Podcast appearances and mentions of Angela Nagle

My guest on the show today is Geoff Shullenberger, managing editor of Compact magazine and host of their Blame Theory podcast. Geoff emailed me a few months back, after a post of mine that touched on the the risks of hitching one's identity too thoroughly to hating on the left. What do I think, he asked, about the “post-left.”To which my answer was, “What's that?”That's the topic of much of this episode of the podcast. One answer comes from a piece on the phenomenon that Park MacDougald wrote a few years ago for Unherd. In it, he wrote:The core assertion of the post-Left is relatively simple: The real ruling class in America is the progressive oligarchy represented politically by the Democratic Party. The Democrats are the party of Silicon Valley, Wall Street, the Ivy League, the media, the upper layers of the national security state and federal bureaucracy, and of highly educated professionals in general. The Republicans, however loathsome, are largely a distraction — a tenuous alliance between a minority faction of the ruling class and petit bourgeois.… Although professing commitment to traditionally Left-wing goals such as anti-capitalism, the post-leftists are defined mostly by their aggressive hostility to both the Democratic Party and the radical Left — including the Democratic Socialists of America and the academic-literary Left of magazines such as Jacobin, n+1 and Dissent.Aside from Cryptofash, other leading lights include What's Left? co-hosts Aimee Terese and Oliver Bateman, editor of The Bellows Edwin Aponte, the Irish writer Angela Nagle and a coterie of pseudonymous Twitter accounts, such as @ghostofchristo1. Red Scare co-hosts Anna Khachiyan and Dasha Nekrasova might be considered fellow travellers.To put it another way, this was not the class-first, anti-woke internal critique that I think is more familiar to many us. It shares some DNA with that critique. Like that crew, the post-lefties thought identitarian politics were a fraud, a way for already elite actors to make themselves out to be tribunes of the people, to claim oppressed status in order to advance themselves. But unlike that class firsters, the post-lefties also thought the class first critique was a fraud too. It's all fraud all the way down, wholly disconnected from the vulnerable people it claims to represent, all a project of the elite for the elite. Geoff and I talk about the origins of this group, his own adjacency to it for a little while, the distinctions between the post-left and other post-something groups, including his own crew at Compact, the dangers of finding your identity in pure critique, and just in general the challenges of staying thoughtful in a politically chaotic time. Get full access to Eminent Americans at danieloppenheimer.substack.com/subscribe

Angela Nagle joins to discuss her new Compact piece “The Rage Behind the Dublin Riots.”   Compact Magazine is reader-supported. Become a member and gain unlimited access. https://compactmag.com/subscribe

In today's episode I explore a powerful article about the role of moral confidence from the Substack files of Angela Nagle. She reminds us that the most powerful force in human affairs is that of moral confidence. It is a deep internal knowing that what you are doing with your life is worthwhile and worth sharing. Angela Nagle Full Article is here: https://angelanagle.substack.com/p/the-magic-spell-of-moral-confidence?s=r (https://angelanagle.substack.com/p/the-magic-spell-of-moral-confidence?s=r) Grab your free access to my awesome resource for Catholic teachers right here: https://cf.onecatholicteacher.com/oct-opt-in (https://cf.onecatholicteacher.com/oct-opt-in) Find out about booking Jonathan to come and speak at your school or event https://cf.onecatholicteacher.com/catholic-speaking (https://cf.onecatholicteacher.com/catholic-speaking)

Recorded May 21st, 2022Matt and Dan talk with the online right's minister of aesthetics himself, Gio Pennacchietti, about judging Passage Prize's visual category, the definition of right-wing art, the usefulness of critical theory, and his incipient mission of cataloging the history of our scene in a manner eclipsing Angela Nagle's 2017 book. Matt Pegas Twitter Dan Baltic TwitterGio Pennacchietti Twitter

The wonderful Angela Nagle joins us to talk about Robert Hughes' fantastic study of modern art, The Shock of the New.Subscribe to Angela's substack: https://angelanagle.substack.com/Buy Angela's book, Kill All Normies: https://www.amazon.com/Kill-All-Normies-Culture-Alt-Right/dp/1785355430 

If you dig this unlocked Patrons-first episode, please consider supporting us at Patreon.com/ThePopularPod. Leighton Woodhouse is a freelance journalist and documentary filmmaker whose works include 'Trumpland: Kill All Normies', based on Angela Nagle's book. We got together to talk protest movements, COVID restrictions, Joe Rogan, and the afterlife of key figures in the alt right and Intellectual Dark Web.

George Orwell's "The Road to Wigan Pier" begins as a report on life in the depressed coal and industrial region of Northern England and expands into an ambivalent critique of socialism and progress. It's a book that belongs to its era – which saw the Great Depression, the peak of industrialism in the capitalist core countries, the rise of both communist and fascist challenges to the interwar liberal order – but also speaks in interesting ways to ours. Angela Nagle returns to Outsider Theory for an appreciative discussion of Orwell's book and its relationship to her longstanding interests. Follow Angela's Substack: https://angelanagle.substack.com/

Angela Nagle 09/19/2021 by @Bog_Beef @Maarblek

Angela Nagle discusses Millennial values, Silicon Valley ideology, NGO's and moral fanaticism.

I met Mike Cernovich a few years ago when I was making a documentary based on Angela Nagle’s book, Kill All Normies. Back then I had the same impression of him that you likely did, and that you probably still do: I thought he was a Trump-loving, men’s rights-touting, right wing troll.But after chatting with him, I liked him anyway. Mike was thoughtful, honest, candid, reasonable, self-disparaging, and fair-minded. I’d read the New Yorker profile of him. I’d seen the tweets and heard the slander. I’d even interviewed Zoë Quinn, Mike’s Gamergate nemesis, (I liked her, too), who’d told me exactly what she thought of Mike Cernovich (she despises him). Liking this guy was not what I’d expected.I could have easily made the decision then to tell everyone who’d listen that I’d met Mike Cernovich and he was exactly the piece of human garbage you’ve been told he was. My milieux back then was pretty conventionally left-wing, so that would have been the easiest thing to do. (I did in fact say basically that about Lucian Wintrich, who I also interviewed for the same film, because that’s exactly how he came across to me.) I probably could’ve even gotten VICE to run it.But that would have been a lie. And even worse, it would have cost me the opportunity to get to know someone who came from a completely different political tribe than I did — an enemy tribe, no less — to learn what values he actually holds and why he holds them. It would have cost me the chance to learn, for the hundredth time, that the cartoon characters the media writes about rarely measure up to the actual human beings they’re meant to describe (Wintrich being the exception to that rule).Over the years, Mike and I DM’d quite a bit on Twitter and became friends. We shared some important things in common, such as a deep moral concern for the welfare of industrially exploited animals, and a reflexive distrust of the elite, whether they’re dressed up in right wing or left wing garb.As it turned out, by the end of the Trump presidency, we came to share another thing in common: a deep contempt for Trump.Mike went to the mat for Trump in 2016, and among liberals, he’s still regarded as a Trumpist. But Mike has in fact come to loathe the man, for reasons we go into in this podcast.Mike didn’t benefit politically from his turn against the former President. It certainly didn’t do anything to soften his image in the liberal media (nor did he try to capitalize on it by selling himself as a Lincoln Project-style turncoat to the MSNBC crowd), and it earned him plenty of enemies among his own erstwhile fans. But along with the rest of us, he had watched this undeniably buffoonish administration embarrass itself, and instead of making excuses, he was honest about it.Whenever I discuss my fondness for Mike publicly, somebody trots out a bunch of his old tweets and demands that I answer for them. It’ll probably happen this time, too. But I don’t take the bait, not only because it’s a boring subject but also because I don’t demand of others that they justify everything that their friends and associates have ever said, so I don’t acknowledge that as a legitimate expectation of myself. Mike has a big megaphone to speak for himself, anyway. He doesn’t need my defense, and I don’t feel obligated to defend myself.Regardless, I’ll probably lose a few followers and subscribers for “platforming” Mike Cernovich (whose own platform dwarfs my tiny little perch in the first place). But if Mike is comfortable losing some friends by being honest about what a pathetic little worm of a man Trump is, then I guess I can follow his example and lose a few by being honest about what a smart and decent guy I believe Mike to be.If you’re skeptical about that, then just go ahead and listen to the episode. If, after hearing him for yourself, you remain unconvinced, then fair enough. I make a point of not letting political disagreements get in the way of personal relationships, which is the entire reason I became friends with Mike Cernovich in the first place. But I think you’ll change your mind, even if only a little bit, about Mike.—LeightonP.S. I’ve already released the next episode of the podcast, with Catherine Liu, to paid subscribers only. I eventually make every episode fully public, but if you’d like to hear them a few days in advance, here’s the button: This is a public episode. Get access to private episodes at leightonwoodhouse.substack.com/subscribe

We're releasing the second part of our discussion with Angela Nagle from back in May of this year. In the second part of our interview with Angela we discuss the stunted development of Irish capitalism, the inter-imperialist rivalry between the USA and China as well as the impact of the Covid year on art and culture. Be sure to subscribe to Angela's substack page: https://angelanagle.substack.com/

On this episode of the DrugCultGang podcast Tony is joined by Academic Fraud and Beyond Woke & Problematic to talk about His book The Memeing of Mark Fisher // Hunter S. Thompson gonzo journalism // Heat (1995) // Angela Nagle (get her on the pod) Kill All Normies 2: More kills, More Normies // Snitch culture cyber wars // Mencius Moldbug (Curtis Yarvin) and much more! Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/drugcultgang/posts Instagrams: https://www.instagram.com/drugcultgang/ https://www.instagram.com/academicfraud/ https://www.instagram.com/beyond_woke_and_problematic/

Ringing Rocks Park--  Wear sturdy shoes and bring a hammer and camera! Kevin Spencer and Angela Nagle with Bucks County highlight a “musical,” geological wonder in the woods of Pennsylvania. Ringing Rocks Park, about 15 miles east of Allentown, boasts a bevy of boulders that you can climb across and hit with your hammer for a melodic ring. More Information

In our latest 3A, we discuss "the clerisy" and how it relates to the PMC; how the EU is doing forever war just as much as the US; and the hyper-commodification of football. The full episode is for subscribers only. Sign up at patreon.com/bungacast Articles: Did Populism Start A 21st Century Anti-Clerical Revolution?, Angela Nagle, Substack Interview with Wolfgang Streeck: The EU's war in Africa, Jonas Elvander, Brave New Europe Cursed and compromised but Euro 2020's irresistible circus rolls on, Barney Ronay, The Guardian

Angela Nagle (Substack Controversy) by @Bog_Beef @Maarblek

Angela Nagle Interview

In the lead-up to our 200th episode later this month, we're exceptionally re-releasing our 100th episode special this week. On the 30 years since 1989. For our 100th episode, we invited our favourite guests to reflect on the question: “What one event, personal or political, most captures for you the past thirty years, since 1989?”  Are we still living in the death throes of the 20th century, or is something new emerging? Guests: (00:07:42) - Maren Thom (00:14:14) - David Broder (00:21:33) - Ashley Frawley (00:26:11) - Catherine Liu (00:33:05) - Angela Nagle (00:40:49) - Benjamin Fogel (00:46:25) - Alex Gourevitch  (00:51:31) - BungaCast hosts (00:59:22) - David Adler (01:04:05) - Amber A'Lee Frost (01:08:48) - James Heartfield (01:16:17) - Anton Jaeger (01:23:24) - Leigh Phillips (01:30:25) - Lee Jones (01:36:03) - Karl Sharro

You can support this podcast and get early releases at https://www.patreon.com/aksubversive Or check out my writing on Substack at https://www.alexkaschuta.substack.com​ I speak to Angela about rootlessness as the price of empire, woke NGOs as the enforcers of global capital, hyperreal online spaces and the people that populate them, boring local politics vs. the dopamine rush of the 24/7 kaleidoscope of U.S. politics, having skin in the game of politics and what happens if you don't, the machinations of power at a global level, and the fertility crisis. Angela Nagle is the author of "Kill All Normies" and a writer for American Affairs and Unherd. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/aksubversive/message

In dieser Folge sprechen wir mit unseren zwei spannenden Gästen klassenbewusster Corgi (www.instagram.com/klassenbewusster.corgi) und Genosse Kevin (www.instagram.com/genosse_kevin) über Linke Meme Kultur. Zuerst geben wir eine kleine Einführung darin was Memes überhaupt sind und ihre Geschichte. Dann reden wir über Memes als Aktivismus, über Memes und Zeitgeist, die unkritische Verwendung von Templates durch Linke und zum Abschluss über Memes und Kulturindustrie. Es ist ein spannendes Gespräch welches aber durchaus teilweise unverständlich sein kann, für diejenigen von euch die nicht so sehr im Thema drin stecken, wir hoffen aber das es auch euch gefällt. Hier noch die im Podcast genannten Empfehlungen und weiteres Wissenswertes: * Was ist Incel? de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incel * ContraPoints: www.youtube.com/user/ContraPoints * Tom Nicholas: www.youtube.com/channel/UCxt2r57cLastdmrReiQJkEg * Jacob Geller: www.youtube.com/user/yacobg42 * Lindsay Ellis: www.youtube.com/user/chezapoctube * Vertraut & Seltsam: www.youtube.com/channel/UC-oVwmN8Alt2cPsPw-5htnw * Philosophy Tube: www.youtube.com/user/thephilosophytube * Freie Arbeiter*innen Union: fau.org * 4 Stunden Liga: 4hour-league.org * Incels - Geschichte, Sprache und Ideologie eines Online-Kults von Veronika Kracher: www.ventil-verlag.de/titel/1862/incels * „Kill All Normies“ von Angela Nagle: www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/angela-nagle-kill-all-normies-amerika-unter-trump-die.1270.de.html?dram:article_id=408170

Aimee is joined by Angela Nagle to discuss her recent article, "Reprivatizing Fine Art In The Name Of Equality." They talk beauty as a public good, the intersection of identity and art, neoliberal gender politics, and much more. To listen to the full 3-hour conversation, become a patron at patreon.com/whatsleft Read Angela's article and subscribe to her newsletter here: https://angelanagle.substack.com/p/reprivatizing-fine-art-in-the-name

Listen to the full episode here: https://www.patreon.com/posts/interview-with-2-51677876 In the second part of our interview with Angela Nagle, we discuss the stunted development of Irish capitalism, the inter-imperialist rivalry between the USA and China as well as the impact of the Covid year on art and culture.

JP Morgan hath spoken and their prophecy is sounding pretty grim. Join us for our take on their tea leaves, labor solidarity with Palestine, the crypto crash, Angela Nagle missing the fucking point, and more!

Part 2: https://www.patreon.com/posts/interview-with-2-51677876 We sat down last week for an extensive discussion with Angela Nagle to discuss her latest writings on her new substack page, the Blair/third way phenomena, the death of academia and the virtues of going independent. Be sure to check out Angela's writing on substack - https://angelanagle.substack.com/

For the inaugural episode of the Outsider Theory podcast, I speak to Angela Nagle, author of Kill All Normies, about the Capitol riot and what it reveals about the right-wing embrace of transgression and subversion; the shift in the liberal consensus from celebratory views of technology to more censorious attitudes; and the ongoing weaponization of the left's countercultural energies by the neoliberal center. Links: Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies (https://www.johnhuntpublishing.com/zer0-books/our-books/kill-all-normies) Geoff Shullenberger, "Theorycels in Trumpworld (https://outsidertheory.com/theorycels-in-trumpworld/)" Geoff Shullenberger, "Goodbye Trump, our carnival king (https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/goodbye-trump-our-carnival-king)"

In this episode we discuss Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities by Eric Kaufmann. Next time we will discuss True Names by Vernor Vinge. Some highlights from Whiteshift: Many people desire roots, value tradition and wish to maintain continuity with ancestors who have occupied a historic territory. This means we're more likely to experience what I term Whiteshift, a process by which white majorities absorb an admixture of different peoples through intermarriage, but remain oriented around existing myths of descent, symbols and traditions No one who has honestly analysed survey data on individuals – the gold standard for public opinion research – can deny that white majority concern over immigration is the main cause of the rise of the populist right in the West. This is primarily explained by concern over identity, not economic threat. We are entering a period of cultural instability in the West attendant on our passage between two relatively stable equilibria. The first is based on white ethnic homogeneity, the second on what the prescient centrist writer Michael Lind calls ‘beige' ethnicity, i.e. a racially mixed majority group. In the middle lies a turbulent multicultural interregnum. We in the West are becoming less like homogeneous Iceland and more like homogeneous mixed-race Turkmenistan. But to get there we'll be passing through a phase where we'll move closer to multicultural Guyana or Mauritius. The challenge is to enable conservative whites to see a future for themselves in Whiteshift – the mixture of many non-whites into the white group through voluntary assimilation. Anyone who wants to explain what's happening in the West needs to answer two simple questions. First, why are right-wing populists doing better than left-wing ones? Second, why did the migration crisis boost populist-right numbers sharply while the economic crisis had no overall effect? If we stick to data, the answer is crystal clear. Demography and culture, not economic and political developments, hold the key to understanding the populist moment. Because Western nations were generally formed by a dominant white ethnic group, whose myths and symbols – such as the proper name ‘Norway' – became the nation's, the two concepts overlap in the minds of many. White majorities possess an ‘ethnic' module, an extra string to their national identity which minorities lack. Ethnic majorities thereby express their ethnic identity as nationalism. I contend that today's white majorities are likely to successfully absorb minority populations while their core myths and boundary symbols endure. This will involve a change in the physical appearance of the median Westerner, hence Whiteshift, though linguistic and religious markers are less likely to be affected. Getting from where we are now, where most Westerners share the racial and religious features of their ethnic archetype, to the situation in a century or two, when most will be what we now term ‘mixed-race', is vital to understanding our present condition. In our more peaceful, post-ideological, demographically turbulent world, migration-led ethnic change is altering the basis of politics from class to ethnicity. On one side is a conservative coalition of whites who are attached to their heritage joined by minorities who value the white tradition; on the other side a progressive alliance of minorities who identify with their ethnic identity combined with whites who are agnostic or hostile towards theirs. Among whites, ethno-demographic change polarizes people between ‘tribal' ethnics who value their particularity and ‘religious' post-ethnics who prioritize universalist creeds such as John McWhorter's ‘religion of anti-racism'. Whites can fight ethnic change by voting for right-wing populists or committing terrorist acts. They may repress anxieties in the name of ‘politically correct' anti-racism, but cracks in this moral edifice are appearing. Many opt to flee by avoiding diverse neighbourhoods, schools and social networks. And other whites may choose to join the newcomers, first in friendship, subsequently in marriage. Intermarriage promises to erode the rising diversity which underlies our current malaise. Religion evolved to permit cooperation in larger units.31 Our predisposition towards religion, morality and reputation – all of which can transcend the tribe – reflects our adaptation to larger social units. Be that as it may, humans have lived in large groups only in the very recent past, so it is reasonable to assume tribalism is a more powerful aspect of our evolutionary psychology than our willingness to abide by a moral code. Today what we increasingly see in the West is a battle between the ‘tribal' populist right and the ‘religious' anti-racist left. Much of this book is concerned with the clash between a rising white tribalism and an ideology I term ‘left-modernism'. A sociologist member of the ‘New York Intellectuals' group of writers and literary critics, Daniel Bell, used the term modernism to describe the spirit of anti-traditionalism which emerged in Western high culture between 1880 and 1930. With the murderous excesses of communism and fascism, many Western intellectuals embraced a fusion of modernist anti-traditionalism and cultural egalitarianism, distinguishing the new ideology from both socialism and traditional liberalism. Cosmopolitanism was its guiding ethos. Unlike socialism or fascism, this left-wing modernism meshed nicely with capitalism and globalization. The left-modernist sensibility spread from a small elite to a much wider section of middle-class society in the 1960s with the rise of television and growth of universities, taking over as the dominant sensibility of the high culture. As it gained ground, it turned moralistic and imperialistic, seeking not merely to persuade but to institutionalize itself in law and policy, altering the basis of liberalism from tolerating to mandating diversity. This is a subtle but critical shift. Meanwhile the economic egalitarianism of socialism gave way to a trinity of sacred values around race, gender and sexual orientation. Immigration restriction became a plank of the Progressive movement which advocated improved working conditions, women's suffrage and social reform. This combination of left-wing economics and ethno-nationalism confounds modern notions of left and right but Progressive vs. free market liberal was how the world was divided in the late nineteenth century. A prominent plank in the Progressive platform was temperance, realized in the Volstead Act of 1920 prohibiting the sale of alcohol. The Prohibition vote pitted immigrant-origin Catholics and upper-class urban WASPs such as the anti-Prohibition leader and New York socialite Pauline Morton Sabin on the ‘wet' side against ‘dry' working-class, rural and religious Protestants. For Joseph Gusfield, Prohibition was principally a symbolic crusade targeted at urban Catholic immigrants who congregated in saloons and their ‘smart set' upper-class allies. This was a Protestant assertion of identity in an increasingly urban nation in which Catholics and Jews formed around a fifth of the population. Those of WASP background had declined to half the total from two thirds in the 1820s. What's interesting is that Anglo representatives did not make their case in ethno-communal terms, nor did they invoke the country's historic ethnic composition. Rather they couched their ethnic motives as state interests. Instead of coming clean about their lament over cultural loss, they felt obliged to fabricate economic and security rationales for restriction. Much the same is true today in the penchant for talking about immigrants putting pressure on services, taking jobs, increasing crime, undermining the welfare state or increasing the risk of terrorism. In my view it would be far healthier to permit the airing of ethno-cultural concerns rather than suppressing these, which leads to often spurious claims about immigrants. Likewise, immigrants' normal desires to defend their interests are decried as ‘identity politics'. [Randolph] Bourne, on the other hand, infused Kallen's structure with WASP self-loathing. As a rebel against his own group, Bourne combined the Liberal Progressives' desire to transcend ‘New Englandism' and Protestantism with Kallen's call for minority groups to maintain their ethnic boundaries. The end product was what I term asymmetrical multiculturalism, whereby minorities identify with their groups while Anglo-Protestants morph into cosmopolites. Thus Bourne at once congratulates the Jew ‘who sticks proudly to the faith of his fathers and boasts of that venerable culture of his', while encouraging his fellow Anglo-Saxons to: Breathe a larger air … [for] in his [young Anglo-Saxon's] new enthusiasms for continental literature, for unplumbed Russian depths, for French clarity of thought, for Teuton philosophies of power, he feels himself a citizen of a larger world. He may be absurdly superficial, his outward-reaching wonder may ignore all the stiller and homelier virtues of his Anglo-Saxon home, but he has at least found the clue to that international mind which will be essential to all men and women of good-will if they are ever to save this Western world of ours from suicide. [1916] Bourne, not Kallen, is the founding father of today's multiculturalist left because he combines rebellion against his own culture and Liberal Progressive cosmopolitanism with an endorsement – for minorities only – of Kallen's ethnic conservatism. In other words, ethnic minorities should preserve themselves while the majority should dissolve itself. Cosmopolitanism must manage the contradiction between its ethos of transcending ethnicity and its need for cultural diversity, which requires ethnic attachment. Bourne resolved this by splitting the world into two moral planes, one for a ‘parental' majority who would be asked to shed their ethnicity and oppose their own culture, and the other for childlike minorities, who would be urged to embrace their heritage in the strongest terms. This crystallized a dualistic habit of mind, entrenched in the anti-WASP ethos of 1920s authors like Sinclair Lewis and H. L. Mencken and the bohemian ‘Lost Generation' of American intellectuals such as F. Scott Fitzgerald. All associated the Anglo-Protestant majority with Prohibition, deemed WASP culture to be of no value, and accused the ethnic majority of suppressing more interesting and expressive ethnic groups. The Lost Generation's anti-majority ethos pervaded the writing of 1950s ‘Beat Generation' left-modernist writers like Norman Mailer and Jack Kerouac – who contrasted lively black jazz or Mexican culture with the ‘square' puritanical whiteness of Middle America. As white ethnics assimilated, the despised majority shifted from WASPs to all whites. The multiculturalism of the 1960s fused the Liberal Progressive pluralist movement with the anti-white ethos of the Beat counterculture. The situation by 1924 was a far cry from the pre-1890 dispensation, when a liberal-assimilationist Anglo-Americanism spanned both universalist and ethno-nationalist shades of opinion. Prior to 1890, most Anglo-Protestant thinkers held the view that their ethnic group could assimilate all comers. During moments of euphoria, they talked up the country as a universal cosmopolitan civilization; in their reflective moods, they remarked on its Anglo-Saxon Protestant character. By 1910, this Emersonian ‘double-consciousness' was gone, each side of its contradiction a separate and consistent ideology. Most WASP intellectuals were, like New England patrician Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, ethno-nationalists who backed restriction, or, like Bourne and Dewey, cosmopolitans calling for diversity and open borders. Few ethno-nationalists favoured open immigration. No pluralists endorsed restriction. Herein lie the roots of our contemporary polarized condition. Critical race theorists contend that white ethnics only ‘became white' when they became useful to the WASP majority. Even Bill Clinton, a southern Protestant whose Irish heritage is undocumented, latched on to the idea that his Irish forebears ‘became' white. Irish Catholics in the north, some claim, were important allies of southern whites in the struggle against Yankee republicanism, so southerners embraced the Irish.60 I'm less convinced. The Irish, Jews and Italians may not have been part of a narrower WASP ‘us', but they were perceived as racially white, thus part of a pan-ethnic ‘us'. This entitled them to opportunities not available to African- or Asian Americans. Post-1960s intermarriage led to an extension of American majority ethnic boundaries from WASP to white but the foundations for expansion were already in place. From the 1960s on, the religious marker of dominant ethnicity came to be redefined from Protestant to ‘Judaeo-Christian'. This chapter underscores several aspects of American ethnic history that are relevant today. First, that the US, like most European nations, has had an ethnic majority since Independence. Second, that the Anglo-Protestant majority underwent a Whiteshift in the mid-twentieth century which permitted it to absorb Catholics and Jews, members of groups once viewed as outsiders. Finally, certain ethnic groups – notably Anglo-Protestants and African-Americans – have become symbolically intertwined with American nationhood. Two thirds of Americans are not members of these groups, yet many recognize them as ethno-traditional: part of what makes the nation distinct. On the right, an ethno-traditional nationalism focused on protecting the white Anglo heritage is emerging as an important force in American politics. Culture is not ethnicity and the two have too often been conflated. Even if white culture remains the default mode, ethno-cultural decline may proceed apace. There are two separate ethno-cultural dynamics, white ethnic decline and the attenuation of the white tradition in American national identity. Only whites will be concerned with the former, but conservative-minded minorities may be attached to white ethno-traditions of nationhood. That is, they will wish to slow changes to the America ‘they know'. Where conservatives seek to preserve the status quo, which might be multiracial, authoritarians always prefer less diversity and dissent. Conservatives are not the same as authoritarians. For instance, authoritarians dislike inequality – a form of economic diversity – thus may find themselves on the left Electoral maps based on aggregate county results matched to census data offered the first snapshot of the social drivers of Trump, and it was apparent that education, not income, best predicted Trump success. Still, at first glance, maps reinforce stereotypes like the urban–rural divide. As with Brexit, income is correlated with education, but there are many wealthy people – think successful plumber – with few qualifications. Similarly, many resemble struggling artists, possessing degrees but little money. When you control for education, income has no effect on whether a white person voted for, or supports, Trump. Being less well-off produces an effect on Trump voting only when authoritarian and conservative values are held constant – and even then has a much smaller impact than values. Education is the best census indicator because it reflects people's subjective worldview, not just their material circumstances. Researchers find that teenagers with more open and exploratory psychological orientations self-select into university. This, much more than what people learn at university, makes them more liberal. Median education level offers a window onto the cultural values of a voting district, which is why it correlates best with Trump's vote share. In American exit polls, Trump won whites without college degrees 67–28, compared to 49–45 for whites with degrees. The changing racial demographics of America could permit the Democrats to consistently win first the presidential, then congressional, elections. Alternatively, the Republican establishment may be able to install a pro-immigration primary candidate. But is this a solution? With no federal outlet for white identity concerns or ethno-traditional nationalism, and with a return to policies of multiculturalism and high immigration which are viewed as a threat to these identities, it's possible the culturally conservative section of the US population could start viewing the government as an enemy. This is an old trope in American history and could pose a security problem. It is also how violent ethnic conflict sometimes ignites. For instance, the British-Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, where parties run on ethnic lines, meant Irish Catholics lost every election in the province between 1922 and the abolition of the Northern Ireland provincial government in 1972. This lack of political representation produced alienation which helped foment the civil war in 1969. What happens if rural and red-state America is permanently frozen out of power when it considers itself the repository of authentic Americanism? [EUROPE:] Liberals fought against the ‘normalization' of the far right, but with rising populist-right totals and coalition arithmetic pulling towards partnership it was only a question of time before the consensus gave way. The anti-racist norm against voting for the far right began to erode and centrist parties started adopting their policies. Elite obstruction may actually have contributed to an angrier anti-elite mood, recruiting yet more voters to the far-right banner. The anti-racist taboo against them has weakened but remains: more voters express strong anti-immigration views than are willing to vote far right.4 Yet, as I explain in chapter 9, the higher the populist right's vote share, the more the taboo erodes. This eases their path to a higher total when conditions permit, setting in motion a self-fulfilling spiral. Economic rationales frequently disguise underlying psychological drivers. For instance, in small opt-in samples on Prolific Academic, one group of white Republican voters scored the problem of ‘unchecked urban sprawl' a 51 out of 100, but another group of white Republicans who saw the question as ‘unchecked urban sprawl caused by immigration' scored it 74/100 (italics added for emphasis). Likewise, among a sample of white British Brexit voters, the problem of ‘pressure on council housing' scored a 47/100 but ‘immigrants putting pressure on council housing' was rated 68/100. In both cases, it logically cannot be the case that the immigration-driven portion of the problem of urban sprawl or pressure on council housing is more important than the problem itself. Thus what's driving opposition to immigration must be something prior to these material concerns. Likewise, the large-sample, representative British Election Study shows that concerns over the cultural and economic effects of immigration are tightly correlated. This suggests opposition to immigration comes first (Jonathan Haidt's unconscious ‘elephant' moves us to act) and various rationalizations like pressure on public services follow (Haidt's conscious ‘rider' telling us a story about why we acted as we did).17 But rationales matter. If a morally acceptable rationale is not there, this inhibits a party's ability to articulate its underlying anti-immigration grievances. This is why restrictionists tend to don the cloak of economic rationalization. The idea that the country has a traditional ethnic composition which people are attached to – what I term ethno-traditional nationalism – and which should not change too quickly, is viewed as beyond the limits of acceptable debate. This is a pity, because the ‘legitimate' arguments stigmatize minorities and are often racist in a way the ‘illegitimate' arguments about wanting to slow cultural loss are not. Only when the latter is taken to the extreme of wanting to bar certain groups or repatriate immigrants do they become racist. Rising diversity polarizes people by psychological outlook and reorients party platforms. As countries ethnically change, green parties move to capture cosmopolitan liberals and the populist right targets conservatives and authoritarians.88 While attitude liberalization did throw up cultural debates over religion, gay marriage and traditional values, these are on their way to becoming marginal in Europe as liberal attitudes attain mass acceptance. The legalization of drugs and the question of how best to address crime are live social issues, but neither promises the same radical transformation of society as ethnic change. Therefore it is ethno-demographic shifts which are rotating European societies away from a dominant left–right economic orientation to a globalist–nationalist cultural axis. The West is becoming less like homogeneous South Korea, where foreign policy and economic divisions dominate, and more like South Africa, where ethnicity is the main political division.89 When a regalizing order fails to make a charge of deviance stick, the norm begins to unwind, leading to a period of intense cultural contestation. Competing groups police norm boundaries and marginalize deviants who are seen to have violated their community's sacred values. I maintain we are currently in such a period, in which hegemonic liberal norms known as ‘political correctness' are being challenged by both populists and centrists, some of whom are trying to install new social norms, notably those defining Muslims and cosmopolitans as deviant. Fascism and socialism lost out after the Second World War, but what of the victor, liberalism? The Allies' victory did enlarge and protect the scope of negative liberty. But alongside this success a positive liberalism was smuggled in which advocated individuality and cosmopolitanism over community. Most, myself included, value individual autonomy, but one has to recognize that not all share this aim. Someone who prefers to wear a veil or dedicate their lives to religion is making a communitarian choice which negative liberalism respects but positive liberalism (whether of the modernist left or burqa-banning right) does not. Expressive individualism advocates that we channel our authentic inner nature, or what H. G. Wells or Henri Bergson termed our life force, unconstrained by tradition or reason. Aesthetically, it tended towards what the influential American sociologist Daniel Bell terms modernism, rejecting Christian or national traditions while spurning established techniques and motifs.22 Not only were traditions overturned but esteem was accorded to those whose innovations shocked sensibilities and subverted historic narratives and symbols the most. Clearly something happened between the nation-evoking historical and landscape painting of a Delacroix or Constable in the early nineteenth century and Marcel Duchamp's urinal of 1917. This ‘something' was the rise, after 1880, of what Bell terms modernism and Anthony Giddens calls de-traditionalization. For Bell, modernism is the antinomian rejection of all cultural authority. For Giddens, the shift is from a past- to a future-orientation and involves a decline in existential security.23 For Bell, modernism replaces contemplation of external reality and tradition with sensation and immediacy.26 The desire to seek out new and different experiences elevates novelty and diversity into cardinal virtues of the new positive liberalism. To favour tradition over the new, homogeneity over diversity, is to be reactionary. Left-modernism continually throws up new movements such as Surrealism or Postmodernism in its quest for novelty and difference. The shock of the new is accompanied by a cosmopolitan pastiche of borrowings from non-Western cultures, as with the Primitivism of Paul Gauguin. Yet there is a tension between the expressive-individualist and egalitarian strands of left-modernism. Gauguin, for example, who considered himself a cosmopolite defending Tahitian sexual freedom against the buttoned-down West, stands accused by the New Left of cultural appropriation, colonialism, orientalism and patriarchy. The social penetration of left-modernist ideas would take a great leap forward only in the 1960s as television and university education soared. In America, the share of 18- to 24-year-olds in College increased from 15 per cent in 1950 to a third in 1970. Given the large postwar ‘baby-boom' generation, this translated into a phenomenal expansion of universities. The growth of television was even more dramatic: from 9 per cent penetration in American homes in 1950 to 93 per cent by 1965.41 The New York, Hollywood and campus-based nodes in this network allowed liberal sensibilities to spread from a small coterie of aficionados to a wider public. Rising affluence may also have played a part in creating a social atmosphere more conducive to liberalism. All told, these ingredients facilitated a marked liberal shift across a wide range of attitudes measured in social surveys from the mid-1960s: gender roles, racial equality, sexual mores and religion – with the effects most apparent in the postwar Baby Boom generation.42 Since so much of the debate around the boundaries of the permissible revolves around racism, we need a rigorous – rather than political – definition of the concept. It's very important to specify clearly, using analytic political theory and precise terminology, why certain utterances or actions are racist. Only in this manner can we defend a racist taboo. I define racism as (a) antipathy to racial or pan-ethnic outgroups, defined as communities of birth; (b) the quest for race purity; or (c) racial discrimination which results in a violation of citizens' right to equal treatment before the law. The problem is that left-modernism has established racial inequality as an outrage rather than one dimension – and not generally the most important – of the problem of inequality. If racial inequality is one facet of inequality, it should be considered alongside other aspects such as income, health, weight or age. To focus the lion's share of attention on race and gender disparities entrenches ‘inequality privilege', wherein those who suffer from low-visibility disadvantages are treated less fairly than those who fit totemic left-modernist categories. A white male who is short, disabled, poor and unattractive will understandably resent the fact his disadvantage is downplayed while he is pilloried for his privilege. In effect, the 2010s represent a renewed period of left-modernist innovation, incubated by near-universal left–liberal hegemony among non-STEM faculty and administrators. Most academics are moderate liberals rather than radical leftists, but in the absence of conservative or libertarian voices willing to stand against left-modernist excess, liberal saturation reduced resistance to the japes of extremist students and professors. Social media and progressive online news acted as a vector, carrying the new left-modernist awakening off-campus much more effectively than was true during the first wave of political correctness of the late 1980s and 1990s. Angela Nagle finds that leftist radicalism emerged first, attracting a far-right response. One of the first to trace the emergence of this polarizing dynamic, she shows how, in left-modernist online chat groups, those who stake outlandish claims about white male oppression win moral and social plaudits. These in turn are lampooned by the alt-right, who leverage left-modernist excesses to legitimate blatant racism and sexism. This begins a cycle of polarizing rhetorical confrontation. Alt-right message boards adopt a playful countercultural style, emphasizing their rebellion against a stifling, puritanical-left establishment.11 Whereas bohemians like the Young Intellectuals of the 1910s and 1920s lauded African-American jazz and immigrant conviviality as a riposte to an uptight Prohibitionist Anglo-Protestant culture, the alt-right champions white maleness as a liberation from the strictures of the puritanical left. Hamid argues that being attached to an ethnic group and looking out for its interests is qualitatively different from hating or fearing outgroups. This is a distinction social psychologists recognize, between love for one's group and hatred of the other. As Marilyn Brewer writes in one of the most highly cited articles on prejudice: The prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, ingroup bias, and prejudice presumes that ingroup love and outgroup hate are reciprocally related. Findings from both cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments support the alternative view that ingroup identification is independent of negative attitudes toward outgroups.54 If politics in the West is ever to return to normal rather than becoming even more polarized, white interests will need to be discussed. I realize this is very controversial for left-modernists. Yet not only is white group self-interest legitimate, but I maintain that in an era of unprecedented white demographic decline it is absolutely vital for it to have a democratic outlet. Marginalizing race puritanism is important, but muzzling relaxed versions of white identity sublimates it in a host of negative ways. For example, when whites are concerned about their decline but can't express it, they may mask their concern as worry about the nation-state. It's more politically correct to worry about Islam's challenge to liberalism and East European ‘cheap labour' in Britain than it is to say you are attached to being a white Brit and fear cultural loss. This means left-modernism has placed us in a situation where expressing racism is more acceptable than articulating racial self-interest. David Willetts, Minister of Education in David Cameron's Conservative government: The basis on which you can extract large sums of money in tax and pay it out in benefits is that most people think the recipients are people like themselves, facing difficulties which they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state. People ask, ‘Why should I pay for them when they are doing things I wouldn't do?' This is America versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the US you have a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to fellow citizens. Progressives want diversity but they thereby undermine part of the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests.62 trying to reconstruct our racial categories from above through politics may be as difficult as trying to get people to unlearn the primary colours. This doesn't mean categories can't evolve, but it suggests the process is complex, evolutionary and bottom-up. As the median racial type changes, the boundaries of whiteness may expand because people judge categories based on the average type they encounter. Hispanics, like the Italians before them, may become part of the ethnic majority in the not-too-distant future. Many white Americans currently view those with Spanish surnames or Hispanic features as outsiders. A majority of Hispanics see themselves as white, but only 6 per cent of Hispanics who identify as white say they are accepted as such by American society. Even among those with just one Latino grandparent, 58 per cent identify as Hispanic.43 Yet this may change with increased intermarriage, cultural assimilation and the arrival of more culturally distant groups. Already, lighter-skinned Hispanics are more likely to vote Republican or live in the same neighbourhoods as whites.44 As group lines are blurred by intermarriage, ethnic boundaries may shift: Ramirez may be considered an Anglo-American on a par with De Niro. Hispanic surnames are unlikely to be ‘counter-entropic' barriers to assimilation. This assimilation process is a major reason why the centre-left writer John Judis revised his thesis that America's changing demographics will automatically produce Democratic victories in the future.45 When the criteria for defining who is in or out of the majority change, whole chunks of the population who are not of mixed origin – like the fully Irish John F. Kennedy – suddenly become part of the ethnic majority. The analogy would be if fully Hispanic or Asian Americans came to be viewed as white. I deem this unlikely, given the proximity to Mexico and the established nature of the racial categories noted by Richard Dawkins. What seems more likely is that the high rate of intermarriage between Latinos and whites, as well as the rising share of native English-speakers, Protestants or seculars among them, may expand the boundaries of whiteness to include those of mixed parentage. That is, those with some European background who are culturally assimilated and have Anglo first names – but who have Spanish surnames or a Hispanic appearance – may be accepted as white.

In this episode, Adam and Ben discuss transgression/provocation and how it successfully manifests in late modernism. In Vincent Gallo, queen Aimee Terese, and our beloved president Donald Trump, the duo understands the parameters of the cultural sphere that must be understood to not just successfully transgress the hegemony, but to transgress in a way that exposes the hypocrisies of our political world and the liberal order.  Vincent Gallo's "artworks": https://www.vgmerchandise.com/store/home.php?cat=4 An essay by Vincent Gallo: https://www.anothermanmag.com/life-culture/10236/an-open-letter-from-vincent-gallo-unfiltered-and-unedited On the Queen Aimee: https://collegium.fandom.com/wiki/Aimee_Terese Michael Brooks on Angela Nagle: https://youtu.be/TZ1kA91_DNI Eric Vance on why Donald Trump has been Andy Kaufman from the start: http://www.erikvance.com/donald-trump-is-the-worlds-greatest-performance-artist/

Techno producer, DJ, Internet provocateur, and operator of the MoMAPS5 account He Valencia joins Adam and Ben for a freewheeling discussion about neoliberalism's pulverizations of art, politics, and everything else in its path. He Valencia discusses the suffocating wokeness thrown his way in the electronic music world, versus the genre's history as a proletarian art form that transcended racial boundaries. Beyond that, we talk about Killer Mike's recent controversy by doing actual politics and being effective at actual politics (fuck the haters Mike, you a real one!), our class reducing daddy Adolph Reed taking petty snipes at queen Angela Nagle (what's up with that, Adolph?), and He Valencia's burgeoning friendship with pop music's last free thinker Azealia Banks. (note: Adam mentioned industrial musician and artist Boyd Rice being connected to the alt-right, Boyd has never claimed allegiance to the alt-right and Adam meant to only emphasize what art world progressives have mislabeled Boyd as, the air quotes did not come through on the recording) (Note: towards the end of the episode, Adam mentions that a gallery owning friend of his gets shit for now showing enough white artists, he meant black artists*) He Valencia on soundcloud: https://soundcloud.com/he_valencia He Valencia on instagram: https://www.instagram.com/moma.ps5/?hl=en Adolph Reed taking snipes at Angela Nagle on radlib supreme Katie Halper's show: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nHXXS375AY Killer Mike hangs with Gov. Brian Kemp: https://www.ajc.com/politics/politics-blog/kemp-and-killer-mike-try-to-clear-the-air-after-their-sitdown-sparked-uproar/CJRIH7ISBZEPDGEYKGRPOCTWNQ/ Hieroglyphic Being on Bandcamp: https://hieroglyphicbeingofficial.bandcamp.com/ Underground Resistance documentary: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JI4cBPgETnU Endangered Species Records: https://www.endangeredspecies.biz/ Darja Bajagic at le Confort Moderne: https://www.confort-moderne.fr/fr/agenda/event/GOREGEOUS-Darja-Bajagi/2446  

Very special episode. To set the record straight once and for all, Adam and Ben have an anonymous Bernie 2020 organizer on to tell us all the things that he saw going wrong from the beginning. Intra-campaign chaos. Unprofessional behavior. Chapo-lite antics on the Slack. Pronoun battles. Celebrity endorsement glee. It goes on and on. We have masked the organizer's voice to protect his identity, and some details of his story have been slightly altered to similar ends. This is an indictment of the left. They blew the biggest opportunity that working class Americans will have because they could not make the sacrifices that needed making to win people over and make Bernie president. They (we) should never, ever be forgiven. Scipio Sattler 'How Warren and the Professional Class Undermined the Sanders Candidacy': www.collidemag.com/post/how-warren…ed-sanders-2020 Angela Nagle and Michael Tracey 'First as Tragedy then as Farce': americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/05/fir…n-as-farce/ Barbara Ransby 'The White Left Needs to Embrace Black Leadership': www.thenation.com/article/activism…ives-white-left/

MGTOW stands for "Men Going Their Own Way", which is a movement advocating for men to separate themselves from women and a society which they believe has been destroyed by women. Lamprey is the host of the MGTOW Chats podcast and he is also a writer at The American Sun. --- MGTOW is part of the "manosphere", a collection of online communities which includes incels, MRA's, and pickup artists, according to Angela Nagle. We had a good debate on the state of our country, personal liberties, and it gets VERY heated. We found a lot of middle ground, which I am very happy about. - Trigger Warning - Find Lamprey at MGTOW Chats: https://www.bitchute.com/channel/xsxWLVADosPB/ and at The American Sun: https://theamericansun.com/.

The three horsegirls of the apocalypse (Aimee, Anna, and Angela) talk feminine psychological warfare, Glenn Greenwald and nice leftists, the self-victimization of the Squad, and why we probably all have a Cluster B personality disorder. To hear the full 3 hr episode, become a patron at patreon.com/whatsleft

Lauren Southern could spew racist propaganda like no other. But the men around her were better at one thing: trafficking in ugly misogyny. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/10/alt-right-star-racist-propagandist-has-no-regrets/616725/ Skip to content Dear Therapist Crossword Puzzle Manage Subscription PopularLatestPoliticsIdeasPhotoScienceCulturePodcastsHealthEducationPlanetTechnologyFamilyProjectsBusinessGlobalEventsBooksFictionNewsletterPlay CrosswordLatest IssuePast IssuesGive a Gift Dear Therapist Crossword Puzzle Manage Subscription PopularLatestSign In My Account PoliticshereFrom the November 2020 issue: Right-wing militias are bracing for civil warWhite NoiseRead: Four years embedded with the alt-rightFrom the June 2017 issue: How Richard Spencer became an icon for white supremacistsFrom the December 2017 issue: Angela Nagle on the young men of the alt-rightRead: To learn about the alt-right, start with the ‘manosphere’From the May 2018 issue: The era of fake video beginsRead: Instagram is the internet’s new home for hateRead: The women behind the ‘alt-right’The Making of an American NaziWhite Nationalism’s Deep American RootsWatch: Rebranding white nationalismDaniel LombrosoTwitter

Greetings! Welcome to Part Two of Episode 26, where we continue our interview with Adam Proctor. As I noted last time, while this is a long interview, it was also a long overdue interview. There was so much good stuff to talk about, it seemed wasteful to try to cram it all into one episode. In Part One, we spent some time looking back over the main themes and controversies of four years of DPS (freedom of speech issues, cancel culture, race essentialism, etc.). We also talked socialist strategy, and the application of work by Sam Ginden and Leo Pantich to the Grexit question. In Part Two, we turn our gaze more to the present, and to future. We join the conversation mid-flow, debating the post-Bernie moment, and the question of whether or not we should swallow, as it is sometimes termed, “the black pill.” Here, I push Adam on his latest slogan. That is, a warning that we should eschew taking up residence in “the basement of the vampire’s castle.” This of course is a modification of Mark Fisher’s ‘Vampire Castle’ hypothesis. In a well-known 2013 essay, Exiting the Vampire Castle, Fisher noted how in Late Capitalism the left confronts obstacles emanating not only from its foes on the other side of the ideological equation, but also from its own tendency for self-destructive behavior. Part of the problem, he wrote, is that the hyper-individuation of social life under the neoliberal cultural project has been so successful that even the left has forgotten the importance of collective power for politics. Hence its paradoxical descent into culture war and performativity. Addressing this critique, we discuss first the importance of Angela Nagle’s stance on sub-culture, and its tendency to compete for the accumulation of cultural capital, before then moving on to address what we might call “the black pill” question. The key, Adam notes, is to take measure of the goals you want the left to accomplish, and then envision what the left would have to look like, in order for these goals to be achieved. Later in the episode, we look at the post-2008 de-linking of the financial economy from the productive economy, the threat of a return of austerity (did it ever go?) in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, and the question of what the left is, today. And we wrap up with a sympathetically critical discussion of the state of left media in general, and the “Patreon” model of left podcasting in particular.

The Right thinks it understands the Left - it's motivations and how it thinks about itself - but Malcom and Angela explain how the Right gets it all wrong and how that misunderstanding makes the Right less effective. Having spent years on the Left before being thrown out for unapproved thoughts, Malcom and Angela offer an insider's perspective full of fascinating insights. Pay special attention to the discussion of the Left's essential union with corporate power, it's implicit sadism, it's ritual desecration of relationships, and it's war on beauty.

In which we discuss a hot topic coldly, using NOT ONE BUT TWO ARTICLES BY WOMEN as a reference for our conversation: The Left Case against Open Borders by Angela Nagle: https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/11/the-left-case-against-open-borders/ The Case for Open Borders by Suzy Lee https://catalyst-journal.com/vol2/no4/the-case-for-open-borders#fn-no-34

Aimee, Oliver, Angela, and Malcom discuss the work of doing politics. Census Data: https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/p20/580/table07.xlsx https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/

Do they know it's a grift or are they just idiots! After a quick glance at the current situation in the Failing United States! The comrades debunk Angela Nagle's latest article that has been making waves and raising eyebrows in the twittersphere, woke multiantionalism capital vs. ethnonationalism in Ireland.. a thing that doesnt exist. "Will Ireland Survive the Woke Wave" provides fun, woke nationalism and the green voter, statues and complex history, a soup of nonsense with a tincture of self aware grifting. Seb reads and Kev groans a lot. We learn that a 27 year old movie, The Commitments, has a more sophisticated view of race in Ireland than Angela does. We discover that the author knows less about Irish history than the average 14 year old school goer. At the end we learn what happens when you look for Far-Right people in the police and military - YOU FIND THEM! Last part we look at some aniversaries, 100 years ago Communist Party of GB founded, 20 Communists in Chicago jailed for Sedition, a lynching in Texas... on a happier note 60 years, ago Oswald Mosley got coined by antifascists. ENJOY meteorology matters // the limp kennedys // stanning for the squad // Greg Palast // who crimes better wins // evil aperatchicks and bonehead autocrats // "Will Ireland Survive the Woke Wave?" WTF // Irish Nationalism was NOT ethnonationalist! // complicated sense of national pride // the blueshirts love britain // fiscallyconservative-sociallyliberal douchery // you have to pick: multinationalism // 1940s germany, was a famously nazi period // Irish Lord HawHaw // decapitating statues // BLACK AND PROUD // problematic proclamation signitories // all these people are dead but they left good shit behind // havin' a laugh on Mayday // how you know it is a grift // the psychic impact of post-industrialism // corporations don't give a shit about wokeness // solidarity with BLM // 5 Star Slave Girls // Angela Nagle caught the 4ChanVirus // KSK dismantled in Germany // Anniversaries Angela Nagle's article the lads made fun of... https://unherd.com/2020/07/will-ireland-survive-the-woke-wave/ Music Mustang Sally - The Commitments

This week we read Angela Nagle's book "Kill All Normies" and discuss the genesis of the online alt-right. Thanks to Gordon Gilmore for the rec - pick up the book and join the conversation! https://www.johnhuntpublishing.com/zer0-books/our-books/kill-all-normies Music: Protofunk by Kevin MacLeod Link: https://incompetech.filmmusic.io/song/4247-protofunk License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/godlycommunists/message

Angela and Malcom return to discuss Michael Lind's reception among the left, materialism, class war, and the halcyon days of 2016. Michael Lind's article: https://www.thebellows.org/the-double-horseshoe-theory/

I think we’re alone now… and Elon Musk has thoughts on socialism, Saira Rao has thoughts on white people, the US state department has thoughts on gays in Chechnya, and Angela Nagle has thoughts on Ireland. All this and more!

Angela and Malcom return for another long conversation about statues in Ireland, the relationship between NGOs and global capitalism, and the rewriting of history in the culture wars, among other things.

In this Patreon exclusive, Aimee and Oliver are joined by again Angela Nagle and Malcom Kyeyune to discuss the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone in Seattle. To become a patron, subscribe at patreon.com/whatsleft

Supreme financial advice, Angela Nagle's 'Kill All Normies', Jenna Marbles exiting youtube, and Amy Shark's latest stinker 'Everybody Rise' Intro: Azealia Banks - 212 Outro: Monolake - Mass Transit Railway

Aimee and Oliver are joined by again Angela Nagle and Malcom Kyeyune to discuss how the united front of elites are getting their revenge on awful populists. They talk cancellations, the media, and the ugly work of left politics.

This is a sample. For the full episode go to patreon.com/bungacast  Bonus content (always the best stuff) from our interview with Angela and Michael (episode 126). 

In this talk I outline what Marx means by Class Conflict and explore why he believed that this was the central antagonism within Capitalism. Note: In the Q&A I said that I thought that the term 'Cultural Capitalism' was used by Angela Nagle on the podcast What's Left, but that's not correct.

Why did Bernie Sanders fail?In the third in an occasional series on the US presidential election and the Left, we talk to Angela Nagle and Michael Tracey about their analysis of Bernie Sanders' campaign. We put to bed some bad arguments as to why Bernie didn't win the nomination, and examine some better ones: was the campaign was too establishment-friendly? too "left"? too middle-class? too anti-nationalist?... or are structural factors to blame instead?And we ponder the end of the union of Old and New Lefts, of cultural liberalism and socialism. And the most worrying of all: was Bernie just a blip? Reading: First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: The Collapse of the Sanders Campaign and the "Fusionist" Left, Angela Nagle & Michael Tracey, American Affairs

Aimee and Oliver are joined by Angela Nagle and Malcom Kyeyune to discuss some of their recent writing. They talk left discourse, culture war and class war, Strasserism, and the big red button that says "Please Don't Press, or Racism Will Happen." Reading: "First as Tragedy, Then as Farce: The Collapse of the Sanders Campaign and the Fusionist Left" | https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2020/05/first-as-tragedy-then-as-farce/ "On Strasserism and the Decay of the Left" | https://tinkzorg.wordpress.com/2020/05/07/on-strasserism-and-the-decay-of-the-left/

Everyone loves Bernie Sanders and hates Angela Nagle, but when it comes to the enforcement of borders, their politics are basically the same. Using the power of HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, returning guest Ross Wolfe (@RossWolfe) traces the origins of the modern nation state, explains the limits of economic nationalism and social democracy in one country, and makes the case for why nothing short of GLOBAL COMMUNIST REVOLUTION is necessary to avoid a descent into fascism and horror. Read Ross's piece, 'Nationalism, Borders and the State' at The Brooklyn Rail or MR online. Outro music: Antischism - Lines on a Map

In this very interactive episode, the skeleton crew gives thanks to Comrade Gritty, the first sports mascot who is actually mocking the fans. We then take questions from you, the listeners, on a broad range of topics including: witches & the occult, mandatory voting, Jamie's political tendency, why Sean says "deadass" so much, how often we question our beliefs, and the ever spicy Angela Nagle controversy. Outro music: Vincas - Black Rose Donate to DSA Tallahassee's hurricane relief efforts here: https://www.gofundme.com/dsa-tlh-hurricane-relief-fund Become a supporter at patreon.com/theantifada Follow us on Twitter: @the_antifada, @spaceprole, @jamie_elizabeth