Podcasts about Potsdam

How do you become a C++ Standards Committee member?Why is C++ prevalent in audio?Should you still use it for audio software?Honestly, Timur Doumler is someone I have looked up to ever since I saw his “C++ in the audio industry” talk at CppCon 2015.He has a rich development history with C++ and/or audio:developer at Native Instrumentsdeveloper of the JUCE C++ framework (podcast sponsor ❤️)C++ linter developer and developer advocate at JetBrains (who make the CLion IDE)founder of Cradle, an audio plugin startupC++ Standards Committee memberCppCast podcast hostnotorious Audio Developer Conference and CppCon speakerI have probably missed a ton of stuff here, but that should already give you a flavor of what Timur is up to

Winterliches Moin aus dem verschneiten Potsdam & Dresden! Da Abraham es heute nicht ins Café geschafft hat, setzen sich Gina & Alex bei einem Tässchen Winterpunsch zusammen und besprechen die fulminanten letzten Wochen von Alex' Schauspieltour & Gina's Regiestudium. Also schnappt euch eure Schneeflockenlimonade und auf geht's! Auf YouTube, Spotify, iTunes, Deezer, Amazon Music, Google Podcasts & als RSS-Feed Instagram: → https://www.instagram.com/setcafe.podcast/ Alexander Diosegi → https://www.instagram.com/alexanderdiosegi/ Abraham Nielebock → https://www.instagram.com/anpicturesx/ Regina Grimm → https://www.instagram.com/reginaginagrimm/

For transcriptions and more detailed shownotes, please go to: https://swordschool.shop/blogs/podcast/episode-207-the-perfectly-rational-fencer-with-martin-hoppner  To support the show, come join the Patrons at  https://www.patreon.com/theswordguy Dr Martin Höppner has been involved in historical martial arts since joining a local reenactment club, “Berliner Rittergilde” in 2008 before getting into historical fencing in 2015 studying classical sabre and rapier at the University of Berlin club. He then moved into sword and buckler, inspired by Roland Warzecha's work (you can hear from Roland here) and Fiore's Art of Arms, before being seduced by Manciolino and Marozzo. In 2017 he co-founded Schildwache Potsdam as a collaboration between the Berliner Rittergilde and the University of Potsdam's Academic Sports Centre. In 2020 and 2021 he was on the DDHF national longsword first squad. And since 2022 he was on the Rapier national squad, where he is now head coach. He runs the Schildwache Potsdam YouTube channel, and is one of the organizers of one of my favourite events, Swords of the Renaissance. He is a research associate at the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg and has a PhD in economics and social sciences. Economics is very relevant to this episode, because Martin and I discuss how Game Theory relates to fencing. What is it rational to do when sparring and what do people actually do? What is the most rational way to react to an opponent who hits you increasingly hard or fast? Should you match them, or walk away? We also talk about rule sets in tournaments, and Martin's thoughts on how to devise them to stop people gaming the rules, and make the fencing cleaner and scoring fairer.   Links of interest: Schildwache Potsdam (Martin's club) and info on Swords of the Renaissance event: https://schildwache-potsdam.de/ The Schildwache Potsdam Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/cw/SchildwachePotsdam Schildwache Potsdam YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/schildwache-potsdam  

Send us a textThis conversation delves into the complexities of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, featuring insights from Dr. Ivan Katchanovski and his newly published book The Russia-Ukraine War and its Origins, an expert in Ukrainian politics. The discussion covers recent developments, military strategies, domestic politics, and the influence of Western countries on the conflict. Katchanovski highlights the challenges faced by Ukraine, the political landscape under Zelensky, and the implications of international involvement in the war. The conversation emphasizes the need for a nuanced understanding of the situation and the potential for resolution amidst ongoing turmoil.===Ivan Katchanovski teaches at the School of Political Studies and the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. He was Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, Visiting Assistant Professor at the Department of Politics at the State University of New York at Potsdam, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, and Kluge Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. He received his Ph.D. from the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University under the direction of Seymour Martin Lipset.===Help to make the book open access; https://gofund.me/79a58e94d https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-98724-3Most recent books:The Russia-Ukraine War and its Origins published by Palgrave Macmillan in October 2025; https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/the-russia-ukraine-war-and-its-origins/51519284The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: The Mass Killing that Changed the World https://link.springer.com/book/10.100...Social Media:X: https://x.com/I_KatchanovskiAcademia: https://uottawa.academia.edu/IvanKatc...===Make Your Life a Masterpiece! Enroll NOW: programs.the-ykm.com/collectionstheykm.comthe-ykm.comwhyknowledgematters.comprograms.the-ykm.comtheykm.comthe-ykm.comwhyknowledgematters.com#whyknowledgematters #podcast #theykm #livelearnlove Support the show

Japan's stance on the Taiwan question has long defined its relations with China. Japan must reaffirm its commitment to the four important documents which are the bedrock of bilateral relations. However, it has purposely maintained strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question.日本在台湾问题上的立场长期决定着中日关系的走向。日本必须重申其对构成两国关系基础的四个重要政治文件的承诺。然而，日本在台湾问题上刻意保持战略模糊。As a result, the Taiwan question has remained a persistent pivot, shaped by Japan's post-war legal positioning, its domestic political constraints and, above all, its reliance on the United States-Japan security alliance.因此，台湾问题一直是中日关系的关键点，受日本战后法律定位、国内政治约束，尤其是对美日同盟依赖的共同影响。After World War II, Japan accepted the Potsdam Proclamation and its requirement to restore Taiwan to China. But in practice, it followed the US-led "Treaty of San Francisco" signed in 1951, which had been signed without the participation of representatives from China. That "treaty" required Japan only to "renounce" Taiwan, without specifying its return to China. Using this omission as an excuse, Japan claimed it did not have the legal authority to define "Taiwan's status".二战后，日本接受《波茨坦公告》及其“台湾归还中国”的要求。但在实践中，日本却遵循1951年美主导的《旧金山和约》——该“和约”签署时并无中国的参与。该“和约”要求日本“放弃”台湾，但并未明确台湾应归还中国。日本借此漏洞声称其无权定义“台湾地位”。The position was blatantly contradictory. Japan was simultaneously agreeing to adhere to the Potsdam Proclamation while relying on a so-called "treaty" that obscured what Potsdam had made explicit. This dual-track approach was driven not by legal logic, but by strategic calculation.这种立场明显自相矛盾。日本一方面声称遵守波茨坦公告，另一方面又依赖一个刻意模糊其明确内容的所谓“和约”。这种“双轨策略”源于战略算计，而非法律逻辑。Another key factor in Japan's Taiwan policy is the US-Japan security framework during the Cold War. During the early Cold War, the US regarded Taiwan as a critical strategic asset.影响日本台湾政策的另一关键因素是冷战时期的美日安全框架。在早期冷战中，美国将台湾视为重要战略资产。As China and Japan sat down to normalize ties in the 1970s, the US was deeply concerned about how Japan would address the Taiwan question in the negotiations. Tokyo repeatedly reassured Washington that the US-Japan alliance would not be affected and that the US would have access to bases for "Taiwan-related operations".当中日于上世纪70年代讨论邦交正常化时，美国高度关注日本在谈判中如何处理台湾问题。东京反复向华盛顿保证，美日同盟不会受影响，美国仍可使用驻日基地进行“涉台行动”。Even after normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations, Japanese officials stated that including Taiwan within the "Far East" framework served US strategic interests.即便中日实现邦交正常化，日本官员仍声称将台湾纳入“远东”框架符合美国战略利益。After the Cold War, Japan further strengthened these security linkages. The 1997 and 2015 revisions in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation broadened bilateral roles in regional contingencies, widely interpreted as including the Taiwan island.冷战结束后，日本进一步强化了这些安全联动。《日美防卫合作指针》于1997年和2015年的修订扩大了双方在地区突发事件中的角色，普遍被解读为涵盖台湾地区。Japan's 2015 security legislation tried to provide so-called "legal grounds" for supporting US military operations in a "crisis in Taiwan".日本2015年的安保法试图为日本在“台湾有事”时支持美国军事行动提供所谓“法律依据”。In 2021, for the first time since 1969, Japan and the US issued a joint statement expressing concerns over peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.2021年，美日首次自1969年以来在联合声明中对台湾海峡的和平与稳定表示关切。The recent provocative remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi have severely damaged ties with China.日本首相高市早苗近期的挑衅性言论严重损害了中日关系。Speaking in the Japanese Diet, she claimed that a "Taiwan contingency" would constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan — the most explicit formulation ever made by a serving Japanese leader.她在国会中声称，“台湾有事”将构成日本的“存亡危机事态”——这是日本在任领导人迄今最明确的表述。Her statement not only breaks with Tokyo's long-standing strategic ambiguity but also signals a shift toward treating Taiwan as a core element of Japan's national security, which is a blatant violation of China's internal affairs.此言论不仅突破东京长期坚持的战略模糊，更表明日本正将台湾视为其国家安全核心要素，公然干涉中国内政。Japan's dual-track approach of offering political assurances to China while aligning with the US regional strategy during past US administrations has given Tokyo flexibility, but also created inconsistencies.日本过去以对华政治保证与配合美国地区战略并行的“双轨模式”虽为东京带来灵活性，却也造成了明显矛盾。Japan claims it abides by the Potsdam Proclamation but relies on the "San Francisco Peace Treaty", which China regards as invalid.日本声称遵守《波茨坦公告》，却依赖中国明确视为无效的《旧金山和约》。Japan reassures China that it does not support Taiwan independence and upholds the one-China principle, yet expands the scope of US-Japan military cooperation in ways that could involve Japan in "Taiwan contingencies".日本安抚中国，声称不支持“台独”并坚持一个中国原则，但同时不断扩大可能使其卷入“台湾有事”的美日军事合作范围。However, as the Chinese leadership and the incumbent US administration reaffirm the importance of managing the Taiwan question responsibly, Japan's increasingly explicit security framing stands in sharp contrast.然而，在中美领导层均强调负责任管控台湾问题的重要性之际，日本愈发明确的安全定位形成鲜明对比。Rather than reducing tensions, Tokyo's new rhetoric risks injecting additional uncertainty into an issue that the world's two major countries are actively seeking to stabilize.东京的新言论非但不会缓和局势，反而可能向这一中美共同努力稳定的问题注入更多不确定性。Fortunately on Nov 24, President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump held a phone conversation in which the Taiwan question was a central focus.所幸的是，11月24日，习近平主席与美国总统特朗普通话，台湾问题成为核心议题。President Xi elaborated on China's principled position, stressing that the restoration of Taiwan to China is an integral part of the post-war international order.习近平主席阐明了中方原则立场，强调台湾回归中国是战后国际秩序的重要组成部分。President Trump responded by expressing the US side's understanding of Taiwan's significance to China, signaling that even amid strategic competition, Washington acknowledges the sensitivity and centrality of the issue.特朗普总统表示美方理解台湾对中国的重要性，显示出即使在战略竞争中，美国也承认这一问题的敏感性和核心地位。Hopefully, the phone call between the Chinese and US top leaders, followed by another call between President Trump and Prime Minister Takaichi, has clearly conveyed China's unshakable stance on the Taiwan question to the Japanese politicians.希望中美元首的通话，以及随后特朗普总统与高市早苗的通话，已向日本政界清晰传达了中国在台湾问题上的坚定立场。Additionally, President Trump can demonstrate his political acumen by influencing Japan, encouraging the Japanese politician to correct her missteps.此外，特朗普总统也可通过劝导日本纠正其错误言论来展现政治智慧。For Japan, strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan question is a shield. From Japanese politicians' perspective, an explicit acknowledgment that Taiwan is part of China may undermine Japan's post-war "security architecture" and its flexibility to maneuver in the region's shifting geopolitical landscape.对日本而言，台湾问题上的战略模糊是一种“保护伞”。从其政界角度看，明确承认“台湾属于中国”可能冲击日本战后“安全架构”，削弱其在地区地缘政治变化中的操作空间。However, if Japan fully implements the latest remarks, it will be seen as a blatant infringement on China's integrity of sovereignty and territory, given that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.然而，如果日本真正落实其最新言论，则将被视为公然侵犯中国主权和领土完整，因为台湾是中国不可分割的一部分。Such statements, made on the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1931-45), are evoking strong memories among the Chinese people of Japan's military past and also remind the people of the Asia-Pacific region of Japan's wartime atrocities in the region.在中国人民抗日战争（1931–45）80周年之际发表此类言论，更激起中国人民对日本军国主义历史的强烈记忆，也提醒亚太地区民众注意日本战争暴行的历史。It is crucial for Takaichi to retract her misguided remarks, especially at this highly sensitive time, as they risk paving the way for a revival of militarism that can threaten regional peace.在当前高度敏感的时期，高市早苗必须撤回其错误言论，因为这类言辞可能助长军事主义复活，威胁地区和平。The author is director-general of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and chairman of the Chinese Association for Japanese Studies.The views don't necessarily represent those of China Daily.normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations实现外交关系正常化internal affairs内政Potsdam Proclamation《波茨坦公告》San Francisco Peace Treaty《旧金山和约》blatantly contradictory明显自相矛盾

Hello everyone, a big thanks to all of you who joined the patreon and voted for this to be the next episode, you all are awesome. This is a part 2 about Hirohito's responsibility during the wars of 1931-1945, so if you have not heard part 1, perhaps go do so, or maybe you just don't care about 1931-1940 and just want to hear about the 1941-1945 period, hell by all means enjoy.   So last time we kind of left it on a bit of a dramatic cliff hanger. I spoke about Emperor Hirohito's involvement in what was called at the time the “China Incident”. It was not an official declared war until December of 1941. We left off in 1940, Hirohito was struggling with a situation of juggling two things: 1) how the hell to finally end the China War 2) how to do it without receiving horrible ramifications from the international world. On July 22nd of 1940, Konoe was back and formed a second cabinet. Notably General Hideki Tojo went from vice to army Minister during this time. If you guys ever want a podcast on Hideki Tojo, let me know, he is one rather bizarre figure that's for sure. Konoe tackled his job by holding an imperial HQ government liaison conference. For 90 minutes everyone worked on a new national policy designed to exploit the international situation, IE: Germany bulldozing europe.  The result was a document on national policy dated July 27th. It shifted focus to the “southern area” IE: southeast asia and the Pacific if the China war did not end quickly. Its basis was to exploit the foreign nations that had their hands full in europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands. It called for an invasion of French Indochina to establish bases to launch assaults against the Dutch East Indies for natural resources if diplomatic means failed. It acknowledged if the Dutch East Indies were seized through military means, Japan would also seek to fight Britain, but not the US, instead Japan would prepare for a possible war with the Americans. To all of this Hirohito approved. The army also kept pressuring its desire to ally with Germany. Throughout 1939-1940 Hirohito rejected this idea, not because of any ideological differences, it was because of Germans anti aggression pact with the USSR. If Japan were to ally to Germany, Hirohito wanted it to be mutually to fight the USSR. The Navy likewise opposed allying to Germany because they believed it would force Britain and the US to increase their aid to Chiang Kai-shek.   However the Blitzkrieg changed everything. Everyone was shocked at how well Germany was doing. Prince Chichibu repeatedly argued with Hirohito to change his mind over the alliance idea. Then suddenly the Navy changed their mind and began favoring an alliance. This changed came about in June of 1940 when the France fell. The Navy changed their mind based on a few factors, a major component was the belief if Germany and the USSR were allied, than at least Japan would not have to worry about the USSR and could focus on the pacific. Both the IJA and the IJN believed Hitler would soon take Britain and thus there was a huge desire to join the new international order on the winning side. A third factor was a new clause in negotiations with Germany and Japan, that if they allied Japan would not automatically be drawn into a war with Britain against her will. Some in the navy also believed perhaps Germany could help their diplomatic situation with the Americans. So the army and navy were now both demanding an alliance with Germany, it was all up to hirohito.    At an imperial briefing on June 19th of 1940, Hirohito asked chief of staff Prince Kan'in and the Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” Such as question revealed Hirohito's perception at the time that Germany was on the verge of victory and that he was gradually considering the deployment of troops in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies as neither parent nation were in a position to defend their holdings. In regards to the China war, the Japanese sought to end leaks of materials getting into China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicated Britain would not accept closing the movement of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military acknowledged it would probably be required to invade Hong Kong and thus declare war on Britain. Upon hearing of this Hirohito remarked “Should that happen, I am sure America will use the method of an embargo, don't you agree?” To this his lord of the privy seal, Kido reassured him stating “the nation must be fully resolved to resist to proceed cautiously and not to be dragged into events precipitated by the overseas agencies”. Konoe's second cabinet resolved to end the China war, construct a new order in greater east asia and to complete war preparations as a national defense state. On July 27th at a liaison conference a document was adopted, affirming a course of advancing to the south and to ally with Germany. Japan would incorporate the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and other resource rich areas of Southeast Asia into its new order while simultaneously bolstering its relationship with the Axis states. After hearing and reading everything, Hirohito sanctioned it all. Thus Hirohito had sanctioned the preliminary actions that would set Japan into a collision course with the US.   In September Japan began sending troops into northern French Indochina after concluding its Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy. Now Hirohito was briefed beforehand by Army Minister Tojo and other chiefs of staff about securing bases in northern French indochina. Hirohito agreed to this under the belief acquiring such bases would stop more leaked materials going into China and thus contribute to the fall of Chongqing. But Hirohito also sanctioned it under the full knowledge it was preparing the Nanshin-ron advance and that carried a risk of going to war with Britain and by proxy the US. Naturally he wanted to thwart any war breaking out with the US by it seems his officials had convinced him they could manage most of their plans without aggravating the US.   On July 29th with the German offensive aimed at finishing off Britain, Hirohito summoned his chiefs and vice chiefs of staff to the imperial HQ. He began to question the prospects of war with the US. Prince Fushimi replied “[u]nless we complete our domestic preparations, particularly the preparation of our material resources, I do not think we should lightly start war even if there is a good opportunity to do so.” Hirohito then asked if  “the Army were planning to occupy points in India, Australia, and New Zealand.” But overall Hirohito seemed to be the most concerned about the US, Germany and the USSR. “Could Japan, obtain a victory in a naval battle with the United States as we once did in the Battle of the Japan Sea? . . . I heard that the United States will ban exports of oil and scrap iron [to Japan]. We can probably obtain oil from other sources, but don't you think we will have a problem with scrap iron?” In regards to the USSR “If a Japan-Soviet nonaggression treaty is made and we advance to the south, the navy will become the main actor. Has the army given thought to reducing the size of its forces in that case? . . . How do you assess the future national power of Germany? . . . Both Germany and the Soviet Union are untrustworthy countries. Don't you think there will be a problem if one of them betrays us and takes advantage of our exhaustion fighting the United States?I]t seems as though you people are thinking of implementing this plan by force because there is a good opportunity at this moment for resolving the southern problem even though some dangers are involved. . . . What does a good opportunity mean? [To this question Sawada replied: “For example, if a German landing in England commences.”] In that case wouldn't the United States move to aid Britain? . . . Well, I've heard enough. I take it, in short, that you people are trying to resolve the southern problem by availing yourselves of today's good opportunities.”   You can tell Hirohito understood the very real threat of an Anglo-American alliance and was very cautious. It seemed to Hirohito, that his officials were trying to take the limelight off the abysmal situation in China but emphasizing a southern advance. Well Americans response to the Japanese movement into northern French indochina was to see it as a direct threat. Something I have not paid much attention to was Hirohito's decision making being the direct result of trying to mediate between competing entities, ie: the IJA and IJN. At this point in time the IJA and IJN top officials had the power to simply stop governmental functions from occurring altogether whenever they were displeased with a decision. As you can imagine the IJA and IJN were also competing for resources and political power. Thus Hirohito spent a lot of time and effort trying to formulate decisions that at a minimum kept the governance going.    In the end Hirohito sanctioned Imperial HQ army order number 458, ordering the area army to begin the entry into French Indochina. Thus once again Hirohito sanctioned aggression aboard. America began what it called a “moral embargo” on aircraft parts, scrap iron and aviation gasoline. This was one of many gradual steps America took to incrementally sanction Japan, while aiding China to keep it bogged down. Japan's direct response was joining the Axis with a clause “to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict”. This clause was designed specifically to check Britain and the US. Hirohito knew this was a turning point carrying the possibility of war with the US. Later he would blame some officials and even his brothers Chichibu and Takamatsu, but not his own actions sanctioning the Axis pact.    Speaking of his brothers, at this time Chichibu got severely ill with tuberculosis and as a result retired from active public life, now Prince Takamatsu stood as next regent. Thus Takamatsu would begin reading reports and advise Hirohito. Takamatsu like Chichibu approved the Tripartite Pact and found his brother Hirohito's performance lacking. Meanwhile Britain responded to the Tripartite pact by opening up the Burma road and America made a loan to Chiang Kai-shek.   The Soviets came to Japan for a neutrality pact and sweetened the deal by offering Soviet coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin. Hirohito ratified the treaty on April 25th of 1941. 5 weeks later on June 5th, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi reported to Hirohito and the high command that Hitler was about to invade the Soviets. The Army high command sprang into action drafting plans to open a war with the Soviets while simultaneously advancing south into French Indochina. But many in the military also sought to wait until the time was ripe, and a rift emerged. Operation barbarossa commenced and on June 23rd the IJN high command gave their opinion that Japan should seize all military bases and airfields in southern French Indochina even at the risk of war with Britain and America. Can you say boy that escalated quickly?   There was obvious temptation to invade Siberia towards Lake Baikal, but at the same time the western powers were tightening sanctions on Japan, she needed resources. At this point Japan had been stuck in China for 4 years and 5 months, the army had expanded from 17 divisions totalling 250,000 men in july of 1937 to 51 divisions at 2.1 million men in December 8th of 1941. On July 2nd, 10 tens into Operation barbarossa, Konoe summoned an imperial conference to debate actions going forward. The consensus was that southern French Indochina needed to be taken and that it probably would not provoke the US going to war with Japan. Hirohito sanctioned it and on July 30th made a major operational intervention by advising General Sugiyama to build up forces in Manchukuo to prevent the Soviet Far Eastern Army.   Japan negotiated with Vichy France to allow Japanese troops to occupy southern parts of French Indochina. What was to be originally just 40,000 IJA forces turned into 185,000 and in response America increased sanctions and began preparing the Philippines for war. Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the US on July 26th and by August the 1st a total embargo of oil and gasoline exports to Japan. Konoe's cabinet, the military high command, pretty much everyone was shocked by how harsh the economic sanctions were. Emperor Hirohito told Sugiyama to halt mobilizing forces in Manchukuo and the army basically dropped all plans of attacking the USSR. A month after the US oil embargo suddenly the army had changed its mind to go all in on the southern advance. Britain likewise began sanctions against Japan and both Britain and the US managed to convince the Dutch to follow suit by refusing to sell oil to Japan. The Dutch even took it a step further and followed Americans lead in freezing Japanese assets.    Konoe was in full panic mode, be believed his ambassador to washington was a moron and sought to go in person to speak to Roosevelt. At 11:40am on August 4th Konoe spoke to Hirohito about the plan, but Washington kept making up excuses prolonging any meeting from taking place. Meanwhile Washington was building up its navy, and the IJN were stressing, in the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.    On september 3rd at a liaison conference it was decided Japan was to prepare for a war against the US, UK and Netherlands while simultaneously pursuing diplomacy. If diplomacy failed by early October the decision for war would be made. Konoe presented everything to Hirohito on September 5th and requested an imperial conference on the matter. The most important decision of his life was about to be made.    Now take a second to feel the moment. Germany's invasion of the USSR was in its 6th week and not producing a decisive victory; Britain was still in the fight and the Japanese ambassador to London reported back Britain would allow Japan to maintain its great power status and exert influence in asia if they stayed out of the European War and “re-examined their current policy”. An olive branch. Hirohito had options is what I am arguing. He could stale things, he could mobilize units into Manchukuo to simply threaten the Soviet border, he could simply stay out of new wars, even it the China war would get worse, but try to profit from the situation in Europe. He could stop the southern advance, lose the chance to seize the resource in southeast asia, but perhaps the US, UK and Netherlands would lift some sanctions.   After speaking back and forth with Konoe while scolding Sugiyama here is a bit of their conversation:    Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory?  Sugiyama: Yes, they will.  Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time. . . .  Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties. . . . [ellipses in original]  Emperor: Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me? Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement.  Emperor: Go ahead.  Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there. . . . Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor's diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don't you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today. . . . If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won't be able to do a thing about it.  Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.]  Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow's agenda? How would you like me to go about it? Emperor: There is no need to change anything.   There is no need to change anything. Konoe grabbed Hirohito for a private audience afterwards and tried to get Hirohito to revise the outline, but Hirohito ignored this. Hirohito at that point could have stopped or at least slowed down the countdown to all out war. Hirohito instead did not want to displease the pro-war factions in his military, perhaps he saw them as a threat to his authority. Hirohito was not at all pleased with the policy plan. When he was shown in on september 5th, he looked extremely irritated and blew up on Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole. 20 minutes before the Imperial conference on September 6th, Hirohito spoke with his lord of the privy Kido and told him he was going to raise some questions at the meeting. Kido told him that it would be best to leave the questions at the very end, basically he was advising to allow for things to go through. Thus Hirohito sat through the meeting and sanction the preparations for war. Here is a conversation between Hirohito and the Chiefs of the general staff:   Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you'll stop, won't you?  Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will.  Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]?  Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us   Meanwhile Konoe's deadline to reach a diplomatic resolution with the US was fast approaching. On October 13th Hirohito told Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.” The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting and Army minister Tojo took the lionshare of talking:   For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked. . . . Our decision was “to start the war . . . if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth. . . . We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough. . . . The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]. ...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined   And so Konoe resigned two days later, but before he did his last official action was to recommend Prince Higashikuni to succeed him, in fact he got Tojo to do the same. Prince Higashikuni was deemed capable of controlling both the Army and Navy. And what did Hirohito say to this? He said no, and appointed Hideki Tojo. Why? As going back to the beginning of this series, to protect the Kokutai. He did not want a member of the royal family to hold the seat as Prime Minister during a time when war might be declared, a war that Japan might lose, which would toss the responsibility onto the imperial house. It was a threat to the Kokutai. Hirohito chose Tojo because Tojo was 100% loyal subject to the emperor. Tojo was the perfect fall guy if one ever existed.    Between November 8-15th, Hirohito received a full rundown of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack plan and sanctioned it. The deadline to reach a diplomatic solution with the US was set for midnight December 1st.    Hirohito ever since the Mukden Incident had expressed fear that not taking warlike actions, not pumping up the kokutai or not suppressing dissent would jeopardize the imperial system of government and damage the imperial institution itself. For Hirohito domestic conflicts were more dangerous than external ones, because they carried the risk of eroding the monarchy. As the time approached for his finally decision on declaring war, Hirohito requested a last round of discussion. The carriers enroute to Pearl harbor departed on november 27th, while on December 1st, 19 leaders, the entire Tojo cabinet and Emperor met. Tojo pulled a rather cheeky maneuver, he reported the response from America, the famous Hull note by stating “the United States . . . has demanded that we withdraw troops from all of China [emphasis added],” but in fact, Hull had used only the word “China.” Hara asked “I would like to know,whether Manchukuo is included in the term ‘China'? Did our two ambassadors confirm this point?” Togo's reply to this was “However . . . the American proposal [early in the negotiations on] April 16 stated that they would recognize the state of Manchukuo, so Manchukuo would not be part of China. . . . On the other hand . . . there has been a change in their position . . . they look upon Chungking as the one and only legitimate regime, and . . . they want to destroy the Nanking regime, [so] they may retract what they have said previously” A nonsensical gibberish answer, intentionally done to make everyone think America did in fact include Manchukuo, thus forcing everyone to see the demands as impossible to comply with. Togo finished the meeting : “Once His Majesty decides to commence hostilities, we will all strive to meet our obligations to him, bring the government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation united will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set his majesty's mind at ease. I now adjourn the meeting.” Hirohito simply nodded. Sugiyama remarked that the emperor did not show the slightest sign of anxiety, in fact he looked like he was in a good mood.   Hirohito's naval aid Jo Eiichiro wrote minutes on the first day of the pacific war, recording the emperors actions. 4 A.M. (Japan time): Japan issued a final ultimatum to the United States. 3:30 A.M.: the Hawaiian surprise attack was successful. 5:30 A.M.: Singapore bombed. Great results. Air attacks on Davao, Guam, Wake. 7:10 A.M.: All the above was reported to the emperor. The American gunboat Wake was captured on the Shanghai front. The British gunboat Petrel was sunk. From 7:15 to 7:30 the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the war situation. At 7:30 the prime minister informally reported to the emperor on the imperial rescript declaring war. (Cabinet meeting from 7 A.M.). At 7:35 the chief of the Army General Staff reported on the war situation. At 10:45 the emperor attended an emergency meeting of the privy council. At 11:00 A.M. the imperial rescript declaring war was promulgated. 11:40 A.M. Hirohito conferred with Kido for about twenty minutes.] At 2:00 P.M. the emperor summoned the army and navy ministers and bestowed an imperial rescript on them. The army minister, representing both services, replied to the emperor. [At 3:05 P.M. the emperor had a second meeting with Kido, lasting for about twenty minutes.] At 4:30 P.M. the chiefs of staff formally reported on the draft of the Tripartite (Germany-Italy-Japan) Military Pact. At 8:30 P.M. the chief of the Navy General Staff reported on the achievements of the Hawaii air attack. . . . Throughout the day the emperor wore his naval uniform and seemed to be in a splendid mood.   Hirohito believed Germany would win, thus if with their help he believed Japan could thwart off the US until a negotiated peace. Having made his choice, Hirohito devoted himself to presiding over and guiding the war to victory at all costs. He was a extremely cautious person, every single campaign he looked for what could go wrong, made worse case scenario predictions and was very suspicious of reports from his high officials. He was notably very harsh and critical on said high commanders. Although he did not visit the war theaters as did other commanders in chief, he exercised and controlled influence on theater operations, both in the planning and execution whenever he chose to do so. As was the same case with the China war before it, he issued the highest military orders of the Imperial HQ, performed audited conferences and led to decisions transmitted in his name. He received generals and admirals to the imperial palace who gave full reports of the battlefront. He visited bases, battleships, various army and naval headquarters. He inspected military schools, you know the full shebang.    After 26 months of war, the naval air force had lost 26,006 aircraft, nearly a third of its total power, thousands of veteran pilots were dead. Hundreds of thousands of tons of warship was sunk, the merchant and transport fleet was crippled. Late 1943 saw the Americans turning the initiative of the war, Japan was on the defensive. Guadalcanal had been the major turning point. During the staled battle for the philippines, Hirohito pressed upon Army chief of staff Sugiyama to increase troop strength to knock out Bataan. The problem persisted, on February 9th and 26th Hirohito pressed Sugiyama again about getting more troops to take Bataan.   Hirohito was confronted with the prisoner of war issue after the doolittle raid. When the pilots were caught, Togo initially opposed executions, but many in the IJA sought all 8 men executed. Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the execution of 5 out of the 8. Why just 5, no one knows to this day, but its theorized it was to demonstrate his benevolence while simultaneously giving a bit of what the army wanted.    The CBI theater took the lionshare of his attention in 1942, he continuously pressed up Sugiyama when a final blow would be delivered against Chongqing. When the Midway disaster occurred, Hirohito was given a full report of what happened, but he chose to hid the extent of the loss from the IJA. In fact in response to the Guadalcanal campaign he was heard once asking “I wonder if this is not the start of the AmericanBritish counteroffensive?” He urged his commanders to increase offensive activities and to toss all weapons possible at the enemy, because Japan needed more time to secure its reserves of vital oil, rubber and iron. When he heard the first report of the Ichiki detachment being wiped out, he simply stated “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” With numerous reports pouring in about the men dying from tropical disease and starvation, Hirohito kept demanding greater efforts from them. Hirohito continuously applied pressure on his naval and land commanders to recapture the island. On September 15th, November 5th and November 11th he called for more IJA troops and aircraft to be allocated to it. Sugiyama was nervous about sending more IJA pilots as they were inexperienced in transoceanic combat and he sought to reinforce the north china army to hit Chongqing. Hirohito demanded it a second time and Sugiyama replied the IJA had deployed its air power instead to New Guinea and Rabaul. Hirohito continuously hammered the issue despite the high level commanders disagreeing with it. By late november it was clear guadalcanal was a lost cause.    At an imperial HQ conference on December 31st of 1942, the chiefs of staff reported they would cancel the attempts to recapture guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned it but stated “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” Hirohito forced the issue and it was decided the new strategic points would be in the solomons north of New Georgia and the Stanley range on New Guinea. Hirohito in fact threatened not to authorize the withdrawal of men from Guadalcanal until such a plan was made. Hirohito would go on to oppose the withdrawal from the Munda airfield on New Georgia since it contradicted the new defensive line. As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern solomons was crumbling, Hirohito continued to demand the navy fight decisive battles to regain the initiative so ships could begin transports supplies to the countless soldiers trapped on islands without them. When Hirohito heard of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd he stated  “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for awhile.” “Do this for me” would become his signature message.    In August of 1943 as the fall of the solomons progressed, Hirohito lambasted “Isn't there someplace where we can strike the United States? . . . When and where on earth are you [people] ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?Well, this time, after suffering all these defeats, why don't you study how not to let the Americans keep saying ‘We won! We won!'[emphasis added]”” Hirohito berated his chiefs of staff and in the face of mounting defeats he remained undismayed, rigidly self disciplined and aggressive as ever. When he received a report on September 21st of 1943 that the allies were heading for Finschhafen he replied “Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking.”   When the Americans destroyed the main naval anchorage at Truk forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind numerous tanks, the dream of fighting one great decisive naval battle in the central pacific was over.    On February 21st of 1944, Hirohito took the unprecedented action to force Sugiyama to resign so Tojo could assume his position, alongside that of army minister and prime minister. He did this to end dissent. Hirohito and Tojo oversaw the haymaker attempts in 1944, like operation Ichi-go and the Imphal campaign fall into ruins. It looked like the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Bonin islands and eventually the home islands would be invaded. When Saipan fell, the home islands had at last come into range of the dreaded B-29 Super flying fortresses. Hirohito had warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” For two days his chiefs of staff explained the dire situation on Saipan was hopeless, but Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Admiral Shimada to recapture it, the first department of the navy general staff immediately poured themselves into the problem. Day and night they worked, until a draft plan was created on June 21st, 3 days later the combined fleet gave opposition. Tojo and Shimada formally reported to Hirohito the recapture plan needed to be canceled. Hirohito refused to accept the loss of Saipan and ordered his chief aide General Hasunuma to convene in his presence the board of field marshals and fleet admirals. They all met on the 25th, upon which they all unanimously stated the reports indicating Saipan was a lost cause were valid, Hirohito simply told them to put it in writing and he left the room.    Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tojo, allowing Tojo's numerous enemies to take down his cabinet on July 18th 1944. But Hirohito was undaunted in determination to steal victory from the allies. Imperial HQ on October 18th ordered a decisive naval battle and the battle of Leyte Gulf was it. After the war Hirohito would go on the record stating “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.” This statement shows the facts as they were, Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, General Tomoyuki Yamashita to engage the American invasion force in a place Yamashita did not want to fight nor prepared adequate defenses. It was a horrible loss.   The Kamikaze attacks increased as Japan's desperation wore on. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?”  On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    Konoe re-entered the stage writing to Hirohito pleading with him to order a surrender because from his perspective “The Soviet Union is Japan's biggest threat. Defeat was inevitable, but more to be feared than defeat was the destruction of the Kokutai. Sue quickly for peace, before a Communist revolution occurred that would make preservation of the kokutai impossible”. Hirohito was taken aback by this, as he shared his military's hope that the Soviets would help Japan reach a peace settlement. So he rejected the advice of Konoe. Hirohito remarked “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.” Then Japan's intelligence units reported the Soviets were going to break the neutrality pact and join the war once the Germans were done. Meanwhile Tokyo was turned to rubble on March 9th 1945 by 334 B-29's dropping firebombs, 40% of the capital was destroyed, up to 100,000 were dead. Hirohito remained undaunted. 60 Japanese cities were leveled by firebomb campaigns. Europe's war finished. Then the battle for Okinawa was lost, suddenly Hirohito began looking for ways to end the war.   On June 22nd Hirohito personally informed the supreme war leadership council his desire to see diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. A special envoy was sent to Moscow, while Hirohito publicly issued an imperial rescript ordering the nation “to smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations and achieve the goals of the war”. B-29's began dropping leaflets with joint declarations issued by the US, UK and China requesting the citizens of Japan demand their government surrender. Prefectural governors, police chiefs and officers began submitting home ministry reports on the rapid deterioration of the nations spirit.   Germany signed the unconditional surrender documents on May 7th and 8th of 1945, Japan was alone. Newly installed President Truman declared on May 8th, Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people, but the unconditional surrender principles remained unaltered. The Japanese meanwhile were awaiting word from the Soviets. The Americans unleashed their first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th of 1945 killing up to 140,000 people. Then on August 8th the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began an invasion of Manchuria. On August 9th the second atomic bomb hit Nagasaki killing around 40,000 people.   Thus began the surrender clock as I like to say. After the first atomic bomb, Hirohito said and did nothing about the surrender terms. Hirohito then authorized Togo to notify the world on August 10th that Japan would accept the allied terms of surrender with one condition “that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.” The next day, Secretary of State Byrnes replied by alluding to the subordination of the emperors authority to the supreme commander of the allied powers. It was ambiguous as hell. The Japanese leaders erupted into arguments, and on August 14th, Hirohito went before a microphone and recorded his capitulation announcement which aired on August 15th to all in Japan, they surrendered. Why did it take so long?   The peace talks between the Japanese and Soviets went on through June, July and early August. Japan offered the Soviets limited territorial concessions and they refused to accept the envoy on July 22nd because the Japanese were being too ambiguous in their terms. There was continuous back and forth between the intelligence of Moscow and Japan trying to figure out the stance of the other, but then Stalin heard about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he was shocked and ordered an invasion of Manchuria in response. In the meantime the Japanese were tossing all sorts of concessions at Moscow, they stated they would allow Japanese to be used as forced laborers in Siberia, a form of reparation as it were, that they would demobilize the military and so on. The response was the invasion of Manchuria.    Hirohito knew prior to the bombing of Hiroshima that the cabinet was divided on accepting the Potsdam terms. Hirohito also knew he and he alone could unify governmental affairs and military command. Why then did he wait until the evening of August 9th to surrender?   The reality of the matter is its complicated, numerous variables at play, but let me try to pick at it. The people of japan under the firebomb campaigns were becoming hostile towards the military, the government and many began to criticize the emperor. Hirohito was given reports from the Home Ministry from governors and police chiefs all over Japan revealing people were speaking of the emperor as an incompetent leader who was responsible for worsening the war situation. Does that sound like a threat to the Kokutai? People were starving en masse, the atomic bomb is flashy, but what really was killing the Japanese, it was starvation. The home islands were blockaded and the sea approaches mined as pertaining to the optimally named “operation starvation”. Hirohito knew full well how bad his people were suffering but he did not surrender for so long.   After Hiroshima was bombed, Hirohito delayed for 2 days before telling Kido at 10am on August 9th “quickly control the situation, the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us”. Now here is a piece of Hirohito's surrender proclamation to the citizens of Japan    “Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable ”.   Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai. Did you know there was a rescript of this proclamation that was made to the entire IJA and IJN? Yes Emperor Hirohito gave out two different proclamations for surrender, here is what the armed forces heard.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The proclamation does not speak of the atomic weapons, but emphasizes the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Hirohito was presented as a benevolent sage and an apolitical ruler that had ended the war. Hirohito sought to justify the surrender upon the bombs to the public, but did he believe so, did his armed forces believe so? People debate to this day why the surrender occurred, I love the fact there are two message offered because both are true. Hirohito's decision to surrender was based on numerous variables, the atomic bombs, the invasion of Manchuria by the soviets, but above all else, what really was important to the man, the emperor, the god? The kokutai. The Soviets were more of a threat to the kokutai, thus Hirohito jumped into the arms of the Americans. The language between the Americans and Japanese in the communications for unconditional surrender were ambiguous, but Hirohito and the high commanders knew there was zero chance of the kokutai surviving if the Soviets invaded Japan, perhaps the Americans would allow it to continue, which is just what they ended up doing. The entire purpose of this series would to emphasize how Hirohito definitely had a active role in the war of 1931-1945, he had numerous occasions where he could put the hammer down to stop the situation from escalating. But in the end when his back was against the wall, he did what he did to cling on to the Kokutai.   I shall leave you with this. On August 12th, as Hirohito came to inform the imperial family of his decision to surrender, Prince Asaka asked him whether the war would continue if the Kokutai could not be preserved, what do you think he said? “Of Course”. 

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Elisabeth Niejahr, Geschäftsführerin der Gemeinnützigen Hertie-Stiftung, und Helene Bubrowski nähern sich der „Stadtbild-Debatte“ aus einem anderen Blickwinkel. Niejahr betont, dass öffentliche Plätze und gut gestaltete Räume Orte der Begegnung und des demokratischen Miteinanders sind. Niejahr kritisiert: „Niemand hat eine positive Visionen entwickelt, wie ein gutes Stadtbild auch aussehen könnte." Die Politik verpasse hier eine Chance. [12:57]Die BSW-Fraktion im brandenburgischen Landtag hat mit vier Abtrünnigen einen schweren Riss erlitten. Und heute wird sich zeigen, welche konkreten Auswirkungen die Spaltung hat: Im Landtag in Potsdam wird über die neuen Medienstaatsverträge abgestimmt. Eine Zustimmung ist wahrscheinlich, weil die CDU-Opposition zustimmen will. Eine eigene Mehrheit hat die SPD-BSW-Koalition vermutlich nicht.[01:30]Der deutsch-französische Gipfel zur Europäischen Digitalen Souveränität soll ein Signal für mehr Unabhängigkeit von US-Tech-Giganten und chinesischen Anbietern sein. Der Gründer und CEO von DeepL, Jarosław Kutyłowski, sieht in dem Gipfel einen Anfang. Europa, sagt er, sei durchaus nicht abgehängt bei der KI. Innovative Forschungsideen könnten das Rennen jederzeit neu aufrollen. [05:42]Hier geht es zur Anmeldung für den Space.TableTable Briefings - For better informed decisions.Sie entscheiden besser, weil Sie besser informiert sind – das ist das Ziel von Table.Briefings. Wir verschaffen Ihnen mit jedem Professional Briefing, mit jeder Analyse und mit jedem Hintergrundstück einen Informationsvorsprung, am besten sogar einen Wettbewerbsvorteil. Table.Briefings bietet „Deep Journalism“, wir verbinden den Qualitätsanspruch von Leitmedien mit der Tiefenschärfe von Fachinformationen. Professional Briefings kostenlos kennenlernen: table.media/testenHier geht es zu unseren WerbepartnernImpressum: https://table.media/impressumDatenschutz: https://table.media/datenschutzerklaerungBei Interesse an Audio-Werbung in diesem Podcast melden Sie sich gerne bei Laurence Donath: laurence.donath@table.media Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Inmitten ihrer Krise entscheidet in Potsdam die Koalition aus SPD und BSW über die Rundfunkreform. Die EU-Kommission will ihre Digitalgesetze entrümpeln. Und: Wird der zweite Teil von „Wicked“ auch ein Erfolg?

(Nov 18, 2025) As Elise Stefanik sets her sights on the governor's mansion, we take a look at her impact on New York's 21st Congressional District; the village of Potsdam is getting millions of dollars from the state to address flooding after months of community members working together to find solutions; and astronomer Aileen O'Donoghue guides us through this month's night sky.

Vor 70 Jahren, am 12. November 1955: Die Bundeswehr feiert ihren Gründungstag. Wie entstand im westlichen Teil des zerstörten Deutschlands mit seinem diktatorischen Erbe eine neue Armee der Demokratie? Darüber spricht Prof. Dr. Sönke Neitzel von der Universität Potsdam mit Oberstleutnant Michael Gutzeit aus dem ZMSBw. Die noch junge Bundesrepublik bekommt nur zehn Jahre nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wieder Streitkräfte, auch mit alten Wehrmachtssoldaten. Die Gründung der Bundeswehr markiert für Westdeutschland einen Wendepunkt auf dem Weg von Besatzung zu Bündnispolitik und westdeutscher Souveränität. Doch der Weg dorthin war hart umkämpft: Der Koreakrieg hatte den Westen unter Führung der USA alarmiert, während in Deutschland Proteste gegen eine Wiederbewaffnung aufflammten. Denn die Angst vor einem „Staat im Staate“ saß nach historischen Erfahrungen tief. Altes und NeuesIm Gespräch mit Sönke Neitzel beleuchtet die neue Zugehört-Folge die politischen, militärischen und gesellschaftlichen Spannungen während der Aufbauzeit der Bundeswehr. Besonders die ersten zwanzig Jahre nach ihrem Gründungstag liegen im Fokus, denn diese waren doch so prägend wie wenige danach. Die Entstehung der „Himmeroder Denkschrift“ als Schlüsseldokument der westdeutschen Wiederbewaffnung, aber auch der Personalgutachterausschuss und seine Arbeit demonstrieren, wie stark ehemalige Wehrmachtsangehörige am Neuaufbau der Streitkräfte beteiligt waren. Gleichzeitig entstand mit der „Inneren Führung“ das Leitbild des „Staatsbürgers in Uniform“ – ein Versuch, demokratische Verantwortung und soldatische Tradition zu verbinden. Aber die neue Führungsphilosophie war alles andere als unumstritten. Licht und SchattenDazu sprechen wir über innere Konflikte wie die Auseinandersetzung der „Leutnante von Hamburg“ mit den „Hauptleuten von Unna“. Auch Skandale und Affären werden thematisiert, wie das Iller-Unglück 1957, der Spiegel-Skandal von 1962, die Nagold-Affäre 1963, oder die von der Schnez-Studie 1969 ausgelöste Debatte. Neben allen Zweifeln der Nachkriegszeit sprechen wir aber auch über Lichtblicke, wie die Fluthilfe der Bundeswehr an der Elbe im Jahr 1962. Des Weiteren spannt die Folge einen Bogen von der Einführung der Wehrpflicht und der Atomwaffenfrage bis hin zur Ostpolitik der 1970er-Jahre, in einer Zeit, als die Bundeswehr eine Stärke von fast einer halben Millionen Soldaten erreicht. Am Ende zieht Prof. Neitzel eine Bilanz, vor allem darüber, was wir aus unserer Geschichte für unsere Gegenwart und Zukunft lernen können.

It has long been debated as to whether or not Adolf Hitler had just one testicle. Now, a new documentary on Channel 4 explores this and other intimate topics associated with the infamous dictator.Joining Seán to discuss is one of the participants, Dr. Alex Kay from the War Studies Department at the University of Potsdam.

In dieser Episode begleiten Sie Audiotraveller Henry Barchet auf eine außergewöhnliche Flusskreuzfahrt mit der „Thurgau Chopin“ – von der Kieler Förde bis zur Spree. Die Route führt durch maritime Highlights wie den Nord-Ostsee-Kanal und das Schiffshebewerk Scharnebeck. Unterwegs erwarten Sie spannende Landausflüge in Kiel, Lüneburg, Potsdam , der Autostadt in Wolfsburg und Hamburg – inklusive einem nächtlichen Besuch auf der legendären Reeperbahn. Weitere Informationen unter Thurgau Travel: Von der Förde an die Spree  

Michael Panser ist 1988 in Potsdam geboren und dort auch aufgewachsen. In seiner Jugend war er antifaschistisch organisiert und machte sich mit Freund*innen auf eine Reise nach Lateinamerika zu den Spuren revolutionärer Geschichte. Danach ging er für einige Zeit studieren, verließ dann allerdings die Universität, um sein gesamtes Leben als Studium zu begreifen. 2012 lernte er die kurdische Befreiungsbewegung und die Schriften Abdullah Öcalans kennen. Er bereiste nun alle vier Teile Kurdistans, kehrte aber immer wieder nach Europa zurück, um das Gesehene und Erlebte mit anderen zu teilen. 2015 ging Michael Panser nach Rojava und 2016 nach Şengal. 2017 entschied er sich, einen weiteren Schritt zu gehen und sich der Guerilla in den Bergen Kurdistans anzuschließen, um eine revolutionäre Persönlichkeit zu entwickeln. Im Rahmen eines breit angelegten Angriffes hat die türkischen Armee ihn am 14.12.2018 durch einen Luftschlag ermordet.Während all seiner Reisen und den verschiedenen Etappen seiner Suche führte er durchgängig Tagebuch, schrieb Gedichte ebenso wie tiefgehende politische und gesellschaftliche Analysen. Teile seiner Schriften vertonten einige Weggefährt*innen im Dezember 2020 anlässlich seines Todestages zu einer musikalischen Lesung.Termine der Lese-Reise 2025 zum neuen Buch "Werde, der du bist":1.11. Basel - Gewerkschaftshaus, Rebgasse 1 - 17 Uhr14.11. Wangen - Jugendzentrum Tonne Wangen e.V., Lindauer Straße 2 - 18 Uhr17.11. Darmstadt - Oetinger Villa, Kranichsteiner Str.81 - ab 19 KüfA, Lesung 20 Uhr26.11. Kassel - Kollektivcafé Kurbad, Sternstraße Nr.20 - 19 Uhr26.11. Pößneck - Freizeitzentrum Franz-Schubert-Straße 8 - 19 Uhr2.12. Bremen - INS GLÜCK, Vor dem Steintor 139 - 18:30 Uhr3.12. Heilbronn3.12. Hamburg - Fabrique im Gängeviertel, Valentinskamp 34A -  18:30 Uhr4.12. Neuruppin - Emil Wendland Platz 1 - 18 Uhr 4.12. Lübeck - schickSAAL*, Clemensstr. 7 - 18:30 Uhr4.12. Schwenningen - Linkes Zentrum Schwenningen, Bürkstraße 46 - 20 Uhr5.12. Kiel - Stadtteilladen Anni Wadle, Kieler Str. 12 - 18:30 Uhr5.12. Zürich - Infoladen Kasama, 8004 Zürich - 19 Uhr6.12. Bern7.12. Innsbruck9.12. Klagenfurt10.12. Graz - Die Kometin (Kulturverein) Rechbauerstraße 19a/3, 8010 Graz - 18.30 Uhr11.12. Wien12.12. Linz13.12. Ingolstadt - Solidarisches Zentrum Azad Serges, Schäffbräustraße 15, 85049 Ingolstadt - 18 Uhr14.12. Potsdam16.12. Leipzig - Körnerstraße 56 - 19 Uhr 17.12. Halle Saale - Pusch, Puschkinstraße 22 - 18 Uhr18.12. Magdeburg - in:takt, Breiter Weg 32-34 - 18 Uhr    und noch weitere.Das ist der Stand vom 13.11.2025 - googelt es am besten nochmal kurz vorher. Ihr wollt eine Lesung in eurer Stadt organisieren? Meldet euch einfach bei Buchvorstellungen_WerdeDerDuBist@riseup.netDas Buch "Werde, der du bist" mit Texten von Michael Panser: https://unrast-verlag.de/produkt/werde-der-du-bist/Mehr Infos zur Aktion von Widersetzen: https://widersetzen.com/Support the showSchickt uns Feedback an hallo-gkw@riseup.net Schickt uns Postkarten, Bücher und was immer ihr wollt an Geschichte der kommenden Welten c/o Radio BlauPaul-Gruner-Straße 6204107 Leipzig Abonniert unseren Telegram-Kanal @linkegeschichte um die Fotos zu sehen und keine Folge zu verpassen: https://t.me/linkegeschichte Folgt uns auf Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/linkegeschichte/Unterstützt diesen Podcast mit einer Spende: https://steadyhq.com/de/linkegeschichte/about

It has long been debated as to whether or not Adolf Hitler had just one testicle. Now, a new documentary on Channel 4 explores this and other intimate topics associated with the infamous dictator.Joining Seán to discuss is one of the participants, Dr. Alex Kay from the War Studies Department at the University of Potsdam.

In 1991, I began my journey as a DJ, initially in Potsdam and later in various clubs in Berlin, although there are so many venues that I can't even recall them all. My time spent at Delicious Doughnuts, where I had a six-year residency, had a profound impact on me. Since then, I've developed a preference for playing sets that span at least four hours. Throughout my career, I've witnessed a great deal and consistently strived to uphold the values of the early 1990s. I've made a conscious effort to steer clear of any form of commercialization of techno and house, and I've never been fond of the DJ cult phenomenon. Instead, I've remained focused on the music itself, supporting emerging talents and ensuring that electronic music remains connected to funk, jazz, soul, and contemporary art. And if you're convinced by my sound then it would be great if I see you at one of the irregular gigs somewhere in Potsdam or anywhere. Please check: minmon.de/category/base/dates And - I really appreciate feedback on my mixes! Thanks! Thanks!

"Womanizer für Alle"– Warum Sextoys für Frauen viel über den Stand der Emanzipation sagen und als Geschäftsmodell boomen.(Hördauer ca. 13 Minuten)Rätsel des Lebens. Wie, um Himmels willen, geschieht es, dass ein Buch, ein Artikel, ein Aufsatz zu leben beginnt? Worte, die wir geschrieben haben, trafen auf Menschen wie ein magischer Bumerang, der eben diese Menschen zu uns zurückholt?Es ist doch so: Wir schreiben ein Buch, einen Aufsatz, eine Kolumne. Der Text wird „publiziert“, dem lesenden Publikum ausgeliefert. Fremde und vertraute Menschen lesen jene Worte und Sätze, die uns Autorin oder Autor in den Sinn kamen, als wir geschrieben haben. Wir haben keine Kontrolle darüber, was unsere Leserschaft mit unseren Gedanken, Einfällen und Formulierungen anfängt. Meistens erfahren wir das nicht, manchmal aber doch.Den Text der Kolumne finden Sie hierDirk Kaesler Prof. Dr., war nach seiner Promotion und Habilitation an der Universität München von 1984 bis 1995 Professor für Allgemeine Soziologie an der Universität Hamburg, von 1995 bis zu seiner Pensionierung 2009 an der Universität Marburg. Er lebt inzwischen in Potsdam. Zu seinen Forschungs- und Publikationsschwerpunkten gehören Wissenschafts- und Religionssoziologie, Politische Soziologie, Geschichte und Theorien der Soziologie, ihre Klassiker und Hauptwerke und dabei vor allem Max Weber. Zu seinen letzten Buchveröffentlichungen gehören die 2014 im Verlag C.H. Beck erschienene Biographie „Max Weber. Preuße, Denker, Muttersohn“ und sein zusammen mit Stefanie von Wietersheim 2021 im Verlag LiteraturWissenschaft veröffentlichter Band "Schön deutsch. Eine Entdeckungsreise".2009 bis 2014 sind in "literaturkritik.de" regelmäßig seine Glossen "Abstimmungen mit  der Welt" erschienen.Stefanie von Wietersheim ist Kulturjournalistin und Buchautorin. Ihre Bildbände Frauen & ihre Refugien, Vom Glück mit Büchern zu leben und Mütter & Töchter wurden zu Klassikern ihres Genres. In ihrem Buch Grand Paris – Savoir-vivre für Insider und solche, die es werden wollen schreibt sie über ihre Wahlheimat Frankreich. Sie geht als Autorin der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung im In- und Ausland auf Reportage. Zusammen mit Dirk Kaesler veröffentlichte sie 2021 im Verlag LiteraturWissenschaft.de Schön deutsch. Eine Entdeckungsreise. Sprecher: Matthias PöhlmannAufnahme, Schnitt und Realisation Uwe Kullnick

In Städten wie Berlin oder Potsdam eine halbwegs günstige Mietwohnung zu finden, ist gering. Bietet der Immobilienkauf einen bezahlbaren Ausweg aus der Misere? Von Johannes Frewel

(Nov 7, 2025) Author Tracey Lange returned to the setting of her newest novel "What Happened to the McCrays?" and got behind-the-scenes tours of the places that her characters inhabit.

Manche schreiben Bücher oder drehen Filme, Daniel Stoyanovs Medium der Wahl für das Erzählerische ist die Musik. Mit dem neuen Album "Greetings from Soulgaria" (VÖ: 10.10.25) nimmt uns Bulgarian Cartrader mit auf einen Roadtrip – natürlich nach Bulgarien. Dort verbringt Stoyanov die ersten Lebensjahre und wächst anschließend in Deutschland auf. Mit Humor, Nostalgie und einer unbändigen Tanzfreude lässt uns Bulgarian Cartrader an seinen Geschichten teilhaben. Auf dem neuen Album, übrigens eine Anspielung an Bruce Springsteens Album "Greetings from Asbury Park, N.J.", blickt Stoyanov in seine Vergangenheit und kulturelle Herkunft zurück. Durch die herzerwärmenden Geschichten fordert er die Zuhörer*innen auf, ihre Stereotype gegenüber osteuropäischer Kultur zu hinterfragen. Musikalische Unterstützung erhält er dabei von billigen Synthesizern und einer hundertjährigen Gitarre. Daniel Stoyanov ist seit 2021 als Bulgarian Cartrader unterwegs, hat aber auch schon auf anderen Wegen musikalische Spuren hinterlassen. Zum Beispiel in den Songwriting-Credits von Peter Fox, SEEED oder Casper. Zudem war er schon als Background-Sänger, Salsa-Tänzer und ja, wenn auch nur kurz als Autohändler aktiv. Im radioeins-Kosmos ist Bulgarian Cartrader längst keine Unbekannte mehr. Schon zwei Mal spielte er mit seiner Band auf dem radioeins-Parkfest und war zu Gast im studioeins im Bikini Berlin. Am Donnerstag stattet er uns als Lokalmatador einen Besuch in Potsdam ab.

Manche schreiben Bücher oder drehen Filme, Daniel Stoyanovs Medium der Wahl für das Erzählerische ist die Musik. Mit dem neuen Album "Greetings from Soulgaria" (VÖ: 10.10.25) nimmt uns Bulgarian Cartrader mit auf einen Roadtrip – natürlich nach Bulgarien. Dort verbringt Stoyanov die ersten Lebensjahre und wächst anschließend in Deutschland auf. Mit Humor, Nostalgie und einer unbändigen Tanzfreude lässt uns Bulgarian Cartrader an seinen Geschichten teilhaben. Auf dem neuen Album, übrigens eine Anspielung an Bruce Springsteens Album "Greetings from Asbury Park, N.J.", blickt Stoyanov in seine Vergangenheit und kulturelle Herkunft zurück. Durch die herzerwärmenden Geschichten fordert er die Zuhörer*innen auf, ihre Stereotype gegenüber osteuropäischer Kultur zu hinterfragen. Musikalische Unterstützung erhält er dabei von billigen Synthesizern und einer hundertjährigen Gitarre. Daniel Stoyanov ist seit 2021 als Bulgarian Cartrader unterwegs, hat aber auch schon auf anderen Wegen musikalische Spuren hinterlassen. Zum Beispiel in den Songwriting-Credits von Peter Fox, SEEED oder Casper. Zudem war er schon als Background-Sänger, Salsa-Tänzer und ja, wenn auch nur kurz als Autohändler aktiv. Im radioeins-Kosmos ist Bulgarian Cartrader längst keine Unbekannte mehr. Schon zwei Mal spielte er mit seiner Band auf dem radioeins-Parkfest und war zu Gast im studioeins im Bikini Berlin. Am Donnerstag stattet er uns als Lokalmatador einen Besuch in Potsdam ab.

Manche schreiben Bücher oder drehen Filme, Daniel Stoyanovs Medium der Wahl für das Erzählerische ist die Musik. Mit dem neuen Album "Greetings from Soulgaria" (VÖ: 10.10.25) nimmt uns Bulgarian Cartrader mit auf einen Roadtrip – natürlich nach Bulgarien. Dort verbringt Stoyanov die ersten Lebensjahre und wächst anschließend in Deutschland auf. Mit Humor, Nostalgie und einer unbändigen Tanzfreude lässt uns Bulgarian Cartrader an seinen Geschichten teilhaben. Auf dem neuen Album, übrigens eine Anspielung an Bruce Springsteens Album "Greetings from Asbury Park, N.J.", blickt Stoyanov in seine Vergangenheit und kulturelle Herkunft zurück. Durch die herzerwärmenden Geschichten fordert er die Zuhörer*innen auf, ihre Stereotype gegenüber osteuropäischer Kultur zu hinterfragen. Musikalische Unterstützung erhält er dabei von billigen Synthesizern und einer hundertjährigen Gitarre. Daniel Stoyanov ist seit 2021 als Bulgarian Cartrader unterwegs, hat aber auch schon auf anderen Wegen musikalische Spuren hinterlassen. Zum Beispiel in den Songwriting-Credits von Peter Fox, SEEED oder Casper. Zudem war er schon als Background-Sänger, Salsa-Tänzer und ja, wenn auch nur kurz als Autohändler aktiv. Im radioeins-Kosmos ist Bulgarian Cartrader längst keine Unbekannte mehr. Schon zwei Mal spielte er mit seiner Band auf dem radioeins-Parkfest und war zu Gast im studioeins im Bikini Berlin. Am Donnerstag stattet er uns als Lokalmatador einen Besuch in Potsdam ab.

Manche schreiben Bücher oder drehen Filme, Daniel Stoyanovs Medium der Wahl für das Erzählerische ist die Musik. Mit dem neuen Album "Greetings from Soulgaria" (VÖ: 10.10.25) nimmt uns Bulgarian Cartrader mit auf einen Roadtrip – natürlich nach Bulgarien. Dort verbringt Stoyanov die ersten Lebensjahre und wächst anschließend in Deutschland auf. Mit Humor, Nostalgie und einer unbändigen Tanzfreude lässt uns Bulgarian Cartrader an seinen Geschichten teilhaben. Auf dem neuen Album, übrigens eine Anspielung an Bruce Springsteens Album "Greetings from Asbury Park, N.J.", blickt Stoyanov in seine Vergangenheit und kulturelle Herkunft zurück. Durch die herzerwärmenden Geschichten fordert er die Zuhörer*innen auf, ihre Stereotype gegenüber osteuropäischer Kultur zu hinterfragen. Musikalische Unterstützung erhält er dabei von billigen Synthesizern und einer hundertjährigen Gitarre. Daniel Stoyanov ist seit 2021 als Bulgarian Cartrader unterwegs, hat aber auch schon auf anderen Wegen musikalische Spuren hinterlassen. Zum Beispiel in den Songwriting-Credits von Peter Fox, SEEED oder Casper. Zudem war er schon als Background-Sänger, Salsa-Tänzer und ja, wenn auch nur kurz als Autohändler aktiv. Im radioeins-Kosmos ist Bulgarian Cartrader längst keine Unbekannte mehr. Schon zwei Mal spielte er mit seiner Band auf dem radioeins-Parkfest und war zu Gast im studioeins im Bikini Berlin. Am Donnerstag stattet er uns als Lokalmatador einen Besuch in Potsdam ab.

Achtung (Werbung in eigener Sache):  Jetzt mein neues Buch (in Co-Produktion mit Prof. Dr. Johanna Bath): "Die perfekte Employee Journey & Experience" bestellen (erschienen Oktober 2025): Springer: https://link.springer.com/book/9783662714195 Amazon: https://bit.ly/44aajaP Thalia: https://www.thalia.de/shop/home/artikeldetails/A1074960417 Dieses Fachbuch stellt die wichtigsten Elemente der Employee Journey vor – vom Pre-Boarding bis zum Offboarding – und erläutert, wie Verantwortliche in Unternehmen eine gelungene Employee Experience realisieren und nachhaltig verankern können.   Mein Gast: Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes (CEO & Co-Founder von Zortify, Gründungsprofessor für Digital HR und Leadership an der XU Exponential University of Applied Sciences in Potsdam) Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes ist CEO & Co-Founder von Zortify, einem mehrfach ausgezeichneten Unternehmen, das mit KI-gestützten HR-Diagnostiken neue Maßstäbe in der Personalauswahl, Teamentwicklung und im Bereich Leadership setzt. Seine Mission: HR-Professionals mit datenbasierten Insights zu befähigen, bessere und zugleich menschlichere Entscheidungen im Recruiting und in der Personalentwicklung zu treffen. Parallel zu seiner Tätigkeit als Unternehmer ist Florian Gründungsprofessor für Digital HR und Leadership an der XU Exponential University of Applied Sciences in Potsdam. Die Verbindung von Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch seine Arbeit – insbesondere im Bereich Diagnostik, wo wissenschaftliche Fundierung und praktische Anwendung untrennbar miteinander verbunden sind. Mit seinem Buch „Revolution? Ja, bitte. Wenn Old-School-Führung auf New-Work-Leadership trifft" hat er eindrucksvoll gezeigt, wie sehr sich Führungskultur verändern muss, um Wandel, Diversität und Empowerment wirklich zu leben. Welchen Einfluss KI-gestützte Eignungsdiagnostik dabei nehmen kann, bespreche ich nun mit Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes hier in der heutigen Podcastfolge.   Thema: Mit Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes habe ich in der GainTalents-Podcastfolge 425 über das Thema KI in der Eignungsdiagnostik besprochen. Florian bietet als Co-Founder von Zortify eine spannende Lösung diesbezüglich und wir haben uns über das Zortify-Verfahren und weitere Dinge im Kontext von KI in der Eignungsdiagnostik ausgetauscht. Herzlichen Dank an Florian für dieses sehr gute Gespräch und auch für die sehr guten Insights zum Thema.   Was können moderne, KI-gestützte Verfahren der Eignungsdiagnostik heute bieten? fairer und effizienter als gängige Verfahren berücksichtigt den EU-AI-Act in vollem Umfang Selbsteinschätzung durch Online-Befragung (Fragen mit Auswahlantworten sowie Fragen, bei denen Freitext als Antwort eingegeben werden muss) verwendet werden nur aktive Daten der Probanden (keine anderen Daten stehen der KI zur Verfügung oder werden analysiert!) Evaluiert werden: Big 5 - Persönlichkeitseigenschaften Unternehmerisches Kapital (Optimismus, Resilienz, Selbstwirksamkeit, Agility Mindset) Kontraproduktive Verhaltenstendenzen (Dunkle Triade: Impulsivität, Taktisch-Manipulativ, Selbstbezogenheit) was und wie es gemessen wird, ist entscheidend - soziale Erwünschtheit (Bias) wird durch die Kombination von Fragen mit vorgegebenen Antworten und Freitextantworten ausgehebelt Idealerweise erfolgt im Recruiting erst die Diagnostik und dann das Tiefeninterview   #KI #AI #HRTech #PeopleAnalytics #Eignungsdiagnostik #DataDrivenHR #Recruiting #Talententwicklung #NewLeadership #CandidateExperience #EmployeeExperience #HRInnovation #GainTalentspodcast   Links Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/florianfeltes/ Webseite: https://zortify.com/de/ Artikel Harvard Business Manager: https://hubs.ly/Q03QJdnM0 OMR Reviews Zortify: https://omr.com/de/reviews/product/zortify  Links Hans-Heinz Wisotzky:  Website: https://www.gaintalents.com/podcast und https://www.gaintalents.com/blog Podcast: https://www.gaintalents.com/podcast Bücher: Neu (seit Oktober 2025 verfügbar): Die perfekte Employee Journey und Experience https://link.springer.com/book/9783662714195 Erste Buch: Die perfekte Candidate Journey und Experience https://www.gaintalents.com/buch-die-perfekte-candidate-journey-und-experience   LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/hansheinzwisotzky/ LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/gaintalents XING https://www.xing.com/profile/HansHeinz_Wisotzky/cv Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GainTalents Instagram https://www.instagram.com/gain.talents/ Youtube https://bit.ly/2GnWMFg  

Achtung (Werbung in eigener Sache):  Jetzt mein neues Buch (in Co-Produktion mit Prof. Dr. Johanna Bath): "Die perfekte Employee Journey & Experience" bestellen (erschienen Oktober 2025): Springer: https://link.springer.com/book/9783662714195 Amazon: https://bit.ly/44aajaP Thalia: https://www.thalia.de/shop/home/artikeldetails/A1074960417 Dieses Fachbuch stellt die wichtigsten Elemente der Employee Journey vor – vom Pre-Boarding bis zum Offboarding – und erläutert, wie Verantwortliche in Unternehmen eine gelungene Employee Experience realisieren und nachhaltig verankern können.   Mein Gast: Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes (CEO & Co-Founder von Zortify, Gründungsprofessor für Digital HR und Leadership an der XU Exponential University of Applied Sciences in Potsdam) Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes ist CEO & Co-Founder von Zortify, einem mehrfach ausgezeichneten Unternehmen, das mit KI-gestützten HR-Diagnostiken neue Maßstäbe in der Personalauswahl, Teamentwicklung und im Bereich Leadership setzt. Seine Mission: HR-Professionals mit datenbasierten Insights zu befähigen, bessere und zugleich menschlichere Entscheidungen im Recruiting und in der Personalentwicklung zu treffen. Parallel zu seiner Tätigkeit als Unternehmer ist Florian Gründungsprofessor für Digital HR und Leadership an der XU Exponential University of Applied Sciences in Potsdam. Die Verbindung von Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch seine Arbeit – insbesondere im Bereich Diagnostik, wo wissenschaftliche Fundierung und praktische Anwendung untrennbar miteinander verbunden sind. Mit seinem Buch „Revolution? Ja, bitte. Wenn Old-School-Führung auf New-Work-Leadership trifft" hat er eindrucksvoll gezeigt, wie sehr sich Führungskultur verändern muss, um Wandel, Diversität und Empowerment wirklich zu leben. Welchen Einfluss KI-gestützte Eignungsdiagnostik dabei nehmen kann, bespreche ich nun mit Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes hier in der heutigen Podcastfolge.   Thema: Mit Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes habe ich in der GainTalents-Podcastfolge 425 über das Thema KI in der Eignungsdiagnostik besprochen. Florian bietet als Co-Founder von Zortify eine spannende Lösung diesbezüglich und wir haben uns über das Zortify-Verfahren und weitere Dinge im Kontext von KI in der Eignungsdiagnostik ausgetauscht. Herzlichen Dank an Florian für dieses sehr gute Gespräch und auch für die sehr guten Insights zum Thema.   Was können moderne, KI-gestützte Verfahren der Eignungsdiagnostik heute bieten? fairer und effizienter als gängige Verfahren berücksichtigt den EU-AI-Act in vollem Umfang Selbsteinschätzung durch Online-Befragung (Fragen mit Auswahlantworten sowie Fragen, bei denen Freitext als Antwort eingegeben werden muss) verwendet werden nur aktive Daten der Probanden (keine anderen Daten stehen der KI zur Verfügung oder werden analysiert!) Evaluiert werden: Big 5 - Persönlichkeitseigenschaften Unternehmerisches Kapital (Optimismus, Resilienz, Selbstwirksamkeit, Agility Mindset) Kontraproduktive Verhaltenstendenzen (Dunkle Triade: Impulsivität, Taktisch-Manipulativ, Selbstbezogenheit) was und wie es gemessen wird, ist entscheidend - soziale Erwünschtheit (Bias) wird durch die Kombination von Fragen mit vorgegebenen Antworten und Freitextantworten ausgehebelt Idealerweise erfolgt im Recruiting erst die Diagnostik und dann das Tiefeninterview   #KI #AI #HRTech #PeopleAnalytics #Eignungsdiagnostik #DataDrivenHR #Recruiting #Talententwicklung #NewLeadership #CandidateExperience #EmployeeExperience #HRInnovation #GainTalentspodcast   Links Prof. Dr. Florian Feltes LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/florianfeltes/ Webseite: https://zortify.com/de/ Artikel Harvard Business Manager: https://hubs.ly/Q03QJdnM0 OMR Reviews Zortify: https://omr.com/de/reviews/product/zortify  Links Hans-Heinz Wisotzky:  Website: https://www.gaintalents.com/podcast und https://www.gaintalents.com/blog Podcast: https://www.gaintalents.com/podcast Bücher: Neu (seit Oktober 2025 verfügbar): Die perfekte Employee Journey und Experience https://link.springer.com/book/9783662714195 Erste Buch: Die perfekte Candidate Journey und Experience https://www.gaintalents.com/buch-die-perfekte-candidate-journey-und-experience   LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/hansheinzwisotzky/ LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/gaintalents XING https://www.xing.com/profile/HansHeinz_Wisotzky/cv Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GainTalents Instagram https://www.instagram.com/gain.talents/ Youtube https://bit.ly/2GnWMFg  

Er ist der Pokerface-Werwolf im Schlachthof, der Fledermausmann aus Spandau, und er trinkt Karottensaft im Vollmondschein. Mit dem Schauspieler und Drehbuchautoren reden wir über die erste Reality-Show der ARD, über Sagowürmer in Malaysia, über Stachelrochen, Haie, Nasenaffen und die Todesstrafe in Brunei. Ein wilder Ritt der Diversität von Potsdam bis Paris.

Lübeck, Rostock, Potsdam y Ratisbona

Ein Vortrag des Militärsoziologen Heiko BiehlModeration: Katrin Ohlendorf**********Die Diskussion um die Bundeswehr und die Wehrpflicht läuft schon lange. Angesichts des Ukraine-Kriegs hat sie noch mehr an Fahrt aufgenommen. Was steckt hinter den Argumenten für Pflicht oder Freiwilligkeit? Ein Vortrag des Militärsoziologen Heiko Biehl.Heiko Biehl ist Politikwissenschaftler und Soziologe. Er leitet den Forschungsbereich Militärsoziologie am Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr (ZMSBw) in Potsdam. Seinen Vortrag "Die Wehrpflicht — mehr als ein Rekrutierungstool? Thesen und Befunde zu einer Form des militärischen Dienstes" hat er am 30. September 2025 gehalten, also noch bevor die erzielte Einigung zum Wehrdienst zwischen Union und SPD wieder geplatzt war. Den Vortrag hat das Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (HIS) veranstaltet.**********Schlagworte: +++ Deutschlandfunk Nova +++ DLF +++ Hörsaal +++ Vortrag +++ Bundeswehr +++ Heer +++ Armee +++ Militär +++ Verteidigung +++ Sicherheitspolitik +++ Krieg +++ Wehrpflicht +++ Wehrdienst +++ Freiwilligkeit +++ Freiwilligenarmee +++ Boris Pistorius +++ Rekruten +++ Rekrutinnen +++ Soldaten +++ Soldatinnen +++ NATO +++ Militärsoziologie +++**********Ihr hört in diesem Hörsaal:00:01:55 - Beginn des Vortrags00:07:00 - Die zentralen Fragen des Vortrags00:08:28 - Die Rolle der Wehrpflicht für das Verhältnis der Bürger*innen zum Staat00:18:50 - Die Auswirkungen der Wehrpflicht auf die Sicherheitspolitik und die Kriegsführung00:29:00 - Die Erkenntnisse der Militärsoziologie über die Wirkung der Wehrpflicht00:44:20 - Fazit00:45:55 - Vorschau auf die nächste Hörsaal-Folge**********Quellen aus der Folge:Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline (Hg.): Debatten um die Wehrpflicht. Friedensethik nach der Zeitenwende, Band 2. (2025)Graf, Timo (2025): Deutschland in der militärischen Führungsrolle? Forschungsbericht 139. Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2025.Elbe. Martin (2023): Bewerberstudie 2022. Vom anfänglichen Interesse bis zur abgeschlossenen Bewerbung bei der Bundeswehr.Heiko Biehl/Bastian Giegerich/Alexandra Jonas: Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht. Erfahrungen und Lehren westlicher Partnerstaaten. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Nr. 48, 61. Jg., 2011. S. 32-38**********Mehr zum Thema bei Deutschlandfunk Nova:Sicherheitspolitik: Deutschland und Europa im WeltordnungskonfliktBundeswehr: Neuer Wehrdienst - Mehr Soldaten, mehr Chaos?Frauen an der Waffe: Die erste Frau in der Bundeswehr 1975**********Den Artikel zum Stück findet ihr hier.**********Ihr könnt uns auch auf diesen Kanälen folgen: TikTok und Instagram .

Das Einhorn stand in der Kunst zunächst für Christus und wurde auf Altarbildern oft mit einer Jungfrau gezeigt. Damit sei es zum Symbol der Keuschheit geworden, so Michael Philipp. Er hat die Ausstellung "Faszination Einhorn" in Potsdam kuratiert. Philipp, Michael www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Studio 9

Reber, Simone www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de, Fazit

durée : 00:10:47 - Le Fil de l'histoire - par : Stéphanie Duncan - Comment faire céder l'empire du soleil levant ? En juillet 1945, à la conférence de Potsdam qui réunit les dirigeants des 3 pays vainqueurs, le nouveau président américain Harry Truman, en aparté, informe Staline que son pays possède une arme secrète nouvelle d'une puissance inédite... - invités : Olivier WIEVIORKA - Olivier Wieviorka : Historien, professeur à l'École normale supérieure de Cachan - réalisé par : Claire DESTACAMP Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

(Oct 20, 2025) About 7 million people across the country took to the streets over the weekend to protest the Trump Administration, including more than a thousand people in Potsdam; a private group chat is having big consequences for Republicans around the country and in New York; and sit down with a local philosopher and Quaker to talk about what makes for effective demonstrations. 

(Oct 20, 2025) On today's Story of the Day, we hear from Trump opponents and supporters who attended Saturday's "No Kings" rally in Potsdam. Also, a jury has convicted one former corrections officer and acquitted two others of murdering inmate Robert Brooks at Marcy Correctional Facility last year.

Die ehemalige Welttorhüterin und heutige Trainerin spricht mit Arnd Zeigler u.a. über ihre Kindheit und Jugend in einer Sportlerfamilie, den Weg an die Weltspitze, die größten Erfolge sowie über den bedeutendsten Patzer ihrer Karriere. Außerdem geht es um die extrem positive Entwicklung des Frauenfußballs in den letzten Jahren, den wichtigsten Losentscheid ihres Lebens und die Wünsche für die Zukunft. Von Arnd Zeigler.

In the second of our episodes based on the topics discussed at the conference “Addressing the Risks and Responses to Climate Overshoot”, organised by the AXA Research Fund, CEPR, and Paris School of Economics, Tim Phillips talks to Matthias Kalkuhl of the University of Potsdam about how to remove carbon from the atmosphere. The innovative technologies that might be able to do this in the future need investment now – so one idea is for firms to buy the right to emit carbon now, as long as they commit to remove carbon when mature technology exists. But to administer this, Europe would need a dedicated Carbon Central Bank. Who would be in charge of it, how would it work, and is any politician brave enough to set it up?

(Oct 3, 2025) Two colleges in the region have lost funding for a federal college prep program; we revisit an audio postcard from a sailing trip with Potsdam's Jim Benvenuto, who died in a motorcycle accident a couple weeks ago; and ahead of this weekend's World Cup mountain biking races in Lake Placid, we listen back to a story about the races last fall.

La nouvelle inquiétante est tombée mercredi 24 septembre : une septième limite planétaire a été franchie cette année, sur les neuf existantes. Dans son rapport annuel baptisé « Planetary Health Check », l'Institut de recherche de Potsdam sur les effets du changement climatique (PIK) annonce que l'acidification des océans a désormais dépassé un seuil critique.Ce phénomène est le résultat de l'augmentation des émissions de CO2 dans l'atmosphère, résultant des activités humaines. Les océans, surchargés par ces émissions, n'arrivent plus à digérer le CO2 et s'acidifient, mettant en danger les écosystèmes qu'ils abritent.Au-delà de l'acidification des océans, il existe huit autres « limites planétaires », identifiées par les chercheurs du PIK, dont le changement climatique, l'érosion de la biodiversité ou encore la pollution chimique.Comment ces limites ont-elles été définies ? Quelles conséquences si elles sont franchies ? Font-elles l'objet d'un consensus dans la communauté scientifique ? Réponses dans cet épisode de « L'Heure du Monde » avec Audrey Garric, journaliste au service Planète du Monde.Un épisode d'Audrey Travère et Adélaïde Tenaglia. Réalisation : Florentin Baume. Présentation et suivi éditorial : Jean-Guillaume Santi. Rédaction en chef : Adèle Ponticelli.Cet épisode a été diffusé le 2 octobre 2025---Assistez au cours du soir de notre chroniqueuse judiciaire Pascale Robert Diard sur les coulisses des grands procès qu'elle a couverts et les mécanismes de la justice Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Ein Vortrag von Carlo Masala, Universität der Bundeswehr München Moderation: Katja Weber ********** Mit Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und der Abkehr der Vereinigten Staaten vom Verteidigungsbündnis Nato muss Deutschland seine Rolle neu definieren. Eine Analyse und ein Ausblick des Verteidigungsexperten Carlo Masala. Carlo Masala ist Professor für für Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik an der Universität der Bundeswehr München und Direktor des Metis Instituts für Strategie und Vorausschau. Seinen Vortrag hat er am 23. September 2025 in Potsdam gehalten, auf Einladung des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr. Der Titel: "Zwischen Putin und Trump. Wie weiter mit der deutschen und europäischen Sicherheitspolitik?" ********** +++ Carlo Masala +++ Sicherheitspolitik +++ Verteidigung +++ Nato +++ Russland +++**********VeranstaltungstippWir sind beim Silbersalz-Festival dabei! Vom 29. Oktober bis 2. November in Halle (Saale). Hier geht's zum ganzen Programm**********Ihr hört in diesem Hörsaal:00:02:52 - Vortragsbeginn: Wie verändern sich die internationalen Beziehungen? Und: Was bedeutet das für Deutschland und Europa?00:26:55 - Wie reagiert Deutschland darauf? Welche Baustellen gibt es?00:38:42 - Offene Fragen**********Quellen aus der Folge:Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Sabine Fischer: Moskaus Verhandlungsoffensive.Bundeswehr: Bevölkerungsbefragung 2025: Deutschland in der militärischen Führungsrolle?Nato-Vertragstext**********Mehr zum Thema bei Deutschlandfunk Nova:Sicherheitspolitik: Europas Umgang mit Russlands AggressionInternationale Politik: Und jetzt? Europa in einer neuen WeltordnungUkraine: "Dieser Krieg untergräbt die internationale Sicherheitsordnung"**********Den Artikel zum Stück findet ihr hier.**********Ihr könnt uns auch auf diesen Kanälen folgen: TikTok und Instagram .

Une septième limite planétaire – sur neuf - vient d'être franchie, celle de l'acidification des océans, selon l'Institut de recherche de Potsdam qui suit l'évolution de ces mesures. Mais que signifie exactement ce concept ? La spécialiste Natacha Gondran répond dans le Point J. Caroline Stevan Réalisation : Brian Lanni

Die Sonne schickt Licht und Wärme ins All, aber auch geladene Teilchen: den Sonnenwind. Wird der Wind zum Sturm, kann das unsere Technik lahmlegen - und Astronauten gefährden. Das macht die Vorhersage des "Weltraumwetters" wichtig. Ein Podcast von David Globig. Wir freuen uns, von Euch zu hören: WhatsApp (https://wa.me/491746744240) oder iq@br.de Autor und Sprecher dieser Folge: David Globig Technik: Seed Redaktion: Sarah Bioly Unsere InterviewpartnerInnen: Prof. Yuri Shprits: GFZ Helmholtz-Zentrum für Geoforschung in Potsdam, https://www.gfz.de/staff/yuri.shprits Dr. Thomas Berger: Physiker, Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt DLR in Köln, https://www.dlr.de/de/blog/autorinnen-und-autoren/thomas-berger Dr. Jens Berdermann: Institut für Solar-Terrestrische Physik in Neustrelitz, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt DLR, https://www.dlr.de/de/so Prof. Sami Solanki: Max-Planck-Instituts für Sonnensystemforschung in München, https://www.mpg.de/360140/sonnensystemforschung-solanki Zum Weiterhören: Gibt es Aliens? | Astronomie-Spezial (1) https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/urn:ard:episode:64a7c922242a4ba0/ Leben wir im Multiversum? | Astronomie-Spezial (2) https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/urn:ard:episode:2f2740c42b963b89/ Der Anfang des Universums - Gab es den Urknall doch nicht? | Astronomie-Spezial (3) https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/urn:ard:episode:6d7bcab40f8b2bdc/ Falls Euch der IQ-Podcast gefällt, freuen wir uns über eine gute Bewertung, einen freundlichen Kommentar und ein Abo. Und wenn Ihr unseren Podcast unterstützen wollt, empfehlt uns gerne weiter! IQ verpasst? Hier könnt ihr die letzten Folgen hören: https://1.ard.de/IQWissenschaft

Idan Dershowitz joined the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University in 2024. Previously, he was a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows and served as Director of the School of Jewish Theology and Chair of Hebrew Bible at the University of Potsdam. His current research focuses on the evolution of biblical religion, the techniques employed by biblical scribes and editors, and the development of AI tools to trace the origins of ancient texts.

Subduction zones can be very long-lived, persisting for tens of even hundreds of millions of years. During that time they rarely stay still, but instead retreat, advance, move laterally, or reverse direction. In the podcast, Claudio Faccenna discusses the processes that govern these movements. It turns out that they depend not only on the properties of the subducting slab, but also on the environment, including the proximity of other subduction zones.Faccenna has been studying how convergent margins evolve for over 30 years, concentrating particularly on the Mediterranean region.  He is Head of the lithospheric dynamics section at the Helmholtz Center for Geosciences at GFZ in Potsdam in Germany and also a Professor at the Department of Science at Roma Tre University.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

“World War II was a brilliant work of American strategy, productivity, and courage and sacrifice. And the result was we destroyed the greatest threat to mankind, and we did it as economically as we could in American cost and lives,” Victor Davis Hanson says. He also addresses why the U.S. allied with the Soviet Union during the war: "We fought World War II and won the war, and we came away with losing very few soldiers. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union had no intention … of honoring their commitments made both at Yalta and then before the Japanese theater had ended at Potsdam. “But nevertheless, when the war was over, the United States was the preeminent power in the world—except for Britain—had lost fewer combatants than any of the major three allies, Britain, the United States, Russia, and China as well, and had lost fewer than Japan and Germany. “So, we fought that war very economically by giving material aid to the Soviet Union, who used their manpower and lost 20 million people to kill three out of every four German soldiers. “That's not an argument that you like the Soviet Union. I detest the Soviet Union. But it's an argument that in the ability of the United States to defeat Germany in 1941, it was a wise military strategy to use a third party to kill the German army, kill it off, and that's what happened, it was a success."

In addition to the United States, several key European governments continue to provide intelligence and arms to the Israeli military—support that enables the ongoing genocide in Gaza and obstructs the path toward a political solution. Germany is among these governments, and its complicity is particularly striking given its own history of genocides in the 20th century. In a recent article for Middle East Eye titled “As Gaza becomes a death camp, German complicity reveals the West's racist biopolitics,” Dr. Jürgen Mackert analyzes how this ideology determines who is deemed worthy of life and resources, and who is not. Dr. Mackert is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Potsdam, Germany, and the author of several works. His most recent book, On Social Closure: Theorizing Exclusion, Exploitation, and Elimination, explores the mechanisms by which societies create and enforce boundaries of belonging.

(Aug 29, 2025) Sen. Chuck Schumer says the ROTC program at Clarkson University in Potsdam will not shut down, a reversal of a previous Army announcement; a volunteer who works with children who have been abused shares why the work is valuable to him; NY-21's Elise Stefanik addressed concerns that ICE recruitment would take away from local police hires; we tag along with Emily Russell for a trail run in the Mediterranean; and, a preview of the Northern Current Music Festival in Saranac Lake.

(Aug 28, 2025) Clinton Community College started classes at its new campus this week, now sharing space with SUNY Plattsburgh. Students and employees say the move is bittersweet. Also: The Army is doing an about-face and keeping open the R-O-T-C program based at Clarkson University in Potsdam.

durée : 00:10:47 - Le Fil de l'histoire - par : Stéphanie Duncan - Comment faire céder l'empire du soleil levant ? En juillet 1945, à la conférence de Potsdam qui réunit les dirigeants des 3 pays vainqueurs, le nouveau président américain Harry Truman, en aparté, informe Staline que son pays possède une arme secrète nouvelle d'une puissance inédite... - invités : Olivier WIEVIORKA - Olivier Wieviorka : Historien, professeur à l'École normale supérieure de Cachan - réalisé par : Claire DESTACAMP Vous aimez ce podcast ? Pour écouter tous les autres épisodes sans limite, rendez-vous sur Radio France.

En el verano de 1945 el imperio japonés se encontraba ante una situación insostenible tras la derrota de Alemania, que durante toda la guerra había sido su principal apoyo. Esto permitía a los aliados, especialmente a EEUU, concentrar todos sus recursos en el Pacífico y redoblar el esfuerzo para rendir a Japón. A pesar de que la fuerza aérea aliada había realizado devastadores bombardeos con bombas convencionales, como los de Tokio en el mes de marzo, el Gobierno japonés, dominado por la facción más militarista del régimen imperial, rechazaba la rendición incondicional que le exigía EEUU. Lo cierto es que, aunque en el curso de la guerra Japón había perdido territorios, su imperio aún abarcaba desde Manchuria hasta Indonesia. Incluía Corea, partes de China, Indochina y muchas islas del Pacífico. Entretanto, la Unión Soviética de Stalin permanecía neutral para evitar abrirse un segundo frente. En la conferencia de Potsdam, que se celebró entre julio y agosto de 1945, los aliados exigieron la rendición incondicional de Japón advirtiendo a su Gobierno que, de no ser así, el país sería destruido. En Japón ignoraron el ultimátum, lo que llevó al presidente de Estados Unidos, en aquel entonces Harry Truman, a decidirse por el uso de la bomba atómica que acababa de ser desarrollada en el Proyecto Manhattan. De este proyecto, en origen concebido para Alemania, salieron dos bombas a las que bautizaron "Little Boy" y "Fat Man”. Ambas estaban operativas. En julio se realizó en el desierto de Nuevo México la prueba Trinity que confirmó la viabilidad de "Fat Man”, una bomba de plutonio algo más compleja que su hermana. La "Little Boy” era de uranio y no se ensayó previamente porque el equipo científico estaba completamente seguro que funcionaría. La decisión de usar las bombas no fue unánime. Truman justificó su empleo para evitar una invasión terrestre, la Operación Downfall, que estimaban que costaría entre 250.000 y un millón de bajas aliadas. Los números los calcularon tomando como referencia las numerosas bajas en la batalla de Okinawa. Pero generales de alto rango como Dwight Eisenhower y William Leahy se opusieron. Creían que Japón ya estaba derrotado por el bloqueo naval y los bombardeos convencionales. Pero el lanzamiento tenía también un propósito geopolítico, el de demostrar superioridad tecnológica estadounidense ante la Unión Soviética. Se escogieron los objetivos y, con todo listo, el 6 de agosto "Little Boy" fue lanzada desde un avión B-29 llamado Enola Gay sobre Hiroshima. Tres días más tarde y como Japón no se rendía, se lanzó"Fat Man" sobre la ciudad de Nagasaki. Los ataques fueron devastadores. Ocasionaron la muerte de entre 150.000 y 250.000 personas y ambas ciudades quedaron completamente destruidas. Los supervivientes sufrieron algo desconocido hasta entonces, el síndrome de irradiación aguda que terminó provocando muchas más muertes y sufrimiento a cientos de miles de personas durante años. Pero las bombas consiguieron su objetivo. Eso y que los soviéticos declararon la guerra a Japón el 8 de agosto. Una semana después, el 15 de agosto, el emperador Hirohito anunció públicamente que aceptaba la declaración de Potsdam. Japón se rindió oficialmente el 2 de septiembre a bordo del acorazado Missouri fondeado en la bahía de Tokio. La rendición supuso el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, dio comienzo a la ocupación estadounidense de Japón y marcó el surgimiento de Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética como superpotencias. Pese a que la guerra terminase con estas dos bombas atómicas, el debate ético sobre si se debieron lanzar o no persiste hasta nuestros días. Unos justifican los bombardeos como un mal necesario para evitar una invasión muy costosa en vidas. Otros creen que fueron crímenes de guerra inaceptables. En El ContraSello: 0:00 Introducción 4:22 La bomba de Hiroshima 1:23:00 La reunificación de Suiza 1:26:50 La Biblia en castellano Bibliografía - "La segunda guerra mundial" de Antony Beevor - https://amzn.to/4mp95Ah - "Hiroshima" de John Hersey - https://amzn.to/45PphnH - "Hiroshima" de Agustín Rivera - https://amzn.to/4fWkDc8 - "Flores de verano" de Tamiki Hara - https://amzn.to/4fJUU6s · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “Contra la Revolución Francesa”… https://amzn.to/4aF0LpZ · “Hispanos. Breve historia de los pueblos de habla hispana”… https://amzn.to/428js1G · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #hiroshima #nagasaki Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

We just finished our Adventures by Disney in Germany, where we spent seven full days exploring Munich, Nuremberg, Rothenburg, Potsdam, and Berlin. We toured Neuschwanstein (the castle that inspired Disney Castles), Dachau Concentration Camp, significant historic sites, palaces, and so much more throughout the trip, making some of the best memories that will last a […] The post Germany Adventures by Disney | Trip Report appeared first on Addicted to the Mouse.