Podcasts about formosa

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

Bargirls, bar fights, beer, and bong hits – yes, those topics are covered, but this interview features much more than salacious tales. TC Brown, who first came here at the age of 18, served in the U.S. Air Force as a police officer – or “Sky Cop” – at the famous CCK Air Base in Taichung during the Vietnam War era. Brown's recent book, Made in Taiwan, is a wonderfully honest memoir; an important first-hand account of his five-year deployment and a glimpse into a radically different Taiwan, and he's a great storyteller… as you will hear. Please rate or review the program! It helps people find the show.

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

Last time we spoke about the surrender of Japan. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender on August 15, prompting mixed public reactions: grief, shock, and sympathy for the Emperor, tempered by fear of hardship and occupation. The government's response included resignations and suicide as new leadership was brought in under Prime Minister Higashikuni, with Mamoru Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister and Kawabe Torashiro heading a delegation to Manila. General MacArthur directed the occupation plan, “Blacklist,” prioritizing rapid, phased entry into key Japanese areas and Korea, while demobilizing enemy forces. The surrender ceremony occurred aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, with Wainwright, Percival, Nimitz, and UN representatives in attendance. Civilians and soldiers across Asia began surrendering, and postwar rehabilitation, Indochina and Vietnam's independence movements, and Southeast Asian transitions rapidly unfolded as Allied forces established control. This episode is the Aftermath of the Pacific War Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Pacific War has ended. Peace has been restored by the Allies and most of the places conquered by the Japanese Empire have been liberated. In this post-war period, new challenges would be faced for those who won the war; and from the ashes of an empire, a defeated nation was also seeking to rebuild. As the Japanese demobilized their armed forces, many young boys were set to return to their homeland, even if they had previously thought that they wouldn't survive the ordeal. And yet, there were some cases of isolated men that would continue to fight for decades even, unaware that the war had already ended.  As we last saw, after the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur's forces began the occupation of the Japanese home islands, while their overseas empire was being dismantled by the Allies. To handle civil administration, MacArthur established the Military Government Section, commanded by Brigadier-General William Crist, staffed by hundreds of US experts trained in civil governance who were reassigned from Okinawa and the Philippines. As the occupation began, Americans dispatched tactical units and Military Government Teams to each prefecture to ensure that policies were faithfully carried out. By mid-September, General Eichelberger's 8th Army had taken over the Tokyo Bay region and began deploying to occupy Hokkaido and the northern half of Honshu. Then General Krueger's 6th Army arrived in late September, taking southern Honshu and Shikoku, with its base in Kyoto. In December, 6th Army was relieved of its occupation duties; in January 1946, it was deactivated, leaving the 8th Army as the main garrison force. By late 1945, about 430,000 American soldiers were garrisoned across Japan. President Truman approved inviting Allied involvement on American terms, with occupation armies integrated into a US command structure. Yet with the Chinese civil war and Russia's reluctance to place its forces under MacArthur's control, only Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand sent brigades, more than 40,000 troops in southwestern Japan. Japanese troops were gradually disarmed by order of their own commanders, so the stigma of surrender would be less keenly felt by the individual soldier. In the homeland, about 1.5 million men were discharged and returned home by the end of August. Demobilization overseas, however, proceeded, not quickly, but as a long, difficult process of repatriation. In compliance with General Order No. 1, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters disbanded on September 13 and was superseded by the Japanese War Department to manage demobilization. By November 1, the homeland had demobilized 2,228,761 personnel, roughly 97% of the Homeland Army. Yet some 6,413,215 men remained to be repatriated from overseas. On December 1, the Japanese War Ministry dissolved, and the First Demobilization Ministry took its place. The Second Demobilization Ministry was established to handle IJN demobilization, with 1,299,868 sailors, 81% of the Navy, demobilized by December 17. Japanese warships and merchant ships had their weapons rendered inoperative, and suicide craft were destroyed. Forty percent of naval vessels were allocated to evacuations in the Philippines, and 60% to evacuations of other Pacific islands. This effort eventually repatriated about 823,984 men to Japan by February 15, 1946. As repatriation accelerated, by October 15 only 1,909,401 men remained to be repatriated, most of them in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Higashikuni Cabinet and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru managed to persuade MacArthur not to impose direct military rule or martial law over all of Japan. Instead, the occupation would be indirect, guided by the Japanese government under the Emperor's direction. An early decision to feed occupation forces from American supplies, and to allow the Japanese to use their own limited food stores, helped ease a core fear: that Imperial forces would impose forced deliveries on the people they conquered. On September 17, MacArthur transferred his headquarters from Yokohama to Tokyo, setting up primary offices on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, an imposing edifice overlooking the moat and the Imperial palace grounds in Hibiya, a symbolic heart of the nation.  While the average soldier did not fit the rapacious image of wartime Japanese propagandists, occupation personnel often behaved like neo-colonial overlords. The conquerors claimed privileges unimaginable to most Japanese. Entire trains and train compartments, fitted with dining cars, were set aside for the exclusive use of occupation forces. These silenced, half-empty trains sped past crowded platforms, provoking ire as Japanese passengers were forced to enter and exit packed cars through punched-out windows, or perch on carriage roofs, couplings, and running boards, often with tragic consequences. The luxury express coaches became irresistible targets for anonymous stone-throwers. During the war, retrenchment measures had closed restaurants, cabarets, beer halls, geisha houses, and theatres in Tokyo and other large cities. Now, a vast leisure industry sprang up to cater to the needs of the foreign occupants. Reopened restaurants and theatres, along with train stations, buses, and streetcars, were sometimes kept off limits to Allied personnel, partly for security, partly to avoid burdening Japanese resources, but a costly service infrastructure was built to the occupiers' specifications. Facilities reserved for occupation troops bore large signs reading “Japanese Keep Out” or “For Allied Personnel Only.” In downtown Tokyo, important public buildings requisitioned for occupation use had separate entrances for Americans and Japanese. The effect? A subtle but clear colour bar between the predominantly white conquerors and the conquered “Asiatic” Japanese. Although MacArthur was ready to work through the Japanese government, he lacked the organizational infrastructure to administer a nation of 74 million. Consequently, on October 2, MacArthur dissolved the Military Government Section and inaugurated General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, a separate headquarters focused on civil affairs and operating in tandem with the Army high command. SCAP immediately assumed responsibility for administering the Japanese home islands. It commandeered every large building not burned down to house thousands of civilians and requisitioned vast tracts of prime real estate to quarter several hundred thousand troops in the Tokyo–Yokohama area alone. Amidst the rise of American privilege, entire buildings were refurbished as officers' clubs, replete with slot machines and gambling parlours installed at occupation expense. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted over Tokyo, while the display of the Rising Sun was banned; and the downtown area, known as “Little America,” was transformed into a US enclave. The enclave mentality of this cocooned existence was reinforced by the arrival within the first six months of roughly 700 American families. At the peak of the occupation, about 14,800 families employed some 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the “rigours” of overseas duty. Even enlisted men in the sparse quonset-hut towns around the city lived like kings compared with ordinary Japanese. Japanese workers cleaned barracks, did kitchen chores, and handled other base duties. The lowest private earned a 25% hardship bonus until these special allotments were discontinued in 1949. Most military families quickly adjusted to a pampered lifestyle that went beyond maids and “boys,” including cooks, laundresses, babysitters, gardeners, and masseuses. Perks included spacious quarters with swimming pools, central heating, hot running water, and modern plumbing. Two observers compared GHQ to the British Raj at its height. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, warned during his 1948 mission to Japan that Americans had monopolized “everything that smacks of comfort or elegance or luxury,” criticizing what he called the “American brand of philistinism” and the “monumental imperviousness” of MacArthur's staff to the Japanese suffering. This conqueror's mentality also showed in the bullying attitudes many top occupation officials displayed toward the Japanese with whom they dealt. Major Faubion Bowers, MacArthur's military secretary, later said, “I and nearly all the occupation people I knew were extremely conceited and extremely arrogant and used our power every inch of the way.” Initially, there were spasms of defiance against the occupation forces, such as anonymous stone-throwing, while armed robbery and minor assaults against occupation personnel were rife in the weeks and months after capitulation. Yet active resistance was neither widespread nor organized. The Americans successfully completed their initial deployment without violence, an astonishing feat given a heavily armed and vastly superior enemy operating on home terrain. The average citizen regarded the occupation as akin to force majeure, the unfortunate but inevitable aftermath of a natural calamity. Japan lay prostrate. Industrial output had fallen to about 10% of pre-war levels, and as late as 1946, more than 13 million remained unemployed. Nearly 40% of Japan's urban areas had been turned to rubble, and some 9 million people were homeless. The war-displaced, many of them orphans, slept in doorways and hallways, in bombed-out ruins, dugouts and packing crates, under bridges or on pavements, and crowded the hallways of train and subway stations. As winter 1945 descended, with food, fuel, and clothing scarce, people froze to death. Bonfires lit the streets to ward off the chill. "The only warm hands I have shaken thus far in Japan belonged to Americans," Mark Gayn noted in December 1945. "The Japanese do not have much of a chance to thaw out, and their hands are cold and red." Unable to afford shoes, many wore straw sandals; those with geta felt themselves privileged. The sight of a man wearing a woman's high-buttoned shoes in winter epitomized the daily struggle to stay dry and warm. Shantytowns built of scrap wood, rusted metal, and scavenged odds and ends sprang up everywhere, resembling vast junk yards. The poorest searched smouldering refuse heaps for castoffs that might be bartered for a scrap to eat or wear. Black markets (yami'ichi) run by Japanese, Koreans, and For-mosans mushroomed to replace collapsed distribution channels and cash in on inflated prices. Tokyo became "a world of scarcity in which every nail, every rag, and even a tangerine peel [had a] market value." Psychologically numbed, disoriented, and disillusioned with their leaders, demobilized veterans and civilians alike struggled to get their bearings, shed militaristic ideologies, and begin to embrace new values. In the vacuum of defeat, the Japanese people appeared ready to reject the past and grasp at the straw held out by the former enemy. Relations between occupier and occupied were not smooth, however. American troops comported themselves like conquerors, especially in the early weeks and months of occupation. Much of the violence was directed against women, with the first attacks beginning within hours after the landing of advance units. When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence, and drunken brawling ensued. Newspaper accounts reported 931 serious offences by GIs in the Yokohama area during the first week of occupation, including 487 armed robberies, 411 thefts of currency or goods, 9 rapes, 5 break-ins, 3 cases of assault and battery, and 16 other acts of lawlessness. In the first 10 days of occupation, there were 1,336 reported rapes by US soldiers in Kanagawa Prefecture alone. Americans were not the only perpetrators. A former prostitute recalled that when Australian troops arrived in Kure in early 1946, they “dragged young women into their jeeps, took them to the mountain, and then raped them. I heard them screaming for help nearly every night.” Such behaviour was commonplace, but news of criminal activity by occupation forces was quickly suppressed. On September 10, 1945, SCAP issued press and pre-censorship codes outlawing the publication of reports and statistics "inimical to the objectives of the occupation." In the sole instance of self-help General Eichelberger records in his memoirs, when locals formed a vigilante group and retaliated against off-duty GIs, 8th Army ordered armored vehicles into the streets and arrested the ringleaders, who received lengthy prison terms. Misbehavior ranged from black-market activity, petty theft, reckless driving, and disorderly conduct to vandalism, arson, murder, and rape. Soldiers and sailors often broke the law with impunity, and incidents of robbery, rape, and even murder were widely reported. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent; victims, shunned as outcasts, sometimes turned to prostitution in desperation, while others took their own lives to avoid bringing shame to their families. Military courts arrested relatively few soldiers for these offenses and convicted even fewer; Japanese attempts at self-defense were punished severely, and restitution for victims was rare. Fearing the worst, Japanese authorities had already prepared countermeasures against the supposed rapacity of foreign soldiers. Imperial troops in East Asia and the Pacific had behaved brutally toward women, so the government established “sexual comfort-stations” manned by geisha, bar hostesses, and prostitutes to “satisfy the lust of the Occupation forces,” as the Higashikuni Cabinet put it. A budget of 100 million yen was set aside for these Recreation and Amusement Associations, financed initially with public funds but run as private enterprises under police supervision. Through these, the government hoped to protect the daughters of the well-born and middle class by turning to lower-class women to satisfy the soldiers' sexual appetites. By the end of 1945, brothel operators had rounded up an estimated 20,000 young women and herded them into RAA establishments nationwide. Eventually, as many as 70,000 are said to have ended up in the state-run sex industry. Thankfully, as military discipline took hold and fresh troops replaced the Allied veterans responsible for the early crime wave, violence subsided and the occupier's patronising behavior and the ugly misdeeds of a lawless few were gradually overlooked. However, fraternisation was frowned upon by both sides, and segregation was practiced in principle, with the Japanese excluded from areas reserved for Allied personnel until September 1949, when MacArthur lifted virtually all restrictions on friendly association, stating that he was “establishing the same relations between occupation personnel and the Japanese population as exists between troops stationed in the United States and the American people.” In principle, the Occupation's administrative structure was highly complex. The Far Eastern Commission, based in Washington, included representatives from all 13 countries that had fought against Japan and was established in 1946 to formulate basic principles. The Allied Council for Japan was created in the same year to assist in developing and implementing surrender terms and in administering the country. It consisted of representatives from the USA, the USSR, Nationalist China, and the British Commonwealth. Although both bodies were active at first, they were largely ineffectual due to unwieldy decision-making, disagreements between the national delegations (especially the USA and USSR), and the obstructionism of General Douglas MacArthur. In practice, SCAP, the executive authority of the occupation, effectively ruled Japan from 1945 to 1952. And since it took orders only from the US government, the Occupation became primarily an American affair. The US occupation program, effectively carried out by SCAP, was revolutionary and rested on a two-pronged approach. To ensure Japan would never again become a menace to the United States or to world peace, SCAP pursued disarmament and demilitarization, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war. This involved destroying military supplies and installations, demobilizing more than five million Japanese soldiers, and thoroughly discrediting the military establishment. Accordingly, SCAP ordered the purge of tens of thousands of designated persons from public service positions, including accused war criminals, military officers, leaders of ultranationalist societies, leaders in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, business leaders tied to overseas expansion, governors of former Japanese colonies, and national leaders who had steered Japan into war. In addition, MacArthur's International Military Tribunal for the Far East established a military court in Tokyo. It had jurisdiction over those charged with Class A crimes, top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Also considered were Class B charges, covering conventional war crimes, and Class C charges, covering crimes against humanity. Yet the military court in Tokyo wouldn't be the only one. More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Of the 5,700 Japanese individuals indicted for Class B war crimes, 984 were sentenced to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. Among these, many, like General Ando Rikichi and Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, chose to commit suicide before facing prosecution. Notable cases include Lieutenant-General Tani Hisao, who was sentenced to death by the Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal for his role in the Nanjing Massacre; Lieutenant-General Sakai Takashi, who was executed in Nanjing for the murder of British and Chinese civilians during the occupation of Hong Kong. General Okamura Yasuji was convicted of war crimes by the Tribunal, yet he was immediately protected by the personal order of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek, who kept him as a military adviser for the Kuomintang. In the Manila trials, General Yamashita Tomoyuki was sentenced to death as he was in overall command during the Sook Ching massacre, the Rape of Manila, and other atrocities. Lieutenant-General Homma Masaharu was likewise executed in Manila for atrocities committed by troops under his command during the Bataan Death March. General Imamura Hitoshi was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he considered the punishment too light and even had a replica of the prison built in his garden, remaining there until his death in 1968. Lieutenant-General Kanda Masatane received a 14-year sentence for war crimes on Bougainville, though he served only four years. Lieutenant-General Adachi Hatazo was sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in New Guinea and subsequently committed suicide on September 10, 1947. Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro received three years of forced labour for using a hospital ship to transport troops. Lieutenant-General Baba Masao was sentenced to death for ordering the Sandakan Death Marches, during which over 2,200 Australian and British prisoners of war perished. Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake was sentenced to death by a Dutch military tribunal for unspecified war crimes. Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu was executed in Guam for ordering the Wake Island massacre, in which 98 American civilians were murdered. Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae was condemned to death in Guam for permitting subordinates to execute three downed American airmen captured in Palau, though his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1951 and he was released in 1953. Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio was sentenced to death in Guam for his role in the Chichijima Incident, in which eight American airmen were cannibalized. By mid-1945, due to the Allied naval blockade, the 25,000 Japanese troops on Chichijima had run low on supplies. However, although the daily rice ration had been reduced from 400 grams per person per day to 240 grams, the troops were not at risk of starvation. In February and March 1945, in what would later be called the Chichijima incident, Tachibana Yoshio's senior staff turned to cannibalism. Nine American airmen had escaped from their planes after being shot down during bombing raids on Chichijima, eight of whom were captured. The ninth, the only one to evade capture, was future US President George H. W. Bush, then a 20-year-old pilot. Over several months, the prisoners were executed, and reportedly by the order of Major Matoba Sueyo, their bodies were butchered by the division's medical orderlies, with the livers and other organs consumed by the senior staff, including Matoba's superior Tachibana. In the Yokohama War Crimes Trials, Lieutenant-Generals Inada Masazumi and Yokoyama Isamu were convicted for their complicity in vivisection and other human medical experiments performed at Kyushu Imperial University on downed Allied airmen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which began in May 1946 and lasted two and a half years, resulted in the execution by hanging of Generals Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishiro, and former Prime Ministers Hirota Koki and Tojo Hideki, for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, specifically for the escalation of the Pacific War and for permitting the inhumane treatment of prisoners of war. Also sentenced to death were Lieutenant-General Muto Akira for his role in the Nanjing and Manila massacres; General Kimura Heitaro for planning the war strategy in China and Southeast Asia and for laxity in preventing atrocities against prisoners of war in Burma; and General Matsui Iwane for his involvement in the Rape of Nanjing. The seven defendants who were sentenced to death were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. Sixteen others were sentenced to life imprisonment, including the last Field Marshal Hata Shunroku, Generals Araki Sadao, Minami Hiro, and Umezu Shojiro, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro, former Prime Ministers Hiranuma Kiichiro and Koiso Kuniaki, Marquis Kido Koichi, and Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, a major instigator of the second Sino-Japanese War. Additionally, former Foreign Ministers Togo Shigenori and Shigemitsu Mamoru received seven- and twenty-year sentences, respectively. The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials of Japanese war criminals, including the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, which tried and found guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial, as MacArthur granted immunity to Lieutenant-General Ishii Shiro and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ-w warfare data derived from human experimentation. If you would like to learn more about what I like to call Japan's Operation Paper clip, whereupon the US grabbed many scientists from Unit 731, check out my exclusive podcast. The SCAP-turn to democratization began with the drafting of a new constitution in 1947, addressing Japan's enduring feudal social structure. In the charter, sovereignty was vested in the people, and the emperor was designated a “symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people in whom resides sovereign power.” Because the emperor now possessed fewer powers than European constitutional monarchs, some have gone so far as to say that Japan became “a republic in fact if not in name.” Yet the retention of the emperor was, in fact, a compromise that suited both those who wanted to preserve the essence of the nation for stability and those who demanded that the emperor system, though not necessarily the emperor, should be expunged. In line with the democratic spirit of the new constitution, the peerage was abolished and the two-chamber Diet, to which the cabinet was now responsible, became the highest organ of state. The judiciary was made independent and local autonomy was granted in vital areas of jurisdiction such as education and the police. Moreover, the constitution stipulated that “the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights,” that they “shall be respected as individuals,” and that “their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall … be the supreme consideration in legislation.” Its 29 articles guaranteed basic human rights: equality, freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. Finally, in its most controversial section, Article 9, the “peace clause,” Japan “renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation” and vowed not to maintain any military forces and “other war potential.” To instill a thoroughly democratic ethos, reforms touched every facet of society. The dissolution of the zaibatsu decentralised economic power; the 1945 Labour Union Law and the 1946 Labour Relations Act guaranteed workers the right to collective action; the 1947 Labour Standards Law established basic working standards for men and women; and the revised Civil Code of 1948 abolished the patriarchal household and enshrined sexual equality. Reflecting core American principles, SCAP introduced a 6-3-3 schooling system, six years of compulsory elementary education, three years of junior high, and an optional three years of senior high, along with the aim of secular, locally controlled education. More crucially, ideological reform followed: censorship of feudal material in media, revision of textbooks, and prohibition of ideas glorifying war, dying for the emperor, or venerating war heroes. With women enfranchised and young people shaped to counter militarism and ultranationalism, rural Japan was transformed to undermine lingering class divisions. The land reform program provided for the purchase of all land held by absentee landlords, allowed resident landlords and owner-farmers to retain a set amount of land, and required that the remaining land be sold to the government so it could be offered to existing tenants. In 1948, amid the intensifying tensions of the Cold War that would soon culminate in the Korean War, the occupation's focus shifted from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation and, ultimately, the remilitarization of Japan, an shift now known as the “Reverse Course.” The country was thus rebuilt as the Pacific region's primary bulwark against the spread of Communism. An Economic Stabilisation Programme was introduced, including a five-year plan to coordinate production and target capital through the Reconstruction Finance Bank. In 1949, the anti-inflationary Dodge Plan was adopted, advocating balanced budgets, fixing the exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar, and ending broad government intervention. Additionally, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was formed and supported the formation of conglomerates centered around banks, which encouraged the reemergence of a somewhat weakened set of zaibatsu, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. By the end of the Occupation era, Japan was on the verge of surpassing its 1934–1936 levels of economic growth. Equally important was Japan's rearmament in alignment with American foreign policy: a National Police Reserve of about 75,000 was created with the outbreak of the Korean War; by 1952 it had expanded to 110,000 and was renamed the Self-Defense Force after the inclusion of an air force. However, the Reverse Course also facilitated the reestablishment of conservative politics and the rollback of gains made by women and the reforms of local autonomy and education. As the Occupation progressed, the Americans permitted greater Japanese initiative, and power gradually shifted from the reformers to the moderates. By 1949, the purge of the right came under review, and many who had been condemned began returning to influence, if not to the Diet, then to behind-the-scenes power. At the same time, Japanese authorities, with MacArthur's support, began purging left-wing activists. In June 1950, for example, the central office of the Japan Communist Party and the editorial board of The Red Flag were purged. The gains made by women also seemed to be reversed. Women were elected to 8% of available seats in the first lower-house election in 1946, but to only 2% in 1952, a trend not reversed until the so-called Madonna Boom of the 1980s. Although the number of women voting continued to rise, female politicisation remained more superficial than might be imagined. Women's employment also appeared little affected by labour legislation: though women formed nearly 40% of the labor force in 1952, they earned only 45% as much as men. Indeed, women's attitudes toward labor were influenced less by the new ethos of fulfilling individual potential than by traditional views of family and workplace responsibilities. In the areas of local autonomy and education, substantial modifications were made to the reforms. Because local authorities lacked sufficient power to tax, they were unable to realise their extensive powers, and, as a result, key responsibilities were transferred back to national jurisdiction. In 1951, for example, 90% of villages and towns placed their police forces under the control of the newly formed National Police Agency. Central control over education was also gradually reasserted; in 1951, the Yoshida government attempted to reintroduce ethics classes, proposed tighter central oversight of textbooks, and recommended abolishing local school board elections. By the end of the decade, all these changes had been implemented. The Soviet occupation of the Kurile Islands and the Habomai Islets was completed with Russian troops fully deployed by September 5. Immediately after the onset of the occupation, amid a climate of insecurity and fear marked by reports of sporadic rape and physical assault and widespread looting by occupying troops, an estimated 4,000 islanders fled to Hokkaido rather than face an uncertain repatriation. As Soviet forces moved in, they seized or destroyed telephone and telegraph installations and halted ship movements into and out of the islands, leaving residents without adequate food and other winter provisions. Yet, unlike Manchuria, where Japanese civilians faced widespread sexual violence and pillage, systematic violence against the civilian population on the Kuriles appears to have been exceptional. A series of military government proclamations assured islanders of safety so long as they did not resist Soviet rule and carried on normally; however, these orders also prohibited activities not explicitly authorized by the Red Army, which imposed many hardships on civilians. Residents endured harsh conditions under Soviet rule until late 1948, when Japanese repatriation out of the Kurils was completed. The Kuriles posed a special diplomatic problem, as the occupation of the southernmost islands—the Northern Territories—ignited a long-standing dispute between Tokyo and Moscow that continues to impede the normalisation of relations today. Although the Kuriles were promised to the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement, Japan and the United States argued that this did not apply to the Northern Territories, since they were not part of the Kurile Islands. A substantial dispute regarding the status of the Kurile Islands arose between the United States and the Soviet Union during the preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco, which was intended as a permanent peace treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers of World War II. The treaty was ultimately signed by 49 nations in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and came into force on April 28, 1952. It ended Japan's role as an imperial power, allocated compensation to Allied nations and former prisoners of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes, ended the Allied post-war occupation of Japan, and returned full sovereignty to Japan. Effectively, the document officially renounced Japan's treaty rights derived from the Boxer Protocol of 1901 and its rights to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, the Spratly Islands, Antarctica, and South Sakhalin. Japan's South Seas Mandate, namely the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Caroline Islands, had already been formally revoked by the United Nations on July 18, 1947, making the United States responsible for administration of those islands under a UN trusteeship agreement that established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In turn, the Bonin, Volcano, and Ryukyu Islands were progressively restored to Japan between 1953 and 1972, along with the Senkaku Islands, which were disputed by both Communist and Nationalist China. In addition, alongside the Treaty of San Francisco, Japan and the United States signed a Security Treaty that established a long-lasting military alliance between them. Although Japan renounced its rights to the Kuriles, the U.S. State Department later clarified that “the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... are properly part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them,” hence why the Soviets refused to sign the treaty. Britain and the United States agreed that territorial rights would not be granted to nations that did not sign the Treaty of San Francisco, and as a result the Kurile Islands were not formally recognized as Soviet territory. A separate peace treaty, the Treaty of Taipei (formally the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty), was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952 between Japan and the Kuomintang, and on June 9 of that year the Treaty of Peace Between Japan and India followed. Finally, Japan and the Soviet Union ended their formal state of war with the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, though this did not settle the Kurile Islands dispute. Even after these formal steps, Japan as a nation was not in a formal state of war, and many Japanese continued to believe the war was ongoing; those who held out after the surrender came to be known as Japanese holdouts.  Captain Oba Sakae and his medical company participated in the Saipan campaign beginning on July 7, 1944, and took part in what would become the largest banzai charge of the Pacific War. After 15 hours of intense hand-to-hand combat, almost 4,300 Japanese soldiers were dead, and Oba and his men were presumed among them. In reality, however, he survived the battle and gradually assumed command of over a hundred additional soldiers. Only five men from his original unit survived the battle, two of whom died in the following months. Oba then led over 200 Japanese civilians deeper into the jungles to evade capture, organizing them into mountain caves and hidden jungle villages. When the soldiers were not assisting the civilians with survival tasks, Oba and his men continued their battle against the garrison of US Marines. He used the 1,552‑ft Mount Tapochau as their primary base, which offered an unobstructed 360-degree view of the island. From their base camp on the western slope of the mountain, Oba and his men occasionally conducted guerrilla-style raids on American positions. Due to the speed and stealth of these operations, and the Marines' frustrated attempts to find him, the Saipan Marines eventually referred to Oba as “The Fox.” Oba and his men held out on the island for 512 days, or about 16 months. On November 27, 1945, former Major-General Amo Umahachi was able to draw out some of the Japanese in hiding by singing the anthem of the Japanese infantry branch. Amo was then able to present documents from the defunct IGHQ to Oba ordering him and his 46 remaining men to surrender themselves to the Americans. On December 1, the Japanese soldiers gathered on Tapochau and sang a song of departure to the spirits of the war dead; Oba led his people out of the jungle and they presented themselves to the Marines of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company. With great formality and commensurate dignity, Oba surrendered his sword to Lieutenant Colonel Howard G. Kirgis, and his men surrendered their arms and colors. On January 2, 1946, 20 Japanese soldiers hiding in a tunnel at Corregidor Island surrendered after learning the war had ended from a newspaper found while collecting water. In that same month, 120 Japanese were routed after a battle in the mountains 150 miles south of Manila. In April, during a seven-week campaign to clear Lubang Island, 41 more Japanese emerged from the jungle, unaware that the war had ended; however, a group of four Japanese continued to resist. In early 1947, Lieutenant Yamaguchi Ei and his band of 33 soldiers renewed fighting with the small Marine garrison on Peleliu, prompting reinforcements under Rear-Admiral Charles Pownall to be brought to the island to hunt down the guerrilla group. Along with them came former Rear-Admiral Sumikawa Michio, who ultimately convinced Yamaguchi to surrender in April after almost three years of guerrilla warfare. Also in April, seven Japanese emerged from Palawan Island and fifteen armed stragglers emerged from Luzon. In January 1948, 200 troops surrendered on Mindanao; and on May 12, the Associated Press reported that two unnamed Japanese soldiers had surrendered to civilian policemen in Guam the day before. On January 6, 1949, two former IJN soldiers, machine gunners Matsudo Rikio and Yamakage Kufuku, were discovered on Iwo Jima and surrendered peacefully. In March 1950, Private Akatsu Yūichi surrendered in the village of Looc, leaving only three Japanese still resisting on Lubang. By 1951 a group of Japanese on Anatahan Island refused to believe that the war was over and resisted every attempt by the Navy to remove them. This group was first discovered in February 1945, when several Chamorros from Saipan were sent to the island to recover the bodies of a Saipan-based B-29. The Chamorros reported that there were about thirty Japanese survivors from three ships sunk in June 1944, one of which was an Okinawan woman. Personal aggravations developed from the close confines of a small group on a small island and from tuba drinking; among the holdouts, 6 of 11 deaths were the result of violence, and one man displayed 13 knife wounds. The presence of only one woman, Higa Kazuko, caused considerable difficulty as she would transfer her affections among at least four men after each of them mysteriously disappeared, purportedly “swallowed by the waves while fishing.” According to the more sensational versions of the Anatahan tale, 11 of the 30 navy sailors stranded on the island died due to violent struggles over her affections. In July 1950, Higa went to the beach when an American vessel appeared offshore and finally asked to be removed from the island. She was taken to Saipan aboard the Miss Susie and, upon arrival, told authorities that the men on the island did not believe the war was over. As the Japanese government showed interest in the situation on Anatahan, the families of the holdouts were contacted in Japan and urged by the Navy to write letters stating that the war was over and that the holdouts should surrender. The letters were dropped by air on June 26 and ultimately convinced the holdouts to give themselves up. Thus, six years after the end of World War II, “Operation Removal” commenced from Saipan under the command of Lt. Commander James B. Johnson, USNR, aboard the Navy Tug USS Cocopa. Johnson and an interpreter went ashore by rubber boat and formally accepted the surrender on the morning of June 30, 1951. The Anatahan femme fatale story later inspired the 1953 Japanese film Anatahan and the 1998 novel Cage on the Sea. In 1953, Murata Susumu, the last holdout on Tinian, was finally captured. The next year, on May 7, Corporal Sumada Shoichi was killed in a clash with Filipino soldiers, leaving only two Japanese still resisting on Lubang. In November 1955, Seaman Kinoshita Noboru was captured in the Luzon jungle but soon after committed suicide rather than “return to Japan in defeat.” That same year, four Japanese airmen surrendered at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea; and in 1956, nine soldiers were located and sent home from Morotai, while four men surrendered on Mindoro. In May 1960, Sergeant Ito Masashi became one of the last Japanese to surrender at Guam after the capture of his comrade Private Minagawa Bunzo, but the final surrender at Guam would come later with Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi. Sergeant Yokoi Shoichi survived in the jungles of Guam by living for years in an elaborately dug hole, subsisting on snails and lizards, a fate that, while undignified, showcased his ingenuity and resilience and earned him a warm welcome on his return to Japan. His capture was not heroic in the traditional sense: he was found half-starving by a group of villagers while foraging for shrimp in a stream, and the broader context included his awareness as early as 1952 that the war had ended. He explained that the wartime bushido code, emphasizing self-sacrifice or suicide rather than self-preservation, had left him fearing that repatriation would label him a deserter and likely lead to execution. Emerging from the jungle, Yokoi also became a vocal critic of Japan's wartime leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, which fits a view of him as a product of, and a prisoner within, his own education, military training, and the censorship and propaganda of the era. When asked by a young nephew how he survived so long on an island just a short distance from a major American airbase, he replied simply, “I was really good at hide and seek.”  That same year, Private Kozuka Kinshichi was killed in a shootout with Philippine police in October, leaving Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo still resisting on Lubang. Lieutenant Onoda Hiroo had been on Lubang since 1944, a few months before the Americans retook the Philippines. The last instructions he had received from his immediate superior ordered him to retreat to the interior of the island and harass the Allied occupying forces until the IJA eventually returned. Despite efforts by the Philippine Army, letters and newspapers left for him, radio broadcasts, and even a plea from Onoda's brother, he did not believe the war was over. On February 20, 1974, Onoda encountered a young Japanese university dropout named Suzuki Norio, who was traveling the world and had told friends that he planned to “look for Lieutenant Onoda, a panda, and the abominable snowman, in that order.” The two became friends, but Onoda stated that he was waiting for orders from one of his commanders. On March 9, 1974, Onoda went to an agreed-upon place and found a note left by Suzuki. Suzuki had brought along Onoda's former commander, Major Taniguchi, who delivered the oral orders for Onoda to surrender. Intelligence Officer 2nd Lt. Onoda Hiroo thus emerged from Lubang's jungle with his .25 caliber rifle, 500 rounds of ammunition, and several hand grenades. He surrendered 29 years after Japan's formal surrender, and 15 years after being declared legally dead in Japan. When he accepted that the war was over, he wept openly. He received a hero's welcome upon his return to Japan in 1974. The Japanese government offered him a large sum of money in back pay, which he refused. When money was pressed on him by well-wishers, he donated it to Yasukuni Shrine. Onoda was reportedly unhappy with the attention and what he saw as the withering of traditional Japanese values. He wrote No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War, a best-selling autobiography published in 1974. Yet the last Japanese to surrender would be Private Nakamura Teruo, an Amis aborigine from Formosa and a member of the Takasago Volunteers. Private Nakamura Teruo spent the tail end of World War II with a dwindling band on Morotai, repeatedly dispersing and reassembling in the jungle as they hunted for food. The group suffered continuous losses to starvation and disease, and survivors described Nakamura as highly self-sufficient. He left to live alone somewhere in the Morotai highlands between 1946 and 1947, rejoined the main group in 1950, and then disappeared again a few years later. Nakamura hinted in print that he fled into the jungle because he feared the other holdouts might murder him. He survives for decades beyond the war, eventually being found by 11 Indonesian soldiers. The emergence of an indigenous Taiwanese soldier among the search party embarrassed Japan as it sought to move past its imperial past. Many Japanese felt Nakamura deserved compensation for decades of loyalty, only to learn that his back pay for three decades of service amounted to 68,000 yen.   Nakamura's experience of peace was complex. When a journalist asked how he felt about “wasting” three decades of his life on Morotai, he replied that the years had not been wasted; he had been serving his country. Yet the country he returned to was Taiwan, and upon disembarking in Taipei in early January 1975, he learned that his wife had a son he had never met and that she had remarried a decade after his official death. Nakamura eventually lived with a daughter, and his story concluded with a bittersweet note when his wife reconsidered and reconciled with him. Several Japanese soldiers joined local Communist and insurgent groups after the war to avoid surrender. Notably, in 1956 and 1958, two soldiers returned to Japan after service in China's People's Liberation Army. Two others who defected with a larger group to the Malayan Communist Party around 1945 laid down their arms in 1989 and repatriated the next year, becoming among the last to return home. That is all for today, but fear not I will provide a few more goodies over the next few weeks. I will be releasing some of my exclusive podcast episodes from my youtube membership and patreon that are about pacific war subjects. Like I promised the first one will be on why Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Until then if you need your fix you know where to find me: eastern front week by week, fall and rise of china, echoes of war or on my Youtube membership of patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

Last time we spoke about the Soviet Victory in Asia. After atomic bombings and Japan's surrender, the Soviets launched a rapid Manchurian invasion, driving toward Harbin, Mukden, Changchun, and Beijing. Shenyang was taken, seeing the capture of the last Emperor of China, Pu Yi. The Soviets continued their advances into Korea with port captures at Gensan and Pyongyang, and occupation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, ahead of anticipated American intervention. Stalin pushed for speed to avoid US naval landings, coordinating with Chinese forces and leveraging the Sino-Soviet pact while balancing relations with Chiang Kai-shek. As fronts closed, tens of thousands of Japanese POWs were taken, while harsh wartime reprisals, looting, and mass sexual violence against Japanese, Korean, and Chinese civilians were reported.  This episode is the Surrender of Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  With the Manchurian Campaign over and Japan's surrender confirmed, we've reached the end of the Pacific War and the ushering of a new era. This journey took us 3 years, 8 months, and 27 days and it's been a rollercoaster. We've gone over numerous stories of heroism and horror, victory and defeat, trying to peel back a part of WW2 that often gets overshadowed by the war in Europe. Certainly the China War is almost completely ignored by the west, but fortunately for you all, as I end this series we have just entered the China war over at the Fall and Rise of China Podcast. Unlike this series where, to be blunt, I am hamstrung by the week by week format, over there I can tackle the subject as I see fit, full of personal accounts. I implore you if you want to revisit some of that action in China, jump over to the other podcast, I will be continuing it until the end of the Chinese civil war. One could say it will soon be a bit of a sequel to this one. Of course if you love this format and want more, you can check out the brand new Eastern Front week by week podcast, which really does match the horror of the Pacific war. Lastly if you just love hearing my dumb voice, come check out my podcast which also is in video format on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube, the Echoes of War podcast. Me and my co-host Gaurav tackle history from Ancient to Modern, often with guests and we blend the dialogue with maps, photos and clips. But stating all of that, lets get into it, the surrender of Japan. As we last saw, while the Soviet invasion of Manchuria raged, Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire on August 15. Public reaction varied, yet most were stunned and bewildered, unable to grasp that Japan had surrendered for the first time in its history. Many wept openly as they listened to the Emperor's solemn message; others directed swift anger at the nation's leaders and the fighting services for failing to avert defeat; and some blamed themselves for falling short in their war effort. Above all, there was a deep sympathy for the Emperor, who had been forced to make such a tragic and painful decision.  In the wake of the Emperor's broadcast, war factories across the country dismissed their workers and shut their doors. Newspapers that had been ordered to pause their usual morning editions appeared in the afternoon, each carrying the Imperial Rescript, an unabridged translation of the Potsdam Declaration, and the notes exchanged with the Allied Powers. In Tokyo, crowds of weeping citizens gathered all afternoon in the vast plaza before the Imperial Palace and at the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines to bow in reverence and prayer. The shock and grief of the moment, coupled with the dark uncertainty about the future, prevented any widespread sense of relief that the fighting had ended. Bombings and bloodshed were over, but defeat seemed likely to bring only continued hardship and privation. Starvation already gripped the land, and the nation faced the looming breakdown of public discipline and order, acts of violence and oppression by occupying forces, and a heavy burden of reparations. Yet despite the grim outlook, the Emperor's assurance that he would remain to guide the people through the difficult days ahead offered a measure of solace and courage. His appeal for strict compliance with the Imperial will left a lasting impression, and the refrain “Reverent Obedience to the Rescript” became the rallying cry as the nation prepared to endure the consequences of capitulation. Immediately after the Emperor's broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki's cabinet tendered its collective resignation, yet Hirohito commanded them to remain in office until a new cabinet could be formed. Accordingly, Suzuki delivered another broadcast that evening, urging the nation to unite in absolute loyalty to the throne in this grave national crisis, and stressing that the Emperor's decision to end the war had been taken out of compassion for his subjects and in careful consideration of the circumstances. Thus, the shocked and grief-stricken population understood that this decision represented the Emperor's actual will rather than a ratified act of the Government, assuring that the nation as a whole would obediently accept the Imperial command. Consequently, most Japanese simply went on with their lives as best they could; yet some military officers, such as General Anami, chose suicide over surrender. Another key figure who committed seppuku between August 15 and 16 was Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro, the father of the kamikaze. Onishi's suicide note apologized to the roughly 4,000 pilots he had sent to their deaths and urged all surviving young civilians to work toward rebuilding Japan and fostering peace among nations. Additionally, despite being called “the hero of the August 15 incident” for his peacekeeping role in the attempted coup d'état, General Tanaka felt responsible for the damage done to Tokyo and shot himself on August 24. Following the final Imperial conference on 14 August, the Army's “Big Three”, War Minister Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu, and Inspectorate-General of Military Training General Kenji Doihara, met at the War Ministry together with Field Marshals Hata and Sugiyama, the senior operational commanders of the homeland's Army forces. These five men affixed their seals to a joint resolution pledging that the Army would “conduct itself in accordance with the Imperial decision to the last.” The resolution was endorsed immediately afterward by General Masakazu Kawabe, the overall commander of the Army air forces in the homeland. In accordance with this decision, General Anami and General Umezu separately convened meetings of their senior subordinates during the afternoon of the 14th, informing them of the outcome of the final Imperial conference and directing strict obedience to the Emperor's command. Shortly thereafter, special instructions to the same effect were radioed to all top operational commanders jointly in the names of the War Minister and Chief of Army General Staff. The Army and Navy authorities acted promptly, and their decisive stance proved, for the most part, highly effective. In the Army, where the threat of upheaval was most acute, the final, unequivocal decision of its top leaders to heed the Emperor's will delivered a crippling blow to the smoldering coup plot by the young officers to block the surrender. The conspirators had based their plans on unified action by the Army as a whole; with that unified stance effectively ruled out, most of the principal plotters reluctantly abandoned the coup d'état scheme on the afternoon of 14 August. At the same time, the weakened Imperial Japanese Navy took steps to ensure disciplined compliance with the surrender decision. Only Admiral Ugaki chose to challenge this with his final actions. After listening to Japan's defeat, Admiral Ugaki Kayō's diary recorded that he had not yet received an official cease-fire order, and that, since he alone was to blame for the failure of Japanese aviators to stop the American advance, he would fly one last mission himself to embody the true spirit of bushido. His subordinates protested, and even after Ugaki had climbed into the back seat of a Yokosuka D4Y4 of the 701st Kokutai dive bomber piloted by Lieutenant Tatsuo Nakatsuru, Warrant Officer Akiyoshi Endo, whose place in the kamikaze roster Ugaki had usurped, also climbed into the same space that the admiral had already occupied. Thus, the aircraft containing Ugaki took off with three men piloted by Nakatsuru, with Endo providing reconnaissance, and Ugaki himself, rather than the two crew members that filled the other ten aircraft. Before boarding his aircraft, Ugaki posed for pictures and removed his rank insignia from his dark green uniform, taking only a ceremonial short sword given to him by Admiral Yamamoto. Elements of this last flight most likely followed the Ryukyu flyway southwest to the many small islands north of Okinawa, where U.S. forces were still on alert at the potential end of hostilities. Endo served as radioman during the mission, sending Ugaki's final messages, the last of which at 19:24 reported that the plane had begun its dive onto an American vessel. However, U.S. Navy records do not indicate any successful kamikaze attack on that day, and it is likely that all aircraft on the mission with the exception of three that returned due to engine problems crashed into the ocean, struck down by American anti-aircraft fire. Although there are no precise accounts of an intercept made by Navy or Marine fighters or Pacific Fleet surface units against enemy aircraft in this vicinity at the time of surrender. it is likely the aircraft crashed into the ocean or was shot down by American anti-aircraft fire. In any event, the crew of LST-926 reported finding the still-smoldering remains of a cockpit with three bodies on the beach of Iheyajima Island, with Ugaki's remains allegedly among them. Meanwhile, we have already covered the Truman–Stalin agreement that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel would surrender to the Soviets while those to the south would surrender to the Americans, along with the subsequent Soviet occupation of Manchuria, North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. Yet even before the first atomic bomb was dropped, and well before the Potsdam Conference, General MacArthur and his staff were planning a peaceful occupation of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The first edition of this plan, designated “Blacklist,” appeared on July 16 and called for a progressive, orderly occupation in strength of an estimated fourteen major areas in Japan and three to six areas in Korea, so that the Allies could exercise unhampered control over the various phases of administration. These operations would employ 22 divisions and 3 regiments, together with air and naval elements, and would utilize all United States forces immediately available in the Pacific. The plan also provided for the maximum use of existing Japanese political and administrative organizations, since these agencies already exerted effective control over the population and could be employed to good advantage by the Allies. The final edition of “Blacklist,” issued on August 8, was divided into three main phases of occupation. The first phase included the Kanto Plain, the Kobe–Osaka–Kyoto areas, the Nagasaki–Sasebo area in Kyushu, the Keijo district in Korea, and the Aomori–Ominato area of northern Honshu. The second phase covered the Shimonoseki–Fukuoka and Nagoya areas, Sapporo in Hokkaido, and Fusan in Korea. The third phase comprised the Hiroshima–Kure area, Kochi in Shikoku, the Okayama, Tsuruga, and Niigata areas, Sendai in northern Honshu, Otomari in Karafuto, and the Gunzan–Zenshu area in Korea. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff initially favored Admiral Nimitz's “Campus” Plan, which envisioned entry into Japan by Army forces only after an emergency occupation of Tokyo Bay by advanced naval units and the seizure of key positions ashore near each anchorage, MacArthur argued that naval forces were not designed to perform the preliminary occupation of a hostile country whose ground divisions remained intact, and he contended that occupying large land areas was fundamentally an Army mission. He ultimately convinced them that occupation by a weak Allied force might provoke resistance from dissident Japanese elements among the bomb-shattered population and could therefore lead to grave repercussions. The formal directive for the occupation of Japan, Korea, and the China coast was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 11. The immediate objectives were to secure the early entry of occupying forces into major strategic areas, to control critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and to demobilize and disarm enemy troops. First priority went to the prompt occupation of Japan, second to the consolidation of Keijo in Korea, and third to operations on the China coast and in Formosa. MacArthur was to assume responsibility for the forces entering Japan and Korea; General Wedemeyer was assigned operational control of the forces landing on the China coast and was instructed to coordinate his plans with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek; and Japanese forces in Southeast Asia were earmarked for surrender to Admiral Mountbatten. With the agreement of the Soviet, Chinese, and British governments, President Truman designated MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 15, thereby granting him final authority for the execution of the terms of surrender and occupation. In this capacity, MacArthur promptly notified the Emperor and the Japanese Government that he was authorized to arrange for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date and directed that the Japanese forces terminate hostilities immediately and that he be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such termination. He further directed that Japan send to Manila on August 17 “a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender.” General MacArthur's stipulations to the Japanese Government included specific instructions regarding the journey of the Japanese representatives to Manila. The emissaries were to leave Sata Misaki, at the southern tip of Kyushu, on the morning of August 17. They were to travel in a Douglas DC-3-type transport plane, painted white and marked with green crosses on the wings and fuselage, and to fly under Allied escort to an airdrome on Lejima in the Ryukyus. From there, the Japanese would be transported to Manila in a United States plane. The code designation chosen for communication between the Japanese plane and US forces was the symbolic word “Bataan.” Implementation challenges arose almost immediately due to disagreements within Imperial General Headquarters and the Foreign Office over the exact nature of the mission. Some officials interpreted the instructions as requiring the delegates to carry full powers to receive and agree to the actual terms of surrender, effectively making them top representatives of the Government and High Command. Others understood the mission to be strictly preparatory, aimed only at working out technical surrender arrangements and procedures. Late in the afternoon of August 16, a message was sent to MacArthur's headquarters seeking clarification and more time to organize the mission. MacArthur replied that signing the surrender terms would not be among the tasks of the Japanese representatives dispatched to Manila, assured the Japanese that their proposed measures were satisfactory, and pledged that every precaution would be taken to ensure the safety of the Emperor's representatives on their mission. Although preparations were made with all possible speed, on August 16 the Japanese notified that this delegation would be somewhat delayed due to the scarcity of time allowed for its formation. At the same time, MacArthur was notified that Hirohito had issued an order commanding the entire armed forces of his nation to halt their fighting immediately. The wide dispersion and the disrupted communications of the Japanese forces, however, made the rapid and complete implementation of such an order exceedingly difficult, so it was expected that the Imperial order would take approximately two to twelve days to reach forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas. On August 17, the Emperor personally backed up these orders with a special Rescript to the armed services, carefully worded to assuage military aversion to surrender. Suzuki was also replaced on this date, with the former commander of the General Defense Army, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, becoming the new Prime Minister with the initial tasks to hastily form a new cabinet capable of effecting the difficult transition to peace swiftly and without incident. The Government and Imperial General Headquarters moved quickly to hasten the preparations, but the appointment of the mission's head was held up pending the installation of the Higashikuni Cabinet. The premier-designate pressed for a rapid formation of the government, and on the afternoon of the 17th the official ceremony of installation took place in the Emperor's presence. Until General Shimomura could be summoned to Tokyo from the North China Area Army, Prince Higashikuni himself assumed the portfolio of War Minister concurrently with the premiership, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai remaining in the critical post of Navy Minister, and Prince Ayamaro Konoe, by Marquis Kido's recommendation, entered the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio to act as Higashikuni's closest advisor. The Foreign Minister role went to Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had previously served in the Koiso Cabinet. With the new government installed, Prince Higashikuni broadcast to the nation on the evening of 17 August, declaring that his policies as Premier would conform to the Emperor's wishes as expressed in the Imperial mandate to form a Cabinet. These policies were to control the armed forces, maintain public order, and surmount the national crisis, with scrupulous respect for the Constitution and the Imperial Rescript terminating the war. The cabinet's installation removed one delay, and in the afternoon of the same day a message from General MacArthur's headquarters clarified the mission's nature and purpose. Based on this clarification, it was promptly decided that Lieutenant General Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, should head a delegation of sixteen members, mainly representing the Army and Navy General Staffs. Kawabe was formally appointed by the Emperor on 18 August. By late afternoon that same day, the data required by the Allied Supreme Commander had largely been assembled, and a message was dispatched to Manila informing General MacArthur's headquarters that the mission was prepared to depart the following morning. The itinerary received prompt approval from the Supreme Commander. Indeed, the decision to appoint a member of the Imperial Family who had a respectable career in the armed forces was aimed both at appeasing the population and at reassuring the military. MacArthur appointed General Eichelberger's 8th Army to initiate the occupation unassisted through September 22, at which point General Krueger's 6th Army would join the effort. General Hodge's 24th Corps was assigned to execute Operation Blacklist Forty, the occupation of the Korean Peninsula south of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur's tentative schedule for the occupation outlined an initial advance party of 150 communications experts and engineers under Colonel Charles Tench, which would land at Atsugi Airfield on August 23. Naval forces under Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet were to enter Tokyo Bay on August 24, followed by MacArthur's arrival at Atsugi the next day and the start of the main landings of airborne troops and naval and marine forces. The formal surrender instrument was to be signed aboard an American battleship in Tokyo Bay on August 28, with initial troop landings in southern Kyushu planned for August 29–30. By September 4, Hodge's 24th Corps was to land at Inchon and begin the occupation of South Korea. In the meantime, per MacArthur's directions, a sixteen-man Japanese delegation headed by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Torashiro, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, left Sata Misaki on the morning of August 19; after landing at Iejima, the delegation transferred to an American transport and arrived at Nichols Field at about 18:00. That night, the representatives held their first conference with MacArthur's staff, led by Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland. During the two days of conference, American linguists scanned, translated, and photostated the various reports, maps, and charts the Japanese had brought with them. Negotiations also resulted in permission for the Japanese to supervise the disarmament and demobilization of their own armed forces under Allied supervision, and provided for three extra days of preparation before the first occupying unit landed on the Japanese home islands on August 26. At the close of the conference, Kawabe was handed the documents containing the “Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” which concerned the arrival of the first echelons of Allied forces, the formal surrender ceremony, and the reception of the occupation forces. Also given were a draft Imperial Proclamation by which the Emperor would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and command his subjects to cease hostilities, a copy of General Order No. 1 by which Imperial General Headquarters would direct all military and naval commanders to lay down their arms and surrender their units to designated Allied commanders, and the Instrument of Surrender itself, which would later be signed on board an American battleship in Tokyo Bay. After the Manila Conference ended, the Japanese delegation began its return to Japan at 13:00 on August 20; but due to mechanical problems and a forced landing near Hamamatsu, they did not reach Tokyo until August 21. With the scheduled arrival of the advanced party of the Allied occupation forces only five days away, the Japanese immediately began disarming combat units in the initial-occupation areas and evacuating them from those areas. The basic orders stated that Allied forces would begin occupying the homeland on 26 August and reaffirmed the intention ofImperial General Headquarters "to insure absolute obedience to the Imperial Rescript of 14 August, to prevent the occurrence of trouble with the occupying forces, and thus to demonstrate Japan's sincerity to the world." The Japanese government announced that all phases of the occupation by Allied troops would be peaceful and urged the public not to panic or resort to violence against the occupying forces. While they sought to reassure the population, they faced die-hard anti-surrender elements within the IJN, with ominous signs of trouble both from Kyushu, where many sea and air special-attack units were poised to meet an invasion, and from Atsugi, the main entry point for Allied airborne troops into the Tokyo Bay area. At Kanoya, Ugaki's successor, Vice-Admiral Kusaka Ryonosuke, hastened the separation of units from their weapons and the evacuation of naval personnel. At Atsugi, an even more threatening situation developed in the Navy's 302nd Air Group. Immediately after the announcement of the surrender, extremist elements in the group led by Captain Kozono Yasuna flew over Atsugi and the surrounding area, scattering leaflets urging the continuation of the war on the ground and claiming that the surrender edict was not the Emperor's true will but the machination of "traitors around the Throne." The extremists, numbering 83 junior officers and noncommissioned officers, did not commit hostile acts but refused to obey orders from their superior commanders. On August 19, Prince Takamatsu, the Emperor's brother and a navy captain, telephoned Atsugi and personally appealed to Captain Kozono and his followers to obey the Imperial decision. This intervention did not end the incident; on August 21 the extremists seized a number of aircraft and flew them to Army airfields in Saitama Prefecture in hopes of gaining support from Army air units. They failed in this attempt, and it was not until August 25 that all members of the group had surrendered. As a result of the Atsugi incident, on August 22 the Emperor dispatched Captain Prince Takamatsu Nabuhito and Vice-Admiral Prince Kuni Asaakira to various naval commands on Honshu and Kyushu to reiterate the necessity of strict obedience to the surrender decision. Both princes immediately left Tokyo to carry out this mission, but the situation improved over the next two days, and they were recalled before completing their tours. By this point, a typhoon struck the Kanto region on the night of August 22, causing heavy damage and interrupting communications and transport vital for evacuating troops from the occupation zone. This led to further delays in Japanese preparations for the arrival of occupation forces, and the Americans ultimately agreed to a two-day postponement of the preliminary landings. On August 27 at 10:30, elements of the 3rd Fleet entered Sagami Bay as the first step in the delayed occupation schedule. At 09:00 on August 28, Tench's advanced party landed at Atsugi to complete technical arrangements for the arrival of the main forces. Two days later, the main body of the airborne occupation forces began streaming into Atsugi, while naval and marine forces simultaneously landed at Yokosuka on the south shore of Tokyo Bay. There were no signs of resistance, and the initial occupation proceeded successfully.  Shortly after 1400, a famous C-54  the name “Bataan” in large letters on its nose circled the field and glided in for a landing. General MacArthur stepped from the aircraft, accompanied by General Sutherland and his staff officers. The operation proceeded smoothly. MacArthur paused momentarily to inspect the airfield, then climbed into a waiting automobile for the drive to Yokohama. Thousands of Japanese troops were posted along the fifteen miles of road from Atsugi to Yokohama to guard the route of the Allied motor cavalcade as it proceeded to the temporary SCAP Headquarters in Japan's great seaport city. The Supreme Commander established his headquarters provisionally in the Yokohama Customs House. The headquarters of the American Eighth Army and the Far East Air Force were also established in Yokohama, and representatives of the United States Pacific Fleet were attached to the Supreme Commander's headquarters. The intensive preparation and excitement surrounding the first landings on the Japanese mainland did not interfere with the mission of affording relief and rescue to Allied personnel who were internees or prisoners in Japan. Despite bad weather delaying the occupation operation, units of the Far East Air Forces and planes from the Third Fleet continued their surveillance missions. On 25 August they began dropping relief supplies, food, medicine, and clothing, to Allied soldiers and civilians in prisoner-of-war and internment camps across the main islands. While the advance echelon of the occupation forces was still on Okinawa, “mercy teams” were organized to accompany the first elements of the Eighth Army Headquarters. Immediately after the initial landings, these teams established contact with the Swiss and Swedish Legations, the International Red Cross, the United States Navy, and the Japanese Liaison Office, and rushed to expedite the release and evacuation, where necessary, of thousands of Allied internees.  On September 1, the Reconnaissance Troop of the 11th Airborne Division conducted a subsidiary airlift operation, flying from Atsugi to occupy Kisarazu Airfield; and on the morning of September 2, the 1st Cavalry Division began landing at Yokohama to secure most of the strategic areas along the shores of Tokyo Bay, with Tokyo itself remaining unoccupied. Concurrently, the surrender ceremony took place aboard Halsey's flagship, the battleship Missouri, crowded with representatives of the United Nations that had participated in the Pacific War.  General MacArthur presided over the epoch-making ceremony, and with the following words he inaugurated the proceedings which would ring down the curtain of war in the Pacific “We are gathered here, representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored. The issues, involving divergent ideals and ideologies, have been determined on the battlefields of the world and hence are not for our discussion or debate. Nor is it for us here to meet, representing as we do a majority of the people of the earth, in a spirit of distrust, malice or hatred. But rather it is for us, both victors and vanquished, to rise to that higher dignity which alone befits the sacred purposes we are about to serve, committing all our peoples unreservedly to faithful compliance with the understandings they are here formally to assume. It is my earnest hope, and indeed the hope of all mankind, that from this solemn occasion a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past — a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish for freedom, tolerance and justice. The terms and conditions upon which surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces is here to be given and accepted are contained in the instrument of surrender now before you…”.  The Supreme Commander then invited the two Japanese plenipotentiaries to sign the duplicate surrender documents : Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, and General Umezu, for the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters. He then called forward two famous former prisoners of the Japanese to stand behind him while he himself affixed his signature to the formal acceptance of the surrender : Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, hero of Bataan and Corregidor and Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, who had been forced to yield the British stronghold at Singapore. General MacArthur was followed in turn by Admiral Nimitz, who signed on behalf of the United States. Alongside the recently liberated Generals Wainwright and Percival, who had been captured during the Japanese conquest of the Philippines and Singapore respectively, MacArthur then signed the surrender documents, followed by Admiral Nimitz and representatives of the other United Nations present. The Instrument of Surrender was completely signed within twenty minutes. Shortly afterwards, MacArthur broadcast the announcement of peace to the world, famously saying, “Today the guns are silent.” Immediately following the signing of the surrender articles, the Imperial Proclamation of capitulation was issued, commanding overseas forces to cease hostilities and lay down their arms; however, it would take many days, and in some cases weeks, for the official word of surrender to be carried along Japan's badly disrupted communications channels. Various devices were employed by American commanders to transmit news of final defeat to dispersed and isolated enemy troops, such as plane-strewn leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, strategically placed signboards, and prisoner-of-war volunteers. Already, the bypassed Japanese garrison at Mille Atoll had surrendered on August 22; yet the first large-scale surrender of Japanese forces came on August 27, when Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio surrendered Morotai and Halmahera to the 93rd Division. On August 30, a British Pacific Fleet force under Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt entered Victoria Harbour to begin the liberation of Hong Kong; and the following day, Rear-Admiral Matsubara Masata surrendered Minami-Torishima. In the Marianas, the Japanese commanders on Rota and Pagan Islands relinquished their commands almost simultaneously with the Tokyo Bay ceremony of September 2. Later that day, the same was done by Lieutenant-General Inoue Sadae in the Palaus and by Lieutenant-General Mugikura Shunzaburo and Vice-Admiral Hara Chuichi at Truk in the Carolines. Additionally, as part of Operation Jurist, a British detachment under Vice-Admiral Harold Walker received the surrender of the Japanese garrison on Penang Island. In the Philippines, local commanders in the central Bukidnon Province, Infanta, the Bataan Peninsula, and the Cagayan Valley had already surrendered by September 2. On September 3, General Yamashita and Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi met with General Wainwright, General Percival, and Lieutenant-General Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of Army Forces of the Western Pacific, to sign the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. With Yamashita's capitulation, subordinate commanders throughout the islands began surrendering in increasing numbers, though some stragglers remained unaware of the capitulation. Concurrently, while Yamashita was yielding his Philippine forces, Lieutenant-General Tachibana Yoshio's 109th Division surrendered in the Bonins on September 3. On September 4, Rear-Admiral Sakaibara Shigematsu and Colonel Chikamori Shigeharu surrendered their garrison on Wake Island, as did the garrison on Aguigan Island in the Marianas. Also on September 4, an advanced party of the 24th Corps landed at Kimpo Airfield near Keijo to prepare the groundwork for the occupation of South Korea; and under Operation Tiderace, Mountbatten's large British and French naval force arrived off Singapore and accepted the surrender of Japanese forces there. On September 5, Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke surrendered his garrison on Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls, as did the garrison of Yap Island. The overall surrender of Japanese forces in the Solomons and Bismarcks and in the Wewak area of New Guinea was finally signed on September 6 by General Imamura Hitoshi and Vice-Admiral Kusaka Jinichi aboard the aircraft carrier Glory off Rabaul, the former center of Japanese power in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Lieutenant-General Nomi Toshio, representing remaining Japanese naval and army forces in the Ryukyus, officially capitulated on September 7 at the headquarters of General Stilwell's 10th Army on Okinawa. The following day, Tokyo was finally occupied by the Americans, and looking south, General Kanda and Vice-Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige agreed to travel to General Savige's headquarters at Torokina to sign the surrender of Bougainville. On September 8, Rear-Admiral Kamada Michiaki's 22nd Naval Special Base Force at Samarinda surrendered to General Milford's 7th Australian Division, as did the Japanese garrison on Kosrae Island in the Carolines. On September 9, a wave of surrenders continued: the official capitulation of all Japanese forces in the China Theater occurred at the Central Military Academy in Nanking, with General Okamura surrendering to General He Yingqin, the commander-in-chief of the Republic of China National Revolutionary Army; subsequently, on October 10, 47 divisions from the former Imperial Japanese Army officially surrendered to Chinese military officials and allied representatives at the Forbidden City in Beijing. The broader context of rehabilitation and reconstruction after the protracted war was daunting, with the Nationalists weakened and Chiang Kai-shek's policies contributing to Mao Zedong's strengthened position, shaping the early dynamics of the resumption of the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, on September 9, Hodge landed the 7th Division at Inchon to begin the occupation of South Korea. In the throne room of the Governor's Palace at Keijo, soon to be renamed Seoul, the surrender instrument was signed by General Abe Nobuyuki, the Governor-General of Korea; Lieutenant-General Kozuki Yoshio, commander of the 17th Area Army and of the Korean Army; and Vice-Admiral Yamaguchi Gisaburo, commander of the Japanese Naval Forces in Korea. The sequence continued with the 25th Indian Division landing in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan on Malaya to capture Port Dickson, while Lieutenant-General Teshima Fusataro's 2nd Army officially surrendered to General Blamey at Morotai, enabling Australian occupation of much of the eastern Dutch East Indies. On September 10, the Japanese garrisons on the Wotje and Maloelap Atolls in the Marshalls surrendered, and Lieutenant-General Baba Masao surrendered all Japanese forces in North Borneo to General Wootten's 9th Australian Division. After Imamura's surrender, Major-General Kenneth Eather's 11th Australian Division landed at Rabaul to begin occupation, and the garrison on Muschu and Kairiru Islands also capitulated. On September 11, General Adachi finally surrendered his 18th Army in the Wewak area, concluding the bloody New Guinea Campaign, while Major-General Yamamura Hyoe's 71st Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered at Kuching and Lieutenant-General Watanabe Masao's 52nd Independent Mixed Brigade surrendered on Ponape Island in the Carolines. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division, with French troops, arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom and accepted the surrender of Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, who had already met with Viet Minh envoys and agreed to turn power over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 15 August 1945, the Viet Minh immediately launched the insurrection they had prepared for a long time. Across the countryside, “People's Revolutionary Committees” took over administrative positions, often acting on their own initiative, and in the cities the Japanese stood by as the Vietnamese took control. By the morning of August 19, the Viet Minh had seized Hanoi, rapidly expanding their control over northern Vietnam in the following days. The Nguyen dynasty, with its puppet government led by Tran Trong Kim, collapsed when Emperor Bao Dai abdicated on August 25. By late August, the Viet Minh controlled most of Vietnam. On 2 September, in Hanoi's Ba Dinh Square, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As the Viet Minh began extending control across the country, the new government's attention turned to the arrival of Allied troops and the French attempt to reassert colonial authority, signaling the onset of a new and contentious phase in Vietnam's struggle.  French Indochina had been left in chaos by the Japanese occupation. On 11 September British and Indian troops of the 20th Indian Division under Major General Douglas Gracey arrived at Saigon as part of Operation Masterdom. After the Japanese surrender, all French prisoners had been gathered on the outskirts of Saigon and Hanoi, and the sentries disappeared on 18 September; six months of captivity cost an additional 1,500 lives. By 22 September 1945, all prisoners were liberated by Gracey's men, armed, and dispatched in combat units toward Saigon to conquer it from the Viet Minh, later joined by the French Far East Expeditionary Corps, established to fight the Japanese arriving a few weeks later. Around the same time, General Lu Han's 200,000 Chinese National Revolutionary Army troops of the 1st Front Army occupied Indochina north of the 16th parallel, with 90,000 arriving by October; the 62nd Army came on 26 September to Nam Dinh and Haiphong, Lang Son and Cao Bang were occupied by the Guangxi 62nd Army Corps, and the Red River region and Lai Cai were occupied by a column from Yunnan. Lu Han occupied the French governor-general's palace after ejecting the French staff under Sainteny. Consequently, while General Lu Han's Chinese troops occupied northern Indochina and allowed the Vietnamese Provisional Government to remain in control there, the British and French forces would have to contest control of Saigon. On September 12, a surrender instrument was signed at the Singapore Municipal Building for all Southern Army forces in Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the eastern islands; General Terauchi, then in a hospital in Saigon after a stroke, learned of Burma's fall and had his deputy commander and leader of the 7th Area Army, Lieutenant-General Itagaki Seishiro, surrender on his behalf to Mountbatten, after which a British military administration was formed to govern the island until March 1946. The Japanese Burma Area Army surrendered the same day as Mountbatten's ceremony in Singapore, and Indian forces in Malaya reached Kuala Lumpur to liberate the Malay capital, though the British were slow to reestablish control over all of Malaya, with eastern Pahang remaining beyond reach for three more weeks. On September 13, the Japanese garrisons on Nauru and Ocean Islands surrendered to Brigadier John Stevenson, and three days later Major-General Okada Umekichi and Vice-Admiral Fujita Ruitaro formally signed the instrument of surrender at Hong Kong. In the meantime, following the Allied call for surrender, Japan had decided to grant Indonesian independence to complicate Dutch reoccupation: Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta signed Indonesia's Proclamation of Independence on August 17 and were appointed president and vice-president the next day, with Indonesian youths spreading news across Java via Japanese news and telegraph facilities and Bandung's news broadcast by radio. The Dutch, as the former colonial power, viewed the republicans as collaborators with the Japanese and sought to restore their colonial rule due to lingering political and economic interests in the former Dutch East Indies, a stance that helped trigger a four-year war for Indonesian independence. Fighting also erupted in Sumatra and the Celebes, though the 26th Indian Division managed to land at Padang on October 10. On October 21, Lieutenant-General Tanabe Moritake and Vice-Admiral Hirose Sueto surrendered all Japanese forces on Sumatra, yet British control over the country would dwindle in the ensuing civil conflict. Meanwhile, Formosa (Taiwan) was placed under the control of the Kuomintang-led Republic of China by General Order No. 1 and the Instrument of Surrender; Chiang Kai-shek appointed General Chen Yi as Chief Executive of Taiwan Province and commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command on September 1. After several days of preparation, an advance party moved into Taihoku on October 5, with additional personnel arriving from Shanghai and Chongqing between October 5 and 24, and on October 25 General Ando Rikichi signed the surrender document at Taipei City Hall. But that's the end for this week, and for the Pacific War.  Boy oh boy, its been a long journey hasn't it? Now before letting you orphans go into the wild, I will remind you, while this podcast has come to an end, I still write and narrate Kings and Generals Eastern Front week by week and the Fall and Rise of China Podcasts. Atop all that I have my own video-podcast Echoes of War, that can be found on Youtube or all podcast platforms. I really hope to continue entertaining you guys, so if you venture over to the other podcasts, comment you came from here! I also have some parting gifts to you all, I have decided to release a few Pacific War related exclusive episodes from my Youtuber Membership / patreon at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel. At the time I am writing this, over there I have roughly 32 episodes, one is uploaded every month alongside countless other goodies. Thank you all for being part of this long lasting journey. Kings and Generals literally grabbed me out of the blue when I was but a small silly person doing youtube videos using an old camera, I have barely gotten any better at it. I loved making this series, and I look forward to continuing other series going forward! You know where to find me, if you have any requests going forward the best way to reach me is just comment on my Youtube channel or email me, the email address can be found on my youtube channel. This has been Craig of the Pacific War Channel and narrator of the Pacific war week by week podcast, over and out!

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

Despertamento espiritual na porta formosa - Pr. Israel Trota by Igreja Missionária Evangélica Maranata de JacarepaguáPara conhecer mais sobre a Maranata: Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/imemaranata/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/imemaranataSite: https://www.igrejamaranata.com.br/Canal do youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCa1jcJx-DIDqu_gknjlWOrQDeus te abençoe

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

A Marinha do Brasil informou, nesta quarta-feira (20), que cancelou a realização da Operação Formosa, treinamento militar que ocorre desde 1988 na cidade de Formosa, em Goiás. O exercício estava previsto para começar no início de setembro. O motivo da suspensão é a crise diplomática entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos.

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

En Argentina quedan entre 250 y 300 ejemplares del yaguareté en libertad, la especie es considerada "monumento natural nacional" y está protegida por la Ley 22.421. El año pasado se viralizaron imágenes de cuatro cazadores que mataron a un ejemplar en Formosa y el delito fue llevado a la justicia por parte de una organización ambientalista, lo que marca un precedente histórico. De eso habló Rodrigo Díaz Gil en su columna de derecho ambiental de cada lunes en #AgendaPropia.

Archive film isn't for everyone -- but for film buffs who are interested in Taiwan's film history, there is the Taiwan Film and Audio Visual Institute, which owns the most extensive collection of old films and newsreels in Taiwan. Its Director Iris Du talks about the importance of maintaining a film archive and. Hosted by I-C-R-T's Hope Ngo. A part of TFAI's library may be accessed through its YouTube Channel. -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

加入會員，支持節目： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w 留言告訴我你對這一集的想法： https://open.firstory.me/user/ckbrc9xz33pse0918wxz4pc5w/comments Powered by Firstory Hosting

One of the more memorable days of my life was spent at Michael Hill's house at Lake Hayes in Central Otago. He showed me his art. There was a lot of it and it was eclectic. He had his own nine-hole golf course, and it was all par 3s. This was in the days before The Hills, which in many respects was what Michael was all about – vision. He took his par 3s and then turned it into one of the best golf courses in the country. Watching the New Zealand Open each year is worth it just for the views of his course. When I was there, the charity event he ran started at Millbrook just across the way. Millbrook was new then and you wondered whether it was one of those investments that would grow to be the success it has or turn out like Formosa or Gulf Harbour. I had won the pro-am that day. He presented me with a ticket to Australia, a few thousand dollars, and various bits and pieces from his jewellery business, that I ironically couldn't accept, given I wasn't a pro, and amateurs were banned from winning stuff. But I had beaten Sean Fitzpatrick, Andrew Mehrtens, Peter O'Malley, and Greg Turner, so what did I need prizes for? Michael never forgot the day and reminded me each time I talked to him that I should give golf a go again and to come and play at his place anytime I liked. I first interviewed him in the 80's. He was newish then. The story of the Whangarei shop, the fire, setting up his own business, it became New Zealand business folklore. I did one of those motivational events with him, where I hosted. He and other success stories told paying guests how they did it, what the tips were, and how to never give up. He was big into classical music and was a philanthropist in that area. His company became a household name, expanding into Australia, Canada, and the US. The advertising was genius. He revelled in the personality thing. He was a health nut, doing a lot of juicing, probably before his time in that sense. Like most success stories, he had a magnetism about him. He was very likeable, had good stories and was funny with it. He was in many respects the quintessential New Zealand success story – hard working, self-made, and deprecating. He was a memorable, inspiring Kiwi. He will be missed. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this week's edition of the Flavors of Northwest Arkansas podcast, we're talking to Russell Ingram, co-owner of the very popular Dot's Hot Chicken that recently made the change from food truck to brick and mortar. But first?!?! FOOD NEWS!!! We've hit the time of year where we get some temporary restaurant closures, especially in Fayetteville before the U-of-A gets back in session. Torchy's Taco's re-opens soon in Fayetteville after a remodel. Little Bread Company is taking the week off. Rick's Bakery took some time off, but are back! Baked by Kori is taking the week off in Fayetteville, but open in Rogers. Fayetteville Restaurant Week is next week! Formosa has been closed for over a month but are supposed to come back soon. The revival of the AQ Chicken House is taking a pause. Happy 4 years this weekend to Rendezvous Junction Brewing! Big party there this weekend! Russell Ingram and his wife Sarah moved from Nashville to Fayetteville where she's originally from. Russell has a chef background and learned hot chicken from when they made it as a special at a restaurant where he worked in Nashville. He grew to love it and didn't like that he was moving to a place that didn't have it, so he started his own- Dot's Hot Chicken, and they hit the ground running! They opted for a food truck first.  They bought one that they had to drive back from outside of Houston, and the trip was SCARY. You'll hear that story. Also, who is Dot and how many awards has her chicken won? Russell will tell us. They recently moved into a brick-and-mortar restaurant from the food truck. Russell will talk about that transition, and what that allows them to do that they couldn't do in the food truck... and it's all next right here on the Flavors of Northwest Arkansas!

Summer In The City: Built Different - Pastor Zach FormosaThis week Pastor Zach Formosa kicks off our brand new summer series!Want to connect more with Rose Church? Find more information at https://www.rosechurch.org and give at - https://www.rosechurch.org/give Make sure to subscribe so you don't miss more incredible sermons like this one or previous series like “Breaking the Cycle” or “The Spiritual Realm” from Pastor Andrew Damazio, Dr. AJ Swoboda, Pastor Julia Damazio and many other incredible pastors!Thanks for listening!

New health requirements for tourists, elections in Formosa and Santa Fe, a higher threshold for tax evasion, a critical minerals deal with France, another public transit fare increase, Argentine artists at Glastonbury, and much, much more!Thanks for tuning in!Let us know what you think and what we can improve on by emailing us at info@rorshok.com. You can also contact us through Instagram @rorshok__argentina or Twitter @Rorshok_ARG Like what you hear? Subscribe, share, and tell your buds.Rorshok Ocean Update Job Description: https://rorshok.com/updates/ocean/writer/We want to get to know you! Please fill in this mini-survey: https://forms.gle/NV3h5jN13cRDp2r66Wanna avoid ads and help us financially? Follow the link: https://bit.ly/rorshok-donate

In these days of domineering corporate rule, where can we commoners go to find even a little bit of justice?Right where they've been found throughout human history: Within ourselves. Specifically, in our rebellious spirit, our willingness to confront the greedheads and boneheads who feel entitled to run roughshod over us.For example, The Formosa Four.You probably haven't heard of them, since the mass media powers don't cover something as consequential and uplifting as a nation of Davids challenging Goliath – such as “The Formosa Four.” They are members of a tenacious and scrappy coalition that has dared to confront one of the most flagrant corporate criminals on the globe: Formosa Plastics. It's a $6 billion-a-year profiteer that constantly and carelessly spews millions of tons of plastic contaminants into our environment and ourselves.But last summer, the bully tried to play victim. When about 70 protestors defiantly converged on Formosa's US headquarters in New Jersey, corporate executives had four of the leaders arrested and charged with criminal trespass – a power play to prevent free speech and scare off future protestors.Yes, a global behemoth that's a deadly polluter and serial human rights violator had our government arrest and prosecute grassroots critics for the “high crime” of trespassing. Such is the pettiness – but liberty-busting seriousness – of today's arrogant forces of plutocracy.Justice fighters, though, aren't easily spooked by bullies, and the movement succeeded last week in having all charges dismissed. As one protester said, it takes “regular people putting their bodies on the line to make these things happen. One victory today, and many more in the future.” For more information, go to Formosa4.org.Jim Hightower's Lowdown is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit jimhightower.substack.com/subscribe

Last time we spoke about liberation of Luzon.. American forces, led by General Eichelberger and supported by General Krueger's armies, relentlessly advanced against the entrenched Japanese defenders of General Yamashita's 14th Area Army. Amid thick jungle and treacherous terrain, battles raged through the northern mountain ranges, as American troops aimed to restore the Filipino government. Facing overwhelming odds, the Japanese forces displayed extraordinary resilience, temporarily halting American progress. Remarkable efforts from General Swift's 1st Corps across Routes 9 and 11 led to significant breakthroughs as American forces captured critical positions, including Sablan and Baguio. However, the Japanese command, complacent and misjudging the American strategy, fell into disarray. As the tide turned with relentless American assaults, key Japanese positions were systematically dismantled. By late April, most of Luzon was liberated, restoring hope and autonomy to the Filipino people.  This episode is Invasion of Balikpapan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The battles for Okinawa and Luzon just closed up, and today we are going to be venturing back to the Dutch East Indies. As we left off in mid-May, the tides of war were shifting dramatically on the island of Luzon, with General Krueger's 6th Army celebrating significant victories across the region. In the north, General Swift's 1st Corps had successfully secured the scenic Baguio area, known for its lush mountains and cool climate, a stark contrast to the tropical heat that engulfed much of the Philippines. Yet, the fighting was far from over, as fierce battles continued on three major fronts. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla 121st Regiment was making strides, snagging much of the strategically vital Bessang Pass, a crucial artery connecting northern Luzon to the central regions. However, their success came at a cost, leaving them overextended amidst fierce Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, General Gill's weary 32nd Division managed to claim dominance over the rugged terrain of Salacsac Pass along the historic Villa Verde Trail, known for its breathtaking views and treacherous paths that had challenged both soldiers and their supply lines. General Mullins' 25th Division achieved a remarkable breakthrough by capturing the key Balete Pass, opening the way for further advances. Not stopping there, the 25th Division pressed onward, quickly redirecting their focus northward towards the town of Santa Fe. By May 24, the 27th Regiment had cleared the Sawmill River valley, an area teeming with dense foliage and rugged hills, a significant accomplishment that paved the way for the next objectives. From there, the 1st Battalion expertly maneuvered eastward against the imposing Kanami Ridge. On May 22, the 161st Regiment dealt a heavy blow to Japanese positions in a stronghold on Mount Haruna, a location known for its steep, challenging slopes. Following this triumph, they began their descent down the northern slopes of Haruna Ridge, gearing up for a critical junction with the Villa Verde Trail by May 27. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment launched a vigorous assault from Balete Pass, systematically clearing out the remaining Japanese caves and fortifications by May 26, culminating in the capture of Santa Fe the very next day. At Salacsac, the Japanese forces, led by General Iwanaka, initiated a limited counteroffensive, presumably to buy time for a strategic evacuation of their increasingly tenuous positions. If delay was indeed Iwanaka's intention, he executed it well; it wasn't until May 19 that the American supply line was finally deemed secure again. The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment resumed its push east from Hill 525, but the progress was slow. By May 22, the 1st Battalion had only managed to advance a mere 500 yards east from Hill 508, while the 3rd Battalion commenced a southward and southeastward advance from Hill 516 on May 16. It was not until May 24 that the relentless fighting in the region bore fruit, leading to the eventual clearing of the area, and Salacsac Pass was officially declared secured. On that pivotal day, General Iwanaka began the difficult task of withdrawing the remnants of his battered forces northward, retreating up the winding valley of the Imugan River. This river, which flows through a lush, verdant landscape, would serve as a vital sanctuary, albeit one fraught with danger for the disheartened Japanese troops. Meanwhile, the American forces were gaining ground. The 2nd Battalion aggressively seized control of Hill 527, a position that provided a commanding view of the surrounding area, crucial for planning further advances. The 126th Regiment took decisive action, utilizing trucks to transport troops swiftly along Route 5 to Balete Pass before launching an assault toward Imugan from the east and southeast. Concurrently, the guerrilla 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment embarked on a northward push from Valdez, culminating in the hard-fought capture of Hill 528 on May 28. This hill, commanding and steep, presented a formidable challenge but also promised a vantage point critical for any further operations in the region. The very next day, Imugan finally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the advancing American forces, marking a significant milestone as the Villa Verde Trail came firmly under American control. This development effectively concluded the arduous operations of the 32nd Division. It was a costly campaign for General Gill; the division suffered approximately 825 men killed, 2,160 wounded, with an alarming 6,000 classified as non-battle casualties. In stark contrast, the Japanese defense was decimated, with at least 5,750 of the 8,750 troops they had deployed to defend the trail lying dead. As we gaze northward, we find Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas, who had extended themselves too thinly across Bessang Pass and into the challenging terrain of Yubo Ridge. The aftermath of their overreach saw them facing fierce Japanese counterattacks that swiftly pushed them back across Lamagan Ridge in the latter part of May. However, a small contingent managed to hold tenaciously onto the eastern slopes of Langiatan Hill, a strategic position that allowed them to maintain some level of influence in the region. Additionally, a robust force from the Japanese 76th Regiment assembled south of Butac, planning an offensive northward. However, this advance was met with fierce resistance from the guerrilla 15th Regiment, who successfully repelled the attack. Seizing the momentum, Volckmann directed the 15th Regiment into a new offensive eastward, and by the end of May, they had successfully re-secured their foothold up to Lamagan Ridge. Meanwhile, elements of the 121st Regiment executed a remarkable retaking of both Langiatan Hill and Yubo Ridge, gradually restoring control over this strategically vital area. Looking south, we find General Hall's 11th Corps vigorously engaged in two crucial offensives aimed at capturing Ipo Dam and Wawa Dam, both essential water reservoirs located east of Manila. The strategic importance of these dams cannot be overstated; they were vital not only for securing fresh water but also for controlling the flow of operations in the region. However, the relentless heavy downpours that characterized the season rendered air support missions impractical, exacerbating an already challenging supply situation for the advancing troops. As a result, General Wing's 43rd Division was forced to pause its offensive late on May 14 to reassess and devise new attack plans.  As of late May 14, the 43rd Division found itself in a precarious situation, necessitating a halt to operations to devise new attack plans. To this point, the division had made limited progress toward securing Route 52, a crucial supply line vital for their mission to capture Ipo Dam. Recognizing the urgency, General Wing decided it was essential to commit the 169th Regiment to a targeted attack to clear this road, as it would serve as a critical route for both supply and evacuation in the coming days. The adverse weather conditions had created a significant operational hindrance. For nearly the entire duration of their offensive, intermittent rains had severely disrupted ground and aerial supply chains, as well as evacuation and the crucial air support operations necessary for a successful advance. Ground conditions had become challenging, and division engineers struggled to construct and maintain supply roads at a pace even close to that of the infantry's advances. Consequently, supply drops and hand-carried provisions were just sufficient to keep combat units barely above the minimum required levels, but the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers remained a pressing issue that plagued the division. By May 14, the situation worsened significantly. For the first time since May 6, the 5th Air Force was completely grounded, unable to conduct any air support or supply missions due to the worsening weather conditions. This represented a troubling turning point for the 43rd Division. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that sizable groups from the Japanese Tomono and Hanabusa Detachments had shifted their focus away from their defenses along Route 52, moving instead to confront the 103rd and 172nd Regiments attacking from the south. General Wing recognized that this presented a timely opportunity for the 169th Regiment. Striking directly along Route 52 would likely be far easier and less costly than it would have been just a week prior. Furthermore, a successful offensive by the 169th could not only expedite the capture of Ipo Dam but also prevent further eastward redeployments of Japanese forces. This would be a vital maneuver, potentially relieving pressure from Fork Ridge, where the left flank of the 172nd Regiment was currently bogged down in fierce fighting. Time was of the essence, and decisive action was required to turn the tide in favor of the 43rd Division. The situation was critical; delay would allow Japanese forces to fortify their defenses further. In response, Wing mapped out a robust plan: he directed the 103rd Regiment to capture the Route 52 terminus at Ipo Dam itself, which was crucial for any further advances. Their orders included not only taking control of the dam but also clearing the high ground north of the road and west of the dam to ensure a secure position against any possible counterattacks. Additionally, he tasked the 172nd Regiment with seizing Hill 804, a vantage point that could provide vital intelligence and support to the offensive, while the 169th Regiment was directed to eliminate the last Japanese defenders in the Bigti area before advancing eastward along Route 52 to connect with the 172nd. A break in the weather finally came on May 17, allowing the 43rd Division to launch their offensive with much-needed air support. Aircraft successfully dropped napalm and strafed Japanese defensive positions, a strategy that proved devastatingly effective. General Kawashima, facing mounting losses, ultimately ordered the remnants of his command to withdraw to an assembly point on the western slopes of Mount Maranat, a retreat that revealed their deteriorating ability to hold the line. With the air support providing a critical advantage, the 103rd Regiment advanced boldly and swiftly cleared the last Japanese holdouts from Hill 860, securing an essential position. However, it was the guerrilla forces, under the command of Colonel Augustin, from the Marking Regiment who achieved a historic victory by capturing Ipo Dam shortly after noon. His patrols descended the slopes of Hill 803, crossed the Angat River at the dam, and triumphantly raised the American flag over the powerhouse on the south bank, a potent symbol of liberation and resistance. Simultaneously, the 172nd Regiment seized control of Fork Ridge, further tightening the noose around Japanese forces, while the 169th Regiment secured strategic ground from Hill 535 to Osboy Ridge, pushing forward with relentless determination. In the following four days, the 43rd Division, supported by the fearless Marking guerrillas, meticulously mopped up the area west of Ipo Dam. Their efforts culminated in the successful opening of Route 52 from Bigti to Ipo on May 19, a critical milestone that allowed for the unhindered movement of troops and supplies. By May 21, they completed the operation by clearing out the last pockets of organized resistance in the region west of the dam and south of the Angat River, a crucial waterway that would play a significant role in sustaining American operations. With the capture of Ipo Dam intact, General Wing achieved his primary objective, making a significant contribution to addressing Manila's pressing water supply problems. This success would have lasting implications for the civilians and military alike, as the dam was key to ensuring a reliable water supply in the region. The 43rd Division maintained its momentum, continuing mopping-up operations through May 31. They patrolled eastward across the Ipo River, pressed northeast up the Angat from the dam, and scoured the areas that had witnessed some of the most intense fighting during the campaign. The cost of these operations was notable; Wing's forces suffered losses of 120 killed and 515 wounded, while the Kawashima Force endured devastating casualties, with over 2,700 men killed and approximately 115 captured during the grueling battle. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division pressed forward with its offensive against Wawa Dam, following the failure of General Yokoyama's most recent counteroffensive. The 145th Regiment found itself holding a precariously exposed salient at Mount Binicayan, which severely hampered their ability to launch an effective attack toward Wawa Dam. Japanese positions on the high ground to the north of the dam dominated the narrow, winding road with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, making any advance perilous. In response to this daunting challenge, General Chase decided to launch an offensive with the 151st Regiment in the area north of the Marikina River, targeting the formidable Mounts Pamitinan and Hapanong-Banoy. This bold maneuver was contingent upon the 152nd Regiment gaining momentum in its attack to clear Woodpecker Ridge. As such, on May 19 and 20, the 152nd Regiment executed enveloping maneuvers centered on Woodpecker Ridge, ultimately breaking through enemy lines on May 21. The breakthrough was dramatically supported by the introduction of medium tanks and flamethrower tanks, powerful assets that helped turn the tide of battle. The following day, what began as a breakthrough rapidly escalated into a rout of Japanese defenders. By May 25, the 152nd Regiment had established control over the strategic junction of the Marikina and Bosoboso Rivers, a key position that not only bolstered their operational capabilities but also positioned them for further advances in the ongoing campaign. As Japanese resistance began to dissipate under the relentless pressure from the advancing American forces, the 149th Regiment, which had successfully relieved the 145th at Mount Binicayan, launched a bold strike toward Wawa Dam on May 27. Encountering little to no opposition, they secured the dam intact the following morning, marking a significant victory. It was on May 27 that General Yokoyama ordered a general retreat, recognizing the untenable position of his forces. Acting on these instructions, General Kobayashi's remaining troops fell back, pursued by vigilant patrols from the 38th Division. With Wawa Dam secured, General Chase shifted his strategy; rather than launching direct assaults against organized Japanese lines, he opted to focus on mopping up operations and pursuing the retreating enemy. The human cost of the campaign was significant. Chase's forces sustained losses of 160 killed and 590 wounded, while the Kobayashi Force suffered catastrophic losses, with over 10,000 men killed since the onset of the offensive.  Shifting focus southeast, the 7th Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Anderson's guerrillas converged on the coastal town of Infanta in late May. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Japanese naval garrison retreated westward into the Sierra Madre mountains, a rugged and dense area that posed challenges for both sides. Infanta ultimately fell on May 25, and by the evening of the following day, the reinforced 7th Cavalry had successfully cleared the entire flat, rice-rich region surrounding the town, encountering only scattered and ineffective resistance. In a strategic move bolstered by overwater supply movements, the 7th Cavalry implemented an aggressive patrolling program to the southwest, seeking out any remaining enemy forces. Meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry focused its efforts on clearing the northern section of Santa Maria Valley, advancing northward into the Sierra Madre. By the end of May, the Shimbu Group, once a significant Japanese fighting force, was rendered ineffective. Its main units began to disband, breaking into small groups in a desperate bid to forage for food or to navigate their way to safety in northern Luzon. At the end of May, the Shimbu Group still boasted a strength of nearly 26,000 men, over half of its total personnel as of February 20. However, the remaining survivors were not the elite forces they once were. The relentless campaigns by the 11th and 14th Corps had decimated the best-trained and most well-equipped units, leaving behind a shell of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Of the approximately 13,000 survivors still organized into units, their combat effectiveness had deteriorated so significantly that it's worthy of mention only in passing. Meanwhile, about 13,000 others were struggling to survive without proper organization; roughly 5,000 of these were receiving whatever limited medical treatment the Shimbu Group could provide. The remaining 8,000 men had essentially lost all structure, scattering into small groups to forage for food or attempting to make their way north to Luzon, where they hoped to find safety and sustenance. The supply situation faced by the Shimbu Group at the end of May was even more dire than its personnel situation. They had been unable to transport significant portions of their vast stockpiles of supplies into the Sierra Madre mountains, a shortfall that would prove catastrophic for their survival. The only supplies they still possessed in any quantity were ammunition for small arms and machine guns, alongside medical materials for treating combat wounds. The most pressing issue, however, was a critical lack of food. The early loss of several key agricultural regions, including the Bosoboso Valley, the shores of Laguna de Bay, the Santa Maria Valley, and the fertile Infanta region, had deprived the Shimbu Group of expected food stocks. Most of the supplies brought out of Manila had already been consumed. For instance, the organized remnant of the Noguchi Force could currently allocate a meager two ounces of rice per day for each man—a portion that would undoubtedly vanish by mid-June. The Kobayashi Force fared little better, while the Kawashima Force managed to issue slightly more, around six to eight ounces of rice daily. The troops were gradually reduced to scavenging for survival, resorting to eating roots, bark, grass, and whatever food they could find in long-abandoned Filipino gardens. It's worth noting that after just a few days in June, there wasn't a single pig, carabao, or dog left alive within sight of the remnants of the Shimbu Group. Recognizing that mere existence was the overarching challenge, General Yokoyama hoped to regroup his organized units and move them into areas where they might have some chance to cultivate food, scattering them through the challenging terrain of the Sierra Madre. This desperate strategy highlighted the dire straits faced by the Shimbu Group as their chances for survival dwindled. Meanwhile, the Noguchi Force received orders to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay, where some of its elements were already positioned. This shift aimed to gather their forces in a more favorable terrain, potentially allowing for better access to resources. The Kobayashi Force was tasked with establishing a defensive sector in the area north of Mount Purro and east of Wawa. In a coordinated effort, the 31st Infantry, minus its 3rd Battalion, along with various miscellaneous troops from the 8th Division, were ordered to occupy positions north of the Lenatin River, enhancing their defensive capabilities in a strategic location. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already in the process of withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were instructed to relocate to the mountains east of San Miguel, approximately 22 miles northwest of Ipo. This area was believed to have more abundant food supplies, crucial for the survival of their forces. However, as circumstances unfolded, this transfer later proved impossible. Unable to move effectively, the bulk of the Kawashima Force remained entrenched in the area surrounding Mount Inuman, where they faced mounting challenges in sustaining their troops. In the following month, General Hall directed the 38th Division and Major Edwin Ramsey's 2nd Provisional Regiment to pursue the remnants of Yokoyama's forces as they moved eastward toward Santa Iñez. Meanwhile, the 112th Cavalry employed various mountain and river valley trails to mount a converging attack from the south. They encountered light opposition and successfully captured the town on June 9, further consolidating their gains in the region. At the same time, patrols from the 43rd Division reported no signs of organized resistance north and east of Ipo Dam. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, alongside Anderson's guerrillas, effectively dispersed the last organized remnants of the Kogure Detachment and the remaining Japanese naval units at Lamon Bay. By the end of June, the only indication of organized Japanese resistance in an area extending five miles north and ten miles east of Wawa Dam was found in the Lenatin River valley, approximately three miles north of Santa Iñez. This development forced the remnants of Yokoyama's forces into trackless and only partially explored wilderness, significantly complicating their ability to regroup or launch further operations. The operations throughout June were costly for Hall, resulting in approximately 110 men killed and 370 wounded. In contrast, Japanese losses during the month were staggering, amounting to 7,540 killed or found dead, alongside 1,105 captured.  Looking back north, General Yamashita aimed to avoid a similar fate for his northern forces. Ever since the fall of Baguio, he had been meticulously planning for the ultimate withdrawal of the Shobu Group deep into the Cordillera Central.  On May 5, less than two weeks following the fall of Baguio, General Yamashita disseminated an outline plan for future operations to the major components of the Shobu Group throughout northern Luzon. His strategy was built on three fundamental premises: Estimation of Enemy Actions: Yamashita assessed that the 6th Army would concentrate its main effort on a northward drive along Route 5, anticipating that General Krueger would only launch secondary attacks toward Bontoc via Routes 4 and 11. This understanding allowed him to anticipate the flow of enemy movements and allocate his resources more effectively. Timing for Resource Stripping: He calculated that the Shobu Group would have approximately three months during which it could strip the Cagayan and Magat Valleys of the essential food and military supplies needed for a protracted stand in the mountains. During this period, the group aimed to transport this matériel into the Cordillera Central through the junction of Routes 4 and 5, located near Bagabag, 25 miles north on Route 5 from Bambang. Control of Key Routes: Yamashita recognized that the success of his planned withdrawal and future delaying actions hinged on maintaining control over the Routes 4-5 junction for as long as possible. He estimated that his defenses south of Santa Fe would be robust enough to hold until mid-June. Additionally, he planned to construct new defensive positions across Route 5 between Santa Fe and Bambang, enabling him to contain the 1st Corps south of Bambang until the end of June. Most crucially, he believed that he would be able to retain control of the Junction of Routes 4 and 5 until the end of July, which was essential for his operational strategy. His initial perimeter encompassed the vital Route 11 terminus of the Baguio-Aritao supply road, as well as key locations such as Bessang Pass, Bontoc, Banaue, Oriung Pass, and Santa Fe In his May 5 plan, Yamashita outlined the necessity of holding the Salacsac Pass-Balete Pass line until mid-June while constructing additional defenses between Santa Fe and Bambang. After mid-June, the Japanese forces were to withdraw to a second perimeter, extending through Ambuclao, Mankayan, Sabangan, Bontoc, Oriung Pass, and Bambang, strategically positioning themselves for potential future engagements. Yamashita understood that these defenses would need to hold until July, when the defenders would be expected to retreat to his last-stand positions centered around Bokod, Mankayan, Polis Pass, the Rayambugan Farm School, and Bambang. He anticipated that the Shobu Group would be compelled to hold their ground until annihilation at these key locations. On April 27, the 103rd Division received orders from the Area Army to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving behind only the Yuguchi Detachment 80th Brigade Headquarters in Aparri, which comprised a meager two battalions of nuclear infantry. Yamashita's plans called for virtually abandoning the Cagayan Valley, temporarily retaining only the 103rd Division, which was significantly outnumbered and equated to less than two American Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), particularly since the Araki Force was stationed in the Cervantes area. The primary duty of the 103rd Division would be to gather all available resources in the valley, including rice and livestock such as carabaos, and dispatch these supplies into the Cordillera Central through Bagabag. Once this crucial task was completed, the division would also withdraw into the mountains, aligning with Yamashita's broader strategic objectives. Yamashita's decision to abandon the Cagayan Valley made logical sense. He realized that the forces he had remaining could not hold the valley for much longer. Additionally, there seemed little necessity to maintain a strong presence there any further. Initially, he had kept units in the valley to harvest and gather food, deny the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) the use of airfields for strikes against Formosa and Okinawa, and hold onto Aparri in the hope that supplies and reinforcements might still reach Luzon. However, by early May, Yamashita concluded that the situation at Okinawa was largely resolved, negating any strategic purpose behind holding the valley airfields. The hope for reinforcements had long since faded, and crucially, his troops had already gathered the early rice harvest from the valley. With no new crop expected to come in until late September, Yamashita recognized that he would not be able to harvest this future crop, further solidifying his decision to withdraw. Yamashita also ordered the 79th Brigade to take over the defense of Banaue, while directing the 105th Division to defend both the Magat Valley and the Bato Bridge area against potential airborne attacks. However, by the end of May, the situation deteriorated significantly: Santa Fe had fallen, and the retreat of the 10th Division had devolved into a chaotic rout. This development put the defenders at risk of allowing the enemy to reach Bambang before they could establish any strong delaying positions south of the town. In response, Yamashita ordered the 10th Division and the 2nd Tank Division to assemble for a defensive stand across Route 5 at Bato Bridge. He also repositioned the 105th Division to the Rayambugan Farm School and directed the 103rd Division to occupy the vacated defenses at Oriung Pass. Despite these strategic maneuvers, time was not on their side. General Krueger wasted no time launching an aggressive pursuit northward, immediately sending the relatively fresh 37th Division to drive straight up Route 5 from Santa Fe to Bagabag. This force was then to swing east through Oriung Pass into the Cagayan Valley, continuing its advance north along Route 5 toward Aparri. To prepare for a larger offensive, Krueger also intended to use the 25th and 33rd Divisions in the initial assault against the Japanese home islands. To this end, he directed the 32nd Division to take over operations in the Baguio area, while the 6th Division was tasked with relieving the 25th at Santa Fe before striking northwest up Route 4 into the deep Cordillera Central, pursuing the Japanese forces further into the mountainous terrain. Finally, Swift was ordered to execute limited attacks up Route 11 from Baguio, maintain the guerrilla offensive against Cervantes, and deploy the Connolly Task Force to follow Route 3 around the northwest tip of Luzon to secure the Aparri region. Leading the charge, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Division advanced north from Santa Fe on May 31, quickly encountering a reinforced provisional anti-tank unit just south of Aritao. This unit managed to delay the town's capture until June 5. However, the following day, Bambang fell without resistance, and the 129th faced only token opposition at Bato Bridge before ultimately reaching Bayombong on June 7. On June 8, the 145th Regiment took over the lead, and by nightfall, they had seized the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag without a fight. Advancing further, the 145th crossed the Magat River on June 9 and pressed toward Oriung Pass, where they rapidly engaged the reinforced 179th Independent Battalion. Although the outgunned and outnumbered defenders valiantly delayed the advance, the 145th pushed through the pass along Route 5 and secured it late on June 12. This breakthrough prompted the bulk of the 103rd Division to decide on a strategic retreat toward the Bontoc-Natonin area, while the remnants of the 4th Air Division abandoned Echague to join this withdrawal. By the evening of June 13, the 145th finally halted its advance at Santiago, while the 148th Regiment worked to neutralize the remaining Japanese positions at Oriung Pass. With these positions secured, the offensive resumed, resulting in the fall of the Echague airbase on June 14, followed by the occupation of Cauayan two days later. As we can see, neither the 10th Division nor the 2nd Tank Division managed to reach Bagabag in time to impede the American advance; the latter was assembling along the Bambang-Pingkian road. On June 12, the 20th Regiment initiated a southwest drive along this road from Bambang. Two days later, elements of the 126th Regiment began pushing west toward Pingkian from Aritao, thereby applying significant pressure on Iwanaka's beleaguered troops. Meanwhile, the 10th Division had become hopelessly cut off east of Route 5 and had retreated to the Old Spanish Trail south of Aritao. On June 11, the 25th Division launched a two-pronged attack against this isolated group, forcing General Okamoto's remnants to retreat eastward deep into the Sierra Madre. In the meantime, General Clarkson dispatched the 130th Regiment up Route 11, where they encountered the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was only capable of weak resistance. Poor weather conditions hindered the 33rd Division's operations in the following days, but by June 15, elements of the 130th Regiment had swung east along the Baguio-Aritao supply road and reached Ambuclao on the Agno River. To the north, Volckmann continued his offensive throughout June, deploying the 121st Regiment to clear Route 4 and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Regiment was tasked with advancing to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then moving generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. Additionally, the still-arriving 66th Regiment aimed to secure the area south of Butac and swing to the east on the 15th's right flank. As a result, both Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge were cleared by June 5, with the 15th Regiment then turning its focus toward Upper Cadsu while the 121st Regiment advanced directly toward Bessang Pass. Volckmann's Provisional Battalion launched an attack on Magun Hill and, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of the area by June 10. On that day, the 121st Regiment initiated a final assault toward Bessang Pass, advancing from the west and southwest. The following day, the Provisional Battalion began pressing in from the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the 15th Regiment overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu on June 12, just as the 66th Regiment was reaching the southwestern corner of the ridge. Supported by artillery, the 121st finally overcame the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on June 14, establishing contact with the Provisional Battalion east of the pass. On the same day, the final pockets of opposition crumbled before the 15th and 66th Regiments south of the pass. Consequently, the remnants of Japanese forces fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Regiments, which successfully secured the town before dark on June 15. During this final offensive, the guerrillas suffered losses of 119 men killed and 120 wounded, while exaggerated estimates placed Japanese losses at around 2,600 killed. At the same time, by mid-June, the guerrilla 11th and 14th Regiments had cleared almost all the valley west of the Cagayan River, stretching from Cauayan north to Aparri. They also gained complete control over Route 11 from Bontoc to the valley, effectively preventing the 103rd Division from joining Yamashita's last-stand positions. Meanwhile, the Connolly Task Force, after a largely uneventful march, approached Aparri and began an attack on June 11 to clear the last Japanese forces from the area. The last event forcing Yamashita to alter his plans came on 13 June, when the 6th Division's 63d Infantry began probing northwest up Route 4 from Bagabag. The reconnaissance foreshadowed a push that Yamashita especially feared, since Route 4 provided direct access to the deep Cordillera Central. The 105th Division, with defenses across Route 4 at the Rayambugan Farm School, did not have sufficient strength to hold the highway, Yamashita knew. Recognizing that he could not hope to maintain control along any of the three perimeters he had established in May, Yamashita issued new orders for a strategic withdrawal to a last-stand area. This new perimeter would be set up along the inhospitable valley of the Asin River, positioned between Routes 4 and 11. Accordingly, the orders were as follows: The 105th Division was to retreat from Route 4 to the Pacdan-Antipolo line. The 2nd Tank Division was to move north and hold the line from Tubliao to Antipolo. The 23rd Division was tasked with defending along the Adaoay-Bokod line. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was to hold the Agno Valley from Buguias south to Adaoay. The 19th Division was to consolidate the bulk of its forces into the Agno Valley, defending the river line from the Loo Valley south to Buguias. The 79th Brigade was assigned to defend Route 390 at Hapao. Once this last-stand perimeter collapsed, Yamashita planned for all remaining forces to retreat into the barren Asin Valley between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, prepared to fight to the death. The area behind this new last-stand perimeter boasted excellent defensive terrain, and Yamashita estimated that most of his units had sufficient ammunition for machine guns, mortars, and small arms to hold their positions for an extended period. However, the Shobu Group faced dire challenges: they were virtually out of medical supplies, had no clothing stocks, and their food reserves would be completely exhausted by mid-September. If they were not annihilated by the advancing Filipino-American forces, the Shobu Group could only anticipate a slow death by starvation and disease. Now, it's time to shift focus from the Philippines and head to Borneo to cover the preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan, codenamed Operation Oboe II. As the 9th Australian Division completed its tasks in North Borneo, General Milford's 7th Australian Division was assembling at Morotai for the upcoming invasion scheduled for July 1. Milford's plan entailed an amphibious assault on a two-brigade front between the Klandasan Besar River and Klandasan town, where the Japanese had established their strongest defenses.  In June, it was estimated that approximately 3,900 troops were stationed around Balikpapan, composed of: 1,500 in mobile units. 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units. Additionally, there were 1,100 Japanese workers, 2,400 Indonesians, and 1,000 Formosans present. Near Samarinda, it was believed there were about 1,500 troops, plus possibly a battalion that had recently arrived from Tarakan. Experience had demonstrated that when estimating the strength of the enemy's resistance, every Japanese and Formosan, whether part of a fighting unit, base unit, or civilian labor group, had to be regarded as a combatant. Key defensive features included: At least 18 coast-defense guns, primarily located on ridges overlooking the sea. 26 heavy dual-purpose guns and 78 medium and light anti-aircraft guns. Offshore, between Klandasan and Manggar, rows of stout poles were driven into the seabed, horizontally braced with timber, and protected with barbed wire. An almost continuous anti-tank ditch, from 12 to 14 feet wide, extended above the beach from Stalkudo to Sepinggang. Extensive trench systems, with many tunnel openings, were detected on the ridges overlooking Klandasan. Numerous concrete strongpoints and a continuous line of bunkers lined the beach's fringe. This area was among the most strongly fortified that the Australians had encountered during the war. Indeed, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, responsible for air support of the landing, cautioned the Prime Minister in a letter that these meticulously prepared defenses might result in Australian casualties comparable to those experienced during the landing at Gallipoli. It appeared that the Japanese had established their main defenses on the slopes overlooking the beaches from Klandasan to Stalkudo. The Australian staff believed the Japanese would attempt to contain the invaders within their beachhead area for as long as possible, before withdrawing inland, either south to Bandjermasin or overland to Bintulu in Sarawak. Additionally, it was anticipated that the enemy would direct burning oil onto the beach unless the oil tanks were destroyed during the preliminary bombardment. Brigadier Ivan Dougherty's 21st Brigade was to land with one battalion on Green Beach, while Brigadier Frederick Chilton's 18th Brigade would go ashore with two battalions on the Yellow and Red Beaches. Once a beachhead was secured, the 18th Brigade would seize the high ground dominating the town and clear the harbor for use, while the 21st Brigade would advance along the coast to capture the airstrips. Additionally, Brigadier Kenneth Eather's 25th Brigade, held in reserve, was set to land on July 2 with the likely objective of thrusting inland along the Milford Highway. Although Admiral Barbey favored a landing site farther east, possibly at Sepinggang, where their ships could be positioned more safely and further from Japanese coastal defense guns, Milford countered with sound reasoning: “Why land up the coast and have to fight miles through jungle, which suits the enemy, when you can go straight in under heavy supporting fire, which the enemy can't withstand, in comparatively open and favorable country?” Supported by General Morshead, this plan received approval, and by June 16, the 7th Division was successfully assembled at Morotai. Admiral Noble's Task Force 78 would once again transport the Australian troops to the landing area, supported by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruiser group and Rear-Admiral William Sample's escort carriers. Against the Japanese defenses, Admiral Kamada's 22nd Special Base Force consisted of approximately 3,900 troops, with 1,500 in mobile units and 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units, in addition to an estimated 4,500 laborers. In preparation for the invasion, aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and the 5th and 13th Air Forces began bombarding enemy defenses and storage tanks on June 4. These attacks intensified a week later as they specifically targeted Japanese gun positions. On June 15, Noble's minesweepers arrived to clear the sea around Balikpapan of magnetic mines, but faced losses, with three ships sunk and three damaged during the operation. Ten days later, American underwater demolition teams began working to locate and breach the underwater obstacles, often under heavy gunfire. To further confuse the enemy, efforts were made to create the impression that the landing would occur at Manggar. This included spreading rumors, landing a reconnaissance party in that area, and demolishing underwater obstacles at both Manggar and Sepinggang. Finally, on June 26, Noble's convoy set sail from Morotai. After an uneventful voyage, they reached Balikpapan unmolested just before dawn on July 1. During the morning, Riggs' cruisers and Noble's destroyers shelled the landing beaches and the defenses behind them, continuing the bombardment until the first waves of landing craft were within 1,300 yards of the shore, at which point the fire shifted to the flanks and rear of the enemy positions. About an hour before the landing, a combined rocket barrage and low-level airstrike were executed, followed by a second rocket barrage just ten minutes before the troops hit the beaches. In total, during the 20 days leading up to the assault, the Balikpapan-Manggar area received 3,000 tons of bombs, 7,361 rockets, 38,052 shells, and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons, all aimed at crippling the formidable Japanese defenses. Covered by a successful bombardment, the assault waves finally hit the beaches just before 09:00. However, due to navigation errors, the troops were put ashore at the wrong locations. The 2/27th Battalion landed on Yellow Beach instead of Green Beach and quickly captured the Ration, Romilly, Rottnest, and Charlie's Spur positions. The 2/12th Battalion landed on Red Beach instead of Yellow, necessitating a northeast swing to take over Ration and reduce the remaining Japanese defenses in the area. A platoon was also detached to push inland along Vasey Road to seize Portee, while other elements secured Parkes, Plug, and Blyth's Junction. The 2/10th Battalion, correctly landing on Red Beach, rapidly seized the high ground in front of them. Patrols found Prudent and Petersham Junction to be unoccupied. The 2/10th then assembled at Petersham Junction and captured the lower slopes of Hill 87, successfully taking the hill under assault by noon. Meanwhile, Dougherty landed his reserve units, which also came ashore further west than expected on Yellow Beach. The 2/16th Battalion quickly assembled at Ravenshoe and captured Record, Pigeon, and Mount Malang. By 11 a.m. the battalion was on Ravenshoe, whence Malang and Pigeon were visible. Advancing under sharp fire Captain Madigan's company on the left took Record about 4 p.m., killing 46 Japanese. At 4.5 Captain R. H. Christian's company launched a concerted attack on Malang, sup-ported by the fire of artillery, mortars and machine-guns, and using a flame-thrower. The hill was taken and 40 Japanese were killed. The Australians lost four killed, including the leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Armstrong, and 14 wounded. By nightfall the 2/16th held a line through Malang, Pigeon and Record. It had lost 6 killed or died of wounds in the day and 24 wounded; 86 Japanese dead had been counted.  The 2/14th Battalion advanced swiftly to secure a bridgehead over the Klandasan Besar and seized the Stalkudo ridge. The 2/5th Commando Squadron passed through this bridgehead and attacked northeast but encountered heavy opposition. Returning to Hill 87, the 2/10th Battalion assaulted and captured Parramatta in the afternoon, aided by artillery and tanks, while patrols further secured Newcastle and the Cracking Plant by dusk. A patrol led by Sergeant A. A. Evans was sent out from Davey's platoon towards Newcastle. They silenced a bunker with a flame-thrower, and came to a house from which Japanese were firing. They overcame this position with grenades and small arms fire and then moved on to New-castle. As Evans reached Newcastle he saw the surviving Japanese making off towards Portee. Davey's platoon now occupied Newcastle and the other platoon took up positions on Parramatta. The seizure of Parramatta gave the 2/10th observation over the low ground to the north and the northern end of the town, and tied the battalion in with the 2/12th on Portee; the Japanese were now in a very poor position to counter-attack from the western end of the beach-head. Lieutenant Russack of Sanderson's company led a patrol to the Cracking Plant where it silenced a Japanese pill-box. This patrol was strafed by American aircraft, but worse was to follow. At 4.55 American carrier-borne aircraft made a run over Parramatta from the west and dropped bombs and fired rockets across Hill 87, which had then been in the hands of the 2/10th for four hours and a half. Much of this fire landed in the area into which Captain Brocksopp's" company ("D") had moved and where Daly's command post was established. Three were killed, including Lance-Sergeant Hackett, a veteran of several cam-paigns, and 14 wounded, including Major G. R. Miethke and two other officers. Air panels were displayed in all platoon areas after this. Daly decided to hold that night as far forward as Newcastle, on which he placed two platoons plus a platoon of the 2/1st Machine Gun Bat-talion, all under Captain Bowie. In the day the battalion had lost 13 killed and 30 wounded, but 216 Japanese dead were counted. That night 24 more Japanese were killed while trying to penetrate the Australians' positions and no Australian was hit. All night there were fires round about where houses were burning, and the blazing oil tanks on the Tank Plateau 600 yards to the west of the Parramatta ridge lit up the landscape. Finally, Brigadier Chilton also landed the reserve 2/9th Battalion on Red Beach and sent it west in the afternoon to occupy Klandasan town, leading to the capture of Santosa Hill by nightfall. Thus, the Australians successfully landed at Balikpapan and secured a sizable beachhead, marking the beginning of what would become a fierce and challenging battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In June 1945, American forces, led by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fought fiercely against Japanese troops in Luzon, achieving significant victories despite heavy resistance. The tide turned as they captured key positions, restoring hope to Filipinos. Meanwhile, preparations for the Balikpapan invasion intensified. The 7th Australian Division readied for an amphibious assault on July 1 against well-fortified Japanese defenses. Despite facing strong opposition, the Australians successfully landed at various beaches, seizing vital ground.

Resumen de noticias de la mañana de LA NACION del 30 de junio de 2025 

《聽見花蓮：聲音裡的英語與旅行》——英文老師變導遊，維尼用聲音帶你旅行花蓮，學英文、看在地風景，還有滿滿故事和笑料！ 花蓮的故事該怎麼用英文說？從葡萄牙水手眼中的「Formosa」，到奇萊平原的撒奇萊雅傳說，再到「洄瀾」這個名字的由來，本集帶你走進花蓮的歷史與神話。還有不能錯過的花蓮石雕藝術與原民創作，主角是土生土長的阿美族藝術家鄭詠鐸，透過他的雕刻，一起感受部落的記憶與文化的力量！

住近美術館，把握最後機會 《惟美術》3房熱銷倒數 輕奢品味，全新完工，即刻入住 近鄰輕軌C22站，設籍明星學區 預約來電 07-553-3838 https://sofm.pse.is/7qr2ke -- 新鮮事、新奇事、新故事《一銀陪你聊“新”事》 第一銀行打造公股銀行首創ESG Podcast頻道上線啦 由知名主持人阿Ken與多位名人來賓進行對談 邀請您一起落實永續發展 讓永續未來不再只是想像 各大收聽平台搜尋：ㄧ銀陪你聊新事 https://sofm.pse.is/7qlgrn －－－－以上訊息由 SoundOn 動態廣告贊助商提供－－－－ 「台獨金孫」賴清德當上總統之後不再提台獨，只能算「華獨金孫」？台獨將何去何從？台灣正名制憲建國仍是遙不可及的企盼嗎？所謂開羅「宣言」其實只是個「公報」？根本沒有法律效力？「舊金山和約」才是台灣主權獨立的真憑實據？1912年孫中山創立的「中華民國」、和蔣介石在台灣借殼還魂的「中華民國」其實是兩個截然不同的國家？精彩訪談內容，請鎖定@華視三國演議！ 本集來賓：#陳峻涵 #黃澎孝 主持人：#矢板明夫 以上言論不代表本台立場 #舊金山和約 #開羅宣言 #台獨 #自決 電視播出時間

You've read his work (or you should); this awesome guy has been pumping out informative weekly history columns (and now YouTube videos) for close to a decade. His name is Han Cheung (learn how to pronounce that by listening to this interview), and he went from being one of the only Asian-Americans in a small town in Wyoming - where he wrote for a local newspaper about the history of that state's Wild West era - to returning to his parents' adopted home of Taiwan to write "Taiwan in Time." It's been quite a journey for Han, and in this interview, we talk about everything from history to "slow death metal" with half-Cantonese lyrics. Enjoy! PS: Sorry for the delay in release. Eryk caught some covid-adjacent flu and was unable to move. Gratefully, Eryk is feeling better, but Eryk is still referring to himself in the third person, which history shows isn't such a good idea.

La banda sonora de la película sobre Vinicius de Moraes, 'Vinicius', de Miguel Faria Jr. estrenada en 2005: con lecturas de un par de textos del poeta y las grabaciones de Ricardo Blatt (texto de Rubem Braga), Renato Braz ('Se todos fossem iguais a você'), Mônica Salmaso ('Insensatez'), Camila Morgado ('Soneto da fidelidade'), Yamandu Costa ('Valsa de Eurídice'), Chico Buarque ('Medo de amar'), Caetano Veloso ('Poema dos olhos da amada'), María Bethânia ('Soneto do amor total'), Adriana Calcanhotto ('Eu sei que vou te amar'), Carlos Lyra ('Você e eu'), Mart´nália ('Sei là a vida tem sempre razão'), Toquinho ('Tarde em Itapoã'), Edu lobo ('Berimbau'), Zeca Pagodinho ('Pra que chorar'), Gilberto Gil ('Formosa'), Mariana de Moraes ('Coisa mais linda'), Renato Braz ('Por toda minha vida'), Olivia Byington ('Modinha'), María Bethânia ('O que tinha de ser'), Francis Hime ('Sem mais adeus'), Sérgio Cassiano ('Pau de arara') y Mônica Salmaso ('Canto triste').Escuchar audio

Last time we spoke about the breakthrough on Okinawa. Despite relentless attacks on critical positions like Sugar Loaf Hill and Wana Ridge, American Marines encountered heavy casualties. Yet, they persisted, inching forward against tenacious resistance. As mid-May approached, the situation for Japanese commanders deteriorated. Encircled and suffering significant losses, they began plotting a retreat to more defensible positions. On the ground, Marines battled through mud and enemy fire, showcasing incredible resolve amidst dire circumstances. Communication crumbled, supplies dwindled, and morale waned, yet the determination of both sides was undeniable. By late May, the tides shifted further in favor of the Allies, marking pivotal breakthroughs despite the challenges. Amidst ruin and chaos, the relentless struggle for control over Okinawa symbolized the brutal nature of war and the unwavering spirit of those fighting on both sides, setting the stage for an eventual Allied victory.  This episode is the Fall of Shuri Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the battle for Okinawa was reaching a critical juncture. General Buckner's 10th Army had made significant gains, successfully breaking through the fortified Japanese defenses on both flanks. The 6th Marine Division, under General Shepherd, had effectively established control over the Naha area, while General Arnold's 7th Division achieved an impressive penetration at Yonabaru. However, despite these advancements, the remainder of the American forces faced formidable obstacles. They were grappling with relentless rain, fierce enemy resistance, and severe supply shortages, which left them effectively stalled in front of Shuri. In response to the encroaching American forces, General Ushijima had dispatched General Fujioka's 62nd Division to launch a counter-offensive aimed at driving the invaders out of Yonabaru. Meanwhile, Ushijima was preparing his 32nd Army for a strategic withdrawal south to the Kiyamu Peninsula. Fortunately for the Americans, they had caught wind of the defenders' intentions. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, on May 27, General Buckner ordered his troops to apply strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. The goal was clear: keep the Japanese forces off balance and prevent an easy transition to new defensive positions. Although the continuing downpour hindered the possibility of a large-scale, coordinated army-wide attack, it did not deter Buckner's strategy. Instead, he initiated a series of strong combat patrols along the front lines, which immediately encountered stiff resistance from Japanese troops that had not yet begun their withdrawal. On the west coast, as patrols from Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines scouted the area, they discovered that the Japanese had largely abandoned Naha. This news spurred the 2nd Battalion into action. They crossed the Asato River, moved through the lines established by Shepherd's Reconnaissance Company, and pressed deeper into the western part of Naha. Simultaneously, Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines made their last desperate push to extend American control into eastern Naha, fighting valiantly against the entrenched enemy. Farther east, Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment once again faced fierce resistance from the hastily committed 62nd Division, which staunchly defended its position. However, not all was lost; patrols from Colonel Green's 184th Regiment managed to reach Inasomi, meeting only scattered resistance. This breakthrough provided a crucial indication that the enemy had no intention of withdrawing into the Chinen Peninsula. As the clocks struck midnight, a significant yet largely unnoticed transition occurred in the waters off Okinawa: Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet relieved Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet. For the troops ashore, this change in command went by without a hint of recognition. The same ships and task groups continued their crucial support for ground operations, now operating under new numerical designations and leadership. However, Halsey faced an immediate challenge as Admiral Ugaki launched an extensive Kikisui attack, a large-scale kamikaze assault involving 110 enemy aircraft. The day of May 27 proved costly, with three destroyers, one destroyer minesweeper, two transports, one subchaser, and two auxiliary ships all suffering damage. The following morning brought clear skies, which only heightened the danger for American naval forces. Several kamikaze aircraft succeeded in sinking the destroyer USS Drexler, while also inflicting damage on a transport ship, three freighters, and a landing craft throughout the day. Meanwhile, on land, Colonel Whaling's rehabilitated 29th Marines took over from the battered 4th Marines along the west coast. The 1st Battalion executed a concerted attack alongside the 22nd Marines, advancing successfully by 250 yards through the rubble-strewn city of Naha. In an impressive display of momentum, Roberts' men pushed forward unopposed toward the Kokuba estuary, eventually encountering resistance near Ono-Yama Island. To the east, the improvement in weather allowed Colonel Mason's 1st Marines to launch a coordinated offensive. The 2nd Battalion fought valiantly, climbing to the peak of 110 Meter Hill. The forward elements of Company E gained the hill crest but were forced to withdraw by vicious enemy fire which raked their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Magee felt that his depleted battalion, down to a total strength of 277 men in the rifle companies, might recapture the hill, but "it could not possibly hold it against a strong enemy counterattack." Although new replacements were available to regiments for training or other use, a division order prevented their being sent to front line units during a battle situation that called for the utmost in skill and knowledge of veterans. Throughout most of the morning and all of the afternoon, 2/1 concentrated the fire of its supporting weapons on the reverse slopes of 110 Meter Hill and engaged the Japanese in a fierce and continuous fire fight. Nightfall brought no cessation of enemy resistance, and many infiltrators were killed in the battalion's lines. In contrast, the 3rd Battalion experienced relatively little opposition, allowing some patrols to penetrate into Wana Draw. At the same time, Colonel Griebel's 3rd Battalion effectively moved its front line to the Asato River, while his 1st Battalion achieved a significant milestone by capturing Beehive Hill. However, despite the break in the rain, the conditions on the ground rendered large-scale movements impractical, stalling further advances across the battlefield. Despite Arnold's determined efforts to push west through Fujioka's blocking positions, progress was minimal. Nevertheless, he was able to consolidate his grip on the Ozato hill mass as Green's 2nd Battalion advanced to a position within 1,000 yards of Shinazato, strategically located at the neck of the Chinen Peninsula. The lack of success from the 62nd Division in driving back the breaching American forces reinforced General Ushijima's resolve to evacuate Shuri while the opportunity still existed. In light of this, he ordered the withdrawal to commence the following evening. On May 29, while the 7th Reconnaissance Troop managed to scout a significant portion of the Chinen Peninsula without incident, the 7th and 96th Divisions faced fierce resistance as they attacked toward the road network south of Shuri. The enemy's resolute defense resulted in only minimal gains for the American assault units. General Bruce's 77th Division, after what can be described as "a day almost entirely spent in hand-to-hand combat," found itself unable to penetrate the intense cordon of defensive fire that protected the Japanese positions. In stark contrast, to the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion made a rapid advance, quickly gaining the crest of Shuri Ridge. They launched a bold assault on Shuri Castle. On May 25, as part of the final stages of the Okinawa campaign, the American battleship USS Mississippi bombarded the castle for three days, and by May 27, it was engulfed in flames. That night, the Japanese forces retreated, abandoning Shuri while US troops pursued them southward. The 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines had started its attack on 29 May with Companies B and C in assault and Company A following in trace of Company C. The Marines quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge and Lieutenant Colonel Shelburne requested permission for one of his companies to storm Shuri Castle which commanded his position. Although the castle was in the zone of action of the 77th Infantry Division, General del Valle gave his assent to the request in view of the great danger of enemy action from the strong point. The 1st Marine Division commander felt that "at that time the position of the 77th Division was such that it would have taken several hard day's fighting through enemy resistance" before the castle could be taken. Company A drove east along the muddy ridge line, overwhelming the few Japanese in its path, and by 1015 the castle, core of the Shuri bastion, had been secured. The Marine unit entered Shuri through a gap in the covering forces caused by the withdrawal of the 3d Battalion, 15th Independent Mixed Regiment of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, in the course of the Japanese retreat from Shuri. This seems to have been the only notable instance of confusion and mistake in the Japanese withdrawal operation as a whole. Everywhere else around Shuri the Japanese still held their covering positions in the front lines. The 77th Division, which had scheduled air strikes and a heavy artillery bombardment on the castle heights for 29 May, received little prior warning of the Marines' assault and "was barely able to avert [its] called strikes in time." Without taking any credit away from Company A of the 5th Marines for its feat of capturing Shuri Castle, its success was clearly the result of the combined effort of all the assault and support troops of Tenth Army which had maintained relentless pressure on the enemy defenses and paved the way for the breakthrough.  Capitalizing on this momentum, General Del Valle swiftly reorganized his forces to bypass Wana Draw and consolidate these crucial gains. Meanwhile, Griebel's 3rd Battalion maneuvered down the division boundary, reaching a position just 2,000 yards from the village of Kokuba, prompting Whaling's 3rd Battalion to push their lines forward by approximately 600 yards. In a coordinated effort, the 29th Marines executed a wheeling assault on 29 May with 1/29 pivoting on 3/29 and attacking south and then east to bring the regiment on line with the 22d Marines. The ultimate objective of the 1st Battalion's attack was the high ground northwest of Shichina. The approach to the objective was over low and open terrain which drew the comment from regiment that it was "about as suitable to fighting as a billiard table." Fire from strong points in tombs and caves on the small hills and ridges to the front kept the advance to a slow pace, and the assault companies, A and C, dug in slightly to the left rear of the positions of the 22d Marines at nightfall. On another front, Roberts' 1st Battalion successfully crossed the Kokuba River and advanced toward Telegraph Hill in east Naha. However, despite their efforts, intense fighting erupted throughout the day without yielding any significant gains. Back at sea, the threat of kamikaze attacks returned with ferocity, yet this time, American defenses held strong, resulting in only a single destroyer and one transport sustaining damage. As night fell, the Japanese began their long-anticipated withdrawal. General Amamiya's 24th Division commenced disengagement, moving southward while leaving a small force, including the 22nd Independent Battalion, to cover their retreat at Shuri. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade held their defensive lines outside Naha, and the 62nd Division maintained its positions near Chan and Karadera. By dawn on May 30, the bulk of the 32nd Army had successfully evacuated the Shuri lines, slipping away from the flanking maneuvers of Buckner's 10th Army. Thanks to a continuous curtain of rain, General Ushijima executed a meticulously planned "properly deft withdrawal." His covering forces were strategically positioned to provide him with the necessary time to organize a defensive stance on the Kiyamu Peninsula. However, the Americans, ever vigilant, were quick to capitalize on the enemy's disarray, maintaining relentless pressure on the faltering Japanese front. On the west coast, Roberts' 2nd and 3rd Battalions crossed the canal, seamlessly moving through the 1st Battalion to take up the assault. They pushed forward tenaciously until they captured the entire area encompassing Telegraph Hill and Hill 27. A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Enemy machine guns emplaced in burial tombs on Hill 27 in east Naha temporarily checked the infantry. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. During most of the day tanks were unable to reach the position, but in the afternoon three worked their way along the road north of the hill, and their direct fire enabled the marines to seize it. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall. Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. At the same time, Whaling's 1st Battalion joined the offensive, encountering fierce resistance as they pressed through 600 yards of enemy territory. To the east, the Marines under Del Valle shifted their focus to vigorous patrolling, as the supply situation gradually improved thanks to dedicated carrying parties and aerial air drops. Despite their efforts, the 306th Regiment's assault on 110 Meter Hill encountered heavy opposition once again. However, Colonel Hamilton's 307th Regiment finally achieved a breakthrough, seizing the strategic Three Sisters. Dorothy Hill, a fortress directly east of Shuri and a tower of strength in the enemy's inner line for the past two weeks, was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division. The first platoon to reach the base of the hill was pinned down by heavy fire, the platoon leader and all noncommissioned officers being wounded. Other platoons maneuvered into position and finally one squad reached the crest at the right end. This entering wedge enabled two companies to reach the top, from which they discovered three levels of caves on the reverse slope. They went to work methodically, moving from right to left along the top level, burning and blasting each cave and dugout, the flame-thrower and satchel-charge men covered by riflemen. When work on the top level was finished, the second level of caves and tunnels received similar treatment, and then the third and lowest level. That night fifteen Japanese who had survived the day's fighting crawled out of the blasted caves and were killed by Americans from their foxholes. A great amount of enemy equipment, including ten destroyed 150-mm- guns and twenty-five trucks, was found on the south (reverse) side of Dorothy Hill, testifying to the enemy fire power at this strong point. On 30 May, the 77th Division also took Jane Hill on its left flank and then almost unopposed took Tom Hill, the highest point of ground in the Shuri area, by 1700. This critical victory paved the way for Colonel Smith's forces to advance into the northern outskirts of Shuri through Ishimmi. In a remarkable display of coordination, Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment finally secured the strategic Hen Hill and Oboe Hill areas, while also capturing Hector Hill on their left flank. For nine days elements of the 96th Division had been stalemated at the base of Hen Hill, just northeast of Shuri. On the 30th, Company F and one platoon of Company G, 382d Infantry, resumed the attack on Hen Hill. Pfc. Clarence B. Craft, a rifleman from Company G, was sent out ahead with five companions to test the Japanese positions. As he and his small group started up the slope, they were brought under heavy fire from Japanese just over the crest, and a shower of grenades fell on them. Three of the men were wounded and the other two were stopped. Craft, although a new replacement and in his first action, kept on going, tossing grenades at the crest. From just below the crest he threw two cases of grenades that were passed up to him from the bottom, those of the enemy going over his head or exploding near him. He then leaped to the crest and fired at point-blank range into the Japanese in a trench a few feet below him. Spurred by Craft's example, other men now came to his aid. Reloading, Craft pursued the Japanese down the trench, wiped out a machine gun nest, and satchel-charged the cave into which the remaining Japanese had retreated. Altogether, in the taking of Hen Hill as a result of Craft's action, about seventy Japanese were killed, at least twenty-five of whom were credited to Craft himself. This daring action won him the Congressional Medal of Honor. To the left (east), Company F at the same time engaged in a grenade battle for Hector Hill, using ten cases of grenades in the assault on the crest. It was finally won after a satchel charge was hurled over the top and lit in the enemy trench on the other side, parts of Japanese bodies and pieces of enemy equipment hurtling into the sky in the blast. Hen and Hector Hills had fallen by 1400. Southeast of their position, Colonel May's 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached Love Hill and dug in, although scattered fire was still received from a machine gun in a nook of Charlie Hill and there were a few live Japanese on Love itself. In the afternoon the 3d Battalion, 383d Infantry, left its foxholes on Oboe, where it had experienced so great an ordeal, and proceeded down the reverse slope of the hill, finding only a few scattered Japanese. That night the 383d Infantry expressed a heartfelt sentiment when it reported "infinite relief to have Conical Hill behind us." Although there had been suicidal stands in a few places by the last of the holding force, the advances had been rapid. Simultaneously, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment effectively reduced the Conical Hill-Cutaway area and seized Roger Hill, both regiments then advancing toward the vital Naha-Yonabaru road. At the same time, the 32nd Regiment launched a coordinated offensive that allowed them to successfully capture Oak, Ella, and June Hills. This advance brought Finn's troops directly into confrontation with Mabel and Hetty Hills, facing the formidable defenses of Chan. Meanwhile, strong patrols from the 184th Regiment ventured into the Chinen Peninsula's strongholds, encountering only light enemy resistance, a turn of events that buoyed American morale. As night fell, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division began their long-anticipated evacuation from Shuri. They pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan, executing their withdrawal amidst a progressively decreasing barrage of artillery and mortar fire. Consequently, when Buckner's assault troops launched their offensive against the Shuri positions on the morning of May 31, they were met with an eerie silence, the stillness only interrupted by sporadic sniper fire and the distant crack of machine guns.The 77th Division swiftly took 110 Meter Hill and advanced into Shuri with little to no resistance. Concurrently, Mason's units surrounding Shuri Castle moved north unopposed, aiding in the occupation of the battered ruins and the troublesome Wana Draw.  Shuri, the second town of Okinawa, lay in utter ruin. There was no other city, town, or village in the Ryukyus that had been destroyed so completely. Naha too had been laid waste. Certain villages which had been strong points in the enemy's defense, such as Kakazu, Dakeshi, Kochi, Arakachi, and Kunishi, had been fought over and leveled to the ground. But none of these compared with the ancient capital of the Ryukyus. It was estimated that about 200000 rounds of artillery and naval gunfire had struck Shuri. Numerous air strikes had dropped 1000-pound bombs on it. Mortar shells by the thousands had arched their way into the town area. Only two structures, both of concrete, the big normal school at the southwestern corner and the little Methodist church, built in 1937, in the center of Shuri, had enough of their walls standing to form silhouettes on the skyline. The rest was flattened rubble. The narrow paved and dirt streets, churned by high explosives and pitted with shell craters, were impassable to any vehicle. The stone walls of the numerous little terraces were battered down. The rubble and broken red tile of the houses lay in heaps. The frame portion of buildings had been reduced to kindling wood. Tattered bits of Japanese military clothing, gas masks, and tropical helmets-the most frequently seen items-and the dark-colored Okinawan civilian dress lay about in wild confusion. Over all this crater of the moon landscape hung the unforgettable stench of rotting human flesh. To  the west, Griebel's 1st Battalion built upon Mason's gains, but it was the 3rd Battalion that led the main effort, successfully pushing to the hills just north of Shichina.Meanwhile, General Bradley's advancing battalions moved rapidly toward their assigned objectives, spending much of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. This relentless advance effectively pinched off the 77th Division, further consolidating American control in the region. On the extreme left flank, Halloran's 1st Battalion faced enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line, marking the only area where the 96th Division failed to reach the corps boundary. However, the Shuri area had now been completely secured, and contact was made with Del Valle's Marines in the center. On the flanks, though, Buckner's units continued to encounter fierce resistance from the tenacious Japanese defenders. The 32nd Regiment, battling bravely through a series of heavily fortified strongpoints held stubbornly by Fujioka's troops, managed to seize Duck Hill, consolidate its positions on Turkey Hill, and capture the forward face of Mabel. Ultimately, they halted their advance just short of Chan. Meanwhile, on the west coast, Shepherd's Marines pushed forward with support from tanks and artillery, targeting the strategic high ground west of Shichina and Kokuba. However, their advance was stalled by intense enemy fire emanating from Hill 46. During the night, the battered 44th Independent Mixed Brigade executed a withdrawal southeast towards the Kiyamu Peninsula, covered by the 62nd Division, which quickly established a new defensive line along the Kokuba River and around Tsukasan. With the fall of Shuri and the withdrawal of Japanese forces, Buckner's troops had emerged victorious in one of the most difficult and bloody battles of the Pacific War. By the end of May, reports indicated that approximately 62,548 Japanese soldiers had been confirmed killed, with another estimated 9,529 thought to have perished, 64,000 of whom were believed to have fallen in the fierce fighting within the Shuri fortified zone alone. While these casualty figures may be somewhat exaggerated, there is little doubt that Japanese forces, especially their infantry combat units, had suffered severe depletion. In contrast, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps recorded significant losses of its own, with 1,718 killed, 8,852 wounded, and 101 missing during the fighting around Shuri. Additionally, the losses for General Hodge's 24th Corps over two months of combat totaled an alarming 26,044 casualties. On June 1, the American forces faced surprisingly little opposition from the enemy. A frustrated General Buckner, who had hoped to trap the defenders at Shuri, ordered his troops to advance rapidly in pursuit of the retreating Japanese units. With the 77th Division methodically mopping up remnants in the Shuri zone, General Hodge made a strategic decision. He shifted the 7th Division toward the east and ordered the 96th Division to move south to relieve the 32nd Regiment, taking up the western end of the Corps line. This strategic relief enabled Arnold to immediately push south with both the 17th and 184th Regiments in assault, managing to advance approximately 1,100 yards toward Okota and Batan despite increasingly stiff resistance from smaller enemy units. To the northwest, a coordinated attack by the Marine divisions successfully secured all high ground overlooking the primary east-west road in the Kokuba Valley. The 5th Marines anchored their position on the hills east of Shichina, while Shepherd's regiments seized the dominating heights north of Kokuba. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Oroku Peninsula, General Geiger planned a shore-to-shore landing there. To gather intelligence, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. Their findings confirmed that the peninsula was not fortified with significant enemy strength. The following day, Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines advanced to relieve the 6th Marine Division on the west coast. The 2nd Battalion continued the momentum by crossing the Kokuba River, moving into the hills on the south bank. Meanwhile, to the east, the 5th Marines also crossed the upper branch of the river and pressed forward to secure the ridgeline that controlled the approaches to Tsukasan. This maneuver effectively placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road firmly in American hands, further tightening their grip on the battlefield. That evening, Shepherd dispatched his Reconnaissance Company to conduct an amphibious reconnaissance of the Oroku Peninsula. Their mission revealed that the peninsula was not heavily defended, opening up opportunities for American forces. Further east, the 383rd Regiment successfully cleared out Chan and seized the high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. Meanwhile, the 381st Regiment conducted repeated assaults on hill positions that impeded its advance, ultimately managing to penetrate to Karadera. The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure on the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula, advancing its lines by 2,400 yards toward Itokazu and Kerabaru. Now, it's time to shift our focus away from Okinawa and examine the latest operations of General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command. Since the invasion of Okinawa, Admiral Nimitz had requested that the B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers assist his naval forces in countering the deadly kamikaze attacks. In response, LeMay dispatched 53 bombers to target airfields at Kanoya on April 8, although the city of Kagoshima ended up being bombed instead. On April 17, 134 B-29s were sent against Kyushu, successfully neutralizing enemy airfield operations for 18 hours. However, as we've observed, the Japanese continued to launch both scattered and mass kamikaze attacks. To address this ongoing threat, the 21st Bomber Command, bolstered by the arrival of Brigadier General Roger Ramey's 58th Bombardment Wing, dedicated 75% of its combat effort to providing direct tactical support for the Okinawa campaign up to May 11. During this period, they flew a total of 2,104 sorties against 17 airfields in Kyushu and Shikoku. Although they did not fully neutralize these targets, significant damage was inflicted on enemy storage, maintenance, and repair facilities. The bombers also served to keep the Japanese off balance, significantly disrupting their ability to plan and execute large, coordinated attacks. In total, 24 B-29s were destroyed and 233 damaged during these operations, while 134 enemy interceptors were shot down. Between the strikes on Kyushu, General LeMay managed to fit in several medium-strength precision attacks against the Japanese aircraft industry, along with two large-scale night incendiary missions in the Tokyo Bay area. The first of these missions took place on April 13, when 327 B-29s dropped an impressive 2,139 tons of ordnance on the arsenal district of Tokyo, located northwest of the Imperial Palace. The resulting fires consumed 11.4 square miles of this crucial industrial zone, destroying arsenal plants responsible for manufacturing and storing small arms, machine guns, artillery, bombs, gunpowder, and fire-control mechanisms. Just two nights later, on April 15, 303 bombers executed another incendiary attack, dropping 1,930 tons of explosives with equal success. This raid devastated 6 square miles in Tokyo, 3.6 square miles in Kawasaki, and 1.5 square miles in Yokohama, which suffered collateral damage from the fire spills. Cumulatively, these two raids resulted in the destruction of 217,130 buildings in Tokyo and Yokohama and 31,603 in Kawasaki. On April 24, 131 B-29s conducted a highly successful precision strike against the Tachikawa plant of the Hitachi Aircraft Corporation. Although the next planned attack was thwarted by inclement weather, 148 B-29s struck Kure on May 5, delivering devastating damage. After being relieved from support for the Okinawa operation on May 11, LeMay initiated a month of heavy fire raids to complete the campaign that had begun in March, while also addressing top-priority precision targets as opportunities arose. Accordingly, on May 14, 529 B-29s were dispatched to strike northern Nagoya, with 472 successfully dropping 2,515 tons of munitions, resulting in the burning of 3.15 square miles and inflicting significant damage to Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works. Just two nights later, 522 bombers returned to Nagoya, with 457 of them effectively delivering 3,609 tons over the dock and industrial areas in the southern part of the city, burning 3.82 square miles and causing extensive damage to Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. These two incendiary attacks finished Nagoya as an objective for area attacks. Good targets remained in the city, and the command was to return six more times for precision attacks before V-J Day. But the industrial fabric of the city had been ruined in the earlier precision attacks and in the fire raids that had burned out twelve square miles of a total built-up urban area of about forty square miles. In all, 113460 buildings had been destroyed, 3866 persons had been killed and 472701 rendered homeless. The displacement of workers aggravated the difficulties caused by physical damage and had an important effect on civilian morale.  After a week of respite, temporarily interrupted by a 318-plane precision attack on the Tachikawa Aircraft Company, 562 B-29s were dispatched to strike Tokyo once more on May 23. Out of these, 520 bombers reached their target, dropping an impressive 3,646 tons of explosives over the district stretching southward from the Imperial Palace along the west side of Tokyo Harbor. Despite encountering strong opposition, this attack resulted in the destruction of 5.3 square miles of area. Two nights later, 502 B-29s returned to Tokyo, targeting the area just north of their previous hit. They faced heavy resistance again, dropping 3,262 tons of incendiaries on the city, which resulted in the destruction of 16.8 square miles, marking the largest area devastated in a single Tokyo raid. In light of the heavy casualties suffered during these last two strikes, General LeMay decided to assign P-51s from Iwo Jima to escort future attacks. As a result, on May 29, 517 B-29s were escorted by 101 P-51 fighters during an assault on Yokohama. These bombers successfully dropped 2,570 tons of munitions, burning out 6.9 square miles while the escorting fighters engaged in fierce battles against about 150 aggressive interceptors. Meanwhile, General Whitehead's 5th Air Force was conducting an extensive program of area bombing against Formosa, experimenting with various types of bombs and tactics in preparation for future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Taihoku, the capital and political and financial center of Taiwan, was subjected to constant aerial bombardment. The largest strike against modern-day Taipei, known as the Taihoku Air Raid, occurred on May 31, when units of the Fifth Air Force consisting of 117 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers were sent to conduct the largest air raid ever on Taiwan. The bombing began from around ten o'clock in the morning and lasted until one o'clock in the afternoon, during which the attack was non-stop. The Americans met virtually no resistance from the Japanese, mainly due to the attrition the Japanese air forces had suffered in the Aerial Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa, which completely exhausted Japan's fighter units in Taiwan. They successfully dropped approximately 3,800 bombs targeting military units and governmental facilities. The Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan suffered a direct hit, in spite of the building being heavily camouflaged to avoid being targeted. The building suffered extensive damage from fire caused by the bombs and almost collapsed on itself; it was rendered unoccupiable and was not repaired until the Nationalist Chinese takeover. Other facilities hit during the bombing included the residence of the Assistant Governor-General, Taiwan Railway Hotel, Office of Governor-General Library, Army Headquarters, Taihoku Imperial University, Taihoku Station, Bank of Taiwan, Taihoku High Court, Taihoku New Park, and many other facilities. Many civilian installations were damaged, including Taihoku Prefectural Taihoku First Girls' High School, Huashan Catholic Church of Taihoku, and the famous Lungshan Temple of Manka, which was hit in the main building and the left corridor; many precious artifacts and art works in the temple were lost in the ensuing fire. As a result of the extensive bombing campaigns, more than 3,000 civilians lost their lives. Tens of thousands were displaced or left homeless, and countless buildings were destroyed, either directly by the attacks or by the fires they ignited. This devastation left a profound impact on the local population and infrastructure, marking yet another tragic chapter in the toll of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the midst of the brutal Battle of Okinawa, American Marines faced relentless resistance as they pushed towards Shuri. Despite heavy casualties and daunting conditions, the tide turned when General Buckner ordered aggressive assaults that outmaneuvered the encircled Japanese forces. After days of relentless combat, they captured the stronghold, leading to the collapse of Japanese defenses. As the dust settled, Shuri lay in ruins, marking a pivotal moment in the Pacific War and showcasing the indomitable spirit of both American and Japanese soldiers.

  Last time we spoke about the February 26th incident. Within the turbulent “ government of assassination” period of 1936 Japan, a faction of discontented junior officers, known as the Kodoha, believed that their emperor, Hirohito, was being manipulated by corrupt politicians. In a desperate bid for what they termed a "Showa Restoration," they meticulously plotted a coup d'état. On February 26, they launched a rebellion in Tokyo, attempting to assassinate key figures they deemed responsible for undermining the emperor's authority. The young officers executed coordinated attacks on prominent leaders, resulting in several deaths, while hoping to seize control of the Imperial Palace. However, their plan unraveled when their actions met with unexpected resistance, and they failed to secure strategic locations. Dark snow blanketed the city as Hirohito, outraged by the violence, quickly moved to suppress the uprising, which ultimately led to the downfall of the Kodoha faction and solidified the military's grip on power, ushering in a new era marked by militarism and radicalism.   #151 The Suiyuan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we last left off with the February 26th incident breaking out in Japan, but now I would like to return to China. Now we spoke a little bit about some influential Japanese politicians in the previous episode. Prime Minister Satio Makoto oversaw Japan from May 1932 to July 1934, succeeded by Prime Minister Keisuke Okada from July 1934 to March 1936. The foreign policy of Japan towards China during the Saitō and Okada administrations exhibited a notable paradox, characterized by two conflicting elements. On one hand, Foreign Minister Hirota championed a diplomatic approach that emphasized friendship, cooperation, and accommodation with China. On the other hand, the military actively undermined the authority of the Nationalist government in northern China, creating a significant rift between diplomatic rhetoric and military action.    The Okada cabinet then endorsed the Army Ministry's "Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" on January 13, 1936. This policy document explicitly proposed the eventual detachment of five provinces, Hubei, Chahar, Shanxi, Suiyuan, and Shandong from the Nationalist government in Nanking. The approval of this outline marked a pivotal moment, as it represented the first official government endorsement of the military's longstanding agenda and underscored the army's evolution from a mere rogue entity operating in the region to the de facto authority dictating the course of Japan's policy towards China. Despite this, on January 22, during the 68th Diet session, Hirota reaffirmed his dedication to fostering better ties with China, to which a representative from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded positively. The Nationalist government in Nanjing also expressed interest in engaging in formal negotiations. However, this diplomatic initiative quickly faltered, and the expected discussions in Nanjing never took place. Shortly thereafter, a mutiny by young army officers on February 26, 1936, led to the fall of the Okada cabinet. Following Prince Konoe Fumimaro's refusal of the imperial mandate to form a new government, Hirota stepped in to establish a cabinet on March 9. General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed as the Minister of the Army, Admiral Nagano Osami took charge of the Navy Ministry, and Baba Eiichi became the finance minister. Hirota briefly served as foreign minister until Arita Hachirö, who had just submitted his credentials as ambassador to China on March 6, returned to Japan. The Hirota Koki cabinet, established immediately following the February 26 incident further entrenched military influence in politics while allowing interservice rivalries to impede national objectives. In May 1936, Hirota, influenced by army and navy ministers, reinstated the practice of appointing military ministers solely from the ranks of high-ranking active-duty officers. He believed this would prevent associations with the discredited Imperial Way faction from regaining power. By narrowing the candidate pool and enhancing the army's power relative to the prime minister, Hirota's decision set the stage for army leaders to leverage this advantage to overthrow Admiral Yonai's cabinet in July 1940. Arita began his new job by meeting with Foreign Minister Chang Chen while hearing views from the Kwantung Army chief of staff General, Itagaki Seishiro. Yes, our old friend received a lot of promotions. Itagaki had this to say about the Kwantung Army's policy in China "The primary aim of Japan's foreign policy, is the sound development of Manchukuo based upon the principle of the indivisibility of Japan and Manchukuo. If, as is probable, the existing situation continues, Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union, and the attitude of China at that time will gravely influence operations [against the Soviet Union]." The Kwantung Army's was growing more and more nervous about the USSR following its 7th comintern congress held in July and August of 1935. There it publicly designated Japan, Germany and Poland as its main targets of comintern actions. Japanese intelligence in the Red Army also knew the Soviets were gradually planning to expand the military strength so they could face a simultaneous west and east front war. This was further emboldened by the latest USSR 5 year plan. Alongside the growing Red northern menace, the CCP issued on August 1st a declaration calling upon the Nationalist Government to end their civil war so they could oppose Japan. By this time the CCP was reaching the end of its Long March and organizing a new base of operations in Yenan in northern Shanxi. The developments by the USSR and CCP had a profound effect on Japan's foreign policy in China. The Kwantung Army believed a war with the USSR was imminent and began to concentrate its main force along the border of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army's plan in the case of war was to seize Vladivostok while advancing motorized units towards Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, hoping to threaten the Trans-Siberian Railway near Lake Baikal. Their intelligence indicated the USSR could muster a maximum of 250,000 troops in eastern Siberia and that Japan could deal with them with a force two-thirds of that number. The IJA at that point had inferior air forces and armaments, thus urgent funding was needed. The Kwantung Army proposed that forces in the home islands should be reduced greatly so all could be concentrated in Manchuria. To increase funding so Kwantung leadership proposed doing away with special allowances for Japanese officials in Manchuria and reorganizing the Japanese economic structure. The Kwantung leaders also knew the submarine base at Vladivostok posed a threat to Japanese shipping so the IJN would have to participate, especially against ports and airfields. All said and done, the Kwantung Army planned for a war set in 1941 and advised immediate preparations. On July 23, 1936, Kanji Ishiwara presented the army's document titled “Request Concerning the Development of Industries in Preparation for War” to the Army Ministry. He asserted that in order to prepare for potential conflict with the Soviet Union, Japan, Manchukuo, and North China must have the industries critical for war fully developed by 1941. Ishiwara emphasized the urgent need for rapid industrial growth, particularly in Manchukuo. He followed this request on July 29 with a draft of a “Policy on Preparations for War” regarding the Soviet Union, advocating for immediate reforms to Japan's political and economic systems to facilitate economic expansion and lay the groundwork for future fundamental changes. However, he cautioned that if significant turmoil erupted in economic sectors, Japan must be ready to execute a comprehensive overhaul without delay. At the same time, the Hirota cabinet initiated a review of its policy towards China. In the spring of 1936, a secret committee focused on the Current Situation was formed, consisting of officials from the Army, Navy, and Foreign ministries. Their discussions led to the adoption of the "Measures to Implement Policy toward China" by the Four Ministers Conference on August 11, along with the "Second Outline of Policy to Address North China," which the cabinet approved as part of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" on the same day. The first of these documents outlined the following actionable steps: “1. Conclusion of an anti-Communist military pact. a) To prepare for the conclusion of such a pact, a special secret committee of military experts from both countries should be organized. b) Their discussions should cover the scope and substance of the pact and ways and means of realizing the objectives of the pact.  2. Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance. A special secret committee, composed of an equal number of delegates from each nation, should be organized to prepare for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance against attack by a third country.  3. Acceleration of solutions of pending questions between China and Japan. a) Engagement of a senior political adviser: The Nationalist government should engage a senior Japanese political adviser to assist in the conduct of the domestic and foreign affairs of the Nationalist government. b) Engagement of military advisers: The Nationalist government should engage military advisers, along with military instructors. c) Opening of airline services between China and Japan: Airline services between China and Japan should be opened immediately. To realize such a service, various means should be used to induce the Nanking authorities to establish an airline corporation in North China, to begin flights between Formosa and Fukien province, and to start test flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka. d) Conclusion of a reciprocal tariff treaty: A reciprocal tariff treaty should be concluded promptly between China and Japan, on the basis of the policy approved by the ministries concerned, with regard to the abolition of the special trade in eastern Hopei province and the lowering of the prohibitively high tariffs. For this purpose Japan should, if necessary, propose the creation of a special committee composed of Japanese and Chinese representatives.  4. Promotion of economic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan should promote cooperation with the common people of China to establish realistic and inseparable economic relations between China and Japan that will promote coexistence and co-prosperity and will be unaffected by changes in the Chinese political situation. “ The document also included suggestions for Japan's economic expansion into South China. This included tapping into the natural resources of the provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, building a railway between Guangzhou and Swatow, and establishing air routes between Fuchoz and Taipei, which would connect to services in Japan and Thailand. It also called for survey teams to be dispatched to explore the resources of Sichuan, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Qinghai provinces, and for support to be provided to the independence movement in Inner Mongolia. However, these initiatives presented significant challenges. The preface to the "Second Outline of Policy to Deal with North China" cautioned, "In implementing this policy, we must carefully consider the Nanking government's prestige and avoid actions that could prompt it to adopt an anti-Japanese stance in response to the desires of the Chinese people."  On September 19th, six fundamental points for a settlement in North China were dictated to China to “establish a common defense against communism, promoting economic cooperation, lowering tariffs, initiating an airline service between the two nations, employing Japanese advisers, and controlling subversive Koreans." September 22 was set as the deadline for a response from China. While agreeing to some Japanese requests, the Chinese included several counter-demands that the Japanese found completely unacceptable. These demands required Japan to “(a) refrain from using armed intervention or arbitrary actions in its dealings with China, (b) recognize China as an equal and sovereign state, (c) avoid leveraging antigovernment groups or communist elements, and (d) remove any derogatory references to China from Japanese textbooks. The Chinese also insisted that any agreement regarding North China “must precede the annulment of the Tanggu and Shanghai cease-fire agreements, the disbanding of the East Hopei regime, a prohibition on unauthorized Japanese flights over North China, a ban on smuggling activities by Japanese, the restoration of China's right to control smuggling, and the disbandment of the illegal East Hopei government along with the armies of Wang Ying and Prince De in Suiyuan”. Now that mention of a Prince De in Suiyuan brings us to a whole new incident. This podcast series should almost be called “the history of Japanese related incidents in China”. Now we've spoken at great lengths about Japan's obsession with Manchuria. She wanted it for resources, growing space and as a buffer state. Japan also had her eyes set on Inner Mongolia to be used as a buffer state between Manchukuo, the USSR and China proper. Not to mention after the invasion of North China, Inner Mongolia could be instrumental as a wedge to be used to control Northern China. Thus the Kwantung Army began fostering a Mongolian independence movement back in August of 1933. They did so through a special organ led by chief of the general staff Koiso Kuniaki. He began work with the Silingol League led by Prince Sonormurabdan or “Prince So” and another influential Mongol, Prince Demchukdongrob or “Prince De”. Prince De was the West Sunid Banner in Northern Chahar. Likewise the Kwantung Army was grooming Li Xuxin, a Mongol commoner born in southern Manchuria. He had been a bandit turned soldier absorbed into Zhang Xueliangs army. Li had distinguished himself in a campaign against a group of Mongols trying to restore the Qing dynasty to further establish an independent Mongolia. During Operation Nekka Li had served in a cavalry brigade under Zu Xingwu, reputed to be the best unit in Zhang Xueliangs Northeastern border defense army. He led the army's advance unit into western Shandong. Afterwards Li suddenly became friends with Major Tanaka Hisashi, the head of the Special Service Agency at Dungliao where he defected to the Kwantung Army. He soon was leading a force too strong to be incorporated into the Manchukuo Army, thus it was disbanded, but his Kwantung Army buddies encouraged him to move to Tolun in Rehe province. At one point during the Nekka campaign, Li's army was threatened by a strong Chinese counterattack, but they had Manchukuo air support allowing them to capture Tolun. This victory launched what became the East Chahar Special Autonomous District with Li becoming a garrison commander and chief administrator.  Back in time, upon the founding of the Chinese Republic, the affairs of Inner Mongolia fell upon the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. This was reorganized in 1930 into the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs when the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningxia were organized. Prince De had been a member of a nationalist group known as the Young Mongols, although his aim was self-determination for Inner Mongolia within China, not independence. The Nationalist government's support for Chinese settlement in Mongol territories and its disregard for Mongol perspectives quickly triggered a rise in Mongol nationalism and anti-Chinese feelings. This was exacerbated by the government's introduction of a law on October 12, 1931, requiring local Mongolian administrative units to consult with hsien officials on matters concerning their administration. The nationalist sentiment was further fueled by the presence of the neighboring Mongolian People's Republic in Outer Mongolia and the establishment of Xingan province in western Manchuria by Manchukuo authorities in March 1932. This new province included the tribes of eastern Inner Mongolia and granted them greater autonomy than other Manchukuo provinces while banning Chinese immigration into it. When Nanjing did not react to these developments, Prince De and his supporters took steps toward gaining autonomy. On July 15th, 1933, Mongol leaders from western Inner Mongolia gathered at Pailingmiao for two weeks to deliberate on a declaration for regional independence. Although many princes were initially hesitant to take this step, they reconvened on August 14 and sent a cable to Nanjing announcing their decision to create an autonomous Mongolian government. The cable was signed by Prince So and Prince De. Over the following two months, additional conferences at Pailingmiao were held to organize the new government, which would operate under Nanking's guidance but without involvement from provincial chairmen. On October 22, Prince Yun, head of the Ulanchap League and a close ally of Prince De, was elected to lead the new regime, with Prince De assuming the role of chief of its political affairs bureau. After receiving a cable from the Mongolian leaders in August, Nanjing quickly sent Minister of the Interior Huang Shao-hung and Xu Qingyang, head of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, to halt the movement. However, the Mongols declined to travel to Kalgan or Kueisui to meet Huang. In November, as the leader of a special commission appointed by Nanjing, Huang reached an agreement with Yun De and other Mongolian leaders concerning a proposal that abandoned the Mongols' demand for an autonomous government. This agreement was later altered by Nanjing, and its essential points were excluded from a measure approved by the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang on January 17, 1934. The dispute reignited, fueled by the Nationalist government's rising concerns over the anticipated enthronement of Pu Yi in Manchukuo. On February 28, the Central Political Council enacted a measure that outlined "eight principles of Inner Mongolian autonomy" and created the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council. Since these principles did not grant authority over foreign and military affairs, powers explicitly reserved for the central government in the January measure, they were seen as a concession to the Mongols and were accepted. On March 7, the central government issued regulations to establish a semi autonomous regime for Inner Mongolia, which was officially launched at Pailingmiao on April 23. Although the council was led by three moderate princes, Prince Yun, supported by Princes So and Sha, the real administrative authority was held by Prince De, who served as the secretary-general. Most of the twenty-five council members were of Mongolian royalty, through whom Prince De aimed to fulfill his objectives. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government seemed to consider the council merely a token gesture to placate De, as Nanking never provided the promised administrative funds outlined in the "eight principle declaration." Was not much of a shock Prince De sought support from the Kwantung Army, which had established contact with him as early as June 1934. Japanese pressures in North China were starting to alter the power dynamics, and after the first Western incident in Jehol in February 1935, it compelled the relocation of Sung Queyuan's army from Chahar to Hopei, providing encouragement to Prince De. In May, he met with Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirö, Intelligence Section Chief Kawabe Torashirö, and staff officer Tanaka Ryükichi, where he was officially informed for the first time about the Kwantung Army's intention to assist him. On July 25, the Kwantung Army drafted its "Essentials of Policy toward Inner Mongolia," which regarded Japanese support for cooperation between De and Li Xuxin as part of their strategic preparations for a potential conflict with the Soviet Union. Shortly after this policy was adopted, a conflict arose over who had the authority to appoint the head of the Mongol Xukung banner, situated north of the Yellow River and Paot'ou. Following the death of the previous administrator, Prince Xu declared that he had taken control of the position. In response to a request from the local abbot, Prince Yun, acting in his capacity as chairman of the Mongolian Political Council, dismissed Xu. Xu then turned to Nanking through Suiyuan Provincial Chairman Fu Zuoyi, arguing that the central government held the authority to appoint heads of administrative units. In retaliation, Prince De dispatched troops to Xukung. On November 10, Fu presented a mediation proposal, which was rejected since it not only failed to acknowledge Shih's dismissal but also demanded the withdrawal of De's forces. De refused to pull back, further intensifying his hostility toward the Nanking government. In December, the Kwantung Army attempted to move Li's forces from eastern Chahar into the six Xun to the north of Kalgan, which serves as Chahar's granary. Following the Qin-Doihara agreement, Matsui Gennosuke from the Kalgan Special Service Agency secured a deal to separate these six districts from the southern region predominantly populated by Chinese; a Mongolian peace preservation corps was tasked with maintaining order in the northern area, while a Chinese corps was responsible for the south. During the discussions for an autonomous regime centered around Song Queyuan in North China in November 1935, Kwantung Army troops were concentrated around Gubeikou. To exert pressure on Song's rear, the Kwantung Army proposed replacing the Chinese peace preservation unit in the area north of Kalgan with Li Xuxin's army, which would establish this territory as its base.   The operation commenced on December 8. In a surprise attack just before dawn, Li captured Paochang. By December 12, despite facing strong Chinese resistance and the heaviest snowfall in sixty years, Li, aided by Kwantung Army planes disguised as those of the Manchukuo Airline Corporation, had taken control of Kuyuan. Further advances were halted by an order from Kwantung Army headquarters, and on December 13, it was reported that, had the operation not been stopped, Tokyo would have issued an imperial command. The operation had faced opposition from the Tientsin army, which feared it would weaken Song Queyuan's position just as they were informing Tokyo that the autonomy movement was going smoothly. Additionally, both Britain and the United States publicly expressed strong opposition to the Kwantung Army's involvement in the autonomy movement. However, the directive was ultimately prompted by the emperor's anger upon discovering that a unit of the Kwantung Army led by Colonel Matsui Takurö had advanced to Tolun to support Li's progress. Although Li's advance was halted, the operation undeniably contributed to the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council.   Although the operation was halted, the Kwantung Army remained committed to its objectives. They contended that Li's army's advance into the six districts north of Kalgan was merely a peace preservation unit moving into territory within the truce line established by the Tanggu Agreement. Consequently, on December 29, they ordered Li to advance southward. Li peacefully occupied Changpei the following day and entered Shangtu on December 31. Manchukuo civil officials were appointed to oversee the six districts, and the currency of Manchukuo was introduced, although the existing tax system initially remained unchanged. The Kwantung Army allocated silver worth 6 million yuan to support administrative expenses. This outcome, known as the Eastern Chahar incident, marked a complete success for the Kwantung Army, which then redirected its focus toward Suiyuan Province. Each year, the Kwantung Army developed a secret plan for covert operations for the following year. The 1936 plan included strategies to secure air bases for routes connecting Europe and Asia, targeting Tsinghai and Sinkiang provinces, Outer Mongolia, Western Mongolia, and even remote areas of Ningxia province. In January 1936, staff officer Tanaka Ryūkichi formulated a document titled "Essentials of Policy Toward (Northwestern) Inner Mongolia." This document advocated for the establishment of a Mongolian military government to facilitate Japanese operations in northwestern Mongolia and suggested pushing Fu Tso-yi out of Suiyuan into Shansi province. Tanaka's proposals were incorporated into the final plan of the Kwantung Army, ultimately leading to the Suiyuan incident of November 1936. In February 1936, a meeting at Pailingmiao, where Prince De proposed the independence of Inner Mongolia, resulted in the departure of Prince So and several other Mongolian leaders from the coalition. They sought to establish a rival political council at Kueisui under the protection of Fu Zuoyi. By April, De and his supporters decided to form a military government at Tehua in Chahar, which was officially inaugurated in June as the Inner Mongolian government, headed by De with Li Shou-hsin as his deputy. This new government quickly signed a mutual assistance treaty with Manchukuo, and the emperor granted De the title of prince.   In July, at a conference in Tehua, Tanaka was appointed as the head of the Special Service Agency for Inner Mongolia with the mission of implementing the army's Intelligence Section plans. He traveled to Pingtiqüan alongside Chief of Staff Itagaki and Intelligence Chief Mutō Akira to propose a local anti-Communist agreement to Fu. After failing to convince Fu, he attempted to persuade Sun Tien-ying to form a puppet army but managed to recruit only a bandit from Suiyuan, Wang Ying. The February 26 mutiny in Tokyo heightened anti-Japanese sentiments in China, resulting in increased violence. By August, the construction of an airplane hangar in Paot'ou was halted due to riots by local Chinese residents. On August 13, a group of fifteen Japanese, led by Nakajima Manzo, was ambushed while delivering ammunition to a pro-Japanese leader who was shortly thereafter assassinated. Chinese soldiers from Wang Qingkuo's 70th Division carried out the attack, and tensions escalated as the arrival of ammunition and Japanese laborers in Kalgan prompted border villages to strengthen their defenses.   By late September, Tanaka's "Guidelines for the Execution of the Suiyuan Operation" received approval, with operations set to commence in early November. The plan evolved from a covert mission into a personal initiative by Tanaka, financed largely through funds from the Kwantung Army's secret services and profits from special trading in eastern Hopei. Tanaka claimed to have transported 600,000 yen to Tehua in October and later sent 200,000 yuan into Inner Mongolia, estimating total expenses at approximately 6 million yen. He acquired new weaponry from the disbanded Northeast Army and established three clandestine forces: Wang Ying led 500 men, including artillery; Qin Xiashan commanded 3,000 from Sun Tienying's army; and Chang Futang also led 3,000 specialized units. During strategic meetings, Tanaka dismissed proposals for unified command and refusing to integrate secret units into the Mongolian army. He advocated for the slogan "Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek," while Matsui managed to include "Independence for Inner Mongolia."   The Japanese had developed the entire battle strategy. The 1st Army, commanded by Li Xuxin, would serve as the left flank, while the 2nd Army, led by Demchugdongrub, would be positioned on the right. Wang Ying's forces were designated as the central force. Their initial targets would be Hongort, Xinghe, Tuchengzi, and Guisui city, followed by a division to seize Jinging, Baotou, and Hetao. On November 13, Prince Demchugdongrub's and Wang Ying's forces left Shandu in two columns to assault Xinghe and Hongort. By the 15th, 1,500 troops reached Hongort, where they engaged the 1st Cavalry Division led by Peng Yubin. The next day, Ryukichi Tanaka, Demchugdongrub's chief advisor, sent two cavalry brigades and one infantry brigade to capture the town, effectively overrunning its defenders. Meanwhile, Wang Ying dispatched a smaller group to secure Tuchengzi.   Fu Zuoyi established his headquarters in Jining that same day. After assessing the situation, he concluded that if the enemy secured Hongort, it would diminish his defenders' morale. Consequently, he launched a counterattack. Peng Yubin led a joint force of the 1st Cavalry Division and Dong Qiwu's 218th Brigade to confront around 400 of Wang Ying's men defending Hongort and Tuchengzi. By 7 AM on the 18th, Tuchengzi was reclaimed, and at 8:30 AM, the 1st Cavalry Division entered Hongort, charging through 500 of Wang Ying's soldiers. The struggle for Hongort persisted for over three days, resulting in nearly 1,000 casualties before Fu Zuoyi regained control.   As the tide shifted against the invaders, Fu Zuoyi initiated an offensive toward the Bailing Temple, the rear base of the enemy, well-stocked and defended by 3,000 men under Prince Demchugdongrub. Fu Zuoyi ordered the 2nd Cavalry Division, along with the 211th and 315th Brigades, the 21st Artillery Regiment, and a convoy of 20 trucks and 24 armored vehicles to assault the Bailing Temple as quickly as possible. Taking advantage of the Mongolian chaos, Fu Zuoyi's 35th Brigade executed a flanking maneuver west of the Bailing Temple amid a severe snowstorm.   At 1 AM on the 24th, the battle for the Bailing Temple commenced as the Chinese engaged the Mongolians for the fortified positions around the temple. From 2 to 4 AM, the Chinese advanced closer to the temple walls, facing artillery and machine-gun fire. They launched desperate frontal assaults against the city gates, suffering heavy losses. A fierce stalemate ensued, with Japanese aerial bombardments causing significant casualties to the Chinese forces. Fu Zuoyi subsequently ordered all armored vehicles to converge at the main city gate. Despite intense fire, the armored cars managed to breach the gate, allowing Chinese infantry to flood into the temple area. The resulting carnage within the temple walls led to 900 Mongol deaths, with 300 captured as the rest fled. The Chinese suffered 300 casualties but secured the strategically vital rear base, along with a substantial stockpile of provisions, including 500 barrels of petrol, 600 rifles, 10 machine guns, vehicles, and field guns. Following the devastating defeat at Bailing Temple, the invaders regrouped at Xilamuleng Temple. On the 28th, the Japanese sent 100 vehicles to transport 3,000 troops to prepare for a significant counteroffensive to recapture Bailing Temple. On the 29th, Wang Ying personally led 2,000 cavalry north of Shangdu to Taolin in an attempt to contain the enemy. However, after he left the bulk of his forces at Xilamuleng Temple, officers from the Grand Han Righteous Army secretly began negotiating to defect to the Chinese side, undermining the forces needed for the counterattack against Bailing Temple.   The counteroffensive commenced on December 2nd, with 10 armored vehicles and 1,000 Mongol troops leading the charge at 6 AM. They were pushed back by the heavily fortified 211th Brigade, which was well-supplied with machine guns and artillery. The following day, at 3 AM, the Mongols attempted a surprise attack but faced an ambush as they crept toward the temple. They incurred hundreds of casualties, with 230 men either captured or having defected. After this, the counterattack stalled, as the Mongol forces couldn't approach within 3 miles of the temple. Subsequently, the Chinese 2nd Cavalry Division launched a pincer maneuver, causing significant casualties among the invaders. By 9 AM, the enemy had suffered 500 casualties and was in retreat. At 7 PM, Fu Zuoyi ordered another counteroffensive. By the next morning, hundreds more had been lost, and several hundred soldiers were captured. With such heavy losses, the defense of Xilamuleng Temple weakened significantly, prompting more officers to defect to the Chinese. Late on the 4th, Fu Zuoyi assembled a force comprising two cavalry regiments, one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion, four armored vehicles, and a squadron of cars to launch a nighttime assault on Xilamuleng Temple.   Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Division clashed with Wang Ying's cavalry 30 miles northeast of Wulanhua. Wang Ying's 2,000 cavalry had been raiding nearby villages to create diversions, drawing enemy forces away from the Bailing-Xilamuleng theater. By the 9th, Wang Ying's cavalry were encircled in Xiaobei, where they were nearly annihilated, with Wang escaping with around a hundred guards toward Changpei. On the 7th, some Grand Han Righteous Army officers set in motion plans to defect to the Chinese side. Early on the 9th, these officers led their men to invade the residence of Japanese advisors, killing all 27 Japanese officers under Colonel Obama. Simultaneously, Fu Zuoyi's forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Xilamuleng Temple amidst the chaos. With mass defections, the Chinese forces surged into the temple area, resulting in the invader army disintegrating in confusion and surrender. After seizing the temple, the invaders were routed, their lines of communication severed, and only isolated pockets continued to resist. Taking advantage of the confusion, Fu Zuoyi launched simultaneous attacks, attempting to capture Shangdu. However, Yan Xishan sent him a telegram, ordering him to halt, stating that Shangdu fell under the jurisdiction of Shanxi and not Suiyuan.   In response to the loss, Tanaka planned a counteroffensive with Qin's troops, but Chiang kai-shek commanded a strong defense of Pailingmiao, successfully outmaneuvering Tanaka's strategies. The resurgence of Chinese forces led to the disintegration of Qin's troops, who revolted and eventually joined the Nationalist army. The Kwantung Army aimed to redeploy its forces for recovery but faced opposition from Tokyo, which criticized the situation. After Chiang kai-shek was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang on December 12, Tanaka and Prince De seized the opportunity to reassess their strategy. Ultimately, the Kwantung Army decided to abandon efforts to reclaim Pailingmiao, marking the official end of hostilities on December 21. The Suiyuan incident ultimately strengthened Chinese resolve against Japan and increased international distrust.   The defeat of Japan's proxy forces inspired many Chinese to advocate for a more vigorous resistance against the Japanese. The triumph in Suiyuan was celebrated throughout China and surprised the international media, marking the first occasion where the Chinese army successfully halted a Japanese unit. Delegations traveled from as distant as southern Chinese provinces to encourage the defenders to continue their fight. Captured Japanese weapons and equipment served as proof of Japan's involvement in the conflict, despite Japan's Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita claiming that "Japan was not involved in this conflict in Suiyuan at all." After his defeat, Prince Demchugdongrub and his Inner Mongolian troops retreated to northern Chahar, where he had to reconstruct his army due to significant losses. The Japanese implemented new regulations for the Mongolian Army to enhance its effectiveness, and efforts to recruit new soldiers commenced.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. More incidents and more battles to seize territory raged in North China. However things did not go according to plan for the Japanese and their puppets. The tides had turned, and now a more angry and invigorating China would begin lashing out against the encroachment. It was only a matter of time before a full blown war was declared. 

Last time we spoke about the Allied invasion of Borneo. The Allies initiated the invasion of Borneo, commanded by General Morshead. The operation, known as Operation Oboe, aimed to reclaim vital oilfields from the demoralized Japanese forces. Despite their fierce resistance, American troops swiftly captured strategic locations on the island. The Japanese, already struggling with low morale and supply shortages, were unable to mount an effective defense. Amid the intense fighting, Air Commodore Cobby's forces conducted air assaults on key targets, weakening Japanese positions. As American troops landed on Tarakan Island on May 1, they faced heavy fire but managed to gain significant territory by nightfall. By early May, despite the loss of ground, Japanese forces continued to resist fiercely. This victory in Borneo marked a turning point in the Pacific campaign, ultimately foreshadowing the decline of Japanese influence in the region and paving the way for further Allied advances. This episode is the Second Okinawa Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off, by April 24, General Ushijima's 32nd Army had chosen to abandon the first line of Shuri defenses, with the exception of the extreme right in the Item Pocket area. However, the weary Japanese troops merely withdrew to the next line of prepared positions within the Shuri defense zone, ready to make the American invaders pay for every inch of territory gained. Observing this, General Hodge promptly ordered the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions to regroup and enhance their positions through aggressive maneuvers, seizing strategic ground in front of them and pushing back enemy outposts. His forces were also heavily depleted and exhausted, prompting him to plan a final offensive on April 26 before rotating in the relatively fresh 77th Division and the 1st Marine Division for support. Unbeknownst to him, the 62nd Division had suffered significant losses, nearly losing half of its original strength on the left flank. In response, Ushijima decided to move the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade north to reinforce the Shuri defense zone, establishing a fallback position for retreating forces.This shift also meant that the southern areas were defended only by a hastily assembled Shimajiri Security Force of 5,500 men, drawn from rear-area supply units tasked with delaying any American advances from the south until the main infantry units could return.  The question of a second landing in southern Okinawa was considered by 10th Army most seriously before April 22. General Bruce, commander of the 77th Division, knew that his division would be committed in the Okinawa fighting as soon as lejima was secured. At Leyte the amphibious landing of the 77th Division behind the Japanese line at Ormoc had been spectacularly successful. General Bruce and his staff wished to repeat the move on Okinawa and urged it on the 10th Army command even before the division sailed from Leyte. As the Iejima fighting drew to a close, General Bruce pressed his recommendation to land his division on the southeast coast of Okinawa on the beaches just north of Minatoga. He believed that it would be necessary to effect a juncture with American forces then north of Shuri within ten days if the venture was to be successful. His plan was either to drive inland on Iwa, a road and communications center at the southern end of the island, or to push north against Yonabaru. General Buckner rejected the idea. His assistant chief of staff, G-4, stated that he could supply food but not ammunition for such a project at that time. The Minatoga beaches had been thoroughly considered in the planning for the initial landings and had been rejected because of the impossibility of furnishing adequate logistical support for even one division. The reefs were dangerous, the beaches inadequate, and the area exposed to strong enemy attack. Although beach outlets existed, they were commanded both by the escarpment to the west and by the plateau of the Chinen Peninsula. The 10th Army intelligence officer reported that the Japanese still had their reserves stationed in the south. Both the 24th Division and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade were still in the area and could move quickly to oppose any landings. Artillery positions on the heights overlooking the beaches were fully manned. The 77th Division would be landing so far south that it would not have the support of the troops engaged to the north or of 24th Corps artillery. The steep terrain near the beaches favored the defense, and any unit there would be isolated. It might be more like Anzio than Leyte, Buckner suggested. Besides that, the three divisions on the line needed to be relieved, and Buckner's three unused divisions would all be needed there. On April 25, the main focus of action shifted to the Item Pocket, where Captain Bernard Ryan's Company F of the 165th Regiment surged forward following a 20-minute artillery bombardment to seize the summit of Ryan Ridge. Captain Ryan looked out over the rugged expanse of Ryan Ridge, where the Japanese forces entrenched at the top presented a formidable challenge. They controlled the crucial territory between Ryan and Fox Ridges, creating a dangerous stronghold that threatened his position. For Ryan, the solution lay in artillery fire. He understood that since the supporting fire would fall perpendicular to his attack route, the risk of overshooting or undershooting would be minimal, just a lateral deviation of fifteen yards. With this confidence, he ordered a twenty-minute artillery barrage on the slopes of the ridge.As dawn broke on the morning of the 25th, Ryan gathered his men from Company F. He stressed the importance of a swift ground assault to capitalize on the artillery support. However, this was no easy task; his company was tired, undermanned, and severely low on food and ammunition. Despite these challenges, the two assault platoons sprang into action the moment the first shells began to fall. They charged forward, propelled by the roar of mortars, machine guns, and antitank guns that kept enemy forces at bay.But as they sprinted towards the ridge, the enemy struck back fiercely. Enemy fire and natural obstacles thinned their ranks, yet thirty-one determined soldiers reached the summit. They found themselves standing on a jagged ridge, strewn with rocks and scarred vegetation, a treacherous landscape that added to their struggle. Just as the artillery fire began to fade, the Japanese emerged from their hidden positions: “spider holes,” pillboxes, and tunnels. The Americans stood ready, and for the next twenty minutes, a brutal fight erupted. They engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat, reminiscent of earlier battles on Item Pocket ridge tops. The outcome was grim; thirty-five Japanese soldiers fell, and many more fled in panic. However, the Americans also paid a price, five were killed, and two wounded. Now, the real challenge began: consolidating their hard-won position. Captain Ryan knew that previous units had ascended these ridges only to be pushed back by the enemy. By late afternoon, only twenty-four effective soldiers remained atop the ridge, with each man averaging a mere six rounds of rifle ammunition. Medical supplies had run dry, and all the aid men had become casualties. Communication was severed, and Ryan could sense the tightening noose as the Japanese regrouped for an assault. Understanding the gravitas of their situation, Ryan devised a bold plan. He arranged for Company I to maneuver around to his right flank, hoping to replicate the success of the morning. At 4:05 PM, just fifteen minutes after artillery support resumed, Ryan and his company made their ascent once more, enduring five additional casualties along the route. Unfortunately, Company I struggled to reach the top, cut off by heavy enemy fire on the slopes. In a moment of desperation, Ryan and two men ventured out into the dark to seek reinforcement, a risky endeavor that could easily end in disaster. Although Company I was still bogged down, Captain Betts from Company K recognized the urgency of the situation and quickly mobilized his men. By midnight, all of Company K had reached the ridge, bolstering Ryan's weary but determined troops. As these events unfolded at Ryan Ridge, other companies from the 165th were locked in a brutal struggle at Gusukuma, located southwest of the ridge. Fierce fighting erupted as soldiers moved from wall to wall, tree to tree, fighting for every inch in the rubble of Gusukuma. Company A faced an unrelenting barrage, enduring fire from eight machine guns and a 47-mm antitank gun, much of which came from the yet-untamed eastern slope of Ryan Ridge. Amidst this chaos, Private First Class Richard King from Company A became a beacon of valor. In a remarkable display of courage, he climbed a tree to eliminate a Japanese soldier perched above and, from his vantage point, went on to kill ten more enemies before night fell. The day had been marked by sacrifice and bravery, with Captain Ryan and his men fighting heroically for every inch of ground gained on Ryan Ridge. As the sun set, they prepared for the challenges that lay ahead, their resolve unwavering amid the turmoil of war. Meanwhile, other companies of the 165th Regiment engaged fiercely in assaults against Gusukuma, gradually gaining ground at a high cost to both sides. At the same time, the 96th Division consolidated its position in front of Maeda and Kochi, while Colonel Pachler's 1st Battalion advanced 600 yards with minimal resistance to occupy the slope of Horseshoe Ridge. The following day, April 26, the general offensive resumed, with the bulk of the 165th Regiment continuing its costly advance into the heart of the Item Pocket, successfully clearing Gusukuma as Company F pushed along the crest of Ryan Ridge toward the northern end of the Machinato airstrip. To the east, the 105th Regiment advanced to the southern edge of Nakama, while the 106th Regiment extended the front line toward Yafusu. In the center, Colonel Halloran's 2nd Battalion launched an assault on the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repulsed by a brutal barrage of Japanese fire across the front. However, elements of the 383rd Regiment managed to reach the crests of Hills 150 and 152, securing a strategic position to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy below, as tanks and armored flamethrowers moved to the outskirts of Maeda to wreak havoc. At 4 pm in the afternoon General Ushijima issued a terse order: “The enemy with troops following tanks has been advancing into the southern and eastern sectors of Maeda since about 1 pm. The 62d Division will dispatch local units . . . attack the enemy advancing in the Maeda sector and expect to repulse him decisively.” At the same time, adjacent 24th Division units were ordered to cooperate in this effort regardless of division boundary. Two hours later the Japanese commanding general issued another order: "The army will crush the enemy which has broken through near Maeda. The 24th Division will put its main strength northeast of Shuri this evening." Lastly, Pachler's 1st Battalion attempted to advance along the western flank of Kochi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion moved along the eastern flank. Both battalions were immediately repelled by a barrage of enemy fire. The following day, efforts to establish physical contact between the two units proved costly and futile. Meanwhile, Halloran's 1st Battalion, along with elements of the 383rd Regiment, maneuvered through the saddle between Hills 150 and 152, receiving support from tanks and armored flamethrowers. Although tanks and infantry managed to penetrate to the southern edge of Maeda, the advance was halted by intense enemy fire. Atop the escarpment, an all-out effort was made to reduce a heavily fortified underground pillbox that separated Companies F and G; however, this attempt also failed. Concurrently, as the 105th Regiment organized a defensive line at Nakama, Colonel Stebbins' 2nd Battalion engaged in fierce combat around Yafusu in an effort to straighten their front lines. Meanwhile, the disorganized 165th Regiment continued clearing the Item Pocket, which was finally declared secure, although many Japanese troops remained hidden in deep caves and tunnels. Due to this disorganization and the sluggish progress in securing the pocket, General Griner ultimately decided to relieve Colonel Kelley of his command of the 165th. The regiment would then spend the remaining days of the month patrolling the Kuwan Inlet south of Machinato airfield. Griner's overextended and battered division would not undertake any further offensive actions until being relieved at the end of April. At sea, a Japanese suicide boat successfully dropped a depth charge near the destroyer Hutchins, which had to withdraw due to heavy damage. Additionally, Japanese aircraft reemerged during the night, with a kamikaze crashing into and sinking the ammunition ship Canada Victory, while other planes damaged two destroyers and a transport ship. Random factoid by the way, the SS Canada Victory was among the 531 Victory ships constructed during World War II as part of the Emergency Shipbuilding program. Launched by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation on January 12, 1944, she was completed on February 28, 1944. The ship was designated VC2-S-AP3 by the United States Maritime Commission, with hull number 93 (1009). Following her completion, the Maritime Commission transferred her to the civilian operator Alaska SS Company. This was merely a prelude to Admiral Ugaki's fourth mass Kikisui attack, which launched 115 kamikazes on April 28. While interceptor fighters destroyed most of these aircraft, seven managed to slip past the combat air patrol and crashed into destroyers Daly and Twiggs, the destroyer minesweeper Butler, the evacuation transport Pickney, and the hospital ship Comfort. On the ground, Halloran's Company K attempted to weaken resistance at the escarpment by moving through the 27th Division zone to the west and advancing southeast towards the Apartment House barracks, where they were met with heavy losses and forced to retreat. Meanwhile, on the western side of Kochi Ridge, Pachler's 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion and launched an attack into the gap between the ridge and Zebra Hill. They successfully led Company K through Kochi and into the cut, while Company L moved southward along the western slope. However, upon reaching the cut, both companies were met with a barrage of machine-gun fire, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. To the east, the 32nd Regiment faced delays in initiating their attack due to setbacks around Kochi, despite the successful raids by armored flamethrowers into the heart of Kuhazu. The following day, more kamikaze assaults inflicted additional damage on destroyers Hazelwood and Haggard. By the end of April, American pilots reported 1,216 air-to-air kills, while Japanese sources acknowledged losses exceeding 1,000 aircraft, including 820 destroyed in the first four Kikisui attacks. This left Admiral Ugaki with approximately 370 operational aircraft for future operations. It is also important to note that the Japanese pilots inflicted significant casualties, resulting in Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet suffering the loss of 1,853 sailors killed or missing and 2,650 wounded, averaging one and a half ships hit per day. As April expired, a concerned Nimitz personally visited Okinawa, where Buckner reminded Nimitz that as a land battle, 10th Army operations fell under Army command. “Yes,” Nimitz replied, “but ground though it may be, I'm losing a ship and a half a day. So if this line isn't moving within five days, we'll get someone here to move it so we can all get out from under these stupid air attacks.” Nevertheless, by May, 10th Army had thoroughly bogged down into costly, unimaginative frontal assaults against southern Okinawa's heavily fortified Shuri line. Numerous 10th Army generals urged Buckner to “play the amphib card” and land the reserve 2nd Marine Division in southeastern Okinawa, behind Japanese lines. Buckner ultimately refused, claiming insufficient logistics. Nimitz concurred with Buckner, at least publicly, but few others did. Spruance, Turner, and Mitscher were themselves growing increasingly bitter at 10th Army's lack of progress, as well as USAAF lethargy constructing fighter airfields ashore that could finally relieve the battered carriers. Touring the developing Okinawa airstrips, a 5th Fleet staff officer discovered that General “Hap” Arnold had secretly been writing Okinawa's lead USAAF engineer, urging him to divert assigned fighter strip resources into building B-29 bomber airfields instead. An incredulous Spruance went ashore to investigate and discovered the allegation was true. Stunned, Spruance “turned that situation around in about 15 minutes.” On land, following an unsuccessful tank assault toward Onaga, the 32nd Regiment intensified pressure on enemy positions to the southeast to support operations against Kochi Ridge. However, the 17th Regiment's attacks were still stalled. Meanwhile, after fending off two strong counterattacks that resulted in approximately 265 Japanese casualties, the 383rd Regiment advanced to capture the crest of Hill 318 in fierce close combat. This critical victory finally enabled American forces to direct fire onto Shuri itself. On April 29, the 307th Regiment took over the Maeda Escarpment section of the line from the 381st, and the next morning, the 306th Regiment relieved the 383rd on the left flank of the 96th Division. Simultaneously, the 1st Marines relieved the 165th on the west coast, while the 5th Marines took over the line held by the 105th and 106th Regiments on May 1. Despite ongoing efforts, attacks against Kochi Ridge on April 30 once again failed. However, the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment successfully established Company C on “Chimney Crag” and Company A on the “Roulette Wheel,” located on the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. During the night, large numbers of Japanese infiltrated behind these companies, disrupting the planned relief of the 32nd by the 184th Regiment. This relief, intended to be completed before dawn on May 1, was delayed until late in the afternoon. Despite this setback, Colonel Green's Company L managed to reach Gaja Ridge, positioned just in front of Conical Hill during the night. Concurrently, Colonel Hamilton's Company A attempted to mount ladders at the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but was quickly repelled by fierce defenders. On the western front, however, Company B successfully captured the edge of the escarpment using cargo nets by nightfall, although they were ultimately forced to withdraw due to heavy counterattacks later that night. Additionally, Hamilton's 3rd Battalion moved behind the escarpment to Nakama village, launching an attack eastward toward the Apartment House barracks area. Meanwhile, on the west coast, the 1st Marines had been attempting to advance south for two days but were repelled each time, suffering significant casualties. However, they did succeed in clearing an enemy pocket at Miyagusuku. On May 2, the 5th Marines finally joined the offensive but encountered stubborn resistance, while the 1st Marines continued to struggle to cross the draw south of Nakanishi village in their effort to reach the Jichaku ridge mass. To the east, Hamilton's Companies A and B positioned troops on the edge of the Maeda Escarpment but made no significant gains due to the enemy's intense machine-gun fire. The 17th Regiment eventually mopped up Onaga village, with the 1st Battalion taking control of the area, although they failed to capture Kochi during their renewed efforts. On May 3, after a dawn artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion on the east and the 3rd Battalion on the west advanced in a coordinated attack, which included a movement by Company C against How Hill on the eastern flank of Kochi Ridge. However, this entire effort was thwarted as heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire halted all progress. During 3 May the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, fought a desperate grenade battle to win the top of part of the escarpment. The Japanese showered the top with grenades and knee mortars from the reverse slope and with 81-mm. mortar fire from a distance. Men came back across the narrow top of the escarpment to the north side, swearing and crying, saying they would not go back into the fight. "Yet," observed one platoon leader, "in five minutes' time those men would go back there tossing grenades as fast as they could pull the pins."Finally, while the 1st Marines made only limited gains as they pushed toward the Asa River, the 5th Marines successfully cleared the Awacha Pocket and advanced between 300 and 600 yards in their zone. Unbeknownst to the Americans, their slow, incremental advances and the looming threat of a costly, protracted campaign were far from their only concerns. By the 29th General Cho had argued that in the present state of affairs, the Americans had the upper hand. If the status quo continued, the 32nd Army eventually would be wiped out. At this meeting, only Colonel Yahara spoke for continuing the war of attrition and avoiding an offensive. Yahara pointed out that in modern warfare a superiority of 3 to 1 was usually needed for successful attack. "To take the offensive with inferior forces… is reckless and would lead to certain defeat," he said. Second, the high ground around Minami-Uebaru had already fallen into American hands, giving them a major advantage in defensive terrain. Third, Yahara argued, a hasty offensive would fail, with thousands needlessly lost. Then, 32nd Army's reduced forces would be unable to hold Okinawa for a long period and unable to delay the invasion of Japan. A hasty attack would cause 32nd Army to fail in its duty. And yet, the other young staff members were silent. Cho then declared again that he hoped for an attack to snatch life from the midst of death. At this, Yahara left the room. All the other staff members then agreed to launch an offensive. Cho then tried to manage Yahara by sheer emotional force. At dawn on April 30, before Yahara "had time to splash water on his face," Cho appeared at his quarters. Cho squeezed Yahara's hand and said with genuine enthusiasm that there had been nothing but trouble between them in the past and that they would probably both die together on Okinawa. Cho then asked if Yahara, on this one occasion, would go along with the offensive. As Cho spoke, his tears fell abundantly. Yahara was deeply moved, despite his aloof reputation, and before long he was weeping too. He was overcome by Cho's sudden display of emotion and said, "I consent." Again I have to say, in the “battle of Okinawa” by Yahara, basically his memoirs, in which he notably lies a bunch to cover himself, but I digress, this moment amongst others are really interesting, I highly recommend reading the book. Cho's plan outlined that General Amamiya's 24th Division would lead the main effort on May 4, executing a two-pronged attack on the right half of the line. They intended to sweep past the Tanabaru Escarpment toward Minami-Uebaru hill, ultimately reaching the Futema-Atsuta line. Meanwhile, General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to shift from its reserve position behind the 62nd Division to a location northeast of Shuri and move northwest toward the coastal town of Oyama, effectively cutting off the 1st Marine Division's retreat. In conjunction with this, General Fujioka's battered 62nd Division would hold its position on the left flank and mount an offensive once the attacking units on its right had breached enemy lines. Additionally, the 23rd and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were tasked with conducting counterlandings in the American rear on the east and west coasts, respectively. The Japanese reasoned that success depended on the extent to which they could support their frontline troops with artillery, tanks, supplies, and communications. Their plans specified in detail the role that each of the support units was to play in the projected operations. Artillery units were ordered to regroup in preparation for the attack. Guns and howitzers were pulled out of cave positions and set up farther south in more open emplacements for greater flexibility. They were to open fire thirty minutes before the attack. When the infantry had driven through the American front lines, artillerymen were to move their weapons forward. The 27th Tank Regiment, hitherto uncommitted, was ordered to move from its position near Yonabaru during the night over several routes and support the attack in the Maeda area. To support this comprehensive offensive, Ugaki was alerted to prepare for the fifth mass Kikisui attack directed against the enemy's naval forces. Once the plans were finalized and preparations well underway, Ushijima and Cho celebrated with a pre-victory banquet in their chambers at headquarters. Even as Ushijima's banquet was underway, offensive operations had commenced. Japanese troops infiltrated behind American lines during the night while the shipping engineers prepared for their counterlandings. The 26th and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments set out up the west and east coasts. On beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, men of the shipping engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats. Also, small groups of soldiers with light machine guns infiltrated behind U.S. lines on the night of 3 May to attack Americans as they became visible at dawn. Small units of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" and "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines to attack command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and depots and to send back information by means of smoke signals. The 27th Tank Regiment rumbled up to Ishimmi, several of its tanks being severely damaged by American artillery fire en route. Ugaki's fifth Kikisui attack began on the afternoon of May 3, when at least 19 kamikazes sortied from Formosa, stealthily approaching the American convoys. They successfully sank the destroyer Little and one landing craft, while severely damaging two destroyer-minelayers and another landing craft. Additionally, Japanese aircraft targeted shore installations, focusing their efforts on Yontan airfield. In Nakagusuku Bay, a suicide boat further damaged a cargo ship. At 02:00 on May 4, most of the boats from the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment were spotted approaching the heavily defended area of Kuwan. Armed with antitank guns, heavy machine guns, light arms, and thousands of satchel charges, several hundred men of the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment headed under overcast skies for landing places below Yontan and Kadena airfields. They miscalculated their position and turned, into the shore at a point where it was heavily defended. At 0200 riflemen of the 1st Marine Division on the sea wall near Kuwan caught sight of ten barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Naval flares lighted up the area. One company fired 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars. Several enemy barges burst into flames. One platoon of marines used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels as it sprayed the Japanese trying to cross the reef. Although many of the engineers managed to reach the shore, some fled back to the Japanese lines, while others were trapped in Kuwan, where they were mopped up by the Marines at their leisure. A smaller group of Japanese forces advanced almost as far as Chatan, ultimately landing at Isa, where they were contained without much difficulty and destroyed the following day. The amphibious assault was even less successful on the east coast of Okinawa, as the 25th Shipping Engineer Regiment attempted to land near Ouki. Most of these troops were killed by fire from ships in Buckner Bay or by the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop on land. As a result, the Japanese suffered losses of 500 to 800 men and nearly all their landing craft during these amphibious assaults. At 05:00, Ugaki initiated his main mass attack, launching 125 kamikazes and 103 escorting fighters from Kyushu to target Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 57, which was currently striking the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields. Taking advantage of the weakened anti-aircraft defenses, the kamikazes managed to score hits on the carriers Formidable and Indomitable, though both vessels ultimately survived. They also targeted American shipping, successfully sinking destroyers Morrison and Luce, along with three landing craft. Additionally, they inflicted further damage on the light cruiser Birmingham, the escort carrier Sangamon, the destroyer Ingraham, and two destroyer-minelayers, resulting in a total of 589 sailors killed.   On land, following a heavy artillery bombardment during the night, the 24th Division commenced its main assault. In the pitch darkness Japanese troops made their way toward the American front lines. At 0500 two red flares ordered them to attack. As the artillery fire became heavy, a guard of Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, dropped back below the crest for cover. He thought that the enemy would not attack through his own artillery, but the enemy did just that. A few Japanese appeared on the crest and set up a light machine gun. Pfc. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man, killed the gunner, and as more of the enemy came over the crest he killed four Japanese who tried to man the machine gun. The enemy advanced over the crest in ragged groups, enabling Black to hold his own. Soon the whole company was in action and drove the enemy off the crest. The Japanese abandoned three light machine guns, four mortars, and much ammunition. At another point a surprise attack nearly succeeded. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Onaga a group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th, commanded by Capt. James Parker. In the sudden onslaught that followed, two heavy machine gun crews abandoned their positions. One of them left its weapon intact, and the Japanese promptly took it over and swung it around on the company. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the usurped weapon with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles amid shrill screams, but they made no further progress. By dawn the general pattern of the Japanese attack on the left (east) of the 14th Corps line was becoming clear. In the 184th's sector the enemy's 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover,"had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. They had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi. Another Japanese element had attacked 7th Division lines on the high ground north of Unaha. At dawn 1st Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A, 184th, observed 2,000 Japanese soldiers in the open area east and north of Kuhazu. They were perfect "artillery meat." Unable to get through to his artillery support, McCracken called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury, and described the lucrative targets. Maybury was equally pleased. McCracken suggested, however, that the Colonel should not be too happy--a group of Japanese at that moment was within 100 yards of Maybury's observation post. There was indeed a party of Japanese busily unlimbering two 75-mm, howitzers just below Maybury. But Company C, 17th Infantry, had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. Artillery eliminated the Japanese caught in the open. A mortar duel ensued, sometimes at ranges of 250 yards. The 3d Battalion, 32d, also poured fire on the enemy there. After the impetus of the attack was lost, a Japanese officer stood out on open ground and waved his saber to assemble his men for an attack. American mortarmen waited for a worth-while target to develop, then put mortar fire on it. Four times the officer assembled a group, only to have his men killed or scattered, before he was finally killed. While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the 14th Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the other enemy "spearhead" in the center. Here the Japanese 32d Regiment, supported by tanks and engineers, attacked behind intense artillery fire. This sector was the critical point of attack, for a break-through here would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division. Transportation difficulties beset the 32d Regiment almost from the start. During the night light tanks drove out of Shuri up the Ginowan road (Route 5), but American artillery interdicting the road prevented medium tanks from following. The mediums had to take a long detour, which was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32d Regiment in ensuing operations. Supported by nine light tanks, the 3d Battalion led the assault of the 32d Regiment against the 306th Infantry, 77th Division, before dawn on 4 May. The enemy mounted his assault from southeast of Hill 187 and hit the 77th where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese drove into the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. Shortly before daylight, when the Japanese infantry had failed to take its initial objectives east of Hill 187, Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, a standard element of a Japanese tank regiment. American artillery fire destroyed one platoon, disrupting the attack, and daylight found the surviving troops in a precarious position across from the American lines. Colonel Murakami ordered the company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented a retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shell fire. The survivors straggled back to their front lines after nightfall. All the light tanks that had supported the attack were lost. By 07:30, the 306th Regiment had effectively repelled the enemy. The Japanese, broken up into small groups, attempted to withdraw across terrain subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire, but few made it through. By 08:00, the 89th Regiment had also been pushed beyond grenade range along the entire front of the 7th Division. Instead of retreating or pressing the assault, however, Kanayama's troops made the critical mistake of milling about in the exposed flatlands, rendering them easy targets for American heavy weaponry. As a result, the 89th Regiment suffered severe losses from concentrated land, naval, and air bombardment, losing half its strength. Colonel Yoshida's 22nd Regiment in the center fared no better; its advance was delayed by the necessity of laying smoke, and it encountered significant hardships when the smoke unexpectedly cleared. In the center of the line the Japanese 22d Regiment was never able to fulfill its role of following up the "successful" advance of flank units, and the regiment spent the day locked in a violent fire fight with men of 3/306, 3/17, and 1/17 holding the Kochi-Onaga area. The Japanese reported the 22d "was not able attain results worth mentioning." Unbeknownst to the Americans, elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment had penetrated more than 1,000 yards behind American lines near Kochi, identifying a significant weak point before pulling back to the regimental line. Nevertheless, due to the overall failure of the 24th Division, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was not even committed to the attack. On the fronts at Maeda and the west coast, American forces made some gains. Hamilton's 1st Battalion successfully executed a complex demolition assault on the extensive cave-tunnel-pillbox network located about 200 feet west of the eastern end of the escarpment, effectively repulsing several subsequent counterattacks and inflicting approximately 600 casualties on the Japanese. The 5th Marines also advanced up to 400 yards through hotly contested terrain during the day. Although pinned down in the coastal area, Colonel Chappell's 1st Battalion managed to break through a defile east of Jichaku, while the 3rd Battalion secured a ridge approximately 400 yards ahead of its position. Despite the apparent failure of the Japanese attack, Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive, ordering a renewed effort during the night. Kitago's uncommitted 1st Battalion, along with the attached 26th Independent Battalion, was directed to penetrate the enemy lines northwest of Kochi in a night attack, aiming to replicate the breakthrough achieved by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. Following another artillery bombardment, the Japanese launched their assault against the 306th Regiment at 02:00 on May 5. However, this attack was quickly disrupted by American artillery. Three hours later, the Japanese struck again, this time supported by tanks. They pressed through artillery and mortar fire to engage the 306th in close combat. Fierce firefights erupted along the regiment's entire line, resulting in the Japanese suffering 248 dead during the fighting. Amid the chaos, a significant portion of Kitago's 1st Battalion successfully infiltrated behind American lines, breaching the defenses at a point between Route 5 and Kochi. While approximately 90 of the infiltrators were quickly killed while assaulting the command post of the 306th Regiment, around 450 Japanese troops crossed the divisional boundary and managed to reoccupy the town of Tanabaru and the Tanabaru Escarpment, effectively cutting off the supply road for the 17th Regiment. In response, Pachler sent Company E to eliminate the infiltrators, but they underestimated the enemy's strength and were repelled with heavy losses. With Company E stalled on the eastern slope of the escarpment, Company F, supported by tanks, attempted a broad flanking maneuver. They successfully pushed through Tanabaru, spending the day destroying the enemy's hastily established defenses. Company E then took over the assault, and by nightfall, they had reached the top of the Tanabaru Escarpment following a mortar preparation. The relentless battle for the Tanabaru Escarpment continued for the next two days, resulting in the Japanese losing 462 killed behind American lines. Only a few men managed to escape the Tanabaru death trap and return to the Shuri lines. Made even more desperate by the failure of Amamiya's grand attack, the ragtag battalions of the 62nd Division fought to the death to defend the vital western approaches to Shuri, ensuring that every yard gained came at a steep price in Marine lives. Each pillbox, cave, and tomb became a stronghold that unleashed a torrent of fire against the attacking Marines from all directions. Despite this fierce resistance, Del Valle's units made significant progress on May 5. The 5th Marines advanced their lines by an average of 300 yards, while the 1st Marines seized the high ground along the Asa River. At the Maeda Escarpment, the reverse slope was slowly captured as caves were blasted and sealed off. By midnight, it became clear to Ushijima that the counteroffensive had failed, with the Japanese suffering approximately 6,227 dead and losing 59 artillery pieces. In turn, the 7th and 77th Divisions, which had absorbed the brunt of the enemy counterattack, sustained 714 losses. Despite these heavy casualties, the 1st Marine Division, which continued its push to the south, incurred corresponding losses of 649 men. This indicated that the Americans experienced greater losses due to the Japanese defensive tactics of attrition. However, the morale of the 32nd Army had been shattered, as the Japanese abandoned all hope for a successful outcome from the operation. Nevertheless, the 24th Division and 5th Artillery Command were ordered to reorganize and shift to a holding action. This strategy aimed to bleed American strength by forcing the 10th Army to maintain its slow, deadly, yard-by-yard advance into the fire of prepared positions. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In the fierce Second Okinawa Counteroffensive, weary American troops pressed into determined Japanese defenses. Captain Ryan's valor led to hard-won territory despite heavy casualties. As chaos unfolded, Japanese morale waned, marking a turning point. The relentless battle showcased unparalleled sacrifice, foreshadowing the Allies' gradual victory in the Pacific.  

In this episode of Working Class Audio, Matt welcomes Producer Michael Roache who has worked for Halo/KDA, Blizzard, Formosa, Rebound, and TNM. Now he is launching a new company called Broken Stick. Pyramind Producing Game Sound Blizzard Formosa Mental Health Storytelling Across Mediums Consulting Broken Stick Productions Guest: Michael Roache Host/Engineer/Producer: Matt Boudreau WCA Theme Music: Cliff Truesdell The Voice: Chuck Smith In This Episode, We Discuss:Links and Show Notes:Matt's Rant: Staying Well RoundedCredits: