Podcast appearances and mentions of justice brennan

Should presidents be immune from prosecution? If yes, under what circumstances? Stanford Professor Michael McConnell, a former federal judge, joins Pam Karlan for a discussion on presidential immunity, the Constitution, and former president Trump's cases. In this insightful episode, they discuss the implications of the Supreme Court's stance on criminal versus civil liabilities for presidents, the political ramifications of prosecutorial actions, and the historical context of executive power under the U.S. Constitution.

Sarah and David discuss the laws of war in response to Israel's successful hostage rescue operation in Gaza before turning to the latest First Amendment drama from the 1st Circuit. The Agenda: —Laws of war and the Israeli hostage rescue operation —Materially disruptive speech and t-shirts —Health check on the Constitution —Far-right says freedoms are under attack Show Notes: —David's critique of Israel in the NYT —Angry cheerleader case —Justice Brennan opinion in 1970s book banning case —Tinker v. Des Moines Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Can Congress require China-based ByteDance to divest itself of TikTok as a condition for TikTok continuing to be easily accessible in the US? Alan Rozenshtein, Jane Bambauer, and Eugene Volokh discuss whether the law is consistent with the First Amendment – and with the much more rarely talked about Bill of Attainder Clause. To view the full transcript of this episode, read below: Free Speech Unmuted Eugene Volokh: Hello, welcome to Free Speech Unmuted from the Hoover Institution. I'm your co host Eugene Volokh, now basically emeritus from UCLA Law School and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Jane Bambauer: I'm Jane Bamberger, the Breckner Eminent Scholar and Professor of Law at University of Florida. And today we have with us Alan Rosenstein. So Alan, tell us, tell us about yourself and correct my pronunciation of your name if I just butchered it. Alan Rozenshtein: Sure. it's Rosenstein, but I, don't, I don't, wait, Eugene Volokh: wait, a minute. You, spell it Alan Rozenshtein: Rosenstein. I can't, I, I cannot, I am not responsible for my parents immigration choices. Eugene Volokh: Exactly. So Alan and I. are both of Russian Jewish extraction. I was actually born in Kiev and it came here when I was, seven. Alan's parents are from, from Russia. I don't know the former Soviet union, but he was born very [00:01:00] shortly after they came. So there is always this question of how you, how you transliterate the relic names into something that Americans can pronounce. And I, I'm not sure either of our parents did a great job with that. mu much as we love them on this particular point, they may have aired. Alan Rozenshtein: it's funny because both of our names have these silent Hs and I like to joke that there's a STL somewhere that's missing an H. There you go. Found its way into my name. It's s. Eugene Volokh: But I'm sorry to have interrupted, Alan, tell us about yourself. Alan Rozenshtein: Sure. I'm an associate professor of law at the University of Minnesota where I've taught now for seven years. And I am also a senior editor at Lawfare where I do a lot of my writing on the sorts of topics that we're going to talk about today. and before that, I was a, attorney at the Department of Justice in the law and policy section of the National Security Division. Jane Bambauer: Yeah, so we're here today to talk about the tick tock ban or so called tick tock [00:02:00] ban it will see what, whether it actually, you know what its future actually has in store. But can you tell us a little bit about the law that was passed by Congress and signed by President Biden and then. We'll figure out what the free speech issues are. Alan Rozenshtein: Sure. So the law and, this is actually one of these, cases where Congress did not use a backer name for some reason, it's the protect Americans from foreign adversary controlled applications act. So it's perfect. Jane Bambauer: Yeah. Which is, Alan Rozenshtein: which is not great. which is not great. So we're just going to tell, I'm going to call it the tick talk law. so this was a law that was introduced in the house as part of the, bipartisan select committee on China, sailed through the house, a few months ago, surprising a lot of people how quickly it went through. It seemed to stall in the Senate for a while, but then for a number of reasons, including some changes made to the [00:03:00] law and then the broader, foreign aid package that went through. To assistance to Ukraine, Israel in particular, this was, signed or enacted by Congress and signed the law by the president. I think late last month, and the law, is sometimes called a, it's called by its supporters as a divestment law, it's called by its opponents as a ban law. Basically what it does is it requires bite dance. The Chinese company that owns approximately 20 percent of TikTok to, divest itself of TikTok. And if it doesn't do so within a little less than a year. TikTok is banned now. What band means is a little complicated. really what it is that, the law actually applies to, app stores and in particular, internet providers. They're not allowed to, Host tiktok services, so it doesn't actually make for consumers using tiktok illegal or anything. But given that the vast, majority of people just want to use a, [00:04:00] social media platform without too much, fuss, once the app stores stop carrying updated versions of tiktok. And once it gets, hard to use tiktok through the website, through your internet service provider, the assumption is that tiktok will be for the vast majority of people effectively banned. Jane Bambauer: Yeah. Okay. so you've written on Lawfare about the First Amendment implications and I understand you're going to have another post coming out soon. We'll link to both of those. But what do you make of this? how would you apply First Amendment jurisprudence to this particular law? Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah, no, it's an interesting question. And to be honest, I, it's funny. I, I, have never thought of myself as a first amendment scholar, though, in the last year or two, just given how much time I spend thinking about all things internet related, I feel like I've become one. But really, I think of you two as far more expert in this than I am. So I have my own ideas, but I'm actually very curious This is what you two with kind of a much longer history of thinking about the First Amendment think, so [00:05:00] I think of myself as in the minority of scholars, not a tiny minority, but I think a minority of scholars who think that although the First Amendment arguments that TikTok and TikTok users will be making, against this law, although the arguments are strong, that ultimately the government actually has a pretty good Case and I think more likely than not that the first amendment that the government will ultimately prevail You know at the end of the day and here I'll cheat a little bit in answering your question Jane because When one traditionally starts a first minute analysis the most important thing to do once one has decided that The first time it actually applies so that this is First Amendment protected activity. And I think here there's general agreement that the first time it definitely is implicated is one has to figure out what the appropriate quote unquote tier of scrutiny is. is this a prior restraint, which is the highest level of review? Is it [00:06:00] a viewpoint based? Law. Is it a content based law? Is it a content neutral law? In which case, it's not strict scrutiny, but intermediate scrutiny. And then all these gradations in between, and again, it's something that you two who are real first known scholars know one can spend infinite brain cycles thinking about this. And I think one thing that's interesting about this law is that I think they're actually plausible arguments for all of those positions. I think you can argue that it's a prior restraint, that it's viewpoint based, that it's content based, that it's content neutral. I think part of that is because this is a, I think a pretty novel fact pattern, at least in First Amendment jurisprudence. I think it's also the fact that the tiers of scrutiny analysis has never been, I think, particularly clear. And when I said I'm gonna cheat in your answer a little bit, what I meant is that I think at the end of the day it doesn't matter all that much. Which is to say, at the end of the day, the vast majority of First Amendment cases come down to some sort of balancing of the various interests at stake. And this is particularly true at the Supreme [00:07:00] Court, where, you really, I'll be a little bit of a legal realist here. It's really all about can you count to five justices that will agree that your side's values are more important than the other side's values. and that although the tiers of scrutiny do real work in that they, function as kind of presumptions, if the court concludes that such and such is a prior restraint, then presumptively the government's going to have a big problem, though sometimes prior restraints are fine. Similarly, if the court concludes that this is merely a neutral time, place, and manner restriction, presumptively the government's probably going to be okay, though those are also struck down all the time. At the end of the day, a lot relies again, especially in really high profile, sui generous cases like this on the specific facts. in my writing on this, I have tried not to, and again, I'm happy to get pushback, from, you too. I have tried not to spend too many cycles worrying about exactly what level of scrutiny should apply here. And instead, just [00:08:00] try to outline what are the values on each side? What are the values The First Amendment interests of TikTok, and I think more importantly, the 150 million American users of TikTok on the one hand. Versus on the other hand, what are the government's interests here in potentially banning TikTok, or at least really risking a ban of TikTok? and there are two in particular. One is a data privacy concern, because in the course of personalizing the TikTok algorithm for users, TikTok collects an enormous amount of information on what it is that you are watching and clicking and liking and disliking. and TikTok and therefore ByteDance and therefore the Chinese Communist Party could potentially use that information to America's detriment. So that's the data privacy concern. And the other concern is a foreign manipulation concern. That, because TikTok is You know, entirely run by the algorithm is totally inscrutable. if [00:09:00] a foreign entity can influence that algorithm, they can influence the information ecosystem of 150 million Americans and not just 150 million Americans, but because of TikTok, because TikTok is so popular among young people. And for those young people, TikTok is not just a source of fun cat videos, but it's actually the main source of news that they get. one can imagine, just generally, or especially in a conflict, let's say over Taiwan, that TikTok could suddenly become a, profound, Vector of foreign influence and foreign manipulation. And so I think ultimately comes down to balancing those two. Jane Bambauer: Yeah. Okay. So before we go into the values and the sort of government interest, I do want to pause and Talk through the coverage or maybe levels of scrutiny issue because I'm actually not sure and I really regret to say this because as a policy matter. I have some major issues with the tick tock [00:10:00] band, but I'm not sure that actually the First Amendment would even apply. I'm curious to hear Eugene's thoughts as well. But here's, my thinking. I guess there are two reasons to doubt that we have to do a First Amendment analysis. One is that maybe you could conceive of this as really a trade restriction, that has obvious, free, speech, results, and, maybe even speech related, content based related, even viewpoint based related maybe motivations, but that ultimately still it's a Restriction on managing, trade and so the way, much, much the way that we, don't allow certain other types of, products or services, to, pass through the borders. Another reason though that I have some skepticism is because the Supreme Court in cases that are somewhat old, but, they've suggested that [00:11:00] even when the government's goal basically is to restrict information that comes from outside the borders in. They have wide latitude and, these cases don't seem to really apply a constitutional analysis. So the two cases I have in mind, first, the earliest was Zemel versus Rusk, which is a little different because this is the case that involves, a set of plaintiffs who wanted to travel to, to, Cuba in the sixties. And they alleged, and no one disagreed, that they wanted to go there in order to gather information and an understanding of what's happening in Cuba. And, the Supreme Court went out of its way, not only to say that the government has full authority to decide who can leave the country, but, but also the Supreme Court said that the right to speak and publish does not carry with it unrestrained right to gather information. A lot has happened since that case. And I think the Supreme Court has over time [00:12:00] recognized the right to gather information. but. the board, if you combine that logic with the logic of the whole state control of the borders. you can see where I'm going here. And then the second case, was, Kleindienst versus Mandel. Yeah. yeah. So this one I think is even closer analogy. that one, I know. Yeah. Yeah. And so this one involved, this is a little later in the seventies. It's still a long, long ago though. And it involved, an invitation offered by Stanford University to a Belgian revolutionary Marxist as he himself portrayed. Yeah. Yeah. his own work, who, applied for a visa to come to campus and give a speech and the, customs office said no. And although there were a couple of dissenting, justices, the Supreme Court decided there is, basically that the government has full control over, over these decisions, irrespective of the reasons, the [00:13:00] speech related reasons that they may be made. Eugene, do you, what, do you make of. Just this application question, the coverage question. Eugene Volokh: so I'd love to hear what Alan has to say about those cases. But I'd also add a third one, which is Lamont v. Postmaster General, which specifically involved the travel not of people, but of information. And that was actually, it was 1965, the first Federal statute ever struck down by the Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds. Of course, the Supreme Court has the power to strike down Lamont. It's true. It has the power to strike down federal statutes and often exercises it. In fact, The whole point of the First Amendment originally was to constrain Congress, that's it starts with Congress shall make no law, but it took a long time before the court actually said this federal statute, not a state statute, not a federal executive action, but this federal statute is unconstitutional, happened in 1965. The statute, [00:14:00] basically required Americans who wanted to receive foreign communist propaganda to go to the post office. maybe not the post office, but in any case, go to the government and say, I am willing to receive it by the mail. And it made it illegal to send and deliver it to them, unless they have actually specifically, specifically requested. and the Supreme Court did not decide the question whether foreign. Foreigners, and especially foreign governments, have any First Amendment rights. It didn't focus on the rights of the senders, but it did talk about the rights of the recipients and, concluded that this law was unconstitutional because it interfered with the rights of Americans to receive this information. And so it did not view, federal governments had undoubted power to control what comes into the country, [00:15:00] as A total as being unlimited or put, more positively concluded that even Congress's broad power to, control what goes into the country is limited by the first two. So those are the three cases that strike me as most, most relevant. Although Alan, I totally agree with you that in many ways, this is sui generis and part of the problem is the Supreme Court has never really confronted a question quite like this one. even Lamont, which I do think is. Some respects close. This is a mailings of foreign propaganda to Americans. How many Americans would likely, even if they didn't have to put their name down on a list, would have been particularly interested in reading that? Very few. Tick tock very many. so, it's an interesting, I'm not saying any of these cases are strictly binding here, but I'd love to hear what you think about how these cases play out. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah. so a lot there. So let me say a couple of things. So first, and [00:16:00] this is not dispositive, but it's something all the, all of the courts to have all of the courts who have heard cases like the one that is about to be heard in the DC circuit, because this is not the first attempt to ban tick tock. There was, I think Montana. some Midwestern state. I think it was Montana tried to remove Wyoming, tried to ban it. And then, of course, in the Trump administration, Trump through executive order, tried to ban it in litigation there. everyone seemed to concede. And certainly the courts assumed that there was a first amendment issue here again. That doesn't mean that there necessarily is. But I think that's one data point. The second point I would say is, just to get back to Lamont, because I think Lamont is a very important issue. Case I reread it this morning because I needed to for this law for peace that I'm writing and what you described Eugene as the holding of Lamont, which is that Americans have a right to receive foreign propaganda, which is how Lamont is generally understood. I'm actually not sure. That's what Lamont says. That's what Justice Brennan's concurrent says in Lamont. But Justice Douglas is very short and in [00:17:00] true Justice Douglas fashion, extremely under argued and under theorized opinion really actually focuses on, the, the chilling effect of having to go to the government and say, Yes, I would like to receive the peaking review. And that was coincidentally, the, propaganda at issue. So it's another Chinese propaganda case. but we should get back to Lamont. I think Lamont is an interesting case. Jane Bambauer: Yeah, that, and that, yeah, that, that makes sense. And Brennan is consistent because he also dissented in that client and in the, case involving the Belgian. Yeah. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah, I think, Kleindienst is very interesting, and again, it's, hard to know what exactly to make of that, what I, whatever Kleindienst stands for, the reason I don't think that it would really apply here is, it'd be one thing if the government From a blank slate said, or, let me give you a more specific example. It's one thing if a [00:18:00] Chinese company wanted to buy a us platform and the government, and here would be SIFI as the committee on foreign investment in the United States said, no, you can't do this. And in fact, CFIUS has done this, when a Chinese company tried to buy Grindr, which is a dating service, very popular with gay and lesbian Americans. CFIUS said, no, you can't do this because we don't want the Chinese government to have access to the HIV status of Americans. Cause that's something that Grindr allowed people to put in. that I think is different than you have an existing platform where 150 million users are every day doing things that have profound first amendment implications. And we are now going to ban this platform. I think that's quite different then. There's something outside the United States. And then the question is, can it come into the United States? Something you already have in the United States. Now, to, to your point, Jane, I think the fact that the government generally has broad national security, foreign relations, economic trade, however you want to think of it, powers, is a really important part of the First [00:19:00] Amendment analysis. But I think that, the kind of brute fact that you have 150 million Americans using TikTok every day is going to make it very difficult, I think, for any court, even if they ultimately uphold the law, which I think they will, to say there's no First Amendment issue here. Jane Bambauer: Yeah, I hope you're right, but it is one of those things that where, there's probably all sorts of ways in which our national security or customs and border enforcement, keep us from knowing what we'd actually like to know and we're just And so the being, joining you on the realist side a little bit I, you're probably right but if we knew more about what we're missing from certain policies, maybe that same logic should apply to cases that the Supreme Court, The thought where you're, unrelated to the first moment. So Eugene Volokh: I do want to, I do want to also stand by a little bit my characterization of a Lamonti Postmaster General. I think even in Justice, Douglas's [00:20:00] majority opinion for the court, he talks about how the requirement that the addressee must request in writing that it be delivered Is, quote, an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights. Close quote. Sounds like in context, what he's saying is That the addressee has a First Amendment right to receive information and, that, by saying in order to get the information, you've got to do something that will put you on a list of people who are interested in foreign communists, but again, that which is a list most people might not have wanted to be on. the, the concern there is that, it burdens your ability to receive that information. It imposes a barrier to your First Amendment rights as a listener. But in any case, whether it's Justice Douglas or Justice Brennan's quite influential concurrence that you're [00:21:00] quite right, has gotten a lot of traction since then. I do think in many ways, Structurally it is quite similar because here the concern is also that TikTok users have an interest in using this app and receiving the information on it, although many of them are also TikTok content creators, so they have an interest in being able to use it to distribute their speech. So I'm totally with you that there's a Pretty substantial burden on people's ability to speak and to listen for sure. But also again just returning to your sui generis point You might say that what was true of this relatively minor form a potential form of foreign influence in the form of mailings of the peking review or similar publications from overseas may not be really relevant to a situation where we've got something that's being used by so many, Americans and so many young Americans. Alan Rozenshtein: [00:22:00] Yeah. And I, think it's part, partially what you just said, right? It's a scale issue, but I think it's partially also a transparency issue. So I think one thing that's important about this, ban is that it does not prevent Chinese propaganda. I can go today and I link from this from lawfare. So I the peaking review is interesting. It is, China's only English language state on newspaper. and it you can click on. It's called the Beijing review today. It still operates. it says exactly what you would think it would say. and you can access it and you can access it today. You can access it after the law goes into effect. Similarly, if you want to go and, you want to hear what, The China Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to say you can go and hop on Twitter and read their Twitter account and you'll be able to do after this bill goes into effect as well. So it's not a ban on Chinese propaganda per se, or I think even at all. It's a ban on Chinese control over an information environment. Now why is that different? [00:23:00] if you dig into the justifications, so let's, say that we interpret Lamont Through the Brennan concurrence, right? and, we just say, okay, Lamont stands for some general proposition that Americans have a right to foreign propaganda. Why? I think the, best argument is there's like a marketplace of ideas. argument that foreign propaganda is information like anything else and it should be part of the flow and One person's propaganda is another person's truth And even if it's bad it helps sharpen our understanding all the standard marketplace of ideas arguments that i'm totally happy with but one difference I think between foreign propaganda and foreign control over a platform is foreign propaganda is usually at least Pretty clearly foreign propaganda when you're reading, or at least it's foreign when you're reading the Beijing review, you're reading the Beijing review. You know what you're reading. and I think that helps contextualize what you're reading. You can agree with it, disagree with it when you're on tick tock. The whole point is that this algorithm is totally unscrutable. You have [00:24:00] no idea why you are seeing what you are seeing and the potential for subconscious manipulation, that I don't think, furthers the marketplace of ideas. in the same way that being able to read the Peking Review does. I think that's another really big difference. Now, we could spend all day talking about it, but maybe even, subconscious propaganda still has information and stuff like that. But I think at the very least from a doctrinal matter, it's pretty clear that this distinguishes Lamont and, I emphasize this because I've heard a lot of critics of this law cite Lamont as if it straightforwardly disposes of this case because Lamont stands for some super broad proposition about foreign propaganda. And, what I would say is I don't think the case does. And I also don't think that. The historical context does either. Matt Iglesias, the, well known blogger, had a nice piece a couple months ago, why he is, was for the ban. And he's not a lawyer, so his is more of a policy analysis, but he made a very nice analogy. And he said, look, imagine during the height of the Cold [00:25:00] War, the Soviet Union wanted to go and buy CBS. Would we have allowed that? And the answer is no, we would not have allowed that. And it is, I think, inconceivable that the Supreme Court would have had problems with that. it, it strikes me as very unlikely. Again, this is not a legal point. This is a historical sociological point that even the court that I think unanimously, struck down that law in Lamont in 1965 would have, three years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, been okay with the Soviet Union buying CBS. Because I think there is really a distinction and it's not just one of degree. it's one of kind. Eugene Volokh: so first of all, I'm sorry, you're quite right that, the, court, the court, was unanimous in the case. I was mistaken, talking about dissent. I'm sorry. I should have said that the government's position, in Lamont postmaster general, but the second thing I wanted to say, is that, you, raise this question of buying, broadcasters and indeed, [00:26:00] there are to this day. Limits, substantial limits on foreign ownership of, of, broadcasters, presumptive limits. they could be, as I understand it, waived by the FCC, but there are such limits. what do you think of that as a precedent, do you think? the Supreme Court, to my knowledge, has never really squarely confronted them. But the broad assumption is that they are, they're valid. Is it something that's just a broadcasting only rule? Because there are a lot of. Supreme Court cases that say, broadcasting is special, or is it something that you think stands for a broader proposition and the other thing? actually, I have a follow up question for you, but I wanted to see what you thought about that. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah, I think it's both. So, I do think the broadcast precedents are really important, in terms of, this long history of, foreign ownership rules. And, here I, I will. Suggest, the folks are interested. Ganesh Sitaraman, [00:27:00] who's a law professor at Vanderbilt, wrote a wonderful article in the Stanford Law Review last year, two years ago, I think called Foreign Ownership of Platforms. We can put it in the show notes. That really goes through this history, not just communications platforms, but generally of foreign ownership, restrictions. I think that precedent is, important. I think you're also right, Eugene, to be fair, that, A response could be, yeah, but those were in the broadcast context, and the court has often distinguished restrictions that are okay under the First Amendment for broadcast, or what are something called limited spectrum situations, and that would not be in the context of an unlimited spectrum. But I have a response to that, which is that, it is true that the internet is not limited in the way that broadcast is, right? If I want to broadcast on a radio frequency, no one else can broadcast on that radio frequency, and therefore you need to have government intervention. Otherwise, none of it works. That's not true for the internet. But the internet is limited in a different way, and that is with attention. [00:28:00] it used to be that the bottleneck for communications was the internet. Broadcast or spectrum now it's the attention of the audience and because you still have a bottleneck, right? You can still get monopolistic effects where it used to be that there were a few small a few very large Broadcasters and they carved the broadcast Spectrum that was the bottleneck now. There are a few large platforms. They're not carving up spectrum. They're carving up attention and I think that actually, if you think deeply about, what justified intervention in the broadcast industry, it was general scarcity, but it doesn't just be scarcity Of, of, spectrum. It can be whatever scarcity of the bottleneck there is. And so Jane Bambauer: I think I just go ahead, finish it. Yeah, it will. Alan Rozenshtein: So and, and and I think this is, this is, a different project and maybe this is a project I should write. [00:29:00] And then you Jane can tell me why, I'm wrong. I actually think that, where you have, limited attention, that is just as good of a reason as limited broadcast for the government to, regulate, if it regulates well. Now, ISIL has to regulate well. Jane Bambauer: Yeah, that's not my objection, though. I think the problem is the scarcity that the spectrum scarcity has to do with the means of production. The attention scarcity is more like saying there are only there's at any given point a set number of dollars in the world and consumers don't have unlimited dollars to spend on different types of content. It doesn't actually prevent a competitor from coming in and creating content or curating content, which I think. I think the limited set of platforms that are doing well, because they're actually in fierce competition with each other in a curation market, not in, a traditional content market. But, [00:30:00] nevertheless, there are lots of ways to get copious amounts of information. The trouble is figuring out how to pitch the right information to the right person so that it's worth their time. And there, I just don't see I don't see a monopoly style problem there. And I guess that leads me to the skepticism about, about the, policy behind the tick tock ban that, I, get that there's a lot of really bad content on tick tock and that the Chinese government may have a motivation that's different from the capitalistic one, and that is, that, that, does. seek to cause, disarray and, and, polarization among Americans. But I don't see a big difference between the effects of TikTok and the effects of every other social media company because, first of all, I think there's reason to think that even if you have completely malignant intent. There's [00:31:00] only so much that you can do to manipulate a person into thinking or pursuing some information that they don't already want to pursue. and then also that even through just the normal capitalistic, motivations, most of these platforms are incentivized to find information and curate information. that leads to polarization, that leads to anger and to resentment and to, all, of the things that the Chinese government may benefit from, but doesn't really cause in a, fundamental sense. Alan Rozenshtein: So I, I, so there are a couple, of points there, right? So, one, And let's just say generally, the field of, I don't even know what you'd call it, social media communication psychology, is still quite young. it is advancing very quickly or changing very quickly because The actual infrastructure is changing very [00:32:00] quickly. and if you're looking for a clear social science answer, like you can find, there are lots of papers that will say all sorts of things, right? So policymakers and judges are definitely going to be, legislating and deciding under real uncertainty, which raises interesting meta questions about, okay, then, should we err on this side or that side? then there's a more specific question about, what do we know about specifically China and specifically ByteDance and specifically TikTok? And we can get into the evidence that we have and how speculative or not speculative it is. and then third, we can get into this question of what is the specific threat here? Because I agree with you if the concern is it's in China's interest to addict all our kids to stupid cat videos, or it's in China's interest to feed, TikTok users inflammatory polarizing content because, that's what gets the most clicks. Then I agree with you that would not be a great argument because it's not clear that Twitter or Instagram or Meta operate any differently than, [00:33:00] than, than that, right? I think the unique danger is that, The Chinese government has shown, a couple of things. One, a willingness to, in a very heavy handed way, try to alter how it is perceived around the world with respect to any number of issues. the Hong Kong democracy protests, the issues with the Uyghurs, certainly relations with Taiwan. and in addition, And in a way that just goes beyond your general polarization or feeding people, content that gets them angry. and in addition that, the Chinese government, is also willing to use its, private companies, in a way that very much goes against those private companies own market and capitalist interests. If the Chinese government perceived that it is in their interest, right? And I, think the government's real concern is. In a [00:34:00] shooting war with Taiwan, right? what will the Chinese government, force TikTok to show to 150 million users, right? Now you may say, at the end of the day, people make up their own minds and so forth, right? And, it's a risk. But the question is, is are the courts going to require? And here we have to we have to separate the legal question from the policy questions, because courts have a very specific role. and although we all understand that they make policy, they don't really want to be in a position of second guessing the national security and foreign policy judgments of the political branches. do courts want to tell the government? No, Go get into a war with China. China over Taiwan. Let's see what's on TikTok. And if TikTok spends six months feeding the young people of America, pro China content and gets them all to protest and stuff like that, then we can talk again. That's a bit of a caricature of the view. But I think that's the thing that keeps the government [00:35:00] up at night. and speaking only for myself, right? That's good enough for me. this is a your mileage may vary situation. I totally accept that. Jane Bambauer: Yeah. I see the same logic in the communist era. but Eugene, what do you think? Eugene Volokh: so I want to ask a couple of follow up questions or maybe three questions. one first amendment question and two turns out they're more than first amendment issues in the case. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah. Yeah. Eugene Volokh: So the first is we haven't focused on the fact that this law doesn't ban TikTok as such, but requires. It essentially to be divested from Chinese influenced ownership. So I'm inclined to think that doesn't eliminate the First Amendment issue. But at the same time, it sounds like maybe it Would affect it? maybe not. I'd love to hear your thinking. And then I wanted to follow up, with a couple of more questions. One about the [00:36:00] bill of attainder question, and the other about this weird procedural posture of the case. But first, tell me what you think about this, how this, divestiture option affects the first amendment analysis. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah. again, I take a middle position between some of the defenders of the bill who just say this is just divestiture and some of the critics who say this is an outright ban. It's not. It's you have to divest or you get a ban. I do think, I don't think that eliminates the First Amendment issue because there's a real risk of a ban that has to be taken into account. and the government can't just say, it's China's fault if it's banned and therefore we don't have to defend this law in First Amendment grounds. That's not how this works. On the same, on the other hand, I do think that the divestiture option helps in, two ways. One is that a lot of First Amendment analysis is about overbreath, right? a lot of constitutional analysis is about, did the government's action go further than necessary? And by definition, a law that allows for divestment instead of a ban. is more narrowly tailored, again by [00:37:00] definition, than a law that just does a ban. So it's almost like a good faith showing on the part of the government that we're actually trying to solve a problem here. We're really trying to solve, have different options here. The second reason, and this is maybe a little cute, but I do think it's plays importantly, at least politically, maybe also legally. If the investment fails, it's probably be going to be because China refuses to allow ByteDance to sell the algorithm to TikTok. And in fact, in the complaint that TikTok filed with the D. C. Circuit, they have essentially said that. They said divestment is not an option because China will not allow it. But if China won't allow it, shows a little bit, exactly what the government is worried about. That China cares a lot about this, and it's going to use its weight to, It's going to use its weight around here, which is exactly the point. I want to be fair. Anupam Chander, who's a sparring partner of mine on this and is great. and is at Georgetown, has argued that actually there are plenty of good reasons for countries not to want to allow the [00:38:00] export of sensitive technologies that have nothing to do with manipulation. and that's a fair point, but I think it it's almost like performatively shows. It's very clever. It shows to the courts in part, the very problem that the government is citing, which is China's influence and ability to throw its weight around. so that's the divestment thing. Should we talk about bill of attainder? Eugene Volokh: before we get to bill of attainder, I wanted to ask you about the, procedural issues. So a lot of what we're talking about here turns on facts. just how much influence does the Chinese government have? over bike debts. just, just how much of a burden will this impose on American creators and others? just how much, just what evidence is there of real national security threat? and in a typical situation, what would happen there would be is that there would be a challenge brought in federal district court, which is a trial court, the [00:39:00] judge might have a hearing where the judge would consider both written submissions, written, declarations of experts and others and, and other witnesses, and, at the same time, would also potentially have, have an oral hearing. and then it would go up on appeal where the appellate courts and perhaps eventually the Supreme Court would consider, how the legal rules apply to that. here, Congress provided that the challenge would be brought in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which is an appellate court, which does not regularly, and I'm not sure, If it ever, maybe it does have some mechanisms for this, but at least does not regularly hear evidence. The job of an appellate court is not to hear evidence. It's to review an evidentiary record built either by the, trial courts or by, administrative agencies. So tell us how any of these factual questions are going to be resolved, [00:40:00] in, a case like this. Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah, I will say this is a among the nerderati. This is a real topic of excitement. and we'll have to see. So so a couple of points. so first is, unfortunately, the bill does not have legislative findings attached to it, which is usually actually really important part of these kinds of bills. And it's surprising that it doesn't given that there's been reporting that Congress collaborated very closely with DOJ to really bulletproof this bill. It's not clear why they didn't On the other hand, the co sponsors of the bill, Representatives Gallagher and Krishnamurti, introduced a resolution, which is basically a very long list of legislative findings, and a lot of that resolution ended up in the House Committee Report. that accompanied the bill, and that has a lot of information about classified briefings that Congress received about the threat. Why alternatives that tick tock offered were not sufficient. I think that, though that resolution, this committee reports will play a really important role, [00:41:00] and may go some way to establishing the factual and evidentiary record. But Eugene, you're totally right. It doesn't go all the way, and it's certainly much less than what happened in district court. So what's going to happen? Appellate, you're right, appellate courts, they're appellate courts. They don't usually hear trials or take evidence, but they can, and not just the D. C. Circuit, but the Supreme Court can. So the Constitution provides original jurisdiction for the Supreme Court and all sorts of things. And I, there is at least one time that I know of that the Supreme Court tried to hold a trial and it went extremely poorly. I, have to, I, Once I read a very funny Law Review article about this. I got to dig it out. It's, it was a real comedy of errors, and so from then on, they decided, that what they would do is, in case of original jurisdiction, where like states sue each other, which happens from time to time, they would get a, I think it's called special master, basically an outside lawyer who would go do the fact finding for them. I'm sure the DC circuit could do the same thing. I haven't read the, I'm not a litigator. I haven't read the federal rules of civil procedure in a long time, repellent procedure. [00:42:00] I'm sure there's some mechanism for that. I think what's more interesting is the role of potentially classified information, because a lot of this is classified. the appellate courts can hear classified information. the DC circuit certainly can. It did so routinely in the 2010s during, the many Guantanamo habeas cases, that it heard. and actually just last year, the ninth circuit in another national security case, Twitter versus Garland, had to hear a lot of national classified information to decide whether or not Twitter's challenge against certain gag orders was constitutional and literally in the opinion, the Ninth Circuit says we are not at liberty to discuss the classified information that we have reviewed, but we reviewed it as part of our analysis and trust us. It's fine. I made up that last part. so it may very well be, that there is some classified information that is submitted to the court in camera. Maybe there's a protective order. I have no idea how it's going to work, but it may very well be that the D, the D. C. Circuit says, we look at the classified information, trust us.[00:43:00] Eugene Volokh: Got it. so that's very helpful to know. So let's just close by, stealing something from, we have a sister podcast, the Bill of attainder, unmuted podcast, we probably should have had this other, no, there is no real, for the real Alan Rozenshtein: Nerderati, Eugene Volokh: because it's a pretty rare issue to arise, but there is this issue of whether this law violates the bill of attainder clause and to quote the Supreme Court in actually a case involving President Nixon, is that, Bill of Attainder is a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial tribe. The classic example historically was Parliament backed law. Back in jolly old England would say we think this person is, is a traitor often or has done something [00:44:00] very bad. but maybe he's allied with the king, so we can't trust that he will be normally prosecuted. We're just going to say he is a traitor and needs to be beheaded. And that's that. so I think historically bills of attainder have been mostly for capital, punishment. There also used to be bills of pains and penalties, vague recollection, but the U. S. Constitution Were you Alan Rozenshtein: old enough to remember when Parliament used to do bills of attainder? Yeah, there you go. All that Eugene Volokh: gray hair. so the, so the U. S. Constitution has long forbidden bills of attainder. But the question is, what is a bill of attainder? Whenever we see a law that mentions someone by name, and maybe, interesting question, what about mentioning a business by name, then, people start talking about, maybe that's a bill of attainder, but not all such laws are indeed [00:45:00] unconstitutional. So, again, This is, on the one hand, not a free speech issue, on the other hand, very much an issue in this case, and I suspect many people who may have heard about the case, even if they're not lawyers, would say, wait a minute, this law, it's just the government, the Congress trying to ban a particular business, is that what they're supposed to do? Aren't they supposed to pass general laws that say, here are the criteria that, if met, cause you to be restricted in various ways. So what do you think about this bill of attainder, question, even if just tentative? Alan Rozenshtein: Yeah, I think it's interesting. so a couple of thoughts on the bill of attainder question. So first, there is an open question whether or not the bill of attainder applies to corporations. The Supreme Court has never, Definitively answer that question. I think one lower one appellate court, I forget which one has held that it does apply to corporations. I don't know if there's a circuit split on that or just other circuits haven't gotten to it. But that's [00:46:00] one interesting question. and, especially with the originalist turn that the Supreme Court's had, I think there's going to be a lot of, Justice Alito or, pouring over, 18th century parliamentary records to know was this ever applied to corporations. the second question is, the Bill of Attainder, it's not just about specifically singling someone out. It's specifically singling someone out for punishment and punishment is a technical term of art here. Unfortunately, again, the Supreme Court has never said exactly what a punishment is. There's a historical test and a functional test. so one might argue that this isn't a punishment. Nothing is being stolen. nothing is being taken away from tick tock. No one's being put in jail. This is a proscriptive regulation that tick tock can no longer afford itself of certain, corporate benefits. now, as with many things, There's a certain angels on the head of a pin kind of quality to, is that [00:47:00] a punishment or a regulation? But honestly, this stuff comes up all the time. there are similar logical puzzles in Fifth Amendment takings cases. Is it taking or regulation or whatnot? so that's another question that the courts will have to, decide whether this is a punishment or just a forward looking, prospective. regulation. And the third question is, and this is a part of the law we haven't actually talked about, but it's actually very important. The TikTok ban or divestment and ban is only one part of the law. The law also sets up a broader scheme by which the president can identify other TikTok like companies, which is to say social media platforms that are controlled by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. and, and trigger a similar divestment type process. And so this raises the question of whether or not the government will be able to use that part of the law to soften the fact that the law also targets tick [00:48:00] tock. that may not be relevant to the bill of attainder issue, but tick tock has also made, other arguments that sound similar swiftly run equal protection that they're getting being singled out. and so the government may point to say, no, this is a general law. We're just starting with tick tock. I don't know if that gets there. I suspect that, and again, I'm not an expert in this, but I have done some preliminary research that the courts will ultimately move. This is just not a punishment. It's not a punishment in the way that the bill of attainder, contemplates that this is a, forward looking, regulation. Eugene Volokh: Got it. Thanks very much. very interesting. Jane, any closing questions or remarks? Jane Bambauer: Yeah, I think one thing that all three of us. expressed at one point is that one thing that makes this topic hard is that it's a, there are national security questions and facts that none of us have access to. And so it's hard to know as [00:49:00] a matter of policy, especially what should happen here. And, Alan Rozenshtein: and we haven't even talked about the international dimensions, potential repercussions. This is a big deal. Eugene Volokh: Big deal, indeed. Alan, thank you so much for joining us. It has been tremendously enlightening for me and I, sure for, our viewers and listeners as well. Jane, always a great pleasure to be on with you. And folks, we'll see you in a couple of weeks with our next episode.

On this day in history, July 20, 1990, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan retired. William Joseph Brennan Jr., an influential American jurist, served as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1956 until 1990, making him the seventh-longest serving justice in history. To add some color to that run, he was appointed by President Eisenhower and his successor was appointed by George H. W. Bush. Brennan, originally from Newark, New Jersey, pursued economics at the University of Pennsylvania before studying at Harvard Law School, later practicing law privately in New Jersey and serving in the U.S. Army during WWII. He was appointed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1951 and was placed on the Supreme Court by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 via a recess appointment.On the Supreme Court, Brennan was recognized for his progressive stance, opposing the death penalty, advocating for abortion and gay rights, and dissenting in over 1,400 cases where the court declined to review a death sentence. Brennan penned several landmark case opinions such as Baker v. Carr, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Craig v. Boren, and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, significantly influencing American jurisprudence. His ability to negotiate votes and shape varied opinions led to his recognition as one of the court's most influential members, with Justice Antonin Scalia naming him "probably the most influential Justice of the [20th] century." He retired in 1990 and was succeeded by David Souter. Justice Brennan passed away in 1997 Senator Tom Cotton, a prominent critic of progressive initiatives, has cautioned law firms and their clients regarding their use of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) programs. Following the US Supreme Court's decision to nullify affirmative action in higher education institutions, the Arkansas Republican issued warnings to 51 national and global law firms, stating that their continued endorsement of DEI programs could potentially breach federal law. Cotton, who sits on the Senate Judiciary Committee, predicted that both Congress and private entities would use their respective powers to examine the surge in race-based employment practices.He also communicated to the firms, including Allen & Overy, Greenberg Traurig, and Hogan Lovells, that they should be prepared to answer to Congress if they persist with race-based programs. The notice extended beyond law firms, with Republican Attorneys General from several states also cautioning Fortune 100 CEOs against racially motivated hiring and recruitment practices. Cotton has previously issued similar warnings, including a communication to Target's CEO, advising against the company's DEI practices. Alongside other Republicans, Cotton had issued a warning in November to the same law firms concerning the risks associated with their Environmental, Social, and Governance practices.Big Law's Diversity Efforts May Be Illegal, GOP Senator WarnsDoorDash Inc., a major player in the gig economy, is testing a new hourly wage option for its drivers, which could potentially reshape their classification under federal labor laws. Currently, most gig economy companies, including DoorDash, categorize their workers as independent contractors, who do not receive the same protections as employees under federal employment laws. This new pay model might suggest DoorDash exercises a significant amount of control over its drivers, a key factor in determining whether a worker is an employee or a contractor.DoorDash maintains that the new payment structure gives drivers more choices and control over their pay, signifying an independent contractor status. This comes amidst ongoing debates about worker classification, with claims that companies exploit the independent contractor model to avoid the obligations associated with hiring employees.It's worth noting that both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor (DOL) suggest hourly pay may indicate an employment relationship. This discussion arises as the Biden administration seeks to define the independent contractor status under federal wage laws. However, it's too early to predict how the DOL or courts will interpret DoorDash's move and what influence it might have on other gig economy companies.DoorDash Tests Gig-Economy Model With New Hourly Wage OptionGun rights advocates are challenging Massachusetts' firearm regulations, sparking scrutiny from the US Supreme Court. These challenges follow last year's Supreme Court decision, New York State Rifles & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, which altered how firearms laws are evaluated and left many questions unresolved. Four active suits are currently testing the interpretation of this decision.In one case, Granata v. Healey, gun owners and manufacturers are challenging the state's restrictions on malfunctioning handguns. Another case seeks to have Massachusetts' ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines declared unconstitutional.At the state level, one lawsuit argues that the law allowing a licensing authority to revoke a person's gun license if it deems them unsuitable is too vague under Bruen. Another case aims to apply Bruen's test to the state's law prohibiting people from carrying switchblades.The Supreme Court has agreed to hear United States v. Rahimi, a case concerning the constitutionality of a federal law barring persons subject to a domestic-violence restraining order from possessing guns. This case could provide more guidance on the implementation of Bruen. However, attorneys note that it will take years for courts to refine Bruen's boundaries, and many details, especially concerning weapons that did not exist in the 18th century, remain unresolved.Gun Rights Battles Brew in Massachusetts in Supreme Court's WakeA U.S. judge has denied former President Donald Trump's attempt to move his criminal case from New York state court to federal court. The case is related to hush money payments made to porn star Stormy Daniels before the 2016 presidential election. Trump was indicted in April in Manhattan on 34 counts of falsifying business records to conceal a $130,000 payment to Daniels, facilitated by his then-lawyer Michael Cohen.Trump, currently a front-runner for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, argued that the case should be in federal court as it relates to his 2016 presidency and involves federal election law. However, Judge Alvin Hellerstein refuted these claims, stating that the case involves a personal matter unrelated to Trump's official acts as president.The judge also dismissed the argument that Trump has immunity and that the state charges were pre-empted because they were intended to defraud the voting public during a federal election. Trump's trial is set for March 2024 in the New York State Supreme Court, and it is yet to be confirmed whether he will appeal. Trump continues to argue that the case is politically motivated.Trump loses bid to move New York hush-money case to federal court | ReutersTesla has been instructed to turn over some of CEO Elon Musk's emails to JPMorgan Chase as part of an ongoing lawsuit. The case originates from a dispute over a bond contract that came about after Musk's 2018 tweet about potentially taking Tesla private. JPMorgan claims that Musk communicated about this plan through his SpaceX account. The bank has accused Tesla of breaching a 2014 contract related to stock warrants that it sold to JPMorgan, which it alleges increased in value due to Musk's tweet.The bank has sued Tesla for $162.2 million, arguing it had to reprice the warrants after Musk's tweet, and the subsequent increase in Tesla's stock price necessitated payments that Tesla has not made. Tesla counter-sued JPMorgan, accusing the bank of seeking a "windfall" when it repriced the warrants.Musk, who bought Twitter for $44 billion in 2021, agreed as part of a 2018 deal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to get preapproval for certain tweets from a Tesla lawyer. His attempt to terminate this agreement is currently being considered by a federal appeals court.Tesla to hand over Musk's emails to JPMorgan in lawsuit over 2018 tweet | Reuters Get full access to Minimum Competence - Daily Legal News Podcast at www.minimumcomp.com/subscribe

Audio of the 1964 opinion of the Court in New York Times Company v. Sullivan. During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was charged with perjury in the city of Montgomery, Alabama. Leaders from within the movement published an ad in the New York Times asking for financial contributions for Dr. King's legal defense. Although Montgomery Public Safety Commissioner L.B. Sullivan was not mentioned in the ad, he felt that the ad's criticism of the police, who were under his general leadership, reflected poorly on him.   Sullivan asked the Times for a public retraction, as required or a public figure seeking punitive damages in a lawsuit for libel under Alabama law. The Times refused. So, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and several leaders of the Civil Rights Movement. In state court, the jury in awarded him $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed and the New York Times appealed. The question before the Supreme Court of the United States was whether Alabama's libel law violated the First Amendment's rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled for the Times. The Court held that the a libelous statement must show that it was made with what Justice Brennan called "actual malice," or knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement when it is directed toward a public figure. Access this SCOTUS opinion with citations at: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/39   Music by Epidemic Sound

Hello again, friends. After pro-choice protesters showed up outside the homes of Justice Samuel Alito and two other justices — peacefully chanting while walking in the street that lacked sidewalks — the editorial board of the Washington Post described such protests as “problematic” because they “bring direct public pressure to bear on a decision-making process that must be controlled, evidence-based and rational if there is to be any hope of an independent judiciary.” I'm sympathetic to this view. It's one thing to picket the Supreme Court as an institution; it's quite another to demonstrate in front of the homes of individual justices. But surely the pro-choice protesters have a First Amendment right to be heard. I'm reminded of a 1994 case (Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.) in which the Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion protesters to picket the residences of employees of an abortion clinic, saying the ordinance barring such protests within 300 feet of such residences was too broad. The underlying question is how to weigh the First Amendment rights of protesters against the privacy rights of individual justices. The irony, of course, is that Justice Alito's leaked opinion finds no right to privacy in the Constitution. Please consider a paid or paid gift subscription to sustain this newsletter***Alito's leaked decision has led me to reflect back on my years briefing and arguing cases before the Supreme Court almost fifty years ago. The Court I argued before understood that its role was to balance the scales of justice in favor of the powerless. The two political branches of government (Congress and the executive branch) could not be relied on to do this. Republican appointees to the Supreme Court understood this role as did Democratic appointees. Even Richard Nixon's appointees — Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and Warren Burger — exemplified this. It was Blackmun who wrote the Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, and Powell and Burger joined him, as did four Democratic appointees to the Court — William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, and Potter Stewart.The cases I argued were insignificant. I was a rookie in the Justice Department who was given either sure winners or sure losers to argue because the Department didn't want to take a risk on a rookie — a wise move. (At my first argument, I mistakenly referred to Justice Stewart as Justice Brennan, which caused the two of them to guffaw and me to be mortified.)But I was in awe of that Court. I especially recall Douglas, who had recently suffered a stroke and was in obvious discomfort, looking sharply at me as I made my arguments. Here was the justice who wrote the 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, finding that a constitutional right to privacy forbids states from banning contraception — a right that would be jeopardized by Samuel Alito's current analysis because, again, Alito doesn't recognize a privacy right in the Constitution.Douglas was also the man who decided that the Vietnam war was illegal and issued an order that temporarily blocked sending Army reservists to Vietnam. He was the justice who wrote in the 1972 case Sierra Club v. Morton that any part of nature feeling the destructive pressure of modern technology should have standing to sue in court — including rivers, lakes, trees, and even the air — because if corporations (which are legal fictions) have standing, shouldn't the natural world?Sitting not far away from him on the bench was Thurgood Marshall — who two decades before had succeeded in having the Supreme Court declare segregated public schools unconstitutional, in the 1954 landmark Brown v. Board of Education. Marshall did more than any person then alive to break down the shameful legal edifice of Jim Crow.Douglas, Marshall, and Blackmun were the intellectual leaders of that Supreme Court. Their opinions gave the Court its moral heft. They drew not only from the Constitution as written but also from the nation as it had evolved. They understood the moral leadership America needed to protect the rights of the voiceless and the powerless. Today's Supreme Court majority doesn't have a clue about the Court's moral authority, and couldn't care less. They are political hacks, rigid ideologues, and small minds intent on entrenching the power of the already powerful, comforting the already comfortable, and inflicting pain on the already inflicted. (Five were nominated by presidents who lost the popular vote. Three were nominated by a president who instigated a coup against the United States; they were confirmed because a rogue Republican Party mounted scorched-earth campaigns to put them on the Court.) The intellectual leader of today's majority (if “intellectual” is the appropriate adjective) is Samuel Alito, perhaps the most conceptually rigid and cognitively dishonest justice since Chief Justice Roger Taney (who authored Dred Scott v. Sanford in 1857, finding that Congress had no power to exclude slavery from the territories and that Black people could not become citizens). The authority of the Supreme Court derives entirely from Americans' confidence and trust in it. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers No. 78, the judiciary has no influence over “the sword” (the executive branch's power to compel action) “or the purse” (the Congress's power to appropriate funds). The Supreme Court I was privileged to argue before almost 50 years ago had significant moral authority. It protected the less powerful with arguments that resonated with the core values of the nation. Americans didn't always agree with its conclusions, but they respected it. That respect and trust allowed the Court to lead the way, charting a moral course for the nation. Today's cruel and partisan Supreme Court majority is squandering what remains of the Court's moral authority. That is perhaps the deepest tragedy of all. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit robertreich.substack.com/subscribe

Keyishian v. Board of Regents is read by Don Murphy.  Legal Question: Whether provisions of the Education Law and Civil Service Law requiring public servants to renounce Communism were overly broad and vague.  Action: The Court ruled in favor of the employees and held that the provisions at issue were unconstitutional as applied. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, at 00:58 Mr. Justice Clark, with whom Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White join, dissenting, at 49:36 This opinion's citations have been edited down for ease of listening. For more information, visit our explanation. For more on Keyishian, visit FIRE's First Amendment Library. For more episodes, visit thefire.org/outloud.

Legal Question: Whether a high school principal's removal of two articles from the student newspaper about pregnancy and divorce violated the First Amendment rights of the student editors. To what extent, consistent with the First Amendment, may educators exercise editorial control over school-sponsored speech? Action: The Court, overruling the Eighth Circuit, ruled that the removal did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Brennan, dissenting, at 32:41 This opinion's citations have been edited down for ease of listening. For more information, visit our explanation. For more on Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, visit FIRE's First Amendment Library.  For more episodes, visit thefire.org/outloud.

Legal Question: Whether school officials may prohibit a vulgar and lewd student speech at an assembly even if the speech does not create a substantial disruption. Action: The Court held the district was “within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser” in response to his speech. Justice Brennan, concurring, at 19:43 Justice Marshall, dissenting, at 26:28 Justice Stevens, dissenting, at 27:36 This opinion's citations have been edited down for ease of listening. For more information, visit our explanation. Watch a brief overview of Bethel v. Fraser. For more on Bethel v. Fraser, visit FIRE's First Amendment Library. For more episodes, visit thefire.org/outloud.

“Roe v. Wade has no foundation in either law or logic; it is on a collision course with itself.”  Edward Lazarus, a former law clerk to Roe's author, Justice Harry Blackmun, who writes: As a matter of constitutional interpretation and judicial method, Roe borders on the indefensible. I say this as someone utterly committed to the right to choose, as someone who believes such a right has grounding elsewhere in the Constitution instead of where Roe placed it, and as someone who loved Roe's author like a grandfather. . . . . What, exactly, is the problem with Roe? The problem, I believe, is that it has little connection to the Constitutional right it purportedly interpreted. A constitutional right to privacy broad enough to include abortion has no meaningful foundation in constitutional text, history, or precedent. ... The proof of Roe's failings comes not from the writings of those unsympathetic to women's rights, but from the decision itself and the friends who have tried to sustain it. Justice Blackmun's opinion provides essentially no reasoning in support of its holding. And in the almost 30 years since Roe's announcement, no one has produced a convincing defense of Roe on its own terms.7 Ten Legal Reasons to Condemn Roe v. Wade 1.    The umpires are there to call balls and strikes. In real baseball they cannot be players as well.   The Roe Court far exceeded its constitutionally designated legal purpose and authority.  Under the U.S. Constitution, the power to make laws is vested in Congress and retained by state legislatures. Elected representatives are the proper ‘makers of law.’ These elected officials then answer to the voters. The role of the judiciary in constitutional review is to determine if the law being challenged infringes on a constitutionally protected right. It is not the role to then somehow come up with new laws of their own tastes and inclination. Justice O'Connor, quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger: Irrespective of what we may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult area, "the Constitution does not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense.'"8 In Roe v. Wade and its companion, conjoined case, Doe v. Bolton, the Court struck down criminal laws of Texas and Georgia which outlawed certain abortions by finding that these laws (and those of the other 48 states) violated a "right of privacy" that "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." But such a right is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution nor even derivable from values embodied in it. It was a preference to have such a right and Justice Blackmun’s writings actually set themselves to devise the ‘rules’ that would then ‘emanate’ from such a preferred right. He simply made up new, substitutionary laws and imposed them on all the states!  In his dissenting opinion in Doe v. Bolton, Justice Byron White, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, wrote: I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers ... and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 states are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court. 2. The Roe Decision seriously misrepresents the history of medicine and society’s view of abortion. Justice Blackmun admitted to a serious fascination with the medical profession. Later in Doe v. Bolton we will see an almost passionate commitment to ‘protect the physician from the cloud of possible prosecution.’ The Mayo Clinic, for whom he served as legal counsel, admits to Blackmun’s unique obsession with the medical profession.  Proceedings of the Mayo Clinic Francis Helminski, J.D. Volume 69, Issue 7, p 698-699, July 01, 1994 Although three previous justices of the United States Supreme Court have had formal medical training, none has had more influence on medicine than Justice Harry A. Blackmun. Blackmun, a mathematics major at Harvard College, considered medical school but instead chose legal training. After becoming familiar with the legal work of the Mayo Clinic while practicing with a Minneapolis firm, he was internal legal counsel for the clinic from 1950 to 1959. Blackmun's work contributed to the development of the clinic, especially in the establishment of Rochester Methodist Hospital. As a Supreme Court Justice, Blackmun's concern for medicine was evident in many of his judicial opinions, including Roe v Wade and Regents of the University of California v Bakke. In Roe, he rested much of the constitutional foundation for legalized access to abortion on the integrity of the physician-patient relationship. The apparent purpose of the Roe opinion's long historical excursion is to create the impression that abortion had been widely practiced and unpunished until the appearance of restrictive laws in the prudishly-Victorian 19th Century. One example is adequate to show the distortion of Justice Harry Blackmun's version of history. He must overcome a huge hurdle in the person of Hippocrates, the "Father of Medicine," and his famous Oath which has guided medical ethics for over 2,000 years. The Oath provides in part: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion."9 This enduring standard was followed until the Roe era and is reflected in Declarations of the World Medical Association through 1968: "I will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of conception. ..."10 But Justice Blackmun dismisses this universal, unbroken ethical tradition as nothing more than the manifesto of a fringe Greek sect, the Pythagoreans, to which Hippocrates is alleged to have belonged! 3. Roe wrongly characterizes the common law of England regarding the status of abortion. The Court's language in Roe offers a plastic analysis and conclusion – "it now appears doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus" – is patently false on its face. The Common Law drew its principles from Natural Law. Until quickening there were no objective signs that a human life was present. Quickening, the moment that movement can be detected, was considered objective scientific fact that the fetus was indeed definitively alive.11 William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769), an exhaustive and definitive discussion of English common law as it was adopted by the United States shows that the lives of unborn children were valued and protected, even if their beginning point was still thought to be "quickening" rather than conception: Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the mother's womb.    For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killeth it in her womb ... this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But at present it is not looked upon in quite so atrocious a light, though it remains a very heinous misdemeanor.12 Until well into the 19th century, it was assumed that a child's life may not begin – and certainly could not be proven to have begun to satisfy criminal evidentiary standards – prior to the time the child’s movements were felt by the mother ("quickening"), at approximately 16-18 weeks' gestation. The science of the time was being applied to the enforcement of the law. After the invention of the modern microscope (1836) and the widespread, objective scientific revelation that mammalian life begins at conception, English law then increased the penalties for killing a child before quickening. Consistent with the principle that the law needs to follow objective, observable facts, in 1861 Parliament passed the Offences Against the Person Act. This law extended protection of the life of the child throughout pregnancy. This law was gradually whittled-away starting in the 1980’s. But the Act continued to protect pre-born life in Northern Ireland until 2019.20 The Roe Court looks at the distinction in early common law concerning abortions attempted before or after "quickening," wrongly. It falsely assumes that the law allowed women great latitude to abort their children in the early months of pregnancy. This is like saying people had an unspecified right to hack websites before such acts were criminally prosecuted. The law is designed to enforce known and demonstrable crimes. A law could not protect a human being it did not know to be alive. But as demonstrated by the Offences Against the Person Act, when the facts are known, then the law can be enforced. 4. In Roe, the Court downplays and distorts the purpose and legal weight of state criminal abortion statutes that had been deliberated and passed by the several states In the 19th Century, in virtually every state and territory, laws were enacted to define abortion as a crime throughout pregnancy. They contained only narrow exceptions, generally permitting abortion only if necessary to preserve the mother's life. The primary reason for stricter abortion laws, according to their legislative history, was to afford greater protection to unborn children. This reflected a heightened appreciation of prenatal life based on new medical knowledge. (See the Offenses Against the Person Act in the U.K.) Dr. Horatio R. Storer… etc is significant that the medical profession spearheaded efforts to afford greater protection to unborn lives than had been recognized under the common law's archaic "quickening" distinction. The existence of such laws, and their clear purpose of protecting the unborn, rebuts the Court's claim that abortion has always been considered a liberty enjoyed by women. These laws show broad acceptance of the view that the life of an unborn child is valuable and should be protected unless the mother's life is at risk. In that case, of course, both mother and child were likely to perish, given the primitive care then available for infants born prematurely. How does the Court get around the impressive body of laws giving clear effect to the state's interest in protecting unborn lives? It attempts to devalue them by ascribing a completely different purpose: the desire to protect the mother's life and health from a risky surgical procedure. Applying the maxim "if the reason for a law has ceased to exist, the law no longer serves any purpose," the Court declares that abortion is now "safer than childbirth." Therefore, laws banning abortion have outlived their purpose.   5. A privacy right to decide to have an abortion has no foundation in the text or history of the Constitution. Roe v. Wade locates a pregnant woman's "constitutional" right of privacy to decide whether or not to abort her child either "in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty ..., as we feel it is, or ... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people." The Court does not even make a pretense of examining the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, to determine if it was meant to protect a privacy interest in abortion. Clearly it was not. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to create any new rights, but to secure to all persons, notably including freed slaves and their descendants, the rights and liberties already guaranteed by the Constitution. Several rhetorical devices are used to mask this absence of constitutional grounding. The Court mentions several specifically enumerated rights which concern an aspect of privacy, for example, the Fourth Amendment's "right of the people to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." However, the Court fails to connect these to the newly found "right" to abortion, because no logical connection exists. Justice Blackmun attempts to graft abortion onto the line of decisions recognizing privacy/liberty rights in the following spheres: marriage (Loving v. Virginia, striking down a ban on interracial marriage); childrearing (Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, upholding parental decision-making regarding their children's education); procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma, finding unconstitutional a state law mandating sterilization of inmates found guilty of certain crimes); and contraceptive use by a married couple (Griswold v. Connecticut). Certainly marriage, and building and raising a family are fundamental aspects of human life that predate human laws and nations. They are implicit in the concept of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, though even these rights are subject to state limitation, such as laws against bigamy, incest, and child abuse and neglect. But abortion does not fit neatly among these spheres of privacy. It negates them. Abortion is not akin to childrearing; it is child destruction. A pregnant woman's right to abort nullifies the right to procreate upheld in "Skinner." He no longer has a right to bring children into the world, but only a right to fertilize an ovum, which his mate can then destroy without his knowledge or consent. The fear of government intruding into the marital bedroom by searching for evidence of contraceptive use drove the Griswold Court to find a privacy right for couples to use contraception in the "penumbras, formed by emanations from" various guarantees in the Bill of Rights. But, however closely abortion and contraception may be linked in purpose and effect, they are worlds apart in terms of privacy. Abortions do not take place in the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms, preventing them does not require investigation of private sexual behavior, and they involve personnel other than the spouses. A "privacy right" large enough to encompass abortion could also be applied to virtually any conduct performed outside the public view, including child abuse, possession of pornography or using illicit drugs. The liberty interest to be protected from state regulation is never really defined in Roe. Instead the Court describes at some length the hardships some women face, not from pregnancy, but from raising children: Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by childcare. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. By this reasoning, one might argue that Roe's liberty encompasses ridding oneself of unwanted toddlers! Ordinarily, the defense of rights requires us to forgo lethal methods and use means likely to create the least harm to others. We may not, for example, surround our house and yard with a high voltage fence to deter trespassers. This principle is upended in the abortion context. Adoption, for example, would effectively eliminate all the "hardships" of raising "unwanted" children by non-lethal means. 6. Although it reads the 14th Amendment extremely expansively to include a right of privacy to decide whether to abort a child, the Court in Roe adopts a very narrow construction of the meaning of "persons" to exclude unborn children. Much is made of the fact that "person" as used elsewhere in the Constitution does not refer to unborn children when, for example, discussing qualifications for public office or census-taking. That point proves nothing. The Supreme Court has held that corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the 14th Amendment and they are not counted in the census, nor can a corporation grow up to be president. The Roe Court also ignored the clear and uncontested biological evidence before them that individual human lives begin at conception: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." This is question determined by science, not philosophers or theologians or politicians. But while seeming to sidestep the question, the Court in fact resolved the question at birth, by allowing abortion to be legal throughout pregnancy. In the same vein, the Court refers to the unborn child as only a "potential life" (indeed, an actual life) from the moment of his or her conception. The Roe opinion states that a contrary finding on "personhood" would produce the opposite result (presumably foreclosing the mother's privacy right to an abortion). One does not have to be a "person" in the full constitutional sense, however, for a state to validly protect one's life. Dogs can be protected from killing although they are not "persons."13 And under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), people are prosecuted, fined and jailed for acts that may harm creatures, such as sea turtles, that are not "persons" in the full constitutional sense. Sea turtles are protected not only after they are hatched, but even while in the egg. In fact, each sea turtle egg removed from its nest constitutes a separate violation under the ESA, regardless of whether the sea turtle egg contained an embryo that was alive or "quick" or "viable" or even already deceased at the time of the taking.   7. The Roe Court assumed the role of a legislature in establishing the trimester framework. Roe holds that in the first trimester of pregnancy, the mother's "privacy interest" in an abortion trumps state regulation. From the end of the first trimester to the child's "viability" – which the Court presumed to be no earlier than 26 weeks – the state can regulate abortion practice only in ways reasonably related to advancing the mother's health. In the final trimester, the state – in the interest of protecting the "potential life" of the child – can regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary to preserve the mother's "life or health." Health (see point 8 below) is the exception that swallows the rule. Pre-decision memoranda among members of the Roe Court acknowledged the serious flaw in establishing arbitrary, rigid time frames. Justice Blackmun himself admitted it was arbitrary.14 A reply memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart stated: One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is ... in its fixing of the end of the first trimester as the critical point for valid state action. ... I wonder about the desirability of the dicta being quite so inflexibly "legislative." My present inclination would be to allow the States more latitude to make policy judgments. ..."15 Geoffrey R. Stone, a law clerk to Justice Brennan when Roe was decided, was recently quoted as saying: "Everyone in the Supreme Court, all the justices, all the law clerks knew it was 'legislative' or 'arbitrary.'"16 Justices O'Connor, White and Rehnquist denounced the arbitrary trimester framework in O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Akron: [There] is no justification in law or logic for the trimester framework adopted in Roe and employed by the Court today. ... [That] framework is clearly an unworkable means of balancing the fundamental right and the compelling state interests that are indisputably implicated. The majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services states: The key elements of the Roe framework – trimesters and viability – are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle. ... the result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine. As Justice White has put it, the trimester framework has left this Court to serve as the country's "ex officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States."   8. What Roe gives, Doe takes away. Many Americans believe that abortion is legal only in the first trimester (or first and second trimester). Many pollsters and media outlets continue to characterize Roe v. Wade as the case which "legalized abortions in the first three months after conception."17 In a recent television appearance, NOW's former president Patricia Ireland falsely claimed that "thirty-six states outlaw abortion in the third trimester." As noted above, under Roe state laws banning late-term abortions must contain a "health" exception. Health is defined in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, as including "all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age — relevant to the wellbeing of the patient. All these factors may relate to health." This definition negates the state's interest in protecting the child, and results in abortion on request throughout all nine months of pregnancy. The fact that the Court buries its improbably broad definition of health in the largely unread opinion in Doe v. Bolton makes it no less devastating.   9. The Court describes the right to abortion as "fundamental." The Supreme Court has found certain rights fundamental. Expressed or implied in the Constitution, they are considered "deeply rooted in the history and traditions" of the American people or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such as the free exercise of religion, the right to marry, the right to a fair trial and equal protection. A state law infringing on a fundamental right is reviewed under a rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard. In effect, there is a presumption against constitutionality. The Roe Court claims abortion is fundamental on the ground that it is lurking in the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of Rights or the 14th Amendment, along with privacy rights like contraceptive use. It's ludicrous to claim abortion is deeply rooted in American history or traditions or that our governmental system of "ordered liberty" implicitly demands the rights to destroy one's child, but it was an effective way to foreclose state regulations of abortion. The strict scrutiny test was later abandoned in Casey.   10. Despite the rigid specificity of the trimester framework, the opinion gives little guidance to states concerning the permissible scope of abortion regulation Abortion decisions that followed Roe chronologically have not followed Roe jurisprudentially. Many decisions have five separate opinions filed, often with no more than three justices concurring on most points. Eight separate opinions were filed in Stenberg v. Carhart (which effectively nullified laws in over two dozen states banning partial-birth abortion). The 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey could have resulted in Roe's reversal. The Casey Joint Opinion (there being no majority opinion) comes close to conceding that Roe was wrongly decided: We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and, coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding. Instead they jettisoned Roe's trimester framework and standard of legislative review, but kept Roe alive: Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Casey, in which he is joined in part by Justices White, Scalia and Thomas states: Roe decided that a woman had a fundamental right to an abortion. The joint opinion rejects that view. Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be subjected to "strict scrutiny," and could be justified only in the light of "compelling state interests." The joint opinion rejects that view. ... Roe analyzed abortion regulation under a rigid trimester framework, a framework that has guided this Court's decision-making for 19 years. The joint opinion rejects that framework. ... Whatever the "central holding" of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishe[d] ... Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality. And later in that dissent: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the façade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor "legitimacy" are truly served by such an effort. Roe makes no legal sense whatsoever. It is Doe v. Bolton, handed down the same day, and 'interlocked' by Justice Blackmun, it is Doe that explicitly authorizes medical killing, "without the shadow of possible prosecution."

Following the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Sept. 18, 2020, Berkeley Law professors — Amanda Tyler, Catherine Fisk, Orin Kerr, Bertrall Ross and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky — came together to discuss Ginsburg's legacy, what will be the likely effects of her no longer being in the Supreme Court and what is likely to happen in the nomination and confirmation process of a new justice."Her legacy as an advocate completely changed the face of American society," said Tyler, who clerked for Ginsburg in 1999. "As an advocate, she opened the eyes of the Supreme Court to the lived experiences of both men and women who are held back by gender stereotypes. Because of that, she was able to convince them, to educate them, to teach them as to how gender stereotypes do that, not just to women but to men as well, and how putting women on a pedestal, as Justice Brennan said, and Justice Ginsburg loved this quote, is actually putting them in a cage. It's holding them back."Read a transcript and listen on Berkeley News.Photo credit: Supreme Court of the United States via Flickr See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

As promised, here is Justice Brennan’s Dissent to Kahler v. Kansas. If you have ideas for future episodes, please email me at JoannaReadsPodcast@gmail.com. And if you like what I’m doing, please consider making a small monthly donation. Be safe, be healthy, and #flattenthecurve --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/joanna-sandstrom/support

In 1960, Professor Fred Rodell of Yale Law School, "bad boy of American legal academia," asked his students to write scripts describing important Supreme Court cases. The scripts were directed by David Allen, performed by David Allen, Paul Sparer, and Jack Curtis, and released on LP by Educational Audio Visual, Inc. According to the record sleeve:The arguments of the lawyers in each of these cases are paraphrased from the language used in the original briefs of the contending parties. However, in all cases when the Court speaks, we have quoted the exact language of the judge delivering the opinion, taken from the official report of the case. The opinion, of course, has been condensed and necessary connective words or phrases have been added. The script for each cases was prepared by Yale Law School students in Professor Fred Rodell's Course in Law and Public Opinion.The script for Schechter v. The United States (The National Industrial Recovery Act Case) (1935) was written by William J. Brennan III, the son of Justice Brennan, who later became the President of the New Jersey State Bar Association. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

It's done. Brett Kavanaugh is a Supreme Court Justice. Most of the media coverage of his confirmation centered on the sexual assault allegations made by Dr. Christine Blasey Ford but that's only one part of the story. In this episode, learn about the procedural tricks employed by Senate Republicans and the George W. Bush administration to place Kavanaugh on the Supreme Court and hear highlights from over 40 hours of Brett Kavanaugh's policy-oriented confirmation hearings that most of the country didn't see. Please Support Congressional Dish - Quick Links Click here to contribute a lump sum or set up a monthly contribution via PayPal Click here to support Congressional Dish for each episode via Patreon Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North Number 4576 Crestview, FL 32536 Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD117: Authorization for Limitless War Additional Reading Blog: Why the ACLU opposes Brett Kavanaugh's nomination to the supreme court by Susan N. Herman, ACLU, October 3, 2018. Article: California professor, writer of confidential Brett Kavanaugh letter, speaks out about her allegation of sexual assault by Emma Brown, The Washington Post, September 16, 2018. Records: Records, papers, decisions: Kavanaugh records and the Presidential Records Act, related author Meghan M. Stuessy, FAS.org, August 27, 2018. Report: ACLU report on Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, ACLU, August 15, 2018. Article: Brett Kavanaugh ruled Consumer Financial Protection Bureau structurally unconstitutional by Manuela Tobias, Politifact, July 25, 2018. Article: There's no conspiracy between Trump and Kennedy. There's just the swamp by David Litt, The Washington Post, July 3, 2018. Article: Donald Trump made Justice Kennedy an offer he couldn't refuse by Abigail Tracy, Vanity Fair, June 29, 2018. Article: Inside the White House's quiet campaign to create a Supreme Court opening by Adam Liptak and Maggie Haberman, The New York Times, June 28, 2018. Article: Here's what is known about the surprising choice to lead the CFPB by Francine McKenna, Market Watch, June 18, 2018. Article: The clock is running out on Mick Mulvaney by Renae Merle, The Washington Post, June 12, 2018. Article: Official cause of death for Antonin Scalia released by David Warren, Dallas News, February 2016. Article: George W. Bush's bizarre bathroom self-portraits laid bare by audacious hack by Sam Byford, The Verge, February 8, 2013. Resources Case Information: Carpenter v. United States Executive Order: Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act Sound Clip Sources Hearing: 2004 Kavanaugh Judicial Nomination Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, April 27, 2004. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Sound Clips: 1:14:14 Senator Jeff Sessions (AL): Judges, if you’re confirmed, are not accountable to the public. You never stand for election again. You hold your office for life. Many of your decisions are unreviewable ultimately, and it leaves the American people subject to decisions in an anti-democratic forum unless that judge restrains him or herself and enforces the law as written or the Constitution as declared by the people of the United States. 1:24:15 Senator Patrick Leahy (VT): The question is secrecy in government, and this administration has shown more secrecy than any administration I’ve served with, from the Ford administration forward. You were the author, one of the first indicators of this increase in secrecy, Executive Order 13233, that drastically changed the Presidential Records Act. It gave former presidents, their representatives, and even the incumbent president, virtual veto power over what records of theirs would be released, posed a higher burden on researchers petitioning for access to what had been releasable papers in the past. After the order was issued, a number of historians, public interest organizations, opposed the change. The Republican-led House Committee on Government Reform approved a bill to reverse this. A lawsuit to overturn it was filed by Public Citizen, American Historical Association, Organization of American Historians, and a number of others. Why did you favor an increase in the secrecy of presidential records? Brett Kavanaugh: Senator, with respect to President Bush's Executive Order, I think I want to clarify how you described it. It was an order that merely set forth the procedures for assertion of privilege by a former president, and let me explain what that means. The Supreme Court of the United States in Nixon v. GSA in 1977, opinion by Justice Brennan, had concluded that a former president still maintains a privilege over his records, even after he leaves office. This was somewhat unusual because there was an argument in the case that those are government records. But the Court concluded that both the current president and the former president have the right to assert privilege to prevent the release of presidential records. That’s obviously a complicated situation. The issue was coming to a head for the first time because there’s a 12-year period of repose, so 12 years after President Reagan left office was when this President Bush came into office, and there was a need to establish procedures. How’s this going to work, two different presidents asserting privilege or having the right to review? No one really had a good idea how this was going to work. The goal of the Order was merely to set forth procedures. It specifically says in Section 9 of the Order that it’s not designed in any way to suggest whether a former president or a current president should or should not assert privilege over his records. You’re quite right, Senator Leahy, that there was initial concern by historians about the Order. I think it was—I like to think it was based on a misunderstanding, and Judge Gonzales and I undertook to meet every 6 months or so with a large group of historians, first to discuss the Order and explain it, and then after that, to discuss any problems they were having with the Order, and to help improve it, if they suggested ways for improvement. I think those meetings, I think the historians who’ve come to see us, have found them useful, and I think we helped to explain what we had in mind and what the president's Order meant in terms of the procedure. So, that’s my explanation of that Order. Hearing: 2006 Kavanaugh Judicial Nomination Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, May 9, 2006. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Sound Clips: 58:44 Senator Orrin Hatch (UT): I also want to acknowledge the presence of Mr. Kavanaugh’s parents. I’ve known them for a long time. Ed Kavanaugh, for many years, he headed up the major trade association, the Cosmetic, Toiletries, and Fragrance Association, and he is deservedly admired by many in this town. And his mother served with distinction as a state court judge in Maryland for many, many years. 1:47:15 Senator John Cornyn (TX): Of course, as you know, I met you a number of years ago when I was Attorney General of Texas and had the honor to represent my state in an argument before the United States Supreme Court, and that was Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which involved a question of whether school children could voluntarily offer a prayer or an inspirational saying before school football games in Texas. And as you know, the Court ultimately ruled against that voluntary student prayer in the case. And Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, said that the Court's ruling exhibited hostility to all things religious in public life. And I’m very concerned about that because I do believe that the founders thought that the posture of the government with regard to religious expression should be one of neutrality, not hostility. I realize as a lower court judge you’re going to be bound by the Supreme Court's precedents, but I wonder if you would address the issue of religious liberty and religious speech insofar as how you believe in your position as a circuit court judge, how you would approach those issues. Brett Kavanaugh: Senator, if I were confirmed to be a D.C. Circuit judge, I would of course follow the precedent of the Santa Fe case. That case addressed a question that had been left open in the Lee v. Weisman case in 1992. In that case, there was a school-sponsored prayer at a graduation ceremony where the government was actually involved, and one of the questions that was left open was, what happens if a student or a private speaker participates in a school event as a private speaker? And in the Santa Fe case, I think the Court concluded, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, that it could be attributed to the school and so was a violation of the Establishment Clause. I think the overall area represents a tension the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve throughout the years in terms of facilitating the free exercise of religion without crossing the Establishment Clause lines that the Court has set out for many years now. I know that the Court in recent years has made clear in a number of cases that private religious speech, religious people, religious organizations cannot be, or should not be, discriminated against and that treating religious speech, religious people, religious organizations equally—in other words, on a level playing field with nonreligious organizations—is not a violation of the Establishment Clause. In past years there had been some suggestion that treating religious organizations the same way in the public square as nonreligious organizations could sometimes be a violation of the Establishment Clause. I think the Court's really gone to a principle of equality of treatment does not ordinarily violate the Establishment Clause—again, equality of treatment of religious speech, religious people, religious organizations; equality in the public square. That's been something we've seen over the last, I'd say, decade or a little more. 2:04:00 Former Senator Sam Brownback (KS): But just give me your view of the Constitution as a document itself. Is this a—can you put yourself in a category? Do you have a view that it’s established as a living document, as a strict constructionist of the Constitution itself? Brett Kavanaugh: Senator, I believe very much in interpreting text as it’s written and not seeking to impose one's own personal policy preferences into the text of the document. I believe very much in judicial restraint, recognizing the primary policymaking role of the legislative branch in our constitutional democracy. I believe very much, as a prospective inferior court judge, were I to be confirmed, in following the Supreme Court precedent strictly and absolutely. Once as a lower court judge, I think that’s very important for the stability of our three-level system for lower courts to faithfully follow Supreme Court precedent, and so that’s something that I think’s very important. In terms of the independence of the judiciary, I think that’s something that’s the hallmark of our judiciary, the hallmark of our system, that judges are independent from the legislative branch and independent from the executive branch. I think that’s central to my understanding of the proper judicial role. Hearing: 2018 Day 1 Part 1 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 4, 2018. 12:55 Senator Chuck Grassley (IA): Good morning. I welcome everyone to this confirmation hearing on the nomination of— Senator Kamala Harris (CA): Mr. Chairman? Sen. Grassley: —Brett Kavanaugh— Sen. Harris: Mr. Chairman? Sen. Grassley: —to serve as Associate Justice— Sen. Harris: Mr. Chairman, I’d like to be recognized for a question before we proceed? Unknown Speaker: Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Sen. Grassley: —of the Supreme Court of the United States. Sen. Harris: Mr. Chairman, I’d like to be recognized to ask a question before we proceed. The committee received just last night, less than 15 hours ago— Unknown Speaker: Mr. Chairman, regular order. Sen. Harris: —42,000 pages of documents that we have not had an opportunity to review or read or analyze. Sen. Grassley: You’re out of order. I’ll proceed. Sen. Harris: We cannot possibly move forward, Mr. Chairman, of this hearing. Sen. Grassley: I extend a very warm welcome to Judge Kavanaugh— Sen. Harris: We have not been given an opportunity to have a— Sen. Grassley: —to his wife, Ashley— Sen. Harris: —meaningful hearing on the nominee. Sen. Grassley: —his two daughters, their extended family and friends— Senator Mazie Hirono (HI): Mr. Chairman, I agree with my colleague, Senator Harris. Mr. Chairman— Sen. Grassley: —Judge Kavanaugh’s many law clerks— Sen. Hirono: —we received 42,000 documents that we haven’t been able— Sen. Grassley: —and everyone else joining us today. Sen. Hirono: —to review last night, and we believe this hearing should be postponed. Sen. Grassley: I know this is an exciting day for all of you here, and you’re rightly proud of the judge. Senator Richard Blumenthal (CT): Mr. Chairman, if we cannot be recognized, I move to adjourn. Sen. Grassley: The American people— Sen. Blumenthal: Mr. Chairman, I move to adjourn. Sen. Grassley: —get to hear directly from Judge Kavanaugh later this afternoon. Sen. Blumenthal: Mr. Chairman, I move to adjourn. Mr. Chairman, we have been denied—we have been denied real access to the documents we need to advise— Unknown Speaker: Mr. Chairman, regular order is called for. Sen. Blumenthal: —which turns this hearing into a charade and a mockery of our norms. Sen. Grassley: Well— Sen. Blumenthal: And Mr. Chairman, I, therefore, move to adjourn this hearing. Sen. Grassley: Okay. Protester: This is a mockery and a travesty of justice. This is a travesty of justice, and we’ll not go back. Cancel Brett Kavanaugh. Adjourn the hearing. Leave me alone. Leave me alone. Unknown Speaker: _______(02:07—What do we have to do? Trump? We may have to work with Trump. In a demonstrative adjourn, we have to have—) Unknown Speaker: We’re not in an executive session. Sen. Blumenthal: Mr. Chairman, I ask for a roll-call vote on my motion to adjourn. 18:40 Senator Mazie Hirono (HI): Mr. Chairman, it is also— Senator Chuck Grassley (IA): I think that I— Sen. Hirono: Mr. Chairman, it is also not regular order for the majority— Sen. Grassley: Senator Hirono— Sen. Hirono: —to require the minority to pre-clear our questions, our documents and the videos we would like to use at this hearing. That is unprecedented. That is not regular order. Since when do we have to submit the questions and the process that we wish to follow to question this nominee? Sen. Grassley: Senator— Sen. Hirono: I’d like your clarification. Sen. Grassley: Senator Hirono— Sen. Hirono: I’d like your response on why you are requesting— Sen. Grassley: —I would ask that you— Sen. Hirono: — ____(00:30) order to submit our questions, too. Sen. Grassley: —I ask that you stop so we can conduct this hearing the way we have planned it. Maybe it isn’t going exactly the way that the minority would like to have it go— Protester: [unclear] Sen. Grassley: —but we have said for a long period of time that we were going to proceed on this very day, and I think we ought to give the American people the opportunity to hear whether Judge Kavanaugh should be on the Supreme Court or not. And you have heard my side of the aisle call for a regular order, and I think we ought to proceed in regular order. There will be plenty of opportunities to respond to the questions that the minority is— Protester 2: We didn’t vote for Judge Kavanaugh. [unclear] Sen. Grassley: —legitimately raising. Unknown Speaker: Get her thrown out of here, my god. Protester 3: [unclear] Sen. Grassley: And we will proceed accordingly. Unknown Speaker: What did she say? Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (RI): Mr. Chairman, under regular order, may I ask a point of order, which is that we are now presented with a situation in which somebody has decided that there are 100,000 documents protected by executive privilege, yet there has not been an assertion of executive privilege before the committee. How are we to determine whether executive privilege has been properly asserted— Protester 4: [unclear] Sen. Whitehouse: —if this hearing goes by without the committee ever considering that question? Why is it not in regular order for us to determine before the hearing at which the documents would be necessary whether or not the assertion of privilege that prevents us from getting those documents is legitimate or indeed is even an actual assertion of executive privilege? I do not understand why that is not a legitimate point of order at this point, because at the end of this hearing, it is too late to consider it. Senator Patrick Leahy (VT): Mr. Chairman, if I might add to this, on the integrity of the documents we’ve received, there really is no integrity. They have alterations, they have oddities, attachments are missing, emails are cut off halfway through a chain, recipient’s names are missing—many are of interest to this committee, but it’s cut off. The National Archives hasn’t had a chance to get us all that we want, even though you said on your website the National Archives would act as a check against any political interference. But— Protester 5: [unclear] Sen. Leahy: —I’d check after the hearing is over, there’s no check, I think we ought to at least have the National Archives finish it, and to have for the first time, certainly in my 44 years here, to have somebody say there’s a claim of executive privilege when the president hasn’t made such a claim, just puts everything under doubt. What are we trying to hide? Why are we rushing? Hearing: 2018 Day 1 Part 2 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 4, 2018. Hearing: 2018 Day 2 Part 1 Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 5, 2018. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Sound Clips: 53:00 Senator Dianne Feinstein (CA): What would you say your position today is on a woman’s right to choose? Brett Kavanaugh: Well, as a judge— Sen. Feinstein: As a judge. Kavanaugh: As a judge, it is an important precedent of the Supreme Court—by “it,” I mean Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey—and reaffirm many times Casey is precedent on precedent, which itself is an important factor to remember, and I understand the significance of the issue, the jurisprudential issue, and I understand the significance, as best I can, I always try and I do hear, of the real-world effects of that decision, as I try to do of all the decisions of my court and of the Supreme Court. 1:02:35* Brett Kavanaugh: I can tell you about the U.S. v. Nixon precedent, and I did about Chief Justice Burger’s role in forging a unanimous opinion—and, really, all the justices worked together on that—but Chief Justice Burger, who had been appointed by President Nixon—appointed by President Nixon—writes the opinion in U.S. v. Nixon, 8-0—Rehnquist was recused—8-0, ordering President Nixon to disclose the tapes in response to a criminal trial subpoena. A moment-of-crisis argument, I think July 8, 1974. They decided two weeks later a really important opinion, a moment of judicial independence, important precedent of the Supreme Court. 1:09:49 Senator Orrin Hatch (UT): I’d like to turn now to your work in the Bush administration. As you know, my Democratic colleagues are demanding to see every, every piece of paper or every single scrap of paper you ever touched during your six years in the Bush administration, in part because they want to know what role, if any, you played in developing the Bush administration’s interrogation policies. Well, six years ago, Ranking Member Feinstein, who was then the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and a good one at that, issued a lengthy report on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program under President Bush. The report detailed the origins, development, and implementation of the program. In 2014 a declassified version of that report was released to the public. The declassified version, or report, runs well over 500 pages, and your name appears nowhere in it. Now, I, myself, spent over 20 years on the Intelligence Committee. I know the quality of its staff and the work that they do, and I know the ranking member and how diligent she is. If you had played a role in the Bush administration’s interrogation policies, I think the ranking member would have discovered it. Numerous administration lawyers appear in the report, but not you. And that should tell us something. With that said, Judge Kavanaugh, I want to ask you for the record: what role, if any, did you play in developing or implementing the Bush administration’s detention and interrogation policies? Brett Kavanaugh: Well, the policies that are reflected and described in Senator Feinstein’s extensive, thorough report were very controversial, as you know, Senator—the enhanced interrogation techniques— Sen. Hatch: Right, right. Kavanaugh: —and the legal memos that were involved in justifying some of those techniques also were very controversial when they were disclosed in 2004. And I was not involved. I was not read into that program, not involved in crafting that program nor crafting the legal justifications for that program. In addition to Senator Feinstein’s report, the Justice Department did a lengthy Office of Professional Responsibility report about the legal memos that had been involved to justify some of those programs. My name’s not in that report, Senator, because I was not read into that program and not involved. There were a number of lawyers—and this came up at my last hearing—a number of lawyers who were involved, including a couple who were then judicial nominees. At my last hearing, I recall Senator Durbin asking about whether I also was likewise involved as these other judicial nominees had been, and the answer was no, and that answer was accurate, and that answer’s been shown to be accurate by the Office of Professional Responsibility report, by Senator Feinstein’s thorough report. 2:37:49 Senator Lindsey Graham (SC): So when somebody says post-9/11, that we’ve been at war, and it’s called the War on Terrorism, do you generally agree with that concept? Brett Kavanaugh: I do, Senator, because Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which is still in effect. And that was passed, of course, on September 14, 2001, three days later. Sen. Graham: Let’s talk about the law and war. Is there a body of law called the law of armed conflict? Kavanaugh: There is such a body, Senator. Sen. Graham: Is there a body of law that’s called the basic criminal law? Kavanaugh: Yes, Senator. Sen. Graham: Are there differences between those two bodies of law? Kavanaugh: Yes, Senator. Sen. Graham: From an American citizen’s point of view, do your constitutional rights follow you? If you’re in Paris, does the Fourth Amendment protect you as an American from your own government? Kavanaugh: From your own government, yes. Sen. Graham: Okay. So, if you’re in Afghanistan, do your constitutional rights protect you against your own government? Kavanaugh: If you’re an American in Afghanistan, you have constitutional rights as against the U.S. government. Sen. Graham: Is there a longstanding— Kavanaugh: That’s long-settled law. Sen. Graham: Isn’t there also a long-settled law that—it goes back to Eisentrager case—I can’t remember the name of it— Kavanaugh: Yeah, Johnson v. Eisentrager. Sen. Graham: Right. —that American citizens who collaborate with the enemy have considered enemy combatants? Kavanaugh: They can be. Sen. Graham: Can be. Kavanaugh: They can be. They’re often—they’re sometimes criminally prosecuted, sometimes treated in the military sense. Sen. Graham: Well, let’s talk about “can be.” I think the— Kavanaugh: Under Supreme Court precedent— Sen. Graham: Right. Kavanaugh: —just want to make….yeah. Sen. Graham: There’s a Supreme Court decision that said that American citizens who collaborated with Nazi saboteurs were tried by the military. Is that correct? Kavanaugh: That is correct. Sen. Graham: I think a couple of them were executed. Kavanaugh: Yeah. Sen. Graham: So if anybody doubts, there’s a longstanding history in this country that your constitutional rights follow you wherever you go, but you don’t have a constitutional right to turn on your own government, collaborate with the enemy of the nation. You’ll be treated differently. What’s the name of the case, if you can recall, that reaffirmed the concept that you could hold one of our own as an enemy combatant if they were engaged in terrorist activities in Afghanistan? Are you familiar with that case? Kavanaugh: Yeah. Hamdi. Sen. Graham: Okay. So the bottom line is I want every American citizen to know you have constitutional rights, but you do not have a constitutional right to collaborate with the enemy. There's a body of law well developed long before 9/11 that understood the difference between basic criminal law and the law of armed conflict. Do you understand those differences? Kavanaugh: I do understand that there’re different bodies of law, of course, Senator. Hearing: 2018 Day 2 Part 2 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 5, 2018. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Hearing: 2018 Day 2 Part 3 Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 5, 2018. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Sound Clips: 25:10 Brett Kavanaugh: My case, I upheld, importantly I upheld limits on contributions in the RNC case and in the Bluman case, and the Supreme Court has upheld contribution limits generally but struck them down when they’re too low in cases like Randall v. Sorrell, and McCutcheon. 54:45 Brett Kavanaugh: The religious tradition reflected in the First Amendment is a foundational part of American liberty, and it’s important for us as judges to recognize that and not—and recognize too that, as with speech, unpopular religions are protected. Our job—we can, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, question their sincerity of a religious belief, meaning, is someone lying or not about it? But we can’t question the reasonableness of it, and so the Supreme Court has cases with all sorts of religious beliefs protected—Justice Brennan really the architect of that. So religious liberty is critical to the First Amendment and the American Constitution. 1:50:00 Brett Kavanaugh: All the significant wars in U.S. history have been congressionally authorized, with one major exception—the Korean War. And the Korean War is an anomaly in many respects, and I think some of—the fact that it was undeclared and unauthorized really did lead to the Youngstown decision. But, you know, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, the AUMF against al Qaeda, the 2003 Iraq War, and then going back, World War II, World War I, the War of 1812—they’re all congressionally authorized. You can go back throughout, and I specify that. And so the war power, the power to take the nation into war, at least a significant one—and there’s some questions about short-term air strikes and things like that—but a significant war, that’s the biggest of all, and that’s something that Hamilton talked about in ’69 and that our historical practice, I think, is actually lived up to. I don’t mean to footnote Korea—that’s an enormous exception—but since then, they’ve all been congressionally authorized. 1:56:30 Senator Ben Sasse (NE): And one of the reasons that the executive branch seems so powerful right now is, again, because of how weak the legislature is. I mean, it’s a fundamental part of why we have the term “president.” In the 1780s, this wasn’t a very common term in the English language. “President” was just a nounified form of the name “presiding officer,” and we made it up, our founders made it up so that we wouldn’t have a term that sounded a lot like a king. And so we wanted to be sure that the term “presiding officer” sounded pretty boring and administrative, because the legislative, the policymaking powers were supposed to sit in this body, and the Article Two branch is supposed to preside over and execute the laws that have been passed. It’s not supposed to be the locus of all policymaking in America, but one of the reasons we have some of these problems with so many of these executive agencies is because Congress regularly doesn’t finish its work, punch those powers to Article Two, and then it’s not clear who exactly can execute all those authorities. And so we end up with this debate about the unitary executive, and you had a different term for it, but unpack for us a little bit why you have a different view about both the prudence and the constitutionality of one-person-headed independent executive agencies or pseudo-independent agencies versus commission-structure-headed independent agencies. Brett Kavanaugh: The traditional independent agencies that were upheld by the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor in 1935 are multi-member independent agencies. And so usually sometimes three, five, occasionally more, but they’re multi-member independent agencies, and that’s been all the way through. And then the—for the significant independent agencies—the CFPB—and I had no—it’s not my role to question the policy or to question the creation of the new agency. In fact, I think it was designed for efficiency and centralization of certain overlapping authorities. It’s not my role to question that policy. Someone challenged the fact that it was headed, for the first time on something like this, by a single person. And a couple things, then, I wrote about in my dissent in that case—I’ll just repeat what I wrote in the dissent—I said, “First of all, that’s a departure from historical practice of independent agencies, and that matters according to the Supreme Court.” They had a previous case involving the PCAOB, where they had different innovation there that the Supreme Court had struck down in part because of the novelty of it. So departure from historical practice matters because precedent always matters, including executive precedent. Then, diminution of presidential authority beyond the traditional independent agencies in this sense. With traditional independent agencies, when a new president comes in office, almost immediately the president has been given the authority to designate a new chair of the independent agencies, so when a new—when President Obama came in, was able to designate new chairs of the various independent agencies, and the chairs, of course, set the policy direction and control the agenda. That’s historically been the way. That does not happen with the CFPB. And finally, having a single person—just going back to liberty—who’s in charge, who’s not removable at will by anyone, not accountable to Congress, in charge of a huge agency is something that’s different and has an effect on individual liberty. So a single person can make these enormous decisions—rule makings, adjudications, and enforcement decisions, all of them—and from my perspective—I am just repeating what I wrote here. I’m not intending to go beyond what I wrote in that opinion that was an issue of concern. And I did put in a hypothetical because it seems abstract that—I think we’ll realize this issue with that agency or any other—when a president comes in to office and has to live for three, four years with a CFPB director appointed by the prior president. And then I think everyone’s going to realize—of a different party— Sen. Sasse: Right. Kavanaugh: — in particular—and then I think everyone’s going to realize, wow, that’s an odd structure. Now, maybe not, but that’s what I wrote in my opinion that that will seem very weird because that’s not what happens with all the traditional independent agencies. And so whenever any president leaves and has appointed in the last two years a CFPB director, the new president might campaign on consumer protection. Let’s imagine, okay, presidential campaigns on consumer protection and consumer issues and then comes into office and can’t actually appoint a new CFPB director for the whole term of his or her office, that’s going to seem, I think, quite odd structurally. At least, that’s what I said in my opinion. Hearing: 2018 Day 2 Part 4 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 5, 2018. Witness: Brett Kavanaugh Sound Clips: 4:45 Senator Richard Blumenthal (CT): I want to talk about Jane Doe in Garza v. Hagen. As you know, she was a 17-year-old unaccompanied minor who came across this border, having escaped serious, threatening, horrific physical violence in her family, in her homeland. She braved horrific threats of rape and sexual exploitation as she crossed the border. She was eight weeks pregnant. Under Texas law, she received an order that entitled her to an abortion, and she also went through mandatory counseling, as required by Texas law. She was eligible for an abortion under that law. The Trump administration blocked her. The Office of Refugee Resettlement forced her to go to a crisis pregnancy center, where she was subjected to medically unnecessary procedures. She was punished by her continued requests to terminate her pregnancy by being isolated from the rest of the residents. She was also forced to notify her parents, which Texas law did not require. And the pregnancy, which was eight weeks, was four weeks further when you participated on a panel that upheld the Trump administration in blocking her efforts to terminate her pregnancy. The decision of that panel was overruled by a full court of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. It reversed that panel, and the decision and opinion in that case commented “the flat barrier that the government has interposed to her knowing and informed decision to end the pregnancy defies controlling Supreme Court precedent.” And it said further, “The government’s insistence that it must not even stand back and permit abortion to go forward for someone in some form of custody is freakishly erratic.” In addition to being erratic, it also threatened her health because she was unable to terminate her pregnancy for weeks that further increased the risk of the procedure—one study said 38 percent every week her health was threatened. She was going through emotional turmoil. And yet, in your dissent, you would have further blocked and delayed that termination of pregnancy. All of what I said is correct, hence to the facts here, correct? Brett Kavanaugh: No, Senator. I respectfully disagree in various parts. My ruling, my position in the case would not have blocked— Sen. Blumenthal: It would have delayed it. And it would have set imperiously close to the 20-week limit under Texas law, correct? Kavanaugh: No. We were still several weeks away. I said several things that are important, I think. First— Sen. Blumenthal: Well, I want to go on because I can read your dissent, but I want to go to— Kavanaugh: Well, but you read several things, respectfully—first of all, I think the opinion was by one judge that you’re reading from that was not the opinion for the majority. Secondly, I was trying to follow precedent of the Supreme Court on parental consent, which allows some delays in the abortion procedure so as to fulfill the parental-consent requirements. I was reasoning by analogy from those. People can disagree, I understand, on whether we were following precedent, how to read that precedent, but I was trying to do so as faithfully as I could and explained that. I also did not join the separate opinion, the separate dissent, that said she had no right to attain an abortion. ____(04:29) I did not say that. And I also made clear that the government could not use this immigration-sponsor provision as a ruse to try to delay her abortion past, to your point, the time when it was safe. 21:15 Brett Kavanaugh: And I said, thirdly, that if the nine days or seven days expired, that the minor at that point—unless the government had some argument that had not unfolded yet that was persuasive, and since they hadn’t unfolded it yet, I’m not sure what that would have been—that the minor would have to be allowed to obtain the abortion at that time. Hearing: 2018 Day 2 Part 5 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 5, 2018. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 1 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. 30:35 Senator Dianne Feinstein (CA): It’s my understanding that by agreement with private lawyer Bill Burke, the chairman has designated 190,000 pages of Kavanaugh’s records “committee confidential,” and by doing this, Republicans argue members can’t use these documents at the hearing or release them to the public. Unlike the Intelligence Committee—and I’ve been a member for about two decades—the judiciary committee doesn’t have any standing rules on how and when documents are designated “committee confidential.” Previously, the judiciary committee has made material confidential only through bipartisan agreement. That has not been done in this case. So this is without precedent. Republicans claim that Chairman Leahy accepted documents on a committee-confidential basis during the Kagan administration. It’s my understanding that those documents were processed through the National Archives, not private partisan lawyers, and Republicans agreed. Ninety-nine percent of Elena Kagan’s White House records were publicly available and could be used freely by any member. By contrast, the committee has only seven percent of Brett Kavanaugh’s White House records and only four percent of those are available to the public. No Senate or committee rule grants the chairman unilateral authority to designate documents “committee confidential.” So I have no idea how that stamp “committee confidential” got on these documents. 39:10 Senator John Cornyn (TX): Mr. Chairman, I’m looking at a Wall Street Journal article, back during the Elena Kagan nomination. It says, document production from Elena Kagan’s years in the Clinton White House counsel’s office was supervised by Bruce Lindsey, whose White House tenure overlapped with Ms. Kagan. Bill Clinton designated Mr. Lindsey to supervise records from his presidency in cooperation with the National Archives and Records Administration under the Presidential Records Act. So President Bush, by choosing Mr. Burke, is doing exactly what President Clinton did in choosing Bruce Lindsey for that same purpose. 1:51:22 Brett Kavanaugh: My religious beliefs have no relevance to my judging. I judge based on the Constitution and laws of the United States. I take an oath to do that, and for 12 years I’ve lived up to that oath. At the same time, of course, as you point out, I am religious, and I am a Catholic, and I grew up attending Catholic schools. And the Constitution of the United States foresaw that religious people or people who are not religious are all equally American. As I’ve said in one of my opinions, the Newdow opinion, no matter what religion you are or no religion at all, we’re all equally American, and the Constitution of the United States also says in Article Six, no religious tests shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. That was an important provision to have in the founding Constitution to ensure that there was not discrimination against people who had a religion or people who didn’t have a religion. It’s a foundation of our country. We’re all equally American. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 2 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. 22:30 Senator Mike Lee (UT): What you were asked about was whether or not you were involved in crafting the policies that would govern detention of enemy combatants. Is that right? Brett Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: And that was a classified program, classified at a very high level, presumably compartmentalized such that you would have had to have been read into that program in order to participate in that process. Is that right? Kavanaugh: I believe that’s correct. Read in. I wasn’t necessarily using the formal sense of that, but what I meant is I was not a part of that program. Sen. Lee: Okay. But that is a binary issue. You were either involved in the development of that policy or you were not. Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: And you were not. Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: And Tim Flanigan, who was, I believe, at the time the White House counsel. Kavanaugh: He was the deputy counsel. Sen. Lee: The deputy counsel. Has confirmed that you were not involved in that. Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: We have your word and the word of the then-deputy White House counsel. Then, there is a separate issue. Well, I guess one could argue a related issue, but a separate— Protesters: [unclear] Unknown Speaker: ____(01:17—I don’t know if it’s worth it, but he said something that got read into it. I don’t know whether people understand what it means.) Sen. Lee: I assume that won’t be counted against me, there. Unknown Speaker: It will be counted against you. Sen. Lee: Oh, okay. All right, well, I’ll have to speak more quickly then. When we talk about being read into, that is a colloquial term that we sometimes refer to. It’s government speak that talks about being cleared to discuss certain classified matters. In any event, you were not brought into the development of this policy. Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: Secondly, there was a separate, arguable related, but a distinct issue involving a meeting where you were asked for your opinion about how Justice Kennedy might react to certain legal arguments that people in the administration were pushing. Is that right? Kavanaugh: That’s correct. Sen. Lee: And you answered that question. Kavanaugh: I said that indefinite detention of an American citizen without access to a lawyer, which at the time was what was happening in that particular case, would never fly with Justice Kennedy. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 3 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 4 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. 18:25 Senator Jeff Flake (AZ): Specifically, what impact does technology have on the Fourth and the First Amendments? Brett Kavanaugh: So I think the Carpenter case explains that once upon a time if a piece of information of yours ended up in the hands of a third party, and the government got a third party, that really wasn’t of any effect on your privacy. But now when all of our data is in the hands of a business, a third party, and the government obtains all your data, all your emails, all your tax, all your information, your financial transactions, your whole life is in the hands of a data company, and the government gets that, your privacy is very well affected. And that’s the importance, I think, of the Carpenter decision is that it recognizes that change in understanding of our understandings of privacy, and I think going forward, that’s going to be a critical issue. 1:27:10 Brett Kavanaugh: One of the things that we have to do as judges, as I’ve emphasized many times in this hearing, is maintain the independence of the federal judiciary, independence from politics, independence from political influence or public pressure or public influence. And part of that, part of the canons for federal judges, federal judiciary, is that we don’t attend political rallies, we’re not allowed to donate to political campaigns, support political candidates, put bumper stickers on our cars, signs in our yards. And one of the things I decided—we are allowed, technically, to vote, but one of the things I decided after I voted in the first election, and I read something about how the second Justice Harlan decided not to vote in elections because he thought that reinforced the independence that he felt as a judge. And I thought about that, and I decided to follow that lead. I’m not saying my approach is right, and other judges take a different approach on that, and I fully respect that. But for me it just felt more consistent for me, with the independence of the judiciary, not to vote, because I’ve always considered voting a sacred responsibility and one in which I think very deeply about the policies I’m supporting and the people I’m supporting, and that seemed almost as if I were taking policy views, at least to myself, into the voting booth, and I didn’t want to do that as a judge. So I decided to follow the lead of the second Justice Harlan. I’ll be the first to say I’m not the second Justice Harlan. He was a great justice on the Supreme Court and someone, of course, who I would be—if I were to be confirmed—honored to be on that Court and follow in his lead. Senator John Kennedy (LA): So you don’t vote in political elections. Kavanaugh: I do not vote in political elections. Sen. Kennedy: Interesting. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 5 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 6 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. Hearing: 2018 Day 3 Part 7 Kavanaugh Judicial Confirmation Hearing, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 6, 2018. Hearing: Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Sexual Assault Hearing, Professor Blasey Ford Testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 27, 2018. 3:37 Dr. Christine Blasey Ford: When I got to the small gathering, people were drinking beer in a small living room/family room-type area on the first floor of the house. I drank one beer. Brett and Mark were visibly drunk. Early in the evening, I went up a very narrow set of stairs, leading from the living room to a second floor to use the restroom. When I got to the top of the stairs, I was pushed from behind, into a bedroom across from the bathroom. I couldn’t see who pushed me. Brett and Mark came into the bedroom and locked the door behind them. There was music playing in the bedroom. It was turned up louder by either Brett or Mark once we were in the room. I was pushed onto the bed, and Brett got on top of me. He began running his hands over my body and grinding into me. I yelled, hoping that someone downstairs might hear me. And I tried to get away from him, but his weight was heavy. Brett groped me and tried to take off my clothes. He had a hard time because he was very inebriated and because I was wearing a one-piece bathing suit underneath my clothing. I believed he was going to rape me. I tried to yell for help. When I did, Brett put his hand over my mouth to stop me from yelling. This is what terrified me the most and has had the most lasting impact on my life. It was hard for me to breathe, and I thought that Brett was accidentally going to kill me. Both Brett and Mark were drunkenly laughing during the attack. They seemed to be having a very good time. Mark seemed ambivalent at times, urging Brett on, and at times telling him to stop. A couple of times I made eye contact with Mark and thought he might try to help me, but he did not. During this assault, Mark came over and jumped on the bed twice while Brett was on top of me. And the last time that he did this, we toppled over, and Brett was no longer on top of me. I was able to get up and run out of the room. Directly across from the bedroom was a small bathroom. I ran inside the bathroom and locked the door. I waited until I heard Brett and Mark leave the bedroom, laughing, and loudly walked down the narrow stairway, pinballing off the walls on the way down. I waited, and when I did not hear them come back up the stairs, I left the bathroom, went down the same stairwell, through the living room, and left the house. I remember being on the street and feeling this enormous sense of relief that I escaped that house and that Brett and Mark were not coming outside after me. Hearing: Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Sexual Assault Hearing, Professor Blasey Ford Testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 27, 2018. 1:22:10 Senator Dick Durbin (IL): Dr. Ford, with what degree of certainty do you believe Brett Kavanaugh assaulted you? Dr. Christine Blasey Ford: 100 percent. Hearing: Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Sexual Assault Hearing, Judge Kavanaugh Testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 27, 2018. 10:04 Brett Kavanaugh: This whole two-week effort has been a calculated and orchestrated political hit, fueled with apparent pent-up anger about President Trump and the 2016 election, fear that has been unfairly stoked about my judicial record, revenge on behalf of the Clintons, and millions of dollars in money from outside left-wing opposition groups. This is a circus. 18:04 Brett Kavanaugh: From 2001 to 2006 I worked for President George W. Bush in the White House. As staff secretary, I was by President Bush’s side for three years and was entrusted with the nation’s most sensitive secrets. I travelled on Air Force One all over the country and the world with President Bush. I went everywhere with him, from Texas to Pakistan, from Alaska to Australia, from Buckingham Palace to the Vatican. Three years in the West Wing, five and a half years in the White House. 2:57:20 Senator John Kennedy (LA): None of these allegations are true. Brett Kavanaugh: Correct. Sen. Kennedy: No doubt in your mind. Kavanaugh: Zero. I’m 100 percent certain. Sen. Kennedy: Not even a scintilla. Kavanaugh: Not a scintilla. One hundred percent certain, Senator. Sen. Kennedy: Do you swear to God? Kavanaugh: I swear to God. Meeting: Meeting on Brett Kavanaugh Nomination, Senate Judiciary Committee, September 28, 2018. 4:12:55 Senator Jeff Flake (AZ): I have been speaking with a number of people on the other side. We’ve had conversations ongoing for a while with regard to making sure that we do due diligence here. And I think it would be proper to delay the floor vote for up to, but not more than, one week in order to let the FBI continue—to do an investigation, limited in time and scope to the current allegations that are there, and a limit in time to no more than one week. And I will vote to advance the bill to the floor, with that understanding.   Community Suggestions See Community Suggestions HERE. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)  

Today's episode takes an in-depth historical look at the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" and what that might mean for the future of Obergefell v. Hodges in the next Supreme Court.  What does capital punishment have to do with gay marriage?  Listen and find out! We begin, however, with a discussion of the District Court's refusal to modify the Flores settlement we discussed in Episode 184.  Find out what the court thinks of Trump's Executive Order to "keep families together" at the border... by indefinitely detaining minors in violation of the law. After that, it's time for a double-length dive into the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular, the Supreme Court's decision outlawing capital punishment in 1972 (Furman v. Georgia) and then reversing itself just four years later (Gregg v. Georgia).  Is this a blueprint for what the next SCOTUS will do?  Listen and find out! Finally, we end the answer to Thomas Takes The Bar Exam #84 regarding spousal privilege.  Remember to follow our Twitter feed (@Openargs) and like our Facebook Page so that you too can play along with #TTTBE! Recent Appearances By the time you download this, Andrew will have been a guest discussing Judge Kavanaugh with conservative talk show host Chuck Morse.  If you'd like to have either of us as a guest on your show, drop us an email at openarguments@gmail.com. Show Notes & Links We first discussed the President's Executive Order regarding family separation in Episode 184; and you can click hear to read the District Court's Order refusing to modify the Flores settlement. The first case we discussed was Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017), in which Roberts refused to sign on with the hard-right dissent. Our two main cases we broke down were Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 482 U.S. 153 (1976). Finally, we strongly recommend reading Justice Brennan's 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes lecture in which he explains his view of the Eighth Amendment. Support us on Patreon at:  patreon.com/law Follow us on Twitter:  @Openargs Facebook:  https://www.facebook.com/openargs/ Don't forget the OA Facebook Community! For show-related questions, check out the Opening Arguments Wiki And email us at openarguments@gmail.com  

Justice Brennan’s 1977 article “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” provoked many litigators to look to the state courts to enhance individual liberties beyond the scope of the federal constitution. This came at a time when the conservative legal movement developed out of a perception that the Warren Court and its successors had gone too far, with courts holding an influence far too powerful in American life. They called for a more restrained view of the judicial role, while those on the left looked to state courts to assert their role in protecting individual rights. This sparked a New Federalism that embraced more active and robust efforts to achieve litigation-oriented outcomes through state constitutional litigation. In recent years, many in the conservative legal movement have also come to embrace state constitutions as separate documents that best protect both individual and economic liberty. This panel will offer a historical overview of these trends as well as offer perspectives of the role of state constitutions from the federal and state bench.The Inaugural Wisconsin Lawyers Chapters Conference was held on May 4, 2018, in Madison, Wisconsin.Panelists:Hon. Stephen Markman, Chief Justice, Michigan Supreme CourtJoseph Ranney, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School & Shareholder, DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C.Hon. Jeffrey Sutton, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitModerator: Hon. Brian K. Hagedorn, Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Justice Brennan’s 1977 article “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” provoked many litigators to look to the state courts to enhance individual liberties beyond the scope of the federal constitution. This came at a time when the conservative legal movement developed out of a perception that the Warren Court and its successors had gone too far, with courts holding an influence far too powerful in American life. They called for a more restrained view of the judicial role, while those on the left looked to state courts to assert their role in protecting individual rights. This sparked a New Federalism that embraced more active and robust efforts to achieve litigation-oriented outcomes through state constitutional litigation. In recent years, many in the conservative legal movement have also come to embrace state constitutions as separate documents that best protect both individual and economic liberty. This panel will offer a historical overview of these trends as well as offer perspectives of the role of state constitutions from the federal and state bench.The Inaugural Wisconsin Lawyers Chapters Conference was held on May 4, 2018, in Madison, Wisconsin.Panelists:Hon. Stephen Markman, Chief Justice, Michigan Supreme CourtJoseph Ranney, Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School & Shareholder, DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C.Hon. Jeffrey Sutton, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitModerator: Hon. Brian K. Hagedorn, Wisconsin Court of Appeals

In 1977, the publication of Justice William Brennan’s article, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” provoked many litigators to look to the state courts to enhance individual liberties beyond the scope of the federal constitution. Panelists will discuss the legacy of Justice Brennan’s call for state constitutions to serve as a bulwark for individual liberties. How have state courts responded? Panelists will also discuss if the advancement of federalism has been an unintended consequence of this call to action. They will also discuss what this trend toward greater state judicial engagement means for the separation of powers and legislative action. -- This panel was part of the 2017 Annual Western Chapters Conference at The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, CA on January 28, 2017. -- Forty Years Later: The Brennan Article and State Constitutions -- Dean James A. Gardner, Interim Dean, SUNY Distinguished Professor and Bridget and Thomas Black Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law; Prof. Kenneth Miller, Claremont McKenna College; and Prof. Derek Muller, Pepperdine University School of Law. Moderator: Hon. Jay Bybee, U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit. Introduction: Mr. Eugene B. Meyer, President, The Federalist Society.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. In 1972-73, Geoffrey Stone served as a law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. The 1972 Term was an eventful one for the Supreme Court, resulting in landmark decisions in such areas as obscenity, equal protection, abortion, and criminal procedure. Moreover, the 1972 Term marked a critical transition from the "liberal" era of the Warren Court to a new era, which has now lasted for almost forty years, in which the Court has been dominated by increasingly "conservative" justices. Professor Stone will discuss his experiences and insights during the Court's 1972 Term.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. In 1972-73, Geoffrey Stone served as a law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. The 1972 Term was an eventful one for the Supreme Court, resulting in landmark decisions in such areas as obscenity, equal protection, abortion, and criminal procedure. Moreover, the 1972 Term marked a critical transition from the "liberal" era of the Warren Court to a new era, which has now lasted for almost forty years, in which the Court has been dominated by increasingly "conservative" justices. Professor Stone will discuss his experiences and insights during the Court's 1972 Term.