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For two perspectives on Israel's conflict with Iran and U.S. involvement, Geoff Bennett spoke with Aaron David Miller and Holly Dagres. Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official. Dagres is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and curates "The Iranist," a weekly newsletter on Iran. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
‘No Kings' protests. Israel and Iran conflict. Therapy culture and parenting. Find us on YouTube. This week, Mike and Russell talk with CT's national political correspondent Harvest Prude about the military parade in Washington, DC, and concurrent No Kings protests around the country. Both happened in the aftermath of targeted shootings of political figures in Minnesota. Then, Ahmad Sharawi from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies joins to discuss what's going on in Iran and Israel. Last, author Hannah Anderson joins the show to discuss why young adults aren't having kids these days. Are they too worried about making their parents' mistakes? GO DEEPER WITH THE BULLETIN: Read the opinion piece from the New York Times: There's a Link Between Therapy Culture and Childlessness, referenced in the third segment of today's episode. Join the conversation at our Substack. Find us on YouTube. Rate and review the show in your podcast app of choice. ABOUT THE GUESTS: Harvest Prude is CT's national political correspondent and a congressional reporter based in Washington, DC. She is a former reporter for The Dispatch and World, having served there as political reporter for their Washington bureau. Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs, specifically the Levant, Iraq, and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs, as well as US foreign policy in the region. Previously, Sharawi worked at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused mainly on Hezbollah. He holds a BA in international relations from King's College London and an MA from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Hannah Anderson is an author and speaker whose work explores themes of human flourishing with a particular focus on how ecology, gender, and socioeconomics affect spiritual formation. Besides being a regular contributor to Christianity Today, she has authored multiple books, including All That's Good: Recovering the Lost Art of Discernment and the recently released Heaven and Nature Sing. ABOUT THE BULLETIN: The Bulletin is a twice-weekly politics and current events show from Christianity Today moderated by Clarissa Moll, with senior commentary from Russell Moore (Christianity Today's editor in chief) and Mike Cosper (director, CT Media). Each week, the show explores current events and breaking news and shares a Christian perspective on issues that are shaping our world. We also offer special one-on-one conversations with writers, artists, and thought leaders whose impact on the world brings important significance to a Christian worldview, like Bono, Sharon McMahon, Harrison Scott Key, Frank Bruni, and more. The Bulletin listeners get 25% off CT. Go to https://orderct.com/THEBULLETIN to learn more. “The Bulletin” is a production of Christianity Today Producer: Clarissa Moll Associate Producer: Alexa Burke Editing and Mix: TJ Hester Music: Dan Phelps Executive Producers: Erik Petrik and Mike Cosper Senior Producer: Matt Stevens Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Since Israel launched Operation Rising Lion—a precise and defensive military campaign aimed at preventing the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons—Iran has responded with a barrage of ballistic missiles and drones, indiscriminately targeting Israeli civilians. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a leading expert on Iran's global terror network, explains what's at stake—and what could come next. Take Action: We must stop a regime that vows to murder millions of Israelis from gaining the weapons to do it. Urge your elected leaders to assure that Israel has all the necessary support to end Iran's nuclear threat. Resources and Analysis: Iranian Regime vs. Israel War Explained: What You Should Know AJC Advocacy Anywhere: Israel and Iran: Latest Updates, Global Responses, and the Path Ahead 5 Key Reasons Behind Israel's Defensive Strike on Iran's Imminent Nuclear Threat Listen – AJC Podcasts: The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the Pod: Latest Episodes: Why Israel Had No Choice: Inside the Defensive Strike That Shook Iran's Nuclear Program What Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks' State of the Jewish World Teaches Us Today Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: peopleofthepod@ajc.org If you've appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Transcript of the Interview: Israel's shadow war with the Iranian regime, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, erupted into open conflict last week following a stunning report from the International Atomic Energy Agency that confirmed Iran was much closer to obtaining nuclear weapons than previously known. Since Israel launched a wave of attacks on nuclear sites and facilities, Iran has fired missiles toward Israel's most populated cities. Joining us to discuss what this all means is one of the foremost experts on Iran and its global threats, and a regular guest when trouble arises with Iran. Dr. Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Counterterrorism Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Matt, welcome back to People of the Pod. Matthew Levitt: It's a pleasure to be back, but I need to come sometime when the world's okay. Manya Brachear Pashman: That would be nice. That'd be nice. But what will we talk about? Matthew Levitt: Yeah, just call me one of the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. Manya Brachear Pashman: Well, you are one of the foremost experts on the dangers posed by Iran, especially its terror proxies. And you've written the definitive book on Hezbollah, titled Hezbollah: the Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God. And I say that whole title, I want to get in there, because we are talking about global threats here. Can you explain the scale of Iran's global threat and the critical role that its terror proxies, like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, play in advancing that strategy? Matthew Levitt: So I really appreciate the question, because it's really important to remind listeners that the Israel Iran war did not start Thursday night US time, Friday morning, Israel time. In fact, it's just the latest salvo where the Israelis, after years and years and years of Iranian we call it malign activity, but that's too soft a term. We're talking about Iran sending weapons and funds to proxies like Hamas to carry out October 7, like Hezbollah to fire rockets at Israel almost daily for almost a year. Like the Houthis, who were much more than a thorn in the Saudi backside until the Iranians came and gave them more sophisticated capabilities. We're talking about an Iran that a few years ago decided that instead of making sure that every gun that it sent to the West Bank had to go to Hamas or Islamic Jihad. They decided to just flood the West Bank with guns. Who cares who's shooting at the Israelis so long as somebody is. And an Iran that not only carries out human rights abuses of all kinds at home, but that threatens Israel and its neighbors with drones, low altitude cruise missiles, short range ballistic missiles, and medium and long range ballistic missiles. And so the totality of this, much like the totality of Hezbollah's striking Israel for almost a year, ultimately led Israel to do what most people thought couldn't be done, and just tear Hezbollah apart, that the Israel war on Hezbollah is the prequel to what we've been seeing over the past few days in Iran. Similarly, for the Israelis, it got to be too much. It wasn't even really that President Trump's 60 days expired and Israel attacked on day 61. It wasn't only that the IAEA came out with a report saying that the Iranians have refused to explain certain activities that can only be explained as nuclear weaponization activities. It was that the Israelis had information that two things were happening. One, that Iran was working very, very hard to rebuild its capability to manufacture medium, long range ballistic missiles that can hit Israel. After the Israeli reprisal attack last October took out a key component of that program, the mixers that are important for the solid propellant, without which you can't make ballistic missiles. And Iran is believed to have, at least the beginning of this recent round of the conflict –Thursday, Friday–about 2000 such missiles. Far fewer now, the Israelis say they've taken out about a third of them, plus launchers, plus radars, et cetera. But that Iran had a plan within just a few years to develop as many as 8000 of these. And that simply was not tolerable for the Israelis. And the second is that the Israelis say that they compiled evidence that Iran had a secret, secret nuclear weapons program that had been going on predating October 7, but was fast tracked after October 7, that they were planning to maintain this program, even as they were negotiating over the more overt program with the Trump administration. President Trump has even taken issue with his own Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, who testified in March that the US intelligence committee does not assess that Iran is weaponizing. And President says, I don't care what she says, I think they were very close to weaponizing. The Israelis say they have shared this information at least recently with their US counterparts and that was not tolerable. So the primary goals that Israel has set out for itself with this campaign is beyond the critically important shattering the glass ceiling. Think where people in particular, in Iran thought this would never happen, was two things, one, addressing and significantly degrading and setting back the Iranian ballistic missile production program, and second, doing the same to the nuclear program. They've already carried out strikes at Isfahan, Natanz, even at the upper parts of Fordow. And there is an expectation that the Israelis are going to do something more. The Israeli national security advisor said on Israeli television today, We are not going to stop without addressing the nuclear activities at Fordow. Manya Brachear Pashman: You know, you called it a prequel, Israel's operations against Hezbollah last year. Did you know that it was a prequel at the time and to what extent did it weaken Iran and leave it more vulnerable in this particular war? Matthew Levitt: I'm going to be the last person in Washington, D.C. who tells you when he doesn't know. And anybody who tells you they did know is lying to you. None of us saw what Israel did to Hezbollah coming. None of us saw that and said, Oh, they did it to a non-state actor right across their border. So they'll definitely be able to do it to Iran, 1000+ kilometers away, big nation state with massive arsenals and a nuclear program and lots of proxies. One plus one does not equal three in this. In other words, the fact that Israel developed mind boggling capabilities and incredible intelligence, dominance and then special tools, pagers and walkie talkies, in the case of Hezbollah, did not mean that they were going to be able to do the same vis a vis Iran. And they did. The same type of intelligence dominance, the same type of intelligence, knowing where somebody was at a certain time, that the protocols would be that certain leaders would get in a certain secret bunker once hostilities started, and they'd be able to take them out in that bunker. As they did to a bunch of senior Hezbollah commanders just months ago. Drone operations from within Iran, Iran being hit with missiles that were fired at Iran from within Iran, all of it. One case did not necessarily translate into the other. It is exponentially impressive. And Israel's enemies have to be saying, you know, that the Israelis are just all capable. Now you're absolutely right. You hit the nail on the head on one critical issue. For a very long time, Israel was at least somewhat deterred, I would say very deterred, from targeting Iran. Because Iran had made very, very clear if Israel or the United States or anybody else targeted Iran or its nuclear program, one of the first things that would happen would be that Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel, Iran's first, most important proxy would rain hellfire in Israel in the form of 1000s upon 1000s of rockets. Until Israel addressed the problem, Hezbollah is believed to have had 150 to 200,000 different types of projectiles, up to and including precision guided munitions. Not only have the overwhelming majority of those been destroyed, Hezbollah still has 1000s of rockets, but Hezbollah leadership has been decimated. There's a new sheriff in town in Lebanon. There's a new government that immediately, when hostility started with Iran's, went to Hezbollah and said, You're not doing this, not dragging Lebanon back into a war that nobody wanted again. We are finally coming out of this economic crisis. And so Iran was faced with a situation where it didn't have Hezbollah to deter Israel. Israel, you know, paved the way for a highway in the air to Iran, taking out air defense systems. It was able to fly over and through Syria. The Syrians are not shedding any tears as they see the Quds Force and the IRGC getting beaten down after what Iran did in Syria. And the Israelis have air dominance now. President Trump said, We, using the we term, air dominance now, earlier today. And they're able to slowly and methodically continue to target the ballistic missile program. Primarily, the medium and long range missiles that target Israel, but sometimes it's the same production lines that produce the short range missiles that Iran uses to target U.S. Forces in the region, and our allies in the Gulf. So Israel is not just protecting itself, it's protecting the region. And then also taking out key military security intelligence personnel, sometimes taking out one person, then a couple days later, taking out the person who succeeded that person, and then also taking out key scientists who had the know-how to potentially rebuild all the things that Israel is now destroying. Manya Brachear Pashman: But Israel is also not hearing from the Houthis, is not hearing from Hamas. It's not hearing from other terror proxies either. Very few attacks from Iran's terror proxies in the aftermath of this wave. Why? Why do you think that is? Matthew Levitt: The crickets are loud. The crickets are loud. Look, we've discussed Hezbollah. Hezbollah understands that if it were to do something, the Israelis will come in even harder and destroy what's left. Hamas is still holding hostages. This is still an open wound, but it doesn't have the capabilities that it once had, and so there have been a couple of short range things that they tried to shoot, but it's not anything that's going to do huge damage, and the Israeli systems can deal with those. The Houthis did fire something, and it hurt some Palestinians near Hebron. You know, the Houthis and the Iranians in particular, in this conflict have killed Palestinians, and in one case, Syrians. They're continuing to hurt people that are not Israelis. One of the things that I think people are hopeful for is that as Iran tries to sue for peace, and it already is, it's been reaching out to Cyprus to pass messages, etcetera. The hope is that Iran will recognize that it's in a position whereby A) there has to be zero enrichment and the facilities have to be destroyed, whatever's left of them. And B) there's a hope that Israel and the United States together will be able to use this diplomatic moment to truly end the conflict in Gaza and get the hostages home. Manya Brachear Pashman: Well, that was what I was going to ask. I mean, if Israel achieves its objectives in this war, primarily eliminating Iran's nuclear threat, how significant a setback would that be for Hamas and Iran's other terror proxies, and could it indeed pave the way for an end of the war in Gaza and the return of the hostages? Matthew Levitt: Like everybody else, I'm so scarred, I don't want to get my hopes up, but I do see this as a distinct possibility, and here's why. Not Hezbollah, not the Houthis, not Hamas, none of them, and plenty of other proxies that don't start in the letter H, none of them could have been anywhere as capable as they've proven to be, were it not for Iranian money and weapons. Also some training, some intelligence, but primarily money and weapons. And so Hamas is already on its back foot in this regard. It can still get some money in. It's still being able to make money off of humanitarian aid. Iran is still sending money in through money exchange houses and hawaladars, but not weapons. Their ability to manufacture weapons, their military industrial complex within Gaza, this is destroyed. Hezbollah, we've discussed, discussed, and a lot of their capabilities have been destroyed. And those that remain are largely deterred. The Houthis did shoot up some rockets, and the Israelis did carry out one significant retaliatory attack. But I think people are beginning to see the writing on the wall. The Israelis are kicking the stuffing out of Iran with pinprick attacks that are targeting the worst of the bad guys, including people who have carried out some of the worst human rights transgressions against Iranians. Let's not pretend that this is not affecting the average Iranian. It is. The president says, Everybody get out of Tehran. That's just not possible. People, average Iranians, good people. It must be just an absolute terror. But Israel's not bombing, you know, apartment buildings, as Iran is doing in Israel, or as Russia is doing in Ukraine. And so it really is a different type of thing. And when the Houthis, when Hamas, when Hezbollah, look at this, you don't you don't poke the tiger when it's angry. I think they also understand now's the time to get into survival mode. What you want is for the regime in Iran not to be destroyed. This is no longer a moment, as it's been since long before October 7, but certainly since then, of how Iran as proxies, export Iran's revolution. This is now a question of how they maintain and preserve the revolution at home. And it's extremely important to the proxies that Iran remain, so that even if it's knocked down over time, hopefully, theoretically, from their perspective, it can regain its footing. It will still have, they hope, its oil and gas, etcetera, and they will get back to a point where they can continue to fund and arm the proxies in. Maybe even prioritize them as it takes them longer to rebuild their ballistic missile, drone, and nuclear programs. Manya Brachear Pashman: Which is a scary prospect as well to know that terror proxies could be spread throughout the world and empowered even a little bit more. President Trump left the G7 summit a day early to meet with security advisors, and just a few hours ago, prior to this interview, President Trump called for Iran's, quote, unconditional surrender, saying that the US knows where the Supreme Leader is, and some other threatening language. But I mean, this appears to be a kind of a clear commitment to Israel. So I'm curious how you assess his administration's actions before and during the war thus far, and do you see the United States edging toward direct involvement? Matthew Levitt: All politics is local, and there is a tug of war within the MAGA movement over whether or not the US should be getting involved. Not only in supporting an important ally, but in removing a critical threat. The President is clearly frustrated that Iran was not being more forthcoming in the negotiations. He said many times, we'd offered you a great deal, you should have taken the deal. He's very aware that his deadline ended, and they didn't particularly seem to care. There's also the background that once upon a time, they tried to assassinate him, I think, after the Israelis did what they did, the President appreciates capabilities. He appreciates success. He likes backing the winning horse. And so the New York Times is reporting that after getting off the phone with Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Trump reportedly turned to some aides and said, maybe we need to help him. Now it's not clear that's what's going to happen, and my understanding is that the Israelis have plans of their own for things like the heavily fortified facility at Fordow, which is the most important and highly fortified, protected of the nuclear installations. The Israeli National Security Advisor spoke today and said, you know, we're not going to be done until we do something with Fordow. The United States can do multiple things only the United States has the MOP: the Massive Ordinance Penetrator, and the airplanes to deliver it, and they could end Fordow if they wanted. Short of that, they could do other things to support Israel. There's been defensive support for the State of Israel already, but there's other things they could do, refueling and other things if they wanted to. And at a minimum, I don't see the president restraining Israel at all. Now, I've heard some people say that so far, the President has fired nothing more than some social media postings, some of them even in all caps. But the truth is, those do have an effect, and so long as Israel is not restrained. I think the Israelis went into this with a plan. That plan is not necessarily to entirely destroy the entire nuclear program, but if the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program are sufficiently degraded so that it will take them years and a tremendous amount of time and money to rebuild, knowing that Israel has broken the glass ceiling on this idea of targeting Iran, that if the Israelis feel they need to, they will come back. If the Iranians rebuild their air defense systems, the Israelis will address them and create a new highway going if they need to. I think the Israelis are making that clear. Knowing that it's going to be a little bit of a road for Iran, especially when it will have to deal with some domestic issues coming out of this. Finally, the Israelis have started signaling there's other things they could do. The Israelis have not yet fully targeted oil and gas fields and facilities. For example, they had one set of attacks where they basically knocked at the front door of some of these facilities without walking in the house. That's signaling, and I think it's one of the reasons you're seeing Iran quietly trying to reach out for some type of a ceasefire. Other signaling, for example, is the Israelis deciding to fly all the way to Mashhad, which is in far eastern Iran, to take out an airplane. That airplane was not particularly important. It was the message. There is nowhere in Iran we can't go. It's not a question of distance, it's not a question of refueling, it's not a question of air defense systems. We can do what we need to do. And I think the Iranians understand that now. Manya Brachear Pashman: So we talked about the commitment to Israel, and how clear, how important it is to clarify that commitment to Israel. How important is it to clarify the United States commitment to Arab partners in the Middle East to help defend them in other words, if this conflict escalates? Matthew Levitt: This is critically important. You know, one of the individuals who was taken out, for example, was the person who was in charge of the drone attack on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia. If you look, for example, at the Saudi statement condemning the Israeli actions, it was issued by the Foreign Ministry without a single name attached to it. Wasn't issued by the Crown Prince, wasn't issued by the foreign minister. So I think you should expect a whole lot of public criticism. I imagine there's a different conversation going on behind closed doors. It's not necessarily, you know, pom-poming. This makes the Gulf states very, very nervous, in part because they understand that one way Iran could try and get out of this is to expand the conflict. And that the reason they haven't is because, short of trying to prevent Iranians from taking to the streets and potentially doing something to maybe overthrow the regime, short of that, the number one thing that the Iranian regime is most desperate to avoid is getting the United States involved militarily. And I think the Iranians really understand and the messaging's been clear. If you target US Forces in the region, if you target our allies in the region, we'll get involved. If you don't, then we might not. Now the President now is talking about potentially doing that, and as a lot of maybe this, maybe that, nothing very clear. I think what is clear is that the Israelis are going to continue doing what they need to do for another one to two weeks. Even going so far as doing something, though they haven't made clear what to address the really complicated problem of the fortified facility at Fordow. Manya Brachear Pashman: So how important is it for global security if Israel is successful in eliminating the nuclear threat in Iran? Matthew Levitt: Look, Iran has been the single most destabilizing factor in the region for a long time now. Imagine a region without a destabilizing revolutionary regime in Iran without a regime that is supporting Shia militants in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Imagine the Shia militias in Iraq suddenly without a funder and a patron, enabling the Shia government in Iraq to actually be able to take control of the country and establish a monopoly over the use of force. At a time when the Shia militias, because of Iran's backing, are becoming more dangerous and more powerful in Iraq. Imagine the Lebanese government being able to be more forward leaning in their effort to establish a monopoly over the use of force in that country, reclaim bases that Hezbollah has used for all this time, and establish a new Lebanon that is not beholden to Iran and Hezbollah. And imagine an Israeli-Palestinian situation where you didn't have Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as spoilers. Recall that October 7 happened in large part because Hamas and Hezbollah and Iran could not tolerate the prospect of Israeli-Saudi normalization. For most Palestinians, this was great news. The Saudis were demanding real dividends for the Palestinians from the Netanyahu government, which was likely going to do them. This was great for Palestinians, bad for Hamas. Imagine Hamas no longer getting that support from Iran. Imagine Iran no longer able to send or being interested in sending millions upon millions of dollars to its proxies, and instead spending what money it has on helping its population, instead of cracking down on it with human rights violations. You could have a very, very different region, let alone imagine Iran no longer carrying out acts of terrorism, kidnapping plots, abduction plots of dissidents and Jews and Israelis and others around the world of the type that we've seen throughout Europe and throughout the Middle East and even in the United States over the past few years. Manya Brachear Pashman: That's quite an imagination you have. But I take your point. Let me ask you this then. Did you ever imagine that Israel would take this dramatic step? Matthew Levitt: What the Israelis have achieved, when you are so against the wall and you're forced to come up with solutions, because it's a matter of life or death – you make the impossible possible. And I think that perhaps the Iranians assumed that the Israeli post-October 7 doctrine applied to non-state actors only. And that doctrine is very simple. Israel will no longer allow adversaries who are openly committed to its destruction to build up weapons, arsenals that they can then use at some point to actually try and destroy Israel. They will not allow that to happen. They allowed it to happen with Hamas. It was a mistake. They allowed it to happen with Hezbollah. It was a mistake that they corrected. And Iran is the biggest, arguably, really, the only existential threat as huge, as a tasking as that was, clearly they invested in doing it. And the question became, not, why can't it be done? What is it that has to be overcome? And I don't think sitting here with you right now, you know, what is it, 3:30 on Tuesday, the 17th, that we've seen the last of the tricks up Israel's sleeve. Manya Brachear Pashman: I only have one last question for you, and that is about the United States. The importance of the United States getting directly involved. I mean, we've talked about previously undisclosed nuclear sites, and who knows how many there could be. We're talking about more than what, 600,000 square miles of Iran. If the goal is a non nuclear Iran, can Israel finish this war without the United States, or does it even matter? I mean, is this just a step to force Iran back to the negotiating table with virtually zero leverage? Matthew Levitt: So look, I don't think the goal here is completely destroying the Iranian nuclear program, or even completely destroying the Iranian ballistic missile program. The goal is to so degrade it that it is set back many, many years, and break that ceiling. People now understand if Israelis need to come back, they're coming back. I think they would like to do as much damage to these destructive programs as possible, of course, and I don't think we've seen the end of it. I think there are more tricks up Israel's sleeve when it comes to some of these complicated problems. Judged by this yardstick, by the way, the Israeli operation is a tremendous success, tremendous success, even though there have been some significant casualties back in Israel, and even though this has caused tremendous trauma for innocent Iranians who have no love for the regime. This is a situation that the Iranian regime has brought down on all of us. I do think that the Israelis have made very, very clear that this doesn't end until something is done to further disrupt and dismantle Fordow, which is the most important and the most heavily fortified, underground, under a mountain facility. It's not clear what the Israelis have in mind. It seems they have something in mind of their own. It's clear they would love for the United States to get involved, because the United States could do real damage to that facility and potentially end the Iranian nuclear program. But at the end of the day, if it can't be completely destroyed, I anticipate it's going to be damaged enough to significantly set it back. This phase of the Israel-Iran war, which didn't start last week, is not about pushing them back a week or a month or two months. Manya Brachear Pashman: Well, Matt, thank you so much for your wise counsel and perspective on this matter, and yes, hopefully we can have you back another time to talk about peace and love and things that have nothing to do with war and conflict with Iran or its terror proxies. Matthew Levitt: I would really look forward to prepping for that interview. In the meantime, I want to thank AJC for all the important work it does, and thank you guys for having me on the podcast. Manya Brachear Pashman: If you missed last week's episodes, be sure to tune in for our crossover episode with Books and Beyond: The Rabbi Sacks Podcast, a podcast of the Rabbi Sacks Legacy, and my conversation with AJC's Jerusalem Director Avital Liebovich. During a special breaking news episode the day after Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, the latest in Israel's ongoing war of self-defense against the Iranian regime.
Good evening: The show begins in Ukraine and the Arctic Circle.1931 GREENLAND 1931 CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9-915 UKRAINE: WARRING ANOTHER YEAR. ANATOL LIEVEN, QUINCY 915-930 ARCTIC. WAR AND PEACE. 930-945 1/2: GOLDEN DOME: : BY 2029?.JOSH ROGIN, WAPO. 945-1000 2/2: GOLDEN DOME: : BY 2029?.JOSH ROGIN, WAPO. SECOND HOUR0 10-1015 IRAN: PENDING HARD POWER. MICHAEL EISENSTAT, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1015-1030 ANTISEMITISM: HOUSE HEARING, MICHAEL WAGENHEIM, I24 TV, MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1030-1045 CITY OF DAVID. DORON SPIELMAN. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1045-1100 GAZA: AID AND RISKS. STEPHAN MILLER CSA. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 GOP: SCARED OF ENTITLEMENTS. VERONIQUE DE RUGY 1115-1130 PRC: EMPTY ORDER BOOKS FOR SIX MORE MONTHS. #SCALAREPORT: CHRIS RIEGEL CEO, SCALA.COM @STRATACACHE. 1130-1145 RUSSIA: OIL FALLING INTO THE 40S. MICHAEL BERNSTAM, HOOVER. 1145-1200 HOTEL MARS: SPACEX: THE STARSHIP PLAN FALLS BEHIND. FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 #NEWWORLDREPORT: COLOMBIA. LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH PROFESSOR EVAN ELLIS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. @REVANELLIS #NEWWORLDREPORTELLIS 1215-1230 #NEWWORLDREPORT: PANAMA. LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH PROFESSOR EVAN ELLIS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. @REVANELLIS #NEWWORLDREPORTELLIS 1230-1245 #NEWWORLDREPORT: MEXICO AND BRAZIL. LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH PROFESSOR EVAN ELLIS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. @REVANELLIS #NEWWORLDREPORTELLIS 1245-100 AM #NEWWORLDREPORT: ARGENTINA. LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH PROFESSOR EVAN ELLIS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. @REVANELLIS #NEWWORLDREPORTELLIS
IRAN: PENDING HARD POWER. MICHAEL EISENSTAT, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1953
What's next for Gaza—and for Israel? In this episode of Middle East Focus, hosts Alistair Taylor and Matthew Czekaj sit down with Ghaith al-Omari, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former advisor to the Palestinian Authority, to unpack the urgent humanitarian crisis gripping Gaza, the impact of Israeli settlement expansion, and what these developments mean for the future of the region. Recorded June 3, 2025
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science
IRAN: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? DENNIS ROSS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1698 JERUSALEM
Good evening: The show begins in Ukraine with a peace plan draft in hand... 1855 CRIMEAN WAR CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor First Hour 9:00-9:15: UKRAINE: PEACE PLAN DRAFT. ANATOL LIEVEN, QUINCY. 9:15-9:30: UKRAINE: PEACE PLAN DRAFT. ANATOL LIEVEN, QUINCY. 9:30-9:45: PRC: BLACK MARKET. #SCALAREPORT: CHRIS RIEGEL CEO, SCALA.COM @STRATACACHE. 9:45-10:00: PRC: CHINA PITCHES THE AMERICAS, WHERE IS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION? MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY Second Hour 10:00-10:15: AZERBAIJAN: WORKING WITH ISRAEL AND TURKEY. KHAZAR IBRAHIM, MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 10:15-10:30: DC SHOOTER: SOCIAL MEDIA LINKS POINT OVERSEAS TO IRAN AND PRC. ALEX GOLDENBERG, NCRI. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 10:30-10:45: IRAN: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? DENNIS ROSS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 10:45-11:00: IRAN: AYATOLLAH DIGS IN. MOHSEN SAZEGARA, MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 Third Hour 11:00-11:15: QATAR: WON'T GET FOOLED AGAIN: CLIFF MAY, FDD 11:15-11:30: LEBANON: IS THERE AN AL-SHARAA? HUSAIN ABDUL-HUSAIN. FDD 11:30-11:45: #HOTEL MARS: "HOW TO KILL AN ASTEROID," ROBIN GEORGE ANDREWS, DAVID LIVINGSTON. 11:45-12:00: #HOTEL MARS: "HOW TO KILL AN ASTEROID," ROBIN GEORGE ANDREWS, DAVID LIVINGSTON. Fourth Hour 12:00-12:15: RUSSIA: NAVALNY FILM AT CANNES, MARIANNA YAROVSKAYA. 12:15-12:30: GOP: DISAPPOINTING TAX AND SPEND BILL. VERONIQUE DE RUGY 12:30-12:45 (1/2): REPUBLIC: IF WE CAN KEEP IT. BEN CRENSHAW, CIVITAS INSTITUTE. 12:45-1:00 AM (2/2): REPUBLIC: IF WE CAN KEEP IT. BEN CRENSHAW, CIVITAS INSTITUTE.
With Eliot still on the road, Eric welcomes Dennis Ross, Counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Director of Policy Planning under James Baker, Special Middle East Envoy under President Clinton among several other high level national security positions at State, Defense and the White House under Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Obama. Dennis is also a prolific author including his memoir of Middle East diplomacy, The Missing Peace, Doomed to Succeed - a history of U.S.-Israel relations, and most recently Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2025). They discuss why Dennis chose to update his 2005 book on Statecraft, his choice of case studies including German Reunification, the First Gulf War, Bosnia, the Iraq War and the Syria policy debacle under President Obama. He describes the contending schools of thought about America's role in the world, including America First, Restrainers, Realists, and Liberal Internationalists and their differences over the use of force, alliances, as well as the role of interests and values in American foreign policy. He outlines the habits of good statecraft, including proper assessments, use of leverage and coercion, Presidential leadership and empowering lower level officials while avoiding groupthink. Along the way they discuss Afghanistan, Libya, the war in Ukraine and Dennis's assessment of President Trump's trip to the Middle East and his policy approach to the war in Ukraine and changing Vladimir Putin's calculus about war termination. Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World: https://a.co/d/j8C7WcH Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.
Donald Trump just finished his first tour of the Middle East since returning to the White House. The region has changed a lot since he was last there as president. There's been Hamas's attack on Israel, the ensuing Israeli retaliation, the weakening of Iran and its proxies, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Trump used the visit to announce flashy deals with Gulf leaders and to commit to lifting sanctions on Syria. But with big questions remaining about Gaza and about nuclear negotiations with Iran, the future of the region and the U.S. role in it remain unsettled. In a recent essay for Foreign Affairs, Dana Stroul argues that a new regional order could emerge from the recent upheaval—but only if Washington takes the lead in what will undoubtedly be an intricate political process. Stroul is director of research and the Shelly and Michael Kassen senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. During the Biden administration, she served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, witnessing firsthand how quickly new regional power dynamics can take shape—and how quickly they can unravel. Stroul spoke with Dan Kurtz-Phelan on May 20 to discuss the prospect of a new Iranian nuclear deal, the future of Israeli policy in Gaza, and what Trump's recent moves herald for the new Middle East. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.
Guest: Matthew Levitt, Director, Reinhard program on counterterrorism & intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former State Department counterterrorism advisor to the special envoy for Middle East regional security.
Donald Trump's return to the Middle East marks a shift toward transactional diplomacy, emphasizing trade, investment, and a retreat from human rights rhetoric. In a striking parallel, China has long pursued a similar approach in the region—prioritizing business ties over political entanglements. The question now is how will China respond to this rapidly changing geopolitical landscape? In this special edition of the podcast, CGSP partnered with The ChinaMed Project to organize an online seminar featuring leading experts from China and the United States, exploring how Beijing will adjust its Middle East engagement strategy in the Trump era. Eric speaks with Zhang Chuchu, a China-Mideast scholar at the school of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, and Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Later in the program, Enrico Fardella and Andrea Ghiselli from the ChinaMed Project join the discussion. JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC: Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Arabic: عربي: www.alsin-alsharqalawsat.com | @SinSharqAwsat JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day
In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war.
“This has been my favorite session of the three days. Thank you,” said one attendee following a powerful live conversation at AJC Global Forum 2025. This exclusive episode of AJC's People of the Pod, presented by AJC's Women's Global Leadership Network, features a candid discussion on the critical impact of Jewish women leaders in global diplomacy and conflict resolution. Casey Kustin, AJC's Chief Impact and Operations Officer, joins former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mira Resnick and Dana Stroul, Research Director and Kassen Family Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to share how they've navigated the corridors of power, shaped international policy from the Middle East to Europe and beyond, and opened doors for the next generation of women in foreign affairs. ___ Resources– AJC Global Forum 2025 News and Video AJC Global Forum 2026 returns to Washington, D.C. Will you be in the room? Listen – AJC Podcasts: Most Recent Episodes: A United Front: U.S. Colleges and AJC Commit to Fighting Campus Antisemitism What is Pope Francis' Legacy with the Jewish People? Why TikTok is the Place to Talk about Antisemitism: With Holocaust Survivor Tova Friedman The Forgotten Exodus: Untold stories of Jews who left or were driven from Arab nations and Iran People of the PodFollow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: peopleofthepod@ajc.org If you've appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. Interview Transcript: Manya Brachear Pashman: Live from AJC Global Forum 2025, welcome to People of the Pod. For audience members who are not in this room, you are listening to a show that was recorded in front of a live studio audience on April 29 at AJC Global Forum 2025 in New York. I'm your host, Manya Brachear Pashman. Thank you all for being here. In countries around the world, women are working more than ever before. But compared to men, they are not earning as much or being afforded an equal voice – at work, at home, or in the community. In no country in the world do women have an equal role. Let me repeat that. In no country in the world, do women have an equal role–when it comes to setting policy agendas, allocating resources, or leading companies. With us today are three modern-day Miriams who have raised their voices and earned unprecedented roles that recognize the intellect and compassion they bring to international diplomacy. To my left is AJC Chief Impact and Operations Officer, Casey Kustin. Casey served as the staff director of the Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee on the House Foreign Affairs Committee for 10 years. She has worked on political campaigns at the state and national level, including on Jewish outreach for Barack Obama's presidential campaign. Welcome, Casey. To Casey's left is Dana Strohl. She is the Director of Research for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. She was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. In this role, she led the development of U.S. Department of Defense policy and strategy for Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq–I'm not done–Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Prior to that, she also served on Capitol Hill as the senior professional staff member for the Middle East on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome, Dana. And last but not least, Mira Resnick. Mira was the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs and Arabian Peninsula Affairs, in which she handled two crucial Middle East portfolios, usually helmed by two separate people. Previously, she oversaw the Department's Office of regional security and arms transfers, where she managed foreign arms sales and shepherded the Biden administration's military assistance to Ukraine and Israel after Russia's invasion and after the October 7 Hamas attacks. Like Casey, Mira has also served as a senior professional staff member with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa. Thank you for being here, Mira. Welcome to all of you, to People of the Pod. I think it's safe to say, this panel right here, and all the knowledge and experience it represents could solve the Middle East conflict in one day, if given the chance. Casey, you served for a decade as staff director for the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee. A decade, wow. You witnessed a lot of transition, but what were the constants when it came to regional cooperation and security needs? Casey Kustin: What's the saying? The enemy of my enemy is my friend. And that's the world that we're all trying to build. So, you know, from an American perspective, which we all came from in our government work, it was trying to find those shared interests, and trying to cultivate, where we could, points of common interest. And even with the challenges of October 7 now, perhaps stalling some of those areas of progress, you still see that the Abraham Accords haven't fallen apart. You saw when Iran launched missiles at Israel. You saw other countries in the region come to, maybe they wouldn't say Israel's defense. It was their airspace defense. But you saw that still working. You see that still working now. And it's every day when we come to work at AJC, we're thinking about how to increase and strengthen Israel's place in the world. Manya Brachear Pashman: So Mira, your role encompassed both Israel and the Gulf for the first time, right? Mira Resnick: That was the first time at my level. Yes. Manya Brachear Pashman: Okay, so whose idea was that, and did that put you or the US in a position to work for the good of the neighborhood, rather than just Israel, or just the Gulf States? Mira Resnick: Yeah, this was an opportunity for the State Department to be able to see all of the different threads that were coming throughout the region. This is something that Dana did on a daily basis. This is something that our colleagues at the NSC did on a daily basis. The Secretary, of course, needs to be able to manage multiple threads at the same time. When I was overseeing arms sales, of course, I would have to consider Israel and the Gulf at the same time. So this wasn't a new idea, that our interests can be aligned within one portfolio, but it was particularly important timing for the United States to be able to see and to talk to and to hear our Gulf partners and our Israeli partners at the same time within the same prism, to be able to truly understand what the trends were in the region at that particularly critical moment, post-October 7. Manya Brachear Pashman: Dana, in your role as Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense, you met with military leaders in the Middle East, around the world, and you were often the only woman at the table. What do women contribute to international conflict resolution that's missing when they're not given a seat at the table? Dana Strohl: Well, let me start out by stating the obvious, which is that women make up 50% of the global population of the world. So if 50% of the world is missing from the negotiating table, from the peacemaking table, from conflict prevention mechanisms, then you're missing 50% of the critical voices. There's evidence, clear evidence, that when women are part of peace processes, when they are part of negotiations, the outcomes on the other side are 35% more sustainable. So we have evidence and data to back up the contention that women must be at the table if we are going to have sustainable outcomes. When I think about the necessity, the imperative, of women being included, I think about the full range of conflict. So there's preventing it, managing it, and then transitioning to peace and political processes in a post-war or post-conflict situation. In every part of that, there's a critical role for women. As examples, I always think about, when you make policy, when you have a memo, when there's a statement that's really nice, in the big capital of some country, or in a fancy, beautiful palace somewhere in the Middle East or in Europe. But peace only happens if it's implemented at a local level. Everyone in the world wants the same things. They want a better life for their kids. They want safety. They want access to basic services, school, health, clean water and some sort of future which requires jobs. Confidence you can turn the light on. You can drive your car on a road without potholes. Those are details that often are not included in the big sweeping statements of peace, usually between men, that require really significant compromises. But peace gets implemented at a very local level. And at the local level, at the family level, at the community level, at the school level, it's women. So how those big things get implemented requires women to champion them, to advance them. And I will also just say, you know, generally we should aspire to prevent conflict from happening. There's data to suggest that in countries with higher levels of gender equality, they are less likely to descend into conflict in the first place. Manya Brachear Pashman: Can you recall a particularly consequential moment during your tenure, when you were at the table and it mattered? Dana Strohl: So my view on this is that it was important for me to be at the table as a woman, just to make the point. That women can serve, just like men. Do the same job. And frankly, a lot of the times I felt like I was doing a better job. So what was really important to me, and I can also just say sitting up here with Mira and Casey, is that all of us have worked together now for more than a decade, at different stages of, getting married, thinking through having kids, getting pregnant, taking parental leave, and then transitioning back to work. And all of us have been able to manage our careers at the same time. That only happens in supportive communities, in ecosystems, and I don't just mean having a really supportive partner. My friends up here know, I ask my mom for a lot of help. I do have a partner who really supported me, but it also means normalizing parenthood and being a woman, and having other obligations in the office space. I would make a point of talking about being a parent or talking about being a woman. To normalize that women can be there. And often there were women, really across the whole Middle East, there were always women in the room. They were just on the back wall, not at the table. And I could see them looking at me. And so I thought it was really important to make the point that, one, a woman can be up here, but I don't have to be like the men at the table. I can actually talk about, well, I can't stay for an extra day because I have a kindergarten, you know, theater thing, and I have to run back and do that. Or there were many times actually, I think Mira was Zooming for parent teacher conferences after we were having the official meeting. But I think it's important to actually say that, at the table, I'm going to leave now and go back to my hotel room because I'm making a parent teacher conference. Or, I have to be back by Friday because I'm taking a kid to a doctor's appointment. So all the women that come after us can see that you can do both, and the men at the table can understand that women have a right to be here. Can do the jobs just as effectively and professionally as the men, and do this other absolutely critical thing. Manya Brachear Pashman: But your point about, it requires a supportive network, a supportive work community. You told me a story before we got up here about just how supportive your colleagues were in the Department of Defense. Dana Strohl: I will give a shout out to Lloyd Austin, the Secretary of Defense. So one of the things you do in our positions is travel with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. And these are not the kind of things where they get on a plane and you land in whatever country. There's a tremendous amount of planning that goes into these. So on a particular trip, it was a four country trip, early in 2023. Secretary Austin was going to multiple countries. He had switched the day, not he, but his travel team, of his departure, which then caused us to switch the day of my son's birthday party. And then they switched the time of his departure from Andrews Air Force Base, and we could not change the birthday party. So I called Secretary Austin's office and said, Listen, I want to be at my son's birthday party. So I've looked and it looks like I can take this commercial flight. So I won't be on the Secretary of Defense's plane, but I can largely land around the same time as you all and still do my job in the region. And to their credit, they said, okay, and then one of the things that you do in my position is you get on the airplane and you talk to the Secretary of Defense about the objectives and the goals and the meetings. So they said, Okay, we'll just change that to earlier. You can do it the day before we depart, so that he can hear from you. You're on the same page. You can make the birthday party. He can do the thing. So we were actually going to Jordan for the first stop. And it turns out, in his itinerary, the first thing we were doing when we landed in Jordan, was going to dinner with the King. And it was very unclear whether I was going to make it or not. And quite a high stakes negotiation. But the bottom line is this, I finished the birthday party, had my mother come to the birthday party to help me clean up from the birthday party, changed my clothes, went to Dulles, got on the airplane, sort of took a nap, get off the airplane. And there is an entire delegation of people waiting for me as you exit the runway of the airplane, and they said, Well, you need to go to this bathroom right here and change your clothes. I changed my clothes, put on my suit, ran a brush through my hair, get in a car, and they drove me to the King's palace, and I made the dinner with the king. It's an example of a team, and in particular Secretary Austin, who understood that for women to have the opportunities but also have other obligations, that there has to be an understanding and some flexibility, but we can do both, and it took understanding and accommodation from his team, but also a lot of people who are willing to work with me, to get me to the dinner. And I sat next to him, and it was a very, very good meal. Manya Brachear Pashman: I find that so encouraging and empowering. Thank you so much. Casey, I want to turn to you. Mira and Dana worked under particular administrations. You worked with members of Congress from different parties. So how did the increasing polarization in politics affect your work, or did it? Casey Kustin: It's funny, I was traveling last week for an AJC event, and I ended up at the same place with a member of Congress who was on my subcommittee, and I knew pretty well. And he looked at me and he said, the foreign affairs committee, as you know it, is no longer. And that was a really sad moment for me, because people always described our committee as the last bastion of bipartisanship. And the polarization that is seeping through every part of society is really impacting even the foreign policy space now. As you see our colleague, our Managing Director of [AJC] Europe, Simone Rodan[-Benzaquen], who many of you know, just wrote a piece this week talking about how, as Israel has become to the progressive, when Ukraine has become to the far right. And I think about all the years I spent when Ted Deutch, our CEO, was the top Democrat on the Middle East subcommittee, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), a great friend of AJC, was the chair of the subcommittee. And Ted and Ileana would travel around together. And when she was the chair, she always made a point of kind of joking like Ted's, my co chair, and we did so many pieces–with Mira's great support of legislation for the US, Israel relationship, for Syria, for Iran, that we worked on together, really together. Like at the table with my staff counterparts, trying to figure out, you know, what can your side swallow? What can your side swallow? And I hear from so many of our former colleagues that those conversations aren't really taking place anymore. And you know, the great thing about AJC is we are nonpartisan, and we try so hard to have both viewpoints at the table. But even that gets harder and harder. And Dana's story about the King of Jordan made me laugh, because I remember a very similar experience where I was on a congressional delegation and Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, and I was six months pregnant at the time, and I wanted to go on the trip, and the doctor said I could go on the trip. And we were seated around the table having the meeting. And I, as you won't be able to hear on the podcast, but you in this room know, look very young, despite my age. And you're self conscious about that. And I remember Ileana just being so caring and supportive of me the entire trip. And I wasn't even her staffer, and I remember she announced to the King of Jordan that I was six months pregnant, and you could kind of see him go, okay. That's very like, thank you. That's very nice. But even just having that moment of having the chairwoman on the other side of the aisle. That whole trip. I think I've told some AJC people another funny story of on that same trip, we met with the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Jerusalem, and she pulled me up to him, and she said to the patriarch, will you bless her unborn child? Knowing I'm Jewish, she leaned over and said to me: Can't hurt. So I hope that we return to a place like that on Capitol Hill. I think there are really good staffers like us who want that to happen, but it is just as hard a space now in foreign policy as you see in other parts of politics. Manya Brachear Pashman: Mira, I want to ask you another policy related question. How did the Abraham Accords change the dynamics of your combined portfolio, and how could it shape the future? Mira Resnik: My first, one of my first trips, certainly my first trip to the Middle East, when I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Security, overseeing security assistance and security cooperation, was to Dubai, as the State Department representative for the Dubai Airshow. And it is a huge event that showcases the world's technology. And I remember walking into the huge hangar, that every country that has a defense industry was showcasing their most important, their most important munitions, their most important aircraft. And I remember seeing the enormous Israeli pavilion when I was there. And I was staying at a hotel, and I get to the breakfast and they said, Would you like the kosher breakfast or the non-kosher breakfast. And I'm like, Am I in Israel? And I was blown away by the very warm relationship–in the security space, in the humanitarian space. I agree with Casey that things have gotten a little tougher since October 7, and since the aftermath in Gaza. But what I would also point out is that April and October, during the time when when we witnessed Israel under cover, when we witnessed Iran's missiles and projectiles going toward Israel and going toward other regional airspace, our diplomats, our militaries, our intelligence officials, all had earlier warning because of the work of other Gulf governments, even those who have not joined the Abraham Accords. And that is a prime example of where this security cooperation really matters. It saves lives. Manya Brachear Pashman: So Casey, so much of what AJC does has to do with international diplomacy and maintaining that regional cooperation and security, and that sounds a lot like your previous role. So I'm really curious how much your job truly has changed since you came to AJC? Casey Kustin: You're absolutely right. There are so many similarities in what we do at AJC and what we did in the government. And the core of that is really those relationships that you build with partners and interlocutors in other countries and other governments, and the foundation, over decades that AJC has laid. Particularly in the Middle East, thanks to 30 years of quiet travel to the region. It struck me when I first came here, the access that AJC has is nearly the same that we had traveling as members of Congress. And the meetings and the quality and the level of meetings that AJC is afforded in these other countries. Our missions, which many of you have been on, often feel like congressional delegation trips to me, and the conversations and the candor with which partners speak to AJC is almost the same that was afforded to members of Congress. And that has been comforting, in a way, as you said Manya, Because there feels like there's continuity in the work that we're doing, and it has made me realize that organizations, non-governmental organizations, advocacy organizations, play such a crucial role in supporting the work of a government, of your country's government. And in reinforcing the values and the interests that we as AJC want to communicate that very much dovetail, with hopefully any US administration. I think that the role that an organization like ours, like AJC, can play in a particular moment, like we're in, where, as we've discussed, there's hyperpartisanship, and we hear a lot, Dana mentioned this. We hear a lot from foreign partners that the way our democracy works with a change in administration every four years is unsettling to some of them, because they don't know if a particular policy or agreement is going to continue the role that we can play, providing some of that continuity and providing a nonpartisan and thoughtful place to have conversations. Because they know that we have that kind of nuanced and thoughtful and nonpartisan insight. Manya Brachear Pashman: I really appreciate your insights on the roles that you've played, and I think the audience has as well. But I want to pivot back to your role as women. Dana, I mentioned that you were often the only woman at the table. Would you discover that when you arrived at meetings and events? Dana Strohl: In Washington, DC, and in particular, I'm very proud to have served in the Biden administration, where there were always women at the table. And I will also say that there was a network of women, and it was the same on the Hill. On the hill, there was actually a box of maternity clothes that was kept in then-Senate Leader Harry Reid's office. And his National Security Advisor called me when she heard I was pregnant the first time, which was during the 2015 JCPOA negotiations on the Hill, which meant that I was super tired and doing all of those congressional hearings and briefings, but there was a network of women who were supporting each other and giving me clothes as I got bigger and bigger. And it continued into the Pentagon and the State Department, where there were always women and when we saw each other at the White House Situation Room or in the different meetings, there was always the quiet pull aside. How are you doing? How are your kids? Are you managing? What's the trade off on your day to day basis? Can I do anything to help you? And in particular, after October 7, that network of people really kicked into high gear, and we were all checking in with each other. Because it was the most intense, most devastating time to work in the government and try to both support Israel and prevent World War III from breaking out across the Middle East. So that was DC. In the Middle East, I largely assumed that I was going to be the only woman at the table, and so I decided to just own it. There are some great pictures of me always in a pink jacket, but the point you know, was that I expected it, and there were always women, again, against the back walls. I made an effort whenever possible to make sure everyone at the table, regardless of your gender, had an opportunity to speak and participate, but I was also not just the only woman. A lot of times, I was the co-chair with whatever partner it was in the Middle East, so I had a speaking role, and I felt was incumbent upon me to present a model of leadership and inclusivity in how we engage with our partners, spoke to our partners, listened to our partners concerns, and that that was part of the job. And only once, I remember it very clearly. We were at a dinner after a big meeting, and somebody looks at me, it's a meeting with all, y7all men, all men for a dinner. And they said, Is this what it's like for you all the time? And I said, Yes, it is. And you know, it took two and a half years for somebody to notice, so. Manya Brachear Pashman: Mira, what have you experienced? And have you ever worried as a woman that you weren't being taken seriously? Mira Resnick: I think that every woman in one of these jobs has imposter syndrome every so often, and walking into the room and owning it, fake it till you make it right. That's the solution. I will. I agree with Dana wholeheartedly that in Washington, I was really proud to walk into the room and never fear that I was the only woman. And I even remember traveling where another delegation was all women, and our delegation was all women, and how surprising that was, and then how disappointing, how surprising that was, but to take notice of the moment, because they don't happen very often. I think that in Washington and throughout diplomacy, the goal is to pay it forward to other women. And I wasn't the last person to pump in the Ramallah Coca Cola factory, and I wasn't the first person to pump in the Ramallah Coca Cola factory. But that is, that was, like, my moment where I was like, Oh, this is a strange place to be a woman, right? But I do find that women really bring holistic views into our policy making, and whether it's meeting with civil society, even if your job is strictly security cooperation to understand the human impacts of your security decisions, or making sure that you are nurturing your people, that you are a good leader of people. I remember post-October 7, I was looking for some way that I could nurture in the personal life. And I see Nadine Binstock here, who goes to my shul, and Stephanie also. Stephanie Guiloff is also in the audience. She's my neighbor, and also goes to my shul. And after October 7, I took on the Kiddush Committee Coordinator at my shul. So that every week, no matter what I was experiencing at the office and no matter where I was in the world, our community would be a little bit more nurtured. And it was a way for me to like to give back to the community, and at the same time be able to continue to do the hard power work of security cooperation. Manya Brachear Pashman: So Mira, Casey, Dana, thank you so much for joining us, sharing your modern-day Miriam experiences. I want to open it up for questions from the audience. Just raise your hand and someone will bring you a microphone. Audience Member: Hi, I'm Maddie Ingle. I'm a Leaders for Tomorrow alum. What is some advice that any of you have for young women like me in the advocacy space and in general. Casey Kustin: First of all, thank you for taking the time to come to Global Forum and for joining LFT. You've already taken the first step to better arming yourself as an advocate. I think there is, I wish someone had said to me, probably before I met the two of them who did say it to me, that it was okay to take up space around the table. I remember sitting in secure facilities, getting classified briefings from ambassadors, male ambassadors who were 30 years my senior, and watching the two of you in particular i. Not be scared to challenge the back and forth when I as a probably still, you know, mid 20s, early 30s, did have fear of speaking up. And I wish someone, when I was your age as a teenager, had, and obviously, I had supportive parents who told me I could do anything, but it's different. It's different than seeing it modeled by people who are in the same space as you, and who are maybe even just a couple years older than you. So I would just say to you not to ever be afraid to use your voice. This is a memory that has stuck with me for 15 years. I was in a meeting, sitting next to my congressman boss, with two men who were probably in their 60s, and a vote was called. And you never know on the Hill when a vote is going to be called. So it interrupts a meeting. And he had to go vote, and he said, Casey will finish the meeting with you. And they looked at him and said, Does she know what we're talking about? Dana Strohl: We have all been there, Casey. Casey Kustin: We have all been there. So even if you're met with a response like that when you try to use your voice, don't let it deter you. Audience Member: Hi, guys. I'm Jenny. This has been my favorite session of the three days. Thank you guys. My mom is the first female, woman brakeman conductor on Amtrak. So you guys are just so empowering. As a long time Democrat, you guys talked about bipartisan issues. With how the Democratic Party is. I know you guys probably can't go fully into this. Do you have any inspiring words to give us hope when it feels very scary right now, as a Democrat, how divided our party is. Casey Kustin: I work for a nonpartisan organization now, so I'll let them handle that one. Dana Strohl: I, so were we all on the Hill during the first Trump administration? And there was still bipartisanship. And what I'm looking for right now is the green shoots of our democracy. And I see them. There is thinking through what does it mean to be in this country, to be an American, to live in a democracy? What does democracy do? I think, first of all, it is healthy and okay for Americans to go through times of challenge and questioning. Is this working for us? And you know, the relationship between the government, whether it's legislative, judicial, executive and the people, and it's okay to challenge and question, and I think it's okay for there to be healthy debates inside both the Republican and the Democratic Party about what what this stands for, and what is in the best interest of our country. And you can see both in polling data and in certain areas where there actually are members of Congress coming together on certain issues, like economic policy, what's in the best interest of our constituents and voters. That there is thinking through what is the right balance between the different branches of our government. I was talking to somebody the other day who was reminding me this actual, you know, we are, we are in a time of significant transition and debate in our society about the future of our country and the future role of the government and the relationship. But it's not the first time, and it won't be the last. And I found to be that part of my job was to make sure I understood the diversity of voices and views about what the role of the government should be, general views about American foreign policy, which was our job, was just such a humble reminder of democracy and the importance of this back and forth. Audience Member: [My name is Allie.] My question for you is, what are your hopes and dreams for generation alpha, who will be able to vote in the next election? Casey Kustin: I think we all have, all our kids are still in elementary, or Mira, your one is going into middle school now– Mira Resnik: To middle school. Casey Kustin: So the vast majority of our children are still elementary school age. And for me, I have a very interesting experience of moving my family out of a very diverse community in Washington, DC to Jacksonville, Florida. And it's a very different environment than I thought that my children were going to grow up in, because at the time, we didn't anticipate leaving DC anytime soon, and it's made me realize that I want them to live in a world where no matter what community They are growing up in, they are experiencing a world that gives them different perspectives on life, and I think it's very easy now that I have gone from a city environment to suburbia to live in a bubble, and I just, I hope that every child in this next generation doesn't have to wait until they're adults to learn these kinds of really important lessons. Dana Strohl: I have two additional things to add. I'm very concerned at what the polling suggests, the apathy of young people toward voting, the power of voting, why it matters. And participation, that you need to be an active citizen in your governments. And you can't just vote every four years in the presidential election, there's actually a ton of voting, including, like the county boards of education, you got to vote all the way up and down you continuously. And that it's okay to have respectful debate, discourse, disagreements in a democracy. So I would like this generation to learn how to have respectful discourse and debate, to believe that their votes matter and just vote. And three, on the YouTube thing, which is terrifying to me, so I'm hoping the educators help me with this is, how to teach our kids to separate the disinformation, the misinformation, and the fiction that they are getting because of YouTube and online. So mine are all elementary schoolers, and I have lost positive control of the information they absorb. And now I'm trying to teach them well, you know, that's not real. And do I cut off certain things? How do I engage them? How do I use books and when? So they need to not just be active participants in their society, all up and down the ballot, multiple times every year, but they need to know how to inform themselves. Manya Brachear Pashman: And Mira? Mira Resnick: I do hope that our children, as they approach voting age, that they see the value in cooperation with each other, that they see the value of face to face conversation. I think that honestly, this is the value of Shabbat in my household. That you take a break from the screens and you have a face to face conversation. My children understand how to have conversations with adults now. Which is, I think, a critical life skill, and that they will use those life skills toward the betterment of their communities, and more broadly, our Jewish community, and more broadly than that, our global community. Manya Brachear Pashman: Thank you so much. Thank you to everyone.
On this week's episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Ambassador Dennis Ross, lead Middle East peace process negotiator in the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations and current counselor and William Davidson distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to unpack President Trump's trip to the Middle East. They provide a high-level overview of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration and discuss the U.S.-Israel and Trump-Netanyahu relationships, the present and future of the Gaza war, prospects for a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Dennis' new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World.Support the showFollow us on Instagram, Twitter/X, and Bluesky, and subscribe to our email list here.
Ark Media is looking for two college summer interns – one who can support operations and another who can support product design. To apply, please follow the links below:Product: https://app.testgorilla.com/s/b1e1of2hOperations: https://app.testgorilla.com/s/7hy7zlpuWatch Call me Back on YouTube: youtube.com/@CallMeBackPodcastSubscribe to Ark Media's new podcast ‘What's Your Number?': lnk.to/HJI2mXArk Media on Instagram: instagram.com/arkmediaorgTo contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: arkmedia.orgDan on X: x.com/dansenorDan on Instagram: instagram.com/dansenor Today's episode:Latest reporting from Times of Israel on wildfires: https://www.timesofisrael.com/fire-authority-needs-double-the-budget-to-cope-during-mega-fires-era-official/Next week, President Trump is heading to Saudi Arabia to convene a summit with leaders from the Gulf Cooperation Council—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. The agenda? Arms deals, AI partnerships, and a substantial Saudi investment pledge. Israel isn't on his itinerary, although Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has just announced that he will be traveling to Israel in advance of President Trump's Middle East trip, and that Secretary Hegseth will be meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Katz and Israel's military leadership. He will then travel to Saudi Arabia to accompany President Trump on his travels. The Middle East visit will also take place against the backdrop of an important personnel change on Trump's national security team – namely, the national security advisor Mike Waltz stepping down and moving to the UN. To unpack what's at stake for Israel and the US, we're joined by Mike Singh, former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council and now managing director at the Washington Institute, and Call me Back regular, Nadav Eyal, columnist for Yediot Ahronot.CREDITS:ILAN BENATAR - Producer & EditorMARTIN HUERGO - Sound EditorGABE SILVERSTEIN - ResearchYUVAL SEMO - Music Composer
The Israeli government voted to expand military operations in Gaza and could end with the reoccupation of the strip. Humanitarian officials warn that an Israeli plan to take over aid distribution in Gaza is unworkable, and more Palestinians will suffer. Nick Schifrin discussed the implications with David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Project on Israel-Arab Relations. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
The Israeli government voted to expand military operations in Gaza and could end with the reoccupation of the strip. Humanitarian officials warn that an Israeli plan to take over aid distribution in Gaza is unworkable, and more Palestinians will suffer. Nick Schifrin discussed the implications with David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Project on Israel-Arab Relations. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
CONFLICT RISK. GAZA, LEBANON, SYRIA, YEMEN, IRAN. ROBERT SATLOFF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 1862 GAZA SAMSON'S GATE
The Islamic State, once a local insurgency rooted in Iraq and Syria, has transformed into a global network with far-reaching influence. In this episode of the podcast, we chart how its operations have expanded beyond the Middle East, as the group leveraged technology, propaganda, and local affiliates to spread its ideology across borders. Host Lucas Webber is joined by Aaron Zelin, a Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and founder of the widely acclaimed website, Jihadology. Aaron explains how The General Directorate of Provinces, a global hierarchy structure responsible for overseeing and coordinating Islamic State's global affiliates, is central to much of the group's expansion.
As news unexpectedly emerged that the US and Iran are to hold talks in Oman this weekend, President Trump warned Tehran that it must either cut a deal to cease all nuclear weapons development, or face the very real threat of military strikes. But just as the Trump Administration is divided on whether or not to attack, so Iranian society is split between those who fear war and those who support removal of the regime at any cost.This podcast was brought to you thanks to the support of readers of The Times and The Sunday Times. Subscribe today: http://thetimes.com/thestoryGuest: Sanam Vakil, Director of Middle East and North Africa programme, Chatham House and Holly Dagres, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute. Host: Manveen Rana.Producer: Edith Rousselot.Further reading: Iran has every incentive to make a nuclear deal with TrumpClips: Sky News, Fox News, TikTok, Al Jazeera, Straight Arrow News, Reuters.Photo: Getty Images.Get in touch: thestory@thetimes.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
How did a small offshoot of Al Qaeda overthrow a major country in the Middle East and establish a diplomatic dialogue with the United States? Dr. Aaron Zelin is one of the foremost experts on jihadist movements past and present. He joined Rep. Crenshaw to discuss the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the rise of its vanquisher – the jihadist group known as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Dr. Zelin analyzes the conditions that led to the shocking revolution in Syria, its geopolitical implications, and the “pragmatic” jihadism of HTS. A comprehensive overview of Sunni extremism, the complex motives of HTS leadership, and how it all fits on the global chessboard. Dr. Aaron Zelin is the Gloria and Ken Levy Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he also directs the Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map project. He is the founder of jihadology.net, where you can find translations and analysis of jihadi source materials. Follow him on X at @azelin.
CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE MIDDLE EASTHEADLINE 1: The Shin Bet and Israel police foiled a plot to carry out a terrorist attack in Jerusalem. HEADLINE 2: A former Islamic Revolutionary Guard from Iran gave a rare interview with Israeli media. HEADLINE 3: Former Israeli hostage Tal Shoham gave an exclusive interview to Fox News.BONUS HEADLINE 4: A Syrian soldier was killed yesterday by a Hezbollah rocket.--FDD Executive Director Jon Schanzer provides timely situational updates and analysis, followed by a conversation with Grant Rumley, who directs The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East.Learn more at: https://fdd.org/fddmorningbrief
The Bulletin discusses Trump disruptions, university investigations, and the recent Syrian massacre. Find us on YouTube. Clarissa and Mike cover this week's headlines as they ask, “Is this the MAGA Americans wanted?” Political commentator Charlie Sykes joins the show to talk about the disruptiveness of Trump's first 50 days in office. Then, The Atlantic's Peter Wehner stops by for a thoughtful conversation about the state of US universities, tribalism, and the uniquely Christian posture of hopeful inquiry. Finally, we consider Syria's recent Alawite massacre and the future of peace in this war-torn region with research analyst Ahmad Sharawi. GO DEEPER WITH THE BULLETIN: Join us and go deeper on our Substack. Find us on YouTube. Rate and review the show in your podcast app of choice. ABOUT THE GUESTS: Peter Wehner is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Trinity Forum. He was formerly a speechwriter for George W. Bush and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Wehner is a contributing opinion writer for The New York Times, and his work also appears in publications including The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and National Affairs. Charles J. Sykes is one of the most influential conservatives in Wisconsin. Until he stepped down in December after 23 years, Sykes was one of the state's top-rated talk show hosts. He is currently an MSNBC contributor. Sykes has written for The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Politico, Salon, USA Today, National Review, The Weekly Standard, and other national publications. He has appeared on the Today Show, ABC, NBC, Fox News, CNN, PBS, and the BBC and has been profiled on NPR. He has also spoken extensively on university campuses. Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs, specifically the Levant, Iraq, and Iranian intervention in Arab affairs, as well as US foreign policy toward the region. Previously, Sharawi worked at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused mainly on Hezbollah. He created a map visualizing the border clashes on the Israeli-Lebanese frontier and authored articles on Jordan and Morocco. Sharawi previously worked at the International Finance Corporation and S&P Global. He holds a BA in international relations from King's College London and an MA from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. ABOUT THE BULLETIN: The Bulletin is a weekly (and sometimes more!) current events show from Christianity Today hosted and moderated by Clarissa Moll, with senior commentary from Russell Moore (Christianity Today's editor in chief) and Mike Cosper (director, CT Media). Each week, the show explores current events and breaking news and shares a Christian perspective on issues that are shaping our world. We also offer special one-on-one conversations with writers, artists, and thought leaders whose impact on the world brings important significance to a Christian worldview, like Bono, Sharon McMahon, Harrison Scott Key, Frank Bruni, and more. “The Bulletin” is a production of Christianity Today Producer: Clarissa Moll Associate Producer: Leslie Thompson Editing and Mix: Kevin Morris Music: Dan Phelps Executive Producers: Erik Petrik and Mike Cosper Senior Producer: Matt Stevens Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Preview: Colleague Anna Borshchevskaya of the Washington Institute explains Putin's global ambition. More later. MOSCOW 1941
GAZA: EGYPTIAN PLAN. DAVID SHANKAR, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE. MALCOLM HOENLEIN @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 1900
After President Trump stated that the US would “take over” Gaza, Egypt has come up with a counter-proposal for reconstruction of the war-ravaged territory that would not displace Gazans into neighbouring countries. Under the plan, revealed this week by The National and set to be presented at an emergency summit in Riyadh on Friday, safe zones would be established while essential services are restored and temporary shelters set up. Other important details include the creation of an independent Palestinian agency that would oversee the enclave. Since Israel's war in Gaza escalated and the extent of the destruction drastically increased, the conversation about what will happen “the day after” has become a contentious issue. Questions over who will govern and administer day-to-day affairs remain unanswered. Another challenge will be defining the roles that Arab states will play in the transitional phase, with regional stability and security remaining a priority. In this episode of Beyond the Headlines, Ghaith Al-Omari and Elizabeth Dent, senior fellows from the Washington Institute, discuss the strengths and challenges of Egypt's proposal, and the relationship that Arab states must navigate as they negotiate with the US.
➡️ If you enjoy this podcast and you want to help to make its existence possible, join our community of geopolitics enthusiasts on PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/DecodingGeopolitics➡️ Sign up to my geopolitics newsletter: https://stationzero.substack.com/Thank you Conducttr for sponsoring the podcast. Take a look at Conducttr's services and its crisis exercise software at: https://www.conducttr.comThis is a conversation with Soner Cagaptay, the director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute and a leading expert on Turkish foreign policy.Turkey is an increasingly influential player in Africa, Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe but at the same time, it's rise and its strategy are hugely overlooked and misunderstood. And so I spoke with Soner about exactly that. About what is Turkey's grand strategy and what is it trying to achieve, how it's becoming a major power in the Middle East, why is it both an enemy and a friend of Russia, why is it even in NATO when it doesn't seem to be aligned on a number of issues with the majority of its members or what's the risk of war between Greece and Turkey - and much more.
Jamie Weinstein is joined Michael Singh, the managing director and Lane-Swig senior fellow at The Washington Institute, to explain how the Trump administration can take on a weakened—but potentially nuclear—Iranian regime. The Agenda: —Preventing a nuclear Iran —Iran's “ring of fire” strategy —Iranian proxies operating abroad —A maximum pressure campaign —Regime change —How to build a nuclear warhead —America's red line —Relations with Russia and China —Is Iran apocalyptic? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
From November 3, 2023: Since Hamas's attack on Israel on Oct. 7, the Israel-Hamas war has largely been fought in Gaza, a small strip of land along the border of the Mediterranean Sea. But farther inland, there has been an uptick in hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians in the Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem says that at least 13 Palestinian herding communities in the West Bank have been forcibly displaced since the beginning of the war due to Israeli settler violence and intimidation, and nearly 100 Palestinians in the territory are reported to have been killed since the war began by both Israeli military strikes as well as settler violence. The fraught relationship between the Israeli government, Israeli settlers, Palestinians, and the Palestinian Authority are not new. But in part because of those existing issues, the West Bank has the potential to expand and complicate the bounds of the Israel-Hamas war—and some may argue that that is already underway. To understand how the West Bank fits into the ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hamas, Lawfare Associate Editor Hyemin Han spoke to Dan Byman from the Center for Strategic & International Studies, who is also Lawfare's Foreign Policy Editor; Ghaith al-Omari of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Scott R. Anderson, Lawfare Senior Editor and Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. They talked about the international law that currently governs the rules of engagement in the West Bank, the political responses of the Israeli government and other Arab states, and how West Bank dynamics will impact the broader outcomes of the Israel-Hamas war. To receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/lawfare-institute.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
To discuss the Israel and Hamas hostage and ceasefire deal that could end the 15-month war in Gaza, Geoff Bennett spoke with David Makovsky of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Hussein Ibish of the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. PBS News is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders
Russia:draw dawn in Syria, not withdrawal. Anna Borshchevskaya, Washington Institute. Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1 1930
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comWhat the hell just happened in Syria? We asked one of the sharpest scholars on the subject to give us a primer. Aaron Zelin is a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he also directs the “Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map” project. He's also a visiting research scholar in the politics department at Brandeis and the founder of the website Jihadology. His first book is titled Your Sons Are At Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad, and his forthcoming book covers the history of Syrian jihadism. We talk about the entire history of Syria, as it faces what could be a turning point. For two clips of our convo — on the evil of the Assad dynasty, and the sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad — pop over to our YouTube page.Other topics: how Aaron's career was influenced by 9/11 at age 15; becoming an expert on jihadism; St. Paul at Damascus; the Ottoman Empire; the Arab Congress; Syria's independence from France after WWII; the subsequent coups; the Sunni majority in Syria; the rise of the Alawites; the Druze and Christians; the Kurds; the optimism in the ‘60s/‘70s for Arab liberalization; pan Arabism and Nasser; the Muslim Brotherhood; Hafez al-Assad coming to power in 1971; his son Bashar educated in the UK; how a former Nazi for real helped shape the regime; al-Qaeda and bin Laden; the Islamic State; “Baby It's Cold Outside”; the secret police of Syria; the 1982 massacre in Hama; Bashar coming to power in 2000 because of his older brother's early death; Bashar seen as nerdy and uncharismatic; the Damascus Spring; the Iraq War; the rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani; his imprisonment in Abu Ghraib; Zarqawi; the Arab Spring; civil war erupting in Syria in 2011; the Free Syrian Army; the Assad regime torturing kids; the refugee crisis; Russia getting bogged down in Ukraine; Hezbollah and Hamas decimated; Iran on the defense; how the Assad regime collapsed in ten days; and Golani's potential as a reformer.Browse the Dishcast archive for an episode you might enjoy (the first 102 are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: Brianna Wu on trans lives, Mary Matalin on our sick culture, Adam Kirsch on his book On Settler Colonialism, John Gray on the state of liberal democracy, Jon Rauch on his new book on “Christianity's Broken Bargain with Democracy,” Nick Denton on the evolution of new media, and Ross Douthat on how everyone should be religious. Please send any guest recs, dissents, and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
From October 19, 2019: It's been a horrible week in northeastern Syria. The U.S. abandoned its Kurdish allies after the president had a conversation by phone with Turkish President Erdogan and pulled the plug on the stabilizing U.S. presence in the region. The Turkish government began a major incursion over the border, which has produced significant casualties and major questions about ISIS detainees in Kurdish custody.To talk through it all, we pulled together quite a group. In the first half of the podcast, Benjamin Wittes spoke with Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Scott R. Anderson and Dan Byman, both of Brookings and Lawfare. In the second half, Ben sat down with Oula A. Alrifai, a fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Leah West, a Lecturer of International Affairs at Carleton University in Canada.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
#SYRIA: Who is Abu Mohammed al Jolani? Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1
GOOD EVENING: The show begins in Ukraine, waiting for negotiations or more predation or both... 1918 Barrage Balloon CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9:00-9:15 Ukraine: Negotiate When? (Part 1) Guest: Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute 9:15-9:30 Ukraine: Negotiate When? (Part 2) Guest: Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute 9:30-9:45 Scala Report: Trade War on the High End Guest: Chris Riegel, CEO, Scala.com, Stratacache 9:45-10:00 Oceania: Western Border Migrants Guest: Cleo Paskal, FDD SECOND HOUR 10:00-10:15 Syria: Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani? Guests: Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents 10:15-10:30 Ceasefire: Why for Hezbollah and Not for Hamas? Guests: Max Boot, Washington Post; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents 10:30-10:45 Syria: Turkey and the HTS Offensive Guests: Sinan Ciddi, FDD; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents 10:45-11:00 Iran: Losing Syria Guests: Mohsen Sazegara; Malcolm Hoenlein, Conference of Presidents THIRD HOUR 11:00-11:15 New World Report: Mexico and the Border Guest: Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 11:15-11:30 New World Report: Can the Border Be Closed? Guest: Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 11:30-11:45 New World Report: Lula de Silva and Nicolas Maduro Guest: Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 11:45-12:00 New World Report: Chile, an Outpost of Liberty Guest: Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute FOURTH HOUR 12:00-12:15 Central Bankers: Suspect Too Independent (Part 1) Guest: John Cochrane, Hoover Institution 12:15-12:30 Central Bankers: Suspect Too Independent (Part 2) Guest: John Cochrane, Hoover Institution 12:30-12:45 Hotel Mars: Dress Rehearsal Soyuz 16 in December 1974 (Part 1) Guests: Anatoly Zak, RussianSpaceWeb.com; David Livingston, SpaceShow.com 12:45-1:00 AM Hotel Mars: Dress Rehearsal Soyuz 16 in December 1974 (Part 2) Guests: Anatoly Zak, RussianSpaceWeb.com; David Livingston, SpaceShow.com
PREVIEW: SYRIA Aaron Zelin, Washington Institute, profiles the "political jihadists" driving on the Assad regime. More tonight. 1898 Damascus
Dr. Matthew Levitt is a subject matter expert on Middle Eastern terrorism and has published extensively on Hezbollah and Hamas. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the Director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and as a counterterrorism intelligence analyst at the FBI. He is the author of Hamas, Negotiating Under Fire, and Hezbollah. He also hosts the Breaking Hezbollah's Golden Rule Podcast. To learn more about Matt, follow him on X @Levitt_Matt SPONSORS CRY HAVOC – A Tom Reece Thriller https://www.officialjackcarr.com/books/targeted-beirut/ Bravo Company Manufacturing: Visit us on the web at BCM Jack Carr MOD 4 pistol grip. Get yours here-https://bravocompanyusa.com/bcm-jack-carr-mod-4-pistol-grip-black/ SIG: Sig Sauer 1911 X. Learn more here-https://www.sigsauer.com/1911- Jack Carr Gear: Explore the gear here - https://jackcarr.co/gear
#IRAQ: Shia militias firing drones and rockets: Dr. Michael Knights is the Jill and Jay Bernstein Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf states. He is a cofounder of the Militia Spotlight platform, which offers in-depth analysis of developments related to Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria. Tigris River
GOOD EVENING: The show begins with the roll-out of the Trump Administration's national security team as reported by Cliff May of FDD... 1955 CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9:00-9:15: POTUS: Trump Administration National Security team roll out. Cliff May, FDD 9:15-9:30: #BRAZIL: Lula da Silva's ambition to be a hegemon. Mary Anastasia O'Grady 9:30-9:45: #PRC: Stock Bubble building at the hands of the CCP. #SCALAREPORT: Chris Riegel, CEO, Scala.com @Stratacache 9:45-10:00: #INDIA: No generalities suit on the polling and voting 2024. Sadanand Dhume, WSJ SECOND HOUR 10:00-10:15: #LEBANON: Hezbollah seeks separate peace. Hussain Abdul-Hussain, Research Fellow at FDD 10:15-10:30: #IRAQ: Shia militias firing drones and rockets. Dr. Michael Knights, Jill and Jay Bernstein Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute 10:30-10:45: #ANTISEMITISM: Dion J. Pierre, Campus Correspondent, The Algemeiner 10:45-11:00: #ISRAEL: ICC attacks; Bernie Sanders fails; EU and UN sanction. Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1 THIRD HOUR 11:00-11:15: #NewWorldReport: APEC, G-20 and Xi 11:15-11:30: #NewWorldReport: Milei and Xi 11:30-11:45: #NewWorldReport: Sheinbaum and Trump 11:45-12:00: #NewWorldReport: US and Maduro All segments with Latin American Research Professor Evan Ellis, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute @revanellis FOURTH HOUR 12:00-12:15: #ICC: Global Lawfare targeting Netanyahu and Gallant. Richard Goldberg, FDD 12:15-12:30: #MRMARKET: FTC vs. Bigness, failing. Veronique de Rugy, Mercatus 12:30-12:45: #RUSSIA: Provocation parade (Part 1). Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute 12:45-1:00 AM: #RUSSIA: Provocation parade (Part 2). Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute
PREVIEW: IRAQ: SAUDI ARABIA: Colleague Michael Knights of the Washington Institute examines the competing Shia gangs that continue to launch drones and missiles into Israel from Iraq and sometimes from Saudi Arabia. More tonight. 1917 Baghdad
GOOD EVENING: The show begin in Ukraine, listening to the hawkish voices in the news from Washington... 1944 CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9:00-9:15 1/2: UKRAINE: TRUMP, ZELENSKY, PUTIN. Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute 9:15-9:30 2/2: UKRAINE: TRUMP, ZELENSKY, PUTIN. Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute 9:30-9:45 #OHIO: #SCALAREPORT: Chris Riegel CEO, SCALA.COM @STRATACACHE. Deep bench of Buckeyes in Columbus and Washington 9:45-10:00 #AMERICAS: "Latino." Mary Anastasia O'Grady, WSJ SECOND HOUR 10:00-10:15 ISRAEL: EXHAUSTED: Seth Frantzman, Senior Correspondent, The Jerusalem Post; Executive Director, Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis 10:15-10:30 IRAN: IAEA TO TEHRAN. Orde Kittrie, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 10:30-10:45 #HOUTHI: NO SOLUTION. Noam Raydan, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 10:45-11:00 ANTISEMITISM EUROPE AND AMERICA. Malcolm Hoenlein @CONF_OF_PRES @MHOENLEIN1 THIRD HOUR 11:00-11:15 #UKRAINE: FOUR PRESIDENTS. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (Retired) @MCCAUSLJ @CBSNEWS @DICKINSONCOL 11:15-11:30 ISRAEL: Iran nuke threat. Colonel Jeff McCausland, USA (Retired) 11:30-11:45 1/2: Iran & What is to be done to end the regime? Behnam Ben Taleblu, FDD 11:45-12:00 2/2: Iran & What is to be done to end the regime? Behnam Ben Taleblu, FDD FOURTH HOUR 12:00-12:15 HOTEL MARS: Hank Alewine, NASA. David Livingston 12:15-12:30 HOTEL MARS: Hank Alewine, NASA. David Livingston, SpaceShow.com 12:30-12:45 MRMARKET: MUSK. Veronique de Rugy 12:45-1:00 #EU: TRADE. Antonia Colibasanu, @GPFUTURES
PREVIEW: YEMEN/HOUTHIS: Conversation with Noam Raydan of the Washington Institute regarding whether or not Iran's resupply of the Houthi arsenal can be severed. More later. 1932 Yemen
For today's episode, Lawfare Senior Editor Scott R. Anderson sat down with Sarah Yerkes, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Sabina Henneberg, the Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Peace, to discuss recent elections in Tunisia, which saw increasingly authoritarian President Kais Saied returned to office with a purported 91% of the vote. They discussed the elections' lack of credibility, how they have been received by U.S. and other foreign officials, and what they say about the trajectory of democracy, both in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Middle East.To receive ad-free podcasts, become a Lawfare Material Supporter at www.patreon.com/lawfare. You can also support Lawfare by making a one-time donation at https://givebutter.com/c/trumptrials.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.