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In January 1860 the New York Times gave its blessing to a new machine: the sewing machine. These "iron needle-women", it wrote, were the only invention that could be claimed “chiefly for women's benefit”. Sewing was women's work in the nineteenth century, rich or poor, and a machine could now do it in a fraction of the time. So did it set women free?Philipp Ager and Davide Coluccia have traced the adoption of the sewing machine in Massachusetts between 1850 and 1900, using census records and digitised business directories to work out who was exposed to it, in the factory and in the home. For poorer women the machine meant work, in garment factories and in boot and shoe production; they married later, had fewer children, and many never married at all. For wealthier women, who had few acceptable jobs open to them, the hours it saved went into earlier marriage and earlier motherhood. Philipp tells Tim Phillips the story of a machine that had very different impacts in different social classes.The research behind this episode:Ager, Philipp, and Davide Coluccia. 2026. "Liberation Technology? The Impact of the Sewing Machine on Women." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 21496. CEPR Press, Paris and London. CEPR Discussion Papers are gated; CEPR members and subscribing institutions can download the paper at the link.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Philipp Ager. 2026. "Did the Sewing Machine Liberate Women?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestsPhilipp Ager is professor of economics at the University of Mannheim, a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, and an editorial board member at Explorations in Economic History. His research spans the economic history of the United States, technological change, and the long-run effects of crises and disasters; his work on the Great Fire of London of 1666 featured in an earlier episode of VoxTalks Economics.Research and sources cited in this episodeThe Song of the Shirt. Thomas Hood's poem about a destitute seamstress was first published anonymously in Punch in December 1843. Hood based it on the case of Mrs Biddell, a London widow prosecuted after pawning clothes she had been given to sew. Godey's Lady's Book. The most widely read women's magazine in the US at the time crowned the sewing machine "the queen of inventions" in 1860, having calculated that a man's shirt took 20,620 stitches and 14 hours to sew by hand, against an hour and a quarter by machine. Singer and the Sewing Machine: A Capitalist Romance. Ruth Brandon's 1977 biography of Isaac Singer (Google Books) is the source for both Singer quotations read in this episode. .How the Other Half Lives. Jacob Riis, a Danish-born police reporter in New York, published his account of tenement and sweatshop life in 1890 (free at Project Gutenberg). The shirtmaker's testimony read in this episode was given to the State Board of Arbitration during the shirtmakers' strike and reported by Riis in his chapter on the working girls of New York.The household appliance revolution. Philipp contrasts the sewing machine with the washing machines and vacuum cleaners that arrived two generations later, which economists have credited with freeing women to join the workforce; "Engines of Liberation" by Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri and Mehmet Yorukoglu, Review of Economic Studies, 2005, covers this topic. The sewing machine saved time in the same way, but in the 1860s far fewer acceptable jobs awaited the women whose time it saved.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThe economic effect of the Great Fire of London. Philipp Ager's previous visit to VoxTalks Economics, with Paul Sharp, on what contemporary records reveal about London's uneven recovery after 1666.Related reading on VoxEUGender norms and the labour market, a VoxEU column on how norms, both internalised and enforced by peers, constrain women's labour market outcomes; the modern counterpart of the stigma that kept married women in Massachusetts out of paid work.

Every day, billions of transactions settle between strangers who have no idea which bank the other uses. That lack of friction is not automatic. Nine-tenths of the money in daily circulation has been created by commercial banks, but it stays trustworthy only because central banks stand behind it, and keep the system in balance.In this week's episode Tim Phillips talks to Stephen Cecchetti (Brandeis University, CEPR) about what happens when new forms of digital money test that architecture. Cecchetti is one of the authors of the eighth Barcelona Report in The Future of Banking series, part of the Banking Initiative at IESE Business School, just published by CEPR as a free download.Will retail central bank digital currencies, tokenised deposits, and stablecoins upset the delicate balance of system that has been running for decades? Stablecoins, for example, do not create money, but they claim the status of money without the institutional guarantee that makes money trustworthy. Three jurisdictions — the US, the EU, and the UK — are each resolving the same underlying contradiction in different ways. None has fully resolved it.The research behind this episode:Niepelt, Dirk, Stephen G. Cecchetti, Hélène Rey, and Xavier Vives. 2026. Digital Money: The Future of Banking 8. London: CEPR Press. Available as a free download from CEPR.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Stephen G. Cecchetti. 2026. “The digital money supply.” VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestStephen Cecchetti is the Rosen Family Chair in International Finance at Brandeis University, a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and a Research Associate at the NBER. He was previously Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settlements, and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. His research spanning monetary policy, financial stability, and banking regulation has shaped both academic and policy debate over three decades. He blogs at moneyandbanking.com.Research cited in this episodeWalter Bagehot's lender of last resort doctrine. In Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873), Bagehot argued that a central bank under stress should lend freely against good collateral at a penalty rate. The prescription remains the intellectual foundation for how central banks manage runs and systemic crises. Cecchetti invokes it to make the point that no private substitute for a central bank backstop has ever proved durable, and that the doctrine is now, one hundred and fifty years on, being tested by instruments its author could not have imagined.Monetary uniformity, mobility, and elasticity. The three institutional conditions underpinning general acceptance of money, developed in analysis by the Bank for International Settlements and discussed extensively in the report. Uniformity means a pound is a pound regardless of which bank holds it. Mobility means claims move between users and institutions at low cost and settle with finality. Elasticity means the supply of money can expand when it is under stress. Together they explain why we accept a deposit at face value without doing any analysis of the bank that issued it; and together they identify exactly where new forms of digital money create institutional gaps.Silicon Valley Bank failure, March 2023. SVB's collapse illustrates both the lender of last resort functioning and the limits of no-bailout commitments. Cecchetti notes that SVB's liabilities were still trading at par on the Thursday before its Friday failure because the Federal Reserve stood behind them. He also notes that Circle, the issuer of USDC, held $3.3 billion of its reserves at SVB and was effectively bailed out in the resolution. The episode is one of two occasions in the past twenty years where money market fund-like instruments have been backstopped by the Federal Reserve under stress.Genius Act (United States). Principle-based stablecoin regulation expected to come into effect in the US around 2027. Under its provisions, only stablecoins issued by bank-affiliated issuers will have access to the Federal Reserve; only those will therefore have the institutional backing needed to function as money. Stablecoins issued by non-bank entities will not.Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA), European Union. The EU framework for crypto assets, which entered into force in 2024. For stablecoins, MiCA requires issuers to hold 30 to 60% of their reserves in bank deposits, with no provision for central bank backing. The stated rationale is to keep deposits within the banking system; Cecchetti notes this creates a different category of vulnerability and leaves the question of what happens under stress unresolved.Bank of England stablecoin proposal (United Kingdom). The Bank of England's approach differs from both US and EU frameworks by explicitly requiring large stablecoin issuers to hold significant reserve deposits at the Bank of England, making them in effect narrow banks with a direct central bank backstop. Cecchetti regards this as the most coherent of the three approaches in terms of institutional logic, though the same fundamental question applies: whether holding to that design under stress would be politically sustainable.Tether and the jurisdictional challenge. Tether, the largest stablecoin issuer, is registered in El Salvador having previously operated out of the British Virgin Islands. Its tokens are held by users in multiple countries, traded on exchanges in multiple jurisdictions, and backed by US Treasury securities. Cecchetti uses this to illustrate why local regulation, however well-designed, is necessary but not sufficient; effective oversight of instruments that are genuinely global requires international standards and coordination.Fractional reserve banking and the goldsmith model. The institutional structure described in the episode has roots in mid-seventeenth century England, when goldsmiths began issuing more paper receipts than they had gold in their vaults. The goldsmiths became bankers; the paper became money; the vulnerability to runs became a structural feature of private money creation that persists today. Cecchetti uses the history to make the point that while technology changes how we store and transmit information, the underlying architecture of trust in private money is as old as Newtonian physics.More VoxTalks Economics episodesMaking banking safe, Stephen Cecchetti and Kermit Schoenholtz. Our financial system is supposed to be more resilient than before the global financial crisis, but that didn't save Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank or First Republic. So what went wrong?Related reading on VoxEUNew coins on the block: Digital currencies and the financial system. The authors of the Barcelona Report warn that “Digital money will be reliable only where sound institutions and robust technology come together.”

Someone once held a patent on the swing. A piece of wood. Two ropes. The US Patent Office granted it. How often does that actually happen, and what does it cost when the system gets it wrong? Or, how often is a valid patent claim rejected?Until now, no one knew. Tim Phillips talks to Mark Schankerman of LSE and CEPR, who with co-authors William Matcham spent eight years building the tools to find out. Using natural language processing across a dataset of around one million patent applications, twenty million claims, and fifty-five million examiner decisions, they measure how similar each incoming claim is to the hundred million claims that preceded it, going back to 1976. They find that 81% of initial patent claims fall below the patentability threshold; examiners must negotiate that figure down round by round. And they do a pretty good job. But around a third of all abandoned applications contain at least one valid claim the system failed to protect. You don't see patents that aren't awarded, so those errors have, until now, been invisible.The research behind this episode:Matcham, William, and Mark Schankerman. Forthcoming. "Screening Property Rights for Innovation." Econometrica. Available as CEPR Discussion Paper DP18334 (gated). Current version dated January 2026.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Mark Schankerman. 2026. “How “well does patent screening work? VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestMark Schankerman is Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics, where his research spans innovation, intellectual property, and the economics of technology. His work has examined how patent rights shape R&D incentives, the market for technology, and the behaviour of innovative firms, with particular attention to the institutions that govern how property rights are allocated and enforced.Research cited in this episodePrior art. In patent law, prior art is any publicly available knowledge that predates a patent application. Examiners are required to search prior art and reject claims insufficiently distinct from it. The concept defines the outer boundary of what can be granted protection; the closer a claim is to prior art, the weaker the case for granting it.Type I and Type II errors in patent screening. A Type I error occurs when an examiner grants a claim that should have been rejected, typically because it is too similar to prior art. This allows the holder to charge royalties and, in the US context especially, to bring litigation. A Type II error occurs when a valid claim is refused or abandoned, depriving the applicant of protection they deserve and reducing future incentives to innovate. Schankerman argues that Type II error is systematically under-discussed in public debate: you can point to a patent that should not have been granted; you cannot point to the invention that was never protected.Structural model. The paper uses a dynamic structural model, meaning it models the actual institutional rules, incentives, and decision sequences that govern patent prosecution at the USPTO. Structural models allow researchers to run counterfactual experiments, asking what would happen if specific rules or incentives were changed, without running those experiments for real. This is the methodological basis for the paper's policy analysis.Patent distance measure. The paper's key methodological innovation is a quantitative measure of how similar a patent claim is to existing claims, constructed using natural language processing. The algorithm is trained on existing patent documents and compares the textual content of each incoming claim against all prior claims, covering roughly a hundred million filings going back to 1976. This produces a scalar distance figure that can be compared against an estimated patentability threshold.Deadweight loss. The standard economic term for the welfare cost created when prices are raised above competitive levels. In the patent context, a wrongly granted claim allows its holder to charge higher licensing fees than the market would otherwise bear, generating a cost for users without a corresponding social benefit.Request for Continued Examination (RCE). A procedural mechanism in the US patent system that allows applicants to re-open a finally rejected application in exchange for a fee. Unlike the European Patent Office or China's patent system, the USPTO places no hard limit on how many times an applicant can return. Schankerman's counterfactual analysis finds that restricting rounds to one substantially reduces screening costs and discourages strategic padding of claims.Unified Patent Court (UPC). A specialised European court that began operating in June 2023. Its remit covers the enforcement of patent rights across participating EU member states; it does not conduct patentability examinations. Schankerman argues that by reducing the cost of enforcement, the UPC raises the stakes of the upstream screening process: a wrongly granted patent becomes cheaper and easier to assert.Amazon one-click patent. Amazon received a US patent on the one-click online purchasing process. Schankerman uses the case to illustrate the core economic argument: the relevant question is not whether an invention is valuable, but whether patent protection was necessary to induce its development. If the invention would have occurred regardless, the grant creates costs without providing the intended innovation incentive.Intrinsic motivation. The tendency for individuals to pursue a task for its own sake rather than for external rewards. Schankerman's model estimates that USPTO examiners exhibit substantial intrinsic motivation and that this is the primary driver of screening quality. In counterfactual simulations, removing intrinsic motivation causes outcomes to deteriorate markedly; removing the credit-based extrinsic incentive system has a much smaller effect.Padding. Schankerman's term for the strategic behaviour in which patent applicants include claims that are broader than what is strictly novel, hoping some will survive examiner scrutiny and expand the scope of their eventual property right. The paper measures the extent of padding directly from the distance data and confirms it is widespread.More VoxTalks Economics episodesPatent pools for generic drugs, Mark Schankerman talks about how diffusion of new drugs is painfully slow in low-income countries. Do patent pools accelerate the process, and how we could still do a better job of licensing life-saving medicines?Related reading on VoxEUPatent screening, innovation, and welfare, Florian Schuett and Mark Schankerman, 6 Nov 2020. Critics of the patent system claim that patent rights are becoming an impediment to innovation, and an instrument to extract rents through patent litigation. This column develops a framework to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of the current US patent system and the welfare impact of reforms.

https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin260522.mp3 Right-click here to download this episode (“Save link as…”). Texas Tribune (5/20/26) This week on CounterSpin: You may have seen videos of college commencement speakers telling students who've spent time and money learning how to read, write and think critically that that was dumb, cuz AI is going to be doing that from now on, so just get on the train or else—wait, why are you booing? That's far from the only disconnect between students and teachers who think higher education means engagement with a range of perspectives, and right-wing politicians and their administrative acolytes saying “not so fast.” We'll hear from Karma Chávez, professor at the University of Texas at Austin, at the center of this assault on academic freedoms. https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin260522Chavez.mp3 CEPR (3/10/26) Also on the show: There is a US State Department memo that calls for “a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.” Thing is: That memo is from 1960. So while Trump is making everything old, new—and ugly and violent—again, he isn't inventing it all. We try not to do media criticism by counterfactual, but consider: What if another country were cutting off resources to the US, in an explicit effort to cause us misery, in hopes that would make us overthrow our government? We'll talk about what sounds reasonable as long as it's about Cuba with Alex Main, director of international policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin260522Main.mp3

More than one in eight people living in the EU today was born in another country. In fourteen of the bloc's largest economies, it is closer to one in six. For ten years, the same team of researchers has asked what happens to those people next: do they find work, close the gap with their native-born neighbours, and build a settled life? The tenth Migration Observatory report is about to be published, and the decade-long picture it paints is not what the political debate might lead you to expect.Tommaso Frattini of the University of Milan, one of the report's editors, joins Tim Phillips to examine what a decade of consistent, comparable data actually reveals about immigrant integration across Europe. Who are Europe's immigrants, and has that changed? Is the employment gap between migrants and natives closing, stable, or widening? And does it matter whether a migrant arrives from inside the EU or out? The politics of migration is often poisonous, but the data tells a different story.The research behind this episodeFrattini, Tommaso, and Anissa Bouchlaghem.  2026. "Immigrant Integration in Europe." Migration Observatory Annual Report, 10th edition. Collegio Carlo Alberto / LdA / CEPR Press. Free download from CEPR Press, forthcoming on 18 May.To cite this episodePhillips, Tim, and Tommaso Frattini. 2026. "Immigration and integration in Europe." VoxTalks Economics (podcast).Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestTommaso Frattini is Professor of Economics at the University of Milan and a member of the CEPR Research Policy Network on the Political Economy of Migration. His research spans labour markets, immigration economics, and the long-run integration of migrant populations in Europe. He is one of the founding editors of the Migration Observatory Annual Report series, now in its tenth year, and a co-author of the Collegio Carlo Alberto / LdA reports that underpin this episode.Research cited in this episodeEuropean Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). Eurostat, collected annually by national statistical offices and harmonised across EU member states. The EU-LFS is the primary source for the Migration Observatory's comparative analysis of employment outcomes across countries and over time. The figures cited in this episode are drawn from the 2024 edition, the most recent available at the time of publication.The employment gap. A measure of labour market integration defined as the percentage-point difference in the probability of being employed between migrants and native-born residents of the same country. A gap of zero would indicate full employment parity. The Migration Observatory computes the gap both raw and adjusted for observable characteristics such as age, education, and gender; the adjusted figure isolates the portion of the gap that cannot be explained by differences in workforce composition between the two groups.Migration Observatory Annual Report series. Published annually since 2016 by the Collegio Carlo Alberto and the LdA (Laboratorio di Economia Applicata), in partnership with CEPR. Each edition uses the EU-LFS to benchmark migrant labour market outcomes against those of natives across EU member states. The tenth edition, published in 2026, is the first to offer a consistent decade-long comparison across the full series.The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Agreed by EU member states in 2024, the Pact is the EU's most significant attempt to harmonise migration and asylum policy across member states. Frattini describes it as a step forward on harmonisation; he also notes that European policy continues to prioritise border control over integration, a balance he argues the data does not support.More VoxTalks Economics episodesImmigration and Public Goods (June 2023). Do immigrants put pressure on local schools, hospitals, and public finances? Research from the United States tests the most common fears directly. The findings have only become more relevant since the episode aired.

The standard story of American innovation features Silicon Valley, venture capital, and the heroic startup founder.When you trace the history of the internet, GPS, mass-produced penicillin, or the COVID vaccine, the starting point is not a term sheet but a government grant. How much does this matter,  and can we measure it?Tim Phillips speaks to Paolo Surico of London Business School and CEPR who, working with Andrea Gazzani, Joseba Martinez, and Filippo Natoli, has built the first systematic empirical account of how government-funded innovation has shaped US productivity since the Second World War. The headline result: government-funded patents account for roughly 2% of all patents filed in the post-war period, but explain around 20% of medium-term fluctuations in total factor productivity and GDP growth. The return on every dollar of public R&D is more than double the return on every dollar of private R&D. The key mechanism is not that government crowds out private investment; it crowds it in. For every dollar of public research, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, as talent from universities and research institutes moves into startups that commercialise what the public sector seeded. The logic is high-risk, high-reward: the government takes on the uncertainty and fixed costs that the private sector will not bear, accepting a large number of failures in order to find the breakthroughs that private capital would never have funded. The model is now under pressure: 2025 brought the largest cuts to US federal science funding in the post-war period. AI adds a further complication: for the first time, a general-purpose technology is being driven primarily by private capital, and that capital is now pulling the best scientific talent out of research institutes and universities and into industry. If that shift becomes permanent, the direction of innovation will be shaped by profitability rather than by broad productivity and living standards. The paper discussed in this episode:Gazzani, Andrea, Joseba Martinez, Filippo Natoli, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." CEPR Discussion Paper DP20788. Centre for Economic Policy Research. [gated]To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Paolo Surico. 2026. "The Public Origins of American Innovation." VoxTalks Economics (podcast/video).  Assign this as extra viewing. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestPaolo Surico is Professor of Economics at London Business School and a Research Fellow of CEPR. [verify URL before publishing] His research focuses on macroeconomics, monetary policy, and the economics of innovation and growth. He has advised central banks and governments on macroeconomic policy and is one of the leading empirical macroeconomists working on the aggregate effects of technology and public investment.Research cited in this episodeScience: The Endless Frontier (Vannevar Bush, 1945) is the report commissioned by President Roosevelt as the Second World War was ending. Bush, Roosevelt's chief scientific advisor, was asked to distil what the wartime mobilisation of research had taught, and how it could be translated into a peacetime innovation ecosystem. The report identified three pillars: government, to set the direction of innovation by funding areas of strategic importance; research institutes and universities, to push the frontier of knowledge without the constraint of commercial goals; and the private sector, to transform new knowledge into new products. The framework became the organisational blueprint for post-war American science and, Surico argues, is the institutional foundation of American technological and economic leadership. The report is in the public domain and available online.The NIH and NSF are the two federal agencies whose funded innovations show the strongest subsequent links to productivity growth in the paper's results. The NIH (National Institutes of Health) funds health and biomedical research; the NSF (National Science Foundation) funds basic research across science and engineering. Both are predominantly funders of university and research-institute work — which is, Surico argues, precisely why their output generates larger productivity gains than defence-funded innovation. The result is not that health research is inherently more productive than defence research; it is that both the NIH and NSF fund more basic, frontier-pushing work, and that basic research generates the largest spillovers regardless of the department that pays for it.Crowding in versus crowding out is the central empirical question in the public R&D literature. Crowding out would mean that government spending on research displaces private spending that would have happened anyway, leaving total innovation roughly unchanged. Crowding in means the opposite: public research creates opportunities and trains talent that then attracts additional private investment. The paper finds consistent evidence of crowding in, particularly when government funds flow to universities and research institutes. For every dollar of public R&D, roughly another dollar of private investment follows, typically as researchers from publicly funded institutions move into startups to commercialise what they developed. This is why the aggregate return on public R&D is more than double the return on private R&D, even though government-funded patents are only two percent of the total.The Solyndra and Tesla parallel is used to illustrate why anecdote-based arguments about public R&D are unreliable. Solyndra — a solar energy company that received a US government loan guarantee and then failed spectacularly — is a frequently cited example of government waste in innovation funding. Tesla received a loan guarantee in the same round of funding and became one of the most valuable companies in history. Surico's broader point is that the government's logic for innovation investment is high-risk, high-reward: it should expect and accept a large number of failures, because the gains from the successes — when they are large enough — more than compensate for the losses. Evaluating public R&D by its failures misses this; evaluating it by its headline successes also misses it. Systematic analysis across the whole portfolio is required.Philippe Aghion's Nobel Prize lecture is cited by Surico on the relationship between innovation, competition, and market structure. Aghion, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2018, developed Schumpeterian growth theory — the idea that economic growth is driven by creative destruction, with new entrants displacing incumbents through innovation. The key implication Surico draws on is that incumbents have a structural incentive not to innovate disruptively, because doing so would destroy the market position they already hold. Startups, which have no existing position to protect, are the natural vehicle for disruptive innovation. This is why the paper finds that government-funded startups generate larger macroeconomic impacts than government-funded incumbents: startups have both the mandate from public funding and the commercial incentive to take market share.DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is the US defence department's high-risk research arm, responsible for funding some of the most consequential technologies of the post-war era, including early internet infrastructure. Surico mentions a less celebrated DARPA project — an attempt to embed microchips into bags for tracking, before drone technology made the approach obsolete — as an example of a genuine failure. It illustrates the high failure rate that comes with high-risk public R&D, and the importance of evaluating the portfolio rather than individual projects.The Draghi report on European competitiveness is cited by Surico as a potential catalyst for a different model of European public investment in innovation. Europe's problem, in his analysis, is not the level of public spending but its composition: too much goes to procurement and too little to basic research and later-stage startup support. Europe has the talent, the research institutes, and the early-stage startups. What it consistently lacks is the capacity to fund the scaling-up phase, which causes European innovations and innovators to be commercialised in the United States. A reallocation of spending toward public R&D that acts as a venture catalyst for later-stage startups — analogous to what Vannevar Bush's framework did for the US after 1945 — is what Surico believes the Draghi report could enable, if acted on.

In 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China's growth model was unbalanced between supply and demand, over-reliant on investment and exports. More than 20 years later, the imbalance is smaller — but China is vastly larger. What its economy produces and exports now moves global markets. The argument about China's external surplus is no longer just a spat between Beijing and Washington.Yiping Huang, Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University, has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, examining China's structural imbalances from the inside. His argument: the same policies that powered 45 years of growth also suppressed household income and consumption. Factor market distortions, especially artificially low interest rates, kept the cost of capital down and subsidised state-owned enterprises; decentralised GDP-target competition pushed local governments toward investment and industrial expansion rather than services and household support.The result was a powerful supply side with a persistently weak domestic demand side. When you produce more than you can sell at home and you are a small economy, you export the rest. When you are the world's second largest economy, the world notices. China's consumption share of GDP rose from around 50% in 2010 to 57% in 2024, still well below the mid-seventies average of comparable economies, and two fresh crises complicate the path. The property market has been contracting since mid-2021 and it is now a drag on local government finances, household wealth, and bank balance sheets. Local government subsidies have created overcapacity in new industries such as electric vehicles and batteries. Huang's conclusion is that rebalancing is necessary and achievable, but it requires the government stepping back from direct resource allocation, the private sector and market taking on larger roles in innovation, and a significant strengthening of social protection to give households both the income and the confidence to spend.The report discussed in this series of episodes:Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org.The chapter discussed in this episode:Huang, Yiping. 2026. "Rebalancing of the Chinese economy: Challenges and policy options." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Yiping Huang. 2026. “Rebalancing the Chinese Economy”. VoxTalks Economics (podcast).Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About Paris Report 4The fourth Paris Report, The New Global Imbalances, is a joint publication of CEPR and Bruegel. It was edited by Hélène Rey (London Business School and CEPR), Beatrice Weder di Mauro (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR, and President of CEPR), and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Bruegel and CEPR). The report examines how, in a high-debt and fragmented world, excess savings, rising surpluses, and rising deficits pose a risk to stability and undermine the global trading system. It is free to download at cepr.org.About the guestYiping Huang is Dean of the National School of Development at Peking University. [verify URL before publishing] He is one of China's leading macroeconomists, with research spanning China's economic transition, financial reform, and the political economy of development. He has advised Chinese policymakers and international institutions including the IMF and the Asian Development Bank on issues of growth, financial reform, and structural change.Research cited in this episodeAsymmetric liberalization is Yiping Huang's term for the approach China took when reforming its economy from the 1980s onward. Rather than the shock therapy adopted by former Soviet economies — privatising state-owned enterprises overnight and hoping markets would fill the gap — China used a dual-track approach. It opened the economy to private firms and foreign investors while maintaining state-owned enterprises in parallel, accepting some inefficiency in exchange for stability in output, employment, and growth. To subsidise the SOEs without direct fiscal transfers, the government kept factor markets, particularly financial markets, partially distorted: deposit and lending rates were held below market-clearing levels, reducing funding costs and effectively transferring income from savers and households to producers. The result was a very strong supply side and a structurally weak domestic demand side, which Huang identifies as the root cause of China's persistent external surpluses.Involution (Chinese: 内卷, nèijuǎn) is a term in wide use in China to describe a particular form of competitive overextension: effort that intensifies without producing proportional gains in quality, efficiency, or welfare. In the economic policy context Huang uses it, involution refers to the overcapacity problem in China's newer industries, including electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. Local governments, motivated by GDP targets and decentralised competition, have subsidised capacity expansion in these sectors without requiring corresponding advances in technology or product quality. The result is high-volume, low-margin competition that can suppress prices globally while leaving firms unable to earn sustainable returns domestically. Huang distinguishes this from the property market crisis, which has a different structure and cause.New quality productive forces is the term used in China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) to describe the supply-side transformation the government is aiming for: a shift away from labour-intensive, low-value-added manufacturing toward high-technology, innovation-driven sectors. It reflects the recognition that the industries China dominated in its first decades of reform — low-cost assembly, commodity manufacturing — are no longer competitive given rising domestic wages and costs, and that the next stage of growth has to be driven by productivity and technology rather than factor accumulation.The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030) is China's current medium-term planning document. Huang identifies two key anchors: the development of new quality productive forces on the supply side, and a shift toward domestic demand — particularly private consumption — on the demand side. The plan signals a different role for government, more focused on providing social infrastructure, basic research, and protection for households, and less focused on direct resource allocation and industrial project selection. Huang describes the two anchors as a circuit: if supply-side innovation and demand-side consumption can be connected efficiently, the Chinese economy can sustain growth for much longer without relying on external demand.The Japan comparison is used by Huang to set expectations for China's consumption rebalancing. Japan's private consumption share of GDP was at its lowest in 1970 and did not reach the average of comparable advanced economies — around the mid-seventies — until around 2010: a process of roughly forty years. China's consumption share is currently around fifty-seven percent, still well below that average. Huang acknowledges the parallel but expresses hope that China can close the gap faster than Japan did; the point of the comparison is that raising household consumption is a structural, decades-long process, not a policy lever that can be pulled in a single plan cycle. It requires sustained growth in household income and improvement in the social safety net to reduce precautionary saving.China's current account surplus peaked at 9.8% of GDP in 2007, immediately before the global financial crisis. Huang notes that significant adjustment has already taken place: the average surplus between 2018 and the mid-2020s was below two percent of GDP, and the investment share of GDP fell from a peak of forty-seven percent in 2011 to forty-one percent in 2024. The surplus rose to 3.7% of GDP in 2024 partly as a result of weak domestic demand following the property market correction. Huang's argument is that the external imbalance and the internal consumption shortfall are the same problem viewed from different angles; fixing one requires fixing the other.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThis is the third episode in our series on Paris Report 4. In the first episode, Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics examines the history of global imbalances and what previous episodes can teach today's policymakers. In the second episode, Gilles Moëc, Chief Economist at AXA, explains why the US government is so keen to promote stablecoins and the risks they may pose to the financial system.For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org.

Ce lundi 20 avril, Isabelle Méjean, économiste et professeure à Sciences Po, et directrice du programme "Trade and Regional Economics" du CEPR, était l'invitée d'Annalisa Cappellini dans Le monde qui bouge - L'Interview, de l'émission Good Morning Business, présentée par Sandra Gandoin. Elles ont notamment évoqué les répercussions de la situation dans le détroit d'Ormuz sur le commerce mondial. Retrouvez l'émission du lundi au vendredi et réécoutez la en podcast.

Three times since the 1970s, global imbalances have grown large. In the 1980s, the US trade deficit ballooned under Volcker's tight money and Reagan's tax cuts and military spending. In the 2000s, a global savings glut and then a US housing credit boom pushed the deficit to 6% of GDP. Today, the imbalances are back. The US current account deficit stood at 3.9% of GDP in 2025. The policy medicine this time: tariffs.Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and CEPR has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, examining that history, how policymakers responded, and what it can tell us about the effectiveness of policy remedies in 2026. He tell Tim Phillips that blaming foreigners misdiagnoses the problem if the US saves too little and invests heavily. The gap has to be financed from abroad. Good policy for the new global imbalances would requires three actors to move together: fiscal consolidation in the US, stronger consumption in China, and more investment in Europe. All three would benefit, none are close to doing it. The longer the can is kicked, Obstfeld warns, the greater the risk that the resolution arrives the way it always has: not through policy, but through crisis.The report discussed in this series of episodes:Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org.The chapter discussed in this episode:Obstfeld, Maurice. 2026. "Global imbalances redux." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Maurice Obstfeld. 2026. “Global imballances redux”, VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About Paris Report 4The fourth Paris Report, The New Global Imbalances, is a joint publication of CEPR and Bruegel. It was edited by Hélène Rey (London Business School and CEPR), Beatrice Weder di Mauro (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR, and President of CEPR), and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Bruegel and CEPR). The report examines how, in a high-debt and fragmented world, excess savings, rising surpluses, and rising deficits pose a risk to stability and undermine the global trading system. It is free to download at cepr.org.About the guestMaurice Obstfeld is Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Research Fellow of CEPR. He served as Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2015 to 2018. His research spans international finance, exchange rate economics, and macroeconomic policy. He is a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Obama.Research cited in this episodeThe Plaza Accord (1985) was a joint agreement between the US, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan to intervene in foreign exchange markets to depreciate the US dollar. It was negotiated because a surging dollar, driven by Volcker's tight monetary policy and the Reagan fiscal expansion, had pushed the US current account deficit to then-unprecedented levels and created severe competitive pressure on US manufacturing. The accord moved the dollar, but did not resolve the underlying imbalances; those were corrected by German reunification and the Japanese asset bubble, which were not planned by anyone.The Louvre Accord (1987) was a follow-up agreement among the same countries to stabilise the dollar once it had depreciated far enough. Obstfeld uses both episodes to illustrate that exchange rate agreements address the symptom, not the cause, and tend to sidestep the hard political decisions about fiscal policy.The global savings glut hypothesis, associated with Ben Bernanke, holds that rising savings outside the US in the early 2000s, particularly from Asian economies building dollar reserves after the Asian financial crisis and from oil exporters, depressed global interest rates and drove capital into US assets. Obstfeld argues that from around 2002 onward the better explanation is US demand pulling capital in: loose Fed policy, the housing boom, subprime lending, and equity extraction from rising home values all drove US spending higher, and the current account deteriorated as the dollar fell rather than rose.The One Big Beautiful Bill Act is US tax legislation that prevents the expiration of tax cuts that had been written into law, effectively delivering a tax reduction. Obstfeld points out that by lowering national saving it pushes the current account in the opposite direction to what the administration wants, partly undoing whatever modest deficit-reducing effect the tariffs might have through their revenue.The Draghi report and the Letta report are European policy documents calling for deeper integration, more investment, improved competitiveness, and a completion of the EU's capital markets and banking unions. Obstfeld cites them as pointing in the right direction for reducing Europe's current account surplus, alongside the defence spending increases that European countries are now pursuing.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThis episode is the first of two published simultaneously to mark the launch of Paris Report 4. In the second episode, Gilles Moëc, Chief Economist at AXA, explains why the US government is so keen to promote stablecoins and the risks they may pose to the financial system in the US and Europe.For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org.

A radical macroeconomic experiment is under way at exactly the moment the US external position is showing signs of real stress.Gilles Moëc, Chief Economist at AXA, has written a chapter in the fourth Paris Report, published jointly by CEPR and Bruegel, on stablecoins: what they are, why the US government is so keen to promote them, and what risks they carry. His argument is that stablecoins are a fast-growing digital asset backed almost entirely by short-dated US government debt. When investors buy a dollar stablecoin, they are effectively buying into a US T-bill at zero interest; the platform keeps the yield. The US government likes this because it draws global savings into dollar assets at minimal cost, extending the dollar's reach and helping fund the deficit. But the regulatory framework has a three-year grace period and leaves supervision partly to the states, which compete to attract platforms. And there's the historical parallel: find out how the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 give us an insight into the attraction, and risks, of using stablecoins in this way.The report discussed in this series of episodes:Rey, Hélène, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (eds). 2026. The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Free to download at cepr.org.The chapter discussed in this episode:Moëc, Gilles. 2026. "Stablecoins and global imbalances: Attempting to preserve the US exorbitant privilege." In Rey, Weder di Mauro, and Zettelmeyer (eds), The New Global Imbalances. Paris Report 4. CEPR Press and Bruegel. Chapter 9, p. 210.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Gilles Moëc. 2026. "Stablecoins and Global Imbalances." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About Paris Report 4The fourth Paris Report, The New Global Imbalances, is a joint publication of CEPR and Bruegel. It was edited by Hélène Rey (London Business School and CEPR), Beatrice Weder di Mauro (Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR, and President of CEPR), and Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Bruegel and CEPR). The report examines how, in a high-debt and fragmented world, excess savings, rising surpluses, and rising deficits pose a risk to stability and undermine the global trading system. It is free to download at cepr.org.About the guestGilles Moëc is Chief Economist at AXA and Head of AXA Research. He previously held senior roles at in the French civil service, Banque de France, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch. His research covers macroeconomics, monetary policy, and the European economy.Research cited in this episodeStablecoins are privately issued digital tokens whose value is pegged to an existing fiat currency, typically the dollar, and backed by safe and liquid assets, typically short-dated US Treasury bills. Unlike most cryptocurrencies, they are designed to maintain a stable exchange rate with the pegged currency. Platforms issue the tokens and invest the cash received in T-bills, keeping the interest for themselves; holders receive no yield. Stablecoin platforms may have absorbed roughly twenty to twenty-five percent of net US T-bill issuance.The GENIUS Act (Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins) is the US federal legislation organising the stablecoin market. It requires platforms to hold back-to-back liquid assets as reserves and establishes common minimum standards across states. Regulatory competition across states means platforms can seek the most permissive jurisdiction. European regulation, MiCA, is more detailed and already in force but has not yet generated European platforms.Exorbitant privilege describes the advantage the US gains from issuing the world's dominant reserve currency. For decades, foreigners were content to hold low-yielding dollar assets while Americans invested in higher-returning foreign assets; the result was a positive US income balance despite a large trade deficit. In 2024, for the first time in modern records, the income balance turned negative: the US was paying more on its foreign liabilities than it was earning on its foreign assets. The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 created a system of private national banks that issued dollar banknotes backed by US government bonds. The structure is the closest historical parallel to today's stablecoin framework: private platforms issuing dollar-denominated tokens backed by government debt. The system required over-collateralisation (one hundred and ten dollars of bonds for every one hundred dollars of notes) and included a Treasury backstop. Milton Friedman, in his Monetary History of the United States, identified the key flaw: money supply became tied to the quantity of public debt rather than the needs of the economy. The system was replaced by the Federal Reserve in 1913.De-dollarisation refers to the trend in some countries toward conducting trade and holding reserves in currencies other than the dollar. Moëc notes examples such as Iranian demands for non-dollar payments for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Stablecoins work against this trend by making dollar access easier and cheaper for people in developing countries with weak or distrusted domestic financial systems; rather than buying dollars directly, they can buy a dollar-pegged token through a digital platform. More VoxTalks Economics episodesThis episode is the second of two published simultaneously to mark the launch of Paris Report 4. In the first episode, Maurice Obstfeld of the Peterson Institute for International Economics examines the history of global imbalances and what today's policymakers can learn from previous episodes. For an interview with two of the report's editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, on the problem of global imbalances, listen to The Sound of Economics, Bruegel's podcast. Available at bruegel.org.

Read the full transcript here. Could AI trigger an economic break as large as the Industrial Revolution, or even larger? What changes when labor stops being the main bottleneck in production? If intelligence becomes reproducible like software, what happens to the structure of an economy? How should we think about a world where capital captures what labor once did? Does faster growth necessarily mean better lives, or only more output? How should economists model an economy when software begins to substitute for minds? Are current production functions adequate for a world of autonomous systems and robotics? Why do small shifts in annual productivity matter so much once compounding takes over? How much of AI's impact depends on cognitive automation alone versus full physical automation? When does automation reduce labor demand, and when does it make human work more valuable? If AI does part of a job better, does that destroy the profession or increase demand for it? Under what conditions do humans remain complements rather than substitutes? Could an AI boom create a recession before it creates abundance? What happens to aggregate demand if white collar workers lose income before productivity gains diffuse widely? If the economy can produce more than ordinary people can afford, who is it really producing for? How quickly can consumption patterns shift in a world of extreme concentration of wealth? Anton is a Professor at the University of Virginia, Department of Economics and Darden School of Business as well as the Faculty Director of the Economics of Transformative AI (EconTAI) Initiative. He was named to the 2025 TIME100 AI list of the most influential people in artificial intelligence. He is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings and the Peterson Institute, a Research Associate at the NBER, a Research Fellow at the CEPR, and serves on Anthropic's Economic Advisory Council. His research analyzes how to prepare for a world of transformative AI systems. He investigates the implications of advanced AI for economic growth, labor markets, inequality, and the future of our society. Links: Anton's Website When Does Automating AI Research Produce Explosive Growth? Economic Growth under Transformative AI Staff Spencer Greenberg — Host + Director Ryan Kessler — Producer + Technical Lead WeAmplify — Transcriptionists Igor Scaldini — Marketing Consultant Music Broke for Free Josh Woodward Lee Rosevere Quiet Music for Tiny Robots wowamusic zapsplat.com Affiliates Clearer Thinking GuidedTrack Mind Ease Positly UpLift [Read more]

On 2 April 2025, the United States imposed tariffs on almost every country on earth. The next day, China responded with export controls on the entire world. In the space of one week, world trade had been weaponised as it has never been in peacetime.Richard Baldwin of IMD Business School, the founder of VoxEU and a former president of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, wrote World War Trade to make sense of the events of the last 12 months. The dramatic April salvos have settled into a trade Cold War; US tariffs and Chinese export controls are lodged in place, with neither side expecting the other to back down. And yet world trade grew in 2025; exports from every country rose except from the US, which recorded its largest trade deficit. The rest of the world is self-organising a new order. When one country joins a rules-based regional agreement, the cost of staying out rises for the next. EU-Mercosur and EU-Australia deals, stalled for years, crossed the line. An expanding CPTPP and early alignment talks between the EU and CPTPP blocs are pulling more partners in. The old system was a cathedral built and maintained largely by the US; the architect burned it down. Something else is being built in its place.The book discussed in this episode:Baldwin, Richard. 2026. World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order. Rapid Response Economics 6. CEPR Press. Free to download from CEPR Press.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Richard Baldwin. 2026. "World War Trade." VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestRichard Baldwin is Professor of International Economics at IMD Business School in Lausanne. He founded VoxEU, the Centre for Economic Policy Research's policy portal, and served as president of CEPR. His research spans trade policy, globalisation, and the political economy of trade; he is one of the architects of modern thinking on global value chains and the "second unbundling" of production. World War Trade is the sixth book in the CEPR Press Rapid Response Economics series.Research cited in this episodeTACO (Trump Always Chickens Out) began as a joke in finance markets as a description of the pattern in which the US president announces aggressive trade measures and then partially or fully reverses them when markets react or negotiations begin. Baldwin argues that financial markets eventually priced in a TACO floor; once they believed Trump would back down before a full market meltdown, they stopped reacting to his escalations as if they were terminal. The dynamic makes tariff threats simultaneously more frequent and less credible.Domino regionalism describes the self-reinforcing logic by which regional trade agreements attract new members. When one economy gains preferential access to a large market, the cost of staying outside that agreement rises for its trading partners; that pressure brings in the next country, which raises the cost for the next, and so on. Baldwin identified this mechanism in the regional trade wave of the 1990s and argues it is now operating again, accelerated by the uncertainty created by US and Chinese trade weapons. The EU-Mercosur deal unblocking was the trigger; EU-Australia followed within weeks.G-0 world is a concept developed by political scientist Ian Bremmer to describe a world in which no single country or group of countries provides consistent global leadership. Baldwin draws on this framework to explain why regional conflicts and trade disputes have become harder to contain since the US began stepping back from its hegemonic role; the trade cold war is one expression of that leadership vacuum, but so is the reduced capacity to broker deals in the Middle East or manage the Black Sea grain corridor.CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) is a rules-based regional trade agreement covering eleven countries across Asia and the Pacific, including Japan, Canada, Australia, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom. It operates without US or Chinese membership and maintains deep disciplines on intellectual property, investment, and trade in services. Baldwin identifies it, alongside the EU, as one of the two main "pools of predictability" around which the new post-war trading order is forming. The two blocs have opened alignment discussions that, if concluded, would bring a very large share of world trade under compatible rules.RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is a large but shallower regional agreement covering much of Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the ten ASEAN nations. It involves Chinese leadership and does not carry the depth of disciplines found in CPTPP. Baldwin notes that it is rules-based and that as long as China plays by those rules it could enlarge; but it has not attracted the same wave of new joiners as CPTPP and the EU framework.The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument is a European Union mechanism, adopted in 2023, allowing the EU to retaliate against third countries that use trade or economic measures to coerce member states into changing their policies. Baldwin cites it as an example of the "building bunkers" response adopted by many economies; rather than retaliating directly against US tariffs, countries are changing their domestic laws to give themselves tools to counter future coercion without breaching WTO rules.More VoxTalks Economics episodesThis is the second time Richard Baldwin has discussed the 2025 trade upheaval on VoxTalks Economics. He appeared alongside Gene Grossman of Princeton in What's Next for Trump's Tariffs, broadcast in January 2026, which covered the seismic moves of 2025 as they were unfolding. 

Eighty years after Indian independence, the economic fingerprint of British colonial rule is still visible at the district level. Two institutions in particular left scars: whether a district was governed directly by British administrators or by one of India's roughly 680 Indian princes, and what kind of land tax arrangement the British put in place. For example, by 1991, directly ruled districts had nine percentage points fewer middle schools and a 20-percentage-point lower probability of having a road than areas under indirect rule. The question was whether those gaps would eventually close.Lakshmi Iyer of the University of Notre Dame tells Tim Phillips that by 2011 infrastructure gaps had closed completely. Targeted post-independence programmes, including the Minimum Needs Program of the 1970s and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan of 2001, pushed schools, health centres, and roads towards underserved districts. The picture for land tenure is mixed. Areas that historically had landlord-based systems are still 17% behind non-landlord areas in wheat yields, and the gap in fertiliser use has widened rather than narrowed. One reason, the policy response was a universal subsidy rather than being specifically aimed at places that had fallen behind.So colonial legacies can be erased, but only by policies designed to reach the places that were left behind. When policies have equalisation built in, historical gaps disappear. When they do not, the gaps persist.The research behind this episode:Iyer, Lakshmi and Coleson Weir. 2025. "The colonial legacy in India: How persistent are the effects of historical institutions?" Journal of Development Economics 177.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim and Lakshmi Iyer. 2026. "The colonial legacy in India: How persistent are the effects of historical institutions?" VoxDev Talk (podcast).Assign this as extra listening: the citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About Lakshmi IyerLakshmi Iyer is Professor of Economics at the University of Notre Dame and a Research Fellow at CEPR. Her research focuses on political economy, governance, and the long-run effects of historical institutions in developing countries. The paper discussed in this episode extends two of her earlier papers, one co-authored with Abhijit Banerjee and one sole-authored, both of which are listed in the research cited section below. Research cited in this episodeIyer, Lakshmi. 2010. "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences." Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (4). The original paper documenting that areas brought under direct British rule had significantly lower access to schools, health centres, and roads in the post-colonial period, using Lord Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse as an instrument for the selectivity of British annexation.Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." American Economic Review 95 (4). Finds that districts where the British assigned proprietary rights in land to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investment and productivity in the post-independence period than areas where rights went to individual cultivators.Nunn, Nathan. 2007. "Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa's Past to its Current Underdevelopment." Journal of Development Economics 83 (1). Develops the theoretical case for why economies displaced into a low-production equilibrium by extraction or oppression can remain there long after the original impetus disappears.More VoxDev Talks on this topicIndia's economic development since independence: Devesh Kapur and Arvind Subramanian discuss how India's transformation across eight decades of independence has defied conventional models of development, and what it reveals about the relationship between political economy and growth.Related reading on VoxDevDrawing the line: The short- and long-term consequences of partitioning India: examines the economic and political legacy of the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, and how a boundary drawn in the final weeks of empire continues to shape outcomes on both sides.Historical legacies and African development: surveys the evidence on how pre-colonial political organisation, colonial-era institutions, and the slave trade have shaped the long-run economic geography of sub-Saharan Africa.

Every Bitcoin transaction needs to be verified on the blockchain. There is no central authority that does this, but Bitcoin's blockchain has run uninterrupted since 2009 and now carries a market capitalisation of $1.3 trillion, roughly 4% of US GDP. Its original promise was more radical: that we do not need a trusted intermediary to spend money, write contracts, or create finance. In the fifth LTI report, published today, Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni ask how much of that promise has held. Bruno talks to Tim Phillips about blockchain's potential, its flaws, and its future.  It is a Nash equilibrium: if you believe others will follow the rules, it is in your interest to follow them too. On that foundation Bitcoin's ledger has been running continuously for 16 years. Smart contracts, pioneered by Vitalik Buterin's Ethereum, extend the logic to financial agreements. Decentralised finance promised to cut out rent-seeking intermediaries. Cryptocurrencies can step in where banks are broken or currencies have collapsed; in Lebanon, when bank accounts were frozen and payments stopped, businesses switched to crypto and kept operating. But the technology's libertarian origins may need to be sacrificed: As Bruno says, without transparency there is no trust, and transparency in this market may require regulation.The research behind this episode:Amoussou-Guenou, Yackolley, Bruno Biais, and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2026. "Can Blockchain Decentralize Money, Contracts, and Finance?" LTI Report 5. CEPR and Long-Term Investors@UniTo. Freely available to download at cepr.org. To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Bruno Biais. 2025. "Can Blockchain Decentralize Money, Contracts, and Finance?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestBruno Biais is Professor of Finance at HEC Paris and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). His research spanning financial market microstructure, corporate finance, and the economics of blockchain has made him one of the leading economists working at the intersection of finance and decentralised technology. He has studied blockchain and cryptocurrency markets since their early years, and his theoretical models of consensus mechanisms and cryptocurrency valuation have shaped how economists understand the conditions under which decentralised systems can and cannot sustain themselves.Research cited in this episodeThe blockchain is a distributed ledger maintained by a network of nodes, each holding an identical copy of the record of ownership. When a transaction is submitted, all nodes verify it against the existing ledger and update their copies to reach consensus on the new state. No central authority manages this process; its stability rests entirely on the incentive structure built into the protocol.Nash equilibrium is a concept from game theory, named for the mathematician John Nash, describing a situation in which each participant's strategy is the best response to the strategies of all others; no individual has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. Biais and co-authors identify the Bitcoin protocol as a Nash equilibrium: if you believe others will follow the rules, it is in your own interest to follow them too. That self-reinforcing alignment of incentives, rather than goodwill or central enforcement, is why the blockchain has remained valid since 2009.Smart contracts are lines of code deposited on a blockchain that execute automatically when specified conditions are met: if X, then Y. Vitalik Buterin introduced them through the Ethereum platform, which offers a richer programming language than Bitcoin and allows users to hold collateral on-chain to guarantee the contract will pay out. Smart contracts underpin automated market makers, decentralised lending, and a wide range of financial applications that require no counterparty or intermediary to enforce the agreement.Oracles are third-party services that transmit data about real-world events to a blockchain, allowing smart contracts to respond to things that happen off-chain. A contract that pays out when a house burns, for example, requires an oracle to report that event to the network. Oracles introduce a point of fragility: the authenticity and accuracy of off-chain information must be established before the network accepts it, and that verification is more vulnerable to error and manipulation than the on-chain consensus mechanism itself.Front-running and miner extractable value (MEV) describe the practice by which technically sophisticated actors exploit the public visibility of pending transactions to extract profits at the expense of ordinary users. Because transactions on public blockchains are broadcast to all nodes before they are confirmed, an actor who sees a large pending purchase can execute the same trade first, drive the price up, and then sell at a profit once the original transaction goes through. The cost falls on the smaller trader. Biais notes that the barriers to entry and economies of scale in this activity have concentrated power in the hands of a small, technically skilled group, recreating the kind of intermediary rents that decentralised finance was designed to eliminate.Automated market makers are smart contracts that provide continuous liquidity for trading between two assets by holding reserves of both in a pool and setting prices according to the ratio of the reserves. A large purchase of one asset depletes that side of the pool and raises its price; a large sale depresses it. Automated market makers have become a central mechanism of decentralised finance, replacing the order-book systems used in traditional exchanges.Stablecoins are cryptocurrency tokens designed to maintain a fixed value relative to a conventional currency, typically the US dollar. They are issued by private entities that hold reserves intended to back the peg. Tether, the largest stablecoin by market capitalisation, holds its reserves in a mix of Treasury bills, Bitcoin, and precious metals; in 2021, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission fined Tether for misrepresenting those reserves and required it to disclose their composition, making this information publicly available for the first time. Dai is an algorithmically managed stablecoin that maintains its peg through over-collateralisation in cryptocurrency rather than conventional reserves.The Diamond-Dybvig model is a theoretical framework developed by Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig explaining why financial intermediaries that hold illiquid assets while issuing liquid claims are inherently vulnerable to runs. When enough depositors demand withdrawal simultaneously, the institution is forced to sell assets at a loss, making further withdrawals impossible and confirming the fears that triggered the run. Biais applies this logic to stablecoins: if enough holders attempt to redeem simultaneously, the issuer must sell its reserves in volume, driving down their price and potentially breaking the peg.Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are digital tokens issued and managed by central banks, distinct from both commercial bank deposits and private stablecoins. Biais distinguishes two potential use cases: retail CBDCs, which would allow individuals to hold central bank money directly, and wholesale CBDCs, which would facilitate settlement between large financial institutions. He regards the wholesale application as the more promising; a wholesale CBDC could enable fast, low-cost atomic settlement of cross-currency transactions between banks under central bank oversight, a significant improvement on current interbank settlement systems.MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation) is the European Union's regulatory framework for crypto-asset service providers, which came fully into force in December 2024. It requires licensing for issuers and service providers operating within the EU and imposes disclosure, reserve, and conduct requirements intended to align the sector more closely with the standards applied in traditional financial markets.Hayek's currency competition refers to the argument by Friedrich Hayek that competition between privately issued currencies would discipline monetary policy: users would switch away from currencies managed irresponsibly, and that threat would encourage better central bank behaviour. Biais applies this argument to cryptocurrencies and stablecoins in countries where the domestic currency has been mismanaged. He cites Nigeria, where sharp depreciation of the naira was accompanied by rising crypto adoption; over the following period, Nigeria's central bank raised interest rates and created a more transparent foreign exchange market. Biais suggests, tentatively, that the competitive pressure from crypto alternatives may have contributed to that improvement.More VoxTalks EconomicsDo stablecoins threaten financial stability? Stablecoins are digital tokens, pegged to a fiat currency. What could possibly go wrong? For one type of stablecoin the answer is: plenty, according to Richard Portes. In coin we trust Crypto investors make a lot of noise, but who are they, and do they behave differently to other retail investors?Do cryptocurrencies matter? Can cryptocurrencies be useful? Not just for crypto bro speculators, but as a shield against the depreciation of the official currency if a government is determined to pursue inflationary policies.

At least 17 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are on board with Trump's new military alliance. They are calling it the America's Counter Cartel Coalition. Latin America's top right-wing leaders are involved, including El Salvador's Nayib Bukele and Argentina's Javier Milei. They met in Florida for the event on March 7th.The United States has promised to use lethal force to destroy cartels and narco-traffickers in those nations. Kristi Noem, the former head of Homeland Security, is the new special envoy for the coalition.This is a new phase of Trump's plan for Latin America. Trump's Donroe Doctrine — Monroe 2.0. The first was the offensive against his enemies in the region. Now, Trump is shoring up his allies and building a coalition where the US military can continue to take action in collaboration with countries allied with Trump. We've already begun to see this unfold in Ecuador. This is Episode 8 of Under the Shadow, Season 2.Under the Shadow is an investigative narrative podcast series that walks back in time, telling the story of the past by visiting momentous places in the present. Season 2 responds in real time to the Trump administration's onslaught on Latin America.Follow Under the Shadow on Spotify and Apple PodcastsHosted by Latin America-based journalist Michael Fox.Many thanks to Belly of the Beast for the interview with Liz Oliva Fernandez and the use of the sound from several of their videos.This podcast is produced in partnership between The Real News Network and NACLA.Theme music by Michael Fox's band, Monte Perdido. Monte Perdido's 2024 album Ofrenda is available on Spotify, Deezer, Apple Music, YouTube or wherever you listen to music.Other music from Blue Dot Sessions.Guests:Alexander Main from the Center for Economic and Policy ResearchAlexis Ponce Script editing by Heather Gies. Hosted, written, produced, mixed and edited by Michael Fox.Resources: You can read Alex's excellent analysis of the Shield of the Americas summit, here.Please also check out CEPR's Americas Live Update Blog, with all of the latest from the region.You can check out the first season of Under the Shadow by clicking hereThe Beginning: Monroe and migration | Under the Shadow, Episode 1Panama. US Invasion. | Under the Shadow, Episode 13The legacy of Monroe | Under the Shadow, Bonus Episode 4 Please consider supporting this podcast and Michael Fox's reporting on his Patreon account: patreon.com/mfox. There you can also see exclusive pictures, video, and interviews.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-real-news-podcast--2952221/support.Help us continue producing radically independent news and in-depth analysis by following us and becoming a monthly sustainer.Follow us on:Bluesky: @therealnews.comFacebook: The Real News NetworkTwitter: @TheRealNewsYouTube: @therealnewsInstagram: @therealnewsnetworkBecome a member and join the Supporters Club for The Real News Podcast today!

Could AI transform our economies to produce explosive growth? Most economists are sceptical at best. Anton Korinek of the University of Virginia, leader of the CEPR research policy network on AI, thinks the threshold is closer than those models suggest.In his latest work, Korinek, Tom Davidson, Basil Halperin, and Thomas Houlden, have built a growth model that captures what happens when AI starts automating AI research itself. Automation does two things simultaneously: it accelerates research, and it offsets the diminishing returns that have historically stopped self-improving processes from compounding. Three reinforcing feedback loops: software quality, hardware quality, and general technological progress, each amplify the others. Korinek's findings are more optimistic than even the AI labs' own roadmaps, which focus on software capability alone. The research behind this episode:Davidson, Tom, Basil Halperin, Thomas Houlden, and Anton Korinek. 2026. "When Does Automating AI Research Produce Explosive Growth? Feedback Loops in Innovation Networks." Working paper, January 2026.To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim, and Anton Korinek. 2026. "When Does Automating AI Research Produce Explosive Growth?" VoxTalks Economics (podcast). Assign this as extra listening. The citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestsAnton Korinek is a professor of economics at the University of Virginia. He leads the CEPR Research Policy Network on AI, which is building a community of researchers to understand and anticipate the economic impact of artificial intelligence. He is a member of Anthropic's Economic Advisory Council and was named by Time magazine among the hundred most influential people in AI. His research spanning the economics of transformative AI, growth theory, and the implications of advanced automation for labor markets and inequality has made him one of the most widely cited economists working on these questions. He is also the founder of the Economics of Transformative AI initiative at the University of Virginia, which focuses on the long-run economic consequences of AI systems that approach or exceed human-level capabilities.Visit the CEPR Research Policy Network on AI.Research cited in this episodeDaron Acemoglu's estimate of AI's growth impact. Acemoglu calculated that AI would raise annual growth by approximately 0.07 percentage points, arriving at this figure by multiplying the share of jobs likely to be affected by AI, the fraction of tasks within those jobs that AI could perform, and the productivity gain per task. Korinek argues the estimate was a reasonable description of the AI that existed in 2024 but did not account for the trajectory of capabilities since, nor for the feedback loops between AI progress and further AI development that his own paper models.Recursive self-improvement. The idea that an AI system, once capable enough, could design improved versions of itself, triggering an accelerating cycle of capability gains. The concept was first articulated by John von Neumann in the 1950s and has since become central to debates about transformative AI. All major AI labs, Korinek notes, are working towards some version of this vision; the economic question is whether the resulting growth would be explosive or would be damped by diminishing returns.Semi-endogenous growth models. A class of economic growth models in which long-run growth depends on the scale of the research workforce and the returns to research effort. The canonical insight, associated most closely with Nicholas Bloom and co-authors, is that "ideas get harder to find"; maintaining a given rate of progress requires ever-increasing research investment. Korinek and co-authors use and extend this framework, showing that automation can counteract diminishing returns by replacing human labor with capital in the research process, creating a new feedback loop that was absent from earlier models.Kaldor's balanced growth facts. Nicholas Kaldor's observation, made in the mid-twentieth century, that the major macroeconomic aggregates, including the capital-output ratio, the labor share of income, and the rate of return to capital, remain roughly stable over long periods. Growth economists built their models, including the Solow and Ramsey models, to fit these regularities. Korinek notes that those models were appropriate precisely because they matched the historical data; the question his paper raises is whether the data of the next few decades will look different enough to require a different class of models.Moore's Law. The empirical regularity, observed in computing hardware since the 1960s, that the number of transistors on a chip approximately doubles every two years. Korinek uses chip progress as a calibration benchmark: maintaining that rate of doubling has historically required roughly an eight percent annual increase in the scientific workforce working on chips. This figure allows the model to be parameterised with a real-world measurement of how much additional research input is needed to sustain a given rate of technological progress.Consumer surplus from digital technologies. Korinek raises the problem that GDP statistics are designed to measure market transactions and therefore do not capture the value people derive from digital goods and services beyond what they pay for them. He references research from the Stanford Digital Economy Lab as an example of work attempting to quantify this surplus. The implication for the paper's argument is that explosive AI-driven growth could be underestimated even in the statistics used to monitor it.More VoxTalks Economics episodes"Our Workless Future", an earlier conversation with Anton Korinek from September 2022, in which he set out the case for taking AI's impact on labor markets seriously.Related reading on VoxEUFirms predict an AI productivity boom is coming, a survey of over 5,000 CFOs, CEOs, and executives shows that around 70% of firms actively use AI, particularly younger, more productive firms. They forecast AI will boost productivity by 1.4%, increase output by 0.8%, and cut employment by 0.7% over the next three years.How AI is affecting productivity and jobs in Europe, firm-level evidence on AI's effects in Europe. The authors find that AI adoption increases labour productivity levels by 4% on average in the EU, with no evidence of reduced employment in the short run.From AI investment to GDP growth: An ecosystem view, how the current AI wave is contributing to US GDP, both directly through investment and indirectly through ongoing service flows. 

Ukraine will emerge from this war with enormous debt. The conventional wisdom treats that as an obstacle: investors weigh it before committing capital, and the burden slows the recovery before it starts. Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Maurice Obstfeld of UC Berkeley argue the opposite. A thorough restructuring of Ukraine's war debts – including, for sufficiently large obligations, outright forgiveness – is not just politically defensible but economically essential for attracting private investment. The bill for rebuilding and growing Ukraine, Gorodnichenko estimates, is $40 billion a year: $20 billion to replace destroyed capital, $10 billion to stop Ukraine falling behind its Eastern European peers, and $10 billion to start closing the gap. Put that figure next to what Poland absorbed in FDI during its post-communist transition, or the €200 billion of Russian state assets currently immobilised in Euroclear, or the budgetary support Ukraine has been receiving since 2022 – and it looks achievable. The harder challenge, they argue, is not raising $40 billion. It is directing it: towards investment rather than consumption. Ukraine didn't grow in the post-Soviet era at the rate that its neighbours achieved. EU accession momentum and secure borders can be a signal to investors that this time the trajectory will be different.The research behind this episode:Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Maurice Obstfeld. 2026. "You Only Live Twice: Financial Inflows and Growth in a Westward-Facing Ukraine." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues, special issue: "What's Next for Ukraine?"To cite this episode:Phillips, Tim. 2025. "You Only Live Twice: Financial Inflows and Growth in a Westward-Facing Ukraine." Economic Policy: Papers on European and Global Issues (podcast).Assign this as extra listening — the citation above is formatted and ready for a reading list or VLE.About the guestsYuriy Gorodnichenko is a CEPR Research Fellow and Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, where he leads CEPR's Ukraine Initiative. His research spans monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the macroeconomics of growth and business cycles.Maurice Obstfeld is a CEPR Distinguished Fellow and Class of 1958 Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He served as Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2015 to 2018, and as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Obama from 2014 to 2015. He is also a Fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.Research cited in this episodeThe discussion of debt overhang draws on a body of work from the 1980s developing-country debt crises, notably the insight that for sufficiently indebted countries, debt reduction can increase the expected value of what creditors recover. Gorodnichenko and Obstfeld apply this framework directly to Ukraine's war debts, arguing that deep restructuring – supported by bilateral official creditors, many of whom are European – is a prerequisite for private investment to follow.The €200 billion figure for immobilised Russian central bank assets held at Euroclear is the basis for Obstfeld's proposal of a reparations loan that would give Ukraine immediate access to large-scale resources, with repayment contingent on Russian reparations. This is discussed in more detail in the related reading below.More in the "What's Next for Ukraine?" seriesThis episode is the first in a three-part series based on papers presented at the inaugural Economic Policy winter conference, Paris, December 2025. Episodes 2 and 3, on rebuilding and the labour market, are forthcoming.Related reading on VoxEUYou only live twice: A growth strategy for Ukraine — Gorodnichenko and Obstfeld's own VoxEU column summarising the key arguments in this paper: why $40 billion a year is achievable, what the policy levers are, and why the window matters.Euroclear and the geopolitics of immobilised Russian assets — The legal and financial context behind the €200 billion of Russian central bank assets frozen at Euroclear, and what it would take to use them for a reparations loan to Ukraine.Using the returns of frozen Russian assets to finance the victory of Ukraine — A VoxEU proposal for channelling the interest income generated by frozen Russian assets to finance Ukraine's needs, without requiring the more politically contested step of confiscating the assets themselves.Ukraine's recovery challenge — An earlier VoxEU overview of the reconstruction task: the scale of damage, the role of EU accession, and the two-phase approach to restoring growth.

What type of manager would you be? An experiment in Ethiopia set out to measure the management traits of young professionals by setting them challenges in a video studio, and along the way also uncovered valuable (and surprising) information about the type of manager that employees and employers preferred.Simon Quinn of Imperial College London and CEPR and Tom Schwantje of Bocconi University were two of the researchers. They tell Tim Phillips about why it is important to develop better managers, and how we might do that for young professionals.

Another special episode recorded at the CEPR annual symposium in Paris. On 20 Jan 2025 when the Trump administration declared foreign aid “antithetical" to American values and suddenly ended many of its overseas programmes. How many lives were lost as a result, and can others step up to try to minimise that damage? Justin Sandefur is well qualified to speak on this topic – he leads Coefficient Giving's programme on economic growth in low- and middle-income countries and is one of the authors in a chapter on this topic in the recent CEPR book, The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration. Tim Phillips asked him about the consequences of the cuts on global health.

Recorded at the CEPR Annual Forum in Paris. Many of the Trump administration policies have direct consequences for Europe. Some of them are directly targeted at Europe. So how should Europe respond? The CEPR Press book The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration covers this in up-to-the-minute detail. In Paris Tim Phillips spoke to two of the editors, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Ugo Panizza of the Graduate Institute Geneva, president and vice president of CEPR. Both have strong views about the challenge to Europe, and how Europe should meet that challenge.

In 2025, the trade story was about tariffs. And that story isn't over. Does anyone know what happens next? Richard Baldwin of IMD Business School and CEPR was author of the chapter on tariffs in the CEPR Press book The Economic Consequences of The Second Trump Administration, and also of The Great Trade Hack, published by CEPR press in 2025. Gene Grossman of Princeton and CEPR analysed the legality of the Trump tariffs in a recent CEPR discussion paper.So, at the CEPR Symposium in Paris, Tim Phillips asked both of them: What happens next?Download The Economic Consequences of The Second Trump AdministrationDownload The Great Trade Hack Download Commandeering the Customs (gated link)

Another special episode recorded at the CEPR annual symposium in Paris.When does the level of debt in the US become a problem for the economy, and for ordinary Americans? And when it does, what are the policy options to fix it?That's the topic of a Chapter in the CEPR book. The authors are Ugo Panizza of the Graduate Institute, Geneva and CEPR, and Antonio Fatás of INSEAD and CEPR. They talk to Tim Phillips about how recent policy – notably the One Big Beautiful Bill Act – is blowing up US debt and warn that the administration can't keep kicking the can down the road for ever.

Stablecoins are digital tokens, pegged to a fiat currency. What could possibly go wrong?For one type of stablecoin the answer is: plenty, according to Richard Portes. The founder and honorary president of CEPR is also co-chair of the European Systemic Risk Board Crypto Asset Task Force. In this role he has been investigating the risks of multi-issuer stablecoins in Europe. He tells Tim Phillips that, if one of these stablecoins hit trouble, US holders could use European regulation to recover their investment from the coin's European reserves. And that, he argues, would be a threat to Europe's financial stability.

In another of our special episodes recorded at the CEPR annual Symposium, we ask: is it time for Europe to rearm?The message from the US could not be clearer: it is time for European countries to take care of their own security. If Europe decides to rearm, it has the industrial base – but Moritz Schularick of the Kiel Institute and CEPR warns that it isn't converting that capacity into credible deterrence. Tim Phillips asks him what European rearmament could mean in practice: not just scaling up production but buying smarter and investing in next-generation technologies that can spill over into the wider economy. And is there enough political will to create a European defence architecture that can stand on its own?

In another of our episodes recorded at the CEPR Paris Symposium, we ask: When Gen AI can do an undergraduate's problem set in seconds, how should teaching, and the syllabus, respond? Who better to answer this than Wendy Carlin of UCL and CEPR? Wendy – who has recently become Dame Wendy – was at the symposium to talk about her project to change economics teaching through the CORE Project, which more than 500 institutions use to teach introductory economics in a way that flips the standard textbook treatment on it head.Recently Wendy and CORE have been working to harness the power of AI to help students apply their knowledge in unfamiliar settings, to reason and discriminate, to make AI into what she calls “A cognitive sparring partner”. She tells Tim Phillips what that means for the Economics Major, and why that might create economics graduates with the skills that employers value. Try CORE, it's free: https://core-econ.org

Another special episode recorded at the CEPR annual symposium in Paris. The Trump administration says it wants America to lead in AI, but what does that mean in practice for trade and productivity? Will AI make growth great again, or just inflate a short-term capital spending boom?Gary Gensler of MIT and CEPR (also a former chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission) unpacks the administration's AI action plan, helps us work out what's happening to export controls, and untangles the deal-making geopolitics of AI hardware. 

At the CEPR annual Symposium in Paris we sat down with Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a distinguished fellow of CEPR, and a global authority on geopolitics and trade to discuss the profound changes in the multilateral order in 2025, how countries will adjust to this new normal – and whether the changes we have seen will ever be unwound.

On this episode of the America's Work Force Union Podcast, Sylvia Allegretto, Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), offered a comprehensive look into lagging teacher compensation, or as she called it, a “teacher pay penalty” in the United States. Allegretto, who has spent over two decades researching labor economics and teacher pay, highlights the “teacher pay penalty” — the wage gap between public school teachers and other college graduates, and how it has grown since the 1960s. In today's episode of the America's Work Force Union Podcast, Bob Funk, Founder of LaborLab, joined to discuss the current landscape of union busting in America. LaborLab is a non-profit watchdog organization that tracks and investigates corporate spending on union-busting activities. During the conversation, Funk touched on statistics regarding the money spent to stop union campaigns, the influence of large corporations like Amazon and Starbucks and the role his organization plays in combating these anti-union tactics.

https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin251205.mp3 Right-click here to download this episode (“Save link as…”). CEPR (12/2/25) This week on CounterSpin: A militarized US Drug Enforcement Administration force declared they'd taken out drug traffickers in the Caribbean, killing some of them in what was sold as a successful operation. Locals on the ground reported differently, saying these people weren't drug traffickers, just human beings who happened to be on the river and got shot up by US forces who were not attacked, as they claimed, but just killed innocent people because they were given orders to kill them. It should sound familiar—but this isn't today in Venezuela; it's 2012 in Honduras. An inspector general review from the State Department and the Justice Department found that, no, this was not a Honduran operation, or a “joint operation” the DEA were helping with; it was a DEA operation, and it killed four innocent people and injured others in a remote, Afro-Indigenous part of Honduras. The story that the DEA pushed on Congress and the press corps was just a lie. But you’d hardly know that history reading current coverage of Honduras, where, as we record on December 4, the presidential election is still in question. Not in question: the US's long history of intervening—violently, dramatically, unaccountably—in Honduras. We'll talk about it with Alex Main, director of international policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin251205Main.mp3 Plus Janine Jackson takes a quick look at media coverage of the murder of Amber Czech. https://media.blubrry.com/counterspin/content.blubrry.com/counterspin/CounterSpin251205Banter.mp3

Economic sanctions are the big geoeconomic bazooka. But what does history tell us about how well they work, and their relevance today. And does the theory match the data? Moritz Schularick of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and CEPR talks to Tim Phillips about the evidence of the history of sanctions on what they can achieve, whether we expect too much too soon from small sanctions – and whether politicians are prepared to impose the sanctions that bite.

In 2021, at COP26, the International Accounting Standards Board announced it would create a standard for this reporting. It wants to integrate sustainability reporting with traditional IFRS accounting. Should firms be compelled by regulators to disclose their impact on the climate in their corporate reporting? Investors value convergence in sustainability reporting standards, but they are facing stiff opposition both in the US and Europe – even while developing economies embrace the new regime. Lucrezia Reichlin of the London Business School and CEPR talked to Tim Phillips on the progress to sustainability standards, the scope of reporting, who wants it, and who's objecting to it. 

Our economy is embedded in nature, but nature is in danger. External funding is needed, especially in the Global South, to support the conservation of our natural ecosystems. Markets can play a role, but the way in which voluntary carbon markets do this has low public trust which, from recent news, may be deserved. Estelle Cantillon of Université libre de Bruxelles and CEPR tells Tim Phillips about her proposal for a new market mechanism to channel funds to projects that will conserve or restore our natural environment by paying dividends to those who invest. But how will it avoid greenwashing, and who will buy the shares? Read about this in Chapter 8 of the Paris report: https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/257653-policy_insight_145_designing_and_scaling_up_nature_based_markets.pdf

In the first of our special episodes from the first Hoffmann Centre / CEPR / ReCIPE Conference, we're discussing what chances there are of significant multilateral agreements being signed at COP 30 and, given that the chances are low, what plan B might be. Beatrice Weder di Mauro of CEPR, Hoffmann Centre and the Geneva Graduate Institute tells Tim Phillips that, if everyone can't agree, then coalitions of the willing – climate or finance clubs that offer incentives for the countries that want to join – can agree their own sustainability policies. But what are those incentives? And who will lead?

A decade ago, the UK voted in a referendum to leave the European Union. It was the culmination of years of partisan arguments over membership. During that time, most newspapers in the UK took strong “leave” or “remain” positions in the stories they wrote. But were they less obviously partisan in their choice of pictures too? Wanyu Chung of University of Birmingham and CEPR was one of a team of researchers that used artificial intelligence to estimate the emotional impact of news images of politicians before and after the Brexit vote. Photo: European Union 2016 - European Parliament

The International Macroeconomic History Online Seminar Series, hosted by CEPR, is turning 100 this month — not years, but episodes. What began as a lockdown experiment has become a global fixture for anyone who believes economics never forgets. In a special edition of VoxTalks Economics, Tim Phillips talks with organisers Nathan Sussman and Rui Esteves of the Geneva Graduate Institute about the moments that shaped the series and what a hundred lessons from history can teach us today. Why does history matter so much to economists? And how can the series help us understand current events?  Nathan's selection The great demographic reversal https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-13-great-demographic-reversal-ageing-societies-waning-inequality-and-inflation Monetary and fiscal history of the US https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-81-monetary-and-fiscal-history-united-states-1961-2021 The journey of humanity https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-37-journey-humanity Rui's selection The Smoot-Hawley trade war https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-26-smoot-hawley-trade-war Financial sanctions https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-59-financial-sanctions-arsenal-democracy-or-feeble-weapon Industrial policy https://cepr.org/multimedia/imhos-93-panel-industrial-policy-history

In the second of our episodes based on the topics discussed at the conference “Addressing the Risks and Responses to Climate Overshoot”, organised by the AXA Research Fund, CEPR, and Paris School of Economics, Tim Phillips talks to Matthias Kalkuhl of the University of Potsdam about how to remove carbon from the atmosphere. The innovative technologies that might be able to do this in the future need investment now – so one idea is for firms to buy the right to emit carbon now, as long as they commit to remove carbon when mature technology exists. But to administer this, Europe would need a dedicated Carbon Central Bank. Who would be in charge of it, how would it work, and is any politician brave enough to set it up?

In the first of two podcasts recorded at the conference “Addressing the Risks and Responses to Climate Overshoot”, organised by the AXA Research Fund, CEPR, and Paris School of Economics, Tim Phillips talks to Franck Courchamp of the University of Paris-Saclay about an aspect of climate change that is rarely talked about, increasingly important, and very costly. When plants or animals move, or are moved, to a place they don't belong, there is a risk of damage to natural habitats and an economic cost too. So how do we estimate the size of this risk, and what can we do about it? 

It's cultural meme that teenagers in New York and Seoul will have more in common with each other than with their parents. Has where we come from been downgraded as an influence on what we like, or is there still what Thierry Mayer of Sciences Po and CEPR calls “gravity in tastes”?  His research focuses on a very important aspect of this question: regional French food. Is there still a France of butter, and a France of olive oil? And, if there is, can we draw it on a map, or is this now a cultural and social divide, rather than a regional one? Vote for VoxTalks Economics in the 2025 Signal Awards! https://talknorm.al/vote

Today generative AI makes it easy to create and distribute convincing fake news stories, pictures, even videos. We've all been hoodwinked – but does that undermine our trust and confidence in the mainstream media? Ruben Durante of National University of Singapore, IPF-ICREA and CEPR is one of the authors of new research that tests how AI-generated misinformation affects our desire for real news. He tells Tim Phillips the good news and bad news for the future of the media's business model.

The annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, in Davos, attended by thousands of business and policy VIPs – is one of those events that pops up on the news every year, as we see photos of multinational CEOs shaking hands with world leaders and taking part in panel discussions on the future of the planet. But how valuable is it to the business people who pay hundreds of thousands of Swiss Francs to attend? Does Davos create business value, or might it be a high-profile way for them to ski and party – in the words of a new discussion paper published by CEPR, is it any more than “a boondoggle”? Andreas Fuchs of University of Goettingen is one of the researchers who asked this question. He reveals to Tim Phillips the size of the impact on stock prices and credit ratings. Photo: WEF/swiss-image.ch/Michael Buholzer

The belief that women are in some way inferior to men has been around for centuries. And throughout that time, women have suffered the consequences. Economists have lately been trying to understand more about the origins of gender biased norms, to help create better policies to challenge them. Their work can build on insights from sociology, anthropology and gender studies, but also raises important questions about the roles of men and women in society. So what should policy attempt to change?  Siwan Anderson of Vancouver School of Economics and CEPR talks to Tim Phillips about what we know on these topics – and the most promising directions for future research.

On 4 August, Paul Atkins, the chair of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, launched “Project Crypto”. The SEC wants to make the US “the crypto capital of the world”. Crypto investors make a lot of noise, but who are they, and do they behave differently to other retail investors? A new CEPR discussion paper called “Do you even crypto, bro?” summarises what a representative sample of US citizens think about crypto investments and highlights the gap in attitudes to risk and investing between crypto holders and the rest of the population. Michael Weber of Purdue University is one of the authors, and he tells Tim Phillips about the beliefs, the politics and the attitude to investment gains that have typified the crypto market so far.

How do criminals choose the weapons they carry, the number of accomplices, the types of business they target? Economists have long argued that decisions to commit economic crimes are strategic, based on a calculation of risk and reward.  The Italian justice system changes the punishment for a crime depending on how it is committed, and so a new analysis of thieves and their crimes, based on data from Milan, tests whether this is really the case. Giovanni Mastrobuoni of the University of Turin, Collegio Carlo Alberto and CEPR is one of the authors of this research. He talks to Tim Phillips about the economics of crime, the problems of collecting data about illegal acts, and Turin's most famous gold heist. 

Economist & co-founder of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, criticizes the Big Beautiful Bill and tariffs as policies that harm the American Economy and the working class.Subscribe to our Newsletter:https://politicsdoneright.com/newsletterPurchase our Books: As I See It: https://amzn.to/3XpvW5o How To Make AmericaUtopia: https://amzn.to/3VKVFnG It's Worth It: https://amzn.to/3VFByXP Lose Weight And BeFit Now: https://amzn.to/3xiQK3K Tribulations of anAfro-Latino Caribbean man: https://amzn.to/4c09rbE

My conversation with Dean starts at about 31 minutes but I have your headlines and clips first! Learn more about Farm Jam Sept 5-7 Please subscribe now for as little as 5$ and gain access to a community of over 700 awesome, curious, kind, funny, brilliant, generous souls Check out StandUpwithPete.com to learn more Dean Baker co-founded CEPR in 1999. His areas of research include housing and macroeconomics, intellectual property, Social Security, Medicare, and European labor markets. His blog, Beat the Press, provides commentary on economic reporting. His analyses have appeared in many major publications, including The Atlantic, The Washington Post, the Financial Times (London), and the New York Daily News. Dean received his BA from Swarthmore College and his PhD in economics from the University of Michigan. Dean has written several books, including Getting Back to Full Employment: A Better Bargain for Working People (with Jared Bernstein, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2013); The End of Loser Liberalism: Making Markets Progressive (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2011); Taking Economics Seriously (MIT Press, 2010), which thinks through what we might gain if we took the ideological blinders off of basic economic principles; and False Profits: Recovering from the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press, 2010), about what caused — and how to fix — the 2008–2009 economic crisis. In 2009, he wrote Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press), which chronicled the growth and collapse of the stock and housing bubbles and explained how policy blunders and greed led to catastrophic — but completely predictable — market meltdowns. He also wrote a chapter (“From Financial Crisis to Opportunity”) in Thinking Big: Progressive Ideas for a New Era (Progressive Ideas Network, 2009). His previous books include The United States Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), The Conservative Nanny State: How the Wealthy Use the Government to Stay Rich and Get Richer (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2006), and Social Security: The Phony Crisis (with Mark Weisbrot, University of Chicago Press, 1999). His book Getting Prices Right: The Debate Over the Consumer Price Index (editor, M.E. Sharpe, 1997) was a winner of a Choice Book Award as one of the outstanding academic books of the year. Among his numerous articles are “The Benefits of a Financial Transactions Tax,” Tax Notes 121, no. 4 (2008); “Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence” (with David R. Howell, Andrew Glyn, and John Schmitt), Capitalism and Society 2, no. 1 (2007); “Asset Returns and Economic Growth,” with Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2005); “Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2004); “Medicare Choice Plus: The Solution to the Long-Term Deficit Problem,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2004); “Professional Protectionists: The Gains From Free Trade in Highly Paid Professional Services,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2003); and “The Run-Up in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2002). Dean previously worked as a senior economist at the Economic Policy Institute and an assistant professor at Bucknell University. He has also worked as a consultant for the World Bank, the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, and the OECD's Trade Union Advisory Council. He was the author of the weekly online commentary on economic reporting, the Economic Reporting Review, from 1996 to 2006.   Join us Monday's and Thursday's at 8EST for our Bi-Weekly Happy Hour Hangout!  Pete on Blue Sky Pete on Threads Pete on Tik Tok Pete on YouTube  Pete on Twitter Pete On Instagram Pete Personal FB page Stand Up with Pete FB page All things Jon Carroll  Follow and Support Pete Coe Buy Ava's Art  Hire DJ Monzyk to build your website or help you with Marketing

Paradigms Radio Show's Baruch Zeichner interviews PDR's Egberto Willies on healthcare & more. Dean Baker, founder of CEPR, discusses tariffs and other topics. TX Rep. James Talarico speaks.Subscribe to our Newsletter:https://politicsdoneright.com/newsletterPurchase our Books: As I See It: https://amzn.to/3XpvW5o How To Make AmericaUtopia: https://amzn.to/3VKVFnG It's Worth It: https://amzn.to/3VFByXP Lose Weight And BeFit Now: https://amzn.to/3xiQK3K Tribulations of anAfro-Latino Caribbean man: https://amzn.to/4c09rbE

Subscribe now⁠ to skip the ads. ⁠Get your limited edition "Robo Washington" poster now⁠. Subscribers get a 50% discount! Economist and co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Mark Weisbrot joins the show to talk about economic sanctions and how they affect people's lives. They discuss the effect of sanctions on migration flows, how the PR about them targeting governments and not civilians is false, how the international financial system and dollar hegemony allow the US to sanction so freely, whether sanctions on other countries actually benefit ordinary Americans, whether tariffs can be considered a form of sanctions, and more. Check out CEPR's work for much more material on sanctions. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

⁠Get your limited edition "Robo Washington" poster now⁠⁠!Economist and co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) ⁠Mark Weisbrot⁠ joins the show to talk about economic sanctions and how they affect people's lives. They discuss the effect of sanctions on migration flows, how the PR about them targeting governments and not civilians is false, how the international financial system and dollar hegemony allow the US to sanction so freely, whether sanctions on other countries actually benefit ordinary Americans, whether tariffs can be considered a form of sanctions, and more.Check out ⁠CEPR's work⁠ for much more material on sanctions.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Stand Up is a daily podcast that I book,host,edit, post and promote new episodes with brilliant guests every day. Please subscribe now for as little as 5$ and gain access to a community of over 700 awesome, curious, kind, funny, brilliant, generous souls Check out StandUpwithPete.com to learn more Dean Baker co-founded CEPR in 1999. His areas of research include housing and macroeconomics, intellectual property, Social Security, Medicare, and European labor markets. His blog, Beat the Press, provides commentary on economic reporting. His analyses have appeared in many major publications, including The Atlantic, The Washington Post, the Financial Times (London), and the New York Daily News. Dean received his BA from Swarthmore College and his PhD in economics from the University of Michigan. Dean has written several books, including Getting Back to Full Employment: A Better Bargain for Working People (with Jared Bernstein, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2013); The End of Loser Liberalism: Making Markets Progressive (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2011); Taking Economics Seriously (MIT Press, 2010), which thinks through what we might gain if we took the ideological blinders off of basic economic principles; and False Profits: Recovering from the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press, 2010), about what caused — and how to fix — the 2008–2009 economic crisis. In 2009, he wrote Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (PoliPoint Press), which chronicled the growth and collapse of the stock and housing bubbles and explained how policy blunders and greed led to catastrophic — but completely predictable — market meltdowns. He also wrote a chapter (“From Financial Crisis to Opportunity”) in Thinking Big: Progressive Ideas for a New Era (Progressive Ideas Network, 2009). His previous books include The United States Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), The Conservative Nanny State: How the Wealthy Use the Government to Stay Rich and Get Richer (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2006), and Social Security: The Phony Crisis (with Mark Weisbrot, University of Chicago Press, 1999). His book Getting Prices Right: The Debate Over the Consumer Price Index (editor, M.E. Sharpe, 1997) was a winner of a Choice Book Award as one of the outstanding academic books of the year. Among his numerous articles are “The Benefits of a Financial Transactions Tax,” Tax Notes 121, no. 4 (2008); “Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence” (with David R. Howell, Andrew Glyn, and John Schmitt), Capitalism and Society 2, no. 1 (2007); “Asset Returns and Economic Growth,” with Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2005); “Financing Drug Research: What Are the Issues,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2004); “Medicare Choice Plus: The Solution to the Long-Term Deficit Problem,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2004); “Professional Protectionists: The Gains From Free Trade in Highly Paid Professional Services,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2003); and “The Run-Up in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble?,” Center for Economic and Policy Research (2002). Dean previously worked as a senior economist at the Economic Policy Institute and an assistant professor at Bucknell University. He has also worked as a consultant for the World Bank, the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, and the OECD's Trade Union Advisory Council. He was the author of the weekly online commentary on economic reporting, the Economic Reporting Review, from 1996 to 2006.   Join us Monday's and Thursday's at 8EST for our Bi-Weekly Happy Hour Hangout!  Pete on Blue Sky Pete on Threads Pete on Tik Tok Pete on YouTube  Pete on Twitter Pete On Instagram Pete Personal FB page Stand Up with Pete FB page All things Jon Carroll  Follow and Support Pete Coe Buy Ava's Art  Hire DJ Monzyk to build your website or help you with Marketing