Podcasts about ismailis

Hello and welcome to the second episode of our two-part series on The Ismailis, which features Dr Farhad Daftary, Director Emeritus of the Institute of Ismaili Studies. This episode continues the history of the community, from the collapse of the Fatimid Empire - the only time Ismailis led a state - all the way to the present day.    One topic that dominates this episode is the legends about the community. For hundreds of years Westerners have been fascinated by stories of the Assassins, their mysterious leader and their remote mountain stronghold at Alamut in Northern Iran. The legends first emerged in the 12th century when Crusaders in Syria came into contact with the Nizari Ismailis, who, at the behest of their leader Hasan bin Sabbah (mythologized as the "Old Man of the Mountain"), engaged in dangerous missions to kill their enemies. Elaborated over the years, the tales culminated in Marco Polo's claim that the "Old Man" controlled the behaviour of his self-sacrificing devotees through the use of hashish and a secret garden of paradise. So influential were these tales that the word "assassin" entered European languages as a common noun meaning "murderer".  Dr Daftary addresses in detail the assassins legend created this time by Muslim polemicists aiming to discredit the Ismaili movement. As such, this episode reveals an extraordinary programme of propaganda rooted in the medieval Muslim world and medieval Europe's ignorance of this world. Do subscribe to our YouTube channel, and follow us for more: https://www.instagram.com/muslimfootprints/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/muslim-footprints https://x.com/MFootprintsPod https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61557285590197 http://www.youtube.com/@MuslimFootprints https://www.threads.net/@muslimfootprints

Hello again and welcome to our two-part series on The Ismailis, which features Dr Farhad Daftary, Director Emeritus of the Institute of Ismaili Studies.   The Ismailis, a branch of Shi'i Islam, emerged in 765 during the formative period of Islam. Today, the community spans more than 30 countries, embodying a global presence with rich cultural and intellectual contributions.   Dr Daftary provides insights into the community's formation, the challenges of documenting its history, and the esoteric doctrines that distinguish Ismailism. At the heart of Ismaili beliefs is its approach to religious scripture and an emphasis on both apparent and hidden meanings. In other words, while Sharia, or religious laws, evolve over time, the inner spiritual teachings remain constant. This adaptability has helped the Ismailis sustain their identity across centuries, allowing the community to thrive in diverse regions and political climates.   The first part of the series continues through the Fatimid period, when Ismailis wielded significant political power and influence.   Do subscribe to our YouTube channel, and follow us for more: https://www.instagram.com/muslimfootprints/ https://www.linkedin.com/company/muslim-footprints https://x.com/MFootprintsPod https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61557285590197 http://www.youtube.com/@MuslimFootprints https://www.threads.net/@muslimfootprints

In this stream I discuss the very interesting history and theology of the Islamic Order of Assassins and why they are still remembered today. Make sure to check it out and let me know what you think. God bless Superchat Here https://streamlabs.com/churchoftheeternallogos Donochat Me: https://dono.chat/dono/dph Join this channel's YouTube Memberships: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCH8JwgaHCkhdfERVkGbLl2g/join Intro Music Follow Keynan Here! https://linktr.ee/keynanrwils b-dibe's Bandcamp: https://b-dibe.bandcamp.com/ b-dibe's Soundcloud: https://soundcloud.com/b-dibe Superchat Here https://streamlabs.com/churchoftheeternallogos Rokfin: https://rokfin.com/dpharry Website: http://www.davidpatrickharry.com GAB: https://gab.com/dpharry Support COTEL with Crypto! Bitcoin: 3QNWpM2qLGfaZ2nUXNDRnwV21UUiaBKVsy Ethereum: 0x0b87E0494117C0adbC45F9F2c099489079d6F7Da Litecoin: MKATh5kwTdiZnPE5Ehr88Yg4KW99Zf7k8d If you enjoy this production, feel compelled, or appreciate my other videos, please support me through my website memberships (www.davidpatrickharry.com) or donate directly by PayPal or crypto! Any contribution would be greatly appreciated. Thank you Logos Subscription Membership: http://davidpatrickharry.com/register/ Venmo: @cotel - https://account.venmo.com/u/cotel PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/eternallogos Donations: http://www.davidpatrickharry.com/donate/ PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/eternallogos Website: http://www.davidpatrickharry.com Rokfin: https://rokfin.com/dpharry Rumble: https://rumble.com/user/COTEL Odysee: https://odysee.com/@ChurchoftheEternalLogos:d GAB: https://gab.com/dpharry Telegram: https://t.me/eternallogos Minds: https://www.minds.com/Dpharry Bitchute: https://www.bitchute.com/channel/W10R... DLive: https://dlive.tv/The_Eternal_Logos Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dpharry/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/_dpharry

rWotD Episode 2501: Abu Zar Ghaffari Welcome to random Wiki of the Day where we read the summary of a random Wikipedia page every day.The random article for Saturday, 9 March 2024 is Abu Zar Ghaffari.Abu Zar Ghaffari (Urdu: ابو ذر غفاری Sindhi: ابو ذر غفاي) is a neighborhood in the Karachi Central district of Karachi, Pakistan. It was previously administered as part of New Karachi Town, which was disbanded in 2011.There are several ethnic groups in Abu Zar Ghaffari including Muhajirs, Sindhis, Punjabis, Kashmiris, Seraikis, Pakhtuns, Balochis, Memons, Bohras, Ismailis, etc. Over 99% of the population is Muslim. The population of New Karachi Town is estimated to be nearly one million.This recording reflects the Wikipedia text as of 00:17 UTC on Saturday, 9 March 2024.For the full current version of the article, see Abu Zar Ghaffari on Wikipedia.This podcast uses content from Wikipedia under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.Visit our archives at wikioftheday.com and subscribe to stay updated on new episodes.Follow us on Mastodon at @wikioftheday@masto.ai.Also check out Curmudgeon's Corner, a current events podcast.Until next time, I'm Joey Standard.

The more we talk to Ismailis, the more they are exposed that whatever has been taught to them doesn't have anything to do with Islam... and the irony is that they themselves don't know and think that they are following Islam... It is therefore responsibility of every Ismaili to search the truth themselves without being biased...   Support the show

Ismailies used to out rightly reject the vacation pictures of Aga Khan with ladies in indecent clothing when we showed it in our Live streams saying these are photoshopped, but, their own Missionary Khalil Andani is telling Ismailies on his website on how to respond to these pictures, indirectly endorsing that these pictures are not fake or treated.... Also, a young brother Ziyan who is on the verge of accepting Islam and leaving Ismailism, discusses his heart out on this Live stream... Support the show

Ismailis from South Asia find their origins in Gujarat, Sindh and Punjab. Their ancestors belonged to various castes such as the Lohana and Bhatia communities, who found themselves drawn to the teachings of Muslim saints, known as pirs or sayyids. According to community tradition, Ismaili pirs were sent from Persia by the Imams – or spiritual leaders – to spread knowledge of who the Ismaili Imams are, and the notion of the Imam as the guide to spiritual enlightenment.  The pirs did this through ginans, one thousand or more religious hymns that are assumed to date as far back as the thirteenth century. The people that accepted these teachings came to be known as Satpanthis: those who followed Satpanth, or the True Path. On this episode, Ali Asani, professor of Indo-Muslim and Islamic Religion and Cultures at Harvard University, speaks to us about ginans, and the fascinating evolution of this particular Ismaili tradition over the past 800 years.

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier.

Teena Purohit's new book Sunni Chauvinism and the Roots of Muslim Modernism (Princeton University Press, 2023) maps how various Muslim modernists from the 19th to the 20th centuries used their Sunni normativity to construct social and political boundaries around conceptions of tawhid or Islamic unity. The book distinctively focuses on how Muslim modernists such as canonical figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Rida and many others, focused on communities such as Shi‘as, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and Bahai's in their activist and intellectual projects that aspired for a singular unified Islam against encroaching western modernity.  For Muslim modernists who were anxious to reclaim a “lost unity” of Islam that existed in the past and believed could be achieved again in the future (though lacking in their time), non-Sunni groups, like Ahmadis for Muhammad Iqbal or esoteric groups for Rashid Rida, became communities that received disparaging attention and intolerant attitudes that led to a particular Sunni chauvinism, Purohit argues. And as such, this obsession with unity (tawhid) and the privileging of Sunnism that went with it was found in all forms of Muslim modernism. This book then invites a rethinking of our conceptualization of Muslim modernism in light of these thinkers approaches to esoteric (i.e., Sufi) and Shi‘a groups who were viewed as problematic for the social and political goal of tawhid. This accessible book will be of interest to those who think and write on Muslim modernism and non-Sunni movements in Islam. It will also be a great teaching resource for undergraduate and graduate classes. Shobhana Xavier is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Queen's University. More details about her research and scholarship may be found here and here. She may be reached at shobhana.xavier@queensu.ca. You can follow her on Twitter via @shobhanaxavier. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/religion

What qualifies a man to lead the Ummah? Islam, like any religious tradition, is not monolithic. Let's explore the history of schisms and the personalities behind them in the early Islamic period.  After Muhammad's death in 632 CE, there was a succession crisis; for some, it was a bigger crisis than for others. The first to be elected to take over leadership was Abu Bakr, the prophet's father-in-law. For decades, the followers of Muhammad were fairly united, until one of his sons-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, took over as the fourth caliph. This was followed by a great schism between what would come to be known as the Sunni and Shia Muslims.The Shia have splintered further since the 7th century: The Ismailis adhere to inheritance of a lost son, and the Twelvers  hope for the return of a mysterious claim of a hidden child.Despite the many schisms that established the disunity of Islamic thought, there is much that they retain in common.We also explore the traditions that fuel the authoritarian fundamental extremists that so many are rightly worried about.All this and more...Support us at Patreon and SpreadshirtJoin the Community on DiscordLearn more great religion facts on Facebook and Instagram

Please visit us:Website: agakhanism.comYoutube: AgaKhanismOfficialTwitter: @AgaKhanismFacebook: AgaKhanismSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

Brother Ibrahim Mauji is an ex-Agakhani. He left Agakhainsm and embraced Islam when he realized the Kufr of Aga Khan's deviant cult.Brother Ibrahim went to a public school where he interacted with Muslim students. When he studied Islamiyat with Muslims, he realized there was a clear difference between Agakhanism and Islam.His mother reverted to Islam and stopped going to Jamatkhana. She raised questions that instilled doubts into brother Ibrahim's mind about Aga Khan and his secretive, heretic cult.Brother Ibrahim also stopped going to Jamatkhana's night-school whose basic purpose is to brainwash young students and make them stubborn Agakhanis.His mother started educating him about the Shirk in Agakhanism and how the Ismaili Dua contradicts every aspect of Islam. He realized the reality of it and started studying Agakhanism deeply, so he could find answers to his mother's questions. But the more he studied Agakhanism, the more he saw confusion and contradictions in the Agakhani religion.He reached the conclusion that Agakhanism is Shirk and his mother was right!Then he started his journey of Truth-seeking. He made new Muslim friends who helped him how to pray and study Islam. He started going to the Masjid and experienced the joy of being a Muslim. He publicly embraced Islam, as a result he faced social boycott from the Agakhani community.But Allah replaced his previous social-circle with a new circle of friends who remind him of Allah and together they strive towards success in both Dunya and Aakhira. Brother Ibrahim gained both the worlds by the Mercy of Allah!Website: agakhanism.comYoutube: AgaKhanismOfficialTwitter: @AgaKhanismFacebook: AgaKhanismSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

Ex-Mukhi Shahnawaz Bhai narrates an inspiring story of his Agakhani-Ismaili friend who reverted to Islam after visiting the Masjid to witness the Muslim prayer in congregation.He then explains how reading the Qur'an with understanding can open the eyes of Agakhani-Ismailis who are deliberately kept away from the Word of Allah to keep them in perpetual ignorance by the salesmen or "missionaries" of Aga Khan.Agakhani-Ismailis as a cult are only exposed to bits and pieces of Verses of the Qur'an, which are misinterpreted by the missionaries of Aga Khan. Followers of Aga Khan are discouraged to read the Qur'an themselves.  This makes it easy for the missionaries to manipulate and feed their brains with whatever suits their cult. We also address several questions in the last part of the podcast.Website: agakhanism.comYoutube: AgaKhanismOfficialTwitter: @AgaKhanismFacebook: AgaKhanismSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

In this episode, I was joined by Proud Pakistani Gay Salman. He was born in Pakistan and grew up as a Muslim. His family was Ismaili and then converted to the Sunni sect of Islam. Salman and I kicked off the conversation by discussing his family and religious background. We then went on to discuss minorities in Pakistan and how the government favors Sunnism over other sects of Islam and other religious minorities. Also, we talked about the safety of minorities as well as the human rights situation in Pakistan.   Salman then shared his experiences of growing up in a devout Sunni family while also being gay. He talked about how the religious teachings and subtle messages from his parents led him to develop internalized homophobia. Salman also discussed how he dealt with internalized homophobia and how that opened a door for him to start critically questioning some of the broader religious beliefs he was holding. He also detailed his struggle to hold onto the Muslim identity even as his beliefs were no longer aligning with traditional/mainstream Islamic teachings. We later talked about how he came to the realization that he was no longer Muslim. The conversation then moved to the topic of coming out as gay and coming as an apostate/ ex-Muslim. Salman shared how his relationship with his family soured when he came out as gay. He also talked about how his relations with various family members are improving with time. We also discussed the need for community and being prepared before coming out. I invite you to take a listen to this insightful discussion! YouTube version of this interview: https://youtu.be/Gx2EgXCFdkU Salman's TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@proudpakistanigay?lang=en Salman's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/proudgaypakistani/ Timestamps: 0:00 Introductions 1:10 Salman's family background 6:54 Is it safe for Ismailis and other religious minorities in Pakistan?  22:05 The importance of enlightenment values and secularism. Is religion still relevant in today's society? 30:50 Salman's religious background and how being gay impacted his religious beliefs. 43:05 Moving out of the family and dealing with internalized homophobia. 49:35 How exploring sexuality helped Salman start questioning some aspects of Islam. 56:50 Are Muslims in the West more accepting of the LGBTQ+ community?  1:05:40 Comments from the live chat 1:06:23 Marriage of convenience. 1:09:56 Salman's social accounts  and channel announcements  1:12:00 Is being gay normal? 1:13:50 Struggling to hold onto the Muslim identity 1:18:46 Salman coming to the realization that he was no longer Muslim and dealing with the grief of losing a community. 1:22:36 Salman's relationship with his family - Coming out as Gay compared to coming out as an ex-Muslim. 1:27:40 The victim mentality in the Muslim community. Islamophobia and anti-Muslim bigotry.  1:33:40 The importance of having a network/ community before coming out. 1:39:11 Salman's goals as an out gay and ex-Muslim. 1:41:50 Salman's advice for Muslims 1:44:27 Final remarks.

Guest: Ex-Mukhi Shahnawaz Our ex-Agakhani-Ismaili guest, Shahnawaz, used to be Mukhi (missionary) in a Jamatkhana. He left Agakhanism about 13 years ago when he realized how it clashes with Islam in fundamental matters of Deen. Not only was he a Mukhi in Jamatkhana, but he also headed Agakhani-Ismaili committees and was paid quite well by the Aga Khan institutions. He left it all for Islam, for Haqq (Truth), and for his ultimate salvation. In this episode, he shares his personal story of the experiences and events in his life that made him question the heretic cult of Aga Khan. He shares how lack of answers and clarity in Agakhanism; all the confusions in their theology and clear-cut contradictions led him to seek Allah's guidance in Qur'an and Sunnah, which is why he decided to leave Agakhanism and become a Muslim. Visit us at the following links:Website: agakhanism.comYoutube: AgaKhanismOfficialTwitter: @AgaKhanismFacebook: AgaKhanismSupport the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

We will discuss how Aga Khan and his family live a lavish life with all the money Aga Khan receives from the Ismaili Jamat as their "spiritual father." The Aga Khan refers to himself as the Ismailis' imam, but in reality, he is a cult leader and extortionist who demands the worship of his Ismaili followers and measures their devotion by the amount of money they give him. The Aga Khan has designed a system of extortion in which the Ismailis must buy their way into certain Jamat Khana congregations to ask the Aga Khan for the forgiveness of their sins. The Aga Khan and his forefathers are carousers and cult leaders, who brainwashed the Ismailis to swindle millions of dollars from their pockets every month. They have kept naive Ismailis in so-called spiritual bondage to keep pumping money into their lavish, jet-setter, playboy lifestyle and to maintain their multiple mansions, villas, private jets, islands, mistresses, horses, studs, hotels, airlines, yachts etc.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

One of the core beliefs in Islam is that of Khatm-e-Nubuwwat, which means Prophet Muhammad (SAW) is the last and final Prophet of Allah. Whoever doesn't believe in Khatm-e-Nubuwwat automatically becomes a Kafir. Based on this, the Qadiyanis have been declared Kafir in Pakistan. In this program, we will discuss the similarities between Qadiyanis and Ismailis and how Ismailis also deny Khatm-e-Nubuwwat by putting the Aga Khan on a higher status than the Prophet (SAW). Both the groups claim that they accept Khatm-e-Nubuwwat, but in reality, their interpretation of Khatm-e-Nubuwwat is totally wrong and alien to Islam.Speakers: Maulana Ali Muawiya - A.K Shaikh (Ex-Ahmadi) - Akbar Khoja (Ex-AgaKhani)Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

 Ex-Ismailis discuss some shocking secrets about Aga Khan and Ismailism. In this episode, they share their research to invite other Ismailis to Islam and leave AgaKhanism.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

Part 2 of 3  -Topic: Imam ki authority or Shajra e NasbKhana e Hikmat se Taluq rakhnay walay Aga Khani Mukhi Rehmat Karim ka Mowlana Qasim Daniyal se discussion ●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●We at AgaKhanism(dot)com are a team of independent researchers. Our mission is to give Dawah to the Ismaili Jamat.●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●Podcasts, Debates, and Documentaries to guide Ismailis towards the Truth.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

Part 1 of 3  -Topic: "Imam ki authority or Shajra e Nasb" - Khana e Hikmat se Taluq rakhnay walay Aga Khani Mukhi Rehmat Karim ka Mowlana Qasim Daniyal se discussion●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●We at AgaKhanism(dot)com are a team of independent researchers. Our mission is to give Dawah to the Ismaili Jamat.Support us and become our Patron at www.patreon.com/IsmailiDawahTeam●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●Podcasts, Debates, and Documentaries to guide Ismailis towards the Truth.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

Part 3 of 3  -Topic: Imam ki authority or Shajra e NasbKhana e Hikmat se Taluq rakhnay walay Aga Khani Mukhi Rehmat Karim ka Mowlana Qasim Daniyal se discussionPart 3 : Rehmat Karim (ismaili Missionary) vs Mowlana Qasim Daniyal ●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●We at AgaKhanism(dot)com are a team of independent researchers. Our mission is to give Dawah to the Ismaili Jamat.Support us and become our Patron at www.patreon.com/IsmailiDawahTeam●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●Podcasts, Debates, and Documentaries to guide Ismailis towards the Truth.

Careers of the Future is a podcast where students can learn from Ismailis at the leading edge of their fields about the future of work. Each episode discusses a particular field of work and explores what students interested in that field can do to prepare for their career.

During a friendly discussion in November 2020, a brother called Imran [Hunzai] revealed the Ismaili belief that Aga Khan still receives revelation and guides Ismailis on the basis of that revelation received. Claims "Ali ka zikr Ibadat hai"Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/IsmailiDawahTeam)

During a friendly discussion in November 2020, a brother called Imran [Hunzai] revealed the Ismaili belief that Aga Khan still receives revelation and guides Ismailis on the basis of that revelation received.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

During a friendly discussion in November 2020, a brother called I*r*n [Hu*z*i] revealed the Ismaili belief that Aga Khan still receives revelation and guides Ismailis on the basis of that revelation received.Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

 In this episode, an Ismaili randomly calls brother Azhar Ali (ex-Ismaili) to discuss Ismailism.Listen to their discussion to see the irrational attitude, ignorance and blindness of the Ismaili disciple of Aga Khan. It's typical of the Ismailis to never accept any rational argument or evidence and blindly believe Karim Shah, their so-called "omnipresent imam" to be the bearer of the Truth. Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/AgaKhanism)

In this episode of the AgaKhanism, a young, confused Ismaili calls in to join the discussion on Ismailism. He fails to comprehend Ismailism, but also doesn't want to comprehend Islam. His confusion is so deep, he doesn't recognize the clear contradiction between Ismailism and Islam.We at AgaKhanism(dot)com are a team of independent researchers. Our   mission is to give Dawah to the Ismaili Jamaat. Support our work and   become our Patron: www.patreon.com/IsmailiDawahTeam●▬▬▬▬▬ஜ۩۞۩ஜ▬▬▬▬▬▬●Podcasts, Debates, and Documentaries to guide Ismailis towards the Truth.

In this exciting episode I delve deeper into the later life of Hassan-i-Sabbah and his secret order of assassins, the legend that inspired the famous Assassins Creed video game series. Continuing from last week, I unveil details of how Nizarism took hold in India and how a Shi'a Imam was transformed via the Ginan tradition into Hindu deities Brahma, Vishnu and Mahesh whilst also being the God of Islam.

Anar Amin is a regional academic lead for ITREB who oversees 20 Jamat Khanas in the U.S and has spent over a decade in the Secondary Teacher Education Program (STEP). She went into the STEP system after a personal tragedy put her on a path of rediscovering her faith. On this episode, we learn more about Anar's childhood and upbringing, her travels teaching in different cities and countries—from Los Angeles to Germany, and her advice for aspiring educators.  Connect with Anar Amin on LinkedIn Learn more about STEP For those interested in learning more about Muslim Societies and Civilizations or aspiring to be STEP educators, you can pick up any of the Secondary Curriculums published by The Institute of Ismaili Studies here. STEP educators also teach these modules in Religious Education Classes worldwide.  Daughters of Abraham book club Read the transcript here. Books Mentioned:  The Power of Now by Eckhart Tolle Braving the Wilderness by Brené Brown No God But God by Reza Aslan A Short History of Ismailis by Dr. Farhad Daftry The Alchemist by Paulo Coelho  

DAMN! Mans are in LOCKDOWN again! Lala starts off by saying f**k the TikTok trolls, while Arsy seems to enjoy clapping back at them a bit too much for a grown a** man! The Mans also shout out Scarborough brand Life & Wisdom and encourage everyone to support local TO businesses in these tough times (1:00). Arsy calls out Lala's spending habits for buying a new Xbox, and Lala goes all Beautiful Mind breaking down the math on the new Xbox game pass flex which is the Netflix of games. Arsy boasts about his gaming skills, issuing Lala a FIFA challenge (stay tuned!) and talks about a weekend FIFA crew he has been part of for almost 12 years running! (6:15) The Mans get into the recent Verzuz battle with Jeezy and Gucci Mane and then dive into some of the best diss-tracks of all-time (14:30). Arsy jumps into his recent experience buying weights on FB marketplace which leads him to ask why all Ismaili people know each other, and the Mans conclude that Ismailis are basically like the stonecutters from the Simpsons (20:05). Arsy comments on the MuslimPRO CIA Scandal and like everyone, the Mans are hoping for a Covid vaccine to come out real soon and discuss the latest developments. Arsy tells cautionary Quaran-tales for any Covid deniers of a Covid scare in his family, and recounts how it led to him chaotically running a bed and breakfast and full-time daycare for his Family for two weeks straight! (29:50). If you're a small business owner struggling with the COVID-19 pandemic, reach out to @torontomanspod or @arsytv on IG and we'll shout you out to our followers FOR FREE! Subscribe to the Toronto Mans Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify Podcasts, or anywhere else you listen to podcasts! --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/torontomanspod/message

Meet Nausheen Rajan, Co-Founder of Ismailis Rise Up, on Episode 074 of Dear Asian Americans. The policy expert and Princeton graduate school student joins Jerry on the show to share stories of her parents journey to American, her commitment to uplift the Ismaili community, and what she hopes to inspire in others to follow her in the world of policy.

In the dusty flood plain, 100,000 men and many times that in horses surround the walls of Baghdad. Catapults lob stones relentlessly into the city walls, hauled from great distance. Here, towers collapse under the barrage; there, ladders bring Mongol and subject peoples onto the fortifications, seizing them from the disorganized and panicking garrison. Arrows, some bearing messages, bring both confusion and injury where they land. The mighty Tigris River, the city’s lifeblood, is now part of the trap; pontoon bridges, from them dangling nets embedded with iron hooks, rest both north and south of the city to catch those trying to flee. The final ‘Abbasid Caliph sits frightened and overwhelmed in his palace, as the grasp of Hulegu Khan closes around him. Today, we discuss the fall of Baghdad, 1258. But first, we’d like to remind you that for those of you who enjoy the podcast, your support would be highly appreciated and would help us keep going. We have a patreon available for monthly or even one-time donations or, if you aren’t able to support us financially, positive reviews on Apple Podcasts or other review sites really helps us out. And now, I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   We left our previous episode off with Hulegu destroying the Nizari Ismaili state, better known at the Order of Assassins, who had controlled a series of fortresses across eastern and northern Iran. By the end of 1256, Hulegu had reduced them to but a few holdouts, and he could begin to look to his next target. Considered heretics of the worst variety by most Sunni Muslims, the Persian writer Juvaini, a member of Hulegu’s retinue, described his victory over the Nizaris in glowing terms, Hulegu as a sword of Islam carrying out God’s will. Juvaini presents Hulegu’s war as a more ‘civilized’ form of conquest compared to that of his grandfather, Chinggis Khan. Destruction was limited to Ismaili territories and the towns and fortresses that failed to submit, as opposed to the veritable tsunami of bloodshed Chinggis Khan wrought on the Khwarezmian empire over thirty years prior. What Hulegu was soon to do in Baghdad and to the titular head of Sunni Islam would not be so praised, and it is perhaps no coincidence that Juvaini’s own chronicle ends with the fall of the Ismailis. As Hulegu left Ismaili territory in the final month of 1256, his eye was drawn to the ‘Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad.   In Islam, the spiritual leader of the religion was whoever was considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad. For Shi’a Muslims, this was the imam- for Nizari Ismailis, the Imam was the ruler of Alamut, who had just been put to death on Mongol orders. For the majority of Muslims, known as Sunnis, the head of their faith was the Caliph, literally meaning ‘successor.’The first four Caliphs to succeed the Prophet were the “Rightly Guided,” the Rashidun, whose legitimacy is generally unquestioned by most Muslims. The Rashidun were succeeded by the Umayyads, who greatly extended Muslim rule east and west, across North Africa into Spain and across Eastern Iran into Central Asia. In 750, the Umayyad Caliphs were overthrown in the ‘Abbasid revolution. Claiming descent from the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas, it was under the early ‘Abbasids that the Caliphal capital was moved from Damascus to the newly established Baghdad along the Tigris River. Never comparable to the power of the Umayyads at their height, from the 9th century onwards the still vast ‘Abbasid empire fragmented with threat from all directions: the Fatimids in Egypt, the Samanids, Buyids and Saffarids of Iran and finally from the steppes, the Great Seljuqs, all of which ground the ‘Abbasids down until their state hardly stretched past the walls of Baghdad. The weakening of the Seljuqs after Sultan Malik-Shah’s death in 1092 allowed the ‘Abbasids to gradually reclaim independence and some authority, even repulsing a Seljuq army attacking Baghdad in 1157. The long reigns of Caliph al-Nasir and al-Mustansir, from 1180 until 1242, saw the ‘Abbasids reclaim much of central and southern Iraq. A far cry from the sweeping power they had held in the 8th century, by the 13th century they still remained influential and held prestige. For 500 years they had been the heads of Islam, and had long cultivated an useful image as invioable and holy, above temporal affairs though they were more often than not mired in them.    For instance, in the late 12th century Caliph al-Nasir was in conflict with the Seljuqs who continued to rule in Iran. He allied with the rising power northeast of the Iranian Seljuqs, the Khwarezmian Empire. Once vassals of the Great Seljuqs, the Khwarezm-shahs now butted heads with them as they expanded southwards, and the reigning Khwarezm-Shah, Tekesh bin Il-Arslan, was happy to ally himself with the Caliph. In 1194 at Rayy, modern Tehran, Tekesh defeated and killed the last Seljuq Sultan in Iran, Toghrul III, ending the dynasty and sending the Sultan’s severed head to al-Nasir in Baghdad. Rather than provide freedom for the Caliphate, Tekesh now wanted to step into the place of Seljuqs. The Seljuqs’ territory in Iran was largely annexed by Tekesh Khwarezm-shah, who soon began making aggressive motions to the Caliph. Al-Nasir encouraged the Khwarezmians’ eastern neighbours, the Ghurids, in their war with Tekesh. Tekesh died in 1200, succeeded by his son Muhammad II as Khwarezm-shah who, through luck, timely assassinations and military victories, overcame the Ghurids, consolidated power over Iran and in 1217 tried to march on Baghdad itself. Muhammad’s march on Baghdad was halted by a vicious snowstorm as he crossed the Zagros mountains, forcing him back. Returning to the northeast of his empire, Muhammad would there make the poor decisions which led to the Mongol Invasion of Khwarezm, covered way back in episode 9 of this podcast.   Now, some authors of the period assert that Caliph al-Nasir actually invited Chinggis Khan to attack Muhammad of Khwarezm- when placed in the context of the Caliph switching to support whoever was on the eastern side of his current foe, there is definitely a logic to it. However, as we described in detail in episode 8 of the podcast, the cause of the Mongol invasion can be found in the foolery of Muhammad Khwarezm-shah alone. Had the Mongols come on the invitation of the Caliph, then surely they would have publicized that to justify the attack and sow further confusion among the Khwarezmians.    In fact, in 1221 when detachments of Jebe and Subutai’s army penetrated into northern Iraq, Caliph al-Nasir was hardly welcoming. Along with the rulers of northern Iraq’s most important cities, Muzaffar ad-Din of Irbil and Badr al-Din Lu’lu’, the de facto ruler of Mosul, the Caliph organized a short lived military coalition, which proved unnecessary as the Mongols soon withdrew. Evidently, the ‘Abbasids spread a rumour that their army was absolutely gargantuan, their power unassailable and heavenly protected, and the Mongols were hesitant to commit. Had they paid close attention in the following years, they might have called the Caliph’s bluff. In 1225 that favoured Khwarezmian rapscallion, Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, defeated a Caliphal army after the ‘Abbasids failed to provide him assistance. Jalal al-Din chased the survivors right to the suburbs of Baghdad, then went north, defeated an army from Irbil sent to assist the Caliph and captured Irbil’s ruler, Muzaffar ad-Din. Caliph al-Nasir, by then elderly, paralyzed and blind for three years, died soon after Jalal al-Din’s attack, and was succeeded by his son, az-Zahir, as the 35th Caliph… for nine months. On Caliph az-Zahir’s death in 1226, he was succeeded by his own son, al-Mustansir, the 36th and penultimate ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad.    As Caliph, al-Mustanir continued to try to strengthen ‘Abbasid control in Iraq and expand the army, but Mongol rule steadily spread over the region. By the start of the 1230s, Chormaqun Noyan and his lieutenants brought the submission of most of Iran and cast Mongol authority over the Caucasus. For Caliph al-Mustansir, the Mongol empire was a vast crescent to his north and east, where it stretched seemingly indefinitely. By 1235, Mongol forces mainly under Chagatai Noyan, “the Lesser,” were probing northern Iraq and directly, but hesitantly, testing ‘Abbasid hegemony in the region. In June 1237, Chagatai Noyan captured Irbil in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan, though the Citadel held out and in August Caliphal forces relieved the city. In February of 1238, an attack was launched on Baghdad, and a panicked Caliph al-Mustansir sent messages to the remaining independent Muslim powers from the Jazira and Syria down to Egypt for aid. Only 2,000 troops from the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt,  al-Kamil, reached Baghdad, and in June 1238 a caliphal army was defeated near the city. However, the defences of Baghdad itself remained formidable and the city stood defiant while the Mongols turned back from the walls, unprepared for both a long siege and or the fearsome Iraqi summer.  Possibly, the Mongols suffered some sort of reverse while attacking Baghdad; some sixty years later, when the Persian historian Wassaf [vassaf] visited Baghdad, he recorded a Mongol defeat outside the walls, though this goes unmentioned by the other sources.    While Baghdad remained independent, the Mongols continued to take cities in the region. Chormaqun’s successor Baiju brought the submission of the Seljuqs of Anatolia in 1243; in 1244, the Mongol general Yasa’ur rode into Syria, dislodging the remnants of Jalal al-Din’s Khwarezmians. The Ayyubids of Syria, the successors of the once mighty empire of Saladin Ayyubi, largely submitted over 1244-5, and even Antioch, one of the last of the Crusader Kingdoms, offered its submission.  In late 1245 another attack on Baghdad was launched but soon aborted. The new Caliph since 1242, al-Mustasim ibn al-Mustansir, was lucky the attack was called off, for he was rather rapidly running out of allies. It seem that the new Caliph managed to avoid further attacks with a token submission: the Franscisan Friar John de Plano Carpini, present at the coronation of Guyuk Khaan in 1246, noted ‘Abbasid envoys were present in Karakorum and believed they paid a regular tribute.    The 38th and final ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, al-Mustasim, was not the equal of his father or great-grandfather. While al-Nasir and al-Mustansir sought to strengthen the Caliphate, al-Mustasim was more interested in the luxury of Baghdad, and was nearly universally condemned for decadence. A great lover of music, he sponsored an entire neighbourhood in Baghdad to house musicians, including the most famous of the age, Saif al-Din Urmawi. A lover of pigeon racing, art, calligraphy and treasures, al-Mustasim was also indecisive and easily swayed by factions in his court, some of whom, such as the vizier, sought accomodation with the Mongols, while others urged to meet them in battle. As we will see shortly, the result was al-Mustasim vacillating in policy, wavering between antagonizing the Mongols and sending them gifts. Essentially, the worst sort of man to have in power when Hulegu marched on him with upwards of 100,000 men.    Neither was weak leadership the only problem. Corruption and decadence of Baghdad’s elite alienated the lower classes. A weak currency and high food prices contributed to revolts; many of Baghdad’s soldiers increasingly found themselves unpaid and resorted to bandity or desertion. Topping off years of natural disasters- heavy rain, storms, annual flooding, in 1256, the Tigris, the river which runs through Baghdad, flooded for over a month, washing away much of Baghdad’s lower city. Attributed to divine displeasure at the decadent al-Mustasim, for decades afterwards this flood was remembered as the “Mustasimid flood.” As Mongol armies approached the city, pestilence killed many hundreds, if not thousands. The Caliph stood in a precarious position.   Likely in late 1255, Hulegu sent a message to Caliph al-Mustasim demanding, as Hulegu had done with other rulers across the region, that Baghdad supply troops to help in the attack on the Nizari Isamilis. Al-Mustasim refused. As the ‘Abbasids had been sending tribute in the previous years and were considered vassals, such a refusal was a declaration of independence. Hulegu, having been sent in part to find how sincere the Caliph’s submission was, now had his casus belli, for to the Mongols, the Caliph of Baghdad was now in open revolt. War with the Caliph was not intended to punish Islam specifically; had the Mongols caught the Pope and considered him a rebel, certainly he would have shared a similar fate. What mattered to the Mongols was submission to their divinely mandated rule; refusal to submit was blasphemy of the highest order.   After the fall of Alamut in December 1256, and spending some time near the still-resisting Nizari fortress of Lammasar, Hulegu stayed in Qazwin, just south of Alamut, until March 1257. From Qazwin he undertook a somewhat repetitive journey: from Qazwin he went to Hamadan, then to Dinavar, then Tabriz, then back to Hamadan, then back to Tabriz, then back to Hamadan in September 1257, from whence he would finally march on Baghdad. The reasons for this were multiple, and not just because Hulegu really liked northwestern Iran, though it did give him good time to evaluate the region. Firstly, Hulegu did not want to besiege Baghdad in the summer months, and instead needed to time the march so he arrived outside the city in the winter. Secondly, it provided time for his lieutenants to secure the neighbouring theaters: Kitbuqa Noyan secured through force and diplomacy Luristan and the passes through the Zagros mountains, ensuring Hulegu’s main army could march unimpeded when the time came. In Anatolia, Baiju Noyan had needed to put down a Seljuq revolt, culminating in the battle of Aksaray in October 1256. Baiju then needed to move back east, in order to march on Baghdad from the west when the time came.   Thirdly, Hulegu and the Caliph engaged in an entertaining round of diplomatic fisti-cuffs. Hulegu offered the Caliph another chance to surrender, repudiating him for his failure to send troops against the Nizaris. Hulegu’s threat, as recorded by the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din, went as follows:   “Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us. If you do not wish to come, send all three, the vizier [al-Alqami], Sulaymanshah, and the Dawatdar, that they may convey our message word for word. If our command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, and subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad, even if you hide in the sky or in the earth, ‘I shall bring you down from the turning celestial sphere; I shall pull you up like a lion. I shall not leave one person alive in your realm, and I shall put your city and country to the torch.’ “If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s heads, heed my advice. If you do not, let us see what God’s will is.”   The Caliph refused Hulegu’s demands, and when he sent back Hulegu’s envoys, they were harassed by the people of Baghdad; the Caliph’s vizier, ibn al-Alqami, had to send soldiers to protect the envoys to ensure they weren’t killed. When Hulegu learned of the incident, he derided the Caliph as a total incompetent, and then flew into a rage when he heard the official response, which called Hulegu a young and inexperienced man: somewhat humorous, considering al-Mustasim was only four years older than Hulegu. Hulegu’s response was about as subtle as you’d expect. Again, as per the account of Rashid al-Din, quote:   “God the eternal elevated [Chinggis] Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them. Love of status and property, conceit, and pride in transitory fortune have so seduced you that even the words of your well-wishers have no effect on you. Your ear cannot hear the advice of the compassionate, and you have deviated from the path of your fathers and forebears. You must get ready for battle, for I am coming to Baghdad with an army as numerous as ants and locusts. Be the turning of the celestial sphere how it may, the power to command is God’s.”   Upon hearing this message, al-Mustasim’s vizier ibn al-Alqami understood the colossal danger they were in, and fervently argued for the Caliph to appease the Mongols. Al-Alqami has something of a bisecting reputation in the Islamic world. For some, reading the Mamluk sources, the Shia Muslim ibn al-Alqami was a conspirator, plotting with Hulegu to topple the head of Sunni Islam for his own gain. For those reading from Persian and Ilkhanid sources, ibn al-Alqami was earnestly trying to steer the Caliph away from annihilation and save as many lives as he could. On this last response from Hulegu, al-Alqami was able to convince al-Mustasim to send gifts, only for the Caliph to be talked out of it by the dawatdar, Mugahid al-Din Aybek, the Caliphate’s top military man and a staunch supporter of resistance against Hulegu. Convincing the Caliph to abandon the expensive gifts, al-Mustasim sent the following message to vizier al-Alqami to assuage his worries:   “Do not fear the future, and do not talk fables, for there is friendship and unity, not enmity and hostility, between me and Hülägü and [Mongke Khaan]. Since I am their friend, they are of course friendly and benevolent toward me. The envoys’ message is false. Even if these brothers contemplate opposition to or treachery against me, what has the Abbasid dynasty to fear, when the monarchs of the face of the earth stand as our army and obey our every command? If I request an army from every country and mount to repulse the foe, I can incite Iran and Turan against these brothers. Be of stout heart, and do not fear the threats of the Mongols, for although they are powerful upstarts, they pose nothing but an empty threat to the House of Abbas.” If Rashid al-Din is accurate in recording this message, then it goes some way to demonstrate just how greatly al-Mustasim misunderstood the situation. al-Mustasim’s next letter to Hulegu spoke of monarchs who had attacked the ‘Abbasids and suffered divine retribution for it, noting specifically Muahmmad Khwarezm-shah, who for his attack on Baghdad in 1217 suffered the power of Hulegu’s grandfather. Hulegu sent another threat, promising to bring the Caliph “down miserably into the jaws of a lion,” and had enough of parlay.   Hulegu had only to check with the astrologers and diviners of his retinue in order to ensure the assault had good fortune. Variously they warned of failure, catastrophe, and death for harming the Caliph. Finally, Hulegu turned to the famed Iranian scholar rescued from the Nizari fortresses, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and asked what he thought of the matter. After thinking for a moment, Tusi told Hulegu that none of these things would happen. Hulegu asked what would. Tusi replied, “Hulegu Khan will take the Caliph’s place.” And that was enough for Hulegu. The border passes were now secured, and the march on Baghdad could begin.    As Hulegu marched through Kermanshah, massacres followed him. His army approached Baghdad in three directions. Kitbuqa took a route through Luristan, and would march on Baghdad from the south. Baiju Noyan came through northern Iraq, crossing the Tigris near Irbil and closing in on Baghdad’s west and north. Hulegu took the main army through the Hulwan pass and would close off Baghdad from the east, thus encircling the city.    As the armies entered Iraq, cities and towns across Mesopotamia surrendered to them. In January 1258 as the Mongols closed in on the city, the Caliphal army under the Dawatdar tried to repulse Baiju’s army. They were lured into a feigned retreat; a dyke was broken and their camp flooded. Few survivors escaped back to Baghdad. By January 22ned, the Mongol armies had linked up around the city. Not just Mongols, but subject Iranians, Turks, Georgians and Armenians made up this force, with a thousand Chinese siege engineers. The defenders of Baghdad were outnumbered and without hope. For a week, the Mongols prepared their siege lines. Pontoon bridges were built across the Tigris, nets and iron hooks hanging from them to ensure none could escape either up or downriver. No stones for the catapults were within the area, so they needed to be hauled in from elsewhere. A ditch was dug around the city, the earth from the ditch used to build a rampart with gates set in it. Protective coverings were built for the siege engines. With the typical thoroughness of the early Toluids, Baghdad was closed off, its fate sealed.   The assault began on January 29th. An incessant barrage of stones and arrows brought the defenders to their knees. The artillery upon the walls of Baghdad was poorly maintained and outranged by that of the Mongols, useless in the words of one source. Under mobile wooden shelters, the Mongols advanced on the walls, sending arrows deeper into the city. One of the Caliph’s daughters was killed when an arrow passed through a window in his palace. Messages were tied to arrows, proclaiming that all those who did not resist would be spared. By the start of February, towers and bastions along the walls were collapsing. By February 3rd, Mongol forces were capturing the walls. When one of Hulegu’s commanders was killed by an arrow sent from the city, he angrily forced his army on at greater speed.   Realizing just how monumentally he had erred, al-Mustasim sent envoys, among them the once bellicose Dawatdar, to discuss terms with Hulegu. They were quickly put to death. Nothing but the unconditional surrender of the Caliph himself was good enough. Finally, on February 10th, al-Mustasim and his family came out from Baghdad, and put his life in the hands of Hulegu. Initially, the Caliph was treated respectfully. Other notables came out to submit to Hulegu, and many others fled out of the city to escape the pestilence which had already claimed thousands within. These who came out were trapped between the walls of Baghdad and the Mongol palisade. Once the garrison and its weapons were collected, on the 13th of February, the sack of Baghdad began.   In popular culture, the sack of Baghdad is uncontrolled, disorganized, horrifically violent and results in the city’s utter destruction and death of a million people. In reality it was controlled, organized, horrifically violent and resulted in only most of the city’s destruction and deaths of thousands. Rather than wiping Baghdad from the map, it was more of an organized dismemberment. Evidence comes from multiple accounts, but we’ll focus on that of the musician, Urmawi. In contrast to the image of the mob running wild over Baghdad, Urmawi’s account, recorded by the Mamluk historian Shihab al-Din al-’Umari, records the Mongols meticulously planned the sacking. Depending on rank, commanders were given 1 to 3 days to collect loot from sections of the city allotted to them. In Urmawi’s case, his neighbourhood was allotted to Baiju Noyan and his retinue- notably just men Baiju picked to bring into the city with him, rather than a whole portion of his army. Urmawi greeted Baiju with gifts and hosted a feast for him, entertaining him with music and ingratiating himself to the Noyan. Baiju was so pleased he urged Urmawi to come with him to play before Hulegu. Hulegu enjoyed a concert before the walls of Baghdad, ordered Urmawi’s neighbourhood spared and protected with picked men, and even granted Urmawi gardens which had belonged to the Caliph.   Likewise, various sources note that a number of segments of the populations were spared and their property protected: Christians, notably Nestorian priests; Shi’ites and Alids; Khurasani merchants, Qadis, scholars, shaykhs and in one source, Jews. Individuals are mentioned petitioning Hulegu to spare their homes- likely for a hefty payment, of course- but in order to follow these orders, the forces looting the city had to be disciplined enough to actually take note of addresses. Even the oft-repeated statement that the Tigris River ran black with ink of the books of Baghdad’s library must be re-examined, for Nasir al-Din Tusi took many with him to Maragha, where he built his famous observatory. A number of sources indicate the city’s looting lasted only a week, rather than a full month.   Clemency was extended to multiple groups… but for the majority of the city’s population who did not fall into these categories, it appears no quarter was given. For all the gated neighbourhoods like Urmawi’s which were protected, many more were gutted and looted. Treasures collected over the city’s 500 years were stolen, the finest architecture of the ‘Abbasids ruined and torn down. Hulegu entered the city on February 15th, visiting the Caliph’s palace, where al-Mustasim was forced to reveal where he had hidden his wealth. 12,000 severed ears were brought before Hulegu to mark the slain citizenry. The dead littered the street; after a few days, the heat and stench of the rotting bodies led Hulegu to end the looting by February 20th. Notably, the city was not to be left to brigandage: a governor and Mongol officials were appointed, ibn al-Alqami kept his position as vizier, to clean up the bodies and restore the city.   On the 20th of February, Hulegu moved to the village of Waqaf to avoid the foul air of Baghdad, from which he apparently fell sick. At Waqaf, Hulegu had al-Mustasim put to death, most likely rolled into a carpet and stomped upon to avoid spilling his blood on the earth. His family soon followed him.  In European accounts, the popular version was that Hulegu locked Mustasim in his treasury, where he starved to death in an ironic punishment to mark the Caliph’s failures to pay for troops and defences.   So ended the 500 year old ‘Abbasid Caliphate. The impact on Islam is hard to understate. Since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there had been a widely recognized successor to him in the form of the Caliphs -Rashidun, Umayyad and ‘Abbasid. Most Muslims saw him as the spiritual, if not the actual political, head of Islam. For the Caliphate, seemingly inviolable and permanent, to come to such a violent and sudden end sent shockwaves throughout the Islamic world. Caliphates had been overthrown before; previous dynasties like the Buyids and Seljuqs had held the Caliphs as puppets and militarily defeated them, while the Nizari Assassins had claimed the lives of at least two; but never before had the Caliphate actually been erased from existence by a power claiming universal sovereignty in its place. Distant relations of al-Mustasim were eventually set up in Mamluk Cairo as new Caliphs, but were never widely recognized. The Ottoman Sultans would also claim the title of Caliph in time, but none have ever been able to step into the position held by the ‘Abbasids. It’s no surprise that many Muslims throughout the following centuries have referred to the sack of Baghdad as a scar of the psyche of the ummah, one which it has not recovered from today. With the fall of Baghdad, Hulegu could now cast his eyes onto Syria, down the Levantine coast to the newly established Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. The sense was real that Hulegu was about to bring the whole of Islam under the authority of the house of Chinggis. Our next episode takes us to the Mongol drive to the Meditteranean- and the famous clash of ‘Ayn Jalut, an episode you won’t want to miss. Be sure to subscribe to our podcast, and to help up continue bringing you great content, consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.

Before we get into this week's episode, I want to give a shout out to another podcast that we’ve recently discovered here at Ages of Conquest! Pax Britannica is a narrative history podcast on the British Empire. Season 1 covered the start of English colonisation in North America and the Caribbean, the first decades of the East India Company, and the ruthless politics of the British Isles. Season 2 has just begun on the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. Civil war and revolution erupt in England, Ireland, and Scotland, pitting the forces of Charles I against his own subjects. By the end, the king will be dead, the monarchy abolished, and Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell will be at the head of a militarised and expansionist Commonwealth. If any of this sounds even remotely appealing, go give Pax Britannica a listen; available where all fine podcasts are downloaded. And now, on with OUR show!   “You are to go with a large army and innumerable force from the borders of Turan to the country of Iran. Observe Chinggis Khan’s customs and yosun and yasa in all matters large and small. From the River Oxus to the farthest reaches of the land of Egypt, treat kindly and affectionately and reward sufficiently whoever obeys and submits to your orders. Grind beneath the feet of your wrath those who resist, along with their wives, children, and kith and kin. Begin with Quhistan and Khurasan, and destroy the fortresses and castles. Rip up GirdKoh and [Lammasar] fortress and turn them upside down! Neither let any bastion remain in the world nor leave a pile of dust standing! When you are finished there, head for Persia and eliminate the Lurs and Kurds who constantly practice brigandage along the highways. If the Caliph of Baghdad comes out to pay homage, harass him in no way whatsoever. If he is prideful and his heart and tongue are not one, let him join the others. In all cases make your clear-sighted intelligence and golden mind your guide and leader, and be awake and sober in all situations. Let the subjects be free of excessive taxes and impositions. Return devastated lands to a flourishing state. Conquer the realm of the rebellious through the might of the great god so that your summer and winter pastures may be many. Consult Doquz Khatun on all matters.”       So were the orders Mongke Khaan, Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, gave to his brother Hulegu on the outset of his campaign in 1253, according to the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din. Among the most famous of the Mongol campaigns, Hulegu led Mongol armies to destroys the Ismaili Assassins in Iran, the ‘Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad and into Syria, the prelude to the famous clash at Ayn Jalut. As this is perhaps the Mongol campaign with the greatest surviving detail, and one of the most well known, we’re going to take you on a thorough look at Hulegu’s western march, beginning with the destruction of the so-called “Order of Assassin.” I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       Hulegu, the famed sacker of Baghdad, was the younger brother of Great Khan Mongke and Kublai, the third son of Tolui with Sorqaqtani. As mentioned back in episode 23, Mongke Khaan took the throne in 1251 with a renewed drive to complete the Mongol conquest of the world. He organized administrative reforms, censuses, and new taxes to levy the forces of the empire for this goal. In 1252, he held a meeting in Mongolia to put this next round of conquest in motion, placing his brothers at the head of two great armies. Kublai was sent against the Kingdom of Dali, in China’s modern Yunnan province, as the opening move in the conquest of Song Dynasty. Hulegu meanwhile was to march west and subdue the few independent powers of the Islamic world: specifically, the Nizari Ismailis, popularly known as the Assassins; the Kurds and Lurs of western Iran, who annoyed the Great Khan through their brigandage, and the ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad.       There is discrepancy in the sources as to what precisely Hulegu’s mandate was. A number of later authors of the Ilkhanate- the state which emerged from Hulegu’s conquests- assert that Mongke intended for the area from the Amu Darya River to the Meditteranean to be ruled by Hulegu as another ulus, or Khanate of the empire, a counterbalance to those of Jochi and Chagatai, a sort of Toluid axis across Asia sandwiching the Chagatayids. This is hardly agreed upon however. Other sources present Hulegu’s command as a temporary military one. The Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rashid al-Din wrote that Mongke told Hulegu to return to Mongolia once he had achieved his tasks; Hulegu had to confer with his commanders on all strategic decisions, which included representatives from the houses of Jochi, Chagatai and even Ogedai, a first amongst equals rather than an almighty prince; and when Hulegu began to seize Jochid possessions in Iran, Khurasan and the Caucasus after Mongke’s death, it seems to have taken them quite by surprise, for in the early 1250s Mongke confirmed grants of Caucasian territory to the house of Jochi. It’s likely that Mongke had intended for Iran and much of the Middle East to be dominated by the Central Imperial Government, but did not intend to remove land rights the other branches of the family enjoyed in the region.          So, who was Hulegu? Born in 1217, he was two years younger than Kublai, almost ten years younger than Mongke, and a few years older than their youngest brother, Ariq Boke. His life before the ascension of Mongke is almost totally unknown to us, but he presumably received similar education in both governing and warfare to his brothers.  While Mongke was groomed for the possibility of stepping into the imperial throne, Hulegu, to our knowledge, was not provided any such pretensions. He was well exposed to other religions and cultures; his mother, Sorqaqtani was a Nestorian Christian, as was his most influential wife, Doquz Khatun, who had been a widow of his father Tolui. Despite this, he showed more personal interest in Buddhism, though he took part in shamanistic practices throughout his recorded life. He was interesedt in science, especially astronomy, though for Hulegu this was more so in the form of astrology, which he often consulted for major decisions. He was a heavy drinker, with the lovely combination of often flying into horrific rages. Even reading pro-Ilkhanid sources like Rashid al-Din, who long served the descendants of Hulegu, one is shocked by the regularity in which Hulegu fell into a towering rage, which tended to be quite dangerous for whomever it was targeted at. His final years were marked by ill health, brought on excessive drinking, and at least one source indicates he suffered from epilepsy.       With the quriltai of 1252, the plan to finalize the conquest of western Asia was set, and Hulegu put in motion. A member of Mongke’s keshig was provided for Hulegu’s command, Kitbuqa of the Naiman tribe, also a Nestorian Christian. Kitbuqa departed as Hulegu’s vanguard in August 1252 with 12,000 men, beginning operations against the Ismailis in eastern Iran. Various sources give Hulegu’s own departure from Mongolia as Autumn 1253 or 1254. By the 1250s, the Mongols had an absolutely massive army: some estimates put the nomadic soldiers at their disposal upwards of one million men, and many more among the sedentary peoples across Eurasia to be called upon.  Mongke provided Hulegu with a relatively small contingent of Mongols at the outset: perhaps as low as a tumen, 10,000 men, for Hulegu in addition to the 12,000 Kitbuqa had already set out with. As Hulegu moved west, his army snowballed, as contingents from across the empire met with him. 1,000 Chinese siege engineers and crossbowmen were provided for him. Most of the former warriors of the house of Ogedai were conscripted for Hulegu’s army. He was joined by a contingent of Oirats under Buqa Temur, the brother of Hulegu’s first senior wife, named somewhat amusingly, Guyuk. A grandson of Chagatai, Teguder, headed the perhaps 10,000 Chagatayid troops provided for Hulegu as he marched through their ulus. As many as 30,000 troops under the Jochid princes Balaghai, Quli and Tutar were provided by Batu. Tamma forces stationed in Kashmir and in the Caucasus, under Baiju Noyan, would also link up with Hulegu, and forces were supplied by all the client sultans, maliks, and atabegs of Iran, the Caucasus and Anatolia. By the time Hulegu’s army converged on Baghdad at the start of 1258, he commanded perhaps 150,000 men if not more.        Extensive preparation was necessary for this army’s movement. We are told that roads were cleared of obstructions, bridges built and boats readied to cross rivers. All the pastures and meadows on Hulegu’s route were reserved for the feeding of his army’s horses and livestock. Flour and skins of wine were levied from across the subject populations and stored at depot stations along the way. Thanks to the census launched at the start of Mongke’s reign, the imperial government had a good idea of what could be called upon to provide for Hulegu’s army.        By Autumn 1255 Hulegu was near Samarkand, where he rested for 40 days, feasting with the head of the Secretariat for Central Asia, Mas’ud Beg. Another month was spent at Kish, about 80 kilometres south of Samarkand and the later birthplace of amir Temur, or Tamerlane. There, Hulegu feasted with the head of the Secretariat for Iran and Western Asia, Arghun Aqa. These were not just engagements for drinking (though there certainly was that) but to confer with the regional administrators and line up further provisions, troops and intelligence. At Kish, messengers were sent to vassals across Iran calling upon them to provide troops and assistance against the Ismaili assassins, whose territory Hulegu entered in the spring of 1256.   This takes us to Hulegu’s first target, the Assassins, which we’ll introduce and address some popular myths. Though popularly known as the Order of the Assassins, this is quite the misnomer; more accurately called the Nizari Ismaili state, they controlled a number of fortresses and settlements in three general regions; in Syria, centered around Masyaf; in the rugged eastern Iranian region called Quhistan; and in northwestern Iran’s Alburz mountain, where their  leadership was based across several mountain fortresses, most famously Alamut. Leadership of the branches in Quhistan and Masyaf was generally appointed by Alamut, but were autonomous otherwise. Shi’a Muslims, specifically Ismailis, in the late 1080s and 1090s the Ismaili Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt suffered a succession dispute as to who would succeed the Imam, the rather distant successor to the Prophet Muhammad and ehad of Shi’a Islam. The supporters of one candidate, Nizar, were known as Nizaris, and hence, Nizari Ismailis. For the majority of Muslims, who were Sunnis, the Nizaris were seen as a sect within a sect, and heretics par excellence. At the same time as this succession dispute an Ismaili revolt broke out in Seljuq ruled Iran. In 1090, Hassan-i Sabbah captured the fortress of Alamut, while other adherents seized territory in Quhistan and elsewhere. The last of the Great Seljuqs, Sultan Malik-Shah I, attempted to crush them, but his untimely death, and the ensuing succession risis which splintered the vast Seljuq Empire, allowed the Ismailis to consolidate. Geographically spread out and lacking great economic or military power, they had to rely on other means to protect themselves and convince their neighbours to not attack them.  One tool was assassinations, making a big splash with the murder of the Great Seljuq Vizier Nizam al-Mulk in 1092. Alongside well defended and inaccessible fortresses, it was a useful deterrent for any would-be conqueror. The assassinations were often public and dramatic to make the message as loud as possible. One method was for Ismailis to infiltrate the households of powerful figures as servants: they could then kill the man when he became too great a danger, or leave a warning, such as a knife, on the sleeping man’s pillow. The threat of assassination was as effective as an actual assassination, and soon anyone could be worried he had a secret Nizari Ismaili hiding in his entourage. Because of this, popular myths that the Ismaili imbued copious amounts of hashish before going on assassinations can be ignored. There is no evidence for this, and it’s unlikely considering the patience and planning that went into these missions. However, the appellation of them as heavy users of hashish stuck, hashishiyya, which became “assassin.”   So the Nizaris carried on for over a century. Hassan-i Sabbah and his successors, without any clear imam after Nizar’s death in 1095, basically stepped into the role themselves. The Ismaili leaders -popularly known in the West as ‘the Old Man of the Mountain,’- were generally long reigning without succession disputes, withstanding outside pressures while they mulled over doctrine, all the while being decried as just the worst sort of heretic by Sunni Muslims. In 1210, the ascension of the new imam and Ismaili leader, Hassan III, brought something of a rapprochement. Generally, the Ismailis had poor relations with the head of Sunni Islam, the ‘Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad. They had after all claimed responsibility for the murders of two Caliphs in the 1130s. Yet Hassan III dramatically declared he followed the Sunni Sharia and fostered better relations with both the Caliph and other neighbouring Sunni rulers, such as Ozebg, the Eldeguzid Atabeg of Azerbaijan, and Muhammad II Khwarezm-shah. According to ‘Ata-Mailk Juvaini, a member of Hulegu’s entourage, Hassan III was also the first monarch west of the Amu Darya to submit to Chinggis Khan. Despite his state being largely surrounded by the Khwarezmian Empire, Ismaili fortresses in the Elburz Mountains and Quhistan were spared Mongol attacks. Indeed, Quhistan was a veritable island of security as the Mongols overran the Khwarezmian Empire. Juzjani, a Sunni Khwarezmian refugee who fled to Quhistan before later finding refuge in Delhi, describes the Ismailis in glowing terms.    Hassan III’s successor, ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad III, abandoned the overtures to the ‘Abbasid Caliph, but maintained the ties with the Mongols. When Jalal al-Din Mingburnu returned to western Iran in the mid 1220s, the Ismailis had no love for him and assassinated at least one of his lieutenants. When major Mongol forces returned to the region under Chormaqun Noyan at the start of the 1230s, the Ismailis provided valuable information on the whereabouts and weaknesses of Jalal al-Din, and within a year the Khwarezmian Prince was driven to his death. The details of the Mongol relationship with the Ismails for the next decade is difficult to discern. In 1246 Ismaili representatives came to the coronation of Guyuk Khaan in Mongolia, where they were insulted and sent off. Precisely what occurred is unclear. A possible reconstruction is offered by historian Timothy May in his article on the “Mongol-Ismaili Alliance.” He suggests the positive Mongol-Ismaili relationship was a case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” No record is made of Mongol demands for troops or tribute from the Ismailis, and it may have been that while powerful Khwarezmian elements were still extant, relative Ismaili independence was permitted as they were useful allies. After Mingburnu’s death in 1231, and especially after the death of Chormaqun in 1241, Mongol demands on the Ismailis may have increased, and in the early 1230s the Mongols annexed Ismaili controlled Damghan. The Ismailis were so concerned that in 1238, the English Monk Matthew Paris recorded that representatives of “the Old Man of the Mountain,” had come to England and France trying to organize a Christian-Muslim alliance against the Mongols, warning the King of England that “if they themselves could not withstand the attacks of such people, nothing remained to prevent their devastating the countries of the west.” Three years later, Mongol armies under Subutai and Batu crossed the Carpathian Mountains into Hungary.   Back in the Middle East, one Mongol commander, Chagatai Noyan “the Lesser,” may have moved to enforce demands on the Ismailis, and was assassinated at some point in the early 1240s. Perhaps intended as just a warning, the Ismailis realised this was a mistake and sent representatives to Guyuk’s coronation in 1246. The Mongols were never forgiving of such things, and the destruction of the Ismailis was added to the agenda. An opportunity to actually do this didn’t present itself until the reign of Mongke Khan. The qadi of Qazwin, a city south of Alamut and quite antagonist to the Ismailis, came to Mongke’s court and revealed, in quite the breach of etiquette, that he had a suit of maille worn underneath his robes, claiming that his fear of the Ismailis was so great even in the Mongol court he needed this protection. When the Franciscan Friar William of Rubruck came to Mongke’s court in 1253, he heard rumours that 400 assassins had been dispatched to kill Mongke, and the Mongols were concerned enough that they were checking and interrogating everyone entering Karakorum. The threat of the assassins was taken seriously, and on Mongke’s directive Hulegu would treat the assassins very seriously   By then, the only independent power within proximity to Alamut was, somewhat ironically, the Caliph in Baghdad. The Ismailis stood alone against the incoming might of Hulegu. In the winter of 1255, as Hulegu stood at the border of Ismaili Quhistan, the imam ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad was murdered, quite likely on the instigation of his young and inexperienced son, Rukn al-Din Khwurshah, who then ascended to the imamate.  ‘Ala al-Din was long on bad terms with his son, and seems to have suffered some sort of mental decline as news of Hulegu’s overwhelming force approached. Rukn al-Din may have thought himself capable of maneuvering them out of the impending disaster, but would have no success in the matter.   In the spring of 1256, Hulegu and his ever growing army entered Quhistan. Kitbuqa had been campaigning throughout the region since 1253, but had had no success in holding settlements like Tun, Ismaili Quhistan’s chief city, taking them only to lose them once he moved on. The Ismaili fortresses, built on imposing mountains and hard to access sites, proved beyond his means to siege. On Hulegu’s arrival, the dynamic was quickly changed. Vague ‘incidents’ mentioned by Juvaini and Rashid al-Din as Hulegu entered the region may refer to Ismaili attacks in some form, but Hulegu’s army was beyond compare. The chief cities of Quhistan fell within days, and by the summer Kitbuqa led the vanguard to Mazandaran and raiding parties probed towards Alamut. Once Quhistan was subdued, Hulegu moved west, skirting around the edge of Iran’s uninhabitable Great Salt Desert, the Dasht-e Kevir, to arrive at the eastern endof the Alburz mountains. Near Damghan stood the Ismaili fortress of Girdkuh; Kitbuqa had first attempted to attack it in May of 1253. Hulegu committed more troops for it, then moved on. The castle, receiving only minor reinforcement from Alamut, held out until 1271. Such was the design of these fortresses when properly defended.   Rukn al-Din Khwurshah was within the fortress of Maymundiz, downstream of Alamut towards the western end of the Alburz mountains. As Hulegu moved westwards along the Alburz, he sent messengers to Rukn al-Din, demanding his submission. He was nervous, and as Hulegu’s second set of messengers arrived at the beginning of September 1256, Rukn al-Din was convinced to offer submission by the captive scholar, polymath, mathematician, astronomer and theologian, Nasir al-Din Tusi. Tusi was a much, much smarter man than Rukn al-Din Khwurshah and well respected. Having lived through Chinggis Khan’s destruction of Khwarezm, Tusi calculated that a lengthy Mongol siege wouldn’t be very healthy for anyone left inside the citadel. Therefore, on Tusi’s urging, Rukn al-Din sent his brother to Hulegu, offering the submission of the Ismailis. Hulegu thought this was nice, and treated Rukn al-Din’s brother well. He then sent another embassy with demands that Rukn al-Din tear down the Ismaili forts. Rukn al-Din was slow to respond; Hulegu was quick to advance. The token attempt by the Ismaili leader to abate Hulegu by abandoning 5 lesser castles and demolishing a few towers on Alamut, Maymundiz and Lammasar did not succeed. Unwittingly, Rukn al-Din was caught in a nerge, a Mongol hunting circle, as multiple armies converged on him from several directions and trapped him. As the armies neared Maymundiz, taking castles and settlements as they went, Rukn al-Din frantically sent a son and another brother to Hulegu, to no avail, hoping to at least stall until the cold of winter set in. By the 7th of November 1256, the three armies had Maymundiz surrounded.   Hulegu needed a quick victory. So many troops and horses needed a vast quantity of feed, the local environment was depleted and winter was forthcoming. Hulegu demanded provisions from across Iran and the Caucasus be delivered and, as if the seasons themselves adhered to the bidding of the Great Khan, the winter was mild and refused to hampher the Mongols as they approached Maymundiz. Once the armies were arrayed outside of the fortresses, Hulegu surveyed the site. Like so many Ismaili fortresses, Maymundiz was perched on a mountaintop, and hard to access. But Hulegu had his plan.    Fighting began on November 12th, 1256. The first weapons Hulegu brought forth were the kaman-i-gav, as they were known in Persian sources, generally taken to refer to the ox-bow, a Chinese siege machine which was essentially a large, mounted crossbow. These were not for destroying walls, but for picking off defenders. The writer ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, who accompanied Hulegu on his sieges of the Ismaili cities describes “meteoric shafts,”  from these weapons “burning up” the “devil-like heretics” of Maymundiz, in constrast to stones cast by the defenders which could only hurt single persons. Historian Stephen Haw postulates that this is a reference to gunpowder weapons being used by the Mongols, in the form of explosives tied to the shafts fired from the oxbow, perhaps propelling it as an early rocket. A common critique of this argument is that such poetic language is rather typical of Juviani’s writing, and nowhere else in Hulegu’s campaign does he appear to use such dramatic weapons.    By November 17th, Hulegu’s teams had constructed their catapults and hauled them to a nearby hilltop. It’s possible that these were not just traction style Chinese catapults, but those of the counterweight variety- trebuchets. It’s not specified in written sources that Hulegu used them, but we know they were used by the Mongols by the 1270s, in addition to artwork from later in the century depicting them. Some modern authors like Michael S. Fulton believe the speed at which the major fortresses and cities of the region fell to Hulegu, even those of stone as opposed to stamped earth or mud brick, indicate the usage of counterweighted artillery. Far more powerful with greater range than man-powered traction catapults, instead of teams of men hauling on ropes, the counterweight catapult relied on, well, a counterweight instead, using gravity to propel the projectile with much greater force. Some authors also assert that the Chinese had their own counterweight catapult which the Mongols also used, but the matter is contentious, our sources providing no illumination.   The Mongols differed in their usage of artillery by relying on constant barrages. Their access to a large number of knowledgeable engineers, teams of specialists and overseers allowed them to keep up an unceasing rate of fire day and night, often from dozens of machines at once. For the defenders huddled behind the walls, psychologically it was exhausting. Aside from stones, naphtha, a petroleum-based weapon, was hurled into the city to start fires. Gunpowder bombs may have been lobbed as well. Unused to such weapons, especially in the form of the noise and smell they made, the impact must have seemed unearthly. After less than a week of bombardment, Rukn al-Din Khwurshah surrendered, and the Mongols soon demolished Maymundiz.   Hulegu received the Khwurshah kindly, for he needed him. Through his mediation, Rukn al-Din convinced some 40 odd Ismaili strongholds to surrender to Hulegu and tear down their walls. Alamut and Lammasar held out, and both were put under siege. Rukn al-Din was able to get Alamut’s garrison to come to terms, and it surrendered by December 15th. Briefly, Hulegu went sight-seeing around the castle after it surrendered, amazed by the size of the mountain, the many storerooms and indomitable defenses. It certainly saved him some time to not have to storm it! ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini was able to get permission to take some of the rare and useful tomes from Alamut’s library before the fortress was destroyed and its books burnt. Lammasar took a year to fall, but fall it did.   Hulegu kept Rukn al-Din with him until the great majority of the Ismaili fortresses in Iran had submitted or been torn down. He humoured Rukn al-Din, granting him a Mongol wife and watching Rukn al-Din’s favourite sport of camel fighting. Helping the Mongols avoid many lengthy, difficult sieges on the well defended Ismaili strongholds saved Hulegu considerable effort, but personally Hulegu found him repellent. Once his usefulness was over, in early 1257 Hulegu shipped him off to Mongke Khaan to deal with. According to Rashid al-Din, when Mongke learned the Khwurshah was in Karakorum, he was annoyed and said, “why are they bringing him and tiring a horse uselessly?” then ordered Rukn al-Din’s death. Upon learning of this, Hulegu ordered the deaths of the rest of Rukn al-Din’s captive family, sparing only a young son. Some Ismaili traditions attest another son was snuck away and kept safe, raised as the next imam in secret, but such beliefs never found widespread acceptance. As far as we are concerned, the Nizari Ismaili state ceased to exist by the end of 1256, sparing a few holdouts in Iran and their castles in Syria, as yet untouched by the Mongols.    Hulegu had completed the first of his tasks. After wintering near Lammasar and then Qazwin, in the early months of 1257 he set out west for the greatest target of the campaign: Baghdad, and the 500-year-old Abbasid Caliphate. So be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals Podcast to pick up with that next week. To help us continue bringing you great content, consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we will catch you on the next one. 

This week, we sit down with our friends Mishaal and Zarek to talk about the colorism that is so deeply entrenched in many minority communities, including our own. Mishaal breaks down why exactly colorism is so harmful, and how it feeds into anti-blackness. Zarek shares his personal experiences with Ismailis in other parts of the world, and how they perceive skin color so differently. Further, we discuss how South Asians both borrow from other cultures, and are victims of cultural appropriation. We also define gaslighting, and the unique way in which it is used as a manipulation tactic to trivialize the experiences of marginalized communities. Plus, we read listener stories surrounding their own experiences with colorism. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

The two founders of Cake Meets Sherbet, a first-of-its-kind Ismaili matchmaking service targeted toward millennials, talk to us about why Ismailis have a hard time keeping things casual, trends they've gleaned from their service surrounding what Ismailis value in a partner, why Ismaili men struggle sliding into DMs, their decision to remain anonymous for months, and more. Plus, Anam shares her experience using her own matchmaking service, and hiding from her match that she was the founder. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

Dr Sayed Ammar Nakshawani | Night 6 Muharram 1441/2019 - 05/09/2019 MKSI Leicester - Masjid Al Husayn

Ryan Makhani and Shaida Adatia, Sufi meditation Wedensday, June 7, 2017 Ryan Makhani and Shaida Adatia discussed and led participants through a diverse range of Sufi meditative traditions with an emphasis on spiritual and mystical practices from around the world, highlighting the ideas of compassion and prayer. Participants were exposed to Islamic traditions from countries as far ranging as Turkey, Tajikistan, India, Indonesia, Iran and Morocco. The meditation was in three parts: -An introduction and brief on the richness of poetry and the oral tradition in Mecca in the 7th century. -Islamic Music as sung and played in public places or private devotions. Due to Islam being a multi-ethnic religion, the musical expression of its adherents is vastly diverse. The indigenous musical styles of these areas have shaped the devotional music enjoyed by contemporary Muslims. -The esoteric form of prayer known as Dikr, which is a Quranic term used for remembrance of Allah or repeating His name. About the meditation leaders: For the last decade, Ryan Makhani has served as a Religious Education Teacher for Ismaili Muslim youth focusing on ethics and humanities. Inspired by students in his Ethical Pathways to Human Development course, he founded BuildMyIdea.org, which aims to enable young people to be innovative leaders. As a teacher educator, Ryan has led sessions on mindfulness, self-awareness and servant leadership. He completed a Masters in Teaching and Masters in Muslim Societies and Civilizations from University of London's Institute of Education and the Institute of Ismaili Studies. Ryan has a keen interest in Sufism and mysticism. Shaida Adatia is a professional educator with more than two decades of experience in Central Africa, Canada and the United States. She is involved in work around the world that promotes empowerment in youth through education. She is also involved in Houston’s interfaith community circles focusing on bridge building. In her spare time she loves to read about and research various faith traditions. The Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims, generally known as the Ismailis, belong to the Shia branch of Islam. The Shia form one of the two major branches of Islam, the Sunni being the other. The Ismailis live in over 25 different countries, mainly in Central and South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, as well as in Europe, North America and Australia. About Twelve Moments series: Twelve Moments: Experiencing Spiritual and Faith Traditions is a monthly series presented in partnership with Ligmincha Texas Institute, The Jung Center of Houston, MD Anderson Cancer Center, and the Rothko Chapel. Since September 2005, on the first Wednesday of each month from 12-1pm, the Rothko Chapel hosts a meditation or contemplative practice focusing on a different spiritual or faith tradition featuring teachers and religious leaders from throughout the greater Houston community. This series provides opportunities for visitors to learn more about a specific spiritual or faith tradition, and experience a related meditation or contemplative practice, such as prayer, chanting, etc.

This is one of the earlier discussions of Mohammad Shaikh from 1989 where he is hosting a doctor who belonged to a particular religious sect known as the Ismailis. This sect (like others in traditional Islamic communities) also accepts Quran as an authority.  The viewers are recommended to watch this discussion in conjunction with others … Continue reading Urdu Mohammad Shaikh ka Ismaili doctor se mukalma →

Peter is joined by Farhad Daftary, a leading expert on the Shiite group known as the Ismā'īlīs.

A lecture by Dr. Omar Ali-de-Unzaga, Research Associate, The Institute of Ismaili Studies, London. Part of the conference "Reflections on Ismaili Studies: Standing on Poonawala's Shoulders."

A lecture by Dr. Sumaiya Hamdani, Associate Professor, History and Art History Dept., George Mason University. Part of the conference "Reflections on Ismaili Studies: Standing on Poonawala's Shoulders."

Dr Farhad Daftary, from the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, discusses the history of Iranian Ismailis. (October 08, 2009)

The school looks just as it was but I understand it has taken a lot of energy and time to restore it. Consider donating to the school if you were a student there. More than 80,000 asian refugess leaving Uganda in 1972 in 90 days. Where did they go? Find out about their stories.To add your story please contact Umeeda Umedaly at switlo@shaw.caAll stories are welcome on MP3 format with a photo. Interview someone in your family, capture our stories of our elders and find out about why there are so resiliant.