Podcasts about Hu Jintao

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics.

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/technology

China's approach to digital governance has gained global influence, often evoking Orwellian 'Big Brother' comparisons. Governing Digital China (Cambridge UP, 2025) challenges this perception, arguing that China's approach is radically different in practice. This book explores the logic of popular corporatism, highlighting the bottom-up influences of China's largest platform firms and its citizens. Drawing on extensive fieldwork and nationally representative surveys, the authors track governance of social media and commercial social credit ratings during both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. Their findings reveal how Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Sina, Baidu, and Alibaba, have become consultants and insiders to the state, thus forming a state-company partnership. Meanwhile, citizens voluntarily produce data, incentivizing platform firms to cater to their needs and motivating resistance by platforms. Authors Daniela Stockmann and Ting Luo unveil the intricate mechanisms linking the state, platform firms, and citizens in the digital governance of authoritarian states. Daniela Stockmann is Director of the Centre for Digital Governance and Professor of Digital Governance at the Hertie School. Ting Luo is an Associate Professor in Government and Artificial Intelligence at the University of Birmingham. Interviewer Peter Lorentzen is an associate professor of economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads the Master's program in International and Development Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day

THE FORBIDDEN MUSEUM OF SHANTOU Colleague Tanya Branigan. Tanya Branigan discusses her book, Red Memory, and her visit to the Cultural Revolution Museum in Shantou. Founded by former official Peng Qi'an, this was the only museum in China dedicated to recording the era's violence and chaos. Built in a remote location on a site of mass graves to avoid scrutiny, the museum was eventually suppressed by authorities. Branigan recounts visiting during the Hu Jintao era while being monitored by undercover police. Today, the site is closed, unlike the National Museum, which relegates the decade-long catastrophe to a single "dingy corner." TANYA BRANIGAN NUMBER 11905 SHANGHAI MIXED COURT

Marxist-Leninist ideology in China has remained consistent since 1949 with successive dictators adapting Mao's version of communism with new twists and turns. Deng Xiaoping took the greatest departure from Maoism but kept Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao put their spin on communism, while also maintaining ideological continuity. Under Xi Jinping today, communism in China is experiencing a forced revival within the Chinese Communist Party despite the masses of China's people recognizing it as a failed European ideology deserving of contempt. This episode explains how Xi is reverting to Mao-style totalitarian communism and a more aggressive expansion around the world. For the counterproposal, this episode explains why mere anti-communism is not enough and a new faith-based worldview is the ultimate solution to defeating communism. For the news section, this program addresses how artificial intelligence is being used by the Indo-Pacific command to deter conflict with China. The interview portion hears from Bradley Thayer, an expert on both China and communism.

Plan ,,Trumpa" dla Ukrainy w ujęciu gospodarczym i przepływy kapitałowe. Stosunki gospodarcze Chiny - Ukraina oraz historyczne podejście Chin do Ukrainy jeszcze za Hu Jintao i Jiang Zemina. Czy Chiny dążą do pokoju w Ukrainie, czy wręcz odwrotnie przedłużająca się wojna jest w ich interesieZapraszam na spotkanie z dr Danielem Szeligowskim, analitykiem PISM oraz dr Łukaszem Kossackim-Lytwynem z kancelarii Hanglung Biernat Kossacki.Black Weeks w Militaria.pl - https://mltr.pl/PBPBW2025

The common story of modern China's development is that it has two ages: Mao, and reform. The truth is there are at least six internally coherent economic eras within the country's journey from basket case to superpower. Each with their own rules and obsessions. That's certainly the view of Philip Pilkington, who has been crunching the deep data on the Chinese economy, in a new paper for Eurasia Magazine. This week, in an hour long special, Andrew Collingwood quizzes him on the particularities of these periods: from the black-and-white-cats of Deng, to the red-in-tooth-and-claw market mercantilism of Hu Jintao, up to Xi's property sinking funds and robot army. As Philip argues, most US Republicans still imagine that the central danger of China is that it trades unfairly - in truth, the country has moved on from that point on the global value chain.Remember you can get special paywalled premium episodes of Multipolarity every month on Patreon: https://patreon.com/multipolarity or by becoming a member on our YouTube Channel (just click Join).

For ten years between 2003 and 2013, Chinese organizer Lu Jun worked to build a movement of advocacy and litigation to secure human rights.  He first joined the fight against stigma attached to people with Hepatitis B that limited their access to education and work, and later founded what was to become the main human rights organization in China, the Yirenping Center.  But that was under then President Hu Jintao. When Xi Jinping came to power, political space shrunk sharply. In this episode,  Lu Jun reflects on how a nationwide network of lawyers and NGOs coped with the crackdown and shows how human rights work continues. Contact us at pod@strengthandsolidarity.orgWe are now publishing our newsletter on Substack, if you would like to subscribe: https://substack.com/@strengthsolidarity⁠Transcript availble here.⁠

Na de wapenstilstand in de Amerikaans-Chinese handelsoorlog, die Donald Trump en Xi Jinping overeenkwamen, wordt het steeds duidelijker dat Xi de winnaar is. Of Trump het helemaal door heeft is niet duidelijk, maar het is Xi die de spelregels bepaalt. Trump denkt dat hij heeft gewonnen omdat hij een heffing van 47 procent op Chinese producten handhaaft, en omdat China de stopzetting van de levering van zeldzame aardmetalen een jaartje heeft uitgesteld. Voor een tansactionele leider als Trump is dat een goed resultaat. Xi ziet de overeenkomst met Trump niet als een verdrag maar hooguit als een nuttig gesprek. De kou is een beetje uit de lucht en dat heeft de schijn van wat Chinezen heel belangrijk vinden: harmonie. In werkelijkheid was de ontmoeting een nieuwe bouwsteen in de strategie waaraan China al 20 jaar werkt, dus die al begon onder Xi’s voorganger Hu Jintao. Die strategie komt erop neer dat China ernaar streeft een geheel op zichzelf staande economie te worden. In een uitstekende analyse in de New York Times wordt het beeld geschetst van een land dat de economische zelfstandigheid op alle fronten bevecht. Lang niet alle Chinese producten kunnen zich kwalitatief meten met westerse, maar dan moet de burger maar genoegen nemen met een tandje lager. En voor steeds meer producten geldt het omgekeerde: die doen kwalitatief inmiddels niet meer onder voor de westerse concurrentie, en zijn vaak zelfs beter. De auto-industrie is een lichtend voorbeeld. Het gevecht van westerse merken om hun positie op de Chinese markt te behouden is een verloren strijd. Chinezen hebben geduld – ze zijn er tenslotte al twintig jaar mee bezig – maar het doel is de import tot een absoluut minimum te reduceren, terwijl hun producten of grondstoffen voor het Westen onmisbaar zijn. Zoals farmaceutische producten, accu’s, zonnepanelen, elektronica, aardmetalen. Er zijn twee producten waarvan de Chinezen zelf zeggen nog stevig achter te lopen: hoogwaardige halfgeleiders en vliegtuigonderdelen. Maar ook die kloof zijn ze van plan te overbruggen, en ze nemen er alle tijd voor. Wat voor de Verenigde Staten geldt, geldt ook voor Europa. De moraal van het verhaal: wij, in Nederland, en in de Europese Unie zijn voortdurend aan het schaven en vijlen aan een Chinapolitiek, die is gebaseerd op het verminderen van de import, en dus de afhankelijkheid. Waar we niet bij stilstaan is wat er gebeurt als China wegvalt als exportbestemming. Hebben we daar een strategie voor? Die wil de nieuwe Tweede Kamer dan vast graag eens zien.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People's Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China's efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people's struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China's top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. What are Beijing's interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama's passing? I'm delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled Beijing's Dangerous Game in Tibet”.Timestamps[00:00] Start [02:08] Beijing's Key Interests in Tibet [04:06] Xi Jinping's Approach to Tibet [07:00] Internal and External Drivers of Tibet Policy [08:08] Xi's Recent Visit to Tibet [11:34] Infrastructure Developments and Expansionism  [15:27] Beijing's Succession Plans and Tibetan Reactions to a Future Dalai Lama [20:27] Risk of Unrest and Crackdowns [25:43] Implications for Neighboring States 

This week we talk about cyberespionage, China, and asymmetrical leverage.We also discuss political firings, hardware infiltration, and Five Eyes.Recommended Book: The Fourth Turning Is Here by Neil HoweTranscriptIn the year 2000, then-General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin (jong ZEM-in), approved a plan to develop so-called “cyber coercive capabilities”—the infrastructure for offensive hacking—partly as a consequence of aggressive actions by the US, which among other things had recently bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as part of the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia.The US was a nuclear power with immense military capabilities that far outshone those of China, and the idea was that the Chinese government needed some kind of asymmetrical means of achieving leverage against the US and its allies to counter that. Personal tech and the internet were still relatively young in 2000—the first iPhone wouldn't be released for another seven years, for context—but there was enough going on in the cyber-intelligence world that it seemed like a good point of leverage to aim for.The early 2000s Chairman of the CCP, Hu Jintao, backed this ambition, citing the burgeoning threat of instability-inducing online variables, like those that sparked the color revolutions across Europe and Asia, and attack strategies similar to Israel's Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran as justification, though China's growing economic dependence on its technological know-how was also part of the equation; it could evolve its capacity in this space relatively quickly, and it had valuable stuff that was targetable by foreign cyberattacks, so it was probably a good idea to increase their defenses, while also increasing their ability to hit foreign targets in this way—that was the logic here.The next CCP Chairman, Xi Jinping, doubled-down on this effort, saying that in the cyber world, everyone else was using air strikes and China was still using swords and spears, so they needed to up their game substantially and rapidly.That ambition seems to have been realized: though China is still reportedly regularly infiltrated by foreign entities like the US's CIA, China's cybersecurity firms and state-affiliated hacker groups have become serious players on the international stage, pulling off incredibly complex hacks of foreign governments and infrastructure, including a campaign called Volt Typhoon, which seems to have started sometime in or before 2021, but which wasn't discovered by US entities until 2024. This campaign saw Chinese hackers infiltrating all sorts of US agencies and infrastructure, initially using malware, and then entwining themselves with the operating systems used by their targets, quietly syphoning off data, credentials, and other useful bits of information, slowly but surely becoming even more interwoven with the fabric of these systems, and doing so stealthily in order to remain undetected for years.This effort allowed hackers to glean information about the US's defenses in the continental US and in Guam, while also helping them breach public infrastructure, like Singapore's telecommunications company, Singtel. It's been suggested that, as with many Chinese cyberattacks, this incursion was a long-game play, meant to give the Chinese government the option of both using private data about private US citizens, soldiers, and people in government for manipulation or blackmail purposes, or to shut down important infrastructure, like communications channels or electrical grids, in the event of a future military conflict.What I'd like to talk about today is another, even bigger and reportedly more successful long-term hack by the Chinese government, and one that might be even more disruptive, should there ever be a military conflict between China and one of the impacted governments, or their allies.—Salt Typhoon is the name that's been given to a so-called '“advanced persistent threat actor,” which is a formal way of saying hacker or hacker group, by Microsoft, which plays a big role in the cybersecurity world, especially at this scale, a scale involving not just independent hackers, but government-level cyberespionage groups.This group is generally understood to be run out of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, or MSS, and though it's not usually possible to say something like that for certain, hence the “generally understood” component of that statement, often everyone kind of knows who's doing what, but it's imprudent to say so with 100% certainty, as cyberespionage, like many other sorts of spy stuff, is meant to be a gray area where governments can knock each other around without leading to a shooting war. If anyone were to say with absolute certainty, yes, China is hacking us, and it's definitely the government, and they're doing a really good job of it, stealing all our stuff and putting us at risk, that would either require the targeted government to launch some sort of counterstrike against China, or would leave that targeted government looking weak, and thus prone to more such incursions and attacks, alongside any loss of face they might suffer.So there's a lot of hand-waving and alluding in this sphere of diplomacy and security, but it's basically understood that Salt Typhoon is run by China, and it's thought that they've been operating since at least 2020.Their prime function seems to be stealing as much classified data as they can from governments around the world, and scooping up all sorts of intellectual property from corporations, too.China's notorious for collecting this kind of IP and then giving it to Chinese companies, which have become really good at using such IP, copying it, making it cheaper, and sometimes improving upon it in other ways, as well. This government-corporation collaboration model is fundamental to the operation of China's economy, and the dynamic between its government, it's military, its intelligence services, and its companies, all of which work together in various ways.It's estimated that Salt Typhoon has infiltrated more than 200 targets in more than 80 countries, and alongside corporate entities like AT&T and Verizon, they also managed to scoop up private text messages from Kamala Harris' and Donald Trump's presidential campaigns in 2024, using hacks against phone services to do so.Three main Chinese tech companies allegedly helped Salt Typhoon infiltrate foreign telecommunications companies and internet service providers, alongside hotel, transportation, and other sorts of entities, which allowed them to not just grab text messages, but also track people, keeping tabs on their movements, which again, might be helpful in future blackmail or even assassination operations.Those three companies seem to be real-deal, actual companies, not just fronts for Chinese intelligence, but the government was able to use them, and the services and products they provide, to sneak malicious code into all kinds of vital infrastructure and all sorts of foreign corporations and agencies—which seems to support concerns from several years ago about dealing with Chinese tech companies like Huawei; some governments decided not to work with them, especially in building-out their 5G communications infrastructure, due to the possibility that the Chinese government might use these ostensibly private companies as a means of getting espionage software or devices into these communications channels or energy grids. The low prices Huawei offered just wasn't worth the risk.The US government announced back in 2024 that Salt Typhoon had infiltrated a bunch of US telecommunications companies and broadband networks, and that routers manufactured by Cisco were also compromised by this group. The group was also able to get into ISP services that US law enforcement and intelligence services use to conduct court-authorized wiretaps; so they weren't just spying on individuals, they were also spying on other government's spies and those they were spying on.Despite all these pretty alarming findings, in the midst of the investigation into these hacks, the second US Trump administration fired the government's Cyber Safety Review Board, which was thus unable to complete its investigation into Salt Typhoon's intrusion.The FBI has since issued a large bounty for information about those involved in Salt Typhoon, but that only addresses the issue indirectly, and there's still a lot we don't know about this group, the extent of their hacking, and where else they might still be embedded, in part because the administration fired those looking into it, reportedly because the administration didn't like this group also looking into Moscow's alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election, and Salt Typhoon's potential interference with the 2024 presidential election, both of which Trump won.The US government has denied these firings are in any way political, saying they intend to focus on cyber offense rather than defense, and pointing out that the current approach to investigating these sorts of things was imperfect; which is something that most outside organizations would agree on.That said, there are concerns that these firings, and other actions against the US's cyberthreat defensive capabilities, are revenge moves against people and groups that have said the 2020 presidential election, which Trump lost to Joe Biden, was the most secure and best-run election in US history; which flies in the face of Trump's preferred narrative that he won in 2020—something he's fond of repeating, though without evidence, and with a vast body of evidence against his claim.The US has also begun pulling away from long-time allies that it has previously collaborated with in the cyberespionage and cyberdefense sphere, including its Five Eyes partners, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.Since Tulsi Gabbard was installed as the Director of National Intelligence by Trump's new administration, US intelligence services have been instructed to withhold information about negotiations with Russia and Ukraine from these allies; something that's worrying intelligence experts, partly because this move seems to mostly favor Russia, and partly because it represents one more wall, of many, that the administration seems to be erecting between the US and these allies. Gabbard herself is also said to be incredibly pro-Russian, so while that may not be influencing this decision, it's easy to understand why many allies and analysts are concerned that her loyalties might be divided in this matter.So what we have is a situation in which political considerations and concerns, alongside divided priorities and loyalties within several governments, but the US in particular right now, might be changing the layout of, and perhaps even weakening, cybersecurity and cyberespionage services at the very moment these services might be most necessary, because a foreign government has managed to install itself in all kinds of agencies, infrastructure, and corporations.That presence could allow China to milk these entities for information and stolen intellectual property, but it could also put the Chinese government in a very favorable position, should some kind of conflict break out, including but not limited to an invasion of Taiwan; if the US's electrical grids or telecommunications services go down, or the country's military is unable to coordinate with itself, or with its allies in the Pacific, at the moment China invades, there's a non-zero chance that would impact the success of that invasion in China's favor.Again, this is a pretty shadowy playing field even at the best of times, but right now there seems to be a lot happening in the cyberespionage space, and many of the foundations that were in place until just recently, are also being shaken, shattered, or replaced, which makes this an even more tumultuous, uncertain moment, with heightened risks for everybody, though maybe the opposite for those attacking these now more-vulnerable bits of infrastructure and vital entities.Show Noteshttps://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/china-used-three-private-companies-hack-global-telecoms-us-says-rcna227543https://media.defense.gov/2025/Aug/22/2003786665/-1/-1/0/CSA_COUNTERING_CHINA_STATE_ACTORS_COMPROMISE_OF_NETWORKS.PDFhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/05/us/politics/trump-loomer-haugh-cyberattacks-elections.htmlhttps://www.france24.com/en/americas/20250826-has-the-us-shut-its-five-eyes-allies-out-of-intelligence-on-ukraine-russia-peace-talkshttps://www.axios.com/2025/09/04/china-salt-typhoon-fbi-advisory-us-datahttps://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/chinese-spies-hit-more-than-80-countries-in-salt-typhoon-breach-fbi-reveals-59b2108fhttp://axios.com/2025/08/02/china-usa-cyberattacks-microsoft-sharepointhttps://www.axios.com/2024/12/03/salt-typhoon-china-phone-hackshttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/world/asia/china-hack-salt-typhoon.htmlhttps://www.euronews.com/2025/09/04/trump-and-jd-vance-among-targets-of-major-chinese-cyberattack-investigators-sayhttps://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12798https://www.fcc.gov/document/implications-salt-typhoon-attack-and-fcc-responsehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_Typhoonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_global_telecommunications_hackhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_interference_in_the_2024_United_States_electionshttps://www.theregister.com/2025/08/28/how_does_china_keep_stealing/https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/4287371/nsa-and-others-provide-guidance-to-counter-china-state-sponsored-actors-targeti/https://chooser.crossref.org/?doi=10.2307%2Fjj.16040335https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare_and_Chinahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volt_Typhoon This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are often overlooked but pivotal figures in recent Chinese history whose role in steering China through its extraordinary economic transformation in the 1990s and 2000s is overshadowed by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This is the first in a series of podcasts about these two figures and how they created the China now ruled by Xi Jinping.*****STOP PRESS*****I only ever talk about history on this podcast but I also have another life, yes, that of aspirant fantasy author and if that's your thing you can get a copy of my debut novel The Blood of Tharta, right here:Help the podcast to continue bringing you history each weekIf you enjoy the Explaining History podcast and its many years of content and would like to help the show continue, please consider supporting it in the following ways:If you want to go ad-free, you can take out a membership hereOrYou can support the podcast via Patreon hereOr you can just say some nice things about it here Become a member at https://plus.acast.com/s/explaininghistory. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China's foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:37] Behind the Creation of BRICS[04:08] BRICS+ in China's Foreign Policy Objectives[06:20] Domination of China in BRICS+[09:13] Russian and Chinese Interest in BRICS+[14:16] China and the Expansion of BRICS[18:07] Noteworthiness of the Kazan Declaration[21:10] Possibility of a BRICS Currency[28:11] BRICS+ and U.S. Policy Under Donald Trump[30:26] Responding to BRICS+ and a Multipolar World

Bill Clinton e Jiang Zemin; George W. Bush e Hu Jintao; Barack Obama e Xi Jinping; Donald Trump e Xi Jinping: quattro incontri tra un presidente degli Stati Uniti e uno della Cina per capire cosa dovremmo aspettarci in futuro nelle relazioni tra Cina e Usa, dopo il voto presidenziale americano ormai alle porte. Una storia fatta di dialoghi, sorprese, accuse, passeggiate e torte servite annunciando bombardamenti in giro per il mondo. Gli inserti audio della puntata sono tratti da: U.S.-China Joint News Conference, C-Span, 26 giugno 1998; Bush welcomes Hu, ceremony, speeches, heckler led away, photo op, Ap Archive, 21 luglio 2015; Obama, Xi Meet in California, Voice of America, 8 giugno 2013; President Trump At Mar-A-Lago Dinner Table With Chinese President Xi Jinping, canale YouTube LiveNow from Fox, 7 aprile 2017. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Where is China today? Will its rise continue to benefit the vast majority of its population? Or is Xi Jinping's increasingly repressive government committing one of the biggest blunders of modern history? This is the final episode in the China-trilogy, the product of hours of conversations I've had with ChinaTalk's Jordan Schneider and MIT professor Yasheng Huang. In part 1, we discussed the deep currents of Chinese history, shaping the country's destiny from its early technological lead to its more recent decline and stagnation. In part 2, we discussed China during and after Mao, trying our best to explain the Chinese economic miracle. In this final episode, we discuss questions about China's present and future, guided by lessons from its recent past. We touch upon issues such as: The causes and consequences of Xi Jinping's rise Why both Chinese leaders and Western observers misunderstand China's miracle – and why this matters for the future Why China is on course towards a sudden eruption of political chaos As always, we finish with my guest's reflections on humanity. LINKS You can read my essays and get the On Humans newsletter at ⁠OnHumans.Substack.com⁠. Are you a long-term listener? Feeling generous today? Join the wonderful group of my patrons at ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon.com/OnHumans⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠! For other episodes on economic history, see my series on the ⁠⁠⁠⁠Birth of Modern Prosperity⁠⁠⁠⁠, with Daron Acemoglu, Oded Galor, Brad DeLong, and Branko Milanovic. MENTIONS Scholars Gordon Tullock | Joseph Torigian CCP figures Hua Guofeng 华国锋 | "Gang of Four" 四人幫 | Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 | Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 | 习近平 China's history | Xi Jinping | Chinese miracle | China's political leadership | Xi Jinping reforms | Hu Jintao policies | China leadership generations | Chinese Communist Party | Deng Xiaoping reforms | Chinese economy | China's political control | Chinese corruption | Rural poverty in China | China's environmental policies | China economic inequality | Chinese rural income | Chinese political system | China's globalized economy | Chinese private sector | China geopolitical tensions | China-West relations | Chinese GDP growth | CCP succession | Xi Jinping succession | Autocracy in China | China's term limits | China's leadership transitions | Vietnam-China war | China's authoritarianism | Chinese economic growth | Xi Jinping's leadership style | Chinese politics and reforms | China's environmental issues | China's green policies | Urban-rural gap

O 45 Graus está de férias, por isso não há episódios novos. É uma boa altura para re-publicar alguns dos melhores episódios das últimas temporadas (os mais ouvidos e que mais feedback tiveram dos ouvintes). Este, um regresso da Raquel Vaz-Pinto ao podcast, é um belo exemplo disso; e, com este tema, é um episódio que -- feliz ou infelizmente -- vai manter-se actual ainda por muito tempo. A quem não teve oportunidade de ouvir na altura, espero que gostem! Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) da Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Prof. Auxiliar Convidada da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma Universidade, onde lecciona as disciplinas de Estudos Asiáticos e História das Relações Internacionais. Foi consultora do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 2020 a 2022 e Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Autora de vários artigos e livros entre os quais A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos editado pela Tinta-da-China e Os Portugueses e o Mundo editado pela Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.  Os seus interesses de investigação são Política Externa e Estratégia Chinesa; os EUA e o Indo-Pacífico; e Liderança e Estratégia. É analista residente de política internacional da SIC e da TSF. Actualmente, está a terminar um livro, que será publicado pela Tinta-da-china, sobre os desafios colocados pela China às democracias liberais europeias, incluindo a portuguesa. -> Apoie este podcast e faça parte da comunidade de mecenas do 45 Graus em: 45grauspodcast.com -> Inscreva-se aqui nas sessões de setembro e outubro dos workshops de Pensamento Crítico, módulo "Desinformação e Números que Enganam. _______________ Índice (com timestamps): (0:00) Introdução ​(9:47) O que mudou na rivalidade CN-EUA desde o nosso episódio de 2018? | Wolf warrior diplomacy | Os diplomatas chineses mal-comportados | Índia | Quad (30:18) A política externa dos EUA em relação à China começou por ser complacente e tornou-se demasiado agressiva? | Artigo de John Mearsheimer | Estratégia dos G7 em relação à CN: do decoupling ao de-risking | Matérias primas críticas e terras raras (e aqui) (42:10) Já podemos falar de uma Guerra Fria entre EUA e CN? | A Armadilha de Tucídides (Livro: História da Guerra do Peloponeso)| Houve uma crença exagerada no Ocidente nos efeitos da abertura económica? | Como os manuais de economia americanos sobrevalorizam a economia da URSS | Frase atribuída a Deng Xiaoping: «Hide your strength, bide your time» (55:26) Comparação China vs URSS | O papel da ideologia na guerra fria vs na nova ‘ordem chinesa' | Aumento do autoritarismo do regime chinês | Digital Dictators | Cimeira da Ásia Central, sem a Rússia | Nova política externa defendida pelo SPD alemão | A nova ambição da China para o Ártico (1:18:37) O que esperar do futuro -- e o que fazer para evitar uma escalada do conflito? | Tese do ‘peak China' | O problema demográfico da china (e os telefonemas aos recém-casados) | Livro: Leftover Women, de Leta Hong Fincher | Episódio com Hu Jintao no congresso do CCP | European Critical Raw Materials Act | A integração económica é um garante de que não ocorre uma guerra ou é, pelo contrário, uma fonte permanente de tensões? _______________ Obrigado aos mecenas do podcast: Francisco Hermenegildo, Ricardo Evangelista, Henrique Pais João Baltazar, Salvador Cunha, Abilio Silva, Tiago Leite, Carlos Martins, Galaró family, Corto Lemos, Miguel Marques, Nuno Costa, Nuno e Ana, João Ribeiro, Helder Miranda, Pedro Lima Ferreira, Cesar Carpinteiro, Luis Fernambuco, Fernando Nunes, Manuel Canelas, Tiago Gonçalves, Carlos Pires, João Domingues, Hélio Bragança da Silva, Sandra Ferreira , Paulo Encarnação , BFDC, António Mexia Santos, Luís Guido, Bruno Heleno Tomás Costa, João Saro, Daniel Correia, Rita Mateus, António Padilha, Tiago Queiroz, Carmen Camacho, João Nelas, Francisco Fonseca, Rafael Santos, Andreia Esteves, Ana Teresa Mota, ARUNE BHURALAL, Mário Lourenço, RB, Maria Pimentel, Luis, Geoffrey Marcelino, Alberto Alcalde, António Rocha Pinto, Ruben de Bragança, João Vieira dos Santos, David Teixeira Alves, Armindo Martins , Carlos Nobre, Bernardo Vidal Pimentel, António Oliveira, Paulo Barros, Nuno Brites, Lígia Violas, Tiago Sequeira, Zé da Radio, João Morais, André Gamito, Diogo Costa, Pedro Ribeiro, Bernardo Cortez Vasco Sá Pinto, David , Tiago Pires, Mafalda Pratas, Joana Margarida Alves Martins, Luis Marques, João Raimundo, Francisco Arantes, Mariana Barosa, Nuno Gonçalves, Pedro Rebelo, Miguel Palhas, Ricardo Duarte, Duarte , Tomás Félix, Vasco Lima, Francisco Vasconcelos, Telmo , José Oliveira Pratas, Jose Pedroso, João Diogo Silva, Joao Diogo, José Proença, João Crispim, João Pinho , Afonso Martins, Robertt Valente, João Barbosa, Renato Mendes, Maria Francisca Couto, Antonio Albuquerque, Ana Sousa Amorim, Francisco Santos, Lara Luís, Manuel Martins, Macaco Quitado, Paulo Ferreira, Diogo Rombo, Francisco Manuel Reis, Bruno Lamas, Daniel Almeida, Patrícia Esquível , Diogo Silva, Luis Gomes, Cesar Correia, Cristiano Tavares, Pedro Gaspar, Gil Batista Marinho, Maria Oliveira, João Pereira, Rui Vilao, João Ferreira, Wedge, José Losa, Hélder Moreira, André Abrantes, Henrique Vieira, João Farinha, Manuel Botelho da Silva, João Diamantino, Ana Rita Laureano, Pedro L, Nuno Malvar, Joel, Rui Antunes7, Tomás Saraiva, Cloé Leal de Magalhães, Joao Barbosa, paulo matos, Fábio Monteiro, Tiago Stock, Beatriz Bagulho, Pedro Bravo, Antonio Loureiro, Hugo Ramos, Inês Inocêncio, Telmo Gomes, Sérgio Nunes, Tiago Pedroso, Teresa Pimentel, Rita Noronha, miguel farracho, José Fangueiro, Zé, Margarida Correia-Neves, Bruno Pinto Vitorino, João Lopes, Joana Pereirinha, Gonçalo Baptista, Dario Rodrigues, tati lima, Pedro On The Road, Catarina Fonseca, JC Pacheco, Sofia Ferreira, Inês Ribeiro, Miguel Jacinto, Tiago Agostinho, Margarida Costa Almeida, Helena Pinheiro, Rui Martins, Fábio Videira Santos, Tomás Lucena, João Freitas, Ricardo Sousa, RJ, Francisco Seabra Guimarães, Carlos Branco, David Palhota, Carlos Castro, Alexandre Alves, Cláudia Gomes Batista, Ana Leal, Ricardo Trindade, Luís Machado, Andrzej Stuart-Thompson, Diego Goulart, Filipa Portela, Paulo Rafael, Paloma Nunes, Marta Mendonca, Teresa Painho, Duarte Cameirão, Rodrigo Silva, José Alberto Gomes, Joao Gama, Cristina Loureiro, Tiago Gama, Tiago Rodrigues, Miguel Duarte, Ana Cantanhede, Artur Castro Freire, Rui Passos Rocha, Pedro Costa Antunes, Sofia Almeida, Ricardo Andrade Guimarães, Daniel Pais, Miguel Bastos, Luís Santos _______________ Esta conversa foi editada por: Hugo Oliveira  

This week's guest is Dr. Gerard Postiglione, Professor Emeritus and Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Education at the University of Hong Kong. In this episode, Gerry takes us through changes in higher education in China, from the initial opening under Deng Xiaoping, through the rapid system expansion under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, to the present system under Xi Jinping. 

Putin was a working class outsider who rose through the ranks to the Country's top job. Once at the top, Putin consolidated his position by eiminating opposition and giving Russia a strategic economic advantage. Xi was a Princeling who ended up on the wrong side during Mao's time. But Xi believed in Mao and came back, aspiring to be Mao 2.0

Broken China? China borders 14 countries and is the 4th largest country in the world and second largest in terms of population. It's very surprising to know so little about the Chinese even though western think tanks and news articles have written volumes. It's shocking that a county which is at the very enter of the global supply chain for nearly every other country in the world is enigmatic, challenging, and difficult to understand. Perhaps it's due to China being an officially atheist state with over 40% of the population identifying as agnostic or atheist? This is remarkably different from nearly any other country in the world as is the lack of ethnic diversity 91.6% identify as ethnically Han. China is different, or is it really? In this video podcast with Comrade Ian Thornton-Trump CD, CISO for Cyjax, Comrade Lisa Forte and Comrade Philip Ingram MBE we wave the Chinese flag passionately as we explore China. Lisa, was our woman on the ground who travelled the length and width of the region including rural Mongolia in -45 Celsius (-49 Fahrenheit) and visited Beijing as well as some rural villages - we can categorically state China has some of the best ice climbing opportunities in the world. The ice climbing opportunities aside this video podcast is supported by a new report from our sponsor Cyjax written by Comrade Nikita Cole whose draft helped structured our discussion - the paper is available here:  This short excerpt from the CIA world fact book paints the picture and rather surprisingly is unbiased in relating to China's resent ascension to the second largest economy in the world (2024).    "MAO Zedong died in 1976. Beginning in 1978, subsequent leaders DENG Xiaoping, JIANG Zemin, and HU Jintao focused on market-oriented economic development and opening the country to foreign trade, while maintaining the rule of the CCP. Since the change, China has been among the world's fastest growing economies, with real gross domestic product averaging over 9% growth annually through 2021, lifting an estimated 800 million people out of poverty, and dramatically improving overall living standards." What the CIA world fact book has left out is the lifting out of poverty has created a massive middle class anxious for western consumer and luxury goods. The 2023 McKinsey China Consumer Report also found the middle class continues to rise. There is still no other country that adds as many households to the middle class each year as China does. Over the next three years, China is expected to add another 71 million upper-middle and high-income households adding to the 693.3 million identified in 2022. It's massive and a massive market opportunity for any firm.  But all may not be as well as it seems - the panel explores some of doom and gloom associated with China and how cracks may be showing in foreign policy, international relations and its relationship with the world's largest economy the USA - join us for a fascinating look at a country described by some as a "Frenemy" to the west but has radically transformed in less than 1/2 a lifetime - 45 years.

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping's leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi's assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group.  Timestamps[01:32] Historical Significance of Foreign Affairs Work Conference[07:09] Xi's Key Messages from the Conference in December[11:10] Xi's Concept of the Community of Common Destiny[15:26] Major Country Diplomacy in Chinese Foreign Policy[20:03] China's Diplomacy Going Forward[23:07] Xi's Speech to Chinese Ambassadors 

Formulated by PRC think tanks in the mid-1990s, China's official slogan of the "peaceful rise" sought to calm Western fears regarding its blossoming economic, military, and political power as the nation resumed an outsized role in global affairs. However the mood did not last long, as in the later years of President Hu Jintao's administration, policies hardened into a more aggressive, militaristic stance, and then was continued by the personalistic regime of President Xi Jinping, as China sought to project power abroad to boost popularity of the regime at home. There are few people more qualified to examine this period than Susan Shirk, a professor at the University of California San Diego and the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. In her latest book, "Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise," Shirk takes apart some of the most common myths and narratives held by observers of China - namely that the "peaceful rise" was a deception instead of an intention, but this was not the case. Shirk explores the numerous and complex domestic factors guiding of Chinese foreign policy, while rejecting the premise that all decisions stem from the personal whims of Xi Jinping and his agenda for Chinese primacy. Xi does not enjoy any sort of full control over China, Shirk argues, but sits atop a complex, competing system of institutional imperatives, such as weiquan (sovereignty rights defence) and weiwen (stability maintenance). These imperatives often produce policies at odds with Xi's preferences, and leave China with a government that shouldn't be considered a rational unitary actor. In crafting policy responses to China's growing power and influence, Shirk warns against overreacting in ways that weaken the ability of the US to compete. In other words, stay true to the principles of a free and open market democracy.   The state behaves in ways that are not directed by and are sometime at odds with the preferences of the leader, particularly in the areas of , or, broadly, international and domestic security.    She takes a contrary view to those who would locate the source of Beijing's behaviour purely in terms of Xi Jinping's mission to centre China on the world stage. Instead, she notes that friction over the same issues analysts now frequently associate with Xi began much earlier than his term. These tensions have worsened under Xi, but they are not merely a product of his leadership. Nor, she argues, is Xi totally in control.

On today's podcast: 1) Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said both Israel and the Palestinians need new leadership in order to have a chance of achieving a peace deal once the current war in the Gaza Strip ends. 2) The five Republicans scrapping to fashion themselves as the alternative to Donald Trump opened their debate Wednesday night blaming the former president for the party's latest election embarrassment — then spent the next 90 minutes doing little to distinguish themselves from the GOP frontrunner. 3) Donald Trump's daughter Ivanka Trump testified she had no role in preparing his allegedly inflated financial statements and wasn't aware that he was claiming a net worth of more than $4 billion as she was trying to get a Trump Organization loan for the Doral golf club in Florida in 2011 3) Missed your favorite actors? After nearly four months of striking, they're coming back. Wednesday's deal between striking actors and studios and streaming services won't immediately restore filming to its full swing. That will take months. 5) Walt Disney, embroiled in another fight with activist investor Nelson Peltz, posted fourth-quarter profit that beat analysts' expectations and said it will cut an additional $2 billion in expenses. Disney stock jumps.  Full Transcript: Good morning, I'm Nathan Hager and I'm Karen Moscow. Here are the stories we're following today. We begin with the latest developments in the war in the Middle East. The Pentagon says the US IS carried out an airstrike on a weapons warehouse in eastern Syria. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says the self defense strike was in retaliation for attacks on American forces in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, Israel says some fifty thousand more Palestinians have fled to southern Gaza as Israel's army pushes deeper in to Hamas strongholds in the north of the territory. All this as, Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says, both Israel and the Palestinians need new leadership. So I think you have to create the environment in which there is a chance to revitalize the peace process and a potential for a two state solution. Hamas is not interested in a two state solution. They are dedicated to the destruction of Israel. That is in their charter. If you've been watching lots of different outlets over the last month, that is what the leaders of Hamas say, you know they want to destroy Israel. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added that while Israel's unlikely to agree to a ceasefire that would benefit Hamas, it probably will accept pauses to allow aid to reach civilians in Gaza. Clinton made the comments in an interview with Bloomberg's editor in chief John Micklethwaite at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore. Well Nathan. The war in the Middle East was a major topic at last night's Republican presidential debate in Miami. The five candidates on the NBC stage were united in support of Israel, including Florida Governor Ronda Santis. I would be telling BB finish the job once and for all with these butchers. Come on, they're proris, their massacring innocent people. But there were devides over a to Ukraine and how to approach China. Of ak Ramaswami and Nikki Haley had a sharp exchange over banning TikTok in the last debate. She made fun of me for actually joining TikTok while her own daughter was actually using the app for a long time. So you might want to take care of your family first. Read my appreciation daughter man. Nikki Haley and the other candidates also went after front runner Donald Trump for skipping the debate. Jeanie she and Zano is a politics contributor for Bloomberg. She said he was a good president for the time, but he is not the right president for now. And then she pointed to the fact that he created eight trillion dollars in debt, he's wrong on Ukraine now, and the fact that we can't live in the past. Genie she Andzano notes the former president held a rally ten miles away rather than appearing on the debate stage. Meanwhile, Nathan House Republicans have issued subpoenas to members of President Biden's family. The move to subpoena the president's son Hunter and brother James comes as Republicans look to gain ground in their nearly year long investigation. So far, they have failed to uncover evidence directly implicating the President in any wrongdoing. Now to the latest developments caring in the New York Front trial of Donald Trump, his daughter Ivanka's day on the witness stand was filled with denials of any knowledge of her family's net worth calculations. Sloomberg's Ed Baxter has the story. She says she didn't know that her dad was claiming and that worth of more than four billion dollars as she tried to get a loan for the Durreal Golf Club in Florida. She flatly says she's not involved in his personal financial statements. Attorney General Letitia James says, not true. Ivanka Trump secured negotiated loans to obtain favorable terms based on fraudulent statements of financial condition, and she says the Trumps cannot hide from the truth. The Attorney General has wrested Ad Baxter. Bloomberg Radio all right ed, thanks well. From New York to Hollywood. The actors' union has reached a deal with studios to end its strike. Can we get the latest from Bloomberg's Doun Prisner. The vote by the union's Theatrical Committee was unanimous. Common ground was found on issues ranging from the use of artificial intelligence to payment from streaming services, and now, after four months, the strike by some one hundred and sixty thousand actors is over. The previously striking screenwriters have been back on the job for more than a month, so now production of scripted TV shows and movies can resume. And like the writers, the Actors' Union benefited from direct involvement in the talks by some of the most powerful people in Hollywood in New York. I'm Doug Prisner, Bloomberg Radio. All right, Doug, thanks now. Some of those most powerful people included Bob Eiger, and the settlement comes the same day Eigers Walt Disney Company posted fourth quarter profit that beat analyst estimates. Disney also says it'll cut an additional two billion dollars in expenses. Bob Iger says his company will also launch a beta trial bundle of Disney Plus and Hulu next month. We expected Hulu on Disney Plus will result in increased engagement, greater advertising opportunities, lower churn, and reduced customer acquisition cost, thereby increasing our overall margins. Man Right now, shares of Bob Bigers Walt Disney Company are higher by four percent in early trading. Well Nathan, Another CEO, is making news this morning. Bank of America's Brian moynihan said his company has a succession plan in place and that nothing is left a chance in deciding on his eventual replacement. Moynahan, who made the remarks at the Reuters Next conference, took the helm in twenty ten in the wake of the global financial crisis. And there's another bank in the spotlight this morning, Karen. That would be Morgan Stanley. Its wealth management business is under Federal Reserve scrutiny, sources say the New York based banks top regulators pressing whether the firm is taking adequate measures to prevent potential money laundering by wealthy clients outside the US. Representatives for the FED and Morgan Stanley declined to comment. And it's time now for a look at some of the other stories making news around the world. For that, we're joined by Bloomberg's John Tucker, John Good morning, Hey, Good morning Karen. Former President Donald Trump did skip the third uop to at in Miami, instead holding a campaign rally about ten miles away in Heyaliah twenty twenty four is our final battle. Stand with me in the fight. We will finish the job that we started so brilliantly seven years ago. We never had a country like we had just three years ago. Meantime, at judge in Michigan expected to hear arguments today whether the Secretary of State there has the authority to keep Donald Trump's name off state ballots for president. Various groups have filed similar lawsuits in other states, portraying Trump as the insider of the January sixth Capitol riot. They point to part of the Constitution the prohibits a person from running for federal office if they've engaged in insurrection or rebellion. Industry regulators say power grades that supply more than half of the US population may run short of electricity during an extended cold snap or severe storm over the coming winter. That story in this report from Bloomberg's Charlie Pellett. The North American Electric Reliability Corps as regional system operators in a vast swath of the country, stretching from Texas to New England, are at risk of insufficient electricity supplies during peak winter conditions. The report came in a winter reliability assessment which also showed Quebec and Saskatchewan facing the threat of power shortfalls. The outlook is even more dire than last year's report, which set a quarter of Americans were at risk of cold weather power emergencies in New York Charlie Pellett Bloomberg Radio, the population of the US climbed to about three hundred seventy million and twenty eighty before reversing course starting to fall before the turn of the century. This according to News Census Bureau projections and the bureau's most likely scenario, the number of people sixty five or older, we'll overtake the number under eighteen in just six years. Add A nineteen thirty two painting by Pablo Picasso, fem A la Montre, sold for one hundred and thirty nine point three million dollars last night at Sotheby's in New York. At a stroke, it becomes the second most expensive piece by the artist to santl at auction. Global News twenty four hours a day and whenever you want it with Bloomberg News Now. I'm John Tucker and this is Bloomberg Karen. All right, John, thank you well. We do bring you news throughout the day right here on Bloomberg Radio. But now, as John said, you can get the latest news on demand whenever you want it. Subscribe to Bloomberg News Now to get the latest headlines at the click of a button. Get informed on your schedule. You can listen and subscribe to Bloomberg News Now on the Bloomberg Business app, Bloomberg dut Plus, Apples, Spotify, and anywhere else you get your podcasts. Four off time now for the Bloomberg Sports Update with John Stashauer, John Karen. The NBA took Tuesday off to let everyone vote back with a busy night on Wednesday, including showdowns in the East and West. Both games won by home teams by three points. In Philadelphia, the Sixers made it six wins in a row. They beat the Celtics one oh six to one oh three. They lost to Boston to the second round of last year's playoffs, when they blew a three to two series lead. The Sixers had the best record in the East and the Denver Nuggets, defending NBA champs, had the best record in the league eight and one. They beat Golden State one o eight to one oh five. N Koleokus scored thirty five points. Klay Thompson couldn't get a shot off at the buzzer as he tried to tie the game. Victor Wembin Yama's first game in New York it didn't go well. He scored only fourteen points, not only four of fourteen. The Spurs lost to the Knicks one twenty six to one oh five. The Lakers got blown out at U and lost by thirty four Lakers or zero to five on the road. Shay Gilgess Alexander report in forty three points for Oklahoma City in a win over Cleveland. Capitals lost in overtime Florida one four to three. Ron Washington, a seventy one year old baseball lifer, named the new manager of the Los Angeles Angels. He managed the Texas Rangers for eight years, won a couple of tenants there, but he has not managed in the big leagues since twenty fourteen. Not a great NFL game tonight Chicago and Carolina. The Bears will again be quarterbacked by the undrafted rookie Tyson Badge in third straight week as Justin Field's not ready to return from the injured thump. John stash Ellert Bloomberg Sports from coast to coast, from New York to San Francisco, Boston to Washington, DC, nationwide on Syrias Exam the Bloomberg Business Appen Bloomberg dot Com. This is Bloomberg Daybreak. Good morning, I'm Nathan Hager. We want to take you to Singapore now and the Bloomberg New Economy Forum, where world leaders have been weighing in on the economy and geopolitical risks, including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She sat down with Bloomberg News Editor in chief John Micklethwaite to discuss Israel, Ukraine, China, and the future of the United States. They began with a discussion on President Biden's upcoming meeting with Chinese President She Jinping. Part of the reason it was, you know, somewhat more positive when I was there and we had a very regular set of meetings is because Hu Jintao was a Chinese leader who decided he would not stay for life, he would fulfill his term, he would follow the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party, there would be a transition a new group of leaders. You know, some holdovers, but you know, other new faces would be in power, and so there could be a constant renewing of both the Chinese government and through that the American relationship. Once she Jin Ping decided to stay in office for life, that creates a lot of you know, challenges within their own system, and I think we're seeing some of that. And so part of what I hope will come out of this meeting is an attitude by President Shei that you know, he wants to get back to some kind of regular order, that he sees it in China's interests to really dig in with the President Biden, develop a platform for discussions for problem solving, really sending that signal. I think he will find a receptive partner with President Biden if that's available. Israel and Hamas, I think you are in favor of a humanitarian pause or pauses, but you're against the SIESFA which many people in this region asking for. You know, the numbers of dead arising rapidly ten thousand according to Hamas Italy, but you still got like eighty nine dead at the UN which is a gigantic number for United Nations, the Red Crescent and so on. Can you perhaps explain why you don't want to cease far? There is a difference between a ceasefire which would in effect freeze the situation in Hamas's favor. I negotiated a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in November of twenty twelve, and at that point both parties did not want to go any further. The breaching of a pre existing ceasefire by Hamas with rockets being sent into Israel had not caused a lot of damage, and there also had not been the development of the infrastructure of terror that Hamas has built in Gaza. I don't know any nation represented at the New Economy Forum faced with the kind of assault that Israel was faced with by Hamas that would not be number one defending itself and number two trying to prevent it from happening again, because with every other cease fire it did happen again until finally we got to the breach of a ceasefire which was in existence on October seventh with the terrible attack by Hamas. So a ceasefire, if it were possible which frankly, I don't think is possible. I don't think you know, Israel is interested in a ceasefire at this point, but they are perhaps willing to have what we do call humanitarian pauses for the purpose of both getting aid in to try to assist the civilians in Gaza, but also getting the more than two hundred and forty hostages out. You know, these hostages are not just Israeli. One of the biggest groups of hostages are workers from Thailand who are working on farms in Israel. So there is a global dimension to the hostages that a pause could perhaps inspire some willingness on the part of Hamas to let the hostages go. But a ceasefire that would freeze the situation at this point is not something that is going to, you know, really undermine Hamas's capacity, especially with two hundred miles of tunnels that they have constructed over the last decade, to launch yet another attack on Israel, and that would be intolerable, and I think it would be intolerable for you know, any nation represented at the forum. Well, this seemed to be kind of two big theories going on about this war. One is that this is the end of the peace process, the other, which you've championed. The other is that this is if nothing else, this will prompt finally some move towards the two state solution. Which which which side of that do you fit on? Well? I actually try to fit on both, and I'll tell you, John, I think it's important to have some aspiration, some goal that we can look toward. Many of us, my husband particularly, worked very hard on trying to get a two state solution, and it, frankly, in retrospect, is heartbreaking that Yaser Arafat walked away from the deal that Bill had broker between Israel and the Palestinian authority back in two thousand. There could have been a Palestinian state up to ninety seven percent of the land from the nineteen forty eight division that would have been in existence for twenty three years now. So I think you have to create the environment in which there is a chance to revitalize the peace process and a potential for a two state solution. Hamas is not interested in a two state solution. They are dedicated to the destruction of Israel. That is in their charter. If you've been watching lots of different outlets over the last month. That is what the leaders of Hamas say. You know, they want to destroy Israel. So Hamas is not a partner for any kind of peace or two state solution. But the Palestinian authority might one time again be. New leadership in Gaza might again be So we have to get to a point where that's possible. Do you think that Benuine Nasignol, who is a partner for a two state solution. I don't think there is any evidence of that. I think the Israeli people will have to decide about his leadership. I think there will be investigations about what led up to and what happened on October the seventh. But I think there needs to be new leadership of the Israelis and the Palestinians in order to have any chance at some kind of peace deal, especially a two state solution. There's one area just I lost you once serious one, then that are slightly more amusing one. But on the serious side, you look at things like Ukraine. At the moment, there is definitely a strategy among America's enemies. You could see putin waiting perhaps for Trump, trying to dig in and wait, but also I think also counting on Congress where you feel that Congress feels over extended. It's got the border, it's got spotenningh I'm in Israel. Do you worry about America feeling as if it's over extended and unable to carry out the kind of global policies that you believed in. Well up until now, the Biden administration has done quite a remarkable job. I mean, they put together a coalition to support Ukraine, which I think many people would have thought unlikely when Biden took office. So I do think the legislative agenda that Biden got passed is also another very strong indicator of being able to get things done. I do agree with you that it is going to be challenging in the Congress to get more funding for Ukraine to provide the funding Israel needs to provide the kind of support that is required to keep our alliances strong around the world. But at the end of the day, I think the president will get that. And I also think there's an opportunity for the President because the Republicans in the Senate have said, you know, we're on board with all of this, but we want to make some changes at the border. I think that, you know, the Democrats should negotiate to see what kinds of changes would be palatable for the Democrats in order to secure the border, in order to make it clear that you know, Democrats want a secure border and a humane system for people who are trying to enter the United States, but we want it to be orderly. So I think there's going to be a lot of tough negotiation. At the end, I think the president will get what he needs. One very last things on the Republican side, you will have noticed how much traction Nicky Haley has been getting as a woman who was the American ambassador the UN. Do you think that Biden was to stumble that might be room for another woman with slightly more foreign policy. Well, I don't know the answer to that, but I hope Biden doesn't stumble. I hope that he goes all the way to the finish line because I think he's earned it, he deserves it, and you know, honestly, the only real argument or complaint is that he's old. And you know what, I think everybody who's his age would be very happy if they were as productive as he is and has gotten as much done as he has, and traveled the schedule he's traveled, so you know, I'm going to continue to support him, and I think he's our best candidate for twenty twenty four. And that was former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaking with Bloomberg News Editor in chief John Mikelthwaite. This is Bloomberg day Break Today, your morning brief on the story's making news from Wall Street to Washington and beyond. Look for us on your podcast feed at six am Eastern each morning, on Apple, Spotify, and anywhere else you get your podcasts. You can also listen live each morning starting at five am Wall Street time on Bloomberg eleven three to zero in New York, Bloomberg ninety nine to one in Washington, Bloomberg one oh six to one in Boston, and Bloomberg ninety sixty in San Francisco. Our flagship New York station is also available on your Amazon Alexa devices. Just say Alexa play Bloomberg eleven thirty plus. Listen coast to coast on the Bloomberg Business app, SERIUSXM, the iHeartRadio app, and on Bloomberg dot Com. I'm Nathan Hager and I'm Karen Moscow. Join us again tomorrow morning for all the news you need to start your day right here on Bloomberg DaybreakSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last weekend, the Chinese Communist Party concluded a two-day National Ideological and Cultural Work Conference. The big outcome of this was the establishment of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture. In this episode, Anushka Saxena and Manoj Kewalramani discuss why the canonisation of such ideas as thoughts matters in Chinese politics and what are the implications of this new thought. Do check out Takshashila's public policy courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/courses We are @‌IVMPodcasts on Facebook, Twitter, & Instagram. https://twitter.com/IVMPodcasts https://www.instagram.com/ivmpodcasts/?hl=en https://www.facebook.com/ivmpodcasts/ You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featured Follow the show across platforms: Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Gaana, Amazon Music Do share the word with your folksSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Deuxième épisode de notre série « nouvelles routes de la soie, dix ans après ». La Malaisie est un point de passage vital pour le commerce maritime mondial, et en particulier pour la Chine. Pékin y construit des ports et des chemins de fer pour éviter le détroit de Malacca, contrôlé par les Américains. C'est la justification première des « nouvelles routes de la soie ». Mais où est l'intérêt de la Malaisie ? Les populations locales affectées par les projets chinois souffrent du manque de transparence et de la corruption des élites.  En Asie du Sud-Est, la Malaisie occupe une place stratégique. Son versant Ouest longe le détroit de Malacca, qui sépare le pays de l'Indonésie. Il est le passage obligé des routes commerciales maritimes qui relient l'Europe et le Moyen-Orient à l'Asie. Entre le tiers et la moitié des flux mondiaux de marchandises transitent par ce détroit. La Malaisie est donc centrale dans tout projet qui vise à faciliter l'intégration de la région au commerce mondial. « Cela permet également de faciliter le commerce entre les pays de l'Asean ainsi qu'entre l'Asean, la Chine et d'autres parties du monde », explique Liew Chee Yoong, économiste spécialisé en gouvernance d'entreprise et développement financier à l'université de UCSI de Kuala Lumpur. Cela découle de l'augmentation de la connectivité induite par les projets des « nouvelles routes de la soie ». « Ces projets seront en fait très positifs et peut être très fructueux, compte tenu de ce qui se passe actuellement dans divers pays de l'Asean. »Un millier de bateaux empruntent le détroit de Malacca chaque jour - et faire passer les marchandises à travers la Malaisie pourrait faire gagner des jours entiers. Afin que les marchandises puissent être transportées plus rapidement et plus efficacement de la côte Est en Ouest, une ligne ferroviaire traversant le pays est en cours de construction, permettant ainsi d'éviter le détroit de Malacca. Nouvelle voie terrestreC'est à Kuantan, sur la côte Est du pays, ville incontournable sur les « nouvelles routes de la soie », qu'ont débuté les travaux de construction d'une ligne de chemin de fer nommée ECRL (East Coast Railway Link), ou ligne ferroviaire de la côte est, et de gares afin de faciliter le transport des marchandises.  Sauf que ces projets ne font pas l'unanimité auprès des populations locales. À une cinquantaine de kilomètres au nord de Kuantan, la maison de Rokamar, dame âgée au visage souriant, est plantée au milieu d'un grand terrain sur lequel se trouvent des poulaillers, des ateliers de construction… Tout ce que sa famille a bâti depuis plus de 40 ans sera réduit à néant pour faire place à une route bétonnée. « Nous avons été pris au dépourvu dès le début du projet. Les responsables ne sont venus ici que lorsque les choses ont été finalisées, nous confie Rokamar. Il n'y a donc rien que l'on puisse faire, nous devons accepter ce que Dieu nous a imposé. Je suis en colère que nous soyons forcés d'accepter ces projets et que nous soyons obligés de céder nos terres. »Sulung, son mari, peau burinée à force de travailler en extérieur, voudrait que le projet soit déplacé de quelques kilomètres. « À proximité, il y a des milliers de kilomètres carrés de marécages, ils pourraient construire là-bas, dit-il en tendant le bras vers un espace vide. Ce n'est pas que nous soyons contre le progrès, mais ils pourraient déplacer la ligne ferroviaire dans la zone marécageuse, il n'y a rien du tout là-bas. Lorsqu'ils sont venus faire des relevés et des mesures, ils nous ont dit que c'était pour construire une route d'accès à la gare. Il ne s'agit même pas d'y installer la voie de chemin de fer, mais une voie d'accès ! »Rokamar exprime tout haut ce que tous dans leur village pensent tout bas. « Pour moi, ceux qui ne sont pas directement touchés peuvent facilement parler des avantages de l'ECRL. S'ils étaient frappés de plein fouet, comme nous, ils sauraient à quel point c'est un bouleversement de devoir tout changer à sa vie. »Quelles indemnisations ? Le couple, parents de huit enfants, a toutefois une chance que d'autres n'ont pas : un titre de propriété de leur terre, garantissant un minimum d'indemnisation pour leur perte. Mais pour Razali, qui vit à moins de 5 km de là, ce n'est pas le cas. « Ils disent qu'ils paieront une somme, je cite, “symbolique”, je ne vais pas pouvoir faire grand-chose avec… Je ne peux pas reconstruire ma maison avec une somme symbolique ! » explique le vieil homme, assis en tailleur sur un tapis dans son salon. « S'ils m'indemnisent correctement, je pourrai, après l'expropriation, aplanir le terrain derrière ma maison, qui est pour le moment un marécage et y construire ma nouvelle maison. S'ils ne m'indemnisent qu'un peu, je pourrai seulement me permettre de drainer ce marécage. Mais je n'aurai pas assez pour construire une maison. Alors je suppose que je vais simplement rester là, assis sur le sol. J'ai fait appel mais ils ne veulent plus m'écouter, alors je n'ai plus d'options. Je veux pouvoir reconstruire ma maison, car je ne peux plus travailler, je suis un vieil homme. » Sa femme Zakaria a le regard triste, rempli d'incompréhension face à une situation qui les dépasse. « Mon cœur n'est pas en paix, confie-t-elle après un moment d'hésitation. Notre maison, nous y avons vécu si longtemps. C'est comme si on plantait un arbre et que, lorsqu'il porte des fruits, quelqu'un venait l'abattre. C'est difficile pour nous de perdre notre logement, tout s'écroule. Ce fut un sacrifice de toute une vie. Depuis notre jeunesse, on a gagné péniblement notre vie, en faisant des petits boulots pour construire cette maison. Aujourd'hui, nous approchons de la fin de notre vie, nous n'avons plus la force. Ils viennent soudainement tout démolir, cela m'attriste. » Leur voisine, Wan Zainab, tient une échoppe non loin de là. Elle aussi sera détruite pour laisser place à la construction de la voie ferrée. « C'est triste parce que nous sommes là depuis si longtemps. J'ai démonté les étagères, la plupart des affaires sont maintenant sur le sol, ça ne paye pas de mine, nous dit-elle en montrant le parterre encombré. À ce stade, je n'ai pas d'autre source de revenus si le magasin est démoli. Mais je dois quand même gérer une affaire, trouver un autre endroit. Vendre des choses est la seule chose que je sais faire, je ne connais rien d'autre. »Wan Zainab a tenté de faire entendre les problèmes qu'elle rencontrait. « Je suis allée au bureau du cadastre. Nous avons demandé ce qu'il en était pour les terres sans titres, et ils ont répondu qu'ils accorderaient une compensation de 30 %. Comment reconstruire avec 30 % de la valeur du bâtiment ? Est-ce suffisant ? »Des projets qui ne cessent de s'agrandir De retour à Kuantan, nous rencontrons Bakar, une représentante de la communauté locale. Selon elle, l'arrivée des investissements chinois est une bonne nouvelle, même si, ce qui l'inquiète, c'est le Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park situé à Kuantan. Cette entité économique est jumelée au China Malaysia Qinzhou Industrial Park en Chine - un nouveau modèle d'exploitation des capacités de production internationales baptisé « Deux pays, deux parcs ».« Ce qui est un peu inquiétant, c'est qu'il s'étend, s'étend, s'étend… Il en est maintenant à la troisième ou quatrième phase d'expansion, raconte-t-elle. Le fait que le parc s'étende à ce point signifie que de plus en plus de nos terres sont convoitées par le gouvernement chinois. Mais la réalité qui se cache derrière est discutable et douteuse. Pourquoi ? Parce que nous avons entendu des rumeurs selon lesquelles le bail pourrait nous échapper car ils ont déjà dépensé beaucoup d'argent. »Cela entraîne d'autres problématiques, souligne-t-elle, qui affectent les Malaisiens. « Ils n'embauchent pas beaucoup de locaux : ils ont leurs propres structures, des condominiums de cinq blocs où vivent tous leurs travailleurs qui viennent de Chine travailler ici. Ils restent à l'intérieur. Cela ne crée donc pas d'emploi, ou très peu. Et puis à l'intérieur, c'est comme en Chine. Ils ont des distributeurs automatiques qui utilisent des yuans, la monnaie chinoise. Ils ont leur propre supermarché. C'est pratiquement comme une ville chinoise ici. Leurs travailleurs ne viennent pas en ville. Ils sont juste confinés à l'intérieur. Nous ne savons pas ce qui se passe à l'intérieur. On voudrait de la transparence. » Ce constat n'étonne pas l'économiste Liew Chee Yoong. Mais il pense qu'au bout du compte, ceux qui sont affectés par ce développement finiront par le voir sous un meilleur jour : « Je pense qu'il faut penser aux retombées économiques, et qu'il faut se projeter sur le long terme. Cette connectivité peut apporter de nombreux avantages économiques en stimulant l'hôtellerie, le tourisme, les industries logistiques et ainsi de suite, malgré les incertitudes économiques mondiales. »Malgré toutes les opinions et effets négatifs potentiels, l'économiste estime que les avantages l'emportent. Selon lui, de nombreux pays impliqués dans ce projet en tireront d'énormes bénéfices d'un point de vue économique. Y compris la Malaisie. Malacca, port en haute merLa ligne de chemin de fer en cours de construction à Kuantan aura pour destination la capitale Kuala Lumpur. Mais elle fera également la jonction avec un autre grand port de la côte ouest, Malacca. Le plus ancien des ports de Malaisie est marqué par près de 130 ans de colonisation portugaise, et l'on peut apercevoir dans son centre l'héritage de cette époque coloniale. Mais tout autour, ce qui est frappant, ce sont les immeubles abandonnés, les chantiers en cours un peu partout aux abords de la ville. Ce que déplore Jane, dont le nom a été modifié car elle travaille pour une entreprise sino-malaisienne. Elle a grandi à Malacca et pour elle, le visage de la ville a complètement changé. « Si vous traversez les quartiers de la ville, vous verrez des bâtiments abandonnés. Pourquoi ne pas faire revivre ces bâtiments ? s'interroge-t-elle. Nous sommes une ville historique. La ville est vide partout. Personne ne vient s'y installer. Alors qui gagne de l'argent ? Le nombre de touristes venant à Malacca a considérablement baissé par rapport aux cinq dernières années. »Elle ne comprend pas la façon dont les travaux s'organisent. « Comme vous avez des yeux, vous pouvez voir tous ces bâtiments abandonnés. Dans un tel état, pourquoi creusent-ils encore ? Si vous voulez vraiment vous développer, il faut peupler et donc remplir d'abord les espaces vides. »Ce qui l'inquiète le plus, c'est la perte d'identité de sa ville natale. « Ce n'est plus Malacca. Maintenant, il y a des magasins chinois partout. Vous avez une rue où il y a une prédominance de personnes qui ne sont pas de votre pays. Qu'il y ait un quartier chinois, c'est très bien. Mais à présent, tout le monde ne parle que le mandarin. C'est l'une des choses dont je me suis rendue compte et qui a changé tout l'écosystème ici : c'est la langue. »L'économiste Liew Chee Yoong modère cependant les choses. Selon lui, blâmer uniquement les investisseurs chinois à Malacca n'est pas raisonnable. « Je pense que ces magasins vides et ces nombreux bâtiments sont davantage la conséquence de l'environnement économique du pays, ce qui n'est pas seulement le cas à Malacca, mais aussi ailleurs dans d'autres États de la Malaisie. »Aux yeux de Liew, cette responsabilité particulière incombe également au gouvernement de l'État de Malacca. Il ne s'agit pas seulement du côté chinois, mais de la manière dont l'ensemble du projet est mis en œuvre et des parties prenantes qui doivent communiquer en premier lieu, et il souligne que le gouvernement local aurait pu faire beaucoup mieux. « Je ne rejetterai donc pas la faute à 100 % sur les Chinois. Oui, ils pourraient avoir une part de responsabilité, mais je pense que le gouvernement de Malacca pourrait en réalité intervenir pour mieux gérer le projet dès les premières étapes. Avant que le projet ne commence, ils devraient mener une enquête auprès de toutes les parties prenantes concernées. »  Manque de transparenceLe quartier historique de la ville est devenu un quartier chinois. Tout est écrit en mandarin. D'innombrables lanternes rouges et jaunes décorent les immeubles et l'une des plus grandes attractions de la ville est le plus vieux temple bouddhiste de Cheng Hoon Teng, dans un pays majoritairement musulman. D'ailleurs, pour qui regarde sa géolocalisation sur son téléphone, il est inscrit Jīcháng jiē - Jonker Street - en caractères chinois. C'est là que nous rencontrons Lim, un ancien journaliste local doué d'une connaissance approfondie des projets chinois à Malacca. Comme Jane, il est effaré de la rapidité du développement de la ville sans planification appropriée. « Il n'y a pas beaucoup d'informations disponibles publiquement, déplore-t-il. Ils ne divulguent pas vraiment ce qu'ils font. Ils disent qu'il s'agit d'un port en eau profonde, entièrement géré par une société chinoise, la China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). »  « Qui est donc aussi impliqué ? Qui bénéficie des contrats ? Nous devrions avoir plus d'informations à ce sujet, poursuit Lim. Il n'y a pas de transparence. Nous disposons d'informations, mais très limitées. Beaucoup de choses ne sont pas encore terminées. Et certains chantiers sont simplement bloqués, arrêtés à mi-chemin. Par ailleurs, les locaux, quelle que soit l'ampleur des investissements, sont confrontés aux problèmes liés au coût de la vie : si vous n'augmentez pas les salaires pour qu'ils atteignent un niveau adéquat, vous ne pourrez pas bénéficier des projets. Or le coût de la vie a augmenté, mais pas les salaires. À Malacca, le niveau de vie est encore très bas. » La crainte de Lim : et si les choses tournaient mal pour l'économie malaisienne ? « Le Sri Lanka est le meilleur exemple de la façon dont les choses peuvent mal tourner si vous ne contrôlez pas vos infrastructures essentielles, compare-t-il. Ils construisent un port en eau profonde ici. Que se passera-t-il si nous suivons la voie du Sri Lanka ? Pouvons-nous vraiment rembourser si les choses tournent mal ? Nous ne voulons pas suivre la voie du Sri Lanka. Et je pense qu'il n'est pas le seul. Le Pakistan a également des problèmes, l'Afghanistan, et quelques autres pays d'Asie centrale, ont déjà des difficultés à rembourser la Chine. »Cependant, souligne Lim, le ton a changé depuis une dizaine d'années. « La Chine est dure en affaires. La situation était très différente sous Hu Jintao, les choses ont changé lorsque Xi Jinping est arrivé au pouvoir. Xi s'enhardit maintenant parce qu'il a un contrôle absolu. Sous le règne de Hu Jintao, tout était encore négociable, mais sous Xi Jinping, les choses sont très, très opaques. On ne sait pas ce qu'il va faire. Qui sait, il pourrait même retirer ses investissements. »La question de l'absence de transparence revient souvent. Ce qui, selon l'économiste Liew Chee Yoong, témoigne d'une différence culturelle. « Si vous faites des affaires en Chine, et pas seulement dans le cadre des "nouvelles routes de la soie", les Chinois ont tendance à se concentrer davantage sur l'établissement de relations pour commercer. Et, en Chine, les règles ne sont pas non plus très claires. C'est pour cela que ces questions de transparence sont soulevées, ce que je ne conteste pas, je pense que c'est en partie vrai. Mais si vous ne pouvez pas rembourser le prêt, vous ne devriez pas le contracter en premier lieu. Je ne pense pas qu'il faille rejeter la responsabilité à 200 % sur la Chine elle-même. Je pense que les pays concernés doivent gérer correctement leurs finances avant de s'engager. Un pays doit s'engager quand il est prêt, c'est la meilleure stratégie. Mais bien sûr, nous ne pouvons pas attendre trop longtemps, parce que nous avons besoin de compétitivité économique. » Craintes pour le patrimoineDans le quartier portugais de la ville, nous retrouvons Martin Theseira, ancien pêcheur qui lutte contre l'appropriation de ses terres par les investisseurs chinois. Amoureux de la mer, il nous explique que les îles que nous apercevons dans le port sont artificielles, qu'elles ont été créées de toutes pièces, en peu de temps, avec du sable et de la végétation, en attendant d'y voir de nouveaux complexes de loisirs pousser…Ces îlots qui détruisent son horizon lui laissent un goût amer. « Ce qui motive des projets comme ça, c'est l'avidité pure et simple, pointe-t-il entre ses dents. Les autorités sont irresponsables d'autoriser de telles constructions parce que, premièrement, ce n'est pas durable. Les dommages causés à l'environnement et à la communauté côtière sont irréversibles. Les biologistes marins nous disent qu'il s'agit d'une diversité marine unique. Notre communauté est affectée car notre mode de vie dépend de la mer. Pour nous, la mer est notre bouée de sauvetage. En réalité, nous nous battons depuis le premier jour et nous sommes toujours dans la même situation. Il n'y a pas d'amélioration réelle parce qu'il n'y a pas d'engagement sérieux. »Sa grande crainte est la disparition de sa communauté, de son patrimoine et de son héritage. « Je pense que tout disparaîtra dans les dix à vingt prochaines années. Pouvez-vous compenser la perte de l'accès à la mer pour la communauté ?  Vous ne pouvez pas. On ne peut pas la remplacer. Aucune somme d'argent ne peut remplacer la disparition de ressources pour la communauté. L'argent n'est pas une compensation qui peut tout régler. »Les changements sont perceptibles ailleurs, souligne Martin, ce qui appuie son argument. « Nous constatons les changements dans la région, les tensions avec les États-Unis. Les Chinois se montrent très audacieux en mer de Chine méridionale. Mais que pouvons-nous vraiment faire ? Ce sont des superpuissances qui sont en train de montrer leurs muscles. » L'économiste Liew Chee Yoong souligne cependant que la compétition économique, quelle qu'elle soit, n'est pas une mauvaise chose. « Si l'on parle de commerce économique, d'expansion vers d'autres pays, il s'agit plutôt pour la Chine de montrer son soft power au reste du monde. Ce n'est pas une mauvaise dynamique. Nous-mêmes essayons de nous engager économiquement avec d'autres parties du monde, mais la Chine l'a fait plus tôt que d'autres. Si vous regardez les pays d'Afrique, vous verrez qu'ils ont beaucoup bénéficié des investissements de la Chine sur le continent. Au fil des années, les Chinois se sont développés au Kenya, au Nigeria ou en Tanzanie. La Chine aide d'autres pays à se développer économiquement, et l'Europe et les États-Unis peuvent aussi le faire, il n'y a rien de mal à cela. »Personne en Malaisie n'ignore la compétition économique mondiale qui se joue ici entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Face au projet tentaculaire des « nouvelles routes de la soie » qui dispose d'importantes réserves de liquidités, les États-Unis ont lancé leur pilier asiatique. Dans l'Indo-Pacifique, Washington multiplie les partenariats économiques avec des dizaines de pays, dont la Malaisie.À lire aussiRetrouvez l'intégralité de notre dossier sur les «nouvelles routes de la soie»

In episode 8 of ECON 102, Noah Smith and Erik Torenberg discuss the factors brewing up a major crisis for China's economy, and what this means for the US and other international powers. If you're looking for an ERP platform, check out our sponsor, NetSuite: http://netsuite.com/turpentine -- Sponsors: GIVEWELL | DAFFY | NETSUITE  Have you ever wondered where your donation could have the most impact? GiveWell has now spent over 15 years researching charitable organizations and only directs funding to the highest impact opportunities they've found in global health and poverty alleviation. Make informed decisions about high-impact giving. If you've never donated through GiveWell before, you can have your donation matched up to $100 before the end of the year, or as long as matching funds last. To claim your match, go to givewell.org and pick “Podcast” and enter Econ 102 at checkout.  Daffy is the most modern and accessible donor-advised fund, making it easier to put money aside for charity. You can make your tax-deductible contributions all at once or set aside a little each week or month. And you don't just have to donate cash, you can easily contribute stocks, ETFs, or crypto. Plus, you never have to track receipts from your donations again. It's free to get started and Econ 102 listeners get $25 towards the charity of their choice. Daffy is offering Econ 102 listeners a free $25 for the charity of their choice when they join Daffy https://www.daffy.org/econ102  NetSuite has 25 years of providing financial software for all your business needs. More than 36,000 businesses have already upgraded to NetSuite by Oracle, gaining visibility and control over their financials, inventory, HR, eCommerce, and more. If you're looking for an ERP platform head to NetSuite http://netsuite.com/102 and download your own customized KPI checklist. -- Econ 102 is a part of the Turpentine podcast network. To learn more: www.turpentine.co -- RECOMMENDED PODCAST:  Every week investor and writer of the popular newsletter The Diff, Byrne Hobart, and co-host Erik Torenberg discuss today's major inflection points in technology, business, and markets – and help listeners build a diversified portfolio of trends and ideas for the future. Subscribe to “The Riff” with Byrne Hobart and Erik Torenberg: https://link.chtbl.com/theriff RECOMMENDED PODCAST: LIVE PLAYERS Join host Samo Burja and Erik Torenberg as they analyze the mindsets of today's most intriguing business leaders, investors, and innovators through the lens of their bold actions and contrarian worldviews. You'll come away with a deeper understanding of the development of technology, business, political power, culture and more. LIsten and subscribe everywhere you get your podcasts: https://link.chtbl.com/liveplayers. -- TIMESTAMPS: (00:00) Episode Preview (01:37) Noah's observations from his trip to Japan (03:03) Chinese Economic Carnage (04:09) Who is affected? (04:59) How will falling resource prices affect inflation? (14:12) China's upcoming recession (16:41) China's building investments need to stop (20:12) China's paradox of thrift (20:57) China's boomer republican leaders (21:39) What can China's growth look like from here? (27:11) What are China's options for allaying the unrest? (28:44) Extend and Pretend (29:26) Balaji was wrong about China as diplomatic power (33:18) China owns a Sri Lankan city now (34:04) When Noah was most bullish on China's future: the Hu Jintao era (36:33) Xi JinPing as Stalin; Steve Ballmer (40:00) The revolution of rising expectations theory in American  (44:52) Spelling out our biggest fears about China (47:23) Successes in recent alliances: Japan and Korea alliances, India, Vietnam, (51:00) What are we watching for next?

#china #socialism #xijinping #communism Socialism with Chinese characteristics is a phrase that comes up when discussing Chinese politics. It's a cornerstone of Chinese political theory and heavily relied on by leadership when formulating new internal policies and deciding the direction the country is headed.Socialism with Chinese characteristics is an evolving theory that encapsulates the thoughts of China's major leaders, and is the lens through which the country sees itself and the party sees its mission. It includes concepts like economic prosperity, territorial integrity, social stability, and the continued political leadership of the CCP.Link to the Youtube poll to vote for the next episode: https://www.youtube.com/post/Ugkx_LM44S61UAXDi7zJT-X44KsO-je_K_EU?lc=Ugz2EJGLmmQ6YHZTcip4AaABAg&lc=Ugz2EJGLmmQ6YHZTcip4AaABAg The Zhao Ziyang biography that I mention is called Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao ZiyangIntroDefinition 1:20Deng era (1980-1992) 7:52Jiang Zemin era (90s) 18:12Hu Jintao era (00s) 22:12Xi Jinping era (10s-20s) 24:30Policy application 33:10The 14th 5 year plan 40:22Outro 44:45*My voice changes noticeable at around 21:25. Had to stop recording and restart after a break after which point my cold was significantly worse. Apologies!-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources2012 Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 18th Party Congress2018 Backgrounder_ Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era - Xinhua China's Plan for Economic and Social Development - Jun Yin and Jia XuChinese Economic Statecraft from 1978 to 1989 The First Decade of Deng Xiaoping's Reforms - Priscilla Roberts edsConstructing Political Economy with Chinese Characteristics - Fang Cai and Xiaojing ZhangSocialism with Chinese Characteristics - Roland BoerSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod

This week, Mike and Jude are joined by Dr. Susan Shirk, Founding Chair of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego and the author of Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise (Oxford University Press, 2022), which examines the evolution of China's domestic and foreign policy over the last 15 years.  The conversation begins by examining steps taken toward political decentralization and economic liberalization under Hu Jintao—and the reversal of these trends under Xi Jinping. Next, they discuss Xi's governance style and the shortcomings of loyalty-based political systems. The discussion then turns to the recent G7 summit in Hiroshima and China's reaction to its outcomes. After assessing U.S. China policy during the Trump and Biden administrations, they then consider how Xi might respond to renewed diplomatic overtures. After a discussion of the risks of U.S. overreaction to Beijing's policies, they conclude with reflections on what—if any—actions can be taken to stabilize the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship.

Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) da Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Prof. Auxiliar Convidada da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma Universidade, onde lecciona as disciplinas de Estudos Asiáticos e História das Relações Internacionais. Foi consultora do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 2020 a 2022 e Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Autora de vários artigos e livros entre os quais A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos editado pela Tinta-da-China e Os Portugueses e o Mundo editado pela Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.  Os seus interesses de investigação são Política Externa e Estratégia Chinesa; os EUA e o Indo-Pacífico; e Liderança e Estratégia. É analista residente de política internacional da SIC e da TSF. Actualmente, está a terminar um livro, que será publicado pela Tinta-da-china, sobre os desafios colocados pela China às democracias liberais europeias, incluindo a portuguesa. ->Workshop de Pensamento Crítico: sessões de Lisboa, Porto e online esgotadas! Inscreva-se aqui para ser avisado(a) de futuras edições. -> Apoie este podcast e faça parte da comunidade de mecenas do 45 Graus em: 45grauspodcast.com _______________ Índice (com timestamps): ​(9:47) O que mudou na rivalidade CN-EUA desde o nosso episódio de 2018? | Wolf warrior diplomacy | Os diplomatas chineses mal-comportados | Índia | Quad (30:18) A política externa dos EUA em relação à China começou por ser complacente e tornou-se demasiado agressiva? | Artigo de John Mearsheimer | Estratégia dos G7 em relação à CN: do decoupling ao de-risking | Matérias primas críticas e terras raras (e aqui) (42:10) Já podemos falar de uma Guerra Fria entre EUA e CN? | A Armadilha de Tucídides (Livro: História da Guerra do Peloponeso)| Houve uma crença exagerada no Ocidente nos efeitos da abertura económica? | Como os manuais de economia americanos sobrevalorizam a economia da URSS | Frase atribuída a Deng Xiaoping: «Hide your strength, bide your time» (55:26) Comparação China vs URSS | O papel da ideologia na guerra fria vs na nova ‘ordem chinesa' | Aumento do autoritarismo do regime chinês | Digital Dictators | Cimeira da Ásia Central, sem a Rússia | Nova política externa defendida pelo SPD alemão | A nova ambição da China para o Ártico (1:18:37) O que esperar do futuro -- e o que fazer para evitar uma escalada do conflito? | Tese do ‘peak China' | O problema demográfico da china (e os telefonemas aos recém-casados) | Livro: Leftover Women, de Leta Hong Fincher | Episódio com Hu Jintao no congresso do CCP | European Critical Raw Materials Act | A integração económica é um garante de que não ocorre uma guerra ou é, pelo contrário, uma fonte permanente de tensões? _______________ Pode parecer estranho o que vou dizer -- tendo em conta que a política internacional parece estar  dominada pela Guerra da Ucrânia desde fevereiro do ano passado -- mas a verdade é que, muito provavelmente, não será este o tema central das Relações Internacionais da nossa época.  O tema que vai marcar, muito provavelmente, as próximas décadas é outro: a rivalidade entre os Estados Unidos e a China, que se vai instalando à medida que esta vai ascendendo na ordem internacional e disputando a ordem unipolar até aqui dominada pelos norte-americanos. Há mesmo quem ache que já estamos a viver uma nova Guerra Fria entre as duas potências. Esta ideia não será novidade para os mais atentos a estas lides, e sobretudo não o é para quem ouviu o episódio #38 do 45 Graus, publicado em 2018, cuja convidada foi Raquel Vaz Pinto. O tema geral desse episódio foi a China e um dos tópicos que discutimos foi, precisamente, até que ponto a rivalidade entre Pequim e Washington iria marcar as próximas décadas. Ora, se já na altura, há quase 5 anos, isso era uma probabilidade forte, hoje é quase uma certeza. Ao mesmo tempo, passou-se entretanto muita coisa na relação entre os dois países, desenvolvimentos esses que nos vieram dar uma ideia mais clara (embora ainda repleta de incógnitas) sobre a forma que esta rivalidade poderá tomar nos próximos anos. Além disso, ao longo destes anos, fui recebendo muitos elogios ao episódio -- não só pela relevância do tema (que justificava mais do que um episódio), mas, sobretudo, pela convidada. A Raquel não só sabe muito, como é uma excelente comunicadora.  Por isso, decidi convidá-la para regressar ao 45 Graus para discutir este tema: com mais profundidade do que na 1ª conversa e tirando partido da informação adicional que hoje temos. E ela teve a gentileza de aceitar. Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) da Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Prof. Auxiliar Convidada da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma Universidade, onde lecciona as disciplinas de Estudos Asiáticos e História das Relações Internacionais. Foi consultora do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 2020 a 2022 e Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Autora de vários artigos e livros entre os quais A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos editado pela Tinta-da-China e Os Portugueses e o Mundo editado pela Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.  Os seus interesses de investigação são Política Externa e Estratégia Chinesa; os EUA e o Indo-Pacífico; e Liderança e Estratégia. É analista residente de política internacional da SIC e da TSF. Actualmente, a terminar um livro, que será publicado pela Tinta-da-china, sobre os desafios colocados pela China às democracias liberais europeias, incluindo a portuguesa. Quando gravámos a nossa conversa em 2018, estas tensões entre os EUA e a China estavam ainda, de certa forma, no início. Donald Trump tinha tomado posse apenas no início do ano anterior, pondo em prática uma mudança radical na postura americana em relação à China, impondo tarifas a uma série de bens chineses. Essa medida gerou uma réplica do lado chinês, dando início a uma guerra comercial entre os dois países.  Mas, desde então, já muita tinta correu. A guerra comercial -- mesmo já com a Administração Biden -- acentuou-se e estendeu-se a outras áreas, e os dois países têm acumulado várias divergências na arena internacional, nomeadamente em relação à Guerra da Ucrânia, na qual a China tem adoptado uma postura no mínimo ambivalente. teoricamente neutra mas, na prática, próxima da Russia. Ao mesmo tempo, a retórica belicosa que Trump tinha inaugurado do lado norte-americano tem sido mais do que correspondida do lado chinês, com líderes políticos e diplomatas a adoptarem um discurso cada vez mais assertivo (e, em alguns casos, mesmo agressivo). Estas disputas comerciais e divergências geopolíticas são, no entanto, segundo muitos analistas, apenas as causas próximas do aumento da conflitualidade entre CN e EUA. A causa última – o factor fundamental por trás desta mudança – reside, para muitos, na denominada ‘Armadilha de Tucídides', de que falámos também no episódio de 2018.  A ‘armadilha' tem este nome porque foi postulada pela primeira vez pelo historiador ateniense Tucídides, na sua História da Guerra do Peloponeso, que opôs Atenas a Esparta. Segundo ele, a guerra entre os dois era inevitável, uma vez que Atenas estava a crescer e ganhar poder, o que fazia aumentar a sua ambição, enquanto essa situação gerava em Esparta, o poder incumbente uma forte ansiedade.  Esta ideia tem sido amplamente discutida nos últimos tempos, a propósito da rivalidade CN-EUA, por académicos e analistas, tanto do lado norte-americano como também do chinês. Um dos mais conhecidos é Graham Allison, que popularizou o conceito no seu livro: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? , Segundo os proponentes da “Armadilha”, sempre que uma potência emergente ameaça substituir uma potência hegemónica existe uma tendência inexorável para a guerra entre as duas. Aplicada à relação entre a China e os EUA, isto implica que à medida que o poder económico e militar da primeira se vai aproximando do dos EUA, isso cria-lhe, inevitavelmente, um sentimento de auto-importância crescente e de direito a ter um papel mais activo na política global. Ao mesmo tempo, cria nos Estados Unidos, a potência incumbente, medo, insegurança e uma determinação de defender o status quo a todo o custo .  Esta visão da Armadilha de Tucídides enquanto espécie de “lei das relações internacionais” atinge o seu pináculo em académicos da chamada escola ultra-realista das RI. O maior exemplo -- de quem falamos no episódio -- é talvez John Mearsheimer (de quem também falei no episódio sobre a Guerra da Ucrânia, com Lívia Franco).  Para Mearsheimer, esta armadilha é de tal modo uma inevitabilidade, que afirma que o governo norte-americano deveria ter antecipado o perigo do crescimento económico acelerado da China e, simplesmente, tentado impedi-lo.  Ancorados nesta ideia, há, assim, um número crescente de analistas e oficiais -- tanto nos Estados Unidos como na China -- que discutem hoje, abertamente, a possibilidade de um conflito entre os dois países, seja ele uma guerra directa (de maior ou menor escala) ou uma guerra fria, como a com a URSS, sem conflitos directos mas com as charadas “guerras por procuração”.  No entanto, como a Raquel chama a atenção, as RI são demasiado complexas para podermos tomar esta armadilha como lei de forma simplista. Há factores que contribuem para este desenlace, mas outros há que não e, sobretudo, persistem ainda muitas incógnitas sobre o que pode acontecer.  Espero que gostem! _______________ Obrigado aos mecenas do podcast: Francisco Hermenegildo, Ricardo Evangelista, Henrique Pais João Baltazar, Salvador Cunha, Abilio Silva, Tiago Leite, Carlos Martins, Galaró family, Corto Lemos, Miguel Marques, Nuno Costa, Nuno e Ana, João Ribeiro, Helder Miranda, Pedro Lima Ferreira, Cesar Carpinteiro, Luis Fernambuco, Fernando Nunes, Manuel Canelas, Tiago Gonçalves, Carlos Pires, João Domingues, Hélio Bragança da Silva, Sandra Ferreira , Paulo Encarnação , BFDC, António Mexia Santos, Luís Guido, Bruno Heleno Tomás Costa, João Saro, Daniel Correia, Rita Mateus, António Padilha, Tiago Queiroz, Carmen Camacho, João Nelas, Francisco Fonseca, Rafael Santos, Andreia Esteves, Ana Teresa Mota, ARUNE BHURALAL, Mário Lourenço, RB, Maria Pimentel, Luis, Geoffrey Marcelino, Alberto Alcalde, António Rocha Pinto, Ruben de Bragança, João Vieira dos Santos, David Teixeira Alves, Armindo Martins , Carlos Nobre, Bernardo Vidal Pimentel, António Oliveira, Paulo Barros, Nuno Brites, Lígia Violas, Tiago Sequeira, Zé da Radio, João Morais, André Gamito, Diogo Costa, Pedro Ribeiro, Bernardo Cortez Vasco Sá Pinto, David , Tiago Pires, Mafalda Pratas, Joana Margarida Alves Martins, Luis Marques, João Raimundo, Francisco Arantes, Mariana Barosa, Nuno Gonçalves, Pedro Rebelo, Miguel Palhas, Ricardo Duarte, Duarte , Tomás Félix, Vasco Lima, Francisco Vasconcelos, Telmo , José Oliveira Pratas, Jose Pedroso, João Diogo Silva, Joao Diogo, José Proença, João Crispim, João Pinho , Afonso Martins, Robertt Valente, João Barbosa, Renato Mendes, Maria Francisca Couto, Antonio Albuquerque, Ana Sousa Amorim, Francisco Santos, Lara Luís, Manuel Martins, Macaco Quitado, Paulo Ferreira, Diogo Rombo, Francisco Manuel Reis, Bruno Lamas, Daniel Almeida, Patrícia Esquível , Diogo Silva, Luis Gomes, Cesar Correia, Cristiano Tavares, Pedro Gaspar, Gil Batista Marinho, Maria Oliveira, João Pereira, Rui Vilao, João Ferreira, Wedge, José Losa, Hélder Moreira, André Abrantes, Henrique Vieira, João Farinha, Manuel Botelho da Silva, João Diamantino, Ana Rita Laureano, Pedro L, Nuno Malvar, Joel, Rui Antunes7, Tomás Saraiva, Cloé Leal de Magalhães, Joao Barbosa, paulo matos, Fábio Monteiro, Tiago Stock, Beatriz Bagulho, Pedro Bravo, Antonio Loureiro, Hugo Ramos, Inês Inocêncio, Telmo Gomes, Sérgio Nunes, Tiago Pedroso, Teresa Pimentel, Rita Noronha, miguel farracho, José Fangueiro, Zé, Margarida Correia-Neves, Bruno Pinto Vitorino, João Lopes, Joana Pereirinha, Gonçalo Baptista, Dario Rodrigues, tati lima, Pedro On The Road, Catarina Fonseca, JC Pacheco, Sofia Ferreira, Inês Ribeiro, Miguel Jacinto, Tiago Agostinho, Margarida Costa Almeida, Helena Pinheiro, Rui Martins, Fábio Videira Santos, Tomás Lucena, João Freitas, Ricardo Sousa, RJ, Francisco Seabra Guimarães, Carlos Branco, David Palhota, Carlos Castro, Alexandre Alves, Cláudia Gomes Batista, Ana Leal, Ricardo Trindade, Luís Machado, Andrzej Stuart-Thompson, Diego Goulart, Filipa Portela, Paulo Rafael, Paloma Nunes, Marta Mendonca, Teresa Painho, Duarte Cameirão, Rodrigo Silva, José Alberto Gomes, Joao Gama, Cristina Loureiro, Tiago Gama, Tiago Rodrigues, Miguel Duarte, Ana Cantanhede, Artur Castro Freire, Rui Passos Rocha, Pedro Costa Antunes, Sofia Almeida, Ricardo Andrade Guimarães, Daniel Pais, Miguel Bastos, Luís Santos _______________ Esta conversa foi editada por: Hugo Oliveira

There's been a lot of speculation in the news recently over whether or not China will come to Russia's aid in the fight in Ukraine. Although many Western outlets are panicking about the likelihood, is it as straightforward as China jumping into the fray? The answer may lie in the recent history of the relationship of the two powers.Sources"China and Russia: Economic Unequals", Jonathan E. Hillman, 2020"China's Relations with Russia", Alexei D. Voskressenski (in China and the World, David Shambaugh eds.), 2020"FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS?: Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis", Alexander Gabuev, 2016"The "Rise" of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source of Threats or New Opportunities?", Anastasia Solomentseva, 2014"Russia: New Eastern Perspectives", Vladimir Putin, 2000"Will China rescue Russia", Sinobabble Substack Axis of authoritarians:  Implications of China-Russia Cooperation,  Richard J. Ellings and Robert Sutter, 2018 "China and Russia: united in opposition", Roderick Kefferpütz (text) and Vincent Brussee (data), 2022"Moscow's Failed Pivot to China", Thomas S. Eder and Mikko Huotari, 2016Chapters00:00: Intro02:07: Deng Xiaoping Era03:49: Jiang Zemin Era09:50: Hu Jintao Era17:43: Xi Jinping Era23:35: The Future of China-Russia Relations27:30: OutroSupport the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod

2022 was a big year in China news. While a lot of events were unforeseen, astute China watchers could probably have predicted most of them. That's because what happened in China followed a pattern we've seen in China and around the world before; China seems doomed to repeat history if it continues down its current path. In this episode of China Unscripted, we look back at the biggest China stories of 2022: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's role in it, illegal overseas Chinese police stations, Xi Jinping getting a third term, Hu Jintao seemingly being purged, China's real estate crisis, US and other countries' support for Taiwan, and US trade restrictions on semiconductors to China.

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being  kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other  interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words,  Xi Jinping.  is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly.  Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing.  And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going  in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend  towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something  to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well  which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris:  And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there.  as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts,  starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng  and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period.  and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on  his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was,  by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some  Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that.  Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there,  for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into  the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and  and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right?  if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response  that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say,  in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said  Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times  so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan  multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs  to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons  be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

This week on Sinica, our friends at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs invited us for a live show taping before a small group. Kaiser is joined by Lizzi Lee, MIT-trained economist-turned-reporter who hosts the Chinese-language show "Wall Street Today" as well as The China Project's "Live with Lizzi Lee," both on Youtube; and by Damien Ma, who heads the Paulson Institute's in-house think tank MacroPolo. These two top-shelf analysts of Chinese politics break down what was important — and what was just a sideshow — at the 20th Party Congress, and offer their knowledgeable perspectives on the individuals named to key posts and what this likely means for China's direction. Don't miss this one!2:40 – Findings from MacroPolo's “fantasy PBSC” experiment 8:18 – Did China watchers overemphasize Xi Jinping's political constraints? 12:31 – Support for Li Qiang across different political factions17:23 – The changing factional composition of Chinese elite politics20:20 – Return of the technocrats23:27 – “Generation-skipping” in China's recent political promotions28:26 – The selection of Cai Qi32:46 – Li Shulei as a successor to Wang Huning 37:07 – The future of China's economic leadership39:52 – Selection of the vice premiers 41:18 – The future of China's diplomatic core45:28 – The Hu Jintao episode49:22 – Revising the “Zero-COVID” policy51:17 – Reassessing China's intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan A transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.com.Recommendations: Lizzi: Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao by Joseph TorigianDamien: Slouching Towards Utopia by Brad DeLongKaiser: "Taiwan, the World-Class Puzzle," a Radio Open Source podcast hosted by Christopher LydonSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week we talked about Paul Pelosi getting attacked in his home by a neonazi, and the NY Times' very normal and not overwrought at all analysis of Hu Jintao being escorted from the Chinese Party Congress. https://twitter.com/TraitorHater14/status/1584542686270279682?s=20&t=gM-asoFIkmqJfu6ReOHKsQ http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/scionews/2022-02/28/content_78076572.htm https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/27/world/asia/hu-jintao-congress-videos.html Cars & Comrades Podcast https://media.rss.com/carsandcomrades/feed.xml https://instagram.com/cars_and_comrades_podcast/ https://twitter.com/CarsAndComrades https://facebook.com/Cars-Comrades-Po…-101908671824034 Collective Action Comics Podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/coll…cs/id1573028630 https://podbay.fm/p/collective-action-comics https://www.patreon.com/collectiveactioncomics Cosper's weekly Kant lecture https://discord.com/events/873020220380…1016486757405040713 https://discord.com/invite/GuvnFcgVzq Decolonized Buffalo on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/decolonized_buffalo/ https://twitter.com/decolonizedbp https://open.spotify.com/show/5HNK0mWbkbxoynVEKwgvVC https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/deco…lo/id1530454129 RadLeftDad: https://www.instagram.com/radleftdad/ https://twitter.com/radleftdad Rootin' 4 Lenin https://youtube.com/channel/UC8rptl6HjNotk-2PAwrkfWw The Intervention Podcast: https://theinterventionpod.buzzsprout.com/ https://instagram.com/intervention_pod TransXBombshell: https://www.twitch.tv/transxbombshell https://twitter.com/transXbombshell https://www.instagram.com/transxbombshell/ Turn Leftist Podcast https://linktr.ee/turnleftist https://instagram.com/turnleftist https://twitter.com/turnleftistpod

Subscribe to The Parrot Room at https://patreon.com/parrotroom0:00 Mickey takes a bite out of midterm “overism” 15:58 How revolutionary will Musk's Twitter reign be? 28:50 Who quashed the Progressive Caucus's Ukraine letter? 31:14 What's holding up diplomacy in Ukraine? 40:32 Is Blob opinion on the war starting to split? 45:02 The cost of US hypocrisy 48:33 The media's weird coverage of the ‘dirty bomb' story 54:56 Parrot room preview: implausible dirty bomb scenarios; UK PM's dramatic early moves; a few words about the late Lucianne Goldberg; an (iffy) argument against lefty state legislature alarmism; Mickey's labor-relations observations; Xi Jinping and the Hu Jintao removal; illustrating the dangers of war-time overreaction by way of Russian relocation coverage; Joe's McCarthyism; Russians adopting Ukrainian children; what's in it for Putin-humiliation-pushers? Robert Wright (Bloggingheads.tv, The Evolution of God, Nonzero, Why Buddhism Is True) and Mickey Kaus (kausfiles, The End of Equality). Recorded October 28, 2022. Comments on BhTV: http://bloggingheads.tv/videos/65124 Twitter: https://twitter.com/bloggingheads Facebook: https://facebook.com/bloggingheads/ Podcasts: https://bloggingheads.tv/subscribe This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit nonzero.substack.com/subscribe

Mickey takes a bite out of midterm “overism” ... How revolutionary will Musk's Twitter reign be? ... Who quashed the Progressive Caucus's Ukraine letter? ... What's holding up diplomacy in Ukraine? ... Is Blob opinion on the war starting to split? ... The cost of US hypocrisy ... The media's weird coverage of the "dirty bomb" story ... Parrot room preview: implausible dirty bomb scenarios; UK PM's dramatic early moves; a few words about the late Lucianne Goldberg; an (iffy) argument against lefty state legislature alarmism; Mickey's labor-relations observations; Xi Jinping and the Hu Jintao removal; illustrating the dangers of war-time overreaction by way of Russian relocation coverage; Joe's McCarthyism; Russians adopting Ukrainian children; what's in it for Putin-humiliation-pushers? ...

O ex-chanceler do Tesouro "sucedeu" @ alface e é o novo primeiro-ministro britânico. Também aproveitamos para dar um giro pelo velho continente, além de trazer as últimas atualizações da invasão russa à Ucrânia, que completou 8 meses.Já no Oriente Médio, repercutimos a assinatura do acordo marítimo entre Líbano e Israel e fizemos uma prévia das eleições deste país.No mais, demos uma volta na bacia do Pacífico, com o anúncio do novo mandato de Xi Jiping como secretário-geral do Partido Comunista da China e uma polêmica com o seu antecessor Hu Jintao.

Misha is joined by occasional co-host Cindy Yu and veteran Sinologists Rana Mitter and Jude Blanchette, to take apart the 20th Party Congress, Xi's “running the table,” the Hu Jintao shocker, and the Party's new era. 

The one where we speculate about what Xi's unprecedented third term means for China and their relationship with the world, as well as what happened to Hu Jintao, the former president of China.This Podcast is a companion piece to the article you can read here.Thank you for listening,Jay and Griff This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.didnothingwrongpod.com/subscribe

Canary Cry News Talk #551 - 10.24.2022 - Recorded Live to Tape WHO'S HU - Yecosystem, Occult Rishi, Elon Everywhere, Bob Nephilim Dylan  A Podcast that Deconstructs Mainstream Media News from a Biblical Worldview. Harvard: Index of MSM Ownership (Harvard.edu)   SHOW NOTES PODCAST T-2:11   HELLO, RUN DOWN  2:35 V / :24 P YE 6:46 V / 4:35 P Kanye West Wants to Build His Own Mini-City Called the ‘Yecosystem' (Rolling Stone)  → Daniel 11; god of fortresses    DAY JINGLE/PERSONAL/EXEC.  18:46 V / 16:35 P   FLIPPY  27:22 V / 25:11 P Flippy start's podcasting (HypeBeast)   CHINA  41:32 V / 39:21 P *China's ex-president Hu Jintao, 79, is 'erased from the Internet' (DailyMail)  → Clip: Footage Jintao being removed (Guardian) *DOJ indicts nearly a dozen people in China espionage cases (Yahoo/Politico) → Hu Jintao mentioned in Confucius Institute PDF (Confucius Institute)    BBB/UK/RISHI *Rishi Sunak Wins Vote to Become U.K.'s Next Prime Minister After Liz Truss Resigns (WSJ) *Pound seesaws as Rishi Sunak prepares to confront UK's huge economic challenges (CNN) Source: UK Finance document 2019 PDF [Aadhaar, Aadhaar Act 2016]   PARTY TIME  56:47 V / 54:36 P BREAK 1: TREASURE  57:44 V / 55:33 P   COVID/FAUCI/PSAKI  1:08:31 V / 1:06:20 P Judge orders Fauci, Psaki deposed in social media censorship lawsuit (NY Post)   ELON  1:17:51 V / 1:15:40 P 'Elon, The Everywhere' Elon Musk is worrying gov officials, report says (Insider)  → Biden could ultimately kill Elon Twitter the deal (Insider)   BREAK 3: TALENT  1:23:36 V / 1:21:25 P   NEPHILIM UPDATE  1:32:27 V / 1:30:36 P Bob Dylan refers to biblical Nephilim in book discussing song meanings (NY Times)   BREAK 4: TIME  1:36:13 V / 1:34:02 P END   This Episode was Produced By: Executive Producers Rab**   Producers Sir MORV Knight of the Burning Chariots, Sir LX Protocol V2 Knight of the Berrean Protocol, Tami C, Dame Miss G of the OV and Deep Rivers, Sir Casey the Shield Knight, Dame Gail, Sir Scott Knight of Truth, Runksmash, Sir Darrin Knight of the Hungry Panda's   Audio Production BrotherG   Visual Art Dame Allie of the Skillet Nation Sir Dove Knight of Rusbeltia   Microfiction Runksmash - Boris the White appears on every screen around Chris as he walks briskly through the hall to the stairs, “Prime Citizen, Chris Tien, return to your dwelling. You have been exposed to the contagion -misinformation-. A counselor will text you shortly.”   CLIP PRODUCER Emsworth, FaeLivrin, Epsilon   TIMESTAPERS Jackie U, Jade Bouncerson, Christine C, Pocojoyo, Joelle S   SOCIAL MEDIA DOERS Dame MissG of the OV and Deep Rivers   LINKS HELP JAM   ADDITIONAL STORIES History made in China as Xi to serve third term - breaking decades-long precedent (Sky News)  Anti-Xi protest spreads in China and worldwide as Chinese leader begins third term (CNN)  Mysterious $11bn Swiss swapsies (Financial Times) (Archive)  The global economy is in chaos. Nobody's coming to the rescue. (Politico)  Robert Kiyosaki Says US Dollar Is Toast Citing Saudi Arabia's Request to BRICS (Bitcoin News)  → The Treasury Market Could Seize Up. That Could Be Disastrous for Everyone. (Barron's)  → Elon Musk Predicts U.S. In Recession Until "Spring Of 2024" (Twitter) Rishi Sunak WILL be the next PM: Penny Mordaunt drops out of Tory race allowing a coronation for ex-Chancellor after he racks up backing from 200 MPs including key Boris allies (DailyMail) Sandy Hook Families Ask Judge to Max Out Alex Jones Penalty (Bloomberg) (Archive)  Work begins on Saudi Arabia's 75-mile-long megacity, The Line: Drone footage shows excavators digging the foundations for £440billion project (DailyMail)  Zuckerberg's private jet burned $158k worth of fuel in two months (Fox Business)  Australian Bank Begins Linking Customer Transactions to Carbon Footprint (Summit News)  Microsoft's Army Goggles Left US Soldiers With Nausea, Headaches (Bloomberg) (Archive)  'The devices would have gotten us killed.' Microsoft's military smart goggles failed four of six elements during a recent test, internal Army report says (Insider) (Archive)  Day care workers who used horror mask to scare children charged felony child abuse (abc) Note: Namahage tradition in Akita Prefecture Japan, demon masks, scaring kids  Endonuclease fingerprint indicates a synthetic origin of SARS-CoV-2 (bioRxiv)  Judge grants depositions of Fauci, Psaki, other high ranking Biden officials in case over 'collusive relationship' between adm and social media companies to 'censor free speech' (DailyMail) → HISTORIC: Dr. Fauci's Official Work Calendar (Nov 2019 – Mar 2020) (Open the Books) (PDF) Tired of laundry folding? AI breaks the robot folding speed record (Ars Technica)  In Japan, humanoid robots could soon become part of the family (Big Think) Ballerina physicist who dances with robots is coming to the GoTech World event (Romania) Katakem's 'robot chef' speeds up drug development with reliable chemistry (Yahoo) …more on Sunak… → Diwali: A celebration of the goddess Lakshmi, and her promise of prosperity and good fortune → Sunak May Become Britain's First Hindu Prime Minister — A Lesson For India (World Crunch) → The significance of diyas at Diwali (Times of India) → Why Do We Light A Diya And The Importance Of Diwali Diyas (eCraft India) → Diwali (Wikipedia) → Lakshmi (goddess) (Wikipedia) (from 2015) Goddess Kali projected on New York's Empire State Building (Times of India)  (from 2015) Goddess Kali seen in New York's Empire State building (One India/ YoTube) 

Federico comenta la renovación del mandato del tirano Xi Jinping de China, la purga de su predecesor Hu Jintao y otros asuntos de la actualidad.

The closing ceremony of China's Communist Party congress was marked by the unexplained removal of Hu Jintao, a former president, from the stage. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In our news wrap Saturday, the White House is urging people to continue applying for student loan relief after a judge put Biden's plan on hold, residents of Kherson were ordered to evacuate ahead of an expected Ukrainian effort to recapture the city, Giorgia Meloni was sworn in as Italy's prime minister, and China's former president Hu Jintao was removed from the party congress closing ceremony. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

Boris Johnson, the man ousted as UK prime minister by his own government just three months ago, has emerged as an early front-runner to be the next prime minister. He remains under investigation by the Parliamentary Standards Committee, which could, in theory, lead to him being suspended from Parliament, or even being kicked out as an MP. Also in the programme: the frail-looking former Chinese leader Hu Jintao has been led out of the closing ceremony of the Communist Party Congress, with no explanation given. Photo: Boris Johnson arrives at UK's Gatwick Airport after a holiday in the Caribbean. Credit: REUTERS

More than 100 Conservative MPs have backed the former chancellor Rishi Sunak to become the UK's next prime minister. Mr Sunak hasn't officially said he is running, it's believed he will do so soon. Meanwhile, supporters of the former Prime Minister Boris Johnson say he also has more than 100 backers but without evidence. We hear from supporters of the two men. Also in the programme: Blackouts are being reported in cities across Ukraine after attacks from Russian forces; and Chinese state media says former president Hu Jintao was led out of the Communist Party Congress because of ill health. (Picture: Conservative MP Rishi Sunak leaves his home address in London. Credit: REUTERS/Maja Smiejkowska)

This week on Sinica, Kaiser chats with Susan Shirk, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific and Research Professor and Chair of the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UCSD, about how the deliberately collective leadership of the Hu Jintao years set the stage for the over-concentration of power under Xi Jinping and created conditions for overreach. She argues that Chinese overreach was met with American overreaction — not just in the Trump years, but continuing into the Biden administration.11:35 – The thesis of Overreach and misconceptions based on the title15:50 – The decline of collective leadership 19:57 – Selection process of politburo members27:48 – The advantages of China's former collective leadership system31:40 – How collective leadership often lead to overreach39:40 – How personalistic, overly centralized rule can also result in overreach43:02 – Increased paranoia, insecurity, and “permanent purge” culture under Xi49:59 – American overreaction to China's ambitionsA transcript of this episode is available at TheChinaProject.com.Recommendations: Susan – Born in Blackness: Africa, Africans, and the Making of the Modern World by Howard French Kaiser – His hobby of Asian archery and finding a community/activity you're passionate about outside your professional line of workSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.