Rulers of Umayyad Caliphate
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4 episodes with umayyads
3 episodes with umayyads
2 episodes with umayyads
3 episodes with umayyads
2 episodes with umayyads
In this episode of the Umayyad Caliphate, we continue our exploration of Caliph Hisham ibn Abdul Malik's reign as the Umayyad Caliphate faces mounting crises across its vast empire. The year is 110 AH (728 CE), and the empire's edges are on fire. In the Caucasus, Maslamah ibn Abdul Malik leads a grueling campaign against the Khazar Khaganate through the treacherous Darial Pass. Despite claiming victory, his retreat is chaotic, marked by ambushes, torrential rain, and widespread exhaustion. Meanwhile, cracks appear in the empire's eastern front. In Khurasan, a well-intentioned tax policy by Governor Ashras unleashes a wave of conversions among non-Arab Muslims—but when the policy is reversed, these new converts revolt. Their rebellion draws in the powerful Turgesh Khaganate, sparking a devastating loss for the Umayyads at the Battle of Baykand and the bloody Siege of Karmajah. We also examine the collapse of Muslim authority in India, the chaotic military campaigns in Anatolia led by Hisham's sons, and the shocking fall of Ardabil to the Khazars—a disaster that results in the death of a Muslim governor and the capture of tens of thousands of civilians. As we move through these events, we see a common theme: a once-dominant caliphate now overstretched, undermanned, and increasingly reactive. The Muslim armies are no longer conquering; they're fighting to survive. Strategic missteps, overreliance on loyalist Syrian troops, and a refusal to adapt military policy are setting the stage for further instability. This episode paints a grim but necessary portrait of an empire entering a period of sustained decline. From Armenia to Transoxiana, we witness the human cost of imperial overreach—and the resilience of those left to defend a collapsing frontier.
By 711 Europe and the Frankish warlords were facing a graver threat than ever before. Bands of Northern African, nominally Muslim raiders had begun a steady incursion throughout the West, loosely unified under the banner of the Umayyads. Having already taken and plundered the Christian territories of the Goths, their eyes now fell upon the Frankish kingdom in Gaul, by now the greatest power in Europe. It would be a formidable prize if taken. But fortunately for the Franks, their leader was the greatest of their warlords since the rise of Clovis I: the mighty Charles Martel. Finally, the two great hosts - Charles with his allies from Aquitaine and the Umayyads under the leadership of Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi. A world shaking, spear shattering, blood-letting battle would ensue, the outcome of which would come to determine the future of Europe. Join Tom and Dominic as they discuss the build up to, climax, and aftermath of the Battle of Tours - one of the most important battles in Western history, which would prove the making of the Franks, and pave the road to the ascent of Charlemagne. _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett + Aaliyah Akude Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
The Germanic peoples and the Arabs were in a similar condition when they took over their respective parts of Roman territory. A century after they did, the West lived through the Dark Ages, while the East entered a Golden Age. What explains this? In this episode, we try to find out. Most important (extra) sources for the episode (for general list see 3.1): LEWIS D.L. God's Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570-1215. Norton, 2009, 522 p. BORRUT A., COBB P.M., Umayyad Legacies. Medieval Memories from Syria to Spain. Brill Academic Pub. 2010, 528 p.
On this episode of Unsupervised Learning Razib talks to professor Sean Anthony about his book Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam. Anthony is a historian in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at The Ohio State University. He earned his Ph.D. with honors in 2009 at the University of Chicago in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, and has a mastery of Arabic, Persian, Syriac, French, and German. Anthony's interests are broadly religion and society in late antiquity and medieval Islam, early canonical literatures of Islam (Koran and Hadith) and statecraft and political thought from the foundational period of Islam down to the Abbasid Caliphate over a century later. Razib and Anthony discuss the state of the controversial scholarship about the origins of Islam, which often comes to conclusions that challenge the orthodox Muslim narrative. This earlier generation of scholars, like Patricia Crone, challenged the historicity of Muhammad, the centrality of Mecca in early Islam and even the distinctive religious identity of the early 7th century's Near East's Arab conquerors. This revisionist school serves as the basis for Tom Holland's 2012 book, In the Shadow of the Sword: The Birth of Islam and the Rise of the Global Arab Empire. While Holland's work was an accurate summary of research before the 2010's, Anthony argues that since then new findings have updated and revised the revisionism itself. A Koran dating from the mid-7th century seems to confirm the antiquity of this text and traditions around it, while contemporaneous non-Muslim sources refer to Muhammad as an Arabian prophet. While it is true that coinage did not bear the prophet's name until the end of the 7th century, it may be that earlier generations of scholars were misled by the lack of access to contemporary oral sources themselves necessarily evanescent. Razib and Anthony also discuss whether the first Muslims actually self-identified as Muslims in a way we would understand, as opposed to being a heterodox monotheistic sect that emerged out of Christianity and Judaism. Though classical Islam qua Islam crystallized under the Abbasids after 750 AD, it now seems quite clear that the earlier Umayyads had a distinct identity from the Christians and Jews whom they ruled.
The fourth and final volume of the Anthems of al-Andalus series, John D. Cressler takes the reader to Spain and tells the tale of forbidden love during a bloody war that heralds the end of a golden age. As much a tale of fiction, it is also one of history, which most never learn about in the west. Most of modern Spain was under Muslim control from 711 to 1492 C.E. This time was one of deep influence in world events, including the rediscovery, translation and dissemination of the lost works of science, medicine, and philosophy of the ancient Greeks. The Umayyads were great lovers of books and learning, and the 10th and 11th centuries was a period of religious and spiritual acceptance, where Muslim, Jewish and Christian communities embraced one another. The three traditions sparked a cultural revolution. This discussion with host Lawrence Knorr provides insight into centuries past, and how faiths lived and grew together and inspired immense change, now seemingly lost. John D. Cressler is the Schlumberger Chair Professor in Electronics at Georgia Tech. His debut novel, "Emeralds of the Alhambra," was released by Sunbury Press in 2013, followed by "Shadows in the Shining City," and "Fortune's Lament." He is also the author of non-fiction works that include "Silicon-Germanium Heterojunction Bipolar Transistors," "Silicon Earth," and "Extreme Environment Electronics." You can find out more about him at his website.
In this episode, Xavier Bonilla has a dialogue with Sam Ottewill-Soulsby about Christians and Muslims relationships during the age of Charlemagne. They discuss Charlemagne and his context, the viewpoint of the Muslim world, and the landscape of the Abbasid and Umayyad empires. They discuss prestige diplomacy, frontier diplomacy, importance of Islam and Christianity, four legal schools of Islam, and Carolingian religious values. They also discuss the dynamics with the Abbasid, gift giving, war and peace with the Umayyads in the 9th century, and many more topics. Sam Ottewill-Soulsby is a researcher at the University of Oslo. He has a Bachelors in History from the University of York, Masters in Medieval History and PhD in History from the University of Cambridge. He has been a Research Associate for the Impact of the Ancient City project at the University of Cambridge. He was also Visiting Research Fellow at the Migration and Mobility in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Tübingen. He is the author of the book, The Emperor and the Elephant: Christians and Muslims in the Age of Charlemagne. Twitter: @sottewillsoulsb Get full access to Converging Dialogues at convergingdialogues.substack.com/subscribe
“No city in the world will ever rival it for prosperity...“ Baghdad, originally a Christian village in Iraq, was chosen by the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mansur as the site for the new capital of his empire, and it would become a cosmopolis to rival Rome or Babylon. Its foundations were built in a perfect circle, with walls 90 feet tall, and at its heart, the monumental Palace of the Golden Gate. Rejecting the Umayyad Caliphate's desire to conquer Constantinople, Al-Mansur founded his own “centre of the universe”. In the second part of our series on Baghdad, Tom and Dominic look at how the Abbasids solidified their rule after overthrowing the Umayyads, and the beginnings of Baghdad as their new capital. *The Rest Is History Live Tour 2023*: Tom and Dominic are back on tour this autumn! See them live in London, New Zealand, and Australia! Buy your tickets here: restishistorypod.com Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
The sharing of culture was vital for the Abbasids. Even their predecessors, the Umayyads, had been fascinated by the knowledge of other cultures and societies. The Abbasids took things one step further when they created The House of Wisdom: an important library and institution that funded scholars, learning, and most importantly translation. This is the final episode of Baghdad Soundwalks, but stay tuned for Season 2 where we introduce you to those who lived, schemed, and made medieval Baghdad what it was. From brilliant scholars, to powerful caliphs, from eloquent poets to the women behind the throne, Season 2 brings you the lives at the heart of the Abbasid empire. **Episode 1 drops October 16**An original Ubisoft series, produced by Paradiso Media.Written by: Ali A OlomiHosted by: Ali A Olomi, Deana HassaneinMixing and editing: Adrien Le Blond, Jimmy BardinPre-existing music: Music from Assassin's Creed Mirage (Original Game Soundtrack) by Brendan Angelides, and from Walissarābi Minnal‘irfān (A Tribute To Mirage).Label: Ubisoft MusicIllustration: © Ubisoft Entertainment. All Rights ReservedProduction Coordinator: Brendan GalbreathAdditional Production Assistants: Yael Even Or, Molly O'Keefe, Madeleine Weinberg, Aimie FaconnierProducers: Axelle Gobert, Abi McNeilExecutive Producers Ubisoft: Etienne Bouvier, Julien FabreExecutive Producers Paradiso Media: Benoit Dunaigre, Emi NorrisIf you liked this podcast please subscribe, rate & review. To find out more go to Assassins Creed or find us on Facebook, Twitter & Instagram. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
A story of great myth and of huge historical significance, the foundation of Baghdad is a fundamental episode in the development of Islam. The Umayyad Caliphate, the first great Islamic empire, stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of China; no dynasty had ever presided over a greater array of conquests. But amongst growing sectarian and internal divisions, discontent on the fringes of the caliphate, and the emergence of influential religious scholars, the Umayyads are challenged by a new power, which pretends to restore Muhammad's bloodline to rule over Islam. In the first part of our series on the history of Baghdad, Tom and Dominic tell the story of the founders of the city, the Abbasids, and delve into the roots of the revolution that saw them overthrow the Umayyad Caliphate… *The Rest Is History Live Tour 2023*: Tom and Dominic are back on tour this autumn! See them live in London, New Zealand, and Australia! Buy your tickets here: restishistorypod.com Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Two separate branches of Muslim predominate this faith. 90% of the Muslim world is Sunni, and 8% is Shia in faith. The followers of Shia are commonly found in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and a few other places. The difference between Sunni and Shia arose because of a political division at the time in history when Shia followers went their separate way. Yet, while the split started as a difference of opinion in politics, some significant theological differences emerged later, with Shia incorporating many unconventional, foreign concepts into their theology. The Sunni and Shia split found its origin in a disagreement about the leadership of the Muslim community after the death of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. After his death, his companions were forced to choose the next leader, the ruler, and the successor of the Muslim community, commonly known as the Caliphate. Sunnis believed that Prophet Muhammad PBUH did not explicitly designate his replacement, and they needed to appoint this leader by mutual consultation. The Shia believed that the Prophet PBUH designated his cousin and son-in-law, Ali PBUH, to assume the role of Caliph.Sunni Muslims deemed Abu Bakr R.A., the Prophet's closest companion, as the fittest to lead the Muslim community. Abu Bakr became the first Caliph, and Ali eventually became the fourth, serving in the wake of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, peace be upon them. Ali was well-satisfied with the decision to appoint Abu Bakr R.A. as the ruler, but others were less pleased.The word Sunni comes from the term Sunnah, which refers to the teachings and practice of Prophet Muhammad PBUH, who in turn was taught by Angel Gabriel—who, for his part, learned the faith from God. Sunni Muslims consider themselves followers of Islam's orthodox tradition, adhering to the pure, uninfluenced faith taught by Prophet Muhammad PBUH. Shia linguistically means party, sect, supporters, or a group of similar-minded people. Shia is an abbreviation for Shiatu Ali, which signifies a group or supporters of Ali. Shia was a political faction that claimed the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, PBUH, should lead the Islamic community as the Caliphate in place of Abu Bakr R.A.Initially, this group of Ali's supporters, known as Shia, stood against the Umayyads political party but remained purely Sunni in their theology and faith, unlike modern-day Shia. Yet, with passing years, significant doctrine/theological differences arose. The famous 12 Imams that certain Shia holds in the highest regard were Sunni in Creed, not Shia.If Prophet Muhammad PBUH explicitly appointed Ali PBUH, as the Shia claim, that would mean Abu Bakr was appointed unjustly in the role of a caliph. It means he disobeyed and went against the wishes of the Prophet, PBUH, despite his role as his closest associate and dearest friend. Additionally, this move implied that the companions who accepted Abu Bakr R.A. as the Caliphate went against the Prophet PBUH despite earning a high rank and God's praise in the Holy Quran.Many beliefs of Shiism claim no basis in the religion of Islam. Shiism evolved from its role as a political sect supporting and favoring the leadership of Ali and his descendants, who they label as Imams, over more qualified companions, to a holder and conveyor of strange ideas foreign to Islam.
War A to Z▪️Abbasid Revolution▪️Date- 747 A.D. - 750 A.D.Location - Khorasan province IranParticipants - Umayyads vs AbbasidsKey Players - Caliph Marwan, Governor Nasir Ibn Sayyar, Muhammad Ali, Abu MuslimKey Battles - Merv, Nahavand, Isfahan, Mosul▪️The Issue - The powerful Umayyad Caliphate, the second of the original four in early Islamic history, had a rocky relationship with its many subjects. The Umayyads were an Arab dynasty but could prove no direct relationship or bloodline to the Prophet's family, and they had a willingness to tax all subjects at very high rates, Arab and non-Arab alike. Because they treated Arabs better than anyone, and should no preference for non-Arab muslims, the Umayyad's had few friends in their lands. Some of the more discriminatory policies led to unrest and two leaders started to form an opposition party; Muhammad Ibn Ali, who could boast a blood tie to the Prophet and Abu Muslim, an Iranian leader that gave voice to the over taxed non-Arab and non-muslims. Wearing black and touting a black flag, mirroring the Prophets own battle flag, the Abbasids began their revolution in 745.▪️The Result - The ensuing five years saw dozens of battles, from Merv to Nahavand, Isfahan to Mosul. The Abbasid forces crippled the Umayyad power structure and forced the governor of Khorasan to flee from city to city until at last he died in 748 A.D. The ignominious death of Governor Sayyar was to be repeated by the Caliph himself. As Abu Muslim's forces marched on Harrran, Caliph Marwan ran for safety making it all the way to Egypt. Unfortunately for him, Marwan didn't live long in the land of the pharaohs, he was murdered in 750 A.D. The resulting power vacuum caused by the Umayyad collapse allowed Abu Muslim to roll up Syria, Iraq, and Iran into the Abbasid Empire. A legitimate Islamic government was installed and tax laws and revenues regulated by the ruling Muslim dynasty. Abu al-Abbas was chosen as their first caliph and he ruled from the new capital of the Islamic world - Baghdad.▪️Rate/Review/Subscribe▪️Source - MacGill's Military History
The opening of Season 4, the final season, is dedicated to one of the most iconic buildings of Jerusalem: the Dome of the Rock. While the Dome has become a sort of brand defining the image of Jerusalem, there is a lot of confusion about its history and purpose. Built by the Umayyads in the late 7th century, scholars developed different ideas about the Dome and our guest, Beatrice St. Laurent, makes some order and gives us a good sense about the chronology and history of the building and how its significance changed throughout time. Today the Dome and the Haram al-Sharif at large have become a key feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the target of Israeli-Jewish right wing organizations who seek to regain the area in order to build a new Temple; however after the destruction of the Temple in 70AD by the Romans, the site had become a quarry and while it was known to many that the area was sacred, it did not serve any particular purpose until the arrival of the Arab armies in the 7the Century.Beatrice, in her work and in this episode, has challenged many of the common views and histories of the Dome of the Rock, an excellent way to think about one's next visit to Jerusalem.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/jerusalemunplugged. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim Sheykh Lokman Efendi explains the rights of the Khalifah and speaks about Islamic history, from the time of the Umayyads to the Abbassids, the Seljuks and finally to the rise of the Great Ottomans naksibendi.us
The Abbasid path to power required stealth, deceit, and most of all patience. The Hashemite family managed to unseat the Umayyads through cultivating a secret movement that benefitted from all the social tensions which plagued the umma. They drew on Hashemite support by calling for the rights of the prophet's clan, they championed the southern or Yemeni side of the tribal feud, and they were deeply anti-Umayyad. Their success would have been unlikely in Hisham's age, but times had changed in the few years since then.
Hisham's Palace and the mosaics were very recently renovated and the mosaics are now covered and protected by a special shield and that's why there has been quite a lot of attention for the place, even from the world media, because the mosaics are one of the largest mosaic carpets in such a good shape, in the world. The mosaics cover an area of about 900 square meters. In this episode you can learn about the Umayyads, why they built palaces in the desert and I will take you on a virtual tour to visit the remains of Hisham's Palace with the famous mosaic carpets.My daughter Louisa and I also made a five minutes video of our visit that you can see on the YouTube channel. Everything you hear in this episode you can see in those five minutes!If you are interested to dig a little bit deeper into the mosaics then I recommend reading these two articles that I also used for my research:https://www.academia.edu/12102557/The_Mosaics_of_Khirbet_el_Mafjar_Hishams_Palacehttps://eprints.soas.ac.uk/388/1/Lion-Gazelle_mosaic.pdfYou can find all the links to the social media, YouTube channel, website and to register for the email list here: https://linktr.ee/StoriesfrompalestineIf you enjoy listening to Stories from Palestine then you should also check out the podcast Jerusalem Unplugged. You can find it on most podcast players and on social media.
While the Umayyads fought among themselves in distant Syria, dangerous developments were underway in Khurasan. The umma's divisions in the Eastern province were deep enough to give the coming revolution its first foothold in the caliphate. Its final Umayyad governor, Nasr ibn Sayyar, bore witness to the entire transformational era in the region, and he did an admirable job holding things together until his final breath.
On this episode we cover the conflict between the Umayyads and the Aquitanians in southern France!Join me on Patreon to support the show and get your questions answered on the podcast!:https://www.patreon.com/historyofportugalJoin us on social media!Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/historyofportugalInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/historyofportugalpod/ If you have any questions or comments, you can reach me at historyofportugalpod@gmail.comFlag Image by Miguel Á. Padriñán from Pixabay Our GDPR privacy policy was updated on August 8, 2022. Visit acast.com/privacy for more information.
The capable Hisham protected his caliphate from the many enemies who lined its borders. These were not the only ones he had to contend with however, the umma itself was somewhat fragmented, and opposition to the Umayyads had swelled during the short and tumultuous reigns of his predecessors. As a result, Hisham had to face resistance from Arabs with kharijite or Hashemite loyalties. There was no stopping this effective caliph though, and he came out on top in all issues, save one.
We're joined by the Dean of Social Sciences at New York University and Professor of Political Science David Stasavage (@stasavage) who wrote the recent book (The Decline and Rise of Democracy). We talk about: - the first principles and definitions of what we exactly mean by 'democracy' - a compressed summary of the origins, and pre-17th century non-European early forms of democracy in the Islamic world, China, Africa. - democracy, institution-building, and state development in early Rashidun Caliphates, Umayyads and Chinese empires. - Does adopting democracy automatically lead to more economic development and innovation? - The reasons for the development of late democracy in Europe. - The reasons for development of the democratic model in the United States. - Technology and the future of democracy in the world. Follow our host Waheed Rahman (@iwaheedo) for more updates on tech and civilization. Here are the timestamps for the episode. On some podcast players, you should be able to click the timestamp for the episode. (00:00) - Episode intro and key moments (04:55) - Why David wrote a book on the history of Democracy across different regions? (05:52) - Definitions and first principles of Democracy. (07:10) - Is democracy a consensus-based system? (07:45) - First principles of early vs modern democracy (08:58) - Examples of early democracy across the world (09:32) - Compressed summary of the origins of democracy till today (11:20) - The role of democracy between 7th and 13th CE Islamic world (14:08) - How decentralised system of governance made democracy possible? (15:15) - Democratic process of the early Rashidun caliphates (16:30) - Standardization and unification of democratic policies (17:11) - How is China's political development different from the rest of Europe and the Islamic world (21:41) - How is democracy tied to the idea of economic development? (24:30) - The role of democracy when it comes to technological innovations (25:48) - Emergence of democracy in Europe (28:09) - Why were Aristotle's democratic discussions more popular in Europe than in the rest of the world (29:31) - Impact of Aristotle's democratic theory on early Europe (30:23) - Does democracy help reduce inequality? (35:50) - What is bureaucracy? (37:49) - Mixtures model of democracy (39:25) - Are there hierarchies in a modern democracy? (41:54) - Does democracy change forms? (45:04) - Is autocracy deeply rooted in the culture of political and state development? (47:14) - Development of the democratic model in the US and the future of democracy (49:48) - Outro
Continuing our exploration of gender and sexuality in Islamic history we turn to the figure of the mukhannathun, a third gender category in early Islam. We trace ideas of gender as a fluid spectrum through the lives of these individuals examining their existence in the life of Muhammad and the nascent Muslim community, the Umayyads,...
This week we're getting ready for the big event, the royal rumble, the epic battle for the ages that would, one way or another, seal the fate of Europe as either a Christian or Muslim land… Okay, okay, I'm getting a little carried away with the UFC/WWE fight build-up, but given the way that some commentators talk about the Battle of Poitiers/Tours, well, it's easy to get spun up. And this hype gets a touch of official recognition: if you remember back to the first episode of this podcast, we discussed the Gallery of Battles in Versailles and all of the paintings in that hall that depict the military glories of France up until the Age of Napoleon. Well, the painting of the Battle of Poitiers is, on the historical timeline, the second painting that we will be getting to, the first having been Clovis and his outstretched arm at the Battle of Tolbiac (also known as this show's cover art!). This means that out of all of the other battles we have discussed up until this point, a period covering about 240 years since Tolbiac, this is the first battle that is deemed important enough to have made it to the Gallerie. Here's the craziest thing about this battle, IMO, and we'll be discussing it quite a bit in today's build-up episode to Poitiers: there's an argument to be made that the savior of Francia was not Charles Martel, but Odo of Aquitaine! Odo had already defeated the Umayyads once, in 721, when they marched on Toulouse. He landed a crippling blow, killing and wounded thousands of Umayyad fighters and killing their commander at that time. Later, in 732, it was Odo who faced the reconstituted Umayyad forces at Bordeaux, and it was Odo who called in Charles Martel for back-up. Odo even made one of the key flanking maneuvers in the actual 732 battle (more on that next week!). With all of this said, Charles wouldn't have had time to build his armies if Odo hadn't given him the space to do so. Charles may not have known the Umayyads were headed his way if not warned by Odo, and they may have had much larger numbers and a better base of operations if Odo hadn't beat them in 721. But does anyone recall Odo today? Not many. Let's fix that! * * * Final note for the day: I wanted to take a quick moment to let you know about another project we're working on here at T+M. In a few weeks, in the mid to late part of July, Amazon plans to roll out a new feature for Kindle called Vella. Vella is a platform for serialized fiction, stories told episode by episode, and we've decided to publish one of the projects we're working on to this new platform, to be one of the first published when it goes live. What's cool about this is that we've been working on a story based around Fredegunda and Brunhilda pretty much since we first talked about them here on this podcast. Their story is dark, thrilling, and audacious, and is absolutely perfect to be broken out in more scope and detail. And Vella seems the perfect place to do this, as telling serialized stories over time is kinda what we've been doing for the better part of the past two years! With all of that said, be on the lookout for Kindle Vella, and when it goes live, look for our story on there. The title is Queens of Blood, and we'll be sure to let you know if there and any changes and the Vella launch date here and on the socials. Anyway, if you've ever wanted to help the show and you've already rated us and left a review, well, here's another way! We hope you'll check it out and enjoy! * * * Links to social media and the website: History of Spain Podcast: Apple Podcasts Site: https://www.thugsandmiracles.com/ Email: thugsandmiracles@gmail.com Twitter: @thugsandmiracle (with no “s” on the end) Facebook: @ThugsAndMiracles Instagram: @ThugsAndMiracles YouTube: Thugs and Miracles Patreon: Who We Support Listenable: History of the Merovingians, 451-613
The second fitna revealed the unprecedented level of division within the umma, divisions which only grew as the civil conflict ground on for a decade. Under Abdulmalik's leadership, the Umayyads managed to slowly grow their power until they found themselves in a position to challenge for the umma's leadership once again.
Allahu Taala has established the Islamic religion in such a manner that it addresses every new development and invention in every country. Showing toleration and latitude not only in social life, but also in worships, the Islamic religion has given men freedom and the right of ijtihad (meaning or conclusion drawn by great scholars called mujtahids through endeavoring to understand the hidden meaning in an ayat karima or a Hadith sharif) when they confront with different conditions and necessities. During the times of Hazrat Umar, the Umayyads and such a big empire as the Ottoman Empire, large communities of various peoples, living over continents, were administered with these divine rules. Muslims' accomplishments and glories have been famous throughout history. And in the future, every nation, big or small, will attain comfort, peace and happiness in proportion to the extent to which it obeys and practices these unchangeable divine rules. Nations and societies which deviate from the social and economic rules declared by Islam will not escape hardships, suffering and trouble. It is written in history that this has been so with nations in the past, and so will it certainly be in the future. History is repetitive. Muslims should attach great importance to national unity and solidarity; they should be extremely active materially and morally in making their country stronger; they should learn the teachings of the Islamic religion very well; they should abstain from haram; and they should pay their debts to Allahu Taala, the State and His human creatures. They should be embellished with the beautiful morals of Islam and should not cause harm to anybody. They should not be a means of agitation, that is they should not cause anarchy, and they should pay their taxes. Our religion, Islam, commands us to behave in that manner. The first obligation of a Muslim is to avoid being guilty of breaking State laws and going against Allahu Taala by sinning, by not following the devil or one's nafs, and by not believing bad, insidious, disobedient and rebellious people.
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur'an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony's book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Contemporary historians have searched for the historical Muhammad along many paths. In Muhammad and the Empires of Faith: The Making of the Prophet of Islam (University of California Press, 2020), Sean Anthony, Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at Ohio State University, recommends employing non-Muslim and Muslim sources in tandem in order to view a fuller landscape of Late Antiquity. Anthony revisits the earliest Arabic materials, including the Qur’an, epigraphic and archeological evidence, as well as contemporaneous non-Muslim sources, and accounts preserved in the sira-maghazi literature. These make up the four cardinal sources for his historical and philological method. Anthony’s book both introduces a comprehensive portrait of the sources available for understanding Muhammad in his time period, as well as demonstrates how we can arrive at new insights through a “lateral” reading across the Late Antique period. In our conversation we discuss the earliest evidence mentioning Muhammad, non-Muslim testimonies, narratives of Muhammad under the Umayyads, reinvestigating Muhammad as a merchant, the role of the scholarly tradition in recording biographical accounts, the sira of Ibn Ishaq, how Abbasid imperial discourses shaped biographical narratives, literary conventions and cultural aesthetics of the late antique hagiographical writings, comparative readings across Late Antiquity, and future directions for historians. Kristian Petersen is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Old Dominion University. You can find out more about his work on his website, follow him on Twitter @BabaKristian, or email him at kpeterse@odu.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
narrated by Chris Gratien featuring Hugh Kennedy, Joshua White, Fahad Bishara, Maryam Patton, and Jeannie Miller | The first decades of Islam were characterized by a rapid territorial expansion accompanied by conflicts over leadership following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite opposition from the supporters of Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan would become Caliph and establish a dynasty for his clan: the Banu Umayyah. The next centuries of Islamic history would be defined by the imperial Caliphates of the Umayyads and Abbasids, who controlled empires stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to India. This episode of The Making of the Islamic World focuses on the creation of these Islamic empires, their institutional legacy, and the intellectual life of the Abbasid Caliphate during its height. We conclude with the Abbasid luminary al-Jahiz and what his writings tell us about the changing social fabric of the Abbasid world during the 9th century. « Click for More »
narrated by Chris Gratien featuring Hugh Kennedy, Joshua White, Fahad Bishara, Maryam Patton, and Jeannie Miller | The first decades of Islam were characterized by a rapid territorial expansion accompanied by conflicts over leadership following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite opposition from the supporters of Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muawiya Ibn Abi Sufyan would become Caliph and establish a dynasty for his clan: the Banu Umayyah. The next centuries of Islamic history would be defined by the imperial Caliphates of the Umayyads and Abbasids, who controlled empires stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to India. This episode of The Making of the Islamic World focuses on the creation of these Islamic empires, their institutional legacy, and the intellectual life of the Abbasid Caliphate during its height. We conclude with the Abbasid luminary al-Jahiz and what his writings tell us about the changing social fabric of the Abbasid world during the 9th century. « Click for More »
In this podcast, we look at the life of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, he ruled for only 30 months but during this short period he changed the world. His tenure was the brightest period in the 92-year history of the Umayyads, He was the son of Abdul Aziz bin Al-Marwan, the governor of Egypt while his mother, Umm-i-Aasim was the granddaughter of Umar Ibn Al-Khattab [RA], he was very pious and averse to worldly luxuries. He preferred simplicity to extravagance. he even abandoned the royal palace and preferred to live in a modest house. He wore rough clothes instead of royal robes and often went unrecognized in public like his great grandfather Umar ibn Al-Khattab.
The Umayyad Caliphate struggled to hold onto its possessions during the reigns of Sulayman, Umar II, Yazid II, and Hisham. The Umayyads lost north Africa to the Berbers, began losing to the Byzantines, were holding steady against the Khazars, defeated Coptic revolts in Egypt, faced an Alid rebellion in Iraq, and were desperate to maintain their holdings in Transoxania.
After the Umayyads emerged victorious after the Second Fitna, their leaders, Abd al-Malik and al-Walid, would rule at the height of Umayyad power.
During the Second Fitna, the Umayyads, Zubayrids, Alids, and Kharijites battled for supremacy over the Islamic world. (Spoiler alert: the Umayyads won.)
In 962- Alaptagin establishes Kingdom of Ghazna. 968-Umayyads establishes University of Cordoba. 969- City of Cairo is established by Fatimids, the 6 largest city in the world. 970- Fatimids conquer Mecca and Medina with this the title Caliph. 971- Al Azhar University is established. 988- Russia and Ukraine accepted Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 996- Pope Pious declares Crusade. 997- Mahmud of Ghazna succeeded Alptagin. 1000- Mahmud starts raiding India. 1004- Mahmud defeats Dawud the fatimid ruler of Multan. 1017- Druze sect is started in Lebanon. 1020- Author of Shah Nama Firdowsi dies. 1024- Mahmud raids Somnath Temple in India.1031- Caliphate of Cordoba disintegrates --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/support
In the dusty flood plain, 100,000 men and many times that in horses surround the walls of Baghdad. Catapults lob stones relentlessly into the city walls, hauled from great distance. Here, towers collapse under the barrage; there, ladders bring Mongol and subject peoples onto the fortifications, seizing them from the disorganized and panicking garrison. Arrows, some bearing messages, bring both confusion and injury where they land. The mighty Tigris River, the city’s lifeblood, is now part of the trap; pontoon bridges, from them dangling nets embedded with iron hooks, rest both north and south of the city to catch those trying to flee. The final ‘Abbasid Caliph sits frightened and overwhelmed in his palace, as the grasp of Hulegu Khan closes around him. Today, we discuss the fall of Baghdad, 1258. But first, we’d like to remind you that for those of you who enjoy the podcast, your support would be highly appreciated and would help us keep going. We have a patreon available for monthly or even one-time donations or, if you aren’t able to support us financially, positive reviews on Apple Podcasts or other review sites really helps us out. And now, I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest. We left our previous episode off with Hulegu destroying the Nizari Ismaili state, better known at the Order of Assassins, who had controlled a series of fortresses across eastern and northern Iran. By the end of 1256, Hulegu had reduced them to but a few holdouts, and he could begin to look to his next target. Considered heretics of the worst variety by most Sunni Muslims, the Persian writer Juvaini, a member of Hulegu’s retinue, described his victory over the Nizaris in glowing terms, Hulegu as a sword of Islam carrying out God’s will. Juvaini presents Hulegu’s war as a more ‘civilized’ form of conquest compared to that of his grandfather, Chinggis Khan. Destruction was limited to Ismaili territories and the towns and fortresses that failed to submit, as opposed to the veritable tsunami of bloodshed Chinggis Khan wrought on the Khwarezmian empire over thirty years prior. What Hulegu was soon to do in Baghdad and to the titular head of Sunni Islam would not be so praised, and it is perhaps no coincidence that Juvaini’s own chronicle ends with the fall of the Ismailis. As Hulegu left Ismaili territory in the final month of 1256, his eye was drawn to the ‘Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. In Islam, the spiritual leader of the religion was whoever was considered the successor to the Prophet Muhammad. For Shi’a Muslims, this was the imam- for Nizari Ismailis, the Imam was the ruler of Alamut, who had just been put to death on Mongol orders. For the majority of Muslims, known as Sunnis, the head of their faith was the Caliph, literally meaning ‘successor.’The first four Caliphs to succeed the Prophet were the “Rightly Guided,” the Rashidun, whose legitimacy is generally unquestioned by most Muslims. The Rashidun were succeeded by the Umayyads, who greatly extended Muslim rule east and west, across North Africa into Spain and across Eastern Iran into Central Asia. In 750, the Umayyad Caliphs were overthrown in the ‘Abbasid revolution. Claiming descent from the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas, it was under the early ‘Abbasids that the Caliphal capital was moved from Damascus to the newly established Baghdad along the Tigris River. Never comparable to the power of the Umayyads at their height, from the 9th century onwards the still vast ‘Abbasid empire fragmented with threat from all directions: the Fatimids in Egypt, the Samanids, Buyids and Saffarids of Iran and finally from the steppes, the Great Seljuqs, all of which ground the ‘Abbasids down until their state hardly stretched past the walls of Baghdad. The weakening of the Seljuqs after Sultan Malik-Shah’s death in 1092 allowed the ‘Abbasids to gradually reclaim independence and some authority, even repulsing a Seljuq army attacking Baghdad in 1157. The long reigns of Caliph al-Nasir and al-Mustansir, from 1180 until 1242, saw the ‘Abbasids reclaim much of central and southern Iraq. A far cry from the sweeping power they had held in the 8th century, by the 13th century they still remained influential and held prestige. For 500 years they had been the heads of Islam, and had long cultivated an useful image as invioable and holy, above temporal affairs though they were more often than not mired in them. For instance, in the late 12th century Caliph al-Nasir was in conflict with the Seljuqs who continued to rule in Iran. He allied with the rising power northeast of the Iranian Seljuqs, the Khwarezmian Empire. Once vassals of the Great Seljuqs, the Khwarezm-shahs now butted heads with them as they expanded southwards, and the reigning Khwarezm-Shah, Tekesh bin Il-Arslan, was happy to ally himself with the Caliph. In 1194 at Rayy, modern Tehran, Tekesh defeated and killed the last Seljuq Sultan in Iran, Toghrul III, ending the dynasty and sending the Sultan’s severed head to al-Nasir in Baghdad. Rather than provide freedom for the Caliphate, Tekesh now wanted to step into the place of Seljuqs. The Seljuqs’ territory in Iran was largely annexed by Tekesh Khwarezm-shah, who soon began making aggressive motions to the Caliph. Al-Nasir encouraged the Khwarezmians’ eastern neighbours, the Ghurids, in their war with Tekesh. Tekesh died in 1200, succeeded by his son Muhammad II as Khwarezm-shah who, through luck, timely assassinations and military victories, overcame the Ghurids, consolidated power over Iran and in 1217 tried to march on Baghdad itself. Muhammad’s march on Baghdad was halted by a vicious snowstorm as he crossed the Zagros mountains, forcing him back. Returning to the northeast of his empire, Muhammad would there make the poor decisions which led to the Mongol Invasion of Khwarezm, covered way back in episode 9 of this podcast. Now, some authors of the period assert that Caliph al-Nasir actually invited Chinggis Khan to attack Muhammad of Khwarezm- when placed in the context of the Caliph switching to support whoever was on the eastern side of his current foe, there is definitely a logic to it. However, as we described in detail in episode 8 of the podcast, the cause of the Mongol invasion can be found in the foolery of Muhammad Khwarezm-shah alone. Had the Mongols come on the invitation of the Caliph, then surely they would have publicized that to justify the attack and sow further confusion among the Khwarezmians. In fact, in 1221 when detachments of Jebe and Subutai’s army penetrated into northern Iraq, Caliph al-Nasir was hardly welcoming. Along with the rulers of northern Iraq’s most important cities, Muzaffar ad-Din of Irbil and Badr al-Din Lu’lu’, the de facto ruler of Mosul, the Caliph organized a short lived military coalition, which proved unnecessary as the Mongols soon withdrew. Evidently, the ‘Abbasids spread a rumour that their army was absolutely gargantuan, their power unassailable and heavenly protected, and the Mongols were hesitant to commit. Had they paid close attention in the following years, they might have called the Caliph’s bluff. In 1225 that favoured Khwarezmian rapscallion, Jalal al-Din Mingburnu, defeated a Caliphal army after the ‘Abbasids failed to provide him assistance. Jalal al-Din chased the survivors right to the suburbs of Baghdad, then went north, defeated an army from Irbil sent to assist the Caliph and captured Irbil’s ruler, Muzaffar ad-Din. Caliph al-Nasir, by then elderly, paralyzed and blind for three years, died soon after Jalal al-Din’s attack, and was succeeded by his son, az-Zahir, as the 35th Caliph… for nine months. On Caliph az-Zahir’s death in 1226, he was succeeded by his own son, al-Mustansir, the 36th and penultimate ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad. As Caliph, al-Mustanir continued to try to strengthen ‘Abbasid control in Iraq and expand the army, but Mongol rule steadily spread over the region. By the start of the 1230s, Chormaqun Noyan and his lieutenants brought the submission of most of Iran and cast Mongol authority over the Caucasus. For Caliph al-Mustansir, the Mongol empire was a vast crescent to his north and east, where it stretched seemingly indefinitely. By 1235, Mongol forces mainly under Chagatai Noyan, “the Lesser,” were probing northern Iraq and directly, but hesitantly, testing ‘Abbasid hegemony in the region. In June 1237, Chagatai Noyan captured Irbil in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan, though the Citadel held out and in August Caliphal forces relieved the city. In February of 1238, an attack was launched on Baghdad, and a panicked Caliph al-Mustansir sent messages to the remaining independent Muslim powers from the Jazira and Syria down to Egypt for aid. Only 2,000 troops from the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, al-Kamil, reached Baghdad, and in June 1238 a caliphal army was defeated near the city. However, the defences of Baghdad itself remained formidable and the city stood defiant while the Mongols turned back from the walls, unprepared for both a long siege and or the fearsome Iraqi summer. Possibly, the Mongols suffered some sort of reverse while attacking Baghdad; some sixty years later, when the Persian historian Wassaf [vassaf] visited Baghdad, he recorded a Mongol defeat outside the walls, though this goes unmentioned by the other sources. While Baghdad remained independent, the Mongols continued to take cities in the region. Chormaqun’s successor Baiju brought the submission of the Seljuqs of Anatolia in 1243; in 1244, the Mongol general Yasa’ur rode into Syria, dislodging the remnants of Jalal al-Din’s Khwarezmians. The Ayyubids of Syria, the successors of the once mighty empire of Saladin Ayyubi, largely submitted over 1244-5, and even Antioch, one of the last of the Crusader Kingdoms, offered its submission. In late 1245 another attack on Baghdad was launched but soon aborted. The new Caliph since 1242, al-Mustasim ibn al-Mustansir, was lucky the attack was called off, for he was rather rapidly running out of allies. It seem that the new Caliph managed to avoid further attacks with a token submission: the Franscisan Friar John de Plano Carpini, present at the coronation of Guyuk Khaan in 1246, noted ‘Abbasid envoys were present in Karakorum and believed they paid a regular tribute. The 38th and final ‘Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad, al-Mustasim, was not the equal of his father or great-grandfather. While al-Nasir and al-Mustansir sought to strengthen the Caliphate, al-Mustasim was more interested in the luxury of Baghdad, and was nearly universally condemned for decadence. A great lover of music, he sponsored an entire neighbourhood in Baghdad to house musicians, including the most famous of the age, Saif al-Din Urmawi. A lover of pigeon racing, art, calligraphy and treasures, al-Mustasim was also indecisive and easily swayed by factions in his court, some of whom, such as the vizier, sought accomodation with the Mongols, while others urged to meet them in battle. As we will see shortly, the result was al-Mustasim vacillating in policy, wavering between antagonizing the Mongols and sending them gifts. Essentially, the worst sort of man to have in power when Hulegu marched on him with upwards of 100,000 men. Neither was weak leadership the only problem. Corruption and decadence of Baghdad’s elite alienated the lower classes. A weak currency and high food prices contributed to revolts; many of Baghdad’s soldiers increasingly found themselves unpaid and resorted to bandity or desertion. Topping off years of natural disasters- heavy rain, storms, annual flooding, in 1256, the Tigris, the river which runs through Baghdad, flooded for over a month, washing away much of Baghdad’s lower city. Attributed to divine displeasure at the decadent al-Mustasim, for decades afterwards this flood was remembered as the “Mustasimid flood.” As Mongol armies approached the city, pestilence killed many hundreds, if not thousands. The Caliph stood in a precarious position. Likely in late 1255, Hulegu sent a message to Caliph al-Mustasim demanding, as Hulegu had done with other rulers across the region, that Baghdad supply troops to help in the attack on the Nizari Isamilis. Al-Mustasim refused. As the ‘Abbasids had been sending tribute in the previous years and were considered vassals, such a refusal was a declaration of independence. Hulegu, having been sent in part to find how sincere the Caliph’s submission was, now had his casus belli, for to the Mongols, the Caliph of Baghdad was now in open revolt. War with the Caliph was not intended to punish Islam specifically; had the Mongols caught the Pope and considered him a rebel, certainly he would have shared a similar fate. What mattered to the Mongols was submission to their divinely mandated rule; refusal to submit was blasphemy of the highest order. After the fall of Alamut in December 1256, and spending some time near the still-resisting Nizari fortress of Lammasar, Hulegu stayed in Qazwin, just south of Alamut, until March 1257. From Qazwin he undertook a somewhat repetitive journey: from Qazwin he went to Hamadan, then to Dinavar, then Tabriz, then back to Hamadan, then back to Tabriz, then back to Hamadan in September 1257, from whence he would finally march on Baghdad. The reasons for this were multiple, and not just because Hulegu really liked northwestern Iran, though it did give him good time to evaluate the region. Firstly, Hulegu did not want to besiege Baghdad in the summer months, and instead needed to time the march so he arrived outside the city in the winter. Secondly, it provided time for his lieutenants to secure the neighbouring theaters: Kitbuqa Noyan secured through force and diplomacy Luristan and the passes through the Zagros mountains, ensuring Hulegu’s main army could march unimpeded when the time came. In Anatolia, Baiju Noyan had needed to put down a Seljuq revolt, culminating in the battle of Aksaray in October 1256. Baiju then needed to move back east, in order to march on Baghdad from the west when the time came. Thirdly, Hulegu and the Caliph engaged in an entertaining round of diplomatic fisti-cuffs. Hulegu offered the Caliph another chance to surrender, repudiating him for his failure to send troops against the Nizaris. Hulegu’s threat, as recorded by the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din, went as follows: “Previously we have given you advice, but now we say you should avoid our wrath and vengeance. Do not try to overreach yourself or accomplish the impossible, for you will only succeed in harming yourself. The past is over. Destroy your ramparts, fill in your moats, turn the kingdom over to your son, and come to us. If you do not wish to come, send all three, the vizier [al-Alqami], Sulaymanshah, and the Dawatdar, that they may convey our message word for word. If our command is obeyed, it will not be necessary for us to wreak vengeance, and you may retain your lands, army, and subjects. If you do not heed our advice and dispute with us, line up your soldiers and get ready for the field of battle, for we have our loins girded for battle with you and are standing at the ready. When I lead my troops in wrath against Baghdad, even if you hide in the sky or in the earth, ‘I shall bring you down from the turning celestial sphere; I shall pull you up like a lion. I shall not leave one person alive in your realm, and I shall put your city and country to the torch.’ “If you desire to have mercy on your ancient family’s heads, heed my advice. If you do not, let us see what God’s will is.” The Caliph refused Hulegu’s demands, and when he sent back Hulegu’s envoys, they were harassed by the people of Baghdad; the Caliph’s vizier, ibn al-Alqami, had to send soldiers to protect the envoys to ensure they weren’t killed. When Hulegu learned of the incident, he derided the Caliph as a total incompetent, and then flew into a rage when he heard the official response, which called Hulegu a young and inexperienced man: somewhat humorous, considering al-Mustasim was only four years older than Hulegu. Hulegu’s response was about as subtle as you’d expect. Again, as per the account of Rashid al-Din, quote: “God the eternal elevated [Chinggis] Khan and his progeny and gave us all the face of the earth, from east to west. Anyone whose heart and tongue are straight with us in submission retains his kingdom, property, women, children, and life. He who contemplates otherwise will not live to enjoy them. Love of status and property, conceit, and pride in transitory fortune have so seduced you that even the words of your well-wishers have no effect on you. Your ear cannot hear the advice of the compassionate, and you have deviated from the path of your fathers and forebears. You must get ready for battle, for I am coming to Baghdad with an army as numerous as ants and locusts. Be the turning of the celestial sphere how it may, the power to command is God’s.” Upon hearing this message, al-Mustasim’s vizier ibn al-Alqami understood the colossal danger they were in, and fervently argued for the Caliph to appease the Mongols. Al-Alqami has something of a bisecting reputation in the Islamic world. For some, reading the Mamluk sources, the Shia Muslim ibn al-Alqami was a conspirator, plotting with Hulegu to topple the head of Sunni Islam for his own gain. For those reading from Persian and Ilkhanid sources, ibn al-Alqami was earnestly trying to steer the Caliph away from annihilation and save as many lives as he could. On this last response from Hulegu, al-Alqami was able to convince al-Mustasim to send gifts, only for the Caliph to be talked out of it by the dawatdar, Mugahid al-Din Aybek, the Caliphate’s top military man and a staunch supporter of resistance against Hulegu. Convincing the Caliph to abandon the expensive gifts, al-Mustasim sent the following message to vizier al-Alqami to assuage his worries: “Do not fear the future, and do not talk fables, for there is friendship and unity, not enmity and hostility, between me and Hülägü and [Mongke Khaan]. Since I am their friend, they are of course friendly and benevolent toward me. The envoys’ message is false. Even if these brothers contemplate opposition to or treachery against me, what has the Abbasid dynasty to fear, when the monarchs of the face of the earth stand as our army and obey our every command? If I request an army from every country and mount to repulse the foe, I can incite Iran and Turan against these brothers. Be of stout heart, and do not fear the threats of the Mongols, for although they are powerful upstarts, they pose nothing but an empty threat to the House of Abbas.” If Rashid al-Din is accurate in recording this message, then it goes some way to demonstrate just how greatly al-Mustasim misunderstood the situation. al-Mustasim’s next letter to Hulegu spoke of monarchs who had attacked the ‘Abbasids and suffered divine retribution for it, noting specifically Muahmmad Khwarezm-shah, who for his attack on Baghdad in 1217 suffered the power of Hulegu’s grandfather. Hulegu sent another threat, promising to bring the Caliph “down miserably into the jaws of a lion,” and had enough of parlay. Hulegu had only to check with the astrologers and diviners of his retinue in order to ensure the assault had good fortune. Variously they warned of failure, catastrophe, and death for harming the Caliph. Finally, Hulegu turned to the famed Iranian scholar rescued from the Nizari fortresses, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and asked what he thought of the matter. After thinking for a moment, Tusi told Hulegu that none of these things would happen. Hulegu asked what would. Tusi replied, “Hulegu Khan will take the Caliph’s place.” And that was enough for Hulegu. The border passes were now secured, and the march on Baghdad could begin. As Hulegu marched through Kermanshah, massacres followed him. His army approached Baghdad in three directions. Kitbuqa took a route through Luristan, and would march on Baghdad from the south. Baiju Noyan came through northern Iraq, crossing the Tigris near Irbil and closing in on Baghdad’s west and north. Hulegu took the main army through the Hulwan pass and would close off Baghdad from the east, thus encircling the city. As the armies entered Iraq, cities and towns across Mesopotamia surrendered to them. In January 1258 as the Mongols closed in on the city, the Caliphal army under the Dawatdar tried to repulse Baiju’s army. They were lured into a feigned retreat; a dyke was broken and their camp flooded. Few survivors escaped back to Baghdad. By January 22ned, the Mongol armies had linked up around the city. Not just Mongols, but subject Iranians, Turks, Georgians and Armenians made up this force, with a thousand Chinese siege engineers. The defenders of Baghdad were outnumbered and without hope. For a week, the Mongols prepared their siege lines. Pontoon bridges were built across the Tigris, nets and iron hooks hanging from them to ensure none could escape either up or downriver. No stones for the catapults were within the area, so they needed to be hauled in from elsewhere. A ditch was dug around the city, the earth from the ditch used to build a rampart with gates set in it. Protective coverings were built for the siege engines. With the typical thoroughness of the early Toluids, Baghdad was closed off, its fate sealed. The assault began on January 29th. An incessant barrage of stones and arrows brought the defenders to their knees. The artillery upon the walls of Baghdad was poorly maintained and outranged by that of the Mongols, useless in the words of one source. Under mobile wooden shelters, the Mongols advanced on the walls, sending arrows deeper into the city. One of the Caliph’s daughters was killed when an arrow passed through a window in his palace. Messages were tied to arrows, proclaiming that all those who did not resist would be spared. By the start of February, towers and bastions along the walls were collapsing. By February 3rd, Mongol forces were capturing the walls. When one of Hulegu’s commanders was killed by an arrow sent from the city, he angrily forced his army on at greater speed. Realizing just how monumentally he had erred, al-Mustasim sent envoys, among them the once bellicose Dawatdar, to discuss terms with Hulegu. They were quickly put to death. Nothing but the unconditional surrender of the Caliph himself was good enough. Finally, on February 10th, al-Mustasim and his family came out from Baghdad, and put his life in the hands of Hulegu. Initially, the Caliph was treated respectfully. Other notables came out to submit to Hulegu, and many others fled out of the city to escape the pestilence which had already claimed thousands within. These who came out were trapped between the walls of Baghdad and the Mongol palisade. Once the garrison and its weapons were collected, on the 13th of February, the sack of Baghdad began. In popular culture, the sack of Baghdad is uncontrolled, disorganized, horrifically violent and results in the city’s utter destruction and death of a million people. In reality it was controlled, organized, horrifically violent and resulted in only most of the city’s destruction and deaths of thousands. Rather than wiping Baghdad from the map, it was more of an organized dismemberment. Evidence comes from multiple accounts, but we’ll focus on that of the musician, Urmawi. In contrast to the image of the mob running wild over Baghdad, Urmawi’s account, recorded by the Mamluk historian Shihab al-Din al-’Umari, records the Mongols meticulously planned the sacking. Depending on rank, commanders were given 1 to 3 days to collect loot from sections of the city allotted to them. In Urmawi’s case, his neighbourhood was allotted to Baiju Noyan and his retinue- notably just men Baiju picked to bring into the city with him, rather than a whole portion of his army. Urmawi greeted Baiju with gifts and hosted a feast for him, entertaining him with music and ingratiating himself to the Noyan. Baiju was so pleased he urged Urmawi to come with him to play before Hulegu. Hulegu enjoyed a concert before the walls of Baghdad, ordered Urmawi’s neighbourhood spared and protected with picked men, and even granted Urmawi gardens which had belonged to the Caliph. Likewise, various sources note that a number of segments of the populations were spared and their property protected: Christians, notably Nestorian priests; Shi’ites and Alids; Khurasani merchants, Qadis, scholars, shaykhs and in one source, Jews. Individuals are mentioned petitioning Hulegu to spare their homes- likely for a hefty payment, of course- but in order to follow these orders, the forces looting the city had to be disciplined enough to actually take note of addresses. Even the oft-repeated statement that the Tigris River ran black with ink of the books of Baghdad’s library must be re-examined, for Nasir al-Din Tusi took many with him to Maragha, where he built his famous observatory. A number of sources indicate the city’s looting lasted only a week, rather than a full month. Clemency was extended to multiple groups… but for the majority of the city’s population who did not fall into these categories, it appears no quarter was given. For all the gated neighbourhoods like Urmawi’s which were protected, many more were gutted and looted. Treasures collected over the city’s 500 years were stolen, the finest architecture of the ‘Abbasids ruined and torn down. Hulegu entered the city on February 15th, visiting the Caliph’s palace, where al-Mustasim was forced to reveal where he had hidden his wealth. 12,000 severed ears were brought before Hulegu to mark the slain citizenry. The dead littered the street; after a few days, the heat and stench of the rotting bodies led Hulegu to end the looting by February 20th. Notably, the city was not to be left to brigandage: a governor and Mongol officials were appointed, ibn al-Alqami kept his position as vizier, to clean up the bodies and restore the city. On the 20th of February, Hulegu moved to the village of Waqaf to avoid the foul air of Baghdad, from which he apparently fell sick. At Waqaf, Hulegu had al-Mustasim put to death, most likely rolled into a carpet and stomped upon to avoid spilling his blood on the earth. His family soon followed him. In European accounts, the popular version was that Hulegu locked Mustasim in his treasury, where he starved to death in an ironic punishment to mark the Caliph’s failures to pay for troops and defences. So ended the 500 year old ‘Abbasid Caliphate. The impact on Islam is hard to understate. Since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, there had been a widely recognized successor to him in the form of the Caliphs -Rashidun, Umayyad and ‘Abbasid. Most Muslims saw him as the spiritual, if not the actual political, head of Islam. For the Caliphate, seemingly inviolable and permanent, to come to such a violent and sudden end sent shockwaves throughout the Islamic world. Caliphates had been overthrown before; previous dynasties like the Buyids and Seljuqs had held the Caliphs as puppets and militarily defeated them, while the Nizari Assassins had claimed the lives of at least two; but never before had the Caliphate actually been erased from existence by a power claiming universal sovereignty in its place. Distant relations of al-Mustasim were eventually set up in Mamluk Cairo as new Caliphs, but were never widely recognized. The Ottoman Sultans would also claim the title of Caliph in time, but none have ever been able to step into the position held by the ‘Abbasids. It’s no surprise that many Muslims throughout the following centuries have referred to the sack of Baghdad as a scar of the psyche of the ummah, one which it has not recovered from today. With the fall of Baghdad, Hulegu could now cast his eyes onto Syria, down the Levantine coast to the newly established Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. The sense was real that Hulegu was about to bring the whole of Islam under the authority of the house of Chinggis. Our next episode takes us to the Mongol drive to the Meditteranean- and the famous clash of ‘Ayn Jalut, an episode you won’t want to miss. Be sure to subscribe to our podcast, and to help up continue bringing you great content, consider supporting us on Patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one.
In this episode we will see the rise of Abbasid's, the establishment of emirate in Spain by Umayyads, the death of Imam Ismail, Imam Jafar As Sadiq, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik Ibn Anas, Imam Musa Al Kazim, Rabia al Basri, Imam Shafii and we will see the rise of fatimid branch- the only shia branch to rule muslim world and Baghdad becoming the Cradle of civilization and the Rise of Idrisids in North Africa, Establishing Moroccan State and the disintegration of Abbasid Dynasty. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/support
In this episode we will learn about the Marwanid branch of Umayyad Caliphs and how we captured Spain and Indian Subcontinent. We will learn about the rise of Abbasid revolt also --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/history-of-islam/support
This week, Rachel discusses the creation of Islam and its empires such as the Umayyads and Abbasids as well as a cool new job for all the teenagers that have ever been called odd. On this week's myth moment, Rachel continues to mispronounce everything while we talk about some special rain that allows you to regrow your pelvis.Leave a review on Spotify, Apple Podcast, or wherever you listen to podcasts to help spread the word! You can also leave a voice message that can be used to give a shoutout to someone, ask a question, or help by fixing pronunciation or a fact and all will be mentioned next week during the break. What myth do you want to be covered next week?We have a website! https://sites.google.com/pobschools.org/historyheardhere/homeWe also have a Pinterest! Just search for History Heard Here.Leave a Voice Message! - https://anchor.fm/HistoryHeardHere/messageGoogle Podcasts - https://www.google.com/podcasts?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3IuZm0vcy8xYzM3MWE3NC9wb2RjYXN0L3Jzcw==Apple Podcasts - https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/history-heard-here/id1507393073Spotify - https://open.spotify.com/show/2IanAM50kGMjDzLCsKvaJfAnchor - https://anchor.fm/HistoryHeardHerePocket Casts - https://pca.st/39rdqawqBreaker - https://www.breaker.audio/history-heard-hereRadioPublic -https://radiopublic.com/history-heard-here-69PvY3Overcast - https://overcast.fm/itunes1507393073/history-heard-here--- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app--- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/historyheardhere/message
This episode discusses some elements related to the transition from the first dynasty of the world of Islam, the Banu Umayya, to the highly influential ruling dynasty of the Banu al-Abbas, bringing Muhammad's clan of Banu Hashim back to a leadership role.
This is episode 37 called Umayyads in peril and in this episode you will learn: SHOW NOTES - The short reign of Emir al-Mundhir - The personality of Emir Abd Allah and the big picture of his reign - The qasi-Taifa states of Murcia and Seville, respectively ruled by Daysam ibn Ishaq and the Banu Hayyay clan - The story of the maritime Republic of Pechina, in Almería - The Muslim conquest of the Balearic Islands under Isam al-Hawlani - The Berber and Messianic movement that ended up in the Day of Zamora - The peak of Umar ibn Hafsun's power and the loss of initiative - Why the Umayyad dynasty of Córdoba managed to survived this turbulent period and an illustrative example of the extreme fragility of Umayyad rule - A general overview of the situation of Medieval Spain before Abd al-Rahman III's accession to the throne - An effort to imagine how the average Andalusi lived during this period
The finale of the Ramadhaan 2020 drama series, From Russia with love. Tsar Abdullah's family has been through many ordeals, and the Umayyads and the Khazar are at war. All unfolds, in this episode.
This is the second episode, which will explore what are the key factors, which effected the departure of Muhammed bin Kassim, into the subcontinent. You can support us on https://www.patreon.com/mphistoryor you can send us an email on muslimphistory@gmail.comcheck out our site www.muslimphistory.comFurther Reading The End of the Jihad State: The Reign of Hisham Ibn Abd Al-Malik and the collapse of the Umayyads by Khalid Yahya Blankinship Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/mphistory)
Difference between Sunni & Shia (Shiites) 90% of the Muslim world is Sunni and 8% is Shia in faith. Shia followers, also spelled Shiite, are commonly found in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and a few other places. The difference between Sunni and Shia arose as a result of a political division, as a result of Shia followers went their separate way. Yet while the split started as a difference of opinion in politics, some major theology differences occurred later; with Shia incorporating many unconventional, foreign concepts into their theology and faith. The Sunni and Shia division found its origins as a disagreement about the leadership of the Muslim community after the death of Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him. After his death, his companions were forced to choose the next leader, the ruler, the successor of the Muslim community, commonly known as the Caliphate. Sunnis believed that Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him did not explicitly designate his replacement, and that they needed to appoint this leader by mutual consultation. The Shia, by contrast, believed that the Prophet designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali, peace be upon him to resume the role of Caliph. Sunni Muslims deemed Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s closest companion, the most fit to lead the Muslim community. Abu Bakr hence became the first Caliph and Ali eventually became the fourth, serving in the wake of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman peace be upon them. Ali himself was well satisfied with the decision to appoint Abu Bakr as the ruler, but others were less pleased with the decision. Sunni Muslims consider themselves followers of Islam’s orthodox tradition; following the pure, uninfluenced faith taught by Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him. The word ‘Sunni’ comes from the term ‘Sunnah,’ which refers to the teachings and practice of Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him--who in turn was taught by Angel Gabriel, who learned the faith from God himself. The term ‘Shia’ linguistically translates to mean party, sect, supporters, a group of similar minded people. The term ‘Shia’ is an abbreviation for ‘Shiatu Ali,’ which signifies ‘Group or ‘supporters of Ali.’ Shia was a political faction who claimed that the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad should have led the Islamic community as the Caliphate, in place of Abu Bakr. Originally, this group of Ali’s supporters known as Shia stood against the Umayyads political party but remained purely Sunni in their theology and faith--unlike modern-day Shia. Yet with passing years arose major doctrine/theological differences. The famous 12 Imams who Shia hold in the highest regard were Sunni in Creed--not Shia. If Ali indeed was explicitly appointed by Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, as the Shia claim, then that would mean that Abu Bakr was appointed unjustly in the role of a caliph—also meaning that he disobeyed and went against the wishes of the Prophet, despite his role as his closest associate and dearest friend. Additionally, this move would imply that the companions who accepted Abu Bakr as the Caliphate went against the Prophet, peace be upon him, despite earning a high rank and God’s praise in the Holy Quran. Many of the beliefs of Shiism claim no basis in the religion of Islam. Shi’ism evolved from its role as a political sect supporting and favoring the leadership of Ali and his descendants--whom they label as Imams--over more qualified companions, to a holder of strange ideas foreign to Islam.
Friday prayer with Imam Asi 10-18-2019 Sunnis against Umayyads need Shi'is against Safawis
This episode looks at how the Umayyads forged Muslim Spain into a great emirate, separate from the Caliphate in Baghdad, and which would be the cultural rival to the great Abbasid Empire. Their capital, Cordoba, was the largest city in Europe, surpassing Constantinople, and a center for transmission of knowledge into Europe. It was a time when the greatest world powers were rival Muslim states.
This evening on FNL, Zaffar Iqbal takes the hotseat to discuss Islamophobia within the Tory Pary, the Furious Muslim parents that withdrew children from school claiming their children are being brainwashed about gay rights in equality lessons, Ilhan Omar accused of Anti Semistism after tweets about israel (First female muslim and hijabi elected as a member of House of Representatives) and the history of the Umayyads.
After the Muslims exploded onto the scene in the 7th century, they learned that anyone can take a empire, but holding an empire is another matter entirely. We go to Syria, where Damascus served as the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyads were the family who eventually took control following the turmoil of finding successors to Muhammad. Ali A Olomi, historian and host of Head on History, rejoins us to take us into the next phase of Muslim history, in which the rich and connected Banu Umayya demonstrate the durability of hegemony: after every revolution, the elite and connected always come back in the end. The Umayyads may get a bad rap in places, but they left an enduring empire in their wake, best shown in the remarkable mosque in their capital. While we discuss the splendor and tragedy of Damascus, try some tabbouleh, my all-time favorite salad. Sources: Armstrong, Karen. Islam: a Short History. Donner, Fred McGraw. Muhammad and the Believers: at the Origin of Islam Ingraham, Christopher. “How rising inequality hurts everyone, even the rich” in Washington Post Keenan, Brigid. Damascus: Hidden Treasures of the Old City Kennedy, Hugh. Caliphate: the History of an Idea Bradt guide to Syria Footprint Syria handbook Photograph by wikipedia user Aladdin
Tackling the foundations, some social characteristics, and the very basics of the Umayyads and Abbasids. Be sure to check out my recommendation in this episode for lots more info about Islam! The podcast is now available on iTunes AND Stitcher! Links below. iTunes: https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/world-history-class-with-mr-lutz/id1418821133?mt=2 Stitcher: https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/mike-lutz/world-history-class-with-mr-lutz The primary document I sourced in “The Explainer” Recommendation: Subscribe to … Continue reading "Episode 8 – The Rise and Spread of Islam"
Oppression (in Arabic) comes from the word (ظلم). Dhulm means to put something where it does not belong. So, sin (because it places a person’s nature where it should not be, sinful) is a form of oppression; as is associating partners with God (since the norm is to worship God alone). However, in this article I will address injustice and oppression amongst people: a person transgressing the rights of others through environmental injustice by torture, injury or death, economic injustice by force, plunder or theft or personal injustice by shaming, intimidating or false accusations. لَا تَظْلِمُونَ وَلَا تُظْلَمُونَ (279) رَبَّنَا أَخْرِجْنَا مِنْ هَذِهِ الْقَرْيَةِ الظَّالِمِ أَهْلُهَا وَاجْعَل لَنَا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ وَلِيًّا وَاجْعَل لَنَا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ نَصِيرًا (75) } عَطْفٌ عَلَى اسْمِ اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، أَيْ وَفِي سَبِيلِ الْمُسْتَضْعَفِينَ، فَإِنَّ خَلَاصَ الْمُسْتَضْعَفِينَ مِنْ سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ. (وَلِيًّا) أَيْ مَنْ يَسْتَنْقِذُنَا (وَاجْعَلْ لَنا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ نَصِيراً) أَيْ ينصرنا عليهم وَاجِبٌ عَلَى النَّاسِ أَنْ يَفْدُوا الْأُسَارَى بِجَمِيعِ أَمْوَالِهِمْ While the harm injustice and oppression cause is apparent to most people, where they differ is the degree win which they oppose it. Consider the pagan Qur’eish: consistently rocked by large numbers of claimants to power, and those claimants continued jockeying for authority, they were left with no central authority to settle their disputes. As a response, they allied (حلف الفضول) in the home of ‘Abdullah bin Jad’an to collectively repel injustice and intervene to protect the oppressed. The Prophet (sa) witnessed that alliance as a young man. After he became a prophet and settled in Medina, he said, لَقَدْ حَضَرْتُ فِي دَارِ ابْنِ جُدْعَانَ حِلْفًا لَوْ دُعِيتُ إِلَيْهِ الْآنَ لَأَجَبْتُ “I witnessed in the home of ‘Abdullah bin Jad’an alliance. If I were called to join something similar to in Islam, I would accept.” Ibn al-Athir mentions that they named it the alliance of virtues, honoring an ancient association of the same name, which took place at a time when the Meccans stood united for justice and the defense of the marginalized. Imam Fayruzabadi wrote that they gave it that name because each of its participants swore that they would not allow another person to use his status (fall) to oppress another person. Once Islam arrived, it made opposition to oppression as one of its aims. The Prophet (sa) further emphasized that when he said, “Fear committing oppression because oppression will bring oppression In the Hereafter.” The ancient Arabs used to say, “Help you, brother, if he is oppressed.” The Prophet (sa) added, “Help you, brother, if he is oppressed or an oppressor.” He (sa) was asked, “We can help an oppressed person, but how do we help an oppressor?” The Prophet (sa) clarified that saying, “Stop him from his oppression, even if you have to take him by his hand. That is how you help him.” The early Caliphs of Islam would confront oppression and injustice head-on. However, during the reign of the first four Caliphs injustice was handled largely by reminding people of their responsibility to God. But, as the Muslim empire grew, the number of Muslims swelled, and life became more complicated. Thus, during the reign of Abd al-Malik bin Marwan, he chose a day to listen to the concerns of the oppressed. If their concerns were problematic or required a judgment, he sent them to al-Qadi Abu Idris al-Awaydai. During the reign of ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Aziz after Sulayman bin ‘Abd al-Malik was buried, Caliph ‘Umar sat and had a caller inform the people that anyone mistreated by Sulayman should make their claim. By the time he was done, everything acquired by Sulayman and his family (The Umayyads) unjustly was returned. Such that a friend said to ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Aziz, “Do you not fear the wrath of those you’ve punished?” He responded, “Each day that I fear their wrath instead of the wrath of the Hereafter, Then the Abbasi Caliph came to power, and it continued that tradition with al-Mahdi, then al-Hadi, then Rashid, the al-Mamun until the reign of al-Muhtadi in the year two hundred and fifty-five after the Migration of the Prophet (sa). It did not stop them, but because of volume, the state delegated the responsibility to judges who appointed case workers who could look into the claims each day. Eventually, these cases were taken to the high court where they were settled. أن الأمير نوح بن (أسد) أحد الولاة على ما وراء النهر ،لما فرض الخراج على أهل سمرقند ،بعث بريدا اليهم بذلك ، فأحضر أمير سمرقند الأئمة والمشايخ وأعيان البلد وقرأ عليهم الكتاب ،فقال الفقيه أبو منصور الماتريدي: قد أديت رسالة الأمير فاردد إليه الجواب وقل له: زدنا ظلما حتى نزيد في دعاء الليل ،ثم تفرقوا، فلم تذهب إلا أيام حتى وجدوه قتيلا ، وفي بطنه زجَّ رمح مكتوب عليه : بغى وللبفي سهــــامٌ تنتـــــظر......أتته من أيدي المنـايا والقــدَرَ سهام أيدي القانتات في السحر......يرمين عن قوس لها الليل وتَرَ There are numerous examples of leaders who opposed injustice in Islamic history. I would like to mention one noteworthy example here. Once a man came to the court of al-Mansur ibn abi ‘Amir, claiming that one of al-Mansur’s servants had wronged him. He expressed that he had the man subpoenaed by the court, but he refused to come. Al-Mansur turned to his servant, ordering him to go and stand with the man making the claims. There, in front of al-Mansur, the case was heard. After it was over, the Caliph ordered the servant taken away to “The person in charged of the oppressed,” sentenced and removed from his post. That was in Spain, al-Andalus. What is remarkable is that there was a person, “In charge of the affairs of the oppressed.” During the Caliphate of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir, the Caliph was looking to purchase some property. He approached al-Qadi Mundhir bin Sa’id al-Buluti, offering to purchase an orphanage attached to al-Buluti’s home. The Qadi noted that the house was in excellent condition and that the Orphans were financially well off (Implying that the price would not be low): “If you offer them a price that will make them happy, I will command the person in charge of their trust to sell it to you.” The Caliph balked, refusing to offer even fair price. Al-Buluti, fearing that the Caliph would try to usurp the property, had it demolished, selling what was left over for an excellent amount: enough to suffice the orphans. When the Caliph inquired why, al-Buluti read the verse, “Regarding the boat, it belonged to a group of poor sailors, so I decided to damage it because there was a king chasing them who had taken previous boats for plunder.” Qur’an 18-79 Sheikh Hamuda al-Rikli was a scholar from Tunis. During hit time, the government of Tunis was kind to scholars, keeping them close to power, showing them with patronage and doing what every it could to keep them happy. One night, he was sitting the president of Tunis who said, “The kings before us killed scholars, but we honor them and bring them close to power.” Sheikh Hamuda responded, “This reality is clear: The kings of old committed atrocities, the scholars repudiated them, so they killed those scholars. We are quiet because of your patronage so why would you kill us?” The leader became upset, returned to his quarters and ordered all the scholars to return to their homes to save Sheikh Hamuda. As they left, they were certain that Sheikh Hamuda would be punished. After a little while, the leader came out, thanked the sheik for his honesty and gifted him a private car. Abu Bakr TarTusha advised the leader of the Andalusian army, “Fix the barrier by helping the oppressed.” And Salim bin “Abdullah sent a letter to ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Aziz saying, “If you can, come off the last day without any oppressed person making a claim against you.”
In this episode we discuss the formation of Shia orthodoxy. Picking up from our earlier episode on early Shi’ism we explore how the experience of persecution under the Umayyads and Abbasid shaped Shia thought and doctrine. We discuss the Muhammad al Baqir and Jaffar as Sadiq and their contributions to the theological principles of Shi’ism....
In this episode we talk about the end of the Umayyads with the Abbasid revolt, focusing not only on the major battles, but why the Abbasids were successful in overthrowing the Umayyad Caliphate. We discuss how the caliphate changes over time and how the historical circumstances of the Abbasids, geography, and technology shape the new...
This episode covers the schism betweeen Sunnism and Shi’ism, detailing how historical circumstances and experiences are overlaid with theological significance. Focusing on the experience of the Muslim community during the early fitnas we discuss how political movements about legitimacy and authority shape what later becomes theological stances. This episode details tribulations after the death of...
Jacob Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari discuss some recent anomalies in the Middle East and consider the relationship between sectarianism and nationalism in the Muslim world. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hi everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I'm sorry that we missed last week but we're back this week and I am joined once again by Kamran Bokhari, who is one of our senior analysts. Nice to have you back Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: It's good to be back Jacob. JLS: And we're going to pick up a little bit where we left off last week, or not last week, two weeks ago. Two weeks ago, we were talking about the situation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and we thought we'd just have a more general conversation this week about the Middle East, Islam, maybe some nationalism to throw in there. And but Kamran before we get started, we just noticed a report before we were recording that the al-Nuri mosque in Mosul, Iraq apparently has been destroyed in some kind of explosion. This mosque is important because it's where the ISIS founder and leader al-Baghdadi actually declared the caliphate years ago. You were telling me that it kind of struck you as weird. Why was it weird to you, what's going on do you think with this report? KB: We've seen ISIS and other jihadist groups attack mosques of Muslims that they don't deem to be “true Muslims” or from their point of view deviant Muslims. But this is anomalous in that ISIS would actually blow up a mosque that it has been using and it's been sort of a place from where they declared their caliphate and something that they've used. Now, it could be that there may be things or something that's in that mosque that they didn't want coalition forces to get their hands on, so they decided to go ahead and destroy the facility. But it's still very odd that they would take a risk like that because they are already on the defensive and why would they do something that could potentially cause them great backlash. JLS: Yeah, I think one of the things I was thinking about though was according to the reports Iraqi security forces were approaching the mosque and they blew it up as sort of a way to defend themselves and not let the mosque fall into enemy hands, necessarily. But I think this is an example of how ISIS has a very pragmatic ideology. We think of them as religious fanatics, and they are religious fanatics, but they also deal with things pragmatically, especially the defense of the territories and places that they defend and it's something that just popped into my head. It's also strange that fundamentalist groups like this also always seem to have an aversion to anything resembling idolatry. ISIS was famous for blowing up a lot of these antiquities in Palmyra and other places that they've been or taking the antiquities and selling them on the black market. They don't really care about big beautiful structures or things like that. I think in some ways they think of structures as something that the Saudis are building. You think about the Saudis and all the stuff they are building around the Kaaba in Mecca, that sort of comes to mind. And ISIS has always been more spartan, has always been not attached to I don't know larger images or beautiful mosques, that's not really what it's about. So yeah, don't you think it could just be a symbol of their pragmatism in general? KB: I think you are onto something here that's important. I think that what you said in the beginning is that we tend to look at these groups as very rigid in their interpretation of religious text and whatnot, which is true on one level. But on another level, they display a great deal of, for lack of a better term, pragmatism or they make things up as they go and they change interpretations and they adopt interpretations that normally would not be the case. And I think that given the way that ISIS has evolved and grown, one of the key things in their toolkit has been that you don't stick with necessarily the old formulations or understandings of religious texts. As far as buildings are concerned, I think they look at it from a utilitarian point of view. And then of course, this is war, and I think that in war they tend to be a bit more casual about things and because what is at stake is being able to protect themselves as an institution and so buildings may not necessarily be of importance. And again, we're speculating because just not a whole lot of information as to how ISIS blew this up – was it booby-trapped, were there fighters holed up there and they blew themselves up because they didn't want to get caught or wanted to achieve “martyrdom” and especially given it being Ramadan or the tail end of Ramadan. And so there are just too many unanswered questions. JLS: Well another report I wanted to ask you about Kamran, and I haven't raised this with you before but we'll see what you think about it, is that I hadn't realized this but I read a report today that there are actually a number of polio cases in Deir el-Zour in particular but also in Raqqa and other places that the Islamic State and even in other places that the Islamic State is not controlling in Syria and in Iraq right now. And for some reason that really struck me on sort of a symbolic level. I think there maybe is not a better symbol for Western science than vaccines. And in some ways vaccines have had a little bit of a troubled history in the Muslim world, right? There were all those allegations of CIA agents posing in Pakistan as doctors who were giving polio vaccines and that ruining trust in Pakistan for doctors. And Pakistan remains one of the places where polio still exists and – in part because of that distrust. And I don't think that ISIS meant for polio to sprout back up in Syria. I'm not even saying that it's really their fault. We know that you know in a lot of these war-torn places, things like basic hygiene are some of the first things to go. We're seeing a cholera outbreak in Yemen right now, which is affecting tens if not hundreds of thousands of people. But I just wonder how you react to that. On the one hand, ISIS is really staked some of its legitimacy on behaving like a state and on providing basic services and the Assad regime has done some of that too. But at the same time, I think we're really beginning to see both in Syria and some parts of Iraq and Yemen where these wars have been going on for so long, we're beginning to really see the total breakdown of bureaucracy and some of the basics that we've come to expect of 21st century society. So, I just wonder what you think about all of those things that I just threw at you and whether it was as striking to you as it was striking to me. KB: It is striking, and what's striking to me is that wherever there's a jihadist entity that is taking control of an ungoverned space and set up shop and declared an emirate or a caliphate – I mean the parallel with Pakistan is very apt – that we see these diseases that we thought had been largely eradicated from the rest of the world like polio and cholera, they begin to emerge. And obviously it has a lot to do with the lack of governance, sanitation being very poor quality, hygiene not being maintained. A lot of it just may be because of the lack of resources. And it really speaks to the idea that somehow the caliphate was a place where people should migrate to in terms of the recruits of ISIS, people who were inspired by ISIS. One of the things that ISIS was saying to people all across the world was come join the caliphate, you know, you need to come to the land where the caliphate exists. And so that's really a blow to that idea that life is so harsh and we can only speculate as to the availability of food supply and other basic services that we have taken granted for in pretty much the rest of the world. I mean even in Pakistan, even in Syria, there are places that do not have this kind of situation. In fact, these are really small pockets of territory where you have the outbreak of such diseases. In Pakistan, we did have that whole thing about the CIA and the conspiracy theory amongst the jihadists, amongst the Pakistani Taliban and their supporters that we should not allow our children to be immunized by doctors because somehow this is a CIA plot to undermine fertility or trying to gain intelligence through the dispensation of vaccines. But at the same time, it really speaks about how really primitive society and governance becomes once jihadists take over. It speaks to the lack of facilities and the lack of resources and you know utter lack of sophistication when it comes to statecraft or just dispensing basic services – collecting garbage, dealing with cleanliness, having a place where people can be treated for you know injuries or wounds. After all, one of the major enterprises of groups like ISIS and the Taliban is warfare. You would think that they would invest in hospitals. But it seems like this is the place where they were at the very least cutting corners. JLS: Yeah, that's fair enough. Well that was a curve ball to start off with but I want to take us back to something that some of our readers have written in to ask us to talk about. And there's not a better person to ask this question than you Kamran. Tell us the difference in a short group of words about what is the difference between Sunnis and Shiites, what is the big deal, why are Sunnis and Shiites always fighting each other throughout the Middle East and where does this go from here? KB: So initially when it all started, it started right after the death of the prophet. And at the time, there was nothing called a Sunni or a Shia. These were categories that developed many, many years later – many decades later and became full-fledged sects, rival sects over centuries. But at the time, the question was, who is going to succeed the prophet because the prophet himself is reported to have said that when God sent one prophet to the children of Israel and would take him away then he would be replaced by another prophet but after me there are no more prophets. And then his companions and his followers asked, “Well, prophet who will guide us and who will lead us?” And he said there will be caliphs and there will be many, some of whom you would love and they would love you and some of whom would despise you and you would despise you in return and that was sort of the end of that story. But the unanswered question was, well ok, who succeeds the prophet? So those who became later on Sunnis decided to go with an individual by the name of Abu Bakr who was the closest friend of the prophet and an associate and he was an individual of advanced age. But those who later on became Shia, and much later on, said no, the cousin of the prophet and who also happened to be his son-in-law, Ali, is most deserving of the position because he spent so much time, he's young, he's energetic, he's demonstrated his capability as a top aide and also on the battlefield. And eventually that whole dispute over time led to a divide and there was a very early civil war issue on this as well during the time of the third caliph, I would say in the '50s. Eventually, jurisprudence that differed between the two sects didn't emerge until well after, I would say 300 years after, the prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina and established the first Islamic polity. But really the sect, as in full-fledged sects, they didn't emerge – the Shia and the Sunni – in the theological sense until well into the 16th century when the Safavid Empire in Iran adopted Shia Islam as a state religion and expected people to be or subscribe to what became Shia Islam and then Shia Islam is broken down into subsects just as the Sunni side is fragmented. JLS: How would you describe the relationship in terms of its relationship to nationalism currently right now? So there are a lot of different nation-states in the Middle East: there's Iraq, there's Jordan, there's Saudi Arabia, there's Egypt. There's a certain level of national pride for the different groups that live in these states. But then the sectarian stuff when you overlay it doesn't always line up exactly with it, right? Because in Iraq there's a majority Arab population and on the one hand because of the sectarianism, they feel closer to Iran. But there are also Arabs; they're not Persians so in that sense they feel closer to Arabs and it's just this whole mess of things so what do you think is the relationship between nationalism and sectarianism? KB: So I think what you're asking is sort of the geopolitics of sectarianism because when it becomes geopolitical, when you have major states or empires as we had back in the Medieval times when Shia/Sunni – I mean the Shia/Sunni conflict is not new. It's been raging and it has assumed different forms in different time periods so the geopolitics of sectarianism, when sectarianism becomes geopolitical, it's no longer simply a religious divide. It is, no you pray differently, you believe in different things and you have a different view of collective history and shared memory. It really becomes ethnic categories so it's almost like a form of nationalism where the Shia identity becomes very primary and the Sunni identity also becomes really highly sensitized and that happens because in the here and now, especially after the late '70s and early '80s, it's because of the rise of Islamism on both sides of the sectarian divide. You have Iran becaming the first Islamist regime in the Muslim world but it subscribes to Shia Islamism or it's an Islamism or Shia variant. At the same time, you have Islamism on the Sunni side and because of this heightened religiosity, the sectarian identity has become almost the primary identity for at least those people who are waging war against each other. So Saudi Arabia looks at Iran and says we don't like Iran because they're Persians but more so because they're Shia and they want to subvert Sunni orthodoxy. And conversely when the Iranians look at the Saudis they see an entity that is trying to undermine the Shia religious creed and mind you the Shia being the minority have mostly been on the receiving end throughout the history of Islam. So there is this sense of minority status that also kicks in and therefore the Iranian identity sort of gets subdued or exists parallel to the Shia identity. Likewise, on the Sunni side, yes we're Saudis, we're Arabs and people in Lebanon are Lebanese and Iraqis have their national identity but as these nation-states are in meltdown mode and there's growing geopolitical sectarianism, it's the sectarian identity that has become the primary thing. I mean those who are fighting the Assad regime in Syria, they're largely driven by the fact that they see an Alawite Shiite conspiracy to destroy Sunnism in Syria and they're defending Sunni Islam against what they deem as a form of deviants, the Alawite Shiite creed. Same thing in Yemen between the Houthis and their opponents. And so the nation-state is still in somewhere; people haven't completely discarded it. But at the same time, because the nation-state has become weak, this sectarian identity has taken center stage. JLS: Is it fair to say that there are less subcategories of Shiites than there are of Sunnis? Like there are more Sunnis in the Middle East than there are Shiites, but would it be fair to say that the Sunni community throughout the entire Middle East is actually much more fractured and has a number of different subsets? Whereas, because maybe there are less Shiites, that camp is more unified? Or would you say there are actually, when you actually look into the camps themselves, there's actually a lot of subdivisions and internal rivalries that maybe don't even bubble up to the surface or that aren't obvious to the casual observer of news in the Middle East? KB: You are absolutely right and you have pointed to a key characteristic of this sectarian conflict that's brewing. So on the Sunni side, you have not just multiple subsects but you have, as I mentioned earlier, the nation-state or the national identity hasn't completely gone away. And you have multiple claimants who represent Sunni Islam. Saudi Arabia has since its founding tried to position itself as not just a leader of the Sunni world or the Arab world but the Islamic world in general. And in recent times with Turkey moving away from a Kemalist version of secularism to a more religious version of secularism, a more religious society not necessarily a religious state, it also sees itself as the leader of the region, the Middle East and of course the wider Islamic world. And ISIS is doing the same thing; al-Qaida claims the leadership of the Islamic world, the Sunni world as well. There is no unified coherent Sunni camp if you will. Now in contrast and in sharp contrast, because the Shia are a minority, their divisions – so the Syrians aren't mainstream, the Syrian Alawites aren't mainstream Shia. They're a heterodox offshoot of mainstream Shia Islam but yet they're close with mainstream Shiites in Iran, in Iraq and in Lebanon. Likewise, you have the Houthis who are Zaidis, who are another form of Shia Islam, which in a way from a doctrinal way is actually not so close to mainstream Shia Islam. It shares a lot more with Sunni Islam, but nonetheless, it is a form of Shia Islam, so therefore we see this alignment with Iran and that Shia camp. And so what we're seeing is a more coherent Shia camp because the Shia are a minority and they have this collective memory that they hark back to, when they have historically been suppressed at the hands of Sunni powers. And now that Sunni Islam has fragmented along multiple lines and one of the things that has really accelerated this fragmentation is the so-called Arab Spring phenomenon or what we call at Geopolitical Futures the hollowing out of the Arab world. You've written about this yourself. And so that has exacerbated the fragmentation on the Sunni side and the Shia look at this and say this is a historic opportunity and I would go on to say that if we look at the history of sectarianism in the Muslim world, it runs on a 500-year cycle. So around 1000 when the Sunni world was fragmenting, we see the rise of Shia policies such as the Fatimid empire in North Africa extending into the Levant and the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula. You had the Buyid empire in what is Mesopotamia and Persia and as time goes on other Shiite polities emerge. But then the Ottomans come back and they reclaim the Sunni center and Sunni Islam once again begins to thrive until the rise of the Safavid empire, which poses a challenge to the Ottomans, and now 500 years later today, we are once again seeing the rise of Shia Islam because Sunni Islam or Sunni Muslim territories are at war with each other. JLS: Kamran on a practical level, is there any significant difference between a Shiite country and Sunni country? Is that going mean anything for the way that particular country acts? Or are those countries just going to act in their geopolitical interest and whatever sect that country happens to be really doesn't play that much into it? I guess to even sharpen the question, does Iran act the way it does in some cases because it is a Shiite country or is that not really something that you can see? KB: At a practical level, different states, different types of states, you know operate more or less the same. You know, you have interests that are material interests and it doesn't matter whether you are Shia or whether you are al-Qaida or ISIS or Sunni or Turkey or whatever. I think that from a practicality point of view, the sect doesn't matter. You have to pursue your imperatives and deal with your constraints like anybody else and actually you're very similar to your rivals. But sect does come into play in terms of behavior, so I'll give you an example. So Iran realizes that it represents a minority sect and a minority ethnicity. They're Persians and they're Shiites in a Middle East that's largely Arab and largely Sunni. And therefore, that creates limitations and so yes they want to expand into Iraq because the majority of Arabs are Shia there. It has developed and cultivated Hezbollah because a majority of Lebanese Muslims are Shia. It's aligned with the Shia because the Alawite regime or the Alawites have dominated the Syrian regime for a long time. It's playing into Yemen to a certain extent because of the Houthis. But it can't go into Saudi Arabia just yet because that's a stronghold of very hardcore Sunni identity and ideology and they won't find so many converts there or supporters. So the Shiite and the Sunni thing does place constraints and limitations in terms of behavior. For example, ISIS only recently, a few weeks ago, was able to stage an attack inside Iran. It's been cultivating, I am pretty sure that it took a long time for it to cultivate the assets to pull off that attack on the shrine of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Parliament. But you don't see the volume of attacks that you see even next door in a Shia majority country like Iraq and of course the list goes on and on. So I think that the sect does place constraints in how far a particular power can expand its tentacles and its influence. JLS: The follow-up question to that is I mean really this sectarian battle is focused in the Middle East mainly around the Levant, maybe extending a little bit outwards. But once you get into North Africa or once you get more to South Asia, countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh, you don't have the same type of sectarian rivalry and we see IS trying to expand outwards into these regions especially as it comes under so much pressure in the caliphate itself. Do you think that IS will have trouble finding the same type of equation that allowed it to rise in Syria and Iraq because there isn't that sectarian divide to join on or is there enough subdivision within Sunni Islam and some of these other countries that those are de facto sects already, if that question makes sense? KB: No absolutely and again this is another important point that you raise. What really made ISIS into the jihadist regime it has become, and controlling territory, having a very sophisticated military force and intelligence service and wreaking havoc all across the region and beyond even in the West, is the fact that it was able to consolidate itself in Iraq and Syria because of the sectarian divide. It exploited heavily the Shia/Sunni anxieties on both sides and created space for itself and essentially took over the leadership of first the Sunnis of Iraq because they're a minority in their country and they were disenfranchised after regime change in 2003 that toppled the Saddam regime. And then in the wake of the civil war and uprising against Assad, it tried to take over the leadership of the Sunnis who were trying to battle the Assad regime and trying to topple it. And it really gave them a boost, and exponentially, we saw the growth of ISIS. Now those things as you just mentioned do not exist in North Africa, those conditions. There aren't that many Shia beyond the Levant and beyond the Arabian Peninsula and that sort of heart of the Middle East, no matter which direction you go. You can even go into Central Asia and you won't find the same sectarian polarization, much less Southeast Asia like Indonesia and the Philippines. But I think that having said that, it may not see a major boost; it may take longer for ISIS to develop itself in a place like Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are already a saturated jihadist market if you will. Much less Bangladesh and Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines, but there is sufficient chaos in these other countries and internal divides within Sunni Islam and the question of who speaks for the religion. I was speaking to a journalist who's been doing a lot of work in Indonesia and she was telling me about how a version of Wahhabi Islam or Salafi Islam is really growing by leaps and bounds in a country like Indonesia, which was insulated from this ideology for the longest time. And I think that political conditions, the growing religiosity in Muslim societies across the world, these provide for that fertile ground or these are the conditions with which ISIS can latch onto and then begin to expand. So the scale may be different, the timeframe may be different, but I think that there are enough conditions on the ground in these various areas where there aren't any Shiites that will allow and become enablers for ISIS or other groups to expand. JLS: I want to ask you one more question Kamran before we wrap up and it might be an involved question but I think that it's an important one and it's one that I've been thinking about a lot. The sort of smaller version of this question is: Is it possible for nationalism and Islam to coexist? Are those two ideas that can actually be held at the same time in a person's mind and that they make sense or are they mutually exclusive? And if you zoom out a little bit, I would ask that question of all religions. Do you think it's possible for all religions and nationalism to really work in the same type of way or is it that nationalism is sort of at its core, I don't want to say atheistic because it's not that nationalism is going to say that there is no God, but nationalism is going to say that the nation is the most important thing. The defense of the nation, protection of the national interest is the most important all abiding thing that a state must provide for, whereas religion, if you really get down to it and if you want to be ideologically consistent, religion is not going to tolerate anything being the most important thing besides God. They might be willing to have the nation as a subset of that or a caliphate or something like that as a subset of that, but the most important thing is going to be God and if there is a disjuncture between what is interpreted as what God wants versus what is best for the nation, you know usually what God wants is going to win out or what God wants is going to be reinterpreted such that it is in the best interest of the nation. So we started with this strange report of ISIS potentially blowing up one of their own mosques and we've danced around the subject but I wonder if you could sort of speculate for a second about whether nationalism and religion just can't actually fit together or if they can? KB: Well I mean first of all, any religion emanates from a core text or texts that are considered sacred by the believers and those texts are simply texts collecting dust unless the believers operationalize them and it depends on the context, so there is text without context. And those contexts vary over time and we've seen historically – take the case of Islam. Islam has manifested itself in very, very diverse ways and this is not in the here and now, it all goes back to the very earliest centuries of Islam and you see rival groups practicing Islam in very different ways. Yes, there is a core belief that there is no God but God and Muhammad is his last messenger and there is something called a prayer and fasting and charity and pilgrimage and the list can continue depending on what your sectarian persuasion is. But at the end of the day, if we look at the period of the Umayyads, the first dynasty to rule over the Muslim lands and this dynasty took power very early on in 661 and they ruled until the mid-700s and then beyond that in the Iberian Peninsula. That was a dynasty that was built around a clan and it never really – yes it behaved in a religious way, it was motivated by religion but what was dominate was the power of the dynasty, the ruling clan. You had to be from the Umayyad clan. It was father, son and grandson and so on and so forth and it became an imperial dominion and therefore it became a nationalistic entity in some respect. This is obviously pre-nationalism as we understand in a modern world, post enlightenment. But nonetheless, it was not very religious as we understand religion. It wasn't solely religious. And you move through history. You have the various polities that existed. They were geographic and we had multiple competing caliphates. Some of them didn't even call themselves caliphates; they were sultanates. So the Ottomans never really referred to them on a day-to-day basis; the Ottoman emperors referred to them as Sultans. They called themselves the Ottoman Empire; there was an Ottoman identity and Islam was there but it wasn't really in the forefront. And you had divisions, so there is this sort of understanding that somehow the Middle East and the wider Muslim world has adopted nationalism because of the import-export of European thought and through the vehicle of colonialism and then decolonization. Well that's true, but it's not as if the Muslim world was united on the basis of religion. I mean you had multiple competing entities, all throughout history. So I think that nationalism exists in various forms. In the contemporary world, it exists; it manifests itself as the nation-state. The nation-state is the biggest sort of or the most profound expression of nationalism as we understand it. But nationalism has evolved over time so I don't think that Islam is somehow separate or cannot exist. I think that Islam is operationalized in different spatial, temporal settings and they can vary so who is to say which one is pure Islam and which one is veering towards more nationalism. I think it's a hodge-podge and a complex mixture. JLS: I agree with you, although I think just the last thought that I'll close on which came to me as you were talking was that, and you sort of talked in the beginning about how the main split between Sunni and Shiite really happens after the prophet passes away and some people want Abu Bakr to take over as caliph but then others want Ali to take over as caliph and one of the main reasons for Ali was that he was in the family of the prophet, right? So in some ways we might say that for the Shiites the blood has always been a little bit more important than it was in the Sunnis. I know the Umayyads were also – I mean they were a Sunni type of regime if we can even talk about Sunnis existing back then. But they were on that side of the split, right? They believed the chain went through Abu Bakr and that was the legitimate right of succession. But the Shiites think that there is something about being in the prophet's family that is very important, and there is this aspect of blood tied into the religion that maybe isn't there in Sunni Islam. KB: You are absolutely right. I would just sort of modify that quickly and say that for the Shia, leadership of the faith and the community and the Muslim community, the ummah is divinely ordained, so the imams, they are divinely ordained and they follow from the family of the prophet. Whereas Sunnis believe that this is a political position that comes about through political ways and in many ways it could be, some would argue it could be democratic, some could argue it comes with the power of who has the stronger military force. But ultimately, it's a political position for the Sunnis and a more religious position for the Shia. JLS: Yeah so if we were going to grossly over simplify, we might say something along the lines of Sunni Islam is more democratic whereas Shiite Islam tends to more nationalistic principles. KB: The Iranian government would beg to differ with us [laughs]. They would say that we have achieved a hybrid between religion and politics. We have elected officials, even our clerics have been popularly elected. I mean, they would make that assertion. JLS: Yes, but not the supreme leader, correct? KB: Not the supreme leader. Although they would argue that he could be removed by the Assembly of Experts, which is a body of popularly elected leaders or clerics. JLS: Well when they do that, we can talk about it. But in the meantime, Kamran thanks for joining us. It's always a pleasure. For listeners out there, thank you for listening. We're sorry we missed last week but we're back on and we are going to keep doing these once a week and maybe even increase them more. As always, if you have comments and critiques: comments@geopoliticalfutures.com or just leave comments here on Sound Cloud or whatever your medium you're listening to us through and we'll see you out there. Thanks.
The Umayyads had the practice of cursing Ali during their sermons. Many of the party of Ali did not like that. One of these men was Hujr ibn Adi, a companion and commander in Ali's army. When he heard the Umayyads cursing Ali, he would shout at them and to make them stop. But Ziyad ibn Abihi, the governor of Kufah and Basra, would not tolerate such defiance. He decided to find Hujr and make an example of him for others This episode chronicles the story of Hujr ibn Adi and one of the early incidents that led to the split between Sunnis and Shiites. After the show is over, be sure to visit the Show Notes page. The Show Notes are available at IslamicLearningMaterials.com/Hujr Here's some of what you'll find: The transcript for this episode Links to the Muslim Podcast of the Week Links to other related resources You can support the Islamic History Podcast by doing one (or more) of the following: Give a monthly pledge on Patreon Subscribe on iTunes Share with your friends and family You can do it all and more at the Show Notes page: IslamicLearningMaterials.com/Hujr
with Hugh Kennedyhosted by Taylan GüngörDownload the podcastFeed | iTunes | SoundcloudWhat is a caliphate? Who can be caliph? What is the history of the idea? How can we interpret and use it today? In this podcast we discuss with Prof Hugh Kennedy his forthcoming book The Caliphate (Pelican Books) and the long-term historical context to the idea of caliphate. Tracing the history from the choosing of the first caliph Abu Bakr in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632, the Orthodox (Rashidun) caliphs (632-661), the Umayyads (661-750), the Abbasids (750-1258) and the use of the idea of caliphate by the Ottomans down to the emergence of another Abu Bakr as “caliph” of the IS in 2014.« Click for More »
This episode highlights another round of internal strife within the early community (680-692). Umayyad rule is challenged from many corners. The grandson of Muhammad, Husayn and a number of his followers are massacred at Karbala, the Kharijites dominate central Arabia, and Abdullah Ibn al-Zubayr establishes himself as a serious alternative to the Umayyads.
If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Elizabeth Urban is a graduate student at the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago.
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