Podcasts about kurdistan regional government

The national census in Iraq is scheduled for November 20, 2024. Dr. Sherko Kirmanj, an academic and researcher, provides his insights on the involvement of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the upcoming census. - Akademîsyon û lêkolîner Dr Şêrko Kurmanc, nêrînên xwe yên ji perspektîfa Kurdî derbarê serjimêriya bêt ya Iraqê ku biryar e di 20 Mijdarê de pêk were, bi me re parevedike.

Naseem Sadiq discusses the Kurdistan Regional Government's initiative to provide a one-off payment to government employees to scale down tensions. Additionally, he addresses the recent severe snowfall that has compounded hardships including fuel shortages, inflation and lack of infrastructure.

Iraq has vowed to take Iran to the UN security council after the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed they had attacked an Israeli “espionage headquarters” in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.We hear from a senior adviser to the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, in Iraq.Also on the programme: We hear fond memories from the brother of the Gaza Strip's women's karate champion who was was injured in an Israeli air raid in December and did not recover from her injuries; and Donald Trump's path to seizing the Republican presidential nomination.(Picture: Funeral of Iraqi businessman and daughter killed in Iranian attack, Erbil, Iraq Credit: Gailan Haji/EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock)

The Aid Market Podcast, hosted by Mike Shanley, explores USAID growth strategies, including bootstrapping, external investment, and mergers & acquisitions (M&A). Guests Keith Ives, CEO of Causal Design, and Santiago Sedaca, President of Empower International Development, share their experiences and insights. Edward Williams,  partner at Williams LLP, joins the conversation to discuss legal considerations in M&A. The discussion concludes with Christy Hollywood, COO of Konektid, who provides a summary of the key takeaways. Throughout the episode, guests share their experiences and insights on regulatory compliance, due diligence, and the importance of relationships in government contracting. The conversation also emphasizes the value of M&A for career opportunities and impactful development work, highlighting the legal and financial considerations involved. Clear communication, cultural fit, and market understanding are highlighted as crucial factors in ensuring successful acquisitions. IN THIS EPISODE: [01:44] Keith Ives reflects on his educational and business background, culminating in his being a founding partner in Causal Design. [06:24] Keith discusses the importance of relationships and attendance at industry events. He also comments on the importance of independent CPA-reviewed financials.  [15:36] When should a firm start sponsoring events?  [18:23] Santiago Sedaca discusses mergers and acquisitions in the USAID market, and he reflects on the acquisition of his company by Palladium.  [25:20] Santiago describes the process of a merger or acquisition and how to prepare for them.  [36:17] Mike asks if localization plays into acquisitions, and Santiago comments on private equity firms buying up small businesses.  [41:46] Keith comments on not being a small business if acquired and doing a test run with contracts. Santiago points out that culture is a factor.  [46:52] Edward Williams describes what happens when a client wants to merge with or acquire another firm and whether there are additional complications if a non-US firm intends to acquire a US firm.   [55:54] Christy Hollywood shares her takeaways from today's conversation.    KEY TAKEAWAYS:  Building strong relationships with prime contractors and key players in the industry is crucial for success in the USAID market. Attending industry events and networking can open doors and create opportunities for collaboration. In USAID contracting and international development, successful mergers hinge on factors like net income, reputation, and strong market relationships. Cultural fit is vital, and post-acquisition success requires careful integration planning. The sector's low net income margins and minimal involvement of investments or private equity present unique challenges in M&A activities. The importance of understanding the "why" behind mergers and acquisitions, as it can be a mission-driven decision, not just a financial one. This understanding can provide opportunities for career advancement and better development work.   RESOURCES: Aid Market Podcast Mike Shanley - LinkedIn Causal Design - Website Keith Ives - LinkedIn Santiago Sedaca - LinkedIn Williams LLP - Website Edward Williams - LinkedIn Konektid - Website Christy Hollywood - LinkedIn   BIOGRAPHIES Santiago Sedaca Executive experience in thriving organizations (CARANA, Palladium, DT Global, Wise Responder) leading strategy, developing top performing teams, and managing large technical, business development and operations teams (1000+ people), producing market-leading financial results and social impact (managed $100 million+ P&L). Expert innovator in international development and commercial strategies in emerging markets, working across a range of disciplines with a strong track record in public-private partnerships, sustainability, innovative finance, private sector development, improved governance and natural resource management. Business Development track record, selling more than $700 million in new projects in the last ten years, with networks within USAID, FCDO, DFAT, MCC, DFC, multilateral agencies, and corporations, having worked in more than forty countries. Edward Williams is a powerful and efficient advocate for his clients. Since 2015, Super Lawyer has rated him a Rising Star in the area of commercial litigation.An experienced attorney with a long history of success in trial practice and transactional matters, T. Edward Williams is a skilled business attorney who have litigated cases involving in variety of business litigation cases, including partnership and shareholder disputes, employment law, uniform commercial code law, oil and gas law, and securities law. Edward is also skilled in bankruptcy and international arbitration matters.Edward has represented American and foreign companies in matters involving the Defend Trade Secrets Act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, among others. Keith Ives is a project and policy leader passionate about evidence-based decision-making in development economics and humanitarian response. Before bringing the Causal Design team together, he consulted for The World Bank and worked for Georgetown University's Initiative on Innovation, Development, and Evaluation (gui2de) designing mobile phone-based surveys and managing randomized trials in Kenya and Nigeria. Keith has designed evaluations for the Liberian and Rwandan Ministries of Agriculture, executed a growth diagnostic for the Kurdistan Regional Government, coordinated humanitarian responses in Haiti, Nigeria, and the United States, managed economic development projects in Kenya and Burkina Faso, and led Marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Christy Hollywood supports Konektid clients and consultants with skills honed during 20+ years of leadership in international development, professional services, and consulting organizations. She led a successful consulting firm of her own for 11 years. Earlier, she served as Vice President for BD of Cardno (a large USAID and MCC contractor, since acquired) and held pivotal business development roles at KPMG's Emerging Markets Group, RTI International, PATH, as well as Fidelity Investments and Noblis. A recognized expert in business development consulting, she's authored several articles and is five-time invited presenter at international conferences on proposal management, competitive intelligence, and business development.  

A united Ireland is among the most contentious issues in Irish and Northern Irish politics. At times during the past century, the idea united Ireland has seemed impossible or been dismissed as romantic but unrealistic. However, in recent years, the outcome of the Brexit referendum, changing demographics in Northern Ireland, and the electoral success of nationalism in Northern Ireland's most recent elections have reinvigorated the debate around Irish unity, and whether, how, and when it should happen. In his most recent book, Making Sense of a United Ireland, Professor Brendan O'Leary, a global expert on the politics of divided places, explains how unification could happen, sets out potential models of a united Ireland, and analyses the economics and politics of Irish unity. In this keynote address to the IIEA, Professor O'Leary addresses questions of preparation and strategy in the light of public opinion North and South. About the Speaker: Brendan O'Leary is the Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Queen's University, Belfast. He is the author, co-author, and co-editor of thirty books and collections, and he has written extensively on the Northern Ireland conflict. Professor O'Leary also is a founding member of ARINS (Analysing and Researching Ireland North and South) programme at the Royal Irish Academy. Professor O'Leary's three-volume study, A Treatise on Northern Ireland, received the James S. Donnelly Sr. best book prize of the American Conference on Irish Studies in 2020, and he is the inaugural winner of the Juan Linz prize of the International Political Science Association for contributions to the study of multinational societies, federalism and powersharing. Professor O'Leary has also been a political and constitutional advisor to the United Nations, the European Union, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, the Governments of the UK and Ireland, and to the British.

The Kurdistan in America podcast is proud to present an interview with  two distinguished guests in the fourth episode of Season Four. We are honored to have on our show Minister Mohammad Shukri, Chairman of the Kurdistan Board of Investment, and Ms. Carez Dargallay, Head of the Board's Foreign Direct Investment Unit. Through our discussion, we hope to gain a deeper understanding of Kurdistan's economic potential and the efforts being made to attract investment to the region, including from the United States.In this episode, we delve into Kurdistan's economic prospects and the openings available to foreign investors. Dr. Mohammad Shukri shares his insights on the Board of Investment's objectives and how they align with Prime Minister Masrour Barzani's economic reform strategy, the Board's efforts to attract foreign investment and the Kurdistan Regional Government's priority sectors. Ms. Dargallay joins us to discuss how her unit promotes foreign investment in Kurdistan and offers her advice to international companies considering investing in the region. Join us for this informative episode as we explore the economic landscape of Kurdistan and the Board of Investment's role in driving economic growth and development.

The idea of digital records is a fundamental cornerstone for well established, developed democracies all around the world. It's easy to take digitalization for granted. But the struggle to implement a digital system for areas such as migration, education and health is Deputy Minster Hiwa Afandi's task in the Kurdistan Regional Government. We discuss some these struggles, as well as digitalization's role in combating corruption oil and real estate sectors, and the growing topic of AI in the public sector.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

With anti-advocacy legislation still in play in the Kurdistan Regional Government's Parliament, the situation for the queer community in Iraq and Kurdistan is more uncertain than it has been in decades. In this first of two episodes with guest Kween B, we explore the complicated nature of gender and politics in the region, as well as the issues the transgender community in Iraq and Kurdistan face specifically. This episode focuses on Kween's life, growing up and navigating her own identity as she figured out who she is today.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Since 2014, when ISIS launched its genocidal campaign against the Yazidis—a minority ethno-religious group within the Kurdish-majority areas of Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, as well as in Armenia–hundreds of thousands of Yazidis have been displaced from their native home in the Sinjar region of Iraq.The U.S. government remains deeply invested in helping stabilize the Sinjar region and making it a viable home again for the displaced Yazidis. As USCIRF has consistently reported, Sinjar is not yet a hospitable environment for the Yazidi people. The United States and wider international community have a role to play in encouraging all stakeholders—including Yazidis and authorities in both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi federal government—to help this vulnerable religious minority to safely return to Sinjar.Co-Founder and Managing Director of The Zovighian Partnership, Lynn Zovighian, joins us today to discuss the challenges the Yazidi community and the Sinjar region continue to face as new stages of the genocide unfold.With Contributions from:Susan Bishai, Policy Analyst, USCIRFVeronica McCarthy, Public Affairs Associate, USCIRF

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. **Tai-Ex opening ** The Tai-Ex opened up 84-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 13,550 on turnover of 3.2-billion N-T. The Tai-Ex joined other regional markets and lost ground on Wednesday, following a wobbly session on Wall Street overnight, as markets churned over the prospect of a possible recession. **US Speaks Up for Taiwan's Participation at ICAO Assembly ** The U-S Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg is calling for Taiwan's inclusion (包括、加入) in the International Civil Aviation Organization on the opening day of the agency's assembly in Montreal, According to Buttigieg, the U-S believes "all of international civil aviation's most important stakeholders, particularly those who would administer critical aerospace, like Taiwan, should have the opportunity to participate meaningfully. Germany's Ministry for Digital and Transport, Stefan Schnorr, also called on the global aviation body to include all parties involved - saying it should "include those that are not members." However, he did not mention Taiwan by name. Civil Aeronautics Administration Director-General Lin Jun-liang is heading a delegation to Montreal this week, to promote Taiwan's inclusion in the International Civil Aviation Organization. **Inbound Visitors can Travel if Tour Group Members Contract Coronavirus ** The Central Epidemic Command Center says members of inbound tour groups will be allowed to continue traveling in Taiwan, even if other members of their group test positive for the coronavirus during their trip. However, they will need to take a rapid test and obtain (獲得) a negative result every two days. The statement comes as the ban on inbound and outbound tour groups as well as for mandatory quarantine for arriving visitors is set to be lifted as part of a new "0+7" policy on October 13. The "0+7" policy will replace the current "3+4" policy - but all arrivals must observe seven days of self-conducted epidemic prevention measures, and will be allowed to outside if a test taken within the past two days returned a negative result. **Iran Drone Bombing Leaves Dead and Wounded ** An Iranian drone bombing campaign targeting the bases of an Iranian-Kurdish opposition group in northern Iraq has killed at least nine people and wounded 32 others. The Kurdish Regional Government's Health Ministry said the strikes Wednesday came as demonstrations continued to engulf (吞噬) the Islamic Republic after the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian Kurdish woman who was detained by the Iranian morality police. Local officials say Iran's attacks targeted Koya, some 65 kilometers east of Irbil. Iraq's Foreign Ministry and the Kurdistan Regional Government have condemned the strikes. Hurricane Ian Makes Landfall in Florida Florida's governor Ron De Santis is warning that "nasty" days are ahead as Hurricane Ian makes landfall in the US state. Forecasters said cities at the heart of the storm were facing extremely (極其) dangerous winds and rains, as officials warned it was too late to evacuate in some places. Our US correspondent Kate Fisher reports That was the I.C.R.T. news, Check in again tomorrow for our simplified version of the news, uploaded every day in the afternoon. Enjoy the rest of your day, I'm _____.

The Minister of Transport and Communications in Kurdistan Regional Government; Mr Ano Jawhar Abdoka spoke to Naseem Sadiq about internet safety control in the Kurdistan region.

On June 10, the United Nations Investigation Team for Accountability for Crimes Committed by ISIS met at United Nations Headquarters in New York to discuss the atrocities and massacres of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. KRG's Coordinator for International Advocacy Dr Dindar Zebari attended the meeting too. More on this subject in Ahmad Ghafur's report from Erbil. - ** Di 10î Hezîranê de tîmê Neteweyên Yekgirtî bo vekolîna tawanên DAIŞê (UNITAD) bi hevkarî li gel nûnerê hertimî yê Iraqê li baregeha Netewên Yekgirtî li New Yorkê civînek derbarê tawanên DAIŞ û kuştinên komî li Iraq û Sûriyê lidar xist. Nûnerê HHK Dr Dîndar Zêbarî jî di civînê beşdar bû. Zêdetir derbarê vê babetê di raporta Ehmed Xefûr ji Hewlêrê de heye.

Taxi drivers are urging the Kurdistan Regional Government to reduce the cost of fuel. More on this topic can be found in Ahmad Ghaur's report from Erbil.  - Şofêrên taksiyan daxwazê ji hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê dikin ku  kêmkirin di nirxê sotemeniyê û hin benzînxaneyên ku bi bihayekî kêmtir xizmeta şofêrên taksiyan bikin daxwaz dikin. Zêdetir derbarê vê mijarê di raporta Ehmend Xefûr ji Hewlêrê de heye.  

The Kurdistan in America podcast is honored to have Ms. Ashti Waissi as its guest this month.Ms. Waissi is Legislative Assistant at the Canadian Parliament and a former staff assistant to the Co-Founder of the Parliamentary Friends of the Kurds Group, Mr. Tom Kmiec, MP for Calgary Shepard. She has a dual degree in Political Science and Sociology.  Ms. Waissi's family is from Iranian Kurdistan, but she was born in a refugee camp in Iraq. She tells us her experience living in the camp and the challenges of integrating into Canadian society. She also shares some new and surprising information on the Kurdish diaspora in Canada.

President of the Independent Human Rights Commission in the Kurdistan Regional Government, Dr Muna Yaku, talks to SBS Assyrian about what she claims is a violation of human rights and religious freedom in Iraqi and Kurdistan law. 

Iraq's Supreme Court struck down the legal justifications for Kurdistan Region's oil policy, effectively calling into question the future of the region's oil contracts, exports and revenues. More regarding this topic in Ahmad Ghafur's report from Erbil.  - Dadgeha Bilind ya Iraqê hincetên qanûnî yên siyaseta niftê ya Herêma Kurdistanê hilda û bi awayekî dikaribû siberoja girêbestên neftê, hinardekirin û dahata Herêmê xiste ber pirsê. Zêdetir di raporta Ehmed Xefûr ji Hewlêrê de heye.

The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq has sealed a critical border crossing to the US protected and Kurdish governed zone in northeast Syria over a violent clash between a Syrian Kurdish youth organization and Iraqi Kurdish border forces. The closure has interrupted the flow of aid to the region as northeast Syria grapples with the effects of US sanctions against the Syrian regime, and of the COVID 19 pandemic not mention its worst drought in decadesAnalyst Hiwa Osman explains what is at stake.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

The Kurdistan Regional Government delivers a message following New Years celebrations in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. - Deselatî Başûrî Kurdistan peyamêkyan rrageyand le ser yadkirdinî salî nwê.

Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at CFR, leads a conversation on geopolitics in the Middle East.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you want to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's topic is geopolitics in the Middle East. Our speaker was supposed to be Sanam Vakil, but she had a family emergency. So we're delighted to have our very own Steven Cook here to discuss this important topic. Dr. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of several books, including False Dawn; The Struggle for Egypt, which won the 2012 Gold Medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling But Not Governing. And he's working on yet another book entitled The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. So keep an eye out for that in the next year or so. He's a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and contributor and commentator on a bunch of other outlets. Prior to coming to CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. So, Dr. Cook, thank you for being with us. I thought you could just—I'm going to give you a soft question here, to talk about the geopolitical relations among state and nonstate actors in the Middle East. And you can take that in whatever direction you would like. COOK: Well, thanks so much, Irina. It's a great pleasure to be with you. Good afternoon to everybody who's out there who's on an afternoon time zone, good morning to those who may still be in the evening, and good evening to those who may be somewhere where it's the evening. It's very nice to be with you. As Irina mentioned, and as I'm sure it's plenty evident, I am not Sanam Vakil, but I'm happy to step in for her and offer my thoughts on the geopolitics of the Middle East. It's a small topic. That question that Irina asked was something that I certainly could handle effectively in fifteen to twenty minutes. But before I get into the details of what's going on in the region, I thought I would offer some just general comments about the United States in the Middle East. Because, as it turns out, I had the opportunity last night to join a very small group of analysts with a very senior U.S. government official to talk precisely about the United States in the Middle East. And it was a very, very interesting conversation, because despite the fact that there has been numerous news reporting and analytic pieces about how the United States is deemphasizing the Middle East, this official made it very, very clear that that was practically impossible at this time. And this was, I think, a reasonable position to take. There has been a lot recently, in the last recent years, about withdrawing from the region, from retrenchment from the region, reducing from the region, realignment from the region. All those things actually mean different things. But analysts have essentially used them to mean that the United States should deprioritize the Middle East. And it seems to me that the problem in the Middle East has not necessarily been the fact that we are there and that we have goals there. It's that the goals in the region and the resources Washington uses to achieve those goals need to be realigned to address things that are actually important to the United States. In one sense that sound eminently reasonable. We have goals, we have resources to meet those goals, and we should devote them to—and if we can't, we should reassess what our goals are or go out and find new resources. That sounds eminently reasonable. But that's not the way Washington has worked over the course of the last few decades when it comes to the Middle East. In many ways, the United States has been overly ambitious. And it has led to a number of significant failures in the region. In an era when everything and anything is a vital interest, then nothing really is. And this seems to be the source of our trouble. For example, when we get into trying to fix the politics of other countries, we're headed down the wrong road. And I don't think that there's been enough real debate in Washington or, quite frankly, in the country about what's important in the Middle East, and why we're there, and what we're trying to achieve in the Middle East. In part, this new book that I'm writing called the End of Ambition, which, as Irina pointed out, will be out hopefully in either late 2022 or early 2023, tries to answer some of these questions. There is a way for the United States to be constructive in the Middle East, but what we've done over the course of the last twenty years has made that task much, much harder. And it leads us, in part, to this kind of geostrategic picture or puzzle that I'm about to lay out for you. So let me get into some of the details. And I'm obviously not going to take you from Morocco all the way to Iran, although I could if I had much, much more time because there's a lot going on in a lot of places. But not all of those places are of critical importance to the United States. So I'll start and I'll pick and choose from that very, very large piece of geography. First point: There have been some efforts to deescalate in a region that was in the middle of or on the verge of multiple conflicts. There has been a dialogue between the Saudis and the Iranians, under the auspices of the Iraqis, of all people. According to the Saudis this hasn't yielded very much, but they are continuing the conversation. One of the ways to assess the success or failure of a meeting is the fact that there's going to be another meeting. And there are going to be other meetings between senior Iranian and Saudi officials. I think that that's good. Egyptians and Turks are talking. Some of you who don't follow these issues as closely may not remember that Turkey and Egypt came close to trading blows over Libya last summer. And they pulled back as a result of concerted diplomacy on the part of the European Union, as well as the Egyptian ability to actually surge a lot of force to its western border. Those two countries are also talking, in part under the auspices of the Iraqis. Emiratis and Iranians are talking. That channel opened up in 2019 after the Iranians attacked a very significant—two very significant oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, sort of scaring the Emiratis, especially since the Trump administration did not respond in ways that the Emiratis or the Saudis had been expecting. The Qataris and the Egyptians have repaired their relations. The Arab world, for better or for worse, is moving to reintegrate Syria into is ranks. Not long after King Abdullah of Jordan was in the United States, he and Bashar al-Assad shared a phone call to talk about the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria and to talk about, among other things, tourism to the two countries. The hope is that this de-escalation, or hope for de-escalation coming from this dialogue, will have a salutary effect on conflicts in Yemen, in Syria, in Libya, and Iraq. Thus far, it hasn't in Yemen, in particular. It hasn't in Syria. But in Libya and Iraq, there have been some improvements to the situation. All of this remains quite fragile. These talks can be—can break off at any time under any circumstances. Broader-scale violence can return to Libya at any time. And the Iraqi government still doesn't control its own territory. Its sovereignty is compromised, not just by Iran but also by Turkey. But the fact that a region that was wound so tight and that seemed poised to even deepen existing conflicts and new ones to break out, for all of these different parties to be talking—some at the behest of the United States, some entirely of their own volition—is, I think, a relatively positive sign. You can't find anyone who's more—let's put it this way, who's darker about developments in the Middle East than me. And I see some positive signs coming from this dialogue. Iran, the second big issue on the agenda. Just a few hours ago, the Iranians indicated that they're ready to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. This is sort of a typical Iranian negotiating tactic, to push issues to the brink and then to pull back and demonstrate some pragmatism so that people will thank for them for their pragmatism. This agreement to go back to the negotiating table keeps them on decent terms with the Europeans. It builds on goodwill that they have developed as a result of their talks with Saudi Arabia. And it puts Israel somewhat on the defensive, or at least in an awkward position with the Biden administration, which has very much wanted to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. What comes out of these negotiations is extremely hard to predict. This is a new government in Iran. It is certainly a harder line than its predecessor. Some analysts believe that precisely because it is a hardline government it can do the negotiation. But we'll just have to see. All the while this has been going on, the Iranians have been proceeding with their nuclear development, and Israel is continuing its shadow campaign against the Iranians in Syria, sometimes in Iraq, in Iran itself. Although, there's no definitive proof, yesterday Iranian gas stations, of all things, were taken offline. There's some suspicion that this was the Israelis showing the Iranians just how far and deep they are into Iranian computer systems. It remains unclear how the Iranians will retaliate. Previously they have directed their efforts to Israeli-linked shipping in and around the Gulf of Oman. Its conventional responses up until this point have been largely ineffective. The Israelis have been carrying on a fairly sophisticated air campaign against the Iranians in Syria, and the Iranians have not been able to mount any kind of effective response. Of course, this is all against the backdrop of the fact that the Iranians do have the ability to hold much of the Israeli population hostage via Hezbollah and its thousands of rockets and missiles. So you can see how this is quite worrying, and an ongoing concern for everybody in the region, as the Israelis and Iranians take part in this confrontation. Let me just continue along the line of the Israelis for a moment and talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict, something that has not been high on the agenda of the Biden administration, it hasn't been high on the agenda of many countries in the region. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, there have been some significant developments. The normalization as a result of the Abraham Accords continues apace. Recently in the Emirates there was a meeting of ministers from Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan. This is the first kind of face-to-face meeting of government officials from all of these countries. Now, certainly the Israelis and the Emiratis have been meeting quite regularly, and the Israelis and the Bahrainis have been meeting quite regularly. But these were broader meetings of Cabinet officials from all of the Abraham Accords countries coming together in the United Arab Emirates for talks. Rather extraordinary. Something that thirteen months—in August 2020 was unimaginable, and today is something that doesn't really make—it doesn't really make the headlines. The Saudis are actually supportive of the normalization process, but they're not yet willing to take that step. And they're not willing to take that step because of the Palestinian issue. And it remains a sticking point. On that issue, there was a lot of discussion after the formation of a new Israeli government last June under the leadership, first, of Naftali Bennett, who will then hand the prime ministership over to his partner, Yair Lapid, who are from different parties. That this was an Israeli government that could do some good when it comes to the Palestinian arena, that it was pragmatic, that it would do things that would improve the lives of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, and seek greater cooperation with both the United States and the Palestinian authority toward that end. And that may in fact turn out to be the case. This government has taken a number of steps in that direction, including family reunification, so that if a Palestinian on the West Bank who is married to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the Palestinian in the West Bank can live with the family in Israel. And a number of other things. But it should also be clear to everybody that despite a kind of change in tone from the Israeli prime ministry, there's not that much of a change in terms of policy. In fact, in many ways Prime Minister Bennett is to the right of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. And Yair Lapid, who comes from a centrist party, is really only centrist in terms of Israeli politics. He is—in any other circumstances would be a kind of right of center politician. And I'll just point out that in recent days the Israeli government has declared six Palestinian NGOs—long-time NGOs—terrorist organizations, approved three thousand new housing units in the West Bank, and worked very, very hard to prevent the United States from opening a consulate in East Jerusalem to serve the Palestinians. That consulate had been there for many, many, many years. And it was closed under the Trump administration when the U.S. Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration would like to reopen that consulate. And the Israeli government is adamantly opposed. In the end, undoubtably Arab governments are coming to terms with Israel, even beyond the Abraham Accords countries. Egypt's flag carrier, Egyptair, announced flights to Tel Aviv. This is the first time since 1979. You could—you could fly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, something that I've done many, many times. If you were in Egypt, you'd have to go and find an office that would sell you a ticket to something called Air Sinai, that did not have regular flights. Only had flights vaguely whenever, sometimes. It was an Egyptair plane, stripped of its livery, staffed by Egyptair pilots and staff, stripped of anything that said Egyptair. Now, suddenly Egyptair is flying direct flights to Tel Aviv. And El-Al, Israel's national airline, and possibly one other, will be flying directly to Cairo. And there is—and that there is talk of economic cooperation. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm al-Sheikh not long ago. That was the first meeting of Israeli leaders—first public meeting of Israeli leaders and Egyptian leaders in ten years. So there does seem to be an openness on the part of Arab governments to Israel. As far as populations in these countries, they don't yet seem to be ready for normalization, although there has been some traffic between Israel and the UAE, with Emiratis coming to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and so on and so forth. But there are very, very few Emiratis. And there are a lot of Egyptians. So as positive as that all is, this is—this has not been a kind of broad acceptance among the population in the Arab world for Israel's legitimate existence. And the kind of issue du jour, great-power competition. This is on everybody's lips in Washington, D.C.—great-power competition, great-power competition. And certainly, the Middle East is likely to be an arena of great-power competition. It has always been an arena of great-power competition. For the first time in more than two decades, the United States has competitors in the region. And let me start with Russia, because there's been so much discussion of China, but Russia is the one that has been actively engaged militarily in the region in a number of places. Vladimir Putin has parlayed his rescue of Hafez al-Assad into influence in the region, in an arc that stretches from NATO ally Turkey, all the way down through the Levant and through Damascus, then even stretching to Jerusalem where Israeli governments and the Russian government have cooperated and coordinated in Syria, into Cairo, and then into at least the eastern portion of Libya, where the Russians have supported a Qaddafist general named Khalifa Haftar, who used to be an employee of the CIA, in his bid for power in Libya. And he has done so by providing weaponry to Haftar, as well as mercenaries to fight and support him. That episode may very well be over, although there's every reason to believe that Haftar is trying to rearm himself and carry on the conflict should the process—should the political process in Libya break down. Russia has sold more weapons to Egypt in the last few years than at any other time since the early 1970s. They have a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. It's not clear what that actually means, but that defense agreement was signed not that long after the United States' rather chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which clearly unnerved governments in the Middle East. So Russia is active, it's influential, its militarily engaged, and it is seeking to advance its interests throughout the region. I'll point out that its presence in North Africa is not necessarily so much about North Africa, but it's also about Europe. Its bid in Libya is important because its ally controls the eastern portion of Libya, where most of Libya's light, sweet crude oil is located. And that is the largest—the most significant reserves of oil in all of Africa. So it's important as an energy play for the Russians to control parts of North Africa, and right on Russia's—right on Europe's front doorstep. China. China's the largest investor and single largest trading partner with most of the region. And it's not just energy related. We know how dependent China is on oil from the Gulf, but it's made big investments in Algeria, in Egypt, the UAE, and in Iran. The agreement with Iran, a twenty-five-year agreement, coming at a time when the Iranians were under significant pressure from the United States, was regarded by many in Washington as an effort on the part of the Chinese to undercut the United States, and undercut U.S. policy in the region. I think it was, in part, that. I think it was also in part the fact that China is dependent in part on Iranian oil and did not want the regime there to collapse, posing a potential energy crisis for China and the rest of the world. It seems clear to me, at least, that the Chinese do not want to supplant the United States in the region. I don't think they look at the region in that way. And if they did, they probably learned the lesson of the United States of the last twenty-five years, which has gotten itself wrapped around the axle on a variety of issues that were unnecessary and sapped the power of the United States. So they don't want to get more deeply involved in the region. They don't want to take sides in conflicts. They don't want to take sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't take sides in the conflict between the United States and Iran, or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They want to benefit from the region, whether through investment or through extraction, and the security umbrella that the United States provides in the region. I'm not necessarily so sure that that security umbrella needs to be so expensive and so extensive for the United States to achieve its goals. But nevertheless, and for the time being at least, we will be providing that security umbrella in the region, from which the Chinese will benefit. I think, just to close on this issue of great-power competition. And because of time, I'm leaving out another big player, or emerging player in the region, which is India. I'm happy to talk about that in Q&A. But my last point is that, going back to the United States, countries in the region and leaders in the region are predisposed towards the United States. The problem is, is that they are very well-aware of the political polarization in this country. They're very well-aware of the political dysfunction in this country. They're very well-aware of the incompetence that came with the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, or any number of disasters that have unfolded here in the United States. And it doesn't look, from where they sit in Abu Dhabi, in Cairo, in Riyadh, and in other places, that the United States has staying power, the will to lead, and the interest in remaining in the Middle East. And thus, they have turned to alternatives. Those alternatives are not the same as the United States, but they do provide something. I mean, particularly when it comes to the Chinese it is investment, it's economic advantages, without the kind of trouble that comes with the United States. Trouble from the perspective of leaders, so that they don't have to worry about human rights when they deal with the Chinese, because the Chinese aren't interested in human rights. But nevertheless, they remain disclosed toward the United States and want to work with the United States. They just don't know whether we're going to be there over the long term, given what is going on in the United States. I'll stop there. And I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Steven, that was fantastic. Thank you very much. We're going to now to all of you for your questions. So the first raised hand comes from Jonas Truneh. And I don't think I pronounced that correctly, so you can correct me. Q: Yeah, no, that's right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Cook, for your talk. I'm from UCL, University College London, in London. COOK: So it is—(off mic). Q: Indeed, it is. Yeah. That's right. COOK: Great. Q: So you touched on it there somewhat particularly with great-power competition, but so my question is related to the current energy logic in the Middle East. The Obama administration perhaps thought that the shale revolution allowed a de-prioritization, if I'm allowed to use that word, of the Middle East. And that was partly related to the pivot to Asia. So essentially does the U.S. still regard itself as the primary guarantor of energy security in the Persian Gulf? And if so, would the greatest beneficiary, as I think you indicated, would that not be China? And is that a case of perverse incentives? Is there much the U.S. can do about it? COOK: Well, it depends on who you ask, right? And it's a great question. I think that the—one of the things that—one of the ways in which the Obama administration sought to deprioritize and leave the region was through the shale revolution. I mean, the one piece of advice that he did take from one of his opponents in 2002—2008, which was to drill, baby, drill. And the United States did. I would not say that this is something that is specific to the Obama administration. If you go back to speeches of presidents way back—but I won't even go that far back. I'll go to George W. Bush in 2005 State of the Union addressed, talked all about energy independence from the Middle East. This may not actually be in much less the foreseeable future, but in really—in a longer-term perspective, it may be harder to do. But it is politically appealing. The reason why I say it depends on who you ask, I think that there are officials in the United States who say: Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed. But when the Iranians attacked those two oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, that temporarily took off 50 percent of supply off the markets—good thing the Saudis have a lot stored away—the United States didn't really respond. The president of the United States said: I'm waiting for a call from Riyadh. That forty years of stated American policy was, like, it did not exist. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine suddenly didn't exist. And the entirety of the American foreign policy community shrugged their shoulders and said: We're not going to war on behalf of MBS. I don't think we would have been going to war on behalf of MBS. We would have been ensuring the free flow of energy supplies out of the region, which is something that we have been committed to doing since President Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, and then President Reagan added his corollary to it. I think that there are a number of quite perverse incentives associated with this. And I think that you're right. The question is whether the competition from China outweighs our—I'm talking about “our”—the United States' compelling interest in a healthy global economy. And to the extent that our partners in Asia, whether it's India, South Korea, Japan, and our important trading partner in China, are dependent upon energy resources from the Gulf, and we don't trust anybody to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, it's going to be on us to do it. So we are kind of hammered between that desire to have a healthy global economy as being—and being very wary of the Chinese. And the Chinese, I think, are abundantly aware of it, and have sought to take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, which got an up-vote, from Charles Ammon, who is at Pennsylvania State University. And I think this goes to what you were building on with the great-power competition: What interests does India have in the Middle East? And how is it increasing its involvement in the region? COOK: So India is—imports 60 percent of its oil from the region. Fully 20 percent of it from Saudi Arabia, another 20 percent of it from Iran, and then the other 20 percent from other sources. So that's one thing. That's one reason why India is interested in the Middle East. Second, there are millions and millions of Indians who work in the Middle East. The Gulf region is a region that basically could not run without South Asian expatriate labor, most of which comes from India—on everything. Third, India has made considerable headway with countries like the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, in counterextremism cooperation. This has come at the expense of Pakistan, but as relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and relations between Pakistan and the UAE soured in recent years, the Indians have been able to take advantage of that. And Indian leaders have hammered away at the common interest that India and leaders in the region have in terms of countering violent extremism. And then finally, India and Israel have quite an extraordinary relationship, both in the tech field as well as in the defense area. Israel is a supplier to India. And the two of them are part of a kind of global network of high-tech powerhouse that have either, you know, a wealth of startups or very significant investment from the major tech players in the world. Israel—Microsoft just announced a huge expansion in Israel. And Israeli engineers and Indian engineers collaborate on a variety of projects for these big tech companies. So there's a kind of multifaceted Indian interest in the region, and the region's interest in India. What India lacks that the Chinese have is a lot more capacity. They don't have the kind of wherewithal to bring investment and trade in the region in the other direction. But nevertheless, it's a much more important player than it was in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: How do you envision the future of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia politics for the next thirty years? Ethiopia controls the Nile dam projects. And could this dispute lead to a war? And what is the progress with the U.S. in mediating the talks between the three countries? COOK: Thank you. FASKIANOS: And that is coming from the King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. COOK: Fabulous. So that's more than the evening. It's actually nighttime there. I think that the question of the great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is really an important one, and it's something that has not gotten as much attention as it should. And for those of you who are not familiar, in short the Ethiopians have been building a massive dam on the Blue Nile, which is a tributary to the Nile. And that if—when competed, threatens the water supply to Egypt, a country of 110 million people that doesn't get a lot of rainfall. Ethiopia, of course, wants to dam the Nile in order to produce hydroelectric power for its own development, something that Egypt did when it dammed the Nile River to build the Aswan High Dam, and crated Lake Nasser behind it. The Egyptians are very, very concerned. This is an existential issue for them. And there have been on and off negotiations, but the negotiations aren't really about the issues. They're talks about talks about talks. And they haven't gotten—they haven't gotten very far. Now, the Egyptians have been supported by the Sudanese government, after the Sudanese government had been somewhat aligned with the Ethiopian government. The Trump administration put itself squarely behind the Egyptian government, but Ethiopia's also an important partner of the United States in the Horn of Africa. The Egyptians have gone about signing defense cooperation agreements with a variety of countries around Ethiopia's borders. And of course, Ethiopia is engaged in essentially what's a civil war. This is a very, very difficult and complicated situation. Thus far, there doesn't seem to be an easy solution the problem. Now, here's the rub, if you talk to engineers, if you talk to people who study water, if you talk to people who know about dams and the flow of water, the resolution to the problem is actually not that hard to get to. The problem is that the politics and nationalism have been engaged on both sides of the issue, making it much, much more difficult to negotiate an equitable solution to the problem. The Egyptians have said in the past that they don't really have an intention of using force, despite the fact of this being an existential issue. But there's been somewhat of a shift in their language on the issue. Which recently they've said if red lines were crossed, they may be forced to intervene. Intervene how? What are those red lines? They haven't been willing to define them, which should make everybody nervous. The good news is that Biden administration has appointed an envoy to deal with issues in the Horn of Africa, who has been working very hard to try to resolve the conflict. I think the problem here however is that Ethiopia, now distracted by a conflict in the Tigray region, nationalism is running high there, has been—I don't want to use the word impervious—but not as interested in finding a negotiated solution to the problem than it might have otherwise been in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Bob Pauly, who's a professor of international development at the University of Southern Mississippi. It got three up-votes. What would you identify as the most significant likely short and longer-term effects of Turkey's present domestic economic and political challenges on President Erdogan's strategy and policy approaches to the Middle East, and why? COOK: Oh, well, that is a very, very long answer to a very, very interesting question. Let's see what happens in 2023. President Erdogan is facing reelection. His goal all along has been to reelected on the one hundredth anniversary of the republic, and to demonstrate how much he has transformed Turkey in the image of the Justice and Development Party, and moved it away from the institutions of the republic. Erdogan may not make it to 2023. I don't want to pedal in conspiracy theories or anything like that, but he doesn't look well. There are large numbers of videos that have surfaced of him having difficulties, including one famous one from this past summer when he was offering a Ramadan greeting on Turkish television to supporters of the Justice and Development Party, and he seemed to fade out and slur his words. This is coupled with reports trickling out of Ankara about the lengths to which the inner circle has gone to shield real health concerns about Erdogan from the public. It's hard to really diagnose someone from more than six thousand miles away, but I think it's a scenario that policymakers in Washington need to think seriously about. What happens if Erdogan is incapacitated or dies before 2023? That's one piece. The second piece is, well, what if he makes it and he's reelected? And I think in any reasonable observer sitting around at the end of 2021 looking forward to 2023 would say two things: One, you really can't predict Turkish politics this far out, but if Turkish elections were held today and they were free and fair, the Justice and Development Party would get below 30 percent. Still more than everybody else. And Erdogan would have a real fight on his hands to get reelected, which he probably would be. His approaches to his domestic challenges and his approaches to the region are really based on what his current political calculations are at any given moment. So his needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean was a function of the fact that he needed to shore up his nationalist base. Now that he finds himself quite isolated in the world, the Turks have made overtures to Israel, to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia. They're virtually chasing the Egyptians around the Eastern Mediterranean to repair their relationship. Because without repairing these relationships the kind of investment that is necessary to try to help revive the Turkish economy—which has been on the skids for a number of years—is going to be—is going to be more difficult. There's also another piece of this, which is the Middle East is a rather lucrative arms market. And during the AKP era, the Turks have had a significant amount of success further developing their defense industrial base, to the point that now their drones are coveted. Now one of the reasons for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is that the United States will not sell Saudi Arabia the drones it wants, for fear that they will use them in Yemen. And the Saudis are looking for drones elsewhere. That's either China or Turkey. And Turkey's seem to work really, really well, based on experience in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. So what—Turkish foreign policy towards the region has become really dependent upon what Erdogan's particularly political needs are. There's no strategic approach to the region. There is a vision of Turkey as a leader of the region, of a great power in its own right, as a leader of the Muslim world, as a Mediterranean power as well. But that's nothing new. Turkish Islamists have been talking about these things for quite some time. I think it's important that there's been some de-escalation. I don't think that all of these countries now love each other, but they see the wisdom of pulling back from—pulling back from the brink. I don't see Turkey's position changing dramatically in terms of its kind of reintegration into the broader region before 2023, at the least. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's go next to, raised hand, to Caleb Sanner. And you need to unmute yourself. Q: Hello, my name is Caleb. I'm from the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. So, Dr. Cook, you had mentioned in passing how China has been involved economically in North Africa. And my question would be, how is the U.S. taking that? And what are we doing, in a sense, to kind of counter that? I know it's not a military advancement in terms of that, but I've seen what it has been doing to their economies—North Africa's economies. And, yeah, what's the U.S. stance on that? COOK: Well, I think the United States is somewhat detached from this question of North Africa. North Africa's long been a—with the exception of Egypt, of course. And Egypt, you know, is not really North Africa. Egypt is something in and of itself. That China is investing heavily in Egypt. And the Egyptian position is: Please don't ask us to choose between you and the Chinese, because we're not going to make that choice. We think investment from all of these places is good for—is good for Egypt. And the other places where China is investing, and that's mostly in Algeria, the United States really doesn't have close ties to Algeria. There was a tightening of the relationship after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, recognizing that the Algerians—extremist groups in Algerian that had been waging war against the state there over the course of the 1990s were part and parcel of this new phenomenon of global jihad. And so there has been a security relationship there. There has been some kind of big infrastructure kind of investment in that country, with big companies that build big things, like GE and others, involved in Algeria. But the United States isn't helping to develop ports or industrial parks or critical infrastructure like bridges and airports in the same way that the Chinese have been doing throughout the region. And in Algeria, as well as in Egypt, the Chinese are building a fairly significant industrial center in the Suez Canal zone, of all places. And the United States simply doesn't have an answer to it, other than to tell our traditional partners in the region, don't do it. But unless we show up with something to offer them, I'm afraid that Chinese investment is going to be too attractive for countries that are in need of this kind of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to a written question from Kenneth Mayers, who is at St. Francis College in Brooklyn. In your opinion, what would a strategic vision based on a far-sighted understanding of both resources and U.S. goals—with regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms and values such as human rights—look like in the Middle East and North Africa? COOK: Well, it's a great question. And I'm tempted to say you're going to have to read the last third of my new book in order to get the—in order to get the answer. I think but let me start with something mentioned about norms and values. I think that one of the things that has plagued American foreign policy over the course of not just the last twenty years, but in the post-World War II era all the way up through the present day, you see it very, very clearly with President Biden, is that trying to incorporate American values and norms into our approach to the region has been extraordinarily difficult. And what we have a history of doing is the thing that is strategically tenable, but morally suspect. So what I would say is, I mean, just look at what's happened recently. The president of the United States studiously avoided placing a telephone call to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Egyptians, as many know, have a terrible record on human rights, particularly since President Sisi came to power. Arrests of tens of thousands of people in the country, the torture of many, many people, the killings of people. And the president during his campaign said that he was going to give no blank checks to dictators, including to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And then what happened in May? What happened in May was that fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas and others in the Gaza Strip, a brutal eleven-day conflict. And Egypt stepped up and provided a way out of the conflict through its good offices. And that prompted the United States to—the president of the United States—to have two phone calls in those eleven days with the Egyptian leader. And now the United States is talking about Egypt as a constructive partner that's helping to stabilize the region. Sure, the administration suspended $130 million of Egypt's annual—$130 million Egypt's annual allotment of $1.3 billion. But that is not a lot. Egypt got most of—most of its military aid. As I said, strategically tenable, morally suspect. I'm not quite sure how we get out of that. But what I do know, and I'll give you a little bit of a preview of the last third of the book—but I really do want you to buy it when it's done—is that the traditional interests of the United States in the Middle East are changing. And I go through a kind of quasi, long, somewhat tortured—but very, very interesting—discussion of the origins of our interests, and how they are changing, and how we can tell they are changing. And that is to say that the free flow of energy resources may not be as important to the United States in the next twenty-five years as it was over the course of the previous fifty or sixty years. That helping to ensure Israeli security, which has been axiomatic for the United States, eh, I'd say since the 1960s, really, may not be as important as Israel develops its diplomatic relations with its neighbors, that has a GDP per capita that's on par with the U.K., and France, and other partners in Europe, a country that clearly can take care of itself, that is a driver of technology and innovation around the globe. And that may no longer require America's military dominance in the region. So what is that we want to be doing? How can we be constructive? And I think the answers are in things that we hadn't really thought of too systematically in the past. What are the things that we're willing to invest in an defend going forward? Things like climate change, things like migration, things like pandemic disease. These are things that we've talked about, but that we've never been willing to invest in the kind of the resources. Now there are parts of the Middle East that during the summer months are in-habitable. That's going to produce waves of people looking for places to live that are inhabitable. What do we do about that? Does that destabilize the Indian subcontinent? Does it destabilize Europe? Does it destabilize North Africa? These are all questions that we haven't yet answered. But to the extent that we want to invest in, defend and sacrifice for things like climate, and we want to address the issue—related issue of migration, and we want to deal with the issue of disease and other of these kind of functional global issues in the Middle East is better not just for us and Middle Easterners, but also in terms of our strategic—our great-power competition in the region. These are not things that the Chinese and the Russians are terribly interested in, despite the fact that the Chinese may tell you they are. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Ahmuan Williams, with a raised hand, at the University of Oklahoma. COOK: Oklahoma. Q: Hi. And thank you for being here. You kind of talked about the stabilization of northern Africa and the Middle East. And just a few days ago the Sudanese government—and they still haven't helped capture the parliamentarian there—have recycled back into a military—somewhat of military rule. And it's been since 2005 since the end of their last civil war, which claimed millions of innocent civilians through starvation and strife and, you know, the lack of being able to get humanitarian aid. There was also a huge refugee crisis there, a lot of people who evacuated Sudan. How's that going to impact the Middle East and the American take to Middle East and northern Africa policy, especially now that the Security Council is now considering this and is trying to determine what we should do? COOK: It's a great question. And I think that, first, let's be clear. There was a coup d'état in Sudan. The military overthrew a transitional government on the eve of having to hand over the government to civilians. And they didn't like it. There's been tension that's been brewing in Sudan for some time. Actually, an American envoy, our envoy to East Africa and Africa more generally, a guy named Jeff Feltman, was in Khartoum, trying to kind of calm the tension, to get the two sides together, and working to avert a coup. And the day after he left, the military moved. That's not—that doesn't reflect the fact that the United States gave a blessing for the military to overthrow this government. I think what it does, though, and it's something that I think we all need to keep in mind, it demonstrates the limits of American power in a variety of places around the world. That we don't have all the power in the world to prevent things from happening when people, like the leaders of the Sudanese military, believe that they have existential issues that are at stake. Now, what's worry about destabilization in Sudan is, as you point out, there was a civil war there, there was the creation of a new country there, potential for—if things got really out of hand—refugee flows into Egypt, from Egypt across the Sanai Peninsula into Israel. One of the things people are unaware of is the large number of Sudanese or Eritreans and other Africans who have sought refuge in Israel, which has created significant economic and social strains in that country. So it's a big deal. Thus far, it seems we don't—that the U.S. government doesn't know exactly what's happening there. There are protesters in the streets demanding democracy. It's very unclear what the military is going to do. And it's very unclear what our regional allies and how they view what's happening. What Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, what Saudi Arabia, what Israel—which Sudan is an Abraham Accords country now—what they are doing. How they view the coup as positive or negative will likely impact how effective the United States can be in trying to manage this situation. But I suspect that we're just going to have to accommodate ourselves to whatever outcome the Sudanese people and the Sudanese military come to, because I don't think we have a lot of—we don't have a lot of tools there to make everybody behave. FASKIANOS: OK. So I'm going to take the next question from Elena Murphy, who is a junior at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. And she's a diplomatic intern at the Kurdistan Regional Government's Representation in the United States. COOK: That's cool. FASKIANOS: That's very cool. So as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional hegemony has affected Erdogan's domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors policy? COOK: Great. Can I see that? Because that's a long question. FASKIANOS: Yeah, it's a long question. It's got an up-vote. Third one down. COOK: Third one down. Elena, as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism—I'm sorry, I'm going to have to read it again. How much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional has affected Erdogan's both domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors? OK. Great. So let us set aside the term “neo-Ottomanism” for now. Because neo-Ottomanism actually—it does mean something, but people have often used the term neo-Ottomanism to describe policies of the Turkish government under President Erdogan that they don't like. And so let's just talk about the way in which the Turkish government under President Erdogan views the region and views what Turkey's rightful place should be. And I think the Ottomanism piece is important, because the kind of intellectual framework which the Justice and Development Party, which is Erdogan's party, views the world, sees Turkey as—first of all, it sees the Turkish Republic as a not-so-legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. That from their perspective, the natural order of things would have been the continuation of the empire in some form or another. And as a result, they believe that Turkey's natural place is a place of leadership in the region for a long time. Even before the Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, Turkey's earlier generation of Islamists used to savage the Turkish leadership for its desire to be part of the West, by saying that this was kind of unnatural, that they were just merely aping the West, and the West was never actually going to accept Turkey. Which is probably true. But I think that the Justice and Development Party, after a period of wanting to become closer to the West, has turned its attention towards the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world more generally. And in that, it sees itself, the Turks see themselves as the natural leaders in the region. They believe they have a cultural affinity to the region as a result of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and they very much can play this role of leader. They see themselves as one of the kind of few real countries in the region, along with Egypt and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the rest are sort of ephemeral. Needless to say, big countries in the Arab world—like Egypt, like Saudi Arabia—don't welcome the idea of Turkey as a leader of the region. They recognize Turkey as a very big and important country, but not a leader of the region. And this is part of that friction that Turkey has experienced with its neighbors, after an earlier iteration of Turkish foreign policy, in which—one of the earliest iterations of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which was called no problems with neighbors. In which Turkey, regardless of the character of the regimes, wanted to have good relations with its neighbors. It could trade with those neighbors. And make everybody—in the process, Turkey could be a driver of economic development in the region, and everybody can be basically wealthy and happy. And it didn't really work out that way, for a variety of reasons that we don't have enough time for. Let's leave it at the fact that Turkey under Erdogan—and a view that is shared by many—that Turkey should be a leader of the region. And I suspect that if Erdogan were to die, if he were unable to stand for election, if the opposition were to win, that there would still be elements of this desire to be a regional leader in a new Turkish foreign policy. FASKIANOS: Steven, thank you very much. This was really terrific. We appreciate your stepping in at the eleventh hour, taking time away from your book. For all of you— COOK: I'm still not Sanam. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) I know, but you were an awesome replacement. So you can follow Steven Cook on Twitter at @stevenacook. As I said at the beginning too, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine. So you can read his work there, as well as, of course, on CFR.org, all of the commentary, analysis, op-eds, congressional testimony are there for free. So I hope you will follow him and look after his next book. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday November 3, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. In the meantime, I encourage you to follow us, @CFR_Academic, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. And stay well, stay safe, and thank you, again. COOK: Bye, everyone. FASKIANOS: Bye. (END)

This month, the Kurdistan in America podcast is honored to have Dr. Matthew Zais as its guest. Matt is the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of International Affairs at the US Department of Energy. Currently, he serves as the Vice President of Government Relations at HKN Energy, which has invested in Kurdistan's oil sector. Matt also served as Iraq Director at the Trump White House National Security Council for two years and the US military for over two decades as a career US Army officer. Matt shares his insight on the Kurdistan Region's oil and gas industry as a former US government official and now working in the private sector. He also sheds light on his encounters in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region while serving in the US Army.

This episode is also available as a blog post: http://donnyferguson.com/2017/10/25/emergency-statement-from-the-kurdistan-regional-government/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/donny-ferguson/message

This episode is also available as a blog post: http://donnyferguson.com/2017/11/02/statement-from-the-kurdistan-regional-government-representation-in-the-united-states/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/donny-ferguson/message

This month, the Kurdistan in America podcast is honored to have Colonel Myles Caggins as its guest. Colonel Caggins currently serves as the Director of the Public Affairs for the U.S. Army’s III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, and was the former Spokesperson for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve: The international military intervention against ISIS. He shares with us his upbringing, lifelong professional experience in the U.S. Army, including his views of and encounters with the people of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Rojava (North-East Syria) while serving as the Spokesperson for the Anti-ISIS Coalition and since his return to the United States. He also talks about his hopes of visiting Kurdistan in the future in a personal capacity.

Saudi Arabia is looking to patch its relationship with Qatar after a three-and-a-half-year blockade that split the Gulf region. With the help of the Trump administration, the countries are talking to end the crisis. Plus, we look at the situation in northern Iraq, where the Kurdistan Regional Government wants the PKK terror group out of the region. Abdullah Baabood Visiting Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan Giorgio Cafiero Founder and CEO of Gulf State Analytics Saad Al-Muttalibi Political Security Adviser at Baghdad Security Council Murat Aslan Security Researcher at SETA Foundation

Clashes in northern Iraq between the PKK terror group and Kurdistan Regional Government are raising fears of an all-out war. The Iraqi central government and KRG have deployed around 6,000 security forces near the Sinjar area to eliminate PKK presence, but that has only escalated the fighting. So could this turn into a full on war that can spell the end of the terror group in the region? Guests Saad Al-Muttalibi Political Security Adviser at Baghdad Security Council Murat Aslan Security Researcher at SETA Foundation

Iraq and Saudi Arabia have opened the Arar border crossing for trade for the first time in 30 years. Officials from both countries- including the Saudi ambassador to Iraq and the Iraqi interior minister, travelled to Baghdad to open the border. Both goods and people will be able to pass through Arar which had remained closed since Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Relations between the two countries started to take a positive turn in 2017 when representatives from each country had made a visit to one another, consequently leading to the initiation of commercial flights between the two neighbours. The current prime minister of Iraq, Mustafa al-Kadhimi is said to be on good terms with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. One group known as the Ashab al-Kahf published a statement however expressing a rejection of “the Saudi project in Iraq”. The Iraqi prime minister welcomes the development, in hope that it may provide employment opportunities to 1/3 of the youth who are unemployed.Approximately 4,000 prisoners are meant to be on death row, after being charged with terrorism offences in unfair trials, claims United Nation human rights experts. The UN has asked the Iraqi government to halt plans of executions, after 21 men were executed last Friday. Six Iraqi demonstrators have been killed from bullet wounds in the capital of Nasiriya after clashes have erupted between anti-government protestors and thousands of Muqtada al-Sadr supporters in Tahir Square. The Sadrist movement called for protests to back the reform of what he views a corrupt state. By Saturday morning, at least 60 people were wounded. Sadr on Wednesday called for relations between Shiite factions and parties to be repaired and to sign a political honour code from internal and external challenges facing the country. The leader of Al-Fatah Alliance, MP Karim Aliwi welcomed this proposal, stating that it will have popular support because it's in the interests of the country and its citizens.  Kurdish journalist Sherwan Amin Sherwani has been imprisoned for almost two months by Iraqi Kurdish authorities for political reasons fuelled by his involvement as editor-in-chief of Bashur, a magazine that has been openly critical of the Kurdish political elite. Notably, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the powerful Barzani family who are based in Erbil and Duhok provinces. Whilst Sherwani's lawyer is adamant that there is no legal basis for his confinement, representatives from the Kurdistan Regional Government have reiterated the reason for his arrest as being his threat to the security of the region. The responsibility of a rocket attack at an oil refinery in Northern Iraq has been claimed by ISIS. The attack occurred on the 29th of November, which yielded no casualties, the oil ministry says. There was another attack executed by them 8 days prior in the Salahuddin province where a bomb hit a civilian car. Members of ISIS then killed six Iraqi security officers that had arrived on the scene along with four civilians. On the 27th of November, a massage parlour was raided in Baghdad, where inside facilitates were destroyed with batons and men and women were violently pushed onto the street. Rab'Allah initially took responsibility for the raid on social media, stating it is their duty to ‘stand against societal corruption' which has been inspired by ‘ideas of America and Israel'. A day later however, they denied their involvement in the incident. Other attacks followed on Christian and Yazidi-owned liquor stores across the capital. One shop owner said that he had been bribing armed groups to protect his business from being raided.The US is set to reduce its troops in Iraq to 2,500 by January 12th next month.Support the show (https://www.justgiving.com/tncf)

A week ago, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq set up checkpoints on the road to the villages of Nahla, under the pretext of imposing a siege on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is spread in large areas of the region. This siege affects the people of the eight villages and increases their suffering.

Details of the agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq on the normalization of the situation in Sinjar have been clarified, and according to that agreement, the federal government administers security. More about this agreement in Ahmad Ghafur's report from Erbil. - Hûrgiliyên naveroka rêkeftina di navbera Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê û Hikumeta Iraqê derbarê asayîkirina rewşa Şingalê diyar bûn û li gor wê rêkevtinê Hikûmeta federalî ya îdareya ewlehîyê dike. Bêtir derbarê vê rêkeftinê di raporta Ehmed Xefûr ji Hewlêrê heye.

I denne episoden diskuterer Hiwar en "Gender Reveal Party" som har fått skylden for enda en massiv brann i California. På den andre siden av kloden; Brann i Moria flyktningleir i Levsos, Hellas. Hellas og Tyrkia er i en konflikt om ressurser i middelhavet. Tyrkia og Iran samarbeider i å bombe Kurdistan Regional Government. Iran henretter Kurdisk aktivist. Russisk opposisjonspolitiker forgiftet med nervegift, Kreml nekter innblanding. Japans statsminister har gått av og en ny leder er utnevnt. Til slutt: Hva skjer med TikTok nå da?

Our correspondent Hatice Kamer reports on the latest in regards to the increase of coronavirus cases in Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani's visit to Turkey. - Nûçegihana SBS Kurdî Hatice Kamer ragihandinên herî dawî derbarê zêdebûna dozên vîrosa korona li Tirkiyê û seredana Serokê Herêma Kurdistanê Nêçirvan Barzanî ya Tirkiyê radigihîne.

What is the Kurdistan Regional Government? Can we really call it one unified government or are we really looking at the same two KDP and PUK governments from the 90's with a shiny new label? Explaining the way in which the administration seems to work is Megan Connelly, a non-resident fellow at IRIS.

The Kurdistan Regional Government began to ease restrictions on markets and movement between the regions of the province.

Ahmad Ghafur's report from Erbil focuses on the continuing problems of salary payments and the oil crisis, which has been a source of tension between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government for some time. - Raporta Ehmed Xefûr ji Hewlêrê îroj li ser berdewambûna pirsgirêkên ne-dayîna mûçeyê û li ser pirsgirêka neftê ku ev bû demeke ev kêşeyana di navberî hukmeta navendî ya Îraqê û Hukmeta Herêma Kurdistanê de hene.

While the Kurdistan regional government had previously decided to close schools and gathering places , the people took advantage of these days, they considered it a holiday to take out public trips and hold their parties in the open air.

On this episode of Going Underground, we speak to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq's High Representative to the UK Karwan Jamal Tahir. He discusses the Kurdish art exhibition where our interview is taking place, the values of Kurdish culture, the 32nd anniversary of the Halabja massacre which saw then US-UK ally Saddam Hussein drop chemical weapons and kill over 5,000 Kurds, the Kurdish uprising which saw the establishment of democratic Kurdish autonomous rule in Iraq, the legacy of the Iraq War, the Kurdish reaction to the US assassination of Qassem Soleimani, and the KRG's response to the coronavirus outbreak. Next, we speak to the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan representative, 'Heela.' Her face is blurred to hide her identity for her safety. She discusses the US' war crimes in Afghanistan, the instability the US presence has caused, the marriage between radical Islam and the United States in Afghanistan, US torture using black sites, and more! Finally, Going Underground's social media producer Farhaan Ahmed speaks to former secretary of state for Scotland David Mundell MP about the new budget presented by Rishi Sunak, whether the Conservative Party is turning to the left, whether the government's coronavirus measures are enough, whether the NHS is truly prepared for the Covid-19 pandemic, large-scale poverty in the UK, and more!

The Turkish incursion into northern Syria has left the leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq in a difficult position. While the KRG has expressed concerns for ethnic kin in Syria, it has to be careful not to jeopardise its crucial, some would say lifeline, commercial trade with Turkey. Alaco Head of Content Yigal Chazan discusses the dilemma with one of Alaco’s Middle East analysts Kavar Kurda.

Brendan O'Leary is an Irish, European Union, and US citizen, and since 2003 has been the Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author, co-author, and co-editor of 26 books; and the author or co-author of hundreds of articles or chapters in peer-reviewed journals and university presses, encyclopedia articles, and numerous other forms of publication. Professor O’Leary was the inaugural winner of the Juan Linz prize of the International Political Science Association for contributions to the study of multinational societies, federalism and power-sharing, and in 2016 he was elected an honorary member of the Royal Irish Academy, principally because of his contributions to the field of power-sharing. In addition to his scholarly work, O’Leary has been a political and constitutional advisor to the United Nations, the European Union, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, the Governments of the UK and Ireland, and to the British Labour Party (before and during the Irish peace process). Between 1983 and 2003, O’Leary was on the faculty of the London School of Economics & Political Science, where he was successively Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader, and Professor of Political Science; the first elected head of the LSE Government Department (1998-2001); and an elected Academic Governor (2000-1). He has been a visiting professor of political science at Uppsala University, the University of Western Ontario, Canada, and at Queen's University Belfast, and a Moore fellow at the National University of Ireland-Galway. Brendan O’Leary was a political advisor to the British Labour Shadow Cabinet on Northern Ireland between 1987-8 and 1996-7, advising the late Kevin McNamara and the late Marjorie (“Mo”) Mowlam, shadow Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland. He advised Irish, British, and American ministers and officials, and the Irish-American Morrison delegation during the Northern Ireland peace process, appeared as an expert witness before the US Congress, and was a guest at the White House in 1994, 1995 and 1998. His work with John McGarry on police reform was singled out in the press for influencing the independent commission on police reform which reported in 1999. O’Leary has been a constitutional advisor for the European Union and the United Nations in the promotion of the confederal and federal re-building of Somalia, and for the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development in consultancies on power-sharing in coalition governments in Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa, and in Nepal. For the United Nations O’Leary was a contributing consultant to its 2004 United Nations Human Development Report on Culture and Liberty, co-edited by Amartya Sen. In 2009-2010 he was seconded to the UN as the Senior Advisor on Power-Sharing in the Standby Team of the Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs. In that capacity he had field experience in numerous conflict-sites, including in Sudan, South Sudan, Nepal and Kyrgyzstan. Since 2003 O’Leary has regularly been an international constitutional advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, assisting in the negotiation of the Transitional Administrative Law (2004); electoral systems design (2004-5); the Constitution of Iraq (2005); the draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region (2005-); and in monitoring violations of the Constitution of Iraq by its federal government. He has also been an expert witness on Iraq and Kurdistan to branches of the US Government, and to the United Kingdom's Iraq Commission.

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker and John Kiriakou are joined by Richard Wolff, a professor of economics emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst and founder of the organization Democracy at Work. His latest book is “Capitalism's Crisis Deepens: Essays on the Global Economic Meltdown.”Canada and the US have come to an agreement on trade. This agreement, along with the agreement the US and Mexico came to, will collectively be called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and will be a replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. Monday’s regular segment Technology Rules with Chris Garaffa is a weekly guide on how monopoly corporations and the national surveillance state are threatening cherished freedoms, civil rights and civil liberties. Web developer and technologist Chris Garaffa joins the show. After the extremely dramatic events on capitol hill last week, the FBI investigation into alleged sexual assaults committed by Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh is underway. Just a few swing votes in the Senate will determine the fate of his confirmation. Brian and John speak with Dan Kovalik, a human rights and labor lawyer who is the author of the book “The Plot to Attack Iran.” This weekend, Brazilians rallied against presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro in a series of huge demonstrations titled “Not Him”. With just one week left before the first round of the election, could Brazil really elect a far-right, dictatorship-admiring president like Bolsonaro? Or will the candidate of imprisoned ex-President Lula’s Workers Party prevail? Brazilian-British activist Victor Fraga with Democracy for Brazil UK joins the show. Monday’s segment “Education for Liberation with Bill Ayers” is where Bill helps us look at the state of education across the country. What’s happening in our schools, colleges, and universities, and what impact does it have on the world around us? Bill Ayers, an activist, educator and the author of the book “Demand the Impossible: A Radical Manifesto,”, joins Brian and John. Iran fired missiles today at the terrorists who Iran’s Intelligence Ministry has accused of carrying out a deadly attack on a military parade on September 22, killing 25 and injuring many more. Iran’s government has stated that Israel, the United States, and gulf monarchies shared responsibility for the attack. Massoud Shadjareh, the founder of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, joins the show.The Kurdistan region of Iraq held elections yesterday that will determine control of the Kurdistan Regional Government. These elections are the first to be held since the highly controversial and ultimately unsuccessful referendum to secede from Iraq last year, and come during a period of extreme tension in Iraqi politics. Brian and John speak with Yerevan Saeed, a political analyst who researches and writes on security, political, and energy issues in the Middle East, focusing on Iraq, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf, and the Levant and has served as White House correspondent for the Kurdish Rudaw TV.

Erin Banco on "Pipe Dreams: The Plundering of Iraq's Oil Wealth" (Columbia Global Reports), uncovering squalid deals, unscrupulous foreign oil companies, and rampant corruption in the Kurdistan Regional Government since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It also touches on Turkey's role in fostering Erbil's independence from Baghdad through oil deals. Become a Turkey Book Talk member to support the podcast, getting full transcripts (in English and Turkish) of every interview upon publication, transcripts of the entire Turkey Book Talk archive, and access to an exclusive 30% discount on over 200 Turkey/Ottoman history titles published by IB Tauris.

On the heels of the announcement that the Islamic State group had essentially been ousted from Iraq in September 2017, the Iraqi military along with Iranian-backed militias launched an incursion into Kirkuk in northern Iraq. Almost 200,000 people have been displaced, hundreds have been killed and Kurdish officials say "ethnic cleansing" is taking place. Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government to the U.S., shared the details with us. We also spoke with Lt. Gen. Paul Funk II, commander of the Operation Joint Task Force -- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) coalition in the region, about how all of this is impacting the fight against IS.

In September, Iraqi Kurds voted for independence. Host Dan Loney talks with Brendan O'Leary, Constitutional Advisor to the Kurdistan Regional Government and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, to discuss what this means, what has happened in the region since then, and what could happen next on Knowledge@Wharton. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker and John Kiriakou are joined by international affairs and security analyst Mark Sleboda.Yet another twist has emerged in the “Steele dossier” prepared by the opposition research firm Fusion GPS -- it turns out that the Clinton campaign and the DNC were financial backers of the report. The battle between Donald Trump and Republicans in the Senate continues, as the high profile feud with Jeff Flake of Arizona and Bob Corker of Tennessee escalates. What next in the Republican Party civil war? Eugene Puryear, the host of Radio Sputnik’s By Any Means Necessary, and Bob Schlehuber, the producer of By Any Means Necessary, join the show for that discussion.After the expiration of its 120-day prohibition on refugee resettlement, the Trump administration has now come out with a new order banning refugees from 11 countries from coming into the United States for another 90 days. Anoa Changa, host of the weekly radio show The Way With Anoa, joins Brian and John.Following large scale Iraqi military maneuvers, the Kurdistan Regional Government has now offered to suspend the results of the referendum on Kurdish independence and has signaled its openness to negotiations. Ali Musawi, war correspondent based in Iraq, joins the show along with Kani Xulam, director of the American Kurdish Information Network.The final batch of documents relating to the 1963 assassination of president John Kennedy are about to be released, but some are calling for key pieces of information to be withheld. Congressman Walter Jones joins the show.Finally, the U.S. government’s attack on civil liberties didn’t begin with Donald Trump, but he certainly hasn’t made it any better. In this segment, we’ll take a look at the mass arrests and felony prosecutions of protesters at Trump’s inauguration. Chip Gibbons, policy and legislative counsel for Defending Rights & Dissent, joins Brian and John along with Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, executive director of the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund.

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker and Walter Smolarek are joined from Germany by Dastan Jasim, and from London by Mark Campbell, both are supporters of the Kurdish movement in Syria. The Kurdish YPG forces did the bulk of the fighting in the liberation of the Raqqa from ISIS, but the future of Syria is far from certain. U.S. military forces supported the Kurdish-led offensive. But the Syrian government demands that all U.S. forces leave Syria. We discuss the political position of the Kurdish movement as it relates to the United States and the Syrian government. Meanwhile, fears of all-out war between the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq and the central government Baghdad continue following the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the disputed city of Kirkuk.The future of healthcare in the United States is in the headlines, as a new proposal from Senators Michael Bennet and Tim Kaine is announced and Trump’s “drug tsar” nominee is forced to step down due to his ties with pharmaceutical companies fueling the opioid crisis. Dr. Margaret Flowers, co-director of Popular Resistance, joins the show.Next, The Chinese Communist Party’s congress opens tomorrow, as President Xi Jinping seeks to solidify his leadership and congress delegates discuss the future of the country’s economic and political reforms. Brian and Walter are joined by political analyst Ajit Singh. Then, Mexico’s currency is tumbling as the United States takes a hard line in NAFTA negotiations. Are we headed towards a complete breakdown of the agreement. Economist Steve Keen discusses developments in the ongoing negotiations.The judge in Senator Robert Menendez’s corruption case refused to throw out the case yesterday, ordering the trial to move forward. Who is Robert Menendez, and will this scandal claim his career? Andrés Gómez, the Editor of Areito Digital, joins the show.

Seventy years ago, the leader Mustafa Barzani made a declaration of Kurdish independence which was ignored. Last month, his son -Masoud, won a referendum in Iraq intended to achieve it. However, Baghdad says it will impose its rule instead. If the Kurds are to succeed, Masrour, grandson of one Barzani, son of the other, will need all the clout he's acquired waging war on the group that calls itself Islamic State. He believes that has earned Kurds the right to a state of their own. But with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and much of the world against them, could this referendum end up delivering the Kurds even less than the autonomy that they enjoy now?

Seventy years ago, the leader Mustafa Barzani made a declaration of Kurdish independence which was ignored. Last month, his son -Masoud, won a referendum in Iraq intended to achieve it. However, Baghdad says it will impose its rule instead. If the Kurds are to succeed, Masrour, grandson of one Barzani, son of the other, will need all the clout he's acquired waging war on the group that calls itself Islamic State. He believes that has earned Kurds the right to a state of their own. But with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Syria and much of the world against them, could this referendum end up delivering the Kurds even less than the autonomy that they enjoy now?

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker and Walter Smolarek are joined by Marcia Stedman, President of Health Care for All - Washington, and by Marc Stier, Director of the Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center. A dramatic new move from the Trump administration could totally upend insurance markets and lead to the collapse of the Affordable Care Act. Reaffirming its staunchly anti-Palestinian orientation, The Trump administration announced today that the United States was withdrawing from UNESCO, the cultural and social organization of the United Nations, citing supposed “anti-Israel bias”. Brian and Walter are joined by Jafar Ramini, a Palestinian writer, political analyst and commentator, and by Kim Ives, an editor for Haiti Liberte. The long Palestinian division between the West Bank and Gaza may finally be coming to an end as a result of an agreement signed today in Egypt. Alberto Garcia Watson, former senior Middle East correspondent for HispanTV, comments on the developments. Peshmerga briefly blocked the roads between main cities of of the Kurdistan Regional Government and Mosul to protest Iraqi troop movements in the latest escalation of tensions following an independence referendum. Ali Musawi, a war correspondent covering the fight against Daesh in Iraq, joins the show. Theresa May has said her government is preparing for the dreaded “no deal” scenario in the negotiations over Britain’s exit from the European Union, causing even more disunity in her government. Alexander Mercouris, editor-in-chief of The Duran, discusses the latest in the Brexit fiasco. Appearing on Fox News, Donald Trump shed some light on his ominous “calm before the storm” remark, confirming that Korea was the target he had in mind. Keith Bennett, China and Korea expert, joins the show.

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker and John Kiriakou are joined by Anoa Changa, Deputy Director of MPACT and the host of the radio show The Way With Anoa, and David Cobb, campaign manager of the 2016 Jill Stein/Ajamu Baraka presidential campaign. The newfound partnership between Donald Trump and congressional Democrats has upended politics in the United States. First the debt ceiling deal, now DACA, what’s next? Could we be set for a major realignment of political parties? In the second hour, John and Brian take a look at the breaking news of the day. First, the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is determined to push ahead with an independence referendum. Kani Xulam, founder of the American-Kurdish Information Network, joins the show. Next, military exercises in Russia lead to a heating up of the rhetoric in the new cold war. They speak with Mark Sleboda, an international affairs and security analyst. In the third segment, the hosts talk to Ben Norton, a journalist with Alternet’s Grayzone Project about reports that the Trump administration is considering a drastic reduction in the number of refugees admitted into the country. And finally, Will the de-escalation zones in Syria hold? The fate of opposition-controlled Idlib province hangs in the balance as the sixth round of the Astana peace talks open today. The hosts are joined by investigative journalist Rick Sterling.

Jacob L. Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari make sense of the numerous geopolitical developments that occurred in the world's most volatile region this week. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I am joined this week by Kamran Bokhari, thanks for joining us Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: Good to be here. JLS: What we're going to do this week is we're going to try and sort out some of the mess that's been going on in the Middle East. It's been a very chaotic week in the Middle East and we thought we'd take a step back and try to explain it to listeners in about 30 or 40 minutes. It's a tall task but we'll see how we go. Kamran, I think the first thing that you might be able to help out with our listeners understanding is understanding a little bit more about the history of Qatar – the history of Qatar's relationships in the region, how it's always sort of been on the outside looking in – but what exactly Saudi Arabia, and the states that Saudi Arabia's convinced to go along with this diplomatic isolation of Qatar, are seeing that upsets them so much. KB: So ever since 1995, when the father of the current emir of Qatar took power, his name was Sheikh Hamad Al Thani, and he actually overthrew his father in '95 and ousted him and took power. Qatar has been on a strange trajectory. I say strange because it's not normal for the Arab world or more specifically the Persian Gulf Arab world, the Khaleejis, to behave in this way. I am referring to an openness for lack of a better term. I mean Al Jazeera was started by the current emir's father and it became sort of the standard bearer of 24/7 news in the Arab world. That made a lot of traditional Arab leaders, both Republican regimes and of course the monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, very, very uncomfortable because it was not the way that they had ran their political economies. There's no concept of having discourse. But to make matters worse this new regime post-1995 began with a very what I would call pragmatic approach to the region. It could afford to do because it is the world's largest LNG exporter, that brings in a lot of money. The population, those who are Qatari nationals, is very small – less than 300,000 people. In fact, there are more expats in that country, which is also true for a number of other GCC states. But in the case of Qatar, what happened is that this allowed for the regime to flirt with all sorts of radical political forces ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to more radical elements along the Islamist spectrum. And even give air time to what we used to call secular left-wing Arab nationalists and it began a policy of opening to Iran, developing a relationship that was out of step with the GCC consensus, if you will. And steering towards an independent foreign policy. And a lot of people say, Qatar has been punching above its weight when it comes to foreign policy. It's a tiny, little state. But it's been trying to play major league geopolitics. That's a fair assessment. But I would say that the Qataris are cut from a different cloth if we are to compare them to the rest of the Arab regimes. JLS: Yes, although I think one thing that you perhaps left out was that there's a regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command in Qatar and that Qatar is for all intents and purposes it's sort of in the U.S. camp in the region, or generally has been. And that the U.S. has been able to use Qatar at times in order to have unofficial dialogue with some of these groups that are considered beyond the pale for normal political discourse, right? KB: Absolutely, that's important to note that when Qatar is reaching out to these unsavory characters, from the point of view of the region and the international community, it's not doing so in defiance of the West, it's doing so in concert with its great power ally, the United States. And mind you, that base at Al Udeid where the U.S. Central Command has a major hub in the region, in fact, the regional hub is based in Qatar of Central Command, and that happened after 9/11 and the decision of the United States government, the Bush administration, to pull out of Saudi Arabia. There was a huge base in Saudi Arabia, and Qatar offered space so it was just a minor relocation. At the same time, there are relations between the Qatari government and Israel. There are a lot of rumors about the nature of it. Nobody officially denies or rejects it. But it's well known that there's some form of relationship there. So, Qatar has been reaching out to all sorts of entities and Qatar is the one Arab state that also sees eye-to-eye with Turkey in the region. And so it's had a really diversified foreign policy portfolio. JLS: I want to bring it back to Turkey in a minute but I'll just ask one more thing about Qatar which is that you know you've pointed out that they've always been reaching out to these different groups and they've always had a more independent foreign policy. I think that one of the things that we were discussing internally was that it was very hard to read whether Qatar had simply done something that had gone too far beyond the pale for Saudi Arabia or whether this had sort of been planned for a while and that this is really more of a reflection of the Saudis weakening and not being willing to tolerate Qatar breaking ranks. I noticed recently that Qatar actually asked a lot of people from Hamas, who nominally are based in Qatar, to leave. And it seems like Qatar has actually done some things and has been very open to trying to solve of this diplomatic spat, especially in terms of the United States. So do you think that Qatar actually did something, that it flirted with Iran in a serious way, that both Saudi Arabia and even perhaps the United States didn't mind Saudi Arabia sort of dinging Qatar on the head and saying, nah, that's too far? Or do you think that this really has more to do with Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia trying to consolidate control at the diplomatic level in the same way that Saudi Arabia wasn't going to tolerate internal unrest in a country like Bahrain in 2011? KB: I think it's the latter. I don't see the Qataris doing anything new. The Iranian relationship has been there, there's more made out of it in terms of the public discourse than there is actually. The whole idea of support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, that's old stuff, that's been going along for a long time. I haven't seen anything fresh that would suggest that the Qataris crossed some sort of red line. I think it's a lingering dispute and if we go back to 2014, for the better part of that year, the Saudis and the Bahrainis and the UAE, they downgraded diplomatic relations in that year in the spring. And it was not until the fall that they had an agreement of sorts, which was never made public, but according to the reports Qatar had agreed to scale back its involvement with all these groups and not encourage them to where that damaged the interests of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and others. And so, I think that that's a long-standing dispute and I think that now Saudi Arabia is getting desperate because things are not going well for Saudi Arabia. And the last thing it wants is one of its own GCC members doing things that undermine its collective efforts. So, number one, and I think this is foremost, is Iran. If you go back to the Trump visit that was like three weeks ago to Riyadh and there was a gala event attended not just by Middle Eastern leaders but also from the wider Muslim majority countries. It was very clear that Saudi Arabia had finally got the United States to where it wants to be. Remember that under the Obama administration, the Saudis had a terrible relationship with Washington. Under Trump, they know think that they now have Washington where they want it to be and they want to move forward in isolating Iran. And Qatari dealings with Iran really poke holes into the Saudi strategy. So, I think that this is a case of the Saudis not being able to take it anymore and saying you know enough is enough. If the Qataris are not behaving, we have to up the pressure to twist their arm. JLS: Yeah and I think this is a move that could really backfire on Saudi Arabia. You already see it backfiring a little bit in the sense that they were able to assemble an impressive coalition of countries in this diplomatic offensive against Qatar, but they have not really been able to extend the diplomatic offensive outside of its immediate vicinity and outside of those countries that are immediately dependent on it. And even some of the other GCC states have not gone along to the same extent that Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis and the others have gone to. But you bring up good points with Iran and Turkey and this is another reason why I think this might backfire on the Saudis, which is because if Qatar is looking at this and if Qatar is trying to establish some kind of independence of action, Saudi Arabia is really on a downward slope. Especially when you consider that oil prices right now are continuing to go down and that Saudi has basically proven ineffective in getting the price of oil to come back up and that really is the source of Saudi power. Qatar, as you said, has a close relationship with Turkey. Qatar as you also said also has a closer relationship with Iran than perhaps any of the other Arab countries in the region. You brought up the specific point of the fact that Qatar and Turkey have seen eye to eye for a while right now. I know that there's a lot of stuff there in terms of the political ideology that both Qatar and Turkey favor that you can shed some light on. So how about you go a little bit more in depth into how Turkey and Qatar see the region in the same way, and what is the way in which they've been trying to reshape the region, not just recently but for many years now? KB: From the point of view of the Qataris, they're not so much in ideological sync with the Islamists, they take a more pragmatic view. Unlike Egypt, unlike Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states, the Qataris say, look, you know we can't dial the clock back. And what do I mean by that is that the Saudis are using tools that used to be effective back in the day, pre-Arab Spring, where there was no opposition of any sorts to the regimes in the region. And Qatar looks at that and says that thing, that tool kit, that approach is useless because it only makes matters worse. Qatar says, look, these forces, the Hamases of this world, the Muslim Brotherhoods of this world, they are a reality and we can't wish them away and we can't suppress them because it only makes matters worse and we need to somehow reach out to them in order for, and this is based on my conversations with Qatari officials over the years, their view is that these are realities and if we don't control them, if we just leave them to their own devices, then they will do things that will undermine the interests of the region and the security of the regimes. So it's sort of flipping the Saudi argument on its head. The Saudis say well you need to keep them under lock and key and that's the way to go. As far as Turkey is concerned, Turkey is more ideologically in tune with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas because the ruling AKP party comes from an Islamist heritage although it's not an Islamist party, its roots lie in Islamism. So there's a meeting of minds. And Qatar realizes that it's a small country and the rest of the Arab states are not really getting it. And they realize that if there's going to be a counterweight to Iran, it's going to be Turkey. And the Qataris have accepted the fact that the Arabs do not have any intrinsic power of their own in the region and therefore they must piggyback on Turkey and hence that relationship. So it's a convergence of interests and ideas. JLS: Yeah, although I want to push back a little bit because I think you're right that Qatar reaches out to a lot of different groups that other countries in the region and most countries in the world wouldn't do business with, right? But I don't think when it comes to more Muslim Brotherhood-oriented groups that Qatar sees them sort of as redheaded stepchildren that it's going to let into Qatar. I think there, Qatar has actually more of an affinity to some of those groups and has used some of those groups in order to push Qatar's influence throughout the region, which is why I suggested that perhaps Turkey and Qatar see more eye to eye ideologically. Do you think I am taking that too far or would you agree with that assessment? KB: I think that your argument has some merit to it, and actually a lot of merit to it, but when I was saying ideologically I was meaning the ideology of the ruling family or the regime in Qatar. They're not Islamists. They don't share those ideologies. If you go to Qatar you know it's fairly Westernized and it's fairly open and so it's not necessarily Islamist but they see these actors as, what you just said, tools to pursue their foreign policy agenda, to be able to have influence. And in my conversations, I did feel that the Qataris really believe that there is no way around these actors. Qatar has sort of, in a self-styled manner, appropriated this task of bringing reconcilable – what they call reconcilable – Islamists to the mainstream. And so that's also a foreign policy offering that Doha sort of says that this what we can do for the world. And they find reception in circles in Washington. Back in 2013, the United States Department of Defense dealt with certain Islamist factions within the Syrian rebel landscape in order to find common ground because of the fear that we're not going to get secular Syrian nationalists under the banner of the Free Syrian Army. And that was mediated by Qatar. And if you look at the Taliban relationship, clearly that was very openly Qatar helping the United States deal with the Taliban. It didn't go too far because of other complications, but nonetheless, it's a great example of how Qatar is trying to say: this is our value proposition that we bring to this region and to great powers who are stakeholders in this region. JLS: Yes, although the flip side of that is it means Qatar is playing with fire. I mean I really, I was really struck by what you said that the ruling family is not Islamist. But that Qatar thinks of using the Islamist groups as tools in order to develop Qatar's power or to protect Qatar's position. I cannot think of a more secular entity that used Islamists that didn't have the Islamists come back to bite them in the end. We have seen over and over and over, whether it was the United States, whether it was Saudi Arabia, whether it was Turkey, it doesn't really matter if the country itself was Muslim or if it's Western or not. It's very, very difficult to control Islamist groups once they get going. So the idea that Qatar is going to be able to use these Islamist groups when they want to use them and is not going to face backlash from them, especially because Qatar is playing such a dual game and is really dealing with all sides. It seems to me that that's, I don't want to say shortsighted and I don't even say it's not going to work. I just can't think of another example of that actually working in the long term for a country's foreign policy. Can you come up with any examples? KB: I can't, and you are absolutely right. I mean this is almost like they are holding up and trying to balance two parallel universes. And it's difficult. But I think that, if we look at it geopolitically, from their point of view, they have no other choice. They have to do this and I think what gives them a bit of hope is that they're a small country. They have enough money to where people don't indulge in politics so this is not going to undermine them domestically anytime soon. But yes, for the region, this could all blow up in their face. And I actually believe that it will. Because there's just no way, given the scale of chaos in the region, that somehow the Qataris will be able to fine tune these Islamist proxies to where they will live in a Muslim democracy of sorts. I just don't see that happening. So you are absolutely right. I don't disagree with that. I was just trying to explain the perspective of the Qataris. JLS: Yeah, but that also explains the perspective of not just the Saudis but even the Emiratis and Bahrain and some of these other groups, for whom, they see Qatar messing around with the Islamists and are sort of asking themselves what on Earth are you doing? We've already seen what happens when we mess with these things and now is a time to close ranks and tighten up against this, not to invite them into our own space. But that's a good segue way into a second… KB: I just want to point out one thing and for our listeners, the UAE making this case is more genuine. But the Saudis accusing the Qataris of doing this is like the kettle calling the pot black or vice versa. The Saudis are still playing with this fire, so they don't have the argument. So yes, they are not with Hamas, they're not with the Muslim Brotherhood, but they are the biggest exporter of Salafism and jihadism on the planet. JLS: Yes, and it's a good segue way into you know sort of the other major developments that have been changing things in the Middle East this week, which is ISIS, which Saudi Arabia you know you can't directly prove that they had a role in helping ISIS develop, but certainly Saudi Arabia and some of the groups that it was funding and some of the things that it was doing when it was involved in Syria supporting different proxies, had a role in the Islamic State coming to the prominence that it has. But you know we saw two major things from the Islamic State this week. We saw, first of all, that the Islamic State is finally coming under some serious existential pressure in its self-declared caliphate. Raqqa has really been the capital and center and focal point of ISIS operations, but you've got the Syrian Democratic Forces, who are made up mostly of Syrian Kurds under the YPG group (there are so many acronyms here that it's sometimes hard to keep track of) but we'll say the SDF, those are the Syrian Kurds and they are U.S. backed, and then we've also seen, surprisingly, the Syrian army has been moving on multiple fronts to get closer to Raqqa. The result of all this is that the Islamic State's position in Raqqa is pretty weak and we've seen them pulling back and we've seen some relative successes for the U.S.-backed forces as they get closer to the city. That was one major development we saw this week. And then the other major development was really the unprecedented IS attack they claimed in Iran. So, I want to tackle both of those things. Maybe let's start with the second one first because I know you were looking at this very closely. Talk about why this is such a big deal and why this isn't just another ISIS terrorist attack in the region. What are the greater implications of ISIS hitting Iran the way that they did? KB: I would begin by saying that this is not something that ISIS just sort of said – oh, well I want to attack Iran tomorrow and let's do it. This is something that speaks to the sophistication, especially as an intelligence entity, of ISIS. The Islamic State has been cultivating these assets for a while, and not just in Iran. We see this happening in as far-flung areas as the Philippines as well. So this is something that's been in the works for a while. They've devoted a certain amount of resources to this project. I suspect that over the years that they've been based in Iraq and they've had proximity to Iran that they were cultivating this. And they saw an opening in Kurdistan, and I am talking about the Iranian province of Kurdistan, and there's more than one province where Iranian Kurds live and they're mostly Sunni and over the years what I've learned is that is Salafism and even jihadist ideology has made its way into the Iranian Kurdish community. And the Kurds are, there's an alienation that they feel, as an ethnic community as well, from Tehran and there is this sort of deep resentment that ISIS really exploited and was able to set up at least this cell. I suspect that this isn't just one cell. There are probably others that ISIS has in its tool kit and will activate at some point in the future, so this is not the last attack in Iran. But what is significant is that Iran is not an Arab state. One of the biggest sectors of the Iranian state is the security sector. There are multiple organizations that deal with security. You know in my visit to Iran, I noticed these guys working firsthand, and they're obsessed with security. They're obsessed with security because they fear Israeli penetration, U.S. penetration, Saudi penetration and so this is not an open, if you will, arena where ISIS could just jump in and say, you know, we're gonna send in suicide bombers. It had to do a lot of work to be able to penetrate that and that speaks to ISIS' capabilities and sophistication. As for the implications, I mean look, ISIS has gamed all of these things out. We tend to look in the open sources, when you read stuff there is this assumption that somehow these are all sort of disconnected attacks that are not linked to some strategic objective. And at Geopolitical Futures, that's what we talk about is, we can't look at events as sort of randomly taking place or taking place as some entity hates another entity. There is a strategic objective. The strategic objective of ISIS is to, a) survive, especially now that it's under pressure, that you just mentioned. You know it's in the process of losing Raqqa. It'll take a long time, but that process has begun. At the same time, so there's that threat but there's also an opportunity. The opportunity is that the sectarian temperature in the region is at an all-time high and this would explain the timing of this attack. ISIS would like nothing more than for Iran and Saudi Arabia to go at each other because, a) it gives them some form of respite. You know, they're not the focus, and it undermines the struggle against ISIS. And b) it creates more opportunity for ISIS to exploit. The more there's sectarianism, the more the Saudis go and fight with Iran and vice versa, the more space there is for ISIS to grow. So I think that this attack in Iran has very deep implications moving forward. JLS: Those are all good points and I want to draw special attention to one of the points you made and then ask you to play what you're saying forward a little bit. First thing, I just want to point out is that you were talking about the Iranian Kurds and how they had somehow been radicalized and there was a sense of disenchantment, or disenchantment is probably not even strong enough, but an antagonism with the current regime in Tehran. And I just want to point out that it's very difficult to speak of the Kurds as a monolith. I think often times people say the word the Kurds and they think of you know just all the Kurds in the Middle East and they're all the same. But we really have to think of in terms of – there are Kurds in Iran, there are Kurds in Iraq, there are Kurds in Syria, there are Kurds in Turkey. They have different religious affiliations, different ideological affiliations, sometimes are speaking different languages that are almost unintelligible to each other. So I try very hard in my writing and when I am speaking about these types of things to be very specific about when I am talking about the Kurds and I thought one of the things you did there was you brought up was just how complicated that situation is and that, of course, has relevance throughout the region. We saw that the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government are talking about an independence referendum and maybe we can get to that in a little bit. But you gave a really good explanation of why this is extremely important from Iran's perspective. But what do you think Iran is going to do? What response does this mean Iran is going to have to make? What is the next step for Iran both in terms of, you know, Qatar, which it had some sort of relationship with and it can certainly see this diplomatic offensive led by Saudi Arabia as a diplomatic move against Iran, and then second of all this move by ISIS. What are the practical concrete things that Iran is going to have to do to respond here in the next couple weeks? KB: With regards to Qatar, what we have is a situation where its own GCC allies, its fellow Arab states, have shunned Doha. And so Doha right now needs a lot of friends. The United States has not de-aligned from Qatar and joined the Saudi bandwagon, so that's good. It's forging some sort of a relationship today, the Qatari foreign minister is in Moscow, so there's a Russian angle to that as well. We've already talked about Turkey. At this stage, it wouldn't hurt, necessarily, for Qatar to reach out or benefit from Iranian assistance, but it has to be very careful. It doesn't want to do something with Iran or get too close, especially now, and give a bigger stick to the Saudis with which Riyadh can beat Doha. And so, I think from a Qatari point of view, it's essential that they strike a balance when it comes to Iran. Conversely the Iranians, this is a great opening. And they would like to exploit this to the extent that it is possible. But I think that the Iranians are no illusion as to their limitations. They know that – they'll milk this for whatever it's worth. But they're not under the illusion that somehow Qatar will join them and be part of their camp. That's actually taking it too far. I don't think that they can rely on Qatar. But from the Iranian point of view, so long as Qatar is at odds and defying Saudi Arabia, that's good enough. They don't need more from Qatar and they will milk that to the extent that it is possible. As far as ISIS is concerned, I think that there are two things here. One is that both of them will benefit ISIS, both moves that the Iranians make will benefit ISIS. First is that there is an imperative for the government, for the security establishment, to make sure that this doesn't happen again or at least begin to neutralize, before it grows. There's a sizeable Sunni population in Iran. It's not just the Kurds, there's a sizeable Turkmen population in the northeast near Turkmenistan and there are some of the Arabs, not a majority, but a minority of the Arabs in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, the Ahwazi Arabs as they are called. They are, a minority of them and a significant one, are Sunnis as well. And then you have the big province in the southeast, that's Sistan and Baluchistan, and that province is majority Sunni and ethnically Baluch and already has a jihadist problem and there's cross-border terrorism that takes place where Baluch jihadist rebels go to Pakistan and then you know from there they have a sanctuary that they come in and they strike at the Iranian security forces. They've been pretty successful over the years in killing some very high-ranking IRGC commanders. So from Iran's point of view, this is a lot of vulnerability. So the Sunnis are suspect right now after what happened. I mean it's not easy and I've been to the Khomeini shrine and I can tell you that it's not something, it's not just a cake walk that you can get in there and do all this kind of stuff, let alone parliament. And so from the Iranian point of view, they feel very terrified right now because they used to think they're safe. And this is sort of really a wake-up call for them. So they're gonna go after the Sunnis. The more they go after the Sunnis, the more they are gonna create resentment, not just within their borders, but sectarian tensions are going to rise. And ISIS is going to say, see we told you, and they will have more recruits to go fight the “evil” Iranians and the “evil” Shiites. But at the same time, the Iranians do not think that this is ISIS alone. They deeply believe, at least their security establishment, and I saw a report yesterday where the Iranian intelligence minister was urging caution, saying, let's not jump to conclusions and let's not accuse the Saudis just yet. Let the investigation finish. But the security establishment and the hawks are convinced that there is, even though ISIS is involved, that there is a Saudi footprint in this attack and they'll give you evidence and they'll point to Saudi intent to undermine their country. And so they're gonna go after Saudi Arabia. They're gonna retaliate. It's horrible to predict another bombing, but if a bomb went off inside Saudi Arabia, I would not be surprised that it, you know, Iran somehow retaliated in that shape or form. I am not sure if it will. But I'm just saying that if it does that, then I wouldn't be surprised, because the Iranians, they're not going to just accept this. They have to retaliate and respond. The more they retaliate, they set into motion, they trigger a broader conflict. I am not saying the two sides are going to go to war, but it's going to an ugly proxy battle at least in the immediate future. JLS: In many ways, that proxy battle has already been going on. I think what you are talking about is going to be a real worsening of the situation and unfortunately, that's the way things are going in the Middle East right now. The last thing I want to touch on before we break is the Islamic State, because we've sort of been talking about them in a roundabout way when we talk about all these other issues, but for a long time, the Islamic State, and when I say long time I mean maybe the past two or three years, the Islamic State really has been the center of gravity I think in the Middle East. And I think one of the reasons we're seeing all of these things happening on the periphery is that the force of IS as the center of gravity is actually weakening because IS itself is actually weakening. Now I know that that doesn't mean that ISIS is going to disappear, but I think it does mean that the Islamic State as a strong territorial entity that can threaten some of the different states in the region from a conventional point of view, is actually weakening. So can you talk a little bit about what it means for the Islamic State to have come under such pressure at its capital in Raqqa and what Islamic State's activities are going to look like going forward? We know they're going to pull back a little bit and try and get strength in numbers and some strategic depth but ultimately they are outnumbered and they're outgunned. So they're probably going to have to go back to some tactics of blending back into the population and waiting really for a lot these sectarian dynamics that we're talking about right now to overwhelm the region once more so that they can take advantage of the power vacuum. KB: So I would compare what is happening to ISIS to what happened to the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11. They lost the cities, and for a while, they were an incoherent entity, but they weren't decimated or eliminated, they just were lying low. And they were slowly rebuilding themselves. And now they are at a point where – and I would say it's not just now, it's been the case all along, at least since 2003 – that they exist in ungoverned spaces outside the cities. See we have this perception that if you don't hold a city then you're not a serious player. That may be true at one level, but at another level, it just means that you are operating in an area where the good guys can't project power, at least not effectively, and you exist. So I think – I don't see necessarily just ISIS devolving into an insurgent movement or a terrorist organization – I think that the so-called caliphate is going to shift into a rural area. And this is not something that is a setback from an ISIS point of view, because I don't think that ISIS ever believed – I mean it's a serious player and they've been here before, it was not as big as what they have, I mean I'm talking about their holdings, but in Iraq, they have been driven out of cities before. They've been in the desert, in the rural areas, only to come back because the underlying political, economic, social circumstances really don't get addressed and its enemies start fighting with each other, providing the room for ISIS to once again revive itself. I think that it remains to be seen how quickly ISIS can be pushed out of Raqqa, pushed out of Deir al-Zour, into the desert. And even when it does go there, it's going to still have a space and the time to continue its activities, perhaps not as effectively as it has since Mosul. I think that ISIS knew this would come, ISIS did not believe that – you know, now they have Mosul, now they have Raqqa, now they have Deir al-Zour – that they're not going to see reversals. I think theirs is a very long game and they will go back and forth. And so I think that we need to be cautious when we talk about progress against ISIS. JLS: Is there anything that can be done to solve the underlying political and social circumstances that create ISIS and give ISIS fuel to continue running? KB: That would require the Iranians and the Saudis sitting at a table sharing drinks and having food, and you know that's not happening. So, if that's not happening, and I don't think that there's any power on Earth that can fix those underlying sectarian tensions. I mean if you just look at the Sunnis in Iraq. I mean, there's this big euphoria about how Mosul is no longer in ISIS hands. And I'm saying, well that is true and it is a victory and an important one. But I'm looking at a year, two years, three years down the line. The Sunnis are completely a shattered community in Iraq. They fight with each other. ISIS existed because there's no Sunni core, no Sunni mainstream in Iraq. Ωnd they're losing territory, especially now if the Kurds are moving towards independence, they'll lose territory to the Kurds. They have already lost ground to the Shiites. This is probably the first time, the price of removing ISIS from Mosul is Shiite control over Iraq's second largest city, which was majority Sunni and a majority of Sunnis and Kurds. Now you have a Shiite-dominated military force along with militias that are going to make sure that ISIS doesn't come back, and they're going to engage in some very brutal activities. And that's going to pour you know gasoline on the fire of sectarianism that's already burning. And that's, from an ISIS point of view, another opportunity to exploit and they're looking forward to it. And that's sort of the irony in all of this. JLS: Well it's not a hopeful note to end the week on but unfortunately, it's the reality. Thank you for joining us Kamran, and thank you, everyone, for listening. If you enjoyed this podcast, I encourage you to visit us at geopoliticalfutures.com. I also encourage you to email us with comments, critiques, suggestions for topics and anything else you want. You can just email us at comments@geopoliticalfutures.com. I'm Jacob Shapiro, I'm the director of analysis, and we'll see you out here next week.

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