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Paul and Macca look back at at this segment from, Saturday 23rd, November, 2024: Senator Dean Smith and John Judis, Freelance US Journalist: Trump's Re-Election. Macca and Nevena are in... LEARN MORE The post Sat 04/Jan/2025: REPRIZE-Saturday 23rd, November, 2024: Senator Dean Smith and John Judis, Freelance US Journalist: Trump's Re-Election appeared first on Saturday Magazine.
Macca and Nevena are in the hosting seats this week. A very special segment starts off this week with WA Senator Dean Smith in the studio and freelance US journalist... LEARN MORE The post Saturday, 23rd, November, 2024: Senator Dean Smith and John Judis, Freelance US Journalist: Trump's Re-Election appeared first on Saturday Magazine.
Matthew Pantelis speaks with John Judis, US political commentator and author, 2024 scholar in residence, Centre for Independent Studies on the US election. Listen live on the FIVEAA Player. Follow us on Facebook, X and Instagram.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Yascha Mounk, Ruy Teixeira, and Yuval Levin discuss why American elections are so close—and how one party could build a stable majority. Ruy Teixeira is the co-founder and politics editor of The Liberal Patriot, and the author, with John Judis, of The Emerging Democratic Majority and, most recently, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes. Yuval Levin is the director of Social, Cultural, and Constitutional Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. Levin is the author of A Time to Build: From Family and Community to Congress and the Campus and, most recently, American Covenant: How the Constitution Unified Our Nation—and Could Again. In this week's conversation, Yascha Mounk, Ruy Teixeira and Yuval Levin discuss “politics without winners,” or America's unusual streak of close-run elections; why both Democrats and Republicans have failed to build a dominant coalition; and what it would take for either party to win a durable majority. This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. Please do listen and spread the word about The Good Fight. If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone. Email: podcast@persuasion.community Website: http://www.persuasion.community Podcast production by Jack Shields, and Brendan Ruberry Connect with us! Spotify | Apple | Google Twitter: @Yascha_Mounk & @joinpersuasion Youtube: Yascha Mounk LinkedIn: Persuasion Community Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Rod Arquette Show Daily Rundown – Monday, April 1, 20244:20 pm: Bill Duncan, Constitutional Law and Religious Freedom Fellow at the Sutherland Institute joins Rod to discuss his piece in the Washington Examiner about how we can set aside the predictions of doom heading into the 2024 election.4:38 pm: Ginny Gentles, Director of the Education Freedom Center at the Independent Women's Forum, joins Rod to discuss her piece about Joe Biden's decision to designate Easter Sunday at “Transgender Day of Visibility.”6:05 pm: Edward Ring, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Greatness joins the show to discuss his piece about how the establishment narrative that the future of the United States is negative is completely farcical.6:20 pm: John Judis, Editor-at-Large for Talking Points Memo joins Rod for a conversation about his piece in the Deseret News on how many small-town Americans see Democrats as jetsetters and globalists and are abandoning the party.6:38 pm: Matt Margolis, author and columnist at PJ Media joins Rod to discuss his piece about what Joe Biden doesn't want you to know about his fundraising numbers.
It can often feel as if politicians use a lot of words without saying much of anything. So how do journalists and citizens make sense of what's said (and unsaid) in the many congressional reports, court decisions and campaign memoirs that pour out of Washington?This week on “Matter of Opinion,” Carlos Lozada makes the case for reading the Capitol, and uses insights from his new book, “The Washington Book,” to help his co-hosts decode everyone from Donald Trump to Mike Pence to Barack Obama.(A full transcript of this audio essay will be available within 48 hours of publication in the audio player above.)Recommended in this episode:“The Washington Book” by Carlos Lozada“What Were We Thinking” by Carlos Lozada“The Woman at the Washington Zoo” by Marjorie Williams“Postwar” by Tony Judt“The Emerging Republican Majority” by Kevin Phillips“The Emerging Democratic Majority” by John Judis and Ruy Teixeira“Chain Reaction” by Thomas B. Edsall and Mary D. Edsall“Dead Right” by David Frum“The Grand New Party” by Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam“The Speechwriter” by Barton SwaimThoughts about the show? Email us at matterofopinion@nytimes.com or leave a voicemail at (212) 556-7440.
On this week's episode of Parsing Immigration Policy, we are joined by Ruy Teixeira, co-author with John Judis of last fall's book, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes. Teixeira, currently a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, worked from 2003 to 2022 as a […]
On this week’s episode of Parsing Immigration Policy, we are joined by Ruy Teixeira, co-author with John Judis of last fall’s book, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes. Teixeira, currently a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, worked from 2003 to 2022 as a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a left-leaning public policy... Source
On this week's episode of Parsing Immigration Policy, we are joined by Ruy Teixeira, co-author with John Judis of last fall's book, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes. Teixeira, currently a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, worked from 2003 to 2022 as a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a left-leaning public policy research and advocacy organization.Teixeira explains that Democrats were not always proponents of the open-border agenda. The Democratic party used to see illegal immigration as a threat to low-wage workers and unions. In fact, in the 1980s, organized labor was the main group pushing for more hawkish immigration policies.Teixeira stresses the importance of including the people at the center of the American electorate in policy debates, stating that the Democratic leadership is way off where the public is not. Many issues have become “culturalized” and reflect the agenda of what he calls a “shadow party” that includes activist groups, donors, academics, et al. who view issues, especially immigration, through a good-versus-evil lens, which does not foster productive debate or compromise.Today, he said, Democrats refuse to even acknowledge a problem at our southern border and have generally alienated the working class, which once made up a significant part of their base. Additionally, they often categorize their opponents as evil rather than merely mistaken. Teixeira sums up the view of the Democratic “shadow party” on immigration as “more is better and less is racist.”In his closing commentary, Mark Krikorian shares what he saw on a recent trip to the Del Rio and Eagle Pass areas of Texas, which has been “Ground Zero” for the border crisis. However, almost overnight the illegal immigration flow has virtually stopped in this area, thanks to a Mexican army crackdown on illegal migrants that followed December visits to Mexico by President Biden and other senior officials.HostMark Krikorian is the Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies.GuestRuy Teixeira is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.RelatedRuy Teixeira AEI profileCould Immigration Hand the 2024 Election to Trump?Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of ExtremesHow Biden Could Act on the Border and Help Himself in NovemberFollowFollow Parsing Immigration Policy on Ricochet, Apple Podcasts, Amazon Music, Spotify, Stitcher, Google Podcasts.Intro MontageVoices in the opening montage:Sen. Barack Obama at a 2005 press conference.Sen. John McCain in a 2010 election ad.President Lyndon Johnson, upon signing the 1965 Immigration Act.Booker T. Washington, reading in 1908 from his 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech.Laraine Newman as a "Conehead" on SNL in 1977.Hillary Clinton in a 2003 radio interview.Cesar Chavez in a 1974 interview.House Speaker Nancy Pelosi speaking to reporters in 2019.Prof. George Borjas in a 2016 C-SPAN appearance.Sen. Jeff Sessions in 2008 comments on the Senate floor.Charlton Heston in "Planet of the Apes".
Yascha Mounk and Ruy Teixeira discuss what Biden would need to do to rebuild a broad coalition for the 2024 election. Ruy Teixeira is a political scientist, the co-founder and politics editor of The Liberal Patriot, and the author, with John Judis, of The Emerging Democratic Majority and, most recently, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes. In this week's conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ruy Teixeira discuss how Democrats lost the working class and what it might take to win it back; how Teixeira's theory that demographic change would favor the Democratic Party has been misinterpreted; and why Democrats, despite Trump's unpopularity, have failed to open up a decisive lead in the polls. This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity. Please do listen and spread the word about The Good Fight. If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone. Email: podcast@persuasion.community Website: http://www.persuasion.community Podcast production by Jack Shields, and Brendan Ruberry Connect with us! Spotify | Apple | Google Twitter: @Yascha_Mounk & @joinpersuasion Youtube: Yascha Mounk LinkedIn: Persuasion Community Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Distinguished political analyst John Judis returns to The Commonwealth Club to share his wake-up call for Democrats, who he feels have lost sight of their core principles, endangering their own political future. For decades, American politics has been plagued by a breakdown between the Democratic and Republican parties, in which victory has inevitably led to defeat and vice versa. Judis says both parties have lost sight of the people at the center of the American electorate, leading to polarization and paralysis. In their book Where Have All the Democrats Gone? The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes, Judis and co-author Ruy Teixeira reveal the tectonic changes shaping the country's current political landscape that many pundits and political scientists have missed. Judis says that the Democratic Party, once the preserve of small towns as well as big cities, of the industrial working class and the newly immigrated, has abandoned and even actively alienated many of those voters. He issues a clarion call for common sense and common ground, revealing the transformation of American politics and providing his critique of where the Democrats have gone awry and how they can avoid political disaster in the days and years ahead. MLF ORGANIZER: George Hammond A Humanities Member-led Forum program. Forums at the Club are organized and run by volunteer programmers who are members of The Commonwealth Club, and they cover a diverse range of topics. Learn more about our Forums. This program is part of our Good Lit series, underwritten by the Bernard Osher Foundatio Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Ruy Teixeira is the author or co-author of ten books and a prolific writer on politics in America. In this episode, Teixeira, who identifies as a Democrat, talks about Joe Manchin's retirement from the U.S. Senate, the 2024 presidential election, why he thinks Joe Biden will be the Democratic nominee, how his party got captured by climate change activists and “cultural radicalism,” and what the party needs to do to restore its appeal to working-class voters. (Recorded November 10, 2023.)
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With the historian John Judis we are looking for a longer timeline in the crisis of Gaza, Israel, Palestine. It has been, in fact, a century of layered conflict between Arabs and Jews, two peoples ...
In the past few decades, the Democratic Party has undergone a seismic shift. Kitchen table issues like the economy and public safety have been overshadowed by more elitist topics like identity politics, gender ideology, defunding the police, climate change, and the vaguely defined yet rigidly enforced ideology of anti-racism, which sees white supremacy as the force behind every institution in America. But while activists, lobbyists, and pundits were busy reshaping the Democratic Party, ordinary voters—including the working class, middle-class families, and ethnic minorities—were simply leaving. All of which has stranded a large group of Americans on an island, voters in the center of nowhere. Two people who have spent years thinking about how the Democratic Party lost its vision are our guests today, political analysts Ruy Teixeira and John Judis. Their new book, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?, offers up a map to help us understand how liberals lost their way. On today's episode, guest-hosted by Michael Moynihan, Teixeira and Judis trace the influence of big money forces behind what they call the Democrats' “shadow party,” and offer a path forward away from the radical cultural issues embraced by party elites and back to core economic issues that matter to the working class, a group that Democrats need to win back if they want to win in 2024. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
John Judis and Ruy Teixeira, co-authors of “The Emerging Democratic Majority,” are back with a new book that argues that the Democrats are imperiled by a “shadow party” that is forcing them into “radical” positions on cultural issues and diverting them away from their core economic issues. Ryan Lizza is a Playbook co-author for POLITICO. John Judis is editor at large at Talking Points Memo and co-author of "Where Have All the Democrats Gone?" Ruy Teixeira is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and co-author of "Where Have All the Democrats Gone?" Kara Tabor is a producer for POLITICO audio. Alex Keeney is a senior producer for POLITICO audio.
In 2016, as has been widely reported, white working-class voters shifted decisively to the right. In 2020, working-class voters of color followed suit to varying degrees, though still giving President Joe Biden a clear majority of their support. This has left both parties with the understanding that going forward a multiracial, working-class majority will play a pivotal role in their electoral fortunes. So why have we seen these recent shifts to the right and what will both parties do to either capitalize on or reverse these trends? In this installment of the 538 Politics podcast, Galen speaks with two authors who have recently published books about precisely those questions, but from opposite sides of the political aisle. Democratic political scientist Ruy Teixeira recently co-wrote the book “Where Have All The Democrats Gone? The Soul Of The Party In The Age Of Extremes” along with John Judis. Republican pollster Patrick Ruffini wrote the book, “Party Of The People: Inside The Multiracial Populist Coalition Remaking the GOP.” Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comGraeme is a foreign correspondent, and one of the most brilliant men I've ever met. He's been a staff writer at The Atlantic since 2006 and a lecturer in political science at Yale since 2014. He's also been a contributing editor to The New Republic and books editor of Pacific Standard, and he's the author of The Way of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State. Graeme was in Israel when we spoke earlier this week. It's — shall we say — a lively conversation, covering every taboo in the Israel/Palestine question.You can listen to the episode right away in the audio player above (or on the right side of the player, click “Listen On” to add the Dishcast feed to your favorite podcast app). For two clips of our convo — on the ways Hamas is more evil than even ISIS, and on the ethnic cleansing in the West Bank — pop over to our YouTube page.Other topics: growing up in an upper-middle-class home in Dallas; how his parents gave him the travel bug, which he took to the extreme; why the challenges of travel are often the best parts; how time slows down abroad; Paul Theroux and Emerson on travel; going to Afghanistan in 2001 at age 21; why ISIS hated the Taliban and considered them non-Muslims; the caliphate; the easy divisibility of Islamists because of doctrinal differences; Israelis leaving Gaza in 2005; a Nakba in the West Bank; Bibi opposing a two-state solution; the savagery and evil glee of 10/7; the rank corruption and greed of the Hamas government; the dismal economy of Gaza; the terrible conundrum of killing Hamas among human shields; Fallujah vs. Gaza; the fanatical settlers; how the Orthodox right doesn't start tech companies or join the military; Kushner funding the settlements; Trump and the Abraham Accords; Graeme disagreeing with me over the Accords; the protests over judicial reform; the Israelis who oppose settlements; AIPAC and the dearth of US pushback on Israel; the Dem rift over the Gaza war; far-left denialism over 10/7; destroying the posters of hostages; and the upcoming mass protest in London on 11/11.Browse the Dishcast archive for another convo you might enjoy (the first 102 episodes are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: David Leonhardt on his new book about the American Dream, John Judis and Ruy Teixeira on Where Have All the Democrats Gone?, Cat Bohannon on Eve: How the Female Body Drove 200 Million Years of Human Evolution, Matthew Crawford, and Jennifer Burns. Please send any guest recs, dissent and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
John Judis and Ruy Teixiera drop by to answer the question posed in the title of their new book Where Have All the Democrats Gone? Their warning is that the more Dems tack left, the more likely the only constituency left will be "the left." Plus, the guilty plea of a mass shooter's father. And the meaning imparted in the misreported presence of beheaded babies in Israel. Produced by Joel Patterson and Corey Wara Email us at thegist@mikepesca.com To advertise on the show, visit: https://advertisecast.com/TheGist Subscribe to The Gist Subscribe: https://subscribe.mikepesca.com/ Follow Mikes Substack at: Pesca Profundities | Mike Pesca | Substack Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
This week on the Enemies List, Rick is joined by Ruy Teixeira and John Judis. Ruy is an author and political commentator and John is the editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, as well as an author and journalist. Together, the three discuss the most compelling trends and statistics that signal how the 2024 election may go, including underrated voting demographics, turnout of young voters, and much more. Ruy and John's new book, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?, available now. Timestamps: [00:01:44] The unseen story [00:06:42] The centrist middle [00:08:46] The emergence of young voters [00:14:53] Florida is our warning [00:17:42] Where have all the democrats gone Follow Resolute Square: Instagram Twitter TikTok Find out more at Resolute Square Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comPamela is a journalist. For nine years she was the editor of The New York Times Book Review, where she also hosted a weekly podcast, and she's now a columnist for the Opinion section of the Times where she writes about culture, ideas, society, language and politics. She's the author of eight books, most recently 100 Things We've Lost to the Internet. We had a fun chat about a whole host of topics.You can listen to the episode right away in the audio player above (or on the right side of the player, click “Listen On” to add the Dishcast feed to your favorite podcast app). For two clips of our convo — on how computers are killing off deep reading, and the growing rate of anorexia among girls — pop over to our YouTube page.Other topics: growing up in NYC and Long Island with divorced parents; her mom wrote ad copy and her dad was a contractor; Pamela was the only girl among seven brothers; she always wanted to be a writer; studied history at Brown; considered a PhD but didn't want to focus on an “ism”; spent a year alone in northern Thailand with little tech — “probably best decision of my life”; how a career is not a linear path, especially in your 20s; the benefits of very little Internet; how media today is homogenized across the Western world; the publishing industry; Jon Stewart ambushing me on his show; how non-natives often see a country better than its natives; Tocqueville; how professors have stopped assigning full books; the assault on the humanities; Reed College and Hum 110; the war in Israel and Gaza; the ignorance and hateful ideology against Israel; Jewish liberals waking up to wokeness; how Israeli officials are botching their PR; “the death of Israeli competence”; gender and trans ideology; how gays and trans people are far more persecuted outside the West; Iran's program of sex changes; what priests and trans activists have in common; Thatcher a much better feminist than Clinton; the decline of magazines and the blogosphere; The Weekly Dish; and Pamela defending the NYT against my barbs.Browse the Dishcast archive for another convo you might enjoy (the first 102 episodes are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: David Leonhardt on his new book about the American Dream, John Judis and Ruy Teixeira on Where Have All the Democrats Gone?, Cat Bohannon on Eve: How the Female Body Drove 200 Million Years of Human Evolution, Matthew Crawford, and McKay Coppins. Please send any guest recs, dissent and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
This week's podcast interview (audio above) is with Ruy Teixeira, about his new book with John Judis, Where Have All the Democrats Gone?: The Soul of the Party in the Age of Extremes.It is an argument that both parties have been co-opted by big business. It spends all its time blaming the Democrats for their part in this, but that's because the authors believe the Democrats used to be the party of the working person, and that it can and should be again. They also view the Republican party, or at least large swaths of it, as a threat to democracy.They are interested in Democrats winning elections, and winning elections is an issue of math. And they believe, based on quite a bit of statistical evidence and history, that the Democratic party has alienated key elements of the country that they need to win elections, both by losing touch with working class people on economics, and on social issues.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
It seemed impossible that Donald Trump could ever make inroads with Hispanic voters, but in 2020, he did. And he could again in 2024. Ruy Teixeira— co-founder of The Liberal Patriot and co-author of the new book Where Have All the Democrats Gone— joins Sarah for a frank exchange of ideas about how Democrats can win back a community that might decide the 2024 election. show notes: Forthcoming book by Ruy and John Judis: https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250877499/wherehaveallthedemocratsgone#:~:text=In%20Where%20Have%20All%20the,and%20partnership%20of%20the%20working
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comDavid is a long-time columnist for the New York Times. He's also a commentator on “PBS NewsHour,” NPR's “All Things Considered” and NBC's “Meet the Press.” Plus he teaches at Yale. His new book is How to Know a Person: The Art of Seeing Others Deeply and Being Deeply Seen.You can listen to the episode right away in the audio player above (or on the right side of the player, click “Listen On” to add the Dishcast feed to your favorite podcast app). For two clips of our convo — on how to be a better friend to suffering loved ones, and how loneliness leads to authoritarianism — pop over to our YouTube page.Other topics: his upbringing in Greenwich Village among intellectuals and gays; his beatnik Jewish parents; his father the NYU professor and his mother with a PhD from Columbia; “not the most emotionally intimate” family; how people shouldn't separate thinking from emotions; the French Enlightenment; Jungian/Burkean conservatism; Hume; nationalism and King Charles III; Orwell's “The Lion and the Unicorn”; Disraeli; conservatism and the current GOP as a nihilist cult; Isaiah Berlin; how you're an “illuminator” or “diminisher” when meeting new people; how most don't ask questions and instead broadcast themselves; Trump; how Trump supporters are “hard to hate up close”; Hamas and Israel; Hannah Arendt; how to encounter a super woke person; arguments as a form of respect; suppressing your ego for better conversations; Taylor Swift on narcissism; suicidal friends; the distortion of reality when depressed; the AIDS crisis and losing friends; marriage equality; one changing in midlife; Oakeshott; overprotective parents; the value of play; Gen Z's low social trust; boys growing up with poor flirting skills; casual dating and ghosting; the historical amnesia and unhappiness of young gays; the tension between individualism and belonging; extroverts vs. introverts; how Jesus disarmed people; and the loving kindness of Buddhism.Browse the Dishcast archive for another convo you might enjoy (the first 102 episodes are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: David Leonhardt on his new book about the American Dream, NYT columnist Pamela Paul, and the authors of Where Have All the Democrats Gone? — John Judis and Ruy Teixeira. Later on: Cat Bohannon and McKay Coppins. Please send any guest recs, pod dissent and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comSpencer is a writer and podcaster. He's currently an associate editor at the Claremont Review of Books and the host of the “Young Heretics” podcast. He's also the author of How to Save the West: Ancient Wisdom for 5 Modern Crises and the editor of Gateway to the Stoics. You can follow his latest writing on Substack.For two clips of our convo — on finding God in the humanities, and why so many gays throughout history have been drawn to the Church — pop over to our YouTube page. Other topics: Spencer's upbringing in NYC and London and elsewhere; his rigorous schooling in Britain; his dad the prominent novelist; his lapsed Catholic mom and lapsed Jewish dad; Spencer as a teen converting to Christianity — “conversational, not doctrinal”; coming to terms with his homosexuality; Yale for undergrad and Oxford for a PhD in the Classics; his initial calling as an actor; learning Latin and ancient Greek; how the Greeks had two words for forgiveness; the Gospels; Aquinas; the Scientific Revolution; how evolution is compatible with Christianity; James Madison; Tocqueville; the suffering that brings one closer to God; the waning of both the humanities and religion in American life; climate doomerism; postmodernism; Judith Butler; the transing of gender-dysphoric kids; Alasdair MacIntyre; and how genetics is “necessary but not sufficient” for seeking truth.Browse the Dishcast archive for another convo you might enjoy (the first 102 episodes are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: David Brooks on his new book How to Know a Person,” his fellow NYT columnist Pamela Paul, and the authors of Where Have All the Democrats Gone? — John Judis and Ruy Teixeira. Also: David Leonhardt, Cat Bohannon, and McKay Coppins.Have a question you want me to ask one of those future guests? Email dishpub@gmail.com, and please put the question in the subject line. Send any guest recs, pod dissent and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comMartha is a philosopher and legal thinker. She has taught at Harvard, Brown, Oxford and is currently the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, appointed in the Philosophy Department and the Law School. Her many books include The Fragility of Goodness, Sex and Social Justice, Creating Capabilities, and From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law. Her new book, which we discuss in this episode, is Justice for Animals.You can listen to the episode right away in the audio player above (or on the right side of the player, click “Listen On” to add the Dishcast feed to your favorite podcast app). For two clips of our convo — on whether fish feel pain, and if we should sterilize city rats instead of killing them — pop over to our YouTube page.Other topics: Martha growing up in NYC; converting to Judaism; studying Latin and Greek; becoming a professional actress; giving up meat; her late daughter's profound influence on Justice For Animals; Aristotle's views on justice; the difference between instinct and sentience; why crustaceans and insects probably don't feel pain; preventing pain vs. stopping cruelty; Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer; the matriarchal society of orcas; Martha and Amartya Sen's creation of the “capability approach”; how zoos prevent pain but nevertheless limit life; how parrots are content living solo, even in a lab; why we shouldn't rank animals according to intelligence; George Pitcher's The Dogs Who Came to Stay; the various ways humans are inept compared to animals; how a dolphin can detect human pregnancy; how some animals have a precise sense of equality; the diffuse brain of the octopus; the emotional lives of elephants; our brutality toward pigs; why the intelligence of plants is merely “handwaving”; how humans are the only animals to show disgust with their own bodies; our sublimation of violent instincts; mammals and social learning; Matthew Scully's Dominion and the “caring stewardship” of animals among Christians; whether humane meat on a mass scale is possible; the emergence of lab meat; Martha's advice on what you can do to protect animals; JR Ackerley's book My Dog Tulip; euthanasia; and various tales of Bowie, my beloved, late beagle.The subject of animal rights was first tackled on the Dishcast with vegan activist John Oberg, and we posted a ton of your commentary here. Browse the Dishcast archive for another convo you might enjoy (the first 102 episodes are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up soon: Spencer Klavan on How to Save the West: Ancient Wisdom for 5 Modern Crises and Matthew Crawford, author of Shop Class as Soulcraft. Later on, two NYT columnists — David Brooks and Pamela Paul — and the authors of Where Have All the Democrats Gone?, John Judis and Ruy Teixeira.Have a question you want me to ask one of these future guests? Email dishpub@gmail.com, and please put the question in the subject line. Please send any guest recs, pod dissent and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
American politics are evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. But our guest argues that it doesn't have to be this way. He tells fellow Democrats: "Given the problems the Republicans have, why aren't you beating the hell out of these people?"Political scientist and author Ruy Teixeira says that recent election results have been a lost opportunity as the left pursued identity politics instead of focusing on class. While more white college-educated voters have abandoned the Republicans in the past decade, Democrats have lost ground among white and hispanic working class voters. "That's a fundamental question that Democrats should be confronting, but don't," he tells us.Ruy Teixeira is among America's best-known political thinkers. He's a senior fellow at The American Enterprise Institute, where he writes and does research about changing party coalitions and the future of electoral politics. He calls himself a social democrat.He is co-author with John Judis of "The Emerging American Majority" that was published two decades ago. The highly influential book argued that Democrats would gain a lasting advantage in twenty-first century America. But the party has not made significant gains. Their next book, out this fall, is called "Where Have the All Democrats Gone?: The Soul Of The Party In The Age of Extremes".In this episode we hear about a wake-up call for Democrats. Teixieira argues for a return to policies of growth, prosperity and economic abundance that enabled the left to dominate American politics in much of the second half of the last century. Recommendation: Richard has read James Wilson's critically acclaimed and profoundly moving book "The Earth Shall Weep: A History of Native America." Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
In 2002, sociologist Ruy Teixeira (and co-author John Judis) published The Emerging Democratic Majority, a diagnosis and prescription for the Democratic Party that the New York Times later called “one of the most influential political books of the 21st century.” The book argued that the United States was changing demographically, economically, and ideologically in ways that could benefit Democrats electorally. All too often, however, the book's thesis was interpreted as a “demographics is destiny” argument, positing that population growth among a left-leaning “rising American electorate” — including young people, minorities, college-educated professionals, and single women — inevitably would lead to Democratic landslides. Teixeira, however, maintained that this winning Democratic coalition would only be possible if the party retained a strong level of white working-class support. Over time, and particularly after the 2016 election, Teixeira continued to insist that the Democrats, as they tilted toward college-educated voters, were repelling their working-class supporters by embracing cultural leftism and racial identitarianism as well as writing off all of Trump's working-class voters as irredeemable racists and xenophobes. Such criticism was increasingly unwelcome in Democratic circles and Teixeira's employment at the left-leaning Center for American Progress, where he had been a fellow since 2003, became untenable. In 2022 his departure from CAP, and his subsequent hiring at the right-leaning American Enterprise Institute, made national headlines. In this podcast episode, Teixeira discusses his founding of The Liberal Patriot, which has recently expanded from a newsletter into an online publication and nonprofit organization, and the tough-love criticism he has continued to offer to the Democratic Party. Teixeira believes that the Democrats' long-term electoral viability depends upon their being able to regain at least some level of rural and working-class support by moving to the center on cultural issues, promoting an abundance agenda, and embracing patriotism and liberal nationalism. Teixeira is no fan of the current inception of the Republican Party, which he says no longer has any real idea of what it needs to do in order to be a successful conservative party again. But, he adds, “it also became the case over time that the Democrats lost track of what it would take to be a successful and productive liberal party, and how to be the actual party of the ordinary America, which is their historical brand and where they've had the greatest success.”
On this episode of The Feudal Future, hosts Joel Kotkin and Marshall Toplansky are joined by political demographer, Ruy Teixeira, and author and principal, Soledad Ursua to discuss the future of Latinos in politics.Soledad Ursúa is a principal at Orinoco Equities. She is a Los Angeles native, and an elected local official of the Venice Neighborhood Council and resident of Venice Beach.Ruy Teixeira is an American political scientist and commentator who has written several books on various topics in political science and political strategy. He is most noted for his work on political demography, and particularly for The Emerging Democratic Majority (2002), which he co-wrote with John Judis, a book arguing that the Democratic Party are demographically destined to become a majority party in the United States of the early 21st century. He writes and edits the weblog The Democratic Strategist.The California Dream:From Chapman's Center of Demographics & Policy, Joel Kotkin & Marshall Toplansky co-author the brand new report on restoring The California Dream.If you haven't downloaded the report, see it here: https://joelkotkin.com/report-restoring-the-california-dream/Visit Our Pagewww.TheFeudalFuturePodcast.comSupport Our WorkThe Center for Demographics and Policy focuses on research and analysis of global, national, and regional demographic trends and explores policies that might produce favorable demographic results over time. It involves Chapman students in demographic research under the supervision of the Center's senior staff.Students work with the Center's director and engage in research that will serve them well as they look to develop their careers in business, the social sciences, and the arts. Students also have access to our advisory board, which includes distinguished Chapman faculty and major demographic scholars from across the country and the world.For additional information, please contact Mahnaz Asghari, sponsored project analyst for the Office of Research, at (714) 744-7635 or asghari@chapman.edu.Follow us on LinkedIn:https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-feudal-future-podcast/Tweet thoughts: @joelkotkin, @mtoplansky, #FeudalFuture #BeyondFeudalismLearn more about Joel's book 'The Coming of Neo-Feudalism': https://amzn.to/3a1VV87Sign Up For News & Alerts: http://joelkotkin.com/#subscribeThis show is presented by the Chapman Center for Demographics and Policy, which focuses on research and analysis of global, national and regional demographic trends and explores policies that might produce favorable demographic results over time.
In 2002, President George W. Bush stood astride the post–September 11 political world and Republicans looked poised to do the unthinkable and strengthen their positions in Congress in a midterm year. Yet liberal scholars John Judis and Ruy Teixeira published a provocative thesis: A new Democratic majority would “emerge” by the end of the decade. Traditional middle-class and working-class Democrats would be joined by growing ethnic minority populations, especially Asians and Hispanics; by working, single, and highly educated women voters; and by a growing share of the professional class, paving the way for a new majority. After President Barack Obama's re-election in 2012, the thesis seemed airtight and its guidance likely to live long after the decadal horizon its authors had adopted. Except, just after the majority “emerged,” it started to crack. Then came Donald Trump. Follow our socials: • Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/capitalresearchcenter • Twitter: https://twitter.com/capitalresearch • Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/capitalresearchcenter • YouTube: https://bit.ly/CRCYouTube • Rumble: https://rumble.com/capitalresearch • Gettr: https://gettr.com/user/capitalresearch
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Israel's COVID infection rate broke all-time records this week as the omicron variant washed over the country. But the same Israel that offered inspiration by being the first in the world to offer booster shots against the delta variant, now seems inclined to let this outbreak simply run its course. Rules for testing and quarantine constantly change, and many Israelis are left confused and angry. We discuss this evolving situation with Prof. Diane Levin from Clalit, Israel's largest health care provider. Also in this episode: Days after America marked one year to the January 6 attack on Congress and the attempt to subvert American democracy, author and political analyst John Judis joins the podcast to offer a disturbing view of these events and their place in U.S. history, and to discuss his book "The Politics of our Time: Populism, Nationalism, Socialism." Listen to his full conversation with host Amir Tibon starting at time code 13:35. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Michael Barone, senior political analyst at the Washington examiner, is one of the most important political writers and thinkers of his time. He helped found the Almanac of American Politics in the early 70s and was the lead author for decades. He worked in politics himself, before transitioning to a role as a journalist, author, and pundit - always being an incisive and influential analyst of American politics at each stop along the way. In this conversation, we talk his roots in post-war Detroit, his time working for Democratic candidates and as a Democratic pollster, founding the Almanac, moving from left-of-center to right-of-center, and he gives his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues facing the political system and country today.IN THIS EPISODE…Michael's memories of growing up in post-war Detroit…The first election Michael remembers in detail…The up-and-coming politician Michael worked for at an important time…Michael talks his movement from liberal to conservative…Michael shares his memories of being on the scene during the momentous 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention…The off-hand comment that led to Michael's involvement in forming and writing the Almanac of American Politics…Michael talks the nuts and bolts that have gone into writing the Almanac for 40 years…Michael spends several years working with legendary Democratic pollster Peter Hart…The time when Senator Joe Biden took issue with something Michael wrote in the Almanac…Michael remembers the impact of Senator Pat Moynihan…Some of Michael's favorite political convention memories…Michael's involvement in the infamous 1980 convention fights between the forces of Jimmy Carter and Ted Kennedy…How Michael makes the jump from political consultant to an opinion writer and journalist…The 3 books that shaped Michael's political thinking…Michael's thoughts on today's political writing…Michael talks the unusual place that California holds in today's politics…Michael's take on the current state of both political parties…Michael compares today's political scene to the politics of the 1880s…Michael's current view on what demographics tell us about politics…The issue of the last decade on which Michael wishes he'd have been much more active…AND…the 1967 Detroit riots, 8 Mile Road, the UAW, US-16, the arsenal of democracy, Dan Balz, Big 3 Auto Companies, baloney and malarkey, David Broder, James Buchanan, George W. Bush, Pat Caddell, Jimmy Carter, Jerome Cavanaugh, Bill Clinton, Geoffrey Cowan, Mario Cuomo, Richard D. Daley, Duke University, Dwight Eisenhower, flotsam and jetsam, Gerald Ford, John Kenneth Galbraith, Newt Gingrich, Meg Greenfield, Martha Griffiths, Jon Grinspan, John Gunther, Lou Harris, Hubert Humphrey, Al Hunt, Jim Hunt, Harold Ickes, Jesse Jackson, John Judis, Jack Kemp, John Kennedy, Ted Kennedy, V.O. Key, Lyndon Johnson, John Lindsay, Samuel Lubell, Madison Square Garden, Walter Mondale, The Moynihan Report, Wade McCree, George McGovern, Ralph Nader, Newton's Second Law of Motion, Richard Nixon, Kirk O'Donnell, Tip O'Neill, Charles Oakman, Barack Obama, obvious impractical proposals, Nancy Pelosi, podium passes, prayers of political scientists, Franklin Pierce, David Price, Oliver Quayle, Nancy Reagan, Ronald Reagan, recessed steering columns, Nelson Rockefeller, George Romney, Tim Russert, E.E. Schattschneider, Mark Shields, superdelegates, supply side economics, John Paul Stevens, Ted Stevens Airport, Ruy Teixeria, Bob Torricelli, Donald Trump, Grant Ujifusa, Carl Wagner, George Wallace, Woodrow Wilson, Worland Wyoming, Sam Yorty, Coleman Young, & more!
Distinguished political analyst John Judis returns to The Commonwealth Club for a timely discussion on the major political issues that have shaped America's tumultuous last decade and can be seen around the world. Over the past five years, Judis has written three books—The Populist Explosion in 2016, The Nationalist Revival in 2018, and The Socialist Awakening in 2020—that have charted the rise of unexpected political movements in the United States and Europe that have grown in impact in the wake of the Great Recession, the conflict with al-Qaeda and ISIS, and encroaching climate change. These three books have all been updated and combined into a new volume that expands Judis's focus to include the Trump presidency and the response to the COVID-19 global pandemic. This new book, The Politics of Our Times, is an important guide to understanding the significant currents and emotions that have transformed the world and influenced political parties and politicians on both the Right and Left. As the United States and Europe look to emerge from the global pandemic, understanding the major political trends that help guide our civic discussion are critical. Please join us for this important conversation. SPEAKERS John Judis Editor-at-Large, Talking Points Memo; Author, The Politics of Our Time George Hammond Author, Conversations With Socrates—Moderator In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are currently hosting all of our live programming via YouTube live stream. This program was recorded via video conference on May 18th, 2021 by the Commonwealth Club of California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Distinguished political analyst John Judis returns to The Commonwealth Club for a timely discussion on the major political issues that have shaped America's tumultuous last decade and can be seen around the world. Over the past five years, Judis has written three books—The Populist Explosion in 2016, The Nationalist Revival in 2018, and The Socialist Awakening in 2020—that have charted the rise of unexpected political movements in the United States and Europe that have grown in impact in the wake of the Great Recession, the conflict with al-Qaeda and ISIS, and encroaching climate change. These three books have all been updated and combined into a new volume that expands Judis's focus to include the Trump presidency and the response to the COVID-19 global pandemic. This new book, The Politics of Our Times, is an important guide to understanding the significant currents and emotions that have transformed the world and influenced political parties and politicians on both the Right and Left. As the United States and Europe look to emerge from the global pandemic, understanding the major political trends that help guide our civic discussion are critical. Please join us for this important conversation. SPEAKERS John Judis Editor-at-Large, Talking Points Memo; Author, The Politics of Our Time George Hammond Author, Conversations With Socrates—Moderator In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are currently hosting all of our live programming via YouTube live stream. This program was recorded via video conference on May 18th, 2021 by the Commonwealth Club of California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
John Judis an Editor-at-Large at Talking Points Memo, as well as a journalist and author of his latest book (out now), “The Politics of Our Time: Populism, Nationalism, Socialism.” In today’s episode, he joins Mark to discuss the intersections and differences between the three and which of them he believes have plateaued as a movement (for the time being, anyway). He considers this in the context of the upcoming 2022 midterm elections, which have the potential to put us in another legislative stalemate if Republicans win the House back. Executive Producer: Adell Coleman Producer: Brittany Temple Distributor: DCP Entertainment For additional content: makeitplain.com
In this episode of "Keen On", Andrew is joined by John Judis, the author of "The Politics of Our Time: Populism, Nationalism, Socialism", to discuss the rise during the second decade of the twenty-first century of new and unexpected political movements in the United States and Europe that arose in the wake of the Great Recession, the conflict with al-Qaeda and ISIS, and encroaching climate change. John B. Judis is Editor-At-Large at Talking Points Memo and author of eight books, including The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics (Columbia Global Reports, 2016), Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origin of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (Scribner, 2004), The Emerging Democratic Majority with Ruy Teixeira(Scribner, 2002), and The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests, and Betrayal of Public Trust (Pantheon, 2000). He has written for numerous publications, including The New Republic, The National Journal, The New York Times Magazine, Mother Jones, and The Washington Post. Born in Chicago, he received his B.A. and M.A. degrees in Philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley. He lives in Silver Spring, MD. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
A virtual conversation with Henry Olsen and Ruy Teixeira, prominent pollsters and political commentators on different sides of the aisle, on the 2020 election. Event took place on October 29, 2020. About the speakers: Henry Olsen is a Washington Post columnist focusing on politics, populism, and American conservative thought and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center Olsen began his career as a political consultant at the California firm of Hoffenblum-Mollrich. After three years working for the California Assembly Republican Caucus, he returned to school to become a lawyer. Following law school he clerked for the Honorable Danny J. Boggs on the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and as an associate in the Philadelphia office of Dechert, Price & Rhoads. He then joined the think tank world where he spent the next eighteen years as an executive at a variety of institutions, serving as the President of the Commonwealth Foundation, a Vice President at the Manhattan Institute, and as Vice President and Director, National Research Initiative, at the American Enterprise Institute. He left AEI in 2013 to pursue a career in political analysis and writing at EPPC. During that time his work has appeared in variety of leading publications in America and the United Kingdom. He is the author or co-author of two books, “The Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism” and (with Dante J. Scala) “The Four Faces of the Republican Party”. His biennial election predictions have been widely praised for the uncanny accuracy, and he is a frequent guest on television and radio programs. Olsen regularly speaks about American political trends and global populism in the United State, Europe, and Australia. Ruy Teixeira is a senior fellow at American Progress. He is also co-director of the States of Change: Demographics and Democracy project, a collaboration that brings together the Center for American Progress, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Democracy Fund's Voter Study Group and demographer William Frey of the Brookings Institution. The goals of the project are to document and analyze the challenges to democracy posed by the rapid demographic evolution of the United States from the 1970s to the year 2060 and to promote a wide-ranging and bipartisan discussion of America’s demographic future and what it portends for political parties and the policy challenges they—and the country—face. His most recent book is The Optimistic Leftist: Why the 21st Century Will Be Better Than You Think. His other books include The Emerging Democratic Majority; America’s Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still Matters; The Disappearing American Voter; and Red, Blue, and Purple America: The Future of Election Demographics. Teixeira’s book The Emerging Democratic Majority, written with John Judis in 2002, was the most widely discussed political book of that year and generated praise across the political spectrum, from George Will on the right to E.J. Dionne on the left. It was selected as one of the best books of the year by The Economist. Teixeira’s recent writings for American Progress include “America’s Electoral Future: The Coming Generational Transformation” and “The Path to 270 in 2020”. Recent essays include "Can Biden Hold the Democrats Together?" (Wall Street Journal) and "Demography Is Not Destiny" (Persuasion). A complete list of recent publications can be found on his website, The Optimistic Leftist, where he also blogs regularly. Teixeira holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
In this episode we discuss Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities by Eric Kaufmann. Next time we will discuss True Names by Vernor Vinge. Some highlights from Whiteshift: Many people desire roots, value tradition and wish to maintain continuity with ancestors who have occupied a historic territory. This means we're more likely to experience what I term Whiteshift, a process by which white majorities absorb an admixture of different peoples through intermarriage, but remain oriented around existing myths of descent, symbols and traditions No one who has honestly analysed survey data on individuals – the gold standard for public opinion research – can deny that white majority concern over immigration is the main cause of the rise of the populist right in the West. This is primarily explained by concern over identity, not economic threat. We are entering a period of cultural instability in the West attendant on our passage between two relatively stable equilibria. The first is based on white ethnic homogeneity, the second on what the prescient centrist writer Michael Lind calls ‘beige' ethnicity, i.e. a racially mixed majority group. In the middle lies a turbulent multicultural interregnum. We in the West are becoming less like homogeneous Iceland and more like homogeneous mixed-race Turkmenistan. But to get there we'll be passing through a phase where we'll move closer to multicultural Guyana or Mauritius. The challenge is to enable conservative whites to see a future for themselves in Whiteshift – the mixture of many non-whites into the white group through voluntary assimilation. Anyone who wants to explain what's happening in the West needs to answer two simple questions. First, why are right-wing populists doing better than left-wing ones? Second, why did the migration crisis boost populist-right numbers sharply while the economic crisis had no overall effect? If we stick to data, the answer is crystal clear. Demography and culture, not economic and political developments, hold the key to understanding the populist moment. Because Western nations were generally formed by a dominant white ethnic group, whose myths and symbols – such as the proper name ‘Norway' – became the nation's, the two concepts overlap in the minds of many. White majorities possess an ‘ethnic' module, an extra string to their national identity which minorities lack. Ethnic majorities thereby express their ethnic identity as nationalism. I contend that today's white majorities are likely to successfully absorb minority populations while their core myths and boundary symbols endure. This will involve a change in the physical appearance of the median Westerner, hence Whiteshift, though linguistic and religious markers are less likely to be affected. Getting from where we are now, where most Westerners share the racial and religious features of their ethnic archetype, to the situation in a century or two, when most will be what we now term ‘mixed-race', is vital to understanding our present condition. In our more peaceful, post-ideological, demographically turbulent world, migration-led ethnic change is altering the basis of politics from class to ethnicity. On one side is a conservative coalition of whites who are attached to their heritage joined by minorities who value the white tradition; on the other side a progressive alliance of minorities who identify with their ethnic identity combined with whites who are agnostic or hostile towards theirs. Among whites, ethno-demographic change polarizes people between ‘tribal' ethnics who value their particularity and ‘religious' post-ethnics who prioritize universalist creeds such as John McWhorter's ‘religion of anti-racism'. Whites can fight ethnic change by voting for right-wing populists or committing terrorist acts. They may repress anxieties in the name of ‘politically correct' anti-racism, but cracks in this moral edifice are appearing. Many opt to flee by avoiding diverse neighbourhoods, schools and social networks. And other whites may choose to join the newcomers, first in friendship, subsequently in marriage. Intermarriage promises to erode the rising diversity which underlies our current malaise. Religion evolved to permit cooperation in larger units.31 Our predisposition towards religion, morality and reputation – all of which can transcend the tribe – reflects our adaptation to larger social units. Be that as it may, humans have lived in large groups only in the very recent past, so it is reasonable to assume tribalism is a more powerful aspect of our evolutionary psychology than our willingness to abide by a moral code. Today what we increasingly see in the West is a battle between the ‘tribal' populist right and the ‘religious' anti-racist left. Much of this book is concerned with the clash between a rising white tribalism and an ideology I term ‘left-modernism'. A sociologist member of the ‘New York Intellectuals' group of writers and literary critics, Daniel Bell, used the term modernism to describe the spirit of anti-traditionalism which emerged in Western high culture between 1880 and 1930. With the murderous excesses of communism and fascism, many Western intellectuals embraced a fusion of modernist anti-traditionalism and cultural egalitarianism, distinguishing the new ideology from both socialism and traditional liberalism. Cosmopolitanism was its guiding ethos. Unlike socialism or fascism, this left-wing modernism meshed nicely with capitalism and globalization. The left-modernist sensibility spread from a small elite to a much wider section of middle-class society in the 1960s with the rise of television and growth of universities, taking over as the dominant sensibility of the high culture. As it gained ground, it turned moralistic and imperialistic, seeking not merely to persuade but to institutionalize itself in law and policy, altering the basis of liberalism from tolerating to mandating diversity. This is a subtle but critical shift. Meanwhile the economic egalitarianism of socialism gave way to a trinity of sacred values around race, gender and sexual orientation. Immigration restriction became a plank of the Progressive movement which advocated improved working conditions, women's suffrage and social reform. This combination of left-wing economics and ethno-nationalism confounds modern notions of left and right but Progressive vs. free market liberal was how the world was divided in the late nineteenth century. A prominent plank in the Progressive platform was temperance, realized in the Volstead Act of 1920 prohibiting the sale of alcohol. The Prohibition vote pitted immigrant-origin Catholics and upper-class urban WASPs such as the anti-Prohibition leader and New York socialite Pauline Morton Sabin on the ‘wet' side against ‘dry' working-class, rural and religious Protestants. For Joseph Gusfield, Prohibition was principally a symbolic crusade targeted at urban Catholic immigrants who congregated in saloons and their ‘smart set' upper-class allies. This was a Protestant assertion of identity in an increasingly urban nation in which Catholics and Jews formed around a fifth of the population. Those of WASP background had declined to half the total from two thirds in the 1820s. What's interesting is that Anglo representatives did not make their case in ethno-communal terms, nor did they invoke the country's historic ethnic composition. Rather they couched their ethnic motives as state interests. Instead of coming clean about their lament over cultural loss, they felt obliged to fabricate economic and security rationales for restriction. Much the same is true today in the penchant for talking about immigrants putting pressure on services, taking jobs, increasing crime, undermining the welfare state or increasing the risk of terrorism. In my view it would be far healthier to permit the airing of ethno-cultural concerns rather than suppressing these, which leads to often spurious claims about immigrants. Likewise, immigrants' normal desires to defend their interests are decried as ‘identity politics'. [Randolph] Bourne, on the other hand, infused Kallen's structure with WASP self-loathing. As a rebel against his own group, Bourne combined the Liberal Progressives' desire to transcend ‘New Englandism' and Protestantism with Kallen's call for minority groups to maintain their ethnic boundaries. The end product was what I term asymmetrical multiculturalism, whereby minorities identify with their groups while Anglo-Protestants morph into cosmopolites. Thus Bourne at once congratulates the Jew ‘who sticks proudly to the faith of his fathers and boasts of that venerable culture of his', while encouraging his fellow Anglo-Saxons to: Breathe a larger air … [for] in his [young Anglo-Saxon's] new enthusiasms for continental literature, for unplumbed Russian depths, for French clarity of thought, for Teuton philosophies of power, he feels himself a citizen of a larger world. He may be absurdly superficial, his outward-reaching wonder may ignore all the stiller and homelier virtues of his Anglo-Saxon home, but he has at least found the clue to that international mind which will be essential to all men and women of good-will if they are ever to save this Western world of ours from suicide. [1916] Bourne, not Kallen, is the founding father of today's multiculturalist left because he combines rebellion against his own culture and Liberal Progressive cosmopolitanism with an endorsement – for minorities only – of Kallen's ethnic conservatism. In other words, ethnic minorities should preserve themselves while the majority should dissolve itself. Cosmopolitanism must manage the contradiction between its ethos of transcending ethnicity and its need for cultural diversity, which requires ethnic attachment. Bourne resolved this by splitting the world into two moral planes, one for a ‘parental' majority who would be asked to shed their ethnicity and oppose their own culture, and the other for childlike minorities, who would be urged to embrace their heritage in the strongest terms. This crystallized a dualistic habit of mind, entrenched in the anti-WASP ethos of 1920s authors like Sinclair Lewis and H. L. Mencken and the bohemian ‘Lost Generation' of American intellectuals such as F. Scott Fitzgerald. All associated the Anglo-Protestant majority with Prohibition, deemed WASP culture to be of no value, and accused the ethnic majority of suppressing more interesting and expressive ethnic groups. The Lost Generation's anti-majority ethos pervaded the writing of 1950s ‘Beat Generation' left-modernist writers like Norman Mailer and Jack Kerouac – who contrasted lively black jazz or Mexican culture with the ‘square' puritanical whiteness of Middle America. As white ethnics assimilated, the despised majority shifted from WASPs to all whites. The multiculturalism of the 1960s fused the Liberal Progressive pluralist movement with the anti-white ethos of the Beat counterculture. The situation by 1924 was a far cry from the pre-1890 dispensation, when a liberal-assimilationist Anglo-Americanism spanned both universalist and ethno-nationalist shades of opinion. Prior to 1890, most Anglo-Protestant thinkers held the view that their ethnic group could assimilate all comers. During moments of euphoria, they talked up the country as a universal cosmopolitan civilization; in their reflective moods, they remarked on its Anglo-Saxon Protestant character. By 1910, this Emersonian ‘double-consciousness' was gone, each side of its contradiction a separate and consistent ideology. Most WASP intellectuals were, like New England patrician Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, ethno-nationalists who backed restriction, or, like Bourne and Dewey, cosmopolitans calling for diversity and open borders. Few ethno-nationalists favoured open immigration. No pluralists endorsed restriction. Herein lie the roots of our contemporary polarized condition. Critical race theorists contend that white ethnics only ‘became white' when they became useful to the WASP majority. Even Bill Clinton, a southern Protestant whose Irish heritage is undocumented, latched on to the idea that his Irish forebears ‘became' white. Irish Catholics in the north, some claim, were important allies of southern whites in the struggle against Yankee republicanism, so southerners embraced the Irish.60 I'm less convinced. The Irish, Jews and Italians may not have been part of a narrower WASP ‘us', but they were perceived as racially white, thus part of a pan-ethnic ‘us'. This entitled them to opportunities not available to African- or Asian Americans. Post-1960s intermarriage led to an extension of American majority ethnic boundaries from WASP to white but the foundations for expansion were already in place. From the 1960s on, the religious marker of dominant ethnicity came to be redefined from Protestant to ‘Judaeo-Christian'. This chapter underscores several aspects of American ethnic history that are relevant today. First, that the US, like most European nations, has had an ethnic majority since Independence. Second, that the Anglo-Protestant majority underwent a Whiteshift in the mid-twentieth century which permitted it to absorb Catholics and Jews, members of groups once viewed as outsiders. Finally, certain ethnic groups – notably Anglo-Protestants and African-Americans – have become symbolically intertwined with American nationhood. Two thirds of Americans are not members of these groups, yet many recognize them as ethno-traditional: part of what makes the nation distinct. On the right, an ethno-traditional nationalism focused on protecting the white Anglo heritage is emerging as an important force in American politics. Culture is not ethnicity and the two have too often been conflated. Even if white culture remains the default mode, ethno-cultural decline may proceed apace. There are two separate ethno-cultural dynamics, white ethnic decline and the attenuation of the white tradition in American national identity. Only whites will be concerned with the former, but conservative-minded minorities may be attached to white ethno-traditions of nationhood. That is, they will wish to slow changes to the America ‘they know'. Where conservatives seek to preserve the status quo, which might be multiracial, authoritarians always prefer less diversity and dissent. Conservatives are not the same as authoritarians. For instance, authoritarians dislike inequality – a form of economic diversity – thus may find themselves on the left Electoral maps based on aggregate county results matched to census data offered the first snapshot of the social drivers of Trump, and it was apparent that education, not income, best predicted Trump success. Still, at first glance, maps reinforce stereotypes like the urban–rural divide. As with Brexit, income is correlated with education, but there are many wealthy people – think successful plumber – with few qualifications. Similarly, many resemble struggling artists, possessing degrees but little money. When you control for education, income has no effect on whether a white person voted for, or supports, Trump. Being less well-off produces an effect on Trump voting only when authoritarian and conservative values are held constant – and even then has a much smaller impact than values. Education is the best census indicator because it reflects people's subjective worldview, not just their material circumstances. Researchers find that teenagers with more open and exploratory psychological orientations self-select into university. This, much more than what people learn at university, makes them more liberal. Median education level offers a window onto the cultural values of a voting district, which is why it correlates best with Trump's vote share. In American exit polls, Trump won whites without college degrees 67–28, compared to 49–45 for whites with degrees. The changing racial demographics of America could permit the Democrats to consistently win first the presidential, then congressional, elections. Alternatively, the Republican establishment may be able to install a pro-immigration primary candidate. But is this a solution? With no federal outlet for white identity concerns or ethno-traditional nationalism, and with a return to policies of multiculturalism and high immigration which are viewed as a threat to these identities, it's possible the culturally conservative section of the US population could start viewing the government as an enemy. This is an old trope in American history and could pose a security problem. It is also how violent ethnic conflict sometimes ignites. For instance, the British-Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, where parties run on ethnic lines, meant Irish Catholics lost every election in the province between 1922 and the abolition of the Northern Ireland provincial government in 1972. This lack of political representation produced alienation which helped foment the civil war in 1969. What happens if rural and red-state America is permanently frozen out of power when it considers itself the repository of authentic Americanism? [EUROPE:] Liberals fought against the ‘normalization' of the far right, but with rising populist-right totals and coalition arithmetic pulling towards partnership it was only a question of time before the consensus gave way. The anti-racist norm against voting for the far right began to erode and centrist parties started adopting their policies. Elite obstruction may actually have contributed to an angrier anti-elite mood, recruiting yet more voters to the far-right banner. The anti-racist taboo against them has weakened but remains: more voters express strong anti-immigration views than are willing to vote far right.4 Yet, as I explain in chapter 9, the higher the populist right's vote share, the more the taboo erodes. This eases their path to a higher total when conditions permit, setting in motion a self-fulfilling spiral. Economic rationales frequently disguise underlying psychological drivers. For instance, in small opt-in samples on Prolific Academic, one group of white Republican voters scored the problem of ‘unchecked urban sprawl' a 51 out of 100, but another group of white Republicans who saw the question as ‘unchecked urban sprawl caused by immigration' scored it 74/100 (italics added for emphasis). Likewise, among a sample of white British Brexit voters, the problem of ‘pressure on council housing' scored a 47/100 but ‘immigrants putting pressure on council housing' was rated 68/100. In both cases, it logically cannot be the case that the immigration-driven portion of the problem of urban sprawl or pressure on council housing is more important than the problem itself. Thus what's driving opposition to immigration must be something prior to these material concerns. Likewise, the large-sample, representative British Election Study shows that concerns over the cultural and economic effects of immigration are tightly correlated. This suggests opposition to immigration comes first (Jonathan Haidt's unconscious ‘elephant' moves us to act) and various rationalizations like pressure on public services follow (Haidt's conscious ‘rider' telling us a story about why we acted as we did).17 But rationales matter. If a morally acceptable rationale is not there, this inhibits a party's ability to articulate its underlying anti-immigration grievances. This is why restrictionists tend to don the cloak of economic rationalization. The idea that the country has a traditional ethnic composition which people are attached to – what I term ethno-traditional nationalism – and which should not change too quickly, is viewed as beyond the limits of acceptable debate. This is a pity, because the ‘legitimate' arguments stigmatize minorities and are often racist in a way the ‘illegitimate' arguments about wanting to slow cultural loss are not. Only when the latter is taken to the extreme of wanting to bar certain groups or repatriate immigrants do they become racist. Rising diversity polarizes people by psychological outlook and reorients party platforms. As countries ethnically change, green parties move to capture cosmopolitan liberals and the populist right targets conservatives and authoritarians.88 While attitude liberalization did throw up cultural debates over religion, gay marriage and traditional values, these are on their way to becoming marginal in Europe as liberal attitudes attain mass acceptance. The legalization of drugs and the question of how best to address crime are live social issues, but neither promises the same radical transformation of society as ethnic change. Therefore it is ethno-demographic shifts which are rotating European societies away from a dominant left–right economic orientation to a globalist–nationalist cultural axis. The West is becoming less like homogeneous South Korea, where foreign policy and economic divisions dominate, and more like South Africa, where ethnicity is the main political division.89 When a regalizing order fails to make a charge of deviance stick, the norm begins to unwind, leading to a period of intense cultural contestation. Competing groups police norm boundaries and marginalize deviants who are seen to have violated their community's sacred values. I maintain we are currently in such a period, in which hegemonic liberal norms known as ‘political correctness' are being challenged by both populists and centrists, some of whom are trying to install new social norms, notably those defining Muslims and cosmopolitans as deviant. Fascism and socialism lost out after the Second World War, but what of the victor, liberalism? The Allies' victory did enlarge and protect the scope of negative liberty. But alongside this success a positive liberalism was smuggled in which advocated individuality and cosmopolitanism over community. Most, myself included, value individual autonomy, but one has to recognize that not all share this aim. Someone who prefers to wear a veil or dedicate their lives to religion is making a communitarian choice which negative liberalism respects but positive liberalism (whether of the modernist left or burqa-banning right) does not. Expressive individualism advocates that we channel our authentic inner nature, or what H. G. Wells or Henri Bergson termed our life force, unconstrained by tradition or reason. Aesthetically, it tended towards what the influential American sociologist Daniel Bell terms modernism, rejecting Christian or national traditions while spurning established techniques and motifs.22 Not only were traditions overturned but esteem was accorded to those whose innovations shocked sensibilities and subverted historic narratives and symbols the most. Clearly something happened between the nation-evoking historical and landscape painting of a Delacroix or Constable in the early nineteenth century and Marcel Duchamp's urinal of 1917. This ‘something' was the rise, after 1880, of what Bell terms modernism and Anthony Giddens calls de-traditionalization. For Bell, modernism is the antinomian rejection of all cultural authority. For Giddens, the shift is from a past- to a future-orientation and involves a decline in existential security.23 For Bell, modernism replaces contemplation of external reality and tradition with sensation and immediacy.26 The desire to seek out new and different experiences elevates novelty and diversity into cardinal virtues of the new positive liberalism. To favour tradition over the new, homogeneity over diversity, is to be reactionary. Left-modernism continually throws up new movements such as Surrealism or Postmodernism in its quest for novelty and difference. The shock of the new is accompanied by a cosmopolitan pastiche of borrowings from non-Western cultures, as with the Primitivism of Paul Gauguin. Yet there is a tension between the expressive-individualist and egalitarian strands of left-modernism. Gauguin, for example, who considered himself a cosmopolite defending Tahitian sexual freedom against the buttoned-down West, stands accused by the New Left of cultural appropriation, colonialism, orientalism and patriarchy. The social penetration of left-modernist ideas would take a great leap forward only in the 1960s as television and university education soared. In America, the share of 18- to 24-year-olds in College increased from 15 per cent in 1950 to a third in 1970. Given the large postwar ‘baby-boom' generation, this translated into a phenomenal expansion of universities. The growth of television was even more dramatic: from 9 per cent penetration in American homes in 1950 to 93 per cent by 1965.41 The New York, Hollywood and campus-based nodes in this network allowed liberal sensibilities to spread from a small coterie of aficionados to a wider public. Rising affluence may also have played a part in creating a social atmosphere more conducive to liberalism. All told, these ingredients facilitated a marked liberal shift across a wide range of attitudes measured in social surveys from the mid-1960s: gender roles, racial equality, sexual mores and religion – with the effects most apparent in the postwar Baby Boom generation.42 Since so much of the debate around the boundaries of the permissible revolves around racism, we need a rigorous – rather than political – definition of the concept. It's very important to specify clearly, using analytic political theory and precise terminology, why certain utterances or actions are racist. Only in this manner can we defend a racist taboo. I define racism as (a) antipathy to racial or pan-ethnic outgroups, defined as communities of birth; (b) the quest for race purity; or (c) racial discrimination which results in a violation of citizens' right to equal treatment before the law. The problem is that left-modernism has established racial inequality as an outrage rather than one dimension – and not generally the most important – of the problem of inequality. If racial inequality is one facet of inequality, it should be considered alongside other aspects such as income, health, weight or age. To focus the lion's share of attention on race and gender disparities entrenches ‘inequality privilege', wherein those who suffer from low-visibility disadvantages are treated less fairly than those who fit totemic left-modernist categories. A white male who is short, disabled, poor and unattractive will understandably resent the fact his disadvantage is downplayed while he is pilloried for his privilege. In effect, the 2010s represent a renewed period of left-modernist innovation, incubated by near-universal left–liberal hegemony among non-STEM faculty and administrators. Most academics are moderate liberals rather than radical leftists, but in the absence of conservative or libertarian voices willing to stand against left-modernist excess, liberal saturation reduced resistance to the japes of extremist students and professors. Social media and progressive online news acted as a vector, carrying the new left-modernist awakening off-campus much more effectively than was true during the first wave of political correctness of the late 1980s and 1990s. Angela Nagle finds that leftist radicalism emerged first, attracting a far-right response. One of the first to trace the emergence of this polarizing dynamic, she shows how, in left-modernist online chat groups, those who stake outlandish claims about white male oppression win moral and social plaudits. These in turn are lampooned by the alt-right, who leverage left-modernist excesses to legitimate blatant racism and sexism. This begins a cycle of polarizing rhetorical confrontation. Alt-right message boards adopt a playful countercultural style, emphasizing their rebellion against a stifling, puritanical-left establishment.11 Whereas bohemians like the Young Intellectuals of the 1910s and 1920s lauded African-American jazz and immigrant conviviality as a riposte to an uptight Prohibitionist Anglo-Protestant culture, the alt-right champions white maleness as a liberation from the strictures of the puritanical left. Hamid argues that being attached to an ethnic group and looking out for its interests is qualitatively different from hating or fearing outgroups. This is a distinction social psychologists recognize, between love for one's group and hatred of the other. As Marilyn Brewer writes in one of the most highly cited articles on prejudice: The prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, ingroup bias, and prejudice presumes that ingroup love and outgroup hate are reciprocally related. Findings from both cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments support the alternative view that ingroup identification is independent of negative attitudes toward outgroups.54 If politics in the West is ever to return to normal rather than becoming even more polarized, white interests will need to be discussed. I realize this is very controversial for left-modernists. Yet not only is white group self-interest legitimate, but I maintain that in an era of unprecedented white demographic decline it is absolutely vital for it to have a democratic outlet. Marginalizing race puritanism is important, but muzzling relaxed versions of white identity sublimates it in a host of negative ways. For example, when whites are concerned about their decline but can't express it, they may mask their concern as worry about the nation-state. It's more politically correct to worry about Islam's challenge to liberalism and East European ‘cheap labour' in Britain than it is to say you are attached to being a white Brit and fear cultural loss. This means left-modernism has placed us in a situation where expressing racism is more acceptable than articulating racial self-interest. David Willetts, Minister of Education in David Cameron's Conservative government: The basis on which you can extract large sums of money in tax and pay it out in benefits is that most people think the recipients are people like themselves, facing difficulties which they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state. People ask, ‘Why should I pay for them when they are doing things I wouldn't do?' This is America versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the US you have a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to fellow citizens. Progressives want diversity but they thereby undermine part of the moral consensus on which a large welfare state rests.62 trying to reconstruct our racial categories from above through politics may be as difficult as trying to get people to unlearn the primary colours. This doesn't mean categories can't evolve, but it suggests the process is complex, evolutionary and bottom-up. As the median racial type changes, the boundaries of whiteness may expand because people judge categories based on the average type they encounter. Hispanics, like the Italians before them, may become part of the ethnic majority in the not-too-distant future. Many white Americans currently view those with Spanish surnames or Hispanic features as outsiders. A majority of Hispanics see themselves as white, but only 6 per cent of Hispanics who identify as white say they are accepted as such by American society. Even among those with just one Latino grandparent, 58 per cent identify as Hispanic.43 Yet this may change with increased intermarriage, cultural assimilation and the arrival of more culturally distant groups. Already, lighter-skinned Hispanics are more likely to vote Republican or live in the same neighbourhoods as whites.44 As group lines are blurred by intermarriage, ethnic boundaries may shift: Ramirez may be considered an Anglo-American on a par with De Niro. Hispanic surnames are unlikely to be ‘counter-entropic' barriers to assimilation. This assimilation process is a major reason why the centre-left writer John Judis revised his thesis that America's changing demographics will automatically produce Democratic victories in the future.45 When the criteria for defining who is in or out of the majority change, whole chunks of the population who are not of mixed origin – like the fully Irish John F. Kennedy – suddenly become part of the ethnic majority. The analogy would be if fully Hispanic or Asian Americans came to be viewed as white. I deem this unlikely, given the proximity to Mexico and the established nature of the racial categories noted by Richard Dawkins. What seems more likely is that the high rate of intermarriage between Latinos and whites, as well as the rising share of native English-speakers, Protestants or seculars among them, may expand the boundaries of whiteness to include those of mixed parentage. That is, those with some European background who are culturally assimilated and have Anglo first names – but who have Spanish surnames or a Hispanic appearance – may be accepted as white.
The Battle Between the Haves and the Have-Nots Over Who Gets the Vaccine at an Affordable Price | The Journalist Who Asked Giuliani Whether He Is a Crook | Socialism's Contribution to American Justice and Equity and the Socialist Awakening Underway backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia
SPEAKERS John Judis Editor-at-Large, Talking Points Memo; Author, The Socialist Awakening: What's Different Now About the Left George Hammond Author, Conversations With Socrates—Moderator In response to the Coronavirus COVID-19 outbreak, this program took place and was recorded live via video conference, for an online audience only, and was live-streamed by The Commonwealth Club of California from San Francisco on October 14th, 2020.
In the aftermath the 2007–08 financial collapse, the increasing inequality seen in countries around the world, and the fallout from the global pandemic, there has been an increase in global citizen interest in exploring alternative economic systems.. In the United States, whether it is the presidential candidacy of Bernie Sanders, the popularity on the Left of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, or protesters flooding the streets in unprecedented numbers seeking racial and economic equality, you can find something in common among many of those disillusioned with the way things are—and an interest in socialism. How did this happen? Why now? In his new book, longtime political journalist John Judis—himself a veteran of socialist movements—explores how an ideology thought to be long dead has taken hold as a broad movement among younger people dissatisfied with mainstream politics both on the Right and the Left, in America and around the world. From Karl Marx to Eduard Bernstein, Eugene Debs to Victor Berger, Bernie Sanders to Jeremy Corbyn, The Socialist Awakening chronicles the rebirth of an idea driven by a rising anti-capitalist resentment among those looking to assert public power over the direction of private enterprise. Please join us for an important conversation just weeks before the presidential election. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
The presidential debate held on Sept. 30 will be remembered as the first time that an American president openly allied with white supremacists. “The remarks addressed to the Proud Boys stood out as a kind of bellwether of something pretty severe and to be taken seriously,” says Lawrence Rosenthal, the founder of the Center for Right Wing Studies at UC Berkeley and author of Empire of Resentment: Populism's Toxic Embrace of Nationalism. “He was giving them orders: Stand down, stand by. He was also giving orders to his army of pollwatchers…a force of intimidation. Trump last night crossed the Rubicon.” Trump also claimed that former Vice President Joe Biden is a socialist and part of the “radical left.” John Judis, editor-at-large of Talking Points Memo and author of The Socialist Awakening: What's Different Now About the Left, asserts that Biden “is not in any sense a doctrinaire socialist.” But he adds that Biden, who may be forced by the pandemic to expand national health care and other social welfare programs, might “tend toward policies that put the public first, that put the public interest before profits and that shift the balance of power in America.” Judis also says that Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, together with Eugene V. Debs, are the "two great figures in the history of American socialism."
Tom's guest is journalist John Judis, an editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo and the author of many books. He’s just out with the third in a trilogy of books he's written for Columbia University's Columbia Global Reports that examines three potent political movements that have shaped, and continue to shape, the world we live in: populism, nationalism and socialism. Judis' first book in the trilogy, The Populist Explosion, was published in 2016. He followed it with The Nationalist Revival in 2018. And coinciding with another election cycle, the third book, published today, is called The Socialist Awakening: What’s Different Now About the Left. In 1912, the Socialist Democratic Party boasted 118,000 members, and 1,200 elected officials in offices around the US. Does the wide popular support for Bernie Sanders -- along with the failure of laissez-faire globalized capitalism to manage the health and economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic -- indicate a newly reinvigorated public interest in socialism? Will Donald Trump’s behavior in office and this week’s revelations about his manipulation and apparent abuse of the tax code further advance the appeal of socialism as a political movement? John Judis describes himself as “a longtime leftist who labored unsuccessfully 50 years ago trying to create a socialist movement in the United States.” But he writes that now may be the perfect moment for a resurgence of FDR-style, New Deal-type programs that favor labor at the expense of capital and that address not just the challenges of COVID 19, but those of climate change and income inequality as well. John Judis joins Tom on Zoom to discuss The Socialist Awakening: What’s Different Now About the Left. Listener calls, emails and tweets are welcomed.
The populism we need now. Revisiting the fight against gerrymandering . Plus Bill Press on Donald Trump’s broken vision of immigration. David Daley on how to restore fairness and democracy to elections. John Judis and a progressive vision of populism and nationalism. Plus Bill Press on how to solve America’s immigration crisis. David Daley The Supreme Court’s decision on partisan gerrymandering dealt a huge blow to the future of democratc elections in America. David Daley is one of the nation's leading experts on partisan gerrymandering. He says it’s not too late to fight back. John Judis Across the globe, nationalism and populism are being co-opted by the right, and democracy is paying the price. Veteren journalist John Judis says it doesn’t have to be that way. He says the left needs to embrace both ideas for the promise they hold for a progressive and inclusive politics. Tom Jawetz Bill Press gets to the truth about immigration with Tom Jawetz, Vice President for Immigration Policy at the Center for American Progress Jim Hightower Trump puts opponent of public lands in charge of public lands.
The Great Battlefield podcast sits down with author John Judis to talk about his career as a political analyst, journalist and historian. As well as his recent books "The Populist Explosion" and "The Nationalist Revival".
To understand the populist phenomenon that led to Donald Trump's election, many turned to John Judis's book. ‘The Populist Explosion', back in 2016. He gave a clear-and prophetic-explanation of the rise of populism. Two years into the Trump Administration, and with similar political upheavals around the world, he attempts to explain the resurgence of ‘us … Continue reading EP 219 THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL
Political trends in recent years have seen a rise of right-leaning nationalism and populism around the globe, including in the United States. What are the sources of nationalism, and what are its effects on modern politics? On this episode, Lawfare founding editor and Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith sits down with John Judis, editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo and author of "The Nationalist Revival." They discussed Judis’s book, including the necessity of nationalism in developed democracies, why right-wing nationalist and populist movements seem to be winning out over those on the left, and how Donald Trump successfully raised the profile of nationalist politics in the United States.
In this episode of The Good Fight, Yascha Mounk talks to John Judis about the case for nationalism, how to deal with immigration, and the right model of integration. Email: thegoodfight@newamerica.org Twitter:@Yascha_Mounk This podcast was made in collaboration with New America. Podcast production by John T. Williams. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
In this episode of The Good Fight, Yascha Mounk talks to John Judis about the case for nationalism, how to deal with immigration, and the right model of integration. Email: thegoodfight@newamerica.org Twitter:@Yascha_Mounk This podcast was made in collaboration with New America. Podcast production by John T. Williams. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
It seems that every day, as Trump makes another seemingly horrible comment, we ask ourselves how did this happen? Millions of words have been spilled trying to answer that question. Fascism, bigotry, populism, social and cultural issues, have all been trotted out. But first and foremost is the jingoistic nationalism that seems to be rampant among Trump's base, as it is around the world. As dislocation, change, and creative destruction continues, people seek solace in their most fundamental national tribe. But is the left making a mistake by rejecting nationalism out of hand, or is there a place for nationalism and national identity even as one believes in immigration, open borders, free trade, and globalization? That the questions that John Judis takes on in The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization My conversation with John Judis:
This event hosted by Birkbeck on 15 November 2018 focused on and around topics from Eric Kaufmann's new book Whiteshift. The book argues that we need to talk about white identity if we hope to address the root causes of populism and polarisation. The West is in the midst of two epochal demographic transformations. First, the white share of the population is projected to drop to less than half the total by 2050 in North America and 2100 in Western Europe. Second, the mixed-race population is projected to rise exponentially late this century to form the majority in western countries by the early 2100s. The first phase of Whiteshift, which we are currently in, increases the existential insecurity of conservative whites and emboldens the cosmopolitan left, with its dream of radical cultural transformation. Left-liberal hegemony in the high culture and its attempt to stanch the expression of conservative anxieties in established institutions has delegitmated the cultural elite in the eyes of conservatives, opening space for right-wing populism and 'culture wars' polarisation. The advent of mass racial melting offers a way out of this impasse, if we are able to grasp it. Panellists discussed aspects of the theme of 'Right-Wing Populism and the Left' alongside Kaufmann's new book. PANELLISTS Eric Kaufmann is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck and author of the forthcoming Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (Penguin Allen Lane, 25 October, 2018) Munira Mirza was Deputy Mayor for Education and Culture of London. She is author of The Politics of Culture: The Case for Universalism (2012). Trevor Phillips, writer and broadcaster, was formerly head of the Commission for Racial Equality and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. John Judis, author of a new book The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization (2018) and The Populist Explosion (2016), an editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, a former senior writer at The National Journal and a former senior editor at The New Republic. David Goodhart, author of The Road to Somewhere: the Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (2017), and The British Dream. He was founding editor of Prospect magazine, was director of the think tank Demos and is currently Head of the Demography, Immigration and Integration Unit at the think tank Policy Exchange. CHAIR Robert Singh, Professor of Politics at Birkbeck will chair the event. Robert is is a specialist in contemporary US politics and the politics of American foreign policy. He is the author of eleven books - including, most recently, In Defense of the United States Constitution (Routledge, 2018)
This event hosted by Birkbeck on 15 November 2018 focused on and around topics from Eric Kaufmann's new book Whiteshift. The book argues that we need to talk about white identity if we hope to address the root causes of populism and polarisation. The West is in the midst of two epochal demographic transformations. First, the white share of the population is projected to drop to less than half the total by 2050 in North America and 2100 in Western Europe. Second, the mixed-race population is projected to rise exponentially late this century to form the majority in western countries by the early 2100s. The first phase of Whiteshift, which we are currently in, increases the existential insecurity of conservative whites and emboldens the cosmopolitan left, with its dream of radical cultural transformation. Left-liberal hegemony in the high culture and its attempt to stanch the expression of conservative anxieties in established institutions has delegitmated the cultural elite in the eyes of conservatives, opening space for right-wing populism and 'culture wars' polarisation. The advent of mass racial melting offers a way out of this impasse, if we are able to grasp it. Panellists discussed aspects of the theme of 'Right-Wing Populism and the Left' alongside Kaufmann's new book. PANELLISTS Eric Kaufmann is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck and author of the forthcoming Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (Penguin Allen Lane, 25 October, 2018) Munira Mirza was Deputy Mayor for Education and Culture of London. She is author of The Politics of Culture: The Case for Universalism (2012). Trevor Phillips, writer and broadcaster, was formerly head of the Commission for Racial Equality and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. John Judis, author of a new book The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization (2018) and The Populist Explosion (2016), an editor-at-large at Talking Points Memo, a former senior writer at The National Journal and a former senior editor at The New Republic. David Goodhart, author of The Road to Somewhere: the Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (2017), and The British Dream. He was founding editor of Prospect magazine, was director of the think tank Demos and is currently Head of the Demography, Immigration and Integration Unit at the think tank Policy Exchange. CHAIR Robert Singh, Professor of Politics at Birkbeck will chair the event. Robert is is a specialist in contemporary US politics and the politics of American foreign policy. He is the author of eleven books - including, most recently, In Defense of the United States Constitution (Routledge, 2018)
We begin today with a conversation about the rise of nationalism as a political movement. Brazil is holding a run-off election at the end of the month following the near victory of Jair Bolsonaro, an admirer of some of Brazil’s past dictators. Several countries in Europe have seen a far-right brand of nationalism ascendant in recent years, and of course, Donald Trump’s doctrine of “America First” and his rallying motto, ----Make America Great Again---- were key ingredients to his electoral victory in 2016.Tom's guest is John Judis, who trains his gaze on the global rise of nationalism in his latest book. John Judis is a former senior editor at the New Republic. He is an Editor at Large at Talking Points Memo, and the author of seven books. The new one is called The Nationalist Revival: Trade, Immigration, and the Revolt Against Globalization.
The Anti-Defamation League sets a low bar for hate speech. According to the ADL, one of the criteria for a person to be labeled an "Anti-Semite," is for a person to think "Jews stick together." In this thought provoking, 25 minute podcast, We Hold These Truths' Craig Hanson reports on his attendance at a local synagogue that hosted a speaker from the ADL, speaking on the subject of "Anti-Semitism." Craig learned that according to the ADL speaker, "Anti-Zionism" is not "Anti-Semitism," but support for BDS (Boycots, Divestments and Sactions) is. Books recommended by Craig in the podcast are: "Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict" by John Judis and "Against Our Better Judgment: The Hidden History of How the U.S. Was Used to Create Israel" by Alison Weir. And, this documentary by Israeli filmaker, Yoav Shamir, is most enlightening: "Defamation: The Anti-Semitism Movie."
Full interview with Daniel Dale and John Judis by Allie Elwell Lead Guest: Daniel Dale, The Toronto Star’s Washington Bureau Chief Follow Daniel on Twitter: @ddale8 Check out his Definitive Donald Trump Fact Check Complimentary Guest: John Judis, Author “The …
Media & Truth - Full interview with Daniel Dale and John Judis with Allie Elwell
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Guest: Barry Casselman, The Prairie Editor.........we will look at the state of US politics, from President Trump completing month 8, to the US Congress as dysfunctinal as ever, to the media losing creibility and early talk of 2018 for the US House and US Senate..............not so fast on demographics explains John Judis.........and other stories.... Please check my posts and podcasts, my book "Cubanos in Wisconsin" and follow me on Twitter.
A New Republic article by John Judis on voting demographics. Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery on youth suicide prevention.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
John Judis, author of The Populism Explosion, joins our US Editor John Prideaux to explore what lies behind the surge of political revolts in Europe and America and the difference between left and right-wing populism. Can President Trump turn his brand of disruption into a recipe for government? See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
John Judis, author of The Populism Explosion, joins our US Editor John Prideaux to explore what lies behind the surge of political revolts in Europe and America and the difference between left and right-wing populism. Can President Trump turn his brand of disruption into a recipe for government? See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Donald Trump’s attacks on elites and us-versus-them rhetoric are classic populist themes. But what happens when populists actually take office, and suddenly joins the ruling class? John Judis, author of "The Populist Explosion,” helps us define populism and explains why Trump may not be able to live up to voters’ expectations.
What’s behind this year’s populist explosion? In the latest episode of Deep Dish, Council vice president of studies Brian Hanson interviews John Judis, author of The Populist Explosion, to put the year’s political movements—from Brexit to Trumpism—into historic context. Hanson then sits down with Council President Ivo Daalder and Chatham House Director Robin Niblett to discuss the implications of populism for the established world order.
Journalist and author John Judis says populism, from left or right, can demonstrate something is wrong with the body politic, but it rarely succeeds in governing. Professor Rick Hasen argues that money doesn’t buy election outcomes but does increase your chances. And Bill Press interviews former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, who says Donald Trump is a “Russian dupe” and a “jackass.” John Judis Author John Judis has written a book on the history of populism. On the left, he says, populism is the people against the elite. On the right, it is attacking the elite for coddling outsiders. Rick Hasen Law professor Rick Hasen says money may not WIN you the election but it sure gives you a better chance, and he is critical of Democrats as well as Republicans for maintaining the current system of campaign financing. Martin O’Malley Coming up, former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley analyzes the election on the Bill Press Show. Jim Hightower The Wells Fargo Gang – rogue bank robs customers Support the Show Are you tired of Tea Party Republicans and Rush Limbaugh dominating the airwaves? Do you want the facts you won't get on Fox -- or even on CNN? Then stay tuned.
Vic Fingerhut is a Democratic strategist who is concerned that the Clinton campaign is not doing all it can to win a critical voting group. Author John Judis explores the populist explosion in American politics and around the world. And political scientist Dante Chinni tells Bill Press what the latest polls mean. Vic Fingerhut Progressive political strategist Vic Fingerhut is warning the Clinton campaign not to ignore the key swing group in the election – self-identified independents. John Judis Editor-at-large John Judis of Talking Points Memo has written a book about the rebirth of populism in America. Are Democrats on the wrong side of it? Dante Chinni Political scientist Dante Chinni tells Bill Press how we ought to look at political polling. Jim Hightower Why is delivering “Mail by the Pail” important?
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
Independent investigative journalism, broadcasting, trouble-making and muckraking with Brad Friedman of BradBlog.com
This week the election panel wonder what - if anything - the BBC adaptation of Le Carre's novel 'The Night Manager' has to say about the UK's place in the world. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.