -- Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Alito. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Erin Sheley, who is Assistant Professor at University of Calgary Faculty of Law.
On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided three consolidated death penalty cases: Kansas v. Carr, a second Kansas v. Carr, and Kansas v. Gleason. -- A Kansas jury sentenced Sidney Gleason to death for killing a co-conspirator and her boyfriend to cover up the robbery of an elderly man. In a joint proceeding, a Kansas jury also sentenced brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr to death for a crime spree that culminated in the brutal rape, robbery, kidnapping, and execution-style shooting of five young men and women. The Supreme Court of Kansas vacated the death sentences in each case, holding that the sentencing instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by failing “to affirmatively inform the jury that mitigating circumstances need only be proved to the satisfaction of the individual juror in that juror’s sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt.” It also held that the Carrs’ Eighth Amendment right “to an individualized capital sentencing determination” was violated by the trial court’s failure to sever their sentencing proceedings. -- The two questions before the U.S. Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Constitution required the sentencing courts to instruct the juries that mitigating circumstances “need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (2) whether the Constitution required severance of the Carrs’ joint sentencing proceedings. -- By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court and remanded the cases. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that (1) the Eighth Amendment does not require capital-sentencing courts to instruct a jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the Constitution did not require severance of joint sentencing proceedings because the contention that the admission of mitigating evidence by one defendant could have "so infected" the jury's consideration of the other defendant's sentence as to amount to a denial of due process does not stand in light of all the evidence presented at the guilty and penalty phases relevant to the jury's sentencing determination. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Kent S. Scheidegger, who is Legal Director & General Counsel at Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
On January 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez. This case concerns a complaint by Jose Gomez that Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant for the U.S. Navy, allowed a third-party vendor to send him unsolicited text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The case presents two questions for the Supreme Court: (1) whether a case becomes moot when a plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim, including in a class action, and (2) whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity for government contractors is limited to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held that Gomez’s individual and class claims were not mooted, and that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to derivative sovereign immunity. -- By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding that (1) an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case, so the district court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s complaint, and (2) a federal contractor is not entitled to immunity from suit for its violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act when it violates both federal law and the government's explicit instructions. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Alito joined. Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark Chenoweth, who is General Counsel at Washington Legal Foundation.
On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court decided several energy cases consolidated under the heading Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association. These cases concern a practice called “demand response,” in which operators of wholesale markets pay electricity consumers for commitments not to use power at certain times. In the regulation challenged here, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required those market operators, in specified circumstances, to compensate the two services equivalently—that is, to pay the same price to demand response providers for conserving energy as to generators for making more of it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated this regulation, however, holding it beyond the FERC’s authority under the Federal Power Act as well as arbitrary and capricious, for failure to justify adequately a potential windfall to demand response providers. -- The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) Does the Federal Power Act permit FERC to regulate these demand response transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge on the States’ residual authority? (2) Even if FERC has the requisite statutory power, did FERC fail to justify adequately why demand response providers and electricity producers should receive the same compensation? -- By a vote of 6-2, the Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case, holding that (1) FERC did possess adequate regulatory authority under the Federal Power Act; and (2) FERC’s decision to compensate demand response providers at locational marginal price was not arbitrary and capricious. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito was recused from this case. -- To discuss the case, we have James Coleman, who is assistant professor at the University of Calgary, Faculty of Law and Haskayne School of Business.
Self Directed Investor Talk: Alternative Asset Investing through Self-Directed IRA's & Solo 401k's
The SUPREME COURT leveled a massive attack against REAL ESTATE INVESTORS in a huge ruling from yesterday. This one is big, folks. I’m Bryan Ellis, and I’ll tell you how they’re stealing your rights again right now in Episode #90----------It’s a somber time as a real estate investor, and a somber time as an American. Yesterday, the US Supreme Court issued major rulings that make it imminently clear that the plain language of a law is not the standard by which the court will rule. Rather, they’ve ruled egregiously in favor of the expansion of federal power, and against YOUR RIGHTS as a citizen of our once great country.You may think I’m referring to the ruling about Obamacare, the law which is already a disaster from any perspective. And yes, that case was CERTAINLY an example of ignoring the language of the law in order to expand federal power. There’s simply no arguing that point.But the case I’m referring to, which is so huge and so distinctly NEGATIVE for real estate investors, was between the Texas Department of Housing and the “Inclusive Communities Project”.So here’s what the case was about… and why it’s terrifying for real estate investors. The question that the court had to decide was this: Are you guilty of racial discrimination if you have no policies that have racial discrimination as an objective?Yes, that’s a convoluted notion… as is the entire case… but I’ll give you an example to clarify it:Let’s just say you live in a neighborhood and you also own a rental property in that neighborhood. You’ve got kids, and you want to keep them safe. And let’s say that you have a real conviction that you will not serve certain types of people with your rental property, in order to keep your family, and your neighborhood, safe. The standard you’re using to filter out dangerous people… well, it’s completely objective. And it’s not random. You see, the group of people you refuse to service is convicted sex offenders. You refuse, in principle, to serve such egregious scum.Fair enough, right? Your property, your decision, right?Of course, there is the issue of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, a law that makes it illegal to discriminate in housing matters on the basis of race and a few other issues.But that’s not an issue for you. You’re not a racist to begin with. You’re happy for any qualified party to rent your property, regardless of their race… so long as they’re not a baby rapist.Guess what? You’re quite certainly guilty of racial discrimination.Yep, that’s right. And the lawsuit that results from it is going to be very expensive and will likely crush your financial objectives.So, how are you guilty of racial discrimination, when the parties you’re actually filtering from your rental property are baby rapists?Well, here’s the thing: If the universe of people who are convicted baby rapists in your area happen to be mostly of a racial minority, then you are – according to this absolutely STUPID, INSULTING and TERRIFYING ruling – YOU are guilty of racial discrimination.Yep, you heard that right.Because you’re trying to protect your family and your neighborhood from baby rapists…Because you’re unwilling to provide housing to people who sexually assault children…Because you have standards of behavior which say that you won’t allow your business to benefit people who would rather RAPE your children rather than say hello to them…Well, you’re a racist.That’s right. That’s what this decision from the Supreme Court effectively means for you.The judges who decided this are: Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonya Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.To each one of those justices, I say: GO TO HELL. Making bad decisions as judges is one thing. Making it ILLEGAL for Americans to protect their families is entirely another. Making it illegal for people to live out their values in their business is REPUGNANT. Each one of you judges are horrible human beings.A child rapist… no matter what his skin color… doesn’t deserve one ounce of respect or consideration. But you people are DEMANDING that the one factor that trumps EVERY OTHER CONSIDERATION is race. Each one of you is a race bigot.Of course, I’m assuming that there isn’t a law that protects baby rapists from discrimination. In our screwed up society, there probably is. But I’m going to continue on the assumption that there’s not.Let’s look back to the immortal words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr: “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.”I agree with Dr. King. I’ll bet you do, too. But the Supreme Court has just ruled – ostensibly to “protect” minority rights – that the one thing that MUST be ignored about a person is the content of their character, and the one thing that MUST be considered about a person is the color of their skin.Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan: You’ve just crushed the dream of Dr. King… and of everyone who believes that skin color has nothing to do with the value of a human being. I’d like to repeat: You’re all HORRIBLE people.But… that’s not the end of the bad news, my friends.The real problem is WHO can take legal action against you. You see, it’s NOT likely that a baby rapist will sue you based on this particular issue, which is called “disparate impact” in legal parlance. No, it’s worse than that.You see, this ruling opens the door for supposed community groups – who have not been damaged by your policies in any way, and who exist solely to pick race-based legal fights – to sue you in order to make their vision of the world – the one where the content of one’s character MUST be IGNORED, and where the color of one’s skin MUST be considered above all other factors.Here’s the next objective for our government: They’re going to try to make it illegal for you to sell your real estate to the highest bidder. Why? There’s a disparate impact against racial minorities who may not have enough money to buy where your property is located. The time is coming, folks.None of this is helpful to racial minorities, or to any other people… but it’s wildly valuable for the government. Why? It increases the government’s role in your life… and with every additional hint of government involvement in your daily life, your business and your family, the government’s power grows… and yours shrinks.My friends, I love America. But we’re getting what we deserve. By putting politicians in office who nominate Supreme Court justices like Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan… we’re getting exactly what we’ve asked for.I would also criticize our choices of Congress members and Presidents as well because it is they who create these laws to begin with. But, as this case, and the yesterday’s ruling from the Obamacare case makes clear… the language of those laws don’t really matter anyway. What matters in today’s America is the pronouncements from on high at the Supreme Court… and in every way, the Supreme Court is showing itself to be a friend of the huge federal government, and the enemy of individual citizens who love liberty and justice for all.It’s a sad day in America, my friends. Thanks to the Supreme Court – and to the liberal philosophy they’re pushing – it’s just become much harder to invest wisely toda … and to live well forever. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
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