Podcasts about Li Keqiang

Kia ora,Welcome to Monday's Economy Watch where we follow the economic events and trends that affect Aotearoa/New Zealand.I'm David Chaston and this is the international edition from Interest.co.nz.And today we lead with news the world seems to be bracing for the uncertainties of the incoming US Administration, but it is starting from a generally resilient position (although that doesn't seem to include New Zealand).But first, the week ahead will be dominated locally by our Q4 CPI release. Markets expect a 2.1% year-on-year rate, only marginally less than the Q3 rate of 2.2%. We will also get another full dairy auction on Wednesday too. The REINZ will release its December data sometime, maybe Tuesday. And we can expect other banks to react to ASB's home loan rate reductions.Elsewhere, there will be more PMI releases, GDP releases for South Korea and Taiwan, and rate decisions from Norway, Turkey, Malaysia, and the big one from Japan at the end of the week. Data out of Australia will be minor this coming week. But all the while, important earnings reports will flow on Wall StreetOver the weekend, China said new home prices in 70 cities dropped by an average -5.3% in December from a year ago, slowing from a -5.7% decline in the previous month. This was the softest fall since August but is the 18th consecutive month of decreases. "Second hand home" prices fell faster, and there were no cities where prices rose. The string of decreases come despite efforts from Beijing to reduce the impacts of a prolonged property weakness, efforts such as lowering mortgage rates and cutting home buying costs.China released data that showed electricity production was only up +0.6% from a year ago in December. For the whole of 2024 the rise was +4.6%. The year ended weakly with neither November nor December rising more than +1%. This is a telling indicator of real activity. (This is the metric then-to-be Premier Li Keqiang famously referred to after dismissing their GDP results.)But they said industrial production was up +6.2% in December. Retail sales were up +3.7%. And through all this they claimed Q4-2024 GDP rose +5.4% and its fastest pace of the year. Frankly, that is hard to see based on the components that make it up. Apparently it is based on export growth, but as good as that is, it is hard to see that behind the claimed growth. But the links here, plus this one, and they should be enough to inspect their data and for you to make your own judgement.Singapore's exports surged +9% in December from the same month a year ago, after a +3.4% gain in November. This exceeded the +7.4% rise in November and is the fastest pace in export growth since August. A key driver is a sharp rebound in non-electronic product sales.Globally, the January update of the IMF's World Economic Outlook estimated global growth to be +3.3% in 2025, a slight increase from the 3.2% forecast in October. The rise was driven by the US which offset downgrades in other major economies. Growth for 2026 is also expected at 3.3%, unchanged from the previous projection.They say the US faces upside risks that could bolster growth in the near term, but other nations remain exposed to downside risks amid heightened policy uncertainty. The US economy is now forecast to grow by 2.7% in 2025 (vs 2.2% in October), and China's GDP growth was revised slightly higher to 4.6% (vs 4.5%).Conversely, the Euro Area's growth projection was downgraded to 1% (vs 1.2%), while Japan's growth forecast remains steady at 1.1%. Projections for India's GDP growth were maintained at 6.5%. Australia is expected to grow +2.1% in 2025 and +2.2% in 2026. New Zealand doesn't get a mention in these forecasts.Underscoring the US growth upgrade, American housing starts surged by almost +16% from the previous month to an annualised rate of 1.5 mln units in December, the most since March 2021 and well above the expected 1.32 mln level.And industrial production in the US was up an outsized +0.9% in December and well above the +0.3% expected rise to the strongest increase since February. It was helped by the end of strikes, and a jump in the production of aircraft.But there is a bump in the road about to start: the latest US debt limit deal is about to expire very soon. The new US Administration will have to grapple with that in its early days. Trump wants no debt limits to constrain his tax cuts and spending plans, but his hardline conservative supporters won't agree to more deficits. This will be interesting.Trump has already had an effect on the US Federal Reserve, getting them to withdraw from the 144 member NGFS. of which the RBNZ.And separately, we should probably note that the aluminium price is at a two month high, and heading toward a two year high.The UST 10yr yield is now at just on 4.62%, and up +2 bps from this time Saturday.The price of gold will start today at US$2702/oz and down -US$14 from Saturday.Oil prices are down -50 USc at just under US$78/bbl in the US while the international Brent price is now just under US$81.The Kiwi dollar starts today just under 55.9 USc and down -10 bps from this time Saturday. Against the Aussie we unchanged at 90.1 AUc. Against the euro we are down -10 bps at 54.4 euro cents. That all means our TWI-5 starts today just on 66.8 and down -10 bps from yesterday, but up +20 bps from a week ago.The bitcoin price starts today at US$104,704 and down -0.3% from this time Saturday. Volatility over the past 24 hours has been modest at +/- 1.1%.You can find links to the articles mentioned today in our show notes.You can get more news affecting the economy in New Zealand from interest.co.nz.Kia ora. I'm David Chaston. And we will do this again tomorrow.

Kia ora,Welcome to Wednesday's Economy Watch where we follow the economic events and trends that affect Aotearoa/New Zealand.I'm David Chaston and this is the international edition from Interest.co.nz.And today we lead with news the US Fed is telling markets rate cuts from them are not coming soon.First up today, the overnight dairy auction confirmed the recent rises, but didn't add to them in a subdued event. In USD terms overall prices were up +0.1 and in NZD terms up +1.5%. Volumes were seasonally small however. Perhaps of some concern in this data was that foodservice components like butter, cheddar, and mozzarella all fell, by -1.4%, -8.5%, and -3.8% respectively. However, given the overall 'hold', it is unlikely any farmgate payout forecasts will be changed by today's outcomes.US housing starts and new building consents are in the doldrums as this sector continues to fade. March brought steep drops, almost -15% below February levels for new housing starts, -4.3% lower than year-ago levels. The situation isn't going to get much better because residential building consents also fell, down -4.3% from February although marginally up on March a year ago.US retail sales rose +4.9% last week in their Redbook tracker, the tenth week in the past 13 that the rise has bested inflation. The retail expansion is embedded now.US industrial production rose +0.4% from the previous month in March, in line with expectations and following an upwardly revised +0.4% increase in February. A rise in vehicle production was a notable component of the recent up-trend.Meanwhile, Fed boss Powell was out speaking indicating their policy rate will stay elevated for some time yet. They see no pressing need to cut, or in fact make any changes. Meanwhile there was some important Canadian data released overnight. They said consumer inflation rose 2.9% in the year to March with their core rate rising just 2.0%And Canadian housing starts eased slightly in March from February although they were +13.5% higher than year-ago levels.In China, electricity production rose just +2.8% on March from a year ago, a huge retreat from the +8.0% rise in December. This is an important background data that should be reflected in China's economic activity (GDP). But Beijing reported Q1-2024 GDP rose +5.3% (up from 5.2% in Q4-2023) and this was despite retail sales only rising +3.1% and national real estate investment falling -9.5% in official data. They say industry expanded +4.5% (and down from the +6.8% rate in December). While we have raised our eyebrows at how they can deliver a credible GDP result just 16 days after the quarter end (no-one else can), few of the major components show expansions at the level of the claimed overall growth, and readers can draw their own judgements on the credibility of the rising 5.3% growth in Q1. Certainly ex-Premier Li Keqiang did.Meanwhile, China's new home prices dropped by -2.2% in the year to March, faster than the -1.4% fall in February. It was the ninth straight month of decline and the steepest pace since August 2015, despite multiple support measures. For second-hand dwellings none of the 70 largest cities reported any rises, and the average fall over this set is now -5.9% year-on-year.China continues to struggle with youth unemployment. You will recall they withdrew data that reflected badly on them last year and replaced it with 'better data'. But now an official confirms that even this data, the next update yet to be released, shows a situation that "requires a high degree of attention".In Europe, the ECB said that they will likely cut rates soon. She was speaking at the IMF's release of their 2024 growth forecast update, and those revealed that despite gloomy predictions, "the global economy remains remarkably resilient, with steady growth and inflation slowing almost as quickly as it rose". They say: "growth this year and next will hold steady at 3.2%, with median headline inflation declining from 2.8% at the end of 2024 to 2.4% at the end of 2025. Most indicators continue to point to a soft landing."Join us at 10:30am this morning to find out what New Zealand's CPI inflation level came in at in Q1-2024..Ratings agency Moody's said overnight that New Zealand's sovereign credit rating stays at its current maximum Aaa grade. The outlook is Stable. They are the only ratings agency to assign a triple A to New Zealand. The UST 10yr yield is now at 4.66% and up +3 bps from yesterday. The price of gold will start today higher by +US$31 from this time yesterday at US$2394/oz.Despite continuing Middle East tensions and uncertainties, oil prices have changed little at just under US$85/bbl in the US while the international Brent price is also unchanged at US$89.50/bbl.The Kiwi dollar starts today at just over 58.8 USc and down -30 bps from yesterday and a new five month low. Against the Aussie we are firmish at 91.8 AUc. Against the euro we are down another -20 bps to 55.4 euro cents. That all means our TWI-5 starts today just over 68.8 and down -20 bps and a ten day low.The bitcoin price starts today lower at US$62,368 and down -2.6% from this time yesterday. Volatility over the past 24 hours has been modest at just on +/- 1.9%.You can find links to the articles mentioned today in our show notes.You can get more news affecting the economy in New Zealand from interest.co.nz.Kia ora. I'm David Chaston. And we will do this again tomorrow.

O Presidente de Angola está na China para uma visita oficial de três dias que pretende dar uma nova dinâmica às relações entre os dois países. A dívida de Angola à China ascende a cerca de 17 mil milhões de dólares (15,6 mil milhões de euros), o economista angolano, Alves da Rocha, afirma que Angola tem capacidade de pagar a dívida a Pequim.   O chefe de Estado de Angola está na China para uma visita oficial de três dias que pretende dar uma nova dinâmica às relações entre os dois países. Depois de encontro com o primeiro-ministro chinês, Li Keqiang, João Lourenço afirmou ter conseguido renegociar os termos da dívida de Luanda junto de credores chineses. A dívida de Angola à China ascende a cerca de 17 mil milhões de dólares (15,6 mil milhões de euros), o economista angolano, Alves da Rocha, afirma que Angola tem capacidade de pagar a divida china.Em Moçambique, o ministro do Interior garantiu que o novo “modus operandi” dos grupos terroristas, que aumentaram os ataques no sul da provincia de Cabo Delgado, revela que estão sob uma nova liderança. Pascoal Ronda, que respondia às perguntas colocadas pelas bancadas da Frelimo, Renamo e MDM, reiterou que a luta contra o terrorismo continua a ser uma prioridade.Na Guiné-Bissau, o PAIGC afirma que a detenção dos dirigentes Suleimane Seidi, ex-ministro da Economia e Finanças, e António Monteiro, ex-secretário de Estado do Tesouro é abusiva e ilegal.São Tomé e Príncipe, a Agripalma, unidade fabril de produção de óleo de palma está em greve há um mês, os funcionários exigem o pagamento de melhores salários. O secretário-geral da Organização Nacional dos Trabalhadores, João Tavares, pede a intervenção do Governo junto da empresa de forma a encontrar-se uma solução.Em Cabo Verde, a ausência de mulheres a encabeçar as listas autárquicas do MpD para eleições deste ano está a gerar muitas críticas. O Presidente do MpD e primeiro-ministro do país, Ulisses correia e Silva, justifica a escolha dos candidatos.No Senegal, os opositores Ousmane Sonko e Bassirou Diomaye Faye- candidato independente às eleições presidenciais de 24 de Março- foram libertados da prisão, a dez dias das eleições. O anúncio da libertação desencadeou um cenário de euforia em Dacar. Em entrevista à RFI, Oumar Diallo, Professor na Universidade Cheick Anta Diop, reconhece que esta decisão foi recebida com alguma ambiguidade.

In 2024 is het 150 jaar geleden dat de Tweede Kamer het ‘kinderwetje' aannam, de eerste sociale wet van Nederland. Het bezorgde indiener Samuel van Houten (1837-1930) een plek in de geschiedenisboeken. Maar Van Houten, grote vernieuwer van het liberalisme en ‘politiek moordenaar' van staatsman Thorbecke, was meer dan zijn kinderwet. Twintig jaar lang was hij de belangrijkste voorvechter van kiesrechtuitbreiding en rechtvaardiger belastingen. Katholieken verafschuwden hem, feministen droegen hem op handen. Historicus Coen Brummer brengt hem, 150 jaar na zijn kinderwet, weer tot leven in zijn eerste volwaardige biografie. Hij spreekt erover in Wat blijft met Floortje Smit. Verder in Wat blijft: Chinese premier Li Keqiang, zanger O.V. Wright en presentator Karel van de Graaf. In het tweede uur en de podcastserie van Wat blijft: Toen begin jaren ‘90 de oorlog in Joegoslavië uitbrak, ontvluchtte schrijver en literatuurwetenschapper Dubravka Ugrešić haar land. Ze streek neer in Nederland maar heeft hier nooit echt kunnen wortelen. Ze bleef zich een vluchteling voelen. Ugrešić vermengde het persoonlijke met het politieke en schreef over nationalisme, ontheemding en ze maakte zich hard voor het recht van schrijvers om zich niets van etnische of nationale grenzen aan te trekken. Haar boeken werden over de hele wereld gelezen en ze won verschillende internationale prijzen.    Inge ter Schure volgt het spoor terug met goede vriendin en biograaf Angela Dekker, schrijver en oud-uitgever Reinjan Mulder en documentairemaker en goede vriendin Lidija Zelovic.  --- Redactie: Laura Iwuchukwu, Nina Ramkisoen, Geerte Verduijn, Maartje Willems Eindredactie: Bram Vollaers

#PRC: Who was Li Keqiang of the CCP?  Elizabeth Larus, Pacific Forum. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/remains-of-former-chinese-premier-li-keqiang-to-be-cremated-and-flags-to-be-lowered/ar-AA1j7Npl 1930 Yangtze River

Aila Wang is a member of New Federal State of China (NFSC). Gettr: @NFSCSpeaks. Former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang died at 68. CCP state media announcement was released hours before his official death time.  Top PLA General met with Russia Defense Minister in Beijing: China will deepen cooperation with Russia and show no mercy against any Taiwan Independence Moves. White House confirmed Biden-Xi meeting at APEC in November.

On today's show Bill and Andrew begin with the passing of Li Keqiang, the grief that swept China over the weekend, and the various party protocols that were set in motion to control the mourning process this week. From there: Another Politburo meeting comes and goes with no news about a third plenum to devise new economic policy, the modest progress and persistent structural challenges animating the US-China relationship in 2023, and the MSS turns its eyes to meteorology. At the end: Extended thoughts on Gavin Newsom's trip to China, a look at the strategic advantages China brings to the global market for a select group of commodities, the Foreign Ministry complains about Rahm Emanuel's approach to diplomacy, and Yao Ming makes an appearance for the NBA's opening week.

#PRC: The mystery of Li Keqiang's endings. Charles Burton, MacDonald Laurier. @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-67236049 1950 PRC/CCP

Shane Leary joins Miles Yu to discuss the death of former Premier Li Keqiang, and the Chinese Communist Party's paranoia surrounding public mourning of high-level officials. They then discuss Wang Yi's visit with President Joe Biden, and Miles offers his thoughts on the upcoming Biden-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations. Finally, they turn to the latest Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, when on October 22 a Chinese Coast Guard vessel collided with a Philippine ship.Follow the China Center's work at https://www.hudson.org/china-center

Indian markets suffered their worst weekly sell-off since mid-September last week. Surging US Treasury yields and oil prices, coupled with simmering tension in West Asia, dragged benchmarks 2.5% lower in barely 4 sessions. But Friday came as a relief. So is this pullback rally a sign of trend reversal? Or is there more pain in store for the Indian markets? While checking the stock prices, do you sometimes, or often, wander off and open your Insta, Twitter or Facebook account. Well you are not alone. That feeling of restlessness, that anxiety of missing out on something crucial ... It is increasingly gripping people. Kids too are hooked to it and are reportedly losing focus. In the United States, at least 30 states have sued Facebook parent Meta for allegedly jeopardising young minds. Find out if it's high time to regulate access to social media usage for children. The rise of social media and small screen entertainment has dealt a big blow to movie theatres too. Single screen halls, which used to dot the city landscape, have almost disappeared. And not all can afford to watch movies in multiplexes. Thanks to costly tickets. Even well healed too complain about several additional charges. One of them is convenience fees. Several other platforms too are charging it, which is at times as high as 20%. So is someone looking out there? What are the regulations around it? China, on the other hand, has proposed to limit children's smartphone time to a maximum of 2 hours a day. In 2019, it had restricted children's daily online game time to 90 minutes a day. Moving on, the country lost a key political figure last week. Former premier of China, Li Keqiang, died of a heart attack. He was also a prominent economist whose mistrust of official GDP numbers gave birth to an economic indicator. It was named after him. Find out more on it in this episode of the podcast. 

#Ukraine:  Xi steps past his old rival,  Li Keqiang.  Professor H.J. Mackinder, International Relations. #FriendsofHistoryDebatingSociety 1959 Guangzhou

Voici ma vision de la vie et de la mort de Li Keqiang, héros discret que le régime veut d'urgence faire oublier  Tous ces épisodes, inspirés par mes souvenirs et l'actualité, n'ont que le double but de vous amuser et de matérialiser la Chine, la rendre vivante et présente à vos oreilles. Si vous aimez ce que vous entendez, merci de reposter le lien sur Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, TikTok etc. J'en ai besoin, car le nombre d'auditeurs reste trop bas. Vous pouvez aussi me répondre pour commenter -sur LinkedIn, en titrant mon nom. Merci - Eric MEYER

Former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's Legacy: A Closer LookFormer Premier Li Keqiang's Most Sensitive SpeechesChina's Chief Epidemiologist, COVID-19 Advisor DiesU.S.: Chinese Jet Got Within Ten Feet of B-52 BomberDeSantis: Wars in Middle East, Ukraine Benefit ChinaGov. Newsom Tours Great Wall Alongside Climate TalksSan Francisco Bay Area City Denounces IsraelAustralia Charges Seven with Laundering $144 Million for Chinese Crime SyndicateChina Accepts Invitation to AI Summit in UK‘There's No Hope Now': Graceffo on Waning Chinese Economic Liberalization Amid Li Keqiang Death

News

UN agencies have warned that civilians in Gaza are facing an ever more desperate situation after three weeks of Israeli siege and bombardment. Aid trucks that have been allowed in through an Egyptian crossing point so far have provided only "crumbs", says UNRWA (the UN's agency for Palestinian refugees) chief Phillippe Lazzarini. Also in the programme: Former premier Li Keqiang has died of a heart attack aged 68; and scientists say they have found evidence that some chimpanzees go through menopause in the wild. (PHOTO: A UN vehicle carrying water that got through Gaza on 26 October. Credit: Reuters)

Plus: China's former No. 2 leader Li Keqiang dies at age 68. And Apple faces a potential U.S. import ban on certain smartwatches. Keith Collins hosts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

NTD News Today—10/27/20231. Maine Rep. Describes Empty Portland Streets2. Father: ‘Hate Will Never Bring My Son Back'3. Lewiston Police Chief Gives Update4. Israeli Airstrike Kills Hamas Commander5. Projectile Impact an ‘Aerial Threat': Israel6. U.S. Fighter Jets Strike Targets in Syria7. U.S. Deploying 900 Troops to Middle East8. Aid Reaches Desperate Palestinians in Gaza9. EU Pledges $52M in Additional Aid to Gaza10. U.S. Expands Sanctions for Links to Hamas11. Insight Into Attacked Israeli Communities12. Interfaith Response to Hamas Attacks13. Call for Leaders, Universities to Back Israel14. U.S. Deploys 900 to Middle East: Why?15. How to Prevent Hamas War From Escalating?16. Strategist on U.S. Presence in Middle East17. International Players in the Israel-Hamas War18. Ukraine, Israel Aid Better Separate: Speaker19. House Passes First Bill Under New Speaker20. Dean Phillips Challenging Biden in Primary21. Biden Under Fire for $200,000 Payment in 201822. Break-In Attempted Twice at Home of RFK Jr.23. Intruder Arrest: RFK Jr. Calls for Protection24. Is RFK Jr. Still Gaining Popularity?25. What Does RFK Jr. Run Mean for Trump, Biden?26. Texas Illegal Immigration Arrest Bill Passes27. San Francisco Bay Area City Denounces Israel28. DC: Murder Suspect Captured Nearly Two Months After Escape29. BP Buys $100M Worth of Tesla Chargers30. New Jersey Smokestack Landmark Demolished31. Texas Tornado: ‘It's Coming Right at Us'32. Mexico: Hurricane Otis Kills at Least 2733. Former CCP Premier Li Keqiang Dead at 6834. Most EU Leaders Want to Send $50B to Ukraine35. EU Ukraine Strategy Failed: Hungarian Leader36. Blinken: $150M Security Pkg Going to Ukraine37. Russia Executes Soldiers Who Refuse Order: Us38. Pro-Russia Ukrainian Politician Shot, Wounded39. Black Sea Corridor to Continue: Zelenskyy40. 1st Armeni, Azeri PM Encounter Since Conflict41. Spanish Police Stage Terror Attack Drill42. Military Divers Remove Ordnance in Hungary43. Endangered Red Wolves Get Dental Check-Ups44. Slice of Life From Central Park in Fall45. Study Visualizes How Plants Communicate46. Death Valley Now Growing Flowers47. Maine Rep. Describes Empty Portland Streets48. Father: ‘Hate Will Never Bring My Son Back'49. Lewiston Police Chief Gives Update50. Santos Pleads Not Guilty to New Charges51. U.S. Expands Sanctions for Links to Hamas52. FMR Border Patrol Chief on Terror Threat53. Who Is Placed on the Terror Watch List?54. Terror Threats Entering, Already in U.S.55. Dean Phillips Challenging Biden in Primary56. Biden Under Fire for $200,000 Payment in 201857. Break-In Attempted Twice at Home of RFK Jr.58. Intruder Arrest: RFK Jr. Calls for Protection59. Is RFK Jr. Still Gaining Popularity?60. What Does RFK Jr. Run Mean for Trump, Biden?61. Blinken Meets With China's Top Diplomat62. Former CCP Premier Li Keqiang Dead at 6863. World Leaders Respond to Li Keqiang's Death64. How Did Li Keqiang View China's Economy?65. China's Chief Epidemiologist Dies at 6066. RPT: China Developing New Nuclear-Powered Sub67. Deadly Stampede: Mom Wants Justice 1 Year On68. Solar-Powered Cars Speed Through Australia69. Style Guide for the Fashion Shy Guy70. Inspiration: The Stylish Men of Italy71. Experience a Bespoke Clothing Retail Lounge72. Naples: ‘Silicon Valley for Craftsmanship'73. What Is Style? A Suit Maker Explains.74. The Moment of a Lifetime75. Airbnb Using AI to Prevent Halloween Parties76. World's Largest Lego Pumpkin on Display

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En av Kinas tyngsta maktspelare under 2000-talet, Li Keqiang, är död. Han var Kinas premiärminister under ett decennium. Men Xi's närmste man anses inte alltid ha varit lojal. Hör om hur Li Keqiangs död kan påverka Xi och maktbalansen i Kina. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. Medverkande: Björn Djurberg, Kinakorrespondent och Hanna Sahlberg, Kinakommentator.Producent: Therese Rosenvinge

Former Chinese premier Li Keqiang died early this Friday from a heart attack at the age of 68, months after retiring from nearly a decade in office. When he took up his post, reformers had hoped Li would initiate bold economic change. Barclays even coined the term "Likenomics" to describe his broad economic vision. Ultimately, Li failed to implement significant reforms and in recent years was sidelined by President Xi Jinping, who steered the world's second-largest economy in a more statist direction. We take a closer look.

Former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, once seen as a reform-minded contender to the country's top leadership role, died of a sudden heart attack early Friday in Shanghai, state media reported. He was 68 years old. Li, who was nominally China's No. 2 leader until late last year, served as the country's premier – traditionally in charge of the economy – for a decade from 2013 to March this year under strongman leader Xi Jinping. During his time in the role, Li navigated the world's second-largest economy through a challenging period of rising technology and trade tensions with the United States, mounting government debt and unemployment, and the Covid-19 pandemic. In his final year in power, the economist by training had been a strong voice warning of challenges to China's economy amid widespread Covid-19 lockdowns. He backed efforts to boost employment and maintain economic stability. As the news of Li's death broke Friday morning, social media users circulated a line from Li's annual address to China's rubber stamp parliament in 2022, where he pledged that, “No matter how the international environment may change, China will keep the course of wider openness.” Li, known to use his English language skills on occasion in appearances outside the mainland, was seen as representing a different approach to China's ties with the world, at a time when the country's relations with the West have grown increasingly strained. “China and the United States have common interests,” Li said in response to CNN's question at his annual press conference in March 2021. “The two countries need to put more energy on their common ground and expand converging interests.” Li is also remembered for his focus on addressing societal ills – with social media users on Friday also pointing to his 2020 comments noting that China still had 600 million people with a monthly income of 1,000 yuan ($137). Those remarks came at a time when China was touting its success in lifting millions out of poverty as a point of national pride. Li, a highly educated technocrat with degrees in law and economics, was considered friendly to the private sector. He was seen to have an increasingly diverging economic policy stance from Xi, who tightened party control over the economy. A reform-minded leader Li is widely seen as a protege of Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, who presided over an era of rapid growth in China from 2002 to 2012. The men shared economic sensibilities and rose to power through the Communist Party's Youth League, once seen as a training ground for future leaders. The faction was known for producing reform-minded leaders hailing from humble family backgrounds, but its influence is believed to have been crushed by Xi since he came to power. The relationship between Li and Hu was in the spotlight last year when the former top leader was unexpectedly led out of the closing ceremony of the October 2022 Communist Party Congress, where Xi further consolidated power. In a moment of drama during a usually highly choreographed event, Hu was escorted from the room, pausing on his way out to pat a stony-faced Li on the shoulder, who nodded and turned to watch the former leader depart. State media later suggested Hu left due to health issues. Under Hu, Li was named to the party's top leadership body, the Politburo Standing Committee, in 2007. He previously held key roles as party chief in industrial Liaoning province and was provincial leader of Henan, an agricultural base. Born in Anhui, Li spent his late teens doing manual labor with the Dongling Production Brigade in the eastern province during the Cultural Revolution, a decade-long social and political upheaval launched by late Chinese leader Mao Zedong. Li was among the first batch of students to sit the college entrance exam after it was reinstated following the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, he enrolled at the prestigious Peking University, where he studied law and later obtained a doctorate in economics. Unlike Xi, Li is not considered one of China's princelings hailing from a prominent party family. He held positions in the Communist Youth League Central Committee during the 1980s and 90s. His time in the top echelons of China's Communist Party came to a close last October, when he was not named to the party's Central Committee during a twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle that saw Xi surround himself with key allies. Then 67, Li was one year short of the unofficial retirement age for senior Chinese Communist Party leaders. He was succeeded as premier earlier this year by former Shanghai party chief and Xi loyalist Li Qiang. - by Simone McCarthy and Steven Jiang, CNNSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

WORLD: Former premier Li Keqiang, China's top economic official, dies at 68 | October 27, 2023Subscribe to The Manila Times Channel - https://tmt.ph/YTSubscribe Visit our website at https://www.manilatimes.net Follow us: Facebook - https://tmt.ph/facebook Instagram - https://tmt.ph/instagram Twitter - https://tmt.ph/twitter DailyMotion - https://tmt.ph/dailymotion Subscribe to our Digital Edition - https://tmt.ph/digital Check out our Podcasts: Spotify - https://tmt.ph/spotify Apple Podcasts - https://tmt.ph/applepodcasts Amazon Music - https://tmt.ph/amazonmusic Deezer: https://tmt.ph/deezer Stitcher: https://tmt.ph/stitcherTune In: https://tmt.ph/tunein #TheManilaTimes Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Strong Demand Drives Rally in High Sulphur Fuel Oil Unforeseen winds of change swept through the freight industry as iron ore prices soared, driven by the unwavering commitment of China's Premier Li to bolster domestic demand. Freight industry traders and professionals! Brace yourselves for a rollercoaster ride.  This unexpected twist in the market will challenge conventional strategies, forcing you to question the status quo. Will you adapt and seize the opportunity to redefine your path? Or will you remain rooted in the familiar, unaware of the untapped potential that awaits? Make sure you listen to this new episode of "Freight Up" from FIS to get all the insight you need to make your decision! "For them all to be rallying, it shows some good health in the fuel market" - Archie Smith  Hi, I'm Fernanda, host of the Frieght Up podcast! Archie Smith and James Robinson join me to discuss the current market trends in fuel oil and iron ore. Archie dives into the rally in fuel oil cracks, particularly in high sulphur fuel oil, which he attributes to movements in the East, with our friends in China.  He also highlights the tightening gap between the cracks. James talks us through the significant rally in iron ore prices, also driven by Chinese commitments to demand. Timestamped summary of this episode: 00:00:00 - Introduction 00:00:29 - Fuel Oil Update 00:05:52 - Iron Ore Update 

On March 5th, Chinese outgoing Premier Li Keqiang opened the National People's Congress meeting with his annual Work Report and revealed a growth target of “around 5%”, the lowest since 1976. For decades, the country had expanded by more than 10% annually. Even though China missed its target last year by a wide margin due to its zero-Covid policy, not many people expected this low of a target from Xi Jinping's government. What kind of economic policy will China need to adopt to revive its economy, and where is the future of the U.S-China economic relationship? Join us for a conversation with Dr. Yukon Huang, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Former Work Bank's country director for China on Tuesday, This is the second of Network 20/20's Deep Dives: China program.Follow us at:Network2020.orgTwitter: @Network2020LinkedIn: Network 20/20Facebook: @network2020Instagram: @network_2020"Image" by Infractionhttps://bit.ly/3n8XQiJMusic promoted by Inaudio: http://bit.ly/3qxoX6UFollow us at:Network2020.orgTwitter: @Network2020LinkedIn: Network 20/20Facebook: @network2020Instagram: @network_2020

As Covid-19 restrictions lifted around the world and countries stopped reporting on case numbers, the events of 2020 and 2021 faded further into our collective memory. Against the threat of looming recession and a war in Europe, it was easy to forget the turmoil brought on by the pandemic. Then, in January 2023, China announced it was reopening its borders and abandoning quarantine measures. After 3 years, in which the entire population was locked down without regard for cost or consequence, China was open for business. It's ‘zero-Covid' policy hit its economy hard. GDP in 2022 slumped to its lowest growth rate in almost half a century. Energy demand was affected as a result: LNG imports slumped 20% year-on-year, as did oil consumption. At the opening of the National People's Congress in early March, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang announced a growth target of around 5% for 2023. Will China's reconnection with the global economy provide enough of a boost in trade and investment? Under Wood Mackenzie's base-case scenario, we now expect China's economy to grow 5.5% this year. On the podcast today, we look at the possible pathways to growth for the Chinese economy, and the impact of its reopening on energy supply, markets and prices. Joining Liz Dennett are Alan Gelder and Massimo Di-Odoardo. Alan is Vice President of Refining, Chemicals and Oil Markets at Wood Mackenzie. Massimo is Vice President of Global Gas and LNG Research at Wood Mackenzie. Find out more and read the full Horizons report hereSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Xi Jinping se aseguró la semana pasada un tercer mandato como presidente de China. Tras el XX Congreso del partido, celebrado a finales del año pasado su poder era incontestable, por lo que la renovación no ha sorprendido a nadie. En el sistema político chino el cargo de presidente tiene, de cualquier modo, un rol protocolario, su verdadero poder le viene de ser secretario general del Partico Comunista de China (PCCh) y presidente de la Comisión Militar Central. Xi Jinping controla ambos desde hace diez años. Comisiones militares hay dos, una dependiente del partido y la otra del Estado. Desde el jueves pasado Xi Jinping ocupa ambas. La presidencia de la república, no obstante, le otorga la capacidad de nombrar directamente al primer ministro y a los miembros del Ejecutivo. Se espera que el nuevo gabinete esté formado por leales a Xi Jinping empezando por Li Qiang, que ya ha sido nombrado y que releva a Li Keqiang, que ha ocupado el cargo de primer ministro desde 2013. No habrá novedades dignas de ser reseñadas, tan sólo continuismo en la línea que Xi Jinping ha ido consolidando a lo largo de los últimos años. El tercer mandato convertirá a Xi Jinping en el presidente chino que más tiempo ha pasado en la más alta magistratura del Estado. Sus antecesores se retiraron a los diez años de mandato o incluso antes. Existía, de hecho, un límite constitucional de dos mandatos que Xi Jinping eliminó en 2018. Su intención es mantenerse en el poder hasta culminar su proyecto de convertir a China en la primera potencia mundial. Xi Jinping no es precisamente joven, tiene 69 años (70 cumplirá en junio) y se encuentra ante una China muy diferente a la de hace diez años cuando se aupó por primera vez a la presidencia. El país ya no crece con el mismo vigor que durante las dos primeras décadas del siglo. La pandemia ha hecho daño a la economía, un daño agravado por la política de covid cero que su Gobierno mantuvo hasta hace unos meses. La tasa de natalidad está en descenso y la población envejece a un ritmo muy rápido por culpa de la política de hijo único, adoptada en 1979 y que no se abandonó hasta 2015. En el plano internacional la luna de miel de la China popular con Occidente hace tiempo que terminó. Las relaciones con Estados Unidos son malas. La desconfianza mutua es la norma y llueven las acusaciones por ambas partes. En el plano geopolítico la guerra en Ucrania no ha hecho más que complicar las cosas ya que Xi Jinping se ha negado a sumarse a las sanciones contra Rusia. El asunto de Taiwán, entretanto, sigue presente envenenando aún más la relación con las potencias occidentales y con sus vecinos regionales como Japón o Corea del Sur. Es una incógnita si un Xi Jinping fortalecido será suficiente para superar todos esos problemas o quizá servirá como catalizador para empeorarlos. Su receta es bien conocida: centralización del poder en el interior y asertividad en el exterior. Lo que todos dan por descontado es que una era termina en China y empieza otra cuyos perfiles ya se han visto a lo largo de la última década. No habrá más reformas ni más apertura. El liderazgo colectivo que hace más de cuarenta años estableció Deng Xiaoping ha pasado definitivamente a mejor vida. En La ContraRéplica: - El SVB y la reserva fraccionaria - Temporales y fijos discontinuos - Oligopolios en la Argentina peronista · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “Hispanos. Breve historia de los pueblos de habla hispana”… https://amzn.to/428js1G · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #China #Xijinping Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

 China aims for around 5% growth in 2023, Premier Li Keqiang highlights financial risk management, and business leaders push tech agenda at the annual meetings. Subscribe to our free newsletters:  https://www.caixinglobal.com/newsletter/  Are you a big fan of our shows? Then please give our podcast account, China Business Insider, a 5-star rating on Spotify, Apple, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

This month China's prime minister, Li Keqiang, will retire. He was once a rising star of the Communist Party and a contender to lead it, but under Xi Jinping he had little chance to shine. The Economist's Beijing bureau chief, David Rennie, and senior China correspondent, Alice Su, ask what Mr Li's career and retirement reveals about power in China. They speak to two people who know Mr Li: Tao Jingzhou, a former university classmate, and Joerg Wuttke, the head of the European chamber of commerce in China, about his political and economic outlook. And The Economist's James Miles decodes the choice of Mr Li's successor. Sign up to our weekly newsletter here and for full access to print, digital and audio editions, as well as exclusive live events, subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/drumoffer. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The National Congress of China has gathered to hear the final speech of outgoing Premier Li Keqiang, who served ten years in command of the country's cabinet.

China forecasts a more modest 5 per cent growth as it opens its annual National People's Congress. Premier Li Keqiang praised the economy's resilience amid a challenging global environment. Chinese stocks, however, are down but the rest of Asia is in the green following last week's positive close on Wall Street. Harris Associates offloads its remaining Credit Suisse stake citing a lack of confidence in the lender's new strategy, accusing it of burning through capital. And in tech news, UK chip maker ARM hopes to raise $8bn to reach a valuation of $50bn after opting to list in New York rather than London. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

China has set a growth target of “around 5%” for 2023. Premier Li Keqiang announced the target on Sunday as he delivered a government work report to the opening session of the National People's Congress, China's top legislative body. In the meantime, the report sets a goal of 3% for the consumer price index, a 5.5% urban unemployment rate, among other economic targets. The report says spurring domestic demand will be one of this year's priorities for economic policy. The report has also reviewed China's achievements in the past year and past five years in areas such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure construction and environmental protection. Host Ding Heng is joined by Yao Shujie, Chueng Kong Professor of Economics with Chongqing University; Sultan Hali, a retired Air Force officer in Pakistan, and author of the book "Hundred Years of Communist Party of China".

China and Cambodia have agreed to strengthen ties during Li Keqiang's visit (0:58). The fifth China International Import Expo is drawing to a close in Shanghai (8:03). Both chambers of the U.S. Congress remain too close to call in the midterm elections (16:04).

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being  kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other  interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words,  Xi Jinping.  is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly.  Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing.  And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going  in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend  towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something  to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well  which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris:  And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there.  as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts,  starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng  and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period.  and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on  his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was,  by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some  Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that.  Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there,  for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into  the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and  and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right?  if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response  that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say,  in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said  Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times  so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan  multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs  to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons  be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

Given the opaque nature of the leadership changes prior the 20th Party Congress, the announcement of the composition of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee will surely surprise many observers of Chinese elite politics. In conversation with National Committee President Stephen Orlins, Cheng Li provides fresh insights into the main surprises on the personnel front. In addition, Dr. Li discusses whether the appointments reveal any shifts in the balance of power and factional fault lines in Zhongnanhai, what the new leadership suggests about the trajectory of domestic and foreign policy, and what Xi Jinping might have signaled regarding future political succession. This webinar was conducted at 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 2022, three days after the conclusion of the Party Congress. 3:05 What is the structure of the Chinese Communist Party? 7:07 Who will be on the Politburo Standing Committee? 10:20 What are the surprises coming out of the 20th Party Congress? 23:31 What will China's foreign policy and economy teams look like? 31:03 How many Politburo members are foreign-educated? 32:59 What are Xi Jinping's priorities in his next term? 38:30 What happened to Hu Chunhua and Hu Jintao? 42:45 Is Qin Gang's ascension to Foreign Minister attributed to his relationship with Xi Jinping? 51:01 What will be the role of the State Council? 55:08 What are the implications for the Taiwan Affairs Office? 58:23 How has China's middle class responded to these appointments? About the speaker: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/20th-party-congress/ Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).

It's Tuesday, October 25th, A.D. 2022. This is The Worldview in 5 Minutes heard at www.TheWorldview.com. I'm Adam McManus. (Adam@TheWorldview.com) By Kevin Swanson First Hindu British Prime Minister After a thousand years of Christian rule in the English Isles, since King Athelstan incorporated Christian law in AD 930, English government has at last been turned over to a Prime Minister of Hindu persuasion. Rishi Sunak takes the helm, after a failed governance under Conservative Party member, Liz Truss. Sunak is of Punjabi Indian descent, his parents having immigrated to the UK in the 1960s.  Less than 3% of Britons attend church weekly According to Evangelical Focus, 2,000 churches have closed in the United Kingdom over the last 10 years. Less than 50% of Britons indicate they are Christian, reports The Guardian. Worse yet, weekly church attendance in the Church of England dropped below 1% in 2019.  For other denominations, weekly church attendance hovers around 2-3%.  Worldwide economic downturn As the fifth largest economy in the world, the United Kingdom faces its own economic crisis with the pound slipping 14% against the dollar over the last year.   China, the second largest economy in the world, is experiencing similar turmoil at the top. The Hang Seng index crashed another 9% yesterday, registering a 74% drop since early 2021. That was the largest 1-day drop since 2008. And, over the last year, the Chinese Yuan has lost 12% of its value against the U.S. dollar. Alibaba lost 19% of its stock value.  Xi Jinping increasing dominance This comes after Xi Jinping, the President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, increased his dominance in national governance, by assuming a third term of five years. The Chinese hegemony is tightening. Over the weekend, political maneuverings at the highest levels resulted in the yanking of the #2 national leader, Premier Li Keqiang, who was known to advocate for more free market policies. An official document states that all future political appointments must be in line with “the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping,” and all political leaders must hold to the “standards of Marxist statesmen.” (You can look at this site and Google translate it into English) Catholic Church allows Commies to choose bishops Plus, the Roman Catholic Church has renewed its agreement with the Communist Chinese government, allowing Beijing to choose their bishops. Since the agreement was inaugurated in 2018, the communist state has appointed six pastors. Let us keep Psalm 22:28 in mind: “For the kingdom is the Lord's, and He rules over the nations.”  America's crippling deficit under Biden The U.S. federal deficit for 2022 was a whopping $1.4 trillion.  That's 43% higher than the 2019 budget deficit before COVID.   President Biden's deficits are running an average of 9.2% of the Gross Domestic Product. That compares to Trump's average deficit per GDP of 7.4%, Barack Obama's average deficit per GDP of 4.9%, George W. Bush's average deficit per GDP of 3.3%, and President Bill Clinton's average deficit per GDP of just 1.6%.  Baptists and Presbyterians affirm homosexual identity and orientation Last week, in Plano, Texas, leaders from the Southern Baptist and Presbyterian Church of America denominations held another conference affirming homosexual identity and orientation, reports World Magazine.  The conference, termed Revoice, has been in operation since 2017, led by Greg Johnson, a homosexual PCA pastor from St. Louis, Missouri. Speaker Gregory Coles told the crowd:  “Following Jesus hasn't made me less gay and it hasn't made me more gay. I've been riding steady at a Kinsey 6 for the last 20 years,” referring to the highest rating for homosexual affinity explained by sexual pervert, Alfred Kinsey. Voter concerns: Money ranks higher than abortion for Evangelicals And finally, money is the top concern for those who worship it. A shocking report from George Barna finds that abortion is not even on the list of the top 5 concerns for Evangelicals as we approach the 2022 elections.   Gas prices come in at #1, inflation at #2, food prices at #3, crime and personal safety at #4, and protection from terrorism at #5.   Among those who have a biblical worldview, as defined by Barna, inflation came in at #1, gas prices at #2, abortion at #3, and religious freedom at #4.  Well, in Luke 12:15, Jesus said, “Take heed and beware of covetousness, for one's life does not consist in the abundance of the things he possesses.” Close And that's The Worldview in 5 Minutes on this Tuesday, October 25th, in the year of our Lord 2022. Subscribe by iTunes or email to our unique Christian newscast at www.TheWorldview.com. Or get the Generations app through Google Play or The App Store. I'm Adam McManus (Adam@TheWorldview.com). Seize the day for Jesus Christ.

Este domingo en Pékin más de 2.200 delegados inaguraron el XX Congreso del  Partido Comunista que eligirá los dirigentes que conducirán el rumbo del país en los próximos cinco años. Un nuevo quinquenio para Xi JInping es casi seguro, en cambio un nuevo primer ministro debería  ocupar el cargo del economista Li Keqiang , en un contexto de continuidad de la politica exterior.

Este domingo en Pékin más de 2.200 delegados inaguraron el XX Congreso del  Partido Comunista que eligirá los dirigentes que conducirán el rumbo del país en los próximos cinco años. Un nuevo quinquenio para Xi JInping es casi seguro, en cambio un nuevo primer ministro debería  ocupar el cargo del economista Li Keqiang , en un contexto de continuidad de la politica exterior.

Este domingo en Pékin más de 2.200 delegados inaguraron el XX Congreso del  Partido Comunista que eligirá los dirigentes que conducirán el rumbo del país en los próximos cinco años. Un nuevo quinquenio para Xi JInping es casi seguro, en cambio un nuevo primer ministro debería  ocupar el cargo del economista Li Keqiang , en un contexto de continuidad de la politica exterior.

Rumors, tweets, and even reports in serious newspapers are suggesting that Premier Li Keqiang is challenging Xi Jinping's authoritarian rule, and may even put an end to Xi's plans to rule for a third term after the upcoming Party Congress. Forget about it, argues veteran China business journalist Dexter Tiff Roberts.Click here to read the article by Dexter Tiff Roberts.Narrated by Sylvia Franke.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Lei starts the pod out with the announcement that China EVs & More reached its 10,000th download so both Tu and Lei took a moment to reflect, thank their listeners but also look forward to what's up next for the podcast.Tu then moves over to discuss his adventures getting back to the US including detailing his multiple layover flight that included the screeching halt of the plane he was in headed to JFK. Lei then moves the conversation back to this week's biggest news and summarizes a few of the battery related announcements with a specific focus on CATL. The discussion moves to Li Auto earnings, especially the Li management admitting that they're seeing more cannibalization of the Li ONE from the L9 than they'd originally forecasted. Lei then unpacks XPeng's event announcing their super fast charging that should be available in volume by the end of this year for all new XPeng vehicles.Tu and Lei move the conversation over to the significance (highly) Li Keqiang's visit to BYD and the broader implications of continuing the NEV purchase subsidies in China. Lei's prediction was that it would continue through 2023 and Tu agreed. The pod closes out with a brief chat about what to expect from the Chengdu Motor Show. 

Happy summer solstice 夏至! Summary of the Essential Eight: Outbreaks - Jilin City is back in lockdown andMacau has a new outbreak, which raises concerns about infections spreading over the border into Zhuhai and beyond, as they did into Shenzhen from the big Hong Kong outbreak a few months ago. I am still struggling to understand how the authorities are going to avoid new rounds of mass lockdowns as the Omicron sub-variants that are even more transmissible eventually make it into the PRC.

Today’s Essential Eight items: Li Keqiang chairs teleconference on stabilizing the economy - The message was grim to the likely 100,000 or so cadres in attendance. There is no way they hit 5.5% GDP growth in 2022, they may not even have growth in Q2, and while there may be “extraordinary measures to stimulate the economy” as one provincial Party secretary is reported to have said, it is not clear they can really get it stimulated so long as economic activity in large areas can be halted overnight due to Covid lockdowns. And the Omicron variant that has caused so much trouble in China in the last couple of months is not nearly as transmissible as the one that is rampaging through the US right now, and that variant will inevitably get into China. I have no idea how we are not in for a long, brutal summer at least.

No one is arguing against the growing evidence for Li Keqiang's increased media mentions. But there is no evidence that Li has CCP's support to challenge Xi. ----more---- https://theprint.in/opinion/chinascope/xi-missing-from-front-pages-of-ccps-peoples-daily-experts-reading-between-the-lines/966754/ 

The rumors about Xi being in trouble continue. I understand why people want to believe them. Many inside the CPC system and inside the PRC, as well as around the world, are very worried about the prospect of Xi remaining in power at the 20th Party Congress and beyond, and his “retirement” in a few months would probably be one of the greatest boosts for the PRC and Hong Kong stock markets ever. But hope is different than evidence, and so far, in spite of the rumors and stories in overseas media, I am not seeing any reason to believe that Xi’ s hold on power is under any real threat.

China's sputtering economy is altering the balance of power among its top leaders. For years, President Xi Jinping sidelined his second in command, Premier Li Keqiang, a proponent of economic liberalization. WSJ's Lingling Wei explains that Li is now gaining clout and pushing back on Xi's socialist policies. Further Reading:  - China's Economic Distress Deepens as Lockdowns Drag On  - China's Forgotten Premier Steps Out of Xi's Shadow as Economic Fixer  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Things in Shanghai do seem to be improving somewhat but the city is far from fully exiting lockdowns, and there are lockdowns and disruptions in dozens of other cities, as Gavekal Research noted in a tweet to today: No wonder Premier Li sounds increasingly worried about the mounting economic challenges. In the last few days he has held meetings with local government officials and entrepreneurs and economists. The messaging from both meetings has been similar, that there are “greater uncertainties and challenges to the stable economic performance” and “unexpected changes and mounting downward pressures both domestically and externally” and they need to do more.

Today’s Essential Eight: Outbreaks spread Ukraine and US-China meeting Li Keqiang lays out the tasks from the NPC Economic data surprises, no rate cut Xi going to Saudi Arabia? More pain for Internet firms and their investors Censorship at the printing press

The CPPCC session ended today, the NPC closes tomorrow, and then later Friday we have the annual press conference with the Premier. Premier Li Keqiang’s meeting with the media will likely be his last appearance at an NPC presser. The information content of these events is usually low, but I thought it would be worth taking a trip down memory lane to review some of then-Premier Wen Jiabao’s remarks at his last NPC press conference in 2012.

Perhaps the biggest surprise from the government work report that Premier Li Keqiang delivered to the National People’s Congress was the GDP growth target of “around 5.5%”. That is definitely at the high end of the range most people were expecting, and the setting of the target so high has fueled hopes in some quarters of much more stimulus to come this year. The PRC domestic stock markets did not seem too excited though, as share prices