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Chinese universities are accelerating efforts to integrate education with artificial intelligence, with more AI colleges opening to cultivate interdisciplinary talent and more general AI courses and textbooks introduced.中国高校正加速推进教育与人工智能融合，通过成立更多的人工智能学院来培养复合型人才，并引入更多的人工智能通识课程和教材。Tsinghua University, one of China's top schools, recently announced it will increase its undergraduate admissions by about 150 students this year and establish a new undergraduate college for general AI education. The students will enroll in the new program, which aims to integrate AI across multiple disciplines.近日，清华大学作为中国顶尖学府之一，宣布2025年将增加约150名本科生招生名额，并成立新的本科书院发展人工智能通识教育。新增本科生将进入新成立的书院学习。该项目旨在将人工智能与多学科交叉融合。The initiative pools academic resources from various fields, seeking to develop students with a solid foundation in AI, high proficiency in AI technologies and strong innovative capabilities, the university said. The move is part of Tsinghua's efforts to advance AI-related professional training and support China's push for high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, according to Xinhua News Agency.清华大学表示，这一项目汇聚各领域的学术资源，将培养具有深厚人工智能素养、熟练掌握人工智能技术、具备突出创新能力的学生。据新华社报道，清华正深入推进人工智能相关专业人才培养，以期为中国高水平科技自立自强提供有力支撑，该项目就是其中的一部分。As AI rapidly evolves, reshaping education and driving socioeconomic development, the need for individuals with comprehensive AI knowledge and skills is becoming increasingly urgent.人工智能的快速发展正在重塑教育、推动社会经济发展，对具备综合人工智能知识技能的人才的需求越来越迫切。Wang Xuenan, deputy director at the Digital Education Research Institute of the China National Academy of Educational Sciences, told China Central Television the number of students majoring in AI was estimated at more than 40,000 last year, yet "the number still falls far short of the needs of the industry."中国教育科学研究院数字教育研究所副所长王学男在接受中央电视台采访时表示，2024年人工智能专业的学生大概是4万多人，但“这一数字仍远远不能满足行业的需求”。Market consultancy McKinsey& Company estimates that China will need 6 million professionals with proficient AI knowledge by 2030.市场咨询公司麦肯锡估计，到2030年，中国对人工智能专业人才的需求预计将达到600万。In November 2023, a talent training initiative on collaborative research in general AI was jointly launched by the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, Peking University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and 13 other leading universities. Zhu Songchun, director of the Beijing institute and dean of the School of Intelligent Science and Technology at Peking University, told Guangming Daily that the plan will leverage the resources of these universities to create a training system that seamlessly connects undergraduate and doctoral education.2023年11月，北京通用人工智能研究院、北京大学、上海交通大学及其他13所顶尖高校共同启动“通用人工智能协同攻关合作体人才培养计划”。北京通用人工智能研究院、北京大学智能学院院长朱松纯告诉《光明日报》，该计划将利用这些高校的资源，打造通用人工智能本博贯通的培养体系。In September last year, Nankai University and Tianjin University introduced a general AI course through a massive open online course, or MOOC, targeting more than 100,000 undergraduates in Tianjin. The course covers AI's basic principles and history while exploring cutting-edge generative AI models and their applications in healthcare, intelligent manufacturing and autonomous driving, according to Xu Zhen, director of the department of higher education at the Tianjin Municipal Education Commission.2024年9月，南开大学和天津大学通过大型开放在线课程平台慕课，推出了一门人工智能通识课程，面向天津10万余名本科生。天津市教育委员会高等教育处处长徐震表示，该课程涵盖人工智能的基本原理和发展历程，同时探讨生成式人工智能模型等前沿技术及其在医疗、智能制造、自动驾驶等领域的应用。Zhejiang University announced in March that it will lead an upgrade of the "AI plus X" micro program in collaboration with Fudan University, Nanjing University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the University of Science and Technology of China. The country's first micro program integrating AI with other disciplines, it aims to bridge technology with fields such as humanities, social sciences, agriculture, medicine and engineering.3月，浙江大学宣布将联合复旦大学、南京大学、上海交通大学、中国科学技术大学，牵头升级“AI+X”微专业。这是全国首个将人工智能与其他学科相结合的微专业，旨在搭建技术与人文、社科、农业、医学、工程等领域的桥梁。interdisciplinaryadj.学科间的，跨学科的enrollv.（使）加入；招（生）seamlesslyadv.顺利地；连续地collaborationn.合作；协作
Chinese Battery Maker Signs Memo with TsinghuaWhite House: Multiple Nations Targeted by China HackersIs America Ready for Tech-Based Hybrid Warfare?Taiwan Calls House Speaker; China Sanctions US FirmsTaiwan President: Will Not Bow to TotalitarianismNDAA 2025 to Include Over 70 China-Related BillsSouth Korea's Ruling Party Opposes Yoon ImpeachmentShen Yun Warns Americans About China's InfiltrationHouse Committee Urges Action to Bolster US DefenseBiden Hopes Trump Will Keep Up Africa ProjectsGM CEO: Very Few Carmakers Making Money in ChinaVietnam Suspends Temu for Missing Registration Deadline
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Don't Force It: How to Get into College without Losing Yourself in the Process
In today's episode, I sit down with Jamie Beaton, founder of Crimson Education. Jamie shares his impressive academic journey and dives into the complexities of college admissions. BioJamie has earned Bachelor's and Master's degrees at Harvard, as well as Master's degrees at Stanford, UPenn, Princeton, and Tsinghua, a PhD at Oxford, and JD at Yale Law School. He has grown Crimson into the world's most successful university admissions consultancy, having assisted thousands of students worldwide in gaining entry to the most competitive universities in the US and the UK. Follow Jamie on LinkedIn.Sign up to join our live coaching session and receive personalized insights!Application for StudentsApplication for Parents and Other AdultsAccess free resources and learn more about Sheila and her team at Signet Education at signeteducation.com or on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/in/sheilaakbar/.
The G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro will help foster global consensus and bridge differences, creating a favorable environment for entrepreneurship that can help tackle today's global challenges and support sustainable development, said Gao Jian, director of the Entrepreneurship Research Center on G20 Economies at Tsinghua University.清华大学二十国集团（G20）创业研究中心主任高建表示，里约热内卢G20峰会将有助于凝聚全球共识、弥合分歧，为创业创造良好环境，从而帮助应对当今全球挑战、支持可持续发展。"The G20 is a broad international mechanism that includes both developing and developed countries, ensuring representation from various regions and continents. Each participant plays a unique role. Therefore, the annual G20 Summit and its agenda are indeed beneficial for global economic development," Gao said.高建认为，“二十国集团是一个广泛的国际机制，既包括发展中国家，也包括发达国家，确保了各地区和各大洲的代表性。每个参与者都发挥着独特的作用。因此，一年一度的G20峰会及其议程确实有利于全球经济发展”。"This year's theme — 'Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet' — indicates that in global development, every economy aims to create more employment opportunities, secure a good position in global trade, and avoid falling behind. However, this must not come at the expense of sustainable development, which requires addressing employment issues and the green and digital transition," said Gao, who is also professor at the department of innovation, entrepreneurship and strategy at Tsinghua's School of Economics and Management.“今年以‘构建公正世界和可持续星球'为主题表明，在全球发展中，每个经济体都希望创造更多就业机会，在全球贸易中占据有利地位，避免落后。然而，这绝不能以牺牲可持续发展为代价，其需要解决的问题包括就业、绿色转型和数字化转型。”清华大学经管学院创新创业与战略系高建教授说。"Only through global cooperation and joint efforts can we achieve sustainability. And in this process, companies need to update technologies, reduce carbon emissions and foster new innovation.“只有通过全球合作和共同努力，我们才能实现可持续发展。而在这一过程中，企业需要更新技术，减少碳排放，促进新的创新。”"Innovative entrepreneurial companies are essential for providing new solutions to solve these problems. For instance, China's globally leading electric vehicle industry, largely driven by startups, exemplifies this," Gao said.“创新型创业公司对于提供解决这些问题的新方案至关重要。例如，中国的电动汽车产业在全球处于领先地位，而这主要是由初创企业推动的。”高建表示。The Entrepreneurship Research Center on G20 Economies was established in 2017 to promote the implementation of the consensus reached by G20 leaders at the Hangzhou Summit the previous year.二十国集团创业研究中心成立于2017年，旨在推动落实二十国集团（G20）领导人在前一年的杭州峰会上达成的共识。In the G20 Entrepreneurship Action Plan adopted at the G20 Labour and Employment Ministers' Meeting in 2016, it pointed out that waves of technological change, economic globalization and industrial and demographic changes present new challenges and opportunities for G20 economies in both the short and longer terms. The plan urged for G20 members to redouble efforts to support a more innovative pattern of inclusive economic growth, with new engines of development and new pathways for job growth.2016年，二十国集团（G20）劳工就业部长会议通过的《二十国集团创业行动计划》中指出，技术变革、经济全球化以及产业和人口结构的变化，给二十国集团经济体带来了短期和长期的新挑战和新机遇。该计划呼吁二十国集团成员加倍努力，支持更具包容性和创新性的经济增长模式，为发展提供新引擎，为就业增长开辟新途径。Jointly established by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and Tsinghua University, the research center tracks and analyzes the progress of the G20 Entrepreneurship Action Plan and shares valuable entrepreneurial practices and experiences among G20 members.该研究中心由人力资源和社会保障部与清华大学共同设立，其研究主要包括跟踪和分析G20各成员国《创业行动计划》的进展，总结和分享各国具有借鉴意义的创业实践和经验。Since its inception, the center has hosted an annual G20 Entrepreneurship Roundtable to review and evaluate the progress of G20 members in implementing the entrepreneurship action plan.自成立以来，该中心每年主办一次G20创业圆桌对话，审查和评估G20各成员国在实施《创业行动计划》方面的进展。"Overall, G20 members are keeping pace with the times in entrepreneurship, especially in emerging industries like the digital economy and green transition. In terms of entrepreneurial policies, developed countries tend to have more detailed and systematic policies, while developing countries may lag in this aspect," Gao noted.“总体而言，G20成员国在创业方面与时俱进，尤其是在数字经济和绿色转型等新兴产业领域。在创业政策方面，发达国家往往有更详细、更系统的政策，而发展中国家在这方面可能相对滞后。”高建指出。"China, as a G20 member, has significant advantages in providing entrepreneurship services. For example, China emphasizes tailored policies for different groups, such as incubation services for young people, women and new university graduates, provided by social institutions. This is considered an advanced practice internationally," Gao said.“中国作为G20成员国之一，在提供创业服务方面具有显著优势。例如，中国强调为不同群体量身定制政策，如由社会机构为青年、妇女和大学应届毕业生提供孵化服务。这在国际上被认为是一种先进的做法。”高建说。"China's reform and opening-up policies are also conducive to global economic development and openness. As an inclusive nation promoting globalization, China's development benefits global entrepreneurs. Events like the China International Import Expo and the Canton Fair also stimulate international entrepreneurship," said Gao.“中国的改革开放政策也有利于全球经济的发展和开放。作为一个推动全球化的包容性国家，中国的发展惠及全球企业家。中国国际进口博览会和广交会等活动也激发着国际创业精神。”高建表示。global consensus全球共识entrepreneurshipn. 创业tailorv. 定制，使适合digital transition数字化转型
This week, in a show taped in Beijing at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, I speak with Professor Da Wei about a new public opinion poll on China's perception of international security and review its important findings. We also discuss Chinese views on the Russo-Ukrainian War and the upcoming U.S. presidential election.2:11 – Da Wei's new podcast 4:05 – CISS's “Public Opinion Poll: Chinese Outlook on International Security 2024”7:46 – The poll's findings on pessimism about global security and the global influence of the U.S. and China11:56 – China's growing national confidence and growing pessimism about the U.S.-China relationship 18:26 – Paradoxical poll findings: proactive foreign policy stance vs. prioritizing domestic affairs, and involvement in global scientific cooperation vs. withdrawing in other areas of international agreement 24:30 – Why older respondents tended to be more pessimistic about China's international security situation 25:58 – Understanding negative attitude toward the United States and the effectiveness of diplomacy 30:17 – The belief that the U.S. goal is containment of China's development and the shift in view of America from a values-based country to a power-based country 36:12 – Chinese viewpoints on the Russo-Ukrainian war 39:22 – Da Wei's travels in the U.S. and the changes he has perceived 45:04 – The U.S. agenda to dissuade China from deepening its involvement with Russia 49:02 – How Chinese views on the upcoming U.S. election have changed since Kamala Harris' nominationRecommendations:Da Wei: Chen Jian's Zhou Enlai: A Life; for Chinese to travel to the U.S. moreKaiser: Chen Jian and Odd Arne Westad's The Great Transformation: China's Road from Revolution to Reform; for Americans to travel to China (and Beijing) See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
► Hier findest du die Jungbrunnen Akademie http://jungbrunnen.live/ ► Ich wünsche euch allen einen wunderschönen Tag und heiße euch herzlich willkommen zu einer ganz besonderen Episode meines Podcasts "Alles Menschen". Ich frage dich mal direkt: Bist du bereit, aus dem Hamsterrad auszubrechen und wirklich dein Leben zu verändern? In meinem Gespräch heute geht's um genau das. Wir sprechen über die "Jungbrunnenformel" und wie du in sieben Wochen sieben Jahre jünger werden kannst – und das nicht nur äußerlich, sondern auch im Herzen. Es geht um Bewegung, Ernährung, Atem, aber vor allem um deine innere Haltung. Willst du endlich aufwachen und dein Potenzial leben? Dann hör genau zu! Alles, was du brauchst, ist schon in dir. Dein größter Feind? Dein Unbewusstsein. Dein größter Verbündeter? Klarheit und Mut! Also, wenn du wirklich bereit bist, deinem Leben eine neue Richtung zu geben, dann bleib dran. Alles beginnt mit dem ersten Schritt: deinem JA zu dir selbst. Herzlich Willkommen Prof. Dr. Sven Voelpel Ich wünsche euch viel Freude beim Hören und tiefe Erkenntnisse. In Verbundenheit, Veit Sieben Jahre jünger in sieben Wochen? | Geheimnisse unseres inneren Jungbrunnens | Prof. Dr. Sven Voelpel im Gespräch mit Veit Lindau | Folge 88 ► Hier kannst du den Jungbrunnen Alterstest: https://alterstest.jungbrunnenapp.de/ ► Hier findest du das aktuelle Buch "7 Jahre jünger in sieben Wochen": https://amzn.to/47hpVZV ► Hier findest du alle Bücher von Prof. Dr. Sven Voelpel: https://svenvoelpel.com/de/publications/ ► Hier findest du die Jungbrunnen App: https://www.jungbrunnenapp.de/ Über Prof. Dr. Voelpel Der ALTERSFORSCHER Sven C. Voelpel, Jahrgang 1973, ist Professor für Betriebswirtschaft an der Jacobs University in Bremen und international tätiger Altersforscher. Eine seiner Thesen lautet: „Alter ist Kopfsache- denn Jungbleiben beginnt im Kopf!" und „Wir werden im Laufe des Lebens immer glücklicher“. Wie der ehemals weltweit jüngste Professor darauf kommt, erläutert er in seinem Spiegelbestseller und Amazon Platz 1 Buch: „Entscheide selbst, wie alt du bist. Was die Forschung über das Jungbleiben weiß“. Voelpel studierte in Augsburg, London, Oxford sowie als Doktorand in St. Gallen und an der Harvard University. Er hielt zahlreiche Gastprofessuren an international renommierten Universitäten (INSEAD, Tsinghua, St. Gallen, Visiting Fellowships an der Harvard University) Der Wissenschaftler, Startup Unternehmer und internationale Bestsellerautor lebt mit seiner Familie in Bremen. Alles zu Prof. Dr. Sven Voelpel ► Homepage: https://svenvoelpel.com/de/ ► Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/svenvoelpel/ ► Jungbrunnen App: https://www.jungbrunnenapp.de/ Alles zu Veit Lindau ► Homepage: https://go.veitlindau.com/bold-impact ► Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/veit.lindau/ ► Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/veitlindau ► Lust auf mehr? Hier geht's zu homodea: http://go.homodea.com/hd191 ► homodea Meditations-App: https://homodea-meditation.com/ ► Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/homodea/ ► Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/homodea ► Du kannst dir den Podcast überall auf Apple Podcasts, Spotify, meinem Blog, YouTube, SoundCloud und allen Podcastapps kostenlos anhören. ► Wir freuen uns sehr, wenn dich die Folge inspiriert. Schreibe uns sehr gern unter podcast@veitlindau.com deine Wünsche für weitere Gäst:innen. ► Du möchtest etwas Gutes für die Welt beitragen? Die ichliebedich-Stiftung fördert weltweit integrale Projekte der Potenzialentfaltung und der Kultur des Mitgefühls, besonders für Kinder und Jugendliche. https://ichliebedich-stiftung.de/ ich liebe dich-Stiftung https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/ichliebedich oder IBAN: DE37 6625 0030 0030 0711 46 BIC: SOLADES1BAD #jungbrunnen #alter #gesundheit #seelengevögelt
Les générateurs de vidéos à partir de simples commandes textuelles, comme VideoCrafter-2.0, Pika Labs ou Open-Sora, ont rapidement gagné en popularité grâce à leurs capacités impressionnantes. Cependant, un projet open source mené par des chercheurs de l'université Tsinghua et de Zhipu AI, en Chine, pourrait bien révolutionner le domaine de l'IA vidéo.Ce nouvel outil, nommé CogVideoX, permet de créer des vidéos de six secondes à partir d'invites textuelles. Bien que ses performances soient encore en deçà des solutions commerciales, avec une définition de 720×480 pixels à huit images par seconde et cinq milliards de paramètres, son caractère open source pourrait redistribuer les cartes. En effet, l'implication de la communauté mondiale des développeurs pourrait accélérer son amélioration et son adoption. Sur le plan technique, les chercheurs ont mis au point un autoencodeur variationnel 3D (VAE), capable de compresser efficacement les vidéos. À cela s'ajoute un « transformateur expert », qui permet d'interpréter plus finement les commandes textuelles pour générer des vidéos en adéquation avec les attentes des utilisateurs.Cependant, cette ouverture n'est pas sans risques. L'accès libre à CogVideoX pourrait faciliter la création de deepfakes et d'autres contenus trompeurs. Avec une telle technologie disponible en open source, il est difficile de prédire si elle sera principalement utilisée pour le meilleur ou pour le pire. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est clair que CogVideoX marque une étape significative dans l'évolution de l'IA vidéo, avec des implications potentielles tant positives que négatives. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI?, published by Nick Corvino on September 2, 2024 on The AI Alignment Forum. Intro In April 2024, my colleague and I (both affiliated with Peking University) conducted a survey involving 510 students from Tsinghua University and 518 students from Peking University - China's two top academic institutions. Our focus was on their perspectives regarding the frontier risks of artificial intelligence. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), publicly accessible survey data on AI is relatively rare, so we hope this report provides some valuable insights into how people in the PRC are thinking about AI (especially the risks). Throughout this post, I'll do my best to weave in other data reflecting the broader Chinese sentiment toward AI. For similar research, check out The Center for Long-Term Artificial Intelligence, YouGov, Monmouth University, The Artificial Intelligence Policy Institute, and notably, a poll conducted by Rethink Priorities, which closely informed our survey design. You can read the full report published in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief here: Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI? Key Takeaways Students are more optimistic about the benefits of AI than concerned about the harms. 80 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that AI will do more good than harm for society, with only 7.5 percent actively believing the harms could outweigh the benefits. This, similar to other polling, indicates that the PRC is one of the most optimistic countries concerning the development of AI. Students strongly believe the Chinese government should regulate AI. 85.31 percent of respondents believe AI should be regulated by the government, with only 6 percent actively believing it should not. This contrasts with trends seen in other countries, where there is typically a positive correlation between optimism about AI and calls for minimizing regulation. The strong support for regulation in the PRC, even as optimism about AI remains high, suggests a distinct perspective on the role of government oversight in the PRC context. Students ranked AI the lowest among all possible existential threats to humanity. When asked about the most likely causes of human extinction, misaligned artificial intelligence received the lowest score. Nuclear war, natural disaster, climate change, and pandemics all proved more concerning for students. Students lean towards cooperation between the United States and the PRC as necessary for the safe and responsible development of AI. 60.7 percent of respondents believe AI will not be developed safely without cooperation between China and the U.S., with 25.68 percent believing it will develop safely no matter the level of cooperation. Students are most concerned about the use of AI for surveillance. This was followed by misinformation, existential risk, wealth inequality, increased political tension, various issues related to bias, with the suffering of artificial entities receiving the lowest score. Background As the recent decision (决定) document from the Third Plenum meetings in July made clear, AI is one of eight technologies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sees as critical for achieving "Chinese-style modernization (中国式现代化)," and is central to the strategy of centering the country's economic future around breakthroughs in frontier science ( People's Daily, July 22). The PRC also seeks to shape international norms on AI, including on AI risks. In October 2023, Xi Jinping announced a "Global AI Governance Initiative (全球人工智能治理倡议)" ( CAC, October 18, 2023). Tsinghua and Peking Universty are the two most prestigious universities in the PRC (by far), many of whose graduates will be very influential in shaping the cou...
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI?, published by Nick Corvino on September 2, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Introduction In April 2024, my colleague and I (both affiliated with Peking University) conducted a survey involving 510 students from Tsinghua University and 518 students from Peking University - China's two top academic institutions. Our focus was on their perspectives regarding the frontier risks of artificial intelligence. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), publicly accessible survey data on AI is relatively rare, so we hope this report provides some valuable insights into how people in the PRC are thinking about AI (especially the risks). Throughout this post, I'll do my best to weave in other data reflecting the broader Chinese sentiment toward AI. For similar research, check out The Center for Long-Term Artificial Intelligence, YouGov, Monmouth University, The Artificial Intelligence Policy Institute, and notably, a poll conducted by Rethink Priorities, which closely informed our survey design. You can read the full report published in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief here: Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI? Key Takeaways Students are more optimistic about the benefits of AI than concerned about the harms. 80 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that AI will do more good than harm for society, with only 7.5 percent actively believing the harms could outweigh the benefits. This, similar to other polling, indicates that the PRC is one of the most optimistic countries concerning the development of AI. Students strongly believe the Chinese government should regulate AI. 85.31 percent of respondents believe AI should be regulated by the government, with only 6 percent actively believing it should not. This contrasts with trends seen in other countries, where there is typically a positive correlation between optimism about AI and calls for minimizing regulation. The strong support for regulation in the PRC, even as optimism about AI remains high, suggests a distinct perspective on the role of government oversight in the PRC context. Students ranked AI the lowest among all possible existential threats to humanity. When asked about the most likely causes of human extinction, misaligned artificial intelligence received the lowest score. Nuclear war, natural disaster, climate change, and pandemics all proved more concerning for students. Students lean towards cooperation between the United States and the PRC as necessary for the safe and responsible development of AI. 60.7 percent of respondents believe AI will not be developed safely without cooperation between China and the U.S., with 25.68 percent believing it will develop safely no matter the level of cooperation. Students are most concerned about the use of AI for surveillance. This was followed by misinformation, existential risk, wealth inequality, increased political tension, various issues related to bias, with the suffering of artificial entities receiving the lowest score. Background As the recent decision (决定) document from the Third Plenum meetings in July made clear, AI is one of eight technologies that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership sees as critical for achieving "Chinese-style modernization (中国式现代化)," and is central to the strategy of centering the country's economic future around breakthroughs in frontier science ( People's Daily, July 22). The PRC also seeks to shape international norms on AI, including on AI risks. In October 2023, Xi Jinping announced a "Global AI Governance Initiative (全球人工智能治理倡议)" ( CAC, October 18, 2023). Tsinghua and Peking Universty are the two most prestigious universities in the PRC (by far), many of whose graduates will be very influential in sh...
This conversation discusses the divorce of a Tsinghua graduate who founded a genderless clothing brand from his wife, the CEO of a successful healthcare company. His wife's family had invested heavily in his troubled business, but he was criticized for his lack of responsibility.Join other motivated learners on your Chinese learning journey with maayot. Receive a daily Chinese reading in Mandarin Chinese in your inbox. Full text in Chinese, daily quiz to test your understanding, one-click dictionary, new words, etc.Got a question or comment? Reach out to us at contact[at]maayot.com
Li Long, 35, graduated from Tsinghua University many years ago. With his heart set on studying medicine, he took the college entrance exam again this year. Although he only studied for less than two hundred days, Li Long scored 626 points. Netizens were surprised by this score and expressed their admiration for him.Join other motivated learners on your Chinese learning journey with maayot. Receive a daily Chinese reading in Mandarin Chinese in your inbox. Full text in Chinese, daily quiz to test your understanding, one-click dictionary, new words, etc.Got a question or comment? Reach out to us at contact[at]maayot.com
A la toute fin du XXème siècle, et alors que la société chinoise connaît des transformations majeures, une étudiante de la prestigieuse université de Tsinghua tombe gravement malade, dans des circonstances troublantes. Que s'est-il passé ? Et pourquoi cette affaire a-t-elle marqué l'histoire moderne de la Chine ? Merci à Evann Loget Raymond et Noémie Dournaud pour le générique.Loik Bredolese : All the regretsMyuu : Hold OnHébergé par Ausha. Visitez ausha.co/politique-de-confidentialite pour plus d'informations.
"'Fake it before you make it' is an ignoble product of Silicon Valley," said Christopher Manning, director of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at Stanford University, commenting on some researchers at the university who plagiarized the achievements by institutions such as China's Tsinghua University.斯坦福大学人工智能实验室主任克里斯托弗·曼宁就该校某些研究人员抄袭中国清华大学等机构成果的行为评论说:“‘作假，直至成功'，这是硅谷不光彩的文化。”On May 29, a research team at Stanford University released a large model called Llama3-V, claiming it can achieve the same effects as large models such as GPT-4V with a pre-training cost of only US$500. The news was widely spread on social media and in the academic community of artificial intelligence.5月29日，斯坦福大学一个研究团队发布名为Llama3-V的大模型，声称只要500美元的预训练成本，就能用它获得比肩GPT-4V等著名大模型的效果。这一消息在社交媒体和人工智能学术界被广泛传播。However, industry insiders soon suspected that the Standford team plagiarized the MiniCPM-Llama3-V 2.5 large model released by Tsinghua University and other Chinese institutions.Both Llama3-V and the MiniCPM-Llama3-V 2.5 large model are based on the open-source Llama3 large model. Still, the team in Tsinghua conducted unique training, including using the "Tsinghua Bamboo Slips," a collection of Chinese texts written on strips of bamboo which date back to the Warring States Period (475-221 BC), to train the model to recognize ancient Chinese characters.但业内人士很快怀疑，斯坦福团队抄袭了清华大学等中国机构发布的MiniCPM-Llama3-V 2.5大模型。Llama3-V和MiniCPM-Llama3-V 2.5大模型都基于开源的Llama3大模型。不过清华团队进行了独特的训练，包括利用“清华简”，这是一套写在竹片上的中国文字，可以追溯到战国时期（公元前475年至公元前221年），以训练模型识别古代汉字。Tests show that the model released by the Stanford University team can also recognize the "Tsinghua Bamboo Slips."测试显示，斯坦福大学这个团队发布的大模型居然也能识别“清华简”。"We are quite sure that the Stanford team has plagiarized our big model research results," Liu Zhiyuan, a tenured associate professor of the Department of Computer Science at Tsinghua University, told Xinhua.清华大学计算机系长聘副教授刘知远对新华社记者说:“已经比较确信，斯坦福这个团队‘套壳'了我们的大模型研究成果。”"The data we scanned and annotated word by word from the 'Tsinghua Bamboo Slips' has never been made public, and Llama3-V has shown the same ability to identify the 'Tsinghua Bamboo Slips,' even the error examples are the same," said Liu, who is also a member of the Tsinghua big model team.刘知远说：“我们从‘清华简'逐字扫描并标注的数据集从未公开，而Llama3-V展现出了一模一样的识别‘清华简'能力，连做错的样例都一样。”刘知远是清华这个大模型团队成员。As doubt accumulated, the Stanford team deleted the database and promotion articles on the Internet, Liu said, adding "from the evidence and their reactions, the nature of plagiarism has been relatively confirmed."在质疑声发酵后，斯坦福大学团队删除了网上发布的数据库和宣传文章，刘知远说，并补充“从证据和对方反应来看，抄袭性质已比较确定”。Following Manning's criticism, two members of the Stanford team, Aksh Garg and Siddharth Sharma, formally apologized on social media.在曼宁的批评之后，斯坦福团队的两名成员阿克什·加格（Aksh Garg）和西达尔特·夏尔马（Siddharth Sharma）在社交媒体上正式道歉。"We've taken all references to Llama3-V down and we apologize once again for the inconvenience we may have caused," they said.他们说:“我们已经撤下了所有提及Llama3-V的内容，我们再次为我们可能造成的不便表示歉意。”Amid the current AI boom, this incident has aroused widespread attention. It shows that although the United States is leading in AI technologies overall, it is far from omnipotent.在当前人工智能热潮中，这一事件引起了广泛关注。这表明，尽管美国在人工智能技术方面总体领先，但它远非全能。The Silicon Valley where Stanford University is located is considered to be the center of innovation in the United States. While having nurtured many advanced technologies, it has also cultivated a negative culture including the "fake it till you make it" ethos.斯坦福大学所处的硅谷地区被认为是美国科技创新的中心。既孕育了许多先进技术，也培育出“作假，直至成功”等负面文化。For example, Elizabeth Holmes, who dropped out of Stanford University to start a business, boasted that she had a disruptive technology that could draw finger blood to test diseases like cancers. She was regarded as a female Steve Jobs but was later found to have fooled everyone and was sentenced to imprisonment for fraud.比如，从斯坦福大学退学创业的伊丽莎白·霍姆斯曾吹嘘有颠覆性检测技术可“抽指血查癌症”。她一度被视为女史蒂夫·乔布斯，但后来发现她造假，并因欺诈被判入狱。When Google's artificial intelligence model Gemini Pro was asked in Chinese who it was, it would answer that it was "Ernie Bot", a Chinese big model developed by Baidu. Industry insiders believe that the reason may be that Google "referenced" the relevant data of the large model "Ernie Bot" when training its large model.当谷歌的人工智能模型“双子座”Pro版（Gemini Pro）被用中文问及是谁时，它会回答自己是百度开发的中文大模型“文心一言”。业界人士认为，其原因可能是谷歌在训练大模型时“参考”了“文心一言”相关数据。"China's AI research has an increasing influence," Liu said, noting the plagiarism incident reflects that "our innovative achievements are attracting international attention."“中国人工智能研究的国际影响力越来越大”，刘知远说，并指出抄袭事件反映了“我们的创新成果正在受到国际关注”。Overall, there is still a significant gap between China's research level and the world's top level, but in some specific segments such as AI innovation, China has rapidly grown into an important promoter, he added.他补充说，总体而言，中国研究与国际顶尖成果仍有显著差距，但在人工智能科技创新等一些具体领域，中国已快速成长为重要推动者。Plagiarism剽窃disruptive technology颠覆性技术
Événements · Voici les slides et vidéos de la journée Teratec/HQI du 24 avril 2024 sur le pack quantique Ile de France · Le 16 mai, workshop sur le calcul quantique organisé avec Le Lab Quantique à Station F slides. · France Quantum a eu lieu le 21 mai avec plus de 700 personnes, un record pour un événement quantique en France. · Vivatech avait lieu juste après avec une forte activité sur le stand HQI avec de nombreuses présentations ainsi que sur les stands du CNRS (Qperfect) et de la Région IDF (Alice&Bob). · Forum Teratec 2024 au Parc Floral les 29 et 30 mai. https://www.forumteratec.com/en Événements à venir :· TQCI benchmarking à Reims les 4 et 5 juin. Programme et inscriptions.· Q-Expo à Amsterdam, organisé par QuiC le 12 juin. https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7201492633590898688/. · Lindau Nobel Laureate Meetings en Allemagne,https://www.mediatheque.lindau-nobel.org/meetings/2024/programme France Deux annonces d'implantation en France, pour IBM et IQM à l'occasion de l'événement « Choose France » Investissement de 100M€ d'IQM en France et à Grenoble pour la création d'une ligne pilote industrielle de qubits supraconducteurs, montée avec le CEA-Leti et aussi Alice&Bob.https://www.meetiqm.com/newsroom/press-releases/iqm-to-build-a-fabrication-facility-in-france Investissement de 45M€ d'IBM en France pour la création d'un laboratoire sur le quantique, focalisé sur les outils logiciels. Il sera situé sur le plateau de Saclay dans le même bâtiment que leur laboratoire sur l'IA créé il y a quelques années. Annonce d'Alice&Bob le 15 mai 2024. Leur premier qubit de chat est maintenant disponible sur Google Cloud. https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/alice-bob-quantum-processor-available-on-google-cloud-marketplace/ Et un partenariat avec Riverlane pour la correction d'erreurs. https://www.hpcwire.com/off-the-wire/alice-bob-partners-with-riverlane-to-accelerate-quantum-error-correction/ · Annonce de Pasqal et Aramco. Aramco fait l'acquisition d'une machine de Pasqal de 200 qubits. L'équipe de Pasqal et de l'IOGS (Antoine Browaeys et Thierry Lahaye) démontrent une première mondiale avec le contrôle précis et le réarrangement de 828 atomes avec des pinces optiques contrôlées par un FPGA et grâce à l'emploi de deux lasers fonctionnant sur différentes longueurs d'ondes, à 813 et 818 nm. Rearrangement of single atoms in a 2000-site optical tweezers array at cryogenic temperatures by Grégoire Pichard, Desiree Lim, Etienne Bloch, Julien Vaneecloo, Lilian Bourachot, Gert-Jan Both, Guillaume Mériaux, Sylvain Dutartre, Richard Hostein, Julien Paris, Bruno Ximenez, Adrien Signoles, Antoine Browaeys, Thierry Lahaye, and Davide Dreon, arXiv, May 2024 (6 pages). · Annonce OVHcloud avec IBM Qiskithttps://fr.newsroom.ibm.com/OVHcloud-propose-le-kit-de-developpement-logiciel-Qiskit-dIBM-dans-le-cadre-de-son-portefeuille-de-notebooks-quantiques · Annonce SGPI avec l'AFNUM pour la vulgarisation du quantique, avec Pasqal, Cryptonext Security et TheGreenBow https://www.afnum.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/CP-France-2030-quantique-28-mai-2024.pdf · Un Livre blanc sur le quantique du GIFAS qui montre l'appropriation des technologies quantiques par les industriels de l'aérospatial.https://www.gifas.fr/brochures?prod_pages%5BrefinementList%5D%5Btags.name%5D%5B0%5D=innovation International IBM et annonce d'évolutions de Qiskit. Notamment gestion de batches avec plusieurs jeux de circuits.https://www.ibm.com/quantum/qiskit?social_post=sf188632769&sf188632769=1 Quantum computing with Qiskit by Ali Javadi-Abhari, Matthew Treinish, Kevin Krsulich, Christopher J. Wood, Jake Lishman, Julien Gacon, Simon Martiel, Paul D. Nation, Lev S. Bishop, Andrew W. Cross, Blake R. Johnson, and Jay M. Gambetta, arXiv, May 2024 (16 pages). PsiQuantum fait encore des siennes, cette fois-ci à Chicago. https://thequantuminsider.com/2024/05/06/a-quantum-manhattan-project-in-chicago-media-reports-on-20-billion-quantum-computing-campus/ QCI (Yale) lève $25Mhttps://thequantuminsider.com/2024/05/29/quantum-circuits-inc-quietly-raises-26-5-million/ Un record dans les ions piégés en Chine Une équipe de recherche chinoise de l'Université de Tsinghua a démontré un contrôle record de 512 ions d'ytterbium (171Yb+) piégésformant un cristal de Wigner 2D dans un piège de Paul 3D monolithique. Divers Manifesto Women 4 Quantum piloté notamment par Pascale Senellart. https://women4quantum.eu/https://women4quantum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/w4q-manifesto-of-values.pdf
This week on Sinica, I'm delighted to welcome Dá Wēi (达巍), one of China's foremost scholars of China's foreign relations and especially relations with the U.S. Da Wei is the director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University in Beijing, and is a professor in the department of International Relations at the School of Social Science at Tsinghua. Before September 2017, Professor Da served as the Director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a leading think tank in Beijing. He was at CICIR for more than two decades and directed the Institute of American Studies from 2013 to 2017.We discuss the state of Chinese understanding of the United States: how China's strategic class assesses the state of the relationship, what brought it to this point, and what the future might hold.2:52 – American attitudes toward the U.S.-China relationship5:32 – The focus of academic think tanks and strategic communities in the U.S. versus China 11:13 – The Chinese strategic community's understanding of American domestic politics with respect to the upcoming U.S. presidential election 15:08 – The Chinese strategic community's understanding of why and how the current state of relations developed, and why China changed its trajectory 23:12 – The Chinese strategic community's perspectives on American policy: Do they see a difference between the parties?27:02 – Da Wei's concept of “Sullivanism” 33:41 – The question of mutual misunderstanding 38:37 – The role and influence of China's think tanks in the policymaking process43:29 – The idea of cognitive empathy — aka strageic empathy, or intellectual empathy — and how it could aid mutual understanding and the policymaking process52:30 – The Chinese perspective on Russia and the war in Ukraine 57:37 – The Chinese perspective on China's other international relations and the global context of the U.S.-China relationship 1:04:19 The issue of Taiwan and the question of the “status quo” 1:13:52 The importance of building people-to-people ties 1:16:51 – Da Wei's personal anecdote about an experience that influenced his understanding the U.S.-China relationshipRecommendations:Da Wei: Lust for Life by Irving Stone — a biography of Vincent van Gogh; Pablo Casals's recording of Johann Sebastian Bach's Cello Suites; the films Cinema Paradiso (1988) and Forrest Gump (1994). Kaiser: The Sopranos (1999-2007) TV series and The Sopranos Family Cookbook: As Compiled by Artie Bucco, written by Allen Rucker with recipes by Michele Scicolone. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
Marathon Digital Holdings, the world's largest publicly-traded miner by market cap, has launched their new Slipstream technology stack in an effort to service Bitcoin users to include non-standard Bitcoin transactions such as those related to Ordinals and inscriptions. Hear from the team behind the initiative, as well as what this might mean for the future of the Bitcoin mempool, fee estimation and more. Read more about Marathon's announcement: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/marathon-launches-slipstream-tech-stack-to-process-non-standard-bitcoin-transactions Guests:Portland HODL (https://twitter.com/PortlandHODL)Charlie Schumacher (https://twitter.com/charlieschu)Jullian Duran (https://twitter.com/jullian0701)Hosts:Spencer Nichols (https://twitter.com/DeSpencer_)Shinobi (https://twitter.com/brian_trollz) ______________________________ Enter to win 1 BTC in prizes with the Bitcoin Halving Challenge powered by Nitrobetting.eu! Guess the price of Bitcoin at the halving to enter: https://www.bitcoinhalving.com/?v=new#challenge X (formerly Twitter) Bitcoin Magazine (@BitcoinMagazine) on X LIVE: @MarathonDH Launches Slipstream for Non-Standard #Bitcoin Transactions RSVP and join the Spaces https://t.co/7i1OFVJ4pg Bitcoin Magazine - Bitcoin News, Articles and Expert Insights Marathon Launches Slipstream Tech Stack to Process Non-Standard Bitcoin Transactions The world's largest publicly traded miner has released its Slipstream service, allowing participants to directly publish complex and non-standard Bitcoin transactions through its MARA Pool. https://bitcoinmagazine.com/technical/marathon-launches-slipstream-tech-stack-to-process-non-standard-bitcoin-transactions X (formerly Twitter) Portland.HODL (@PortlandHODL) on X #Bitcoin Core Contributor - Creator of @nyan_keys - No Price Talk - Builder for @MarathonDH 32C5 E0F2 CC4E AEBD 4A21 8CB0 C0AF 3AD0 83D6 B40A X (formerly Twitter) Charlie Schumacher (@charlieschu) on X Former actor and competitive exerciser. Professional #Bitcoin propagandist. Wordsmith Wizard at @MarathonDH $MARA. All opinions are my own. X (formerly Twitter) Jullian Duran (@jullian0701) on X Product @ MARA | Co-Founder of https://t.co/C8nosykkr0 | Harvard & Tsinghua
Anupam Chander, Scott Ginsburg Professor of Law and Technology at Georgetown, and Visiting Scholar at Harvard's Institute for Rebooting Social Media, discusses the future of humanity during a wave of paid technology innovation. He also shares how AI is impacting digital sovereignty. Key Takeaways: Why Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act has been so important for people online How US Internet Laws impact its dominance as a world innovation leader Ways that regulators are having to balance new technologies The impact that judges, regulators, and the courts have had on the evolution of new technologies Guest Bio: Anupam Chander is Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law and Technology at Georgetown. A Harvard College and Yale Law graduate, he is the author of The Electronic Silk Road, published by Yale University Press. He practiced law in NY and Hong Kong with Cleary, Gottlieb, and has been a visiting law professor at Yale, Chicago, Stanford, Cornell, and Tsinghua. A recipient of Google Research Awards and an Andrew Mellon grant, he has consulted for the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and UNCTAD. A non-resident fellow at Yale's Information Society Project, he is a member of the American Law Institute. In 2023-24, he's a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Rebooting Social Media at Harvard University, and Cheng Yu Tung Visiting Professor at the University of Hong Kong. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- About this Show: The Brave Technologist is here to shed light on the opportunities and challenges of emerging tech. To make it digestible, less scary, and more approachable for all! Join us as we embark on a mission to demystify artificial intelligence, challenge the status quo, and empower everyday people to embrace the digital revolution. Whether you're a tech enthusiast, a curious mind, or an industry professional, this podcast invites you to join the conversation and explore the future of AI together. The Brave Technologist Podcast is hosted by Luke Mulks, VP Business Operations at Brave Software—makers of the privacy-respecting Brave browser and Search engine, and now powering AI everywhere with the Brave Search API. Music by: Ari Dvorin Produced by: Sam Laliberte
One of the guiding norms that has shaped the internet over the last few decades is that of online free speech. This norm is protected in many countries by exempting online platforms and intermediaries from liability for the user-generated content published on these platforms. For example, in India, Section 79 of the IT Act of 2000 protects intermediaries from such liability. However, over the last few years, these exemptions have been under scrutiny. Many have called for greater regulation of the practices of platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Reddit. Some reasons for this are the problems related to disinformation, instances of incitement to violence through these platforms, and the censorship of free speech in some cases. To address such concerns, some legislation has been floated or enacted in jurisdictions such as the United States, India, and the European Union. How will these laws alter the digital economy and the norm of protecting free speech online? What are the risks associated with implementing such legislation? What should policymakers keep in mind as these developments pan out?In this episode of Interpreting India, Anupam Chander joins Anirudh Burman to discuss these pressing questions.Episode ContributorsAnupam Chander is the Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law and Technology at Georgetown University Law Center. He is the author of The Electronic Silk Road and an expert on the global regulation of new technologies. He practiced law in New York and Hong Kong with Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. He has been a visiting law professor at Yale, the University of Chicago, Stanford, Cornell, and Tsinghua. He previously served as the director of the California International Law Center and the Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis. Anirudh Burman, is an associate research director and fellow at Carnegie India. He works on key issues relating to public institutions, public administration, the administrative and regulatory state, and state capacity. He has also worked extensively on financial regulation and regulatory governance.Readings:Facebookistan by Anupam ChanderFree Speech by Anupam Chander and Uyên P. LêGoogling Freedom by Anupam ChanderThe Electronic Silk Road by Anupam Chander Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U.S. ___ (2023)The Digital Services Act Every two weeks, Interpreting India brings you diverse voices from India and around the world to explore the critical questions shaping the nation's future. We delve into how technology, the economy, and foreign policy intertwine to influence India's relationship with the global stage.As a Carnegie India production, hosted by Carnegie scholars, Interpreting India, a Carnegie India production, provides insightful perspectives and cutting-edge by tackling the defining questions that chart India's course through the next decade.Stay tuned for thought-provoking discussions, expert insights, and a deeper understanding of India's place in the world.Don't forget to subscribe, share, and leave a review to join the conversation and be part of Interpreting India's journey.
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In this episode of Student Affairs Voices From the Field, Dr. Jill Creighton hosts Dr. Yisu Zhou, an accomplished university professor from the University of Macau. Dr. Zhou shares his unique journey from being an international student to becoming a professor and provides insights into the transitions in higher education, particularly in China and Asia. The episode begins by introducing Dr. Yisu Zhou's background and educational journey. He highlights his early experiences as an English teacher in rural China, which sparked his interest in education. He pursued his PhD in the United States, which ultimately led him to his current role as a professor at the University of Macau. Dr. Zhou emphasizes the impact of internationalization in higher education, discussing how the economic growth in China over the past two decades has created a demand for high-quality education. This demand has led to an increase in Chinese students pursuing undergraduate and graduate degrees abroad, especially in the United States. He also touches on the various stages of this trend, starting with Chinese students seeking doctoral programs overseas and later expanding to undergraduate programs. The podcast delves into the differences between teaching styles in the West and East, highlighting the smaller class sizes and active communication in Western universities compared to the more lecture-focused approach in many Eastern institutions. Dr. Zhou suggests that educators and student affairs professionals should understand these cultural differences and proactively support international students in adapting to the new learning environment. Dr. Zhou encourages student affairs professionals to be patient and understanding when working with students from different cultural backgrounds. He explains that while students from Asia may initially appear passive, they are actively processing information and sometimes take longer to initiate help-seeking behavior due to cultural differences. The podcast concludes with Dr. Zhou emphasizing that international students can be valuable assets to higher education programs, as they bring strong work ethics and a commitment to academic excellence. He also highlights the need for international students to develop skills for navigating diverse and complex educational systems, which can differ significantly from their home countries. This episode offers valuable insights for student affairs professionals and educators, providing a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities that come with the internationalization of higher education and the diverse cultural backgrounds of students. TRANSCRIPT Dr. Jill Creighton [00:00:02]: Welcome to Student Affairs Voices From the Field, the podcast where we share your student affairs stories from fresh perspectives to seasoned experts. This is season 9 on transitions in student affairs. This podcast is brought to you by NASPA, And I'm doctor Jill Creighton, she, her, hers, your essay voices from the field host. Welcome back to another episode of SA Voices from the Field, where today I'm delighted to bring you a conversation with an accomplished university professor from the University of Macau. Isoo Cho is an associate professor at the faculty of education and by courtesy, the department of sociology at the University of Macau. He earned his PhD team from Michigan State University's College of Education. Joe's doctoral dissertation focused on the teaching profession, specifically out of field teachers and utilize a large scale survey from OECD. Before attending MSU, Joe received his bachelor's degree in statistics from East China Normal University and worked as an English teacher in rural Shanxi province from 2005 to 2006, where his passion for understanding the educational process bloomed. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:01:06]: Joel employs a sociological perspective when examining various policy issues, including school finance, teacher professionalization, and higher education cation reform. His work has been published in Discourse, Sociological Methods and Research, Chinese Sociological Review, international journal of educational development, and other notable journals. Zhou has also been feasted on various Chinese media outlets, such as the paper Peng Pai Xing Wen, Beijing News, Xing Jing Bao, and China Newsweek, Zhongguo Xing Wen, Zhoukan. In the University of Macau community. Joe is deeply committed to teaching and service. He created the 1st generation course aimed at raising global awareness for undergraduate students across all majors and departments. And with an innovative approach to nurturing students from diverse backgrounds, this course is widely accepted by those students and running at full capacity every year. Professionally, he's actively engaged across the university and scholarly community, and he received the outstanding reviewer award from occasional researcher in 2015. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:02:04]: Joel's service work reflected his thinking of higher education as an ecology of knowledge experts. He's penned a 5 year strategic plan, advise on a library strategic plan, and architected a doctoral of education program. He is the recent recipient of the faculty service award for 2017, 18, and also so 21/22. Isu, we're so glad to have you on the show today. Yisu Zhou [00:02:25]: Thank you very much for having me, Jill. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:02:27]: And even better for me that we're in the same time zone, that as a gift I don't get on the show a lot. Yes. Yes. You had lots of international people appearing on our show. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:02:35]: And you're at the University of Macau, how so folks know listeners who are not familiar with the geography of China. Macau is in the southern part of China. It's a beautifully warm place. It's also famous for casinos, amongst other things. Yisu Zhou [00:02:48]: Like Orento, Las Vegas, if you want a short metaphor. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:02:52]: You can even go to, like, the MGM in The Venetian in Macau. Yisu Zhou [00:02:55]: It's actually the same. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:02:56]: But that is not the reason you're in Macau. No. So So we're glad to talk to you today about your experiences as a professor of higher education studies. And normally, I think our listeners are exposed to professors of higher ed who are pretty western centric. So this is a great opportunity to learn more about higher education and the study of higher cation in Asia. But before we talk about your expertise in the transformations and transitions of higher ed in China, I'd love to talk to you first about how you became a professor. Yisu Zhou [00:03:25]: Oh, yeah. No problem. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:03:27]: So what's the story? Yisu Zhou [00:03:29]: I think you can say part of that is is running through the family. So both my Parents are academe, working in the, academia, which give me some exposure to how institutions work in the Chinese setting when I was little. But I I didn't actually made up my mind before well, I think well into my PhD program. When I grow up, I wanna be a scientist. So I think in college, I study, statistics. So, kind of the applied field of, mathematics in a sense that I wanna things, and, I wanna run data. I'm really interested in data as a kid, when I grow up. But, after college, I also wanna get some exposure about Interacting with people. Yisu Zhou [00:04:07]: I'm kind of, you know, in that, gap sort of a mentality, that I'm interesting a lot of things, but I really I had a mid in my mind about what I'm going to commit my life to doing. So I spent a year actually teaching in a rural village in the Western China, which kind of a place they have a poverty line, which give me a lot of experience working with, rural children, rural parents. And I taught English at 6th grade, in that particular school, for the year. So I really start to think about how I can observe social life, Particularly school life. That is, I I think the main motivation and the main sort of event that, direct me toward a study of education. So after that year, I went to the United States. I, went to Michigan State to do my PhD degree. I first Enrolled in, psychometric program because of my statistics background, and people really want me to contribute to that. Yisu Zhou [00:05:03]: And after 2 years, I found that my passion and my interest has, sort of shifted toward international and competitive education. So I'm trained as an international comparative, educator in my PhD program. And, well, Macau sort of come as a supply because I am the part of the, post, What we call, 2008 survivors of the, economic meltdown so that many, US universities, freeze hiring during the time. It's been actually, they fed. It's quite, last quite, for some time. So when I was in the job market in 2011, The the domestic job market is basically so competitive that there are only very handful places openings in that particular year. So when I was searching the catalog job postings on Chronicle, this place called University Macau sort of, appeared in my search. I actually have never heard of this university before, And this is really a new experience. Yisu Zhou [00:05:59]: I know places in Hong Kong because they are more established. They have university of Hong Kong and Chinese university of Hong Kong are the 2 sort of the star universities in a region, and people already know that. But never heard of University of Macau. So I did a little bit of research. I think, well, maybe I should try that mostly because it's close to home And it's an international environment which allows me to conduct international research and to teach in English and, had the opportunity to with a lot of, international colleagues. And, well, when I I didn't expect a lot, you know, when I submit my application, but think, like, 2, 3 weeks later, I got a call from my former dean, and he says, he just moved from, University of Virginia, actually, to Macau. And he's really looking for people who have received a very rigorous American style academic training to work with him. So, you know, we had a nice conversation. Yisu Zhou [00:06:48]: And he invited me over for a job talk. And, well, the rest is history. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:06:53]: And you have since become quite an accomplished publisher share amongst many other things. I would encourage all of you to go look up Zhou Isu on, Google Scholar. You can see he's just got quite picture related to education in the Chinese region. But thinking about what you're studying now, what's your focus now in your work? Yisu Zhou [00:07:12]: So because I'm getting older and my also my role with inside institutions sort of transitioned toward more of the administrative side, I've been involving a lot of, program administration, my faculty administration, and, of course, some university side of business, which I think it give me a kinda unique Sort of an insider perspective in terms to understand how institution work. So my interest gradually shifts toward this institutional perspective about university, I think higher, education because my current working situation and the network I've been building because of my professional lives. So I think recent years, my interest gradually shift toward, understanding, higher education development in China, in Particular internationalization of higher education in China. I think that's one thing currently I'm doing some research at the moment. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:08:00]: The institution I'm working for currently is a great example of internationalization. Yisu Zhou [00:08:05]: Exactly. I really had a privilege and opportunity to visit DKU during the summer. And it's really impressed me and opened my mind. We have so much to learn from you guys, a top elite private institution and working in China And catering to a lot of Chinese student demand and, to really establish yourself as an em embracer of this movement of, internationalization of higher ed in China. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:08:29]: And the joint venture universities in China are varieties of years old. We have a neighbor, Shaqingqiao, Liverpool, which is much to older than us, but our closest most similar university, NYU Shanghai, is the same age as us, and that's a decade. So it's to a wide variety. There's also the University of Nottingham Ningbo down the road, which, again, also much older than us, Wenjoking, and then some that are younger than us like Tianjin Juilliard. So it's all over the map. Yisu Zhou [00:08:54]: Yeah. It is. It's it's all over the map. And I think from a policy perspective, China really sort of embraced In, multifaceted, you can say, strategies in terms of working with international partners. We have American University, European University, Right. Coming to China, setting up joint ventures. There are also several, Hong Kong institutions. They have different levels of cooperation in China. Yisu Zhou [00:09:16]: Right. They have joint ventures. They have sites like campus. But most of them actually have a research institution set up in China. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:09:22]: So let's go back and think about the transition of the movement to begin opening doors for internationalization of education in this part of the world. What can you tell us about that history? Yisu Zhou [00:09:34]: I think from our perspective, there is a demand and the, sort of, the need for a high Quality, higher education really came, dates back to early 2000 when, economically, China took off, Which cultivated a very strong local base of parents who have done business with, western, partners, Or they have traveled the world. They have seen places elsewhere, and because of free flow of information allows them to understand and to see how Western education sort of, opens up a different kind of possibility for their child. So I think this is so, you know, if if if you count that, it's been about 20 years up to this point. And I think we can divide it into, like, several stages because at first, it's most about sending your kids overseas. And that trend first started with the PhD programs because most parents just cannot afford, Right. A 4 year, college life for their kids in the United States. And the PhD and some master program, they do offer very generous, scholarships For those academically talented Chinese students, so you know? But the the numbers are usually not very large, right, because their Resources is all are always limited. And then starting, I think, a decade into the 1st decade of 21st century, really sees that Chinese parents, they, they become richer, and the opportunities really open up. Yisu Zhou [00:11:05]: Because if we count the kind of international program that is available to Chinese student, Australia and the UK are the 1st large market that sort of opens fully embrace, you know, to the, Chinese student, and they embrace them very Politically in the US because the selectivity and different tiers and such large and diverse system also is very attractive gradually to Chinese student. And because I I think one big attraction about the US higher education is this economy. It's so robust and it's so diverse, which means the student can always think about, right, what I can do after graduation. That, you know, if you go to some smaller places, 2, 3 years later, you need to find a job. Right? And that might not be enough those kind of high quality jobs around. So I think the the 2010 really sees kind of a a higher peak for Chinese student, undergraduate student going overseas. And, of course, this trend also spill over to other segments. So we also, you know, if you read the news, there are Private high schools, in US or even public schools, they cater to international student. Yisu Zhou [00:12:13]: Chinese student, of course, because of the large number, A Korean student, a Japanese student, a student from Middle East, you know, these places where they see a large economic booms and a student wants to have an different opportunities. So I think that sort of these trends sort of coalesced together, making the 2nd decade of 21st century really, really is about international students going into US and going into other western market sort of in large numbers. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:12:40]: So with that transition of of this trend of students going abroad, when they come back with those skills, How has that impacted always of life, always of being with that education and skill set coming back? Yisu Zhou [00:12:54]: I think from my own traction with students and my observations with private business owners or, just talking to graduates coming, you know, Having obtained a western education degree, I think this is really a process of different cultures kind of, mingling together And creating a kind of a hybrid person that they many Chinese students still have a very strong Chinese identity, you know, growing up And coming back to home, but their years, in America, in Australia, or in other places sort of open up their horizon in a sense that they understand, Things such as diversity, things such as, critical thinking. These things are not did not play such an important role in a domestic higher education. So, You know, when we compare them and with their friends who didn't choose to go to abroad. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:13:45]: And we have some incredible universities around this region as well places like Tsinghua, Peking, Pudong, etcetera. What do you see as the biggest difference between the different styles of teaching in the undergraduate frame. Yisu Zhou [00:13:58]: 1st, I I think the institutional setting is really different. Right? So the one thing with DKU and, and, for instance, NYU really struck me is the how small the class size are. The class size are really small, which means individual instructor can give a sort of a tailored Or individualized time to a student to catering to a wide range of needs. Right? Questions you can ask a question immediately. All Almost always. Right? And you can get instant feedback on these kind of things. But I think in China, kind of a broader if you wanna situate this question in border eastern Asian context, A kind of lecture style larger classroom is the standard format of teaching and learning. And in that kind of format, Students' own diligence and their own hardworking is kind of required by default. Yisu Zhou [00:14:46]: So no matter what kind of questions you Have you need to think about the solution your by yourself first. This is the, like, your first option. And then if you can solve it, maybe you can try to look for help from the instructor. Right. So the teacher's role really different because of such large classrooms and because I think mainly towards in century old kind of educational philosophy about how people should learn. But I think the, institutions such as DKU and, like I said, NYU, they offer us a different kind of possibility of how teachers can interact with student and how teacher a student can learn. And based on my Oh, understanding. Student really love that. Yisu Zhou [00:15:23]: And, that sort of enriched their experience and helped them to overcome a lot of, difficulties, I didn't go study. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:15:30]: You've also been an international student yourself, and I'm wondering if you have any advice for our student affairs professionals who are listening on how best to support tuning into US education or US study or even just living in a new country. Yisu Zhou [00:15:44]: I think study abroad is really a very important lesson of my life. I have a lot of struggles, but I think overall, it is a very positive experience. I think for, student affairs, colleagues working in the US, you need to understand that student from the east and China and other parts of the, Asia, they're coming from quite different cultural background, Which means the student are accustomed to the kind of expectations in their home country or home culture. Most of these places sort of a Student are expected to follow an authority to not to sort of challenge the authority and not to break or to question the the rules the rules of the classroom, the rules of the institution, or even interhuman kind of, rules. So they might seem like these student are a little bit passive. I think the student, taking myself as an animal, we're always actively thinking about the situation, trying to decode a situation. It's just that our experience situate us through a certain kind of conditions that we Convinced essentially our mind convinced us, oh, you shouldn't ask this question at this particular time. You should find another, point. Yisu Zhou [00:16:52]: But I think in the US, it's always the communication part is always real time. Right? You can always throw a question. You can always seek any clarification. You can always seek help. This is not something embarrassing. This is actually supported. And, many institutions actually have developed and have very capable professionals to try to help student to do that. But I think the first step is I mean, the the expectation is the student need to make the first move. Yisu Zhou [00:17:19]: Right. They need to go out to reach out to seek clarifications, but that first move sometimes can happen quite late. Not the first day of the orientation may be not even the 1st day of the class. Might you know, it happened 2 or 3 weeks after class sort of started After some, after the student is confident enough that they convince themselves they have interpreted the situation correctly, and then they they trying to go out to say, Hey. I can't I don't really understand this. Can you really help me? So I think a lot of hand holding and to opening up yourself to the international student is really something very important. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:17:53]: I really appreciate that advice because the perspective taking of what I might expect from an authority figure in my home country is truly very different in the US compared to a lot of cultures in this part of the world, which means that help seeking behavior here that we're always trying to draw out of our students. We might need to go an extra step or 3 in order to explain why that's appropriate and why that is culturally spected. Yisu Zhou [00:18:17]: My own experience tells me that in many cases, in the question and answer sessions, in orientation, in a big event When we sort of prepare a lot of materials, we tell the students, sometimes we don't receive sort of a warm kind of a response It which might happen actually in the US context. Right? The US student are most time, they are very active, and they won't hesitate to throw questions at you. But in this Part of the world, sometimes the student a little wants to sit back and they want to deliver their questions in different channels. So that's something I think for any student affairs officers or people who travel, to this part of the world to teach and to engage with student, I think they should realize That's kind of the cultural difference. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:19:00]: Are there any other thoughts you'd like to share on the transitions of higher education that you study in in China, in East Asia, or just any thoughts for our mostly western audience. Yisu Zhou [00:19:09]: I think the Chinese student and many, Asian student, they will be a big asset to the program. These are hard workers, and they sort of really cherish the kind of, academic excellence because they have been expected to perform at relatively high level since they're a kid. The kind of things I think they will learn, and definitely, I think that's that's something they should learn, is the communication skills, the kind of skills how to navigate themselves in a very complex system from the studies of a competitive education. This is one takeaway message that US education system is so different. A comprehensive high school system actually gave the student quite early on experience. I mean, It's not all positive, but it gives most student experience to navigate through a bunch of peers, which are heterogeneous. Right? And they have very diverse interest, And they formed little clicks, and then you need to find your best friend and find the resources and to find the teachers that you can work with. And most Asian students, they don't actually learn that until the university level because they have been segmented in a sort of uniformly set up format throughout a lower secondary an upper secondary school. Yisu Zhou [00:20:19]: So this is really a challenge for them. That is for them to develop the kind of skills to work in a diverse environment. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:20:27]: And that's not to say 1 is better or worse than the other, just the systems are entirely unique and different. Yisu Zhou [00:20:33]: Exactly. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:20:34]: And that means the students are coming with different skill sets. So you might have, you know, 1 student who's better at help seeking behavior, but the other who is just quite a lot better at absorbing information. And it just depends on the strength that we need in the moment. Yisu Zhou Definitely. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:20:46]: It's time to take a quick break and toss it over to producer Chris to learn what's going on in the NASPA world. Christopher Lewis [00:20:52]: Thanks, Jill. So excited to be back in the NASPA world. And as always, there's a ton of things happening in NASPA, and I always love being able to share with you Some of the great things that are happening. The 2024 Dungey Leadership Institute DOI faculty application is currently live. The Dungey Leadership Institute is a signature initiative of the NASPA undergraduate fellows program with the following learning outcomes for fellows gaining Foundational knowledge of the history and functions of student affairs in higher education, gain knowledge of contemporary issues in higher education, Participate in intergroup dialogue around issues of equity and social justice, collaborate with peers to research and present ethical resolutions to current administrative and leadership issues in student affairs. Reflect on and articulate the influence of personal identities and histories on effective student affairs leadership and engage in professional networking with student affairs faculty and administrators. DLI directors, selected faculty members, and NASPA staff plan this 6 day leadership institute to develop leadership skills, enhance cultural competency, and prepare fellows for a career in student affairs. Specifically, faculty will colead a cluster of 8 to 10 students through the DLI experience And provide support to all students attending the institute. Christopher Lewis [00:22:16]: Travel, meals, and housing are provided by NASPA and our host institutions. Faculty within this program are all current NASPA members. Applicants need to have at least 5 full time years of professional experience post your masters at the time of application. NEUF alumni are also eligible to apply with at least 2 years of professional experience post masters. If you apply for this, you must be available June 20th through 26, 2024 for the actual institute. You can apply through Friday, November 13th, and go to the NASPA website to be able to submit your demographic information, your resume or CV application questions and reference information for consideration. NASBA is currently looking for committee members For the mid level administrators steering committee. In 2022, NASPA established the mid level administrators A steering committee to partner with NASPA staff to shape the ongoing development of NASPA's mid level initiatives. Christopher Lewis [00:23:17]: The steering committee works To ensure that mid level relevant programs are offered during regional and national events, NASPA's mid level administrator steering committee Strives to encourage excellence in the mid level positions through professional development, knowledge creation and sharing, networking opportunities, and recognition aimed at the roles of mid level administrators. The steering committee is comprised of 24 mid level administrators who serve at A wide variety of institutional types throughout NASPA's 7 regions. Steering committee members will serve staggered to your terms. If this sounds like something that you're interested in, I highly encourage you to go to the NASPA website to learn more about this. Typically, the time commitment is about 2 to 3 hours per month. I highly encourage you to consider this. Think about it as an opportunity to be able to give back to the association And help to steer NASPA toward providing quality professional development opportunities for mid level professionals. Every week, we're going to be sharing some amazing things that are happening within the association. Christopher Lewis [00:24:23]: So we are going to be able to try and keep you up to date on everything that's happening and allow for you to be able to get involved in different ways because the association is as strong as its members. And for all of us, we have to find our place within the association, whether it be getting involved with the knowledge community, giving back within One of the the centers or the divisions of the association. And as you're doing that, it's important to be able to identify for yourself Where do you fit? Where do you wanna give back? Each week, we're hoping that we will share some things that might encourage you, might allow for you to be able to get some ideas that will provide you with an opportunity to be able to say, hey. I see myself In that knowledge community, I see myself doing something like that or encourage you in other ways that allow for you to be able to Think beyond what's available right now to offer other things to the association, to bring your gifts, your talents to the association and to all of the members within the association. Because through doing that, All of us are stronger, and the association is better. Tune in again next week as we find out more about what is happening in NASPA. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:25:44]: Another wonderful NASPA world segment from you, producer Chris. Thank you again and again for giving us the updates on what's going on in and around NASPA. Alright. Isu, we have come to our lightning round. I have 7 questions for you to answer in about 90 seconds. You ready? Yisu Zhou [00:26:01]: Wow. I'm ready. Yes. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:26:03]: Alright. Question number 1. If you were a conference keynote speaker, what would your entrance music be? Yisu Zhou [00:26:09]: It's gotta be Oasis. I've been a fan since 1994. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:26:13]: Number 2. When you were 5 years old, what did you want to be when you grew up? Yisu Zhou [00:26:17]: A scientist. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:26:18]: Number 3, who's your most influential professional mentor? Yisu Zhou [00:26:21]: I gotta be my PhD supervisor, Amita Sugar. Professor Sugar, if you're listening, you really made my world. You've taught me about professionalism with and care to the student, a true role model. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:26:33]: Number 4, your essential student affairs read. Yisu Zhou [00:26:36]: I think any educator will benefit and read from John Dewey. I've been rereading Dewey a lot for our research project. And for nonfiction, actually, this summer, I've been reading a lot of La La Gwynne. She's my favorite American author, and her fantasy series, Earthsea, really gives this kind of a feminist kind of a perspective about how to approach different people. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:26:55]: Number 5, the best TV show you binged during the pandemic. Yisu Zhou [00:26:59]: The slow horses on Apple TV starring Gary Old man. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:27:03]: Number 6, the podcast you've spent the most hours listening to in the last year. Yisu Zhou [00:27:07]: Okay. There are 2. So there is a Chinese podcast. It's called left You're right. It's a very good conversational kind of intellectual podcast. The English podcast I spend most of time I think it's from NPR. I'm a big fan of their all sounds considerate Podcast. I've been I've been following them for over a decade. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:27:23]: And finally, number 7, any shout outs you'd like to give personal or professional? Yisu Zhou [00:27:27]: I wanna give a shout out to my student, my master and PhD student. No matter if if you are crunching numbers in your little cube or doing field interviews or working on Guys, I hope really hope that you've been enjoying the studies in these universities or anywhere in the world. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:27:43]: It's been a wonderful and donating conversation today. I know I learned a lot from you. I'm sure that others have as well. If anyone would like to contact you after the show, how can they find you? Yisu Zhou [00:27:52]: I think the easiest way is to To search my name, Yisu Zhou on Twitter. I have a Twitter handle. You can also send me an email by, yisuzhou@gmail.com. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:28:00]: Thank you so much, Isoo, for sharing your voice with us today. Yisu Zhou [00:28:03]: Really happy to be here. Thank you for hosting me. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:28:07]: This has been an episode of SA voices from the field brought to you by NASPA. This show is always made possible because of you, our listeners. We are so grateful that you continue to listen to us season after season. If you'd Like to reach the show, you can always email us at essay voices at NASPA.org or find me on LinkedIn by searching for doctor Jill L. Creighton. We welcome your feedback and topic and especially your guest suggestions. We'd love it if you take a moment to tell a colleague about the show, and please like, rate, and review us on Apple podcast, Spotify, or wherever you're listening now. It really does help other student affairs professionals find the show and helps us become more visible in the larger podcasting community. Dr. Jill Creighton [00:28:47]: This episode was produced and hosted by doctor Jill L. Creighton. That's me. Produced and audio engineered by doctor Chris Lewis. Assistance by Lu Yongru. Special thanks to the University of Michigan Flint for your support as we create this project. Catch you next time.
Today's guest is Daniel A. Bell, a professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. Originally from Montreal, he became a specialist in this study of Confucius from the angle of political theory, worked his way into a position at the famed Tsinghua university in Beijing before being named Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University. Bell — so far as I know — is the first westerner to be given senior responsibilities of this nature at a Chinese university, and he has written a charming book about his experiences, called The Dean of Shandong: confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University, published by Princeton University Press. Book:The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese UniversityThe State of Postsecondary Education in Canada 2023:Link to PDF
Today's episode looks at the topic of electric vehicles and their impact on both carbon emissions and urban air quality. China has the world's largest market for electric vehicles, and it is the largest maker of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles manufactured worldwide. Hence, the environmental impact of EVs, even outside of China, often goes back upstream to China. Our guest is Zhang Shaojun, Associate Professor at the Tsinghua University School of the Environment. His research examines the environmental impacts of emissions from road transportation systems on air quality, climate and public health. Before joining Tsinghua University, he was a Postdoctoral Associate at University of Michigan and Atkinson Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Cornell University. Shaojun and his colleagues have published two important papers on these topics this year. The first, in the journal PNAS Nexus, looks at the upstream greenhouse gas emissions from battery manufacturing as well as a regional breakdown of power sector emissions from EV charging. The second paper, in Environmental Pollution, looks at the impact of EVs on air quality, employing Tsinghua's CMAQ model to look at how EVs affect ozone and PM2.5, in particular considering the seasonal effects on air chemistry, which relates to the formation of secondary pollution. (Primary emissions refer to pollutants directly emitted from vehicles or power plants, whereas secondary pollutants are formed in the atmosphere through mixing of chemical precursors.) For further reading: Fang Wang, Shaojun Zhang, Yinan Zhao, Yunxiao Ma, Yichen Zhang, Anders Hove, and Ye Wu, “Multisectoral drivers of decarbonizing battery electric vehicles in China,” PNAS Nexus, Volume 2, Issue 5, May 2023, https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/2/5/pgad123/7159885. Yiliang Jiang, Xinyu Liang, Shaojun Zhang, Zechun Hu, Anders Hove, and Ye Wu, “The future air quality impact of electric vehicle promotion and coordinated charging in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region,” Environ Pollut., 1 September 2023, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envpol.2023.121928. Support us on Patreon! https://www.patreon.com/EnvironmentChina Episode Executive Producer: Anders Hove
Visiting the campuses of the famous Peking University and Tsinghua University is a huge summer attraction for Chinese students and their parents. As only a limited number of visitors are allowed to enter the premises of the two universities on any given day, scalpers are making big money by selling free entry tickets at high prices to eager students. 参观著名的北京大学和清华大学校园是暑期吸引中国学生和家长的一个热门旅游景点。由于这两所大学每天只允许有限数量的游客入内，黄牛们通过高价出售免费门票来赚取高额利润。The campuses have only recently reopened to the public after remaining closed for three years due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Now that visitors are being allowed in again, there is a massive rush to book the limited number of free tickets that are released by the universities for day trips. The scalpers, some of whom are former students of the two universities, have been profiting from this situation. 这两所大学的校园由于新冠疫情封闭了三年之久，最近才重新对公众开放。现在游客再次被允许入内，每天所释放的限量免费门票成为抢手货。其中一些黄牛甚至是这两所大学的校友，他们从中牟利。Peking University has acted against 46 former students who raked in around 1.5 million yuan ($210,000) from 139 students who wanted to visit the campus, said a notice issued by the university recently. Each of the 139 students was charged 10,800 yuan for a "study tour" that included visits to the university. 北京大学日前发布公告称，该校已对46名前学生采取了行动，他们从139名希望参观校园的学生那里敛财约150万元人民币（约合21万美元）。这139名学生每人被收取了10800元的“参观学习”费用，其中包括参观北大。The university, which allows former students to book tickets for up to three companions to enter the campus during the summer vacation, has suspended the 46 former students' access to booking tickets either for themselves or others. 这所大学允许毕业生在暑假期间为最多三名同伴预订进入校园的门票，但已暂停了这46名毕业生为自己或他人预订门票的权限。On July 8, both PKU and Tsinghua reopened their campuses to the public, and visitors need to book appointments in advance. While PKU did not specify how many visitors are being allowed daily, Tsinghua University said it is letting in 4,000 visitors a day. 7月8日，北京大学和清华大学重新向公众开放校园，但参观者需要提前预约。北京大学没有说明每天允许多少游客参观，而清华大学则表示每天允许4000名游客参观。Experts said the strong interest among parents and students to visit the two universities means the campuses would be swamped with people if there are no restrictions, yet allowing in only those who have booked slots in advance is helping unscrupulous elements to exploit the situation. 专家表示，家长和学生对参观两所大学的浓厚兴趣意味着，如果不加限制，两所大学的校园将人满为患，但只允许提前预订时段的人进入，这就助长了不法分子的钻空子行为。On travel portal Ctrip, a five-day summer camp to PKU and Tsinghua costs around 5,000 yuan. The trip includes meeting students from the two universities, taking pictures with them, learning about the admission process from them and also attending lectures given by professors. 在旅游门户网站携程网上，为期五天的北京大学和清华大学夏令营费用约为5000元。行程包括与两所大学的学生见面、合影留念、向他们了解入学流程，以及聆听教授的讲座。However, there is no way of actually verifying if the students and professors are really from the universities. Moreover, the trip does not promise entry into the university campuses. It only talks about visits to the "outside" of the universities. 但是，无法实际核实学生和教授是否真的来自大学。此外，这次旅行并不承诺进入大学校园。它只谈及对大学“外部”的访问。According to Nanfang Metropolis Daily, a woman surnamed Li from Hangzhou said that she signed her child up for a five-day study tour to the universities, costing 4,980 yuan, but her child did not even get to enter the two universities, and had to be satisfied with photographs taken at the gates. 据《南方都市报》报道，杭州一位李姓女士说，她给孩子报了五天的大学游学团，花了4980元，但孩子连两所大学的大门都没进，只能在校门口拍照。Apart from the so-called study tours, simply entering the two universities is now costing a lot of money. Netizens have complained on different social media platforms about the difficulties they have faced in obtaining a free slot to visit the two universities, while others claimed that they got the tickets for a price. 除了所谓的游学团，现在仅仅进入这两所大学就要花很多钱。网民在不同的社交媒体平台上抱怨，他们很难获得免费参观两所大学的名额，而其他人则声称，他们是花钱买到门票的。According to Beijing Business Today, scalpers have been selling tickets for a day tour of the campuses at 300 to 500 yuan. People wanting to visit have to share their ID number and phone number with the scalpers, who claim they can get the entry tickets as soon as they are released. 据《北京商报》报道，黄牛以300至500元的价格出售校园一日游门票。想去参观的人必须把身份证号和电话号码告诉黄牛，黄牛声称只要一放出门票就能拿到。There have been instances where people have paid the money to the scalpers, but have not got the tickets in return. 曾有一些人向黄牛支付了钱，却没有换来门票。A 19-year-old student surnamed Han said he paid a scalper 20 yuan to enter Tsinghua, and sent his personal information as advised. However, when he tried to enter the campus, the security guard told him the ticket system did not have his information. 一位19岁的韩姓学生说，他向黄牛支付了20元钱，并按照建议发送了个人信息，以进入清华校门。然而，当他试图进入校园时，保安告诉他，售票系统没有他的信息。When he tried to ask for his money back, the scalper blocked his number. 当他试图要回自己的钱时，黄牛拉黑了他的号码。Sun Zhifeng, a lawyer at Chance Bridge Law Firm, said it is difficult to crack down on such scalpers, as many are anonymous online entities. 北京卓纬律师事务所的律师孙志峰表示，很难打击此类黄牛，因为许多黄牛都是匿名的网络实体。However, if a lot of money is involved, they can be tracked for committing fraud and carrying out illegal business operations, Sun said.不过，孙志峰说，如果涉及大量资金，就可以追查他们的诈骗和非法经营行为。Profit英/ˈprɒfɪt/美/ˈprɑːfɪt/v.赢利，获利Fraud英/frɔːd/ 美/frɔːd/n.欺诈，骗局，诡计Reporter: Zou ShuoIntern : Zang Tianyi
After more than three years, a number of top universities in China, such as Peking University and Tsinghua University, will allow the public to enter the campus starting on Saturday.经过三年多的时间，包括北京大学和清华大学在内的一些中国顶级大学将从7月8日起允许公众进入校园。Tsinghua will allow ordinary visitors from July 8 to Aug 6, between the hours of 9 to 11 am and 2 to 4 pm. The university is closed to visitors on Mondays.清华大学对外开放参观从7月8日开始，8月6日结束，开放日入校时间为上午9：00至11：00，下午14：00至16：00，每周一为校园休整日，不对外开放。Each visitor is only allowed to visit the university once, and can book three slots for companions.每人在暑期校园参观开放期内仅能成功预约1次，每人最多可为同行的另外3人预约。Group travel is open only to primary and secondary school students.团队参观仅面向中小学生群体开放。In a similar notice, Peking University said that starting from Saturday it will open for ordinary visitors during summer and winter vacations, public holidays and weekends.北京大学也发布了一则类似通知，从7月8日起，北京大学将在寒暑假、法定节假日及双休日期间开放校园参观。Group visits are also only open to primary and secondary school students.团队参观也仅面向中小学生群体开放。Some other famous universities, including Fudan University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Wuhan University have also announced recently that they will allow visitors.其他一些顶级大学，包括复旦大学、上海交通大学和武汉大学最近也宣布，将允许游客参观。For most of the last two or three years, Chinese universities have adopted rigorous closed management policies to contain the COVID-19 epidemic.在过去两三年的大部分时间里，中国的大学采取严格的封闭式管理政策，以遏制新冠疫情。In a poll by Southern Metropolis Daily in late May, while more than 96 percent of college students said they support the idea of opening their universities, they also expressed concerns that it may exert more pressure on maintaining order on campus.《南方都市报》5月底发布的一项民意调查显示，虽然有超过96%的大学生支持开放其大学校园的想法，但他们也担心，这可能会给维持校园秩序带来更大的压力。Top universities have always been popular sites for travelers, especially for Chinese parents and students eager to embrace the academic atmosphere.顶级大学一直是热门旅游景点，特别是对于渴望沉浸在学术氛围中的中国家长和学生来说。In fact, during the past few months, some visitors have gone through "underground" channels to enter the campus.事实上，在过去几个月里，一些游客通过“地下”渠道进入校园。According to a report by the news website ThePaper.cn, some people have been offering paid services to enter the premises of Wuhan University by changing the profile pictures in the university's mini-app to let them enter the gates. The university responded that such actions are not allowed and they would also check the profile photo when they exit the campus.根据澎湃新闻的报道，有些人提供付费服务，通过改变武汉大学小程序中的个人资料照片让他们进入学校大门。校方回应道，不允许这样的行为，他们会在离开校园时检查个人资料照片。On social media platforms, people have complained about the great difficulty in obtaining a booking. Some have claimed they can get tickets for others at a price, yet all universities said that they do not charge for tickets.在社交媒体平台上，人们纷纷抱怨预约订票太困难。有些人声称他们可以为他人有偿提供门票，但所有大学都表示他们并未收取门票费用。Yi Yi, who graduated from a Beijing university last year, was thrilled that she successfully booked tickets for her and her friend to visit Peking University on Sunday.去年刚从北京一所大学毕业的依依表示，她成功地为自己和朋友预约到了周日参观北京大学的门票，对此感到非常兴奋。Although she has long wanted to visit the university, she has never found a good opportunity to do so.尽管她一直都想参观这所大学，但从未找到合适的机会实现。"The top universities are the academic sanctuary for most Chinese students, and they have rich history and great cultural atmosphere," she said. "I want to visit Peking University to feel the atmosphere of one of the best universities in China, which will motivate me to continue learning."“一流的大学是大多数中国学生心目中的学术圣地，它们历史悠久，文化氛围浓厚，”她说。“我想参观北京大学，感受中国最好的大学之一的氛围，这将激励我继续学习。”Wang Qing, a researcher at the Beijing Institute of Technology's School of Humanities and Social Sciences, suggested that universities' opening-up needs to go beyond allowing the public to enter the brick-and-mortar buildings.北京理工大学人文与社会科学学院特别副研究员王青指出，物理空间的开放只是大学开放的表象或结果，而非最核心内容。"Universities should not monopolize the rights to produce and evaluate knowledge. They should create knowledge together with the outside world," he told China Science Daily.他在接受《中国科技报》采访时说道：“大学不再垄断知识的生产权、评估权，而是与外界共同创造知识。”Campus英/ˈkæmpəs/ 美/ˈkæmpəs/n.（大学或学院的）校园Travel英/ˈtræv(ə)l/ 美/ˈtræv(ə)l/v.（尤指长途）旅行
This week leads on an extraordinary story. A new metric, from the world-leading science journal Nature has put Chinese universities above some of the most famous names in higher ed. MIT, Caltech, Cambridge and Imperial are all ranking lower than the likes of Nanjing and Tsinghua. Andrew Collingwood is interested in how far behind the times our cultural imagination is with regards to China. While Philip Pilkington senses that the gains to being world-best will soon start to turn exponential. Both are mildly baffled as to how we've come up with a ranking system that doesn't prioritise innovative research. With China already producing more STEM PhDs than the US, is the Western university still fit for purpose? In Germany, years of pacifism won't be shucked off as easily as Russian shelling of Kiev. The country's incoming coalition government had threatened to raise the national budget. Instead, its defence minister has had to content himself with 'not having the budget cut'. So is Germany's long-held pacifism turning pathological? Or will they wake up to a multipolar world before it's too late? Meanwhile, it's Iran Nuclear Deal season again. After Trump tore up the Obama era plan, and Biden then won re-election promising to put it back, the going has not been slow. For now, the Iranians are continuing to enrich their party packs of uranium. And in a multipolar world, there is no longer so much that the Americans can offer them to stop. The decisive turn, as Philip Pilkington notes, may come from Israel. As alliances swirl, will they continue their targeted assassinations of top scientists? Or is there even a world in which they come down on the side of the mullahs?
L'intelligence artificielle, à laquelle RFI consacre une journée spéciale ce 12 juin, peut être perçue comme facteur de liberté, de rapidité, mais peut aussi permettre un plus grand contrôle des populations. Reportage en Chine, pays qui compte une caméra de surveillance pour deux habitants, et où l'IA accompagne de nombreux appareils connectés de façon à suivre les individus. De notre correspondant à Pékin, avec Louise May du bureau de Pékin,Les échanges avec l'intelligence artificielle commencent dès le matin à Pékin. Ici un haut-parleur conversationnel : « Xiaodu Xiaodu, peux-tu me dire le temps qu'il fait aujourd'hui ? » Réponse : « Il fait un peu plus frais qu'hier, légère pluie et 30 degrés au thermomètre. » La vie ultra-connectée pour accéder aux transports, à sa résidence, pour les paiements électroniques, fait que l'intelligence artificielle brasse des montagnes de données en Chine, des images, mais aussi du son.Justement, à la Security China 2023, l'exposition internationale des professionnels chinois de la sûreté et de la sécurité publique à laquelle s'est rendue RFI, une entreprise lève - un peu - le voile sur le fonctionnement des micros de surveillance dans les lieux publics : « En fait, cela fonctionne par “mots-clés” et avec “l'identification vocale”. Si le système entend quelqu'un tomber sur le sol ou quelqu'un qui appelle la police au milieu de la foule, il transfère immédiatement l'information au centre de contrôle. Même chose s'il entend “au voleur !”, par exemple. Bon, pour l'instant, le système fonctionne uniquement sur des conversations en mandarin... »► À lire aussi : Intelligence artificielle: y a-t-il un pilote dans la maison?Suivi des individus noyés dans la masseLe représentant commercial de ce fabricant d'outil de surveillance ne parle pas d'autres mots-clés, de termes sensibles qui peuvent être ajoutés pour une surveillance plus politique.En Chine, l'IA intégrée dans les caméras à reconnaissance faciale, aux points de contrôle, et le cloud de l'appareil de sécurité publique permettent le suivi des individus noyés dans la masse. C'est le système dit « une personne, un fichier », qui est développé depuis 2016 par des dizaines d'entreprises chinoises présentes au salon de la sécurité et qui travaillent en étroite collaboration avec le gouvernement.L'intelligence artificielle est aussi mis au service de l'hygiène publique, explique un autre exposant. « Ce dispositif est d'abord destiné à la surveillance des écoles et des maisons de retraite. Il y a une capture des images au moyen des caméras et, derrière, les algorithmes moulinent pour déterminer les situations anormales. Tiens ! Cette personne en cuisine n'a pas couvert ses cheveux ! Là, il y a une personne qui fume dans un coin. Et ici, un chat, un chien ou un rat qui passe. »► À lire aussi : Chine: les «notes sociales» débarquent dans le métro de PékinL'inquiétude des autorités chinoises face à ChatGPTL'IA est en alerte et les alarmes se déclenchent. Ou au contraire, pour certaines questions, les robots restent muets. « Qu'est-ce qui s'est passé le 4 juin 1989 ?... Il dit qu'il ne sait pas. » L'amnésie des robots conversationnels chinois épouse les contours de la censure officielle. Mais cela ne vaut pas pour ChatGPT, dont la très grande liberté inquiète les autorités chinoises.« Personnellement, je suis favorable à ne pas laisser entrer ChatGPT en Chine, car cela serait un problème pour la sécurité des données nationales, déclare Yu Yang, professeur adjoint au département Intelligence artificielle de la prestigieuse université Tsinghua. Plus généralement, il faut que tout algorithme d'intelligence artificielle fasse l'objet d'un audit avant son utilisation commerciale. Il faut à chaque fois vérifier leur impact social. Nous avons donc besoin d'audit pour toutes les formes d'intelligence artificielle utilisées dans les entreprises publiques, mais aussi pour le privé et notamment le secteur des services. »► À écouter aussi : Chat GPT, le robot qui fascine et inquièteCet audit systématique est mentionné dans un projet de loi révélé le mois dernier. Les outils d'intelligence artificielle doivent refléter les « valeurs socialistes fondamentales », a affirmé le président chinois, tout en appelant à un plus grand contrôle de l'État chinois sur l'IA.« Nous devons nous préparer au pire [...] de façon à pouvoir résister aux vents violents et aux eaux agités et aux tempêtes dangereuses », aurait aussi déclaré Xi Jinping dans des propos rapportés par l'agence Chine Nouvelle.L'annonce d'un renforcement des contrôles joue également le rôle d'arme de dissuasion. Les Chinois ne savent pas s'ils sont surveillés, et l'incertitude les rend plus obéissants, croient les concepteurs du système.
In this masterclass, you will learn - 1. The art of following your curiosity to build a portfolio of careers 2. Insights on geopolitics, the end of history and public deliberation 3. Mental models on personal productivity Brian is a geopolitical strategist and advisor publishing extensively on Sino-American relations, statecraft in Asia, and the intersection of nascent technologies, political philosophy, and public policy. Currently pursuing a DPhil in Politics at Balliol College, Oxford, Brian graduated with a Distinction in the MPhil in Politics (Theory) at Wolfson College, and First Class Honours from Pembroke with a BA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, having attended Oxford on a full scholarship on a Kwok Scholarship. Brian has taught modules in politics to undergraduate students at Oxford and Stanford Universities (latter on exchange). Brian has presented on Sino-American relations and Chinese foreign policy at Tsinghua, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, Stanford, the Young China Watcher and Tufts Conferences, and advised leading MNCs on macro risks in Asia. As the Founding Editor-in-Chief of Oxford Political Review, a publication aspiring to bridge the theory and practice gap, Brian serves as a columnist for the Hong Kong Economic Journal and the Editor-at-Large for ThriveGlobal, they write regularly for publications such as TIME, Foreign Policy, Aeon, Financial Times, the Diplomat, Fortune, SCMP, Nikkei, Japan Times, SupChina, US-China Perception Monitor, Neican, The Hindu, having also presented and written on issues of public philosophy for the Journal of Practical Ethics, the American Philosophical Association, and the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Brian is also the Founding Fellow of Governance Partners Yangon, a capacity-building oriented policy group and NGO based in Myanmar and Hong Kong, and the former Founding Secretary of Citizen Action Design Ltd., a youth-centric think-tank based in Hong Kong, alongside co-founding Project Change, an initiative designed to support youth with mental health issues in the city.
Great discussion with Professor Simon Chadwick, a highly respected academic in the world of sports, with several books and papers to his name and various successful consulting roles across the world combining academics with the real world. We take a birds eye look at the world of sports, the hottest topics and issues out there, across Simon's 20+ year career. Key Highlights How it all started, growing up living across his local team, Middlesborough – passion passed down by generations Premier League paper in mid 90s got the ball rolling, leading to a PhD with his thesis focused on Football Shirt deals in English Football How to connect a brand to the heart of the fan through shirt sponsorship discussion Working with overseas Master & PhD students to study overseas fan behavior, how do fans in China pick a “favorite club” Stories – Ferran Soriano early vision at Barcelona & Manchester United Tour lessons from 2005 Lessons learned from trips and work IN PLACES INCLUDING THE GULF, China, Russia, - understanding the differences and impact on sports. Teaching around the world from Brazil to Japan TO THE UNITED STATES Qatar Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy – work with them prior to the World Cup Our discussion on “migrant worker” issues and “Sports Washing” history lessons, politics, nation branding, etc China – what is happening since Covid – recent Winter Olympics, dropping the AFC Asia Cup (Football) as host (Geo political issues) Public sector entrepreneur – writing books looking at Mega trends (Managing Football, Handbook of Sports Marketing, etc. New book “The Geopolitical economy of sports” – coming out this year (Publisher: Routledge) Women's sports discussion, opportunities and challenges Esports & Gaming – how countries take advantage of investments in Esports to build new industries, ie. Korea, Saudi Arabia, China Sports coming out of Covid – survival of the fittest, concentration of power (industrial concentration) Recession talk vs Mega Media deals globally (how to explain it) – polarization About Professor Simon Chadwick is a researcher, writer, academic, consultant, policy advisor, and speaker with more than twenty-five years experience in the global sport industry. His work focuses on the geopolitical economy of sport. Chadwick is Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy at Skema Business School in Paris, where he is also a member of its think tank - Publika - as well as Programme Director of Skema's Global Executive MBA in Sport. Simon previously co-founded and directed Emlyon Business School's Centre for the Eurasian Sport Industry, the University of London's Birkbeck Sports Business Centre, Coventry University's Centre for the International Business of Sport, and Salford University's Centre for Sport Business. In addition, he has worked at several of the world's most prestigious business schools, such as IESE in Spain, Otto Beisheim in Germany, Tsinghua in China, COPPEAD in Brazil and Waseda in Japan. He has written numerous articles, books and research reports for the likes of Forbes, Sloan Management Review, the Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Forbes, Thunderbird International Business Review, Mastercard, Newsweek, Reuters, Time, Routledge and Financial Times Prentice Hall. Chadwick has consulted for some of the biggest names in sport, such as FC Barcelona, UEFA, Adidas, the Association of Tennis Professionals, Nielsen, the European Clubs Association, Ping, Formula E, Coca Cola, and the Asian Football Confederation. Simon tweets via @Prof_Chadwick Some examples of his writing can be found via channels including: https://www.iris-france.org/geosport/ https://www.policyforum.net/authors/simon-chadwick/ https://theconversation.com/profiles/simon-chadwick-94601/articles https://www.ejinsight.com/eji/author/id/10880 Follow us on our social sites for the latest updates Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sportsentrepreneurs/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/marcusluerpodcast LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/sports-entrepreneurs Website: https://marcusluer.com Podcast: https://marcusluer.com/podcast To get in touch, please email us at podcast@marcusluer.com Feel Good by MusicbyAden https://soundcloud.com/musicbyaden Creative Commons — Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported — CC BY-SA 3.0 Free Download / Stream: https://bit.ly/_feel-good Music promoted by Audio Library https://youtu.be/bvgIqqRStcQ
Guest of this appointment is a young Korean architect who, endowed with a distinctive personality, has realized interesting works marked by a loud identity. Jo Jinman, graduated from Hanyang University, Seoul, with a later degree from Tsinghua University, Beijing in 2014 and founded his own, eponymous practice, Jo Jinman Architects.He has participated to national exhibitions and won several competitions, acknowledged with the ‘National Young Architect Award' by the Ministry of Culture, Korea, 2015, ‘Korea Public Building Prize', 2016 and ‘Korea Progressive Architect Awards', 2017, by the Ministry of Land and Infrastructure, ‘Seoul Architecture Award', 2018, by Seoul Metropolitan Government, World Architecture Award, 2019, World Architecture Community, 'Emerging Architect Awards' and 'Design Vanguard', 2019, from Architectural Record.His architecture, against the limitations of a simple function, explores challenges and expectations of society, proposing energetic spaces, open to be adopted and developed over time by the people themselves and mostly seeking a continuity between indoor and outdoor. A complex simplicity characterizes his work, aiming to offer new, alternative possibilities and creative solutions.He has worked for several years as Public Architect, for Seoul Metropolitan Government, dedicating his efforts to implement connections between people, city, and nature. Adjunct Professor at the Hanyang University of Seoul (2013~2020), and in 2022 at Taylor's University, Malaysia, he has recently published ‘Notes of a provocative architect, Jo Jinman.'The conversation starts from the period of his post-graduation, a moment represented in Seoul by a massive building development, mainly represented by economic speculations, and his need to reflect about his future responsibilities as architect towards society. A change of environment has brought him to Beijing, for a Master at Tsinghua University, and a working experience at IROJE Architects & Planners, and after some years to OMA, Rotterdam, as senior architect: two different experiences that have positively impacted his formative growth. Return back to Seoul, in 2014, he established his firm, realizing several public interventions, according to an idea of architecture continuously evolving and transforming, eliminating barriers, especially between nature and people, and encouraging relationships. An architecture able to offer hybrid spaces where unplanned things happen. Naesoop Library, a public space open to four completely different sides, growing from a hill, spontaneously fragmenting and adapting its shape to the complex topographical situation, emphasizes, attuned to his design's philosophy, the permeability between inside and outside and the potential to enhance multiple functions, breaking the traditional paradigm of a library as austere environment of silence.We focus then on a research he led years ago, as public architect for Seoul Metropolitan Government about leftover spaces still available for public interventions in the dense Seoul central area, that has identified a series of empty highway underpasses, offering a possible multifunctional network of reconnections in the urban fabric.Two other projects, Riverside Apse, a small iconic café, and Changshin Quarry Viewing Gallery, a simple but impressive, cantilevered observation deck, have been conceived as gestures to bridge past and present, with concern about historic parts of the country, in need not to be forgotten.The special unique identity of K2 office tower, imposing its striking, refined silhouette in a congested part of Seoul, is Jo Jinman's response to the challenging difficult limitations of a narrow site. A harmonious monolithic presence, balancing complexity and simplicity, an extremely creative, elaborate work of technology and craftsmanship, cloaked by a light mantle of repeated, perforated thin cement louvers.Restrictions and demanding situations are for Jinman particular stimulating starting points, that he brilliantly solves with extremely original and pleasant solutions, as in the case of other two residential projects, Layered Terrace House and Nine Wall House, both addressing multiple needs of three-generation families with special minimalist and elegant, distinct formal languages, embracing nature, light and various dynamic creative possibilities able to enrich daily life of the residents.
Episode Notes:A discussion recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally.Links:John Culver: How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan - Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceTranscript:Bill: Welcome back to the very occasional Sinocism podcast. Today we are going to talk about the recently concluded 20th Party Congress and what to expect ahead in US China relations. I'm pleased to welcome back Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China Strategies Group, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute Center for China Analysis and former Senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. This is the 7th Party Congress that Chris has analyzed professionally. So we have a lot of experience here to help us understand what just happened. Chris, welcome back and thanks for taking the time.Chris: My pleasure. Always fun to be with you, Bill.Bill: Great. Well, why don't we jump right in. I'd like to talk about what you see as the most important outcomes from the Congress starting with personnel. What do you make of the leadership team from the central committee to the Politburo to the Standing Committee and what does that say about.Chris: Yeah, well, I, think clearly Xi Jinping had a massive win, you know, with personnel. I think we see this particularly in the Politburo Standing Committee, right, where on the key portfolios that really matter to him in terms of controlling the key levers of power inside the system. So we're talking propaganda, obviously, Uh, we're talking party bureaucracy, military less so, but security services, you know, these, these sort of areas all up and down the ballot he did very well.So that's obviously very important. And I think obviously then the dropping of the so-called Communist Youth League faction oriented people in Li Keqiang and Wang Yang and, and Hu Chunhua being kind of unceremoniously kicked off the Politburo, that tells us that. He's not in the mood to compromise with any other interest group.I prefer to call them rather than factions. Um, so that sort of suggests to us that, you know, models that rely on that kind of an analysis are dead. It has been kind of interesting in my mind to see how quickly though that, you know, analysts who tend to follow that framework already talking about the, uh, factional elements within Xi's faction, right?So, you know, it's gonna be the Shanghai people versus the Zhijiang Army versus the Fujian people. Bill: people say there's a Tsinghua factionChris: Right. The, the infamous, non infamous Tsinghua clique and, and and so on. But I think as we look more closely, I mean this is all kidding aside, if we look more closely at the individuals, what we see is obviously these people, you know, loyalty to Xi is, is sort of like necessary, but not necessarily sufficient in explaining who these people are. Also, I just always find it interesting, you know, somehow over. Wang Huning has become a Xi Jinping loyalist. I mean, obviously he plays an interesting role for Xj Jinping, but I don't think we should kid ourselves in noting that he's been kind of shunted aside Right by being pushed into the fourth position on the standing committee, which probably tells us that he will be going to oversee the Chinese People's Consultative Congress, which is, you know, kind of a do nothing body, you know, for the most part. And, um, you know, my sense has long been, One of Xi Jinping's, I think a couple factors there with Wang Huning.Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.One is, you know, yes, he is very talented at sort of taking their very, uh, expansive, um, theoretical ideas and coming up with snappy, um, snappy sort of catchphrases, right? This is clearly his, um, his sort of claim to fame. But, you know, we had that article last year from the magazine, Palladium that kind of painted him as some sort of an éminence grise or a Rasputin like figure, you know, in terms of his role.Uh, you know, my sense has always been, uh, as one contact, put it to me one time. You know, the issue is that such analyses tend to confuse the musician with the conductor. In other words, Xi Jinping. is pretty good at ideology, right? And party history and the other things that I think the others had relied on.I think the second thing with Wang Huning is, um, in a way XI can't look at him I don't think, without sort of seeing here's a guy who's changed flags, as they would say, right? He served three very different leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi , um, and, and continued on and I think at some level, uh, and we look at the rest of the appointments where it appears that, uh, loyalty was much more important than merit.Um, where that's also a question mark. So there's those issues I think on the Politburo. You know, you mentioned the, the Tsinghua clique it was very interesting. You had shared with me, uh, Desmond Shum of Red Roulette fame's Twitter stream sort of debunking, you know, this, this Tsinghua clique and saying, well, it turns out in fact that the new Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining can't stand Chen Xi, even though, you know, they both went to Tsinghua and were there at the same time and so on.Um, you know, who knows with Desmond Shum, but I think he knows some things, right? And, and, and it just a reminder to us all, I think, how little we understand right, about these relationships, especially now, uh, with Xi's concentration of power. And also a situation where we've had nearly three years of covid isolationBill: Right. And so it's really hard to go talk to people, even the fewer and fewer numbers, people who, who know something and can talk. Back to the standing committee. I, I think certainly just from friends and contacts the biggest surprise you know, I think, uh was Li Keqiang and Wang Yang not sticking around. And as that long explainer said without naming them they were good comrades who steps aside for the good of the party in the country,Chris: Because that happens so often,Bill: whatever that means. Um, but really the, the bigger surprise was that, oh, Cai Qi showing up. Who I think when you look at the standing committee, I think the general sense is, okay, the, these people are all, you know, not, they're loyal, but they're also competent, like Li Qiang, Chris: Right, Bill: The likely new premier number two on the standing committee is pretty competent. The Shanghai lockdown, disaster aside, Cai Qi on the other hand, was just, looks more like, it's just straight up loyalty to Xi. I think he was not really on anybody's short list of who was gonna make it on there. And so, it does feel like something happened, right?Chris: Yeah. Well, um, a couple things there. I think, um, one, let's start with the. The issue you raised about the economic team cuz I think that's actually very important. Um, you know, I, at some level, sometimes I feel like I'm sort of tiring my, of my role as official narrative buster or a windmill tilter.Uh, whether, whether it's pushback from Li Keqiang or the myth of the savior premier as I was calling it, which, uh, we didn't see, or that these norms actually aren't very enduring and it's really about power politics. I, I think I'm kind of onto a new one now, which is, you know, Xi Jin ping's new team of incompetent sycophants.Right? That's kind of the label that's, uh, come out in a lot of the takes, uh, since the Congress. But to your point, I mean, you know, Li Qiang has run the three most important economic powerhouses on China's east coast, either as governor or as party chief. Right. He seems to have had a, a good relationship with both.Private sector businesses and, and foreign, you know, people forget that, you know, he got the Tesla plant built in Shanghai in a year basically. Right. And it's, uh, responsible for a very significant amount of, of Tesla's total input of vehicles. Output of vehicles. Excuse me. Um, likewise, I hear that Ding Xuexiang, even though we don't know a lot about him, uh, was rather instrumental in things.Breaking the log jam with the US uh, over the de-listing of Chinese ADRs, uh, that he had played an important role in convincing Xi Jinping it would not be a good idea, for example, to, uh, you know, we're already seeing, uh, sort of decoupling on the technology side. It would not be a good idea to encourage the Americans to decouple financially as well. So the point is I think we need to just all kind of calm down, right? And, and see how these people perform in office. He Lifeng, I think is perhaps, you know, maybe more of a question mark, but, But here too, I think it's important for us to think about how their system worksThe political report sets the frame, right? It tells us what. Okay, this is the ideological construct we're working off of, or our interpretation, our dialectical interpretation of what's going on. And that, I think the signal there was what I like to call this fortress economy, right? So self-sufficiency and technology and so on.And so then when we look at the Politburo appointments, you can see that they align pretty closely to that agenda, right? These people who've worked in state firms or scientists and you know, so on and forth.Bill: Aerospace, defenseChris: Yeah, Aerospace. Very close alignment with that agenda. I'm not saying this is the right choice for China or that it even will be successful, I'm just saying it makes sense, you know,Bill: And it is not just sycophants it is actually loyal but some expertise or experience in these key sectors Chris: Exactly. Yeah, and, and, and, and of interest as well. You know, even people who have overlapped with Xi Jinping. How much overlap did they have? How much exposure did they have? You know, there's a lot of discussion, for example, about the new propaganda boss, Li Shulei being very close to Xi and likewise Shi Taifeng.Right? Uh, both of whom were vice presidents at the party school when, when Xi also was there. Um, but remember, you know, he was understudy to Hu Jintao at the time, you know, I mean, the party school thing was a very small part of his portfolio and they were ranked lower, you know, amongst the vice presidents of the party school.So how much actual interaction did he have? So there too, you know, I think, uh, obviously. , yes these people will do what Xi Jinping wants them to do, but that doesn't mean they're not competent. On Cai Qi, I agree with you. I think it's, it's, it's difficult. You know, my speculation would be a couple of things.One, proximity matters, right? He's been sitting in Beijing the last five years, so he is, had the opportunity to, uh, be close to the boss and, and impact that. I've heard some suggestions from contacts, which I think makes some. He was seen as more strictly enforcing the zero Covid policy. Right. In part because he is sitting in Beijing than say a Chen Min'er, right.Who arguably was a other stroke better, you know, candidate for that position on the Politburo standing committee. And there, you know, it will be interesting to see, you know, we're not sure the musical chairs have not yet finished. Right. The post party Congress for people getting new jobs. But you know, for example, if Chen Min'er stays out in Chongqing, that seems like a bit of a loss for him.Bill: Yeah, he needs to go somewhere else if he's got any hope of, um, sort of, But so one thing, sorry. One thing on the Politburo I thought was really interesting, and I know we've talked about offline, um, is that the first time the head of the Ministry State Security was, was. Promoted into the Politburo - Chen Wenqing. And now he is the Secretary of the Central Political Legal Affairs Commission, the party body that oversees the entire security services system and legal system. and what do you think that says about priorities and, and, and where Xi sees things going?Chris: Well, I think it definitely aligns with this concept of Xi Jiping's of comprehensive national security. Right. We've, we've seen and heard and read a lot about that and it seems that the, uh, number of types of security endlessly proliferate, I think we're up to 13 or 14Bill: Everything is National Security in Xi's China.Chris: Yeah. Everything is, is national security. Uh, that's one thing I think it's interesting perhaps in the, in the frame of, you know, in an era where they are becoming a bigger power and therefore, uh, have more resources and so on. You know, is that role that's played by the Ministry of State Security, which is, you know, they have this unique role, don't they?They're in a way, they're sort of the US' Central Intelligence Agency and, and FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation combined, and that they do have that internal security role as well, but, They are the foreign civilian anyway, uh, foreign intelligence collection arm. So perhaps, you know, over time there's been some sense that they realized, yes, cyber was great for certain things, but you still need human intelligence.Uh, you know, we don't know how well or not Chen Wenqing has performed, but you know, obviously there, this has been a relentless campaign, you know, the search for spies and so on and so forth. Um, I also think it says something about what we seem to be seeing emerging here, which is an effort to take what previously were these, you know, warring, uh, administrative or ministerial factions, right, of the Ministry of Public Security MPS, the MSS, uh, and even the party's, uh, discipline watchdog, the, uh, Central Commission on Discipline inspection, you know, in an effort to sort of knit those guys into one whole.And you know, it is interesting.Chen wending has experience in all three of those. He started off, I think as a street cop. Um, he did serve on the discipline inspection commission under, uh, Wang Qishan when things were, you know, really going in that department in the early part of, Xi's tenure and then he's headed, uh, the Ministry of State Security.I think, you know, even more interesting probably is. The, uh, formation of the new secretariat, right? Where we have both Chen Wenqing on there and also Wang Xiaohong as a minister of Public Security, but also as a deputy on the CPLAC, right? And a seat on the secretariat. And if we look at the, um, The gentleman who's number two in the discipline inspection, uh, space, he was a longtime police officer as well.So that's very unusual. You know, uh, his name's escaping me at the moment. But, um, you know, so in effect you have basically three people on the Secretariat with security backgrounds and, you know, that's important. It means other portfolios that might be on the secretariat that have been dumped, right? So it shows something about the prioritization, uh, of security.And I think it's interesting, you know, we've, we've often struggled to understand what is the National Security Commission, how does it function, You know, these sort of things. And it's, it's still, you know, absolutely clear as mud. But what was interesting was that, you know, from whatever that early design was that had some aspect at least of looking a bit like the US style, National Security Commission, they took on a much more sort of internal looking flavor.And it had always been my sort of thought that one of the reasons Xi Jinping created this thing was to break down, you know, those institutional rivalries and barriers and force, you know, coordination on these, on these institutions. So, you know, bottom line, I think what we're seeing is a real effort by Xi Jinping to You know, knit together a comprehensive, unified, and very effective, you know, stifling, really security apparatus. And, uh, I don't expect to see that change anytime soon. And then, you know, as you and I have been discussing recently, we also have, uh, another Xi loyalist Chen Yixin showing up as Chen Wenqing's successor right at the Ministry of State SecurityBill: And he remains Secretary General of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission too.Chris: Exactly. So, you know, from, from a, a sheet home where Xi Jinping five years ago arguably had very loose control, if at all, we now have a situation where he's totally dominant. Bill: I think the, the official on the Secretariat, I think it's Liu Jinguo.Chris: That's the one. Yes. Thank you. I'm getting old…Bill: He also has, has a long history of the Ministry of Public Security system. Um, but yeah, it does, it does seem like it's a, it's a real, I mean it, I I, I don't wanna use the word securitization, but it does like this is the indication of a, of a real, sort of, it just sort of fits with the, the general trend towards much more focus on national security. I mean, what about on the, the Central Military Commission? Right? Because one of the surprises was, um, again, and this is where the norms were broken, where you have Zhang Youxia, who should have retired based on his age, but he's 72, he's on the Politburo he stays as a vice chair of the CMCChris: Yep. Yeah, no, at, at, at the rip old age of 72. It's a little hard, uh, to think of him, you know, mounting a tank or something to go invade Taiwan or whatever the, you know, whatever the case may be. But, you know, I, I think here again, the narratives might be off base a little bit, you know, it's this issue of, you know, well he's just picked, you know, these sycophantic loyalists, He's a guy who has combat experience, right?And that's increasingly rare. Um, I don't think it's any surprise that. That himself. And, uh, the, uh, uh, gentleman on the CMC, uh, Li, who is now heading the, um, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also has Vietnam combat experience, not from 79, but from the, uh, the border incursions that went on into the80s. Um, so it's not that surprising really.But, but obviously, you know, Zhang Youxia is very close to Xi Jinping, their father's fought together, right? Um, and they have that sort of, uh, blood tie and Xi is signaling, I want, uh, I. Political control and also technologically or, or, um, you know, operationally competent people. I think the other fascinating piece is we see once again no vice chairman from the political commissar iatside of the PLA.I think that's very interesting. You know, a lot of people, including myself, were betting that Miao HuaWould, would, would get the promotion. He didn't, you know, we can't know. But my sense is in a way, Xi Jiping is still punishing that side of the PLA for Xu Caihou's misdoings. Right. You know, and that's very interesting in and of itself.Also, it may be a signal that I don't need a political commissar vice chairman because I handle the politicsBill: And, and, and he, yeah. And in this, this new era that the, the next phase of the Xi era, it, it is, uh, everybody knows, right? It's, it's all about loyalty to Xi.Chris: we just saw right, uh, today, you know, uh, yet, yet more instructions about the CMC responsibilities, Chairman, responsibility systems. Bill: Unfortunately they didn't release the full text but it would be fascinating to see what's in there.Chris: And they never do on these things, which is, uh, which is tough. But, um, you know, I think we have a general sense of what would be in it, . But, but even that itself, right, you know, is a very major thing that people, you know, didn't really pick up. Certain scholars, certainly like James Mulvenon and other people who are really good on this stuff noticed it. But this shift under Hu Jintao was a CMC vice chairman responsibility system. In other words, he was subletting the operational matters certainly to his uniformed officers, Xi Jinping doesn't do thatBill: Well, this, and here we are, right where he can indeed I mean, I, I had written in the newsletter, um, you know, that she had, I thought, I think he ran the table in terms of personnel.Chris: Oh, completely. Yeah.Bill: And this is why it is interesting he kept around folks like Wang Huning, but we'll move on. The next question I had really was about Xi's report to the party Congress and we had talked, I think you'd also, um, you've talked about on our previous podcasts, I mean there, there seems to be a pretty significant shift in the way Xi is talking about the geopolitical environment and their assessment and how they see the world. Can you talk about a little bit?Chris: Yeah, I mean, I think definitely we saw some shifts there and, uh, you know, you and I have talked a lot about it. You know, there are problems with word counting, right? You know, and when you look at the thing and you just do a machine search, and it's like, okay, well security was mentioned 350 times or whatever, but, but the, you know, in what context?Right. Um, and, uh, our, uh, mutual admiration society, the, uh, the China Media project, uh, I thought they did an excellent piece on that sort of saying, Remember, it's the words that go around the buzzword that matter, you know, just as much. But what we can say unequivocally is that two very important touchstones that kind of explain their thinking on their perception of not only their external environment, but really kind of their internal environment, which had been in the last several political reports, now are gone. And those are this idea of China's enjoying a period of strategic opportunity and this idea that peace and development are the underlying trend of the times. And, you know, on the period of strategic opportunity, I think it's important for a couple reasons. One, just to kind of break that down for our listeners in a way that's not, you know, sort of, uh, CCP speak, , uh, the, the basic idea was that China judged that it's external security environment was sufficiently benign, that they could focus their energies on economic development.Right? So obviously that's very important. I also think it was an important governor, and I don't think I've seen anything out there talking about its absence in this, uh, political report on this topic, It was a, it was an important governor on sort of breakneck Chinese military development, sort of like the Soviet Union, right?In other words, as long as you were, you know, sort of judging that your external environment was largely benign, you. Didn't really have a justification to have a massive defense budget or to be pushy, you know, in the neighborhood, these sort of things. And people might poo poo that and sort of say, Well, you know, this is all just rhetoric and so on. No, they actually tend to Bill: Oh, that's interesting. Well, then that fits a little bit, right, Cuz they added the, the wording around strategic deterrence in the report as well which is seen as a, you know, modernizing, expanding their nuclear forces, right?Chris: Exactly, right. So, you know, that's, uh, an important absence and the fact that, you know, the word, again, word searching, right. Um, strategic and opportunity are both in there, but they're separated and balanced by this risks and challenges, languages and, and so on. Bill: Right the language is very starkly different. Chris: Yeah. And then likewise on, on peace and development. This one, as you know, is, is even older, right? It goes back to the early eighties, I believe, uh, that it's been in, in these political reports. And, uh, you know, there again, the idea was sort of not only was this notion that peace and economic development were the dominant, you know, sort of trend internationally, globally, they would be an enduring one. You know, this idea of the trend of the times, right? Um, now that's missing. So what has replaced it in both these cases is this spirit of struggle, right? Um, and so that's a pretty stark departure and that in my mind just sort of is a real throwback to what you could call the period of maximum danger for the regime in the sixties, right? When they had just split off with the Soviets and they were still facing unremitting hostility from the west after the Korean War experience and, and so on. So, you know, there's definitely a, a decided effort there. I think also we should view the removal of these concepts as a culmination of a campaign that Xi Jinping has been on for a while.You know, as you and I have discussed many times before, from the minute he arrived, he began, I think, to paint this darker picture of the exterior environment. And he seems to have always wanted to create a sort of sense of urgency, certainly maybe even crisis. And I think a big part of that is to justifying the power grab, right? If the world outside is hostile, you need, you know, a strongman. Bill: Well that was a lot of the propaganda going into the Party of Congress about the need for sort of a navigator helmsman because know, we we're, we're closest we have ever been to the great rejuvenation, but it's gonna be really hard and we need sort of strong leadership right. It was, it was all building to that. This is why Ci needs to stay for as long as he wants to stay.Chris: and I think we saw that reflected again just the other day in this Long People's Daily piece by Ding Xuexing, right, Where he's talking again about the need for unity, the throwback, as you mentioned in your newsletter to Mao's commentary, there is not to be lost on any of us you know, the fact that the Politburo standing committee's. Uh, first field trip is out to Yan'an, right? I mean, you know, these are messages, right? The aren't coincidental.Bill: No, it, it is. The thing that's also about the report that's interesting is that while there was, speaking of word counts, there was no mention of the United States, but it certainly feels like that was the primary backdrop for this entire discussion around. So the, the shifting geopolitical, uh, assessments and this broader, you know, and I think one of the things that I, and I want to talk to as we get into this, a little bit about US China relations, but is it she has come to the conclusion that the US is implacably effectively hostile, and there is no way that they're gonna get through this without some sort of a broader struggle?Chris: I don't know if they, you know, feel that conflict is inevitable. In fact, I kind of assume they don't think that because that's pretty grim picture for them, you know? Um, but I, I do think there's this notion that. They've now had two years to observe the Biden administration. Right? And to some degree, I think it's fair to say that by certain parties in the US, Xi Jinping, maybe not Xi Jinping, but a Wang Qishan or some of these characters were sold a bit of a bag of goods, right?Oh, don't worry, he's not Trump, he's gonna, things will be calmer. We're gonna get back to dialogue and you know, so on and so forth. And that really hasn't happened. And when we look at. Um, when we look at measures like the recent, chip restrictions, which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point, you know, that would've been, you know, the, the wildest dream, right of certain members of the Trump administration to do something that, uh, that's that firm, right? So, um, I think the conclusion of the Politburo then must be, this is baked into the cake, right? It's bipartisan. Um, the earliest we'll see any kind of a turn here is 2024. I think they probably feel. Um, and therefore suddenly things like a no limits partnership with Russia, right, start to make more sense. Um, but would really makes sense in that if that is your framing, and I think it is, and you therefore see the Europeans as like a swing, right, in this equation. This should be a great visit, right, for Chancellor Scholz, uh, and uh, I can't remember if it was you I was reading or someone else here in the last day or so, but this idea that if the Chinese are smart, they would get rid of these sanctions on Bill: That was me. Well, that was in my newsletterChris: Yeah. Parliamentary leaders and you know, Absolutely. Right. You know, that's a no brainer, but. I don't think they're gonna do it , but, but you know, this idea definitely that, and, and when they talk in the political report, you know, it, it's, it's like, sir, not appearing in this film, right, from Money Python, but we know who the people who are doing the bullying, you know, uh, is and the long armed jurisdiction and , so on and so forth and all, I mean, all kidding aside, I think, you know, they will see something like the chip restrictions effectively as a declaration of economic war. I don't think that's going too far to say that.Bill: It goes to the heart of their sort of technological project around rejuvenation. I mean, it is, it is a significant. sort of set of really kind of a, I would think, from the Chinese perspective aggressive policies against them,Chris: Yeah, and I mean, enforcement will be key and we'll see if, you know, licenses are granted and how it's done. And we saw, you know, already some, some backing off there with regard to this US person, uh, restriction and so on. But, but you know, it's still pretty tough stuff. There's no two ways aboutBill: No, and I, I wonder, and I worry that here in DC. You know, where the mood is very hawkish. If, if people here really fully appreciate sort of the shift that's taking, that seems to be taking place in Beijing and how these actions are viewed.Chris: Well, I, I think that's a really, you put your hand on it really, really interesting way, Bill, because, you know, let's face it really since the Trump trade war started, right? We've all analysts, you know, pundits, uh, even businesses and government people have been sort of saying, you know, when are the Chinese gonna punch back? You know, when are they going to retaliate? Right? And we talk about rare earths and we talk about Apple and TeslaBill: They slapped some sanctions on people but they kind of a jokeChris: And I guess what I'm saying is I kind of worry we're missing the forest from the trees. Right. You know, the, the, the work report tells us, the political report tells us how they're reacting. Right. And it is hardening the system, moving toward this fortress economy, you know, so on and so forth. And I wanna be real clear here, you know, they're not doing this just because they're reacting to the United States. Xi Jinping presumably wanted to do this all along, but I don't think we can say that the actions they perceive as hostile from the US aren't playing a pretty major role in allowing him to accelerate.Bill: Well, they called me. Great. You justifying great Accelerationist, right? Trump was called that as well, and, and that, that's what worries me too, is we're in. Kind of toxic spiral where, where they see us doing something and then they react. We see them do something and we react and, and it doesn't feel like sort of there's any sort of a governor or a break and I don't see how we figure that out.Chris: Well, I think, you know, and I'm sure we'll come to this later in our discussion, but you know, uh, yes, that's true, but you know, I'm always deeply skeptical of these inevitability memes, whether it's, you know, Thucydides trap or, you know, these other things. Last time I checked, there is something called political agency, right?In other words, leaders can make choices and they can lead if they want to, right? They have an opportunity to do so at in Bali, and you know, we'll have to see some of the, you know, early indications are perhaps they're looking at sort of a longer meeting. So that would suggest maybe there will be some discussion of some of these longstanding issues.Maybe we will see some of the usual, you know, deliverable type stuff. So there's an opportunity. I, I think one question is, can the domestic politics on either side allow for seizing that opportunity? You know, that's an open.Bill: Interesting. There's a couple things in the party constitution, which I think going into the Congress, you know, they told us they were gonna amend the Constitution. There were expectations that it, the amendments were gonna reflect an increase in Xi's power, uh, things like this, this idea of the two establishments, uh, which for listeners are * "To establish the status of Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party's Central Committee and of the whole Party"* "To establish the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era"The thinking, and I, I certainly believe that, I thought that they would write that in. There was some talk that, uh, Xi Jinping Thought the longer version would be truncated to just Xi Jinping thought. that possibly he might get, a, a sort of another title like People's Leader. None of those happened. One thing that did happen, What's officially translated by the Chinese side in English as the two upholds- “Uphold the 'core' status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the CC and “Uphold the centralized authority of the Party” those were written in. And so the question is, was there some kind of pushback or are we misreading we what mattered? And actually the two upholds are more important than the two of establishes.Chris: Well, I, and I think it, this may be a multiple choice answer, right? There might be elements of all the above in there. Uh, you know, I think it is important that he didn't get the truncation to Xi Jinping thought. You have to think that that was something he was keen on. In retrospect, it may be that it was something akin. I've always felt, you know, another thing that was on the table that didn't happen was reestablishing the party chairmanship. My view had always been he was using that largely as a bargaining chip. That, you know, in some ways it creates more trouble than it's worth you. If you're gonna have a chairman, you probably have to have vice chairman and what does that say about the succession? I mean, of course he could have, you know, a couple of geezers on there. as vice chairman too. , But I, my view was always is he was holding that out there to trade away. Right. You know, at, at the last minute. Um, maybe that's what happened with Xi Jinping thought. I don't know.You know, uh, there have been some media articles, one of which, You and I were discussing yesterday from, uh, the Japanese, uh, publication Nikkei, you know, that suggested that, you know, the elders had, this was their last gasp, right? So the Jiang Zemins and the Zeng Qinghongs and Hu Jinataos, so on. Um, I'm a little skeptical of that. It is possible. Uh, but, um, I, I'd be a little skeptical of that. You know, it's, it's not at all clear that they had any kind of a role, you know, even at Beidaihe this year and so on, Jiang Zemin didn't even attend the Party Congress so clearly, you know, he must be pretty frail or he thought it was not with his time. You know, a little hard to say, but, you know, I kind of struggle with the notion that, you know, the 105 year old Song Ping gets up on a chair or something and starts, starts making trouble. Right. You know, uh, the poor man's probably lucky if he stays awake during the meeting. Bill: One question, and again, because of the, just, you know, how much more opaque Chinese politics are than the really I think they've ever been. Um, but just one question. It mean, is it possible, for example, that you know, it's more important to get the personnel done. It's more, and then once you get your, you stack the central committee, you get the politburo, you get the standing committee, that these things are sort of a next phase.Chris: yeah, it's entirely possible and, and I think it, it, it does dovetail with this idea that, you know, another reflection from both the political report and the lineup in my mind, is Xi Jinping is a man in a hurry. Right? And he's kind of projected that, as you said, the great accelerator since he arrived.But I think he sees this next five years is really fundamental, right in terms of breaking through on these chokepoint technologies as they call them. You know, these sort of things. And so maybe therefore having the right people in place to handle, you know, uh, speedier policy, execution, you know, was more important.Likewise, I mean, he's sort of telegraphing, He's gonna be around for a while, right? No successor, no visible successor anywhere. Bill: A successor would need likely need five years on the standing committee. So we're looking at ten more years.Chris: Yes, exactly. And so there will be time. The other thing is, um, Xi Jinping is a, is a sort of determined fellow, right? You know, so of interest, even before the 19th Party Congress, I'd been hearing very strong rumors that the notion of lingxiu was out there, that he was contemplating it, right? And so then we see the buildup with, uh, Renmin lingxiu and so on and so forth.And, you know, it didn't happen clearly at the 19th. It didn't happen. But it doesn't mean it won't, you know, at some point. And I think it's really important also to think about, you know, We just saw a pretty serious, um, enterprise of the, you know, quote unquote norm busting, right? So what's to say that mid-course in this five years, he doesn't, uh, hold another sort of extraordinary conference of party delegates like them, Deng Xiaoping did in 1985, right, to push through some of these. You never know, right? In other words, these things don't necessarily have to happen. Just at Party Congresses. So my guess is, you know, this isn't over yet. Uh, but you know, at some level, given how the system was ramping up with those articles about Navigator and the people's leader stuff and so on, you know, that's usually a tell, and yet it didn't happen. And, and so something interesting there. Bill: now they're in the mode of, they're out with these sort of publicity, propaganda education teams where they go out throughout the country and talk about the spirit of the party Congress and push all the key messaging. Um, you know, so far none of those People's leader truncation have happened in that, which is I think an area where some people thought, Well, maybe that could sort of come after the Congress.Chris: What is interesting is it's all two establishments all the time in those discussions, so that's been very interesting since it didn't make it into the, uh, into the document. I guess the other thing is, At some level, is it sort of a distinction without a difference? You know, I, I haven't done the work on this to see, but my guess is short of, you know, the many times they've just junked the entire constitution and rewritten it, this is probably the most amendments there have been, you know, in the to at one time. You know, to the 1982 constitution, and most of them are his various buzzwords. Right. Um, and you know, I think you've been talking about this in the newsletter, there may very well be, uh, something to this issue of, you know, which is the superior thought two establishments or to upholds/safeguards?Bill: and even if the two establishes were superior and then it didn't go in, then somehow it will be theoretically flipped to what got in the ConstitutionChris: I mean, I guess the, the, the thing though where we, it's fair to say that maybe this wasn't his ideal outcome. To me, there's been a very clear and you know, structured stepwise approach on the ideology from the word go. Right? And the first was to create right out of the shoot, this notion of, you know, three eras, right?The, Mao period, Deng and those other guys we don't talk about it anymore, period. and Xi Jinping's new era, right? And then that was. You know, sort of crystallized right at the 19th Party Congress when you know, Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name went into the Constitution. And so, you know, the next step kind of seemed like that should be it.And as we've discussed before, you know, if he's able to get just Thought, it certainly enhances his ability to stay around for a very long time and it makes his diktats and so on even more unquestionable. But you know, you can say again, matter of prioritization. With a team where there's really no visible or other opposition, does it really matter? You know, in other words, no one's gonna be questioning his policy ideas anyway.Bill: Just an aside, but on his inspection, the new standing committee will go on group trip right after the Party Congress and the first trip sends key messages. And group went to Yan'an, you know, they went, they went to the caves. Um, and you know, in the long readout or long CCTV report of the meeting, the visit, there was a section where the tour guide or the person introducing some of the exhibits talked about how the, the famous song, the East Is Red was, by a person, written by the people sort of spontaneously, and it w it definitely caused some tittering about, well, what are they trying to signal for?You know, are we gonna be seeing some Xi songs? there's some kind of really interesting signaling going on that I don't think we quite have figured out how to parse Chris: My takeaway on all this has been, I, I need to go back and do a little more book work on, you know, what was, what was the content of the seventh party Congress? What were the outcomes? I mean, I have the general sense, right? Like you, I immediately, you know, started brushing up on it. But, you know, Xi delivered a, an abridged work report. Right, A political report, which is exactly what Mao did then. I mean, in other words, they're not kidding around with the parallelism here. The question is what's the message?Bill: Just for background, at the visit last week to Yan'an, and the first spot that was in the propaganda was the, the, site of the seventh party Congress which is where…to be very simplistic, the seventh party was really moment, you know, as at the end of the Yan'am rectification came in, it was the moment where sort of Mao fully asserted his dominance throughout the system. Mao Thought etc. Right? The signaling, you could certainly, could certainly take a view that, you know, he doesn't do these things by coincidence, and this is. This is signaling both of, you know, can through anything because they, livedin caves and ended up beating the Japanese and then won the Civil War. You know this, and we can, and by the way, we have a dominant leader. I mean, there are ways, again, I'm being simplistic, but the symbolism was not, I think one that would, for example, give a lot of confidence to investors, which I think is, you know, one, one of the many reasons we've seen until the rumors earlier this week, a, pretty big selloff in the, in the Hong Kong and manland stock markets rightChris: most definitely. And I think, you know, this is the other thing about, about what I was trying to get at earlier with, uh, forest and trees, right? You know, in other words, . Um, he's been at this for a while too. You know, there's a reason why he declared a new long march right in depths of the trade war with Trump.Bill: And a new historical resolution, only the third in historyChris: Yeah. And they have been stepwise building since then. And this is the next building block.Bill: The last thought, I mean, he is 69. He's. 10 years younger than President Joe Biden. He could go, he could be around for a long timeBill: well just quickly, cause I know, uh, we don't have that much more time, but I, you say anything about your thoughts on Hu Jintao and what happened?My first take having had a father and a stepfather had dementia was, um, you know, maybe too sympathetic to the idea that, okay, he's having some sort of a senior cognitive moment. You know, you can get. easily agitated, and you can start a scene. And so therefore, was humiliating and symbolic at the end of the Communist Youth League faction, but maybe it was, it was benign as opposed to some of the other stuff going around. But I think might be wrong so I'd love your take on that. Chris: Well, I, I think, you know, I, I kind of shared your view initially when I watched the, uh, I guess it was an AFP had the first, you know, sort of video that was out there and, you know, he appeared to be stumbling around a bit. He definitely looked confused and, you know, like, uh, what we were discussing earlier on another subject, this could be a multiple choice, you know, A and B or whatever type scenario as well.We don't know, I mean, it seems pretty well established that he has Parkinson's, I think the lead pipe pincher for me though, was that second longer one Singapore's channel, Channel News Asia put out. I mean, he is clearly tussling with Li Zhanshu about something, right. You know that that's. Yes, very clear. And you know, if he was having a moment, you know, when they finally get him up out of the chair and he seems to be kind of pulling back and so on, you know, he moves with some alacrity there, for an 80 year old guy. Uh, I don't know if he was being helped to move quickly or he, you know, realized it was time to exit stage.Right. But I think, you know, as you said in your newsletter, I, we probably will never know. Um, but to me it looked an awful lot like an effort by Xi Jinping to humiliate him. You know, I mean, there was a reason why they brought the cameras back in at that moment, you know? Unless we believe that that just happened spontaneously in terms of Hu Jintao has his freak out just as those cameras were coming back in the stone faces of the other members of the senior leadership there on the rostrum and you know, Wand Hunting, pulling Li Zhanshu back down kind of saying basically, look buddy, this is politics, don't you don't wanna, that's not a good look for you trying to care for Hu Jintao. You know, I mean obviously something was going on, you know? No, no question. Bill: Right. And feeds into the idea that Hu Chunhua, we all expected that he at least be on the Politburo again, and he's, he's off, so maybe something, something was going Chris: Well, I, I think what we know from observing Xi Jinping, right? We know that this is a guy who likes to keep people off balance, right? Who likes to keep the plate spinning. He, this is definitely the Maoist element of his personality, you know, whether it's strategic disappearances or this kind of stuff. And I think it's entirely plausible that he might have made some last minute switches right, to, uh, the various lists that were under consideration that caused alarm, you know, among those who thought they were on a certain list and and no longer were.Bill: and then, and others who were smart enough to realize that if he made those switches, they better just go with it.Chris: Yeah, go along with it. Exactly. I mean, you know, in some ways the most, aside from what happened to Hu Jintao, the, the most, um, disturbing or compelling, depending on how you wanna look at it, part of that video is when Hu Jintao, you know, sort of very, um, delicately taps Li Keqiang on the shoulder. He doesn't even look at it, just keeps looking straight ahead. Uh, and that's tough. And as you pointed out in the newsletter and elsewhere, you know, how difficult must have that have been for Hu Jintao's son Hu Haifeng, who's in the audience watching this all go on? You know, it's, uh, it's tough. Bill: And then two two days later attends a meeting where he praises Xi to high heaven.Chris: Yeah, exactly. So, so if the darker narrative is accurate, I guess one thing that concerns me a bit is, as you know, well, I have never been a fan of these, uh, memes about comparing Xi Jinping to either Stalin or Mao in part because I don't see him as a whimsical guy. They were whimsical people. I think because of his tumultuous upbringing, he understands the problems with that kind of an approach to life, but this was a very ruthless act. If that more malign, you know, sort of definition is true and that I think that says something about his mentality that perhaps should concern us if that's the case. Bill: It has real implications, not just for domestic also potentially for its foreign policy.Chris: Absolutely. I mean, what it shows, right to some degree, again, man in a hurry, this is a tenacious individual, right? if he's willing to do that. And so if you're gonna, you know, kick them in the face on chips and, you know, things like that, um, you should be taking that into consideration.Bill: And I think preparing for a more substantive response that is more thought out and it's also, it happened, it wasn't very Confucian for all this talk Confucian definitely not. and values. One last question, and it is related is what do you make of this recent upsurge or talk in DC from various officials that PRC has accelerated its timeline to absorb Taiwan, because nothing in the public documents indicates any shift in that timeline.Chris: No. Uh, and well, first of all, do they, do they have a timeline? Right? You know, I mean, the whole idea of a timeline is kind of stupid, right? You don't, if you're gonna invade somewhere, you say, Hey, we're gonna do it on on this date. I mean, 2049. Okay. Bill: The only timeline that I think you can point to is is it the second centenary goal and, and Taiwan getting quote unquote, you know, returning Taiwan to the motherland's key to the great rejuvenation,Chris: Yeah, you can't have rejuvenation without it. Bill: So then it has to be done by 2049. 27 years, but they've never come out and specifically said 27 years or 2049. But that's what No. that's I think, is where the timeline idea comes from.Chris: Oh yes, definitely. And, and I think some confusion of. What Xi Jinping has clearly set out and reaffirmed in the political report as these important, um, operational benchmarks for the PLA, the People's Liberation Army to achieve by its hundredth anniversary in 2027. But that does not a go plan for Taiwan make, you know, And so it's been confusing to me trying to understand this. And of course, you know, I, I'm joking, but I'm not, you know, if we, if we listen now to the chief of naval operations of the US Navy, you know, like they're invading tomorrow, basically.My former colleague from the CIA, John Culver's, done some very, you know, useful public work on this for the Carnegie, where he sort his endowment, where he sort of said, you know, look, there's certain things we would have to see, forget about, you know, a D-day style invasion, any type of military action that, that you don't need intelligence methods to find out. Right. You know, uh, canceling, uh, conscription, demobilization cycles, you know, those, those sort of things. Um, we don't see that happening. So I've been trying to come to grips with why the administration seems fairly seized with this and and their public commentary and so on. What I'm confident of is there's no smoking gun you know, unlike, say the Russia piece where it appears, we had some pretty compelling intelligence. There doesn't seem to be anything that says Xi Jinping has ordered invasion plans for 2024, you know, or, or, or even 2027. Um, so I'm pretty confident that's not the case. And so then it becomes more about an analytic framework. And I, from what I can tell, it's seems to be largely based on what, uh, in, you know, the intelligence community we would call calendar-int.. calendar intelligence. In other words, you know, over the next 18 months, a lot of stuff's going to happen. We're gonna have our midterm elections next week. It's pretty likely the Republicans get at least one chamber of Congress, maybe both.That would suggest that things like the Taiwan Policy Act and, you know, really, uh, things that have, uh, Beijing's undies in a bunch, uh, you know, could really come back on, uh, the radar pretty forcibly and pretty quickly. Obviously Taiwan, nobody talks about it, but Taiwan's having municipal elections around the same time, and normally that would be a very inside Taiwan baseball affair, nobody would care. But the way that KMT ooks like they will not perform, I should say, in those municipal elections. They could be effectively wiped out, you know, as a, as a sort of electable party in Taiwan. That's not a good news story for Beijing.And then of course we have our own presidential in 2024 and Taiwan has a presidential election in 24 in the US case.I mean, look, we could end up with a President Pompeo, right? Or a President DeSantis or others who. Been out there sort of talking openly about Taiwan independence and recognizing Taiwan. And similarly, I think whoever succeeds, uh, President Tsai in Taiwan, if we assume it will likely be a a, a Democratic Progressive party president, will almost by definition be more independence oriented.So I think the administration is saying there's a lot of stuff that's gonna get the Chinese pretty itchy, you know, over this next 18 month period. So therefore we need to be really loud in our signaling to deter. Right. And okay. But I think there's a risk with that as well, which they don't seem to be acknowledging, which is you might create a self-fulfilling prophecy.I mean, frankly, that's what really troubles me about the rhetoric. And so, for example, when Secretary Blinken last week or the before came out and said Yeah, you know, the, the, the Chinese have given up on the status quo. I, I, I've seen nothing, you know, that would suggest that the political report doesn't suggest. Bill: They have called it a couple of times so-called status quo.Chris: Well, Fair enough. Yeah. Okay. That's, that's fine. Um, but I think if we look at the reason why they're calling it the so-called status quo, it's because it's so called now because the US has been moving the goalposts on the status quo.Yeah. In terms of erosion of the commitment to the one China policy. And the administration can say all at once, they're not moving the goal post, but they are, I mean, let's just be honest.Bill: Now, and they have moved it more than the Trump administration did, don't you think?Chris: Absolutely. Yeah. Um, you know, no president has said previously we will defend Taiwan multiple times. Right. You know, um, and things like, uh, you know, Democracy, someone, I mean, this comes back also to the, the framing, right, of one of the risks I think of framing the relationship as democracy versus autocracy is that it puts a very, uh, heavy incentive then for the Biden administration or any future US administration to, you know, quote unquote play the Taiwan card, right, as part of said competition.Whereas if you don't have that framing, I don't think that's necessarily as automatic. Right? In other words, if that's the framing, well Taiwan's a democracy, so we have to lean in. Right? You know? Whereas if it's a more say, you know, straight realist or national interest driven foreign policy, you might not feel that in every instance you've gotta do that,Bill: No, and and I it, that's an interesting point. And I also think too that, um, I really do wonder how much Americans care, right? And, and whether or not we're running the risk of setting something up or setting something in motion that, you know, again, it's easy to be rhetorical about it, but that we're frankly not ready to deal withChris: Well, and another thing that's interesting, right, is that, um, to that point, Some of the administration's actions, you know, that are clearly designed to show toughness, who are they out toughing? You know, in some cases it feels like they're out toughing themselves, right? I mean, obviously the Republicans are watching them and so on and all of that.Um, but you know, interesting, uh, something that came across my thought wave the other day that I hadn't really considered. We're seeing pretty clear indications that a Republican dominated Congress after the midterms may be less enthusiastic about support to Ukraine, we're all assuming that they're gonna be all Taiwan support all the time.Is that a wrong assumption? You know, I mean, in other words, Ukraine's a democracy, right? And yet there's this weird strain in the Trumpist Wing of the Republican party that doesn't wanna spend the money. Right. And would that be the case for Taiwan as well? I don't know, but you know, the point is, I wonder if the boogieman of looking soft is, is sort of in their own heads to some degree.And, and even if it isn't, you know, sometimes you have to lead. Bill: it's not clear the allies are listening. It doesn't sound like the Europeans would be on board withChris: I think very clearly they're not. I mean, you know, we're about to see a very uncomfortable bit of Kabuki theater here, aren't we? In the next couple of days with German Chancellor Sholz going over and, um, you know, if you, uh, read the op-ed he wrote in Politico, you know, it's, it's painful, right? You can see him trying to, uh, Trying to, uh, you know, straddle the fence and, and walk that line.And, and obviously there are deep, deep divisions in his own cabinet, right? You know, over this visit, the foreign minister is publicly criticizing him, you know, and so on. So I think this is another aspect that might be worrisome, which is the approach. You know, my line is always sort of a stool, if it's gonna be stable, needs three legs, right.And on US-China relations, I think that is, you know, making sure our own house is in order. Domestic strengthening, these guys call it, coordinating with allies and partners, certainly. But then there's this sort of talking to the Chinese aspect and through a policy, what I tend to call strategic avoidance, we don't.Talk to them that much. So that leg is missing. So then those other two legs need to be really strong. Right. Um, and on domestic strengthening, Okay. Chips act and so on, that's good stuff. On allies and partners, there seems to be a bit of an approach and I think the chip restrictions highlight this of, look, you're either for us or against us.Right? Whereas I think in, you know, the good old Cold War I, we seem to be able to understand that a West Germany could do certain things for us vis-a-vis the Soviets and certain things they couldn't and we didn't like it and we complained, but we kind of lived with it, right? If we look at these chip restrictions, it appears the administration sort of said, Look, we've been doing this multilateral diplomacy on this thing for a year now, it's not really delivering the goods. The chips for framework is a mess, so let's just get it over with and drag the allies with us, you know? Um, and we'll see what ramifications that will have.Bill: Well on that uplifting note, I, I think I'm outta questions. Is there anything else you'd like to add?Chris: Well, I think, you know, something just to consider is this idea, you know, and maybe this will help us close on a more optimistic note. Xi Jinping is telling us, you know, he's hardening the system, he's, he's doing this fortress economy thing and so on. But he also is telling us, I have a really difficult set of things I'm trying to accomplish in this five years.Right? And that may mean a desire to signal to the us let's stabilize things a bit, not because he's having a change of heart or wants a fundamental rapprochement, so on and so forth. I don't think that's the case, but might he want a bit of room, right? A breathing room. Bill: Buy some time, buy some spaceChris: Yeah, Might he want that? He might. You know, and so I think then a critical question is how does that get sorted out in the context of the negotiations over the meeting in Bali, if it is a longer meeting, I think, you know, so that's encouraging for that. Right. To some degree. I, I, I would say, you know, if we look at what's just happened with the 20th party Congress and we look at what's about to happen, it seems with our midterms here in the United States, Who's the guy who's gonna be more domestically, politically challenged going into this meeting, and therefore have less room to be able to seize that opportunity if it does exist.Exactly. Because I, I think, you know, the, the issue is, The way I've been framing it lately, you know, supposedly our position is the US position is strategic competition and China says, look, that's inappropriate, and we're not gonna sign onto it and forget it.You know, my own view is we kind of have blown past strategic competition where now in what I would call strategic rivalry, I think the chip restrictions, you know, are, are a giant exclamation point, uh, under that, you know, and so on. And my concern is we're kind of rapidly headed toward what I would call strategic enmity.And you know, that all sounds a bit pedantic, but I think that represents three distinct phases of the difficulty and the relationship. You know, strategic enmity is the cold, the old Cold War, what we had with the Soviets, right? So we are competing against them in a brass tax manner across all dimensions. And if it's a policy that, you know, hurts us, but it hurts them, you know, 2% more we do it, you know, kind of thing. I don't think we're there yet. And the meeting offers an opportunity to, you know, arrest the travel from strategic rivalry to strategic enmity. Let's see if there's something there/Bill: And if, and if we don't, if it doesn't arrest it, then I think the US government at least has to do a much better job of explaining to the American people why we're headed in this direction and needs to do a much better job with the allies cuz because again, what I worry about is we're sort of heading down this path and it doesn't feel like we've really thought it through.You know, there are lots of reasons be on this path, but there's also needs to be a much more of a comprehensive understanding of the, of the costs and the ramifications and the solutions and have have an actual sort of theory of the case about how we get out the other side of this in a, in a better way.Chris: Yeah, I think that's important. I want to be real, um, fair to the administration. You know, they're certainly more thoughtful and deliberative than their predecessor. Of course, the bar was low, but, um, you know, they, they seem to approach these things in a pretty. Dedicated and careful manner. And I think they really, you know, take, take things like, uh, looking at outbound investment restrictions, you know, my understanding is they have been, you know, seeking a lot of input about unintended consequences and so on. But then you look at something like the chips piece and it just seems to me that those in the administration who had been pushing for, you know, more there for some time, had a quick moment where they basically said, look, this thing's not working with multilaterally, Let's just do it, you know? And then, oh, now we're seeing the second and third and other order consequences of it. And the risk is that we wind up, our goal is to telegraph unity to Beijing and shaping their environment around them as the administration calls it. We might be signaling our disunity, I don't know, with the allies, and obviously that would not be a good thingBill: That's definitely a risk. Well, thanks Chris. It's always great to talk to you and Thank you for listening to the occasional Sinocism podcast. Thank you, Chris.Chris: My pleasure. Sinocism is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit sinocism.com/subscribe
En este episodio Edgardo Sobenes conversa con el Prof. Jorge Heine sobre el No Alineamiento Activo (NAA) y América Latina. El Profesor Heine inicia explicando la doctrina política que marca la posición de América Latina en el escenario de la geopolítica actual. Explica el concepto No Alineamiento Activo (NAA), y aclara los elementos que lo diferencian con doctrinas políticas anteriores. Aborda el conflicto entre Estados Unidos y China, el aspecto económico y tecnológico del conflicto, el papel de América Latina, la diplomacia de equidistancia y el impacto de la Guerra de Ucrania en el NAA.Posteriormente nos habla sobre la denominada ‘segunda guerra fría', el auge de las economías emergentes en el nuevo siglo, la decadencia de las potencias occidentales tradicionales, el libre comercio, el comercio justo, la globalización y el multilateralismo. Finaliza el episodio reflexionando sobre la importancia del No Alineamiento Activo para poner fin a la creciente marginalidad de la región de América Latina.Membresía del Podcast (https://www.hablemosdi.com/contenido-premium)Acerca del Prof. Jorge Heinehttp://www.jorgeheine.com/Libro: El no alineamiento activo y América Latina: una doctrina para el nuevo sigloProfesor de Relaciones Internacionales en la Escuela Pardee de Estudios Globales en la Universidad de Boston. Ha sido embajador de Chile en China, en India y en Sudáfrica, así como ministro de Estado en el gobierno de Chile. Es ex-vicepresidente de la Asociación Internacional de Ciencia Política (IPSA), y ha sido profesor invitado en las universidades de Constanza, Oxford, París y Tsinghua. Ha publicado 17 libros. Adquiere aquí el libro " Hablemos de Derecho Internacional Volumen I" Support the show
The ZENERGY Podcast: Climate Leadership, Finance and Technology
Dr. Nicola De Blasio is a Senior Fellow leading Belfer Center research on energy technology innovation and the transition to a low carbon economy. With more than 25 years of global experience in the energy sector, Dr. De Blasio is an expert in navigating the challenges of strategic development and technology innovation toward sustainable commercial success, at scale. Dr. De Blasio spent 17 years at Eni, one of the world's leading energy companies, most recently as Vice President and Head of R&D International Development, where he was also responsible for the start-up group. He engineered the strategic alliances between Eni and MIT - which also led to the creation of the Eni-MIT Solar Frontiers Center in 2010 – Stanford, Tsinghua, and other word leading universities. I hope you enjoy our conversation where we explore Hydrogen Technology!
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Earlier this month, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, a bill purportedly meant to revive U.S. dominance in research and development. “We used to rank number one in the world in research and development; now we rank number nine,” Biden said at the signing ceremony. “China was number eight decades ago; now they are number two.” And a recent study from Japan's science ministry reported that China now leads the world not just in quantity of scientific research, but in quality too. The success of the U.S.--and perhaps China, into the future–is due to the “research university”, an academic institution that offers professors the freedom to study and research, and students the freedom to learn, leading to high-quality academic output. Those universities are the subject of Professor William Kirby's Empires of Ideas: Creating the Modern University from Germany to America to China (Harvard University Press, 2022). In this interview, Professor Kirby and I talk about the research university: Humboldt, Harvard, Berkeley, Tsinghua, Nanjing, and the University of Hong Kong. We also discuss what it means for China, and Chinese institutions, to play a bigger role in world academia. How might that change things? William C. Kirby is Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration and T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard China Fund and Faculty Chair of the Harvard Center Shanghai. His many books include Can China Lead? Reaching the Limits of Power and Growth (Harvard Business Review Press: 2014) You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Empires of Ideas. Follow on Facebook or on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/education
Will China become the global leader in higher education in the 21st century? The modern research university was born in 19th century Germany; during the 20th, the United States took the lead. In his book Empires of Ideas, William C. Kirby argues that Chinese universities are among the most innovative educational centers in the world. Professor Kirby examines the successes of several leading universities in Germany and the United States, and compares them to three Chinese universities aspiring to become world-class institutions that can compete with the best that United States and Europe have to offer. In an interview conducted on August 16, 2022, William C. Kirby examines the rise of the modern research university and liberal education, and the challenges facing higher education institutions in China, the United States, and Germany. 0:00 How did U.S. universities come to lead the world? 3:58 What makes a great university? 6:16 How did the German university model change higher education? 9:53: Why are Harvard, Berkeley, and Duke important to understand for the future of U.S. higher ed? 17:08 What can about Tsinghua, Nanjing University, and the University of Hong Kong tell us about Chinese higher ed? 26:00 Are there barriers to conducting research at Chinese universities? 29:03 Is the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship affecting higher ed in both countries? About the speaker: https://www.ncuscr.org/event/chinese-modern-universities/ Follow William C. Kirby on Twitter (@BillKirbyHBS) Subscribe to the National Committee on YouTube for video of this interview. Follow us on Twitter (@ncuscr) and Instagram (@ncuscr).
Neste episódio vamos falar da área do Direito. Como um advogado brasileiro com experiências estudantis e profissionais em escritórios na China, Wallace vai nos contar sobre as similaridades e diferenças do Direito no Brasil e na China, as diferenças culturais, o que esperar de um trabalho em um escritório chinês e como um profissional do Direito brasileiro pode atuar na China. Sim, é possível! Além disso, ele vai nos falar sobre seu curso de Direito Chinês na universidade mais prestigiada do país, a Tsinghua, e dos encontros da Comissão das Relações Brasil-China no qual ele é vice-presidente. Siga o Wallace no Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/wallace-wu-%E9%9B%B7%E4%BC%9F%E9%9C%86-99b164109/
One of the flower industry's biggest days of the year is approaching - but they have a bouquet of problems. Plus: Tim Cook named chairman of Tsinghua, Facebook shuts down their podcast hub, Amazon offers employees $4k in medical travel costs, and more! Join our hosts Zachary Crockett and Rob Litterst as they take you through our most interesting stories of the day. Thank You For Listening to The Hustle Daily Show. Don't forget to hit Subscribe or Follow us on Apple Podcasts so that you never miss an episode! If you want this news delivered to your inbox, join millions of others and sign up for The Hustle Daily newsletter, here: https://thehustle.co/?utm_source=hustle-daily-podcast&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=show-notes Plus! Your engagement matters to us. If you are a fan of the show, be sure to leave us a 5-Star Review on Apple Podcasts https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-hustle-daily-show/id1606449047 (and share your favorite episodes with your friends, clients, and colleagues). The Hustle Daily Show is brought to you by The Hustle in partnership with HubSpot Podcasts.
This episode features an interview with Dr. Mary Meaney, Former Senior Partner at McKinsey and Beamery Board Member. Having worked across different companies and sectors throughout her career, Dr. Mary helps advise a broad range of clients on transformational change, top team alignment, capability-building, leadership development, human resource strategy and performance improvement.On today's episode, Dr. Meaney shares a number of insights from her days at McKinsey, the importance of nurturing and cultivating talent, and how she and Beamery have partnered up to assist Ukrainian refugees in France.--About MaryMary is an angel investor and Board member of a range of Tech companies in the UK (e.g., Beamery, V-Nova, Unmind etc). Mary serves on the Board of Imperial College London and the Advisory Board of Imperial College Business School. She currently leads Solidarite Ukraine, an initiative of the St Omer Foundation which supports hundreds of Ukrainian women and children in France. Previously, she was a Senior Partner at McKinsey where she served on McKinsey's Shareholder's Council (global Board of Directors) and led McKinsey's global Organization practice. She co-authored a book, Leading Organizations: Ten Timeless Truths, as well as the McKinsey Global Institute report on The Future of Work after Covid-19. She was a Trustee of TeachFirst for almost a decade and has lectured extensively at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Imperial, and Tsinghua.About McKinsey & CompanyMcKinsey & Company is a global management consulting firm committed to helping organizations accelerate sustainable and inclusive growth. They work with clients across the private, public, and social sectors to solve complex problems and create positive change for all their stakeholders. They combine bold strategies and transformative technologies to help organizations innovate more sustainably, achieve lasting gains in performance, and build workforces that will thrive for this generation and the next.--“I believe that the real sources of competitive advantage - what will really help companies succeed and thrive and win - is actually all about talent and culture.” -Dr. Mary Meaney--The Blueprint(1:21) Dr. Mary's background and helping organizations thriveThe Journey(3:24) Measuring success through performance and organizational health(7:08) A common sense approach to navigating change and avoiding managerial permafrost(9:29) The myriad of challenges for companies and talent(13:53) Succeeding through talent and culture(14:55) Partnering with Beamery to help Ukrainian refugees in FranceThe Future of Talent(17:24) Dr. Mary's recipe for success: belief from the top, a truly strategic HR function, and thinking of the value proposition(20:26) Prioritizing attraction & retention, learning, and D&I(23:00) Linking the learning agenda to the business strategy(25:48) Dr. Mary's advice to her younger self(27:42) A hope for the future--SponsorThe Talent Blueprint is brought to you by Beamery. Beamery's Talent Lifecycle Management Platform makes it possible for companies to deliver more human talent experiences and unlock the skills and potential of their global workforce using industry leading AI. Learn more at beamery.com.--LinksConnect with Mary on LinkedInConnect with Sultan on LinkedIn
As President Biden wraps up his first year in office and as Russia's invasion of Ukraine threatens to reorient the international order, China watchers reflect on the evolution of U.S.-China relations since President Nixon's first visit to China in February 1972. 50 years later, there remain significant risks and tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. How has the bilateral relationship changed since diplomatic normalization? What are the main features of Biden's approach to China? How will Beijing's position on the war in Ukraine impact U.S.-China ties and China's place in the world? On this joint episode of the China in the World podcast and the 12 Geniuses podcast, Paul Haenle joins Don MacPherson to discuss the history and trajectory of U.S.-China relations in the context of the war in Ukraine.For more in-depth analysis on China's response to the war in Ukraine, be sure to check out Haenle's recently published article for the Carnegie Endowment, “China's Ukraine Calculus Is Coming Into Focus”, as well as Haenle's recent ChinaFile commentary, “China's Calculus on the Invasion of Ukraine.”https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/04/china-s-ukraine-calculus-is-coming-into-focus-pub-86801https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/chinas-calculus-invasion-of-ukraine
The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. Against this background, the two countries' leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden's inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours. To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua's Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China's think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China's top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.
Episode 14: Interview with Danqi Chen, Assistant Professor of CS at Princeton. Stanford PhD. IOI Gold Medal Winner (only woman to win Gold in 2008!). Student in famous Yao Class at Tsinghua University.
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