Podcasts about politburo standing committee

Former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, once seen as a reform-minded contender to the country's top leadership role, died of a sudden heart attack early Friday in Shanghai, state media reported. He was 68 years old. Li, who was nominally China's No. 2 leader until late last year, served as the country's premier – traditionally in charge of the economy – for a decade from 2013 to March this year under strongman leader Xi Jinping. During his time in the role, Li navigated the world's second-largest economy through a challenging period of rising technology and trade tensions with the United States, mounting government debt and unemployment, and the Covid-19 pandemic. In his final year in power, the economist by training had been a strong voice warning of challenges to China's economy amid widespread Covid-19 lockdowns. He backed efforts to boost employment and maintain economic stability. As the news of Li's death broke Friday morning, social media users circulated a line from Li's annual address to China's rubber stamp parliament in 2022, where he pledged that, “No matter how the international environment may change, China will keep the course of wider openness.” Li, known to use his English language skills on occasion in appearances outside the mainland, was seen as representing a different approach to China's ties with the world, at a time when the country's relations with the West have grown increasingly strained. “China and the United States have common interests,” Li said in response to CNN's question at his annual press conference in March 2021. “The two countries need to put more energy on their common ground and expand converging interests.” Li is also remembered for his focus on addressing societal ills – with social media users on Friday also pointing to his 2020 comments noting that China still had 600 million people with a monthly income of 1,000 yuan ($137). Those remarks came at a time when China was touting its success in lifting millions out of poverty as a point of national pride. Li, a highly educated technocrat with degrees in law and economics, was considered friendly to the private sector. He was seen to have an increasingly diverging economic policy stance from Xi, who tightened party control over the economy. A reform-minded leader Li is widely seen as a protege of Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, who presided over an era of rapid growth in China from 2002 to 2012. The men shared economic sensibilities and rose to power through the Communist Party's Youth League, once seen as a training ground for future leaders. The faction was known for producing reform-minded leaders hailing from humble family backgrounds, but its influence is believed to have been crushed by Xi since he came to power. The relationship between Li and Hu was in the spotlight last year when the former top leader was unexpectedly led out of the closing ceremony of the October 2022 Communist Party Congress, where Xi further consolidated power. In a moment of drama during a usually highly choreographed event, Hu was escorted from the room, pausing on his way out to pat a stony-faced Li on the shoulder, who nodded and turned to watch the former leader depart. State media later suggested Hu left due to health issues. Under Hu, Li was named to the party's top leadership body, the Politburo Standing Committee, in 2007. He previously held key roles as party chief in industrial Liaoning province and was provincial leader of Henan, an agricultural base. Born in Anhui, Li spent his late teens doing manual labor with the Dongling Production Brigade in the eastern province during the Cultural Revolution, a decade-long social and political upheaval launched by late Chinese leader Mao Zedong. Li was among the first batch of students to sit the college entrance exam after it was reinstated following the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, he enrolled at the prestigious Peking University, where he studied law and later obtained a doctorate in economics. Unlike Xi, Li is not considered one of China's princelings hailing from a prominent party family. He held positions in the Communist Youth League Central Committee during the 1980s and 90s. His time in the top echelons of China's Communist Party came to a close last October, when he was not named to the party's Central Committee during a twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle that saw Xi surround himself with key allies. Then 67, Li was one year short of the unofficial retirement age for senior Chinese Communist Party leaders. He was succeeded as premier earlier this year by former Shanghai party chief and Xi loyalist Li Qiang. - by Simone McCarthy and Steven Jiang, CNNSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being  kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other  interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words,  Xi Jinping.  is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly.  Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing.  And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going  in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend  towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something  to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well  which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris:  And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there.  as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts,  starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng  and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period.  and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on  his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was,  by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some  Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that.  Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there,  for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into  the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and  and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right?  if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response  that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say,  in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said  Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times  so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan  multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs  to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons  be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

With the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party's 20th National Party Congress last week, Xi Jinping has now secured a precedent-breaking third term as general secretary. The Congress was also notable for Xi's moves to replace the Politburo Standing Committee with a slate of his most committed loyalists, cementing his authoritarian grasp on power. Against the backdrop of these events, E.U. leaders met last week in Brussels to discuss their approach to Beijing, raising concerns over Europe's continued dependence on China for technology and raw materials. How has the war in Ukraine impacted European attitudes and policies toward China? Will German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's planned visit to the PRC this week pose a risk to future European cohesion on China? Bonnie Glaser and Dave Shullman join Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to unpack the party congress and what a third term for Xi means for Europe.  Bonnie Glaser is director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while also serving as a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum.  Dave Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council, where he leads the council's work on China. He has served as one of the US Government's top experts on East Asia, most recently as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council, where he led the IC's strategic analysis on East Asia.

This week Xi Jinping has taken his new Politburo Standing Committee on a group trip – to Yan'An, the base of Mao Zedong's Communist revolution after the Long March. The symbolism is easy to see. On this episode of Chinese Whispers, Bill Bishop, author of the popular Sinocism newsletter, and Professor Victor Shih, author of Coalitions of the Weak, have returned to reflect on the Party Congress just past. It's been a more dramatic event than many (inside and outside the party) expected, starting with a brave, lone protestor hanging a 42-character banner off a popular bridge in Beijing, lambasting the authoritarian regime; and ending with the forcible removal of former general secretary Hu Jintao in front of the world's media. At the congress itself Xi overturned decades-long norms dictating the top leadership of the party – age no longer seems to necessitate retirement, while the Politburo has not a single woman. Above all, Xi has started his third term as general secretary with a loyal cabal of men around him. Did he not want more competent people in the top jobs? 'Loyalty is merit', Bill suggests. What does this mean for China, and the world? Victor makes the point that Xi is putting the pieces in place to push through unpopular decisions – for example, an invasion of Taiwan. 'If you think about it, why would you want people whom you trust absolutely to fill every single position? Because even Chairman Mao didn't do this'. It also means that as Xi becomes more truly dictatorial, the West needs to engage with him more, not less.  We just don't know the kind of information about the US, about other countries, that are landing on Xi Jinping's desk. And this information can be incredibly distorted. So if anything, just presenting an alternative view of how the world works could be helpful. He may not believe you… but if you're able to look him in the eye and tell him something, at least he'll be forced to think about it.As for the party itself, the three of us digest the Hu Jintao incident. Regardless of what you think happened, one thing is for sure – it was a deep and utter humiliation for Hu, especially given China's deep-set Confucian respect for elders. The idea that there is any organised CCP opposition against Xi has been put to bed.

This week Xi Jinping has taken his new Politburo Standing Committee on a group trip – to Yan'An, the base of Mao Zedong's Communist revolution after the Long March. The symbolism is easy to see. On this episode of Chinese Whispers, Bill Bishop, author of the popular Sinocism newsletter, and Professor Victor Shih, author of Coalitions of the Weak, have returned to reflect on the Party Congress just past. It's been a more dramatic event than many (inside and outside the party) expected, starting with a brave, lone protestor hanging a 42-character banner off a popular bridge in Beijing, lambasting the authoritarian regime; and ending with the forcible removal of former general secretary Hu Jintao in front of the world's media. At the congress itself Xi overturned decades-long norms dictating the top leadership of the party – age no longer seems to necessitate retirement, while the Politburo has not a single woman. Above all, Xi has started his third term as general secretary with a loyal cabal of men around him. Did he not want more competent people in the top jobs? 'Loyalty is merit', Bill suggests. What does this mean for China, and the world? Victor makes the point that Xi is putting the pieces in place to push through unpopular decisions – for example, an invasion of Taiwan. 'If you think about it, why would you want people whom you trust absolutely to fill every single position? Because even Chairman Mao didn't do this'. It also means that as Xi becomes more truly dictatorial, the West needs to engage with him more, not less.  We just don't know the kind of information about the US, about other countries, that are landing on Xi Jinping's desk. And this information can be incredibly distorted. So if anything, just presenting an alternative view of how the world works could be helpful. He may not believe you… but if you're able to look him in the eye and tell him something, at least he'll be forced to think about it.As for the party itself, the three of us digest the Hu Jintao incident. Regardless of what you think happened, one thing is for sure – it was a deep and utter humiliation for Hu, especially given China's deep-set Confucian respect for elders. The idea that there is any organised CCP opposition against Xi has been put to bed.

Given the opaque nature of the leadership changes prior the 20th Party Congress, the announcement of the composition of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee will surely surprise many observers of Chinese elite politics. In conversation with National Committee President Stephen Orlins, Cheng Li provides fresh insights into the main surprises on the personnel front. In addition, Dr. Li discusses whether the appointments reveal any shifts in the balance of power and factional fault lines in Zhongnanhai, what the new leadership suggests about the trajectory of domestic and foreign policy, and what Xi Jinping might have signaled regarding future political succession. This webinar was conducted at 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2022, three days after the conclusion of the Party Congress. 3:05 What is the structure of the Chinese Communist Party? 7:07 Who will be on the Politburo Standing Committee? 10:20 What are the surprises coming out of the 20th Party Congress? 23:31 What will China's foreign policy and economy teams look like? 31:03 How many Politburo members are foreign-educated? 32:59 What are Xi Jinping's priorities in his next term? 38:30 What happened to Hu Chunhua and Hu Jintao? 42:45 Is Qin Gang's ascension to Foreign Minister attributed to his relationship with Xi Jinping? 51:01 What will be the role of the State Council? 55:08 What are the implications for the Taiwan Affairs Office? 58:23 How has China's middle class responded to these appointments? About the speaker: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/20th-party-congress/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).

The 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party wrapped up its weeklong, twice-a-decade meeting over the weekend with Chinese President Xi Jinping securing his third five-year term."The third term was not a surprise at all [but] the extent to which he consolidated his power was," Michael Cunningham, a research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, says of Xi's grip on the Chinese Communist Party. (The Daily Signal is Heritage's multimedia news organization.)Xi "managed to get to force people to retire prematurely who were not his proteges and to replace them with proteges, his own handpicked people," Cunningham says. "So now he controls essentially the entire Politburo Standing Committee. There are very few checks on his power now."Rep. Michael Waltz, R-Fla., warned on "Fox News Sunday" that Xi "has become the most powerful Chinese dictator since Mao.""The amount of power consolidation that [Xi] accomplished this time, it really shows that ... there are very few checks to his power now," Cunningham says, adding:It's hard to say for sure what extent that power will be until we see it in action, but just based on the past 10 years, we've seen that even without controlling the entire leadership lineup as he does now, he managed to push through his preferred policies.Cunningham joins "The Daily Signal Podcast" to discuss what the U.S. should expect during Xi's third term, how Taiwan will be affected, and the state of U.S.-China relations.Video of former Chinese President Hu Jintao: https://twitter.com/dansoncj/status/1583663702896967680?s=20&t=cl9y4jE8S3VU50EddnKoTg] Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

0:50 Some parallels between the handling of the Hu Jintao and Peng Shuai incidents.7:17 Following on from Part I, which outlined the top seven sporting figures of the past decade, we move to Part II and reveal who are the stars to watch – starting at the top (again, no spoilers!). Out with the old, in with the…old? 10:39 Second up is Mark's pick for best female athlete of the future. 13:05 The best male athlete serves up a surprise.17:31 The best Olympian of the future is female, competes in a water sport, and has already reached the very top. Does that narrow it down?19:35 The fifth award – for best team – has a new name and a new stadium. 23:34 The People's Choice award resonated with the public this year. But this superstar's staying power is the only question…26:34 The coveted last slot, and winner of the DRESPY, comes out of left field. 30:00 Haig vents a bit about quarantine as the hosts prepare for their in-person reunion.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chinese Leader Xi Jinping secures an extraordinary third term as president and appoints a fully loyalist Politburo Standing Committee. So, will Xi go completely unchallenged within the Communist Party? And what will his reaffirmed authority mean for China, Taiwan and the world? Guests: Xu Qinduo Former China Radio International Chief Correspondent in Washington DC Lim Tai Wei Author of ‘China's One Belt One Road Initiative' Colin Alexander Senior Lecturer in Political Communications in the Nottingham Trent University

0:40 – It's Day 8 of quarantine for Mark on his return to Beijing and he's been preoccupied by the fascinating waste disposal process.6:00 – Former guest on the show Cameron Dicker, who grew up in Shanghai, stars for the Philadelphia Eagles in his NFL debut as the Eagles stay unbeaten.10:50 – In honor of the upcoming 20th Party Congress, Mark reveals his top 7 China sports figures of the past in a very special – and somewhat tongue-in-cheek culminating in a new award (no spoilers).14:12 – Best female and male athletes.18:08 – Best Olympian and best team awards. 21:06 – And you won't want to miss the People's Choice or the DRESPY awards.Stay tuned to see who will be in the new sporting Standing Committee – revealed next week!28:10 Mark gives Haig a few pointers for his upcoming quarantine.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

All eyes are on the Communist leadership this year, as the months count down to autumn's National Party Congress, where Xi Jinping may be crowned for a third term. But how much do we really know about the Party's leadership? In particular, can we better understand them through looking at the experiences that they've had? Take Xi Jinping, who is what is known as a 'princeling' – his father was the Communist revolutionary Xi Zhongxun, one of the Party's early cadres. How did that upbringing impact him, and his faith in the Chinese Communist Party? Also consider the Cultural Revolution – the sixtysomethings on the Politburo Standing Committee would have been teenagers during that decade of turmoil. How did it form who they are as leaders today? Joining Cindy Yu on the podcast is Professor Kerry Brown from Kings College London, whose latest book is Xi: A Study in Power, so very knowledgeable on the President himself; as well as Professor Steve Tsang, a historian at SOAS.

All eyes are on the Communist leadership this year, as the months count down to autumn's National Party Congress, where Xi Jinping may be crowned for a third term. But how much do we really know about the Party's leadership? In particular, can we better understand them through looking at the experiences that they've had? Take Xi Jinping, who is what is known as a 'princeling' – his father was the Communist revolutionary Xi Zhongxun, one of the Party's early cadres. How did that upbringing impact him, and his faith in the Chinese Communist Party? Also consider the Cultural Revolution – the sixtysomethings on the Politburo Standing Committee would have been teenagers during that decade of turmoil. How did it form who they are as leaders today? Joining me on the podcast is Professor Kerry Brown from Kings College London, whose latest book is Xi: A Study in Power, so very knowledgeable on the President himself; as well as Professor Steve Tsang, a historian at SOAS.

China's top leader Xi Jinping has issued the strongest warning yet against anyone who questions the country's zero-Covid policy, as stringent, frequent lockdowns fuel public discontent and deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy.At a meeting chaired by Xi on Thursday, the ruling Communist Party's supreme Politburo Standing Committee vowed to "unswervingly adhere to the general policy of 'dynamic zero-Covid,' and resolutely fight against any words and acts that distort, doubt or deny our country's epidemic prevention policies."This is the first time Xi, who according to state media made an "important speech" at the meeting, has made public remarks about China's battle against Covid since public furor erupted over the harsh lockdown in Shanghai."Our prevention and control strategy is determined by the party's nature and mission, our policies can stand the test of history, our measures are scientific and effective," the seven-member committee said, according to government news agency Xinhua."We have won the battle to defend Wuhan, and we will certainly be able to win the battle to defend Shanghai," it said.The Standing Committee also demanded cadres to have a "profound, complete and comprehensive understanding" of the policies set by the party's central leadership."We should resolutely overcome the problems of inadequate awareness, inadequate preparation and insufficient work, and resolutely overcome contempt, indifference and self-righteousness in our thinking," it said.To analysts who have long observed Chinese politics, the stern warning is a sign that there has been internal pushback against Xi's zero-Covid policy from within the party."This language should be read as a direct criticism of unspecified local CCP leaders who have questioned the policies at the center, or who have been insufficiently successful in applying them," wrote David Bandurski, co-director of the China Media Project."And it is difficult not to hear in this phrase about 'self-righteousness' condemnation of leaders in Shanghai in particular," Bandurski added.Over the past five weeks, many Shanghai residents have taken to social media to call for help and vent their anger over severe food shortages and lack of access to medical care. Some protested from their windows, banging pots and pans and shouting in frustration, others even clashed with police and health workers in the streets -- a rare scene in a country where dissent is routinely suppressed.The grave economic fallout has also drawn concerns from economists and business executives, especially given Shanghai's role as the country's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. In April, China's services sector, which accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment, contracted at the second sharpest pace on record, while the manufacturing sector also shrunk.And as Omicron spreads in other parts of China, more local governments are imposing swift lockdowns in response to just a handful of cases. In Beijing, where more than 500 cases have been reported since April 20, many fear for a Shanghai-style lockdown as authorities roll out increasingly restrictions.But the latest statement from the country's top leaders has made it clear that the Chinese government is doubling down on its approach of relying on swift lockdowns, mass testing and quarantine to squash the highly transmissible Omicron variant for the foreseeable future.Wu Qiang, a political analyst in Beijing, said since April, the question over how the government should deal with the country's worst outbreak since Wuhan has evolved into a "path struggle" within the party."Firstly, it is a struggle over whether it should choose 'dynamic zero-Covid' or a more flexible approach to fight Covid; and secondly, it is also a struggle over whether to make Covid control or economic growth the priority," Wu said.And with the latest statement, it is clear that Xi has picked the...

In 1991, a young Chinese academic published America against America, a look at the contradictions and paradoxes he observed while traveling there. His book was largely forgotten until last year when it went viral for its observations on US cultural decline, becoming a hot topic on Chinese-language forums. It was no less fascinating for who its author was. Wang Huning is today one of the top leaders in the CCP and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Freelance journalist Chang Che (@Changxche) sat down to talk with me about the book and what it tells us about Chinese interpretations of US - and Western - culture.We also discussThe Shanghai lockdownWhy the teaching of Western classical civilization took off in China......But also makes very little mention of religionThe CCP take on the US culture wars and rewriting curriculumsCHECK OUT THE CHINATALK SUBSTACK! https://chinatalk.substack.comSupport us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ChinaTalkChang's Wang Huning Article: https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/how-a-book-about-americas-history-foretold-chinas-futureChang's western classics education article: https://supchina.com/2022/01/13/china-looks-to-the-western-classics/Outro Music: 锦上添花 FREESTYLE by 盛宇 Damnshine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRaoDr1Cbbg Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

In 1991, a young Chinese academic published America against America, a look at the contradictions and paradoxes he observed while traveling there. His book was largely forgotten until last year when it went viral for its observations on US cultural decline, becoming a hot topic on Chinese-language forums. It was no less fascinating for who its author was. Wang Huning is today one of the top leaders in the CCP and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Freelance journalist Chang Che (@Changxche) sat down to talk with me about the book and what it tells us about Chinese interpretations of US - and Western - culture.We also discussThe Shanghai lockdownWhy the teaching of Western classical civilization took off in China......But also makes very little mention of religionThe CCP take on the US culture wars and rewriting curriculumsCHECK OUT THE CHINATALK SUBSTACK! https://chinatalk.substack.comSupport us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/ChinaTalkChang's Wang Huning Article: https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/how-a-book-about-americas-history-foretold-chinas-futureChang's western classics education article: https://supchina.com/2022/01/13/china-looks-to-the-western-classics/Outro Music: 锦上添花 FREESTYLE by 盛宇 Damnshine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRaoDr1Cbbg Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Politburo Standing Committee members Li Zhanshu and Han Zheng appeared on the Thursday CCTV Evening News, so while we do not know why all seven of the PBSC members were out of view for over a week, it looks like things are getting back to “normal”. I’d love to know what they were doing for the last ten days, that seems like a long time to just talk about the Ukraine situation.

It has been a week since Xi or any other members of the Politburo Standing Committee have been seen in public reports. Xi has sent several messages and signed at least one order, and Li Keqiang sent comments to a meeting on agriculture, but they have not personally appeared. They also do not appear in the Tuesday, February 15th People’s Daily.

Photo: Peng Shuai's statement that has caused her to be disappeared by the Chinese Communist Party. Screenshot/capture of Peng Shuai's Weibo post on 2 Nov 2021 regarding Zhang Gaoli. Peng Shuai  Nov 2 22:07 from Huawei .   "I know it's impossible to explain clearly, and even if I were to talk about it it's useless. But still I want to talk about it. I feel so unbearably phony, I admit that I am not a good girl, a terrible terrible girl. Approximately three years ago vice premier Zhang Gaoli you retired, looked for Dr. Liu of the Tianjin Tennis Center and got in touch with me again, asked me for a time to play, at the Kang Ming Hotel in Beijing. After our AM session, your wife Kang Jie and you brought me to your home. Then brought me to a room at your residence, like that time over 10 years ago or prior* in Tianjin, wanted to have sexual relationship* with me. On the afternoon that day I was very scared, had not at all anticipated that things would end up like that, one person helping stand guard outside, because no one would have believed that the wife would be willing. Seven years ago or prior* we had sexual relationship* once, afterwards you were promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee, left for Beijing, and didn't contact me again. Originally I buried everything inside my heart, if you fundamentally don't plan on being responsible, why did you still bother to come around and look for me, bring me to your home and compel* me to have relationship* with you? Yes it's I who do not have evidence, while it's fundamentally impossible to leave any evidence.  Afterwards you kept denying it, but truly it was you who favored me first, otherwise I would not have been able to come into contact with you. On the afternoon that day I originally did not agree and kept crying, had supper with you and aunt Kang Jie together, you said the universe is very very big, the Earth is a grain of sand within the universe, we humans are not even a grain of sand, and spoke about much much more, so that I could let go of thoughts and burdens.  Nonetheless after supper I was also unwilling, you said you hated me! And said in those seven years you had never forgotten about me, will treat me well etc.  . . .  scared and nervous and carrying my feelings for you from seven years ago or prior* I agreed . . .  so yes we had sexual relationship*. Feelings are a very complicated thing, impossible to explain clearly, from that day on I re-opened my love for you, then during the days that I spent with you, just from interacting with you you are a very very nice person, treated me quite well too, we chatted about modern history all the way back to ancient eras, you told me knowledge of many things and economics and philosophy, endless topics. Together we played board games*, sang, played ping-pong, billiards, and tennis we could always play until we couldn't be merrier, our personalities were so compatible as if everything matched.  Since I was little having left home very young, I've been extremely deprived of affection, so facing all that's happened, I've never considered myself to be a good girl, I hate myself, hate why I had to come to this world, to experience this calamity. You told me that you love me, very very much, and hoped that in the next life we could meet when you're 20 and I 18. You said you are very lonely, very pitiable by yourself, we could chat forever, talk on and on without end, you said that with your position there's no way to get a divorse, and had we met when you were still in Shandong, you might still be able to get a divorce, but now there's no way.  I've thought about accompanying you just like this unknown by the outside world, in the beginning things were okay, but as time passed they changed, too many instances of injustice and insult. Every time you let me visit, behind your back your wife said so many nasty and insulting things to me, all kinds of caustic mockery and ridicules. I said I like eating duck tongues, aunt Kang Jie would say right in front of me ~eww so disgusting. When there was smog in Beijing in the winter I said the air quality was not very good sometimes, aunt Kang Jie would tell me, that's in your rural areas, we do not feel it over here. And so forth many many similar things were said, when you were present she would not speak in such fashion, almost like us, there was one set of behaviors when the two of us were spending time together, but when other people were present you would treat me differently**. [Remainder of the statement is below, at the end.] #PRC: Deriding Gu and Disappearing Peng at the Olympics. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-14/china-mustn-t-embrace-eileen-gu-as-patriot-veteran-editor-warns ..  ..  ..   ** Peng Shuai's statement that has caused her to be disappeared by the Chinese Communist Party, second part. . . . I've told you before, hearing those words so often made me feel especially wronged and hurt, from the day I met you until now I've never used any of your money, let alone using you to obtain any benefit or perk, but this thing called title and status is so important. I had it coming for all of this, bringing disgrace upon myself. From start to finish you've always told me to keep our relationship a secret, especially never to tell my mom about our relationship as a man and a woman, because it was she who saw me off near the Church of the Saviour, Beijing everytime, afterwards I had to change into your household's vehicle before it was okay to enter your courtyard. She always thought I was going to play Mahjong and cards, to hang out at your place. In our respective life each of us is a real-life invisible person, your wife is like the queen from Empresses in the Palace, while words cannot describe how unbearable I feel, many times I thought am I still a person? I feel I am a walking corpse, pretending, pretending everyday, which me is the real me? I shouldn't have come to this world, but neither do I have the courage to die. I very much wish to live more simply, but things didn't go my way. There was a very big dispute on the night of the 30th, you said to go to your house again on the afternoon of the 2nd for us to talk things out, today at noon you called and said something came up and for us to re-connect later, shirking everything, using the excuse of re-connecting later ......, just like this "disappearing" like seven years ago or prior*, after playing around you change your mind the moment you no longer want me. You said what's between us isn't transactional, true, the feeling between us is unrelated to money, power, but I have no way to put my feelings from these three years to rest, have difficulties facing them. You're always afraid I might carry some recording device, leave evidence and so forth. True, beside myself I haven't left any evidence or proof, no audio recordings, no videos, only the true experience of how I've been twisted. I know that to you the powerful and high-ranking vice premier Zhang Gaoli, you've said that you're not afraid. But even if it's hitting rock with eggs, as a moth flying towards flames sacrificing myself I would still reveal what has transpired with you. With your intelligence and strategems you would certainly deny this or you could even serve everything back at me, you can take things not seriously at all to such an extent. You are always saying that you hope your mom is watching over you from the heavens, I'm a bad girl and do not deserve to be a mother, while you are a father with son and daughter, I've asked you even if it were your adopted daughter would you have compelled* her to do so? With all of this that you've done in this life would you be able to face your mom with a clear conscience afterwards? All or both of us* appear very proper and sanctimonious ...... Translator's notes: (年前) years ago or prior: This could mean either a number of years ago/before the present, or a number of years prior to some other reference point established in the context. One interpretation or the other may or may not match the chronology of Zhang Gaoli's career. In certain places in her post, neither interpretation seems to match known facts, so Peng might have made some typos or small errors. On the other hand, it's clearer that whenever she refers to "three years", it means counting back from the present. (性关系/关系) sexual relationship/relationship: While this could refer to Peng's relationship overall, it can also be a euphemism for sexual encounter or intercourse. Her text does not provide additional details. Depending on the context, sexual relationship can also be shortened to relationship, but the latter does not usually refer to a relationship specifically of a sexual nature. (逼) compel: While it's possible for this to mean some involvement of threats or physical force, it could also mean to pressure by persuasion or to push very hard for one's demands, especially in non-formal conversations. Peng's text does not provide additional information. (下棋) played board games: Specifically board games with deployable pieces such as Go, chess, elephant chess, checkers. (我们都) all or both of us: Because this is the last sentence and appears to be incomplete, it's uncertain how many people are being referred to, although in my opinion it probably refers to all of us i.e. more than 2 persons here. For ~90% of the content of her post, I've retained her exact wording, order, repetition, and punctuation (except for asterisks in the translation to indicate my notes). The result should be free of any additions, omissions, interpretations, or changes in meaning. ..  ..  .. 

This week on Sinica, we present a deep-dive into the worldview of China's leading Party theorist, Wáng Hùníng 王沪宁. Wang — the only member of the Politburo Standing Committee who has not run a province or provincial-level municipality — is believed to have been the thinker behind ideas as central (and as ideologically distinct) as Jiāng Zémín's 江泽民 signature “Three Represents,” which brought capitalists into the Chinese Communist Party; Hú Jǐntāo's 胡锦涛 “Scientific Outlook on Development” that focused on social harmony; and Xí Jìnpíng's “Chinese Dream” that aimed at the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” While much of Wang's life since he entered government has been hidden from view, his earlier writings contain many ideas that appear to have shaped Party policy across the tenure of three Party general secretaries over a period of nearly three decades, and offer clues about what still might be in store. Kaiser is joined by Joseph Fewsmith III, an eminent professor of political science at Boston University; the intellectual historian Timothy Cheek, professor of history at the University of British Columbia, whose work has focused on establishment intellectuals in the PRC; and Matthew Johnson, principal and founder of the China-focused consultancy AltaSilva LLC, who has studied and written about Wang extensively.4:31 – An outline of Wang Huning's career8:36 – Wang Huning's personality and temperament12:28 – Wang speaks16:45 – Wang as an example of post-charismatic leadership loyalty24:02 – Wang's America Against America31:04 – Wang Huning's concepts of cultural security and cultural sovereignty46:36 – Wang and Document Number Nine55:39 – Chinese conceptions of democracyA transcript of this podcast is available on SupChina.com.Recommendations:Matt: The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control by Karl Deutsch; and The Logic of Images in International Relations by Robert Jervis.Joe: Now that more Americans recognize that China is not becoming "more like us," they need a deeper understanding of China, and not one just rooted in hostility and militarism.Tim: In Memory of Memory by Maria Stepanova.Kaiser: River of Stars by Guy Gavriel KaySee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party may be fleeing Beijing, and this may include Xi Jinping. We look at public reporting coming out of China, and several anomalies in reporting, as well as timings between their public appearances and shift to video conferences, suggest that the top seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee may have fled. And when movements began under the Obama administration to tear down statues of Confederates, many conservatives, including Trump, were criticized for claiming the rioters would eventually target statues of American figures including the founding fathers. And the predictions are now proving accurate. Statues of Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and others have been destroyed. Even statues of Mohandas Gandhi and Miguel de Cervantes, a Spanish writer and former slave, have been vandalized. The movements we’re now watching sweep the United States to destroy history are not new, and neither are the narratives being used to excuse it. We’ll discuss the history of movements like this, and look at why extremists want to destroy statues, historical relics, and the cultures they represent. These stories and more in this episode of Crossroads. ⭕️ Subscribe for updates : http://bit.ly/CrossroadsYT ⭕️ Donate to support our work: https://www.bestgift.tv/crossroads ⭕️ Join Patreon to Support Crossroads: https://www.patreon.com/Crossroads_Joshua   Contact us: crossroadsjoshua@gmail.com https://twitter.com/crossroads_josh https://www.facebook.com/CrossroadsET

This is video is all about Coronavirus which has been a big thread in Wuhan, China and all around the world these days. I would like to share the information about this virus so you will be more careful about it. Coronavirus is a respiratory-related fatal disease, even though the disease originated in China, its fear is now increasing rapidly worldwide. Many Asian countries are very cautious about this and are trying to take all possible steps to stop the spread of the disease. This virus is found in animals. The seventh virus that spreads from animal to human. Overall, it is like common flu but a more aggressive form. 56 Million Chinese are now On Lockdown As Virus Spreads To Australia and Malaysia. The number of confirmed cases climbs sharply to more than 1,321 worldwide, with 41 deaths reported in China as of Saturday. The news of this virus spreading in many countries of Asia has alerted countries all over the world, and all are trying to stop the spread of deadly viruses and diseases from the country. China has expanded its coronavirus lockdown to more cities, restricting movement to an unprecedented 56 million people as it rushes to build a prefabricated, 1,000-bed hospital for victims. At least five cases were also reported in Hong Kong, two in Macau, and three cases in Taiwan. Worldwide, there are up to 1,321 confirmed coronavirus infections, with cases also reported in Japan (2 cases confirmed ); Thailand (5 cases confirmed); South Korea (2 cases confirmed); United States (2 cases confirmed); Australia (1 case confirmed); France (3 cases confirmed); Malaysia (3 cases confirmed); Singapore (3 cases confirmed); Nepal (1 case confirmed); and Vietnam (2 cases confirmed). Ironically the safest country in the Far East right now is North Korea. Though China has pledged transparency, some suspect that the actual tally of cases within Wuhan is much higher, with the epidemic spiraling out of control. President Xi called a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, a group of China's top leaders, to discuss a response to the virus. It is hard to believe anything coming out of China about internal matters. THANK YOU! PLEASE ***SUBSCRIBE AND CLICK THE LIKE BUTTON*** COPYRIGHT DISCLAIMER: Under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, allowance is made for “fair use” for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, education and research. This presentation contains images that were used under a Creative Commons License

SupChina.direct — China consultants, on demand. Submit your project needs, and we will match you with qualified China consultants. This week, Kaiser sits down with Jude Blanchette in the Sinica South Studio in Durham, North Carolina, to talk about Jude's new book, China's New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong, which just came out on June 3. Jude explains the origins of the neo-Maoists and others on the left opposition, and how overlooking the conservative reaction to reform and opening impoverishes our understanding of China and its politics. What to listen for on this week’s Sinica Podcast: 9:33: The show begins with a discussion on Diāo Wěimíng 刁伟铭, an editor of the prominent neo-Maoist website Utopia (乌有之乡 wūyǒu zhī xiāng), and his untimely death in a vehicle collision while leading a group of Chinese tourists in North Korea visiting the grave of Mao Zedong’s grandson. Jude states: “Not only is his story fascinating and the story of why the heck they were in North Korea, but also [because] the news of the bus crash was originally suppressed.” The sensitivity of information about neo-Maoists reflects how their relationship with the Communist Party is “fraught” and “complex,” Jude says, who adds that this relationship “has been evolving for decades and continues to evolve now.” 18:48: Are there online platforms that lend themselves to radicalization in China? Jude explains how individuals find these communities organically, and moments around the turn of the millennium that prompted galvanization, the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade among them. “Several key print publications were shut down by Jiang Zemin in 2002 and 2003, and these were old, established, thick theoretical journals that essentially had been the only remaining outlets for the conservative intellectuals…and after those publications were shut down, they really cast about to see what to do next, and I think had there been no internet, it would have been quite difficult to reconstitute a movement. But they saw this fledgling piece of information technology…this provided a public square, so to speak, where people could come together.” 27:34: What is neo-authoritarianism? What are the linkages between this ideology, the neo-Maoists, and the increasing prominence of technology? Jude tells the story of this theory in China and of the early progenitors, one of whom now sits on the Politburo Standing Committee. 31:21: How does the radical left in China view the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989? Jude notes: “You would think given what we know about the current political program of neo-Maoism that they would either minimize or deny that there was any sort of massacre on June 4th, but in fact that’s actually not the case…there’s actually a much more nuanced position on things like the Cultural Revolution and June 4th than you would originally think.” 57:32: During Wen Jiabao’s tenure in office, Jude claims there is a reason why he pointed to the Cultural Revolution — to warn against the increase in radical leftist political views: “I do think there is a reason Wen Jiabao chose to invoke the spirit of the cultural revolution when essentially he wanted to warn about the neo-Maoists and Bo Xilai. That there is this thread of radical politics, which is always a threat to the Communist Party. And the most powerful fuel for this radical style of politics is not this sort of Liu Xiaobo, Ai Weiwei [style of] constitutional democracy. That’s not what the Party is really afraid of. It’s more afraid of people who outflank it from the left.” Recommendations: Jude: Behind the Curve, a film investigation into the “Flat Earth” community.   Kaiser: How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States, by Daniel Immerwahr, a story of the United States beyond the lower 48 states.  

Is the ongoing anti-corruption drive a sincere effort to root out official wrongdoing? Or is it a political purge of the enemies of Xí Jìnpíng 习近平? These questions have been hotly debated since the outset of the campaign in 2013. Now Peter Lorentzen of the University of San Francisco and Xi Lu of the National University of Singapore have harnessed data to examine the anti-corruption drive in the hopes of settling the question. Kaiser sat down with Peter on the sidelines of the recent Association for Asian Studies Conference to talk about the findings in their paper, “Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign.” What to listen for on this week’s Sinica Podcast:  22:57: Of the many officials that have been purged since 2012, “three big tigers” in particular stand out: Sū Róng 苏荣, Líng Jìhuà 令计划, and Zhōu Yǒngkāng 周永康. Of the provinces Xi Lu and Peter analyzed, economic performance was a large contributing factor for official promotion except for Jiangxi, Shanxi, and Sichuan. Here, Peter provides background on these three officials, their downfall, and the “tiger territories” they previously oversaw.   30:34: In 2012, Bó Xīlái 薄熙来 was considered one of the main contenders to challenge Xi Jinping’s ascent to power. His association with the murder of a British businessman, Neil Heywood, reportedly ordered by his wife, brought a swift end to his political success. However, Peter was surprised by what he found regarding his political network in the aftermath: “If you rank people using the Google PageRank algorithm, you find Bo Xilai was below 20th. What that means, in practice, is that in our data there were not many people reported as being his cronies who were subordinate to him compared to a lot of other people.” 32:42: What does the inability of Politburo Standing Committee members to protect their personal networks say about the current political climate in China? Peter: “Even when you clump all other six Politburo [Standing Committee] members together, we didn’t see a sort of protective effect. Their associates, people we believed to be connected with them, were just as likely to go down as anyone else. So the question is: Why were they not able to protect their people?... This is not something we can observe directly in our data, but my sense is that it does show the demise of the collective leadership, first-among-equals approach.” 39:26: How many people have been subject to the corruption crackdown? Peter studied those who were investigated, whose names were published in reports by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection by 2015. “We’re looking at the first wave of the crackdown, but that was just a thousand people [whose names we could get]. I was looking at some estimates last night, and I think people are saying that the total number as of the end of last year was 20,000 to 30,000 people overall. And you know, they’re not all people who looked wrong at Xi Jinping some day. So it’s pretty clear that he’s got to have some other way of deciding who goes down.” Recommendations: Peter: Two sitcoms, Speechless (available on ABC) and Kim’s Convenience (available on Netflix). Kaiser: Two playlists on Spotify, “Instrumental Madness” and “Got Djent?”

China, as we say at the beginning of each Sinica Podcast episode, is a nation that is reshaping the world. But what does that reshaping really look like, and how does — and should — the world react to China’s role in globalization? Few are better placed to answer these questions than Kishore Mahbubani, a veteran former diplomat from Singapore who recently ended a stint as dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. He remains on the faculty there but is taking a sabbatical, in part to write a book for Penguin UK titled Has the West Lost It? His most recent book was titled The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace. In this podcast, Kishore, as he often does, brings up a number of provocative ideas (read here a piece in the World Post last year in which he raises many of the same ideas), particularly for Americans. Among them: The most important event of 2001 was not the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. The U.S. and China are perfectly positioned for an infrastructure cooperation deal, but China’s communist identity, more than anything, makes such cooperation unthinkable. To address this psychological block, Americans — and all Westerners — should think of China’s government as led by the Chinese Civilization Party, not the Chinese Communist Party, because its goal is to revive Chinese civilization, not to export communism. If Americans don’t start preparing for a world in which they are the number two power, the political shock when it happens could very well lead to a president even more misguided than Trump. (Both the International Monetary Fund moving its headquarters to China and Chinese currency becoming the primary international reserve currency in the coming decades are inevitable, for example, Kishore argues.) Recommendations: Jeremy: A field guide to the wild birds of Beijing (北京野鸟图鉴 běijīng yěniǎo tújiàn), available only in Chinese. Kishore: A recommendation to visit Indonesia, what Kishore calls “one of the most underrated and underappreciated countries in the world.” A decade ago, it was hit hard by the financial crisis and many Westerners thought it would fracture as a country — but now, it is the most successful democracy in the Islamic world. Kaiser: A typically tongue-in-cheek tweet from New York Times reporter Chris Buckley, which purports to show how the Warring States–era political philosopher Han Feizi explained the selection process for the Politburo Standing Committee at the 19th Party Congress last fall.  

 Kim Jong-un born 8 January 1984 or 5 July 1984)[3] is the Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea. Kim is the second child of Kim Jong-il (1941–2011) and his consort Ko Yong-hui.[6] Little is known for certain about Kim Jong-un. Before taking power, he had barely been seen in public, and many of the activities of both Kim and his government remain shrouded in secrecy.[7] Even details such as what year he was born, and whether he did indeed attend a Western school under a pseudonym, are difficult to confirm with certainty. Kim was officially declared the supreme leader following the state funeral of his father on 28 December 2011. Kim holds the titles of Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chairman of the National Defence Commission, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army,[1] and presidium member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.[8] Kim was promoted to the rank of Marshal of North Korea in the Korean People's Army on 18 July 2012, consolidating his position as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces[9] and is often referred to as Marshal Kim Jong-un or "the Marshal" by state media.[10][11] Kim obtained two degrees, one in physics at Kim Il-sung University, and another as an Army officer at the Kim Il-sung Military University.[12][13] On 12 December 2013 official North Korean news outlets released reports that due to alleged "treachery," he had ordered the execution of his uncle Jang Song-thaek.[14] On 9 March 2014, Kim Jong-un was elected unopposed to the Supreme People's Assembly. He is the first North Korean leader born after the country's founding. Kim Jong-un is widely believed to have ordered the assassination of his brother, Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia in February 2017.[15][16]   From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong-un

 Kim Jong-un born 8 January 1984 or 5 July 1984)[3] is the Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), commonly referred to as North Korea. Kim is the second child of Kim Jong-il (1941–2011) and his consort Ko Yong-hui.[6] Little is known for certain about Kim Jong-un. Before taking power, he had barely been seen in public, and many of the activities of both Kim and his government remain shrouded in secrecy.[7] Even details such as what year he was born, and whether he did indeed attend a Western school under a pseudonym, are difficult to confirm with certainty. Kim was officially declared the supreme leader following the state funeral of his father on 28 December 2011. Kim holds the titles of Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chairman of the National Defence Commission, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army,[1] and presidium member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.[8] Kim was promoted to the rank of Marshal of North Korea in the Korean People's Army on 18 July 2012, consolidating his position as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces[9] and is often referred to as Marshal Kim Jong-un or "the Marshal" by state media.[10][11] Kim obtained two degrees, one in physics at Kim Il-sung University, and another as an Army officer at the Kim Il-sung Military University.[12][13] On 12 December 2013 official North Korean news outlets released reports that due to alleged "treachery," he had ordered the execution of his uncle Jang Song-thaek.[14] On 9 March 2014, Kim Jong-un was elected unopposed to the Supreme People's Assembly. He is the first North Korean leader born after the country's founding. Kim Jong-un is widely believed to have ordered the assassination of his brother, Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia in February 2017.[15][16]   From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong-un

22 July 2016, with Victor Shih For years China was led by consensus – factions in the upper echelons of power were carefully calibrated to keep a balance. But with Xi Jinping all that has changed, says Victor Shih of the University of California, San Diego. Since Xi’s faction within the Central Committee is still rather small, he established a number of new leading small groups to strengthen his influence on policy making. At the 19th party congress next year Xi could now try to shrink the size of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee to obtain absolute power within the CCP. That’s Victor Shih in the latest Merics Experts Podcast.

22 July 2016, with Victor Shih For years China was led by consensus – factions in the upper echelons of power were carefully calibrated to keep a balance. But with Xi Jinping all that has changed, says Victor Shih of the University of California, San Diego. Since Xi’s faction within the Central Committee is still rather small, he established a number of new leading small groups to strengthen his influence on policy making. At the 19th party congress next year Xi could now try to shrink the size of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee to obtain absolute power within the CCP. That’s Victor Shih in the latest Merics Experts Podcast.