Podcasts about Luo

Last time we spoke about the Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941. In November 1940, a Central Hubei operation using multiple task forces aimed to exploit Chinese dispersal, achieving only local successes and no lasting territorial gains. The Japanese then tried again in late January 1941 with a major offensive into southern Henan. Despite concentrating a large force, the campaign failed strategically. After the Henan failure, Japan attempted to regain momentum in spring 1941 by attacking western Hubei around Yichang on the Yangtze. Despite an initial barrage and rapid early gains, Japanese forces became exposed in a narrow salient. The Chinese reorganized their river defenses and launched a converging counteroffensive, driving the invaders back and ending the engagement where it began, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties and their westward push thwarted.   #206 The Battle of Shanggao Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The year 1940 had brought a particular humiliation. In August of that year, Communist General Peng Dehuai had launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive — a massive, coordinated assault across North China that shattered Japanese rail and supply lines, embarrassed Imperial General Headquarters, and demonstrated that the Chinese were far from finished. Japan's response had been brutal, the infamous "Three Alls" campaign of reprisals across the countryside. But the damage had been done, and the attention of Imperial General Headquarters shifted northward. The autumn of 1940 had also seen the First Battle of Changsha, where the Japanese 11th Army under General Sonobe Yahachirō pushed south into Hunan Province expecting to overwhelm the Chinese defenders and finally deal a decisive blow to Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Instead, General Xue Yue — the "Tiger of Changsha" — had allowed the Japanese to advance deep into his prepared killing ground before counterattacking from multiple directions. The Japanese had been forced to retreat in disorder, and the front in Hunan and Jiangxi settled once again into sullen stalemate. It was in this atmosphere of frustrated ambition and strategic inertia that the seeds of Shanggao were sown. By February 1941, Imperial General Headquarters had decided to redeploy the 33rd Division — then garrisoned in the town of Anyi, in northwestern Jiangxi — to North China. The transfer was scheduled to begin in early April, and it made strategic sense: the north required reinforcement, and the front in Jiangxi had been quiet enough that one division could be spared. The problem was that the 33rd Division's departure would leave a gap in Japanese dispositions, and no significant offensive operation had yet been conducted to weaken the Chinese forces that would be left facing a thinned-out Japanese line. Lieutenant General Ōga Shigeru, the energetic commander of the Japanese 34th Division, saw opportunity in the window that existed before the 33rd departed. His division was concentrated around Xishan and Wanshou Palace, astride the Xiang–Gan Highway — the main road running westward through Jiangxi — and across that highway lay the town of Shanggao and the Chinese forces defending it. Ōga proposed exploiting the presence of both divisions for a coordinated strike: a sharp, limited offensive to crush Chinese field forces around Nanchang and the Jiangxi interior before the 33rd Division's train north. The 11th Army headquarters, now commanded by General Marube, endorsed a cautious concept — a "quick strike" with limited objectives. But the 34th Division's staff, energized by Ōga's ambition, had already run well ahead of this guidance. Large-scale requisitioning of coolies for logistics was underway; training exercises aimed at the specific terrain around Shanggao had been conducted; planning had progressed in far more detail than a "limited" operation warranted. This eagerness would prove to be the Japanese undoing before the first shot was fired. Chinese intelligence networks, always attentive to the movement of porters and the telltale preparations that preceded a Japanese offensive, quickly detected the scale of these preparations and reported them to General Luo Zhuoying, commander of the Chinese 19th Army Group. By the time the Japanese columns were forming up to march, Luo had already hardened his defenses and laid the groundwork for a trap. General Luo Zhuoying was not a passive commander. He served simultaneously as commander of the 19th Army Group and as Deputy Commander of the 9th War Zone — the latter post placing him directly under General Xue Yue, the victor of Changsha. Luo had spent the lull after Changsha doing what Chinese commanders across the theater had learned was essential: reorganizing, retraining, and above all improving the defensive architecture of his sector. The plan Luo devised for meeting the anticipated Japanese offensive was elegant in its simplicity and demanding in its execution. Rather than contesting the Japanese advance at the frontier, he would allow the enemy to push westward, yielding ground through three successive defensive lines while bleeding the attackers at every step. The first and second lines would slow the Japanese, exact casualties, and stretch their logistics. The third line — anchored at Shanggao itself — would be the killing ground. There, the Chinese forces would hold fast while other formations swung around the Japanese flanks and rear to close the encirclement. The Japanese, having marched deep into Chinese-held territory with their supply lines thinning and their flanks exposed, would find themselves surrounded rather than victorious. For this plan to work, each Chinese formation had to perform its role with discipline. The 70th Corps, deployed in the north along the arc from Shitou Street through Fengxin to Jing'an, would have to conduct a controlled fighting retreat — yielding ground but making the Japanese pay for it, never breaking and running. The 49th Corps would hold the southern flank and create conditions for flanking action. And the 74th Corps — General Wang Yaowu's elite formation, comprising the 51st, 57th, and 58th Divisions — would hold the final line at Shanggao and serve as the anvil upon which the Japanese advance would shatter. The 74th Corps was by 1941 one of the most battle-hardened formations in the Nationalist Army. It had fought at Shanghai in 1937, at Wuhan in 1938, and in the hills and valleys of Jiangxi through the years since. Its men knew the terrain around Shanggao. They had prepared positions in depth, studied the approaches, and rehearsed the defensive plan Luo had designed. When the Japanese came, they would be ready. Against the Chinese 70,000 — distributed across eleven divisions in four corps, with additional provincial security forces for local coverage — the Japanese would throw roughly 20,000 men: three major formations advancing in coordinated columns. The disparity in numbers was stark, but the Japanese had the advantages of offensive initiative, air superiority, and the formidable fighting quality that the Imperial Army had demonstrated throughout the war in China. The question was whether those advantages would be enough to overcome a prepared defense wielded by a commander who had invited the attack. The operational plan devised by the Japanese 11th Army called for three columns to converge simultaneously on Shanggao from north, center, and south — a classic encirclement concept that, if executed with precision, would catch the Chinese defenders in a tightening vice. In the north, the main force of the 33rd Division under Lieutenant General Sakurai Shōzō would drive westward from its bases around Anyi and Ganzhoujie, descending the Liao River valley to threaten the Chinese right flank and prevent the 70th Corps from interfering with operations in the center.In the center, Ōga's 34th Division would advance along the Xiang–Gan Highway — the direct route from Nanchang toward Shanggao — capturing the town of Gao'an along the way and pressing relentlessly westward until it reached the main defensive positions. This was the principal striking force, the column designed to crack open the Chinese defenses and seize the objective.In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade under Major General Ikeda would cross the Jin River and advance along its south bank, eventually swinging north to link up with the 34th Division and complete the encirclement of whatever Chinese forces remained in the Shanggao area. The plan was coherent on paper. But it contained a structural flaw so serious that, in retrospect, it is difficult to understand how the 11th Army's staff allowed it to proceed uncorrected. The success of any converging operation depends on synchronization — on each column hitting its objectives on schedule and maintaining communication with the others so that each can react to developments on the other prongs. Yet the 11th Army headquarters made no recorded effort to coordinate the 33rd and 34th Divisions before the battle began. There was no forward command post established to oversee the operation. General Marube remained at Hankou, hundreds of miles to the north, throughout the battle — as remote from the fighting as a Tokyo bureaucrat. Operational decisions were left entirely to the individual divisions, with no mechanism to coordinate their actions if something went wrong. Something was going to go wrong. Luo Zhuoying had seen to that. On the morning of March 15, 1941, all three Japanese columns stepped off simultaneously, advancing into the misty hills and rice paddies of northwestern Jiangxi. In the north, Sakurai's 33rd Division moved briskly from Anyi toward Fengxin. The town fell by noon, and the division pressed westward in good order. The Japanese infantry moved confidently along the Liao River valley, experienced soldiers who had fought across China and had no particular reason to expect what was coming. The Chinese 70th Corps gave ground — as it had been ordered to — but did so on its own terms, occupying and then abandoning successive pieces of high ground along both banks of the river, making the Japanese advance uncomfortable and costly. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the 33rd Division was being drawn forward into terrain that favored the defender. By March 18 and 19, the 33rd Division had pushed all the way to Guzhu'ao and Huamenlo — a considerable advance, but one that had taken the division far from its base at Anyi. And it was here, far from support and with flanks increasingly exposed, that the Chinese blocking forces closed in. Chinese infantry, who had been waiting in prepared positions in the high ground overlooking the river valley, launched coordinated counter-attacks that struck the 33rd Division from multiple directions. The fighting was fierce and costly. In two days of close combat, the division suffered more than 2,500 casualties — a grievous toll that represented a significant fraction of its effective strength. The northern column had been stopped dead. On March 19, Sakurai ordered the 33rd Division to reverse course. By March 23, after four days of painful withdrawal under pressure, it had pulled back to Anyi — the same place it had started. The northern prong of the Japanese offensive had accomplished nothing except the loss of thousands of men. In the south, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade had a rougher start. Its initial attempt to cross the Gan-Jin river junction at noon on March 15 was repulsed by Chinese defenders, and it was only under cover of darkness that the brigade managed to force a crossing. Once across, it moved westward along the south bank of the Jin River, but progress was slow and contested. A detachment — the Gan River Detachment — ran into fierce resistance from the 26th Division of the Chinese 49th Corps on March 19. The brigade's main body meanwhile fought its way through the 51st Division of the 74th Corps, but the 107th Division and elements of the 51st managed to contain the advance at the Laichunling–Zhutoushan line. On the night of March 20, the main body of the 20th Brigade crossed the Jin River at Huifu to link up with the 34th Division — but a portion of its troops, cut off on the south bank, was destroyed by Chinese forces. The southern column was across the Jin River, but it had taken losses and was already engaged in ways its planners had not anticipated. In the center, the 34th Division fared best in the early going. Ōga's division moved westward from Xishan along the Xiang–Gan Highway on March 16, and by the 17th had captured Gao'an — a meaningful early success. The Chinese 74th Corps, executing Luo's plan faithfully, dispatched only screening forces east of the Tangpu River to slow the Japanese advance rather than contesting it decisively. The main body of the 74th Corps fell back to the third-line positions at Sixi, Guanqiao, and Tangpu, preparing the killing ground that Luo had designated. Simultaneously, the 26th Division and most of the 105th Division from the 49th Corps were shifted across the Gan River to operate south of the Jin River on the Japanese left flank, and the 72nd Corps was ordered to maneuver on a wide envelopment around Daxia and south of Ganfang. By March 20–21, the 34th Division had pressed forward to attack the Chinese positions at Sixi and Guanqiao. Ōga's men were confident — they had taken Gao'an, they were moving, and the objective of Shanggao lay within reach. But as the division pushed toward Shangjijia, it ran squarely into the 57th and 58th Divisions of the 74th Corps, fighting with a tenacity that told the Japanese plainly enough: this was where the Chinese intended to stand. The week of March 21–24 brought the battle to its crisis. The 34th Division hammered at the Chinese positions defending Shanggao itself, while on the flanks, the fighting took on a character that neither side had entirely anticipated. On March 21, General Wang Yaowu — commanding the 74th Corps from his headquarters in Shanggao — decided it was time to do more than absorb Japanese blows. He ordered General Li Tianxia to clear Japanese forces from the south bank of the Jin River and advance on Gao'an, with the aim of cutting the 34th Division's supply line and threatening its rear. It was an aggressive move, and if it had worked, it might have produced a decisive result earlier than history would record. It did not work — at least not immediately. That very evening, the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade, which had been reorganizing after the chaos of the river crossing, launched a powerful offensive at dawn on the 22nd. Li Tianxia's lead elements had barely set out from Shitou Street when they collided head-on with the main force of the 20th Brigade, which had crossed back from the north bank of the Jin River. The Japanese thrust was coordinated and aggressive: one column circled wide to attack Lazhu Mountain; another swung south of Hu Family west of Shitou Street to strike Li's division in the flank and rear; and nine aircraft with four artillery pieces bombarded the Chinese positions from north to south. Li's division could not hold against this convergent assault and fell back to the high ground southwest of Shitou Street. Wang Yaowu reacted quickly. He ordered Li's main body to wheel left to face the new threat and simultaneously dispatched the Army's Field Supplementary Regiment — held in reserve near Yintang — on a forced march to Huayang to block the Japanese westward drive. This regiment, racing down roads strafed by nine enemy aircraft, covered 15 li per hour and seized Huayang and the high ground to its northeast by around seven in the morning. By nine, the 20th Brigade arrived in strength and — supported by more than ten aircraft — launched a fierce assault on the regiment's positions. The regiment's officers and men held firm, taking heavy casualties but refusing to break. Frustrated at Huayang, the 20th Brigade shifted its effort to the Kuang Family area, linking up with over a thousand men who had crossed from Baichetou to the south bank and pushing along the river toward Xiongfang in an attempt to outflank the Chinese left wing. The Supplementary Regiment sent its 1st Battalion with a mortar company to meet this threat, and the two forces met in a fierce engagement. When the Japanese reinforced their assault and deployed incendiary bombs and poison gas, Xiongfang fell by early afternoon — but Li Tianxia immediately sent two regiments from his right flank to take it back, and by midnight the position was in Chinese hands again. Shitou Street and Jigong Ridge were simultaneously recaptured. The Independent Mixed 20th Brigade now found itself in an increasingly uncomfortable position, fighting with the Jin River at its back and the initiative slipping away. Meanwhile, the main event was being fought in the rubble and ridgelines around Shanggao itself. From March 22 to 25, the 34th Division and whatever remnants of the 20th Brigade could contribute threw themselves repeatedly at the defensive line anchored on Stone Arch Bridge, Xia Po Bridge, Xu Lou, Pan Family Bridge, Cloud Head Mountain, and Lei Family Mountain. This was not the fluid, mobile warfare that the Japanese had envisioned but brutal, grinding attritional combat for individual strongpoints and ridgelines, with positions changing hands multiple times in a single day. The Japanese air arm was deeply involved. Ōga's division had close air support that could operate even in poor weather, and Group 3 of the Japanese Air Force hammered the Chinese positions with sustained effort. On the morning of March 24, after the 34th Division fed in more than 3,000 additional troops transferred across the Jin River, the Air Force dispatched over seventy aircraft that dropped more than 1,700 bombs, largely destroying the defensive positions of Liao Lingqi's division. The Japanese exploited the resulting chaos and twice broke through gaps in the line — but were driven out each time by Chinese counterattacks. At noon, enemy aircraft bombarded in relays and Japanese infantry broke through at Xia Po Bridge. It was at this moment that Li Hanqing, commanding the Chinese infantry defense in that sector, did what officers throughout history have done when systems fail and only personal example can stem the tide: he personally led his officer cadre in repeated counter-attacks, hand-to-hand fighting in the rubble until the Japanese were finally expelled. By this point, the 34th Division's offensive capacity was nearly spent. At the same time — and this was the critical shift that would determine the battle's outcome — General Luo Zhuoying recognized that the moment to spring the trap had arrived. The northern column had already been broken and sent reeling back toward Anyi. The southern column was pinned against the Jin River with its back to the water. The central column was bled white against the defenses of Shanggao. Luo now ordered all his armies to close in from multiple directions. On the morning of March 22, he had already begun revising his orders; by noon on the 23rd, the forces of Liu Duoquan and Li Jue had occupied Shitou Street, Guanqiao Street, and Yanggong Market, pressing on Huifu and Gaoyao. The encirclement of the 34th Division was not yet complete, but its shape was unmistakably forming. By March 25, the 34th Division knew it was in mortal danger. Surrounded on three sides, its ammunition running low and its casualty lists growing by the hour, the division urgently appealed to the 11th Army for rescue. The message that arrived in Hankou was a shock. General Marube and his staff, who had remained at their distant headquarters throughout the battle without establishing a forward command post, had not properly grasped the scale of the disaster unfolding in Jiangxi. The lack of coordination between the 33rd and 34th Divisions — the structural flaw that had been built into the operation from its conception — had allowed Luo Zhuoying to defeat each column separately, and now the central column faced annihilation. The 11th Army responded in a scramble. Chief of Staff Kinoshita was dispatched by aircraft to Nanchang with Operations Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Yamaguchi and Captain Ōne to organize a relief operation. The 33rd Division — barely recovered from its own battering in the north — was ordered to sortie immediately and fight its way to the 34th Division's relief. Sakurai organized his battered 33rd Division into three rescue columns. Infantry Brigade Commander Araki Shōji took the right column, leading Infantry Regiment 215 with one mountain artillery battalion. Infantry Regiment 214 formed the left column. The divisional commander himself led the central column with the main divisional force. On March 24 and 25, all three columns sortied from strongpoints at Niuxing, Fengxin, and other positions, attacking across the Wuqiao River and through Cunqian Street toward Tangpu and Guanqiao. The relief operation brought the battle to its most complicated moment. On the morning of March 25, the 33rd Division launched a fierce assault on the forces that Luo Zhuoying had positioned to tighten the encirclement from the north — striking Zhang Yanchuan's division at Kengkou Leng, Jiezipo, and Nancha Luo. Zhang's division, struck simultaneously from the front and rear, withdrew at dusk to near Tu Di Wang Temple, where it linked up with Tang Boyin's division. What happened next became one of the most controversial decisions of the entire battle. Zhang Yanchuan was serving as deputy army commander in the absence of Li Jue from the front. Surveying the situation — his own division under heavy pressure, the 33rd Division's relief columns pushing aggressively — Zhang concluded that the position was untenable. On his own authority, without authorization from Luo Zhuoying or any superior commander, he withdrew both his own and Tang Boyin's divisions to Fenghuang Market and Zhuangfang. The consequence was immediate and severe. The withdrawal opened a corridor through which the 33rd Division entered Guanqiao and linked up with the encircled 34th Division. An encirclement that had taken days of blood and sacrifice to construct was torn open by a single unauthorized decision. Luo Zhuoying, when he received word of Zhang's withdrawal the following morning, was furious — but he could not change what had already happened. He could only adapt. The breakout itself was an ordeal. A portion of the 34th Division that attempted to escape to the east was intercepted near Huifu by a division of the 49th Corps and lost roughly half its strength before being compelled to turn back. The main body ultimately broke out on March 27, withdrawing in march order that told its own story of disaster: headquarters, baggage, artillery, casualties, field hospital, rear guard — all moving in what the records describe as "a wretched state." On the night of March 27, Japanese troops escorting the 34th Division's field hospital — a field artillery company of the 8th Battery — were completely annihilated in a Chinese night attack. When the division reached Longtuan Xu on March 28, the stretcher-bearer column carrying the wounded stretched some seven to eight kilometers along the road. That same day, the 33rd Division's Infantry Regiment 214 finally made contact with the 34th Division's headquarters, completing what amounted to a rescue of men who had already endured their defeat. The 33rd Division's mountain artillery batteries exhausted their entire ammunition supply covering the retreat and required emergency aerial resupply drops to continue. The 34th Division limped back to its original garrison on April 2. Despite the setback caused by Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal, Luo Zhuoying did not abandon his design. Assessing his situation on the morning of March 26, he found reason for cautious optimism: Wang Yaowu's army was still making progress at Shanggao; the Japanese south of the Jin River had largely been cleared; and Sichuan Army and Northeastern Army units that had been moving to reinforce the battle had now reached the field, meaning Chinese forces retained significant numerical superiority. He resolved to execute a second encirclement. At nine in the morning of March 26, Luo issued strict orders: Zhang Yanchuan's and Tang Boyin's divisions were to immediately comply with their original orders and block the enemy near Guanqiao; Yu Chengwan's division was to attack northward via Pan Family Bridge; Liao Lingqi's and Song Yingzhong's divisions were to press toward Guanqiao with full force; Wang Kejun's division was to strike the enemy's flank and rear east of Guanqiao; Fu Yi's division was to advance south of Jiang Family Isle; and Chen Liangji's division was to swing southeast via Changpu to complete the enemy's destruction. The second ring was being drawn. On March 28, as the 34th Division's battered column trudged eastward toward survival, Wang Kejun's division advancing from Yanggong Market moved to intercept it. The Chinese occupied high ground north and south of Yanggong Market and along Mozi Ridge, and what followed was a grinding all-day battle that fixed the Japanese column at the Xiama Bei–Huxing Ridge line. Part of the 20th Brigade, moving up from Gao'an to assist the withdrawing 34th Division, was blocked near Long Tu Market. Liao Lingqi's division pursued the enemy rear guard to the Changling–Manmei high ground, where the fighting erupted with renewed intensity. At noon, part of Li Tianxia's division arrived and deployed along the Shangluoxiang–Shanyuan–Fangtounao line to harass the Japanese right flank; part of Yu Chengwan's division reached Longxing Mountain and outflanked Guanqiao Street from the south. The surviving Japanese defenders in Guanqiao withdrew into the town for a last stand, and after Liao's division pressed the assault, street fighting raged until five in the afternoon, when over 600 defenders were annihilated. Over 2,000 troops of the Independent Mixed 20th Brigade conducted a fighting withdrawal from Long Tu Market and Yanggong Market, covered by Japanese aircraft bombing to shield the 34th Division's retreat. By noon on March 30, the Japanese had abandoned both strongpoints and scattered northeastward. One group of over 600 men fled directly into the main positions of Zhang Yanchuan's division — an ironic fate, given Zhang's earlier withdrawal — and were largely annihilated. The encircling forces had been essentially dispersed, and the two pursuit columns now pressed forward under the overall direction of General Xue Yue, who had assumed personal coordination of the chase. On March 27, Luo Zhuoying — confident that victory was secured — issued a general order for a final offensive and announced substantial cash rewards to his troops: prizes offered for the capture of Japanese officers, artillery pieces, regimental colors, and other materiel. The rewards were both a practical incentive and a mark of how far the battle had tipped. By midnight on March 31, Chen Hongshi's advance column had recovered Gao'an; Wang Tiehan's division had recovered Xiangfu Guan. On April 2, the divisions of Zhang Yanchuan and Song Yingzhong recovered Fengxin; that afternoon Wang Tiehan's division took back Xishan and Wanshou Palace — the very base from which the 34th Division had launched its offensive. By April 3, the pursuing armies had reached the vicinity of Dacheng and Ganzhoujie. On April 8 and 9, the 70th Corps recovered the outpost strongpoints around Anyi before halting operations. The Japanese had retreated into their original positions and were defending from prepared terrain. The pursuit was over. The Battle of Shanggao had lasted nineteen days and nights. No battle of the Second Sino-Japanese War was ever free of the fog of competing claims, and Shanggao was no exception. On March 29, before the pursuit had even concluded, Luo Zhuoying telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with his accounting of the victory. His numbers were dramatic: Major General Iwanaga, the Japanese infantry commander, killed; regimental commander Colonel Hamada, killed; over 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded in total. Chinese losses, Luo reported, exceeded 20,000. Ten guns, over a thousand rifles, and numerous machine guns had been captured. His superior, General Xue Yue, was skeptical. In a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, Xue reduced Luo's numbers by twenty percent, reporting 12,520 Japanese killed or wounded and 14 prisoners captured. The discrepancy between two Chinese commanders reporting on the same battle speaks to the difficulty of battlefield accounting in any era, and suggests something of the competitive pressures that shaped how Chinese commanders reported their victories to Chongqing. The official Chinese histories, compiled after the war in the History of the War of Resistance, reported approximately 15,000 Japanese killed or wounded, 17 prisoners taken, and significant quantities of captured materiel: 6 mountain guns, 1 mortar, 24 light machine guns, 408 rifles, 24 grenade launchers, and over 111,717 rounds of various ammunition. Chinese casualties, by the same records, were 17,119 killed or wounded and 2,814 missing. Japanese records for the battle do not survive — a consequence of the wholesale destruction of Imperial Army documentation at the war's end. Contemporary scholars, working from other sources, estimate actual Japanese combat losses at approximately 5,500 killed and wounded. This is substantially lower than the Chinese claims, as was nearly always the case in the war, but represents a significant defeat by any measure: roughly a quarter of the force committed, many of them veterans impossible to replace. Chiang Kai-shek subsequently awarded the victorious Chinese units a commendation prize of 150,000 yuan — a substantial sum that marked the battle's significance in Nationalist eyes. The outcome at Shanggao was not accidental. Several interlocking factors combined to produce a Chinese victory, and each deserves consideration. The most fundamental was Luo Zhuoying's defensive plan. The decision to trade space for time — to absorb the Japanese advance through three successive defensive lines rather than contest the frontier — required both tactical confidence and a willingness to accept initial setbacks that could easily be misread as defeat. Chinese forces had to give ground, and they did. They had to suffer through the early days of Japanese advance without breaking and running, drawing the enemy forward and allowing the encirclement to take shape. That they largely succeeded in executing this plan reflects the improving quality of the Nationalist Army by 1941: better trained, better led at the operational level, and — critically — equipped with a strategic design that matched the actual balance of forces. The defeat in detail of the Japanese columns was equally important. By neutralizing the 33rd Division in the north before it could contribute to the central effort, and by pinning the 20th Brigade against the Jin River with its back to the water, Luo's forces ensured that the 34th Division faced the third-line defenses essentially alone — outnumbered, overextended, and unsupported. The Japanese operational concept had been a three-pronged convergence; what actually materialized was a single exhausted division hammering at a prepared defense while two other columns were rendered ineffective. The absence of coordination within the Japanese 11th Army was a gift that kept giving throughout the battle. No forward command post. No mechanism for the divisions to adjust their operations in response to each other's situations. No ability to recognize, in real time, that the northern column was being destroyed and redirect resources accordingly. General Marube's decision to remain at Hankou while his men died in Jiangxi was not merely an administrative failure; it was an operational catastrophe. Japanese commanders acknowledged this failing explicitly after the battle, but the acknowledgment changed nothing for the dead. Zhang Yanchuan's unauthorized withdrawal — the single most consequential individual decision of the battle — ultimately prevented a complete annihilation of the 34th Division rather than affecting the battle's outcome. The 34th Division escaped; but it did so in a "wretched state," having lost enormous numbers of men and equipment. It broke out, not triumphed. The encirclement Luo had constructed was torn open, but the Japanese paid dearly for the breach. The consequences of Shanggao rippled outward in ways that shaped the subsequent course of the war in central China. The transfer of the 33rd Division to North China — the original logistical rationale for the entire operation — was delayed by the division's involvement and subsequent losses at Shanggao. When it finally arrived at the Battle of Central Plains  the following month, it did so on the eve of battle with no time for preparation or orientation, entering combat under severely disadvantaged conditions. The operation that was supposed to facilitate a smooth redeployment had instead damaged one of the two units involved and delayed the other. For the Chinese 74th Corps, Shanggao had an ironic consequence. The Japanese 11th Army, following the battle, formally designated the 74th Corps as a priority target — a "standing enemy" and directed its forces to seek out and destroy it in future operations. At the First Battle of Changsha that September, the 11th Army specifically oriented its forces against the 74th Corps, a testament to the lasting impression that corps's fierce resistance at Shanggao had made on its adversaries. The compliment of being specifically targeted by the enemy was one the 74th Corps had earned in blood at Shanggao's ridgelines and shattered bridges. More broadly, the battle was widely regarded at the time, and has been regarded since, as one of the most significant Chinese tactical victories of the first four years of the War of Resistance. Its significance lay not only in the casualties inflicted — those were contested and probably inflated in the Chinese records — but in what it demonstrated. The improving tactical and operational competence of the Nationalist Army was on display. The deliberate defense, the layered withdrawal, the coordinated encirclement — these were not the operations of an army that had been fighting desperately for survival since 1937 and had learned nothing. They were the operations of an army that had studied its defeats and adapted. Shanggao did not change the strategic situation in China. The front in Jiangxi remained where it had been; the Japanese still occupied Nanchang and the major cities; Chiang Kai-shek was still in Chongqing and the war was still far from over. But it demonstrated something important: that the Chinese Army, given capable commanders, a sound plan, and the discipline to execute it, could do more than survive Japanese offensives. It could reverse them, encircle them, and pursue them back to where they came from. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In March–April 1940, Japanese forces attacked Shanggao with a limited, multi-pronged plan. Chinese troops used elastic defense and coordinated counter-moves, turning initial advantages into a trap. After intense fighting and air strikes, a coordinated encirclement and timely breakout routed the Japanese, forcing retreat despite their numbers in a costly battle.

After China's central government raised the proportion of after-tax profits that State-owned enterprises must remit to the State, a growing number of provinces are following suit, aiming to ease widening fiscal revenue-expenditure gaps and free up more funds for social welfare and livelihood programs.继我国中央政府上调国有企业税后利润上缴国家的比例后，越来越多的省份纷纷跟进效仿，旨在缓解日益扩大的财政收支缺口，为社会福利和民生项目腾出更多资金。The moves come as local governments face mounting fiscal pressures from a protracted property downturn, weak land sales and rising mandatory spending on pensions, healthcare and debt servicing, and tapping SOE profits has become an increasingly important lever, experts said.专家表示，当前地方政府受楼市长期低迷、土地出让收入疲软、养老金、医疗、偿债等刚性支出不断增加影响，财政压力持续加大，盘活国企利润已然成为愈发重要的调控手段。The provinces of Guangdong, Jiangxi, Jiangsu and Hainan have all signaled in their recently released 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) outlines that they will "reasonably raise" profit remittance ratios of local SOEs, and/or dynamically optimize collection rates.广东、江西、江苏、海南等省份在近期发布的“十五五”（2026-2030年）规划纲要中明确提出，将合理上调地方国企利润上缴比例，并动态优化征缴费率。Localities such as the provinces of Guizhou and Hunan, as well as the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, have already steadily increased their own ratios.贵州、湖南、广西壮族自治区等多地已稳步上调本地国企利润上缴比例。China launched its State capital operations budget in 2008, requiring wholly State-owned enterprises to hand over a portion of their after-tax profits. The rates have been raised several times since.我国于2008年设立国有资本经营预算制度，要求国有独资企业上缴部分税后利润，此后该上缴比例已历经多次上调。"Revenue growth has slowed in recent years, but mandatory spending has continued to climb. Increasing the share of SOE profits handed over to the State directly boosts funds available to bridge the gap between income and expenditure, which is the most immediate driver," said Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities.粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒表示：“近年来财政收入增速放缓，但刚性支出持续攀升。提高国企利润上缴比例，能够直接增加可支配资金，填补财政收支缺口，这是当前最直接有效的举措。”Luo said State capital returns had been locked up within individual enterprises, making it hard to create coordinated policy. By centralizing those funds, the government can channel resources into priority areas such as major national initiatives, technological innovation, social programs and risk management.罗志恒称，以往国有资本收益留存于企业内部，难以形成统筹协同的政策效能。通过集中统筹这类资金，政府可以将资源精准投入国家重大战略、科技创新、社会民生、风险防控等重点领域。At the central level, the top rate for tobacco producers and resource-based firms — which account for the lion's share of central government revenue from State capital operations — now stands at 35 percent, up from 20 percent in 2014.在中央层面，烟草企业和资源型企业是中央国有资本经营收入的主要来源，这类企业的最高利润上缴比例已从2014年的20%上调至目前的35%。For local governments, rates vary but are also trending upward. Jilin province, for example, lifted its base rate from 20 percent to 30 percent in 2020.地方国企的利润上缴比例虽各地不一，但整体呈上调趋势。例如，吉林省已于2020年将基础上缴比例从20%提升至30%。Guangxi set a 35 percent rate for financial and resource enterprises and 30 percent for others starting in 2025.广西则自2025年起，将金融类、资源类国企上缴比例定为35%，其他类国企定为30%。"The general direction is a moderate increase, with rates differentiated by industry and region. Financial and resource firms typically pay more, while public-welfare enterprises pay less or may be temporarily exempted to encourage long-term investment," said Li Yan, a professor at Central University of Finance and Economics.中央财经大学教授李岩表示：“整体调控方向是适度上调比例，同时实行分行业、分地区差异化政策。金融、资源类企业上缴比例更高，公益类企业上缴比例较低，或可暂时减免，以此鼓励企业长期投入发展。”The impact on government coffers has been immediate. At the central level, after Beijing raised remittance rates in 2025, State capital operational revenue jumped 73.3 percent year-on-year to 390.3 billion yuan ($57.6 billion), far exceeding the budgeted figure, said the Ministry of Finance.财政部数据显示，政策对财政收入的提振效果立竿见影。2025年中央上调利润上缴比例后，中央国有资本经营收入同比大增73.3%，达到3903亿元（折合576亿美元），大幅超出预算规模。That allowed the central government to transfer 240 billion yuan into the general public budget — a record amount — to fund social welfare, education and infrastructure, the ministry said.财政部表示，这笔资金让中央政府得以向一般公共预算调入2400亿元资金，创下历史新高，专项用于保障社会福利、教育、基础设施建设等民生重点领域。At the local level, State capital operational revenue rose from about 94.7 billion yuan in 2015 to 464.4 billion yuan in 2025, a nearly fivefold increase. Transfers from the State capital budget to the general public budget also expanded, reaching 334.1 billion yuan last year.地方层面，国有资本经营收入从2015年的947亿元增长至2025年的4644亿元，涨幅接近五倍。国有资本经营预算调入一般公共预算的资金规模也持续扩大，去年达到3341亿元。"Raising remittance rates and expanding coverage could help local governments narrow their fiscal gaps and better reflect the public nature of State capital," said Deng Shulian, a professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.上海财经大学教授邓淑莲表示：“上调国企利润上缴比例、扩大上缴范围，能够帮助地方政府缩小财政收支缺口，更好地彰显国有资本的公共属性。”Experts caution against a one-size-fits-all hike.专家提醒，利润上缴比例上调不可采取“一刀切”模式。"The increase should be moderate, differentiated by sector and enterprise type, and be periodically reviewed based on industry conditions, profitability and fiscal needs," Deng said.邓淑莲表示，比例上调应适度推进，根据行业、企业类型实行差异化标准，并结合行业发展形势、企业盈利状况和财政需求进行定期动态调整。remit /rɪˈmɪt/上缴（款项）；汇款；免除fiscal /ˈfɪskl/财政的；国库的protracted /prəˈtræktɪd/持久的，长期拖延的mandatory /ˈmændətɔːri/强制的，法定的，刚性的coffer /ˈkɒfə(r)/（复数）国库，金库；资金储备differentiate /ˌdɪfəˈrenʃieɪt/区分，差异化对待；辨别

We talk about the famous Wu Zetian, as well as Kings Munmu, Sinmun, and Hyoso in Silla.  These were the rulers at the same time that Uno no Sarara was overseeing things in Yamato.  Here we see a bit of tit for tat politics between Yamato and Silla.  We also get a tale of personal sacrifice from veterans of the Silla-Tang war against Baekje. For more notes and references, check out our blogpost page:  https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-149 Rough Transcript Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is episode 149: Kings, Queen, and an Empress   Uno no Sarara and her son, Crown Prince Kusakabe, sat in court.  The trappings of the recent mourning period had been put aside with the recent burial of Uno's husband, Ohoama, and they were now preparing for Crown Prince Kusakabe's coronation.  However, the matter in front of them had nothing to do with that.  Instead, they listened to an official recounting of what had transpired on the peninsula.  The court had explicitly sent an envoy to Silla to inform them of Ohoama's death, but it took much longer than it should have for Norimaro and his party to return.  There had even been an envoy mission from Silla while they were away. As Uno no Sarara listened intently, she found it harder and harder to keep her emotions in check.  She listened as the story of the Yamato mission was told, and as she heard of how her messengers were treated—how they weren't even allowed to tell the Silla court their news all because someone in Silla had decided that they weren't appropriate ambassadors. Silla had finally come to learn of Ohoama's death, and the mission returned home, but this treatment was inexcusable.  These were not just Yamato's messengers, they were carrying the royal word of Queen Uno no Sarara, head of the state and de facto ruler as they mourned the loss of her husband and predecessor.  To have them kept waiting because of some invented protocol was an affront to the nation, but it was also an affront to her. This. Would. Not. Do...     Greetings, everyone!  Thank you once again for tuning in.  As you may recall, last episode we covered the ceremonies around the death and burial of Ohoama, aka Temmu Tennou, as well as the unceremonious death of Crown Prince Kusakabe, leading to the throne being taken by his mother, Queen Uno no Sarara, aka Jitou Tennou.  One aspect of everything that was going on was the relations with the continent.  This included missions from Yamato to the continent—especially those involved with communicating information about the changes in the Yamato court.  So this episode I thought we could look at some of the things we see in the record and go over where things sat with regards to the continent. First things first, let's brush up on where we left off.  Back in episode 140 we talked about how the Silla-Tang alliance had broken down.  With Baekje and Goguryeo both defeated, the Tang had set up commanderies to oversea captured territory in both kingdoms, and even though Emperor Tang Taizong had promised Silla suzerainty over Baekje, his successor, Gaozong, had not adhered to that agreement.  In response, and with the help of Goguryeo rebels, Kind Munmu of Silla had fought back against the Tang forces, eventually consolidating everything south of the Taedong river, approximating the extent of the modern country of South Korea. Meanwhile, Goguryeo rebels continued to trouble the Tang, and King Bojang set up by the Tang dynasty would eventually betray them, allying with the northern Malgal people.  They would continue to fight to restore their sovereignty.  With pressure from Silla and Goguryeo, the Tang commandery pulled back from Pyongyang to Liaoyang—effectively putting the mountainous regions at the head of the Korean peninsula between them and their enemies.  Silla control was de facto, but would not be recognized formally by the Tang dynasty until the early 8th century.  That didn't meant they were completely at odds, however.  Silla would resume diplomatic mission to the Tang, despite their territorial disagreements. Silla's King Munmu, who had pushed back against the Tang, was succeed by his son, known as King Sinmun.  Sinmun had been Crown Prince during the wars against Baekje and Goguryeo.  Much as Ohoama and Uno no Sarara had been doing on the archipelago, he was working to centralize royal authority in Silla. In 681, as Silla was still mourning the death of King Munmu, a rebellion broke out.  It was led by a high ranking Silla official, and father-in-law to Sinmun, Kim Humdol.  It was quickly put down, and Kim Humdol and other officials who were implicated were executed.  This was actually a golden opportunity for the new King Sinmun to help purge the court of any rivals or ministers with less than absolute dedication to his plan to centralize authority. I kind of get the feeling that, for all of the past conflicts between their nations, Sinmun, Ohoama, and Uno might have gotten along quite well.  However, that didn't stop the fact that they were rulers of rival nations, and while they may have had similar concepts of leadership, they also were focused on their own rule and authority. To that end, Sinmun also reached out to the Tang court with tribute missions, and in so doing was at least recognized by the Tang court, who enfeoffed him as King of Silla.  This appears to have been a bit of polite fiction, but that was how a lot of this operated, ultimately.  King Sinmun would have held power in Silla regardless of the Tang court's approval, but the fiction that the court had bestowed his authority no doubt provided some diplomatic benefits, and a context within which to operate on the international stage.  It also no doubt allowed for increased trade, bringing in exotic and high status items, which would have been useful for boosting approval ratings back home. King Sinmun ruled until his death in 691.  He was succeeded by his son, known as King Hyoso.  However, Hyoso was young—about 5 years old when he took the throne.  And so his mother, Queen Sinmok, acted as regent for much of his reign—right up until her death in 700.  Hyoso ended up reigning for a decade, until 702, meaning that he and his mother reigned throughout Uno no Sarara's period as sovereign in Yamato. Hyoso's reign saw continued progress towards centralization of authority, as well as improved relationships with the Tang court.  Silla maintained diplomatic ties and tribute missions, and the Tang court conferred recognition on Hyoso as the King of Silla, in return. Speaking of the Tang Court, Emperor Tang Gaozong passed away before Ohoama had, departing this world in 683.  However, for all that he was the emperor, he had not really been the one running things for some time.  Gaozong came to the throne at roughly 21 years of age, and throughout most of his reign he had to share power with others in the court.  Originally this meant high ranking minister, but there was also his wife, Wu Zhao, aka Wu Zetian.  Wu had been a consort under Tang Taizong, and then continued as a consort for Gaozong as well.  Then, in 655, she was officially made empress. In 660, Gaozong began to suffer from an unknown illness, characterized by headaches, dizziness, , and occasional seizures and loss of vision.  Some have suggested it was a stroke or some form of hypertension.  Either way, these symptoms would plague him for the rest of his reign, and so he began to delegate more and more authority to Wu Zhao, who would handle things on his behalf. Thus, Wu was effectively already running things by the time of Gaozong's death in 683.  At that point, she became the Empress Dowager, and her third son became emperor Zhongzong—at least in name.  Because Wu Zhao maintained all of the power and authority at court.  She was, in fact, the regent, and a mere six weeks after Zhongzong took the throne he was removed by his own mother.  It seems that Zhongzong, who came to the throne at the age of 28, was showing signs of being a little too much under the influence of his wife, Empress Wei.  In fact, he is said to have considered giving her the Empire.  And so Wu had him deposed and exiled.  She then had his younger brother made Emperor Ruizong, though still under Wu Zhao's term as regent. Ruizong was about 22 when he took the throne under his mother in 684.  He would continue to reign until 690, when he abdicated the throne in favor of his mother.  From that point on, Wu Zhao ruled as the sovereign for another 15 years, until the year 705, declaring it a return of the ancient Zhou dynasty.  In other words, for all of Uno no Sarara's reign in Yamato, another woman, Wu Zhao, sat atop the traditionally patriarchal seat of power in the Tang—and later Zhou—court. Wu Zhao is more commonly known to us, today, as Wu Zetian.  This comes from her final title as reigning monarch:  Zetian Dasheng Huangdi, or Heaven-following Great Holy Emperor.  She is often depicted as a ruthless and politically savvy ruler who usurped the throne through her feminine wiles and violence.  We see how she dethroned her own son to avoid him giving up the throne to his wife.  She is also said to have had another son killed because of her ambitions, and is even accused of killing her own daughter just to blame a rival at court.  She is also depicted performing plenty of other unflattering acts. Of course, it is worth noting that she was not the one to write her own history.  After her reign, her epitaph was inscribed by her own political rivals.   It is notable that she is the only Empress to be recognized as ruling in her own right in the entire history of China.  Certainly there were others who reigned as regents, and women with tremendous power and influence, but none of them really held the throne uncontested. Given the animosity of the authors who wrote about her reign, we have to take anything we hear about Wu Zhao with a bit of salt.  On the other hand, Tang dynasty imperial politics were ruthless, and you didn't get to the top because you had a charming demeanor.   While there is no doubt more than a little slander written into the history books, one only has to look at the men who ruled before and after her to wonder whether she really did anything that was so much better or worse than what they did.  Just keep that in mind as we go through some of what she was accused of. Now what we are told is that with her younger son, Emperor Ruizong, she was only nominally pretending to be regent.  She didn't bother to hide behind a screen with him out front and we are told she openly whispered answers and commands that Ruizong would immediately parrot.  Ruizong never moved into the imperial suites of the palace, which his mother maintained.  Ruizong didn't even attend imperial functions, and officials were not allowed to meet with him privately.  An uprising in Yang state was said to be in part because of her rule, and it was suggested that she should step aside and let her son truly rule to restore confidence, but she was having none of it and had those who suggested it arrested.  Later, she would institute post boxes around government buildings for people to snitch on those around them who might be disloyal, and she instituted secret police, who investigated various rumors and false accusations with torture, leading to numerous executions. In 685 she is said to have had an affair with a Buddhst monk, Huaiyi, who was then conferred with various honors.  Then, in 686, she offered to return the throne to Ruizong, but Ruizong, realizing that there was no way she would let go of power, saw it as a test of his obedience, and declined.  In 688 she summoned senior members of the Li Family, the family of the Tang emperors, under the pretense of making sacrifices to the spirit of the Luo river, which flowed through the Eastern Capital of Luoyang.  Several of the Princes of the Li house were worried that she was going to slaughter them all, Red Wedding style, if they showed up, in order to secure the throne to herself, and so they plotted to rebel, but coordination was not the greatest back then, and two princes rose up before the others were ready.  They were crushed, and many other members of the Li family were implicated, arrested, and forced to commit suicide.  In 690, she completely did away with any dissembling and declared a new dynasty—the Zhou dynasty—declaring herself Shengshen Huangdi, or Holy Divine Emperor of the Zhou dynasty.  And yes, this is the same Zhou as the ancient Zhou dynasty—she was apparently claiming descent from the ancient rulers of Zhou. Her son was thus deposed and she ruled uncontested from 690 until her death in705.  She would go by various names.  Three years in and she would add "Jinlun", or "Golden Wheel" to her title, referring to the Buddhist concept of a Chakravartin, or Golden Wheel Turning Monarch. This latter title came in part as she is said to have elevated the foreign religion of Buddhism over the native Taoist religion.  She is also said to have built numerous temples around the capital cities and elsewhere.  In 692, the rising power of the secret police appeared to have been halted.  One of the officials in charge, Lai Junchen, attempted to have a handful of officials executed for false accusastions.  He told them that if they confessed to the accusations, their lives would be spared, and so many of them confessed to the false accusations, but Junchen conspired to have them executed anyway.  One of the officials was none other than the famous Di Renjie.  Renjie wrote a petition on his blanket and then hid that with the laundry that he sent to his family when it was time to change from winter to summer robes.  His family found it and submitted the petition to Wu Zhao, who became suspicious of Junchen.  For his part, Junchen has submitted forged petitions from the prisoners, thanking Empress Wu for preparing to execute them. Other accusations against Junchen's methods came to light, and so Empress Wu interrogated the prisoners personally.  They all disavowed their confessions, and so Wu commuted their sentences from death to exile.  Junchen continued to operate until 697, but there seems to have been a notable decrease in the number of executions after that point.  He would eventually go too far, and planning to accuse the Li and Wu princes and princesses of treason, but they acted first and he ended up being executed.  Without Lai Junchen, the secret police seem to have largely fallen apart. As for Di Renjie, he eventually worked his way back into the good graces of Wu and the court, eventually being recalled to Luoyang to serve.  Di Renjie's own legend grew, and in the 18th or 19th century he was recast as a kind of Tang dynasty detective in the historical crime drama genre popular at the time.  The book, "Di Gong An", or "Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee", was found by a Dutch Ambassador to China, Robert van Gulik, in a used bookstore in Tokyo, of all places.  Van Gulik would go on to translate the stories and penned a number of others using the style and characters of the original.  Judge Dee was cast as the "Sherlock Holmes of China" and has since become popular in both China and the West.  The first novel in the series was actually set in the time of Empress Wu. Robert van Gulik also had several scholarly works, including a translation of the Tang Yin Pi Shih, a 13th century manual for magistrates with examples of cases spanning approximately 1400 years, from the Qin to Song dynasty.  This work really helps to illuminate how the ancient justice system worked back then.  Fictional detectives aside, Empress Wu would continue to reign over an impressive period in history.  There were plenty of deadly politics, various attacks by outside forces, and more. Overall, it was a fairly prosperous time for the empires. When Wu passed away in 705, her son, Emperor Zhongzong, resumed the throne, ending the Zhou dynasty and resuming the Tang dynasty of the Li family.  Still, Wu Zhao, aka Wu Zetian, would be well remembered.  She was buried in the Qianling Mausoleum, near Chang'an, alongside her late husband, Emperor Gaozong.  Various other members of the Royal Li family were also buried there, and many of their tombs have been opened.  The paintings, statues, and artwork and funerary goods provide a tremendously detailed look at Tang court culture and society at this time.  Statues outside indicate officials and ambassadors from across the Tang courts sphere of influence.  There are depictions of court dress and the elaborate hairstyles, fabrics, and more, as the tombs generally include court men and women.  The famous mural of the Ambassadors is shown with Korean, western, and possibly even a Japanese envoy.  The murals also show architectural elements of ancient Chang'an and more. The tombs of Gaozong and Zetian clearly known, but currently have not undergone excavation.  Much like with the tomb of Qin Shihuangdi, the government has put a moratorium on opening the tombs until they can be sure that everything can be properly protected as they do so.  There is a huge concern that the tombs could be robbed or that priceless works could be damaged if they are opened improperly or without sufficient techniques to adequately preserve them. As noted above, although Empress Wu is often demonized by historians, we have to ask if her reign was truly so much different from others.  She was certainly a woman taking power in a male-dominated system.  Where a man projecting power was seen as normal, Empress Wu was seen as perverting the natural order.  An emperor taking to bed numerous consorts and concubines was considered only natural.  However, Empress Wu taking to bed various men for her own enjoyment was seen as licentious and indecent.  The double-standard seems pretty clear. I even have to wonder about things like the secret police.  While it certainly is alarming to see a government sending people out to arrest and charge people on the barest of evidence, often with little or no accountability or transparency, one should consider what justice looked like at the time, more generally.  Tang dynasty justice was often harsh, and torture was considered a standard practice to elicit a confession.  Once someone was accused of a crime, their guilt was assumed, and it was on them to prove their innocence.  This was a tall order, as the thinking of the day was often that if you hadn't done anything wrong, why would anyone risk falsely accusing you?  So clearly you had done *something* to disrupt the social order, even if it wasn't what you were actually accused of. Furthermore, there is a fine line between rooting out disloyalty to the regime and rooting out corruption.  Anonymous tips can be used to call SWAT to someone's house, but it can also be a way for a whistleblower to alert those in authority that something untoward is going on.  And something begun with the best of intentions, can easily be corrupted, especially in the wrong hands. And so I think we can give Empress Wu at least the benefit of the doubt that she seems to have tried to do right by the people and her country.  The Tang court, by all accounts, was a nest of vipers, and I don't think she was a saint, but neither was she the devil incarnate. In fact, a lot of the accusations against Empress Wu would appear to be paralleled, years later, in the archipelago—possibly being parroted by men who were aware of the anti-Wu propaganda.  Kouken Tennou—who would also reign a second time as Shoutoku Tennou, was embroiled in conflict. Like Wu, she came to power in a court embroiled in familial politics.  She was known to be a supporter of Buddhism, and she was also said to have had an affair with a monk, Doukyou, upon whom she is said to have lavished power and authority.  She is also said to have modeled her nengo, the auspicious names for the year, off of Empress Wu.  After her death, her reign was used as a reason why there was not another regnant female sovereign on the throne until the Edo period, and she is often seen as the Last Female Sovereign, much as there was never another Empress regnant amongst the various Sinic dynasties. However, returning ourselves back to the 7th century, those histories had yet to be written.  Instead, one has to wonder how much communication there was between the continent and the archipelago.  Did Uno no Sarara realize that she was not the only woman taking charge at that time?  Was Empress Wu considered a model for her?  Or was she seen as more of a rival?  Or was it neither?  Did either one regard the other at all, embroiled as they were in their own, local and domestic pursuits? If they did, there isn't much, if anything, in the record. There is plenty to be said about relations with both Silla and the Tang dynasty in general, however.  Most of the focus was actually on Silla, to be honest—not surprising given Silla's place in the international arena in relation to Yamato. Last episode we mentioned that an embassy was sent to Silla to announce the death of Ohoama.  It was only several months after he had passed away, on the 19th day of 687.  The chief and assistant envoys were Tanaka no Ason no Norimaro and Mori no Kimi no Karita.  Norimaro is listed as Jikikwoshi rank—the lowest of the Jiki category, which was the 3rd of 6.  This put him about 24 ranks down in the 48 rank system.  Karita, on the other hand, was Tsuidaini, putting him at about 43 of 48 court ranks.  Normally, I don't pay too much attention to the ranks that are given in the Chronicles, mainly for two reasons.  First off is that you aren't always sure that the rank given in the Chronicle corresponds with the rank at the time of the event—sometimes we see ranks that are clearly anachronistic—typically later in their life.  Since people don't typically drop in rank, unless they are demoted, this usually gives you some information, but not always. The second reason I often don't pay attention is because it usually isn't germane to the story.  It is why I'll also drop the uji and the kabane, once we establish a particular person.  Otherwise it feels like word salad. Every once in a while I do like to look at the ranks, however, because they do give us information about things like the individual's general position in the court hierarchy.  In this case we see that, of the officials selected for this assignment, one was near the bottom of the upper half of the court, while the other was really in a much more junior position.  I believe this may also be important later on, because there was a certain expectation that the person representing a sovereign in diplomatic situations would have sufficient rank to indicate some amount of pull, back home. The mission of Norimaro and Karita to Silla may have been ordered in the first month of the year, but it seems it likely took time before it actually left—or something happened.  I say this because in the 9th month we see an embassy from Silla arrive, and they are apparently unaware of any changes in the archipelago.  The embassy was headed by the Prince Gim Sangnim.  We are also told that there were two other officials, Gim Salmo and Gim Insyul, both of Geupson rank.  Then there was So Yangsin of Daesa rank.  That was two of vice ministerial rank and one of lower official rank.  These ranks were connected both to their office and to their family, as Silla still used a fairly rigid system based on the rank of one's family, similar to the way that the old Kabane system worked before it was reformed under Ohoama in the previous reign. The embassy from Silla also included a student-priest, Chiryu.  Presumably Chiryu was from Yamato and had gone abroad to study, and was now making his way back home. It appears as though the embassy had no idea that Ohoama had passed away as we are told that they had to be informed by the Dazai—the Viceroy of Tsukushi.  Once they were informed, they all put on mourning clothing, turned towards the east—towards the capital of Yamato—and they bowed three times and then cried out lamentations three times. I would note that there is another record in the first month of the following year, which states that Gim Sangnim and his colleagues were informed of Ohoama's death and lamented three times.   That could just be a misplaced duplicate of the previous entry, about the embassy—possibly it got recorded multiple times and different ways and on different dates.  It isn't exactly clear.  Either way, it seems that this was not meant to be an official condolence envoy, but just a regular embassy bringing trade goods disguised as tribute.  In fact, in the 2nd month of 688 we are told that the Viceroy of Tsukushi presented the tribute from Silla to the capital.  It is said to have included gold and silver, thin silks, cloth, skins, copper, and iron.  There were also images of the Buddha, all kinds of coloured fine silks, birds, and horses.  Sangnim himself had presents of gold and silver, colored stuffs, and various rarieties—80 items all told.  Sangnim and his crew probably didn't travel to Asuka, because we are told that as of the 10th day of the 2nd month of 688 they were being entertained in the Tsukushi government house, where they were given various gifts by the court, and then they headed out on the 29th day of that month. A year after that, in the first month of 689, Norimaro and Karita returned from Silla, suggesting that the two embassies really had just passed each other—such were the issues with international travel back in the day. Now, normally, we don't hear much about what happened during these embassies.  The Nihon Shoki doesn't typically record anything, possibly because they just didn't have any records.  And the records in the Samguk Sagi often don't mention anything, either.  It is possible that it was just considered too routine to mention the ins and outs.  However, in this instance, we may have some insight, because it is mentioned later in the narrative. You see, four months behind Norimaro and Karita came the formal Silla condolence envoy.  It was headed by Gim Dona, of Geupson rank—so a vice minister instead of a prince heading up the embassy.  Silla also sent student-priests Meiso, Kwanchi, and others, along with a gold-copper image of Amida Buddha and a gold-copper image of Kannon and an image of Daiseishi Boddhisatva, along with colored silks and brocades. A month after they arrived, the condolence envoy received a message from none other than Queen Uno no Sarara herself, but this was not necessarily a good thing.  In fact, she appears to be dressing down the Silla envoys and the Silla court more generally, because of how things had gone with Norimaro and Karita—and this possibly also explains why it took so long for them to get to Silla and back. According to the Yamato court, Norimaro and Karita were sent to Silla to announce the death of Ohoama.  However, Silla protocol stated that persons charged to deliver a royal message had always had the rank of Sopan. This appears to be equivalent to the rank of Japchan, and indicates the third rank in Silla's system.  Because of this, Queen Uno's message goes on to state, Norimaro and Karita were not allowed to deliver their message about Ohoama's passing to the court.  However, back when Karu—Koutoku Tennou—had passed away in 654, Kose no Inamochi went to announce the funerals dates, and he was received by Gim Shunshun listened to the report.  So saying that it is someone of the third rank that is needed goes against precedent. Furthermore, when Naka no Oe passed away in 671, Silla sent Gim Salyu, who was of 7th rank, but now they send someone of 9th rank.  So if precedent was to be followed, wouldn't that also be a problem? This whole thing is really fascinating in that it demonstrates the kind of delicate balance and back and forth that was going on—and I suspect that it was growing even more specific as each country was adopting more rules and laws, and compiling them into codes.  It is notable that the Chronicles make sure to state the rank of each ambassador from Silla, at least in the last several reigns.  That suggests that the government was tracking such things, and that it was important. The rest of the screed by the Yamato court seems a little more about setting out Yamato's position on Silla-Yamato relations.  Here Yamato puts words into the mouths of former Silla officials, claiming that they always addressed Yamato's sovereign with deference.  Yamato claimed Silla had promised service to Yamato since the remote royal ancestors, promising that the oars of the ships bringing tribute to the archipelago would "never become dry", and yet this time, there was only one ship that came to offer condolences.  Furthermore, the Silla kings were to serve the sovereigns of Yamato faithfully, but they had now broken the faith. Therefore their tribute goods were sealed up and returned back. That said, they weren't completely breaking off communications.  This was a rebuke, certainly, but they were willing to keep channels open with hopes that relations might improve in the future. My read on all of this is that the Yamato envoys to Silla had been snubbed by that court for not being of appropriate station by Silla's rules.  Therefore, in a tit-for-tat move, Yamato was treating the condolence envoy similarly. That doesn't mean they didn't show them any hospitality, though.  Queen Uno no Sarara had the Viceroy, Awada no Mabito no Ason, give the student-priests Meiso and Kanchi, who had just come back with the condolence envoy, 140 kin of floss silk for their teachers back in Silla, in apparent gratitude.  And then a few days later they were entertaining the condolence envoys in Wogohori in Tsukushi, and giving them various presents for their trouble. This is likely the kind of "don't shoot the messenger".  Sure, they were returning the tribute and sending a message to Silla, but that wasn't the fault of Gim Dona and his colleagues.  And they were now taking a rather disappointing message back with them—I doubt anyone wanted to be in Gim Dona's shoes as he told the court what had transpired. Gim Dona and crew left shortly after that.  From there, we don't have a lot of information on what happened.  The Silla annals of the Samguk Sagi don't record Gim Dona's embassy, let alone what happened when they came back.  However, Silla  would send future envoys, and diplomatic relations between the two countries continued throughout the reign.  The Silla embassies from that point on are largely, for our purposes, unremarkable.  I may mention them if they relate to other items of note, but for the most part there is really only two other embassies of note, and they were in the year 693.  The first was from Silla, led by Gim Gangnam of Sasan rank, along with Gim Yangweon of Hannama rank—so 8th and 11th rank in the Silla hierarchy, apparently.  They had come to announce the death of King Sinmun, who had passed away the previous year.    And so, on the 16th day of the 3rd month, an embassy was prepared to depart for Silla.  It was headed up by Okinaga no Mabito no Oyu, of Jikikwoshi rank—much as Norimaro had been.  He and his proposed vice envoy, Ohotomo no Sukune no Kogimi, who was Gondaini rank—27th of 48—were both given gifts prior to their election as ambassadors, and were sent as condolence envoys, themselves. Meanwhile, let's take a look at Yamato's interactions with the Tang dynasty. First of all, we see a note in the 6th month of 689 that presents of rice were given to Xu Shouyen, Sa Hungko, and others from the land of the Great Tang.  So was this an embassy?  Not quite. Remember that little scuffle back in the 660s on the Korean Peninsula?  That special military operation by Silla and Tang forces against Baekje, where Yamato had tried to assist, only to have their navy bested by Tang forces? Well during the fighting , there had been numerous prisoners taken, on both sides.  Xu Shouyen and Sa Hungko were two such prisoners.  Except that "prison" in this case was largely being sent to live off the land.  They were probably forced to do labor, though if they had special skills, such as reading and writing, they may have been put to work in another way.  Indeed, we later see these two mentioned not as prisoners or even slaves, but as teachers of "pronunciation".  They were even given rice-land and stipends of their own.  Granted, this is decades after they first came to  Yamato, so this wasn't exactly a smooth ride. But it wasn't just Tang prisoners in Yamato.  Yamato soldiers had also been captured and taken prisoner by Tang forces.  And so, in the 9th month of 690, we see three priests who had gone to the land of Tang to study returned in the company of a Silla escort envoy, and they brought back with them a soldier, Ohotomobe no Hakama, from the Upper Yame district in Tsukushi. The three priests, Chishiu, Gitoku, and Jougwan all made their way to the capital, arriving several weeks after they first made landfall in Tsukushi.  At this point, Prince Kawachi was the Dazai in charge of affairs out there, and soon after the priests arrived at Naniwa and made their way to the capital, in Asuka, messengers going the other way made it out to Tsukushi with orders to give presents and gifts to the Gim Gohun, the escort envoy who had shuttled them all back from the continent. But even more impressive was the royal edict that was dated a week later for Ohotomobe no Hakama.  It lays out the circumstances of his capture and what happened to him that he stayed in the land of the Tang for so long.  You see, Hakama was one of many soldiers who was captured during the war to defend Baekje.  But three years after that conflict, the Tang dynasty was no longer trying to keep them prisoner.  This was a time when you didn't necessarily need to have buildings with walls to keep people prisoner—you just moved them to a new area where they could farm or otherwise set up a livelihood, or starve.  Travel was dangerous and expensive, especially if you didn't speak the language.  Nonetheless, if you did wish to return, there wasn't a lot stopping you, beyond just having the means to do so. And so this group of Wa soldiers got together and debated what to do.  We are told that it was four men—Hashi no Hoto, Kohori no Oyu, Tsukuhi no Satsuyama, and Yuge no Gen Jitsuni—the last one apparently having taken a local name on the continent.  Amongst themselves, they wanted to return to the archipelago not just to see their families and friends, but also to let people back home know about the changing conditions on the mainland.  As you may recall, around this time, Yamato was fiercely building up forces and defenses because they were convinced that there was going to be an attack by the Tang and Silla forces at any moment. The only problem that these four had in getting back was that they had, well, nothing.  They had neither the clothing nor provisions to make such a journey.  What would they eat and how would they pay for passage?  As such, they were unable to get back.  Hearing this, Ohotomobe no Hakama spoke up.  He declared that, as much as he also wished to return, he could at least help them out.  He offered to be sold into slavery so that his companions could obtain money with which to buy food and clothing. And so they did.  Hakama was sold, and he probably had no idea what happened to the four after that. It turns out, however, that they did make it back and were able to give the Yamato court some idea of what had happened.  Meanwhile, Hakama remained in a foreign land as a slave for some 30 years, until he was finally able to make it back to Yamato, apparently with the help of the three monks. This whole story was relayed to the court, and when the Queen heard it, she decided to act.  And thus the edict.  Not only did she recount his story and praise him for his loyalty, but he was granted certain honors.  First off, he was granted the rank of Mudaishi—the 39th rank in the court hierarchy, which gave him not a small amount of status, especially if he stayed in Tsukushi.  He was also granted5 pieses of coarse silk, 10 bundles of floss silk, 30 tan of cloth, and 1000 sheaves of rice.  On top of that, though, he received four chou of rice-land, which was given to him and his descendants, until at least his great-grandchildren.  Finally, his parents, siblings, and children, were also exempted from having to ever provide corvee labor. Now, nobody could give him back his 30 years, but this was quite the consolation prize, at the time.  To basically get rank and status, a stipend down four generations, and exemption from forced labor for him and his relatives, that was pretty incredible, if you think about it. Hakama wasn't the only one who had suffered in the country of the Great Tang and was rewarded for it.  Mononobe no Kusuri, from Iyo, and Mibu no Moroshi, in Higo, were also paid out handsomely in consolation for their sufferings,  though we aren't given details on their stories, or even when they came back. There are also other descriptions of Tang men, but it seems that these were individuals in a similar position to Xu Shouyen and Sa Hungko—they had been captured and were now living in Yamato.  That they were integrating into Yamato society seems clear from the fact that they were given rank and similarly treated like vassals of the throne. What we don't see, however, are any further diplomatic missions.  Those wouldn't start up for a while, and so even if Queen Uno no Sarara had wanted to confer with another female monarch, it would have to have been done through the auspices of Silla, who at t his point seem to have largely controlled the flow of goods, people, and thus information between the straits. And with that, I think we can close out this episode.  Moving forward, we have more details about a lot of different things, and yet others are still lacking.  It is my goal to try and be a little more selective about the passages we pull from the Chronicles.  We don't need to go over every natural disaster or prayer to the wind-gods.  We will take a look at things like the completion of the Fujiwara capital, as well as the 22 volumes of the Asuka-Kiyomihara law codes.  And then there are a few persons of note that we should probably mention as well, such as the appearance of Fujiwara no Fubito.  We should also talk about some of the other royal edicts that were made. All of that for later.  For now, if you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

The Tiger Sisters share the keys to collaborative communication.Good marketing communication doesn't just go one way. As the Tiger Sisters know, building a brand is about bringing your audience into the conversation.Cherie and Jean Luo are sisters, tech and finance experts, and co-hosts of the Tiger Sisters Podcast, a show about money, power, and love. Their approach to content creation mirrors how they think about communication: know your audience, stay curious, and embrace feedback. “We often think about our community as the co-producers of our episodes,” Cherie says. “Each episode we put out is like a mini product. Once we put it out, we can get feedback on whether or not people are resonating.”In this episode of Think Fast, Talk Smart, the Tiger Sisters join host Matt Abrahams, sharing how they've built a thriving brand through collaboration — with each other and with their audience. From simplifying complex topics to crafting messages that resonate, the Luo's insights show why the best communication is about healthy back and forth.Episode Reference Links:Jean LuoCherie Brooke LuoTiger Sisters PodcastConnect:Premium Signup >>>> Think Fast Talk Smart PremiumEmail Questions & Feedback >>> hello@fastersmarter.ioEpisode Transcripts >>> Think Fast Talk Smart WebsiteNewsletter Signup + English Language Learning >>> FasterSmarter.ioThink Fast Talk Smart >>> LinkedIn, Instagram, YouTubeMatt Abrahams >>> LinkedInChapters:(00:00) - Introduction (02:34) - The Tiger Sisters Mission (04:10) - Going Viral on TikTok (06:00) - Explaining Complex Topics (07:56) - Learning from the Audience (10:05) - Working as Sisters & Co-Founders (13:05) - Reinventing Careers (14:31) - Family Expectations (16:20) - Personal Branding (18:57) - Teaching Through Storytelling (21:02) - The Final Three Questions (26:23) - Conclusion ********Thank you to our sponsors.  These partnerships support the ongoing production of the podcast, allowing us to bring it to you at no cost.Strawberry.me. Get 50% off your first coaching session today at Strawberry.me/smartJoin our Think Fast Talk Smart Learning Community and become the communicator you want to be. 

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

A sharp acceleration in infrastructure spending has emerged as a key pillar of China's investment stabilization drive, offsetting a persistent decline in the property sector and helping overall investment return to positive growth in the first quarter, officials and economists said.随着基础设施建设支出显著提速，我国稳投资格局初显成效。在房地产开发投资持续探底的背景下，基建领域的强劲增长有效对冲了行业下行压力，带动一季度整体固定资产投资重回正增长区间。The rebound came after authorities vowed late last year to halt the investment downturn, following a 3.8 percent contraction in fixed-asset investment in 2025.此番回暖发生在此前投资增速持续承压之后。数据显示，2025年全年固定资产投资曾收缩3.8%，有关部门于去年底明确释放了遏制投资下滑的政策信号。According to the National Bureau of Statistics, fixed-asset investment reached 10.27 trillion yuan ($1.51 trillion) in the first quarter, up 1.7 percent year-on-year. Beneath the headline figure, however, lies a sharp divergence. Infrastructure investment surged 8.9 percent, while property development investment plunged 11.2 percent.国家统计局最新公布的数据显示，今年一季度，全国固定资产投资达10.27万亿元，同比增长1.7%。尽管总量增长温和，内部结构分化却极为显著：基础设施投资同比大增8.9%，而房地产开发投资则同比下降11.2%。Wang Qing, chief macroeconomic analyst at Golden Credit Rating International, said that infrastructure investment — the area where the government has the most direct leverage — has ramped up significantly at the start of the year.东方金诚首席宏观分析师王青指出，基建投资作为政府宏观调控最直接有效的抓手，在开年即展现出强劲的拉升势头。"The pace of growth in the first quarter exceeded what the market had anticipated," Wang said.“一季度的实际增速已超出此前市场普遍预期。”王青表示。China has not disclosed the scale of its infrastructure investment in recent years. However, a report by China Galaxy Securities suggests that the proportion of infrastructure investment within total fixed-asset investment has been rising, estimating it at about 45.3 percent as of end-2023.近年来官方虽未单独披露基建投资的绝对规模，但据中国银河证券研报测算，基建投资在固投总额中的占比呈逐年抬升趋势，截至2023年底，该比例约为45.3%。Last year, the sector faced significant headwinds. Due to a combination of fiscal constraints and a high base of comparison, infrastructure investment saw a rare year-on-year decline of 2.2 percent for the full year, according to the bureau.回顾2024年，该领域曾面临不小的增长阻力。受制于财政紧平衡与高基数效应的叠加影响，国家统计局数据显示，全年基础设施投资罕见录得2.2%的同比降幅。Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities, said the robust first-quarter growth accelerated by 8.3 percentage points from the full-year 2025 level and contributed 2.7 percentage points to overall investment growth.粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒分析称，一季度基建投资增速较2025年全年大幅回升8.3个百分点，对整体投资增长的贡献率高达2.7个百分点。"Infrastructure spending countered the drag from the prolonged property downturn and served as the key factor behind the turnaround from negative growth last year," Luo said.“基建支出的放量，有效对冲了房地产长周期调整带来的拖累，是推动固投由负转正的决定性力量。”罗志恒指出。As 2026 is the inaugural year of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30),"Local governments have strong incentives to create economic activities in the first year to set the foundation for the next five years of development."2026年作为第十五个五年规划的开局之年，这一加速增长具有更强的导向意义。分析认为，地方政府在五年规划首年普遍存在“抢先抓早”的能动性，意在通过重大项目落地为后续发展筑牢根基。The NBS said that in the first quarter, investment in projects with planned total investment of 100 million yuan or more rose 4.5 percent year-on-year, indicating that large-scale construction is accelerating.国家统计局数据同时显示，一季度计划总投资亿元及以上大项目投资同比增长4.5%，表明大型工程项目正处于加速建设周期。Funding has followed the projects. Luo said fiscal resources were deployed early and aggressively in the first quarter.资金的保障为项目推进提供了坚实支撑。罗志恒表示，一季度财政资源体现出了明显的“靠前发力”特征。Public bond issuance data show that in the first quarter, local governments issued about 3.1 trillion yuan in bonds, an increase of about 9.3 percent from the same period last year. Newly issued special bonds directly tied to infrastructure project construction reached about 1.2 trillion yuan, up about 25 percent year-on-year.债券发行数据印证了这一判断。一季度，各地累计发行地方政府债券约3.1万亿元，较去年同期增长约9.3%。其中，直接用于项目建设的专项债券规模约1.2万亿元，同比增幅高达约25%。The shift is not just about spending more — it is about spending differently, according to analysts.在分析人士看来，此轮发力不仅体现在投入总量的增加，更体现在投向结构的优化。While traditional rail, road and airport projects remain important, new infrastructure areas including computing centers, 5G and 6G networks, electric vehicle charging piles, and low-altitude flight infrastructure are becoming the new growth drivers, said Wen Bin, chief economist at China Minsheng Bank.中国民生银行首席经济学家温彬认为，在传统“铁公基”项目保持稳定投入的同时，算力枢纽、新一代移动通信网络、新能源充电设施及低空经济配套等新基建领域，正加速成长为驱动投资增长的新引擎。"The government is using infrastructure investment not just to stabilize growth in the short term, but to shape China's transition to a digital, green and innovation-driven economy for the future," Wen said.“当前的基础设施投资已超越单纯的短期逆周期调节功能，更多承载着推动经济向数字化、绿色化、创新驱动转型的长远战略意图。”温彬称。Entering the second quarter, with the peak of project launches coming to an end and special bond issuances normalizing, Luo cautioned that infrastructure growth may slow marginally.展望二季度，随着项目集中开工潮逐步退去，加之专项债发行节奏趋于常态化，罗志恒提醒，基建投资增速或有边际放缓的可能。"Local governments face a dual squeeze from debt servicing and falling land income. Whether infrastructure can continue to play its role as a ballast for investment will depend on policy support from the central level."“现阶段地方政府面临化债支出与土地出让金下滑的双重压力。未来基建能否持续发挥‘压舱石'作用，将在很大程度上取决于中央层面转移支付及增量政策的接续支持力度。”property sector /ˈprɒpəti ˈsektə(r)/房地产行业 halt the investment downturn /hɔːlt ðə ɪnˈvestmənt ˈdaʊntɜːn/遏制投资下滑 divergence /daɪˈvɜːdʒəns/分化；背离 plunge /plʌndʒ/暴跌；骤降 turnaround /ˈtɜːnəraʊnd/扭转；好转 inaugural year /ɪˈnɔːɡjərəl jɪə(r)/开局之年 public bond /ˈpʌblɪk bɒnd/政府债券；公债 ballast /ˈbæləst/压舱石；稳定器

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the first battle of Changsha. From Chongqing, Chiang debated defensive strategies for Hunan, ultimately adopting Plan B after Xue Yue's pleas, focusing on successive resistance north of Changsha to thwart Japanese advances. Japanese forces, under Okamura Yasuji, launched assaults in Jiangxi and Hunan. In Jiangxi, the 106th and 101st Divisions attacked Huibu and Gao'an, where Chinese troops under Luo Zhuoying and Song Kentang fiercely resisted. Gao'an fell briefly but was recaptured by the 32nd Army and the elite 74th Army, with heavy casualties on both sides, as recounted by soldier Liu Qihuai. In Hunan, Japanese units crossed the Xin Qiang River and landed at Yingtian, facing brutal opposition. At Bijia Mountain, Qin Yizhi's 195th Division held for four days; Battalion Commander Shi Enhua's reinforced unit perished entirely, their fragmented remains mourned by locals. Along the Miluo River, Chen Pei's 37th Army fortified positions, repelling waves of Japanese attacks, including suicide squads disguised as civilians. Recruit Yang Peyao's unit endured bombardments, inflicting significant enemy losses before withdrawing at dusk.   #197 The First Battle of Changsha Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Major Luo Wenlang, battalion commander of the 3rd Battalion, 55th Regiment, 19th Division of the 28th Army, harbored a peculiar quirk: he couldn't sleep soundly without unwrapping his leg bindings, a small ritual that anchored him in the chaos of war. Since the war's eruption, such luxuries were rare, and unwrapping his bindings every night became an impossibility, leaving him to endure restless slumbers. Tonight, however, sleep eluded him entirely; he tossed and turned on his makeshift bed, his mind a whirlwind of unrest. Two days after the northern Hunan battle ignited like a powder keg, the 55th Regiment received urgent orders from Division Commander Tang Boyin to race to Wukou in Pingjiang County. Their path wound through Luo Wenlang's hometown of Fulinpu, a twist of fate that stirred conflicting emotions. Entering the village under the cover of night, the entire battalion encamped in the commander's modest family village, with battalion headquarters naturally established in his ancestral home.   Luo yearned to step across that familiar threshold but dreaded it, for his parents remained oblivious to a devastating truth. They slaughtered chickens and prepared meat, hosting the battalion staff with drinks and hospitality, after all, this was their son's unit gracing their home. Luo orchestrated door planks and straw for bedding, posted sentries, and deftly evaded his parents until they retired. Before dawn broke, he mustered the troops, ensured they were fed, and led them onward, slipping away like a shadow. By noon on the 22nd, they reached Wukou, only to receive fresh directives: rush to Yingtian to bolster the 95th Division against the enemy's audacious landings. The 3rd Battalion spearheaded the division's reinforcements, marching relentlessly through day and night, arriving at Dongtang, over 30 kilometers southeast of Yingtian—on the 23rd, hearts sinking upon learning Yingtian had already fallen into enemy clutches.   Luo Wenlang sought out the retreating 95th Division Commander Luo Qi to beg for a mission, his resolve unyielding. Luo Qi, anticipating his arrival, relayed Commander Guan Linzheng's ironclad instructions: The 19th Division's reinforcements would assume Dongtang's defenses. With the main force still en route, Luo Qi tasked Luo's battalion with relieving a segment held by a replacement regiment. He handed over a map, sketching a line with a pencil, a simple stroke that thrust Luo Wenlang and his men onto the front lines of fate. An operations staff was dispatched to guide them to the position and oversee the handover.   As the troops advanced, they encountered scattered soldiers fleeing like startled rabbits; seizing a platoon leader revealed they were indeed from the replacement regiment. Mere minutes from division HQ, the enemy was already closing in, a predator's breath hot on their necks. Luo Wenlang and Deputy Battalion Commander Wu Yacui split the battalion, launching a counterattack on Dongtang from dual routes. Fortune favored them; the Japanese held only an exhausted company, crumbling under a single, ferocious charge. They swiftly deployed two companies to the positions, reserving one as a bulwark. By dusk, the full 55th Regiment arrived, accompanied by the rest of the 19th Division's reinforcements, allowing the battered 95th Division, ravaged at Yingtian, to withdraw for desperate reorganization. The regimental commander positioned Luo's 3rd Battalion on the regiment's vulnerable left wing. In the blink of an eye, it was the 27th, aligning with the 15th of the eighth lunar month. Amid the relentless great battle, few noted the calendar, and the skies hung heavy with clouds. Luo Wenlang twisted on his straw bed, his thoughts a snarled knot of anxiety and memory.   At 11 p.m., gunfire shattered the night; a barrage of machine gun bullets riddled the battalion HQ house, raining thatch and dust upon Luo like fallout from a storm. Catastrophe had struck! Luo surged toward the positions with the bugler—his battalion signal chief—and the reserve force, ascending the hilltop in a frenzy. Halfway up, he spotted 8th Company's Lieutenant Platoon Leader Rong Fayu leading over 20 soldiers in retreat. Bellowing "Why unauthorized retreat?" while brandishing his pistol, he compelled Rong to rally and turn back. The Japanese had launched a nocturnal assault; 8th Company Commander Yi Zuitao lay slain by a fatal shot, over a dozen comrades felled in brutal close combat, the survivors scattered like leaves in the wind; the high ground now belonged to the enemy.   Upon learning of Dongtang's loss, the regimental commander personally led the regimental reserve, his face etched with urgency. Under flickering lantern light, poring over the map with Luo, Division Commander Tang Boyin telephoned, his voice a whipcrack of command: Recapture it before dawn, or both would face the merciless hand of military justice. After seizing the high ground, the enemy hesitated to press further; Luo surmised the darkness concealed paths, and their numbers were not overwhelming. Forgoing the regimental reserve, he led 7th Company's 4 squads and remnants of the routed 8th Company in a stealthy ascent. Near the position, a ravine concealed over 20 8th Company soldiers, rallied by Sergeant Squad Leader Tan Tianrong, who had lurked in wait for reinforcements, dreading exposure at dawn under the enemy's gaze.   Spotting the battalion commander personally spearheading the counterattack, Tan Tianrong's face lit with fierce joy; his men, armed with grenades, surged as the vanguard. Intimate with the terrain even in blindness, they hurled explosives into bunkers, trenches, and works. The commander orchestrated the charge; the Japanese force of 40-50 men crumbled, over half slain or maimed, the remnants fleeing northward to their village stronghold. It was past 4 a.m.; the moon pierced the clouds, bathing the earth in a silvery glow. With positions reclaimed, the night revealed its secret: tonight was Mid-Autumn. Moonlight unraveled the tangled threads of his past; Luo draped his clothes over his shoulders, sat beneath the luminous orb, and wept in solitary anguish.   Before the war, devastating news had arrived: his brother Luo Yinong had been killed in Jiangxi. Luo had three brothers; the eldest shouldered half the family's burdens, their bond unbreakable. The brother had enlisted first in the 50th Army, climbing to battalion commander through sheer valor. He and his younger brother had followed suit, inspired by that call to arms.   Wartime conscription demanded only one per family, but battling the devils was a duty for the nation and its people. His brother had risen to deputy regimental commander before his end. The 50th Army notified him first. Engulfed in battle, there had been no time to console his grieving parents or tend to the funeral; it weighed on his heart like an unyielding stone. His sister-in-law, diligent and unassuming, cared for a young boy and carried another child; the long, arduous days ahead loomed like an endless shadow. The night dew brought a biting chill, the moon an icy sentinel; Luo shivered uncontrollably, his tears mingling with the frost.   The sky hung heavy with overcast gloom, yet the moon lurked beyond the clouds, casting a faint, ethereal light that warded off utter darkness. Along the road, a unit's elongated black shadow snaked southward in hurried silence, a serpent of weary resolve pressing through the night. Qin Yizhi reined in his horse, pausing to gaze back: the queue stretched onward, silent and impeccably orderly, belying the exhaustion of a force scarred by days of ferocious combat, their spirits unbroken amid the shadows. After the Japanese seized the 195th Division's defiant outpost at Bijia Mountain, they surged across the Xin Qiang River in a merciless onslaught. The river, shallow enough to wade knee-deep, offered no true impediment; the real barrier was forged from the defenders' scorching blood, a crimson testament to their unyielding stand. The 195th Division clashed in a maelstrom of cruelty; positions were heaped with corpses time and again, the Xin Qiang's waters churning blood-red in relentless cycles of carnage. From the night of the 23rd to the dawn of the 25th, respite was a forgotten dream; Okamura Yasuji, in a gesture of grim respect, inscribed Qin's name in elegant calligraphy and hung it within his command tent, a haunting trophy of the foe's tenacity.   Following their triumphant landing at Yingtian, the Japanese entangled the Ninth War Zone's left-wing defenders in a protracted snare, their advances grinding slowly like a predator toying with prey, menacing the flanks of the frontal troops with insidious intent. On the evening of the 27th, Xue Yue issued the fateful order for the 15th Army Group to withdraw to the precarious ground between the Miluo River and Shangshan City, ushering this blood-soaked force into an all-night march toward the next defensive crucible. Late into the night, a brief halt was called. Soldiers slumped to the ground, adjusting leg wraps and gear with mechanical precision; logistics teams darted through the ranks, distributing rations like lifelines; cooks, having forged ahead, arrived with steaming pots of rice soup, infusing the air with a rare warmth. Though no clamor broke the hush, a quiet camaraderie enveloped the queue, a fleeting balm against the war's chill.   The division staff claimed a flat expanse beside a farmhouse yard for their respite. Qin settled onto a stone roller used for grinding grain, nibbling at his meager ration and sipping the hot soup that steamed in the cool air. Suddenly, moonlight pierced the clouds, cascading down in silvery streams; the familiar contours of the farmhouse stirred a flood of warmth in his heart, evoking memories of home.   Chongqing, Huangshan Villa. Every window was shrouded in double layers of thick curtains, sealing out any sliver of betraying light, as if the very walls conspired to guard secrets from the encroaching night. Tonight's ethereal protagonist rose languidly from the eastern valley, its orange-red moonlight casting an aura of drowsy reluctance, as though it had not fully shaken off the slumber of the day. The feeble glow dappled the building's roof, balcony, and the surrounding hillsides, intersections, and thickets, where armed shadows lurked, capturing every rustle in the oppressive silence. Only upon close inspection could one discern the faint specks of moonlight glinting off steel helmets. Yet, beyond those fortified walls, another realm pulsed with life, a vibrant contrast to the shadowed vigilance outside. The front hall, living room, and dining room blazed with brilliant light. Vibrant flowers, dominated by chrysanthemums in full, defiant bloom, infused the air with color and fragrance; a phonograph murmured a cheerful Guangdong melody, weaving an atmosphere thick with festive joy, a deliberate illusion amid the storm of war.   Chiang Kai-shek, clad in a flowing black silk gown, strode ahead with poised grace, escorting his guests into the dining room alongside the elegantly attired Soong May-ling, their conversation laced with laughter and warmth. At the table, Soong May-ling's smile was a beacon of diplomacy, as she artfully arranged the seating to suit hierarchies and alliances, while servers in crisp white uniforms moved with nimble precision. This was Chiang Kai-shek's intimate Mid-Autumn family banquet; beyond a handful of pivotal military and political figures, the gathering brimmed with relatives. Guests and kin alike noted Chiang's buoyant spirits tonight; his smiles were wide and genuine, his discourse light and expansive, delving into casual topics with uncharacteristic ease.   In September 1939, China's War of Resistance Against Japan had entered its grueling third year. After the initial cataclysm of turmoil and disarray, the government and military had clawed their way to stability, adapting to this unprecedented historical crucible, with operations finally aligning into a semblance of order. According to figures proclaimed by Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin to Chinese and foreign reporters on the 13th of this month, Japanese invaders had seized 521 counties across 12 provinces, a vast swath of conquest. Yet, the Japanese imperialists had exacted this toll at a staggering cost. Just prior, on August 30, the Hirannuma Cabinet, installed a mere eight months earlier, had collapsed in mass resignation. Hirannuma Kiichiro's predecessor, Konoe Fumimaro, had similarly bowed out amid governmental failures, chiefly the unmet ambitions in the Sino-Japanese War that he had boldly promised to parliament, exacerbating domestic political and economic woes. Days ago, when Wang Pengsheng briefed Chiang on Japan's turbulent politics, he quipped: "Konoe said three months to destroy China; three months didn't work, nor three years, who knows about 30 or 300. Hirannuma had no solutions, down in eight months. Does Abe have good ideas? How long can he be prime minister?" Indeed, Abe Nobuyuki, Hirannuma's successor, would endure a mere four and a half months before resigning in ignominy. Tonight's feast showcased Chiang's favored cuisines: delicate Jiangsu-Zhejiang dishes mingled with robust Sichuan flavors. Chiang abstained from alcohol, raising his cup in mere symbolic toasts to his guests. During the meal, as if by unspoken accord, no one broached the raging domestic battles or the volatile international landscape; conversations meandered through trivialities, skirting anything heavy or discordant, a fragile bubble of normalcy.   On September 3, Britain and France had declared war on Germany, shattering the global order in a seismic shift. Foreign newspapers already bandied the term "Second World War," a phrase that evoked freshness, exhilaration, and sheer terror in equal measure. China's diplomacy surged with newfound vigor. In April, Ambassador to the US Wang Zhengting had negotiated a $20 million loan with American banks on China's behalf. In May, Stalin responded to Chiang's overtures, agreeing to exchange arms for Chinese tea, wool, raw hides, and more. A month later, the first consignment of light and heavy weapons—including artillery and heavy machine guns—arrived via clandestine routes through Xinjiang and Mongolia, bolstering the central army's frontlines. In August, Hu Shih, Wellington Koo, and Chien Tai represented the Nationalist Government at the 19th League of Nations Assembly, laying bare the Japanese imperialists' atrocities in China before the world and rallying global forces for peace to support China's defiant stand. Soon after, British and American civic groups ignited "China Week" campaigns, pressing their governments to aid the beleaguered nation. Waves of foreign volunteers streamed in from distant shores: doctors, journalists, ordnance engineers, even retired soldiers clamoring to join the fray on the frontlines.   "If we could pull America into this war..." Through Soong May-ling's subtle, persuasive influence, Chiang allowed himself to daydream of that prosperous, dynamic young powerhouse across the vast ocean. Thus, on this Mid-Autumn night, his talk turned to America, to his correspondence with President Roosevelt regarding the "tung oil loan." That saga had unfolded the previous October; T.V. Soong had jetted to America, securing a loan with China's tung oil, a commodity scarce in the US, as collateral. China had boldly requested $400 million; America countered with $25 million, a classic tale of "ask high, settle low." Yet, the funds were secured. One success paved the way for many. Soong May-ling had once confided to Chiang: "In mobilizing US aid for China's resistance, I'll make a difference." When Chiang responded with a smile, "Thank you, Madam," he could scarcely foresee how his beautiful wife's extraordinary prowess in fulfilling this solemn vow would astonish him, etching eternal glory for Chinese women worldwide and elevating Soong May-ling to the zenith of her life's achievements.   The most direct echo of the First Battle of Changsha's thunderous saga resides in the Ninth War Zone's meticulous report on the northern Hunan and southern Hubei operations, submitted to the Chongqing Military Committee and Chiang Kai-shek himself, a faded relic now entombed amid the vast ocean of Nationalist Government military and political archives in Nanjing's Second Historical Archives of China. This document, a painstaking compilation of combat dispatches from divisions, armies, and army groups, stands as a testament to valor and sacrifice. Tragically, time's relentless march and human folly have ravaged this priceless artifact, leaving only shards and whispers to conjure the heart-wrenching inferno of that bloody clash.   "October 24, Year 28. Urgent. To Chongqing. Chairman Chiang. Secret. Submitted by Commander Xue on orders." The rice paper has yellowed to a deep, somber hue, brittle and parched; a careless touch could reduce it to dust. Some pages lie fractured, their remnants affixed to white paper, forever unable to reclaim their original wholeness. Leafing through page by page unleashes a pungent miasma, a scorched, acrid, decayed blend that assaults the senses. Traces of fire and water mar the original rice paper sheets, with countless fragments glued haphazardly to white backings, their sequences lost to eternity.   "...The Xin Qiang River spanning from Lujiao to Leishi Mountain, defending a front of over 110 li..." "Enemy 13th and 33rd Divisions, parts of the Hata Detachment, naval units, and artillery, cavalry, engineers totaling..." "...Began attacking us first with artillery... fortifications completely destroyed, then infantry charged; relying on our officers and men all resolved to coexist with the homeland..." "...And launched balloons to direct artillery... our army braved the cannons... repelled them, corpses filling the river, turning the water red..." "Division casualties also reached over a thousand... failed to inflict greater strikes and annihilate... deep inner guilt, besides vigorously training troops awaiting orders to kill the enemy..." "...Attack casualties heavy, then concentrated large forces... artillery fire so dense like continuous firecrackers for hours... released poison gas, Wang Street garrison all heroically sacrificed, then breached... Zhao Gongwu kowtows, October 15"   Zhao Gongwu commanded the 2nd Division under Zhang Yaoming's 52nd Army. This unit first held the line along the Xin Qiang River, then fell back to northeast of Fengjiang Bridge to staunch the enemy tide once more; after October 6, it hammered southward-marching Japanese from the west in the Yanglin Street and Dajing Street regions. Through these crucibles, the division bled over half its strength. A fragment of an envelope clings to a sheet of white paper, its words faintly visible: "Changsha 126-3 Zhang Yaoming," "Hunan Jinjing Air Mail," "Combat Process by..." and the like. The stamp remains remarkably intact—a philatelic gem now. Measuring 1.5 cm square, it features Sun Yat-sen's portrait at its center, inscribed "Republic of China Post" below, with "5" in the upper right, "fen" to the left, and "5" in each lower corner. I sat at the long table in the spacious, brightly lit reading room, staring vacantly, my thoughts grinding to a halt. These remnants are all that endure for posterity, of that monumental battle, of the scorching blood and vanished lives of countless unnamed Chinese soldiers. With hands that once gripped a rifle, I gently caressed those pages from a bygone era; they were cold, devoid of any lingering breath.   As the full moon of the 15th of the eighth month dissolved into the golden-red blaze of sunrise, Qin Yizhi's 195th Division had already plunged into the rugged mountains and dense forests encircling Fulinpu. Per directives from 15th Army Group Commander Guan Linzheng, the 195th was to forge a new defensive bastion centered on Fulinpu, 40 to 70 kilometers from Changsha. Their mandate: stall the Japanese southward juggernaut, granting precious time for allied forces to muster and fortify around the city. Despite the grueling all-night march, morale soared undimmed. The advance chief of staff doled out positions to each regiment, and the troops dove into fortification labors with fervent zeal. The 195th Division's unyielding stand along the Xin Qiang River had already etched preliminary glory upon this unit in its baptism of fire. "Fame in one battle" echoed as a battle cry throughout the division, where collective honor intertwined with personal valor. Honor and triumph formed the bedrock for soldiers and armies alike. Yet, another fire fueled their resolve.   On September 23, amid the Japanese forcing the Xin Qiang River, Guan Linzheng's voice crackled over the phone to Qin Yizhi: "Facing you is the 6th Division." The 6th Division, a name that ignited fury in Chinese troops and civilians, forever linked to the demonic specter of Tani Hisao. Moments later, the whisper spread like wildfire through every trench: "The Japanese army that perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre is right in front." Agitation rippled through the ranks; some donned fresh uniforms and shoes from their packs, casting aside the worn; others flouted discipline to bid farewells to hometown comrades: "Today we fight to the death here; see you in the next life." "Tell my mother I died fighting the Nanjing Massacre enemies."   Some company commanders commanded their mess sergeants to expend all funds on hearty feasts. All Japanese were foes, but the 6th Division embodied a blood debt, an unforgivable vendetta; the Chinese nation does not lightly forget its tormentors. In the Xin Qiang River maelstrom, the 195th Division battled with heroic ferocity. Some soldiers, in their final breaths, murmured: "Die then; it's worth it." Others lamented slaying too few devils, gritting teeth, eyes refusing to close in eternal regret. Now under Inaba Shiro's command, the 6th Division splintered southward after breaching the Xin Qiang; roughly a thousand hounded the 195th to Fulinpu. On the morning of September 29, the Japanese blundered into the 195th's meticulously laid ambush. Qin Yizhi, pulse racing with excitement and tension, fumbled the binoculars from his guard's hand. His command sliced the air: "Begin." War history chronicles: "The 6th Division advanced south from the Miluo River along the Xinshi-Liqiao road and Xinshi-Fulinpu routes. The over a thousand reaching Fulinpu were ambushed by the Nationalist 195th Division, suffering heavy losses." As Japanese artillery and aircraft unleashed hell upon the 195th's positions, Qin orchestrated a swift southward withdrawal to the environs of Shangshan City. Again, without pause, they erected fortifications and set deadly traps.   On the morning of September 30, the pursuers from Fulinpu closed in on Shangshan, their numbers swollen to over 1,500. Qin Yizhi clenched his jaw, his demeanor icy calm, allowing the Japanese to creep into the kill zone before barking: "Hit them hard!" Combat raged from dawn to dusk, obliterating over 700 foes. Qin ascended a hill, surveying through binoculars, then erupted: "Bad! The enemy is retreating." Upon receiving Qin's telegram, Guan Linzheng scrutinized the map, momentarily stunned, then replied: "Enemy shows no retreat signs yet; proceed per original plan. Your unit to block at Shangshan City line until October 2." Xianning, Okamura Yasuji's 11th Army HQ.   Combat maps bristled with markings, staff officers darting amid ringing phones and clattering telegrams. The colossal red arrow in northern Hunan had fractured into tributaries, surging over 100 km southward from the outset; one tendril pierced to Yong'an City, a mere 30 km from Changsha. Vast swaths of northern Hunan lay conquered, yet Okamura sensed the tide turning, it was time to retreat. The Chinese employed their time-honored gradual resistance, battling while retreating with cunning grace. Some units fell back directly, others amassed on flanks—what portent did that hold? In Okamura's shrewd mind loomed an equally shrewd Xue Yue; he envisioned his adversary methodically weaving a snare.   Post-Yingtian landing, the 15th Army Group's timely evasion had unraveled his "Xiang-Gan Operation Plan" like fragile thread. If encircling and annihilating the Chinese main force proved unattainable, what purpose in pressing onward? Telegrams from 3rd Division's Fujita Susumu, 6th's Inaba Shiro, and 13th's Tanaka Seiichi piled on his desk, pleading to assault Changsha—for headlines and Imperial accolades, perhaps, but blind to their exposed supply lines vulnerable to enemy thrusts? Ground logistics teetered on collapse; the air force resorted to airdrops for isolated regiments. Venturing further south would stretch lines to breaking; a severed artery spelled doom for the vanguard. When would these commanders mature into true stewards of the Imperial Army? Okamura fretted and pitied them in equal measure.   At 4 p.m. on September 30, Okamura decreed a halt to advances at Shangshan and Yong'an. He commenced orchestrating the retreat. Changsha, Yuelu Mountain, Ninth War Zone Command Forward HQ. October 1. Xue Yue stood before the map, Guan's latest telegram clutched in hand. Qin's second missive insisted on Japanese withdrawal, corroborated by 15th Army Group scouts from Yingtian: This morning (October 1), Japanese transports unloaded artillery stowed the previous night, hauling it back to Yueyang; intercepted wires revealed a regiment aborting its southward push, standing idle. Guan assessed the mosaic and commanded counteroffensives: intercept if feasible, pursue relentlessly, deny the Japanese escape; he relayed retreat indicators to Xue. Xue paced the chamber, head bowed in contemplation. Chief of Staff Wu Yizhi, Staff Director Zhao Zili, and their cadre tracked his every step with expectant eyes, awaiting the verdict. Xue's thoughts whirled through military stratagems and beyond.   Pre-war, Xue had segmented the war zone's forces into tripartite blocs: Northern Hunan under Guan Linzheng's 15th, Yang Sen's 27th, and Shang Zhen's 20th Army Groups as "A Cluster"; Northern Jiangxi Nanchang with Yunnan Army Lu Han's 1st Army Group and the 74th Army as "B Cluster"; the Wuning, Xiushui, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border guarded by Sichuan Army Wang Lingji's 30th Army Corps, Fan Songpu's Border Advance Army, and 8th Army; augmented by 3 armies' 7 divisions in general reserve. Before the storm broke, Xue pored over maps, tracing every mountain, river, road, and bridge, envisioning burial grounds for the invaders.   Now, beneath Changsha, 200,000 troops formed a tightening net. The "decisive battle in Changsha suburbs" blueprint had been wired to Chongqing. Chiang and the nation yearned for a resounding triumph as the resistance pivoted into a new epoch?! A masterful drama, honed over half a month's toil, neared its crescendo; yet that cunning fox appeared to sniff the trap's metallic tang, freezing in place. "Commander, phone from Minister Chen." "Brother Boling, good news." Chen Cheng's voice brimmed with levity, "Your formal appointment published. What? Ninth War Zone Commander! First to congratulate; document tomorrow." Shedding the "acting" prefix was inevitable; Chiang had intimated as much long ago. But for a man and general, true worth lay not in titles, but in forging indelible feats. Splendor was judged not by underlings, colleagues, or superiors, but by peers in the craft of war.   Unmoved by the promotion, Xue exhaled a profound sigh. Though the 15th's intelligence couldn't confirm a wholesale retreat, preparations for dual contingencies were imperative. Victories came hard; a splendid battle, harder still. He summoned Wu Yizhi and Zhao Zili to devise countermeasures for the enemy's potential flight. October 2, Sichuan Army Yang Sen's 27th Army Group, Yang Gancai's 134th Division special service company, under Company Commander Wan Mingyu, slogged through the profound mountains and forests on the northern Mufu Mountains' flanks. The 134th's covert mandate: infiltrate enemy rear via treacherous terrain, sabotage supply arteries in the Chongyang-Xianning sector, and deliver a dagger to the Japanese spine when opportunity struck, bolstering frontal defenses.   Past 3 p.m., a crystalline mountain stream materialized. Wan decreed a respite. Over 100 soldiers, drained from a half-day's ascent, collapsed like puppets with severed strings. Most propped their torsos with rifles in one hand, fanning hats to ward off the relentless forest mosquitoes with the other. Regaining breath, they devoured rations washed down with stream water. Some unfurled towels and ventured downstream, letting the cool flow rinse away layers of sweat. Then, a muted engine drone encroached from the heavens. Wan peered through the foliage: a low-flying plane vectored southward, its wings emblazoned with the Rising Sun.   A transport; Wan recognized the temporary Japanese airfield near Xianning. With lines overextended, airdrops sustained isolated units. Wan was prying open a can with his bayonet, the tip etching a cross on the lid before levering along the edge; paired with a rice ball, it promised a savory repast. His orderly proffered a cup of fresh stream water; 2nd Platoon Leader Hu Yaozong perched nearby on a rock, smirking, poised to pilfer from the opened tin. Wan warded off this Sichuan Pixian compatriot. The plane droned overhead then.   Both glanced skyward; the platoon quipped: "Open quick, damn, I'll repay two cans later." Commander: "Want cans? Sky has; shoot plane down, enough for two lifetimes, bloat your mother-in-law first." The can hailed from a prior supply raid. Platoon: "You want me to shoot the plane?" Commander: "Bastard! You shooting or not?" The platoon snatched the light machine gun from a tree fork, jamming the butt against his belly, one hand on the grip, aiming crudely: "Come down, you turtle son!" The other hand squeezed the trigger. Wan assumed jest, resuming his task. "Da-da-da..." Wan jolted; the half-opened can tumbled to his feet, spilling Japanese fish onto Chinese soil. Recoil floored the platoon; he hurled the gun like a branding iron, face ashen. Inspecting the trigger, he snarled: "Whose damn fault, why no safety?!" The gunner dashed over; tall and even-tempered: "Safety was on; how'd it fire without pulling?" Wan's initial panic: "Damn! Position exposed."   The company spearheaded the division's reinforced regiment to raze a recent Japanese depot, guarded by a mere company—but exposure doomed the regiment deep in hostile territory. The assault had been plotted for days; pre-departure, Yang Gancai had toasted them. Wan had sworn a blood oath: No return to Sichuan without success. Hu had jested then: "No Sichuan return means wanting Hunan girl as concubine." Banter was fine in peace, but in war's grip, this was no trifling errand. Wan unleashed a torrent of curses, rising to survey the environs. The main force lagged 15 km behind; advance or abort post-blunder? Enemy rear was a labyrinth; this isolated band teetered on a razor's edge. As if to compel a choice, the radio operator approached; Wan itched to lash out. In his fury and indecision, a miracle unfolded.   The transport's engines hacked like a consumptive invalid, then a witness spied the plane banking left, plummeting, its nose inexorably toward a colossal rock 3-4 km distant. It rebounded twice on the stone, nose and left wing crumpling; the fuselage, fragile as parchment, tumbled gently, skewing onto the slope amid splintered trees. Wan gaped, then bellowed: "Assemble!" The men snapped from reverie, charging downhill in a frenzied cascade. One hour later, 134th Deputy Commander and Reinforced Regiment Commander Liu decoded Wan's vanguard transmission via radio. Another hour passed before Liu received Yang Gancai's directive: Abort Mountain Leopard operation; return with documents expeditiously. One day hence, October 3, Okamura Yasuji's original retreat order from October 2 dawn, addressed to northern Hunan's 6th, 33rd Divisions, Nara and Uemura Detachments, plus its Chinese translation, landed on Xue Yue's desk.   Fifteen days later, at the Changsha Victory Celebration, unit accolades were proclaimed; for "shooting down enemy plane, obtaining vital enemy documents," meritorious honors went to 134th Commander Yang Gancai and Deputy Liu. Each received 1000 yuan and one 3rd Class Baoding Medal. Okamura's October 2 order original: Chinese forces retreated to Miluo and Xiushui Rivers banks assembling; to avoid disadvantage, this army should quickly withdraw to original positions, restore combat strength.   Withdrawal plan as follows: … Xue's October 3 order original:   "Northern Hunan frontal units with current posture immediately pursue facing enemy fiercely, must capture in Chongyang-Yueyang south area. ... Pursuit units may detach part to monitor and sweep enemy collection troops; main force execute overtaking pursuit... Already deep behind enemy advance units vigorously destroy enemy transport lines, cut escape routes."   From October 3, Chinese forces unleashed ferocious counteroffensives against the Japanese on three fronts: northern Hunan, southern Hubei, and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border; the invaders receded like a vanishing tide, never to reclaim their ground. The 25th and 195th Divisions hounded the 6th Division and Nara Detachment from Fulinpu back to the Miluo River, then to the Xin Qiang River. On October 8, the Japanese fled across the Xin Qiang; the 195th's 566th Brigade surged in pursuit, launching a nocturnal raid on Xitang-Jianshan. Gains were modest, but the enemy, entrenched in their den, resisted with feral tenacity. Qin commanded the brigade's withdrawal southward; northern Hunan operations concluded.   In southern Hubei, the 79th Army chased remnants of the 33rd Division from Sanyan Bridge to Pingjiang, across Nanjiang Bridge, hounding them back to their Tongcheng lair. On the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border, 30th Army Group Commander Wang Lingji orchestrated a pincer against Japanese at Xiushui. The foes retreated to Sandu, mounting a stubborn defense. Chinese assaults faltered for three days; on the fourth night's blitz, victory crowned their efforts, expelling the invaders to their original Wuning stronghold. With both armies reclaiming pre-war lines, the First Battle of Changsha drew to its resounding close.   Over days, Xue Yue received a deluge of congratulatory telegrams and letters from the Nationalist Government, Military Committee, National Assembly, myriad civic groups, party officials, and social luminaries. As hoped, among them was Chiang Kai-shek's effusive missive, brimming with joy. For Xue Yue, this one sufficed. Chiang Kai-shek's telegram to Xue Yue:   "In this northern Hunan campaign, over half the enemy was annihilated. The triumphant news has invigorated the nation, all due to effective command and soldiers' valor; I commend without reservation. Thoroughly investigate and report meritorious personnel from this battle; also report the dead and wounded for awards and relief. With this initial victory foundation laid, our officers and men's responsibilities grow heavier; urge your subordinates to extra vigilance, redoubled effort, avoiding arrogance or complacency, to amass great achievements, my deepest hopes."   As if countering Chongqing's high-powered broadcasts, Japanese radios in Wuhan, Nanjing, Beiping, and Manchukuo blared at full volume: "In this Xiang-Gan operation, valiant Imperial forces penetrated over 100 km into northern Hunan, sweeping anti-peace elements, routing Chinese central main forces, inflicting over 40,000 enemy casualties, a pivotal triumph advancing the holy war. Having achieved objectives, Imperial troops have victoriously withdrawn..."   In the aftermath of the First Battle of Changsha, the Japanese high command spun a tale of calculated restraint, insisting their assault was merely a spoiling raid, a calculated jab never intended to seize and hold the city indefinitely. With brazen confidence, they downplayed their toll, claiming a mere 850 souls lost to death and 2,700 wounded in the fray, while boastfully asserting they had slain 44,000 Chinese defenders and taken 4,000 captive, painting a picture of overwhelming triumph amid the smoke and ruin. Yet, foreign military observers, peering through the fog of propaganda with detached scrutiny, painted a starkly different canvas. They gauged Chinese losses at a far more tempered 20,000 killed and wounded, a heavy but bearable scar on the nation's resolve, while estimating Japanese casualties soared to around 30,000, a grievous hemorrhage that belied the invaders' claims of minimal sacrifice. Military historian Michael Clodfelter, sifting through the annals of conflict, ventured an even grimmer tally: a staggering 50,000 Japanese casualties endured in the relentless clash, a testament to the ferocity of Chinese resistance and the high price of imperial ambition. In the battle's locale, neither side claimed clear victory, but globally for the resistance, it favored China. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The First Battle of Changsha unfolded in September 1939 during China's War of Resistance Against Japan. Japanese forces under Okamura Yasuji advanced into Hunan and Jiangxi, crossing rivers and capturing key positions like Yingtian amid fierce Chinese defenses led by Xue Yue. 

Application pour EV0360 : https://hlperformance.caRéférences :Bellisle, F. (2003). Why should we study human food intake behaviour? *Nutrition, Metabolism and Cardiovascular Diseases*, *13*(4), 189–193. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0939-4753(03)00063-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0939-4753(03)00063-7)Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction. (2023). *Canada's guidance on alcohol and health*. CCSA. https://www.ccsa.ca/canadas-guidance-alcohol-and-healthDing, D., Nguyen, B., Nau, T., Luo, M., Del Pozo Cruz, B., Dempsey, P. C., Munn, Z., Jefferis, B. J., Sherrington, C., Calleja, E. A., Hau Chong, K., Davis, R., Francois, M. E., Tiedemann, A., Biddle, S. J. H., Okely, A., Bauman, A., Ekelund, U., Clare, P., & Owen, K. (2025). Daily steps and health outcomes in adults: A systematic review and dose-response meta-analysis. *The Lancet Public Health*, *10*(8), e668–e681. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(25)00164-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(25)00164-1)Hall, K. D., & Guo, J. (2017). Obesity energetics: Body weight regulation and the effects of diet composition. *Gastroenterology*, *152*(7), 1718–1727. https://doi.org/10.1053/j.gastro.2017.01.052Hall, K. D., Ayuketah, A., Brychta, R., Cai, H., Cassimatis, T., Chen, K. Y., … & Walter, P. J. (2019). Ultra-processed diets cause excess calorie intake and weight gain: An inpatient randomized controlled trial. *Cell Metabolism*, *30*(1), 67–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmet.2019.05.008Hall, K. D., Sacks, G., Chandramohan, D., Chow, C. C., Wang, Y. C., Gortmaker, S. L., & Swinburn, B. A. (2012). Quantification of the effect of energy imbalance on bodyweight. *The Lancet*, *378*(9793), 826–837. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60812-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60812-X)Mattes, R. D. (2014). Beverages and positive energy balance: The menace is the medium. *International Journal of Obesity*, *38*(S1), S1–S6. https://doi.org/10.1038/ijo.2014.21National Institutes of Health. (s. d.). *NIH Body Weight Planner* [Outil en ligne]. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.niddk.nih.gov/bwpRyan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist*, *55*(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2017). *Self-determination theory: Basic psychological needs in motivation, development, and wellness*. Guilford Press.American College of Sports Medicine. (2022). *ACSM's guidelines for exercise testing and prescription* (11e éd.). Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. *(Position Stand original : 2009)*World Health Organization. (2020). *WHO guidelines on physical activity and sedentary behaviour*. WHO Press. https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240015128

China has urged the United States to rescind its unilateral tariff measures imposed on trading partners, and said it would keep a close eye on any "alternative measures" adopted by Washington to sustain hefty duties, the Ministry of Commerce said on Monday.中国商务部周一表示，中方敦促美方立即取消对贸易伙伴的单边关税措施，并将密切关注美方为维持高额关税而采取的任何"替代措施"。While China remains committed to working with the US for mutual benefit and the stability of the global economy, officials and analysts said that Beijing will take firm countermeasures should Washington take any action that infringes upon its interests.尽管中国致力于与美国合作，实现互利共赢，维护全球经济稳定，但商务部和业内专家表示，如果美国采取任何侵犯中国利益的行动，中方将采取坚定的反制措施。Their comments came after the US Supreme Court scrambled the trade landscape on Friday by striking down sweeping tariffs proposed by US President Donald Trump.上周五，美国最高法院驳回了美国总统特朗普提出的全球关税政策，令贸易格局变得扑朔迷离。However, hours after the ruling, Trump vowed the tariffs would quickly be reimposed in other forms, announcing plans for a new 10 percent "global tariff" under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which he later raised to 15 percent.然而，在裁决出台数小时后，特朗普誓言将以其他形式迅速重新征收关税，并宣布计划根据《1974年贸易法》第122条征收新的10%的"全球关税"，之后他又将这一税率提高至15%。Prior to the US Supreme Court's decision, US tariffs on Chinese imports comprised five layers — 2.5 percent most-favored-nation tariffs, 8.4 percent Section 301 tariffs, 11 percent Section 232 tariffs, 10 percent fentanyl tariffs and 5.1 percent "reciprocal" tariffs — totaling 37 percent, according to calculations by Guosheng Securities, a State-owned enterprise headquartered in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province.据总部位于江西省南昌市的国企国盛证券估算，在美国最高法院做出裁决之前，美国对华关税由五层组成——2.5%的最惠国关税、8.4%的301关税、11%的232关税、10%的芬太尼关税和5.1%的"对等"关税——共计37%。The Supreme Court ruling invalidates the fentanyl tariffs and the "reciprocal" tariffs on China, cutting the baseline rate to 21.9 percent. But the addition of the new 15 percent "global tariff" again pushes up the composite rate to about 28.6 percent, Guosheng Securities noted.国盛证券指出，最高法院的裁决使针对中国的芬太尼关税和"对等"关税失效，基准税率降至21.9%。但新增的15%的"全球关税"再次将综合税率推高至28.6%左右。China is conducting "a comprehensive assessment" of the content and implications of the court ruling, a spokesperson for the Chinese Commerce Ministry said on Monday, stressing that China has consistently opposed all forms of unilateral tariff measures.中国商务部新闻发言人周一表示，中方正在对美国最高法院的判决内容及影响进行全面评估，并强调中方一贯反对各种形式的单边加征关税措施。The spokesperson noted that the US' unilateral actions, including the so-called "reciprocal" tariffs and fentanyl tariffs, not only violate international trade rules but also contravene US domestic law and serve the interests of no party.发言人指出，美方对等关税、芬太尼关税等单边措施既违反国际经贸规则，也违反美国内法，不符合各方利益。"We have also noted that the US is reportedly preparing alternative measures, such as trade investigations, to maintain tariffs on trading partners," the spokesperson said. "China will closely monitor the situation and take firm actions to safeguard its legitimate interests.发言人表示："我们也注意到，美方正在准备采取贸易调查等替代措施，以期维持对贸易伙伴加征的关税，中方将对此保持密切关注并坚定维护中方利益。""Facts have shown that both China and the US stand to benefit from cooperation and lose from confrontation," the spokesperson added.发言人还表示："事实反复证明，中美双方合则两利，斗则俱伤。"Relations between China and the US, after experiencing several ups and downs and multiple rounds of trade talks over the past year, achieved an "overall dynamic stability", as described by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Following the latest trade consultations in Malaysia in October, the two countries agreed to extend their tariff truce for one year.中国外交部长王毅表示，中美关系在过去一年经历波折、展开多轮磋商后，实现了"总体稳定"。今年十月在马来西亚举行的最新一轮贸易磋商后，两国同意将贸易休战期延长一年。Luo Zhiheng, chief economist and head of the research institute at Yuekai Securities, said, "The US still retains relatively high tariffs on China, and its efforts to contain China in high-tech sectors remain unabated."粤开证券首席经济学家、研究院院长罗志恒表示："美国仍然对中国保留了较高的关税，而且遏制中国高科技发展的步伐并未放缓。"Ultimately, the upper hand in future negotiations between China and the US depends on each side's core leverage points — their respective economic resilience and technological strength, Luo added.罗志恒补充道，中美未来博弈的上风，根本上取决于各自的"压舱石"，即经济基本盘和科技实力的较量。For China, the key to mitigating the impact of external uncertainties and securing the initiative in the long-term China-US trade dynamics lies in strengthening its economic fundamentals, enhancing its capacity for independent technological innovation and maintaining strategic resolve amid a complex and evolving international landscape, added Luo, Yuekai Securities' chief economist.罗志恒补充道，对中国来说，应对长期外部不确定性、立于不败之地的关键在于立足国内，夯实经济基本盘、加强科技自立自强，保持战略定力。Xiong Yuan, chief economist at Guosheng Securities, pointed to fundamental constraints that render Section 122 unsuitable as a long-term tariff mechanism. The statute imposes a hard 150-day time limit on any duties imposed, expiring in late July unless extended by an act of the US Congress.国盛证券首席经济学家熊园指出，由于存在根本性的制约因素，第122条不适合作为长期关税机制。根据该法规，任何关税都有严格的150天期限，除非美国国会通过法案延长，否则将于明年7月底到期。The Trump administration's invocation of Section 122 is likely to serve as only an interim measure, with Xiong anticipating a midterm pivot back to the more durable legal frameworks of Sections 301 and 232.熊园认为，特朗普政府援引第122条可能只是一个过渡性举措，预计中期将重新转向更持久的301和232条款的法律框架。Sean Stein, president of the US-China Business Council, said he hopes that future trade talks can move beyond tariffs, tax rates and export controls to explore how the two economies can cooperate more effectively, enabling companies from both countries to better compete and operate in each other's markets.美中贸易全国委员会会长克雷格·艾伦表示，他希望未来的贸易谈判能够超越关税、税率和出口管制，探讨两国经济如何更有效地合作，使两国企业能够在对方市场更好地竞争和运营。"The US and China are the world's two largest, most technologically advanced and most dynamic economies. There are a lot of things that we need to get right on the economic front," Stein said.艾伦说："美国和中国是世界上规模最大、技术最先进、最具活力的两个经济体。在经济方面，我们有很多事情需要处理好。"rescind /rɪˈsɪnd/废除；撤销sustain hefty duties /səˈsteɪn ˈhefti ˈdjuːtiz/维持高额关税infringes upon /ɪnˈfrɪndʒɪz əˈpɒn/侵犯；违背most-favored-nation tariffs /moʊst ˈfeɪvərd ˈneɪʃən ˈtærɪfs/最惠国关税fentanyl tariffs /ˈfentənəl ˈtærɪfs/芬太尼关税reciprocal tariffs /rɪˈsɪprəkəl ˈtærɪfs/对等关税contravene /ˌkɒntrəˈviːn/违反；抵触tariff truce /ˈtærɪf truːs/关税休战interim measure /ˈɪntərɪm ˈmeʒər/ 临时措施

A reupload of a classic history episode in the run up to our book club review of Serve the People! by Yan Lianke.The first of 8 episodes covering the build up, events, and aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which took place in China from 1966 to 1976. In this episode we discuss what the Cultural Revolution was supposed to be, recap its principal causes, discuss the events that led to the declaration of the CR, and cover the formation and expansion of the Red Guards, Mao's children of the Revolution.00:00: Introduction4:23 - What was the Cultural Revolution?15:45 - Events leading up to the Cultural Revolution29:43 - The first stages of the Cultural Revolution37:06 - The formation of the Red Guards43:48 - Those of black class background join the Red Guards46:56 - OutroSome mispronunciations - I found that I mispronounced LUO Ruiqing as LIU Ruiqing, and HAI Rui as HA Rui a few times. My bad, Luo and Hai are the correct terms!Buy bookclub books here            Buy me a coffee Links to everythingSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod

Last time we spoke about the Japanese invasion of Hainan. In early 1939, the Sino-Japanese War shifted from pitched battles to a grueling struggle over lifelines and logistics. Japan pursued a southward strategy (Nanshin-ron), aiming to choke Chinese resistance by isolating key railways and airbases. It seized Hainan in February to secure southern airfields and threaten Indochina routes, then targeted Nanchang to cut the vital Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, crippling Free China's eastern supply lines. The Japanese used a blended-arms approach: concentrated armor, air support, and amphibious and river operations, focusing on rapid, strategic breakthroughs rather than large-scale frontal assaults. China, though battered, relied on a reconstituted defense around Wuhan and Nanchang, with the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue delaying Japanese advances and preserving critical corridors south of the Yangtze. The campaign highlighted the war's broader human and political dimensions: massive casualties, forced labor, and internal political fragility within the Kuomintang, even as both sides sought to outlast the other.   #186 The Battle of Nanchang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. For the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1939 marked a transition from broad occupation tactics to a focused, politically driven military strategy aimed at breaking Nationalist cohesion and isolating key nodes. After the January 11, 1938 Imperial Conference, Tokyo framed the China Conflict as a contest of endurance and political attrition: hold occupied territories as strategic assets, push a narrow operational corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, and treat the broader east-of-line spaces as pacified. The aim was to deny resources to Chiang Kai-shek's regime while awaiting a more opportune political rupture, instead of pursuing indiscriminate conquest. By October 1938, the tactical center of gravity shifted toward Wuhan and the Yangtze corridor. General Headquarters acknowledged the need to adapt to a protracted war: emphasize political strategy alongside combat operations, bolster a new regime in areas under pressure, and gradually erode Chongqing's moral and material resolve. This shift produced a dual track: reinforce a centralized, secure core while permitting peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing.   In early 1939, Japan sought to consolidate gains through layered defenses and strategic war zones, aiming to blunt Chinese mobilization and disrupt critical logistics. The Ninth War Zone, commanded by Xue Yue, formed a defensive umbrella over Nanchang's northern approaches and the surrounding rail-and-river arteries. China's leadership, notably Chiang Kai-shek, pressed for preemption to seize the initiative: an ambitious plan from Xue Yue to strike by March 24, 1939, to prevent a river-crossing Japanese advance and to pin forces before they could entrench. Japan responded with Operation Ren, targeting the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway to sever lines of communication and isolate Nanchang. Okamura Yasuji reorganized heavy weapons into concentrated tank groups, supported by air power, while late-February 1939 movements staged feints and riverine maneuvers to complicate Chinese concentration around Nanchang. The objective was a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to blind the southern airbase network, disrupt the critical rail spine, and push Chinese forces deeper inland, thereby tightening a blockade around southern China. Together, these shifts framed Nanchang not as an isolated objective but as the climactic hinge in a broader strategy of coercive pressure, air-ground mobility, and rail control. The city's fall would represent the culmination of a protracted contest to deny the Nationalist regime its logistical arteries and air superiority, paving the way for further Japanese consolidation and pressure along the Yangtze corridor. In the wake of the Japanese capture of Wuhan in late 1938, the city swiftly transformed into a pivotal stronghold for the Imperial Japanese Army. It became the new base for the 11th Army, occupying the former territories of the National Revolutionary Army's 5th and 9th War Zones. This shift not only consolidated Japanese control over central China but also positioned their forces to launch further offensives, exploiting the region's logistical and geographical advantages. As a key railway hub and the western terminus of the Zhejiang-Hunan Railway, Nanchang served as a vital supply artery connecting the Third and Ninth War Zones of the Nationalist forces. Its airfields further amplified its importance, posing a direct threat to Japanese shipping routes along the Yangtze River. Capturing Nanchang would sever Chinese supply lines, isolate key military districts, and pave the way for deeper incursions into southern China. Faced with this looming threat, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek moved quickly to reorganize its defenses in the 9th War Zone. General Chen Cheng retained his nominal position as commander in chief, but the actual operational reins were handed to General Xue Yue, a seasoned tactician known for his defensive prowess. This restructuring aimed to streamline command and bolster resistance, yet it was hampered by persistent logistical challenges that rendered many changes ineffective on the ground. As tensions escalated in early 1939, Chinese forces began amassing near Nanchang in preparation for the inevitable clash. Over 200,000 troops from 52 divisions were mobilized, drawing from units across the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Area. This region alone housed more than 29 divisions organized into four army groups: the 1st, 19th, 30th, and 32nd. On paper, this formidable assembly included over 16,000 officers and 240,000 enlisted men, representing a significant concentration of Nationalist power.   Leading this defensive effort was General Chen Cheng as the overarching commander in chief, with General Xue Yue stepping in as the acting commander to oversee day-to-day operations. Within this structure, the 19th Army Group stood out under the command of General Luo Zhuoying, supported by Lieutenant General Luo Weixong as his chief of staff. Luo Zhuoying, in particular, emerged as a central figure, assuming overall command for much of the ensuing Battle of Nanchang. His leadership would be tested against the relentless advance of the Japanese Eleventh Army, setting the stage for one of the bloodiest engagements of the war. In July 1938, during their offensive against Wuhan, Japanese forces attempted to advance toward Nanchang but were halted by Chinese defenders along the Xiushui River. The Chinese had established strong, fortified positions that effectively barred the Japanese path. The impasse endured for the rest of the year, with both armies locked in a standoff on opposite sides of the river. By March of 1939, the 11th Army led by General Okamura Yasuji, part of the Central China Expeditionary Army of General Hata Shunroku comprised 3 divisions, the 6th, 101st and 106th, roughly 120,000 men supported by 130 tanks and tankettes, 200 pieces of artillery, 30 warships with 50 motor boats, a battalion of SNLF and several air squadrons.  On March 12,  the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army issued orders to its directly subordinate 116th Division. This division was commanded to dispatch two key detachments: the Ishihara Detachment and the Murai Detachment, the latter composed meticulously of five battalions drawn from the 119th Brigade. Their mission was to conduct a thorough search along the eastern shore of Poyang Lake, supported by naval vessels that patrolled the waters with menacing precision. The purpose was multifaceted: to safeguard the integrity of land and water transportation routes and to protect the left flank of the main Japanese force as it prepared for larger operations. By March 15, these detachments had advanced without encountering any resistance from the Chinese army, allowing them to conclude their search operation successfully. Following this, they deployed the necessary troops at key points along the route, establishing garrisons that would serve as footholds for future advances. This reconnaissance was no mere stroll; it was a calculated probe into enemy territory, drawing lessons from prior engagements like the grueling Battle of Xuzhou in 1938, where intelligence gathering had proven crucial to Japanese successes. The Japanese soldiers boots sank into the marshy banks of Poyang Lake, China's largest freshwater body, covering over 3,500 square kilometers and teeming with reeds that could hide ambushes. The lack of opposition allowed the Japanese to fortify their positions, setting the stage for the preemptive strikes that would follow. The tempo of battle quickened on March 17, 1939, as the Japanese army launched its preemptive attack, a move designed to seize the initiative and disrupt Chinese preparations. The very next day, on March 18, the Murai Detachment departed from Xingzi aboard warships, navigating the treacherous waters to land near Wucheng, approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Yongxiu. Their objective was to assault the Chinese defenders in this area, but they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army and other supporting units, turning the landing into a brutal contest of wills. Concurrently, the main forces of the Japanese 101st and 106th Divisions, bolstered by their artillery and tank units, advanced methodically toward the north bank of the Xiushui River. They occupied their respective attack starting points with precision, after which the artillery units began conducting test firings and further reconnaissance to gauge the strength of Chinese defenses. This phase echoed the Japanese tactics employed in the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, where combined arms operations had overwhelmed urban defenses. A Chinese defender's recollection "We watched the enemy approach like a dark cloud, our rifles ready, knowing that the river would soon run red with the blood of brothers." The climax of preparation erupted at exactly 16:30 on March 20, when the Japanese 11th Army issued orders to the commander of the 6th Artillery Brigade. This commander was directed to orchestrate all available artillery to bombard the positions held by the Chinese 49th and 79th Armies on the south bank of the Xiushui River. What ensued was a pre-general offensive artillery barrage that endured for more than three grueling hours, incorporating a large number of poison gas shells, a heinous weapon that flouted international conventions like the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Many defenders' positions were utterly destroyed in this onslaught, and several officers and soldiers, including the valiant Wang Lingyun, commander of the 76th Division, were poisoned by the toxic fumes, suffering agonizing effects that highlighted the barbarity of chemical warfare. At precisely 19:30 that evening, the 106th Division commenced its forced crossing of the Xiushui River at Qiujin. Later, on the night of the 20th, the 101st Division also initiated its crossing north of Tujiabu. The Xiushui River, measuring about 30 meters in width, had swollen by approximately 3 meters due to continual heavy rains, rendering the crossing exceedingly difficult for the Japanese troops who battled against the raging currents. Nevertheless, the flooding had an unintended benefit for the invaders: many defender positions were inundated, and most water obstacles were washed away by the deluge. Leveraging this, the two Japanese divisions broke through the defenders' front lines and executed continuous night attacks, establishing a beachhead that extended 2 kilometers deep by dawn on the 21st. This foothold provided essential cover for Japanese engineers to construct pontoon bridges amid the chaos. At around 8 a.m., the Japanese tank group crossed these pontoon bridges and launched an attack on the Dongshan garrison from the front of the 106th Division, then proceeded to circle around toward Nanchang along the west side of Nanxun Road. Historian Rana Mitter aptly describes such river crossings as "desperate gambles where nature itself became a combatant," underscoring how environmental factors often tipped the scales in Sino-Japanese confrontations.Chiang Kai-shek, monitoring these developments from his command center, would have felt the weight of impending crisis.   By 21:30 on March 22, the Japanese vanguard tank group had advanced to Fengxin and successfully occupied the Liaohe Bridge outside the South Gate. The sudden and ferocious tank attack caught the defending troops off guard, preventing them from withdrawing the 38 artillery pieces that had been deployed on the city's outskirts before they were forced into a hasty retreat. On March 23, the Japanese army fully occupied Fengxin. Simultaneously, a portion of the 101st Division launched a frontal assault along Nanxun Road. Under the protective cover of artillery, they crossed the Xiushui River and encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 32nd Army at Tujiabu, resulting in a prolonged stalemate where neither side could gain a decisive advantage. Following the Japanese launch of their general offensive, the Guilin Headquarters of the National Government Military Commission, under Director Bai Chongxi, urgently ordered all units of the Ninth War Zone to hold their positions firmly on March 21. On the same day, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone, with specific instructions to immediately transfer the 102nd Division to Nanchang to reinforce the city's defenses, placing it under the command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. He also ordered the 16th and 79th Divisions to proceed to Dongxiang and Jinxian, southeast of Nanchang, to guard the southern bank of Poyang Lake and provide support for operations in Nanchang. Simultaneously, he commanded the 19th Army Group to deploy approximately two divisions of its strongest forces to strike key enemy points in the rear, including Mahuiling, Ruichang, Jiujiang, and De'an, with the aim of sabotaging railways and highways, cutting off enemy rear-area transportation, and preventing reinforcements from reaching the front. However, due to poor communication, slow troop movements, and inadequate coordination among units, these ambitious plans were not implemented, and the battlefield situation had already undergone significant changes by the time adjustments could be made. On the 23rd, Chiang Kai-shek came to realize that the Japanese army was resolutely determined to capture Nanchang, and thus he conceived the strategic idea of inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy before potentially abandoning the city. He specifically telegraphed Xue Yue, commander-in-chief of the Ninth War Zone; Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group; and Xiong Shihui, chairman of Jiangxi Province, with the following directive: "The key to this battle is not the gain or loss of Nanchang, but inflicting the greatest blow on the enemy. Even if Nanchang falls, all our armies should disregard everything and advance toward the designated targets, and decide on future operational plans in accordance with this policy." This telegram, preserved in wartime archives, exemplifies Chiang's shift toward a war of attrition, a tactic that would define much of China's resistance. On March 25, Chiang Kai-shek again telegraphed Bai Chongxi, Xue Yue, Luo Zhuoying, and Gu Zhutong, providing detailed instructions: "1. The main force of Luo's group should maintain focus on the Hunan-Jiangxi Highway, attack the enemy's right flank, and press them toward the Gan River. It is crucial to avoid having the main force operate with its back to the Gan River. (That is, the main force of the 19th Army Group should be moved to a mobile position west of the Gan River to avoid being forced to the Gan River and facing a decisive battle in an unfavorable situation.) 2. A necessary portion should be used to defend the Nanchang front. If necessary, resistance can be carried out gradually between the Fu and Gan Rivers to cover southern Jiangxi." On the very same day, the Japanese army defeated the 102nd Division, which had been reinforced from the Third War Zone, in engagements west of Nanchang. By March 26, the Japanese army had advanced to the vicinity of Shengmi Street on the left bank of the Gan River. They crossed the river that day, executing a maneuver to outflank Nanchang from the south and simultaneously cut off the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway, a critical supply line. The main force of the 101st Division also advanced to Shengmi Street via Wanbu and Huangxi on March 26, crossed the Gan River that evening, and launched a direct attack on Nanchang. Its 101st Brigade, moving along the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway via Lehua and Jiaoqiao, reached the north bank of the Gan River northwest of Nanchang on the 26th. Upon discovering these Japanese advances, the 19th Army urgently ordered the 32nd Army to withdraw from Tujiabu on the Nanchang-Xuncheng Railway back to Nanchang to join the 102nd Division in defending the city. However, before the 32nd Army had fully withdrawn, the Japanese tank group and the 101st Brigade had already advanced to the Gan River bridges to the west and north of Nanchang, respectively. Although the defending forces managed to destroy the bridges to halt their progress west and north of the Gan River, the Japanese 101st Division had already penetrated into Nanchang from the south. The defenders found themselves outnumbered and with weak firepower compared to the invaders. After engaging in intense street fighting, they suffered heavy casualties and were ultimately ordered to retreat to Jinxian. On March 27, the Japanese 101st Division occupied Nanchang, marking a significant, albeit temporary, victory in their campaign. Eyewitness account "The city fell amid the thunder of guns and the wails of the wounded, a testament to the fragility of urban defenses against mechanized onslaught." Following the capture, on March 28, the Japanese 11th Army was ordered to ensure that the main force of the 101st Division would return to Nanchang and that the 106th Division would retake Fengxin, all in preparation for subsequent operations in Gao'an or areas west of Fengxin. By April 2, the Japanese army had occupied Gao'an City, further consolidating their hold on the region. Meanwhile the fighting extended to Wuning. Wuning is located on the north bank of the Xiushui River, approximately 80 kilometers west of the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway. This position holds immense strategic importance, backed by the formidable Mufu Mountains, and serves as a key point on the left flank of the Ninth War Zone's defense line in northern Jiangxi. The forces deployed here included the 72nd and 78th Armies of the 30th Army Group, along with the 8th and 73rd Armies of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army, all positioned along both banks of the Xiushui River under the unified command of Wang Lingji, commander-in-chief of the 30th Army Group. To bolster the defense of Nanchang, the Nationalist Government's Military Commission devised a plan to send a powerful force eastward from Wuning toward Qiujin and De'an, with the intent of harassing the rear and flanks of the enemy advancing south along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway and disrupting their transportation networks. After carefully assessing the Chinese deployments and strategic intentions, the Japanese 11th Army also regarded Wuning as a crucial flank in its overall Nanchang campaign. Consequently, they dispatched their 6th Division to Wuning to contain and block the Chinese army, thereby ensuring the safety of its main force's right flank and facilitating the capture of Nanchang. On March 20, while the Japanese army was heavily engaged on the Nanxun Railway front, its 6th Division launched an attack westward along the north bank of the Xiushui River from Ruoxi (situated between Qiujin and Wuning). However, they encountered fierce resistance from the Chinese 73rd and 8th Armies, which resulted in slow and painstaking progress for the attackers. On the afternoon of the 21st, a portion of the 6th Division, under the protective cover of aircraft and artillery, crossed the Xiushui River east of Ruoxi, and the main force directed its assault toward Wuning, while its 36th Brigade targeted Yangzhou Street. The 30th Army Group, tasked with defending Wuning, mounted a tenacious resistance by leveraging the advantageous mountainous terrain, making the Japanese advance extremely difficult. After four days of fierce and unrelenting fighting, the Japanese were still unable to break through the defenders' positions. On the morning of March 23, under continued air and artillery cover, the Japanese army persisted in its fierce attack, repeatedly dropping incendiary and chemical bombs on Chinese positions. The defending forces suffered heavy losses as a result and were compelled to withdraw from Wucheng Town on the 24th, moving farther back to regroup. After occupying Wucheng, the Murai Detachment continued its operations to clear the Gan River and Xiushui River of obstacles and to remove mines that had been laid by the Chinese forces. By the 28th, they had advanced to the vicinity of Xinning Town, which is about 4 kilometers east of Wuning. Its 36th Brigade engaged in fierce fighting with the defending 19th Division at Yangzhou Street on the 24th and successfully captured Jing'an on the 27th; however, due to the conclusion of the Nanchang battle and the fact that its main force was blocked east of Wuning, it quickly returned and redirected its attack toward Wuning. Because the 73rd and 8th Armies had suffered heavy casualties from days of intense fighting, the 30th Army Group ordered the 72nd Army to assume the defense of northeast Wuning. The Japanese 6th Division concentrated its forces for a fierce and coordinated assault, and by the 29th, the defending forces had retreated to the south bank of the Xiushui River, allowing the Japanese army to occupy Wuning. After further intense fighting, by April 5, the Japanese 36th Brigade had advanced to the south bank of the Xiushui River.During this entire period, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly telegraphed Bai Chongxi and Xue Yue, issuing orders for the 30th Army Group in Wuning and the 31st Army Group in Chongyang and Tongshan (commanded by Tang Enbo) to launch a counteroffensive regardless of the evolving situation in Nanchang. The objective was to flank and attack the enemy's rear, advancing toward Mahuiling, De'an, Yongxiu, and Ruichang on the Nanchang-Xunyi road, to cut off enemy transportation lines and block reinforcements. However, this plan was not implemented due to various logistical and coordination challenges.   After the Japanese army captured Nanchang, it maintained a tense standoff with the Third and Ninth War Zones of China along the southeast bank of Poyang Lake to the east, Xiangtang to the south, and Gao'an, Fengxin, and Wuning to the west. The Military Commission of the National Government made a calculated judgment that although the Japanese had occupied Nanchang, they had suffered heavy losses and had not yet had the opportunity to replenish their forces. The defending forces within the city were deemed insufficient, prompting the Commission to decide on launching a counteroffensive while the Japanese army was still in the process of consolidating its position. At the same time, it ordered each war zone to initiate the "April Offensive" (also known as the "Spring Offensive") with the goals of harassing and containing the Japanese army and preventing it from continuing to advance westward toward Changsha. The Military Commission specifically ordered the Ninth War Zone and the Third War Zone to plan and execute a counteroffensive against Nanchang. The forces designated for this operation were planned to include the 1st, 19th, and 30th Army Groups of the Ninth War Zone and the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, totaling about 10 divisions, all under the unified command of Luo Zhuoying, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army Group. On April 17, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed his detailed "Plan to Conquer Nanchang" to Bai Chongxi, the director of the Guilin Headquarters, and sought his opinion on the matter. The operational strategy outlined was: "First, use the main force to attack the enemy along the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway, effectively cutting off enemy communications, and then use a portion of the force to directly capture Nanchang. The attack is scheduled to begin on April 24th." The main content of its troop deployment was as follows: The 1st Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Gao Yin-huai), the 19th Army Group, and the 74th Army (Commander Yu Ji-shi) were ordered to advance through Fengxin and Dacheng toward the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway between Xiushui and Nanchang, thoroughly disrupting transportation, cutting off enemy reinforcements, and cooperating in the capture of Nanchang; the 49th Army of the 19th Army Group (Commander Liu Duo-quan) was ordered to advance gradually as the general reserve; the 32nd Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Shangguan Yun-xiang) was ordered to attack Nanchang from the east of the Gan River with three divisions, and to organize a regiment to seize Nanchang by surprise; the 30th Army Group (Commander-in-Chief Wang Ling-ji) was ordered to attack Wuning. On April 18, Bai Chongxi replied to Chiang Kai-shek, offering his own suggestions on troop deployment with slight modifications. He emphasized the critical need for a surprise attack and for disrupting and harassing the enemy's transportation and rear areas, as well as cutting off the enemy's communication lines. He also believed that the attack should be brought forward and carried out as soon as possible, at the latest around the 22nd. On April 21, the forces of the Ninth War Zone began their operations in earnest. The 1st Army Group, comprising the 184th Division of the 60th Army and the New 10th Division of the 58th Army, attacked Fengxin, while the New 11th Division of the 58th Army monitored the Japanese forces in Jing'an; the main force of the 74th Army attacked Gao'an, and parts of the 74th Army and the 49th Army crossed the Jinjiang River to the north, attacking Dacheng and Shengmijie. Fierce fighting continued until the 26th, when the Japanese retreated to the areas of Fengxin, Qiuling, and Wanshougong. The 19th Army Group captured strongholds such as Dacheng, Gao'an, and Shengmijie. However, progress thereafter became difficult, and the offensive stalled. Neither army group was able to advance to the Nanchang-Xunyi Railway as originally planned. On April 23, the 32nd Army Group of the Third War Zone, consisting of the 16th and 79th Divisions of the 29th Army, the 5th Reserve Division, and part of the 10th Reserve Division, crossed the Fu River and launched an attack on Nanchang. Fierce fighting persisted until the 26th, when they captured Shichajie (south of Nanchang) and advanced toward the city. On the 27th, the Japanese concentrated the main force of the 101st Division to launch a counterattack. Supported by heavy artillery and air power, they engaged in fierce fighting with the Chinese army in the southeastern and southern areas, repeatedly contesting villages and strongholds. Due to the heavy casualties sustained, Duan Langru, commander of the 79th Division, changed the offensive deployment on the night of April 28 and reported this alteration to the army and army group commanders. The commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army Group, citing unauthorized changes to the plan, reported to the Third War Zone for approval and requested the dismissal of Duan Langru. Eager to capture Nanchang and driven by strategic impatience, Chiang Kai-shek, upon hearing the report, issued a stern order on May 1: Duan Langru was to be executed in front of the army for delaying military operations, He Ping, commander of the 16th Division, was ordered to atone for his crimes by achieving success in battle, and Shangguan Yunxiang was sent to the front to supervise the battle personally, with a strict deadline of May 5 for capturing Nanchang. On May 2, the 102nd Division recaptured Xiangtang and then Shichajie. The 16th Division once captured Shatanbu, but it was subsequently taken back by Japanese reinforcements. Shangguan Yunxiang then committed the 26th Division into the battle. On May 4, they launched another concerted attack. By dusk on the 5th, the 5th Reserve Division had reached the outer perimeter of the city and destroyed the barbed wire defenses, but Japanese firepower was intensely concentrated, causing the division to suffer heavy casualties and rendering it unable to continue the assault. The 152nd Regiment of the 26th Division broke into Xinlong Airport at dawn on the 5th and destroyed three Japanese aircraft. The 155th Regiment broke into the railway station at 9:00 a.m. on the 5th, but was blocked by fierce Japanese firepower and a determined counterattack. On May 5, after Chiang Kai-shek had issued the order to capture Nanchang by May 5, Xue Yue, acting commander of the Ninth War Zone, held the belief that with troops not having been replenished after the defense of Nanchang and with weaponry far inferior to that of the enemy, it was impossible to capture Nanchang within the subjective timeframe set. However, he did not directly dissent to Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 3, he telegraphed Chen Cheng to express his views in detail. He wrote: "Attacks on Nanchang and Fengxin have continued for 11 days since April 23. Because our army's equipment cannot keep pace with the enemy's, and the enemy's heavy weapons, mechanized units, and aircraft can support their ground forces everywhere, it is quite difficult to destroy the enemy's strong positions. Now I have received the Chairman's telegram: our army's operational strategy is to wear down the enemy without being worn down by the enemy, to avoid the enemy's strength and attack their weaknesses, and to achieve a protracted war of resistance. Therefore, this attack on Nanchang is aimed at wearing down the enemy. Under the principle of avoiding the enemy's strength and attacking their weakness, we should lie in ambush in advance and launch a surprise attack from all sides, hoping to recapture Nanchang with the fastest and most agile means. However, the battle has already dragged on; a direct assault is impossible, and striking their weakness is also unattainable. Although the enemy's strength is waning, it is practically impossible to capture Nanchang before May 5. Besides strictly ordering all units to overcome all difficulties and continue the fierce attack at all costs, I intend to politely explain the above situation to Chiang Kai-shek during a telephone conversation." Chen Cheng forwarded Xue Yue's telegram in full to Chiang Kai-shek on May 5. At the time, Bai Chongxi, director of the Guilin Headquarters, also considered the order to capture Nanchang within a limited time to be unrealistic, and on May 5 he telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek and He Yingqin, subtly offering a different suggestion. He stated, "Our army's attack on the enemy must be unexpected to be effective. Now, the enemy in Nanchang is prepared, and our army has launched a ten-day attack and has exerted all its efforts. To consider morale and our highest strategic principles, it is proposed that one-third of our forces continue the siege of Nanchang, while the other two-thirds are reorganized. Outside, we should continue to publicize our aggressive strategy…" The aim of both telegrams was to "turn the enemy's own spear against his shield," hoping Chiang Kai-shek would alter his order to capture Nanchang within a specified time, citing the operational guidance as inconsistent with the broader strategic policy. Upon receiving the telegrams, Chiang Kai-shek also learned of the sacrifice of Commander Chen Anbao and the heavy casualties among the attacking troops. On May 6, the main force of the Japanese 106th Division, supported by aircraft and tanks, launched a pincer attack on the 29th Army in the suburbs of Nanchang and Liantang. By 5 PM, the 29th Army was encircled. Liu Yuqing, commander of the 26th Division, was wounded in the fighting, and army commander Chen Anbao and Xie Beiting, commander of the 156th Regiment, were killed in action. Based on the actual battlefield situation, Xu Zhixun, chief of staff of the 29th Army, and Liu Yuqing, realizing that capturing Nanchang was impossible, decided to break out toward Zhongzhouwei and Shichajie to avoid total annihilation and potential execution by Chiang Kai-shek for failure. A regiment of the 5th Reserve Division, disguised as civilians, had infiltrated the city but was forced to withdraw due to the lack of follow-up support. Finally, on May 9, Chiang Kai-shek issued an order to halt the attack on Nanchang. The Japanese army, having suffered heavy losses themselves, was also unable to mount an effective counterattack, and thus the Battle of Nanchang came to an end, leaving behind a legacy of valor and tragedy. In the Battle of Nanchang, China suffered more than 52,000 casualties, including over 43,000 deaths, while Japan sustained more than 24,000 casualties and over 2,200 deaths. Although the National Army eventually lost Nanchang, the engagement thwarted Japan's plan to crush the main Chinese force. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.   The Nanchang battle was a decisive Japanese victory, yet the Chinese did manage to halt the Japanese western advance and showcased their perseverance amid a growing strategic stalemate. Supplies were still leaking into Nationalist China, the Japanese would have to continuously find and plug them. The war for China was nowhere near over.

China is accelerating its push toward a consumption-led economic model, with policymakers identifying the expansion of domestic demand as the key driver of GDP growth during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-30), economists and officials said.经济学家和相关官员表示，中国正加快向消费主导型经济模式转型，政策制定者已明确将扩大内需列为 “十五五” 规划时期（2026-2030 年）国内生产总值增长的核心驱动力。Following the tone-setting Central Economic Work Conference, which prioritized domestic demand for 2026, experts noted a strategic transition: China is moving beyond simple volume growth toward "structural optimization". This involves leveraging fiscal tools to boost household incomes and specifically targets the high-growth services sector to buffer against external uncertainties.在为 2026 年经济工作定调、并将扩大内需列为重点任务的中央经济工作会议召开后，专家指出中国正迎来战略转型：经济发展正从单纯的规模增长转向 “结构优化”。这一转型包括运用财政工具提振居民收入，并重点瞄准高增长的服务业，以抵御外部环境的不确定性。An official from the Office of the Central Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs confirmed that Beijing will roll out concrete plans to boost household incomes and raise basic pensions while increasing the supply of high-quality products and services and also removing unreasonable restrictions to fully unlock consumption potential.中央财经委员会办公室的一位官员证实，国家将出台具体方案，在提高居民收入、上调基本养老金的同时，增加优质产品和服务供给，消除不合理限制，以充分释放消费潜力。Experts see this policy stance as a signal for significant growth in specific areas, and express optimism about the long-term potential of China's consumer market.专家认为，这一政策立场预示着部分特定领域将迎来大幅增长，并对中国消费市场的长期潜力持乐观态度。Wang Wei, a senior researcher at the Development Research Center of the State Council, said at a recent forum hosted by China News Service: "China's consumption growth maintains strong momentum and ample potential. Emerging areas such as digital services, green technology and health-related demand are expected to become the primary engines of the consumer market."国务院发展研究中心资深研究员王伟在近期由中国新闻社主办的一场论坛上表示：“中国消费增长势头强劲、潜力充足。数字服务、绿色科技以及健康相关需求等新兴领域，有望成为消费市场的核心增长引擎。”Official data support this structural divergence. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, retail sales of services climbed 5.4 percent year-on-year in the first 11 months of 2025, outpacing the overall retail growth of 4 percent.官方数据印证了这一结构性分化趋势。国家统计局数据显示，2025 年前 11 个月，服务业零售额同比增长 5.4%，增速高于整体零售 4% 的同比增幅。Chen Lifen, a researcher at the DRC, described the current phase as a critical evolution from a goods-dominated model to one that balances goods and services, with a long-term trajectory toward a services-led structure.国务院发展研究中心研究员陈丽芬表示，当前阶段正处于关键转型期，经济模式正从商品主导型转向商品和服务均衡型，长期来看将朝着服务主导型结构迈进。"As income levels rise, demand for services, which typically have high income elasticity, naturally increases its share of total wallet spending," Chen said, adding that with basic needs largely met, the "quality upgrade" is driving capital toward personal development, leisure and smart home ecosystems.陈丽芬指出：“随着居民收入水平提升，收入弹性较高的服务类需求在居民总消费中的占比自然会上升。” 她补充道，在基本需求得到充分满足的背景下，“品质升级” 正推动资本流向个人发展、休闲娱乐以及智能家居生态等领域。The shift is already reshaping corporate investment strategies as companies move to capture these high-quality demand pockets.这一转型已经在重塑企业的投资策略，企业纷纷布局以抢占这些高品质需求市场。Fang Xing, a vice-general manager at Ping An Property & Casualty Insurance, highlighted the surging "pet economy" — now valued at approximately 300 billion yuan ($42.81 billion). With veterinary costs often exceeding 10,000 yuan for major procedures, financial institutions are developing specialized insurance products to hedge these rising household costs.平安产险副总经理方兴特别提到了蓬勃发展的 “宠物经济”，其市场规模目前已达约 3000 亿元人民币（合 428.1 亿美元）。由于宠物重大诊疗项目的费用往往超过 1 万元，金融机构正研发专项保险产品，帮助家庭对冲这类不断上涨的支出。Similarly, in the manufacturing sector, the focus has shifted from scale to efficiency. Guo Yanhu, a director with Gree Electric Appliances, said consumer demand for green energy is driving research and development. He cited Gree's investment in AI-driven energy systems — which has boosted efficiency by over 25 percent — as a direct response to both domestic eco-targets and demand from overseas markets.无独有偶，制造业的发展重心也从规模转向了效率。格力电器董事郭彦虎表示，消费者对绿色能源的需求正驱动企业加大研发投入。他举例称，格力对人工智能驱动能源系统的投资，使能效提升超 25%，这一举措既是对国内生态目标的响应，也是对海外市场需求的直接对接。Economists emphasize that sustaining this momentum requires institutional reforms. Su Jian, a professor at the School of Economics at Peking University, said expanding "high-quality demand" requires a virtuous cycle where new products help cultivate new demand, while cost-reducing innovations allow new demand to scale.经济学家强调，要维持这一增长势头，必须推进制度改革。北京大学经济学院教授苏剑表示，扩大 “高品质需求” 需要形成良性循环：新产品助力培育新需求，而降本创新则为新需求的规模化发展提供支撑。While fiscal and monetary policies are essential to expand demand, Su said expanding high-quality demand depends on developing new quality productive forces through product innovation and process innovation.苏剑指出，尽管财政和货币政策对扩大需求至关重要，但扩大高品质需求的核心在于通过产品创新和工艺创新，培育新质生产力。Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities, added that boosting consumption during the 15th Five-Year Plan period is a strategic choice rather than a short-term policy response.粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒补充道，“十五五” 期间提振消费是一项战略抉择，而非短期的政策应对措施。"Key to raising the household consumption rate will be improving income distribution, strengthening social security and widening market access. These are the fundamental levers to converting potential demand into actual economic activity," Luo said.罗志恒表示：“提高居民消费率的关键在于完善收入分配、强化社会保障以及拓宽市场准入。这三项举措是将潜在需求转化为实际经济活动的根本抓手。”consumption /kənˈsʌmpʃn/ 消费domestic /dəˈmestɪk/ 国内的；家庭的innovation /ˌɪnəˈveɪʃn/ 创新elasticity /ˌiːlæstɪˈsɪəti/ 弹性

Alberto Cavaglion"Nella notte straniera"Gli ebrei di Saint Martin de VésubieFusta Editorewww.fustaeditore.itTra 1939 e 1943 il susseguirsi di tragici even- ti favorì il convergere lungo l'arco alpino oc- cidentale di una cospicua quantità di ebrei in fuga dalle persecuzioni. Le leggi razziali in Italia, lo scoppio della seconda guerra mon- diale e la conseguente invasione della Fran- cia meridionale da parte degli italiani, poi la conquista di Parigi da parte dei tedeschi for- mularono una sorta di fatale legge di gravità, capace di attrarre decine e decine di famiglie: donne, anziani e bambini, che ripararono prima lungo la costa che unisce la Riviera di Ponente e la Costa Azzurra (si pensi a Wal- ter Benjamin o Arthur Koestler), poi lungo il versante francese delle Alpi, dalla valle della Vésubie su fino all'Alta Savoia. La maggior parte di loro erano “stranieri”, giunti in Italia dopo il 1933, o fuggiti da Parigi invasa dalle SS. Polacchi, russi, un- gheresi, austriaci. Tra Nizza e Saint Martin vissero un periodo di relativa tranquillità, che di poco precede la fuga attraverso i valichi al- pini al seguito di una armata in rotta. Per una parte di loro l'arrivo in Italia volle dire pri- ma l'internamento nel campo di Borgo San Dalmazzo, poi la deportazione ad Auschwitz. Per i sopravvissuti le valli cuneesi furono ter- ra d'asilo fino alla Liberazione. Una vicenda di grande intensità emotiva, ma un problema non semplice da spiegare per gli storici. Come sciogliere infatti la contraddi- zione di un paese come l'Italia, che s'era dato una legislazione razziale feroce, ma alla fero- cia rinuncia quando si trova a convivere con le strategie di sterminio dell'alleato tedesco e del regime collaborazionista di Vichy?Che cosa fa, di questo libro, qualcosa di diverso da altri su argomenti simili? Forse il fatto che non è solo documento, o cronaca, o descrizione, o rifles- sione, ma un po' tutte queste cose insieme. Andrea Devoto, La Nuova Antologia, 2152, ottobre-dicembre 1984 Le livre suit avec beaucoup de minutie un épisode fort peu connu. Une contribution très attachante qui doit être versée au dossier ouvert par Marrus et Pax- ton dans un ouvrage déja classique. Claude Lévy, Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, XVI, 13, 1982 Una scrittura asciutta, la più lontana possibile da ogni giornalistica ricerca di effetti e che perciò non disperde mai l'insuperabile forza del nudo fatto. Lucio Ceva, Il Risorgimento, XXXIV, 1, febbraio 1982 Cavaglion has pieced together the story of several hundred Jews who moved to Nice in the tiny Ital- ian-held part of France after Mussolini's downfall in 1943, hoping (justifiably) that they would be bet- ter treated by the Italians than by the SS. Memoirs, civic, military, parish and hospital records, local ar- chives, diaries and correspondence. John Gatt-Rutter, Fatal flight, Times Literary Supplement, 30 aprile 1982Alberto Cavaglion (Cuneo, 1956) ha insegnato Storia dell'Ebraismo all'U- niversità di Firenze. Nel 2005 con il libro La Resistenza spiegata a mia figlia (terza edizione aggiornata Feltrinelli, 2023) ha vinto il Premio Lo Straniero. Tra i suoi lavori recenti: Verso la Terra promessa. Scrittori italiani a Gerusalemme da Matil- de Serao a Pier P. Pasolini (Carocci 2016); Guida a ‘Se questo è un uomo' (Carocci 2020); Decontaminare le memorie. Luo- ghi, libri, sogni (Add editore 2021); La misura dell'inatteso. Ebraismo e cultura italiana 1815-1988 (Viella 2022); La filosofia del pressappoco. Weininger, Sesso e carattere e la cultura del Novecento (Bi- bliotheka 2025).Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/il-posto-delle-parole--1487855/support.IL POSTO DELLE PAROLEascoltare fa pensarehttps://ilpostodelleparole.it/

China's efforts to scale up effective investment, with a particular focus on encouraging private sector participation and increasing investment in human capital, will play a key role in boosting domestic demand next year, officials and experts said.政府工作人员和专家表示，中国扩大有效投资的举措，特别是鼓励民营企业参与和增加人力资本投资，将在明年提振内需方面发挥关键作用。The annual Central Economic Work Conference, held earlier this month, emphasized the need to "halt the decline in investment and promote its recovery" amid a complex external environment.本月早些时候召开的年度中央经济工作会议强调，在复杂的外部环境下，必须“遏制投资下滑趋势，促进投资回升”。The government needs to effectively drive investment by making good use of funding sources such as central government budget investments, ultra-long-term special treasury bonds and local government special bonds, Xinhua News Agency quoted an official of the Office of the Central Commission for Financial and Economic Affairs as saying.新华社援引中央财经委员会办公室一位政府工作人员的话称，政府需要有效利用中央财政预算投资、超长期国债和地方政府专项债券等资金来源，有效引导投资。"The government will support private firms' participation in major projects in sectors such as railways and nuclear power, and guide private investment toward new fields such as high-tech industries and the service sector," the official said.该工作人员表示：“政府将支持民营企业参与铁路、核电等领域的大型项目，引导民营资本投向高新技术产业、服务业等新兴领域。”The official added that major projects set for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period could be front-loaded where conditions permit.该工作人员补充说道，在条件允许的情况下，原定于第十五个五年计划（2026-2030年）期间实施的重大项目可提前启动。China's fixed-asset investment fell 2.6 percent year-on-year in the first 11 months of the year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.国家统计局数据显示，今年前11个月，中国固定资产投资同比下降2.6%。China has rolled out a series of targeted policies over the past year, including an 800 billion yuan ($113.8 billion) list of key projects to implement major national strategies and strengthen security capacity in key areas, and 500 billion yuan in new policy-based financial tools to supplement project capital.过去一年，中国推出了一系列定向政策，包括8000亿元（1138亿美元）重点项目清单，以落实重大国家战略、强化重点领域安全保障能力，以及5000亿元新增政策性金融工具，用于补充项目资本金。The economic agenda-setting meeting also called for greater investment in physical assets and human capital.经济议程设定会议还呼吁加大对实物资产和人力资本的投资力度。From the country's sprawling highway networks and bullet trains to its forest of urban high-rises, investment in physical assets played a crucial role in its economic growth over the past decades, said Yu Chunhai, executive dean of Renmin University of China's School of Economics.中国人民大学经济学院执行院长于春海指出，从遍布全国的高速公路网络和高铁系统，到城市摩天大楼林立的景象，过去数十年来，实物资产投资在推动中国经济增长方面发挥了关键作用。However, Yu noted that the country'sincremental capital output ratio, which indicates the amount of capital required for every 1 yuan increase in GDP, increased from 2.84 in 2008 to 9.44 in 2023.然而，于春海指出，中国的边际资本产出比（即每增加1元GDP所需投入的资本量）从2008年的2.84上升至2023年的9.44。Meanwhile, facing diminishing returns from the old growth model and a global shift toward talent-centric competition, China is placing a strategic bet on investing in people, analysts said.与此同时，面对传统增长模式回报递减以及全球向人才竞争格局转变的趋势，中国正将战略重心转向人才投资，分析师指出。Investment in human capital refers to inputs that develop people's capabilities and unlock their potential at all stages of life, including childcare, elderly care, health, education and skills training.人力资本投资指在人生各个阶段提升个人能力、释放潜能的投入，包括儿童保育、老年护理、健康保障、教育培养及技能培训。An aging population and rising labor costs are eroding the traditional demographic advantage. By prioritizing investment in human capital, China seeks to build long-term economic competitiveness for innovation-driven, demand-led growth, said Chen Wenling, former chief economist at the China Center for International Economic Exchanges.中国国际经济交流中心前首席经济学家陈文玲指出，老龄化人口和不断上升的劳动力成本正在侵蚀传统的人口红利优势。通过优先投资人力资本，中国致力于构建长期经济竞争力，推动创新驱动、需求引领的增长模式。"A healthier, better-educated and more secure workforce is the most critical infrastructure for the next stage of China's development," Chen said. "Sustained investment in people's capabilities, health and career development doesn't just improve well-being—it directly fuels economic upgrading."陈文玲表示：“更健康、受教育程度更高、更有保障的劳动力队伍，是中国下一阶段发展最关键的基础设施。持续投资于人民的能力、健康和职业发展，不仅能提升福祉，更能直接推动经济升级。”Meanwhile, analysts believe that investing in people could also help unlock the spending power of China's massive population, creating a virtuous cycle in which social investment fuels consumption resilience.与此同时，分析人士认为，投资于人力资本也有助于释放中国庞大人口的消费潜力，从而形成良性循环，社会投资推动消费韧性增强。The enhanced investments in pensions, childcare and healthcare are designed to alleviate theprecautionary savings burdens that constrain household spending, said Luo Zhiheng, chief economist and head of the research institute at Yuekai Securities.粤开证券首席经济学家兼研究院院长罗志恒表示，加大养老、育儿和医疗领域的投资力度，旨在缓解制约家庭支出的预防性储蓄负担。"This approach transforms social spending into a powerful economic driver. A more secure population is likely to spend more freely," Luo said. "The direction aligns with China's broader economic objectives of rebalancing growth toward high-quality domestic demand."罗志恒表示：“这种做法将社会支出转化为强有力的经济驱动力。生活更有保障的人群往往更愿意消费。该方向与中国更广泛的经济目标相契合，即推动经济增长向高质量的内需转型。”incrementaladj./ˌɪŋ.krəˈmen.t̬əl/递增的precautionaryadj./prɪˈkɑː.ʃən.er.i/预防性的

Ogni mattina, Handa, una giovane ragazza della tribù Luo, porta la colazione a Mondi, la gallina nera di sua nonna. Questa mattina, tuttavia, Mondi non si vede da nessuna parte. Così Handa e la sua amica Akeyo iniziano la ricerca, incontrando due farfalle svolazzanti, tre topi a strisce, quattro piccole lucertole, cinque bellissimi uccelli solari e molte altre creature intriganti. Ma dove potrebbe essere Mondi? E se Mondi avesse una sorpresa per loro (o forse anche dieci)? I colori luminosi raffigurano un ambiente naturale lussureggiante in questa storia delicata e ripetitiva perfetta per la lettura ad alta voce.Vuoi aiutarci a continuare e mantenere il nostro podcast gratuito? Non dimenticarti di iscriverti al nostro canale, di lasciarci un like e condividere i video, Grazie!Hai già scoperto la nostra guida mindfulness per genitori consapevoli? Puoi trovarla sul nostro sito:  https://raccontiperbambiniliberi.com/product/mindfulness-per-bambiniPer acquistare i libri che abbiamo letto nel nostro podcast vieni a scoprire le nostre liste su Amazon:https://www.amazon.it/shop/followthesunfamily?isPublicView=trueI nostri racconti sono disponibili su tutte le piattaforme Podcast e sul nostro sito: www.raccontiperbambiniliberi.comSe non vuoi perderti nemmeno una delle nostre storie iscriviti alla newsletter e seguici su Instagram: @raccontiperbambiniliberiBuon Ascolto!#podcast #tiktok #youtube #youtubeshorts #amor #tiktokvideo #spotify #shortvideo #bedtimestories #googlepodcasts #love #trending #like #shorts #italia

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened up 207-points this morning from yesterday's close at 27,550 on turnover of 8.8-billion N-T. The market tumbled nearly 300 points on Monday amid investor concerns over an A-I bubble - which triggered heavy selling in the bellwether electronics sector, to pull the broader market into negative territory. Top trade negotiator claiming Taiwan 'very likely' to secure stacking relief from US The government's top trade negotiator says the U-S and Taiwan are in the final stages of trade negotiations and the outcome will "very likely" result in Taiwan obtaining tariff stacking relief. According Yang Jen-ni, she firmly believes the negotiating team will achieve such that goal, as it has been working to ensure that any adjusted tariff rate for Taiwan will not be added to the existing ones. Yang says Taiwan might also obtain most favored nation status under Section 232 of the U-S Trade Expansion Act. She's also denying reports the U-S government is seeking a commitment from Taiwan to train American workers in the semiconductor manufacturing sector and other tech industries as part of the trade deal. CDC marks World AIDS Day with a drag show to fight HIV stigma And, The Centers for Disease Control marked World AIDS Day by inviting drag queens for a performance it says was aimed at breaking down stigma (汙名) against people living with HIV. Held under the theme of "Breaking Myths, Keeping Love on Track," the event featured performances by several local drag queens. C-D-C Director-General Philip Luo says more than 1,000 HIV infections were reported last year, and Taiwan's policies on testing, follow-up, and treatment are on the right track, which has led to a decline in new infections this year. Luo also says HIV testing has been more active this year than last year and the C-D-C has forecast that new HIV infections this year will fall below 900, to a 22-year low. Hong Kong arrests more suspects in fire probe as death toll hits 151 Hong Kong authorities said on Monday they had arrested 13 people for suspected manslaughter (誤殺) in a probe into the city's worst fire in more than half a century. At least 151 people are now known to have died. Laura Westbrook reports. Congo Declares Ebola Outbreak Over A recent Ebola outbreak (爆發) in southern Congo has been declared over by health officials, after no new cases were reported for 45 days. Congo's health minister says the outbreak resulted in 53 confirmed cases and 43 deaths. The government announced the latest outbreak of the virus in September in the southern Kasai province town of Bulape, and it spread from there to at least four other towns. It was Congo's 16th outbreak of the disease since it was first reported in the country in 1976. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下為 SoundOn 動態廣告－－－－ 臺企銀Hokii數位帳戶超方便，邀朋友開戶再完成任務各拿一百元獎勵金！ 還能抽RIMOWA、Galaxy S25 Ultra、AirPods4等夢幻好禮～ 年末小紅包這裡領

What a ride this US Tour has been, and I'm stoked to cap it off with Episode 075 straight from Atlanta's buzzing energy, hitting your feeds today on December 6, 2025. This one's all about that raw fusion of Afrohouse heat, Amapiano soul, and deep house vibes that fueled my nights on the road, mixing Southern swagger with beats from around the globe. I threw in some real gems like the atmospheric opener from Stixx, Kirk Franklin's reworked gospel groove that just lifts you up, and that tribal pulse in Boddhi Satva's track—plus, I couldn't resist spotlighting the Kenyan fire with Breyth, Native P., and Tina Ardor's "Kumerera," all about that enduring spirit wrapped in Nairobi's rich vocals and Afrohouse rhythms, and Dylan-S and Aahil's "Jabanation" featuring Buruklyn Boyz, Silverstone Barz, and Makadem, where gritty drill meets punchy rap and traditional Luo nyatiti for some straight-up street storytelling on life's hustle. We ramp up to euphoric closes with remixes from Monkey Safari and Dave Lee's party mix—it's got that feel-good spiritual thread running through. Whether you're vibing solo or turning up with friends, dive in and let's keep the groove going—appreciate you guys for tagging along on this tour, more adventures ahead! #DeeperSoundsOfNairobi #USTour Turn it up, let the music take over, and enjoy the journey.

EMM has been committed to reaching the least-reached people of the world for nearly a century. Our initial ministry to the Luo people of Tanzania was one of reaching out to people who had not heard of Jesus. This continues to be a central focus for EMM: going to places with “open fields.”

In this episode of Walk, Don't Run to the Doctor, we take a deep dive into statins, their true benefits, their real risks, and the massive role lifestyle plays in shaping heart disease outcomes. Rather than accepting oversimplified medical advice, this episode empowers you to think critically, understand uncertainty in medicine, and make fully informed decisions about your own health. You'll learn how to interpret risk statistics (like relative vs absolute risk), why lifestyle may outperform medication for many people, and why statins are helpful for some—yet potentially unnecessary or harmful for others. If you've ever been told "your cholesterol is high, you need a statin," this episode will give you the tools to ask better questions and understand whether that advice truly applies to someone like you.   Key Takeaways: -Medical uncertainty is real — many "facts" are actually opinions without solid or applicable evidence. -Statins help some people more than others: -Strong evidence for people who already had a heart attack. -Much smaller benefit (sometimes minimal) for healthy, active people without prior heart disease. -Absolute vs. relative risk matters: -A "25% reduction in risk" may really mean only 1 fewer event per 100 people. -Lifestyle changes can reduce risk by 50–80%, often outperforming statin benefits—especially for people who exercise, eat whole foods, avoid smoking, keep weight down, and drink moderately. -Statin risks are real: Muscle pain: up to 1 in 10 Diabetes risk increased: about 1 in 200 Possible cognitive impairment (enough for an FDA warning) Polypharmacy (multiple medications) increases uncertainty and side-effect risks.   Get your copy of Good Food Great Medicine, 4th ed.: https://a.co/d/1D6hIYM More references can be found at www.GreatMed.org   Would you like Dr. Hassell to answer your question on the air? Contact us! Phone/text: 503-773-0770 e-mail: info@GreatMed.org EIN: 88-326-7056 Write us a letter. We love to hear from you. This podcast is sponsored by our generous listeners.   Send questions, comments, and support to: GreatMed.org 4804 NW Bethany Blvd., Suite I-2, #273 Portland OR 97229   Check out this video on Completely Rethinking the Link Between Statins, Cholesterol, & Heart Disease, w/ Dr. Aseem Malhotra: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RU3Ouxt1vs&t=251s   References from today's podcast: Ioannidis J. P. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS medicine, 2(8), e124. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 Luo, Y., Liu, J., Zeng, J., & Pan, H. (2024). Global burden of cardiovascular diseases attributed to low physical activity. American journal of preventive cardiology, 17, 100633. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajpc.2024.100633 Ye, Z., Det al.  (2025). Association of statins use and genetic susceptibility with incidence of Alzheimer's disease. The journal of prevention of Alzheimer's disease, 12(2), 100025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tjpad.2024.100025

Episode Notes:Dr Ho describes an empirical research agenda focused on how security actually operates in organisations. He explains his experience with getting this research off the ground to allow them to perform the research in this setting.Study setting and scope: eight-month randomised controlled trial at UC San Diego Health involving ~19,500 employees and ten distinct phishing campaign lures.Annual awareness training: the study found no significant relationship between how recently staff completed the mandated course and their likelihood of failing a simulated phishing campaign.Embedded training (when someone clicks a phishing simulation and is immediately redirected to training): the measurable improvement was very small (≈2% reduction in failure rate) and varied significantly by lure and engagement.Engagement challenge: The vast majority of embedded-training sessions were extremely short or incomplete, a key factor in explaining limited effect size.Variability of lure difficulty: Some phishing lures elicited very low click-rates (~1.8%) while others up to ~30.8%, indicating that the phishing stimulus matters as much as, or more than, the training intervention.Practical takeaway: Organizations should treat training (especially annually mandated modules) as only one part of a broader defence strategy, and design empirical measurement systems (including controls, realistic lures, and sustained engagement) before assuming large effect sizes.About our Guest:Dr Grant Ho Profile: https://cs.uchicago.edu/people/grant-ho/Papers or resources mentioned in this episode:Ho, G.; Mirian, A.; Luo, E.; Tong, K.; Lee, E.; Liu, L.; Longhurst, C.A.; Dameff, C.; Voelker, G.M. (2025). Understanding the Efficacy of Phishing Training in Practice: A Randomized Controlled Trial at a Large Health Organisation. Presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (May 2025). Full PDF: https://people.cs.uchicago.edu/~grantho/papers/oakland2025_phishing-training.pdfOther: I mentioned some figures about the spending on cybercsecurity education and training, You can find those here.  Canadian Survey of Cyber Security and Cybercrime (CSCSC)https://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5244Get convenient Excel Tables of the Statistics from 2017 and 2019. https://www.serene-risc.ca/en/statistics-canadaOther Other:Dr Ho was great to chat with and has a long history of researching phishing, Some of his older work that is more technical in nature, as so we didn't talk about in the episode, but in the case that it  might be interesting to you, here are some links: Ho, G., Sharma, A., Javed, M., Paxson, V., & Wagner, D. (2017). Detecting Credential Spearphishing Attacks in Enterprise Settings. In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security '17), Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 16-18, 2017. USENIX Association. ISBN 978-1-931971-40-9.PDF: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-ho.pdf USENIX+2USENIX+2Presentation page: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/hoUSENIX+1Ho, G., Cidon, A., Gavish, L., Schweighauser, M., Paxson, V., Savage, S., Voelker, G. M., & Wagner, D. (2019). Detecting and Characterizing Lateral Phishing at Scale. In Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security '19), Santa Clara, CA, USA, August 14-16, 2019. USENIX Association. ISBN 978-1-939133-06-9.PDF: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec19-ho.pdf USENIX+1Presentation page: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/ho USENIX

When Kenya's Raila Odinga died, two worlds came together: the ceremony of the state, and the sacred rites of the Luo. From bonfires to buffalo cries, this episode explores what it means to bury a Luo elder.

China must accelerate reform measures to reinforce the stable and healthy development of the capital market in the coming five years as a strategic pivot in transforming the country's economic growth model, said leading economists and financial experts.著名经济学家和金融专家表示，中国必须加快改革措施，在未来五年加强资本市场的稳定和健康发展，作为转变国家经济增长模式的战略支点。Despite Thursday's market correction, they said the recent rally in Chinese equities, together with the ongoing regulatory initiatives to enhance market stability, still highlights a strategic shift toward positioning the capital market as a central driver of innovation, consumption and domestic economic circulation amid external headwinds.他们表示，尽管周四出现了市场回调，但中国股市近期的反弹，以及正在实施的加强市场稳定的监管举措，仍突显出在外部不利因素的影响下，中国将资本市场定位为创新、消费和国内经济循环的核心驱动力的战略转变。Looking at the new round of capital market reform to be unfolded in the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period, top priorities should include firmer determination to close regulatory loopholes that leave room for improper profits, ensure market fairness for retail investors, and improve transparency for global investors, they added.他们补充说，展望第15个五年计划（2026-30）期间将展开的新一轮资本市场改革，当务之急应该包括更坚定地弥补为不正当利润留下空间的监管漏洞，确保散户投资者的市场公平，提高全球投资者的透明度。Proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development will be studied at the fourth plenary session of the 20th Communist Party of China Central Committee, scheduled to be held in Beijing in October.关于制定国民经济和社会发展第15个五年计划的建议将在定于10月在北京举行的中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第四次全体会议上进行研究。Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, called for giving full play to the pivotal role of the capital market at the Central Financial Work Conference in 2023.习近平，中国共产党中央委员会主席，在2023年的中央金融工作会议上，要求充分发挥资本市场的关键作用。At the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau meeting on July 30, which Xi chaired, it was pointed out that the attractiveness and inclusiveness of the domestic capital market should be boosted, in order to consolidate the improving and stabilizing trend of the capital market.7月30日习主持的中共中央政治局会议上，习指出要增强国内资本市场的吸引力和包容性，巩固资本市场向好企稳的态势。"The ongoing rise of A shares reflects that the strategic position of the capital market in China's economic agenda is rising significantly," said Tian Xuan, president of Tsinghua University's National Institute of Financial Research and associate dean of Tsinghua University's PBC School of Finance.清华大学国家金融研究院院长、中国人民银行金融学院副院长田轩表示：“A股的持续上涨反映出资本市场在中国经济议程中的战略地位正在显著上升。”In the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan period, high-quality development of the capital market will act not only as a key pathway to address structural economic issues, but also as the "central pivot" for transforming the country's growth model, Tian said.田说，在即将到来的“十五”计划期间，资本市场的高质量发展不仅是解决结构性经济问题的关键途径，而且是转变国家增长模式的“中心支点”。The bottlenecks faced by traditional growth drivers, the remaining financing difficulties for innovation and intensified global tech competition all demand steady, healthy growth of the capital market to guide long-term capital into core technologies, Tian said. The growing household demand for wealth management also requires the capital market to provide diverse investment channels, he said.田说，传统增长动力面临的瓶颈，创新的剩余融资困难以及加剧的全球技术竞争都需要资本市场稳定，健康的增长，以引导长期资本进入核心技术。他说，家庭对财富管理日益增长的需求也要求资本市场提供多样化的投资渠道。He added that China should further improve fundamental institutions to ensure sustainable market momentum, calling for better management of expectations, greater policy transparency and timely, positive signals to shore up sentiment, as well as stricter information disclosure and an improved delisting mechanism to raise listed companies' quality.他补充说，中国应该进一步完善基本制度，以确保市场的可持续发展势头，呼吁更好地管理预期，提高政策透明度，及时发出积极信号来提振市场情绪，以及更严格的信息披露和完善的退市机制，以提高上市公司的质量。China's A-share market fell on Thursday, as experts cited profit-taking pressure, while the United States Federal Reserve's 25-basis-point interest rate cut on Wednesday fell short of some investors' expectations for a bolder move.中国A股市场周四下跌，专家们认为这是获利了结的压力，而美联储周三降息25个基点的决定，没有达到一些投资者对更大胆举措的预期。Despite a 1.15 percent drop on Thursday, the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index has risen by nearly a quarter from the April trough, closing at 3,831.66 points. US investment bank Goldman Sachs said in a report on Thursday that it forecasts an 8 percent upside for the A-share market over the coming 12 months.尽管周四下跌了1.15%，但基准上证综合指数已经从4月份的低点上涨了近四分之一，收于3831.66点。美国投资银行高盛在周四的一份报告中表示，预计未来12个月a股市场将上涨8%。Liu Jipeng, a senior expert on capital markets and a professor at the Business School of China University of Political Science and Law, said that further closing regulatory gaps to safeguard market fairness and investor interest would hold the key to future capital market reforms and steady market growth.资本市场资深专家、中国政法大学商学院教授刘继鹏表示，进一步缩小监管空白，以维护市场公平和投资者利益，将是未来资本市场改革和市场稳定增长的关键。"A slow bull market has taken shape. The goal should be making it steady and long-lasting, so that the capital market can serve as a platform for common prosperity, where the majority of investors can share returns, rather than only a few getting rich overnight," Liu said.“一个缓慢的牛市已经形成。目标应该是使其稳定和持久，以便资本市场可以作为共同繁荣的平台，大多数投资者可以分享回报，而不是只有少数人一夜暴富。”Wu Qing, chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, pledged at a recent symposium to accelerate the new round of capital market reform and opening-up to consolidate the improving market trend, stressing that the market is at a crucial stage in its pursuit of high-quality development in the 15th Five-Year Plan period.中国证券监督管理委员会主席吴清在最近的一次座谈会上承诺，将加快新一轮资本市场改革开放，巩固市场向好趋势，并强调市场正处于“十五”期间追求高质量发展的关键阶段。China has ramped up capital market reform efforts after it released a high-level guideline in April last year, rolling out nine measures to promote the high-quality development of the capital market.自去年4月发布高层指导意见以来，中国加大了资本市场改革力度，推出了促进资本市场高质量发展的九项措施。Since then, the country has issued new rules and measures to better regulate holding reductions by major shareholders, raise the dividends for equity shareholders, and encourage the entry of long-term capital while improving mechanisms to anchor market liquidity amid slumps.此后，国家出台了新的规则和措施，以更好地规范大股东减持，提高股东股息，鼓励长期资本进入，同时完善机制，以稳定市场流动性。Liu attributed the recent rally to such reform measures, and said that more must be done to further enhance market fairness, including in areas such as stock issuance review and pricing, quantitative trading and large shareholders' stakes.刘将最近的反弹归因于这些改革措施，并表示必须做更多的工作来进一步增强市场公平，包括股票发行审查和定价，量化交易和大股东股权等领域。Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities, said that enforcing rules with greater rigor and raising penalties for fraudulent practices are essential to building lasting investor trust.悦凯证券首席经济学家罗志恒表示，更严格地执行规定，加大对欺诈行为的惩罚力度，对于建立投资者的持久信任至关重要。With the A-share market showing an improving and stabilizing trend, Luo said it can lift household income and offset part of the drag from the housing slowdown, and make people more confident to spend, thus supporting consumption and overall economic vitality.随着A股市场呈现出改善和稳定的趋势，罗说，这可以提高家庭收入，抵消住房放缓的部分拖累，使人们更有信心消费，从而支持消费和整体经济活力。The A-share rally has also enhanced the attractiveness of Chinese financial markets globally.a股的上涨也增强了中国金融市场在全球的吸引力。Thomas Fang, head of China global markets at investment bank UBS, said that global investors are showing greater interest in Chinese financial assets as the country's shining economic prospects help them to diversify their allocations from US dollar-denominated assets.投资银行瑞银（UBS）中国全球市场主管方德华（Thomas Fang）表示，全球投资者对中国金融资产表现出更大的兴趣，因为中国光明的经济前景有助于他们将资产配置从美元计价资产中分散出来。Fang applauded China's recent opening-up policies that offer global investors more instruments to invest in China, facilitating their risk management and helping them take bigger positions in the country.方赞扬了中国最近的开放政策，为全球投资者提供了更多投资中国的工具，促进了他们的风险管理，并帮助他们在中国占据更大的位置。capital market reformn.资本市场改革/ˈkæpɪtl ˈmɑːkɪt rɪˈfɔːm/A-share marketn.A股市场（中国内地股票市场）/eɪ ʃeə ˈmɑːkɪt/

During peak lunch hour at a busy restaurant in Chengdu, Sichuan province, four chefs work in perfect unison, deftly churning out multiple dishes as flames leap from the woks. However, their expertise and execution are not only of interest to the customers waiting for the food, but also to over 50,000 viewers watching them live at work on Douyin, China's short-video platform.在四川省成都市一家人气餐厅的午间用餐高峰时段，四位厨师配合默契，炒锅火光跃动间，娴熟地烹制出一道道菜品。他们的精湛技艺不仅吸引着等候取餐的顾客，还受到中国短视频平台抖音上5万余名实时观看直播网友的关注。Luoxiaoyang Home-Style Cuisine, which opened its doors in June, has attracted more than 1.7 million followers on Douyin by livestreaming what goes on in its kitchen.这家名为“罗小羊家常菜”的餐厅于今年6月开业，通过直播厨房日常运作，已在抖音平台积累超170万粉丝。Responding to increasing public concern about food safety, a number of restaurants nationwide have begun livestreaming their kitchen operations - a strategy aimed at both winning diners' trust and boosting visibility through online engagement.随着公众对食品安全的关注度持续提升，全国多地餐厅纷纷开启厨房直播模式。这一举措既是为赢取消费者信任，也旨在通过线上互动提高店铺曝光度。The growing interest in "transparent kitchen" livestreams follows a heated online debate sparked by celebrity entrepreneur Luo Yonghao. Last week, Luo criticized domestic restaurant chain Xibei on China's popular social media platform Sina Weibo, alleging that many dishes were premade. His post went viral, prompting public discussion about food safety and kitchen transparency.“透明厨房”直播受热捧，源于知名企业家罗永浩引发的一场网络热议。上周，罗永浩在国内知名社交平台新浪微博上，对连锁餐饮品牌西贝提出质疑，称其多款菜品为预制菜。该言论迅速走红网络，引发公众对食品安全与厨房透明度的广泛讨论。Kitchen livestreams are not exactly new. In March, the State Council, China's Cabinet, issued a guideline strengthening food safety supervision, urging platforms and merchants to implement"internet plus transparent kitchen"initiatives and enhance oversight on delivery-only restaurants through public monitoring.厨房直播并非新鲜事物。今年3月，中国国务院印发关于加强食品安全监管的指导意见，明确要求平台与商户落实“互联网+透明厨房”举措，并通过公众监督强化对纯外卖餐厅的监管。Sun Juanjuan, an associate professor at Hebei Agricultural University and researcher at the Center for Coordination and Innovation of Food Safety Governance, said, "As customers have begun focusing on how the food is being prepared, restaurants have shifted focus from price wars to hygiene standards."河北农业大学副教授、食品安全治理协同创新中心研究员孙娟娟表示：“如今消费者更关注菜品制作过程，餐饮企业的竞争焦点已从价格战转向卫生标准。”However, some industry insiders worry that the livestreams could become mere "performances".不过，部分业内人士担忧，厨房直播可能沦为“表演秀”。Zhong Kai, a food safety expert from the China Food Information Center, said the actual impact of livestreaming on food safety supervision might be more about deterrence than regulation."Issues such as pesticide residues or cross-contamination are hard to catch via livestreams. Most food safety incidents that have been exposed have been due to snapshots of chefs not wearing masks or hats, or catching glimpses of rats in kitchens," he said.中国食品信息中心食品安全专家钟凯指出，直播对食品安全监管的实际作用更多体现在震慑层面，而非直接监管。“农药残留、交叉污染等问题难以通过直播发现。目前曝光的食品安全问题，多是因镜头捕捉到厨师未戴口罩、帽子，或厨房内出现老鼠等明显违规场景。”Yet, Sun said: "Implementing 'transparent kitchen' measures in the mass catering sector has always been a regulatory challenge. Now, with public enthusiasm and demand, it can help accelerate implementation across various regions."孙娟娟则认为：“在大众餐饮领域推行‘透明厨房'，一直是监管工作的难点。如今借助公众的热情与需求，有望推动这一举措在各地加速落地。”premadeadj.预制的；预先制作的/ˌpriːˈmeɪd/deterrencen.震慑；威慑/dɪˈterəns/cross-contaminationn.交叉污染/ˌkrɒs kənˌtæmɪˈneɪʃn/

A recent controversy has drawn widespread public attention to pre-made dishes in China, prompting calls for greater standardization and transparency in the industry. Central to the discussion are concerns over food safety and consumers' right to be fully informed.最近的一场争议引起了公众对中国预制菜肴的广泛关注，促使人们呼吁该行业提高标准化和透明度。讨论的核心是对食品安全和消费者充分知情权的担忧。The debate began when celebrity entrepreneur Luo Yonghao, known for his outspoken views and livestreaming influence, took to social media site Sina Weibo on Wednesday to criticize the popular Xibei restaurant chain.这场争论始于周三，以直言不讳的观点和直播影响力而闻名的名人企业家罗永浩在社交媒体网站新浪微博上批评了这家受欢迎的西北连锁餐厅。Luo wrote that after a recent meal with colleagues, he found most dishes were pre-made and costly, calling the experience "disgusting" and urging the government to require restaurants to clearly indicate whenever pre-made dishes are used. The post quickly went viral, garnering millions of comments and sparking industry discussion.罗写道，在最近与同事共进晚餐后，他发现大多数菜肴都是预制的，而且价格昂贵，称这种经历“令人作呕”，并敦促政府要求餐馆在使用预制菜肴时明确注明。这篇帖子迅速走红，获得了数百万条评论，引发了行业讨论。Xibei founder Jia Guolong responded by emphasizing that the chain uses pre-preparation techniques but does not serve pre-made meals. "Not a single dish in Xibei outlets is a pre-made dish," Jia said.西贝创始人贾国龙回应称，该连锁店使用预处理技术，但不提供预制餐。贾说：“在西北分店，没有一道菜是预制的。”。The chain opened its kitchens to media for a firsthand look at operations, but the distinction between pre-made dishes and pre-preparation processes remained unclear, fueling further debate. Jia described the controversy as "the biggest external crisis" in Xibei's history, noting a sharp decline in daily revenue across nearly 400 outlets over several days.该连锁店向媒体开放了厨房，让他们直接了解运营情况，但预制菜肴和预制过程之间的区别仍然不清楚，这引发了进一步的争论。贾将这场争议描述为西北历史上“最大的外部危机”，并指出近400家门店的日收入在几天内急剧下降。Despite widespread adoption in large chain restaurants, pre-made dishes remain controversial for several reasons: small-scale producers may fail to meet food safety standards; consumers lack clarity on what constitutes a pre-made dish; and some businesses mislead patrons by charging for "freshly made" dishes that are actually reheated pre-made products.尽管在大型连锁餐厅被广泛采用，但预制菜肴仍然存在争议，原因有几个：小规模生产商可能无法达到食品安全标准；消费者不清楚什么是预制菜；一些商家通过对“新鲜制作”的菜肴收费来误导顾客，这些菜肴实际上是重新加热的预制产品。Regulatory notices encourage restaurants to clearly indicate their use of pre-made dishes to ensure consumer rights to information and choice.监管通知鼓励餐馆明确表明他们使用预制菜肴，以确保消费者的信息权和选择权。According to a 2024 notice issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation and other authorities, pre-made dishes are pre-packaged food products made from one or more edible agricultural ingredients, with or without seasonings and without added preservatives. They undergo industrial pre-processing — such as mixing, marinating, forming, frying, baking, boiling or steaming — and may include seasoning packets. These products are intended to be consumed after heating or cooking and must be produced, stored, transported and sold according to the conditions specified on their labels.根据国家市场监督管理总局和其他部门发布的2024年通知，预制菜肴是由一种或多种可食用农业成分制成的预包装食品，可以添加或不添加调味料，也可以不添加防腐剂。它们经过工业预处理，如混合、腌制、成型、油炸、烘烤、煮沸或蒸煮，可能包括调味包。这些产品拟在加热或烹饪后食用，必须按照标签上规定的条件生产、储存、运输和销售。Fresh vegetables or ingredients that have only undergone simple processing, including washing, peeling or cutting, as well as ready-to-eat foods — such as salads, convenience meals, steamed buns, pastries, hamburgers, sandwiches, pizzas and central kitchen-prepared dishes delivered to chain outlets — are not considered pre-made dishes. Heating refers to simple reheating before consumption, while cooking indicates thorough preparation of partially processed ingredients.新鲜蔬菜或仅经过简单加工的食材，包括清洗、去皮或切割，以及即食食品，如沙拉、便餐、馒头、糕点、汉堡、三明治、披萨和中央厨房准备的送到连锁店的菜肴，都不被视为预制菜。加热是指食用前的简单再加热，而烹饪是指对部分加工的食材进行彻底准备。The notice outlined measures to strengthen food safety supervision. These include enforcing producer responsibility, verifying raw materials, regulating food additives, revising production licensing, enhancing inspections and promoting clear labeling in restaurants.通知概述了加强食品安全监管的措施。这些措施包括执行生产者责任、核实原材料、监管食品添加剂、修订生产许可证、加强检查和在餐馆推广清晰的标签。Earlier, officials from the State Administration for Market Regulation said pre-made dishes do not require preservatives because cold storage, freezing and sterilization ensure safety, while aligning with consumer expectations and risk control requirements.早些时候，国家市场监督管理总局的官员表示，预制菜肴不需要防腐剂，因为冷藏、冷冻和消毒可以确保安全，同时符合消费者的期望和风险控制要求。Tan Guijun, director of the Nutrition Department at Tianjin First Central Hospital, told Xinhua News Agency that while fresh ingredients retain nutrients more fully and are generally more aligned with the body's needs, this does not mean pre-made dishes should be dismissed entirely. As long as production, transportation, storage and cooking processes comply with relevant food safety standards, pre-made dishes can adequately meet the body's requirements for calories and nutrition.天津第一中心医院营养科主任谭贵军告诉新华社，虽然新鲜食材能更充分地保留营养，而且通常更符合身体的需求，但这并不意味着预制菜肴应该完全被抛弃。只要生产、运输、储存和烹饪过程符合相关食品安全标准，预制菜肴就可以充分满足人体对卡路里和营养的需求。According to previous media reports, consumers and industry insiders said the controversy reflects broader concerns and underscores the need to balance industry efficiency with consumer protection, with transparency, regulation and innovation shaping the sector's future.根据之前的媒体报道，消费者和业内人士表示，这场争议反映了更广泛的担忧，并强调了在行业效率与消费者保护之间取得平衡的必要性，透明度、监管和创新塑造了该行业的未来。sterilizationn.灭菌/ˌster.ɪ.laɪˈzeɪ.ʃən/pre-madeadj.预制的/ˌpriːˈmeɪd/

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened down 40-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 24,237 on turnover of 5-billion N-T. The market gained solid ground on Monday - closing up more than 500-points as investors were boosted by news that the U-S Federal Reserve could soon cuts interest rates. Vice premier confirms ongoing car tariff talks but gives few details Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun says U-S car imports are part of ongoing tariff talks with Washington. Speaking at a legislative hearing, Cheng told lawmakers that Washington has expressed the hope for greater openness and expanded market access (市場准入) for U-S cars. According to Cheng, tariffs on U-S car imports and compliance with safety and emissions standards were still being negotiated. She failed to provide any further details. But Cheng did say she has held three video conferences with U-S officials since returning to Taiwan on August 1 .. KMT's Lo Chih-chiang joins race for party chair K-M-T lawmaker Lo Chih-chiang has announced his plans to seeking the party's leadership. Lo made the announcement in a Facebook post with a photo of him standing next to a statue of Sun Yat-sen. He survived a recall vote on July 26 and said in the post that his top priority (優先考慮的事，重點) will be to stop President Lai Ching-te from winning a second four-year term in 2028. Luo also said in the Facebook post that he will release further details of his campaign to seek the post of K-M-T chair later today. US Trump says he'll meet Kim Jong Un U.S. President Donald Trump says he will meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un - potentially this year and that he 's open to further trade talks with South Korea - as he hosted President Lee Jae Myung at the White House The future of their military alliance (聯盟) was also on the agenda at the meeting just hours after President Trump suggested in a social media post that the US might stop doing business with the country. Kate Fisher reports from Washington. Brazil Buys US Tariff Affected Products Brazil's government says it will buy several domestic products that have been hit by the 50% higher U.S. tariffs on the country's exports. They include acai, coconut water, mangoes, Brazilian nuts, honey and fish. Most of these will be used in state schools or in stock building (增加庫存) nationwide. Officials say coffee and beef, which were also affected by the increase imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump, were not included on the government's list because there are other markets interested in them. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下為 SoundOn 動態廣告－－－－ 無論是駕駛、行人或自行車騎士，「停讓先行」不僅是口號，更是城市交通文化的核心。 讓我們將安全意識化為日常實踐，共同為行人、自行車及校園周邊建構更安全的用路環境，讓澎湖成為全齡友善的宜居城市。 交通部及澎湖縣政府關心您。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

China's commitment to cultivating new quality productive forces through scientific and technological innovation, as reiterated by President Xi Jinping, will help the country gain a competitive edge in strategic emerging fields and tech frontiers, and contribute to global economic growth, said experts and company executives.Highlighting that fostering new growth drivers has been high on China's development agenda, they called for accelerated efforts to achieve breakthroughs in crucial technologies by investing more in fundamental research, reinforcing the dominant position of enterprises in boosting technological advancements, and intensifying financial support for innovation-oriented tech companies.First put forward by Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, during his inspection tour of Heilongjiang province in September 2023, the term "new quality productive forces" has been highlighted at several high-profile meetings.New quality productive forces are driven by revolutionary technological breakthroughs, the innovative allocation of production factors, and deep industrial transformation and upgrading, Xi said while presiding over a group study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in January last year.He pointed out that sci-tech innovation can generate new industries, new models and new growth drivers, which are the core elements of the development of new quality productive forces.The tone-setting Central Economic Work Conference held in December called for more efforts to make sci-tech innovation drive the development of new quality productive forces and build a modern industrial system.Huang Hanquan, head of the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, said, "Developing new quality productive forces is an intrinsic requirement for promoting China's high-quality development and will inject fresh momentum into global economic growth."Huang said that China has favorable conditions for fostering new quality productive forces, given its ever-increasing innovation capacities, complete industrial systems, ultra-large domestic market, high-caliber talent pool and massive data resources.To gain an upper hand in a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, he stressed that more efforts should be made to bolster sci-tech innovation, especially innovation in cutting-edge and disruptive technologies, and to accelerate the industrial application of innovative achievements, further deepen reforms in technology and education mechanisms, and expand high-level opening-up.A meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on July 30, which was presided over by Xi, called for accelerating the cultivation of emerging pillar industries with global competitiveness and promoting the deep integration and development of sci-tech innovation and industrial innovation."Sci-tech innovation plays a pivotal role in nurturing new quality productive forces. China has sent a clear signal that it is dedicated to implementing the innovation-driven development strategy and facilitating the in-depth integration of digital technologies with the real economy, in a bid to drive a shift from old growth drivers to new ones," said Luo Zhongwei, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Industrial Economics.Luo emphasized the need to improve indigenous innovation abilities by stepping up investment in core technologies in key fields to solve bottleneck issues.Pan Helin, a member of the Expert Committee for Information and Communication Economy, which is part of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, said, "The integrated advancements in sci-tech innovation and industrial innovation are crucial for promoting social and economic development, advancing Chinese modernization and cultivating fresh driving forces."According to Pan, China's focus on nurturing new quality productive forces is conducive to speeding up the establishment of a modern industrial system and enhancing the stability and resilience of industrial and supply chains.Pan said that in fostering new quality productive forces, different regions of the country should focus on comparative advantages and base their efforts on local conditions, avoiding blind investment in specific fields.Li Dongsheng, founder and chairman of Chinese consumer electronics maker TCL Technology Group Corp, said, "The development of new quality productive forces requires further stimulating technological innovation, continuously investing in scientific research and talent development, and supporting the intelligent transformation of industries."Li underscored the need to give full play to the leading role of enterprises in bolstering sci-tech innovation and motivate their innovation vitality.China's spending on research and development maintained rapid growth last year, thanks to efforts to support technological innovation. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows that China's R&D expenditure exceeded 3.6 trillion yuan ($502.3 billion) in 2024, up 8.3 percent year-on-year, ranking second in the world.In recent years, the country's strength in sci-tech innovation has taken a major leap. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, China has moved up to 11th place in the rankings of the world's most innovative economies and remains the only middle-income economy in the top 30."China is not only a manufacturing powerhouse, but also a global innovation powerhouse driving trends in digitalization, sustainability and high-tech industries," said Denis Depoux, global managing director of market consultancy Roland Berger."China has emerged as a strong player in the global R&D landscape, and has made rapid progress in the development of AI technology, becoming one of the global leaders, and the pace will further accelerate," Depoux said.The country's emphasis on accelerating the development of new quality productive forces will attract more investment by foreign companies to support Chinese companies' transformation, and to bring more technologies to the world's second-largest economy, he added.Anu Rathninde, president for Asia-Pacific at Johnson Controls, a United States-based smart building solutions provider, said the rise of new quality productive forces signifies a transformative shift in China's economic model, replacing outdated growth drivers with more dynamic ones and establishing the foundation for more sustained and robust economic development in the future.He said that China is an important part of the company's global business network, and will continue to be a key contributor to global economic growth. "We are confident in the Chinese market and determined to deepen our footprint here," he said.Chris Lee, senior vice-president and head of Asia-Pacific at Aveva, a United Kingdom-based industrial software developer, said that China has rapidly emerged as a global frontier for industrial innovation, presenting vast development opportunities fueled by the development of new quality productive forces and the country's vibrant digital economy.The company recently launched its China intelligent innovation center, its first localized R&D center, to deepen its "in China, for China" strategy.Lee highlighted that China's mature and extensive industrial system and supply chain offer an unparalleled platform for technological innovation, adding that the company will deepen its roots locally and collaborate closely with local partners to empower China's smart manufacturing and industrial digitalization.

En este episodio lo último en salud y fitness edición de julio 2025, vamos a platicar de varios temas que sin duda son bastante interesantes.Veremos si la melatonina puede hacerte más rápido (sí, leíste bien), cómo el ejercicio actúa como un antioxidante natural en tu cuerpo, los beneficios del entrenamiento de fuerza para mujeres mayores con obesidad sarcopénica, qué pasa cuando combinas ayuno intermitente con superávit calórico, y hasta cómo la jardinería en realidad virtual puede mejorar la cognición en adultos mayores.Este mes nos enfocamos en estudios que no solo tienen buena base científica, sino que también puedes aplicar en tu día a día. Mi idea es que al terminar este episodio tengas información clara, basada en evidencia, pero que también puedas usar de inmediato. Sin tanta teoría complicada y con consejos que realmente funcionan.Referencias: 1.      Mahdi, N., Delleli, S., Jebabli, A. & Maaoui…, K. B. Melatonin Supplementation Enhances Next-Day High-Intensity Exercise Performance and Recovery in Trained Males: A Placebo-Controlled Crossover Study. Sports (2025).2.      Xie, Y., Gu, Y., Li, Z., Zhang, L. & Hei, Y. Effects of exercise on different antioxidant enzymes and related indicators: a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. Scientific Reports (2025).3.      Guo, C., Dai, T., Zhang, H., Luo, M. & Gao…, J. Effect of resistance training on body composition and physical function in older females with sarcopenic obesity—a systematic review and meta-analysis of …. Frontiers in Aging … (2025).4.      Blake, D. T., Hamane, C. & Pacheco…, C. Hypercaloric 16: 8 time-restricted eating during 8 weeks of resistance exercise in well-trained men and women. Journal of the … (2025).5.      Chuang, I. C., Abdullahi, A., Chen, I. C. & Wu…, Y. R. Effects of immersive leisure-based virtual reality cognitive training on cognitive and physical function in community-based older adults: A randomized controlled trial. Digital … (2025).

Michael Luo is an executive editor at The New Yorker and writes regularly on politics, religion, and Asian American issues. His first book, “Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America,” is a well-researched history of Chinese Americans from the Gold Rush until the 1960s. Using his skills as a former investigative reporter, Luo manages to bring back to life the myriad Chinese Americans who struggled, suffered, and even were murdered in their persistent efforts to make this strange new land a new home for themselves and for those who would one day follow in their footsteps.

Welcome to Season 5, Episode 28! In this episode, we sit down with Michael Luo, the award-winning journalist, editor, and author of Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America. Currently an executive editor at The New Yorker, Michael writes extensively on politics, religion, and Asian American issues. Before joining The New Yorker, he spent over a decade at The New York Times as a national correspondent and investigative reporter, earning accolades like the George Polk Award and the Livingston Award for Young Journalists. His latest book, Strangers in the Land, published by Doubleday in April 2024, is a sweeping and deeply researched narrative history of the Chinese American experience—from the Gold Rush era to the 1960s. Drawing from archival sources, court cases, and personal stories, Luo sheds light on how Chinese immigrants helped build America while simultaneously being pushed to its margins. He highlights the people and policies that shaped their journey—from the railroad workers and early activists to the architects of exclusion laws and the courts that upheld them. Through vivid storytelling and compelling analysis, Luo explores the roots of anti-Asian sentiment in the U.S., the foundations of our modern immigration surveillance state, and the broader struggle for belonging in a multiracial democracy. This is a must-read not only for lovers of history but for anyone seeking to understand how the past shapes our present-day debates on race, immigration, and identity. In our conversation, Michael shares insights on how he approached this project, why it was important to center underrepresented figures like Hung Wah, Wong Chin Foo, Chin Gee Hee, and Sun Chong, and how understanding this history can guide us through today's political and cultural tensions. If you want to hear more from Michael you can read his work in the New Yorker or see his posts on Instagram @luomich. If you like what we do, please share, follow, and like us in your podcast directory of choice or on Instagram @AAHistory101. For previous episodes and resources, please visit our site at https://asianamericanhistory101.libsyn.com or our links at http://castpie.com/AAHistory101. If you have any questions, comments or suggestions, email us at info@aahistory101.com.

Cet été, RFI vous emmène à la découverte des objets de pouvoir, des objets qui sont devenus des symboles de l'autorité de certains hommes d'État ou d'acteurs politiques du continent. Dans cet épisode, nous allons au Kenya pour parler du chasse-mouche, qu'avait adopté Jomo Kenyatta. Il est devenu le premier président du pays le 12 décembre 1964, un an après l'indépendance, et l'est resté jusqu'à sa mort, le 22 août 1978. Les images d'archives le montrent brandissant son chasse-mouche, un accessoire fait à partir d'une queue de vache qui fait sens pour sa communauté, les Kikuyus, mais qui l'aide aussi à affirmer sa position de chef d'État.  De notre correspondante à Nairobi,  Mai 1963, élections générales au Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta est alors le leader de KANU, le parti en tête. Il est photographié jubilant, brandissant son chasse-mouche. « Kenyatta était toujours avec son chasse-mouche, raconte Anaïs Angelo, historienne à l'académie des sciences de l'Autriche, et autrice d'un livre sur l'arrivée au pouvoir et la présidence de Jomo Kenyatta. C'est un objet qu'il apportait avec lui partout où il allait et que l'on retrouve aussi sur toutes les représentations de Kenyatta que ce soit des photos, des statues... Ça fait partie de son personnage politique ». Cet objet, selon cette historienne, a permis à l'ancien président de renforcer son image d'homme proche du peuple : « Dans sa manière de gouverner, il a un rapport très personnel. Ce n'est pas quelqu'un qui investit énormément par exemple dans les médias. Par contre, il va dans des cérémonies collectives, locales... il visite souvent les gens. Et je pense qu'il faut prendre le chasse-mouche comme quelque chose que tout le monde a, qui est quelque part assez banal, assez traditionnel, mais qui est crédible ». À lire aussiJomo Kenyatta, défenseur des droits des Kikuyu (1&2) Dans la culture kikuyu, dont est originaire Jomo Kenyatta, le chasse-mouche permet d'éloigner les insectes, mais il est aussi utilisé pour saluer ou asperger de l'eau bénite lors de cérémonies. Ce sont les hommes qui s'en servent, les plus âgés de la communauté. C'est aussi cet ancrage culturel qu'a voulu montrer Kenyatta, affirme James Nene, secrétaire général du Conseil des anciens Kikuyus : « Traditionnellement, le chasse-mouche permet d'établir un statut d'ancien au sein de la communauté. Aucun ancien ne sortait sans son chasse-mouche. Jomo Kenyatta respectait et suivait la culture kikuyu. Il utilisait donc le chasse-mouche comme un moyen d'identification, à sa culture et à son statut. Cela complétait son image d'ancien et d'homme d'État ». Une image qu'il a soigneusement construite dès 1938, quand il choisit de s'appeler Jomo Kenyatta. « Jomo Kenyatta a inventé son personnage, il a inventé son nom, remarque Anaïs Angelo. C'était quelqu'un qui n'était pas nécessairement prédit pour faire de la politique. C'était un jeune, dans une société kikuyu qui respecte la séniorité. Pour affirmer son autorité politique, il s'est créé un personnage de sage, d'ancien ». En plus du chasse-mouche, il adopte également un chapeau traditionnel Luo, une des plus importantes communautés au Kenya. Et celle dont est originaire celui qui deviendra son rival, Oginga Odinga. À lire aussiKenyatta vs Odinga: début et fin d'une guerre dynastique au Kenya

Shoot us a Text.Episode #1074: We're diving into CDK's post-attack transformation, Waymo's bold NYC ambitions, and China's booming AI-driven live commerce, where digital humans are outselling their creators.Show Notes with links:A year after cyberattacks rocked the industry and CDK Global, the focus has shifted from crisis response to long-term resilience — though not all lessons stuck.Two cyberattacks forced CDK's DMS offline for two weeks, disrupting operations at 15,000 dealerships and costing over $1 billion in sales.Many groups invested heavily in cybersecurity and revised disaster recovery plans as a result, with leaders like Judy Serra and Joe Shaker emphasizing staff training and consultant support as critical steps forward.Helion's Erik Nachbahr noted some dealers quickly reverted to old habits, citing a recent DMS switch that went live without basic protections like multifactor authentication — a move he called unacceptable.CEO Brian MacDonald says CDK is now “stronger than ever,” with deeper investments in security, R&D, and customer experience, saying “Over the past year, we've also seen record customer renewals.”Joe Shaker of Shaker Auto Group and TruVideo said, “It could happen to anyone. My feelings were that after going through what they've gone through and after looking at every nook and cranny of their business for security that [CDK] may be the most secure.”Waymo is preparing to re-enter New York City to map and test its autonomous vehicles — with human drivers — as it eyes a major expansion into one of the most complex and coveted markets in the U.S.Waymo is returning to NYC for the first time since 2021 to resume mapping and testing, though humans will remain behind the wheel due to state law.The company is lobbying for legal changes and applying for a permit to operate in Manhattan with safety specialists in the driver seat.In a groundbreaking move, Baidu aired a 6-hour shopping livestream led entirely by AI-generated digital humans modeled after popular host Luo Yonghao — and it crushed human-led benchmarks.The broadcast introduced 133 products with AI versions of Luo and a co-host responding to viewer comments in real time.The digital duo generated $7.6 million in sales, outperforming Luo's real past performance in just 26 minutes.China's live commerce market hit $695 billion in 2023, and Baidu now counts over 100,000 active digital human hosts, with the company saying digital humans can cut broadcast costs by 80% and boost sales by 62%.“To be honest, I was really shocked by the effectiveness of this digital human,” Luo said post-show, calling it “reality.”Join Paul J Daly and Kyle Mountsier every morning for the Automotive State of the Union podcast as they connect the dots across car dealerships, retail trends, emerging tech like AI, and cultural shifts—bringing clarity, speed, and people-first insight to automotive leaders navigating a rapidly changing industry.Get the Daily Push Back email at https://www.asotu.com/ JOIN the conversation on LinkedIn at: https://www.linkedin.com/company/asotu/

The United States' repeated and unpredictable policy shifts have not only enhanced the risk of deepening its economic and trade frictions with China, but have also weakened its credibility in the international market, analysts and exporters said on Monday.分析人士和出口商周一表示，美国反复无常、不可预测的政策变化，不仅增加了加深其与中国经贸摩擦的风险，也削弱了其在国际市场上的信誉。These policy shifts are undermining the confidence of global businesses and investors in US policies, market conditions and assets, they added.他们补充道，这些政策变化正在削弱全球企业和投资者对美国政策、市场状况及资产的信心。Their remarks came after the Ministry of Commerce urged the US to promptly rectify its wrongful actions. In a statement issued on Monday, the ministry said the US has seriously undermined the consensus reached during the China-US economic and trade talks on May 12 in Geneva, Switzerland, by repeatedly imposing discriminatory and restrictive measures on China.他们的言论是在中国商务部敦促美国立即纠正错误做法之后发表的。商务部在周一发表的声明中表示，美国一再对中国实施歧视性和限制性措施，严重损害了5月12日在瑞士日内瓦举行的中美经贸会谈中达成的共识。The measures include issuing export control guidance for artificial intelligence chips, halting sales of chip design software to China, and announcing the revocation of visas for Chinese students.这些措施包括发布人工智能芯片出口管制指引、停止向中国出售芯片设计软件，以及宣布撤销中国学生签证。The ministry warned that if the US continues to undermine China's interests, China will adopt effective measures to defend its legitimate rights and interests.商务部警告称，如果美方继续损害中方利益，中方将采取有效措施维护自身合法权益。Describing the outcomes of the Geneva talks as "hard-won", the ministry said the US has unilaterally and repeatedly triggered frictions, exacerbating uncertainty and instability in bilateral economic and trade relations.中国商务部将日内瓦会谈的成果描述为“来之不易”，并表示美方单方面、反复挑起摩擦，加剧了双边经贸关系的不确定性和不稳定性。Based on the consensus reached during the talks, China has temporarily canceled or suspended relevant tariff and nontariff countermeasures against the US' "reciprocal tariffs", the ministry said.商务部表示，基于会谈期间达成的共识，中方已暂时取消或暂停针对美方“对等关税”实施的相关关税和非关税反制措施。Wan Zhe, a professor of international trade at Beijing Normal University, said the US tariffs are essentially a radical attempt to politicize and instrumentalize trade issues.北京师范大学国际贸易教授万喆表示，美国的关税本质上是将贸易问题政治化和工具化的激进尝试。"The erratic and unpredictable nature of these tariff and economic measures has damaged the US' credibility in the global economy and dented global investors' confidence in the US market," Wan said, adding that the consequences will come at a steep cost for both its economy and international standing.万喆说：“这些关税和经济措施反复无常、不可预测的性质，损害了美国在全球经济中的信誉，削弱了全球投资者对美国市场的信心。”她补充说，其后果将给美国经济和国际地位带来高昂代价。Zak Stambor, an analyst at eMarketer Inc, a market research company based in New York City, said the US' "ever-shifting trade policies" mean "navigating an increasingly unpredictable landscape", making life and any attempts at financial planning harder for both manufacturers and consumers.纽约市场研究公司eMarketer的分析师扎克·斯坦博表示，美国“不断变化的贸易政策”意味着要“在一个日益不可预测的环境中航行”，这使得制造商和消费者的生活以及任何进行财务规划的尝试都变得更加困难。"The policies in place today may well shift tomorrow, making medium-term planning challenging and long-term planning nearly impossible," he said. "No wonder so many US companies are pulling their guidance altogether."他说：“今天的政策明天就可能改变，这使得中期规划充满挑战，长期规划几乎不可能。难怪这么多美国公司干脆撤回了业绩指引。”The frustration is not limited to US companies.叫苦不迭的不仅仅是美国公司。On Saturday, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, said, "We strongly regret the announced increase of US tariffs on steel imports from 25 percent to 50 percent."周六，欧盟执行机构欧盟委员会表示：“我们对美国宣布将钢铁进口关税从25%提高到50%深表遗憾。”The US' announcement "adds further uncertainty to the global economy and increases costs for consumers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic", the commission said, adding that the plan also undermines efforts to bring an end to the wider tariff standoff.欧盟委员会表示，美国的公告“给全球经济增添了更多不确定性，并增加了大西洋两岸消费者和企业的成本”，并补充说该计划还破坏了结束更广泛关税僵局的努力。Gao Lingyun, a researcher specializing in international trade at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, said the US' broader goals of reshoring manufacturing and maintaining economic hegemony cannot be addressed simply by imposing tariffs and other trade remedy measures on its trading partners.中国社会科学院（北京）国际贸易研究员高凌云表示，美国通过将制造业回流本土和维持经济霸权等更广泛的目标，不可能仅仅通过对其贸易伙伴加征关税和实施其他贸易救济措施就得以解决。In addition to the tariffs, the US has also been resorting to technological blockades and investment restrictions in its bid to contain China. Such multifaceted frictions are likely to be long-term, Gao said.高凌云说，除了关税之外，美国还一直在诉诸技术封锁和投资限制以遏制中国。这种多方面摩擦很可能是长期性的。Diversifying markets市场多元化Ningbo Lemeijia Electric Equipment Technology, a home appliance manufacturer based in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, and long-term supplier to the US market, said the company has actively communicated with its US partners and explored opportunities to bag more orders after the Geneva talks.总部位于浙江省宁波市的家电制造商、美国市场的长期供应商宁波乐美佳电器科技有限公司表示，在日内瓦会谈后，公司已积极与美国合作伙伴沟通，并探索拿到更多订单的机会。Even though the company's exports to the US surged 16.9 percent year-on-year to 220 million yuan ($31 million) last year, Luo Lujin, president of Ningbo Lemeijia, said the company has deployed more resources and manpower this year to cultivate emerging markets, especially those in Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, in order to mitigate the risks brought by unilateralism and geopolitical tensions.尽管该公司去年对美出口额同比增长16.9%，达到2.2亿元人民币（3100万美元），但宁波乐美佳总裁罗鲁津表示，今年公司已投入更多资源和人力来开拓新兴市场，特别是东南亚、拉丁美洲和中东的市场，以减轻单边主义和地缘政治紧张带来的风险。"Global trade flows are being seriously hampered by supply chain breakdowns, high tariff rates and other challenges. This makes diversification not just an option, but an essential strategy for survival," Luo said.罗鲁津说：“全球贸易流动正受到供应链中断、高关税和其他挑战的严重阻碍。这使得多元化不仅是一种选择，更是一种生存必需之策。”trade friction贸易摩擦countermeasures/ˈkaʊntəˌmɛʒəz/n.对策;对抗措施emerging markets新兴市场trade flows贸易流通tariff standoff关税僵局

What does it mean to truly belong in America?  Michael Luo, executive editor at The New Yorker and author of Strangers in the Land, joins Redeeming Babel's director of content, DT Slouffman, to explore the Asian American experience—from the legacy of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the rise in anti-Asian hate during the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing from personal stories and a viral moment that sparked national conversation, Luo confronts the “perpetual foreigner” stereotype and envisions a more inclusive vision of American identity. DT and Michael unpack how race, immigration, and belonging continue to shape all of our lives. Send written questions or voice memos for “Ask Curtis” episodes to: askcurtis@redeemingbabel.org Send Campfire Stories to: info@redeemingbabel.org   Resources mentioned in this episode: Michael Luo's An Open Letter to the Woman Who Told My Family to Go Back to China Kirkus Reviews: A Vast History Began With One Sidewalk Encounter  Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882 The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868 Immigration and Nationality Act, 1965 Pew Research: Asian American discrimination in the COVID-19 pandemic Pew Research: A third of Asian Americans changed daily routine due to threats   More From Michael Luo: Michael Luo's Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America  Michael Luo's latest articles at The New Yorker Follow Michael Luo on Instagram Follow Michael Luo on X (formerly Twitter)   Follow Us: Good Faith on Instagram Good Faith on X (formerly Twitter) Good Faith on Facebook   Sign up: Redeeming Babel Newsletter

In this video, Dr. Ettensohn examines the growing claim that Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) is almost entirely genetic, offering a critical, clinically grounded reflection on what the current science actually supports—and where it falls short. He discusses how genetic contributions to personality traits are often misunderstood, and why claims of “hardwired narcissism” oversimplify a profoundly complex developmental process. Drawing from empirical research, neurodevelopmental theory, and clinical observation, Dr. Ettensohn explores how narcissistic pathology emerges not simply from temperament, but from early relational experiences—especially chronic emotional neglect, inconsistent attunement, and conditional regard. He addresses how brain plasticity, diagnostic controversies, and the misunderstood vulnerable core of NPD further complicate the genetic narrative. This video offers a nuanced perspective for anyone seeking to understand NPD beyond reductive models, emphasizing the importance of relational context, developmental history, and psychological depth. References: Brummelman, E., Thomaes, S., Nelemans, S. A., Orobio de Castro, B., Overbeek, G., & Bushman, B. J. (2015). Origins of narcissism in children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(12), 3659–3662. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1420870112 Chen, Y., Jiang, X., Sun, Y., & Wang, Y. (2023). Neuroanatomical markers of social cognition in neglected adolescents. NeuroImage: Clinical, 38, 103501. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nicl.2023.103501 Gatz, M., Reynolds, C. A., Fratiglioni, L., Johansson, B., Mortimer, J. A., Berg, S., & Pedersen, N. L. (2006). Role of genes and environments for explaining Alzheimer disease. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63(2), 168–174. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.63.2.168 Horton, R. S., Bleau, G., & Drwecki, B. (2006). Parenting Narcissus: What are the links between parenting and narcissism? Journal of Personality, 74(2), 345–376. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00380.x Luo, Y. L. L., Cai, H., & Song, H. (2014). A behavioral genetic study of intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of narcissism. PLOS ONE, 9(4), e93403. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0093403 Nenadić, I., Lorenz, C., & Gaser, C. (2021). Narcissistic personality traits and prefrontal brain structure. Scientific Reports, 11, 15707. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-94920-z Otway, L. J., & Vignoles, V. L. (2006). Narcissism and childhood recollections: A quantitative test of psychoanalytic predictions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(1), 104–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205279907 Schulze, L., Dziobek, I., Vater, A., Heekeren, H. R., Bajbouj, M., Renneberg, B., & Roepke, S. (2013). Gray matter abnormalities in patients with narcissistic personality disorder. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 47(10), 1363–1369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2013.05.017 Skodol, A. E. (2012). The revision of personality disorder diagnosis in DSM-5: What's new? Current Psychiatry Reports, 14(1), 39–43. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11920-011-0243-2

In 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the now infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the country. Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen J. Field characterized Chinese migrants as “strangers in the land.” New Yorker editor Michael Luo says that label persists today, even as more than 22 million people of Asian descent now reside in the U.S. In a new history book, Luo tells the stories of 19th and 20th century Chinese migrants and analyzes the long tail of contemporary anti-Asian racism and violence while championing those who fought against it. We listen back. Guests: Michael Luo, executive editor, The New Yorker; author, “Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America” Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

China's emphasis on accelerating the development of the digital economy and advancing the concept of "Digital China" will give the country a competitive edge in strategic emerging sectors and safeguard global security, said officials and experts.官员和专家表示，中国强调加快发展数字经济，推进“数字中国”建设，将增强中国在战略性新兴领域的竞争优势，维护全球安全。Emphasizing that the boom of cutting-edge digital technologies has emerged as a new engine driving China's economic growth, they called for heightened efforts to push forward the construction of digital infrastructure, bolster the deeper integration of the real and digital economies, and promote technological innovation and the application of rapidly evolving artificial intelligence in a wider range of sectors.他们强调，尖端数字技术蓬勃发展，已成为中国经济增长的新引擎，并呼吁加大力度推进数字基础设施建设，促进实体经济和数字经济深度融合，推动技术创新和快速发展的人工智能在更广泛领域的应用。When delivering a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Second World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, Zhejiang province, in December 2015, President Xi Jinping said that China is implementing the "Internet Plus" action plan and advancing the building of a "Digital China".2015年12月，习近平主席在浙江乌镇举行的第二届世界互联网大会开幕式上发表主旨演讲时表示，中国正在实施“互联网+”行动计划，推进“数字中国”建设。In a congratulatory letter sent to the first Digital China Summit, which opened in April 2018 in Fuzhou, Fujian province, Xi called for fostering new driving forces through informatization, in order to promote new development and make new achievements.2018年4月，首届数字中国建设峰会在福建福州开幕，习近平主席向峰会致贺信。他强调，要通过信息化培育新动能，推动新发展、取得新成就。He emphasized that digitalization, networking and the application of intelligent technologies, which have been greatly developed, are playing increasingly important roles in promoting social and economic development, modernizing China's governance capacity, and meeting the people's ever-growing needs for a better life.他强调，数字化、网络化、智能化技术应用水平显著提升，在促进经济社会发展、推进国家治理能力现代化、满足人民日益增长的美好生活需要方面发挥着越来越重要的作用。This year marks the 10th anniversary of the nation's efforts to construct a "Digital China". China's digital economy has gained strong momentum in recent years, with remarkable achievements made in fields such as artificial intelligence, integrated circuits, industrial software and basic software.今年是“数字中国建设”十周年。近年来，中国数字经济发展势头强劲，人工智能、集成电路、工业软件、基础软件等领域取得了令人瞩目的成就。The added value of core industries of the digital economy accounted for about 10 percent of GDP in 2024, while the total data output reached 41.06 zettabytes, marking a robust 25 percent year-on-year increase, according to the "Digital China Development Report 2024" released by the National Data Administration.根据国家数据局发布的《数字中国发展报告（2024年）》，到2024年，数字经济核心产业增加值占GDP比重将达到10%左右，数据总输出量将达到41.06泽字节，同比增长25%。The report said the total scale of China's computing power reached 280 EFLOPS last year. EFLOPS is a unit of the speed of computer systems and is equal to 1 quintillion floating-point operations per second. Furthermore, it said, the country had built more than 4.25 million 5G base stations by the end of December.报告称，去年中国计算能力总规模达到280 EFLOPS。EFLOPS是计算机系统速度的单位，相当于每秒进行100万亿次浮点运算。此外，报告还称，截至12月底，中国已建成超过425万个5G基站。"To accelerate the building of a 'Digital China', it is crucial to seize the unprecedented opportunities brought about by AI," said Liu Liehong, head of the NDA, at the recently concluded 8th Digital China Summit, highlighting the significance of advancing reforms related to the market-oriented allocation of data elements and implementing the AI Plus initiative.“加快建设‘数字中国'，关键是要抓住人工智能带来的前所未有的机遇。”国家数据局局长刘烈宏在刚刚闭幕的第八届数字中国建设峰会上表示，他强调推进数据要素市场化配置改革、实施“人工智能+”战略具有重要意义。Noting that data serves as a new type of production factor, Liu said that more efforts are needed to increase the supply of high-quality data, accelerate the integration of data elements with AI, technological innovation and industrial development and application, and press ahead with the construction of national computing power infrastructure.刘烈宏指出，数据是新型生产要素，需要加大优质数据供给力度，加快数据要素与人工智能的融合发展、技术创新和产业发展应用，推进国家算力基础设施建设。He noted that new computing power in major computing hubs will account for more than 60 percent of the country's total by the end of this year, and called for cultivating a national integrated data market, establishing standards and systems for data circulation and transaction, and strengthening international cooperation in the digital economy domain.他指出，到今年年底，主要计算枢纽新增算力将占全国新增算力的60%以上。他呼吁培育全国一体化数据市场，建立数据流通交易标准体系，加强数字经济领域的国际合作。Luo Zhongwei, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Industrial Economics, said, "Innovative digital technologies represented by AI, 5G, cloud computing and big data are currently finding a wide range of applications across various industries such as manufacturing, finance and healthcare, and speeding up their integration with the real economy."中国社会科学院工业经济研究所研究员罗仲伟表示：“以人工智能、5G、云计算、大数据等为代表的创新数字技术，正在制造业、金融业、医疗健康等各行各业得到广泛应用，并与实体经济加速融合。”Luo said that facilitating the development of the digital economy is of vital significance for nurturing new quality productive forces, propelling the intelligent transformation and upgrading of traditional industries and consolidating economic recovery momentum, in order to drive a shift from old growth drivers to new ones amid a volatile external environment and tariff pressures from the United States.罗仲伟表示，在外部环境动荡、美国关税压力加大等背景下，推动数字经济发展对于培育新的优质生产力、推动传统产业智能化转型升级、巩固经济复苏势头、促进新旧动能转换具有重要意义。To gain an upper hand amid increasingly fierce international competition, Luo stressed the need to double down on indigenous innovation to make breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields like raw materials, precision components and high-end equipment, and expand the industrial application scenarios of advanced technologies.为了在日益激烈的国际竞争中占据先机，罗仲伟强调，必须加大自主创新力度，突破原材料、精密零部件、高端装备等关键领域的核心技术，拓展先进技术的产业应用场景。In February 2023, China unveiled a plan for the overall layout of its digital development, vowing to make important progress in the construction of a "Digital China" by 2025, with effective interconnectivity in digital infrastructure, a significantly improved digital economy and major breakthroughs in digital technological innovation. By 2035, the nation is expected to be at the global forefront of digital development.2023年2月，中国公布了《数字中国建设整体布局规划》，提出到2025年，“数字中国”建设要取得重要进展，数字基础设施有效互联互通，数字经济水平显著提升，数字技术创新取得重大突破。到2035年，中国数字发展水平要位居世界前列。"As a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation is evolving, promoting the in-depth integration of digital technologies with the real economy is a necessary requirement for establishing a modern industrial system and a strategic choice of forging new competitive advantages on the global stage," said Pan Helin, a member of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's Expert Committee for Information and Communication Economy.工信部信息通信经济专家委员会委员盘和林表示：“新一轮科技革命和产业变革正在兴起，推动数字技术与实体经济深度融合，是构建现代产业体系的必然要求，也是打造国际竞争新优势的战略选择。”The move to develop the digital economy is conducive to enhancing the resilience of industrial and supply chains, advancing new industrialization and realizing Chinese modernization, Pan said.他指出，发展数字经济有利于增强产业链供应链韧性，推进新型工业化，实现中国式现代化。He added that a bigger push is needed to reinforce the dominant position of enterprises in boosting sci-tech advancements, increase financial support for innovation-oriented tech companies, and strengthen the training of high-caliber talent.他补充说，需要加大力度巩固企业在科技进步中的主体地位，加大对创新型科技企业的资金支持，加强高层次人才培养。Wu Jianping, an academician at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, said the emergence of state-of-the-art digital technologies has laid a solid foundation for unleashing the value of massive data elements, which underscores the significance of safeguarding data security, a prerequisite to ensuring the orderly development of the data industry.中国工程院院士吴建平表示，先进数字技术的出现为释放海量数据要素的价值奠定了坚实基础，保障数据安全对于数据产业有序发展至关重要。AI seen as key人工智能被视为关键AI, which has entered a stage of explosive growth, is spearheading the development of the digital economy and is being integrated into every facet of industrial revolution and people's lives.人工智能已进入爆发式增长阶段，引领数字经济发展，并融入到产业变革和人们生活的方方面面。Robin Li, co-founder and CEO of Chinese tech giant Baidu Inc, said that the application of AI technology is reshaping the industrial landscape and will be a transformative force that revolutionizes development over the next 40 years.中国科技巨头百度公司联合创始人兼首席执行官李彦宏表示，人工智能技术的应用正在重塑产业格局，将成为未来40年发展变革的变革力量。Li said the goal of the intelligent transformation of industries and society through AI is to fulfill people's needs—making technology meaningful only if it serves humanity by creating more value and contributing to society.李彦宏表示，人工智能推动行业和社会智能化转型的目标是满足人的需求——只有服务于人类，创造更多价值，贡献社会，技术才有意义。Zhou Hongyi, founder of Chinese internet enterprise 360 Security Group, said: "Looking ahead, the growth potential of China's economy will come from industrial upgrading driven by technological innovation, while AI represented by large language models will give birth to new production and business models in traditional fields such as manufacturing, agriculture and services, creating more social value."中国互联网企业360安全集团创始人周鸿祎表示：“展望未来，中国经济的增长潜力将来自技术创新驱动的产业升级，而以大型语言模型为代表的人工智能将催生制造业、农业、服务业等传统领域的新型生产和商业模式，创造更多社会价值。”Zhou said 360 Security Group will focus on digital security and AI, adding that it is important to promote the digital transformation of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, as they face mounting pressure from a shortage of capital, talent and technology.周鸿祎表示，360安全集团将专注于数字安全和人工智能领域，并指出，推动中小微企业数字化转型至关重要，因为它们面临着日益增长的资金、人才和技术短缺压力。Denis Depoux, global managing director of market consultancy Roland Berger, said, "China has made rapid progress in the development of AI technology, becoming one of the global leaders, and the pace will further accelerate. AI will unlock massive opportunities for our business."市场咨询公司罗兰贝格全球管委会联席总裁丹尼斯·德普表示：“中国在人工智能技术发展方面取得了快速进步，已成为全球领先者之一，而且这一步伐还将进一步加快。人工智能将为我们的业务带来巨大的机遇。”Foreign companies can play a bigger role in supporting China's transformation in fields such as decarbonization and the digitalization of industrial and supply chains, he added.他补充说，外国公司可以在支持中国在低碳化、产业链和供应链数字化等领域转型方面发挥更大作用。digitization/ˌdɪdʒɪtaɪˈzeɪʃn/n.数字化resilience/rɪˈzɪliəns/n.韧性；恢复力interconnectivity/ˌɪntərkəˌnekˈtɪvəti/n.相互连接的状态或能力recalibration/ˌriːˌkælɪˈbreɪʃn/n.再校准；重新调整

Dr. Jenkins sits down with Dr. Liang Luo, Professor at the University of Kentucky and an expert in Chinese folklore, to explore the rich cultural history of snakes in Chinese tradition. The conversation begins with the Legend of the White Snake—one of the four most iconic stories in Chinese folklore—and delves into Dr. Luo's book on the topic. They also discuss the significance of the snake in the Chinese Lunar Calendar, with a special focus on the Year of the Snake. This episode offers a fascinating blend of mythology, history, and cultural insight.Connect with Liang Luo at the University of Kentucky. Connect with Chris on Facebook, Instagram or at The Orianne Society.Shop Snake Talk merch.If you like what you've been hearing on this podcast, consider supporting The Orianne Society today.

In 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the now infamous Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the country. Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen J. Field characterized Chinese migrants as “strangers in the land.” New Yorker editor Michael Luo says that label persists today, even as more than 22 million people of Asian descent now reside in the U.S. In a new book, Luo tells the stories of 19th and 20th century Chinese migrants and analyzes the long tail of contemporary anti-Asian racism and violence while championing those who fought against it. His new history is “Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America.” Guests: Michael Luo, executive editor, The New Yorker; author, “Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America” Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Business groups and economists have welcomed the tariff adjustment measures announced by China and the United States on Monday, expressing the hope that the 90-day triple-digit tariff respite will allow both countries to further de-escalate trade tensions.中美两国周一宣布的关税调整措施受到商界团体和经济学家的欢迎，他们希望这项为期90天的三位数关税缓和政策能够为两国进一步缓解贸易紧张关系创造条件。While this provisional agreement marks a notable development in China-US trade relations, analysts warned that business communities should maintain a measured approach, rather than be overly optimistic, as uncertainties still surround the sustainability of the deal and future trade negotiations.尽管这项临时协议标志着中美贸易关系取得显著进展，但分析人士警告称，商界应保持审慎态度，不应过度乐观，因为该协议的可持续性和未来的贸易谈判仍然存在不确定性。According to a joint statement released by the world's two largest economies after a high-level meeting held over the weekend in Geneva, Switzerland, the US has agreed to slash its 145 percent tariffs on Chinese imports to 30 percent, while China has agreed to lower its tariffs on US goods to 10 percent from 125 percent.根据世界两大经济体上周末在瑞士日内瓦举行的高层会晤后发表的联合声明，美国同意将对中国进口商品征收的145%的关税削减至30%，而中国同意将对美国商品征收的关税从125%降至10%。Thomas Fullerton, an economist and a professor of economics at the University of Texas at El Paso, told China Daily that the 90-day triple-digit tariff respite "will help reduce the odds of a deep 2025 business-cycle contraction in both (the US and China), as well as in Latin America and other regions".德克萨斯大学埃尔帕索分校经济学家兼经济学教授托马斯·富勒顿告诉《中国日报》，为期90天的三位数关税暂缓期“将有助于降低中美以及拉丁美洲和其他地区在2025年出现严重经济周期性衰退的可能性”。"International trade volumes will temporarily accelerate as companies place merchandise import orders that had previously been sidelined," he said.他表示：“随着企业下达此前被搁置的商品进口订单，国际贸易量将暂时加速增长。”Pesitro Healthcare Products Co, a manufacturer of oral care products based in Yangzhou, Jiangsu province, and a longtime supplier to Walmart in the US, expects a significant increase in orders from North American customers.总部位于江苏扬州的口腔护理产品制造商华腾个人护理用品有限公司，是美国沃尔玛的长期供应商，该公司预计来自北美客户的订单将大幅增长。"People are accelerating their purchases because no one can predict future tariff dynamics," said Mu Longsheng, the company's marketing director. "The looming possibility of tariffs rising to 54 percent after 90 days has created additional urgency among North American buyers to secure inventory while rates are still low."“由于无人能够预测未来的关税走势，大家都在加快采购。”该公司市场总监穆龙生说，“90天后关税可能升至54%的预期，使得北美买家更急于在当前税率较低时确定库存。”"The return of the US market is largely attributed to China's resolute countermeasures. Standing firm has earned us the respect and the orders we deserve," Mu added.“美国市场的复苏很大程度上归功于中方的坚决反制。我们的坚定立场为我们赢得了应有的尊重和订单，”穆补充道。Jake Colvin, president of the National Foreign Trade Council based in Washington, DC, said the temporary agreement "cools the rapidly escalating trade war and gives some reprieve to US businesses and consumers".位于华盛顿特区的美国全国对外贸易委员会主席杰克·科尔文表示，这项临时协议“为迅速升级的贸易战降温，并给美国企业和消费者带来了一些喘息的机会”。"However, a temporary pause is just that," he said in a statement. "We urge the administration to continue engagement with China to come to a lasting agreement that will allow American companies to make long-term plans in a more stable and certain environment."“然而，暂时的停摆也只是暂时的，”他在一份声明中表示。“我们敦促政府继续与中方接触，达成一项持久的协议，使美国企业能够在更稳定、更确定的环境中制定长期计划。”US President Donald Trump told reporters on Monday that he was certain a long-term deal would be reached. If it is not, the tariffs will not go back to 145 percent after the 90-day pause ends, but "will go up substantially", he said.美国总统唐纳德·特朗普周一告诉记者，他确信会达成一项长期协议。他表示，如果未能达成，关税在90天的停摆期结束后不会恢复到145%，而是“将大幅上调”。Long battle ahead旷日持久的战斗Analysts expect a long-drawn-out battle ahead, because they believe the gaps between China and the US on existing tariffs and nontariff barriers have further complicated the negotiations.分析人士预计，未来将是一场旷日持久的博弈，因为他们认为，中美在现有关税和非关税壁垒方面的分歧进一步加剧了谈判的复杂性。Gao Lingyun, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of World Economics and Politics, said that despite the progress made in tariff reduction, the current overall duty rates continue to weigh heavily on companies and consumers on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所研究员高凌云表示，尽管在降低关税方面取得了进展，但目前整体税率依然对两岸企业和消费者造成较大压力。Resolving this hefty tariff issue will, therefore, remain a key priority during upcoming negotiations, he said.因此，他表示，解决这一高额关税问题仍将是即将举行的谈判的首要任务。More important, the discussions are expected to expand into the realm of nontariff barriers. Areas such as investment regulations, market access and the supply of critical raw materials are likely to feature prominently on the agenda, he added.更重要的是，预计谈判将扩展到非关税壁垒领域。他补充说，投资监管、市场准入和关键原材料供应等领域可能会成为谈判的重点。Gao noted that both China and the US have long-standing concerns in these areas, and addressing them will be crucial for achieving a comprehensive and durable trade agreement.高凌云指出，中美双方长期以来都对这些领域存在关切，解决这些问题对于达成一项全面持久的贸易协定至关重要。Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities, said, "The results of any future negotiations will ultimately be determined by how each side leverages its power and economic resilience."粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒表示：“未来任何谈判的结果最终都将取决于双方如何利用各自的实力和经济韧性。”The outcome of the talks represented a notable shift from the "maximum pressure" approach that had characterized the previous China trade policy of the US, he said.他表示，此次谈判的结果标志着美国对华贸易政策明显偏离了以往“极限施压”的策略。When confronted with China's firm countermeasures, the effectiveness of such unilateral actions proved less substantial than initially projected, leading to a necessary recalibration of the US' negotiating position, Luo said.罗志恒表示，面对中国的强硬反制措施，此类单边行动未能产生预期效果，因此美国有必要重新调整谈判立场。respite/ˈrespɪt/n.暂缓，喘息calibration/ˌkælɪˈbreɪʃən/n.校准；调适nontariff barriern.非关税壁垒durable/ˈdjʊərəbl/adj.持久的，耐用的

A new study has proven that ancient iguanas rafted over sea all the way from North America to Fiji, a staggering 8,000 km away. We discuss this epic voyage, and then turn our attention to a colourful new species of wolf snake from Myanmar.  Become a Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/herphighlights Merch: https://www.redbubble.com/people/herphighlights/shop Full reference list available here: http://www.herphighlights.podbean.com Main Paper References: Scarpetta SG, Fisher RN, Karin BR, Niukula JB, Corl A, Jackman TR, McGuire JA. 2025. Iguanas rafted more than 8,000 km from North America to Fiji. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122:e2318622122. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2318622122. Species of the Bi-Week: Van Nguyen T, Lee Jl, Jiang K, Ding L, Chit Mat, Poyarkov Na, Vogel G. 2025. A new species of wolf snake Lycodon Fitzinger, 1826 from China and Myanmar (Squamata: Colubridae), and new data on Lycodon gongshan Vogel & Luo, 2011. Zootaxa 5621:1–51. DOI: 10.11646/zootaxa.5621.1.1. Other Links/Mentions: Bakar F. 2019.Frogs who married “to bring rain” to Indian village get divorced. Available at https://metro.co.uk/2019/09/15/frogs-who-married-to-bring-rain-to-indian-village-get-divorced-because-of-too-much-downpour-10745884/ (accessed April 30, 2025). Editing and Music: Intro/outro – Treehouse by Ed Nelson Species Bi-week theme – Michael Timothy Other Music – The Passion HiFi, https://www.thepassionhifi.com Intro visuals – Paul Snelling

What can the lives of trials of our Asian American neighbors teach the rest of us? Michael Luo, executive editor of The New Yorker and author of the new book Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America, joins Mooreto talk about our country's treatment of its Chinese residents, which drew Luo to trace his own family's path to the United States. Moore and Luo discuss not only American sentiments toward the Chinese populations but also the ways our country deals with perceived strangers, the unique challenges of Asian American churches grappling with whether to become multiethnic, Luo's experience of being a Christian in secular media spaces, and the ways his friendship with Tim Keller informed his view of Keller's unique gifts and legacy.   Resources mentioned in this episode or recommended by the guest include: Strangers in the Land by Michael Luo Special offer for listeners of The Russell Moore Show: Click here for 25% off a subscription to CT magazine. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In recent years, there's been a stark uptick in the level of violence and hate crimes that Asian Americans have experienced, but the “precarity of the Asian American experience is not new,” Michael Luo tells David Remnick. Luo is a longtime New Yorker editor, and the author of a new book about the Chinese American experience. He looks at how tensions over labor—with native-born workers often blaming immigrants for their exploitation by business interests—intersected with racial and religious prejudice, culminating in episodes of extraordinary violence and laws that denied immigrants civil rights and excluded new arrivals from Asia. “The way politicians, craven politicians, talk about immigrants today could be just torn from the nineteenth century,” he points out. “I do think that the ‘stranger' label is still there.” But Luo also uncovers the extraordinary support of Chinese Americans from Frederick Douglass, who argued extensively for the immigrants' political participation and civil rights. “Asian American history is American history,” Luo says. “I want all the dads who are reading about World War Two, . . . who are interested in Civil War literature, to read about this different racial conflagration.” Luo's book is “Strangers in the Land: Exclusion, Belonging, and the Epic Story of the Chinese in America.”

We complete our look at Luo's article from PKC Journal. We discuss straight line bagua and its function within the Gao Style.

China has urged the United States to cancel its unilateral tariffs as quickly as possible, and get back on track to properly address differences through equal dialogue.中国敦促美方尽快取消单边关税，回到通过平等对话妥善处理分歧的正轨上来。If the US stubbornly pursues its course of a trade war, China will "fight till the end" to defend its legitimate rights and interests, Chinese officials said on Thursday.中国官员周四表示，如果美方一意孤行地打贸易战，中方将“誓死捍卫自身合法权益”。They didn't specify whether Beijing will again raise tariffs on US goods, which now stand at an additional 84 percent, in response to the latest decision by the US on Wednesday to raise the tariff on Chinese imports to 125 percent.中国官员并未具体说明北京是否会再次提高对美商品的关税。目前，美国对华商品的关税已高达84%，以回应美方周三将对华进口商品的关税提高至125%。The China Film Administration said on Thursday evening that the country—the world's second-largest film market—will moderately reduce the imports of US films.中国国家电影局周四晚间表示，作为全球第二大电影市场，中国将适度减少美国电影的进口。"The US government's abuse of tariffs against China will inevitably lead to a further decline in the favorable perception of US films among the Chinese audience," the administration said in an online statement. "We will adhere to the law of the market and respect the choices of the audience, and moderately reduce the number of US films imported."国家电影局发布声明表示：“美国政府滥用关税对华政策，必然导致中国观众对美国电影的好感度进一步下降。我们将遵循市场规律，尊重观众选择，适度减少美国电影的进口数量。”He Yongqian, spokeswoman for the Ministry of Commerce, said at a news conference on Thursday, "Our position is consistent and clear—the door to dialogue is open, but any discussions must be conducted on the basis of mutual respect and equality."中国商务部发言人何永乾周四在新闻发布会上表示：“中方立场是一贯和明确的——对话的大门是敞开的，但任何讨论都必须在相互尊重和平等的基础上进行。”However, she stressed the abuse of pressure, threats and extortion is not the way to engage with China.但她强调，滥用施压、威胁和勒索并非与中国交往之道。"We hope that the two countries will meet each other halfway and work toward resolving differences through dialogue and consultation, guided by the principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation," she added.她补充道：“我们希望两国相向而行，在相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢的原则指导下，通过对话协商解决分歧。”She noted that the current bonded policies in the special supervision areas of China's free trade zones will still be applicable for US goods, specifying that taxes will still need to be duly paid once the US goods depart the designated areas and enter the Chinese market for sales.她指出，中国自贸区特殊监管区域内的现行保税政策仍将适用于美国商品，并明确规定美国商品离开指定区域进入中国市场销售后仍需按时缴纳税款。US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that he was pausing his new tariffs for 90 days except on China.美国总统唐纳德·特朗普周三表示，他将暂停对除中国以外的所有国家征收新关税90天。Trump said on social media that he had "authorized a 90-day PAUSE, and a substantially lowered Reciprocal Tariff during this period, of 10 percent, also effective immediately". He did not specify which countries the pause would apply to, but he was clear that the levies would climb for China.特朗普在社交媒体上表示，他已“授权暂停90天，并在此期间大幅降低10%的对等关税，同样即日生效”。他没有具体说明暂停措施将适用于哪些国家，但他明确表示，对中国的关税将有所提高。Gary Winslett, an assistant political science professor at Middlebury College in Vermont, said: "The 90-day pause is a step in the right direction, but the trade war with China is still bad, the universal 10 percent tariff is even worse, the on-again-off-again approach is bad for investment and jobs, and we further undermined geopolitical leadership with nothing to show for it."佛蒙特州明德学院政治学助理教授加里·温斯莱特表示：“90天的暂停是朝着正确方向迈出的一步，但与中国的贸易战本身依然有害，10%的普遍关税更糟糕，反复无常的政策令投资与就业环境雪上加霜，我们的地缘领导力也在不断被削弱。”Analysts noted that the Trump administration's 10 percent base tariff is still in place, suggesting that more rounds of tariff negotiations are ahead. The White House said that over 70 countries had come forward to negotiate tariffs this week.分析人士指出，特朗普政府10%的基准关税仍然有效，这表明未来还有更多轮关税谈判。白宫表示，本周已有超过70个国家提出就关税进行谈判。Luo Zhenxing, an associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, said that the US' selective approach to different countries allows Washington to maintain its image, as removing tariffs across the board could be seen as a setback. In addition, it shows that the Trump administration is using tariffs as a tool and weapon, likely targeting China, Luo added.中国社会科学院美国研究所副研究员罗振兴表示，美国对不同国家采取选择性措施，有助于维护自身形象，因为全面取消关税可能会被视为一种挫败。此外，这也表明特朗普政府正在将关税作为一种工具和武器，可能用于针对中国。Such moves by the US have severely disrupted the global trade system. Regardless of future policy directions, key global trade principles like the WTO's nondiscrimination rule have been significantly undermined, potentially leading to a restructuring of global trade and even global financial systems, Luo said.罗振兴表示，美国的此类举动严重扰乱了全球贸易体系。无论未来的政策走向如何，像世贸组织非歧视性规则这样的关键全球贸易原则都已受到严重破坏，这可能导致全球贸易乃至全球金融体系的重组。Lin Jian, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, told a news conference on Thursday that China will never allow the international economic and trade rules and the multilateral trading system to be undermined.外交部发言人林剑周四在新闻发布会上表示，中国绝不允许国际经贸规则和多边贸易体制受到破坏。The US is placing its own interests above the legitimate interests of the rest of the world, sacrificing the just interests of all countries to serve its hegemonic ambitions, Lin said, adding that this will inevitably face stronger opposition from the international community.林坚表示，美国将自身利益置于世界其他国家的合法利益之上，为了实现其霸权野心不惜牺牲所有国家的正当利益，这必将遭到国际社会的强烈反对。China and the European Union have recently exchanged views on strengthening economic and trade cooperation in response to US tariff hikes.中国与欧盟近期就加强经贸合作应对美国加征关税交换了意见。The latest move came as Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held a video call on Tuesday with European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maros Sefcovic, during which they discussed various issues, including enhancing China-EU economic and trade cooperation and responses to the US imposition of so-called "reciprocal tariffs", according to a statement released by the Commerce Ministry on Thursday.据中国商务部周四发布的声明，商务部长王文涛周二与欧盟贸易和经济安全委员谢夫乔维奇举行视频通话，就加强中欧经贸合作、应对美国加征所谓“对等关税”等议题进行了讨论。Wang said that under current circumstances, China and the EU jointly upholding the rules-based multilateral trading system and staying committed to trade liberalization and facilitation will "inject more stability and certainty into the global economic and trade landscape".王文涛表示，在当前形势下，中欧共同维护基于规则的多边贸易体制，坚持贸易自由化便利化，将“为全球经贸格局注入更多稳定性和确定性”。According to the statement, the two sides agreed to immediately start negotiations on electric vehicle pricing commitments, and resume the China-EU trade remedy dialogue mechanism.声明称，双方同意立即启动电动汽车价格承诺谈判，并重启中欧贸易救济对话机制。The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China said on Thursday that China has the chance to establish a business environment that can provide the stability and reliability that investors require.中国欧盟商会周四表示，中国有机会建立一个能够为投资者提供所需稳定性和可靠性的营商环境。On the contrary, the US is now rolling back on many of the principles that have underpinned its approach to global trade and investment, which has created unprecedented global economic uncertainty, the chamber said.该商会表示，相比之下，美国目前正在放弃其全球贸易和投资方针的许多原则，这造成了前所未有的全球经济不确定性。retaliationn.报复sanctionn.制裁levyv.征税equal dialogue平等对话hegemonicadj.霸权的multilateral trading system多边贸易体制

China has vowed to take firm and necessary countermeasures in response to the United States' escalating tariff threats, reaffirming its commitment to defending national interests while upholding the stability of the global trade system.中国发誓将采取坚决必要措施，以应对美国不断升级的关税威胁，重申其维护国家利益和维护全球贸易体系稳定的决心。Analysts said that China's move sent a strong signal to the international community of rejecting unilateralism and joining efforts to safeguard multilateral trade rules.分析人士表示，中国此举向国际社会发出强烈信号，表明中国反对单边主义，携手维护多边贸易规则。They noted that Beijing retains ample policy tools to respond, including raising tariffs on US energy and agricultural imports, as well as further expanding export controls on critical minerals such as rare earth elements. These targeted actions are expected to increase pressure on Washington and could pave the way for a return to rational negotiations, they added.他们指出，北京方面拥有充足的政策工具来应对，包括提高对美国能源和农产品进口的关税，以及进一步扩大对稀土元素等关键矿产的出口管制。他们补充说，这些有针对性的行动预计将加大对华盛顿的压力，并可能为恢复理性谈判铺平道路。"China will resolutely take countermeasures to safeguard its rights and interests, should the United States escalate its tariff measures," the Ministry of Commerce said in a statement on Tuesday, hours after the US threatened to impose a further 50 percent tariff on China if Beijing does not withdraw its 34 percent counter-tariff.中国商务部周二在一份声明中表示：“如果美国升级关税措施，中方将坚决采取反制措施，维护自身权益。”此前数小时，美国威胁称，如果北京不撤销已加征的34%反制关税，将对中国进一步加征50%的关税。US President Donald Trump signed an executive order on April 2 regarding the so-called "reciprocal tariffs", imposing a 10 percent "baseline tariff" and higher rates on certain trading partners.美国总统唐纳德·特朗普于4月2日签署了一项关于所谓“对等关税”的行政命令，决定对部分贸易伙伴征收10%的“基准关税”，并提高其税率。Last week, Beijing adopted an array of countermeasures, including an additional 34 percent tariff on US imports, following a decision by the US to impose an additional 34 percent tariff on Chinese imports.上周，继美国决定对中国进口产品加征34%的关税后，北京方面采取了一系列反制措施，包括对美国进口产品加征34%的关税。"The US' tariff escalation threat against China compounds its mistake and further exposes its nature of blackmail, which China will never accept," the ministry said. "China will fight till the end if the US is bent on going down the wrong path."中国商务部表示：“美方对华升级关税威胁加剧了其错误，进一步暴露了其讹诈本质，中方绝不接受。如果美方执意沿着错误的路走下去，中方将坚决斗争到底。”Analysts believe that the set of forceful and targeted countermeasures that Beijing has taken showed that it has ample tools at its disposal, especially against sectors and companies that are priorities for the Trump administration, and where China's dependence is not significant.分析人士认为，北京方面采取的一系列强硬且有针对性的反制措施表明，其拥有充足的反制手段，尤其针对特朗普政府重点关注、而中国对美依赖程度不高的行业和企业。The energy and agricultural sectors that Trump hopes to bolster are also the primary industries in some US states. Intensifying sanctions on these sectors would therefore heighten domestic pressure on the Trump administration, said Luo Zhiheng, chief economist at Yuekai Securities.特朗普希望加强的能源和农业部门，也是美国一些州的主要产业。因此，粤开证券首席经济学家罗志恒表示，加大对这些行业的制裁力度将加剧特朗普政府的国内压力。Luo said that China can consider extending export restrictions to potentially include lighter rare earth elements like lanthanum and cerium, as the US is highly dependent on such Chinese imports.罗志恒表示，中国可以考虑扩大出口限制，可能将镧和铈等较轻的稀土元素也纳入其中，因为美国高度依赖中国进口稀土元素。"The trade war this time is not one that can easily be settled through concessions," Luo said. "China must take firm and resolute countermeasures to defend its interests, which will then compel the US to come back to the negotiating table."“这次的贸易战不是一场能轻易通过让步解决的贸易战，”罗志恒表示，“中国必须采取坚决有力的反制措施，捍卫自身利益，从而迫使美国重返谈判桌。”The US saw widespread protests over the weekend that in part opposed the Trump administration's aggressive tariff policies, which are seen as inflicting real economic pain on households and businesses across the country.上周末，美国爆发了大规模抗议活动，部分原因是抗议特朗普政府激进的关税政策，这些政策被认为给美国各地的家庭和企业带来了实质性经济伤害。Steve Lamar, president and CEO of the American Apparel & Footwear Association, said in a statement last week, "To be clear, tariffs are taxes borne by the American companies that import the goods and the hardworking American families that buy those goods."美国服装和鞋类协会主席兼首席执行官史蒂夫·拉马尔上周在一份声明中表示：“明确地说，关税是由进口商品的美国公司和购买这些商品的辛勤工作的美国家庭承担的税款。”"Tariffs will significantly increase the cost of manufacturing in the US, and, when paired with the retaliatory tariffs that will surely come, will undermine US export opportunities as well," Lamar said.“关税将大幅增加美国制造业的成本，再加上必然会采取的报复性关税，还将损害美国的出口机会。”拉马尔说道。China's potent countermeasures don't mean that a trade war is the only way forward, as Beijing stands ready to talk with Washington.中国的强硬反制措施并不意味着贸易战是唯一的出路，北京随时准备与华盛顿对话。China urges the US to immediately correct its wrongdoing, cancel all unilateral tariff measures against China, stop its economic and trade suppression, and settle differences with China properly through dialogue on an equal footing and on the basis of mutual respect, the Commerce Ministry said.中国商务部表示，中方敦促美方立即纠正错误做法，取消所有针对中国的单边关税措施，停止其经贸打压，并在平等和相互尊重的基础上通过对话妥善解决与中方的分歧。Beijing is not alone in facing the Trump administration's "Liberation Day" tariffs. The White House has dragged its own long-standing allies into the fray, including imposing additional tariffs as high as 20 percent on imports from the European Union, 25 percent on imports from South Korea and 24 percent on imports from Japan.北京并非唯一面临特朗普政府“解放日”关税的国家。白宫将其长期盟友拖入战局，包括对欧盟进口产品征收高达20%的额外关税，对韩国进口产品征收高达25%的额外关税，对日本进口产品征收高达24%的额外关税。"By placing massive and disproportionate tariffs on our friends and our enemies alike and thereby launching a global economic war against the whole world at once, we are in the process of destroying confidence in our country as a trading partner, as a place to do business and as a market to invest capital," said Bill Ackman, a hedge fund titan who endorsed Trump's run for president.支持特朗普竞选总统的对冲基金巨头比尔·阿克曼表示：“通过对我们的朋友和敌人征收巨额且不成比例的关税，从而同时向全世界发动一场全球经济战，我们正在摧毁人们对我国作为贸易伙伴、经商环境和投资市场的信心。”"We will severely damage our reputation with the rest of the world that will take years and potentially decades to rehabilitate," Ackman said in a post on social media platform X.阿克曼在社交媒体平台X上发帖称：“这将严重损害我们在世界其他国家的声誉，需要数年甚至数十年才能恢复。”Ma Guangyuan, a senior economist, said the era of the US calling the shots and forcing countries to choose sides is over, as the US-led trade system is falling apart. However, this does not mean the end of free trade itself, as the global community still recognizes the benefits of open economic cooperation, Ma said.资深经济学家马光远表示，美国发号施令、迫使各国选边站队的时代已经结束，美国主导的贸易体系正在崩溃。然而，这并不意味着自由贸易本身的终结，因为国际社会仍然认同开放经济合作的益处。"Economics will triumph over politics and free trade will overcome hegemony," Ma added. "China can seize this chance to broaden its circle of friends and jointly foster a new trade framework on the foundation of equality, freedom and mutual benefits with other economies."“经济将战胜政治，自由贸易将战胜霸权，”马光远补充道。“中国可以抓住这个机会，扩大‘朋友圈'，与其他经济体共同构建一个在平等、自由、互利基础上的新型贸易框架。”High-ranking officials from Italy, Portugal and France, as well as the European commissioner for trade and economic security, visited China in late March. Around the same time, South Korea and Japan agreed to accelerate negotiations with China on the stalled trilateral free trade agreement.意大利、葡萄牙和法国的高级官员以及欧盟贸易和经济安全事务专员于3月底访华。与此同时，韩国和日本同意加快与中国就陷入僵局的三边自由贸易协定进行谈判。"Our championing of free trade is not just a response to US aggression, but a strategic initiative to guide the development of the multilateral system in a direction that benefits all," said Mei Xinyu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.中国国际贸易经济合作研究院研究员梅新育表示。“中国倡导自由贸易不仅是对美国侵略行为的回应，更是引导多边体系朝着惠及各方方向发展的战略举措，”"The US' blanket, across-the-board imposition of high tariffs this time might end up uniting all the affected economies into a shared marketplace that could potentially dwarf the size of the US market," Mei said.梅新育说：“美国此次全面征收高额关税，最终可能会将所有受影响的经济体联合成一个共享市场，这可能会使美国市场的规模相形见绌。”countermeasuresn.反制措施baseline tariffn.基线关税unilateralismn.单边主义blackmailn.讹诈；威胁disproportionate tariffs不成比例的关税economic coercionn.经济胁迫

Wenn jemand süchtig ist, betrifft das immer auch seine Familie und Freunde. Betty Taube, bekannt von "Germany's Next Topmodel", ist mit einer alkoholkranken Mutter aufgewachsen. “Mein ganzes Leben wurde von ihr und ihrer Sucht gelenkt”, sagt sie rückblickend. War Betty co-abhängig? Leon und Atze klären heute, was an dem Begriff problematisch ist, warum er dennoch in dutzenden Ratgebern steht – und wie man als Angehöriger helfen kann. Fühlt euch gut betreut Leon & Atze Start ins heutige Thema: 08:01 min. VVK Münster 2025: https://betreutes-fuehlen.ticket.io/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/leonwindscheid/ https://www.instagram.com/atzeschroeder_offiziell/ Der Instagram Account für Betreutes Fühlen: https://www.instagram.com/betreutesfuehlen/ Mehr zu unseren Werbepartnern findet ihr hier: https://linktr.ee/betreutesfuehlen Tickets: Atze: https://www.atzeschroeder.de/#termine Leon: https://leonwindscheid.de/tour/ Im Suchthilfeverzeichnis der Deutschen Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen e.V. könnt ihr nach Hilfsangeboten in eurer Nähe suchen – für Betroffene und Angehörige: https://www.dhs.de/service/suchthilfeverzeichnis Quellen: Die Zahlen der Suchtkranken in Deutschland stehen hier: https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/themen/praevention/gesundheitsgefahren/sucht-und-drogen.html Eine Übersichtsarbeit zu Co-Abhängigkeit findet ihr hier: Bischof, G., & Bischof, A. (2024). Mythos Co-Abhängigkeit. Sozial Extra, 48(2), 95-99. Diese Studie vergleicht die Stigmatisierung verschiedener psychischer Krankheiten: Pescosolido, B. A., Halpern-Manners, A., Luo, L., & Perry, B. (2021). Trends in public stigma of mental illness in the US, 1996-2018. JAMA network open, 4(12), e2140202-e2140202. In dieser Studie wurde “family stigma” erforscht: Corrigan, P. W., Watson, A. C., & Miller, F. E. (2006). Blame, shame, and contamination: the impact of mental illness and drug dependence stigma on family members. Journal of family psychology, 20(2), 239. Das dynamische Modell der Verantwortung wird hier beschrieben: Schomerus, G., Bauch, A., Elger, B., Evans-Lacko, S., Frischknecht, U., Klingemann, H., ... & Rumpf, H. J. (2017). Das Stigma von Suchterkrankungen verstehen und überwinden. Sucht. Hier das Video, in dem Betty von Heidi für "Germany's Next Topmodel" abgeholt wird: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2R4GgCYSwzc Empfehlungen: Die Folge Terra Xplore gibt's auch auf YouTube oder in der ZDF Mediathek: “Sucht in der Familie – Bist du co-abhängig?” Podcast “SodaKlub”, Folge #210 “Wie das Sucht-Stigma auch Angehörige trifft” mit Stigma-Forscher Prof. Georg Schomerus: https://open.spotify.com/episode/3bgyaYXm13urYrHV9ovrir?si=46ce9fa6ed114b93 Redaktion: Mia Mertens Produktion: Murmel Productions

Am 23.02.2025 steht die Bundestagswahl an. Passend dazu, haben Sinja und Boris sich der folgenden Frage gewidmet: Was hat Achtsamkeit mit Politik zu tun? Darüber hinaus sprechen die beiden darüber, ob und wie uns die Achtsamkeit bei der Entscheidung helfen kann. Umfrage: Wie gefällt dir Verstehen, fühlen, glücklich sein? Erzähle es uns hier.Hintergründe und Studien:Pacheco, G., & Lange, T. (2010). Political participation and life satisfaction: a cross‐European analysis. International Journal of Social Economics, 37, 686-702. Link zur StudieGu, X., Luo, W., Zhao, X., Chen, Y., Zheng, Y., Zhou, J., Zeng, X., Yan, L., Chen, Y., Zhang, X., Lv, J., Lang, Y., Wang, Z., Gao, C., Jiang, Y., & Li, R. (2022). The effects of loving-kindness and compassion meditation on life satisfaction: A systematic review and meta-analysis.. Applied psychology. Health and well-being. Link zur StudieFang, S., Galambos, N. L., Johnson, M. D., & Krahn, H. J. (2018). Happiness is the way: Paths to civic engagement between young adulthood and midlife. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 42(4), 425-433. Link zur StudieLong, W. J., (2021). Buddha on Politics, Economics, and Statecraft. A Buddhist Approach to International Relations: Radical Interdependence, 35-50. Link zur StudieTextstellen im Pali-Kanon, in denen der Buddha politische Aussagen macht, sind z.B. Cakkavatti-Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), Kutadanta Sutta (DN 5), Mahaparinibbana Sutta (DN 16), Anguttara Nikaya (AN 10.1), Jataka (Jataka-Mala)

In this episode of the Epigenetics Podcast, we talked with Ferdinand von Meyenn from ETH Zürich about his work on the interplay of nutrition, metabolic pathways, and epigenetic regulation. To start Dr. Meyenn recounts his pivotal research on DNA methylation in naive embryonic stem cells during his time with Wolf Reick. He explains the dynamics of global demethylation in naive stem cells, revealing the key enzymes involved and the unexpected findings surrounding UHF1—its role in maintaining DNA methylation levels and influencing the methylation landscape during early embryonic development. Dr. Meyenn then shares his perspective on the scientific transition to establishing his own lab at ETH. He reflects on his ambitions to merge the fields of metabolism and epigenetics, which is a recurring theme throughout his research. By investigating the interplay between metabolic changes and epigenetic regulation, he aims to uncover how environmental factors affect cellular dynamics across various tissues. This leads to a discussion of his recent findings on histone lactylation and its implications in cellular metabolism, as well as the intricacies of epigenetic imprinting in stem cell biology. Last but not least we touch upon Dr. Meyenn's most recent study, published in Nature, investigating the epigenetic effects of obesity. He provides a detailed overview of how adipose tissue undergoes transcriptional and epigenetic rearrangements during weight fluctuations. The conversation highlights the notion of epigenetic memory in adipocytes, showing how obesity is not just a temporary state but leaves lasting cellular changes that can predispose individuals to future weight regain after dieting. This exploration opens avenues for potential therapeutic interventions aimed at reversing adverse epigenetic modifications.   References von Meyenn, F., Iurlaro, M., Habibi, E., Liu, N. Q., Salehzadeh-Yazdi, A., Santos, F., Petrini, E., Milagre, I., Yu, M., Xie, Z., Kroeze, L. I., Nesterova, T. B., Jansen, J. H., Xie, H., He, C., Reik, W., & Stunnenberg, H. G. (2016). Impairment of DNA Methylation Maintenance Is the Main Cause of Global Demethylation in Naive Embryonic Stem Cells. Molecular cell, 62(6), 848–861. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.molcel.2016.04.025 Galle, E., Wong, C. W., Ghosh, A., Desgeorges, T., Melrose, K., Hinte, L. C., Castellano-Castillo, D., Engl, M., de Sousa, J. A., Ruiz-Ojeda, F. J., De Bock, K., Ruiz, J. R., & von Meyenn, F. (2022). H3K18 lactylation marks tissue-specific active enhancers. Genome biology, 23(1), 207. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13059-022-02775-y Agostinho de Sousa, J., Wong, C. W., Dunkel, I., Owens, T., Voigt, P., Hodgson, A., Baker, D., Schulz, E. G., Reik, W., Smith, A., Rostovskaya, M., & von Meyenn, F. (2023). Epigenetic dynamics during capacitation of naïve human pluripotent stem cells. Science advances, 9(39), eadg1936. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.adg1936 Bonder, M. J., Clark, S. J., Krueger, F., Luo, S., Agostinho de Sousa, J., Hashtroud, A. M., Stubbs, T. M., Stark, A. K., Rulands, S., Stegle, O., Reik, W., & von Meyenn, F. (2024). scEpiAge: an age predictor highlighting single-cell ageing heterogeneity in mouse blood. Nature communications, 15(1), 7567. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51833-5 Hinte, L. C., Castellano-Castillo, D., Ghosh, A., Melrose, K., Gasser, E., Noé, F., Massier, L., Dong, H., Sun, W., Hoffmann, A., Wolfrum, C., Rydén, M., Mejhert, N., Blüher, M., & von Meyenn, F. (2024). Adipose tissue retains an epigenetic memory of obesity after weight loss. Nature, 636(8042), 457–465. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-08165-7   Related Episodes Nutriepigenetics: The Effects of Diet on Behavior (Monica Dus) Epigenetic and Metabolic Regulation of Early Development (Jan Żylicz) Effects of Environmental Cues on the Epigenome and Longevity (Paul Shiels)   Contact Epigenetics Podcast on Mastodon Epigenetics Podcast on Bluesky Dr. Stefan Dillinger on LinkedIn Active Motif on LinkedIn Active Motif on Bluesky Email: podcast@activemotif.com

It's Friday, August 16th, A.D. 2024. This is The World View in 5 Minutes written by Jonathan Clark and heard at www.TheWorldView.com. Filling in for Adam McManus I'm Ean Leppin. Taliban Persecutes Church in Afghanistan International Christian Concern or the ICC reports that the Taliban celebrated its third anniversary of its takeover of Afghanistan.  The climate for believers in Afghanistan has become very dire.  The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has pleaded with the US Department of State to designate Afghanistan as a Country of Particular Concern since 2022.  However the US Department has never recognized those concerns by making Afghanistan a ‘Special Watchlist Country'. According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom the Taliban has implemented an extreme version of Sharia Law in the country since they took power.  The enforcement of that law includes ‘Public executions, lashings and floggings, stoning, beatings, and acts of public humiliation such as forced head shaving.'  Not only that but the Taliban has also restricted contact with the outside world including any efforts to send assistance to the churches through legal and logistical difficulties.  Please pray that believers in Afghanistan would be encouraged and that their faith will remain strong. Joshua 1:9 says “Be strong and courageous. Do not be afraid; do not be discouraged, for the Lord your God will be with you wherever you go.”  Taliban Holds Parade to Celebrate 3 years in Afghanistan On Wednesday the Taliban celebrated their 3 year occupation in Afghanistan with a military parade at Bagram Airfield, which was once the largest US military base in the country.  Not only that but the parade showcased US military vehicles and weapons that were left behind when the US left Afghanistan. Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg told Fox News about the events that led up to such an abrupt evacuation of US military presence and who is responsible. KELLOGG: “It primarily falls on Joe Biden and Kamala Harris, because they walked away from the Doha Agreement.  That was the agreement that President Trump put in place.  It wasn't a perfect agreement.  No agreements are perfect, but it was pretty good to set the stage for good conflict-ending time in Afghanistan.  And it was a conditions-based agreement.  Most importantly, what President Trump had done, is he had established a personal relationship with Omar Baradar, who was the lead Taliban negotiator.  So we had that relationship as well.  And when President Trump talked to Baradar (and I was in the Oval Office when that happened), he told them what would happen if they didn't fulfill their agreement.  And even though it was translated, I kept thinking to myself, ‘Boy, how is this being translated, because it's pretty stern?'  After that discussion with Baradar, not a single American was killed in over a year in Afghanistan, but Biden walked away from that agreement.” The rapid evacuation of the US military resulted in $7 billion of military equipment being abandoned in the region.  Hal Kempfer a retired Marine Intelligence Officer gave Fox News some insight into what it means to run and maintain that much equipment. KEMPFER: “With the Afghan national army, they were dependent on U.S. contractors to keep all that equipment running.  So, even though they inherited $7 billion worth of equipment, which is just- I mean, that just sits on my shoulders, when I think about the sheer amount of equipment that we left there, it's horrible.  Even though we left that, they have a tough time, just like the Afghan national government did, of keeping that stuff going.  And without those U.S. contractor there, they lack the expertise, they don't have the spare parts, they don't have the ability to get the spare parts.  So what you see rolling there, one of my first thoughts was, ‘That may be, all of everything we left, that could be the only stuff that's still operating.  And that may be as fast as some of those things could probably drive too.'  So, it's not a silver lining, but it is something to consider.” New data about Amendment 4 in Florida New polls show Florida Amendment 4, which would legalize abortions up to birth in the state, doesn't have enough support to pass.  LifeNews.com reports that Amendment 4 proposes to codify unrestricted abortion in the state's constitution and would overturn every pro-life law in the state and force taxpayers to fund abortions.  Not only that, but minors wouldn't even need parental consent.  Amending the state's constitution requires approval by a 60 percent majority.  USA Today data is showing that while the 60 percent support is not reflective of the population. They have found that 58 percent of those in Florida are in favor of Amendment 4.  Data released by Florida Atlantic University shows 56 percent of those in Florida support Amendment 4.  Amendment 4 will be on the ballot in Florida this November. Isaiah 5:20 says Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter. Hurricane Ernesto continues to cause damage. Reuters news reports that as of Thursday Hurricane Ernesto has already caused massive damage in Puerto Rico.  It has destroyed over 400,000 homes and businesses and that roughly half of the country is without power. Bermuda is currently under a hurricane warning as forecasters are predicting Ernesto could make landfall later today.  By Saturday experts are expecting Ernesto to strengthen even more.  Pray for those without power and homes and for those who will are in the path of this hurricane. New Medbot could be an answer to a global surgeon shortage. A medical feat was accomplished recently using a remote control robot to remove a tumor from a patient's lung with the Surgeon being 3000 miles away!  Good News Network reports that a Chinese-made 5G Medbot allowed Dr Lou Qingquan to remotely operate robotic arms to complete a surgery.  Dr Luo was seated in the Shanghai Chest Hospital on the Pacific Coast and operated on a patient 3000 miles inland.  This is the nation's first robot-assisted surgery.  There is currently a global shortage of specialist surgeons.  It is calculated that for every 100,000 people in low and middle-income countries there is currently less than 1 specialist surgeon as compared to over 5 in high-income countries.  These Medbots could be a potential breakthrough for those in need worldwide. And that's The World View on this Friday, August 16th, in the year of our Lord 2024. Subscribe by iTunes or email to our unique Christian newscast at www.TheWorldView.com. Or get the Generations app through Google Play or The App Store. Filling in for Adam McManus I'm Ean Leppin. Seize the day for Jesus Christ.

Last time we spoke about Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zongchang. Both men were born into poverty, rose through the ranks of the military, earning popularity. Feng became known for his integrity and generosity. He played a pivotal role during the Xinhai Revolution and the subsequent warlord era, often switching allegiances opportunistically. Feng embraced Christianity and enforced discipline among his troops, earning the nickname "the Christian General." On the other side of the shoulder, Zhang Zongchang became infamous for his brutality and excesses as the "Dogmeat General." His rule over Shandong was marked by tyranny, corruption, and lavish indulgence. While Feng focused on discipline, education, and infrastructure, Zhang oppressed his subjects, enriching himself and his inner circle. Feng was often portrayed favorably, while Zhang reveled in his notorious reputation. Ultimately, they were emblematic figures of the tumultuous warlord era, shaping the course of Chinese history.   #96 Meet the Southern Warlords   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So two episodes back I introduced you all to the Northern Warlords. The father of warlords, Yuan Shikai basically created them all. When Yuan Shikai built his Beiyang Army, many of his best officers became the Northern Warlords after his death. Thus the Northern Faction as its sometimes referred to, really was an elite club of Beiyang Generals who simply were vying for power. They were all scrambling to fund their private armies and whoever at any given time had the strongest force was able to exert control over the Beiyang government located in Beijing. Within this dynamic there was a quasi balance of power going on. For the most part it was dominated by the three largest cliques in the north, the Anhui Clique, Zhili Clique and Fengtian Clique. Yet this really only applied to Northern China. Going back in time somewhat you will remember, when Yuan Shikai stole the presidency, this led to multiple rebellions, notably sprouting in the southern provinces. Dr Sun Yat-Sen stepped down from the provisional presidency, but he had not given up on his dream of a real republic for China. After the assassination of Song Jiaoren in March 1913, many believed Yuan Shikai had ordered the hit. Yuan Shikai proceeded to abuse his power and this led to southern provinces declaring independence. First was Jiangxi, followed by Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian and so forth. This all culminated with the Second Revolution of 1913. Unfortunately for the rebels, Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army yet again proved their might, achieving a complete victory over their revolutionary uprisings. KMT loyalist politicians still refused to submit to Yuan Shikai, so he simply dissolved parliament and began reorganizing China using loyal military governors in the provinces. The KMT may have been dissolved, but they were not down for the count.  After Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself emperor, Dr. Sun Yat Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Party on July 8th of 1914, but this time his old friends and colleagues refused to join him such as Huang Xing, Hu Hanmin, Chen Jiongming and Wang Jingwei. They had seen it all before. Everytime they created a movement against Yuan Shikai, he simply crushed them, they wanted no part of it. As a result, Dr Sun Yat-Sen lost the limelight, he went back into exile, biding his time. After Yuan Shikai's death, Dr Sun Yat-Sen returned to China where he formed a military Junta at Guangzhou to oppose the Beiyang government. The military Junta held a vote, electing Dr Sun Yat-Sen as Generalissimo. Wu Tingfang was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Shaoyi as Chief Finance Officer, although he did not accept the position, Cheng Biguang became the Chief Navy Officer and Hu Hanmin became the Chief Transportation officer. One of the first actions the Junta took was to denounce Duan Qirui and his colleagues as rebels and vowed they would reunify China in a grand “Northern Expedition”. With this proclamation, the Constitutional Protection War had officially begun. The war or better called a movement for now was basically the KMT's third revolution. It was put simply to defeat the Beiyang Government. However, not everyone saw eye to eye. In late 1917, many officials such as Tang Jiyao, Mo Rongxin, Lu Rongting and Tang Shaoyi convened a meeting with southwestern warlords. The purpose of the meeting was to see if they could recognize the Beiyang government and form a coalition with them, basically they were seeking a compromise with the Northern Warlords. Dr Sun Yat-Sen was outraged when he found out and placed blame on the southwestern warlords who he believed had sabotaged the Junta. He resigned angrily in May of 1918, going yet again into exile in Shanghai.While in Shanghai he found supporters and on October 10th of 1919 resurrected the KMT. After this point Dr Sun Yat-Sen would be in conflict with Southern Warlords, basically vying to control southern provincial bases of power. Initially this would be around Guangzhou and Guangdong. Now as most of you probably already know, while Dr Sun Yat-Sen founded the KMT, it ultimately was inherited by a man named Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was born October 31st in Xikou, Zhejiang. He descended from a family of salt merchants. Early in life he became interested in the military. Now he lived during a rough time, China suffered military defeats, natural disasters, famine, rebellion en masse, unequal treaties and such. In 1906 after  his first visit to Japan he began pursuing a military career. He enlisted in the Baoding Military academy that year and then went to the Tokyo Shinbu Gakko, a preparatory school for the IJA Academy for Chinese students. While there he became a revolutionary seeking to end the Qing Dynasty so a Han led Chinese republic could emerge. In 1908 he befriended Chen Qimei and it was Chen who introduced him into the Tongmenghui. After graduating from the Tokyo Shinbu Gakko, Chiang served in the IJA from 1909-1911.  When Chiang heard of the Wuchang uprising he rushed back to China, intending to serve as an artillery officer. He led a regiment in Shanghai under Chen Qimei. Then in 1912 there was a conflict between Chen Qimei and Tao Chengzhang, a revolutionary alliance leader who opposed Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Historians differ on what exactly happened, but its possible Chiang had a hand to play in the assassination of Tao. Regardless Chiang rose up through the ranks and continued to serve under Chen Qimei. Now Chen Qimei had friends in the underworld, such as the Green Gang led by Du Yuesheng. The Green Gang was a criminal syndicate in Shanghai and again historians differ on the extent, but it seems Chiang brushed shoulders with them often. Chiang Kai-Shek became a founding member of the KMT but found himself on the losing end of the Second Revolution in 1913. He fled to Japan in exile, but also secretly traveled to the Shanghai international settlement. Its said there he began working with underworld groups, like the Green Gang. On May 18th, 1916 Yuan Shikai had Chen Qimei assassinated, prompting Chiang to succeed him as leader of the KMT in Shanghai. In 1917 when Dr Sun Yat-Sen came back, Chiang quickly joined up with him, cultivating a spot as his number 2. Now I don't want to give away future episode content just yet, so I will stop it there for the KMT Clique.  The next clique as you may have guessed is of course the Chinese Communist Party. Now we talked quite a bit about its foundation, but for a refresher. After the May Fourth Movement of 1919, numerous foreign ideologies flooded into China, one was Marxism. The Russian Revolution had a profound impact on China. Hundreds of thousands of laborers during WW1 went over to Russia and found themselves stuck in the civil war. They came back and brought with them what they learnt. Two men in particular were greatly inspired by Marxism, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazaho, they were also the first two prominent Chinese figures to endorse Leninism and for a worldwide revolution to take place. They ushered in the New Culture Movement, then aided the May Fourth Movement, but by 1920 they both became very skeptical about reforming the current political situation of China. In 1921 the CCP was founded with help from the USSR. The founding national congress of the CCP was helped between July 23-30th 1921 with only 50 members, amongst whom were Li Dazho, Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong. The CCP grew quickly, originally being held in a house in the Shanghai French Concession until they were caught by police. They moved to Jiaxing, Zhejiang, electing Chen Duxiu as their 1st General Secretary. Chen became “China's Lenin” and certainly the CCP continued to ally themselves to the USSR for both had a common enemy, Japan. Again just like with the KMT, while Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were the initial leaders, Mao Zedong would inherit the leadership.  Mao Zedong was born December 26th of 1893 near Shaoshan in Hunan. His father was an impoverished peasant who grew to be one of the wealthiest farmers in Shaoshan. Mao grew up in rural Hunan and stated in memoirs he was regularly beaten by his father who was a very strict man. His mother, Wen Qimei was a devout buddhist and Mao would follow in her footests trying to become a Buddhist, but ultimately abandoning the path as a teenager. He received a confucian based education and his family arranged a marriage when he was 17 to Luo Yixiu, ultimately to unit their land-owning families. Mao refused to acknowledge the marriage and quickly moved away. The poor Luo was shamed by this and would die in 1910. Mao was a voracious reader, he loved the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margins from a young age and continued to read whatever he could get his hands on. Eventually his reading led him to a political awakening. He began reading Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Montequieu and other western works. He was also interested in history, he took a particularly interest to Napoleon Bonaparte and George Washington.  Mao moved to Changsha for middle school education in 1911 where he came into contact with the revolutionary fervor of the time. He was inspired by Dr Sun Yat-Sen, even wrote about how he thought he should become president in a school essay. Mao like many others cut off their queues during the Xinhai Revolution. Mao found himself joining a real army as a private soldier, but never saw any real combat. In 1912 he resigned from being a soldier and discovered socialism from a newspaper. Mao then enrolled in a police academy but dropped out. He then tried a soap-production school, law school, an economics school and a government run middle school, dropping out of all of them. He spent his time in Changsha's library, reading classical liberal works. Once his father figured out he was basically not doing anything but reading, he cut his allowance, forcing Mao to move into a hostel. Mao then tried to become a teacher and enrolled in the 1st normal school of Changsha. While there he befriend professor Yang Changjia who introduced him to the newspaper “the New Youth” by Chen Duxiu. Mao became inspired, and organized a Association for Student Self-Government that formed protests against school rules. He published articles in the New Youth beginning in 1917 and joined the Society of the Study of Wang Fuzhi, a revolutionary group in Changsha. He began reading about WW1, finding solidarity with the stories of soldiers, but also with workers. After graduating in 1919 he immediately moved to Beijing where his mentor Yang Changji had a job at Peking University. Yang got him a job as an assistant librarian to Li Dazhao. From here Mao became more and more influenced by Marxism, reading about the Russian revolution from the New Youth and books written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Mao joined Li Dazhao's study group becoming more and more enthralled with Marxism. He returned to Changsha working at a primary school while also organizing protests and promoting the New Culture movement there. Mao helped organize a general strike in Hunan, before he returned to Beijing to visit the terminally ill Yang Yangji. After this Mao moved to Shanghai where he met with Chen Duxiu and some prominent KMT members. Mao would brush shoulders with these KMT members often and became one of the founding members of the CCP. Again like with the KMT I don't wont to give away too much future events, so I will stop it there for the CCP. The next group was the Yunnan Clique who were born out of the Xinhai Revolution when Cai E declared Yunnan independent. Cai E had been the commander of the 37th Brigade of the New Army. After the Xinhai Revolution, Cai E tossed his lot in with Yuan Shikai, leaving behind Tang Jiyao to govern Yunnan. When Yuan Shikai initiated operation Walrus Emperor, Cai E covertly departed Beijing and returned to Yunnan to get the old gang back together. He was nearly assassinated on November 11th, but managed to flee to Japan and then Yunnan. Once back in Yunnan he established the local National Protection Army to fight Yuan Shikai. Cai E declared Yunnan independent again and quickly invaded southern Sichuan. Yuan Shikai sent his Beiyang Army south, but found this time his army was less than willing to fight. After Yuan Shikai's death, Cai E retained the position of governor-general over Yunnan and governor over Sichuan. The National Protection War bolstered Cai E as a national hero, however disaster struck in 1916 when he died suddenly of tuberculosis. His chief Lt Tang Jiyao inherited the mantle. Tang Jiyao brushed shoulders with Dr Sun Yat-Sen helping him set up his new KMT in Shanghai and would remain a KMT loyalist. Tang Jiyao also brushed shoulders with the Green Gang who helped him set up an opium trade in Yunnan. Opium grew exceptionally well in Yunnan, its climate was perfect for the plant. Like most of the cliques I will soon be talking about, events unfolded in Northern China that led southern provinces to feel another government was required. A few rival governments would come and go, but the first significant one would be established in Guangzhou and Tang Jiyao joined its committee. Within this government a political war was fought amongst numerous cliques, including Dr Sun Yat-Sen's KMT. As for those other Cliques that would do political battle, one would be the Guizhou Clique. The Guizhou Clique was founded by Liu Xianshi who was born in Xingyi Guizhou. Liu was born into a landlord family who were heavily involved in leading local militias during the late 19th century. He alongside his cousin Liu Xianqian were military men, like their father before them Liu Guanli, who was a regimental commander who helped suppress a Hui uprising. Liu Guanli bolstered his family name to the point the family became heavily dominant within the military forces of Guizhou. During the Wuchang Uprising, Guizhou was tossed into a panic. Li Xianshi went to the capital to help suppress the revolution. Meanwhile, Zhang Bailin, a Tongmenghui leader in Guizhou alongside others stormed the capital and forced the governor, Shen Yuqing to step down. On November 4th, they declared Guizhou independent. However the wannabe revolutionaries failed to take measures to protect their gains and soon Shen Yuqing was fighting back. Liu Xianshi found himself appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Privy Council of a provisional government. Thus emerged a battle between the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. The counter revolutionaries sought assistance and turned to the recently emerged strongman, Cai E of Yunnan. They asked him to invade Guizhou to stop the crisis. Cai E dispatched Tang Jiyao with some troops who entered Guizhou rather peacefully and began to organize proper governance. Then Cai E received panic messages from Tongmenghui Guizhou members asking him to not meddle in Guizhou affairs, and with Sichuan looking more appetizing he backed off. Cai E ordered Tang Jiyao to divert his forces and march into Sichuan. However Tang Jiyao complained that in order to comply he had to take a route through Guizhou and this resulted in his army being chased by revolutionary forces. Well that's one way of stating the story, the other is Tang Jiyao simply sought to conquer Guizhou. Regardless, Liu Xianshi helped Tang Jiyao launch a successful coup against the current Guizhou Junta. Thus Tang Jiyao became the military governor of Guizhou on March 4th of 1912 and Yuan Shikai recognized this a few months later. For his role, Liu Xianshi was appointed Minister of War. Tang Jiyao did what all decent dictators do, he massacred all revolutionary forces he could catch in the province. While Tang Jiyao was at the head, Liu Xianshi used his new political power to begin placing family members in prominent positions. In the meantime Tang Jiyao treated Guizhou like a fiefdom, forbidding modernization efforts and prevented any development of the KMT. It goes without saying Tang Jiyao was not beloved in Guizhou. In November of 1913, Cai E was placed under house arrest and stripped of his rank, so Tang Jiyao ran back to Yunnan to grab his position as governor. This left the mantle of Guizhou to fall into the hands of Liu Xianshi. When Yuan Shikai declared himself Emperor, Liu Xianshi initially kept Guizhou neutral, but as the situation looked more and more dire for Yuan Shikai, he bandwagoned and declared independence on January 27th, 1916. Liu Xianshi sent forces to fight in the National Protection War, then after Yuan Shikai's death, the Beiyang government appointed Liu Xianshi as the military governor over Guizhou. From there Liu Xianshi had pretty much dictatorial power and he soon went to work forming his own Guizhou clique. To make matters even more complicated, within the Guizhou clique were the Xingyi clique, of the Liu family because they came from Xingyi and the Tongzi clique led by Zhou Xicheng. Basically two families and others fought for dominance, leading to a cycle of assassinations followed by seizure of power. Now we come to the Old and New Guangxi Cliques. The Old Guangxi Clique came about after Governor Chen Bingkun declared Guangxi independ during the Wuchang uprising. After the rebellion, Yuan Shikai installed Lu Rongting as the military governor of Guangxi and during the second revolution Lu remained loyal. Yet when Yuan Shikai went Walrus emperor mode, Lu bandwagoned with Cai E and Tang Jiyao. Meanwhile Long Jiguang proclaimed Guangdong independent and after Yuan Shikai's death, Guangxi and Guangdong found themselves at war. The war largely came about when Dr Sun Yat-Sen split from the Guangzhou government, he dispatched a subordinate, Chen Jiongming to seize Guangzhou and effectively get rid of the Guangxi warlords. Both Long Jiguang and Chen Jiongming were KMT loyalists, thus this led Lu Rongting into a bitter war with Guangdong and even Yunnan got involved, and the whole mess saw the Old Guangxi clique beaten severely. Again I don't want to tell to much as it will be covered in future podcasts, but a hell of a mess, lot of backstabbing.  After the Guangxi-Guangdong wars, yes plural, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong formed the New Guangxi clique alongside a brand new Guangxi Army. Li Zongren was its commander in chief, Huang Shaohong deputy commander and Bai Chongxi chief of staff. They all worked together to kick Guangdong forces out of Guangxi and Li Zongren emerged the military governor over Guangxi. The New Guangxi clique came about during the formation of a new coalition I can't get into here. While both the old and new Guangxi cliques were on the smaller side, they would take part in the reunification of China. Next, although we spoke already a bit about them was the Guangdong Clique. Long Jiguang would die in 1918 leaving the mantle to fall onto Chen Jiongming. Cheng Jiongming had joined the Tongmenghui in 1906 and participated in a coup attempt in 1910 in Guangzhou. During the Xinhai revolution Chen Jiongming was part of another uprising in Guangzhou. After this Chen Jiongming received the post as commander in chief of the Guangdong Army and fought for the KMT. He did however butt heads with Dr Sun Yat-Sen, particularly over the direction of reform the KMT should take. Dr Sun Yat-Sen sought to unify China by force and institute change through a centralized government based on a one party system. Chen Jiongming sought a multiparty federalist system with Guangdong being the model province and hoped for a peaceful reunification of China. There would be a split between the two men and it would be quite violent. The Guangdong clique like the old and new Guangxi clique was again a small part of something bigger cooking in the south. The next is the Sichuan Clique which consisted of a loose group of smaller warlords each with their own regions within Sichuan. Each had their own defensive zone, with their own police, political and economic bases. There were not many large conflicts, it mostly came down to coalitions dismantling a disgruntled warlord. As I already mentioned, Yunnan invaded Sichuan during the Yuan Shikai days, and the local Sichuan warlords initially welcomed the Yunnanese, siding with them to declare independence. But as you can imagine, the Yunnanese soon were seen as overbearing and a lot of soured feelings erupted. This was only further soured when troops from Guizhou came into Sichuan. In 1916, the Sichuan troops were led by General Liu Cunhou who quickly established a ceasefire with the Guizhou and Yunnanese forces. Because of her geography, Sichuan was always relatively isolated from the rest of China, thus she turned inwards instead of outwards. For the majority of the warlord period Sichuan was split into half a dozen districts under military rule. During the late 1920s even into the 1930's 5 Sichuan warlords dominated the scene, Yang Sen, Liu Wenhui, Deng Xihou, Tian Songyao and Liu Xiang. Neither had enough power to take all the others on, thus there was a real balance of power at play. In a true game of thrones like fashion, the Sichuan scene was that of warlords forming secret alliance, pitting one against another, but no one ever truly dominated the province. Of the 5 Sichuan warlords, Liu Xiang would be the most influential. Liu Xiang dominated Chongqing and its surrounding areas. His territory straddled the Yangtze River, thus rich in maritime trade, in essence he wielded significant control over Sichuan's economy. By the 1930's Sichuan was ruled by Liu Xiang in the east; Liu Cunhou in the northeast adjoining Shaanxi; Tian Songyao in the north adjoining Gansu; Deng Xihou in the northwest adjoining Qinghai and Liu Wenhui in the southwest adjoining Xikang and Yunnan. Within a small central enclave was also Yang Sen.  After Yuan Shikai's death the province fell into quite a lot of disorder. All the district governors fought each other and quite often at that, but they rarely ever crossed the Sichuan border. The common people of Sichuan lived in despair and fear nicknamed their warlords as Rotten Melons or Crystal Monkey's. Liu Xiang was born in 1889 to a modest family, received a decent education and joined the military. He rose quickly and saw a lot of warfare. By 1926 he had established a strong base in Chongqing and he held onto it until his death. Now the standard troops of Sichuan were lesser than other parts of China. The Sichuan armies were funded largely by taxes levied on grain, salt and opium. Holding Chongqing along the Yangtze, Liu Xiang had an enormous economic base and thus managed to enrich himself and funded a large army. He enforced strict military discipline, though he was known to turn a blind eye to his officers' rackets. Despite this Liu Xiang's army had a lot of problems facing bandits in the rural areas. One of the other Sichuan Warlords, Yang Sen was quite flamboyant. His nickname was rat face because he had a small mouth. Yang Sen had a small enclave, but it consisted of Chengdu which he tried to clean up. He paved streets with flagstone to help increase rickshaw traffic, a rather new concept for many there. Chengdu happened to have a commodity all warlords wanted, an arsenal, so Yang Sen was by no means a poor warlord. While Sichuan seemed to always be in a state of decline, Chengdu in comparison was quite opulent and luxurious. Now again, and I keep saying it, I don't want to give up too much of the later stories, but Sichuan like many other southern provinces would join the Northern Expedition and help reunify China. Now despite the warlord era being technically ended in 1928 when China was reunified, in reality the warlords were around well into WW2. The Sichuan Clique would brush shoulders a lot with Chiang Kai Shek. During the Second Sino-Japanese War Liu Xiang led the Sichuan 15th Army during the battle of Shanghai and the 23rd Army Group during the battle of Nanjing. Later in 1938 he took 100,000 soldiers out of Sichuan to fight the Japanese, showcasing how far he had come as a commander as well as a warlord. Last there was the Hunan Warlords, a similar situation to that of Sichuan, just a lot more autonomous warlords. The first prominent Hunan Clique member was Tan Yankai, a member of the KMT who became the military governor of Hunan. Tan Yankai had connections amongst Guanxi warlords allowing him loose control over his province. He tried to arouse the people of Hunan to take active opposition to the Northern Warlords, but this prompted Duan Qirui to toss a Hunan born commander, Fu Liangzuo to come take his job. Tan Yankai was forced to take the job as civil governor while Fu became the warlord. Tan Yankai appealed to his Guangxi buddies for help. Even Tang Jiyao of Yunnan asked if he could invade Hunan to help, air quotes on help, but it never came about. Unfortunately for Tan Yankai, Hunan was right beside the Zhili Clique and thus got engulfed in the Northern wars. Hunan basically as a result of geography was stuck in the middle of bigger players and would be tossed around like a ragdoll. Tan Yankai would be backstabbed by a subordinate who favored the Zhili, then later another KMT member would simply grab up Hunan during the Northern expedition. Honestly to call Hunan a Clique is a bit of a stretch as it was more of just an area that had overlaps with other cliques all fighting for territory. Now that basically covers the southern cliques, theres actually more, but if I talk about them we would get lost in the weeds as they say. What is important to know going forward, the North-South divide would see two distinct theaters at play. In the North the Anhu, Zhili and Fengtian Cliques would fight for dominance over Beijing. In the South, many KMT oriented, Communist Orient and independent warlords would fight for dominance over Guangzhou, and later in history other rival southern governments. Typically the Warlord Era is taught North to South and I think that will be the case with us because its simply more cohesive. As Samuel Jackson playing Ray Arnold in Jurassic Park once said, “hold onto your butts” because the warlord Era about to begin.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So we talked about the Northern Warlords and now the Southern Warlords. Time to put the Game of Thrones intro music on, as we are soon going to jump into a world of cutthroat backstabbing, secret alliance, little fingers and megalomaniac figures who will all fight to reunify China under their own image. As for the Chinese common people, as usual they will suffer tremendously, continuing the Century of Humiliation.