Podcasts about iraqi kurds

The UK's National Crime Agency has been intensifying its campaign to crack down on people smugglers operating in the Iraqi Kurdish region. Thousands of Iraqi Kurds make the risky journey each year trying to reach Europe and the UK. Many are smuggled there on crowded, ill-equipped boats across dangerous seas in search of a better life. A months-long investigation by The National traced direct links between some of the most notorious smuggler gangs operating from Kurdish towns in Iraq, and in France and the UK. In this episode of Beyond the Headlines, host Nada AlTaher speaks to the reporting team about what they uncovered: a teenage girl stuck in a northern French town, struggling to cross the English Channel; an infamous ringleader who has gone into hiding; and a sham car wash in Wales that pulls the strings from behind the scenes. Sunniva Rose, Aveen Karim and Tariq Tahir recount the details of their investigation and talk about the impact of recent police raids on both smugglers and migrants.

Turkish military forces are carrying out an air assault on US-backed Kurdish forces in Syria, and Ankara has warned that a land operation may follow. The crackdown comes amid reports that Washington may pull its forces out of Syria and Iraq. Turkey's government accuses Kurdish forces in north-eastern Syria of being linked to attacks on its army. Turkish drone strikes are bombarding oil refineries and electricity production in the Syrian border region controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition of ethnic militias and rebel groups."The targets are energy infrastructure and that sort of stuff. Obviously, the goal is to make that area not sustainable, as a sustainable haven for the SDF," says Aydin Selcen, a former senior Turkish diplomat and now regional analyst for the Medyascope news portal.The SDF's ranks include the Kurdish People's Defence Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ), which Ankara accuses of being affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK. The armed movement is considered a terrorist organisation by both Ankara and Washington."The end game as defined by the Turkish authorities is to prevent a terrorist statelet [being created] beyond Turkish borders," explains Selcen."This means allowing the PKK or its Syrian affiliates, the YPG and YPJ, to establish a local administration in that area. War on terror is perhaps the number one priority for this government." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last month threatened a new land invasion into Syria.Turkish forces already control a large swathe of Syrian territory from previous operations against Syrian Kurdish forces.Possible US withdrawalThe SDF is backed by a US military force of around 900 soldiers in the war against the so-called Islamic State group, raising the possibility of a conflict between NATO and its allies.Ankara's ongoing assault comes amid reports that Washington is considering pulling its forces out of Syria and Iraq."Washington may be preparing to hand off SDF as a partner to the Syrian regime and saying: 'you guys sort yourselves out, we are actually going to leave'," said Turkey analyst Sinan Ciddi of the US-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies."The administration is apparently toying with the idea that it's no longer worth keeping US troops there because they are in harm's way," he said.At least some in the US administration want to explore, if they pulled their troops from northern Syria, "the extent to which Turkey could sort out its problems with the Kurds via engaging with the Syrian regime", Ciddi added.US-Turkey resetA US withdrawal from Syria would relieve years of tension between NATO allies Turkey and the United States."Unfortunately, this relationship with the United States and YPG creates a barrier between Turkey and the United States," said Bilgehan Alagoz, a professor of international relations at Istanbul's Marmara University. "A NATO ally should not act against other allies' national concerns," she said. "That's the main reason why Turkey perceives US policy in Syria as a national security concern." Sweden deal unlikely to resolve bitter dispute between NATO and TurkeyWith Ankara last month lifting its veto on Sweden's NATO membership and the White House reciprocating by green-lighting the sale of military jets to Turkey, the NATO allies appear to be seeking to reset ties. Analyst Selcen warns time may be running out for the SDF."If the Americans leave, it will be very difficult for the SDF to survive unless they cut a deal with Damascus," Selcen said. "But the timing is of the essence, of course – they cannot get the same terms that they will get once the Americans leave."Damascus compromiseBut Selcen suggests if the SDF moves quickly, it could secure a deal with Damascus that ensures its survival – at least in the short term, given the weakness of the Syrian security forces."At the end of the day, they will have to come up with some kind of modus vivendi with [Syrian President Bashar Al] Assad. It does not mean that Assad will come to control this region again as he did. But they will have to come up with some sort of a solution with Damascus."There could equally be advantages for the Turkish government, he believes. Turkey lays the ground for a smoothing of relations with Syria"It will also be, in the end, a kind of a safe face-saving formula for Ankara, which can now take Damascus as the main interlocutor to deal with this [Kurdish problem]," Selcen said."All these sides will be very happy to see the American presence leave the region – with the exception of, of course, the Iraqi Kurds and the Syrian Kurds."Opposition to the US military presence in Syria is rare common ground between Ankara and Damascus.If Damascus was to retake control of the predominantly Kurdish region, analysts say, it could be enough for Erdogan to claim victory over the SDF, end Turkey's assault, and remove the main point of tension between Ankara and Washington.

Dr. Gordon W. Rudd will discuss the staff structure of Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) and comparable U.S. agencies focused on the region. ***This lecture is part of the Asia Initiative Lecture Series.*** About Lecture: INDOPACOM is a U.S. regional Combatant Command covering most of Asia and the Pacific. It is based in Hawaii and has an Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, and Special Forces Component Commands, also located in Hawaii. All of these commands have formations located in Asia and the Pacific. These commands have an integrated staff system – to be covered in this presentation. The Department of State and other USG Agencies have comparable regional offices that only loosely align with INDOPACOM, but are not subordinate to it. Theater engagement, i.e. working with friends and allies in the region, is critical to the success of INDOPACOM. About the Speaker: Dr. Gordon W. Rudd has served as Professor of Strategic Studies, U.S. Marine School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) since January 1998. Prior to working with SAW, he spent two years (1996-1998) as Professor of Strategic Studies with the U.S. Marine Command and Staff College. During the period 2003-2004, he was detached for nine months to serve as field historian in Iraq with Office of Reconstruction & Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). From 1972 to 1995, he served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Army. He has had troop service in infantry, airborne, mech, and Special Forces formations. He has served as a Joint Service Officer (JSO) and Foreign Area Officer (FAO). Overseas assignments include: Panama, Lebanon, Israel, Korea, Iraq, Bosnia, and Turkey. His operational experience includes participation in Lebanon 1984-85 (UNTSO), northern Iraq 1991 (PROVIDE COMFORT), and Bosnia 1994 (UNPROFOR). His military training and education courses include: Infantry Basic and Advanced Courses; Ranger, Special Forces, Scuba, and HALO courses; DLI – French; USA Command & General Staff Course (non-res); USN Command & Staff Course (resident). In addition to his full-time teaching, Dr. Rudd has taught military history courses at the Darden School of Business of the University of Virginia and for the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets. While at SAW, he has taught classes at the Marine the Expeditionary Warfare School, the Marine Command and Staff College, and the Marine Corps War College. Dr. Rudd is the author of two books: - Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991, published in 2004. - Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story, published in 2010. His current research interests include military history, particularly WWII, comparative politics, and regional studies. Dr. Rudd earned his doctorate in history from Duke University in 1993. He earned an undergraduate degree in Political Science from Virginia Polytechnic & State University in 1972. He has earned masters degrees from the Naval War College (1988), Duke University (1990), and St. John's College (1999). ***Learn more about IWP graduate programs: https://www.iwp.edu/academic-programs/ ***Make a gift to IWP: https://interland3.donorperfect.net/weblink/WebLink.aspx?name=E231090&id=18

John Wilson on George Alagiah, the BBC Journalist and Presenter is remembered by his colleagues Sophie Raworth and John Simpson. Sinead O'Connor, the Irish singer who won worldwide fame with Nothing Compares 2 U. Ann Clwyd, the former Labour Member of Parliament who held frontbench posts in opposition, and campaigned on behalf of Welsh miners and Iraqi Kurds. Tony Bennett, the consummate crooner who sold 50 million records with hits including I Left My Heart In San Francisco. His son and manager Danny Bennett pays tribute. Trevor Francis, the former England footballer who became Britain's first £1million player when he joined Brian Clough's Nottingham Forest. Interviewee: Sophie Raworth Interviewee: John Simpson Interviewee: Danny Bennett Interviewee: Jo Stevens MP Interviewee: Linda Christmas Interviewee: Tony Woodcock Producer: Gareth Nelson-Davies Archive used: George Alagiah report on the World Bank, Breakfast Time, BBC One, 27/04/1989; George Alagiah report on 40th Anniversary of Ghana independence, BBC News, 22/11/1997; George Alagiah interview, BBC Radio 5 Live, 27/08/2019; Sinead O Connor interview, MasterTapes (Side A), BBC Radio 4, 15/12/2014; Sinead O'Connor interview, MasterTapes (Side B), BBC Radio 4, 16/12/2014; Ann Clwyd question in House of Commons, PMQ's, BBC One, 24/01/08; Ann Clwyd interview at Tower Colliery Protest, BBC News Wales, 15/04/94; Ann Clwyd interview, Iraq War 10 Years On, BBC News Wales, 26/03/13; Tony Bennett interview, Front Row, BBC Radio 4, 02/07/2011; Trevor Francis interviews, BBC News, 02/10/1972; Trevor Francis goal, Nottingham Forest v Malmo, BBC Sport, 30/05/1979; Brian Clough interview, BBC News, 30/05/1979.

Turkey and Iraq have been mired in a legal dispute over the export of Iraqi Kurdish oil through Turkish export terminals. Baghdad says the deal struck between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds to sell oil is illegal. The International Chamber of Commerce's international arbitration fined Turkey for breach of contract. Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds have since agreed to resume exports on new terms that gives the central government a greater say. However, Ankara has not allowed the exports to resume. Bilal Wahab, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, believes Turkey wants pledges from Baghdad that it won't seek further compensation for periods uncovered by the arbitration case. The standoff is leading to a huge loss of revenue for the Iraqi Kurds. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Iraq's Largest Chemical Weapons Attack on Civilians - The Survivors Are Still Seeking Justice!In retribution for Kurdish peshmerga fighters backing Iran in its eight-year war with Iraq, around 5,000 Iraqi Kurds, the majority women and children, were killed in the largest ever chemical weapons attack on civilians.Iraq's Largest Chemical Weapons Attack on Civilians - The Survivors Are Still Seeking Justice!KURIOUS - FOR ALL THINGS STRANGE

The story of the Iraqi Kurds and the establishment of the autonomous zone and the Kurdish Regional Government is a great Middle East epic that continues to play out. The Kurds have sought to carve out their own state amid the turmoil of unfolding regional history. They've been gassed and chased into the mountains by Saddam Hussein and attacked by the dangerous terror group ISIS. The Kurds have stood up courageously against their opponents. The Iraqi Kurds and the United States have had a long history of cooperation and, sadly, at times abandonment. The aspirations of the people of Kurdistan took shape in the 2017 independence referendum as the coalition battle against ISIS was winding down. The referendum won with 92% of Kurds voting to free the region from Baghdad's authority. However, the central government through a Supreme Court ruling, quashed the initiative. The KRG continues its close relationship with Washington as it continues to navigate a tough neighborhood, wedged among its Iraqi neighbors and Turkey, Iran and Syria. The KRG has been very well represented in Washington by the Hon. Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman. TNWAC is pleased to host her for a conversation about the relationship with the U.S. and developments in Kurdistan and the region. Join us.

Some Biden administration officials, notably Brett McGurk, White House coordinator for the Middle East, and Amos Hochstein, special presidential coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Energy Security, have been passing through Iraqi Kurdistan, encouraging Iraqi Kurds to sell oil to Turkey while arguing this will bolster US efforts to isolate Russia and Iran. Expert Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former Pentagon official, joins Thanos Davelis to break down why these energy schemes, primarily from officials like Amos Hochstein, are doing not only Iraq, but Iraqi Kurds and US interests from the Middle East to the Eastern Mediterranean a disservice.Read Michael Rubin's latest in the Washington Examiner: State Department does Iraq a disservice with energy schemesYou can read the articles we discuss on our podcast here:PM ends talks of elections before EasterDefense ministers agree to keep channels open

Men need community and brotherhood Stephen Mansfield is a best-selling author, speaker, a podcaster, and a leadership expert and coach. He's the author of Mansfield's Book of Manly Men, Building Your Brand of Brothers, Men on Fire and more. https://youtu.be/3jPzog9gzQc https://open.spotify.com/show/2QmqLwvb2z6qMbRVuibLbF?si=80cc54350f6b4883 Affirm Science USE MANLIHOOD AT CHECKOUT FOR 10% OFF | https://affirmscience.com/ These words are the lifeblood of Stephen Mansfield's work and the reason why this New York Times bestselling author, entrepreneur, and popular speaker is often to be found serving vital social causes. For example, in recent years Stephen has been captured by the cause of the Kurds. It has led him to write a book about the Iraqi Kurds, give a TEDx talk about “The Most Famous Unknown People in the World,” and to issue an international call for the creation of a Kurdish homeland. Stephen is also deeply concerned about the current state of manhood. To help reverse the downward trend of modern masculinity, he has written leading books on the subject, has appeared in major media, has spoken at conferences around the world, and has launched the GreatMan movement to train men in the art of noble manhood. “You have a destiny, but your destiny is fulfilled by investing in the destinies of others.” -Stephen Mansfield While managing his busy writing and speaking life, he founded a company that helps prominent figures and top organizations produce high-quality books. He began training leaders, often appearing at conferences around the world. He also began coaching leaders to speak well, something he has done with politicians, leading artists, bestselling authors, and at major universities. In May 2021, Stephen was named a Senior Fellow of Public Leadership at Palm Beach Atlantic University where he teaches and coaches current and future leaders. Stephen and his beloved wife, Beverly, split their time between Nashville, Tennessee, and Washington, D.C. More from Stephen Mansfield Official Website | http://stephenmansfield.tv GreatMan Podcast | http://greatman.tv Stephen Mansfield on Facebook | https://www.facebook.com/MansfieldWrites Stephen Mansfield on Instagram | https://instagram.com/mansfieldwrites/ Stephen Mansfield on Twitter | https://twitter.com/MansfieldWrites --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/manlihood/message

On today's Watchman Newscast, host Erick Stakelbeck breaks down the increased use of Iranian suicide drones by Russia in Ukraine and the significant rise of Iranian strikes against the Iraqi Kurds using unmanned aerial vehicles. We also look back to when Erick joined the Kurdish Peshmerga along the Iran/Iraq border, a place where few American civilians have set foot since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Plus, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei blamed Israel and the U.S. for the wave of protests rocking his regime. Will Tehran use this false accusation as a justification for a wave of new attacks? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The US Navy has become a steady presence in Vietnam. It's part of a strategy to help Vietnamese forces stand up to China, which is beefing up its military presence in the area. But just how far will the US go in its relationship with Vietnam's military? Also, in the past few weeks, we've been hearing a lot about the migration crisis in Europe. At the center of the storm are Iraqi Kurds fleeing the semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq. Now, many are being flown back to northern Iraq and having to restart their lives with very little. Plus, the new director of Interpol is the former minister of the interior from the United Arab Emirates. Critics want him removed for his spotty record policing his own country with allegations of abuse, even torture. Every day, our incredible team brings you powerful human stories from diverse perspectives you can't hear anywhere else. Without your support, none of it would be possible. Help us unlock a matching gift of $67,000 by being one of 515 supporters giving $130, or $11 per month. Thank you for being a part of our fall drive, and making our work possible. 

On today's Watchman Newscast, host Erick Stakelbeck visits Erbil, capital of Iraqi Kurdistan and one of the world's oldest continuously inhabited cities. Dalton Thomas of Frontier Alliance International takes Erick to Erbil's ancient Citadel and shares the fascinating Biblical history of the Kurdish people and why the Kurds still have a role to play in the days to come. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Turkey is risking the start of a new intra-Kurdish conflict in northern Iraq by pushing the regional government to deepen its involvement in Ankara's campaign against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), pro-Kurdish activist Sarah Glynn told Ahval News in a recent podcast. Glynn, who recently wrote that Turkey risked pushing Iraqi Kurdistan towards a civil war in an article for Open Democracy, believes that this desire is not an implausible one because it would be the only party to benefit. Using its deepening ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), local peshmerga units have clashed heavily in the last year with PKK militants who have long operated out of Iraq's mountainous north.

Middle East scholar Arzu Yilmaz argues that Iran has made irreversible gains in Iraq allowing it to more or less dictate the limits of Turkish intervention in Iraq. Turkey is free to operate against the Kurdistan Workers Party in Iraqi Kurdistan but territories such as Sinjar that are disputed between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds are a red line.

Join us for this conversation with the Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the U.S., Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, a great friend of the Tennessee World Affairs Council and homeland connection to the thousands of Iraqi Kurds who call Nashville home as new Americans. TNWAC thanks her for her previous programs with the Council including hosting our visiting student groups in Washington, D.C. *** There is a Kurdish proverb, "No friends but the mountains," that captures the sense of what the Kurds face as an ethnic group living across several international borders in the Middle East. The Kurds living in the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq have suffered at the hands of the Saddam Hussein government -- enduring genocidal campaigns -- and attacks from the Islamic State Caliphate. At the end of the Operation Desert Storm, when a U.S.-led military coalition reversed Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, he turned his army on the Kurds in the north and the Shia minority in the south. The Kurds were being driven into the mountains. Here is how Madam Abdul Rahman described it during a 2016 program with TNWAC and Lipscomb University: Saddam turned his weapons on us because he had by then been thrown out of Kuwait, and he committed terrible crimes during that period of the uprising. And this was just a couple of years after the chemical bombardment of Halabja, where five thousand people were killed, and the Anfal genocide campaign, where two hundred fifty thousand people were killed. So when Saddam turned against the Kurdish people everybody thought he would use chemicals again. Everyone fled. They fled to the borders of Iran and Turkey. This was in the spring of 1991, an incredibly cold spring, severe weather conditions. People died on the mountaintops. People starved. They died of exhaustion and exposure. The United States, Britain, France launched Operation Provide Comfort. It was the biggest military and humanitarian operation, and probably the most successful in history. I’ve met some of the military leaders, American military leaders who were involved in that operation, General Jim Jones, General Bob Barrow, General Jay Garner, and others who were involved in that operation, and they all speak of that operation with great pride because they saved lives. They saved hundreds of thousands if not one and a half million lives. [Complete remarks here] The United States went on to enforce a UN "No Fly Zone" that prevented Saddam from persecuting the Iraqi Kurds and allowing the Kurdistan Region to develop as an autonomous area. The 2003 invasion of Iraq permanently eliminated the threat from Saddam. In recent years the Kurds were again beset by the ominous threat posed by the Islamic State. The remarkably brave Peshmerga fighters of Kurdistan stood against ISIS with American and other coalition troops and support joining in the campaign. We commend to your reading the remarks of Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman during her April 2016 program in Nashville. The KRG enjoys a special relationship with the United States. The Kurdish people have been reliable partners, seeking democracy and independence and looking to the West for partners. We invite you to talk with Madam Abdul Rahman in this special program.

Contact the show: 318-599-9192Trump The Art of the Iran Dealhttps://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-02/trump-s-iran-sanctions-won-t-squeeze-oil-markets-too-muchWhat is Trump's strategy when it comes to issuing exemptions for importing Iranian oil? He's not abandoning his hard stance on Iran, but probably had this strategy from the start.Iran Reportedly Turns Off Oil Tanker Tracking Systems as US Sanctions Loomhttps://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201811041069490916-iran-oil-tanker-tracking-sanctions/Trackers may be exhausted, but they're keeping track of Iran's tanker fleet and how much oil is still on the market.Send them some coffee!Iraqi Kurds say upgrade raises oil pipeline capacity to 1 million bpdhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil/iraqi-kurds-say-upgrade-raises-oil-pipeline-capacity-to-1-million-bpd-idUSKCN1N90MXIraq halts Kirkuk oil to Iran for domestic reasons, won’t use KRG pipelinehttp://www.rudaw.net/english/business/041120181Iraqi oil could be key to keep oil prices from surging in 2019, but will the KRG and the Iraqi government reach an agreement on Kirkuk?In Florida, Voters Must Decide Whether To Ban Offshore Drilling And E-Cigshttps://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/11/04/in-florida-voters-must-decide-whether-to-ban-offshore-drilling-and-e-cigs/#3a3b7d8f42fcIf you like offshore drilling then you must also like vaping in the workplace. At least in Florida.Commentary: Hedge funds turn negative on oilhttps://www.reuters.com/article/uk-oil-prices-kemp/commentary-hedge-funds-turn-negative-on-oil-idUSKCN1NA1K7Is this just part of hedge funds overall investment strategy or are they actually reacting to Iran sanctions news? Explains a lot of about why oil has dropped for 5 weeks, but if it goes low enough will their long positions pick back up and send prices higher in 2019?

Contact the show: 318-599-9192Trump The Art of the Iran Dealhttps://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-02/trump-s-iran-sanctions-won-t-squeeze-oil-markets-too-muchWhat is Trump's strategy when it comes to issuing exemptions for importing Iranian oil? He's not abandoning his hard stance on Iran, but probably had this strategy from the start.Iran Reportedly Turns Off Oil Tanker Tracking Systems as US Sanctions Loomhttps://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201811041069490916-iran-oil-tanker-tracking-sanctions/Trackers may be exhausted, but they're keeping track of Iran's tanker fleet and how much oil is still on the market.Send them some coffee!Iraqi Kurds say upgrade raises oil pipeline capacity to 1 million bpdhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil/iraqi-kurds-say-upgrade-raises-oil-pipeline-capacity-to-1-million-bpd-idUSKCN1N90MXIraq halts Kirkuk oil to Iran for domestic reasons, won’t use KRG pipelinehttp://www.rudaw.net/english/business/041120181Iraqi oil could be key to keep oil prices from surging in 2019, but will the KRG and the Iraqi government reach an agreement on Kirkuk?In Florida, Voters Must Decide Whether To Ban Offshore Drilling And E-Cigshttps://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/11/04/in-florida-voters-must-decide-whether-to-ban-offshore-drilling-and-e-cigs/#3a3b7d8f42fcIf you like offshore drilling then you must also like vaping in the workplace. At least in Florida.Commentary: Hedge funds turn negative on oilhttps://www.reuters.com/article/uk-oil-prices-kemp/commentary-hedge-funds-turn-negative-on-oil-idUSKCN1NA1K7Is this just part of hedge funds overall investment strategy or are they actually reacting to Iran sanctions news? Explains a lot of about why oil has dropped for 5 weeks, but if it goes low enough will their long positions pick back up and send prices higher in 2019?

In episode 211, Jack and Miles are joined by writer and Behind The Bastard's host Robert Evans to discuss the Paul Manafort trial, a recap of this past weekend's DefCon, Trump's lack of knowledge when it comes to time zones and how countries are pronounced, Bob Goodlatte's son calling him out, some stories Robert's been following including the state of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, how 'The Meg' has been a huge box office success, some drink related stories, and more! FOOTNOTES: 1. Behind The Bastards: No Matter How Much You Hate Paul Manafort, You Should Hate Him More (And Here’s Why) Part 1 2. Behind The Bastards: No Matter How Much You Hate Paul Manafort, You Should Hate Him More (And Here’s Why) Part 2 3. Manafort Lawyers Rest Without Calling Witnesses in Fraud Trial 4. The Most Terrifying Device Hacks From This Year’s Def Con 5. Trump’s diplomatic learning curve: Time zones, ‘Nambia’ and ‘Nipple’ 6. In Politics, No One Can Call You Out Like Your Family 7. Up to 1,000 more U.S. troops could be headed to Afghanistan this spring 8. With ISIL gone, Iraqi Kurds still battle a weak economy 9. 6 Insanely Post-Apocalyptic Realities of the Ukraine Revolt 10. ‘The Meg’ Is a Surprise Box-Office Monster 11. Man fills water cup with soda and things go unnecessarily haywire from there 12. Why You Should Think Twice Before Ordering Coffee or Tea on a Plane (Video) 13. A Brief History of Vice: How Bad Behavior Built Civilization by Robert Evans 14. WATCH: Ravyn Lenae – Sleep Talking (Official Music Video) Learn more about your ad-choices at https://news.iheart.com/podcast-advertisers

On September 25th, the semi-autonomous Kurds of Northern Iraq called a referendum for independence. Since ISIS was pushed from the country, the Iraqi Kurds’ President Masoud Barzani thought the timing was right. In response, on October 16th, Iraqi federal security forces seized disputed territory occupied by the Iraqi Kurds, quashing any hopes of Kurdish independence. Tensions remain high as the Baghdad government demands a renunciation of the referendum; productive negotiations and the establishment of a cease-fire have yet to be accomplished. This week on War News Radio, our reporters Jake Stattel and Nick Mayo offer a brief historical background on this conflict and the role of the Kurds in Iraq. Tune in to catch up on the breaking story in Iraq, as it continues to unfold.

In September, Iraqi Kurds voted for independence. Host Dan Loney talks with Brendan O'Leary, Constitutional Advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, to discuss what this means, what has happened in the region since then, and what could happen next on Knowledge@Wharton. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Iraq’s Kurds have been making international headlines since September after forging ahead with their independence referendum, despite regional and international warnings. They are the only one of the Middle East's Kurdish communities to have their own regional government. The other notable communities are in Turkey, Iran and Syria. So who are the Kurds? Origins “They are a separate ethnic group, living in the Middle East where Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq meet. They have been there as long as we know,” says Michael Gunter, a professor at the Tennessee Technological University, who has been researching and writing about the Kurds for over 30 years. And as Gérard Gauthier, an anthropologist and researcher at the Kurdish Institute of Paris, adds ”You also have Kurds in the former Soviet Union [….] There have been Kurds in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in Georgia, you even have Kurds, I suspect, in China as well. So they are present in a lot of places. But basically the heart of their area is the Middle East.” While an actual Kurdish state is harder to trace in history, the fact remains that the Kurdish people have been in the Middle East region since as far back as 400BC. Contact with ancient Greece In fact, an ancient Greek general by the name of Xenophon details this in his work, Anabasis (The March Up Country). “Xenophon was the head of a troop of 10,000 Greek mercenaries and they were working for a Persian king," explains Gauthier. "And they were defeated and they had to leave Tsifphon, which is near Baghdad, at the time and had to walk all the way back to Greece. At one point they found a tribe of mountain people who blocked their passage, and those people described themselves as Kardokhoy.” It's hard to verify 100 percent if the Kurds were in fact this Kardokhoy or Karochi group and another theory states they are descendants of the Medes, an ancient people who lived in the north-west of what is now Iran. “The Kurds themselves claim to be the descendants of the Medes," adds Gunter. "The Medes were an Assyrian empire in 612BC. But we're not absolutely sure of that. The origins of the Kurds are lost in history. But they certainly have been there for a long time." Tribal allegiances The Kurds speak a language that is similar to Persian but unrelated to Arabic or Turkish. In fact, Gunter points out that the Kurds are a “separate ethnic group, completely different from the Turks and Arabs. [They] speak an Indo-European language, so they are related to the Iranians.” Even though there was a common language and culture among the Kurds, as was the case among other ethnic groups in the area, Kurdish unity was often based on tribal lines. This idea of fidelity to tribal lines goes back as far as the Middle Ages, says Gauthier, as it was important in “ keeping the communities together in times when you had the big wars and destruction” such as the Crusaders and the invasion of the Mongols. He adds that such events brought along destruction to the Middle East and so divisions along tribal lines would have been reinforced. Arrival of Islam During the seventh century, Islam spread from the Arabian Peninsula, bringing another unifying element to the Kurds: religion. Although uniting the Kurds under one banner was not really what was happening. “Because at the time of the empires -- Ottoman empires, Persian empires -- even before when it was the Caliph and you had a united Middle East with a Muslim caliph, then you had a lot of different communities in there. You had Turks, you had Arabs, Persians, Kurds, and the people they had unity and the banner of Islam basically,” explains Gauthier. He adds that like the other groups within the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds would also have spoken several languages. One famous Kurd from the Abbasid Muslim Caliphate was Saladin; he was a sultan, though he also received the title of king, but he was known for leading Islamic forces against the European Crusaders. After his big victory, however, he was revered not for his ethnicity as a Kurd but simply for being a great fighter. Independence So we see that the Kurds have always been a part of the regional history of the Middle East. But have they ever had independent states? “Well into the 19th century there were Kurdish immigrants who by today's standards meet many of the criteria for independence,” says Gunter. “And there's an ancient Kurdish history called Sharafnama, written by Sharaf al-Din Bitlisi in 1596, in which he talks about at least five Kurdish dynasties or emirates in the past that had the attributes of what we would today call independence. So it's possible to say that in effect there were independent Kurdish entities four to five hundred years ago which were eventually wiped out by the Ottoman and Persian empires.” Gauthier notes that al-Din Bitlisi was in fact a Kurd, although the manuscripts were written in Persian, since he was an administrator in the Ottoman Empire and also with the Savafid shahs, the rival Persian dynasty at the time. He began to put to paper the history of the Kurdish local dynasties. As Gauthier explains, Bitlisi wondered if they, the Kurds, had their own prince who could lead them; perhaps they would no longer be exploited by the Turks, Persians and Arabs. So already by the 16th century, we see that the Kurdish people, under Ottoman rule by then, were feeling the pinch. One mustn’t forget that under Ottoman rule, different ethnic and cultural groups were living side by side; but no one had independence. Each province, such as Syria, or Egypt, was ruled by a chosen representative of the Ottomans. The idea of the nation-state The notion of the nation-state as it is currently understood is a modern idea, appearing at the end of the 19th-century. It was really after World War I, which saw the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, that the push for nation-states took effect in the Middle East. “Obviously there was a big push for the idea of a nation-state with Kurds at the end of the Ottoman empire because the people had to choose,” says Gauthier. “A lot of those Kurds, they were generals, officers, administrators to the Ottoman empire, they had Ottoman identity.” And so when the Ottoman empire ceased to exist, many Kurds had to make a choice. And this is where the Kurds may have had a chance to have a state. But don’t forget they had spent years spread out over the region. So when Turkey, Iraq and Syria all pushed for independent states in response to the mandates run by Western powers that replaced the Ottomans, the Kurds found themselves in the middle of it all. “Then in 1918 when the modern state system was created, you created another division between Kurds: Turkish Kurds, Iranian Kurds, Iraqi Kurds and Syrian Kurds” explains Gunter. “That's been going on for a 100 years now. So that's another way the Kurds are divided between the four states that they live in.” In fact, the Kurds almost had a state. As the big Western powers were carving up the Middle East, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres proposed a Kurdish state in part of what was to become Turkey, although the Kurdish nationalists themselves could not agree on what its borders should be. But the treaty was rejected by the creator of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who launched a war against the Greeks, Italians, British and French. “He [Ataturk] first recruited them [Kurds] against the imperialists, saying we are going to set up a state, which will be a state of brotherhood between Turks and Kurds and when he won he told them there [are] no Kurds,” explains Gauthier. Added to that problem was the fact that the Kurds didn’t have a central figure to bring them together to push for their own state at the time. So they turned to the British. The British were in the north of Iraq and were initially interested in creating a Kurdish state, as a kind of buffer state between Iraq and Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey. “But then they discovered the oil, so they forgot about this buffer state,” says Gauthier. So the Kurdish populations were absorbed into Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. But constant tensions between the Kurdish communities and their country’s governments have always been a reason for them to push for their own state. In the case of Iraq’s Kurds, the US's 2003 invasion of Iras gave them outside support to set up their autonomous region, says Gunter. But as Iraqi’s Kurds face the consequences of pushing ahead with their quest for independence, Falah Mustafa, the foreign minister of the Kurdish Regional Government says that the Kurds are “a different nation”. Their efforts for independence have not worked out thus far, but “we tried our best, we went to Baghdad, we played a positive role. …. we should not be punished. We have to be realistic.”

This week, the Bombshell squad goes shoulder to shoulder into the fray of referenda for the Iraqi Kurds and the Catalans in Spain, alongside a recap of the German general election.  Like many women have before us, we ask "Why Chad?" and explore the merits of the new Trump travel ban. We wonder if it was painful for Secretary Tillerson to get cut off at the knees over North Korea, and contemplate the interagency fun of  the Puerto Rico relief efforts.  Finally, we spend some quality time pondering the existential crises brought on by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's Vietnam documentary on PBS - and also our love of Ross Poldark.   Episode Reading: Lauren Frayer, “Violence Breaks Out During Catalan Independence Referendum,” NPR  Lauren Theisen, “Barcelona Play In An Empty Stadium After Attempted Independence Vote,” Deadspin Julie Smith, “Merkel Will Spend the Next Four Years Battle Forces at Home,” Foreign Policy Kevin Sieff, “Why did the U.S. travel ban add counterterrorism partner Chad? No one seems quite sure,” Washington Post Helene Cooper, Michael D. Shear and Dionne Searcey. “Chad’s Inclusion in Travel Ban Could Jeopardize American Interests, Officials Say,” New York Times Charlie Savage and Eric Schmidt, “Trump poised to drop some limits on drone strikes and commando raids,” New York Times Dana Milbank, “Donald Trump's Dog,” Washington Post Malcolm Gladwell, "Saigon, 1965” (Episode 2), The Revisionist History Podcast  Alyssa Rosenberg, “Ken Burns’s American War,” Washington Post Nicole Cliffe, ”Poldark Season-Premiere Recap: Sunrise, Sunset,” Vulture Producer: Tre Hester, Music: Future Teens - Jennifer Lawrence   

This week, the Bombshell squad goes shoulder to shoulder into the fray of referenda for the Iraqi Kurds and the Catalans in Spain, alongside a recap of the German general election.  Like many women have before us, we ask "Why Chad?" and explore the merits of the new Trump travel ban. We wonder if it was painful for Secretary Tillerson to get cut off at the knees over North Korea, and contemplate the interagency fun of  the Puerto Rico relief efforts.  Finally, we spend some quality time pondering the existential crises brought on by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's Vietnam documentary on PBS - and also our love of Ross Poldark.   Episode Reading: Lauren Frayer, “Violence Breaks Out During Catalan Independence Referendum,” NPR  Lauren Theisen, “Barcelona Play In An Empty Stadium After Attempted Independence Vote,” Deadspin Julie Smith, “Merkel Will Spend the Next Four Years Battle Forces at Home,” Foreign Policy Kevin Sieff, “Why did the U.S. travel ban add counterterrorism partner Chad? No one seems quite sure,” Washington Post Helene Cooper, Michael D. Shear and Dionne Searcey. “Chad’s Inclusion in Travel Ban Could Jeopardize American Interests, Officials Say,” New York Times Charlie Savage and Eric Schmidt, “Trump poised to drop some limits on drone strikes and commando raids,” New York Times Dana Milbank, “Donald Trump's Dog,” Washington Post Malcolm Gladwell, "Saigon, 1965” (Episode 2), The Revisionist History Podcast  Alyssa Rosenberg, “Ken Burns’s American War,” Washington Post Nicole Cliffe, ”Poldark Season-Premiere Recap: Sunrise, Sunset,” Vulture Producer: Tre Hester, Music: Future Teens - Jennifer Lawrence   

Phil and Cooper figured that last week’s referendum in Kurdistan deserved a little more airtime, so we give an update on the threats that the Kurds are dealing with along their borders after this landmark vote. Also, Palestine joins Interpol, and fall is in the air. 05:38 - Iraqi Kurds watch nervously as Erdogan heads for Tehran (Amberin Zaman) 05:38 - Turkey, Iran, Iraq in shaky alignment against Iraqi Kurdistan (Fehim Tastekin) 05:38 - Iran’s pressure on Kurds could backfire (Fazel Hawramy) 16:02 - Palestine’s admission to Interpol sparks angry response from Israel (Daoud Kuttab) Music: Mohammed Assaf - Dammi Falastini (iTunes | Spotify | YouTube)

What’s so important about having your own country? On Monday many Kurds in Northern Iraq voted for independence, and the Spanish government is seeking to stop a separatist referendum in Catalonia this Sunday. But why do many Iraqi Kurds and Catalans want an independent state given that both regions already have a large degree of autonomy? Is it about national identity or economic independence? Are there common themes or is every case unique? And what are the legal precedents for secession? Owen Bennett Jones and his guests look at self-determination, secession, and what it means to be a nation. (Photo: students in Barcelona demonstrating in favour of Catalan independence. Credit: Getty Images)

Iraqi Kurds have voted for a state of their own. But both Iraq's central government and Turkey have called the referendum an illegal and dangerous move in a country that finally has Daesh on the backfoot. They warned of repercussions if the region went ahead with the vote, and now those consequences may be unfolding.

Iraqi Kurds voted in favour of independence this week in a non-binding referendum that angered Baghdad and provoked a furious reaction from neighbouring Turkey. Daniel Dombey discusses what the Kurds hoped to gain and why President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused them of treachery with the FT's Erika Solomon in Irbil and Mehul Srivastava in Istanbul. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Iraqi Kurds voted overwhelmingly to seek national independence - and their neighbors, as well as the Baghdad government, have responded with a rapidly escalating war of words. Iraqi politics expert Bilal Wahab joins us to explain what comes next, whether armed conflict can be avoided, and how the United States can best approach the rising tensions between its vital partners, the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi national government. Near East PolicyCast: Conversations on Middle East issues from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

THIS WEEK ON BACKROOM POLITICS... BREAKING NEWS ON GOP HEALTH CARE BILL... Senate GOP leadership announced that they do not have the votes to carry the Obamacare Repeal Bill to a vote. Are the Republicans done with Obamacare repeal?  Who is going to take the blame when the dust settles from this latest political debacle?  Is this a good thing for Americans? Donald Trump has been Tweeting up a storm regarding the NFL and NBA players kneeling during the National Anthem... we will cover the latest.... On Monday, Iraqi Kurds went to the polls to vote on a Referendum on Independence... and overwhelmingly voted in favor of an Independent Kurdish State...what does the future hold for the Kurds....and can an Independent Kurdistan co-exist in the region with it's neighbors?  As Puerto Rico deals with a growing humanitarian crisis ...can we save Puerto Rico?  Should we save Puerto Rico?  All of this and more, THIS WEEK ON BACKROOM POLITICS!

Jacob L. Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari make sense of the numerous geopolitical developments that occurred in the world's most volatile region this week. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I am joined this week by Kamran Bokhari, thanks for joining us Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: Good to be here. JLS: What we're going to do this week is we're going to try and sort out some of the mess that's been going on in the Middle East. It's been a very chaotic week in the Middle East and we thought we'd take a step back and try to explain it to listeners in about 30 or 40 minutes. It's a tall task but we'll see how we go. Kamran, I think the first thing that you might be able to help out with our listeners understanding is understanding a little bit more about the history of Qatar – the history of Qatar's relationships in the region, how it's always sort of been on the outside looking in – but what exactly Saudi Arabia, and the states that Saudi Arabia's convinced to go along with this diplomatic isolation of Qatar, are seeing that upsets them so much. KB: So ever since 1995, when the father of the current emir of Qatar took power, his name was Sheikh Hamad Al Thani, and he actually overthrew his father in '95 and ousted him and took power. Qatar has been on a strange trajectory. I say strange because it's not normal for the Arab world or more specifically the Persian Gulf Arab world, the Khaleejis, to behave in this way. I am referring to an openness for lack of a better term. I mean Al Jazeera was started by the current emir's father and it became sort of the standard bearer of 24/7 news in the Arab world. That made a lot of traditional Arab leaders, both Republican regimes and of course the monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, very, very uncomfortable because it was not the way that they had ran their political economies. There's no concept of having discourse. But to make matters worse this new regime post-1995 began with a very what I would call pragmatic approach to the region. It could afford to do because it is the world's largest LNG exporter, that brings in a lot of money. The population, those who are Qatari nationals, is very small – less than 300,000 people. In fact, there are more expats in that country, which is also true for a number of other GCC states. But in the case of Qatar, what happened is that this allowed for the regime to flirt with all sorts of radical political forces ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to more radical elements along the Islamist spectrum. And even give air time to what we used to call secular left-wing Arab nationalists and it began a policy of opening to Iran, developing a relationship that was out of step with the GCC consensus, if you will. And steering towards an independent foreign policy. And a lot of people say, Qatar has been punching above its weight when it comes to foreign policy. It's a tiny, little state. But it's been trying to play major league geopolitics. That's a fair assessment. But I would say that the Qataris are cut from a different cloth if we are to compare them to the rest of the Arab regimes. JLS: Yes, although I think one thing that you perhaps left out was that there's a regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command in Qatar and that Qatar is for all intents and purposes it's sort of in the U.S. camp in the region, or generally has been. And that the U.S. has been able to use Qatar at times in order to have unofficial dialogue with some of these groups that are considered beyond the pale for normal political discourse, right? KB: Absolutely, that's important to note that when Qatar is reaching out to these unsavory characters, from the point of view of the region and the international community, it's not doing so in defiance of the West, it's doing so in concert with its great power ally, the United States. And mind you, that base at Al Udeid where the U.S. Central Command has a major hub in the region, in fact, the regional hub is based in Qatar of Central Command, and that happened after 9/11 and the decision of the United States government, the Bush administration, to pull out of Saudi Arabia. There was a huge base in Saudi Arabia, and Qatar offered space so it was just a minor relocation. At the same time, there are relations between the Qatari government and Israel. There are a lot of rumors about the nature of it. Nobody officially denies or rejects it. But it's well known that there's some form of relationship there. So, Qatar has been reaching out to all sorts of entities and Qatar is the one Arab state that also sees eye-to-eye with Turkey in the region. And so it's had a really diversified foreign policy portfolio. JLS: I want to bring it back to Turkey in a minute but I'll just ask one more thing about Qatar which is that you know you've pointed out that they've always been reaching out to these different groups and they've always had a more independent foreign policy. I think that one of the things that we were discussing internally was that it was very hard to read whether Qatar had simply done something that had gone too far beyond the pale for Saudi Arabia or whether this had sort of been planned for a while and that this is really more of a reflection of the Saudis weakening and not being willing to tolerate Qatar breaking ranks. I noticed recently that Qatar actually asked a lot of people from Hamas, who nominally are based in Qatar, to leave. And it seems like Qatar has actually done some things and has been very open to trying to solve of this diplomatic spat, especially in terms of the United States. So do you think that Qatar actually did something, that it flirted with Iran in a serious way, that both Saudi Arabia and even perhaps the United States didn't mind Saudi Arabia sort of dinging Qatar on the head and saying, nah, that's too far? Or do you think that this really has more to do with Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia trying to consolidate control at the diplomatic level in the same way that Saudi Arabia wasn't going to tolerate internal unrest in a country like Bahrain in 2011? KB: I think it's the latter. I don't see the Qataris doing anything new. The Iranian relationship has been there, there's more made out of it in terms of the public discourse than there is actually. The whole idea of support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, that's old stuff, that's been going along for a long time. I haven't seen anything fresh that would suggest that the Qataris crossed some sort of red line. I think it's a lingering dispute and if we go back to 2014, for the better part of that year, the Saudis and the Bahrainis and the UAE, they downgraded diplomatic relations in that year in the spring. And it was not until the fall that they had an agreement of sorts, which was never made public, but according to the reports Qatar had agreed to scale back its involvement with all these groups and not encourage them to where that damaged the interests of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and others. And so, I think that that's a long-standing dispute and I think that now Saudi Arabia is getting desperate because things are not going well for Saudi Arabia. And the last thing it wants is one of its own GCC members doing things that undermine its collective efforts. So, number one, and I think this is foremost, is Iran. If you go back to the Trump visit that was like three weeks ago to Riyadh and there was a gala event attended not just by Middle Eastern leaders but also from the wider Muslim majority countries. It was very clear that Saudi Arabia had finally got the United States to where it wants to be. Remember that under the Obama administration, the Saudis had a terrible relationship with Washington. Under Trump, they know think that they now have Washington where they want it to be and they want to move forward in isolating Iran. And Qatari dealings with Iran really poke holes into the Saudi strategy. So, I think that this is a case of the Saudis not being able to take it anymore and saying you know enough is enough. If the Qataris are not behaving, we have to up the pressure to twist their arm. JLS: Yeah and I think this is a move that could really backfire on Saudi Arabia. You already see it backfiring a little bit in the sense that they were able to assemble an impressive coalition of countries in this diplomatic offensive against Qatar, but they have not really been able to extend the diplomatic offensive outside of its immediate vicinity and outside of those countries that are immediately dependent on it. And even some of the other GCC states have not gone along to the same extent that Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis and the others have gone to. But you bring up good points with Iran and Turkey and this is another reason why I think this might backfire on the Saudis, which is because if Qatar is looking at this and if Qatar is trying to establish some kind of independence of action, Saudi Arabia is really on a downward slope. Especially when you consider that oil prices right now are continuing to go down and that Saudi has basically proven ineffective in getting the price of oil to come back up and that really is the source of Saudi power. Qatar, as you said, has a close relationship with Turkey. Qatar as you also said also has a closer relationship with Iran than perhaps any of the other Arab countries in the region. You brought up the specific point of the fact that Qatar and Turkey have seen eye to eye for a while right now. I know that there's a lot of stuff there in terms of the political ideology that both Qatar and Turkey favor that you can shed some light on. So how about you go a little bit more in depth into how Turkey and Qatar see the region in the same way, and what is the way in which they've been trying to reshape the region, not just recently but for many years now? KB: From the point of view of the Qataris, they're not so much in ideological sync with the Islamists, they take a more pragmatic view. Unlike Egypt, unlike Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states, the Qataris say, look, you know we can't dial the clock back. And what do I mean by that is that the Saudis are using tools that used to be effective back in the day, pre-Arab Spring, where there was no opposition of any sorts to the regimes in the region. And Qatar looks at that and says that thing, that tool kit, that approach is useless because it only makes matters worse. Qatar says, look, these forces, the Hamases of this world, the Muslim Brotherhoods of this world, they are a reality and we can't wish them away and we can't suppress them because it only makes matters worse and we need to somehow reach out to them in order for, and this is based on my conversations with Qatari officials over the years, their view is that these are realities and if we don't control them, if we just leave them to their own devices, then they will do things that will undermine the interests of the region and the security of the regimes. So it's sort of flipping the Saudi argument on its head. The Saudis say well you need to keep them under lock and key and that's the way to go. As far as Turkey is concerned, Turkey is more ideologically in tune with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas because the ruling AKP party comes from an Islamist heritage although it's not an Islamist party, its roots lie in Islamism. So there's a meeting of minds. And Qatar realizes that it's a small country and the rest of the Arab states are not really getting it. And they realize that if there's going to be a counterweight to Iran, it's going to be Turkey. And the Qataris have accepted the fact that the Arabs do not have any intrinsic power of their own in the region and therefore they must piggyback on Turkey and hence that relationship. So it's a convergence of interests and ideas. JLS: Yeah, although I want to push back a little bit because I think you're right that Qatar reaches out to a lot of different groups that other countries in the region and most countries in the world wouldn't do business with, right? But I don't think when it comes to more Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups that Qatar sees them sort of as redheaded stepchildren that it's going to let into Qatar. I think there, Qatar has actually more of an affinity to some of those groups and has used some of those groups in order to push Qatar's influence throughout the region, which is why I suggested that perhaps Turkey and Qatar see more eye to eye ideologically. Do you think I am taking that too far or would you agree with that assessment? KB: I think that your argument has some merit to it, and actually a lot of merit to it, but when I was saying ideologically I was meaning the ideology of the ruling family or the regime in Qatar. They're not Islamists. They don't share those ideologies. If you go to Qatar you know it's fairly Westernized and it's fairly open and so it's not necessarily Islamist but they see these actors as, what you just said, tools to pursue their foreign policy agenda, to be able to have influence. And in my conversations, I did feel that the Qataris really believe that there is no way around these actors. Qatar has sort of, in a self-styled manner, appropriated this task of bringing reconcilable – what they call reconcilable – Islamists to the mainstream. And so that's also a foreign policy offering that Doha sort of says that this what we can do for the world. And they find reception in circles in Washington. Back in 2013, the United States Department of Defense dealt with certain Islamist factions within the Syrian rebel landscape in order to find common ground because of the fear that we're not going to get secular Syrian nationalists under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. And that was mediated by Qatar. And if you look at the Taliban relationship, clearly that was very openly Qatar helping the United States deal with the Taliban. It didn't go too far because of other complications, but nonetheless, it's a great example of how Qatar is trying to say: this is our value proposition that we bring to this region and to great powers who are stakeholders in this region. JLS: Yes, although the flip side of that is it means Qatar is playing with fire. I mean I really, I was really struck by what you said that the ruling family is not Islamist. But that Qatar thinks of using the Islamist groups as tools in order to develop Qatar's power or to protect Qatar's position. I cannot think of a more secular entity that used Islamists that didn't have the Islamists come back to bite them in the end. We have seen over and over and over, whether it was the United States, whether it was Saudi Arabia, whether it was Turkey, it doesn't really matter if the country itself was Muslim or if it's Western or not. It's very, very difficult to control Islamist groups once they get going. So the idea that Qatar is going to be able to use these Islamist groups when they want to use them and is not going to face backlash from them, especially because Qatar is playing such a dual game and is really dealing with all sides. It seems to me that that's, I don't want to say shortsighted and I don't even say it's not going to work. I just can't think of another example of that actually working in the long term for a country's foreign policy. Can you come up with any examples? KB: I can't, and you are absolutely right. I mean this is almost like they are holding up and trying to balance two parallel universes. And it's difficult. But I think that, if we look at it geopolitically, from their point of view, they have no other choice. They have to do this and I think what gives them a bit of hope is that they're a small country. They have enough money to where people don't indulge in politics so this is not going to undermine them domestically anytime soon. But yes, for the region, this could all blow up in their face. And I actually believe that it will. Because there's just no way, given the scale of chaos in the region, that somehow the Qataris will be able to fine tune these Islamist proxies to where they will live in a Muslim democracy of sorts. I just don't see that happening. So you are absolutely right. I don't disagree with that. I was just trying to explain the perspective of the Qataris. JLS: Yeah, but that also explains the perspective of not just the Saudis but even the Emiratis and Bahrain and some of these other groups, for whom, they see Qatar messing around with the Islamists and are sort of asking themselves what on Earth are you doing? We've already seen what happens when we mess with these things and now is a time to close ranks and tighten up against this, not to invite them into our own space. But that's a good segue way into a second… KB: I just want to point out one thing and for our listeners, the UAE making this case is more genuine. But the Saudis accusing the Qataris of doing this is like the kettle calling the pot black or vice versa. The Saudis are still playing with this fire, so they don't have the argument. So yes, they are not with Hamas, they're not with the Muslim Brotherhood, but they are the biggest exporter of Salafism and jihadism on the planet. JLS: Yes, and it's a good segue way into you know sort of the other major developments that have been changing things in the Middle East this week, which is ISIS, which Saudi Arabia you know you can't directly prove that they had a role in helping ISIS develop, but certainly Saudi Arabia and some of the groups that it was funding and some of the things that it was doing when it was involved in Syria supporting different proxies, had a role in the Islamic State coming to the prominence that it has. But you know we saw two major things from the Islamic State this week. We saw, first of all, that the Islamic State is finally coming under some serious existential pressure in its self-declared caliphate. Raqqa has really been the capital and center and focal point of ISIS operations, but you've got the Syrian Democratic Forces, who are made up mostly of Syrian Kurds under the YPG group (there are so many acronyms here that it's sometimes hard to keep track of) but we'll say the SDF, those are the Syrian Kurds and they are U.S. backed, and then we've also seen, surprisingly, the Syrian army has been moving on multiple fronts to get closer to Raqqa. The result of all this is that the Islamic State's position in Raqqa is pretty weak and we've seen them pulling back and we've seen some relative successes for the U.S.-backed forces as they get closer to the city. That was one major development we saw this week. And then the other major development was really the unprecedented IS attack they claimed in Iran. So, I want to tackle both of those things. Maybe let's start with the second one first because I know you were looking at this very closely. Talk about why this is such a big deal and why this isn't just another ISIS terrorist attack in the region. What are the greater implications of ISIS hitting Iran the way that they did? KB: I would begin by saying that this is not something that ISIS just sort of said – oh, well I want to attack Iran tomorrow and let's do it. This is something that speaks to the sophistication, especially as an intelligence entity, of ISIS. The Islamic State has been cultivating these assets for a while, and not just in Iran. We see this happening in as far-flung areas as the Philippines as well. So this is something that's been in the works for a while. They've devoted a certain amount of resources to this project. I suspect that over the years that they've been based in Iraq and they've had proximity to Iran that they were cultivating this. And they saw an opening in Kurdistan, and I am talking about the Iranian province of Kurdistan, and there's more than one province where Iranian Kurds live and they're mostly Sunni and over the years what I've learned is that is Salafism and even jihadist ideology has made its way into the Iranian Kurdish community. And the Kurds are, there's an alienation that they feel, as an ethnic community as well, from Tehran and there is this sort of deep resentment that ISIS really exploited and was able to set up at least this cell. I suspect that this isn't just one cell. There are probably others that ISIS has in its tool kit and will activate at some point in the future, so this is not the last attack in Iran. But what is significant is that Iran is not an Arab state. One of the biggest sectors of the Iranian state is the security sector. There are multiple organizations that deal with security. You know in my visit to Iran, I noticed these guys working firsthand, and they're obsessed with security. They're obsessed with security because they fear Israeli penetration, U.S. penetration, Saudi penetration and so this is not an open, if you will, arena where ISIS could just jump in and say, you know, we're gonna send in suicide bombers. It had to do a lot of work to be able to penetrate that and that speaks to ISIS' capabilities and sophistication. As for the implications, I mean look, ISIS has gamed all of these things out. We tend to look in the open sources, when you read stuff there is this assumption that somehow these are all sort of disconnected attacks that are not linked to some strategic objective. And at Geopolitical Futures, that's what we talk about is, we can't look at events as sort of randomly taking place or taking place as some entity hates another entity. There is a strategic objective. The strategic objective of ISIS is to, a) survive, especially now that it's under pressure, that you just mentioned. You know it's in the process of losing Raqqa. It'll take a long time, but that process has begun. At the same time, so there's that threat but there's also an opportunity. The opportunity is that the sectarian temperature in the region is at an all-time high and this would explain the timing of this attack. ISIS would like nothing more than for Iran and Saudi Arabia to go at each other because, a) it gives them some form of respite. You know, they're not the focus, and it undermines the struggle against ISIS. And b) it creates more opportunity for ISIS to exploit. The more there's sectarianism, the more the Saudis go and fight with Iran and vice versa, the more space there is for ISIS to grow. So I think that this attack in Iran has very deep implications moving forward. JLS: Those are all good points and I want to draw special attention to one of the points you made and then ask you to play what you're saying forward a little bit. First thing, I just want to point out is that you were talking about the Iranian Kurds and how they had somehow been radicalized and there was a sense of disenchantment, or disenchantment is probably not even strong enough, but an antagonism with the current regime in Tehran. And I just want to point out that it's very difficult to speak of the Kurds as a monolith. I think often times people say the word the Kurds and they think of you know just all the Kurds in the Middle East and they're all the same. But we really have to think of in terms of – there are Kurds in Iran, there are Kurds in Iraq, there are Kurds in Syria, there are Kurds in Turkey. They have different religious affiliations, different ideological affiliations, sometimes are speaking different languages that are almost unintelligible to each other. So I try very hard in my writing and when I am speaking about these types of things to be very specific about when I am talking about the Kurds and I thought one of the things you did there was you brought up was just how complicated that situation is and that, of course, has relevance throughout the region. We saw that the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government are talking about an independence referendum and maybe we can get to that in a little bit. But you gave a really good explanation of why this is extremely important from Iran's perspective. But what do you think Iran is going to do? What response does this mean Iran is going to have to make? What is the next step for Iran both in terms of, you know, Qatar, which it had some sort of relationship with and it can certainly see this diplomatic offensive led by Saudi Arabia as a diplomatic move against Iran, and then second of all this move by ISIS. What are the practical concrete things that Iran is going to have to do to respond here in the next couple weeks? KB: With regards to Qatar, what we have is a situation where its own GCC allies, its fellow Arab states, have shunned Doha. And so Doha right now needs a lot of friends. The United States has not de-aligned from Qatar and joined the Saudi bandwagon, so that's good. It's forging some sort of a relationship today, the Qatari foreign minister is in Moscow, so there's a Russian angle to that as well. We've already talked about Turkey. At this stage, it wouldn't hurt, necessarily, for Qatar to reach out or benefit from Iranian assistance, but it has to be very careful. It doesn't want to do something with Iran or get too close, especially now, and give a bigger stick to the Saudis with which Riyadh can beat Doha. And so, I think from a Qatari point of view, it's essential that they strike a balance when it comes to Iran. Conversely the Iranians, this is a great opening. And they would like to exploit this to the extent that it is possible. But I think that the Iranians are no illusion as to their limitations. They know that – they'll milk this for whatever it's worth. But they're not under the illusion that somehow Qatar will join them and be part of their camp. That's actually taking it too far. I don't think that they can rely on Qatar. But from the Iranian point of view, so long as Qatar is at odds and defying Saudi Arabia, that's good enough. They don't need more from Qatar and they will milk that to the extent that it is possible. As far as ISIS is concerned, I think that there are two things here. One is that both of them will benefit ISIS, both moves that the Iranians make will benefit ISIS. First is that there is an imperative for the government, for the security establishment, to make sure that this doesn't happen again or at least begin to neutralize, before it grows. There's a sizeable Sunni population in Iran. It's not just the Kurds, there's a sizeable Turkmen population in the northeast near Turkmenistan and there are some of the Arabs, not a majority, but a minority of the Arabs in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, the Ahwazi Arabs as they are called. They are, a minority of them and a significant one, are Sunnis as well. And then you have the big province in the southeast, that's Sistan and Baluchistan, and that province is majority Sunni and ethnically Baluch and already has a jihadist problem and there's cross-border terrorism that takes place where Baluch jihadist rebels go to Pakistan and then you know from there they have a sanctuary that they come in and they strike at the Iranian security forces. They've been pretty successful over the years in killing some very high-ranking IRGC commanders. So from Iran's point of view, this is a lot of vulnerability. So the Sunnis are suspect right now after what happened. I mean it's not easy and I've been to the Khomeini shrine and I can tell you that it's not something, it's not just a cake walk that you can get in there and do all this kind of stuff, let alone parliament. And so from the Iranian point of view, they feel very terrified right now because they used to think they're safe. And this is sort of really a wake-up call for them. So they're gonna go after the Sunnis. The more they go after the Sunnis, the more they are gonna create resentment, not just within their borders, but sectarian tensions are going to rise. And ISIS is going to say, see we told you, and they will have more recruits to go fight the “evil” Iranians and the “evil” Shiites. But at the same time, the Iranians do not think that this is ISIS alone. They deeply believe, at least their security establishment, and I saw a report yesterday where the Iranian intelligence minister was urging caution, saying, let's not jump to conclusions and let's not accuse the Saudis just yet. Let the investigation finish. But the security establishment and the hawks are convinced that there is, even though ISIS is involved, that there is a Saudi footprint in this attack and they'll give you evidence and they'll point to Saudi intent to undermine their country. And so they're gonna go after Saudi Arabia. They're gonna retaliate. It's horrible to predict another bombing, but if a bomb went off inside Saudi Arabia, I would not be surprised that it, you know, Iran somehow retaliated in that shape or form. I am not sure if it will. But I'm just saying that if it does that, then I wouldn't be surprised, because the Iranians, they're not going to just accept this. They have to retaliate and respond. The more they retaliate, they set into motion, they trigger a broader conflict. I am not saying the two sides are going to go to war, but it's going to an ugly proxy battle at least in the immediate future. JLS: In many ways, that proxy battle has already been going on. I think what you are talking about is going to be a real worsening of the situation and unfortunately, that's the way things are going in the Middle East right now. The last thing I want to touch on before we break is the Islamic State, because we've sort of been talking about them in a roundabout way when we talk about all these other issues, but for a long time, the Islamic State, and when I say long time I mean maybe the past two or three years, the Islamic State really has been the center of gravity I think in the Middle East. And I think one of the reasons we're seeing all of these things happening on the periphery is that the force of IS as the center of gravity is actually weakening because IS itself is actually weakening. Now I know that that doesn't mean that ISIS is going to disappear, but I think it does mean that the Islamic State as a strong territorial entity that can threaten some of the different states in the region from a conventional point of view, is actually weakening. So can you talk a little bit about what it means for the Islamic State to have come under such pressure at its capital in Raqqa and what Islamic State's activities are going to look like going forward? We know they're going to pull back a little bit and try and get strength in numbers and some strategic depth but ultimately they are outnumbered and they're outgunned. So they're probably going to have to go back to some tactics of blending back into the population and waiting really for a lot these sectarian dynamics that we're talking about right now to overwhelm the region once more so that they can take advantage of the power vacuum. KB: So I would compare what is happening to ISIS to what happened to the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. They lost the cities, and for a while, they were an incoherent entity, but they weren't decimated or eliminated, they just were lying low. And they were slowly rebuilding themselves. And now they are at a point where – and I would say it's not just now, it's been the case all along, at least since 2003 – that they exist in ungoverned spaces outside the cities. See we have this perception that if you don't hold a city then you're not a serious player. That may be true at one level, but at another level, it just means that you are operating in an area where the good guys can't project power, at least not effectively, and you exist. So I think – I don't see necessarily just ISIS devolving into an insurgent movement or a terrorist organization – I think that the so-called caliphate is going to shift into a rural area. And this is not something that is a setback from an ISIS point of view, because I don't think that ISIS ever believed – I mean it's a serious player and they've been here before, it was not as big as what they have, I mean I'm talking about their holdings, but in Iraq, they have been driven out of cities before. They've been in the desert, in the rural areas, only to come back because the underlying political, economic, social circumstances really don't get addressed and its enemies start fighting with each other, providing the room for ISIS to once again revive itself. I think that it remains to be seen how quickly ISIS can be pushed out of Raqqa, pushed out of Deir al-Zour, into the desert. And even when it does go there, it's going to still have a space and the time to continue its activities, perhaps not as effectively as it has since Mosul. I think that ISIS knew this would come, ISIS did not believe that – you know, now they have Mosul, now they have Raqqa, now they have Deir al-Zour – that they're not going to see reversals. I think theirs is a very long game and they will go back and forth. And so I think that we need to be cautious when we talk about progress against ISIS. JLS: Is there anything that can be done to solve the underlying political and social circumstances that create ISIS and give ISIS fuel to continue running? KB: That would require the Iranians and the Saudis sitting at a table sharing drinks and having food, and you know that's not happening. So, if that's not happening, and I don't think that there's any power on Earth that can fix those underlying sectarian tensions. I mean if you just look at the Sunnis in Iraq. I mean, there's this big euphoria about how Mosul is no longer in ISIS hands. And I'm saying, well that is true and it is a victory and an important one. But I'm looking at a year, two years, three years down the line. The Sunnis are completely a shattered community in Iraq. They fight with each other. ISIS existed because there's no Sunni core, no Sunni mainstream in Iraq. Ωnd they're losing territory, especially now if the Kurds are moving towards independence, they'll lose territory to the Kurds. They have already lost ground to the Shiites. This is probably the first time, the price of removing ISIS from Mosul is Shiite control over Iraq's second largest city, which was majority Sunni and a majority of Sunnis and Kurds. Now you have a Shiite-dominated military force along with militias that are going to make sure that ISIS doesn't come back, and they're going to engage in some very brutal activities. And that's going to pour you know gasoline on the fire of sectarianism that's already burning. And that's, from an ISIS point of view, another opportunity to exploit and they're looking forward to it. And that's sort of the irony in all of this. JLS: Well it's not a hopeful note to end the week on but unfortunately, it's the reality. Thank you for joining us Kamran, and thank you, everyone, for listening. If you enjoyed this podcast, I encourage you to visit us at geopoliticalfutures.com. I also encourage you to email us with comments, critiques, suggestions for topics and anything else you want. You can just email us at comments@geopoliticalfutures.com. I'm Jacob Shapiro, I'm the director of analysis, and we'll see you out here next week.

Twenty-five years ago, thousands of Iraqi Kurds lost their lives as they fled the forces of Saddam Hussein into the Zagros and Taurus mountains of northern Iraq, towards Iran and Turkey. Massively outgunned, many were killed by the helicopter gunship fire and tanks at the command of Saddam's well trained and brutal troops. BBC Middle East correspondent Jim Muir revisits the exodus.

People in the news: it's a hundred years since the signing of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement under which the British and French agreed to divide up the Middle East, and now the President of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, says it's time for outright independence for the Iraqi Kurds. Jim Muir considers the Kurds' flight from Saddam Hussein 25-years ago and what has happened to some of the people he encountered back then. Bethany Bell is in Austria where voting could result in the country getting Europe's first far right president. The French leader Francois Hollande's again said he wants the new nuclear plant in the English county of Somerset to go ahead. It's to be built by the French. David Shukman's been to a construction site in Finland where the French are building a similar reactor - amid some controversy. Have you had a 'camelccino' yet? Hannah McNeish in Kenya tells us camel milk could be the next big thing and that could mean huge benefits for the country's economy, and its camel herders. And vitriol from the presidential campaign might have given people reasons to be discouraged about America, but Robert Hodierne tells a story which he says illustrates the basic goodness of folks in that country

Barack Obama likes to punch those he knows won't fight back.  He does it all the time. The GOP establishment are the most prominent, but least sympathetic of his victims.  They seem to fear the image of a nearly all-white contingent of politicians aggressively opposing the first black president.  Nevermind the fact that the black president also happens to be the most radical subversive ever elected to the office.  That fact is subordinated to GOP concerns over their public image.  The Republicans in Congress don't act out of fear.  They don't wish to offend the racial sensitivities of the Democrats and their allies in the media, lest they unleash a barrage of accusations, however false they may be,  that their opposition is based less on principles than on racial antipathies.  The shame of the Republican establishment is how little Constitutional principles matter to them, at least when compared to their own political fortunes.  The tragedy is the GOP establishment is the one group which could fight back against the radicalism of the Obama Administration, but don't.  And by doing so, they enable the most authoritarian impulses in the President. Those authoritarian impulses of Obama were evident from the very beginning of his administration.  He fired the CEO of General Motors, Rick Waggoner.  Something he had no authority to do.  Where is it written that the President has the authority to fire the chief executive office of a major American corporation?  There was no Congressional response to that overreach.  And when there is no response to such things, it encourages more of those things.   About the same time, Chrysler was going through a bankruptcy.  Established bankruptcy laws have been in place for centuries.  These laws are to the stability of our credit markets.  In a typical bankruptcy, creditors have their claims settled first, before the claims of shareholders.  This is done to minimize risk to other businesses in securing credit to finance themselves.  If the creditors claims are not settled first, uncertainty and risk in lending necessarily increases.  After all, would you lend money to a business if you suspected if and when that business failed, a politician might intervene to upend existing laws to help his political allies?  That's exactly what happened in the Chrysler bankruptcy.  The Obama Administration intervened and placed the shareholder claims of the United Auto Workers above the claims of the secured creditors.  That led to a virtual freeze on business lending.   Again, there was no response from the Congress or the Judiciary. The Little Sisters of the Poor Gibson Guitars Tea Party and Conservative Groups Spying on Congress Wiretapping journalists Snubbing allies like Great Britain, Israel, Jordan and Poland Police organizations all over America The list goes on and on and on. But there is one group that has stood up to Barack Obama radicalism.  The National Rifle Association.  Despite being continuously slandered by Obama and his anti-Second Amendment friends, the NRA has stood firm and has hit back.  And Obama doesn't like it one bit.  He's been so conditioned to getting his way on practically everything, he can't stomach it when the other side pushes back and pushes back hard. Obama's gutlessness has been exposed by our international adversaries over and over.  He drew a red line in Syria, then backed off.  He gave into Russian aggression in the Crimea as though he was a weak kitten.  He hasn't supported the Ukraine with the arms they asked for just to defend themselves.  He's ignored the pleas of Iraqi Kurds for arms.  He abandoned Poland without being prompted.  He's capitulated to Iran rather than adopt anything resembling a hard line.  He infamously offered flexibility to the notoriously inflexible and difficult Russians.   He has projected weakness and provoked aggression from all of our adversaries.  Among world leaders, there is no doubt that Barack Obama is a weakling, fearful of confrontation from anyone who can push back. Domestically, it's no different.  Obama usually only pushes when he knows there won't be resistance.  But Obama is bound and determined to destroy the Constitutional Republic we have.  That's what fundamental transformation is all about.  And as history teaches us, one key element to the victory of authoritarian dictatorship over a Constitutional Republic based on individual sovereignty is to end the individual right to keep and bear arms.  A disarmed populace is a cornerstone for dictatorship. There are those who scoff at the idea that the American public could ever be totally disarmed.  But I would stipulate that it doesn't need to be totally disarmed, if it can be substantially disarmed and those remaining armed criminalized.  It accomplishes the same thing.  But if Barack Obama were truly a man of honor and political courage, he would accept the challenge of Wayne LaPierre of the NRA.  If he doesn't, why doesn't he?  If Obama honestly believes the argument in favor of what he wants to do with respect to firearms, then confront your leading opponent.  Debate him.  Discredit him.  If you have the courage. But we all know what Obama's answer will be, don't we?

In the 1980s the Ba’ath regime, led by the then Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, launched a genocidal campaign against the country’s Kurdish people. Thousands of Iraqi Kurds were killed in chemical attacks and whole villages destroyed. Today, while many communities have rebuilt their homes and villages, poverty in rural northern Iraq is still prevalent. In this podcast, former communications officer, Antoinette Powell, shares her reflections on visiting a village in northern Iraq where Christian Aid partner REACH works to support a community whose lives were destroyed by conflict and ensuing poverty. #caweek #conflict #peace