Podcasts about sinocism

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Play Episode Listen Later Aug 21, 2023 25:58

178 miles to the east of Beijing, there's a beach resort called Beidaihe. The water is shallow and the sand is yellow and fine. Luxurious holiday villas dot the coastline. Starting from the 1950s, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have moved their families and work to Beidaihe in the summer, making the beach resort something of a summer capital. Secrecy clouds the gatherings, and though this tradition continues, today the resort seems to serve a much more leisurely purpose when the CCP visits. On this episode, I'm joined by the historian James Carter and Bill Bishop, editor of the very popular Sinocism newsletter, to discuss where Communist leaders go, when they go on summer holiday. What is the changing role of Beidaihe, and what does this tell us about the changing nature of Communist leadership? Presented by Cindy Yu. Produced by Cindy Yu and Joe Bedell-Brill.

What Beidaihe reveals about the changing nature of Communist leadership

starting leadership beijing communists ccp chinese communist party secrecy luxurious changing nature james carter bill bishop cindy yu sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 21, 2023 25:58

Why did Joe Biden call Xi Jinping a dictator?

China In Context

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 28, 2023 14:15

Joe Biden has used tough language about Xi Jinping, saying he “does not have a democratic bone in his body” and describing him as a dictator. The Chinese complain they are being provoked. In this podcast, Bill Bishop, author of the Sinocism newsletter, shares his views on President Biden's choice of language. He speaks with the podcast's regular host, Duncan Bartlett, Editor of Asian Affairs.

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Chinese spy balloons are taking over

Full Comment with Anthony Furey

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2023 46:20

The shocking revelation that China has been sailing spy balloons over North America, and who knows where else, has abruptly created a massive foreign policy crisis for the U.S., Canada… and China. The discovery has popped the communist regime's polite pretenses, says Bill Bishop, China analyst and author of the influential Sinocism newsletter. Bishop joins Full Comment host Brian Lilley this week to discuss how the exposure of an apparently vast global surveillance operation by the People's Liberation Army has torpedoed Beijing's hopes of finding better footing with the Biden administration, and how relations between the two powerhouse nations now face the dangerous potential of “free fall.” (Recorded February 10, 2023) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Sinocism's Bill Bishop on building a solo publishing business

The Rebooting Show

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 7, 2023 62:26

Bill Bishop likes to make clear he's not a journalist. Instead, he's a China analyst who brings his deep understanding of the country to an English-speaking language through his newsletter, Sinocism. In 2017, Bill became the “original Substacker” after teaming up with Substack's co-founders to be the first newsletter on the platform. On this week's episode of The Rebooting Show, Bill and I discuss his independent path, and how a subscription model has created different dynamics as opposed to his experiences in the dot-com era as a co-founder of Marketwatch. What's telling to me is that Bill is also now considering advertising. The Substack model of “only ads” doesn't make much sense long term for most writers. Even if they convert 10% of their audience, they're making no money from 90%. Most businesses don't operate that way.

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S06E11 - Washington e Pechino tra politica e propaganda

Il cielo sopra Pechino

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 4, 2023 29:12

Il segretario di Stato Usa, Antony Blinken, avrebbe dovuto visitare la Cina domenica e lunedì per incontrare i vertici della diplomazia cinese e forse perfino Xi Jinping.Tuttavia, un pallone aerostatico si è messo in mezzo, sorvolando i cieli del Montana e portando a nuove tensioni tra Washington e Pechino, oltre all'immediato rinvio a data da destinarsi del viaggio di Blinken.In realtà, tutto l'avvicinamento a questa visita era stato quantomeno accidentato: gli statunitensi avevano attuato una serie di mosse anticinesi su tutti i fronti, mentre la propaganda impazza. E la Cina che fa?Poche ore prima dell'annullamento del viaggio di Blinken, avevamo parlato con un ospite di assoluto livello, residente a Washington, con un lungo passato in Cina e un presente da fine analista delle vicende di Pechino e dintorni: Bill Bishop, autore della newsletter Sinocism (https://sinocism.com/), protagonista, nonostante tutto, della puntata di oggi.

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Decoding China's Zero COVID Protests ft. James Palmer

The Neoliberal Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 7, 2023 61:47

How successful was China's 'Zero COVID' policy really? And what does it mean that the Chinese Communist Party has now abandoned it and COVID is spreading throughout the country? James Palmer of Foreign Policy joins the podcast to discuss COVID in China, the CCP's response, and what this means for more than one billion Chinese people. We talk about how zero COVID worked, why people eventually began to protest it nationwide, how bad things really are in China right now, and how this impacts Xi Jinping's future. Recommended resources: China Brief - https://foreignpolicy.com/category/china-brief/ Sinocism - https://sinocism.com/ China Media Project - https://chinamediaproject.org/ Sixth Tone - https://www.sixthtone.com/ To make sure you hear every episode, join our Patreon at https://www.patreon.com/neoliberalpodcast. Patrons get access to exclusive bonus episodes, our sticker-of-the-month club, and our insider Slack. Become a supporter today! Got questions for the Neoliberal Podcast? Send them to mailbag@cnliberalism.org Follow us at: https://twitter.com/ne0liberal https://www.instagram.com/neoliberalproject/ https://www.twitch.tv/neoliberalproject Join a local chapter at https://cnliberalism.org/become-a-member/

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What the End of ‘Zero Covid' in China Means with Bill Bishop

Why Is This Happening? with Chris Hayes

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 27, 2022 59:55

The pandemic hasn't raged within China the way it has in the rest of the world over the past few years. However, that's beginning to change. Following a wave of protests, Chinese leadership officially rolled back some of the country's most stringent Covid restrictions. The end of “zero Covid” policies, combined with an already strained medical system, along with low vaccination and immunity levels, could lead to disastrous public health and economic consequences. China could see over a million deaths in 2023, according to projections from the University of Washington Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation. Bill Bishop is a longtime expert on China, writer of his own Substack newsletter called “Sinocism,” co-founder of CBS Marketwatch and he worked in China for years. Bishop joins WITHpod to discuss how government control has been consolidated under president Xi Jinping, the timeline of events leading to this moment, why Covid case numbers in China are undercounted and what the latest developments portend for (what could be) a very sobering future.

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If China Invades Taiwan, Is It World War III?

Plain English with Derek Thompson

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 18, 2022 50:47

Today's episode is about China's turn toward authoritarianism—and why it might be one of the most important stories in the world. If you don't know a lot about China—if you've been interested or astonished from afar by its Zero-COVID policy or its alarming saber-rattling toward Taiwan—then you and I are in the same boat. I am not at all an expert on China. But I am fascinated and alarmed by the country's politics and by the character of its leader, Xi Jinping. Today's guest is an expert in all things China: Bill Bishop, who writes the incredibly popular Sinocism newsletter. And he has a new podcast out called 'Sharp China.' In this episode, we discuss my biggest fears and questions: What is happening to the Chinese economy right now? Is Xi Jinping a tyrant? And if he chooses to invade Taiwan, is that World War III? Host: Derek Thompson Guest: Bill Bishop Producer: Devon Manze Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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Sinocism Podcast #5: 20th Party Congress and US-China Relations with Chris Johnson

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 4, 2022 59:34

Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words, Xi Jinping. is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly. Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing. And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris: And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there. as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts, starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period. and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was, by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that. Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there, for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right? if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say, in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe

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Chinese Whispers: Xi's absolute power after the 20th Party Congress

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 30, 2022 32:04

This week Xi Jinping has taken his new Politburo Standing Committee on a group trip – to Yan'An, the base of Mao Zedong's Communist revolution after the Long March. The symbolism is easy to see. On this episode of Chinese Whispers, Bill Bishop, author of the popular Sinocism newsletter, and Professor Victor Shih, author of Coalitions of the Weak, have returned to reflect on the Party Congress just past. It's been a more dramatic event than many (inside and outside the party) expected, starting with a brave, lone protestor hanging a 42-character banner off a popular bridge in Beijing, lambasting the authoritarian regime; and ending with the forcible removal of former general secretary Hu Jintao in front of the world's media. At the congress itself Xi overturned decades-long norms dictating the top leadership of the party – age no longer seems to necessitate retirement, while the Politburo has not a single woman. Above all, Xi has started his third term as general secretary with a loyal cabal of men around him. Did he not want more competent people in the top jobs? 'Loyalty is merit', Bill suggests. What does this mean for China, and the world? Victor makes the point that Xi is putting the pieces in place to push through unpopular decisions – for example, an invasion of Taiwan. 'If you think about it, why would you want people whom you trust absolutely to fill every single position? Because even Chairman Mao didn't do this'. It also means that as Xi becomes more truly dictatorial, the West needs to engage with him more, not less. We just don't know the kind of information about the US, about other countries, that are landing on Xi Jinping's desk. And this information can be incredibly distorted. So if anything, just presenting an alternative view of how the world works could be helpful. He may not believe you… but if you're able to look him in the eye and tell him something, at least he'll be forced to think about it.As for the party itself, the three of us digest the Hu Jintao incident. Regardless of what you think happened, one thing is for sure – it was a deep and utter humiliation for Hu, especially given China's deep-set Confucian respect for elders. The idea that there is any organised CCP opposition against Xi has been put to bed.

china west taiwan weak beijing communists xi xi jinping ccp hu mao zedong coalitions absolute power confucian long march chairman mao party congress politburo hu jintao chinese whispers bill bishop sinocism politburo standing committee

Reflections on the 20th Party Congress: how Xi took complete control

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 28, 2022 32:04

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Chinese Whispers: a look ahead to the 20th Party Congress

china chinese weak look ahead coalitions party congress chinese whispers bill bishop sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 3, 2022 58:05

In this episode of Chinese Whispers, we look ahead to the 20th National Party Congress, where senior members will gather to review the future direction of the party and unveil new leaders. What should China-watchers expect? Will Xi be able to fill the standing committee with those loyal to him? To discuss this important moment in the communist calendar is author of the Sinocism substack Bill Bishop and Professor Victor Shih, expert in Chinese elite politics and author of the new book Coalitions of the Weak. If you enjoy this podcast, you can now register your interest for an upcoming Chinese Whispers newsletter, at www.spectator.co.uk/whispers.

Succession and power: a look ahead to the 20th Party Congress

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Play Episode Listen Later Oct 3, 2022 58:05

Two meetings; US warning to PRC over Russia sanctions; "Empire of lies"; Omicron on the mainland

lies empire ios meetings substack omicron mainland russia sanctions sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 9, 2022

I do not have anything insightful to put into a commentary today. We are in a but of a lull as we await the end of the two meetings. I do have an announcement. Substack, the platform on which I publish Sinocism, has launched an app for iOS. I have been beta testing it for several months and love it, as it lets me read all the newsletters to which I subscribe in one place, avoid all the problems that can come from email delivery, and fix typos after I send out the newsletter, among the many benefits.

Ukraine crisis; Hong Kong outbreak; 50th anniversary of Shanghai Communiqué

russia hong kong vladimir putin shanghai 50th xi outbreak prc ukraine crisis communiqu sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 28, 2022

The PRC system made Xi’s relationship with Putin personal, so do not expect any sort of about face from the PRC on relations with Russia. I have seen some wishful thinking that somehow the horrors of what Putin has unleashed will sway Xi to pull back from the February 4th joint statement (See the February 7 Sinocism “

Sinocism Podcast #4: The Economist's David Rennie on online nationalism, discourse power, reporting from China, US-China relations

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 10, 2022 54:44

Episode Notes:This episode's guest is David Rennie, the Beijing bureau chief for The Economist and author of the weekly Chaguan column. Our topic is online discourse, nationalism, the intensifying contest for global discourse power and US-China relations.Excerpts:I spoke to some very serious NGO people who've been in China a long time, Chinese and foreigners who said that this was the worst time for NGOs since 1989, and the kind of mentions of espionage and national security was a very serious thing. So then I had to make a decision, was I going to try and speak to someone like Sai Lei. Clearly he is an extremely aggressive nationalist, some would call him a troll and there are risks involved in talking to someone like him. But I felt, I'm one of the few English language media still in China, if I'm going to add value, I need to speak to these people.I had a very interesting conversation with a CGTN commentator…He said, I can't tell you how many Western diplomats, or Western journalists they whine. And they moan. And they say, how aggressive China is now and how upset all this Wolf warrior stuff is and how China is doing itself damage. And he goes, we're not, it's working. You in the Western media, used to routinely say that the national people's Congress was a rubber stamp parliament. And because we went after you again and again, you see news organizations no longer as quick to use that. Because we went after you calling us a dictatorship, you're now slower to use that term because we went after you about human rights and how it has different meanings in different countries. We think it's having an effect…One of the things I think is a value of being here is you have these conversations where the fact that we in the West think that China is inevitably making a mistake by being much more aggressive. I don't think that's how a big part of the machine here sees it. I think they think it worked….To simplify and exaggerate a bit, I think that China, and this is not just a guess, this is based on off the record conversations with some pretty senior Chinese figures, they believe that the Western world, but in particular, the United States is too ignorant and unimaginative and Western centric, and probably too racist to understand that China is going to succeed, that China is winning and that the West is in really decadent decline…I think that what they believe they are doing is delivering an educational dose of pain and I'm quoting a Chinese official with the word pain. And it is to shock us because we are too mule headed and thick to understand that China is winning and we are losing. And so they're going to keep delivering educational doses of pain until we get it…The fundamental message and I'm quoting a smart friend of mine in Beijing here is China's rise is inevitable. Resistance is futile…And if you accommodate us, we'll make it worth your while. It's the key message. And they think that some people are proving dimmer and slower and more reluctant to pick that message up and above all Americans and Anglo-Saxons.On US-China relations:The general trend of U.S. China relations. to be of optimistic about the trend of U.S. China relations I'd have to be more optimistic than I currently am about the state of U.S. Politics. And there's a kind of general observation, which is that I think that American democracy is in very bad shape right now. And I wish that some of the China hawks in Congress, particularly on the Republican side, who are also willing to imply, for example, that the 2020 election was stolen, that there was massive fraud every time they say that stuff, they're making an in-kind contribution to the budget of the Chinese propaganda department…You cannot be a patriotic American political leader and tell lies about the state of American democracy. And then say that you are concerned about China's rise…..their message about Joe Biden is that he is weak and old and lacks control of Congress. And that he is, this is from scholars rather than officials, I should say, but their view is, why would China spend political capital on the guy who's going to lose the next election?…The one thing that I will say about the U.S. China relationship, and I'm very, very pessimistic about the fact that the two sides, they don't share a vision of how this ends well.Links:China’s online nationalists turn paranoia into clickbait | The Economist 赛雷：我接受了英国《经济学人》采访，切身体验了深深的恶意 David Rennie on Twitter @DSORennieTranscript:You may notice a couple of choppy spots. We had some Beijing-VPN issues and so had to restart the discussion three times. Bill:Hi, everyone. Welcome back to the `Sinocism podcast. It's been a bit of a break, but we are back and we will continue going forward on a fairly regular schedule today. For the fourth episode, I'm really happy to be able to chat with David Rennie, the Beijing bureau chief for The Economist and author of the weekly Chaguan column. Our topic today is online discourse, nationalism, and the intensifying contest for global discourse power.Bill:I've long been a fan of David's work and the approximate cause for inviting him to join the podcast today was an article on the January 8th issue of The Economist on online nationalism. Welcome David.David:Hello.Bill:So just to start, could you tell us how you got to where you are today?David:I've been a foreign correspondent for frighteningly long time, 24 years. And it's my second China posting. I've been out there so long. I've done two Chinas, two Washingtons, five years in Brussels. I was here in the '90s and then I went off, spent a total of nine years in Washington, DC. And then I came back here in 2018 and I was asked to launch a new column about China called Chaguan, because previously I wrote our Lexington column and our Bagehot column about Britain and our Charlemagne column about Europe. They all have strange names, but that's what we do. And so this is my fourth column for The Economist.Bill:We last met, I think in 2018 in Beijing in what seems like before times in many ways at The Opposite House, I believe.David:And the days when we had visitors, people came from the outside world, all of those things.Bill:Yes. You are quite the survivor, as they say. Although there are advantages to not worry about walking outside and getting sick all the time. Although it's better here in DC now.David:It's a very safe bubble. It's a very large bubble, but it's a bubble.Bill:So let's talk about your article, the January 8th issue. It was titled “China's online nationalist turned paranoia into click bait”. And I thought it was a very good distillation of the surge in nationalists and anti foreign content that is really flooding or was flooded the internet in China. And you interviewed one of the people who's profiting from it because it turns out that not only is it good from a sort of a sentiment perspective, but it's also good from a business perspective.Bill:And that person Sai Lei, interestingly enough, then recorded your conversation and turned it into a whole new post and video about the whole experience of talking to a foreign correspondent. Can you tell us a little about the story and why you chose to write it and just to add the links to David's article and the Sai Lei article will be in the podcast notes.David:So I heard from friends and colleagues, a couple of things in two directions. One was that in the world of private sector media, a couple of reasonably well known explainer sites, popular science video companies had been taken out of business by nationalist attacks. One was called Paperclip, the other called Elephant Union. And their crime in the eyes of online nationalists had been to talk about things which are fairly uncontroversial in Western media, that eating beef from the Amazon or eating beef that is fed soy grown in the Amazon is potentially bad for the rainforest and maybe we should eat less meat.David:But because this was in the Chinese context, that China is the biggest buyer of soybeans, this explainer video was attacked as a plot to deny the Chinese people the protein that they need to be strong, that this was a race traitor attack on the Chinese. And it was outrageous because the West eats so much more meat than China. And so that was one element of it. And I heard that these companies had been shut down. The other was that I'd been picking up that this was an extremely bad time for NGOs, particularly Chinese NGOs that get money from overseas. And we'd seen some really nasty attacks, not just on the idea that they were getting money from overseas, but that they were somehow guilty of espionage.David:And there was an NGO that did incredibly benign work. Tracking maritime and Marine trash, as it floats around the coasts of China based in Shanghai, Rendu Ocean. I'd done a column on them the year before I'd been out with their volunteers. It was a bunch of pensioners and retirees and school kids picking up styrofoam and trash off beaches, weighing it, tracking where it came from and then uploading this data to try and track the fact that China is a big generator of the plastic and other trash in the oceans. They were accused of espionage and taking foreign money to track ocean currents that would help foreign militaries, attack China, that they were guilty of grave national security crimes.David:And they were attacked in a press conference, including at the national defense ministry. And they're basically now in a world of pain. They're still just about clinging on. And so these two things, you have these NGOs under really serious attack, and you also have this attack on online explainer videos. The common theme was that the nationalist attack, they were somehow portraying the country and its national security was a weird combination of not just the security forces, but also private sector, Chinese online nationalists. And in particularly I was told there was a guy called Sai Lei. That's his non to plume who was one of the people making videos taking on these people. He went after celebrities who talked about China should be more careful about eating seafood.David:This was again, sort of race traitors. And he was using this really horrible language about these celebrities who talked about eating more sustainable seafood that they were ‘er guizi”, which is this time about the collaborationist police officers who worked with the Japanese during the World War II. He calls them Hanjian, the s-called traitors to the Chinese race. Very, very loaded language. Went after a group that’s working with Africans down in the south of China, talking about how they faced discrimination. This got them attacked. They had talked also about the role of Chinese merchants in the illegal ivory trade that got them attacked by the nationalists.David:So I thought this question of whether the government is behind this or whether this is a private sector attack on that. There's the profits to be made from this online nationalism struck me something I should write about. So I talked to some of the people whose organizations and companies had been taken down, they were very clear that they thought that was a unholy nexus of profit, clickbait and things like the communist youth league really liking the way that they can turbocharge some of these attacks-Bill:Especially on bilibili, they use that a lot.David:Especially on... Yeah. And so there's this weird sort of sense that, and I spoke to some very serious NGO people who've been in China a long time, Chinese and foreigners who said that this was the worst time for NGOs since 1989, and the kind of mentions of espionage and national security was a very serious thing. So then I had to make a decision, was I going to try and speak to someone like Sai Lei. Clearly he is an extremely aggressive nationalist, some would call him a troll and there are risks involved in talking to someone like him. But I felt, I'm one of the few English language media still in China, if I'm going to add value, I need to speak to these people.David:Yes. And so I reached out to the founder of a big, well known nationalist website who I happen to know. And I said, do you know this guy Sai Lei? And he said, I do, I'll get in touch with him. Sai Lei was very, very anxious about speaking to the Western media. Thought I was going to misquote him. And so eventually we did this deal that he was going to record the whole thing. And that if he thought I had misquoted him, that he was going to run the entire transcript on full on this other very well known nationalist website that had made the introduction. So I said, okay, fine. I have nothing to hide. That's all good. I wrote the column. I quoted Sai Lei. I didn't quote a tremendous amount of Sai Lei because what he said was not especially revealing.David:He was just an extremely paranoid guy. And there was a lot of whataboutism and he was saying, well, how would the American public react if they were told that what they eat damages the Amazon rainforest? And I said, well, they're told that all the time-Bill:All the time.David:It was an incredibly familiar argument. It's on the front page of America newspapers all the time. And so he wasn't willing to engage. And so, I ran this. He then put out this attack on me. It's fair. Look, I make a living handing out my opinions. I knew he was recording me, was it a bit disappointing that he cut and edited it to make me sound as bad as possible rather than running the full transcript. I mean, I interviewed a troll and that was the thing. He attacked me on the basis of my family, which then triggered a whole bunch of stuff that was pretty familiar to me, a lot of wet and journalists get a lot of attacks and it was an unpleasant experience, but I feel that the added value of being here is to talk to people, who The Economist does not agree with.David:And his fundamental problem was that I was using online as a disapproving time. But my line with people like him, or with some of the very prominent nationalists online academics, media entrepreneurs, also with the Chinese foreign ministry, when I'm called in is my job in China is to try to explain how China sees the world. To speak to people in China to let their voices be heard in The Economist. And I absolutely undertake to try and reflect their views faithfully, but I do not promise to agree with them, because The Economist does not hide the fact that we are a Western liberal newspaper. We're not anti-China, we are liberal. And so, if we see illiberall things happening in Abu Ghraib or in Guantanamo Bay or-Bill:DC.David:Being done by Donald Trump or being done by Boris Johnson or Brexit, or Viktor Orbán or in China, we will criticize them because we are what we say we are. We are a liberal newspaper. We have been since 1843. And what's interesting is that online, the reaction was... For a while, I was trending on Bilibili. And that was new. And I take that on the chin. I mean, I'm here, I'm attacking nationalists. They're going to attack back. I think what's interesting is that the online of nationalist attacks were, I hope that the ministry of state security arrest this guy, he should be thrown out of China. Why is he in China? They should be expelled. This guy has no right to be in China.David:I think that at some level, some parts of the central government machinery do still see a value to having newspapers like The Economist, reasonably well read Western media in China. And it's this conversation I've had a lot with the foreign ministry, with the State Council Information Office, which is as you know, it's the front name plate for the propaganda bureau. And I say to them, we are liberals.David:We are not anti-China any more than we're anti-American because we criticize Donald Trump, but you know where we're coming from, but I do believe that if China is concerned about how it's covered, if they throw all of us out, they're not going to get better coverage. I mean, some of the most aggressive coverage about China in the states comes from journalists who never go to China and economists who never go to China. And I think that, that argument resonates with some parts of the machine, to the people whose job is to deal with people like me.David:What I worry about is that there are other parts of the machine, whether it's the Communist Youth League or whether it's the ministry of state security or some other elements in the machine who do also see a tremendous value in delegitimizing Western media full stop, because if you're being criticized and you don't enjoy it. Tactic number one, whether you are Donald Trump talking about fake news, or Vladimir Putin talking about hostile foreign forces, or the Chinese is to delegitimize your critics.David:And I do think that that is going on in a way that in the four years that I've been here this time. And if, I think back to my time here 20 years ago, I do think the attempts to go after and intimidate and delegitimize the Western media they're getting more aggressive and they're trying new tactics, which are pretty concerning.Bill:So that's a great segue into the next question. But first, I just want to ask the nationalist website that you said ran Sai Lei's piece that was Guancha.cn?David:Yeah. And so it's probably not secret, but so I know a bit, Eric Li, Li Shimo, the co-founder Guancha.Bill:Eric actually famous for his TED Talk, went to Stanford business school, venture capitalist. And now, I guess he's affiliated with Fudan, And is quite an active funder of all sorts of online discourse it seems among other things.David:That's right. And I would point out that The Economist, we have this by invitation online debate platform and we invite people to contribute. And we did in fact, run a piece by Eric Li, the co-founder of Guancha, the nationalist website a couple of weeks before this attack, that Guancha ran. And I actually had debate with some colleagues about this, about whether as liberals, we're the suckers that allow people who attack us to write, he wrote a very cogent, but fairly familiar argument about the performance legitimacy, the communist party and how that was superior to Western liberal democracy.David:And I think that it's the price of being a liberal newspaper. If we take that seriously, then we occasionally have to give a platform to people who will then turn around and attack us. And if I'm going to live in China and not see of my family for a very long period of time, and it's a privilege to live in China, but there are costs. If you are an expert, then I'm not ready to give up on the idea of talking to people who we strongly disagree with. If I'm going to commit to living here to me the only reason to do that is so you talk to people, not just liberals who we agree with, but people who strongly disagree with us.Bill:No. And I think that's right. And I think that also ties in for many years, predating Xi Jinping there's been this long stated goal for China to increase its global discourse power as they call it. And to spread more the tell the truth, tell the real story, spread more positive energy about China globally instead of having foreign and especially Western, or I think, and this ties into some of the national stuff increasing what we hear is called the Anglo-Saxons media dominate the global discourse about China. And to be fair, China has a point. I mean, there should be more Chinese voices talking about China globally.Bill:That's not an unreasonable desire, or request from a country as big and powerful as China is. One thing that seems like a problem is on the one hand you've got, the policy makers are pushing to improve and better control discourse about China globally. At the same time, they're increasing their control over the domestic discourse inside the PRC about the rest of the world. And so in some ways, yes, there's an imbalance globally, but there's also a massive imbalance domestically, which seems to fit into what you just went through with Sai Lei and where the trends are. I don't know. I mean, how does China tell a more convincing story to the world in a way that isn't just a constant struggle to use the term they actually use, but more of an actual fact based honest discussion, or is that something that we're just not going to see anytime soon?David:I think there's a couple of elements to that. I mean, you are absolutely right that China like any country has the right to want to draw the attention of the world to stuff that China does. That's impressive. And I do think, one of my arguments when I talk to Chinese officials as to why they should keep giving out visas to people like me is, when I think back to the beginning of the COVID pandemic, I've not left China for more than two years. I've not left since the pandemic began, you had a lot of media writing that this incredibly ferocious crackdown was going to be very unpopular with the Chinese public. And that's because of the very beginning you had people, there lots of stuff on Chinese social media, little videos of people being beaten up by some [inaudible 00:16:26] in a village or tied to a tree, or their doors being welded shot.David:And it did look unbelievably thuggish. And people playing Majiang being arrested. But actually about three weeks into the pandemic, and I was traveling outside Beijing and going to villages and then coming back and doing the quarantine, you'd go into these villages in the middle of Henan or Hunan. And you'd have the earth bomb at the entrance to the village and all the old guys in the red arm bands. And the pitchforks and the school desk, or the entrance to the village with a piece of paper, because you got to have paperwork as well. And you've realized that this incredibly strict grassroots control system that they'd put in motion, the grid management, the fact that the village loud speakers were back up and running and broadcasting propaganda was actually a source of comfort.David:That it gave people a sense that they could do something to keep this frightening disease at bay. And I think to me, that's an absolute example that it's in China's interest to have Western journalists in China because it was only being in China that made me realize that this strictness was actually welcomed by a lot of Chinese people. It made them feel safe and it made them feel that they were contributing to a national course by locking themselves indoors and obeying these sometimes very strange and arbitrary rules. In addition, I think you are absolutely right, China has the right to want the foreign media to report that stuff.David:Instead of looking at China through a Western lens and saying, this is draconian, this is ferocious, this is abuse of human rights. It's absolutely appropriate for China to say no, if you're doing your job properly, you will try and understand this place on China's own terms. You will allow Chinese voices into your reporting and let them tell the world that they're actually comforted by this extremely strict zero COVID policy, which is tremendously popular with the majority of the Chinese public. That is a completely legitimate ambition. And I never failed to take the chance to tell officials that's why they should give visas to have journalists in the country, because if you're not in the country, you can't think that stuff up.David:What I think is much more problematic is that there is alongside that legitimate desire to have China understood on China's own terms, there is a very conscious strategy underway, which is talked about by some of the academics at Fudan who work for Eric Li at Guancha as a discourse war, a narrative war, or to redefine certain key terms.Bill:And the term and the term is really is like struggle. I mean, they see it as a public opinion war globally. I mean, that the language is very martial in Chinese.David:Absolutely. Yeah. And do not say that we are not a democracy. If you say that we are not a democracy, you are ignoring our tremendous success in handling COVID. We are a whole society democracy, which it's basically a performance legitimacy argument, or a collective utilitarian, the maximizing the benefits for the largest number of argument. It's not particularly new, but the aggression with which it's being pushed is new and the extraordinary resources they put into going after Western media for the language that we use of our China. And I had a very interesting conversation with a CGTN commentator who attacked me online, on Twitter and said that I was a... It was sort of like you scratch an English when you'll find a drug dealer or a pirate.David:Now there's a lot of Opium War rhetoric around if you're a British journalist in China. You're never too far from Opium War reference. And for the record, I don't approve of the war, but it was also before my time. So I actually, the guy attacked me fairly aggressively on Twitter. So I said, can you try and be professional? I'm being professional here why won't you be professional. He invited me with coffee. So we had coffee. And we talked about his work for CGTN and for Chaguan and his view of his interactions to Western media. And he said, this very revealing thing. He said, the reason we do this stuff is because it works.David:He said, I can't tell you how many Western diplomats, or Western journalists they whine. And they moan. And they say, how aggressive China is now and how upset all this Wolf warrior stuff is and how China is doing itself damage. And he goes, we're not, it's working. You in the Western media, used to routinely say that the national people's Congress was a rubber stamp parliament. And because we went after you again and again, you see news organizations no longer as quick to use that. Because we went after you calling us a dictatorship, you're now slower to use that term because we went after you about human rights and how it has different meanings in different countries. We think it's having an effect.David:And so I think that this attempt to grind us down is working, although in their view, it's working. And I think that, that ties in with a broader conversation that I have a lot in Beijing with foreign ambassadors or foreign diplomats who they get called into the foreign ministry, treated politically aggressively and shouted at and humiliated. And they say, how does the Chinese side not see that this causes them problems? And I think that in this moment of, as you say, an era of struggle, this phrase that we see from speeches, from leaders, including Xi, about an era of change, not seen in 100 years.David:They really do feel that as the West, particularly America is in decline and as China is rising, that it's almost like there's a turbulence in the sky where these two the two axis are crossing. And that China has to just push through that turbulence. To use a story that I had kept secret for a long time, that I put in a column when Michael Kovrig was released. So, listeners will remember Michael Kovrig was one of the two Canadians who was held cover couple of years, basically as a hostage by the Chinese state security. And fairly early on, I had heard from some diplomats in Beijing from another Western embassy, not the UK, I should say, that the fact that Michael Kovrig in detention was being questioned, not just about his work for an NGO, the international crisis group that he was doing when he was picked up.David:But he was also being questioned about work he'd been doing for the Canadian embassy when he had diplomatic immunity. The fact that that was going on was frightening to Western diplomats in Beijing. And soon after that conversation, I was sitting there talking to this guy, reasonably senior official. And I said to him, I explained this conversation to him. And I said, I've just been having a conversation with these diplomats. And they said, the word that they used was frightened about what you are doing to Michael Kovrig. And I said, how does it help China to frighten people from that country?David:And he'd been pretty cheerful up till then. He switched to English so that he could be sure that I understood everything he wanted to say to me. And he said, this absolute glacial tone. He said, Canada needs to feel pain. So that the next time America asks an ally to help attack China, that ally will think twice. And that's it.Bill:That's it. And it probably works.David:It works. And yeah. So I think that, again, one of the things I think is a value of being here is you have these conversations where the fact that we in the West think that China is inevitably making a mistake by being much more aggressive. I don't think that's how a big part of the machine here sees it. I think they think it worked.Bill:No. I agree. And I'm not actually sure that they're making a mistake because if you look at so far, what have the cost been? As you said, I mean, behavior is shift, but I think it's definitely open for question. I mean, it's like the assumptions you still see this week, multiple columns about how China's COVID policy is inevitably going to fail. And I'm sitting here in DC, we're about to cross a million people dead in this country, and I'm thinking what's failure. It's a very interesting time.Bill:I mean, to that point about this attitude and the way that there seem to be prosecuting a very top down or top level design communication strategy, Zhang Weiwei, who's at Fudan University. And also I think Eric Li is a closer associate of his, he actually was the, discussant at a Politburo study session. One of the monthly study sessions a few months ago, where I think the theme was on improving international communication. And talking about, again, how to better tell China's story, how to increase the global discourse power.Bill:Some people saw that as, oh, they're going to be nicer because they want to have a more lovable China image. I’m very skeptical because I think that this more aggressive tone, the shorthand is “Wolf warriors. wolf-warriorism”, I think really that seems to me to be more of a fundamental tenant of Xi Jinping being thought on diplomacy, about how China communicates to the world. I mean, how do you see it and how does this get better, or does it not get better for a while?David:It's a really important question. So I think, what do they think they're up to? To simplify and exaggerate a bit, I think that China, and this is not just a guess, this is based on off the record conversations with some pretty senior Chinese figures, they believe that the Western world, but in particular, the United States is too ignorant and unimaginative and Western centric, and probably too racist to understand that China is going to succeed, that China is winning and that the West is in really decadent decline.David:And so I think that these aggressive acts like detaining the two Michaels or their diplomatic an economic coercion of countries like Australia or Lithuania. They hear all the Pearl clutching dismay from high officials in Brussels, or in Washington DC-Bill:And the op-eds in big papers about how awful this is and-David:And the op-eds and yeah, self-defeating, and all those things. But I think that what they believe they are doing is delivering an educational dose of pain and I'm quoting a Chinese official with the word pain. And it is to shock us because we are too mule headed and thick to understand that China is winning and we are losing. And so they're going to keep delivering educational doses of pain until we get it. I think they think that's what they're up to-Bill:And by getting it basically stepping a side in certain areas and letting the Chinese pursue some of their key goals, the core interests, whatever you want to call it, that we, yeah.David:That we accommodate. Yeah. The fundamental message I'm quoting a smart friend of mine in Beijing here is China's rise is inevitable. Resistance is futile.Bill:Right. Resistance is futile.David:And if you accommodate us, we'll make it worth your while. It's the key message. And they think that some people are proving dimer and slower and more reluctant to pick that message up and above all Americans and Anglo Saxons. And so they're giving us the touch, the whip. Now, do I think that, that is inevitably going to be great for them? And you ask how does this end well? I mean, I guess my reason for thinking that they may yet pay some price, not a total price, is that they are engaged in a giant experiment. The Chinese government and party are engaged in a giant experiment, that it didn't matter that much, that the Western world was permissive and open to engagement with China.David:That, That wasn't really integral to their economic rise for the last 40 years that China basically did it by itself. And that if the Western world becomes more suspicious and more hostile, that China will not pay a very substantial price because its market power and its own manufacturing, industrial strength, we'll push on through. And so there'll be a period of turbulence and then we'll realized that we have to accommodate. And I think that in many cases they will be right. There will be sectors where industries don't leave China. They in fact, double down and reinvest and we're seeing that right now, but I do worry that there are going to be real costs paid.David:I mean, when I think back to... I did a special report for The Economists in May, 2019 about us generations. And one of the parts of that was the extraordinary number of Chinese students in us colleges. And I went to the University of Iowa and I spoke to Chinese students and you know that now, the levels of nationalism and hostility on both sides and the fear in American campuses, that's a real cost. I mean, I think if you imagine China's relationship with the Western world, particularly the U.S. as a fork in the road with two forks, one total engagement, one total decoupling, then absolutely China is right. There's not going to be total decoupling because we are as dependent as we were on China's, it's just-Bill:Right. Not realistic.David:China is an enormous market and also the best place to get a lot of stuff made. But I wonder, and it's an image I've used in a column, I think. I think that the relationship is not a fork in the road with two forks. It's a tree with a million branches. And each of those branches is a decision. Does this Western university sign a partnership with that Chinese university? Does this Western company get bought by a Chinese company? Does the government approve of that? Does this Western media organization sign a partnership with a Chinese media organization?David:Does this Western country buy a 5g network or an airline or a data cloud service or autonomous vehicles from China that are products and services with very high value added where China wants to be a dominant player. And that's an entirely reasonable ambition, because China's a big high tech power now. But a lot of these very high value added services or these relationships between universities, or businesses, or governments in the absence of trust, they don't make a bunch of sense because if you don't trust the company, who's cloud is holding your data or the company who's made you the autonomous car, which is filled with microphones and sensors and knows where you were last night and what you said in your car last night, if you don't trust that company or the country that made that, none of that makes sense.David:And I think that China's willingness to show its teeth and to use economic coercion and to go to European governments and say, if you don't take a fine Chinese 5g network we're going to hurt you. If you boil that down to a bumper sticker, that's China saying to the world, or certainly to the Western world stay open to China, or China will hurt you. Trust China or China will hurt you. That's the core message for a lot of these Wolf warrior ambassadors. And that's the core message to people like me, a guy who writes a column living in Beijing. And a lot of the time China's market power will make that okay. But I think that's, if you look at that tree with a million decisions, maybe more of those than China was expecting will click from a yes to a no.David:If you're a Western university, do you now open that campus in Shanghai? Do you trust your local Chinese partner when they say that your academics are going to have freedom of speech? And what's heartbreaking about that is that the victims of that are not going to be the politic bureau it's going to be people on the ground, it's going to be researchers and students and consumers and-Bill:On both sides. I mean, that's-David:On both sides. Yeah.Bill:Yeah. That's the problem.David:Yeah.Bill:So that's uplifting. No, I mean, I-David:I've got worse.Bill:Wait until the next question. I think I really appreciate your time and it'd be respective but I just have two more questions. One is really about just being a foreign correspondent in China and the Foreign correspondents' Club of China put out its annual report, I think earlier this week. And it's depressing you read as it's been in years and every year is extremely depressing, but one of the backdrops is really the first foreign ministry press conference of the last year of 2021. It really struck me that Hua Chunying, who is... She's now I think assistant foreign minister, vice foreign minister at the time, she was the head of the information office in I think the one of the spokespeople, she made a statement about how it was kicking off the 100th anniversary year.Bill:And I'm just going to read her couple sentences to get a sense of the language. So she said, and this was on the, I think it was January 4th, 2021, "In the 1930s and 1940s when the Guangdong government sealed off Yunnan and spared, no efforts to demonize the CPC foreign journalists like Americans, Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong and Agnes Smedley, curious about who and what the CPC is, chose to blend in with the CPC members in Yunnan and wrote many objective reports as well as works like the famous Red star over China, giving the world, the first clip of the CPC and its endeavor in uniting and leading the Chinese people in pursuing national independence and liberation."Bill:And then went on with more stuff about how basically wanting foreign correspondents to be like Snow, Strong or Smedley. How did that go over? And I mean, is that just part of the, your welcome as long as you're telling the right story message?David:So there was a certain amount of... Yeah. I mean, we also got this from our handlers at the MFA, why couldn't it be more like Edgar Snow? And I fear the first time I had that line in the meeting, I was like, well, he was a communist, if that's the bar, then I'm probably going to meet that one. Edgar Snow went to Yan’an he spent a tremendous amount of time in Mao hours interviewing Mao. If Xi Jinping wants to let me interview him for hours, I'd be up for that. But I would point out that Edgar Snow, after interviewing Mao for hours, then handed the transcripts over to Mao and had them edited and then handed back to him. And that probably would not be-Bill:But doesn't work at The Economist.David:That wouldn't fly with my editors. No. So I think we may have an inseparable problem there. Look, isn't it the phrase that Trump people used to talk about working the refs? I mean, what government doesn't want to work the refs. So, that's part of it. And I'm a big boy, I've been at Trump rallies and had people scream at me and tell me, I'm fake news. And it was still a good thing to meet. I've interviewed Afghan warlords who had happily killed me, but at that precise moment, they wanted the Americans to drop a bomb on the mountain opposite.David:And so they were willing to have me in their encampment. So, the worker of being a journalist, you need to go and talk to people who don't necessarily agree with you or like you and that's the deal. So I'm not particularly upset by that. What is worrying and I think this is shown in the FCC annual server, which is based on asking journalists in China how their job goes at the moment is there is a sense that the Chinese machine and in particular things like the communist youth league have been very effective at whipping up low public opinion.David:So when we saw the floods in Hunan Province in the summer of 2021, where in fact, we recently just found out that central government punished a whole bunch of officials who had covered up the death doll there, journalists who went down there to report this perfectly legitimate, large news story, the communist youth league among other organizations put out notices on their social media feeds telling people they're a hostile foreign journalists trying to make China look bad, to not talk to them, if you see them, tell us where they are. And you've got these very angry crowds chasing journalists around Hunan in a fairly worry way.David:And again, if you're a foreign correspondent in another country, we are guests in China. So, the Chinese people, they don't have to love me. I hope that they will answer my questions, because I think I'm trying to report this place fairly, but I'm not demanding red carpet treatment, but there is a sense that the very powerful propaganda machine here is whipping up very deliberately something that goes beyond just be careful about talking to foreign journalists. And I think in particular, one thing that I should say is that as a middle aged English guy with gray hair, I still have an easier time of it by far because some of the nastiest attacks, including from the nastiest online nationalist trolls.David:They're not just nationalists, but they're also sexist and chauvinist and the people who I think really deserve far more sympathy than some like me is Chinese American, or Chinese Australian, or Chinese Canadian journalists, particularly young women journalists.Bill:I know Emily Feng at NPR was just the subject of a really nasty spate of attacks online about some of her reporting.David:And it's not just Emily, there's a whole-Bill:Right. There's a whole bunch.David:There's a whole bunch of them. And they get called you know er guizi all sorts of [crosstalk 00:37:15]. And this idea and all this horrible stuff about being race traitors and again, one of the conversations I've had with Chinese officials is, if you keep this up, someone is going to get physically hurt. And I don't think that's what you want. David:And again, I fall back on the fact that I'm a Western liberal. What I say to them is if you tell me that a Chinese-British journalist is not as British as me, then you are to my mind, that's racial prejudice. And if some right wing Western white politician said to me that a Chinese immigrant wasn't fully American, or wasn't fully British, that's racism, right?Bill:That's racism. Yeah.David:And I think that is the really troubling element to this level of nationalism. China is a very big country that does some very impressive things that does some less impressive things and does some very wicked things, but we have every reason to give it credit for the things it does well. And it is not that surprising when any government tries to work the refs.David:And get the best coverage they can by intimidating us and calling us out. I've interviewed Donald Trump and he asked me, when are you going to write something nice about me? I mean, we're grownups, this is how it works, but if they are making it toxic for young women journalists to work in China, or if they are driving foreign correspondent out of China, because their families they're under such intimidation that they can't even go on holiday without their children being followed around by secret police. I think there will be a cost.Bill:But that may be a what the Chinese side sees as a benefit, because then it opens the field for them controlling how the story's told. And then you can bring in a bunch of people or pull a bunch of people out of the foreigners working for state media, hey, the new Edgar Snow, the new Agnes Smedley. I mean, that is one of the things that I think potentially is what they're trying to do, which seems self-defeating, but as we've been discussing, what we think is self-defeating the policy makers, or some of them may see as a success.David:So what I think they're confident of is that being aggressive and making us much more jumpy is a win, but throwing all of us out, I think the people at the top get that, that's not a win because the New York times and the BBC and the Washington post, they're still going to cover China, even if they can't have people in China. And a bunch of that coverage is not going to be stuff that China likes, North Korea doesn't have any resident foreign correspondent, but it doesn't get a great press.Bill:And the other group, of course, but beyond the foreign journalists is all the PRC national journalists working for the foreign correspondent as researchers and, I mean, many of them journalists in all but name because they can't legally be that I've certainly, been hearing some pretty distressing stories about how much pressure they're under. And I think they're in almost an impossible situation it seems like right now.David:Now they're amazingly brave people. They're completely integral to our coverage. And many of them, as you say, they're journalists who in any other country, we would be getting to write stuff with their own bylines. I mean, in incredibly cautious about what we have our Chinese colleagues do now, because they are under tremendous pressure. I mean, not naming news organizations, but the just the level of harassment of them and their families and is really bad. And it's the most cynical attempt to make it difficult for us to do our jobs and to divide Chinese people from the Western media.David:But fundamentally at some level, this does not end well because, and this is not me just talking up the role of the Western media, because I think we're magnificently important people, but at some level there's a big problem under way with this level of nationalism in modern China. I was in China in the '90s, you were in China in the '90s, I think. We remember it was-Bill:'80s, '90s, 2000s. Yeah.David:Yeah. You were there before me, but it was not a Jeffersonian democracy. It was a dictatorship, but this level of nationalism is much more serious now. Why does that matter? Well, because I think that for a lot of particularly young Chinese, the gap between their self perception and the outside world's perception of China has become unbearably wide. They think this country has never been so impressive and admirable. And yet I keep seeing foreign media questioning us and criticizing us. And that just enrages them. They can't conceive of any sincere principle on our part that would make us criticize China that way.David:And going back to my conversation with the online nationalist Sai Lei, when he was saying, well, how would the Americans take it if they were told that eating avocados was bad for the environment? When I said to him, but they are told that. There are lots of environmental NGOs that talk about sustainable fisheries, or the cost, the carbon footprint of crops and things in the West. The two countries are pulling apart and the pandemic has just accelerated that process. And so if you are a Chinese nationalist, not only are you angry about being criticized, but you don't believe that the West is ever critical about itself. You think that the West is only bent on criticizing China. And that gap in perceptions is just really dangerously wide.Bill:And widening, it seems like. I mean, I'm not there now, but it certainly, from everything I can see outside of China, it feels like that's what's happening too.David:Yeah. We need to know more about China.Bill:I agree.David:And report more about China. And I don't just say that because that's how I earn my living. I think it's really, really dangerous for us to think that the solution is less reporting about China.Bill:Well, and certainly, I mean, and all sorts of avenues, not just media, but all sorts of avenues, we're seeing a constriction of information getting out of China. And on the one hand China's growing in importance globally and power globally. And on the other hand, our ability to understand the place seems to be getting harder. And it goes back to, I mean, we just, I think it'll be a mistake if we just get forced into accepting the official version of what China is. That's disseminated through the officially allowed and sanctioned outlets in China. Maybe that'll help China, but I'm not sure it helps the rest of the world.David:And it's not compatible with China's ambitions to be a high tech superpower. China wants to be a country that doesn't just-Bill:That's a very fundamental contradiction.David:Yeah. China wants to sell us vaccines and wants the Western world to buy Chinese vaccines and approve Chinese vaccines. Why has the FDA not yet approved Chinese vaccines? Well, one reason is because China hasn't released the data. You can't play this secretive defensive hermit state and be a global high tech superpower. And China is a very, very big country with a lot of good universities, a lot of smart people. It has every right to compete at the highest levels in global high tech. But you can't do that, if you are not willing to earn trust by sharing the data, or by letting your companies be audited, when they list overseas. They need to decide.Bill:Or being able to handle legitimate criticism. I mean, certainly there has been illegitimate criticism and the attacks on the Western media, I mean, I know the BBC was a frequent target last year. And I think they were able to pull out some errors of the reporting and then magnify it. I mean, it is a struggle. And I think one of the things I think is on the Chinese side, they're very much geared up for this ongoing global opinion struggle. And we're not and we're never going to be, because it's just not how our systems are structured. So it's going to be an interesting few years.David:It is. And it's a tremendous privilege to still be here. And as long as I'm allowed, I'm going to keep letting Chinese people, letting their voices be heard in my column. That's what I think I'm here for.Bill:Okay. Last question. Just given your experience in living in DC and writing for The Economist from here, where do you see us, China relations going? And there is a one direct connection to what we just talked about, the foreign journalists where there theoretically has been some sort of an improvement or a deal around allowing more journalists from each side to go to other country. Although what I've heard is that the Chinese side was been very clear that some of the folks who were forced to leave or were experienced are not going to be welcome back. It's going to have to be a whole new crop of people who go in for these places, which again, seems to be, we don't want people who have priors or longer time on the ground, potentially.David:We think that each of the big American news organizations just going to get at least one visa, initially. And that Is going to be this deal done and it's high time. And you're right, as far as we can tell the people who were expelled or forced to leave are not going to come back. And that's a real tragedy because I have Chinese officials say to me, we wish that the Western media sent people who speak good Chinese and who understand China. And I was like Ian Johnson and Chris Buckley, these people lived for, their depth of knowledge and their love for China was absolutely unrivaled. So, if you're going to throw those people out, you can't complain about journalists who don't like China.Bill:Exactly.David:The general trend of U.S. China relations. to be of optimistic about the trend of U.S. China relations I'd have to be more optimistic than I currently am about the state of U.S. Politics. And there's a kind of general observation, which is that I think that American democracy is in very bad shape right now. And I wish that some of the China hawks in Congress, particularly on the Republican side, who are also willing to imply, for example, that the 2020 election was stolen, that there was massive fraud every time they say that stuff, they're making an in-kind contribution to the budget of the Chinese propaganda department.Bill:I agree completely there. It's not a joke because it's too serious, but it's just ludicrous, hypocrisy and shortsightedness. It's disgusting.David:You cannot be a patriotic American political leader and tell lies about the state of American democracy. And then say that you are concerned about China's rise. So there's a general observation about, if dysfunction continues at this level, then-Bill:No wonder the Chinese are so confident.David:Yeah. I mean, the Chinese line on president Biden is interesting. One of the big things about my first couple of years here when president Trump was still in office was, I'd any number of people in the states saying confidently that Donald Trump was a tremendous China hawk. I never believed. And I've interviewed Trump a few times and spoken to him about China and spoken to his China people. I never believed that Donald Trump himself was a China hawk. If you define a China hawk, as someone who has principled objections to the way that China runs itself. I think that Donald Trump couldn't care less about the Uighurs and Xinjiang. In fact, we know he approved to what they were doing.David:Couldn't care less about Hong Kong couldn't care less frankly, about Taiwan. His objection to the China relationship was that I think he thinks the American economy is the big piece of real estate, and you should pay rent to access it. And he thought China wasn't paying enough rent. So he was having a rent review. I mean, that's what the guy. It was about, they needed to pay more and then he was going to be happy. So he was not a China hawk. What was really interesting was that here in China, officials would be pretty open by the end, took them time to get their heads around Trump. For a long time they thought he was New York business guy. Then they realized that was, he wasn't actually like the other New York business guy they knew.David:And then they thought he was like a super China hawk. And then they realized that that wasn't true. By the end, they had a nail. They thought he was a very transactional guy. And the deal that they could do with him was one that they were happy to do, because it didn't really involve structural change on the Chinese side. Then their message about Joe Biden is that he is weak and old and lacks control of Congress. And that he is, this is from scholars rather than officials, I should say, but their view is, why would China spend political capital on the guy who's going to lose the next election?Bill:And not only the next election but is probably going to lose control of the House, at least in nine, what is it? Nine months or 10 months. So why worry? And that they do and I think, I mean, one of the big milestones will be the national security strategy, the national defense strategy, which in the Trump administration they came out in the December of the first year and then January for the NDS. It's February, we still haven't seen those here. I think certainly as you said, but certainly from Chinese interlock is the sense of, is that they can't come to an agreement on what it should be, the U.S. China policy.David:Yeah. And China has some legitimate concerns. I mean, for example, if you are Xi Jinping and you're trying to work out how ambitious your climate change timetables going to be. How much pain are you going to ask co-producing provinces in the Northeast to take to get out to carbon neutrality as quickly as say, the Europeans are pushing you to do. And part of the equation is America going to take some pain too, or are we going to end up being uncompetitive? Because America's not actually going to do the right thing? Well, Joe Biden can talk a good game on climate as an area for cooperation with China. But if he loses the next election and Donald Trump or someone like Donald Trump wins the White House then if you're shooting pink, why would you kind of strike a painful deal with America if you don't think it's going to last beyond 2024?Bill:Right. You'll do what makes sense for your country and not offer anything up to America because we already have a record of backing out of these deals. That's the problem.David:So that has real world consequences. The one thing that I will say about the U.S. China relationship, and I'm very, very pessimistic about the fact that the two sides, they don't share a vision of how this ends well. There is no end game that I think makes both sides happy, because I think the Chinese vision is America sucks it up and accommodates.Bill:Right. Resistance is futile.David:Yeah, exactly. And the American vision, I think, is that China stumbles, that China is making mistakes, that the state is getting involved in the economy too much. That Xi Jinping is centralizing power too much. And that somehow China's going to make so many mistakes that it ends up to feed defeating itself. I think that's one of the arguments you here in DC.Bill:Yes. It's wishful thinking it's not necessarily based on a rigid rigorous analysis. It seems like it's much more wishful thinking.David:So, that is a reason to be pessimistic about the medium and the long-term. The one thing that I will say based here in China is that when I write really specific color about things like what does China think of the idea of Russia invading Ukraine? And I talk to really serious scholars who spent their lives studying things like Russia policy or foreign policy or international relations, or if I talk to really senior tech people, Chinese tech companies, they do take America's power very seriously. Even though there is absolutely sincere disdain for American political dysfunction.David:I think that America's innovation power, the areas of technology, whether it's semiconductors or some forms of AI algorithms where America just really is still ahead by a long way, the really serious people, when you talk to them off the record, they still take America seriously. And on that Ukraine example, what was really interesting, the prompt for that was seeing commentators in the U.S. saying that Xi Jinping would like Putin to invade Ukraine because this was going to be a test that Biden was going to fail and America was going to look weak. And maybe that would lead Xi Jinping to then invade Taiwan.David:And when I spoke to Chinese scholars, really serious Chinese scholars of Russia, their Irish, it's like, no, no, no. Russia is an economy, the size of Guangdong and they sell us oil and gas, which is nice. But our trade to them is not enough to sacrifice our relationship with America.Bill:Thank you, David Rennie. That was a really good conversation. I think very useful, very illuminating. The links, some of the articles we talked about, the links will be in the show notes. And just a note on the schedule for the sinocism podcast. It is not, I think going to be weekly or biweekly as I thought originally, I'm still working it out, but it will be every, at least once a month. I hope it's the plan, if not, a little more frequent depending on the guests.Bill:So thanks for your patience and look forward to hearing from you. I love your feedback. The transcript will be on the website when it goes live. So please let me know what you think. And as always, you can sign up for sinocism at sinocism.com, S-I-N-O-C-I-S-M.com. Thank you. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

covid-19 united states america american new york university amazon canada donald trump australia europe english ai uk china house washington politics online americans british canadian west club russia joe biden chinese european ukraine japanese dc western irish congress african white house bbc world war ii iowa hong kong wolf republicans britain resistance snow vladimir putin stanford npr brexit taiwan marine tracking fda ted talks beijing north korea reporting economists shanghai foreign northeast freedom of speech ngo boris johnson mfa brussels afghan xi ngos lexington xi jinping fcc michaels discourse lithuania nationalism us china mao chinese americans tactic viktor orban cpc xinjiang yan guantanamo bay anglo saxons charlemagne prc paperclips china us uighurs us china relations yunnan abu ghraib smedley guangdong chinese canadian opium wars nds china's covid hunan henan politburo chinese australian jeffersonian cgtn bilibili fudan university ian johnson michael kovrig david it david you david so david yeah chris buckley hunan province fudan because america bagehot david there david yes emily feng david rennie sinocism bill well bill yes bill yeah david on david they anna louise strong david now david does bill hi

Mainland help likely on the way for Hong Kong; More support for real estate; US-China; New podcast

real estate hong kong new podcast us china mainland china new sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 10, 2022

I released a new episode of the Sinocism podcast earlier today. It is outside the paywall. David is terrific, so I hope you will give it a listen. Today’s Top items: Mainland help likely on the way for Hong Kong Russia-China US-China Pony Ma feels the care and attention of the Party and regulators

Sinocism Podcast #4: The Economist's David Rennie on online nationalism, discourse power, reporting from China, US-China relations

english china online chinese beijing reporting economists ngo ngos discourse nationalism china us us china relations david rennie sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 10, 2022

Listen now (55 min) | Episode Notes: Today's guest is David Rennie, the Beijing bureau chief for The Economist and author of the weekly Chaguan column. Our topic today is online discourse, nationalism, and the intensifying contest for global discourse power. I spoke to some very serious NGO people who've been in China a long time, Chinese and foreigners who said that this was the worst time for NGOs since 1989, and the kind of mentions of espionage and national security was a very serious thing. So then I had to make a decision, was I going to try and speak to someone like Sai Lei. Clearly he is an extremely aggressive nationalist, some would call him a troll and there are risks involved in talking to someone like him. But I felt, I'm one of the few English language media still in China, if I'm going to add value, I need to speak to these people.

Politics and language: decoding the CCP

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 24, 2022 59:17

All political parties have weaknesses for jargon and buzzwords, and the Chinese Communist Party more than most. It's why Party documents – whether they be speeches, Resolutions or reports – can be hard going. Sentences like the following (from the Resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenum) abound: ‘All Party members should uphold historical materialism and adopt a rational outlook on the Party's history.' ‘We need to strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership' In other words, full of platitudes and dense Marxist terminology. So what is, then, the purpose of official Party documents? Can they ever reveal division within the Party, or say anything new at all? And throughout the fusty rhetoric, who is the audience, who are these words designed for? On this episode, I'm joined by two guests expert at reading the Communist tea leaves. In this wide ranging – and slightly longer than usual – Chinese Whispers, we discuss the power of political language and how the Chinese Communist Party makes the most of it, why it's important to control the historical narrative, and exactly what, if anything, does Xi Jinping Thought entail. My guests are Professor Rana Mitter, a historian of China at the University of Oxford and author of numerous books, the latest being China's Good War; and Bill Bishop, who curates the newsletter Sinocism. Bill's newsletter is a must-have round up of the most important political and economic China news, in your inbox four times a week. Very much worth every penny, and frequently featuring translated Party documents and Chinese articles. To continue the conversation, we also mention a couple of past episodes of Chinese Whispers: I interview the exiled Professor Sun Peidong about the witch hunt against her at a top Shanghai University: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/healing-the-cancer-of-the-cultural-revolution. I discuss just why Taiwan is so important to China with Rana and analyst Jessica Drun: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/why-does-china-care-about-taiwan-. You can also find my review of Jing Tsu's Kingdom of Characters here: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-great-chinese-puzzle-how-to-adapt-the-language-to-modern-communication-technologies.

university china politics kingdom chinese resolutions language oxford taiwan characters decoding communists marxist chinese communist party sentences good war chinese whispers bill bishop xi jinping thought sinocism professor rana mitter

Chinese Whispers: do the Party's words mean anything?

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 24, 2022 59:17

All political parties have weaknesses for jargon and buzzwords, and the Chinese Communist Party more than most. It's why Party documents – whether they be speeches, Resolutions or reports – can be hard going. Sentences like the following (from the Resolution adopted at the Sixth Plenum) abound: ‘All Party members should uphold historical materialism and adopt a rational outlook on the Party's history.' ‘We need to strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment with the central Party leadership' In other words, full of platitudes and dense Marxist terminology. So what is, then, the purpose of official Party documents? Can they ever reveal division within the Party, or say anything new at all? And throughout the fusty rhetoric, who is the audience, who are these words designed for? On this episode, Cindy is joined by two guests expert at reading the Communist tea leaves. In this wide ranging – and slightly longer than usual – Chinese Whispers, they discuss the power of political language and how the Chinese Communist Party makes the most of it, why it's important to control the historical narrative, and exactly what, if anything, does Xi Jinping Thought entail. Her guests are Professor Rana Mitter, a historian of China at the University of Oxford and author of numerous books, the latest being China's Good War; and Bill Bishop, who curates the newsletter Sinocism. Bill's newsletter is a must-have round up of the most important political and economic China news, in your inbox four times a week. Very much worth every penny, and frequently featuring translated Party documents and Chinese articles. To continue the conversation, they also mention a couple of past episodes of Chinese Whispers: Cindy interviews the exiled Professor Sun Peidong about the witch hunt against her at a top Shanghai University: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/healing-the-cancer-of-the-cultural-revolution. Cindy discusses just why Taiwan is so important to China with Rana and analyst Jessica Drun: https://www.spectator.co.uk/podcast/why-does-china-care-about-taiwan-. You can also find Cindy's review of Jing Tsu's Kingdom of Characters here: https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-great-chinese-puzzle-how-to-adapt-the-language-to-modern-communication-technologies.

university china kingdom chinese resolutions oxford taiwan characters communists marxist chinese communist party sentences good war chinese whispers bill bishop xi jinping thought sinocism professor rana mitter

This Year's Best Twitter Accounts to Follow

My First Million

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 21, 2021 65:33

Sam Parr (@theSamParr) and Shaan Puri (@ShaanVP) share their favorite Twitter accounts to follow and what they have learned from them. _____ * Do you love MFM and want to see Sam and Shaan's smiling faces? Subscribe to our Youtube channel. * Would you like to participate in our clips contest? Earn up to $10k by remixing My First Million episodes. To learn more, go to mfmpod.com/clips. * Want more insights like MFM? Check out Shaan's newsletter. _____ Show Notes: (00:30) - Sam's body fat % (05:50) - @Post_Market (09:00) - @Ramit (15:40) - @GoodMarketingHQ and @George_Mack (17:55) - TheKanyeStory.com (20:25) - @PessimistsArc (33:25) - @ryanholiday and @dailystoic (38:50) - @AviralBhat (40:40) - Sinocism by Bill Bishop (47:50) - @Woonomic (53:15) - @fjamie013 (55:08) - @nikitabier (55:50) - @haralabob

earn accounts shaan mfm ramit my first million bill bishop sinocism george mack shaan puri shaanvp sam parr thesamparr

Peaceful China; 2022 GDP; Summit For Democracy getting a reaction; IOC and Peng Shuai

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 2, 2021

I hope to see many of you tomorrow’s weekly discussion thread. If you are still looking for the perfect gift for the person with a China connection in your left, please consider giving them a subscription to Sinocism. It is easy, just click this button, you can schedule when you would like it delivered.

china summit democracy peaceful peng shuai sinocism

国之大者 matter(s) of national importance; Real estate; Biden-Xi

joe biden national real estate biden xi sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 9, 2021

Has the central government’s resolve in keeping the pressure on the real estate industry been surprising? Are there signs the pressure is leading to so many problems that the government may need to loosen up a bit? I discussed the real estate market in the recent Sinocism podcast with Chen Long of

Ep. 87: On truth and trust in diplomacy (Morrison vs Macron)

Australia in the World

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2021 44:22

Allan and Darren cannot resist focusing on the escalated and seemingly personal spat between Australian PM Scott Morrison and French President Emmanuel Macron over Australia's cancellation of the French submarine contract, then followed by the launch of AUKUS. During Morrison's recent international trip, Macron called him a liar, to which the Australian side responded by leaking details of private text messages the French president had sent the PM just days prior to the announcement. In Morrison's words: “claims were made, claims were refuted”. Who is in the right/wrong here? Stepping back, what is the role of honesty and integrity, or truth and trust, in international diplomacy? How much does it matter? Along the way, Darren finds the temptation to develop a potted academic theory of a “Morrison doctrine” too strong to pass up. Let the debate begin! We thank Mitchell McIntosh for audio editing and Rory Stenning for composing our theme music. Relevant links Cameron Stewart, “How Biden threw PM under the bus”, The Australian, 2 November 2021: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/how-joe-biden-threw-scott-morrison-under-the-bus/news-story/5dde5b5f35ef17842d83a1f4d74f83a1 Samantha Maiden, “Who is really lying in Scott Morrison, Emmanuel Macron's French submarine feud”, Daily Telegraph, 2 November 2021: https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/business/work/who-is-really-lying-in-scott-morrison-emmanuel-macrons-french-submarine-feud/news-story/f77df0b11df50eee5d07e681a2ef749d Phillip Coorey, “‘I don't like losing': Macron ‘knew' the subs contract was in peril”, Australian Financial Review, 1 November 2021: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/i-don-t-like-losing-macron-knew-the-subs-contract-was-in-peril-20211101-p594xr Stephen Dziedzic and Georgia Hitch “French ambassador says leaking of text messages between Scott Morrison and Emmanuel Macron 'unprecedented new low'”, ABC News, 3 November 2021: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-03/french-ambassador-jean-pierre-thebault-submarines/100590382 Jake Evans, “Scott Morrison refuses to apologise to President Emmanuel Macron after claims PM lied about submarine deal”, ABC News, 3 November 2021: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-03/scott-morrison-refuses-to-apologise-to-macron/100590506 Diplomacy by Harold Nicolson (Goodreads page): https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1678410.Diplomacy Marise Payne “Inaugural Australia-France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations”, 30 August 2021: https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-consultations Daniel Hurst, “Scrapping submarines deal broke trust, Macron tells Australian PM”, The Guardian, 28 October 2021: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/28/france-seeks-tangible-actions-from-australia-after-submarines-row Andrew Tillett, “Defence admits it is looking at back-up plan for French subs deal”, Australian Financial Review, 2 June 2021: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/defence-admits-it-is-looking-at-back-up-plan-for-french-subs-deal-20210602-p57xdu Paul Kelly, “Morrison had to hurt France to get AUKUS subs deal”, The Australian, 3 November 2021: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/morrison-had-to-hurt-france-to-get-aukus-subs-deal/news-story/7e839a998e2bb7faee42334afae724ce Andrew Probyn, “Scott Morrison rejects French President's criticism over handling of scrapped submarine project”, ABC News, 1 November 2021: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-01/scott-morrison-rejects-emmanuel-macrons-accusations-of-lying/100586680 Ben Herscovitch, “Beijing to Canberra and Back” (newsletter): https://beijing2canberra.substack.com/ Adam Tooze, “Chartbook” (newsletter): https://adamtooze.substack.com/ Heather Cox Richardson, “Letters from an American” (newsletter): https://heathercoxrichardson.substack.com/ Bill Bishop, “Sinocism” (newsletter): https://sinocism.com/ Andrew Daily “The Weekly Dish” (newsletter): https://andrewsullivan.substack.com/ American Purpose (newsletter): https://www.americanpurpose.com/ Rohit, “Why do we dislike rules so much”, Strange Loop Cannon (newsletter), 7 September 2021: https://www.strangeloopcanon.com/p/why-do-we-dislike-rules-so-much

Announcing the new Sinocism podcast and the first three episodes

xi chris johnson plenum joanna chiu sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 6, 2021

I wanted to let you know that Sinocism has launched a podcast. It is free and my initial plan is to produce 2-3 new episodes per month. The first three episodes are conversations with Chris Johnson on Xi and the 6th Plenum, Joanna Chiu on her new book “China Unbound” and Chen Long on the economy and the 6th Plenum.

Sinocism Podcast #3: Chen Long on China's economy, Evergrande, Common Prosperity and the 6th Plenum

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021 37:24

Episode Notes:Today's guest is Chen Long, co-founder and partner of Plenum, a research firm covering Chinese economy and politics. Prior to that, he was a China economist at Gavekal Dragonomics. Chen Long is a Beijinger, and graduated from Peking University. Welcome to the podcast. It's great to have you.2:20 - I think the economy is a little bit like ice and fire, for now. There are certain areas certainly doing pretty poorly. Of course, everyone always talking about the property market, Evergrande, and basically every couple weeks we see a property developer default… 6:00 on the power generation problems - usually December is a peak of Chinese electricity consumption. I'm not sure the current supply of coal is not ... I mean, it's better than a month ago, but they probably have to do a little bit more. So I think it's still too early to say that we have totally overcome the end of the shortage.13:07 on whether this time is different with the real estate market - a year after Beijing and many local governments introduced restrictive policies, finally, we had three months in a row of property sales volume falling by double digits, on a year on year basis. But this is just three months, right? If you look at the previous cycles, especially 2015, 16, we could have the down cycle for 15 months. But this is just three, right? So Beijing has not blinked yet, because it's only three months.16:30 on Evergrande - I think there was a little bit of overreaction, especially when you see headlines linking Evergrande to Lehman Brothers, and this sort of thing. And I have to say that this is at least the third time I hear a Chinese Lehman moment in the last ten years.35:50 on the 6th Plenum and likely historical resolution - The previous ones were all about resolutions on certain questions of the party's history. Right? And this one is not uncertain questions. There is no question. It is resolution on the party's accomplishments over the last 100 years, and the lessons. So I guess it's a big, big summary about what he has done. And, of course, this one I think will cement him as the core, right? And we have to follow whatever he thinks we should do soLinks: The Plenum website. Transcript:Bill:Hi everyone. Today's guest is Chen Long, co-founder and partner of Plenum, a research firm covering Chinese economy and politics. Prior to that, he was a China economist at Gavekal Dragonomics. Chen Long is a Beijinger, and graduated from Peking University. Welcome to the podcast. It's great to have you.Chen:Thank you, Bill. It's my honor to be your third guest.Bill:Oh, well, third time is the charm, I hope. And I hope things are well. And I hope things are well in Beijing. I have to say, I very much miss this time of year in Beijing. There is something really special about autumn in Beijing.Bill:So, to kick off, today, I think we want to talk about the state of economy, and various themes related to that, including common prosperity, and real estate, the sixth plenum that's coming up. But, to start out, could you just give a brief intro about yourself, and more specifically what Plenum does?Bill:Just for listeners, it's a high end research service. The website is at Plenum.ai. And it's really terrific. It's one of my top most favorite research services on China now. They're really sharp on economy and politics.Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill. I think, Bill, you have done basically all the marketing I need to do. So we are a pretty young firm. I mean, we were founded two years ago, almost exactly two years ago. And that's when we first started to publish reports. And we write on Chinese economy, policies, politics, geopolitics, other stuff. And we serve institutional clients. Some are financial institutions, some are non-financial corporations.Chen:And I think where we are a little bit different from others, is the team is basically entirely Chinese nationals. But, of course, we'll come from different backgrounds. A lot of people work in the US for many years. And, right now, I'm based in Beijing. Yeah.Bill:And I first came across your work, I think, because you were working with Arthur Kroger, over at Gavekal DragonomicsChen:Yes. I was at Gavekal for almost six years. Yeah.Bill:Right. And I think that's where I first started reading your work. So, anyway, it's great to have you. I've always been a big fan. So-Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill.Bill:From a top level, could you just give us your view on what's going on in the economy in China, and where things are?Chen:Yeah. I think the economy is a little bit like ice and fire, for now. There are certain areas certainly doing pretty poorly. Of course, everyone always talking about the property market, Evergrande, and basically every couple weeks we see a property developer default.Chen:But, on the other hand, you also see this energy crunch, which actually was because energy demand was really strong, right? And industrial demand was strong. And then the grid and then the power plants could not meet up with that demand. So you basically have one big sector of economy, and actually several big sectors, apart from the real estate, you have the automobile market actually shrinking this year, general consumption were pretty mediocre, right? Because whenever there's a COVID cluster, you have local governments will restrict travel, or implement some sort of lockdown for two or four weeks. So consumption will be affected.Chen:But, on the other hand, the export is really strong, right? We're probably seeing the best export performance since 2011. That's the best we have in a decade. And there's no sign that this is putting off. A lot of people have said, "No, this is just temporary. Not going to be sustainable." I've been hearing that argument since a year ago. And, right now, it's still really hot. So that's why you have certain sectors ... So that's a little bit special, I think, compared with any time in the last decade. Yeah.Bill:And, certainly, specifically around the energy challenges, you said it was really because demand was so high. How quickly do you think that the ... There have been a whole flurry of measures from the NDRC, and other government bodies, about making sure that the coal supply increases, and cracking down on price speculation.Bill:And, I mean, how quickly do you think that these regulatory actions are going to solve the problem? And, the reforming or the changing in the price mechanism, is that enough to make the power generators actually make money now, so they're more willing to produce energy? Or are we still going to be looking at probably fits and starts over the next few months?Chen:Yeah. I think a lot of the power plants may not be losing money at this point. The government basically did several things at the same time. One, they told all the coal miners just to increase supply as much as you can. And, two, they told the coal miners also to restrict the prices. Basically, they set a cap. And there's a debate on what exactly is the cap, because there are several different versions of the cap.Chen:But whatever version you believe in, there's a cap. And the cap is a lot lower than the market price we had two weeks ago. That's why we had this Zhengzhou thermal coal future price, basically halve in two weeks. And they also allow the power plants to raise the electricity prices by up to 20%, and more if the users are high energy intensity sectors.Chen:So there are flurry of changes happen just over the last months or so. And I think the coal supply has probably improved quite a bit. And we are hearing a lot less stories on companies running ... They face blackouts, or they were just told in very short notice that they have to cut production. We hear a lot less that sort of story. But that still exists, it's just a lot less than a month ago, or at the end of September.Chen:But with this winter heating season coming again, usually December is a peak of Chinese electricity consumption. I'm not sure the current supply of coal is not ... I mean, it's better than a month ago, but they probably have to do a little bit more. So I think it's still too early to say that we have totally overcome the end of the shortage.Bill:Thanks. I mean, it is interesting how it really seemed to have caught a lot of people by surprise. I think both policy makers, but also investors. It's just interesting how that happened, and how so many people seemed to not understand what was going on, including myself.Chen:Yeah. Because, for 20 years maybe, people talk about China has over capacity in IPP, this is actually the power plants. China invested too much in some coal power plants. And I think, at one point, like 2015 or 2016, when over capacity got really serious. And then that was one of the sectors that local and others had to work very hard to cut capacity.Chen:So we never really thought for a second that China would have electricity shortage, because there's always huge supply, maybe oversupply. But I think a lot of things changed since the beginning of the pandemic. The services sector used to be growing a lot faster. But, so far, it's underperforming, while the industrial sector, which were slowing for many years, has suddenly started to outperform.Chen:So, basically, since the second quarter of last year, we have a Chinese economy moving further away from a service driven economy, to a more industrial driven economy. So that's a completely reversal of the trend since 2010, or even 2005.Bill:That's also a reversal of what a lot of economists have recommended China do, right?Chen:Yeah. I mean, people say, "No, yeah, China should become more service driven, and less industrial driven. And also, of course, more consumption driven, less investment driven." But I would say this whole rebalancing theme has somewhat reversed over the last year or so.Chen:And this just, again, has to do with this fire and ice, as I mentioned earlier. So this is just one sector doing really well, it's industrials. And the manufacturing facilities are just all pretty at fully capacity, demand from the rest of the world is really strong. And while the domestic consumption is very mediocre. And service sector, of course, the people just go out a little bit less than they were, in 2019 or earlier.Chen:So basically the economy itself is consuming much more electricity than it used to be, that means two years ago. So, suddenly, we have this issue.Bill:Interesting. And just on that stronger industrial, weaker consumption service sector, is that by design? Is that something that the policy makers want? Or is this just more of an outgrowth of the pandemic changing global dynamics, potentially consumer spending dropping because of concerns about consumer debt, for example? I mean, what's driving that?Chen:I don't think it's intended or planned, or even foreseen by Beijing, by the leadership, I think when China started to get out of the pandemic, in April or May 2020, I mean, there was a real fear, because the rest of the world is experiencing the worst of the pandemic. So the worry, at the time, was China is going to face a demand collapse from the rest of the world. So you got a double whammy economic crisis. So just get out from the domestic demand collapse, you're going to see an external demand collapse.Chen:But somehow that external demand collapse didn't really happen, or just basically happened for one month or so. And turned out to be that the export was really strong. And people in Beijing could hardly believe that. And people say, "Oh, this is just temporary. Because this supply chain was disrupted. But maybe when the things get better next year, the demand will go away. And somebody might has to do with this stimulus checks, given by US government, European governments. Once that effect expires, the demand will go away."Chen:But, so far, it still hasn't gone away. And with Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe, Latin America, lot of developing manufacture hubs in trouble, China basically became the only manufacture hub that can still maintain enough supplies. So I think that really caught a lot of people, including the Chinese government, by a big surprise.Bill:No, it is. It is really interesting. And so as you talk about the economy, I think you called it fire and ice, I mean, one area that seems a bit icy is real estate. And, obviously, Evergrande's been in the news. But there are plenty of real estate developers that have violated the three red lines, or seem to be in various states of default or near default on some of their debt.Bill:One thing that's been interesting is we've seen real estate stresses that are over the last 15 years or so. Every few years, it seems like there's a cycle, and it's usually policy driven. Because the policy makers want to crack down on real estate speculation and unproductive investment. But then when things start getting bad, and stressed, and companies start having problems, and prices maybe start looking like they're going to drop in some places, the policy makers always blink and pull back, and basically find ways to loosen things up, and let the market return.Bill:It seems like, this time, they've been much more disciplined, I think surprising a lot of people, in terms of being willing to ride out a lot more pain around the real estate sector. Is that a fair assessment? And, if it is, why is that? And if it's not, how do you see what's going on?Chen:Yeah. I tend to believe that this time is not that much different from previous episodes. I mean, I know there's the argument there, saying, "Xi really wants to reduce the share of the real estate in the economy, and wants to curb housing prices." But I don't think this is new. We have this episode, like you just mentioned, multiple times in the last 15 years. Basically every three years, we have a property cycle, from trough to peak to trough. Right? And the Chinese government, in both central and local, that will change policies very, very quickly.Chen:And this time is no different, right? Because you talk about the three red lines, the three red lines really were just introduced a year ago, last August. Right? And, well, the background of that was the PBOC, along with other policy makers, the property market recovered too quickly, and think they're doing too well. And housing prices in cities, especially big cities like Shenzhen or Shanghai, were rising too fast. And that was a little bit unanticipated. So they said, "No, we have to restrict the area, this kind of bull run."Chen:And now a year after Beijing and many local governments introduced restrictive policies, finally, we had three months in a row of property sales volume falling by double digits, on a year on year basis. But this is just three months, right? If you look at the previous cycles, especially 2015, 16, we could have the down cycle for 15 months. But this is just three, right? So Beijing has not blinked yet, because it's only three months. Right?Chen:And we are seeing a little bit some early signs, like PBOC two weeks ago said, "Oh, some banks misunderstood our intention, when we told them to restrict the lending. And some of the normal projects would not be restricted," blah, blah, blah. And then I think today, or yesterday, one of the state-owned media, Economic Daily again published article about these housing regulations. So I think we're seeing some signs that those things are easing a little bit. So it's not like they are just letting the market die.Bill:Right. Well, and I mean, there are real risks. I mean, there are real risks around ... I mean, I owned property in China for a while, and certainly had lots of friends, including some real estate developers, and people with lots of ... I mean, there was just this sense that, in these previous cycles, they would go until prices started dropping, and there was a risk of people getting really pissed off because they were losing money again.Bill:And so is that one of the things ... I mean, again, it doesn't seem like the prices have dropped that much yet in most places. Is that one of the things to look for, where if we start seeing housing prices actually go negative, is that one of the triggers that makes the government maybe start loosening faster, just because they're worried about how ... I mean, they have their constituency, and people who own property. They do care what they think, right?Chen:Yeah. That's certainly one thing they care about. And I think another thing they care about is the impact on economy, like the GDP, right? The housing and the real sector as a whole, if you found all the upstream industries all together, it'd account for probably one third of Chinese economy. Right? So if you kill the real estate sector, basically you kill the economy. And they can't do that. That's suicide.Bill:No. It's still a quarter of the economy. Right? So somewhere around there, if you add up all the various-Chen:Yeah. Depending on how you estimate, anywhere between 20% to a third, that's kind of the estimation. Yeah.Bill:So, Evergrande, there was a massive freak out over Evergrande. And I think it's maybe even a month ago, or a little longer. Did people overreact to what's going on at Evergrande. And what is going on there? And how do you think it gets resolved?Chen:Yeah. I think it has a little bit of sense that people were a little bit overreacting. I got called by Al Jazeera twice in two days, saying, "We need you to comment on Evergrande." I was like, "Come on, guys. You guys, yeah, are very respectful media TV, but you don't need to tell your audience in Qatar what's going on in Evergrande, in two days in a row. And one of that is a Sunday."Chen:So I was like, "Oh, this is really everywhere. Right? It's not just Bloomberg or Wall Street Journal. This has gone to non-financial media as well." And that was basically the main theme in the last week, or last two weeks of September. Right? So I think there was a little bit of overreaction, especially when you see headlines linking Evergrande to Lehman Brothers, and this sort of thing. And I have to say that this is at least the third time I hear a Chinese Lehman moment in the last ten years.Bill:I was just going to say, is the default analogy when ... Oh my God, China's Lehman moment. And we saw it. I remember it was, I think, 2013, when the interbank market basically went crazy, the end of Q2, early Q3. And I forget the other one. But, no, every time I see someone say, "China's Lehman market," basically, just to be honest, I just tune it out. Because it doesn't fit. And it never has. And if China has a big problem like Lehman Brothers, it won't be like Lehman brothers. It'll be something else, is my view.Chen:Yes, totally. And I don't know that even if Lehman Brothers exist today. I mean, if the same thing happens today, with the current federal reserve, with the current Fed chairman, that this will not have happened. Because they would just do QE.Bill:So what does happen with Evergrande? I mean, how does this thing get resolved?Chen:Evergrande, on the surface, just a very large company, over leveraged, and had a liquidity problem, maybe has solvency problem. We don't really know how much of its assets is real, or how much liability is real. Maybe its liability is a lot more than is stated. It says it has 2 trillion RMB liability, but if it has 2.5 trillion, then the company is insolvent, right? So we don't really know.Chen:And the thing is, we just start to see that this company started to have funding problem, since PBOC introduced the three red lines, because it failed in all the three. Banks were afraid of giving it money, and couldn't refinance in the bank market either. And the trust company, and the trust world that everyone saw, started to have problems. So, basically, with leverage at that size, you have to keep borrowing. To Evergrande, they're reducing the debt. And once that snowball stops moving, then basically you collapse, right? So I guess that's basically what it faced.Chen:And how we're going to resolve it, I think, in the best case scenario, that a lot of the estate projects will just ... First, they have to get it finished. And some of the land, or some other projects be sold to other developers. And Evergrande will downsize to a much smaller developer, and then will start to exist.Chen:And that's quite similar to what Wanda did. Wanda was a much bigger property developer five years ago. But then since has sold a lot of the projects, both in China and overseas. And, basically, right now, it's like a property management company, and doesn't have a lot of power assets. So that's what Wang Jianlin did to save himself, basically, and his company.Chen:So maybe, on Evergrande, if you're rational, you think that's a good scenario. But I think Hui Ka Yan doesn't want to give up. I think that he is betting on another big easing from Beijing. Right? Because he has been in this, I would say, in the live or die moment, at least twice in the last 15 years. Right? The first time I heard about Evergrande was 2007, right? I saw news that Hui Ka Yen was having drinks with the Hong Kong tycoons, and playing mahjong together. And, finally, he received a lot of money from the Hong Kong tycoons. And then that saved him in 2008, when the company was on the edge of collapse.Chen:And the second time was 2015. The company was again on the edge of collapse. And then it bet on a big easing from Beijing, and then property market turned around. It became much bigger. And I think, this time, Hui Ka Yen doesn't want give up. But he did say two weeks ago that he wants to move further from property developing, wants to become electricity car company. God knows whether he can succeed or not, but he's not going to just give up.Bill:Right. Right. No, he's the kind of ... I mean, that's why he's been so successful, and why he's been able to pull this off, right? I mean, he's just going to go until he can't go anymore. And it will be-Chen:Yeah, yeah. I think that the government ... Yeah. Sorry.Bill:No, go ahead. Go ahead, please.Chen:Yeah. I think from the government's perspective, the government would just want Evergrande to downsize, finish the existing projects, pay off your debt. It becomes a smaller company. And then your risk also is a lot smaller. But I'm not sure that's something that Hui Ka Yen has decided to do. Because then he will become a much less relevant person. Right?Bill:Right. And the government does also seem concerned now about the risks of defaults in the overseas debt markets. Right? I mean, it seems like this is the constant tension, right? They want introduce some discipline, and they want to avoid moral hazard, but they can't have a bunch of offshore bonds default in a short period of time. Right? Because then that potentially really screws up the market for them for a while, doesn't it?Chen:Yeah. That's actually an interesting point. Because when people ask me about Evergrande like a month and a half ago, and I was basically saying, "I think the dollar bond market matters the least for Beijing." Right? Because you have a different kind of creditors of Evergrande, right? You have the home buyers, who've paid, but they haven't received the houses. And then you have the construction firms and their workers. And you have the domestic banks, the domestic WMP holders, domestic trust companies. And they all matter a great deal for the Chinese financial system. And the last one is a hedge fund or someone who bought a bond in Hong Kong. But all of a sudden, they had a meeting a week ago, saying, "Hey, guys, we have to have a little bit discipline. Don't just run away. And you have to also take care of your offshore debt." I still haven't figured out why, what changed in their thinking. Maybe this is just a way to calm down the Wall Street. But why did they suddenly feel they have to calm down the Wall Street, six weeks after the crisis happened? I haven't figured out.Chen:My hypothesis is maybe some Wall Street bosses put some pressure on Chinese leadership. I did notice that a lot of the big bankers, and the big American company, and the senior executives had a video conference with Wang Qishan two or three weeks ago, in the name of the Xinhua advisory board.Bill:Right. Right, right, right. That's interesting. And I have to say, I find it very, very strange that the US Secretary of State, Blinken, brought up Evergrande a couple weeks ago, which he made some comment about hoping the Chinese manage ... I forget exactly, but it just-Chen:Well, he was asked by CNN, or someone. Yeah, he was asked.Bill:Oh, was it a response? He was asked? Okay. It just seemed like it was very out of his lane, in terms of what the Secretary of State would talk about. So-Chen:Yeah. He basically said, "People have to act responsibly."Bill:Interesting. I mean, I think it is interesting though. It definitely does seem to be a shift. So, speaking of shifts, I know we only have a few more minutes, but I'd love to get your thoughts on ... Again, this is something lots of people ... Outside of China, I know we're scratching their heads, but certainly folks I've talked to inside China too, are trying to really get their hands around, what does common prosperity mean? And, really, what changes, what policy direction are we really going to see around common prosperity? And there was that strange WeChat post that was from a very sort of Neo-Maoist-Chen:Li GuangmanBill:Yeah, yeah, the very Neo-Maoist blogger, that was picked up over the weekend by the online properties of Xinhua big state media properties, which caused a lot of consternation outside China, but I think inside China as well. And so it seems like the messaging is a little bit mixed, and there's obviously a lot of politics involved. But what do you see, or what's your guys' view, the point of view on what common prosperity means going forward?Chen:Well, we tend to think that common prosperity is next step after President Xi completed the poverty alleviation campaign, right? So after poverty alleviation, in theory, China should have no absolutely poorer people, right? Nobody's living in poverty anymore. And then what's the next step, right? That's not the end. Right? You get out of poverty, but you should get richer, and you have a better life.Chen:So I think that's something that he came up with after that, that we want everyone to have a more decent lifestyle. And, of course, he chose Zhejiang province, a province he spent five years as party secretary to be this pilot program, or pilot area for common prosperity. And the thing about Zhejiang was ... The thing Zhejiang published was rather, I would say, a standard, right? It basically said, "No, we want to increase the household time by one percentage point, or increase the GDP by certain percentage point. And then the equality among different cities should be restricted within a ratio, and people should be able to find the jobs very easily," blah, blah. So a lot like that.Chen:So it's still very pro growth, the Zhejiang plan. But we all know the common prosperity is not only about growth, it's also about redistribution, which is something Zhejiang did not mention very much in his own report, which is understandable. Because that requires tax policy changes that Zhejiang has no say. So Beijing has to decide what kind of tax, what you have to introduce, right? People talk about this property tax, and more pilot programs for property taxes. And then we talk about the consumption taxes. So this kind of stuff, Zhejiang has no say, right? So Beijing has to decide what exactly they're going to do with all these taxes.Chen:So there's certainly an element also about redistribution, restricting certain super rich, and especially those who got rich without behaving, how to say, legally, or you operate in gray area. For many years, there was no law or no regulation. You got rich, but maybe you broke the law. Right? So if you got rich through that channel, then maybe you have to rethink a little bit. Yeah. Or at least you have to change your model completely, because that's no longer tolerated. Right? Because the President did say, "We encourage everyone to work very hard to get rich. And that's great. But we also want to restrict people from getting rich using dodgy channels."Bill:Right. And I think that's what has certainly freaked out a fair number of people. Right? Because it's always unclear what the definition of dodgy or not legal actually is, and how far back they might go. And, that, I think also ties a bit into ... I know you guys have written a fair amount about all these various regulatory actions, and specifically around anti-monopoly policies and regulatory decisions, and also the changing approach to internet platform regulation.Bill:Are we in a new normal, when it comes to regulation? I talk to some people who think this is all passed, and it's going to get better again. But, to my perspective, it really feels like we're in a new era of this kind of stuff. And so, the big internet companies, their businesses are still good, but they're never going to be the same. And it feels like, their costs, they're going to have a lot higher cost base, because they're not going to be able to exploit workers and customers, like the way they used to be able to.Chen:Yeah. I think the compliance cost will certainly be a lot higher than before. And these regulations have passed. And they will stay here. They'll not go away. They'll not be rolled back. So I don't think there's anything like the end of the regulation, or the end of the regulatory competitor. There will be no end.Chen:But I do think maybe the peak is behind us. Think about the largest internet companies in China, Alibaba and Meituan were already punished for antitrust. And the Tencent was not directly affected by the trust, but the gaming thing was also mentioned, and a lot of other guys also name checked, like ByteDance, or Pinduoduo, they were also a little bit worried. So it is hard to say who will be bigger than Alibaba, who will be a bigger victim than Alibaba, it's very hard to ... Unless Tencent suddenly runs into a big trouble. But nobody else is bigger than Alibaba in the Chinese internet domain.Chen:So I guess, after these campaigns, maybe since we settled down a little bit, it will not be over, but we're likely to suddenly see another company find 18 billion RB immediately, or another large fintech company saying, "You have to dissolve, or you have to be separated into different arms." Nobody else is really as big as Ant Right? So I guess maybe we have passed a peak.Chen:And especially, this year, again, I think there's something different about this year, is since the very beginning, Xi made it very clear that this is a year that we don't have to worry very much about economic growth, because it's very easy. Right? They said the growth is targeted at 6% intentionally, which is a target they're going to reach anyway. Right? So, basically, they can do a lot of other things, like structural reforms, and some things they wanted to do in the past, but didn't have the time or the capacity. But, finally, this year, you can spend all your efforts in these things.Chen:But next year will be different again. But next year, actually, we'll go back to the normal China, that you have to be worried about growth target, right? Where is Beijing going to set the growth target? People are debating. I think it's still being something like five and a half percent. And I definitely don't think it'll be lower than 5%. And given the current trajectory, they have to change policy quite a bit to reach either target, especially…Bill:So you're saying, if they decide the target for next year is 5%, they'd have to ease up on some things for next year?Chen:Yeah. I think, five, there is a little bit. And if five and a half, they have to ease quite a lot. And that means you have to be a little bit nicer to companies in general. Right? So, last year in 2020, Xi had several symposiums with various people, and at least two with large companies, right? One, there was a foreign company, the other was all Chinese private firms.Chen:But, this year, at least on the record, I haven't seen any of these kind of symposiums with companies. Right? So he only does that when he's worried about the corporate sector. And, this year, he's not worried, apparently. But, next year, if he's worried again, he could come up, and then they'll have a conversation with these guys in person. And if he does that, then the crackdowns will be a lot softer, at least. Right?Bill:Interesting. So last question, I know you got to go, is what do you think we're going to see out of the sixth plenum, that investors and others should really be paying attention to, that starts ... I guess it starts on Monday and runs through, I think, Thursday next week, right?Chen:Yeah. Yeah. Well, the sixth plenum is all about one thing, right? It's this resolution about the accomplishments of the party in the last one, two years. Right? And I think the previous two resolutions, we had one in 1945, another in 1981, right? Maybe the 1981 one is more relevant, because of course that's more recent, and that was done by Deng Xiaoping. And, without the second, we wouldn't have known there would be another resolution. Right?Chen:But I think this time it's quite different. Because both in the first resolution, basically written by and approved by Chairman Mao, and the second one basically drafted and finally approved by Deng and Chen Yun and other old comrades. But they had to fight with a different ideology. Right?Chen:So in the first resolution, Chairman Mao was basically saying that the party made a lot of mistakes in the 1930s. Right? And ended up then with the Long March. And then we had the Zunyi conference. And then I had to be this poor core. And then the party was saved. Right? So there was a real fight between Mao and a lot of other guys, from Wang Ming and others. So he used that resolution to cement what happened in the party over the past 20 years or so, which was right and which was wrong. So that was basically that resolution was all about.Chen:And the 1981 resolution was similar. Right? So this old comrades had to ... They felt they had to come with something to summarize what happened since 1949, what was right, what was wrong? Where did chairman Mao did right? And where did he did wrong? And what we should do next? Right? So there was a lot of that. And also of course Hua Guofeng at the time was still relevant. Right? So he had to make sure that this 两个凡是, that whatever Mao said, we had to follow. Right? This is...Bill:Yeah, the two whateversChen:Yes. Yeah. So he had to crack that. So, in both occasions, there were clear things they had to correct. But, this time, I really don't think there's a clear thing that President Xi has to correct. Because no one is really arguing something else. And I think they usually talk about their mistakes, or some problems the party had since 1981. Maybe the biggest thing was what happened in the late '80s. Right?Chen:But since 1992, when Deng did this sudden speech, and everything was basically all about the reform, and open up, blah, blah. Of course, we had a little bit of chaos during the 18th party Congress, Bo Xilai and all these guys. But that, I think, was so minor, if you compare all the other accidents the party had over the last 100 years, right? Maybe it's only relevant in the last 40 years. So I think this all ...Chen:And also the name was a little bit different, right? The previous ones were all about resolutions on certain questions of the party's history. Right? And this one is not uncertain questions. There is no question. It is resolution on the party's accomplishments over the last 100 years, and the lessons. So I guess it's a big, big summary about what he has done. And, of course, this one I think will cement him as the core, right? And we have to follow whatever he thinks we should do so, and that's something definitely right.Bill:That's an interesting point, about if it's not actually about certain questions. And probably, certainly, if people want to ahead of this, I think reading that document ... I think it came out in August. It was basically a long piece about the party's accomplishments. I'm guessing that there'll be a lot in this resolution that is very similar to that language.Chen:Yeah, yeah.Bill:Right? I mean, it seems like it's a draft almost. And, really, like you said, it's not about settling a fight that's been going on, so much as more forward working. But so what does that mean? I mean, I assume this will tie into common prosperity. And I guess, this plenum, it really is going to be about this. There's probably nothing from a policy perspective that's going to affect the economy, or how investors should look at China in the near term, right?Chen:Yeah. I guess not that much in the near term. Well, of course, this one will set a stage for next year, where the big thing will happen. So the 20th party Congress, will get them to say, "No, we're going to follow this revolution, and then do whatever we should do in the next few years." Right.Bill:Great. Well, hey, I really appreciate your time. I think really want to thank you for being one of the first guest of Cynicism. And I will put a link to the Plenum website in the show notes. And I highly recommend anyone who is a financial market professional in China, you should go sign up for trial. Like I said, these guys, Chen Long and his team, and the Plenum research product is really quite terrific. So thanks again for your time. And I hope everything stays safe in Beijing. We see lots of headlines about COVID in Beijing right now. But I-Chen:Yeah, it is absolutely safe. If I go out, I may not be able to come back. So it's absolutely safe to stay here.Bill:Right. So you're probably not leaving Beijing until February, right? I mean, is it possible that you really can't leave before the Olympics?Chen:I think I can. I think, after next week, things may be a little bit relaxed. I think it's just partly because of next week, the sixth plenum.Bill:The plenum.Chen:And partly because the COVID clusters are still on the rise. But I think after next week, I might be able to travel a little bit.Bill:Great. Well, anyway, thanks again for your time. And I hope to talk to you soon.Chen:Yeah. Thank you, Bill. Yep. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

Sinocism Podcast #1: Chris Johnson on Us-China relations, Xi Jinping and the 6th Plenum

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021 37:36

Episode Notes:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China strategies Group, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic International Studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. 4:45 on US-China relations - I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.13:30 on the 6th Plenum - The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure. 30:00 on the economy and heading towards the 2022 20th Party Congress - Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.37:00 On US-China relations - I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that…Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated.Links: More about Chris Johnson and his China Strategies Group here.Transcript:Bill Bishop:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy, China strategies Group, senior fellow at the center for strategic international studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. Welcome, Chris.Chris Johnson:Great to be here, Bill.Bill Bishop:Chris, welcome. I think today, what I really like to start out with is just an overview where you see the state of US-China relations and how the new administration, I mean it's 10 months now or thereabouts, but how the new administration is doing and how the Xi Jinping administration is reacting.Chris Johnson:Great. Yeah. Well, it's obviously a unique time in US-China relations. I guess, if I had to characterize it in a phrase, I would say, things are a bit of a mess. I think, if we start, it's useful to start at a sort of high order level and then work our way down in terms of thinking about the relationship. So I think at the highest order, one of the things that strikes me is that arguably for the first time, since normalization of relations, really, we're in this strange position where I think both countries, both leaders and perhaps increasingly, even both peoples, aren't overly keen to engage with one another.Chris Johnson:I think, we've had times in the past during the last several decades where maybe one side or the other was feeling that way, but not both. And the sense that I get in terms of the leader to leader view is, both Xi Jinping and President Biden are kind of looking at each other and saying, "I've got a lot going on at home. I'm very focused on what's happening domestically. I know the other guys out there and I need to pay attention to what he's doing, and right now it's all just his. But, if I can kind of keep him at arm's length, that's okay with me." And I think we're kind of seeing that really on both sides of the fence.Chris Johnson:I think for Xi Jinping, it's a little more intense in that it's hard to see where the good outcomes are for him and trying to lean in toward the relationship and so on, because he's kind of getting what he wants to some degree without doing. So, as to your question about how the administration is doing, I think to be fair, I think we have to say probably about as well as they could given both the domestic constraints, what we might call China's own attitudes and approach toward the relationship right now.Chris Johnson:On the domestic side, by constraints, I mean, the administration from my perspective seems to have an almost neurologically fearful stance of being seen as weak on China. Obviously that comes out of four years of the Trump administration and its approach toward China, stories and tales and recreations of history about how engagement was a failure and how the Obama administration was somehow a main sort of group that failed to understand the reality of the relationship and therefore blew it and a lot of those people are back now. And I think that contributes to this fear. And I think the practical impact of that is that, it's inhibited the administration from doing what I think they need to do, which is to have sort of an objective racking and stacking of what they believe China's global ambitions actually are. And then I think critically beyond that, which of those ambitions the US can live with, because in my assessment, we're going to have to live with at least some of them.Chris Johnson:And then to be fair to the administration, I think that same needed exercise has been hamstrung by China's own approach, which at least so far, I think we could probably characterize as an unflinching resistance that the US must adjust it's as they like to call it hostile attitude, if progress is going to be made. And, it's my sense that there's really little chance of progress of China's unwilling to move off of that stance. But at the same time, I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.Bill Bishop:And, they presented two lists to Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. And, it certainly seems like there are some of the things on that list that are being worked through. To follow up though, what do you think the administration is doing around Taiwan? Because it seems like over the last couple of weeks, we've had quite a push from Secretary of State Lincoln and others on Taiwan and sort of whether or not it's giving them, returning them to the UN or in a seat or at least giving them more participation in UN bodies. What do you think is driving that and what do you think realistically, the administration believes the outcome's going to be because it certainly seems to be touching the most sensitive point on the Chinese side?Chris Johnson:Yeah. Well, my sense of it is that, regardless of the administration's intention, and I'm not entirely sure what the intention is, the results in Beijing are the same, which is to say that there would be a perception there that the US is unilaterally making a change to what they see as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, which is the US adherence to the One China Policy. And, if you're sitting in Beijing's shoes and you're hearing, you're seeing things in the press, you're hearing the president himself say, "Well, we will defend Taiwan." Oops. We didn't mean to say that, but it wasn't, but I didn't misspeak, and these sort of things, and a lot of that has to do with the domestic. Look, the Chinese have never doubted that the US would probably mount some kind of a defense. So, it's not really that issue if the Chinese were to attack. It's the accumulation of what they see as salami slicing erosion of the US commitment to the One China Policy.Chris Johnson:And so in my mind, the only relevant element here is not really the motivations, but what's going on in Xi Jinping's mind. Can he see all of this activity and basically respond by making the appropriate judgment about this erosion in the One China Policy and then quietly taking the appropriate adjustments on war planning and on other things? Or does he feel that with the accumulation of these things, whether it's the debate over whether or not to break with strategic ambiguity, changing the name of Taiwan's defacto embassy in Washington, all these sort things, does he feel that he needs to do something demonstrative now to kind of reset the balance, which was really the motivation behind their military exercises in 1995, '96, for example, when [inaudible 00:07:53] came to the United States?Bill Bishop:And of course back then, they had far less capability as they do now. I mean, certainly, I've heard different things and looked at different reports, but it does sound like the PLA has advanced quite rapidly around in areas that they would be able to bring to bear, to deal with Taiwan from their perspective. And that the US, I think is ... One of the things I worry about is just that there's certainly in some quarters in DC, it seems like there's a belief in the US military power that may not be fully rooted in the new realities of the sort of PLA modernization campaign that really has, I think, dramatically accelerated and did much more efficient under Xi Jinping.Chris Johnson:Yeah, definitely. And primarily to the degree, there's been a chief innovation under Xi's leadership. They've finally taken the steps to address what we might call the software issues. In other words, the technology, the hardware, the shiny kit has been being developed since that '95, '96 period. And they've got some very interesting and capable systems now. But the software, the ability to actually conduct joint operations, these sort of things was always a fall down point for them. And then massive restructuring of the PLAs force structure, much along the lines of sort of Goldwater-Nichols that Xi launched early in his tenure is now bearing a lot of fruit and making them more capable from that sort of software side of things as well.Bill Bishop:And that restructuring, that was something that the PLA or that they talked about doing before but had never, no other leader had been able to push it through.Chris Johnson:Correct.Chris Johnson:Even Deng Xiaoping, who himself tried to do sort of a similar restructuring in the aftermath of Tiananmen and in the aftermath of the Yang period.Bill Bishop:That's interesting. I remember we talked when she convened the second Gutian meeting with all the generals that look clearly in retrospect was the kickoff to I think, a massive corruption crackdown inside the PLA.Chris Johnson:No. I call it political shock and awe which was the twin aspect of force restructuring and the anti-corruption campaign in the military, which basically the back of the PLAs political power in the system from my perspective.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well now moving on to politics, we have the Sixth Plenum. That starts in on the 8th of November, I believe. Can you talk a bit about why those plenums are important and what might be especially interesting about this one? Because, one of the things that we keep hearing about, and certainly there are rumors, but there's also, I think, some certainly the way they describe the agenda for the plenum in the official Xinhua release a couple weeks ago. It sure sounds like they're going to push through a third historical resolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, my sense is that's a forgotten conclusion pretty much at this point. To your first question about why plenums are important. In my mind, I think they're employing both mechanically and substantively. Mechanically, having one once a year, since the reform and opening period started really, and really per the requirement in the party's constitution, that happened once a year. That has been fundamental, I think, to signaling both domestic audiences and international audiences that things in China are relatively stable. So, just look at the brouhaha that that occurred, for example, in this current central committee cycle that we're in the 19th central committee where Xi Jinping snuck in effectively an extra plenum early in the process in early 2018 to get the changes to the constitution about term limits put out there, which then meant they had to advance the third plenum from its normal position in that fall, after a party Congress to the usual second plenum, which manages the national people's Congress changes, personnel changes and so on.Chris Johnson:And then, a perception that the fourth plenum therefore had been delayed because it was more than a year before it actually took place. And you'll recall as well. And we talked a about it at the time, all the speculation. Oh, this means Xi Jinping's in trouble and so on and so forth, non-sense from my point of view. So, that's the mechanical aspect.Chris Johnson:Substantively, obviously I think they're important because outside of the political work report that the sitting party general secretary delivers at the five yearly party congresses, the decision documents as they're usually called that come out of the plenums really reflect the most authoritative venue for the party leadership to signal their priorities, their preoccupations and the policies, of course. And of course, there have been some very important plenums in the party's history, most notably the third plenum of the 11th central committee, which at least the official version is that's when reform and opening was launched. There's a lot of debate about whether that's true or not.Chris Johnson:But, turning to the upcoming six plenum, I think they have made it, as I said, a moment ago, pretty clear that there will be a history resolution. Obviously, there's only been two previous ones in the history of the party. One in 1945 and the other by Mao Zedong and the other in 1981 from Deng Xiaoping, largely closing the book on the mount period, and the culture revolution and so on. So from my perspective, if they do do it this time and I think they will, it it's important for several reasons. The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure.Chris Johnson:I think, he's been there for a good long while. And so, this is just about further articulating his leadership supremacy. And indeed I think, his genius really from the beginning was to frame the party's history in these three distinct eras, each roughly 30 years from the founding of the PRC to Mao's death, Deng's reform, an opening period, and now Xi Jinping's so-called new era. And in fact, I think his signature political achievement, among many political achievements that he's had, has been to canonize that framing these three epics under the banner of Xi Jinping thought with on Chinese characteristics for the new era, so long I can never remember. Let's just call it Xi Thought for shorthand. Yes. And I think, he used it to both effectively erase his two immediate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao from history, which is important and also simultaneously to vault past Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of ideology by getting the autonomous thought. And of course, the next iteration will be to truncate Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name.Bill Bishop:Well, and there are multiple variants. There's thought on diplomacy. There's thought on economics. There's thought on law. Chris Johnson:All of that. And I think, the other thing is this ideological crowning, obviously, the significance of it lies in the codification and probably the legitimization then of the sum of all of his actions and pronouncements since he came to power and the equating of those developments and those statements with the party's line. And as you and I have discussed many times, to criticize Xi now then is not just to attack the man, but to attack the party itself. That's very dangerous. And if you're going to do it, you better get it right.Bill Bishop:To that point, isn't that part of his political genius, because he must have, that must have been by design, right?Chris Johnson:Oh, absolutely. It was completely by design and there was a reason I think why Xi, amongst recent leaders, was the one who, if you spoke to people for example, in the party, the central committee department for party history research, they would say when he was vice president leader in training, he actually cared about party history. Jiang and Hu didn't really care, or at least it wasn't a priority for them. It was very meaningful for Xi Jinping, I think for those reasons. And so, this new history resolution, I think, is important in helping him continue this process toward the next revolution, which is to truncate Xi Jinping thought.Chris Johnson:I think, in terms of the substance of a new resolution, it's my sense that there's a tension, not just in Xi's mind, but perhaps in the leadership circles of the people who are working on this thing, between a desire to make that document, only celebratory and forward looking, in other words, why the new era is so amazing versus a desire to tidy up, if you will, some of the bits from history that he doesn't like with criticism, which of course in a very similar fashion to say, Deng Xiaoping 1981 when criticizing the excesses of the cultural revolution. So in my mind, there's two aspects where that criticism could come to the fore, which are very valuable. The first is, will he do in effect to Deng what Deng did to Mao, which is to criticize the excesses of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies.Bill Bishop:Which would be including criticizing then at least indirectly Hu and Jiang who are still alive.Chris Johnson:Well, we'll come back to that in a minute because I think it's a separate animal, but on the reform and opening piece, it very much relates obviously to common prosperity, to the new development concept. I'm seeing right over the last several months, but I think there's a separate aspect from that kind of economic excesses. There is this line. It was a very fascinating. You never want to put too much emphasis on one piece of propaganda, but I believe it was the 24th of September, People's Daily had their latest iteration in the Xi Jinping thought question and answer series. And, it was about kind of party leadership and so on and so forth. And there was a fascinating line in there in my mind, which was the quote was especially after the 18th party Congress in view of quote, the neglect dilution and weakening of the party's leadership for a period of time.Chris Johnson:Now, what period of time is he talking about? He's talking about the tenures of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. So once again, further re-raising them from history, boosting his own stature and creating a justification for him to certainly rule for a third term. And, who knows beyond that?Bill Bishop:And, having a historical resolution, the third one then really does create the third era, right?Chris Johnson:No. It formalizes the kickoff, if you will, of that new era. Yeah.Bill Bishop:And that's why, I struggle with sort of lots of the rumors. Xi's weak. Xi's up or he's down or there's the latest one is he won't travel abroad because he is worried about a coup. "Hey, it's Chinese politics." Maybe it's true, but it seems a little bit of a stretch to me. But, I look at, again, back to his ... You hear lots of things. And certainly, when I was in Beijing and sort of the, probably not now but back then, the Beijing chattering class. He was never the smart guy. He was always kind of slow. And yet, here we are. And here he is. And so I think, he may not be the best educated of Chinese leaders in some formal perspective, but he certainly seems to be as politically savvy as Deng or Mao.Bill Bishop:I mean, he certainly seems to have surpassed Jiang and Hu, but I think one of the things too, back to this question of, is he weak or will he be around? What's going to happen to the 20th plenum? One of the things I go back to is, when he got, Xi Jinping fought and appended, whatever you want behind it, it's a 19 party congress. Doesn't that basically mean though, that as long as Xi's alive, he's kind of the man? [crosstalk 00:20:16] Even, if someone else has the job title, unless the party changes his line and gets rid of Xi's thought, which seems like it would be extremely difficult for a whole bunch of reasons, ultimately as long as he's breathing, isn't he caught up kind of running the show.Chris Johnson:Yes.Bill Bishop:Or, is that too simplistic?Chris Johnson:Very much the case. And in fact, again, his interest in not just Chinese communist party history, but the communist movements history, you can have no Khruschev secret speech. If you do these sort of things, at least while he's alive, to your point. And I think, that's a very important aspect of what he's trying to do here. He's creating the conditions for him to be able to engage in, to steal Barry Naughton’s term for the economy, grand steer edge of the entire system, and I think, that's a very, very important aspect. And just to your point on the intellectual stuff, because I think it's important, there's a difference between book smarts and political street fighting skills. And probably, his education was disrupted. So probably, he may not be God's gift to intellect, but there's no question in my mind that from a political acumen point of view, he's a genius, a tactical genius.Bill Bishop:And, if you think about what his primary book education was when he was in his most formative years, it was Mao thought.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, definitely. And, I just want to come back to that too, because I think it's so important on what could be the meaning, if you will, of this new history resolution, which is that Xi Jinping clearly has a problem with the period of the nineties and what I actually like to call the early naughties in both of their-Bill Bishop:Otherwise known as the Go-Go Years..Chris Johnson:and being naughty. Yeah. The wild west days. And I think, he feels also that the period in the run up to when he took power ahead of the party Congress in 2012, he in many ways saw that as the period of maximum danger for the party. And so, this will be criticized. There's no way in my mind there won’t be some mention of our friends Bo Xilai,and the characters that were purged at that time, maybe not specifically, but in the sideline propaganda and so on, I'm sure will come up.Bill Bishop:So, because one thing when you talked about the resolution, I mean, and what will be in it and sort of how do you balance the sort of criticism or judgment on the past 30 years with forward looking, I found it interesting in yesterday's People's Daily. I had it in the newsletter yesterday, was that very long piece by the sort of the pen name for the People's Daily theory department on Chinese style modernization, which was very forward looking, but also very global looking in terms of talking about how China has created this new style modernization and how it can be a sort of applicable to other countries. And so, tying that back a little bit to your earlier comment about sort of trying to understand, as you said, the administration's rack and stack, how do we sort of go through what we think they're global, the PRCs global ambitions are and what can we live with what we can, what do you think their global ambitions are?Chris Johnson:Well, there are a series of them in their region, certainly, and we can talk. There's endless debate about whether it extends globally and if so, on what timeline, but they certainly want to be seen as a major superpower. No question. I often like to say that their goal in the region certainly, and I think increasingly globally, is that they want countries when a country is thinking of doing something significant in terms of its policies, the leadership and Xi Jinping himself would like that country's leadership to think about how Xi Jinping's going to react to this in the same moment that they think about how will the US react to this? That's what they're after.Chris Johnson:And in my mind, as to whether it is a desire to subvert the rules based global international order and so on, I'm much more skeptical, I think, than a lot of our colleagues on that in part, because implicit in that is this notion of them sitting around in the Politburo meetings, stroking long beards and looking 50 years into the future. They have an inbox too, and they're not infallible nor are they press the end all the time. And, I just think that, it's too much of a teleological view, from my point of view, but that's certainly one of them.Chris Johnson:And I think, this ties to the history resolution bill, because, Xi, in my mind, needs or wants kind of three things from that. The first is, he too needs to create a justification for staying in power. The reality is, no one can stop what he's trying to do next year, or at least that's my opinion, but what they can do is build leverage for the horse trading for all the other positions that will be in play. If he can be criticized, as someone I spoke to about this situation put it to me, even Mao had to launch the cultural revolution to take control over the party again. In other words, even someone of his stature had to do that.Chris Johnson:Second, and it touches on what we were just discussing is his obsession with China breaking through the middle income trap to further prove the legitimacy of the country. And that means breaking from the old economic model. And third, also relevant to our comments just now is, he sees all of this as intimately bound to what we might call the global narrative competition with the US. In other words, if he can be seen as breaking through the middle income trap, doing a better job than the west on income and equality and so on, he sees that paying tremendous dividends for elevating China system.Bill Bishop:At least so for on dealing with COVID. It's paid dividends.Chris Johnson:Absolutely. Yeah. And, indeed further legitimizing the notion that they have found some third way between capitalism and socialism that not just works for them, but increasingly could be exportable.Bill Bishop:Right. So, it's not like everyone has to become a Marxist, Leninist exactly country, or people's dictatorship, but we have this China, this China solution, I think they call it. And certainly, one thing that's interesting too, I think is, and it hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet in more mainstream media, is this global development initiative that she announced at his speech to the UN in September, which now he is regularly bringing up in his calls with developing countries.Bill Bishop:And, it looks to me like it's effectively taking, it's a way of packaging up their lessons from the poverty alleviation campaign that they declared victory in early this year, and trying to take that global. And quite honestly, the world needs more positive development and if China's offering something that's reasonably attractive in the US or Europe isn't, then how can the US criticize these countries for signing onto it?Chris Johnson:No. I'm mean, increasingly, we always want to say, "Well, nobody wants to sign on to their model" or "It doesn't work in other places", but increasingly, what's the narrative that they're touting? One of it is, "Hey, we brought X hundred million people out of poverty." That's very attractive to some other countries. We have a system that works. We have a system that is tolerant of various and sundry approaches, doesn't insist that you change your governance structure or that you support human rights or avoid graft, and things like this. It's very attractive. But the global development initiative, I think in my mind, increasingly, it's sort of an agglomeration of the BRI aspects. And then, there's been so much attention of recent weeks about, particularly Wang Huning's dream weaving of cultural hegemony and all of these sort of//.Bill Bishop:I think people are a bit overindexing a bit on Wang Huning. [crosstalk 00:28:22] important.Chris Johnson:I know they are. I mean, the line I like to use is they're confusing the musician with the conductor.Bill Bishop:Okay. Oh, so you must be up to date on Xi Jinping thought on music. That's good.Chris Johnson:Exactly. Eventually.Bill Bishop:So, I mean, back to the plenum, moving forward from the next year to the 20th party Congress. I mean, normally, the year before a party Congress is a very, very politically sensitive and difficult year where you have the entire system is geared towards the party Congress and basically one not screwing up. And two, anticipating where the people or persons making the decisions on promotions want you to go in terms of policies. And so, in some way, usually it kind of freezes the system. Is there some risk of a fairly difficult year with China? Because, you've got clearly the economy is, I don't want to say struggling, but it's clearly not doing as well as they hoped.Bill Bishop:They seem to continue to be pushed pretty hard on the third tough battle of reducing financial risks. And specifically, I think evergrande is the poster child of that right now. But, what do you think she believes needs to happen over the next year? And what do you think that means for sort of the stuff, a lot of investors feel worried about around real estate, common prosperity? I mean, it just feels like for the first time in a while, things on the economic side at least look a little bit rickety right now.Chris Johnson:No. I agree with that general assessment. Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.Chris Johnson:This also comes back to the issue though of what I mentioned earlier about the politics. It's been quite striking to me given what a momentous occasion is happening next year, how little in the analysis of the crackdowns, the tech lash, these sort of things, property sector, how little attention's being paid to the political dimension. So for example, if you look at sort of this issue that I raised a moment ago of the danger for Xi is not someone's going to stop him or unseat him, but this issue of ... I think, my sense is he views the model of the changeover next year as being the ninth party Congress where I believe there was something like 80% turnover in the central committee.Bill Bishop:This was the 1969 during the middle of the cultural revolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah, in the midst of cultural revolution.Bill Bishop:And, the eighth party Congress was not five years before it was. There was quite a gap.Chris Johnson:Yeah. Huge gap. Yeah. And so, if he would like to sweep away that kind of level of changeover, that means getting rid of a lot of the dead wood of the other constituent groups, let's call them. And I think, his ability to do that is closely tied to whether they can criticize and what are the KPIs that he has put out for himself for this current term, and you just raised them. It's poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and "guarding against financial risk". I think, we can say on the first two, he's done very well. On the third, it's a bit of a disaster.Chris Johnson:So the message, and I'm told that this was sort of some of the discussion on the margins of Beidaihe this year was that, you've got a year or arguably eight months because of the way the system does these things to get that grade on financial risk from a C-, D+ to an A, and poor Liu He in the role of having to figure out how to make that happen operationally. And I think to your point, oftentimes, we do get that paralysis as everybody's kind of looking over their shoulder. But if anything, I think these guys are more inclined to show they're overfulfilling the plan, if you will, in terms of representation and implementation. So, the risk in my mind is not that the various crackdowns will calm down or smooth out, it's that in their zeal to look like they're doing what the boss wants them to do to hopefully be promoted, they might badly over correct. And that I think, has applications for how they handle Evergrande and many of the other associated crackdowns.Bill Bishop:That's an interesting point. And, one of the things I wonder about because it just seems like she has been quite skillful at finding opportunity and what looks like messes. And, if we're looking at an evaluation in the last 30 years, sort of the historical resolution idea, certainly there's a lot to criticize about the economic model. I mean, they criticize it on a regular basis in terms of trying to transition the new development concept. It's an effectively saying the old model doesn't work anymore. And, one of the biggest problems we created was this massive debt problem for China. Is there a cynical way of looking at it and saying, "Okay, if we have this, we being sort of see the top of the party, we have a fair amount of confidence because we've done a lot, so much work on hardening the system and the stability maintenance system that we can tolerate more stress than people think"?Bill Bishop:And, by letting these things get really stressed, does that help remove some of the dead wood in terms of sort of surfacing officials who might be promotable to actually look like they were somehow culpable for some of the decisions that led to things like ever grand or some of these other messes, and then that clears the way for other personnel moves?Chris Johnson:I think, that's certainly part of it. I think, that might be adopting to sort of micro of a frame on it. I think where it's important is, from the perspective of, again, this is Xi's political genius, from my perspective, is the layering of these narratives in the buildup toward a major change or a major development. So, why in the depths of the trade war? Did you start talking about a new long march? And hardship and sacrifice and all of these things, they're preparing the ground. In some reason, why are they maintaining a COVID zero approach? There's lots of reasons. But one of the reasons in my mind is if indeed you feel you must fundamentally break with that old, dirty economic model, which was largely export led, and you want dual circulation to work and you want these things, why not keep the border closed and force the system to transition because it must?Chris Johnson:So, there's a number of these things where I think, again, I don't like to claim that it's all some master plan, but I think there's a lot of thought that's gone into some of these things.Bill Bishop:But clearly, things like the energy crisis, I mean, they clearly have ... There are a lot of moving parts that can blow up pretty quickly. And so I think, to your earlier point, the politics are always in command in China. I think they're more in command now, but it does just feel like the risks or the downside risks on the economy are greater than they've been in a while.Chris Johnson:Yeah. I mean, my sense is, again, what do the officials and particularly the economic technocrats see as the greatest risk? I think they think the great as risk is overdoing it, not underdoing it at this stage.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well, thanks. Anything else you want to talk about?Chris Johnson:No, I think I kind of covered the waterfront. I mean, I guess in summation, I would just say and it maybe kind of comes back nicely to US-China relationship and so on. Discussing what we've just been discussing, I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that.Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated. And if we have those as our working assumptions, I think we will find ourselves framing a better policy. And I guess, if it doesn't go that way, you could be "pleasantly surprised" or whatever you want to say. But is it really a pleasant surprise if you have a leadership crisis in China?Chris Johnson:I mean, this is another thing I think just in conclusion that I find very striking in the absence of information. And I think, one of the challenges for us as watchers, when a collective leadership system like we had before goes away, each one of those collective, all seven or nine, depending on the timeframe of the standing committee members, they all had coteries under them and so on and so forth. In other words, there was a lot of places to tap in to get insight and compare notes. And so, with Xi Jinping, it's a very small circle, clearly. Even Kurt Campbell and other US officials have discussed their frustration with not being able to get in the inner circle.Chris Johnson:And therefore, people just find themselves going to these memes such as, well, they're will inevitably be a succession crisis when Xi Jinping leaves the scene. In my mind, the biggest opportunity for a massive succession crisis in the history of the PRC was Mao's death. And yet, they managed to find a way largely through Deng Xiaoping. But I think in general, because there was a collective understanding that this whole thing's going to unravel if we don't get it together, China's not so worried about that, nor am I worried about an imminent invasion of Taiwan, but that's probably another podcast.Bill Bishop:That was a whole different podcast. And so ... No. Well, look, thank you so much. It's really great as always to talk to you. And, I do hope I can get you back on as a guest at some point.Chris Johnson:Always glad to do so. Anytime, Bill. And, your newsletter in my mind is the best thing out there in terms of keeping me up to speed and subsequently informed every day.Bill Bishop:Thank you. I didn't pay him to say that just to be clear. But, great. Thank you, Chris. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

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Sinocism Podcast #2: Joanna Chiu on her new book China Unbound

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021 46:42

Episode Notes:Today's guest is Joanna Chiu, a long-time journalist covering China from both inside and outside the country, co-founder and chair of the editorial collective 'NüVoices 女性之音', and the author of the new book "China Unbound." She now covers Canada-China issues for the Toronto Star. Joanna, welcome to the podcast.4:20 on Huawei, Meng Wanzhou and the two Michaels - when the whole Huawei, Meng Wanzhou saga was unfolding, I got so many questions from not just Canadian journalists, but media around the world about what was going on. I think it's surprising to us because we've been in the China-watching bubble, but more broadly, what happened was very shocking for a lot of people all over the world23:20 people like me and my family aren't fully accepted as Canadians or as Australians or as Americans, it's always like a hyphen, like Chinese-Canadian, Chinese-American. That just plays into what Beijing wants. When people of Chinese descent are taken as political prisoners or get calls from Chinese police saying, "Stop supporting Hong Kong on social media or stop doing this," these people get less attention. They're not taken seriously when they try to report what's happening because unfortunately a lot of people in the West have accepted the CCP's myth that we're still essentially Chinese36:20 on Canada-China relations - in Canada, the mood after the Michaels returned and the Meng case was resolved is that they really want to go back to business as usual. To not have any kind of plan in place on how to prevent Canadian hostages from being taken in the future. The Prime Ministers office really steering this even though other parts of government was like, "We need some sort of plan, we need some sort of update to foreign policy in general." There's very little political will.Links: China Unbound on Amazon. Joanna Chiu’s websiteNüVoices 女性之音Transcript:Bill:Hi everyone, today's guest is Joanna Chiu, a long-time journalist covering China from both inside and outside the country, co-founder and chair of the editorial collective 'NüVoices', and the author of the new book "China Unbound." She now covers Canada-China issues for the Toronto Star. Joanna, welcome to the podcast.Joanna:Thank you Bill, thanks for having me on your new podcast, very exciting.Bill:Thanks, yeah you are the second guest, and so I'm really happy to have this opportunity to speak with you. Before we dig into your book, could you tell us a little bit about yourself and how you ended up where you are and doing what you do?Joanna:Okay. I guess my bio is that my family is one of the many who left Hong Kong after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests because my parents were worried about what would happen going forward. So growing up in Canada, I felt that China was actually part of my whole family story because what happened led to my family uprooting themselves. So I was always really interested in China and studied Chinese history and wanted to return to be a reporter to chronicle what was happening in the country, which I was so fascinated by.Joanna:So I started reporting on the ground in Hong Kong in 2012, covering all the things that happened there including the Occupy to pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. I moved to Beijing in 2014 and that's where I started covering basically everything in the whole country for European media outlets, including German, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, and AFP (Agence France-Presse). And I guess my career was a bit unique in that I also free-lanced for several stints. So I got to kind of get a sense of what many different jurisdictions and countries wanted to know about China in my time there writing for all sorts of outlets.Bill:Interesting and so I was there until 2015 and I think we overlapped for just about a year. When did you actually leave China to go back to Canada?Joanna:Yeah, I left China in late 2018. I wanted to stay for longer because even seven years on the ground I felt I barely got to scratch the surface of all the things that I could write about in China. Especially because I had such a broad remit where I was a front-line reporter for all of these major events but also could do basically any feature story I wanted. So it was just totally open and I could have stayed there for decades, but I had to go back to Canada. I got asthma from the smog and I think my Canadian lungs just couldn't handle air. I was just like really allergic to Beijing as soon as I landed and I stuck it out for four years. But back in Canada, I felt I would have to move on from my passion and interest in China, but a couple of months after I returned, Meng Wanzhou, a Huawei executive was detained in the Vancouver International Airport. And just over a week later, two Michaels were detained. So definitely I think that was the biggest China story at the time, and it continued to be very impactful around the world.Joanna:So I started covering that and it just led to basically being a reporter for the Toronto Star, focusing on China. And that's what I've been doing since then. I have also been working on my book since early 2019. So not my plan, but definitely the past decade has been very China focused, including my last few years.Bill:It's great, I've always been a fan of your work, and I will say, it's very interesting how many foreign correspondents used to live in China have left the country. Some willingly, some not willingly, but how it turns out how most of them have found jobs covering how China's impacting the world wherever they're now based.Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative).Bill:I think that's a good segue into talking about your book because it really is true that the China story is everywhere now. And that's something, I think, you try and capture in "China Unbound." So tell us who you wrote it for, why you wrote it, and what do you hope that the readers take away from it?Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative). So when the whole Huawei, Meng Wanzhou saga was unfolding, I got so many questions from not just Canadian journalists, but media around the world about what was going on. I think it's surprising to us because we've been in the China-watching bubble, but more broadly, what happened was very shocking for a lot of people all over the world. They didn't know the context of Beijing's political system and its increasing ... how its authoritarianism translates also into its foreign policy and its stances towards different countries and diaspora groups all over the world. But these things were not just stories I covered, but stories that were close to my life. Because growing up, my father worked for a Chinese-Canadian radio station and people were talking already then about pressure to self-censor, pressure from the Chinese embassy on Canadian media outlets. This was happening in the 90s and people of Chinese descent around the world were trying to have discussions about this, but basically not really getting much traction or broader public attention.Joanna:It did seem ... I will ask you if this is what you felt, but it took two white men from Canada being taken hostage over this high-profile executive's arrest in Canada for a lot of people in the world to be like, "Wait, what's going on? How will Beijing's political system and authoritarianism possibly impact me and my family or my country or my business?" So I wrote this book for basically everyone, targeting the general reader because I really try to be as immediate as possible in my writing. Most of the reporting is eyewitness reporting from myself in collaboration with journalists around the world and looking at how we got to this point. Western countries and China, how we got to this point where it seems like a lot of obstacles that seem insurmountable. All of these tensions, all of these worries.Joanna:I wanted for people to start with this book and then I provided this long reading list at the end so they can continue to be engaging with these issues. Because I feel that we might not have really noticed, but a lot of the narratives around China in the mainstream public have been very very simplified. And that is a disservice to all countries. And especially to the people who end up being targets and whose lives end up being affected by some of these big conflicts going on.Bill:What you said earlier about it really taking two white men, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig to get people's attention. It's interesting because these pressures have existed, as you said talking about your father and his experience, but these pressures on the diaspora have existed for decades. They've certainly intensified, and you have multiple instances of ethnic Chinese who are jailed in China, American, Australian, where it didn't seem to kind of capture the national attention the way that the detention of the two Michaels did. And that's unfortunate, but it does feel like the conversation and awareness now has shifted and so there's a lot more awareness that these kind of pressures are existing across all sorts of communities. You can tell me I'm wrong, but the Chinese government has also shifted its approach, hasn't it? Sort of widened its net in terms of how they pressure?Joanna:Yeah, so in the past, you know the united front, a lot of that work of foreign influence in both intimidation and providing carrots and sticks. Flattering global politicians and global members of the elite among the diaspora have been going on, but the most harsh efforts of influence in the past I think were mostly directed at people of Asian descent. It was only in more recent years where the really harsh tactic, the detentions, have been applied to foreign nationals who are not of Asian descent. It seems like that is a deliberate shift in tactics, would you agree?Bill:No, I would. And I think it's interesting when you look at sort of who they've targeted, especially around the Meng Wanzhou case. Two Canadians were very quickly arrested, a third Canadian who had been convicted of dealing drugs had a re-sentence to death. There's still no word about Schellenberg's fate in the wake of the Meng Wanzhou deal. But I think that one thing that's interesting is they've yet to target Caucasian Americans. And so far, certainly what I was fearing in the Meng Wanzhou incident was that ... someone had told me that they had put together lists who they might target but they held back because part of the messaging is they're at least today not quite ready to go toe-to-toe with the U.S.. But willing to penalize countries and the citizens of the countries that are seen as effectively being U.S. allies or lackeys depending on who you're speaking with. Does that make sense?Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative). Yeah, that makes sense. And my book, people have said that because I'm Canadian and I spotlight countries and experiences like Australia, Italy, Greece, Turkey. So so-called middle powers, that middle-power perspective, whereas many books out of the U.S. and China have it from the U.S. perspective.Bill:Right, right.Joanna:And I think that's important context for Americans to understand because in America, it seems like a lot of it is about this almost glorious competition with China where the U.S. has to win. I have been kind of mortified that people commenting on my book have said things like, "We need to read this so that we can win and not let China win." Things like that. But if they had actually read it, they would have probably seen that that's not right. I criticize the Western nations' handling and attitudes towards China as much as I criticize Beijing's actions. So I would also point out that Australian journalists who are white were affecting. Bill Birtles and Michael Smith spent days holed up in their Australian embassies in China. Basically fleeing because they got tipped off that otherwise they might get detained. Related to Australia's more aggressive critical stance towards China as of late.Bill:And also-Joanna:It does seem-Bill:Sorry, was it also related to the detention of Australian Chinese ... Australian journalist Cheng Lei who was originally Chinese then naturalized into Australian citizenship. And she's disappeared into the system in China, right?Joanna:Yeah, so Cheng Lei ... Again, while she's not a global household name like the two Michaels, she is actually detained. Her case ... we know very little about it, but it seems very clear it's related to the political situation between the two countries. And also Bloomberg journal Haze Fan ... and I think actually Haze's case might be as close as China has gotten so far to targeting Americans because even though a Chinese national, she worked for Bloomberg. She was a prominent journalist for Bloomberg. So it's interesting because writing this book, I'm trying to provide this nuance and context for the public but under so much pressure because of global contexts. Things are so tense that it could get worse at any moment and you don't know. You're hearing from your sources about a list that they were preparing of Americans they could possibly target. The stakes are so high.Joanna:Both of us, these are people we know. I don't know if you knew Kovrig, but it's a relief that he's back.Bill:Not well, but I did know a little bit.Joanna:For the more than 1,000 days he was in detention, I was writing this book and that was always on my mind. It's so immediate and it's so urgent for more people to understand what's going on rather than I think fanning the flames or making things worse or not using the opportunities there are to engage more productively with China. But we see the dialogue on China becoming so toxic right now, where it's almost as if there's two camps. The more extreme on both sides seem to get more airtime and interest. And people want those nuggets of talking points on China that really signify this is how we fight back. Rather than the people who are trying to provide a lot more context. It's not as easy as doing this or that to resolve everything or get what you want.Bill:Well with what you said earlier about sort of "we have to win," I have yet to see a clear definition of the theory of victory and what it is. The other thing I'd say, and this will lead into my next question is, we talk about in many ways how toxic the discourse has gotten in the West. It's also incredibly toxic inside China in very worrisome ways. And in many ways, sort of state-supported and state-encouraged ways. One of the questions I want to ask you is how we ... So first question is as you talk about in the book and you've talked about in other places, this whole discussion around Chinese Communist Party influence or interference in other countries ... Whether it's through the United Front or other means or vectors ... How do we differentiate what we should actually, "we" being the countries that are targeted ... How should you differentiate what actually matters that people should be concerned with versus that's the normal thing that a foreign government would do to try and improve other countries' perceptions of that country and advance their interests in those countries.Bill:And related, as this discourse does get more toxic, how do we talk about these things without tipping into racism? In the U.S. certainly, we have a really long and nasty history of anti-Asian and specifically anti-Chinese racism. And there are a lot of reasons to be very worried about going too far where we're back in a very dark place in terms of how people of Asian and Chinese descent are treated in this country. But at the same time, there are real issues and potential threats coming from some of these PRC activities. So how do we talk about that in a way that effectively deals with the problems but also makes sure that people are safe and able to enjoy the rights that they deserve and have?Joanna:Yeah and that's why I try to provide a lot of that history concisely within each chapter of the book because we need to know what happened before to know to be a lot more careful with our language and our actions now. Because definitely it just seems like history is repeating itself during the McCarthy era. Chinese-Americans' loyalties are constantly questioned, they lost their jobs. And now former President Trump has said that he thinks basically all students are possibly Chinese spies. We've seen these prosecutions of certain Chinese national scientist professors in America that were basically pretty embarrassing.Bill:Yes.Joanna:It seemed a lot of the suspicions were unfounded and it was almost like a witch-hunt which is really difficult. When things seemed politicized and politically motivated and you put a blanket suspicion on all these people, it's exactly what happened in the past.Bill:Mm-hmm (affirmative)Joanna:And it's not just America. It was in Canada, Australia, Europe. In Canada, we had internment of Japanese Canadians during World War II. And people know that this is in the background. And even before things got more tense when a lot of the approach among Western countries towards China was that the goal was to expand trade ties and economic ties as much as possible, there was still a lot of racism. Walking down the street, I got called slurs like the c-word in downtown Vancouver multiple times.Bill:Recently?Joanna:Throughout my life living in Canada. In Vancouver, particularly, there was a long-standing stereotype of the crazy rich Asian that was ruining the city with our Maseratis and condo buying.Bill:Wasn't there a reality show that was based on rich Chinese in Vancouver, I think?Joanna:Yeah, there was that and there's a lot of scapegoating against East Asians for lots of problems with COVID-19 and all this with the two Michaels in Huawei. This just really spiked particularly in countries like Canada, U.S., Australia with the large Chinese diaspora in many places. People who weren't even Chinese, like an indigenous woman in Canada, she was punched in the face. Things like that. And its not like we can throw up our hands and be like, "People are just going to be racist, this is just going to happen." I think a lot of people in positions of influence and politicians need to take responsibility for what they've done to stoke this behavior and not condone it. So talking to certain politicians in Canada in the conservative party, they tell me that there's been a shift in strategy to talk about China as the Chinese Communist Party, the communist regime, to deliberately stir up a red scare. In the U.S. definitely, the FBI in an announcement about one of its investigations into a Chinese American scientist said the words "Chinese Communist regime" or "Chinese Communist government" five times.Bill:That was the announcement about the MIT professor, was it Chen Gang, I think?Joanna:Yeah, I think so.Bill:The prosecutor or the FBI folks up in Boston, I believe.Joanna:Right. Yeah, that was the one. And it's just not necessary. You don't need to ... My argument is that the facts about what Beijing is doing are urgent and sobering enough. You don't really need to embellish it with this language of trying to get people scared of this Communist entity. But perhaps it's more to do with domestic politics in each place. Someone explained it to me in the U.S. where pretty much everyone is critical of China. You don't get more attention by just being moderately critical, you have to be really more extreme. It's as if it's like a competition to be as hawkish as possible to get that acclaim and public support.Bill:And as you said, it's unnecessary because as you just said, the facts can speak for themselves in many areas. And it again, it goes back to how do we have rational discussion about what the problems and challenges are without tipping over into something that's really nasty and scary. It's something I struggle with, obviously in my newsletter, I have ... It's funny when you write about China, I have people who think I'm a CCP apologist and people who think I'm way too hawkish. You sort of can't win, it's such a fraught topic that it is something I struggle with. Because you certainly don't want to be in a position where you're stirring things up, but at the same time you can't just throw up your hands and say, "Well we're not going to deal with this because it's too dangerous." I mean, it's too dangerous the other way too, right? But it's really difficult, and the question I have is, do you think the powers in Beijing understand this? Is this something they try to use or leverage?Joanna:Oh yeah, I think so. I think it plays right into what Beijing wants. Because the myth it has been promoting for years is that China is the center of Chinese civilization even if your family has been away from China for generations, you're still Chinese. And since you're still Chinese, your de-facto leader is still the CCP. It's a legitimate power for all Chinese people. Because people like me and my family aren't fully accepted as Canadians or as Australians or as Americans, it's always like a hyphen, like Chinese-Canadian, Chinese-American. That just plays into what Beijing wants. When people of Chinese descent are taken as political prisoners or get calls from Chinese police saying, "Stop supporting Hong Kong on social media or stop doing this," these people get less attention. They're not taken seriously when they try to report what's happening because unfortunately a lot of people in the West have accepted the CCP's myth that we're still essentially Chinese. It's in the law, if there's dual-nationality, they don't accept the second nationality.Joanna:But even more than that, I still worry that ... it's happened to people like me. I actually gave up my Hong Kong citizenship, I'm only Canadian. But just because of my Chinese blood, I'm at greater risk of whatever repercussions. I've definitely been singled out when I was a foreign correspondent in Beijing for writing too much about human rights. And they did not say the same things about other people in my office. So by not listening to people in the diaspora and still treating them as they're still outsiders, we're with this connection to China whether we agree or not, that's really playing into it. And also when there's this racism, Chinese media, Chinese embassies, they've been really up front about condemning this and using it as a way to shore up loyalty among overseas Chinese, especially people who are more recent immigrants to get that support. There's so many of these China Friendship associations around the world. It's tough to understand their impact because it's all basically legal. They are these groups that openly support Beijing's policies all around the world. And they have, in my reporting, taken part in basically trying to make friends with politicians around the world and using those interviews, events, photographs to turn into propaganda to say, "We got support from this politician." There were groups that have offered money for people to vote for certain candidates in other countries' elections.Joanna:So it's complicated because when these groups are alienated, when they still feel that ... On a pragmatic level, it makes better sense for them to have good relations with Beijing. These groups are going to increase and proliferate and it's hard to understand what they're doing because you don't want to villainize it. In a way it's very natural for people, say, with business ties in China to try to hob-nob with Chinese embassies and try to support them. When I do report on some of these activities like the potential vote buying and interfering in elections, people use it as an excuse to say, "Oh, everyone's like that. All recent immigrants are working for the CCP." And that just puts a lot of reporters and researchers in these really tricky situations where you want to report on what's going on, but because discourse just fails to be nuanced enough, people just kind of take it as a reason to be more hostile and to not really open up their minds that there's a diversity of opinions among Chinese people and the Chinese diaspora.Bill:And it's also hard I think because so much of it happens in Mandarin or other Chinese dialects, so most people who don't speak the language have no idea what's going on.Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative). But it's been such a rich field of potential reporting for me, going back to Canada. It's really, really resitting. I have been able to read all of these reports. I've been able to translate these posts into English for audiences who found it really interesting. But I would argue that it's not actually that hard because there are so many Chinese speakers all over the world. It's not like it's a niche population, like a small population. In these stories where Steve Bannon and Miles Kwok's like cultish group was protesting outside a Canadian journalist's house accusing him of being a Chinese spy, when he was actually critical of Beijing. There were death threats.Bill:They did that to a bunch of people in America too. They had a whole program of targeting people.Joanna:Yeah, New Jersey.Bill:Yeah.Joanna:Yeah, so in that case. In Texas, with Pastor Bob Fu, he was one of the targets. And the FBI came in, the bomb squad, they put him and his family in a safe house. But in Canada, police monitored it, checked in once in a while. I actually sent them videos, like this looks like a death threat. And I actually ... Me and my colleagues, we translated some of this information and we posted it on YouTube to explain what was going on. But then it took three months later, this going on in Canada ... Two of these protestors just savagely beat one of the target's friends. And the police were responding to questions of why didn't you step in earlier, there were death threats? They admitted that they were slow with the investigation because they didn't have Chinese language resources. And that doesn't make sense really, in Vancouver, when there are so many people of Chinese descent. It's not hard to find someone to look at something and translate it to understand it.Joanna:In the conclusion of my book, one of the points I make is that information in Chinese language is treated like a secret code that can't be cracked. Instead, people like Newt Gingrich and other kind of just make things up. In his book, Newt Gingrich ... I don't quite remember but he just provided nonsensical translations of Chinese words and then extrapolated a whole bunch of theories about China based on that. Which is insulting to all of the people, not just of Chinese descent, but people like you who have taken the time to learn Mandarin and to understand China.Bill:There's a lot of that here in the U.S., I don't know how much it exists in other countries. But certainly the taking stuff out of context or just crappy language skills. And then, like you said, extrapolating something much bigger and darker and nefarious than in many cases it actually is, for sure.Joanna:Yeah. In the U.S. people tell me that they do have Chinese speakers, but lower down in the chain who provide reports and information. But going up the chain, the politicians and the pundits, they pick and choose information to support what they believe already. So these researchers feel like they're not even being heard because politicians are just grabbing what they want anyways. In many cases, people of Chinese descent are worried about even going to China or talking about their family in China because they're not going to get promoted to more influential positions. They're not going to get security clearance because the assumption is that if you have any sort of China ties that you might be compromised. And that's a very prejudicious trend in D.C.Bill:When I moved back to D.C. after ten years, I had no interest in working for the government, but I had a funny conversation with someone who does have security clearance. He says, "Don't even bother to apply, you'll never get a security clearance because you lived in China for too long."Joanna:That's crazy.Bill:That's fine, but there are reasons for governments to be concerned with ties to other foreign governments, but certainly for folks of Chinese descent it's much more pernicious. And it does seem like in many places the assumption is that you're potentially at risk of compromise. One of the problems is how people's families are being leveraged back in China. You see it in the way the persecutions of the Uyghurs and Tibetans. But you see it also in Han Chinese, people who are doing things that are considered controversial or anti-China outside of China. It's a very common tactic, right, to harass, hassle, otherwise make difficult for family members back in China, right?Joanna:Yeah, and that is a major ... There's no solution to that. I tried to spotlight a lot of these voices in the book. I spoke with people like Vicky Xu, the campaign against her has just been ridiculous. People made fake porn of her, thousands of accounts were basically attacking her, doxxing her.Bill:I feel like that story didn't get as much attention as maybe it should have. She was just so brutally targeted by very obviously state-backed campaigns.Joanna:Yeah. Very personal and they started with her family. She's been open about that, how her family and parents have been pressured. But she didn't stop her work, so they went further. They sent thousands of accounts and they made fake pornography about her so that when people search in Chinese, that's what comes up. And trying to completely smear her character. But that story did not get that much attention.Bill:This is because of her work at the ASPI down in Australia, right? Specifically around XinjiangJoanna:Xinjiang, yeah. I think she's one of the main researchers in Australia that focused on Xinjiang. The bigger issues looking at supply chains, looking at forced labor, and where internment camps are. Recently she found a trove of police documents about the repression. And because of her fluent Chinese and her networks, she was able to find this and provide this information. So people like her, I think, Beijing wants the most to silence and has the means and leverage to try to do so. I think she's unique in that she continues to do this work. We're not sure for how long because you have to wonder how long someone can take this.Bill:Right.Joanna:More people that I know of are either operating anonymously, they're really providing subtle advising roles to governments in a very very anonymous manner. Because they're worried about their families. Or they're writing under pseudonyms and they don't get a lot of attention because no one knows who they are. They're worried about ... not even access. I think a lot of researchers worry about being able to go back to China. At different levels, people who are worried about the safety of themselves and their family members.Bill:So just given the trajectory of China under Xi Jinping, is there any reason to think this is going to get better? Or are we sort of more close to the beginning of where this trajectory goes?Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative) I think we're kind of at a pivotal point. A lot of it isn't waiting for what Beijing does, but there's a responsibly on Western countries to at least be smarter about China and to have proper expertise in places of governments to try to even have some well thought out policy on these issues. In the U.S. Cabinet, very little China experience. And like we talked about, the people with experience ... They have trouble having influence. And in Canada, the mood after the Michaels returned and the Meng case was resolved is that they really want to go back to business as usual. To not have any kind of plan in place on how to prevent Canadian hostages from being taken in the future. The Prime Ministers office really steering this even though other parts of government was like, "We need some sort of plan, we need some sort of update to foreign policy in general." There's very little political will. I think the amount of criticism in different countries' media doesn't reflect the lack of political will of governments to even put the basic structures in place to understand China better. To be able to translate basic things from Chinese into English to be aware of.Bill:And in Canada, why do you thing that is? Especially given the diversity of Canada and the number of people of Chinese descent in the country. But also what just happened over the last close to three years. Why wouldn't the government have had a bit more of a shift in views of how the relationship in China should go?Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative) I think it's related partly to what we were talking about before where politicians are worried about stoking racism, losing support from Canadians of Chinese descent. Partly an election issue, and I think traditionally in Canada, the main government advisors on China have been people in the business world who do have a vested interest in making sure that tensions are as low as possible to facilitate smoother business interactions. But that's also not even the case where if you ... I think the idea in the West has been reformed through trade. Through interactions, economically, China will naturally liberalize, become more democratic. But in recent years, we've seen political tensions move over to economic coercion, economic retaliation. Not just from China but back and forth, with America, Australia, other countries have also did tit-for-tat trade tariffs. Different ways where the political situation can impact the economic relationships. So it's not even necessarily the case that just by focusing on business, everything will be all good. I think a lot of politicians are trying to put their head in the sands about that and not trying to understand the really complex situation unfolding. And Canadians on the whole, surveys show, pretty frustrated about the situation in action and just passiveness that they see from Ottawa.Bill:I guess the Huawei decision will be interesting, whether or not Huawei is allowed into the Canadian 5G network construction. Certainly here in D.C., there's all the factors you talked about and there's a lot of opportunity for lobbyists from various industries and companies to sort of shift Biden administration and Capitol thinking to policies that are more likely to make money dealing with China. And that certainly has an impact on the policies. So just shifting gears quickly because we're almost out of time and this has been a really great conversation. One of the things we were talking about was lifting up and getting more diversity of voices. Can you tell the listeners about NüVoices and what you helped create there? I found that to be a really wonderful and useful project that's been up for a couple years now? Or has it been three years? Time just sort of blended away with the pandemic, right?Joanna:So actually we were founded in 2017.Bill:Oh my gosh, okay.Joanna:In Beijing, so it's almost under five years. It's been like a daily kind of passion project in the community for me. We kind of wanted to create a more open and accepting China space, both in person with events and chapters around the world and also virtually. And it started in reaction with panels and book deals. The people who get platformed on China are often white male experts. No offense to yourself.Bill:People like me. No, no, I get it. I get it.Joanna:You're one of our longtime supporters and our patrons and we've spoken about how this helps to create a better world for your kids, for your daughters. Because we want to remove any excuses that people have for not even having one woman on their panel. Five years ago, people just kept saying to us and our co-founders, "We tried to find a female expert, but we couldn't find one." Or "We couldn't find a woman on this topic." Which is ridiculous because looking around, actually people we know, I see more women than men entering these fields. Definitely being a journalist in China, there's more women than men. And women who can speak Chinese and doing great work. So we created this open-source directory. Now it has more than 600 people all around the world who are women or non-binary on all sorts of topics. And speaking all sorts of languages in all sorts of time zones. I think just that project alone helped to remove those excuses. Any time someone makes an excuse that they couldn't find a woman, someone just has to send that person the link to this directory. No more excuses.Joanna:And on top of that we have a twice monthly podcast which I co-host sometimes and events all around the world. And basically social groups and networks and it's a platform so that people can benefit from this supportive atmosphere. We really try and celebrate diverse voices on China, experts on China. I find that women tend to ... because they're facing so much discrimination, women experts often have to fight harder to provide unique insights and reporting. So the kind of good quality you get just reaching out to any female expert in China, its a pretty good bet on fresh and interesting perspectives. And definitely I found that the case with my book. Because you know I tried to practice what I preach and most of my sources are coming from diverse backgrounds, women and minorities ... I shouldn't even use the word "minorities", people who aren't white basically.Bill:Mm-hmm (affirmative) right.Joanna:In each country, and I think that provides a different layer than people who enjoy positions of more power in those countries, who might not see some of the more uglier sides or the more complicated sides because that's not their experience. They're not getting the five star treatment when they go to China that a lot people in power do.Bill:It's definitely one of the things I enjoy about your book, it does have these different perspectives that are so important as we are all sort of trying to figure out what's going on and start thinking about what we can do. Specifically, NüVoices, I was looking at the directory last week. I think it's like 620 entries or something, I'm certainly planning to mine it for guests for the podcast because it's a really tremendous resource. And I will put a link to it in the show notes when we publish the podcast. Well thank you so much, is there anything else you'd like to add or say to the audience? Other than buy your book, "China Unbound", it's a great book. Please go ahead and go buy it and read it. It's a great book.Joanna:Just asking yourself, being based in the U.S., what are the best avenues for a more productive conversations on China? Instead of going to people who are more simplistic, what are some more resources you'd recommend? Including, of course your newsletter and that community. But who's doing the work to make up more well-informed approaches?Bill:That's a great question, and I'm not actually sure I have a good answer. I'm struggling with that and part of it is maybe that I'm based in D.C. where it is quite ... It's difficult to be in D.C. and to be not hawkish about China if you want to get ahead in certain parts of the government here. And so, I'm not actually sure. I know that there's China Twitter ... I mean Twitter in general is just kind of a cesspool and China Twitter is not a productive or constructive place for discourse about anything. I don't know, I wish I had a better answer for you, I need to think about it more.Joanna:Mm-hmm (affirmative)Bill:Do you have any guesses or any suggestions?Joanna:I was expecting a more simplified reaction to my book, but actually all the events I've been doing so far are conversations with academics and fellow reporters have been really nuanced. And it seems like there's a hunger for people who want to admit there are no simple solutions and to talk about that. But it doesn't' seem like here's a particular space or a think tank that has that approach. It seems-Bill:The think tanks probably are the place. I mean there are other ... The folks at SupChina are trying to do that. I don't know if you've talked to them. Kaiser's got his podcast and they do their conference. I think their conference ... We're recording on the 1st of November so they're I think next week. But in general, I don't know, it's also ... Like anything, it's hard to have a more textured or kind of deeper discussion in these 30 minute chunks or when you're sitting on a panel. It's just putting in the time and having ... Like you're doing, talking to me and you're talking to lots of people for your book. And this is a topic that has probably come up in most of your conversations and it's just something we're going to have to keep talking about. I know over the next few months there are at least two more books that are coming out about China's influence in the world. And so it'll be interesting to see where those goes in terms of how they impact or move the discourse and how those get played. And again, I think it's like I said, me struggling with how do you address these issues that are very real and influence interference without going overboard and over-exaggerating and destroying innocent people's lives. Which I think has already happened and continues to be a big risk.Joanna:I do think simple answers that people need to pay better attention and not just to get a shallow understanding, but to really understand the nitty-gritty and try to untangle complexities. And support the people who are trying to do this work. A lot of their names are in my book. If you don't want to buy it, flip to the back of the notes and you'll get their names and look up those articles. People like Yangyang Cheng, Helen Gao. People who are straddling both worlds, Chinese and Western. Because of those real lived experiences, their perspectives are just naturally very nuanced and insightful, I think. So people are doing this work, its just they're not the ones on CNN and getting book deals because of structures power. So support NüVoices.Bill:Absolutely. Like you said, I'm a supporter of NüVoices, I'm very happy to put a link to that as well. Support you through Patreon, right? We should move you over to Substack, but that's a different discussion. That's my bias. Well look, thank you so much. It's really been a pleasure to speak with you and I hope that many of you listeners will go out and buy the book. It's really a worthwhile read and Joanna really has great reporting, great perspectives. And this book is really important contribution to the conversation we all need to be having about China and the future and China's role in the world. So thank you and hope to talk to you again soon.Joanna:Thank you so much for all of your work, really platforming those more quality, well-informed sources on China. You've run the newsletter for a long time, so I think that makes a big difference as well because you use your expertise to point people to credible, good sources. So I'll also subscribe to your newsletter.Bill:Thank you. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

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Sinocism Podcast #3: Chen Long on China's economy, Evergrande, Common Prosperity and the 6th Plenum

china economy prosperity chen evergrande china's economy plenum common prosperity sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021

Listen now (37 min) | Episode Notes: 2:20 - I think the economy is a little bit like ice and fire, for now. There are certain areas certainly doing pretty poorly. Of course, everyone always talking about the property market, Evergrande, and basically every couple weeks we see a property developer default…

Sinocism Podcast #1: Chris Johnson on US-China relations, Xi Jinping and the 6th Plenum

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021

Listen now (37 min) | Episode Notes: Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China strategies Group, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic International Studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

ceo china xi jinping us china chris johnson central intelligence agency us china relations party congress plenum strategic international studies sinocism

Sinocism Podcast #2: Joanna Chiu on her new book China Unbound

amazon china voices new books unbound toronto star canada china joanna chiu sinocism

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2021

Listen now | Episode Notes: Links: China Unbound on Amazon. Joanna Chiu’s website NüVoices 女性之音 Transcript: Bill: Hi everyone, today's guest is Joanna Chiu; a long-time journalist covering China from both inside and outside the country, co-founder and chair of the editorial collective 'New Voices', and the author of the new book "China Unbound." She now covers Canada-China issues for the Toronto Star. Joanna, welcome to the podcast.

Substack's founders on the shift from publishers to personalities

PressClub with Josh Constine

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2021 69:31

Top writers are leaving publishers like the New York Times to become newsletter writers on Substack. How will the rise of the solopreneur author impact the future of journalism? Substack co-founders Chris Best and Hamish McKenzie join PressClub host Josh Constine to break down why individuals have more power than organizations in the modern media landscape. Listen to learn:Can newsrooms survive the brain drain?Will creators earn a better living on their own? How did the move from desktop to mobile favor email over websites? Can Substack provide star writers enough growth to earn its 10% cut?Why newsletters are unlocking a weirder, more self-expressive way to build community?Plus, get thoughts on how these trends play out from top Substack writers including NYT columnist Zeynep Tufekci, Sinocism's Bill Bishop, and Ask Polly's Heather Havrilesky. Recorded live on Josh Constine's PressClub, on Clubhouse Thursdays at 6pm PT. Subscribe: http://constine.club/PressClub is one of Clubhouse's first and most popular shows, where top business leaders discuss the big issues. It's hosted by Josh Constine, an investor at early-stage venture fund SignalFire and the former Editor-At-Large of TechCrunch. PressClub is a relaxed venue where luminaries can share their stories, passions, thoughts on trends, and visions of the future. Past guests include the CEOs of Facebook, Instagram, Slack, Shopify, Spotify, Substack, WordPress, Craigslist, Dollar Shave Club, and more. Topics have included the creator economy, back to offices vs remote work, the rise of newsletters, the future of celebrity, the ethics of doxxing, and founders becoming philanthropists. Josh and PressClub's content have recently been covered by the New York Times, TechCrunch, Vogue, Bloomberg, Forbes, AdWeek, USA Today, and more.

Ep. 70: Alaska, “competitive co-existence” & duelling sanctions; Quad outcomes; OECD Cormann

Australia in the World

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 29, 2021 42:27

Whereas the previous episode looked at the early weeks of the Biden administration, this week Allan and Darren examine the new trajectory of US-China relations. A theatrical public session grabbed the headlines when senior officials met in Alaska, but the readouts from the closed door meetings were more positive. What should we take away from the public drama? Within a few days of that first meeting, the atmosphere became tenser with the EU joining the US, UK and Canada in sanctioning certain Chinese officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Beijing was furious, and retaliated with sanctions against EU and UK individuals and entities, including academic researchers and think tanks (after recording, Chinese sanctions were also announced on individuals in the US and Canada). Was this a reciprocal response, or were the Chinese escalating? With ratification of an investment agreement between the EU and China before the European Parliament, the sanctions dispute may end up demonstrating how the “adversarial” dimensions of the China’s relationship with the West can spill over and undermine a “collaborative” enterprise, to use Secretary Blinken’s formulation. And given China’s disdain and vitriol towards any criticism of its human rights record, what can the West hope to achieve in this domain? While Australia did not impose its own sanctions, it supported the effort in a joint statement with New Zealand. Allan and Darren mull over Australia’s own dilemma regarding human rights and China, as well as other news on the relationship. Australia’s Ambassador in Beijing, Graham Fletcher, made some very pointed comments to an Australian business audience, describing the trade disruptions as “vindictive”. Meanwhile, Canberra received support from an unexpected source, the Secretary General of NATO, former Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg, who said China “had behaved very badly against Australia”. As the podcast draws to a close, Allan and Darren consider the outcomes from the Quad leaders’ meeting, which for Darren are a useful indication of the type of international cooperation that could become the norm in the future. Finally, with former Australian Finance Minister Mathias Cormann winning his campaign to be elected the next Secretary General of the OECD, Allan discusses the behind-the-scenes effort that would have gone into the campaign, and the significance of his success for Australia. We thank AIIA intern Dominique Yap for research and audio editing today, and thanks also to Rory Stenning for composing our theme music. Relevant Links “How it happened: Transcript of the US-China opening remarks in Alaska”, Nikkei Asia, 19 March 2021: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happened-Transcript-of-the-US-China-opening-remarks-in-Alaska Xinhua Commentary, “Dialogue, win-win are right choices for China-U.S. relations”, 21 March 2021: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/21/c_139824328.htm Thomas Wright, “The U.S. and China Finally Get Real With Each Other”, The Atlantic, 21 March 2021: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/the-us-and-china-finally-get-real-with-each-other/618345/ Richard Maude, “Australia’s China Debate – Where to Now? Asia Society , 25 March 2021: https://asiasociety.org/australia/australias-china-debate-where-now “EU imposes further sanctions over serious violations of human rights around the world”, Press release, 22 March 2021: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/22/eu-imposes-further-sanctions-over-serious-violations-of-human-rights-around-the-world/ “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant EU Entities and Personnel”, 22 March 2021: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1863106.shtml Bill Bishop, “Xi in Fujian; Xinjiang cotton mess; Yuan Peng on PRC-EU relations”, Sinocism, 26 March 2021: https://sinocism.com/p/xi-in-fujian-xinjiang-cotton-mess Stephen Dziedzic, “Australia's ambassador to China says Beijing's trade behaviour is 'vindictive'”, ABC News, 26 March 2021: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-26/australian-ambassador-to-china-says-trade-behaviour-vindictive/100030700 Latika Bourke, “‘Behaving very badly’: NATO boss has Australia’s back on China ‘bullying’”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2021: https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/behaving-very-badly-nato-boss-has-australia-s-back-on-china-bullying-20210324-p57dgp.html “Quad leaders’ joint statement: ‘The spirit of the Quad’”, 13 March 2021: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-leaders-joint-statement-spirit-quad The Dismal Science podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/the-dismal-science/id1214066345 “Patrick Deneen says liberalism has failed. Is he right? | The Ezra Klein Show”, 1 October 2018: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tuG4kqKCd8

021: Byrne Hobart - Build Recurring Revenue With Your Newsletter

The Nathan Barry Show

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 11, 2021 67:36

Byrne Hobart is a chartered financial analyst who loves writing about the intersection between finance and technology. He writes The Diff, one of Silicon Valley's most popular newsletters. In this episode, we dive into how Byrne launched his newsletter, how much he's earning, and how he publishes five times a week!You'll learn why Byrne isn't worried about pirates getting their hands on paid newsletters, and why you should worry about selling hard enough, instead.Byrne talks about how to build recurring revenue, and writing for different types of readers. He also points out an important factor that affects the churn rate of your newsletter!Byrne shares further insights on using free social media to lead people to the channels you monetize, and why he competes for readers' highest-value time, instead of appealing to the lowest common denominator.Links & Resources Jonathan Haidt - Social psychologist - Author - Professor Manhattan Project - Wikipedia Apollo program - Wikipedia Stratechery by Ben Thompson – On the business, strategy, and impact of technology. BitTorrent - Wikipedia Snopes.com - The definitive fact-checking site and reference source for urban legends, folklore, myths, rumors, and misinformation. Byrne Hobart's Links Sign up for The Diff Medium: Byrne Hobart on Medium Twitter: @ByrneHobart LinkedIn: Byrne Hobart Episode TranscriptByrne: [00:00:00] I wasn't really thinking of the paid newsletter as this is going to be the main thing I do. you look at tech companies, they often have multiple lines of revenue, one thing they do is 95% of revenue. And the next thing they do is 2% of revenue, and when companies get more mature, it's sometimes spreads out a little bit, but early on you find one thing that works really well. And that's what you focus on.Nathan: [00:00:25] Today's interview is with Byrne Hobart who writes The Diff. Now Byrne is a chartered financial analyst who loves writing about the intersection between finance and technology. What's really interesting about his writing is that he's read by basically the who's who of Silicon Valley. So it's not just, you know, a larger email list that we're talking about today, but really we're talking about writing the kind of quality content that, You know, billionaires are reading that.Like I first heard about him from Patrick Collison at Stripe. So this is the kind of thing that a lot of really important, really interesting people are paying attention to.So in this episode, we're going to dive into how he launched his paid newsletter, how much he earns. He publishes five days a week.These are long form detailed con detailed articles that Bern is posting basically five days a week, which is, is a crazy consistency. So his writing process, what inspires them and so much more what's that then.Byrne Welcome to the show.Byrne: [00:01:23] Great to be here.Nathan: [00:01:25] So I've been following your newsletter for awhile and I'd love if you just gave a quick intro from your side what you write about and why you find it interesting.Byrne: [00:01:35] Yeah, sure. So the idea is that I like reading history and I found that if you read We contemporary coverage of things that are happening at any given time you do get a lot of the details and then you get a lot of stuff that ends up being totally irrelevant And a lot of really interesting developments just are below the surface or they they matter in retrospect but no one really understood them at the time And so what I'm always trying to do which is a really high bar to reach is to write Right things today from a perspective that will still make sense it'd be relevant in the distant future So it's basically trying to spot the important technology trends trying to spot what mattered what people thought mattered didn't matter how those perceptions changed how how perception and reality have interacted and the way to do that is one to talk about financial markets because financial markets are Aggregating knowledge preferences expectations et cetera from everyone around the world And then the other thing to do is talk about technology particularly technology companies And the nice one of the nice things about those companies is that they have to be somewhat open because they're all constrained by their ability to hire people And one way to hire people if if you're trying to compete with Facebook and Google and Amazon and Microsoft and they can all offer a really generous comp package The way to hire people is to to give them some expectation that this company is going to be totally transformative and amazing So even if the base pay is not quite what you get at Facebook it's still worth doing either to make an impact on the world or to cash in some stock options So a lot of companies have this incentive to actually tell their story in a way that that doesn't happen as much in in other fields But at the same time companies have an incentive to hide their story Because if the story is we're doing X but we're actually going to kill Google And here's how you don't want Google to know that So there's there's always this corporate stress He doesn't where you have to be really appealing and inspiring but you can't tell the whole truth because it's too dangerous So I try to parse thatNathan: [00:03:42] yeah, I think that's fascinating. And I'm spacing on who talks about this a lot is a book that I read fairly recently, but about how, Now, this is going to bother me of who I never, what book it's from, if you'll know it, but how the closer like a startup is going to talk about how they can create a monopoly and they can have all the success.And then the closer they are to actually creating a monopoly, in and succeeding the less they're like, Oh no, no, no. It's not a monopoly at all. No. W like, look at all this competition. We have, everybody has a competitor.Byrne: [00:04:14] One has that, they have this, this like nber line of. Here's like everyone, if you're, if you're an airline, you're like, here's why we're really special. Here's why everyone loves Delta. And the United is like, no, here's why everyone wants United. And then, if you're Google, you're like, well, we're one advertising company among many.And our customers could go to all sorts of different media, but really Google has a, basically a monopoly on search and search is an incredibly lucrative business, but yeah, they, they can't quite talk about that. And there are, there are other companies that have these little monopolies, like sometimes, If you, if you look at the, some of the large us companies that had large research labs in the thirties, forties, fifties, in some cases it seems like part of the point of those labs was to give them somewhere.Somewhere, they could dp their excess profits so that they just didn't look that profitable. So if you're at and T you have this incredibly lucrative business with network effects, you have a technology advantage. And one thing you could do with that is, just run it for maxim profit margins right now.But the other thing you can do with it, if you're worried about. FDR are complaining that you're terrible people is you hire a bunch of scientists. You tell them, please just work on something. It should help us. But, you know, we just, we w it's basically a way for them to defer their profits to some future that's more politically optimal.And, and then you get lots of wonderful side effects. The transistor.Nathan: [00:05:36] Yeah. Oh, there's so much to that. And so, anyway, I think those are just fun. Examples of ideas on what you tend to write about, kind of staying on the topic before we dive into newsletters specifically, saying on the inflection points in business, I'd love to hear like what, or maybe I'll start with what's one or two that you've seen in particular this year, since this year has been a very transformative year.Byrne: [00:06:00] Yeah. So, you can, you can look at the obvious inflection point of, you know, before we were all going to social gatherings and going out to eat and traveling. And now most of us are not doing very much of that at all, but I think one of the inflections there was, this. It results. Some policy argents about the extent to which you can actually solve a recession just by spending a lot of money.So there's always this concern of if we spend a lot of money it's hyperinflationary, but in an economy that's already pretty levered. There's actually, there's a pretty good argent for having somebody stabilize that. Then you can, you could imagine one steady state where we just don't have as much leverage.And so you don't have as many people who, if they lose their job now, they can't pay their rent. So their landlord. Can't pay their mortgage. So the bank has trouble with its finances and it just, just bounces through the rest of the economy. in a less levered economy, that's just less likely, but in an economy where you have this pretty robust financial system, where a lot of people have, fixed obligations, a lot of companies have fixed obligations.As it turns out when there's a huge demand shock to the system, you can actually just spend a ton of money and, and things start to get better. So it's, One of the worst recessions on record, but one of the short-term sessions on record and, it so far has worked well. there is a question of how technocratic we want things to be.There's also a question of, did we. Did we stop a depression in 2020 and get something worse than 2021. So there's still some open questions, but I think it does. It does tell you that some policymakers have, have more power than, than we thought, or it can have, have more powers they can use for good than we thought.But at the same time, you have a lot of people questioning a lot of powerful institutions because they're, if you go back to the, the discourse on COVID in January and February, it was, it was kind of seen as, as sort of extreme and paranoid to worry about it. There's the famous of box piece. Yeah.These people aren't even shaking people aren't even what's wrong with them. It's, it's no worse than the flu, get a grip America, et cetera. So, we've had some institutions where we've had to seriously question their legitimacy and, a lot of these institutions are fighting back by kind of dodging it like, there's, there's been a bit of soul searching and actually, some of the, one of the Vox writers who had covered COVID early, actually talked about how they're, She could have done more.Her name is escaping me right now, but she actually did a fair amount of soul searching and actually wrote a thoughtful piece on, part of it was on just the factual question of when was it clear that this was a crisis and what, what should be done about it? And then part of it was this meditation on the institutional incentives.So. It's it's tough to be early, especially. if you are a journalist at a large publication, you have this surface area problem where, the bigger the publication is the, the more risk they take from any one person saying something crazy. And, the bigger they are, the more newsworthy it is. If any one person says something crazy.So New York times has a lot of writers and it's also a well-known institution, which means that they actually face a ton of risk from their employees going off the reservation. And. What, what I think you see is that a lot of these institutions they're converging on some range of acceptable discourse, and they're just, they're writing off the set of people who.Don't really think that way, but they're very much speaking to the they're preaching to the choir for the people who do agree with them. So you actually end up with a much stronger filter bubbles, as a result of this questioning of legitimacy. So that's, that's an important inflection point. And, I think the other, the other side of that is that we did learn that.Tech companies broadly defined, did a great job. They sent employees home very early. the internet kept running. So the telcos did, an excellent job at, not allowing that whole system to fall apart. a lot of, retailers, for example, and manufacturers were able to adapt quite quickly. So there were toilet paper shortages briefly, but then, We got more toilet paper.there are still shortages in a couple areas, but, stuff like exercise equipment, it's still hard to find. last time I looked podcasting Mike's were still hard to find, but in a lot of cases, the, some parts of the system were exceptionally adaptable. So in many ways, you know, if you, if you didn't like going out that much, if you were already the kind of person who used a lot of, a lot of grub hub and Postmates, Some things haven't changed that much.In some ways, things are actually easier because now, now if you tell someone I don't want to hang out, we should just chat on zoom. It's actually kind of normal. So, you know, for, for introverts and a lot of these companies are, their workforce tends to be more introverted if they're tech companies, it's, it just hasn't been that big, an impact relative to the worldwide impact.Nathan: [00:10:53] Yeah, that makes sense. Is there something that, you know, we've seen these changes happen right now? The, all the things that work from home and everything else that's right in front of us, but what's something that an inflection point that you think has happened, but we haven't noticed the effects of it and we won't.You know, three years from now, we'll look back and be like, Oh, of course, that changed in 2020. But you know, you think people right now would be surprised or, not actually expect to see that change.Byrne: [00:11:22] Interesting. I think, one of the interesting changes is this, this, in the. Hardware business. And specifically in chips, there's been this narrowing of which companies can effectively manufacturer the most cutting edge chips. if you look at the, the nber of semiconductors, your fabs at, at every node of design, as the nodes get more advanced than nber of fabs, that can actually do the nber of companies that own fabs that can do this.Just diminishes and diminishes and diminishes. And now we're at the point where, the most advanced trips can get made in Taiwan or they can get made in, South Korea. And there's really, no one else has caught up to them. And this is something that, that people are aware of, but I don't know how much we've thought through the implications of, One country that has had, had disputes with China here and there.And, it was at war with them at one point, in the fifties. And then you have another country that China says as part of its territory and so very, very serious, very deep-seated disputes there. so. These, these countries are, are both pretty, more geopolitically tenuous than, than other places in the world.And they are the only place where this really essential set of components gets manufactured. So that's, that is a case where the, the world of geopolitics and macroeconomics starts to intersect with the world of technology. Right. And you started asking what it looks like if, the U S no longer has access to tips, or if China no longer has access to tips, because both of these countries are, very close to the U S diplomatically and, they're, they're close to try to geographically, so it's, it makes the world much more interesting and much more high risk.And it's, it's part of a general force and technology that you end up with. These increases only elaborate supply chains, where there are these really narrow slices that are super profitable. And, as, as they get more profitable, they get harder to duplicate. You end up with more monopolies and those monopolies just, as, as an shrinks from, you know, there are, there are dozens of companies that can do this too.There are two that can do this. Then you have to stop thinking of this as a statistical process and start thinking of it as, That's something closer to a narrative where there, there are these very specific entities. There are specific people in charge. They have particular incentives and they think about things in a particular way, and it really matters for the future, how they think and what they decide.Yeah, that's fascinating. I. You know, from the, the nineties and earlier you think of oil as being that, that resource that is worth fighting Wars over. And so that's fascinating that it could turn into chips and it might not go to Wars, but certainly very heavily, you know, a lot, a lot of, geopolitical issues around that.Yeah, there's this The good Lord, didn't see fit to put oil only in places where we'd like to do business, but we go where the oil is. And you can think about that with chips too, where you, if you were designing a, a supply chain for the U S technology sector from scratch, you probably wouldn't put the most strategic components.All right. Next to a country that is trying to build its own supply chain. And that increasingly sees the U as a major rival. You'd probably arrange it a little bit differently maybe, but these, these plants in, I don't know. England, or maybe you put them in America. And the U S is sort of trying to do that.And the semiconductor industry is lobbying very hard for the U S to do that. Taiwan semiconductor has, has plans to open a facility in the U S and, Samsung is expanding some of their manufacturing in the U S so it's, it's slowly edging over that way, but China has. subsidized that business massively, a friend of mine, Jordan Schneider, who writes a China talk, he estimates that it's something like $1.4 trillion that China has, has spent, or is planning to spend on this industry.So that's clearly, clearly they're taking it very seriously.Nathan: [00:15:23] Yeah. Oh, that's fascinating. So I want to transition right now because, and talk more on the newsletter side. Cause this is a taste of the kind of thing you, you write about and the level of detail that you go into. And so this is why, you know, executives and founders at so many top companies are following your stuff.Cause you're watching. These kinds of trends and seeing, okay, what are the implications of this? And so I'd love to go back a little bit in your story and just, focus on three years ago, five years ago, what, what were you doing? And what's the path that led you to this point of kind of being on the cutting edge of, and the narrative of what's going on in the world.Byrne: [00:16:00] Yeah. Sure. So, mostly doing equity research. So I worked for a while at a hedge fund SAC capital, and then, worked for some research providers who work with ones like that. And, that, that work was actually really fun because the equity research it's, It promotes some really healthy mental habits, because if you were trying to decide if a stock is a buy or a sell, you do want to have your thesis, but you actually want to pay very close attention to who you're arguing with and what their thesis is.Because the most valuable things you learn are from the people who disagree with you. And if you tune out the other side of the argent, then you are necessarily the db bunny. So you can get lucky. You can still make money and that's happened to me, but, You it's, it's a lot smarter to know exactly what these guys are betting against and why you think it's wrong.So that's, and that's. Normally in argents, that's the healthiest way to approach things is you figure out how to reproduce the other person's argent and then you figure out what they're missing or, or you just figure out what fundamental disagreements you have. So a lot of political argents, you think that it's an argent over, over policy outcomes, but it's actually an argent over, what is what's practical to implement?And, there's a Jonathan Haidt has a lot of research on that. Or hight has a lot of research on. And this idea of moral foundations where different people just have different things that they care about or different things that are willing to treat as morally significant. And you can, you can have an argent with someone where it seems like the other person is just, Just promoting something totally inhan and evil, because they have a different set of priorities that they're willing to give credence to.And if they, if they only, if you only cared about the, the care versus harm moral foundation, so it, it, does it hurt people or does it help them? You get one set of conclusions, but if you care about that, but you also care about things like. Respect for, respect for authority and respect for these symbolic things that, that don't have real world value, but do matter, in the abstract, then you get to a different set of policies.And, it's what hight claims is that when people with different moral foundations try to model one another's beliefs, they just tend to asse that if someone waits care versus harm differently, it just means they want to hurt people. Whereas what it actually means is they're balancing a different set of priorities.with finance, you don't really have to worry about moral foundations that much because everyone wants to make money. you can sort of have moral foundations with things like, investing in tobacco stocks, but that's a very quick argent. One person says. This company is a very profitable, and we don't think that they're going to shrink as fast as the market thinks.And then someone else says, yeah, but they cost cancer. So I'm not going to invest in that. So that's a very quick argent. It's not like they have any disputes about fundamentals. They just quickly get to what the substance of the dispute is. And then. When people debate companies like, like Netflix and there, you know, you have one side saying original content is this bottomless money pit.And they have to keep spending more and more and more just to, just to keep up with the other streaming companies. And then someone else says that that's theoretically true, but they actually get economies of scale and they get economies of scale on acquiring users. And so you're, as long as you're amortizing content over a larger and larger user base over time.And as long as you have a lot of pricing power, It doesn't really matter that it's expensive to have this original content. And maybe it's actually good because it means that eventually other companies get scared out of competing in the first place. So you at least figure out what the questions are, what the uncertainties are, and then you start modeling.You start trying to figure out what does it look like if you scale the, the Netflix movie production function up to X or up five X. And then what does it look like when Netflix raises prices in a country like the U S versus what a, what pricing power do they have in. a much poorer country, for example, so that that's a really healthy habit where you're, you're trying to figure out what you actually disagree with people on, and then you want to resolve that disagreement and, and get it right.And. Because prices are set by people who are trading. There's actually an incentive for people to share what they figured out out. If they've figured out something novel and insightful, and they've already made the trade. So a lot of people, well exchange ideas, they debate very vigorously and they're in some sense in some totally cynical utility maximizing, since they're still trying to get at the truth in, in just that narrow domain, but you take the habits from that domain and then you apply them to other areas and it's generally useful.Nathan: [00:20:38] Yeah, that makes sense. Before we get to newsletters, I'm realizing I have one more question. what's something surprising that shaped your view of the world. You have a very unique take. And so I'd love to hear what, you know, what's something that people wouldn't expect that plays into that.Byrne: [00:20:52] Yeah. So I, Very rationalist view of the world. And I'm sure I still, I still try to, I still tend to take a more, more linear left-brained view of things, but, I do think that there's, there are important coordinator functions that are served by these irrational, irrational behaviors.So there. So things like financial bubbles, you can look at a financial bubble as just people being bad at math and paying too much for stuff, investing too much and stuff working too hard on, on, on endeavors that are just not going to have any kind of meaningful payoff, but you can also view a bubble as this coordinating function, where for a lot of complicated technologies, you need a lot of things to go right at once.So you can look at the internet bubble as being this combination of a bubble in, And ISP and telecommunications, but also a bubble in creating content online and also a bubble in selling goods online. If those didn't happen all at the same time, none of them would have been possible. So if you build amazon.com and nobody has internet access, then it's worthless.If you, if you build PayPal and nobody's buying anything online, worthless, but if all of these things are happening at once, then collectively, they are actually worth a lot. It it's still very uncertain. And, a lot of people got burned, including anyone who bought Amazon at the peak. It was a very long time before they got back to breakeven, but it did coordinate all of these developments and build something that was hard to replace.And, I, I think there's a parallel between that and. What happens with successful mega-projects from governments. So, if you look at something like the Manhattan project or the Apollo program, there are all these discrete components that have to be built for the project to work. And if you build one of them and the other one doesn't get built, it's worthless.So you have one group of people designing a bomb, and you have another group of people purifying, vast amounts of the correct urani isotopes to build a bomb. If you purify a bunch of the right isotope, but there's no design for a bomb, then you've wasted a ton of money. And I believe by the end of the war, the investment in that urani project was actually larger than the total investment in the automobile industry at that time.So you would huge project could have been worthless. they did a lot of these things in parallel, so they didn't actually know if the final design would work, but. it's very much like a bubble. You're doing this thing that is irrational at one level, but if everyone's irrational in exactly the same way and you all give up what tasks have to get done, then you end up building something that you could not build on your own.You couldn't build it any scale lower than that.Nathan: [00:23:29] Right. Yeah, that makes sense. Okay. So you're going from the world of finance and, then, just this year, right. You made the switch or was it last year? You made the switch to the newsletter.Byrne: [00:23:40] Yeah. So I, messed around for a while, did a little bit of just freelance writing in a couple of different places and did some consulting. And then I, I started the newsletter, mostly promote other writing. So I've been doing that for about 10 years, just very intermittently.And, I started writing the newsletter more regularly and then charging for it in February of this year.Nathan: [00:24:08] I'm realizing we're gonna publish this in 2021. So I should do it throw a year in there. so let's see. Yeah. I mean, going back through your stuff, you've been writing for a very long time, but publish on medi. Well, before you got started on Substack. Yeah. But to what I'd love to hear what some of the things that you were looking at when it was like, okay, let's change it from, you know, we've been newsletter as a way to.Send my writing to people, right. At that point, it's just a push mechanism. And then that transition to the newsletter as a business. Now, maybe two things, one, what were some of the people you're looking to for inspiration there, who sort of charted that path for you? And then, what were the, the markers that you were looking for for like, Oh, I should actually do this.Byrne: [00:24:55] Yeah, I think so there's There's what you work on and then there's how you monetize it and these can be very different. So Nike, for example, in one sense, they are an ad company. They just found a way to monetize by selling shoes. And they're really good at it. And you can look at a lot of other companies that way that they.They do one thing and then they monetize it through something else. So I, I wasn't really thinking of the paid newsletter as this is going to be the main thing I do. I was thinking of it as I have these different channels andI'm in one channel, someone else owns the platform and I, I I really like working with them and I still write for them.but it's, it's, it's not recurring revenue. And so I wanted to have something that's recurring revenue, what I thought. And I actually, I built this little financial model. Which immediately became obsolete. And I was, I was looking at different income sources, different things I'm working on. And, I thought the newsletter, you know, they could end up being a third of my income.And so I'd have this diversified set of, of different activities I do. And there's one that's recurring, so that's really safe, but it won't be that big, cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But, what I should have been thinking was when you look at any. If if you look at tech companies, they often have multiple lines of revenue.And it's like, one thing they do is 95% of revenue. And the next thing they do is 2% of revenue, but they break even doing that. And then the next thing they do is Piney Teddy's revenue. So, I think, and when they, when companies get more mature, it sometimes spreads out a little bit, but early on you find one thing that works really well.And that that's what you focus on. that's, that's roughly how it happened with the newsletter. I got a couple of people to sign up. It started growing and it just, it grew pretty steadily. Like when I look at the chart, there are these bps, mostly from people recommending it publicly. it's and those, those have happened just periodically pretty much since I started.But a lot of it is just this gradual process of. You send an email and a bunch of people read it and some of them send it to someone else and that person reads it, likes it wants to read more. And I have another subscriber. the, the social proof of you got this paid email from some, you got this email, that's a paid subscription product.And, so the person who's sending it to, you knows you and they know you're interested and they're implicitly endorsing paying for it. That's, that's really powerful. So a lot of it is compounding from that. What that means though, is that posting frequently, as long as you have something to say is really powerful.So if you have. Five opportunities a week to do that instead of two, then the compounding process should happen lot faster and there is a balance to strike, but in general, there's a huge amount of information out there. you can, you can always think of just how much competition there is for people's attention, but a lot of it is for attention that people are implicitly putting zero value on.So a lot of, a lot of us, myself included have this just muscle memory for. I'm bored or I'm waiting for something to happen. I'm going to open a new tab and I'm going to go to hacker news or Reddit or Twitter or something. And that time is not the time I'm competing for. I try to compete for time.That's very, fairly valuable. That's why, the newsletter is an appropriate form factor because it's going into the same inbox as a lot of pretty important stuff. I know some people will filter and sort, but. A lot of people have this default approach of I'm going to get a ton of inbound email and I'm going to manually filter through it and decide what's important.So I'm generally competing for people's attention, against pressing business matters. And that's, that sets a really high bar, but it also, again, adds some social proof where if this is worth the time of a busy person, then it's worth it. to read Nathan: [00:28:42] I think that's something with paid newsletters that people worry about, right. Is that I've put this out there and obviously it's only available to paid subscribers, but are they, everyone has it in their inbox. There's no lock on the version in the inbox. So I can just forward that on people say like, But, you know, what's to prevent someone from just giving it away.And what I hear you saying is nothing. And that's the beauty of it, because worst case I'm not going to forward it to dozens or hundreds of people, I'm going to be like, know, I'm going to send it to my friend, Ryan, Hey, Ryan, you've got to read this. And then that's exactly what you're saying of like, Oh, well, if this is $20 a month, I'm reading it.This was good. Nathan pays for it. So he must think that it's worth paying for every month. So like, you know, the other four articles a week are really good, so sure. I'll subscribe and check it out. And you're right. That's really high. It's social.Byrne: [00:29:32] I would say piracy at some point I'm sure it will be a risk I'm sure it will be a risk and I'm it probably exists in private chat groups that there's some roster of. Here's the pirated Stratechery feed here's the pirated sinuses and feed, etc like that stuff happens, but it's just. Part of what you can take advantage of is it's incredibly embarrassing to ask and it's excruciating to ask multiple times, like, I, I signed up for the information because I was midway through sending someone a text message being like, Hey, I saw another headline from the information.I really want to read this article. And I was just imagining him getting this periodic reminder that I'm cheap and just dismissing it. I know people will pirate it some people will pirate stuff at scale, but they're not really, they're not a huge audience. A lot of people just don't behave that way.And in a lot of cases, what we saw in music and movies was that piracy was about usability. That if, if Netflix and Spotify are more convenient than BitTorrent than BitTorrent, it's still a factor, but it's not a huge factor. And a lot of people graduate, they, they torrent the first alb but they eventually get on Spotify and then it's just too easy.They never stop. And, the, since the economics are a lot better for paid newsletters than for piracy, like, look at the ads that, the torrent sites have to run. Clearly, they are not actually hitting a super high-monetization ultra-desirable audience. So I would expect that as piracy becomes a bigger deal, a the, the newsletter technology companies, the platforms are going to notice it before the individual users do.Users, some users might notice and complain. You know, if they see this reader opened the newsletter 500 times and clicked 2000 times on different links, like, okay, that's something something's going on there. But the people who will notice it at scale and actually start detecting it and perhaps come up with countermeasures perhaps just say going to happen, but it's not economically a huge deal for you.that's, that's probably going to be platform-side Nathan: [00:31:31] Well, I think what's most interesting about it is, is not just that it's a small, like piracy being a small issue, as far as the overall monetary side, like, you know, whatever those people were going to pay you, but also that it may be a benefit of, of exposing new people to it. You know, like your friend who sends you, the information says, Hey, you got to read this article.And then later you're texting him, like, can I read that article as well? You know, he introduced you or she introduced you to that quality of reporting and then kind of got you hooked. And so, you know, it's interesting to think about it being potentially a goodByrne: [00:32:04] Yeah, I, I think Piracy is not just, you get an email that you paid for and you send it to someone like piracy is you, you do that systematically, or like you have a special Gmail that a lot of people log into and maybe, maybe they're paying you like $10 in Bitcoin every year to get access to the giant email list.that's that is, there are definitely, there's like a pretty discreet gap and yeah. It's it's kind of, like you can, there's always the continu of how monetizeable a given media, given the physical instantiation of media can be. if you look at the music industry, you could, you could monetize by selling physical albs.You can monetize through radio, you can monetize through touring. You can monetize through merch there's, there's a whole spectrum of price discrimination and you, you generally want to have some aspects of it that monetize very poorly because they have low frictional cost of sharing. In fact, that's a, there's an interesting dynamic across different media sites where sometimes there is a low-monetization low-friction site.And then there's a high-monetization high-friction site that has the same kind of content. But the, there are people who use both of them and they use one to get followers for the other one. And so you can, there are people who will use TikTok to promote their YouTube channel. They know that YouTube subscribers are stickier, they can get advertising on YouTube.A lot of people including me, will use Twitter to monetize Substack So Twitter by design is supposed to be this ultra-seamless process for sharing stuff and having it go extremely viral. Substack is just not going to be extremely viral. There, there are examples of viral emails, but they're all in the distant past.And it's It's viral. But if you look at the, the forward line, it's like 150 people read about it. And then someone posted it, to Snopes.com or something.Nathan: [00:33:58] Right. So let's dive into that on the growth side. I think Twitter is a very common path for growing a newsletter. They, it just has distribution in a way that. You know, email doesn't have built in, or I should say discovery, as discovery built in, in such a good way, what's worked for you on, on Twitter and maybe a couple of examples of either threads or individual tweets or articles that have been right.Byrne: [00:34:22] No, I have, I don't have a good one sense of what actually works in terms of getting a payoff in subscribers, because it seems to happen. So asynchronously that it's more like. If you, if you tweet and people like it, they will follow you on Twitter. Eventually, if you occasionally tweet links or as I do shamelessly tweet links to your newsletter, eventually some of them will subscribe on the free list if they get enough free issues, some of the most apart from the paid list.So the conversion funnel is really gradual and, because. You don't have, you don't have a good way to track the, the user, path from, they saw someone retweet you, but didn't interact too. They saw a tweet. They followed you all the way down to, they paid you money. it's, it's tough to see them through that entire funnel, unless, well, sub-sect dismissed the rors that Twitter was going to buy them.So that will happen. Probably probably for the better anyway. so it's, it's really tough to say other than just, if you can be the, the Twitter ISE 280 character version of what you are in long form on, on a newsletter, then you will, you'll give people a pretty, pretty close approximation. So I'd say that my Twitter.My Twitter feed. I will sometimes tweet general observations. Sometimes I'll tweet something about a story that I end up writing in more detail for the newsletter. Sometimes I'll ask people questions on Twitter. Like if there's just something where I have an open question, I haven't found a good answer from Googling, and I know there's a good answer out there.I'll ask people. I, I do occasional Twitter things that are just things that have to be that day and it, It feels not, not like a good deal at all for someone to put the email newsletter on their expense account and then get a story about a toddler. So, that does not make it into sub stack, but that's just because a lot of my friends follow me on Twitter.So it's a way of keeping in touch with people. I, one of the things I do on Twitter pretty regularly is when I write a post that is paywall, I will generally tweet out a link to it. And I will often tweet out a screen cap of something I said in that post, the only annoying thing there is that I want the screencap to be interesting, but I don't like to post spoilers.Is one of my rules. So I will, I will often screencap a tangent or a footnote or something else in the piece that just gives you a sense of what I'm writing about, but doesn't give away the whole thing for free. And I don't know, I don't know what percentage of the content ends up being given away for free versus, charged for in theory, I, I tell people I'm going to post three times a week.I generally post five times a week. one of those posts is free and the other one's okay. Walled usually, but I will occasionally take something out behind the paywall. So, I had a piece on Palentier that I wrote after the S one was filed and I was just really proud of it. And, I was also kind of disappointed in the overall media coverage of Palentier, which is some combination of this is the evil empire and this company is fantastically overpriced.But when I looked through the S one, it was clear to me that. There's, it's not logically impossible that they're evil, but if you actually look at what they're saying, and you look at what they're doing, they, they make a pretty coherent case that they are fighting for. Good. And. Later on. There was more commentary on them, some interviews with, with the founders.And it did actually seem like they thought through all of these objections. Like if you're, if you're smart people, if you're, the founders are people who majored in philosophy, like they're, they're these used to thinking about moral issues. obviously majoring, yeah. Philosophy doesn't make you a good person.It makes you a person with a better vocabulary for explaining why you're going to do what you want to do. But at least it means that they, they do have this whole, This whole toolkit for, for wrestling, with these issues. And, almost a lack of plausible deniability. Like you, if you know what, what the great thinkers in history have said about things like, is it moral to help, Bad government do something that is going to cause less harm than if you didn't help them, but they're still doing something bad and maybe you're enabling them to do more.And maybe the more that they do will be worse. Like that's, that's stuff people have been thinking about for a couple thousand years now. So, they had been thinking about that and, I was actually really happy with the feedback on the volunteer piece because a lot of people said this. this explains what this at least gives like this counter view to the view that they're evil.But I also had people ping me privately say, yeah, I worked there and this is, this is actually right. Like we, we do believe we're fighting the good fight. that there's a lot that they can't say publicly, in part, because they're working with the government and like a lot of that stuff should not be publicly disclosed, but, that, that was a piece that I made public.More because I thought that it actually contributed to the overall discourse, but a lot of the, a lot of the stuff stays paywalls and, that's, that's something that if people want to pay for it, they should. And in a lot of cases, like the vast majority of people do not, they sign up for the free version.They don't sign up for the paid version. That's fine. And, I'm happy to write for a large audience and get interesting feedback and be an interesting people. even if there's no monetary component whatsoever to that,Nathan: [00:39:39] On the ratio of free to paid and then also the price. So you went with $20 a month or $220 a year. I'd love to hear. You know, is everyone's so many people are like $5 a month and I'm like, no, no, no. Or more like, raise the price for newsletter. It's not, it's not cite there. but what went into choosing the price that youByrne: [00:40:00] So I originally kind of newsy high quality publications that were at 10. And I saw sinus ism was at 15 and Sinocism struck me as very close to what I'm trying to do, which is provide a lot of depth. and be something that you, you could read on your own, but you could also expense at work.either one would make sense. So I basically just said, I'm going to let these people do their, do my research for me. And since cynicism was near the top of the, the meter board, I just went with that. And then, I decided just to see what would happen if I raised the price of it. So raise the price from 15 to 20, I made a big production about it.So I told people two weeks in advance and then when we can advance them the day of, I was like, you need to subscribe by 11:59 PM Eastern time, or it will permanently be. And then, you know, told them. How much they're saving, if they subscribe now, sub-sect does grandfather people in, which is a huge relief to me because I remembered hearing that somewhere and I wrote it in the newsletter.I was like, if you're a subscriber, don't worry, your grandfather did. And you have nothing, nothing you'd have to do. And then I tried to find where on the substantive website, it actually said that, and I couldn't find it. And I was like, I'm going to be Venmo showing hundreds of people $5 a month every month until everyone turns out.And then I found it in that help page somewhere. So that was a huge relief. Anyway, I did that. I sent the, my one actual sales letter to just the free subscribers and it was fun to write. I used to be a copywriter a long, long time ago, and I always liked these bombastic sales letters. And, I occasionally like reading them, like, I like reading Ramit and his sales letters on money and personal finance and career and stuff.And I know I'm being sold to, but it's actually enjoyable and he's really good at it. So I learned a lot from that. I did the sales letter, many thousands of people opened it and plenty of them converted exactly. One person unsubscribed and said, I didn't like this. It was really salesy, but he wasn't even mean about it.He was just like, this isn't really what I wanted. And I was like, that's fine. So, that works out there's there are these, Metta maltheisms. So. Malthus talked about how, when the population grows, you end up with too many people for your food supply. So it always stabilizes at near starvation. And there are a lot of other phenomenon life like that, where if you're not experiencing problems, you could be going further.So, the, the Peter teal quote is if you've never missed a flight that took your life in airports. And I think with newsletters, it's, if you've never gotten a nasty email or even a slightly peeved email from someone saying you're really selling this too hard, You've never gotten that you are not selling nearly hard enough.And I also think there's, there's this, near-moral obligation to sell your stuff. Well, if you think it's good. And I think that part of why people are reluctant to sell is imposter syndrome or maybe some form of cowardice. It certainly is a reason that I'm sometimes reluctant to sell or has happened in the past.And, I it's, it's a way to signal that you actually believe in what you're doing. If you're willing to slightly embarrass yourself with a sales letter and with a sales pitch, and you were willing to pull all the little copywriter tricks, you know, the bullet points and the endorsements from, from celebrities or e-celebrities all of that stuff.Here's what you're getting. Bam, bam, bam, bam, bam, all that stuff. I think there, there are people who can't get away with it and there are people who can get away with it, but don't try it.Nathan: [00:43:31] I think that's a really good point that, that, that you need to be pushing it to the point where at least some nber of people are complaining. If no one is complaining at all, then you're, you're not charging enough. You're not, you know, something like, you're not confident enough in your own value. Because, yeah, there's always someone to complain on the internet.It's if you've managed to find this perfect community, then, then yet you're selling yourself short. now I want to get into your writing process because five newsletters a week, and you're officially promising three, which is good. Right. We're under promising and over-delivering, I think there's something.You know, you could, take from that, but like Tyler, Cowen has this thing that talks about like, what's the Tyler Cowen production function. Like how does he, he's one of just an incredibly prolific, creator, like what makes him tick? What, like, how does all the work that he does happen? That's the question that I have, you know, just watching all of your stuff.Like what, what is your process? And then, you know, starting from. What sparks the inspiration to all the way through to being able to publish, you know, a detailed well-researched article, every Workday.Byrne: [00:44:43] I've always read a lot and I've gotten more systematic about it now that I have the defacto daily deadline. So I have lots of RSS feeds, probably a hundred. I don't really keep track as a lot of them. It's someone who publishes once a month, but it's always good. And then for some of them, it's, this site publishes 50 or a hundred articles a day.Most of them, you read halfway through the headline and it's garbage, but occasionally you'll see something interesting. In terms of what I read of, I try to read one major business publications business section from each of the 10 largest GDPs, the countries with the 10 largest GDPs. I think there's one or two that I'm missing, but I just try to get this cross section of business stories that are going to be local to one place today, and then they'll get big tomorrow or next week.a lot of blogs, I read, the major tech blogs, and then there's this long tail of things like, Industry specific sites. So someone like a semiconductor digest or ad exchanger, finance sites like pension investment online, a lot of these more niche ones where I'm done, probably not reading every single thing that they post, but, I'm looking at the headlines and I'll often find something worth diving into, when I come up with article topics, the structure of the newsletter by the way is, It's one long form piece, only around a thousand words, but it varies a bit.And then, maybe half a dozen short links with commentary. So. A lot of the things that I read, they end up going into that is short links with commentary thing. And that's what I definitely not trying to do is be one of the morning news dp emails, like the deal email. Cause those are, those are really valuable for knowing everything that's going on.And I try to write for someone who either a. Already gets deal books. So they don't need one more of those emails and there are dozens and dozens of them, or be someone who actually doesn't care what's going on. They care about what's. What's interesting. So it's either, and this is why it's called the diff it's from the, the, the Unix function.So I'm, I'm dipping against, like I'm trying to diff out the, the, the interesting stuff and the inflections from just the general flow of news. So I try to, I try to extract that stuff and, be your value added for people who are already immersed in this stuff all the time, which is like a lot of the finance people who read it or to be what interesting thing happened today to someone who's not reading the daily news, for the longer form pieces, there, there are a lot of ideas that sort of vaguely linger in my head for a while.And then. I eventually write something about them or there'll be a pattern where I noticed that I've, I've seen five different instances of this same kind of thing happening. And so I should write a full story about it. So, one example of that from fairly recently was I noticed that retailers and brick and mortar retailers keep launching some kind of ad business that is adjacent to their e-commerce business.And I was wondering why that was, and I realized that. Amazon did it and did it really well because they have all this first party purchase data. So if you are selling anything, Amazon probably knows everyone, almost everyone in the country who has purchased something like that, or who's statistically likely to purchase that.So they should be really good at targeting ads. If you look at someone like, target or CVS or Walgreens or someone like that, they actually have a lot of this offline purchase data that's tied to individuals and their e-commerce position is relatively weaker, which means that their ratio of. First party purchase data to e-commerce data or to e-commerce revenue is really high.So it actually makes sense for them to monetize some of that through ads rather than through selling products directly. so that's, that was one, one case where there was just this ongoing pattern. Another pretty frequent source of things to write about is companies that are just going public. That's often the first time that you get this look into the unit economics of a company that people have known about for a long time.And, there's this tradition where. Company files their to go public and it gets posted to hacker news. And someone pulls out a line from the risk factors saying this company has never reported an accounting profit, and doesn't expect to necessarily the future and is like, this is a disaster it's worth zero.And someone has to chime in and be like, well, if you look at their free cash flow, they've actually been making more money than they spent for a long time. They just have to appreciation or whatever. But basically having, having a cogent answer to the question of why is this not worthless when the company's not reporting an accounting profit, or if it's really profitable, why is this interesting?So, that's, that's another source. And then sometimes there are just general trends that I might not have written about or general patterns I might not have written about where I think it's worth a long treatment. And, that can be, that can be anything from just an economic phenomenon that I know of that, That isn't talked about that often.So one of my early pieces that I was really happy with was about, this economic law for determining the optimal amount of a resource of a finite resource to extract where the paper was. They went through a bunch of complicated math and the basic argent was your, all you're doing is saying. Do I want money now or money in a year.And, like, do I want to drill for oil now and have money now or drill oil in a year and a half the money then? And that, that depletion rate is determined by how much you expect the price to go up. So it ultimately comes back to interest rates, but. If you, if you actually try to operationalize that the interest rate that you should think about is not just what does a treasury bond yield it's actually like, what, how much do you value money right now versus in the future?And what that means is that in a lot of really unstable countries, it actually makes sense to drill way more or drill for way more oil than you otherwise would because. If you are, I don't know the dictator of Venezuela, you don't actually expect to be in power in 20 years. So even if you think oil is gonna go way up 20 years from now, you actually want to drill for it now and spend the money on tanks.Venezuela is a special case because they also are not currently able to drill for oil at all. And, so there's, there's another way the model breaks down, but I thought it was an interesting model to explore because it's. It's useful directionally. And it's actually a really elegant approach for thinking about the question of depleting a finite resource, and it's always wrong.It never actually describes reality, but the, the gap between the model and reality is actually instructive. And I think that's, that's one of my meta themes is that there are all these interesting theoretical models or interesting analogies that are imperfect, but the ways that they're imperfect actually tell interesting about the world.Nathan: [00:51:30] Yeah, that makes sense. So then, so you're doing all of this research and finding those, those trends. what does it look like when you're actually sitting down to write? Is that, are you dedicating, you know, an hour, three hours, five hours a day to writing what's what'sByrne: [00:51:45] I don't keep great I, I will spend a lot of my day reading, reading books, reading news articles, reading sec filings and academic papers and things. And then at some point I realized that I should actually start writing. And so I started writing, but I kinda zone out and I'm always surprised when I look at the clock, when I'm done writing the newsletter with how late it's gotten.So, it, it is a couple hours of writing, but. I think some of it is like trying to get in the zone and that's just, struggle with distraction and then eventually to start writing. And that just happens pretty smoothly until I'm too tired to go on.Nathan: [00:52:24] Yeah, it sounds like you're, I mean, you're doing the research and reading until the article becomes really clear what you want to write becomes clear. And then, then it's the transition to getting into a focused mode to write that.Byrne: [00:52:38] I used to, before I was writing all the time, I did have a backlog of ideas and I slowly worked through the backlog. And for a while, I was at the point where I never knew what I was going to write next. at this point I do sort of have a backlog, but it's more like, So I would have this list of just here are things I want to write about.And then periodically I'd write about one of them off the list. And what naturally happens is you write about the stuff that you can actually get done. And then you don't read about the stuff that's going to take you. So, the list just keeps getting more ambitious on average because it's always like more and more research is required or you've got to somehow find this dataset and do the statistical model, or like, I had a conversation with a commenter who was asking, he was talking about how, There was this big trend towards business articles about, what American can learn from Japan in the seventies and especially eighties.so it looks like Japan is nber one. Like what, what are they doing differently? Why are these companies just, just annihilating the U S auto industry? What can we learn from them? But there haven't been a lot of books like that about China, even though a lot of the, a lot of Chinese companies are competing really effectively.And, in, in cases like conser internet, they, they seem to be well ahead of the U S companies. And, so we were, what, what ended up coming up was the question of in the 1930s and forties, were people writing these like management secrets of Joseph Stalin pieces on like, how can we compete with Russia there?They had, they were this agrarian nation, and now they're making all this steel and mining all this coal. So, I, I Googled around, I actually couldn't find anything good on that, but I realized that you could actually write something interesting about just. What was Soviet economic policy like, because the country did industrialize at that absolutely enormous han cost, but they did industrialize, it didn't hit first world status, but, well, I guess they were second world by that, that taxonomy.But anyway, they, they were a lot richer, afterwards, and then they went through this long stagnation and decline. So I think learning about what. What the Soviets did. And then what was wrong with it is, is something pretty fun. But the sources that I looked into are pretty extensive. So there's going to be a lot of reading.That's gonna be one of the, the very low ROI posts where it's like, I'm going to read three books and write a thousand words in smary, but I'll probably learn a lot in Bali. Find some useful lessons that can apply somewhere else.Nathan: [00:54:59] It'll turn into more than one post over the next period of time. It may not be a series back to back, but over the course of a year or two, you'll pull in trends from that kind of thing. so there's a huge amount of work that goes into all of this, obviously in the end, the, the effort you think there's, do you think it matters for say the economics of your business, right.To be publishing five times a week versus say two.Byrne: [00:55:25] I'm sure it matters. I think there's, there's definitely room to, to adjust the publishing frequency and there's actually room to adjust the schedule. Like when one of the things I pay really close attention to is why people unsubscribe and there's a field that there's a form they can fill out so they can tell me.And they often do. one of the common things people say is there's too much for them to read. And especially that it's too hard to work through the back catalog. If they haven't been reading it for awhile. And I think that is, that is not really about too much content total. It's about email being a really good form factor for sending high value content that someone's gonna read that day.But it's, it's really tough to work through an archive of email newsletters. That's in your inbox, you might have to do some kind of special search, or you might just be scrolling through your inbox. So you're getting this random assortment of here's you know, an invite to a zoom meetup that I didn't go to.Here's an Amazon receipt. here is an essay and then here's another Amazon receipt and another essay. It's just a weird change in context. So. one of the things I've been thinking very hard about is switching some of the things I write to a longer delivery cadence, I'm basically working on a book and then having the giving the subscribers access to that book and probably doing four posts a week instead of five and spending one day a week.Working just on the book. probably a good trade. It's going to be the same level of output, but, I think the final product is going to be something you can actually binge-conse easily. And I think writing, writing for, habitual snackers and writing for bingers is useful because different people have very different approaches to consing information.I do too. Like I, I will have, have times where I'm going back and forth between a lot of different things and reading. Reading little bits of information here and there when I have time and then periods where I'm just going to sit somewhere forfour hourswith a book Nathan: [00:57:18] Right. I think that's really interesting. Kind of what you're getting at is what's the highest leverage, application of your writing. And so if you're, if you're looking to reach new people and this is probably why people like Tyler Cowen have done really well, right? There's a lot of that is going into another book, you know, or Seth Godin, right.We're into the 22nd book or something, right. That he's put out because he's realized it's the same writing that goes into the newsletter or the blog, or, you know, this idea is just flushed out in longer form, but it's higher leverage and that it's going to reach more people. And so, you know, if you keep a hundred percent of your writing for the newsletter, that's going to have one amount of leverage, which is actually pretty significant leverage, which is why we're all here talking about newsletters because they have great leverage and they're amazing.but if you peel some of that off and say, okay, but this is going into. A book that, you know, then you can reach so many more like CNBC is not going to necessarily have you on to talk about the newsletter. But if the book comes out, then they're like happy to have you on, because that is a format of, you know, authors going on TV tours to promote their book is a well-known thing.And so that would get you a level of exposure that the newsletter wouldn't.Byrne: [00:58:28] Yep. Yeah, that's exactly right. That you, you can, you can package content in different sizes, but it's, in some ways there is just a mental difference between what you're doing when you write. An essay versus a tweet versus a book that with an essay, you can have this more unstructured approach where you're, you're watching stories go by and you're just grabbing something that looks good and turning it into, a quick story or a not so quick story.But then with the book you actually want to come up with, you have to find that idea that's actually worth a books or the material. And then there's a lot of research. So, I am working on a book with a friend and, there's. It's like, I'm working on one chapter and stack of books is about this high that we're going to convert into a chapter in a book and it's going to be great.Cause there's going to be a lot that I'm gonna learn. And it's a, it's a fun topic. The chapter has a fun time. So I'm, I'm excited about it, but that, that is a really different process because. And part of what you're doing is, it's like the newsletter process of there are these themes to talk about and you find different iterations on the theme.So they're always reading a story through a bunch of different lenses and trying to see if there's, if there's some broader trend that this story speaks to or contradicts, but wit

Ep. 62: A wild week in Australia-China relations

Australia in the World

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 2, 2020 25:53

In this emergency episode, Allan and Darren react to a tumultuous few weeks in Australia’s bilateral relationship with China. Events discussed include: the “14 points” document provided by the Chinese embassy to Australian journalists, new anti-dumping duties on Australian wine, PM Morrison’s speech to a UK think tank, and the hugely controversial image depicting an Australian soldier tweeted out by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, and the PM’s call for an apology in response. Relevant links Scott Morrison, “UK Policy Exchange Virtual Address”, 23 November 2020: https://www.pm.gov.au/media/uk-policy-exchange-virtual-address Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson, “A collective approach to countering Chinese economic bullying may be Australia’s best option”, The Guardian, 28 November 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/28/a-collective-approach-to-countering-chinese-economic-bullying-may-be-australias-best-option Bill Bishop, Sinocism newsletter: https://sinocism.com/

australia uk china chinese australian events guardian wild week china relations australia china sinocism

Blogging vs Newsletters and optimizing paid conversations on SubStack with Casey Botticello of Blogging Guide

Newsletter Crew

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 28, 2020 37:34

About this episode: This week we have the successful Casey Botticello with us. Casey is a very successful blogger and newsletter creator. He’s one of the few recipients of the Substack Writers Grant, creator of the Substack Writers Facebook group, and has over 10,000 subscribers on his newsletter called Blogging Guide. In this episode, we’ll cover his perspective on blogging versus newsletters, open rates, and optimizing paid conversions on Substack. We also have a second part of this podcast which will cover how to create digital content to increase ROI and revenue and creative uses of newsletters. To get access to this second part, join the Newsletter Crew community.Episode sponsor: SparkLoopNewsletter Crew Membership (20% discount): https://newslettercrew.memberful.com/checkout?plan=53407&coupon=PODCASTMembership to the Newsletter Crew includes access to successful newsletter creators, helpful vibrant community forums and chat, amazing private content, AMAs, webinars, and so much more.Show Notes & Insights:The funding a16z gave Substack makes them a company to be taken seriously with especially with larger publications.Newsletters have been around since the internet was been around, but Substack was able to create a platform where it had everything a publisher would need to be successful.Substack was able to combine WordPress (CRM) and any email marketing platform into one.Blogs are great to get surface area. You have access to SEO, longer-form writing, and generally more eyes on it. While a newsletter is great for building an audience.Even an archived newsletter probably won’t get as much SEO traffic as a blog.Blogs are mostly meant to be useful pieces of content. While newsletters tend to convey more of the personality of the creator.The medium is the message.There really is no definitive answer on when and what day is the best to post your newsletter.The real difficult part to establish is the date and time for a paid newsletter.Most of the top business newsletters (Stratechery, Sinocism, etc) send their newsletters out between 9 am-10 am, where most business professionals are at their inbox.Some newsletters see higher open rates and free-to-paid conversions around 6 pm. Each newsletter is unique and you should experiment with when to send your newsletter.Send more newsletters to the free subscribers. This will encourage more paid conversions.Deviating from your standard schedule might entice a higher open rate since subscribers could see this as something more actionable than the standard.To increase free-to-paid conversions on Substack, utilize the subscriber welcome page and point them to your best content.On Substack optimize the unfinished email subscription page. This is the email that free subscribers of Substacks get when they haven’t upgraded to a paid version. This should be your professional sales copy page.Provide your paid subscribers clear and demonstrable value with their subscription.Give away and include content upfront with a paid subscription. Show the value of the subscription. This will increase paid conversions guaranteed.Every paid subscriber’s expectations are different, so the safest way to provide value is to over-deliver.If less than 10% of your new subscribers are paid subscribers then you should focus on converting your list more.If over 10% of your new subscribers are paid subscribers then you should focus on more content.Newsletter + Guest Info:Casey Botticello: https://caseybotticello.com/Blogging Guide: https://bloggingguide.substack.com20% discount to Blogging Guide: https://bloggingguide.substack.com/newslettercrew_____________________________________If you’re interested in purchasing the Profitable Newsletter course, please use the link below to help support the show.Profitable Newsletters Course: https://kintuhq.podia.com/a/hdixbNewsletter: Join the newsletter to get amazing curated content on how to be a more successful newsletter creator. Go to https://newslettercrew.com/newsletter.Twitter: https://twitter.com/newslettercrewPatreon: if you’re interested in supporting the show, become a patron here https://www.patreon.com/newslettercrew. We’ll be reading the supporters each week.

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China's Dual Circulation Economy

Modlin Global Analysis Newsletter

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 24, 2020 7:59

In the last week, there has been an increase in the discussions about China’s economic plans and what they might mean. This week we are focusing on the importance of flexibility in state planning and the current emphasis on China’s economic concepts and the domestic and international political environment they are developing within. Thank you for subscribing, and if you enjoy reading this, please forward the newsletter to your friends. ~ KevinQuote: “The great source of both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another. Avarice over-rates the difference between poverty and riches: ambition, that between a private and a public station: vain-glory, that between obscurity and extensive reputation. The person under the influence of any of those extravagant passions, is not only miserable in his actual situation, but is often disposed to disturb the peace of society, in order to arrive at that which he so foolishly admires.” ~ Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments A phrase we heard during the US election in 1992 was “It’s the Economy … Stupid”. As we are aware, this catchphrase knows no geographic bounds. News out of China shows an increased emphasis on the economy and a state-led revival of economic development concepts. This is likely due to several factors, as we will examine. That shift in emphasis on the economy may also suggest some things about the national outlook in China. Dual Circulation Theory is an idea being advanced by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party that emphasizes two forms of growth. Economic growth occurs through the country’s domestic consumption market as well as through exports. No doubt many following China could rightfully point out that this concept is similar to the existing economic engines for China. For China, like most countries, this is a typical approach. It is not unlike a company saying it will turn a profit by providing products and services. Both types of claims are sufficiently broad to be useful to operate within. I think the purpose of this framework in discussing the economy is to create an environment where the broad concept can be employed to explain a whole range of scenarios. Why is this descriptive approach employed? China needs both robust exports and domestic consumption. It is assumed that if exports were to decline due to trade competition and manufacturing shifting away from China, the country does not have an adequate domestic market, at least in the short term, to create sufficient demand to meet its supported production. Therefore, I read this language as a sign that China may be preparing for a transition. As always conditions remain influx. Who would have thought 12 months ago that the US and China would have reached a point where their strained relations could affect trade? The enmity on both sides is shared by politicians and the public, and this can be expected to be a serious conditioning force for some years. In response to the epidemic, China shut down numerous cities and production for months, and initially offered targeted relief to specific population hubs. It has recovered somewhat, but China is still projected to have its lowest annual GDP in decades. This dual approach gives China flexibility to modify and promote efficiency or to start emphasizing either domestic consumption or exports. Bill Bishop anticipates this concept will be featured prominently in the roll-out of the Chinese Communist Party’s 14th Five Year Plan. Just as in the USSR these Five-Year Plans outline a prearranged national focus on production, technology, and development. Under the Plan, the proponents aspire to maintain the advancement of a system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. We may see an increased emphasis on domestic consumption that will occur, either from Say’s Law (“the mere circumstance of creation of one product immediately opens a vent for other products”) or the Chinese Communist Party will say to consume certain goods. The two terms “socialism” and “Chinese characteristics” allow for flexibility in implementation, where China emphasizes each concept as needed. So, too, will the Dual Circulation Theory. Others seem to disagree with this argument of flexibility and suggest this is more about China emphasizing domestic consumption. I think this is a possibility but also under this approach, it would allow for trying to emphasize domestic consumption. In the event it fails, then the approach can be modified. A helpful indicator on this front will be how China frames this approach relative to its Belt and Road Initiative, and what commitments are made under each. From an international perspective that maybe China responding to the regional investment challenges it was facing, even before the outbreak of Covid-19. Whether it be the dual circulation approach, Trump’s tactical use of tariffs on steel and aluminum, or the UK restricting technology, we see some economic self-sufficiency winds blowing. It is unclear how strong the winds are and, as I have argued before, the present is not always a very helpful leading indicator of the future. **Regular China news and analysis, I subscribe to Bishop’s Sinocism on Substack** Speaking of the weather, while folks obsess over trivial debates, China has been hit by an extraordinarily severe rainy season. Huge rains have severely taxed China’s elaborate dam system on the Yangtze river basin, and are responsible for the deaths of hundreds and evacuations in the hundreds of thousands. Chinese authorities have had to continue to reassure the public the largest dam on earth, the Three Gorges Dam, will be able to handle this uncharacteristically heavy rain season.I am enjoying the chance to share these newsletters with you in the form of the new podcasts and appreciate your continued feedback. You can reply to this email or leave your comments below. I sincerely enjoy chatting and learning what folks think. Thank you ~ Kevin Get on the email list at modlinglobal.substack.com

'People want to take back their mind': Substack CEO Chris Best on the growing appetite for paid newsletters

The Digiday Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 18, 2020 40:08

Substack is the newest savior for independent publishing, powering an array of subscription newsletters that give hope to the rise of a new class of journalist entrepreneurs. "On Substack there are people paying more for one individual newsletter than they pay for all of Netflix," CEO Chris Best said on the Digiday Podcast. "And it doesn't really make sense if you think about it just in terms of dollars per hour of entertainment or dollars per word that I read or something like that. There has to be something else going on there." People "want to take back their mind" from the social media platforms that have dominated digital ad dollars, Best added. The service launched in 2017 with just one newsletter: Sinocism, a newsletter on China by Bill Bishop that brought in over $100,000 on its first day (Substack takes a 10% cut of subscriber revenue). "We think that we can make the writers much more money, and much more reliable money, by the way," Best said. "A lot of publications have seen their advertising revenue just tank over the course of the crisis, but people who have a subscriber base -- you know, it's much more steady as you continue to provide value." To help them do that, the company has also been piloting Substack Defender, a resource for journalists who have been threatened by a "scary-looking letter on official-looking letterhead from a lawyer saying a bunch of blustery stuff," in Best's description. Often these letters do the trick, intimidating writers who might not have the knowledge to know a legitimate case from a bogus one.

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NEW Look at China with Bill Bishop (Publisher, Sinocism)

The NEW Look

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 16, 2020 67:23

Over the past three decades, the U.S. made a bet that integrating China into the global economy and international institutions would moderate its behavior. But as we've discovered, the opposite happened. Today, the Chinese Communist Party has grown more aggressive at home and abroad, and as a result, we find ourselves at a key phase of a generational struggle that will define our politics for years to come. What led to the current state of affairs between the U.S. and China, and why did it take the U.S. so long to recognize its policy towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) failed? And what can we learn from our mistakes to ensure that the Free World is well positioned to win this competition? To explore these questions, Rep. Gallagher is joined by Bill Bishop, who publishes the highly-regarded China newsletter, Sinocism. Bill spent more than a decade living in China, and has as good a pulse as anyone on how the U.S. relationship with the CCP has evolved over time. And while the majority of the conversation focuses on General Secretary Xi Jinping's ambitions and the administration's posture towards China, Bill also gives Rep. Gallagher a few pop culture tips, including a compelling way to get Tom Cruise to testify before Congress.

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Sinocism Talks Hong Kong

The Pacific Century

Play Episode Listen Later May 29, 2020 38:58

Recorded May 28, 2020 Misha and John welcome a Bill Bishop, author of the widely-read Sinocism Newsletter, called by some “the presidential daily brief for China hands.” Bishop is an entrepreneur and former media executive with more than a decade living in and decoding China. Misha and John ask him about the importance of the recent National People’s Congress meeting in Beijing and its decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. They end by discussing options for the United States and its allies in response to China’s tightening of control over Hong Kong.

united states china congress hong kong beijing national people bill bishop sinocism

A Pandemic's Origins and Viral Geopolitics

The Open Mind, Hosted by Alexander Heffner

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 16, 2020 38:24

Sinocism newsletter author Bill Bishop discusses the pandemic's origins in China, deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and its impact on the 2020 campaign.

china origins viral geopolitics bill bishop sinocism

Sinocism's Bill Bishop on the Politics of Coronavirus

ChinaTalk

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 25, 2020 41:38

Bill Bishop, author of the Sinocism newsletter, comes on the show to discuss the new low in US-China relations. We start off talking about what China's response to coronavirus has taught us about the CCP and then go into the deeper forces behind why the Chinese government has started to blame America for creating the virus. We also touch on China-Taiwan relations, the role Sinocim plays in agenda-setting, as well as binge-able Chinese tv. Please consider donating to my show's Patreon. TV shows discussed: Da Jiang Da He: ENG SUB | Like A Flowing River - EP 01 [Wang Kai, Yang Shuo，Dong Zi Jian] The Longest Day in Chang An: 【ENG SUB】《长安十二时辰》第1集（易烊千玺 / 雷佳音 / 周一围）| 加入Caravan中文剧场会员，抢先独享全季内容！ Xiao Huan Xi: 小歡喜 01 | A Little Reunion 01（黃磊、海清、陶虹等主演） Story of Yanxi Palace 延禧攻略 01 | Story of Yanxi Palace 01（秦岚、聂远、佘诗曼、吴谨言等主演） Get bonus content on Patreon See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

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Sinocism's Bill Bishop on the Politics of Coronavirus

ChinaEconTalk

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 25, 2020 41:39

america tv china coronavirus politics story chinese caravan us china ccp china taiwan bill bishop sinocism

Panic with friends (18) - with Bill Bishop of Sinocism.com

Lindzanity with Howard Lindzon

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2020 51:13

Should we be panicked over China-US relations? Guest - Bill Bishop, Creator of sinocism.com howardlindzon.com, sinocism.com Twitter: @howardlindzon, @niubi

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#54 — Bill Bishop (Sinocism)

Inside The Newsroom with Daniel Levitt

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2019 48:55

Hello! And welcome to another edition of Inside The Newsroom. Today’s guest is… Bill Bishop, author of the Sinocism newsletter. Bill has covered China for several decades and has become an expert on everything China, so we got into why tensions between the U.S. and China are so bad right now, how bad they are in a historical context, and we also discussed what might or might not happen in the latest debacle between the two countries involving the NBA. Below is a post-game of everything we talked about, enjoy! 🤓🇺🇸🇨🇳The NBA’s Poisoned China ChaliceTwo weeks before the new NBA season was due to start, Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey sent a tweet affirming his support for Hong Kong’s freedom. No big deal, right? Well, as soon as you introduce billions of dollars into the mix, it quickly becomes a major problem. It’s estimated that 800 million people watch the NBA in China, almost three times the entire population of the U.S., resulting in around $4 billion in annual revenue for the NBA.Morey deleted the tweet in a hurry, but he should have known that the internet is an unforgiving place, and the backlash started almost immediately in China. Whether he was instructed to by the NBA and the Rockets or not, Morey quickly issued an apology: While much of the fiasco centred around the NBA’s lack of crisis management, it became clear that on American soil, China vs the U.S. is a bipartisan issue. My God did I never thought I’d agree with Mr. Trusted himself, but we’re in weird times.As it stands, Chinese broadcasters have quietly begun to stream games again after threatening to cancel multibillion dollar contracts, while the NBA has made things 10 times worse by attempting to control the narrative back at home by confiscating signs at games in support of Hong Kong. Bill Bishop, SinocismThe Birth of Chinese NationalismNationalism in China as we know it began on May 4, 1919, when 100,000 Chinese students took to the symbolic Tiananmen Square to protest their country’s paltry reparations for helping the allied forces defeat Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. Although they joined the war late, several hundred thousand Chinese workers significantly boosted the allied powers in France, the Middle East and Russia.In return, China wanted to reclaim Qingdao and the surrounding Shandong Peninsula, after Germany occupied the Chinese port city in 1897. When the victorious allies met in Paris to reshape the world after the war, also known as the Treaty of Versailles, the disputed territory was awarded to Japan, and China was given the cold shoulder.On that fiery day in Tiananmen Square 100 years ago, the huge protests led to the dismissal of three pro-Japanese officials and the resignation of the entire cabinet. Thirty-one countries eventually signed the Treaty, but China wasn’t one of them, and nationalism in China was born.Salvatore Babones, Foreign PolicyI Need DopaminePlease like this post by clicking the ❤️ up top to help feed my unsustainable need for dopamine. Thanks 😘This Is the Worst It’s Been Since the Korean WarThe NBA debacle is symbolic for just how tense relations between the world’s two superpowers are. Things may have never been this bad since the breakout of the Korean War in 1950, when China defended communist North Korea and the U.S. backed South Korea. Through the years, the differences have mainly been over core values — like that thing called freedom of speech — and economic superiority. But in the past couple of years, the pressure has been ratcheted up. Back in March, 2018, Donald Trump issued a sweeping round of tariffs on Chinese goods totalling around $50 billion, and then followed that up with a further $34 billion in tariffs four months later. Naturally, China retaliated with tariffs of its own on U.S. products totalling around $34 billion as well. Then came the Huawei lawsuit against the U.S. for banning federal agencies from buying its products. Huawei is of course the Chinese telecommunications company that is reported to have close links with the Chinese government and thus pose a significant security risk. Naturally, this resulted in another Chinese retaliation and a slew of American companies were blacklisted from operating in China. But that’s nothing new, as the “Great Firewall of China” has been in operation for decades. Exhausted yet?The latest round of economic tit-for-tat is being played out as we speak, and the two countries are finalizing the first part of a massive trade deal that should soothe tensions for the time being. Council on Foreign RelationsWhat’s In the Trade Deal?Talks between the U.S. and China are secretive, but here’s what’s been reported to be included…Want to add Inside The Newsroom to your favorite podcasting app? Well now you can do so by clicking on the button below…Next up… is Lindsay Gibbs, author of the Power Plays newsletter, host of the Burn It All Down podcast and writer for the The Athletic.Related Podcasts#40 — Ben Casselman (New York Times) on how the U.S. economy is performing#34 — Dave Weigel (Washington Post) on the rise of the far left and right in America#24 — Ben Hammersley (Technologist) on the future of technology and the internet Get on the email list at insidethenewsroom.substack.com

#53 — Emily Atkin (Heated 🔥)

Inside The Newsroom with Daniel Levitt

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 29, 2019 40:46

Hello! And welcome to another edition of Inside The Newsroom. Today’s guest is Emily Atkin, author of the Heated newsletter for people pissed off with climate change, and also a contributing editor at the New Republic. Emily and I got really, wait for it… HEATED discussing CNN’s actions, or lack of actions, in the fight against the climate crisis, and we also named the world’s worst polluters. Below is a post-game analysis on everything we discussed. Enjoy 🔥What Is CNN For?CNN is somewhat of an enigma when it comes to the climate crisis. One week they’ll absolutely smash the debate out of the park with seven whole hours of climate town halls, but the next week they failed to raise a single question on the issue at the fourth Democratic presidential debate. People were mad, including Republican governor of Washington Jay Inslee.Now, to be fair to CNN, a seven-hour marathon dedicated to the climate crisis is more than any other cable outlet has done. So thank you CNN for that. But there’s simply no excuse not to keep the conversation going. The very purpose of journalism is to inform the public of the most important issues, and the climate IS among the most important issues we face today.Emily Atkin, HeatedWho Are the Worst Polluters?The Guardian published a bombshell of a series on the world’s biggest polluters. It’s no surprise that the top 20 polluters are all energy or oil companies, including BP whose social media team somehow kept a straight face when it tweeted this pile of s**t. It’s one of the only times I’ve seen a mass list of culprits published like this, which I hope signifies a more aggressive approach from across the media to outing the worst offenders.Matthew Taylor and Jonathan Watts, the GuardianIf you like what you read, how about clicking the ❤️ up top. I’ll be very grateful. 😘Oh Hey Google!One company that didn’t make the top 20 list, but is still far from out of the woods, is our darling search engine Google. Google has made substantial donations to some of the biggest climate deniers, despite creating a mirage that it cares about anything other than money. Most prominent on the list is the Competitive Enterprise Institute, which is the Conservative think tank behind convincing Donald Trump to pull out of the Paris agreement. To be fair, it’s not hard to make Trump do something. Google said that donating to the CEI doesn’t mean it supports climate change denial. But that’s the same old excuse you’ll hear from large companies trying to evade any ounce of responsibility. Mr. Zuckerberg espoused the same strategy last week on Capitol Hill. When Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez questioned why The Daily Caller was part of Facebook’s new factchecking service, Zuckerberg quickly palmed responsibility off to an outsourcer, saying that Facebook didn’t actually appoint who fact-checked the content on its own platform. It’s as if he’s missing the point, but I digress. Google should know that donating to certain Conservative organizations will bring with it a justified backlash, and its b******t excuses aren’t going to slide.Stephanie Kirchgaessner, the GuardianBig Oil, Meet Big TobaccoIt was only 20-odd years ago that the U.S. government finally sued Philip Morris and a group of other large tobacco companies for defrauding the public and hiding the truth about nicotine addiction. Not that I was conscious of what was going on back then, but I can’t believe Big Tobacco got away with it for so long. Even more maddening is that climate journalists have to write strikingly similar words today, as ‘Big Tobacco’ has morphed into ‘Big Oil’. So similar are the two that the same lawyers and PR companies that lied to the public all those decades ago about nicotine, are the same people defending and deflecting for the oil companies today. Sharon Eubanks for the Union of Concerned ScientistsExxon Goes To TrialBUT, as wise as the oil companies think they are, the public are following an old playbook of their own. Just as is the case in the opioid crisis and the ‘techlash’, it’s been the people and individual states that have taken action. Last week, New York’s Attorney General began a trial against ExxonMobil for misleading investors by downplaying how much future environmental regulations could affect its bottom line. It might not be perfect, but it could be a major crack in the armor for the oil industry.Justine Calma, The VergeHave Journalists Made Any Progress Covering the Climate?The answer is yes and no, depending on who you ask. But largely we haven’t been able to grapple with the idea that the climate crisis is among the most important issues we face today, if not the most important. Take a read of this article written back in 2008 by the Columbia Journalism Review, and you’ll see that we’re still discussing similar issues of how to tackle covering climate change more than a decade later.Next up… Bill Bishop, author of the Sinocism newsletter, to talk everything China.Related Podcasts'#42 — Kait Parker (Weather.com) on how the climate crisis has already destroyed lives#37 — Josh Morgerman (aka Hurricane Man) on what he’s seen covering hundreds of hurricanes#30 — Art Markman (University of Texas) on the psychology behind climate apathy#23 — Michael E. Mann (Penn State University) on what we can do tomorrow to reduce our impact on the climate Get on the email list at insidethenewsroom.substack.com

#52 — Katie Notopoulos (BuzzFeed News)

Inside The Newsroom with Daniel Levitt

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 24, 2019 52:05

Hello! Welcome to another episode of Inside The Newsroom. Today’s guest is… Katie Notopoulos! Katie covers internet culture and the tech industry for BuzzFeed News, and has a knack for finding kooky stories. We got into some serious stuff including Facebook’s new advertising tool which allows you to see who has your data, as well as why Apple are masquerading as a privacy champion. Below is everything we talked about, enjoy! 🤓Oh, and if you like what you read, how about clicking the ❤️ up top. I’ll be very grateful. 😘Is Apple Really Our Privacy Savior?Compared with Facebook, Apple is a saint. Its main business model is to sell phones and computers, so it doesn’t have a natural incentive to sell your data to ad companies. Regardless of what it sells, it’s not hard to be seen as the good guy when stood next to Facebook, whose founder and CEO would probably sell his own sisters to advertisers. Apple has hit the PR trail hard recently to tell us that, unlike its competitors, the iPhone maker will not track your data and sell it to marketers. But by the very nature of its products — Apple News+ and Apple Pay to name just two — that’s hard to believe. It’s remarkable, and quite laughable, how much Apple’s classic soft sell adverts have morphed into direct and blunt messages about how terrible its competitors are. Gone are the days of Bono making you want to dance around like a prat in your bedroom. Today, Apple’s USP is fundamental privacy features that should be expected of any company.Katie Notopoulos, BuzzFeed NewsFacebook Is Rubbing Your Data In Your FaceFacebook recently rolled out a new tool that shows you all the previously-hidden advertisers that have your data. On the face of it, this is a positive step toward transparency. But it’s also a semi-admission that there are God-knows-how-many companies out there that have your personal data. According to Facebook, "These advertisers are running ads using a contact list they or their partner uploaded that includes info about you. This info was collected by the advertiser or their partner. Typically this information is your email address or phone number." So it’s telling us that random ass companies have our data, but not how they got it and whether they were complicit in this.Now, seeing the likes of Airbnb or Spotify on the list won’t shock or surprise anyone. But I was weirded out as to why The Fillmore Charlotte, a music venue in Charlotte, North Carolina, had my details considering I’d never stepped foot in the state of North Carolina. This is an attempt by Facebook to showcase itself as transparent, but in reality it’s just a submission of the pressure stemming from a New York Times report that revealed Facebook’s emails to reveal their true mission. Katie Notopoulos, BuzzFeed NewsThe ‘Techlash’ Is Coming…Like with most things, it’s easy to become caught in a bubble and lose sight of whether the ‘average’ person even cares about privacy. Thanks to our friends at the Pew Research Center, we know that consumers are starting to turn against social media and tech companies in what has been dubbed the ‘techlash’. It seems like a million years since The Social Network lit up the box office with almost a quarter of a billion dollars, with Zuckerberg and Facebook riding the feel-good factor that came with the success of the movie. But all good things come to an end. Facebook is now largely seen as the devil of the tech industry, which is pretty well justified after they helped screw up the 2016 election, and then failed to learn anything since. Credit: Pew Research CenterLee Rainie, Pew Research CenterU.S. Government to the Rescue? Social media and tech firms have spent millions in lobbying Congress to let them continue to self-regulate, but it appears the tide is changing. The tech industry has suddenly become more open to the idea of the federal government enacting consumer privacy legislation, but don’t be fooled by their new-found receptiveness. Until now, it’s been individual states that have been the most aggressive in the fight against the tech companies — California was the first in the U.S. to mandate companies notify customers in the event of a data breach — and the likes of Google, Microsoft and Uber know that handing the keys to lawmakers in D.C. will override state laws. Neema Singh Guliani, ACLUPoll Finds Facebook RepugnantA joint poll by Axios and Harris Poll ranked the most beloved, and the most hated, companies among the nation’s most recognizable brands. Apple’s marketing seems to be working and has staved off the techlash for now, but the same can’t be said of Facebook. Among the top 100 brands, Facebook is 94th overall, rubbing shoulders with the likes of Goldman Sachs, Trump Org. and the U.S. Government. Among just tech companies, Zuckerberg ranks dead last. Chris Canipe, AxiosA World Where Public Is the NormThe behaviour by the giants at the top has made way for publicly sharing data to be the norm across the industry. Even the likes of Venmo, whose privacy settings are automatically set to public when you first sign up, have taken advantage of the non-existent laws surrounding protecting user data. Each time you send or receive money from someone, Venmo needlessly posts the details of that transaction to all of your connections. And the consequences of such settings, unbeknown to most of its users, are very damaging. Earlier this year a researcher was able to scrape the Venmo API and download personal details of 115,000 transactions per day. In total, he gathered seven million public transactions which, if in the wrong hands, could then be sold onto marketing companies to start advertising to you. Samantha Cole, ViceNext Week… We’ll have the red hot Emily Atkin on the pod, formerly a climate reporter for the New Republic who recently launched her own newsletter on fighting climate change, aptly named Heated. We’ll also have Bill Bishop on, who also has his own newsletter, Sinocism, which is the No. 1 newsletter on Substack!Related Podcasts#43 — Kashmir Hill (New York Times) on cutting out Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft#41 — Jessica Lessin (The Information) on what it will take to break up Facebook#36 — Sam Biddle (The Intercept) on whether Facebook’s algorithms are sexist and racist Get on the email list at insidethenewsroom.substack.com

NBA/China w/ Bill Bishop of Sinocism; Memphis Grizzlies Outlook w/ Chris Herrington

Dunc'd On Basketball NBA Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 14, 2019 110:19

We wade a lot deeper into the NBA’s quagmire in China with expert Bill Bishop. Topics include: Evaluating the NBA’s response; how the NBA has handled this situation compared to others doing business in China; where that apologetic Weibo message came from; whether the outrage in China was real or manufactured, whether the NBA has any leverage in this situation; how this situation can resolve, and Bill’s advice for Adam Silver. Plus Bill gets into a ton of geopolitical background on these issues. Then Chris Herrington joins to discuss the Memphis Grizzlies’ upcoming season. Topics: what should we expect from tentpoles Jaren Jackson, Jr and Ja Morant, how will their system change under new coach Taylor Jenkins, who is going to play on the wings for this team, and where do we expect the Grizzlies to end up this season. With host Nate Duncan (@NateDuncanNBA). And if you like this pod and want additional bonus content, please subscribe to support Nate and Danny at Patreon.com/DuncanLeroux. Merchandise available at NateDuncanNBA.com, sponsors list also available at NateDuncanNBA.com.

china nba basketball outlook free agency evaluating nba draft nba free agency ja morant grizzlies merchandise memphis grizzlies salary caps adam silver nba podcast basketball podcast weibo jaren jackson taylor jenkins bill bishop chris herrington sinocism nate duncan nateduncannba nateduncannba

#011 – How Bill Bishop cut a path from the Tiananmen Square Massacre to the inboxes of America's power brokers

The Substack Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 19, 2018 47:51

Bill Bishop is the author of the Sinocism China newsletter, and our very first publisher on Substack. In this interview, we discuss his secrets to building a great newsletter business and his fascinating career, from running video tape for news stations at Tiananmen Square during the 1989 massacre, to co-founding the financial news site MarketWatch, attempting to build a gaming business in boom-times China, and ultimately starting Sinocism. Get on the email list at on.substack.com

america china substack marketwatch tiananmen square power brokers tiananmen square massacre inboxes bill bishop sinocism

Ep. 52 The Great Firewall of China

So to Speak: The Free Speech Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 22, 2018 39:53

Most Americans are familiar with The Great Wall of China. Fewer are familiar with the Great Firewall of China. The Firewall blocks vast expanses of the world’s web content — and it’s just one of the tools the Chinese government uses to monitor, censor, and even manipulate what its approximately 1.4 billion citizens see online. On this episode of So to Speak, we explore one of the most extensive and effective censorship systems ever devised by a government. How does the Chinese government do it? And why? For answers, we turn to the experts: “Charlie Smith,” the pseudonymous co-founder of anti-censorship group greatfire.org, working secretly in China; Jeremy Goldkorn, a co-founder of the Sinica Podcast and editor of supchina; and Bill Bishop, editor of the popular China policy newsletter Sinocism. www.sotospeakpodcast.com Follow us on Twitter: twitter.com/freespeechtalk Like us on Facebook: facebook.com/sotospeakpodcast Email us: sotospeak@thefire.org Call in a question: 215-315-0100

china technology americans chinese speak censorship great wall firewalls great firewall charlie smith bill bishop sinica podcast sinocism jeremy goldkorn

Takeaways from China’s 19th Party Congress, with Bill Bishop and Jude Blanchette

Altamar - Navigating the High Seas of Global Politics

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 2, 2017 68:20

Today we welcome back to the show two regular Sinica guests, Bill Bishop and Jude Blanchette, to discuss the outcomes of the 19th Party Congress, which wrapped up on October 24 in Beijing. Bill Bishop authors the Sinocism newsletter, an essential resource for serious followers of China policy, and he is regularly quoted in a variety of major news outlets reporting on China. He has been on Sinica most recently to discuss how to understand media coverage of China. Jude Blanchette is the associate engagement director at The Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, and is a scholar writing a book on neo-Maoism in China — you can listen here to a Sinica episode featuring him discussing the topic. Click here to read an article on SupChina that rounds up the top three takeaways of the 19th Party Congress, drawing on both this podcast and on SupChina reporting. Recommendations: Bill: The Spy's Daughter, the third book in a trilogy by Adam Brooks, a former BBC correspondent in China who quit his job and started writing spy fiction based in China. Jeremy: The article “Aerospace experts in China’s new leadership” on China Policy Institute: Analysis, which discusses the substantial number of technocrats in the new Central Committee, even if they are now less prevalent in the upper echelons of leadership. And Ear Hustle, a podcast produced by the inmates of San Quentin State Prison in California about their experience in prison. Jude: Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, a book by Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry on how policy making in China is affected by the Communist Party’s revolutionary experience. Also, the work of the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), where Heilmann now works. Kaiser: Putin’s Revenge, a two-part series on PBS Frontline that explains Putin’s rise and the events that shaped his worldview. And The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia, a book by Masha Gessen.

China and the New World Order [Episode 8]

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 25, 2017 33:24

China has been steadily increasing its global footprint, and since January, the US has been rapidly scaling back its own. With that in mind, China's 19th Communist Party Congress had one overarching theme: China isn't emerging - it has emerged, and it's ready to be a leader. But what does that mean for the rest of us? Peter and Muni are joined by Bill Bishop, a China expert and founder of the Sinocism newsletter, to discuss Xi Jinping's consolidation of power, and what we can expect from him and his China

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Bill Bishop on what it takes to be a good China-watcher

The China in Africa Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later May 4, 2017 61:40

China-watching isn’t what it used to be. Not too long ago, the field of international China studies was dominated by a few male Westerners with an encyclopedic knowledge of China, but with surprisingly little experience living in the country and speaking Chinese. Today, China-watching is different: The old “China hands” are still around and remain authoritative, but an increased number of younger travelers in a much more open China, people with specialized academic backgrounds and advanced language skills, and women — see last week’s Sinica Podcast on female China expertise — are changing the face of this field. Bill Bishop is among the most recognizable China-watchers in the business. His long-running Sinocism newsletter is an essential resource for serious followers of China policy, and he is regularly quoted in a variety of major news outlets reporting on China. Kaiser and Bill sat down at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., on April 6 to record this podcast and discuss how China-watching has changed over the years. And in a reflection of Bill’s point that the media’s conventional wisdom on China is usually wrong, the summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago (occurring during the recording of this podcast) was exactly as Bill predicted: “Bland.” Recommendations: Bill: In the Name of the People (人民的名义 rénmín de míngyì), the big-budget anti-corruption propaganda thriller. And The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao, by Ian Johnson. Kaiser: Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, a provocative and original book by Yuval Noah Harari.

China and the world: what to expect in 2016

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 23, 2015 37:00

The December China-Africa leaders summit in Johannesburg marked the end of what was a very busy year for Chinese president Xi Jinping and his foreign policy team. In many ways, 2015 marked a significant turning point in China's increasingly ambitious global agenda as Beijing deepened its engagement in global institutions while it simultaneously seeks to influence the international order more in its favor. In Africa, China played a critical role in the battle against Ebola, conducted its first overseas deployment of combat troops to South Sudan, signed a lease for its first overseas military installation in Djibouti, pushed for an expanded use of its currency on the continent in countries like Nigeria and Zimbabwe and unveiled a massive $60 billion financial package for Africa at the FOCAC summit in Johannesburg. Africa, though, is a bright spot in China's otherwise tense and complicated international relations. In Asia, China's territorial claims to vast parts of the disputed South China Sea has further riled its neighbors and prompted a potentially dangerous military stand-off with the United States. While tensions with the US rose significantly this past year over issues ranging from cyber attacks to trade, there were also a number of bright spots in Sino-US relations. The two countries appeared to make significant progress in climate talks and global finance when the yuan was added to the IMF's basket of major currencies. The murder of a Chinese national at the hands of ISIS followed by an al-Qaeda attack at a hotel in Mali pushed terrorism to the top of China's foreign policy agenda in late 2015. While the US and China have radically divergent strategies on how to combat terrorism, China recognizes that it will have to cooperate with the US and Europe on security issues in the Middle East and North Africa given Beijing's reliance on imported oil from the region. All of this took place in a year when the Chinese economy began to sputter as the bubble on the Shanghai stock exchanged finally popped, industrial output slowed dramatically and a flood of money poured out of the country. Additionally, the US Federal Reserve's December rate hike also prompted the Chinese yuan to devalue, adding more pressure on China's trading partners in Africa and beyond who are already overwhelmed by low-cost Chinese imports. It was a busy year indeed. Every week, longtime China-watcher Bill Bishop tries to make sense of it all as the editor of the popular Sinocism email newsletter. Bishop spent a decade in Beijing observing, consulting and writing about Chinese politics. Earlier this year, he moved to Washington, D.C. where he joined Eric & Cobus to share his outlook for the year ahead in Chinese international relations.

Huang Guangyu trial and real estate dilemma

Play Episode Listen Later May 1, 2010 47:36

Huang Guangyu, the founder of home electronics chain GOME, was China’s richest man, with a fortune of over 6 billion dollars in 2006, according to Forbes. However, the multi-billionaire was detained in November 2008 on suspicion of bribery, insider trading, and money laundering. The dragnet in the investigation leading up to the trial has already widened, and has implicated a number of high-ranking cadres in the Ministry of Public Security's white-collar crimes division. Is Huang’s case a warning to the Chinese emerging wealthy class? What does Huang's trial mean for rule of law in China? Whether they own property or not, there is nothing that people across China are talking about more than real estate prices. Property prices in 70 cities in China rose by a whopping 11.7% just in March 2010. Records show that new real estate loans grew to over 1.4 trillion dollars in 2009. People all over China talk about the phenomenon of “house slave” — people who are enslaved to their mortgage, and working only to pay off their homes. What dilemma does China face over the soaring property prices? In the mean time, Beijing issues sharp new policies to curb speculation. Do the government's actions portend the collapse of the real estate bubble? Joining host Kaiser Kuo this week are Gady Epstein, Beijing bureau chief for Forbes magazine, and Sinica regulars Bill Bishop and Will Moss. Bill is a tech entrepreneur in Beijing who blogs regularly on politics and economic issues at Sinocism.com. Will is a public relations expert in China and the force behind the popular imagethief.com. References: The Curse of Forbes, by Gady Epstein Rule of Law Implications of Huang Guangyu Trial?, by Stan Abrams How China's Property Bubble Works, by Andy Xie

Iran and the vaccination scandal

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 9, 2010 35:57

While Western countries prepare for tougher sanctions at the UN against Iran regarding its nuclear development, China is reluctant to impose any further sanctions, intensifying the tension between Beijing and Washington. However, increasing signs, including Hu Jintao’s upcoming visit to Washington to attend the nuclear summit, have shown that China may be preparing for an about-turn on Iranian sanctions. Indeed, China is in a tough spot in this situation as Iran has always been its important strategic partner and oil provider. Through delicate maneuvering in the Middle East, China is undoubtedly maximizing concessions from both Iran and the West. Scandal broke out last month involving a number of deaths in Shanxi and Jiangsu among infants and toddlers that appear to be related to bad vaccinations. The crisis was eventually attributed to the private companies that take over the vaccines through local health administrations. How the government will manage this situation, coming after the melamine crisis, is still waiting to be seen. In this week’s installment, host Kaiser Kuo discusses these two issues with Bill Bishop, a tech entrepreneur and blogger at DigiCha.com and Sinocism.com, and William Moss, who writes the blog imagethief.com. How should we interpret China’s signs of willingness to support sanctions on Iran over nuclear weapons development? Will the vaccination scandal become another melamine crisis, or does evidence point to this blowing over quickly? References: The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing, by Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt The Race for Iran blog The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, by Robert Baer 山西疫苗乱象调查：近百名儿童注射后或死或残, by王克勤

Google China and the Pullout