Podcasts about Samar

Meditación del Evangelio según San Mateo 10, 1-7 por el biblista P. Norberto Padilla, misionero claretiano.Miércoles 9/jul/2025, Vayan a las ovejas descarriadas de Israel.Canción: Alma Misionera (2018), de Yuli y Josh----------Lectura del santo evangelio según san Mateo 10, 1-7En aquel tiempo, Jesús llamó a sus doce discípulos y les dio autoridad para expulsar espíritus inmundos y curar toda enfermedad y dolencia. Éstos son los nombres de los doce apóstoles: el primero, Simón, el llamado Pedro y su hermano Andrés; Santiago el Zebedeo y su hermano Juan; Felipe y Bartolomé, Tomás y Mateo, el publicano; Santiago el Alfeo, y Tadeo; Simón el fanático, y Judas Iscariote, el que lo entregó. A estos doce los envió Jesús con estas instrucciones: "No vayan a tierra de paganos, ni entren en las ciudades de Samaría, sino vayan a las ovejas descarriadas de Israel. Vayan y proclamen que el reino de los cielos está cerca."Palabra del Señor... Gloria a ti, Señor Jesús#SoyClaretiano #Evangelio #MisionerosClaretianos #CMFAntillasIntro: Lámpara Es Tu Palabra, de Ain Karem

In jener Zeit rief Jesus seine zwölf Jünger zu sich und gab ihnen die Vollmacht, die unreinen Geister auszutreiben und alle Krankheiten und Leiden zu heilen. Die Namen der zwölf Apostel sind: an erster Stelle Simon, genannt Petrus, und sein Bruder Andreas, dann Jakobus, der Sohn des Zebedäus, und sein Bruder Johannes, Philíppus und Bartholomäus, Thomas und Matthäus, der Zöllner, Jakobus, der Sohn des Alphäus, und Thaddäus, Simon Kananäus und Judas Iskáriot, der ihn ausgeliefert hat. Diese Zwölf sandte Jesus aus und gebot ihnen: Geht nicht den Weg zu den Heiden und betretet keine Stadt der Samaríter, sondern geht zu den verlorenen Schafen des Hauses Israel! Geht und verkündet: Das Himmelreich ist nahe! (© Ständige Kommission für die Herausgabe der gemeinsamen liturgischen Bücher im deutschen Sprachgebiet)

In jener Zeit rief Jesus seine zwölf Jünger zu sich und gab ihnen die Vollmacht, die unreinen Geister auszutreiben und alle Krankheiten und Leiden zu heilen. Die Namen der zwölf Apostel sind: an erster Stelle Simon, genannt Petrus, und sein Bruder Andreas, dann Jakobus, der Sohn des Zebedäus, und sein Bruder Johannes, Philíppus und Bartholomäus, Thomas und Matthäus, der Zöllner, Jakobus, der Sohn des Alphäus, und Thaddäus, Simon Kananäus und Judas Iskáriot, der ihn ausgeliefert hat. Diese Zwölf sandte Jesus aus und gebot ihnen: Geht nicht den Weg zu den Heiden und betretet keine Stadt der Samaríter, sondern geht zu den verlorenen Schafen des Hauses Israel! Geht und verkündet: Das Himmelreich ist nahe!(© Ständige Kommission für die Herausgabe der gemeinsamen liturgischen Bücher im deutschen Sprachgebiet)

In jener Zeit rief Jesus seine zwölf Jünger zu sich und gab ihnen die Vollmacht, die unreinen Geister auszutreiben und alle Krankheiten und Leiden zu heilen. Die Namen der zwölf Apostel sind: an erster Stelle Simon, genannt Petrus, und sein Bruder Andreas, dann Jakobus, der Sohn des Zebedäus, und sein Bruder Johannes, Philíppus und Bartholomäus, Thomas und Matthäus, der Zöllner, Jakobus, der Sohn des Alphäus, und Thaddäus, Simon Kananäus und Judas Iskáriot, der ihn ausgeliefert hat. Diese Zwölf sandte Jesus aus und gebot ihnen: Geht nicht den Weg zu den Heiden und betretet keine Stadt der Samaríter, sondern geht zu den verlorenen Schafen des Hauses Israel! Geht und verkündet: Das Himmelreich ist nahe! (© Ständige Kommission für die Herausgabe der gemeinsamen liturgischen Bücher im deutschen Sprachgebiet)

Muchos más recursos para tu vida de fe (Santo Rosario, Oración, etc.) en nuestra web https://sercreyente.com________________Miércoles, 9 de julio de 2025 (14ª Semana del Tiempo Ordinario)Evangelio del día y reflexión... ¡Deja que la Palabra del Señor transforme tu vida! Texto íntegro del Evangelio y de la Reflexión en https://sercreyente.com/no-he-venido-a-abolir-sino-a-dar-plenitud-2/[Mateo 10, 1-7] En aquel tiempo, llamó Jesús a sus doce discípulos y les dio autoridad para expulsar espíritus inmundos y curar toda enfermedad y toda dolencia. Estos son los nombres de los doce apóstoles: el primero, Simón, llamado Pedro, y Andrés, su hermano; Santiago, el de Zebedeo, y Juan, su hermano; Felipe y Bartolomé, Tomás y Mateo el publicano; Santiago el de Alfeo, y Tadeo; Simón el de Caná, y Judas Iscariote, el que lo entregó. A estos doce los envió Jesús con estas instrucciones: «No vayáis a tierra de paganos ni entréis en las ciudades de Samaría, sino id a las ovejas descarriadas de Israel. Id y proclamad que ha llegado el reino de los cielos».________________Descárgate la app de SerCreyente en https://sercreyente.com/app/¿Conoces nuestra Oración Online? Más información en: https://sercreyente.com/oracion¿Quieres recibir cada día el Evangelio en tu whatsapp? Alta en: www.sercreyente.com/whatsappTambién puedes hacer tu donativo en https://sercreyente.com/ayudanos/Contacto: info@sercreyente.com

In this episode, we bridge the gap between myth and reality as we explore the history and infamy of the San Juanico Bridge. Often romanticized as Ferdinand Marcos's “gift of love” to Imelda, this iconic structure connecting Leyte and Samar is also a concrete symbol of the Marcos regime's controversial “edifice complex,” cronyism, and international scandal. From its politically charged origins and its dark association with a Martial Law torture method to its crucial role as a lifeline during disasters like Super Typhoon Yolanda, we unpack the complicated legacy of an engineering marvel. How can a single object represent both national pride and national shame, and how do we remember a past built in steel and stone? Listen now to find out.

Yau ake cika shekaru 80 da rattaɓa hannu kan yarjejeniyar da ta samar da Majalisar Ɗinkin Duniya da aka gudanar a Birnin San Francisco da ke Amurka, a ranar 26 ga watan Yunin shekarar 1945. Bikin cika shekaru 80 din na zuwa ne a daidai lokacin da Majalisar mai wakilai 193 ke fuskantar kalubale da dama, waɗanda suka hada da makomar ta ko kuma ci gaban tasirinta baki ɗaya. Kan wannan Bashir Ibrahim Idris ya tattauna da Ambasada Abubakar Chika, tsohon jakadan Najeriya a Iran. Ku latsa alamar sauti don jin yadda zantawarsu ta gudana..........

From 'Sea Shells: Emerging Poets from Gaza' selected and translated by Batool Abu Akleen: https://modernpoetryintranslation.com/sea-shells-an-anthology-of-emerging-poets-from-gaza/

Growing up as an Arab-American woman in rural Waverly — and traveling for her career — have shaped Samar Ali's life as a peacemaker.Her journey includes stops at Vanderbilt University, the Supreme Court of South Africa, the White House, and eventually back to her home state. Along the way, she has faced and overcome personal attacks. It's all fueled her longing for unity and justice. Now, through her nonprofit Millions of Conversations, Ali works to create a future where every American feels safe and free to be themselves. In this episode, we explore how her life and career guide her mission to heal division.Further reading Q&A: International conflict expert talks Israel-Hamas war, civilian casualties, and the inevitability of peace (WPLN) Middle Tennessee's shifting media landscape (This is Nashville) Millions of Conversations: The Show (Newschannel 5)

On today's episode, we talk about one of the largest naval battles in history, Leyte Gulf, and the task group that was never created: Task Force 34. A series of decisions often called mistakes led to one of the most famous underdog fights when the small force called Taffy 3 faced down Japanese battleships in the Battle off Samar. If any of those decisions had gone differently, the world might have taken a different path.

Nedá se nic dělat, čím dál častěji teď bilancuju. Japonsko je na dohled a takzvaný normální život taky. Třeba dnes ještě nemám sprchu (probudil jsem se v jednoduchém vesnickém chlívečku na filipínském ostrově Samar), ale když jsem se před chvílí poléval kyblíkem a vědomím, že je to naposledy, lil jsem, lil, nepřestával a vypotřeboval celý velký kanystr. Tolik mi to najednou bylo líto...Možná naposledy jsem se po probuzení obešel bez toaletního papíru, který mi ale dávno nechybí. Jestli správně vzpomínám, papír ze záchodů zcela zmizel na pomezí Íránu a Pákistánu, a já měl zpočátku tendenci shánět nějaký soukromý po obchodech. Za dva nebo tři dny jsem si zvykl a pochopil, že na omývání zadku vodou není nic hrozného – naopak, že je to praktické a hygieničtější.Při bilancování dosavadní cesty mi došlo, že jsem nepotkal žádné opravdu exotické zvíře, ale to se dalo snadno napravit, věděl jsem jak. Byl jsem totiž na ostrově Bohol, kde žijí v kýčovitě roztomilých čokoládových kopcích nártouni – takové opičky s obříma očima. Stopoval jsem tedy přímo do jejich minirezervace, ať si zvíře můžu škrtnout ze seznamu nedodělků.

Kungiyar kasashen Afirka ta Yamma ta ECOWAS ta bayyana shirin kafa sabuwar rundunar hadin kai wadda za ta dinga yaki da yan ta'addan da suka addabi yankin. Wannan na da cikin shirin shugabannin yankin na dakile ayyukan ta'addanci, da suka ƙi ci suka ƙi cinyewa.Bashir Ibrahim Idris ya tattauna da Janar Kape Alwali Kazir mai ritaya a dangane da wannan shiri.Shiga alamar sauti, domin sauraron cikakkiyar tattaunawar.

Cothrom an lá seo deich mbliana ó shín anois chuaigh muintir na hÉireann i mbun vótála i reifreann stairiúil suntasach. Reifreann chun pósadh a leathnú amach d'achan duine – chun go mbeadh an rogha ag daoine duine den inscne chéanna pósadh. Sa deireadh, bhí 62% againn i bhfabhar Bunreacht na hÉireann a athrú. Labhair an Dr John Walsh faoin athrú a tháinig ar an tír ó thréimhse chorrach na nOchtóidí go dtí an lá atá inniu. ­ Foclóir: ­ Aerach: Gay ­ Ní hionann sin: It doesn't mean ­ Díspóireacht: Debate ­ Ginmhilleadh: Abortion ­ Feiceáileacht: Visibility ­ Coiscthe: Banned ­ Cúngaigeanta: Narrow-minded ­ Claonadh gnéis: Sexual orientation ­ Feachtasaíocht: Campaigning ­ Goilleann sé orm: It bothers me ­ Leochaileach: Vulnerable ­ Bagrach: Threatening ­ páirtnéireacht shibhialta: Civil partnership ­ Tháinig sé aniar aduaidh orainn: It took us by surprise ­ Comhionannas: Equality ­ Aischothú: FeedbackSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

In this episode, photojournalist Samar Hazboun shares her perspective on the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the role of visual storytelling in documenting truth, and the emotional weight of witnessing violence and resilience. This conversation explores the power of images, the urgency of narrative justice, and what it means to bear witness in times of crisis. 

#247 Lead Nurturing | In this episode, Danielle is joined by Samar Owais, founder of Emails Done Right; Sheri Otto, CEO of Growth Lane Strategies; and Sofia Silva, Marketing Manager at Reachdesk.These three email experts came together for a live roast of real B2B lead nurture emails, submitted by marketers from the Exit Five community. You'll hear the good, the bad, and the fixable, with practical insights on how to improve your own nurture sequences.Danielle, Samar, Sheri, and Sofia cover:The most common lead nurture mistakes B2B marketers make (and how to fix them)Why every email should be treated as a conversation, not just a campaignHow to write nurture emails that create connection, not clicks for clicks' sakeIf you're building (or rebuilding) your nurture strategy, this one's packed with real examples and expert feedback to guide your next send.Timestamps(00:00) - – Intro: Welcome to the Lead Nurture Roast (02:36) - – Meet the Experts: Samar, Sheri, and Sofia (06:33) - – What Is **Lead Nurturing, Really? (09:26) - – The Problem with “We” Language in Emails (11:48) - – The Biggest Mistakes B2B Marketers Make (14:13) - – Why AI Isn't Your Copywriter (16:08) - – Teardown #1: Subject Line Gone Wrong (20:38) - – How to Build a Nurture Sequence Around a Whitepaper (23:18) - – CTA Overload and Why It Kills Clicks (28:23) - – Teardown #2: Great Open Rate, Low Engagement (32:17) - – The One-CTA Rule (And Why It Matters) (34:59) - – Structuring Long Emails for Skimmability (37:31) - – Teardown #3: Cold Lead, Wrong Email (40:04) - – Re-Engagement Emails That Actually Work (42:54) - – Use Social Proof Instead of Product Pitches (44:34) - – Teardown #4: The Overloaded Onboarding Email (47:29) - – What's a “Micro Conversion” in SaaS Email? (52:04) - – Time-to-Value and the First Action That Matters (54:19) - – This Email Is... a Whole Sequence in One (56:39) - – Teardown #5: Trust Email or Generic Spam? (59:34) - – Why Specificity Beats Industry Buzzwords (01:01:49) - – Final Scores and Wrap-Up Send guest pitches and ideas to hi@exitfive.comJoin the Exit Five Newsletter here: https://www.exitfive.com/newsletterCheck out the Exit Five job board: https://jobs.exitfive.com/Become an Exit Five member: https://community.exitfive.com/checkout/exit-five-membership***Today's episode is brought to you by Knak. Email (in my humble opinion) is the still the greatest marketing channel of all-time.It's the only way you can truly “own” your audience.But when it comes to building the emails - if you've ever tried building an email in an enterprise marketing automation platform, you know how painful it can be. Templates are too rigid, editing code can break things and the whole process just takes forever. That's why we love Knak here at Exit Five. Knak a no-code email platform that makes it easy to create on-brand, high-performing emails - without the bottlenecks.Frustrated by clunky email builders? You need Knak.Tired of ‘hoping' the email you sent looks good across all devices? Just test in Knak first.Big team making it hard to collaborate and get approvals? Definitely Knak.And the best part? Everything takes a fraction of the time.See Knak in action at knak.com/exit-five. Or just let them know you heard about Knak on Exit Five.***Thanks to my friends at hatch.fm for producing this episode and handling all of the Exit Five podcast production.They give you unlimited podcast editing and strategy for your B2B podcast.Get unlimited podcast editing and on-demand strategy for one low monthly cost. Just upload your episode, and they take care of the rest.Visit hatch.fm to learn more

Yara Khoury Nammour interviews London-based Lebanese designer Samar Maakaroun. They discuss at length her journey into the field of branding and lettering, her work at Pentagram studio in London and what it means to be the first Lebanese partner in the studio. They cover her independent project on lettering "29 Words for 29 Letters" – playing with meanings, writing systems, and animation, to build a playful and experimental multicultural glossary, and embracing the multiplicity and complexity that comes from thinking in and working with two languages, and in a diasporic context. Samar discusses a special book project for the charity SkatePal and how the timing of the project lent it a different and more poignant political urgency. The discussion ends with a conversation about AI and how it can be supportive of designers' work, but also how it can be misused. FOLLOW & RATE KHATT CHRONICLES:» Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/khatt-chronicles-stories-on-design-from-the-arab-world/id1472975206» Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/3ATH0MwO1tIlBvQfahSLrB» Anghami: https://play.anghami.com/podcast/1014374489THIS SERIES IS PART OF THE AFIKRA PODCAST NETWORK Explore all episodes in this series: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLfYG40bwRKl5mMJ782dhW6yvfq0E0_HhAABOUT AFIKRAafikra | عفكرة is a movement to convert passive interest in the Arab world to active intellectual curiosity. We aim to collectively reframe the dominant narrative of the region by exploring the histories and cultures of the region – past, present and future – through conversations driven by curiosity.

Shirin  namu na yau zai mayar da hankali ne akan yadda mahukunta a jihar Damagaram ko Zinder ta Jamhuriyar Nijar suka yi hobbasa wajen samar da yanayi mai ƙyau na noman shinkafa ga manoman da suka bada himma  a bara, suka kuma ga amfaninta.

In today's digital-first nonprofit environment, it's not enough to simply invest in a platform—you must also manage that investment intentionally to see long-term value. Samar Haddad, Manager of Client Experience at JMT Consulting, walks us through how nonprofits can shift from reactive to strategic when working with tools like donor databases, accounting platforms, CRMs, and more.From the outset, Samar stresses the importance of selecting not only the right software but also the right solution partner. “Partner solution is just as important as solution selection,” she advises, urging nonprofits to interview potential vendors, understand the structure of their support systems, and clarify expectations around responsiveness and ongoing engagement.This episode dives into why support shouldn't stop after onboarding. “Onboarding and training doesn't just happen once. The solutions are continuously evolving, needs are evolving, regulations are evolving,” Samar shares. This mindset—treating platform management as a living, breathing process—can help nonprofit teams make better use of their tools, align systems with strategic goals, and navigate disruptions with greater resilience.Samar also outlines the value of structured, recurring touchpoints. JMT Consulting meets quarterly with clients, aligned with budgeting, audits, and planning seasons, ensuring that technology is always serving the mission—not the other way around. She encourages teams to be open about their frustrations and compliments, noting that the most productive relationships involve constant dialogue, feedback, and shared discovery.A powerful takeaway from this interview is the idea that nonprofits should strive for “voluntary management instead of involuntary management”—a proactive, data-driven approach that empowers teams to use their platforms with intention rather than reaction.Whether you're onboarding a new tool or rethinking your platform strategy altogether, Samar's insights offer a framework for maximizing ROI, minimizing friction, and advancing your mission through tech-enabled clarity.#NonprofitTech #PlatformManagement #DigitalStrategy Find us Live daily on YouTube!Find us Live daily on LinkedIn!Find us Live daily on X: @Nonprofit_ShowOur national co-hosts and amazing guests discuss management, money and missions of nonprofits! 12:30pm ET 11:30am CT 10:30am MT 9:30am PTSend us your ideas for Show Guests or Topics: HelpDesk@AmericanNonprofitAcademy.comVisit us on the web:The Nonprofit Show

Samar Kargbo (he/him) is a speaker, podcast host, and author who helps nonprofit leaders and passionate professionals recover from burnout and reconnect with their purpose. Drawing on years of experience in leadership and personal development, he equips his clients with practical strategies to gain clarity, build confidence, and take ownership of their path forward. Through grounded conversations and transformative coaching, Samar's work centers on one goal: helping people lead with intention and thrive—personally and professionally. Read more about him and hire him for coaching! https://samarthinks.com/

Adquiere el "LIBRO DE ORACIÓN. Mi día a día con Jesús" en https://sercreyente.com/libros. Con más de 400 páginas, más de 500 oraciones y decenas de ilustraciones. Ve el vídeo en https://youtu.be/_9Z40IqjHj8________________Lunes, 31 de marzo de 2025 (4ª Semana de Cuaresma)Evangelio del día y reflexión... ¡Deja que la Palabra del Señor transforme tu vida! Texto íntegro del Evangelio y de la Reflexión en https://sercreyente.com/si-no-veis-signos-y-prodigios-no-creeis-funcionario-real/[Juan 4, 43-54] En aquel tiempo, salió Jesús de Samaría para Galilea. Jesús mismo había atestiguado: «Un profeta no es estimado en su propia patria». Cuando llegó a Galilea, los galileos lo recibieron bien, porque habían visto todo lo que había hecho en Jerusalén durante la fiesta, pues también ellos habían ido a la fiesta. Fue Jesús otra vez a Caná de Galilea, donde había convertido el agua en vino. Había un funcionario real que tenía un hijo enfermo en Cafarnaún. Oyendo que Jesús había llegado de Judea a Galilea, fue a verlo, y le pedía que bajase a curar a su hijo que estaba muriéndose. Jesús le dijo: «Si no veis signos y prodigios, no creéis». El funcionario insiste: «Señor, baja antes de que se muera mi niño». Jesús le contesta: «Anda, tu hijo vive». El hombre creyó en la palabra de Jesús y se puso en camino. Iba ya bajando, cuando sus criados vinieron a su encuentro diciéndole que su hijo vivía. Él les preguntó a qué hora había empezado la mejoría. Y le contestaron: «Ayer a la hora séptima lo dejó la fiebre». El padre cayó en la cuenta de que esa era la hora en que Jesús le había dicho: «Tu hijo vive». Y creyó él con toda su familia. Este segundo signo lo hizo Jesús al llegar de Judea a Galilea.________________Descárgate la app de SerCreyente en https://sercreyente.com/app/¿Conoces nuestra Oración Online? Más información en: https://sercreyente.com/oracion¿Quieres recibir cada día el Evangelio en tu whatsapp? Alta en: www.sercreyente.com/whatsappTambién puedes hacer tu donativo en https://sercreyente.com/ayudanos/Contacto: info@sercreyente.com

Lesbians and Sex Work The Lesbian Historic Motif Podcast - Episode 309 with Heather Rose Jones In this episode we talk about: Four motifs that connect women loving women and sex work in historic sources Sources used Bennett, Judith and Shannon McSheffrey. 2014. “Early, Erotic and Alien: Women Dressed as Men in Late Medieval London” in History Workshop Journal. 77 (1): 1-25. Beynon, John C. 2010. “Unaccountable Women” in Lesbian Dames: Sapphism in the Long Eighteenth Century. Beynon, John C. & Caroline Gonda eds. Ashgate, Farnham. ISBN 978-0-7546-7335-4 Blackmore, Josiah. 1999. “The Poets of Sodom” in Queer Iberia: Sexualities, Cultures, and Crossings from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance ed. Josiah Blackmore and Gregory S. Hutcheson. Duke University Press, Durham. ISBN 9780822323495 Boehringer, Sandra (trans. Anna Preger). 2021. Female Homosexuality in Ancient Greece and Rome. Routledge, New York. ISBN 978-0-367-74476-2 Burford, E.J. 1986. Wits, Wenchers and Wantons - London's Low Life: Covent Garden in the Eighteenth Century. Robert Hale, London. ISBN 0-7090-2629-3 Cheek, Pamela. 1998. "The 'Mémoires secrets' and the Actress: Tribadism, Performance, and Property", in Jeremy D. Popkin and Bernadette Fort (eds), The "Mémoires secrets" and the Culture of Publicity in Eighteenth-Century France, Oxford: Voltaire Foundation. Choquette, Leslie. 2001. “'Homosexuals in the City: Representations of Lesbian and Gay Space in Nineteenth-Century Paris” in Merrick, Jeffrey & Michael Sibalis, eds. Homosexuality in French History and Culture. Harrington Park Press, New York. ISBN 1-56023-263-3 Craft-Fairchild, Catherine. 2006. “Sexual and Textual Indeterminacy: Eighteenth-Century English Representations of Sapphism” in Journal of the History of Sexuality 15:3 DeJean, Joan. 1989. Fictions of Sappho, 1546-1937. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-14136-5 Donoghue, Emma. 1995. Passions Between Women: British Lesbian Culture 1668-1801. Harper Perennial, New York. ISBN 0-06-017261-4 Engelstein, Laura. 1990. "Lesbian Vignettes: A Russian Triptych from the 1890s" in Signs vol. 15, no. 4 813-831. Garber, Marjorie. 1992. Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety. Routledge, New York. ISBN 0-415-91951-7 Faderman, Lillian. 1981. Surpassing the Love of Men. William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York. ISBN 0-688-00396-6 Gilhuly, Kate. 2015. “Lesbians are Not from Lesbos” in Blondell, Ruby & Kirk Ormand (eds). Ancient Sex: New Essays. The Ohio State University Press, Columbus. ISBN 978-0-8142-1283-7 Habib, Samar. 2007. Female Homosexuality in the Middle East: Histories and Representations. Routledge, New York. ISBN 78-0-415-80603-9 Haley, Shelley P. “Lucian's ‘Leaena and Clonarium': Voyeurism or a Challenge to Assumptions?” in Rabinowitz, Nancy Sorkin & Lisa Auanger eds. 2002. Among Women: From the Homosocial to the Homoerotic in the Ancient World. University of Texas Press, Austin. ISBN 0-29-77113-4 Ingrassia, Catherine. 2003. “Eliza Haywood, Sapphic Desire, and the Practice of Reading” in: Kittredge, Katharine (ed). Lewd & Notorious: Female Transgression in the Eighteenth Century. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. ISBN 0-472-11090-X Jones, Ann Rosalind & Peter Stallybrass. 1991. “Fetishizing gender: constructing the Hermaphrodite in Renaissance Europe” in Body guards : the cultural politics of gender ambiguity edited by Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub. Routledge, New York. ISBN 0-415-90388-2 Jones, Heather Rose. 2021. “Researching the Origins of Lesbian Myths, Legends, and Symbols” (podcast). https://alpennia.com/blog/lesbian-historic-motif-podcast-episode-201-researching-origins-lesbian-myths-legends-and Katritzky, M.A. 2005. “Reading the Actress in Commedia Imagery” in Women Players in England, 1500-1660: Beyond the All-Male Stage, edited by Pamela Allen Brown & Peter Parolin. Ashgate, Burlington. ISBN 978-0-7546-0953-7 Klein, Ula Lukszo. 2021. Sapphic Crossings: Cross-Dressing Women in Eighteenth-Century British Literature. University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville. ISBN 978-0-8139-4551-4 Kranz, Susan E. 1995. The Sexual Identities of Moll Cutpurse in Dekker and Middleton's The Roaring Girl and in London in Renaissance and Reformation 19: 5-20. Merrick, Jeffrey. 1990. “Sexual Politics and Public Order in Late Eighteenth-Century France: the Mémoires secrets and the Correspondance secrète” in Journal of the History of Sexuality 1, 68-84. Merrick, Jeffrey & Bryant T. Ragan, Jr. 2001. Homosexuality in Early Modern France: A Documentary Collection. Oxford University Press, New York. ISBN 0-19-510257-6 Rizzo, Betty. 1994. Companions without Vows: Relationships among Eighteenth-Century British Women. Athens: University of Georgia Press. ISBN 978-0-8203-3218-5 Sears, Clare. 2015. Arresting Dress: Cross-Dressing, Law, and Fascination in Nineteenth-Century San Francisco. Durham: Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-5758-2 Shapiro, Michael. 1994. Gender in Play on the Shakespearean Stage: Boy Heroines and Female Pages. Ann Arbor. Van der Meer, Theo. 1991. “Tribades on Trial: Female Same-Sex Offenders in Late Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam” in Journal of the History of Sexuality 1:3 424-445. Vanita, Ruth and Saleem Kidwai, eds. 2000. Same-Sex Love in India: Readings from Literature and History. St. Martin's, New York. ISBN 0-312-22169-X Velasco, Sherry. 2011. Lesbians in Early Modern Spain. Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville. ISBN 978-0-8265-1750-0 Wahl, Elizabeth Susan. 1999. Invisible Relations: Representations of Female Intimacy in the Age of Enlightenment. Stanford University Press, Stanford. ISBN 0-8047-3650-2 Walen, Denise A. 2005. Constructions of Female Homoeroticism in Early Modern Drama. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 978-1-4039-6875-3 A transcript of this podcast is available here. Links to the Lesbian Historic Motif Project Online Website: http://alpennia.com/lhmp Blog: http://alpennia.com/blog RSS: http://alpennia.com/blog/feed/ Twitter: @LesbianMotif Discord: Contact Heather for an invitation to the Alpennia/LHMP Discord server The Lesbian Historic Motif Project Patreon Links to Heather Online Website: http://alpennia.com Email: Heather Rose Jones Mastodon: @heatherrosejones@Wandering.Shop Bluesky: @heatherrosejones Facebook: Heather Rose Jones (author page)

This episode is part of the 3rd edition of Podcasthon: a global effort among 1000+ podcast hosts to raise awareness and support for important causes by highlighting a charity of their choice during the same week (March 15-21, 2025).  Today's episode features Samar Waqar, the Founder and Executive Director of Kind Theory, a neurodiversity-based nonprofit based in Texas. Using the insights and knowledge of neurodivergent people themselves, Kind Theory educates organizations, institutions, and the general public about neurodiversity, accessibility, and disability rights as these relate to autism and ADHD. In doing so, it improves educational, health, and employment outcomes for these marginalized members of our community. During this episode, you will hear Samar talk about: How her experiences with her autistic son's therapy and her own burnout inspired her to create Kind Theory The events and services that Kind Theory provides for neurodivergent people in Texas and beyond Discovering that she is neurodivergent herself Learn more about Kind Theory at kindtheory.org.  Get in touch with Samar at talktous [at] kindtheory.org or on LinkedIn. Visit www.podcasthon.org to discover hundreds of other nonprofits and charities being highlighted during Podcasthon by podcasters around the world! Watch the video of this interview on YouTube. Read the episode transcript. Follow the Beyond 6 Seconds podcast in your favorite podcast player. Subscribe to the FREE Beyond 6 Seconds newsletter for early access to new episodes. Support or sponsor this podcast at BuyMeACoffee.com/Beyond6Seconds! *Disclaimer: The views, guidance, opinions, and thoughts expressed in Beyond 6 Seconds episodes are solely mine and/or those of my guests, and do not necessarily represent those of my employer or other organizations. These episodes are for informational purposes only and do not substitute for professional medical advice. Consult a medical professional or healthcare provider if you are seeking medical advice, diagnoses, or treatment.*

Maxim Fateev and Samar Abbas from Temporal join us to discuss how their durable execution platform ensures processes complete reliably at scale.We discuss:How Temporal gained enterprise adoption with companies like Airbnb, HashiCorp, and Snapchat.Why Temporal compensates salespeople based on customer consumption.Temporal's role in Snapchat's story processing and Taco Bell's Taco Tuesday scalability.How Temporal earns enterprise trust through security, reliability, and scalability.The structure of Temporal's sales team and their focus on long-term customer success.Exciting trends in AI and low-code/no-code development.This episode is brought to you by WorkOS. If you're thinking about selling to enterprise customers, WorkOS can help you add enterprise features like Single Sign On and audit logs. Links: Temporal Temporal GitHub

Today we explore the hidden Biringan City, then discuss one of the oddest conspiracies I have personally experienced . . .   Original Air Date: Sept. 18, 2018   Patreon (Get ad-free episodes, Patreon Discord Access, and more!) https://www.patreon.com/user?u=18482113 PayPal Donation Link https://tinyurl.com/mrxe36ph MERCH STORE!!! https://tinyurl.com/y8zam4o2 Amazon Wish List https://www.amazon.com/hz/wishlist/ls/28CIOGSFRUXAD?ref_=wl_share   Help Promote Dead Rabbit! Dual Flyer https://i.imgur.com/OhuoI2v.jpg "As Above" Flyer https://i.imgur.com/yobMtUp.jpg “Alien Flyer” By TVP VT U https://imgur.com/gallery/aPN1Fnw “QR Code Flyer” by Finn https://imgur.com/a/aYYUMAh   Links: BIRINGAN CITY, Philippines | Invisible City | Engkanto https://www.aswangproject.com/biringan-city/ Mythical Biringan City – Invisible Portal To Another World Where Dangerous Engkantos Reside http://www.ancientpages.com/2018/02/02/mythical-biringan-city-invisible-portal-another-world-dangerous-engkantos-reside/ Biringan city https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biringan_city Biringan City: The Only Known Supernatural Metropolis in the World is in Samar http://www.reach-unlimited.com/p/493840617/biringan-city-the-only-known-supernatural-metropolis-in-the-world-is-in-samar Buliding 7 South Side Fires https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxGRUjnDwLo WTC7 full uncut collapse video 9/11 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkKgLKyhqHk 9/11: Caught on Tape: WTC Building 7 Damaged by Debris from Twin Towers Collapse (Updated) (WTC 7) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEgPNNcdtu4 2011 Norway Attacks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Norway_attacks Elenin: The Ex-Comet https://www.space.com/20100-comet-elenin.html Disappearance of Comet C/2010 X1 (Elenin): Gone with a Whimper, not a Bang https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.00387 'Doomsday' Comet Elenin Zips by Earth in Pieces https://www.space.com/13302-doomsday-comet-elenin-pieces-earth-flyby.html   ----------------------------------------------- Logo Art By Ash Black Opening Song: "Atlantis Attacks" Closing Song: "Bella Royale" Music By Simple Rabbitron 3000 created by Eerbud Thanks to Chris K, Founder Of The Golden Rabbit Brigade Dead Rabbit Archivist Some Weirdo On Twitter AKA Jack YouTube Champ: Stewart Meatball Reddit Champ: TheLast747 The Haunted Mic Arm provided by Chyme Chili Forever Fluffle: Cantillions, Samson, Gregory Gilbertson, Jenny The Cat Foreign Correspondent: Fabio Nerbon Discord Mods: Mason     http://www.DeadRabbit.com Email: DeadRabbitRadio@gmail.com Twitter: https://twitter.com/DeadRabbitRadio Facebook: www.Facebook.com/DeadRabbitRadio TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@deadrabbitradio Dead Rabbit Radio Subreddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/DeadRabbitRadio/ Paranormal News Subreddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/ParanormalNews/ Mailing Address Jason Carpenter PO Box 1363 Hood River, OR 97031 Paranormal, Conspiracy, and True Crime news as it happens! Jason Carpenter breaks the stories they'll be talking about tomorrow, assuming the world doesn't end today. All Contents Of This Podcast Copyright Jason Carpenter 2018 - 2025  

Last time we spoke about the invasion of iwo jima. General LeMay's B-29 bombers targeted Japan, inflicting heavy damage on Kobe and Ota's Nakajima factory, though at a cost of lost aircraft. Meanwhile, U.S. forces prepared for the Iwo Jima assault. On February 19, Marines landed amid intense bombardment, facing fierce Japanese resistance. Progress was slow, with heavy casualties. By February 21, they fought to capture Mount Suribachi. Amidst the chaos, kamikaze attacks struck American carriers, causing significant losses and foreshadowing the brutal battles ahead. In the midst of a relentless rain on February 22, Colonel Liversedge led the 28th Marines in a fierce assault on Mount Suribachi, facing determined Japanese resistance. Despite harsh conditions and significant casualties, the Marines pushed forward. On February 23, they reached the summit, raising the American flag to symbolize their hard-fought victory. The Secretary of the Navy, inspired by the moment, declared it would ensure the Marine Corps' legacy for centuries. As battles continued, the Marines faced heavy losses but remained resolute in their mission. This episode is the fall of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed in Manila, General Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Admiral Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings located at the southeastern edge of the Walled City. Available information led to the conclusion that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City and that the Japanese expected attack from these, the most logical directions. Japanese garrisons in the Legislative, Finance, and Agriculture Buildings just across Padre Burgos Street southeast of Intramuros could cover these approaches. The 37th Division could, of course, take the government buildings before launching an assault on Intramuros, but it would be easier to attack the government buildings after Intramuros fell. Conversely, planners deemed it feasible to strike into Intramuros from the west, since Japanese defenses along the west wall, across Bonifacio Street from the Manila Hotel and the South Port Area, appeared weak. But in this case, American troops would first have to clear the South Port Area and then, advancing from the west, would have to attack toward much of their own supporting artillery. The artillery's best positions for close support were on the north and northeast, across the Pasig, and on the east, in the area south from the General Post Office to the City Hall, and much of the artillery ultimately did fire from these areas. About halfway from the northeast to the northwest corner of Intramuros the ancient wall ended, providing direct access into the Walled City at the Government Mint. The only other obstacle on the north was a low sea wall running along the south bank of the Pasig, and Japanese defenses along the north face appeared weak except at the northeast corner. Planners therefore decided that there would be an excellent chance to execute a successful amphibious assault from the north bank of the Pasig against the north-central side of the Walled City.  Given that the Japanese defenses were strongest on the southern and eastern sides of the Walled City, and that the ancient wall ended at the Government Mint between the northeast and northwest corners of Intramuros, it was decided to initiate an amphibious attack from the north bank of the Pasig River targeting the north-central section of the Walled City, executed by the 129th Regiment with close artillery support. However, aware that the Japanese had established a complex tunnel system for rapid troop movement within Intramuros, General Beightler deemed it essential to conduct a secondary assault on Quezon Gate near the northeastern entrance to keep the Japanese forces off balance and to split their attention. Since the Japanese had fortified this area with strong pillboxes just inside the walls, the division concluded that heavy artillery would be required to create an additional breach in the thick wall just south of Quezon Gate, where the 145th Regiment would launch its attack. Furthermore, as the Japanese could target the advancing troops with enfilade fire from the three government buildings to the south, Allied artillery would need to neutralize these buildings during the assault on Intramuros. Lastly, the 1st Cavalry Brigade positioned to the west and southwest of Intramuros would block any potential escape routes for Japanese forces from the Walled City. So far, General MacArthur had severely restricted the employment of air in the metropolitan area. In late January and early February Marine Corps SBDs had bombed or strafed a few pinpointed targets in the North and South Port Areas and had also hit some obvious Japanese gun positions in the open areas of Luneta Park and Burnham Green. One or two strikes may also have taken place against specific targets within Intramuros, but all in all it appears that planes of the Allied Air Forces flew no more than ten or twelve individual sorties against targets within the city after February 3. Before that time both carrier-based and land-based aircraft had presumably limited their strikes to targets within the port areas and to oil storage facilities in Pandacan and Paco Districts. Of course some bombs had gone astray during these strikes and had caused damage within Intramuros, while additional damage within the Walled City had resulted from both American and Japanese artillery fire the first two weeks of the battle for Manila. When approached with General Griswold's plan to carry out an intensive aerial bombardment against the Walled City, MacArthur once again objected: “The use of air on a part of a city occupied by a friendly and allied population is unthinkable. The inaccuracy of this type of bombardment would result beyond question in the death of thousands of innocent civilians. It is not believed moreover that this would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations. For these reasons I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intramuros district.” However, General MacArthur had previously issued orders limiting air operations in the metropolitan area, leading him to reject this proposal. Not wanting to rely solely on infantry for the assault, Griswold and Beightler decided to organize a significant artillery preparation, as they were not explicitly prohibited from using artillery. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Japanese in Intramuros to surrender or release the numerous Filipino civilians they were holding hostage, Griswold initiated the bombardment of Intramuros on February 17, creating several breaches in the east wall. On February 22, Allied artillery began targeting the north wall to breach it and eliminate a Japanese stronghold at the Government Mint, while additional guns took up positions for the final barrage before the infantry assault the following morning. Between 07:30 and 08:30 on February 23, the Americans executed the last preparatory bombardment, effectively damaging the walls of Intramuros and covering much of the interior. Once the supporting fire ceased, the infantry assault commenced, with the 3rd Battalion, 129th Regiment swiftly crossing the Pasig River without opposition and advancing through the Government Mint into Intramuros. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 145th Regiment climbed over the breach south of Quezon Gate and entered through the gate unopposed, quickly moving southwest toward Letran University. Ten minutes into the assault, Griswold's artillery resumed fire for the next half hour, deploying high explosives, smoke, and white phosphorus across a 100-yard-wide area between the east and west walls. This aimed to seal off the southern third of Intramuros, preventing the Japanese forces there from observing movements to the north or sending reinforcements. The total artillery and mortar fire supporting the assault amounted to 230 tons, equivalent to over 11,650 rounds. By 08:50, the 129th and 145th Regiments connected at Letran University, with the 129th advancing toward Beaterio Street and Fort Santiago against minimal resistance, while the 145th cleared Letran University and secured the first two blocks southwest of Quezon Gate. At 10:45, the 1st Battalion of the 145th Regiment moved through Parian Gate and headed south. As American troops pushed deeper into Intramuros, the Japanese began to recover from the artillery bombardment, offering sporadic resistance from isolated machine-gun and rifle positions. Nonetheless, the 129th successfully cleared the west wall north of Beaterio Street and captured Fort Santiago in the afternoon. However, the 145th had to halt its advance about four blocks southwest of Quezon Gate as the Japanese started releasing nearly 3,000 civilian hostages from San Augustin and Del Monico Churches. Once the civilian evacuation was complete, American tanks and self-propelled artillery targeted Japanese positions within those churches and other strongholds in the southwestern section of Intramuros. Despite the efforts, the troops were unable to reach the south or west walls before nightfall due to fierce resistance. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, along with the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry, began clearing the South Port Area, facing relatively light opposition except at one strongpoint. Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, and elements of the 148th Regiment contained the enemy at the government buildings. On February 24, while the 129th was finishing operations at Fort Santiago, the 145th continued its offensive, successfully cornering the last pockets of resistance in its area into the Aquarium, situated in a bastion at the southwest corner of Intramuros. Although the resistance was fierce in this location, a tunnel linking the bastion to the main wall was unexpectedly left unguarded, allowing Company C to break through into the Aquarium with ease. The final assault commenced in the afternoon, resulting in 115 Japanese casualties as the last organized resistance within Intramuros was overcome. In total, approximately 1,000 Japanese were killed, and 25 were captured during the assault on Intramuros, with the Americans suffering 25 killed and 265 wounded. Concurrently, the cavalrymen completed the clearing of the South Port Area and turned their attention to the government buildings, which would necessitate another intensive preparatory bombardment.  The imposing, columned façade of the Philippine Commonwealth's Legislative Building--the Philippine Capitol--fronted on Padre Burgos Street opposite the southeast corner of Intramuros and lay 150 yards south of the City Hall. About 100 yards south of the Legislative Building was the Bureau of Finance, and another 250 yards to the south-southeast, near the intersection of General Luna and San Luis Streets, lay the main building of the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce. Architecturally similar to the old Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington DC, the three government structures were modern, earthquake-proof edifices constructed of heavily reinforced concrete. The oblong Legislative Building, with wings four stories high and a central portion rising another two and a half floors, was constructed around two open courtyards. The Finance and Agriculture Buildings, both five-story trapezoids, each featured a central courtyard. The buildings were strong not only by virtue of their construction but because all approaches to them led across wide open ground. Sandbag emplacements and barricades of other types blocked all readily accessible doors and windows, and window-emplaced machine guns covered all approaches. Despite the fact that the Japanese in the three buildings had advantages of position and elevation that permitted them to endanger American and Filipino movements over large areas of Manila, the 14th Corps and the 37th Division at first considered starving the Japanese garrison out. But the two headquarters soon decided this would take too long. Information from prisoners and Filipino hostages who had escaped from the buildings indicated that the Japanese garrisons in the three structures had sufficient strength, ammunition, food, and water to withstand a protracted siege. On February 26, after an hour of final artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion, 148th Regiment entered the ground floor of the Legislative Building from the rear, while the 5th Cavalry attacked the Agriculture Building; however, both units were successfully repelled by the determined defenders. The following day, after a failed attempt to smoke the Japanese out of the Legislative Building, heavy artillery was used to demolish the north and south wings, leaving only the damaged central section, which was subsequently cleared by the infantry. At the same time, the 5th Cavalry cleared out the apartment building and several nearby structures in preparation for another attack on the Agriculture Building, which commenced on February 28 following a three-hour artillery bombardment that caused significant portions of the building to collapse. Facing no initial resistance, the cavalrymen quickly accessed the remnants of the first floor but soon encountered strong opposition from pockets of resistance at the northwest and southeast corners. With support from tanks and armed with small arms, bazookas, and portable flamethrowers, the 5th Cavalry managed to clear the above-ground debris by nightfall, although a few Japanese soldiers remained hidden in basement areas. Ultimately, on March 1, after a failed appeal for surrender, demolitions along with burning gasoline and oil eliminated the last of the Japanese resistance. During this time, artillery, tanks, and tank destroyers relentlessly bombarded the Finance Building from various angles. Eventually, the 1st Battalion of the 148th Regiment would clear the remnants of this building during their final assaults on March 2 and 3. Late on March 3, Griswold joyfully informed Krueger that organized resistance in the Manila area had come to an end. The cost of reclaiming Manila was significant, with over 1,000 Americans killed and 5,500 wounded in the metropolitan area between February 3 and March 3. In contrast, the Japanese suffered approximately 16,000 fatalities in and around Manila. During periods of calm in the fighting, Japanese troops often vented their anger and frustration on the city's civilians, committing acts of violent mutilation, rape, and massacres in schools, hospitals, and convents. This led to the deaths of at least 100,000 Filipino civilians, both from deliberate actions by the Japanese during the Manila massacre and from artillery and aerial bombardments by American and Japanese forces. If you listened to the very first episode of this podcast series, I actually began it with what is known as the Manila massacre. During lulls in the battle for control of Manila, Japanese troops took their anger and frustration out on the civilians in the city. Violent mutilations, rapes, and massacres occurred in schools, hospitals and convents, including San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, Santo Domingo Church, Manila Cathedral, Paco Church, St. Paul's Convent, and St. Vincent de Paul Church. The Bayview Hotel was used as a designated "rape center". General Yamashita was convicted as a war criminal for the Manila massacre, although Admiral Iwabuchi's marines had committed the atrocities and Yamashita had earlier ordered him to evacuate Manila.  By the end of the Battle of Manila, the public transportation system no longer existed; the water supply and sewage systems needed extensive repairs; the electric power facilities did not function; most of the streets needed repaving; and 39 out of 100 or more large and small bridges had been destroyed, including the 6 over the Pasig River. The University of the Philippines and the Philippine General Hospital were largely irreparable. Lower class residential districts north of the Pasig and upper class apartments south of the river had been destroyed; the Philippine Commonwealth's government's center had been wiped out; the 400-year-old landmark of Intramuros had been nearly razed; severe damage had been inflicted on the economically important installations in the North and South Port Areas; and the industrialized Paco and Pandacan Districts had been badly battered. Many buildings still standing would ultimately have to be torn down as unsafe for occupancy. Millions upon millions of dollars' worth of damage had been done and, as a final shocking note of tragedy, an estimated 100000 Filipino civilians had lost their lives during the battle. However, Manila was officially liberated, marking the end of nearly three years of Japanese military occupation in the Philippines. Following Manila's fall, Krueger aimed to eliminate the Shimbu and Shobu Groups to finalize the liberation of Luzon. Meanwhile, MacArthur deemed it crucial to establish a safe, direct shipping route through the central Philippines to support the creation of large air, naval, and logistical bases on Luzon. Consequently, he instructed the 6th Army to secure southern Luzon and the Bicol Peninsula while also ordering General Eichelberger's 8th Army to seize the islands in the Visayan Passages and the northern part of Samar. To facilitate the southern Philippines Campaign, MacArthur reassigned the 40th and 41st Divisions, the 19th and 34th Regiments of the 24th Division, and the 503rd Parachute Regiment back to the 8th Army. Additionally, he designated the 37th Division to garrison Manila. With the 43rd Division sent south to replace the 40th at Clark Field, Krueger assigned the recently arrived 33rd Division, led by Major-General Percy Clarkson, to take control of the Damortis-Rosario sector. Meanwhile, as the 188th Glider Regiment cleared Ternate Island, Krueger also decided to deploy the 11th Airborne Division and the 158th Regiment to secure the northern shores of the Visayan Passages and open Batangas and Balayan Bays. However, this left only the 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regiment available for operations against the Shimbu Group, leading Krueger to reluctantly redeploy the 6th Division south to reinforce the 14th Corps, leaving just the 25th, 32nd, and 33rd Divisions under the 1st Corps for operations in northern Luzon. After making these adjustments, Krueger and Griswold began strategizing their offensive eastward against General Yokoyama's Shimbu Group, which had recently received the Noguchi Detachment from the Bicol Peninsula. To ensure the security and recovery of the Manila Bay area, General Patrick's 6th Division was tasked with first capturing Wawa Dam and its pipeline connections, followed by securing Ipo Dam and its related facilities, essential for meeting Manila's water needs. Meanwhile, General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was assigned to secure the Antipolo-Tagig region. Between February 20 and 22, even before the fierce fighting in Manila began to ease, the 7th Cavalry crossed the Marikina River to take control of Taytay and then ventured into the Sierra Madre foothills. The 8th Cavalry followed suit, crossing the river to secure Tagig. On February 23, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced east toward Antipolo, but General Noguchi effectively utilized artillery and conducted small-scale nightly infiltration attacks, successfully harassing and delaying the cavalrymen, who could only measure their progress in feet. Noguchi's effective passive defense meant that by March 4, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was still a mile and a half from Antipolo, having incurred heavy casualties during this frustrating advance. Among the wounded was General Mudge, who was temporarily replaced by Hoffman as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. On February 22, the 6th Division also began crossing the Marikina River, with the 20th Regiment fording at Marikina town and the 63rd Regiment crossing at Montalban and San Mateo. Facing no resistance, the 20th Regiment advanced a mile into the steep, grassy hills northeast of Marikina, while the 63rd probed into the high ground east of San Mateo by the evening of February 23. The troops initiated an assault on General Kobayashi's primary defenses at Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, but made minimal progress before the 1st Regiment arrived from Bataan on February 25. With this new reinforcement, Patrick launched a coordinated attack involving three regiments against Pacawagan and Mataba. However, by March 4, they had only secured a tenuous foothold on the northern crest of Pacawagan, as the efforts of the 1st and 20th Regiments were entirely unsuccessful.   Meanwhile, noticing an uptick in guerrilla activity in the Bontoc and Baguio areas, which indicated a potential major enemy offensive on Baguio, and considering the possibility of an airborne assault in the Cagayan Valley, General Yamashita began reorganizing his forces while preparing the defenses of the triangular redoubt in northern Luzon. He kept most of the 103rd Division stationed in the Aparri and Vigan sectors, assigned the 177th Independent Battalion to secure the naval air base at Tuguegarao, and started organizing eight provisional companies from the remnants of the 2nd Parachute Group at Echague. He tasked the 10th Division with defending the Salacsac-Balete Pass sector to the last man, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Tank Division at Dupax to reform as an understrength infantry division, and relocated the 105th Division to Bagabag, where it would be bolstered by the 10th Regiment. Additionally, he assigned these three divisions to Major-General Konuma Haruo's self-sufficient Bambang Branch, transferred the 19th Division to the Bontoc area to combat the enemy guerrillas, tasked the Hayashi Detachment with holding San Fernando, began moving the worn-out 58th Independent Mixed Brigade north to defend Route 9, and ordered the fatigued 23rd Division to continue containing the enemy in the Rosario-Baguio sector. General Swift's 1st Corps, which had recently lost two divisions, was focusing its main efforts against Baguio. Clarkson's 33rd Division was set to advance north along Route 11, while General Gill's 32nd Division would move northwest through the Ambayabang, Agno, and Arodogat valleys from the south and southeast. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division planned to launch a holding attack on the Bambang front. However, in mid-February, as Clarkson's forces continued to pressure Japanese troops entrenched along the Hill 600-Hill 1500 ridgeline, they learned that General Sato's withdrawal to the north was already in progress to bolster the San Fernando front. Additionally, the 130th and 136th Regiments successfully cleared the last Japanese forces from the north-central part of the ridgeline by February 22, although they were unable to capture the Hill 600 complex. At the same time, the 32nd and 25th Divisions conducted extensive patrols in their areas, discovering that the Japanese were guarding every approach to the north as various units made contact with Japanese outposts. During this period, the Americans also identified the Baguio-Aritao supply road. Severing this link in the Japanese defensive network would provide the 1st Corps with a significant tactical advantage. Given that the Baguio end of the supply road was more heavily defended and that breaking through to Aritao would threaten the critical Bambang and Bagabag positions, Krueger and Swift decided that the 25th and 32nd Divisions would concentrate their efforts on the Bambang front, while the Baguio front would be maintained in a holding capacity. Volckmann's missions as assigned by 6th Army, which assumed control of USAFIP(NL) on January 13, were to gather intelligence, ambush Japanese patrols, seize or destroy Japanese supplies, disrupt Japanese lines of communication, and block Japanese routes of withdrawal into and exit from the Cagayan Valley. It was not, apparently, initially intended that Volckmann's force would engage in sustained efforts against major Japanese units, and there seems to have been little hope that Volckmann's, or any other guerrilla unit, would ever become effective combat organizations. The most help General MacArthur and Krueger probably expected was in the form of harassing raids, sabotage, and intelligence. But Volckmann--and other guerrilla leaders on Luzon as well--interpreted his missions as broadly as his strength and armament permitted. By the end of February USAFIP(NL) had cleared much of the west coast of Luzon north of San Fernando and also controlled the north coast west of Aparri. Volckmann had rendered Route 11 between Baguio and Tuguegarao and Route 4 from Libtong to Bagabag virtually impassable to the Japanese. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Yamashita moved the 19th Division north had been to regain control over the two vital highways so that supplies could continue moving into the final redoubt. While USAFIP(NL) did not possess sufficient strength to attack major Japanese concentrations or to hold out against large-scale punitive expeditions, it had diverted and pinned down Japanese forces that could undoubtedly have been used to better advantage elsewhere. It would appear that by mid-February USAFIP(NL) had accomplished far more than MacArthur or Krueger had either expected or hoped. Meanwhile, the 121st Regiment secured the highway from Vigan south to Libtong, with Company L capturing Cervantes and pushing the 357th Independent Battalion into the Bessang Pass. Elements of the 121st then shifted their focus to San Fernando, which they attempted to attack unsuccessfully in late February and early March. Following Swift's new strategies, the 33rd Division began patrolling the approaches to Baguio in the last week of February, successfully overrunning the last Japanese positions on Hill 600 and in the Arodogat Valley. Along Route 11, the 71st Regiment executed a successful fighting withdrawal, while American patrols along the coast occupied Agoo and advanced to Pugo with minimal resistance, only to encounter the first sections of the Tuba Trail defended by elements of the 64th Regiment. On the main front, the 25th Division commenced its advance to Puncan on February 21, while the 32nd Division began its push up the Villa Verde Trail toward Santa Fe. The 127th Regiment broke through the trail's outpost line on February 24; the 35th Regiment advanced unopposed along Route 100, reaching Carranglan on February 26; the 161st Regiment targeted high ground overlooking Puncan from the west and successfully secured the trail junction on February 28, diverting the enemy's attention; and the 27th Regiment pushed north along Route 5, facing fierce resistance while clearing the Lumboy area on February 27. On Villa Verde, the 127th Regiment advanced to the Cabalisiaan River crossing by March 1, where they once again defeated the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment. After leaving one battalion to secure the crossing, the 127th continued their advance and encountered the weakened Japanese defenders on March 3. Recognizing the threat to the Salacsac Pass, Konuma promptly sent reinforcements to the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment and ordered General Iwanaka's recently reorganized 2nd Tank Division to prepare for deployment to the Salacsac Pass, taking command of all troops along the Villa Verde Trail. While these reinforcements were en route, the 127th Regiment continued to assault the remaining positions of the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment, ultimately reaching the western entrance of Salacsac Pass on March 5. Meanwhile, to the south, a battalion from the 35th Regiment descended a rugged trail into Puncan from the northeast and secured the heights overlooking the damaged town on March 1. The next day, as patrols entered the deserted Puncan, the rest of the regiment cautiously advanced west along Route 100 from Carranglan, occupying Digdig without resistance on March 3. Over the following two days, organized resistance began to crumble throughout the Lumboy-Puncan area, with Mullins' three regiments successfully connecting at Puncan and Digdig after the encirclement of a 1,250-man enemy force. Concerned about these developments, Konuma quickly decided to bolster the 10th Division with the Takachiho Unit and the majority of the 10th Regiment. Additionally, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley on February 25, successfully reaching Lawican by March 5. In response to this new threat, Yamashita swiftly directed his reserve 16th Reconnaissance Regiment to secure the upper reaches of the Ambayabang. Finally, to the south, the Americal and 24th Divisions were tasked with initiating operations to secure the Visayan Passages. Consequently, on February 19, the 1st Battalion of the 182nd Regiment landed on Capul Island and launched an assault on Biri Island the next day. After discovering other unoccupied islets near Samar, the battalion established a base at the northwestern tip of Samar, ultimately defeating the last organized resistance in that region by March 1. Meanwhile, elements of the 19th Regiment landed on Verde Island on February 23, managing to secure the island by March 3. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Regiment made an unopposed landing on Lubang Island on February 28, and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Regiment successfully captured Ticao and Burias Islands on March 3. Additionally, on the morning of February 23, a task force comprising the 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment, a Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon from the 11th Airborne Division, several guerrilla groups led by Lieutenant-Colonel Honorio Guerrero, along with supporting artillery, tank destroyers, and amphibious tractors, executed a carefully coordinated rescue of 2,147 internees from an internment camp near Los Baños on Laguna de Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 188th Glider Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Soule, launched a diversionary ground attack from the west, while the majority of the 1st Battalion of the 511th Parachute Regiment crossed Laguna de Bay using amphibious tractors. Company B of the 511th Parachute Regiment parachuted directly into the camp, and the Reconnaissance Platoon along with the guerrillas, who had already infiltrated the area, created chaos throughout the camp. The task force eliminated the Japanese garrison of about 250 guards and managed to escape through enemy-held territory before the Fuji Force could mount a counterattack. The casualties were minimal: only 3 Americans and 2 Filipinos lost their lives, while 2 Americans and 4 Filipinos were injured. However, starting two nights after the raid, the 17th Regiment, along with Kempeitai police and Filipino Ganaps, began terror raids in the surrounding barrios, resulting in the deaths of up to 1,500 Filipino civilians over the next few nights. It was now time to leave the Philippines and return to New Guinea to support the ongoing Australian campaign in Aitape-Wewak. Previously, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade had fought its way to Malin and Abau, while Colonel Buttrose's 2/5th Battalion secured Perembil, Asiling, Samisai, and Maharingi. On January 12, Brigadier Moten directed the battalion to initiate a three-pronged offensive toward Luwaite, Bulamita, and Bombisima. The advance was rapid, as patrols encountered only small enemy groups, and all three objectives were successfully captured by the end of January. After the capture of Malin, the 2/8th Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled the rugged terrain between Nimbum Creek and the upper Danmap for three weeks, facing some resistance on Long Ridge. Due to this pressure, General Aotsu's force received additional reinforcements in the latter half of January before withdrawing to join the defenses of the 20th Division, while General Mano's 41st Division retreated to Balif and Salata. Meanwhile, General Stevens had ordered Brigadier Roy King's 16th Brigade to relieve the 19th at the Danmap, but catastrophic floods hindered the completion of this relief in the south before the month ended. In the north, the 2/1st Battalion took over from the 2/11th Battalion on January 24 and began advancing patrols along Nambut Hill, where they faced significant resistance. Due to these patrols, the Australians launched a company attack on February 4, which the defenders easily repelled. Following a heavy air bombardment, the enemy stronghold was captured on February 7, and another company took McNeil's Creek four days later. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion initiated an assault on Long Ridge, inflicting considerable casualties on the enemy at Cory's Spur. At this juncture, Stevens decided to sequentially capture But, Dagua, and Wewak, as well as Maprik in the mountains, and to push eastward. The 16th Brigade was the first to advance to Wank Creek and then to the Anumb River. King promptly sent the 2/1st Battalion to secure Nambut Creek while the 2/3rd Battalion moved to the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line. By February 18, the 2/1st Battalion had fully secured Nambut Hill, with one company advancing along the coast and pushing the Japanese across the creek the next day. By February 22, the area up to Balam Creek was occupied, and barges had delivered supplies at Wank Creek for four days. The following day, they reached the Anumb River and began patrolling toward Sowom while a sloop bombarded enemy positions along the coast. Finally, on February 28, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the weary 2/1st Battalion and started preparing for operations against But. Simultaneously, the 2/3rd Battalion successfully established the Wolhuk Creek-Una Creek line and sent patrols northward to connect with both the 2/1st and 2/2nd Battalions. In early February, the 2/5th Battalion launched an attack on Salata, Balif, and Balaga, sending three companies southward. Salata and Bombeta were captured on February 3, followed by Balif three days later, while Balaga remained successfully defended. The 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment was tasked with supporting Moten's advance toward Maprik, prompting the 2/10th Commando Squadron to move to Ami. After the Australians secured the Balaga-Numango area on February 13, Buttrose dispatched two companies to capture Barangabandangi and Malahun, which fell by February 17. At this time, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had also advanced northeast of Ami to Walahuta, Kualigem, and Amahaur, resulting in several Japanese casualties. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Commando Squadron conducted patrols deep into the Atob River and the headwaters of the Screw River. The 2/5th Battalion was preparing for relief by the 2/7th Battalion but first needed to fend off a strong counterattack at Malahun on February 23. During the 2/5th's advance, most of the 40th Division withdrew south into a densely populated garden area bordered by the Nanu and Amuk Rivers. This southern flank could not be overlooked as the Australians moved toward Maprik, so Moten sent a company from the 2/6th Battalion to advance through M'Bras, Asanakor, Yubanakuor, and then east to the heavily fortified Sinahau villages, pushing the enemy toward Maprik for destruction. Additionally, a rumor was spread among the locals that the commandos would advance on Maprik via Ami, which successfully prompted the Japanese to reposition most of their forces to the north and northeast. Meanwhile, by early March, the 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the 2/5th Battalion and successfully occupied Asanakor on March 7, followed by Inimbi on March 8, Yubanakuor on March 9, and Balangabadabil, Ilahop, and Armimin on March 10. To the north, the 2/2nd Battalion also finished its relief at the Anumb. Additionally, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion and the 2/9th Commando Squadron took over from the 2/3rd Battalion in the mountainous region. The latter began advancing towards Arohemi on March 4, where they encountered a strong Japanese force that resisted for three days. After a significant airstrike, the Australians managed to clear the area west of the Anumb River by March 9. Simultaneously, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward to Simbi Creek, successfully clearing the area and reaching the Ninahau River by March 12. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila is finally over. The capital of the Philippines came at a terrible cost for the Americans, Japanese and innocent Filipino civilians. It would be only a matter of time until the Americans moped up the Philippines and continued onwards to the Japanese home islands.

Join Amanda and Samar as they dive into the multidimensionality of the sign of the Sea Goat, featuring explorations of sustainability vs regeneration, the tender work of connecting with ancestors and legacy, ancient ruins, cultural conditioning and carrying the burden, time, the interconnectedness of joy and suffering and the traditional significations associated with Cap. About our Guest: Samar Jade(they/them) is a Black, queer, and gender-expansive human whose work is rooted in helping others to deepen their capacity to hold space for their complexities. As the Ensoulment Doula, they use astrology, archetypes, and somatic experiencing,to support others in their underworld journeys. In addition, Samar is also a writer. Their first full-length publication, Blue Violet: Haint Spaces, will debut in Fall of 2025.You can find Samar at ensoulmentdoula.com or on Insta or Threads under ensoulment.doula.Links:Amanda's website + newsletter opt-in: aquarianspirals.comAmanda's Patreon: patreon.com/aquarianspiralsAmanda's substack: ⁠⁠⁠theastrophile.substack.com⁠Invoking the Beings of the Three TimesLiving Astrologies Conference

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/african-studies

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Since Kenya's invasion of Somalia in 2011, the Kenyan state has been engaged in direct combat with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab, conducting airstrikes in southern Somalia and deploying heavy-handed police tactics at home. As the hunt for suspects has expanded within Kenya, Kenyan Muslims have been subject to disappearances and extrajudicial killings at the hands of U.S.-trained Kenyan police. War-Making as Worldmaking: Kenya, the United States, and the War on Terror (Stanford University Press, 2024) by Dr. Samar Al-Bulushi explores the entanglement of militarism, imperialism, and liberal-democratic governance in East Africa today. Dr. Al-Bulushi argues that Kenya's emergence as a key player in the "War on Terror" is closely linked—but not reducible to—the U.S. military's growing proclivity to outsource the labor of war. Attending to the cultural politics of security, Dr. Al-Bulushi illustrates that the war against Al-Shabaab has become a means to produce new fantasies, emotions, and subjectivities about Kenya's place in the world. Meanwhile, Kenya's alignment with the U.S. provides cover for the criminalization and policing of the country's Muslim minority population. How is life lived in a place that is not understood to be a site of war, yet is often experienced as such by its targets? This book weaves together multiple scales of analysis, asking what a view from East Africa can tell us about the shifting configurations and expansive geographies of post-9/11 imperial warfare. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose new book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Priyanka Karki, a renowned actor, writer, director, producer, and philanthropist, is set to captivate audiences with her upcoming horror film Mummy. Directed by Samar Niraula, a visionary filmmaker known for his storytelling prowess, Mummy is one of Nepal's most anticipated horror movies, promising to redefine the genre in Nepali cinema.

Josh Sebo (COO of OfferVault), Adam Young (CEO of Ringba), industry legend Harrison Gevirtz and special guest Samar Hussain (CEO of Ecomm Producers) discuss: - Samar's journey from Call Centers to dominating the South Florida Insurance scene. - How is AI Transforming Call Centers? - Cultivating Trust - ColombiaCon2 - Resolving Conflicts through True Leadership - The Art of Balancing Personal and Professional Relationships Follow Us: OfferVault: WEBSITE: https://www.offervault.com/ FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/offervault INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/offervaultmarketing/ TWITTER: https://www.twitter.com/offervault LINKEDIN: https://www.linkedin.com/company/offer-vault/ Adam Young: RINGBA: https://www.ringba.com RINGBA's INNER CIRCLE: https://try.ringba.com/inner-circle/ FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/ringba INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/adamyoung/ TWITTER: https://www.twitter.com/arbitrage LINKEDIN: https://www.linkedin.com/in/capitalist Harrison Gevirtz: INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/affiliate/ LINKEDIN: https://www.linkedin.com/in/harrisongevirtz/ Samar Hussain: ECOMM PRODUCERS: https://ecommproducers.com/ INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/insta_samar/ LINKEDIN: https://www.linkedin.com/in/samar-hussain-6623b978/

EuroLeague, finalmente l'annuncio della Final Four di Abu DhabiVirtus Bologna, arriva Justin Holiday in prova, cosa fa Zanetti? Real Madrid: ufficiale l'arrivo di Fernando, problemi per Dennis Smith Jr? Il Barcelona continua la ricerca di un playmakerL'ALBA Berlino cede Samar in prestito a Gran Canaria Il Panathinaikos forte su Jilson BangoMaccabi Tel Aviv, idea Alondes Williams John Egbunu firma a Napoli Bulleri confermato nuovo allenatore di Sassari Joan Plaza nuvo head coach di Andorra Diventa un supporter di questo podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/backdoor-podcast--4175169/support.

SummaryIn this episode, Samar and Jamie discuss various resources for independent inventors. They highlight the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website as a top resource, which provides information on patent basics, patent scams, and free services offered by the Patent Office. They also mention the Inventor Assistance Center and the Pro Bono Program, which are available through the USPTO. Other resources discussed include search tools like patents.google.com, PQ AI, Pantzilla, WIPO, and the European Patent Office. They also mention local inventor groups and inventor clubs, law schools and nonprofits that help inventors, and the book 'One Simple Idea' by Stephen Key as a great resource for patent licensing.TakeawaysThe USPTO website is a valuable resource for independent inventors. It provides information on patent basics, scams, and free services.Search tools like patents.google.com, PQ AI, Pantzilla, WIPO, and the European Patent Office can help with patent searches.Local inventor groups and clubs offer a supportive community and access to experienced inventors.Law schools and nonprofits can provide pro bono assistance to inventors.The book 'One Simple Idea' by Stephen Key is recommended for those interested in patent licensing.Chapters00:00 Introduction and Purpose of the Episode01:24 Top Resources for Independent Inventors05:37 Useful Patent Search Tools10:21 Joining Inventor Groups and Clubs13:39 Pro Bono Assistance from Law Schools and Nonprofits15:07 Recommended Book for Patent LicensingResourceshttps://www.uspto.gov/https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/inventors-entrepreneurs-resourceshttps://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/official-gazette/official-gazette-patentshttps://www.uspto.gov/patents/basics/using-legal-services/pro-bono/patent-pro-bono-programhttps://patents.google.com/https://projectpq.ai/https://docs.ip-tools.org/patzilla/https://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/https://www.epo.org/en/searching-for-patents/technical/espacenethttps://inventleader.org/inventor-groups/https://inventright.com/books/one-simple-idea/

41Cuando supo Jesús que habían oído los fariseos que Jesús hacía más discípulos que Juan y que bautizaba 2(aunque Jesús no bautizaba, sino sus discípulos), 3dejó Judea y partió de nuevo para Galilea. 4Era necesario que él pasara a través de Samaría. 5Llegó Jesús a una ciudad de Samaría llamada Sicar, cerca del campo que dio Jacob a su hijo José; 6allí estaba el pozo de Jacob. Jesús, cansado del camino, estaba allí sentado junto al pozo. Era hacia la hora sexta. 7Llega una mujer de Samaría a sacar agua, y Jesús le dice: «Dame de beber». 8Sus discípulos se habían ido al pueblo a comprar comida. 9La samaritana le dice: «¿Cómo tú, siendo judío, me pides de beber a mí, que soy samaritana?» (porque los judíos no se tratan con los samaritanos). 10Jesús le contestó: «Si conocieras el don de Dios y quién es el que te dice “dame de beber”, le pedirías tú, y él te daría agua viva». 11La mujer le dice: «Señor, si no tienes cubo, y el pozo es hondo, ¿de dónde sacas el agua viva?; 12¿eres tú más que nuestro padre Jacob, que nos dio este pozo, y de él bebieron él y sus hijos y sus ganados?». 13Jesús le contestó: «El que bebe de esta agua vuelve a tener sed; 14pero el que beba del agua que yo le daré nunca más tendrá sed: el agua que yo le daré se convertirá dentro de él en un surtidor de agua que salta hasta la vida eterna». 15La mujer le dice: «Señor, dame esa agua: así no tendré más sed, ni tendré que venir aquí a sacarla». 16Él le dice: «Anda, llama a tu marido y vuelve». 17La mujer le contesta: «No tengo marido». Jesús le dice: «Tienes razón, que no tienes marido: 18has tenido ya cinco, y el de ahora no es tu marido. En eso has dicho la verdad». 19La mujer le dice: «Señor, veo que tú eres un profeta. 20Nuestros padres dieron culto en este monte, y vosotros decís que el sitio donde se debe dar culto está en Jerusalén». 21Jesús le dice: «Créeme, mujer: se acerca la hora en que ni en este monte ni en Jerusalén adoraréis al Padre. 22Vosotros adoráis a uno que no conocéis; nosotros adoramos a uno que conocemos, porque la salvación viene de los judíos. 23Pero se acerca la hora, ya está aquí, en que los verdaderos adoradores adorarán al Padre en espíritu y verdad, porque el Padre desea que lo adoren así. 24Dios es espíritu, y los que lo adoran deben hacerlo en espíritu y verdad». 25

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Luzon. As Operation Mike 1 commenced, General Swift's 1st Corps prepared to assault Lingayen Gulf while General Griswold's 14th Corps rehearsed at Huon Gulf. Despite successful diversionary strikes, Japanese forces anticipated an invasion. On January 2, enemy ships were spotted heading towards Luzon, confirming fears of a large-scale operation. Kamikaze attacks intensified, damaging Allied vessels, including the USS Long, which sank after being hit. Amidst bombardments, Filipino citizens demonstrated resilience despite the destruction, reflecting their loyalty and hope during the turmoil. As dawn broke on January 9, Kinkaid's amphibious convoys approached Lingayen Gulf, initiating a fierce assault. Preceded by heavy bombardments, American forces landed on the beaches, facing minimal resistance. The 14th Corps advanced toward key locations, while the 1st Corps secured strategic positions despite enduring sniper fire. By nightfall, they established a significant beachhead. Despite sporadic Japanese counterattacks, American troops pressed forward, and reinforcements were deployed to maintain momentum. The stage was set for a crucial campaign in Luzon. This episode is the South China Sea Raid Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, the 1st and 14th Corps had just successfully established a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf. On January 11, General Krueger further reinforced his position by landing additional reserves, aiming to effectively confront the formidable enemy forces entrenched in the eastern hills. Concurrently, Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet units made their entrance into the South China Sea to execute an ambitious raid known as Operation Gratitude. This operation was prompted by misleading intelligence reports suggesting that the hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay. In response, Halsey ordered Admiral Bogan's Task Group 38.2 to launch an assault on these supposed targets. This task group was primarily composed of the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, which were directed to bombard the bay and eliminate any Japanese vessels that had sustained damage from prior airstrikes. To enhance their operational capabilities, Halsey established Task Group 38.5, specifically designed for night operations, which included the night-capable carriers Enterprise and Independence. On January 12, aircraft from these carriers were deployed for a predawn reconnaissance mission over Cam Ranh Bay and its adjacent waters in search of enemy targets. Despite their efforts, the search yielded no results, indicating that the earlier intelligence had been inaccurate. Nevertheless, all three carrier groups proceeded with their planned strikes at 07:30, while the surface action group advanced toward Cam Ranh. Halsey's strategic gamble proved to be remarkably successful. Although the Ise and Hyuga were not present in the bay, American aviators discovered a wealth of enemy shipping, including three significant Japanese convoys. Sherman's TG 38.3 encountered the most valuable target off Qui Nhon north of Cam Ranh. This was convoy Hi-86 with nine merchants and a heavy escort. The convoy had departed Cape St Jacques on January 9 and was headed north. The escort comprised light cruiser Kashii and five kaibokan. Late on January 11, it reached Qui Nhon Bay and anchored. After leaving Qui Nhon Bay, it was discovered by TG 38.3. In two large attacks, aircraft from Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley, and San Jacinto laid waste to the convoy. None of the nine merchant ships in the convoy survived this onslaught. Cargo ships Yoshu Maru and Eiman Maru (loaded with bauxite and raw rubber), along with tanker San Luis Maru, were sunk. The other six ships were damaged and forced to beach. Otsusan Maru (a cargo ship converted to tanker), passenger-cargo ship Tatebe Maru, cargo ship Kyokuun Maru, cargo ship Yusei Maru, ore carrier Tatsubato Maru, and cargo ship Banshu Maru No. 63 all became constructive total losses. The escort for this large convoy met a similar fate. Light cruiser Kashii was hit amidships by a torpedo in the early afternoon. This was followed by two bomb hits aft that detonated her depth-charge magazine. Kashii sank stern first with 621 members of her crew; only 19 survived. CD-23 was attacked north of Qui Nhon and sunk with her entire crew of 155 officers and men. CD-51 suffered the same fate. After she blew up and sank, her depth charges detonated with fatal consequences for any survivors; 159 men were lost. From the entire convoy, only kaibokans Daito and Ukuru, and corvette CD-27 survived, albeit in a damaged state. As a result, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 conducted an impressive total of 984 strike missions throughout the day. This relentless assault led to the sinking of the light cruiser Kashii, two minesweepers, eight kaibokans, two subchasers, five transport ships, fourteen cargo vessels, and nine oilers. Additionally, four kaibokans, one subchaser, three transports, four cargo ships, and two oilers were damaged. This operation marked the highest number of ships sunk by airstrikes in a single day during the war, showcasing the effectiveness of the American air campaign and the critical role of intelligence in naval warfare. In addition to inflicting significant damage on Japanese shipping, the aviators under Admiral Halsey achieved remarkable success by claiming the destruction of 113 enemy aircraft, both in the air and on the ground, while sustaining the loss of 23 American aircraft. The impact of these operations extended beyond aerial engagements; critical infrastructure was also targeted. Airfields, docks, and oil storage facilities located between Tourane and Saigon suffered considerable damage. Notably, the railway station in Nha Trang and a vital bridge on the route connecting Saigon to Bien Hoa were also affected, disrupting transportation and supply lines.   Meanwhile, Bogan's surface strike group was unable to locate any Japanese vessels during their operations and instead focused their firepower on bombarding Cam Ranh Bay, further demonstrating the ongoing conflict's intensity. Turning to the situation in Luzon, the 1st and 14th Corps were poised to advance their offensives. To the west, the 185th Regiment and the 40th Reconnaissance Troop initiated a push toward the recently vacated Port Sual. The 160th Regiment maintained a watchful presence at Aguilar, while patrols from the 148th Regiment ventured into towns occupied by guerrilla forces, specifically Urbiztondo and Bayambang. In the eastern sector, the 6th Division was temporarily held back to prevent the creation of a potentially hazardous gap along the front of the 1st Corps. However, the reinforced 43rd Division continued its advance against the most formidable Japanese defenses encountered on Luzon to date. Along the coastline, the 158th Regiment dispatched patrols into Damortis, discovering the town largely deserted. The 172nd Regiment attempted an attack on Hill 580, which ultimately proved unsuccessful, while the 63rd Regiment was deployed to close the widening gap between the 158th and 172nd Regiments. The primary objective of these coordinated efforts was to defeat Major-General Sato Bunzo's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and secure control of the Damortis-Rosario road. The Damortis-Rosario road, a 2-lane, concrete-paved section of Route 3, led east from the junction of Route 3 and the coast road at Damortis, about 8 miles north of San Fabian, to the junction of Routes 3 and 11, 8 miles inland and a mile east of Rosario. Seizure of the Damortis-Rosario stretch of Route 3 would present 1st Corps with an easy means of access to Route 11, in turn providing a 2-lane asphalt-paved axis of advance toward Baguio along the deep valley of the Bued River. Equally important, if the 1st Corps could quickly gain control over the Damortis-Rosario road and the Routes 3-11 junction, the corps could largely overcome the threat of counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. The Damortis-Rosario road ran sometimes across wooded ravines and sometimes over ridge tops for 3/4 of the way to Rosario, and then continued across open farm land and through Rosario to a junction with Route 11. The road was dominated by broken ridges and steep-sided hills to both the north and the south for the first 5 miles inland. South of the road the hills and ridges were grass-covered; to the north many of the draws and ravines contained thick scrub growth. Bare, steep heights north, northeast, and east of Rosario controlled the Routes 3-11 junction. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, defending the Damortis-Rosario road, had all the advantages of observation, while the relatively soft rock and dirt mixture of the hills and ridges gave the brigade ample opportunity to indulge in what was soon to appear to the 1st Corps as the Japanese Army's favorite occupation--digging caves and tunnels. Achieving this would mitigate the threat of a counterattack against the 6th Army's beachhead from the north and northeast. With the security of its left flank assured, the 14th Corps could then accelerate its advance toward General Krueger's main objective: the Central Plains-Manila Bay region. This strategic maneuvering was crucial for consolidating American forces and ensuring a successful campaign in the Philippines. At the same time, the 169th Regiment faced ongoing challenges at Hill 318 and the southern part of the Japanese-held third ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment made unsuccessful attempts to advance toward the Hill 200 complex, which was firmly defended by the 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment. Meanwhile, General Tominaga executed his final large-scale kamikaze attack during the Philippines Campaign, successfully damaging two destroyer escorts, one destroyer transport, and five merchant ships. The final attacks were recorded on January 13. Only two suicide aircraft were dispatched, both IJA Ki-84 Franks. One surprised the crew of escort carrier Salamaua. Unengaged by antiaircraft fire, the Frank hit amidships. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded on the hangar deck and the second passed through the ship creating a hole near the waterline. The carrier was left without power while major fires took hold. Damage control was ultimately successful, but not before 15 were killed and 88 wounded. Salamaua was out of the war until April. Also on this day, attack transport Zeilin was hit by a probable IJN aircraft conducting an impromptu suicide attack. Ultimately, the 4th Air Army was scheduled to evacuate to Formosa on January 15, marking the end of the threat from Japanese air power in the Philippines, although the Allies were not yet aware of this. Since the initial kamikaze assault on the Mindoro-bound convoys on December 13, Japanese aircraft had sunk 24 vessels and damaged 67 others. Casualties from these air attacks aboard ships were approximately 1,230 men killed and 1,800 wounded, while the Allies estimated they had destroyed around 600 Japanese aircraft during the same timeframe. Back in Lingayen Gulf on January 13, the 172nd Regiment once again advanced up the grassy, steep slopes of Hill 580, successfully securing most of the area against fierce resistance. Simultaneously, the 63rd Regiment attacked north from Hill 247 and captured Hill 363, despite lacking artillery support. Artillery support was to have been provided by the 43rd Division's 155-mm. howitzer battalion, the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion, since the 63rd Regiment's own 105-mm. battalion had been sent south with the rest of the 6th Division. Unfortunately, the 192nd Field Artillery did not learn it was to support the 63rd until after dark on January 12, and could not start moving to good close support positions until daylight on the 13th, after the 63rd had started its attack. Unlike a 105-mm. battalion, the 192nd did not normally operate in direct support roles and lacked the forward observers and communications the lighter battalions possessed. The 192nd might therefore have been expected to take some time to prepare for its direct support mission, but the battalion reported it could have provided some support--with at least one battery--by noon on the 13th had not Colonel Ralph C. Holliday, commanding the 63rd Regiment, insisted that wire be laid for artillery liaison officers and forward observers, a job that was not completed for almost 36 hours. Colonel Holliday may have been influenced in his decision by the fact that the artillery's SCR-610 radio did not work efficiently in the broken terrain of the middle ridge line where the 63rd was attacking. It was not, indeed, until the 43rd Division had supplied the 192nd Field Artillery with infantry SCR-300 sets that the battalion was able to establish satisfactory radio communications. Then, on January 14, the first radio brought up to the battalion's forward observers was promptly destroyed by Japanese artillery, which also cut wire that had already been laid. Support was again delayed, so the entire battalion was not in position and ready to give the 63rd Regiment the support it needed until midafternoon on January 15. Meanwhile the 169th Regiment completed the clearing of the southern end of the ridgeline, while the 103rd Regiment continued its unsuccessful efforts to take Hill 200. To the west, the 6th Division established a fortified line extending from Malasiqui to Manaoag. They promptly dispatched reconnaissance units to the east and south to gather intelligence on enemy movements. The 185th Regiment achieved a significant victory by successfully assaulting Port Sual, while the 160th Regiment engaged in several skirmishes with the reinforced 23rd Reconnaissance Regiment, which had retreated from Port Sual at the onset of the conflict. Meanwhile, patrols from the 148th Regiment advanced into Wawa, strategically located between Bayambang and Urbiztondo. The following day, the 185th Regiment continued its momentum by capturing the crucial road junction town of Alaminos on the Bolinao Peninsula. Some of its elements also pushed northward toward Cabalitan Bay, where they discovered that Allied Naval Forces had already landed to establish a seaplane base, enhancing their operational capabilities in the region. Looking to the east, the 103rd Regiment made gradual but consistent progress along Hill 200, while the 169th Regiment executed a costly frontal assault to clear Hill 318, suffering significant casualties in the process. The 172nd Regiment advanced north along the third ridge, successfully seizing Hill 565 despite facing scattered resistance. The 63rd Regiment continued its slow advance northward, persistently harassed by Japanese artillery and mortar fire, which impeded their progress. Additionally, the 158th Regiment initiated an offensive toward Rosario but was quickly compelled to retreat due to intense Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire. In contrast, General Yamashita, while cautious about launching a major counteroffensive, recognized the necessity of limited offensive actions to regain the initiative. He believed that such actions would effectively disrupt the enemy's advance inland. Consequently, he ordered General Nishiyama's 23rd Division to conduct a robust raiding attack against the San Fabian-Alacan sector during the night of January 16. This strategic decision aimed to exploit the element of surprise and inflict damage on the enemy forces, thereby buying time for his troops to regroup and fortify their positions. In a strategic initiative aimed at maximizing the destruction of enemy weaponry, supplies, and critical base installations, the 58th Brigade, along with the 71st and 72nd Regiments, was instructed to assemble specialized "suicide" raiding units. These units comprised carefully selected soldiers, heavily armed with automatic firearms and supported by demolition teams trained for explosive operations. In addition, a fourth unit was to be formed from the Shigemi Detachment of the 2nd Armored Division, which had recently positioned itself on the southern flank of the 23rd Division. This unit would consist of a mobile infantry company and a medium tank company. The operational plan called for these units to breach the enemy's beachhead perimeter simultaneously at various locations on January 17. Their objective was to swiftly execute their missions and then withdraw to safety. As preparations for this limited counteroffensive unfolded, the American forces continued their own offensive operations, which had commenced on January 15. In this context, the 158th Regiment launched an eastward assault, successfully advancing approximately 1,000 yards. Meanwhile, the 63rd Regiment cautiously pushed forward over a mile and a half northward from Hill 363. The 172nd Regiment made a rapid advance to the Cataguintingan road junction, effectively establishing a battalion at the edge of Route 3, about a mile and a half west of Rosario. In contrast, the 169th Regiment encountered challenges during a two-pronged attack on Hill 355, leading General Wing to order the regiment to bypass the hill to the south and reposition overland to Route 3 at barrio Palacpalac. Conversely, the 103rd Regiment achieved significant success in their assault on the Hill 200 complex. Further to the west, patrols from the 185th Regiment advanced westward, successfully reaching Dasol Bay. Additionally, a battalion from the 129th Regiment crossed the Agno River at Wawa and continued south along a dusty gravel road toward Camiling. Other elements of the 160th Regiment also moved down from Aguilar to Camiling, consolidating their position in the area. After completing refueling operations over the previous days, Task Force 38 resumed its northern advance to launch an assault on Formosa on January 15. Despite Admiral McCain's recommendation to cancel the strike due to inclement weather conditions, Admiral Halsey opted to proceed with the operation. As a result, a series of airstrikes were executed against Formosa and the Pescadores Islands throughout the day. The 16 fighter sweeps conducted during this operation managed to destroy only 16 Japanese aircraft in the air and an additional 18 on the ground. However, the bombing missions targeting enemy shipping proved more effective, leading to the sinking of the destroyers Hatakaze and Tsuga, along with one transport vessel and two merchant ships, albeit at the cost of losing 12 American aircraft. Following these strikes, Task Force 38 redirected its course toward Hong Kong, which came under attack on January 16. Unfortunately, the American forces encountered severe weather conditions and faced intense anti-aircraft fire. This resulted in a limited success, with the Americans sinking just one transport ship, five oilers, one cargo vessel, and one guardboat. Additionally, they inflicted damage on the destroyer Hasu, three destroyer escorts, one corvette, one transport, and one oiler. The strikes also caused significant destruction to key infrastructure, including Kai Tak Airport, the Kowloon and Taikoo docks, the Aberdeen dockyard, the Kowloon-Canton railway, and the Macau Naval Aviation Center. In a broader campaign, the Americans executed secondary strikes against Canton and Hainan Island, as well as targeting several airfields along the Chinese coast, particularly between the Leizhou Peninsula and Swatow. However, this ambitious operation came at a steep cost, with Task Force 38 suffering a total loss of 49 aircraft—27 due to operational issues and 22 as a result of enemy action. With the South China Sea Raid concluded, Admiral Halsey directed his fleet toward the Luzon Strait, adhering to Admiral Nimitz's request. Ultimately, Halsey's aggressive campaign resulted in the destruction of approximately 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping and an estimated 615 Japanese aircraft, all at the expense of 201 American planes. Returning to the Lingayen Gulf, Wing's offensive operations persisted on January 16. The 63rd, 158th, and 172nd Regiments continued their assaults toward the town of Rosario. However, they encountered fierce resistance from the determined Japanese defenders, which significantly hampered their progress. In contrast, the 169th Regiment achieved a notable advancement by reaching Palacpalac, while the 103rd Regiment successfully captured the strategically important Hill 200 complex. From their newly secured positions, elements of the 103rd Regiment pursued the retreating Japanese forces toward Pozorrubio. Meanwhile, two reinforced companies advanced toward Potpot, and both towns ultimately fell into American hands on January 17. In a broader strategic context, General Krueger directed General Griswold to dispatch additional troops south of the Agno River in preparation for a decisive push toward Manila. By January 17, the 14th Corps had established outposts at key locations including Moncada, Nampicuan, Anao, and Paniqui, solidifying their control over the area. Simultaneously, Japanese General Nishiyama was preparing to initiate a local counteroffensive by nightfall on January 16. However, the 72nd Regiment's raiding unit was unable to participate due to enemy penetrations disrupting their plans. On the northern front, Sato's raiding unit conducted a minor raid against an artillery position held by the 158th Regiment, but this attack proved largely inconsequential. In contrast, the raiding unit from the 71st Regiment executed a more impactful maneuver by advancing down the Bued River valley. They successfully infiltrated the rear installations of the 172nd Regiment, where they ignited a gasoline dump, damaging several trucks in the process. This raid resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers and injuries to eight others. At Palacpalac, confusion reigned as the retreating 2nd Battalion of the 64th Regiment inadvertently engaged with the perimeter of the 1st Battalion of the 169th Regiment. This chaotic encounter cost the Japanese approximately 100 men before they retreated in disarray, further illustrating the tumultuous nature of the battlefield. In a dramatic turn of events, the tank raiding unit launched a surprise attack on the newly established outpost at Potpot. Initially, the first two tanks managed to breach the perimeter, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire in all directions as they sped away down the road toward Manaoag. However, the remaining tanks, along with their infantry support, encountered fierce resistance from determined defenders, leading to a sharp and intense fire fight that lasted two hours. Despite their initial success, the attackers were ultimately repelled. As dawn broke, the two tanks that had previously penetrated the defenses returned down the Manaoag road, but this time they met their demise, successfully destroyed by the defenders who had regrouped and fortified their positions. Since the onset of the invasion, the 1st Corps had suffered significant casualties, with approximately 220 men killed and 660 wounded. In stark contrast, Griswold's forces experienced far lighter losses, with only 30 killed and 90 wounded. With the enemy's counterattack thwarted, the 43rd Division managed to secure positions that effectively reduced the likelihood of another large-scale surprise offensive from the Japanese forces. However, to completely eliminate the remaining threats, Commander Wing recognized the necessity of securing control over the Rosario junction and establishing a solid hold on Route 3 to the south of this critical point. The challenge was considerable, as Japanese artillery, mortars, and machine guns positioned on the surrounding high ground commanded all approaches to Rosario. Consequently, Wing had no choice but to restrict the 172nd Regiment to a defensive holding action on its left flank while directing its right flank to seize the high ground immediately to the north and northwest of Rosario. In addition, the 63rd and 158th Regiments were tasked with neutralizing the enemy stronghold along the Rosario-Damortis road. To expedite the capture of the road junction, Wing also planned for the 103rd and 169th Regiments to launch an offensive drive north along Route 3. This coordinated effort aimed to strengthen their strategic position and diminish the Japanese threat in the region, ultimately paving the way for a more secure and stable front. In response to the evolving battlefield situation, General Krueger ultimately ordered General Mullins' 25th Division to secure the right flank previously held by Wing's forces. This strategic move prompted the 27th and 161st Regiments to begin the process of relieving the 103rd and 169th Regiments. By doing so, the 6th Division would be able to resume its advance, now directed towards Urdaneta and the Cabaruan Hills, critical areas for the ongoing campaign. To the west, Krueger aimed to maintain the 14th Corps along the Agno River line until General Swift's 1st Corps could effectively neutralize the enemy resistance stretching from Damortis to Urdaneta. This would enable Swift's forces to maneuver southward alongside Griswold's corps. However, General MacArthur was eager to initiate a southern advance toward Manila as soon as possible. Consequently, he instructed the 14th Corps to reposition its main forces back to their previous outpost line south of the Agno by January 20. Following this, the corps was to launch an offensive towards Tarlac and Victoria. Once they established a presence along the Tarlac-Victoria line, the corps would prepare to advance toward Clark Field, a vital objective necessary for the successful neutralization of Japanese strongholds at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. To bolster this offensive, MacArthur also planned to deploy the 11th Corps on the western coast of Luzon, just north of the Bataan Peninsula. This amphibious operation aimed to disrupt Japanese defensive strategies in the Clark Field area, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of the Allied campaign. In contrast, in reaction to the loss of the Hill 200 complex, Japanese General Yamashita ordered the 2nd Tank Division to advance immediately into the Tayug sector. There, Lieutenant-General Iwanaka Yoshiharu would take command of the 10th Division forces already stationed in the region. The armored units were tasked with positioning themselves along the trail north of San Nicolas and on both sides of the Ambayabang River, with the objective of containing any potential enemy advances to the east. Additionally, the Shigemi Detachment received orders to move its main forces from San Manuel to Binalonan, where they were to defend the town resolutely, prepared to hold their ground against any assault. In addition, General Okamoto was tasked with positioning his main forces to secure the immediate approaches to San Jose. Meanwhile, General Tsuda's 105th Division was instructed to advance northward through Cabanatuan as quickly as possible to establish defensive positions behind the 10th Division, specifically at Minuli and north of Carranglan. However, not all of these strategic plans could be effectively executed. By January 17, Yamashita discovered that the Villa Verde Trail was impassable for tanks and trucks, rendering it unusable for the planned armored movements. Furthermore, the terrain in the Tayug-San Nicolas area proved to be unsuitable for armored operations, complicating the situation further. On January 17 the 14th Area Army commander belatedly learned that the 10th Division had never concentrated at San Jose and that it had made no real effort to dispose itself along the entire Tayug-Umingan-Lupao-San Jose defense line for which it was responsible. General Okamoto, the division commander, had decided that he did not have sufficient strength to hold the relatively open ground assigned to him. Most of his 39th Regiment was with the Kembu Group; the bulk of the 10th Regiment, greatly understrength, was attached to the 103rd Division for the defense of northern Luzon; and, at least as late as of January 15, he had received no word as to when he might expect the attached Tsuda Detachment to arrive in the San Jose area from the east coast. He had therefore withdrawn most of his troops up Route 5 from San Jose and had started disposing them along the line Yamashita had intended the 105th Division to hold; leaving behind only a reinforced infantry company and two artillery battalions to secure the all-important railhead. Okamoto had directed the 10th Reconnaissance Regiment to remain in the San Nicolas area, and he stationed three or four rifle companies of his 63rd Regiment along the Tayug-Lupao line and in rising ground to the southwest. Confronted with these unexpected developments, Yamashita concluded that he had no choice but to accept the redeployment of the 10th Division as an established fact. Consequently, he ordered the 2nd Tank Division, which had already begun its movement toward Tayug, to concentrate its main forces southeast of Tayug to safeguard the immediate approaches to San Jose. Additionally, the 6th Tank Regiment was assigned to position itself in Muñoz to cover the southwestern approach to the area. To further bolster defenses, Tsuda was instructed to deploy two of his five advance battalions to San Jose. However, as these tactical adjustments were being made, it became necessary to shift focus away from Luzon and turn attention toward Leyte, where the final operations on the island were unfolding. It is important to note that the majority of General Suzuki's forces had successfully retreated to the Villaba-Mount Canguipot region, although some strong elements remained isolated further to the east. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army assuming control of the island, American forces commenced the final phase of operations to secure Leyte, methodically working to eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance. From January 1 to February 15, the 11th Airborne Division conducted patrols in the Burauen area, where they engaged and successfully eliminated a well-entrenched enemy force positioned on the southern slopes of Mount Majunag. Meanwhile, the 96th Division carried out extensive patrols in the eastern mountainous regions before taking over from the 11th Airborne Division. In the southern part of the island, the 7th Division launched numerous patrols and deployed a reinforced battalion that effectively neutralized all enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. Additionally, the 77th Division focused on clearing various pockets of enemy resistance located in northwestern Leyte. By late January, the Americal Division arrived to assist in the cleanup operations in Samar and Leyte, a mission that was successfully completed by February 24, with support from the 1st Filipino Regiment. However, during this time, Japanese General Suzuki was formulating his strategy for Operation Chi-Go. This operation involved the amphibious movement of several military units to different islands within the Visayas using large motorized landing barges. Suzuki's initial plan entailed deploying the majority of the 1st Division to establish a garrison on Cebu Island, while the headquarters of the 35th Army was to relocate to Davao. This strategic move would enable him to take direct command of military operations on Mindanao. Following this, he intended to dispatch the 41st and 77th Regiments to Mindanao, assign the 26th Division to the Bacolod area on Negros Island, and send the 5th Regiment along with units from the 102nd Division to Cebu. Furthermore, the 16th Division and the 68th Brigade, commanded by General Makino, were to remain in Leyte to engage in guerrilla warfare tactics.  The 102nd Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of 40 to 50 deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros on boats they had built for themselves. Deserters that were apprehended were court-martialed. General Suzuki for some time had been out of touch with General Fukei, the commanding general of the 102nd Division, which was in the Mt. Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukei was planning to evacuate to Cebu. Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukei "was violating the military code in taking these steps without consent." He therefore ordered Fukei to remain at Leyte. Fukei did not answer but his chief of staff sent the following reply: "We appreciate the efforts of Army but at the present time we are very busy preparing for retreat. The division commander and chief of staff are unable to report to Army Headquarters." Suzuki was "entirely displeased" with the reaction of Fukei and sent his chief of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate the situation. When Tomochika arrived he found that Fukei, with his chief of staff and some headquarters personnel, had already left for Cebu. The sequel to these events was that Suzuki relieved Fukei of his command and ordered him to remain on Cebu until he received further orders. Upon the arrival of Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukei was sentenced to confinement for thirty days. Suzuki asked IGHQ in Tokyo for authority to court-martial Fukei but no reply was forthcoming. In the end, Fukei was released and later returned to command of the 102nd Division. In the midst of ongoing military operations, Suzuki implemented measures to ensure that the forces stationed on Leyte could sustain themselves. He instructed his troops to make the most of local resources by utilizing available food and materials. This included directives to cultivate sweet potatoes and Indian corn, with the hope of sourcing all necessary provisions from the surrounding areas outside their operational base. However, the Japanese forces faced significant challenges due to relentless American air raids and mop-up operations, which severely hindered their ability to procure supplies. The hostile environment made it difficult for them to plant and harvest the crops they had intended to grow. Despite these obstacles, the Japanese managed to capitalize on the conclusion of the harvest season. They were able to secure substantial amounts of food that had been stored by local Filipinos, including a considerable quantity of coconuts and sweet potatoes. By early January, the 1st Division began its gradual movement toward Cebu, successfully transporting around 800 men to the island by mid-January. Unfortunately, the situation worsened as enemy PT boats established a stringent sea blockade, rendering maritime transportation impractical until mid-March. This blockade left approximately 2,000 men from the 1st Division, along with other units of the 35th Army, stranded on Leyte. Simultaneously, the Imahori Detachment, alongside the Mitsui Shipping Unit and the 77th Regiment, advanced to the southern Matag-ob area and subsequently moved toward Villaba, reaching their destination in early February. The majority of the 26th Division also made progress, arriving in the region north of Ormoc in mid-January before commencing a northwestward movement. By February, they successfully established contact with the rest of the 35th Army. Meanwhile, the remnants of the 16th Division could only reach the Valencia area in February, where they would remain until the end of the month. For the foreseeable future, the Japanese units left behind on Leyte faced the daunting task of defending against the advancing Americal Division and the 1st Filipino Regiment, which were steadily gaining ground.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Halsey launched Operation Gratitude, targeting Japanese shipping. Despite misleading intel, they decimated enemy convoys, showcasing the effectiveness of airstrikes and securing strategic advances in Luzon. American forces advanced through Luzon while Task Force 38 struck Formosa and Hong Kong. Despite fierce Japanese resistance and challenging weather, the Allies steadily gained ground, though both sides suffered significant losses in the campaign.

Joining me in this episode is historian Trent Hone, continuing to share stories and insight of Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific and the unique challenges he faced in trying to effectively coordinate assets and work with other commanders. In this episode, Trent brings up the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Battle off Samar, both of which have dedicated episodes coming up with Dr. Regina Akers from the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), US Army veteran, historian, and author Dr. James Young, and retired US Navy LCDR Parks Stephenson. There is also an episode on Kamikaze attacks with Guy Nasuti, US Navy veteran and historian with the NHHC.LinksMastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific by Trent Hone (Amazon)Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the US Navy, 1898 - 1945 by Trent Hone (Amazon)Major Fleet-Versus-Fleet Operation in the Pacific War, 1941 - 1945 by Milan Vego (Amazon)The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost by Cathal Nolan (Amazon)The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the US Navy's Finest Hour by James D. Hornfischer (Amazon)Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by Craig L. Symonds (Amazon)Mother of Tanks website (http://www.motheroftanks.com/podcast/) Bonus Content (https://www.patreon.com/c/motheroftanks)

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

Last time we spoke about the third arakan campaign. In December, General Bruce's forces advanced through Leyte, securing Ormoc and preparing for a decisive push toward Valencia.. The 305th and 306th Regiments steadily overcame enemy positions, while the 307th secured the airstrip. As Japanese forces began to retreat, the 12th Cavalry captured Kananga, opening Highway 2. Meanwhile, in Burma, General Slim devised Operation Extended Capital, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese and cut off their supply lines, setting the stage for a crucial battle. As Admiral Mountbatten pivoted from Operation Dracula to launch Operation Romulus in Arakan, General Christison devised a three-pronged assault on Akyab. Facing fierce Japanese resistance, Private Kweku Pong displayed extraordinary bravery amidst chaos, earning recognition for his valor. Meanwhile, the 28th Army struggled to defend its positions, ultimately retreating under pressure. Amidst strategic deceptions, the Allies advanced through challenging terrain, culminating in significant victories that shifted the tide in Burma, showcasing courage and tactical ingenuity in the face of adversity. This episode is the Victory at Leyte  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last left off, General Krueger's forces had effectively secured the Ormoc Valley, prompting many Japanese units to begin a challenging retreat toward Palompon. From that point, the best General Suzuki's troops could manage was to hold their positions for as long as possible. The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob and the area surrounding it with foxholes and emplacements and had dug spider holes under the houses. South of Matagob, where the road climbed into the hills, the enemy had utilized natural caves, gullies, and ridges on both sides of the road and dug many deep defensive positions. Some of these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges. An excellent, almost invisible installation, which served as an observation post, was dug in on the forward slope of a ridge about three miles north of San Miguel. It had a concealed entrance on the reverse slope. From this post eight miles of the road to the north and east could be observed.  Meanwhile, eager to deliver a decisive blow, Krueger organized his forces for a four-division assault along a wide front toward the west coast. General Bruce's 77th Division was tasked with advancing west along the Palompon road, while the three divisions of General Sibert's 10th Corps embarked on a difficult trek across the mountains to reach the northwest coast. The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests. Palompon had been extensively used by the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to Leyte. The town was the western terminus of the road that ran north and eastward across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. It was this road junction that the 10th and 24th Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as it was called, followed the lower slopes of the hills until the flat interior valley floor was reached. The confining hills were steep-sided with many knife-edged crests. Such was the area into which the forces of the 6th Army had driven remnants of the Japanese 35th Army. To facilitate the capture of Palompon, Bruce planned to land the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment near the port, while the other two battalions advanced westward on the Palompon road. To support this operation, Admiral Kinkaid would provide amphibious vehicles, LCMs, and a PT escort. However, while preparations for the amphibious assault were underway, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment departed from Valencia on December 22, quickly crossing the Togbong and Pagsangahan Rivers without encountering any opposition, and eventually halting just beyond the Humaybunay barrio.  The 302nd Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought the "battle of bridges." The engineers worked around the clock, frequently without any infantry protection, to restore the bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were to be sufficiently strengthened initially to support 2.5-ton truck traffic for infantry supply, then they were to be reinforced to carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward, and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that sufficient Bailey bridges could be made available for important crossings to carry traffic while engineers built wooden bridges under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited number of Bailey bridges were furnished, however, and engineer progress to the west was slowed down. At the same time, patrols from the 128th Regiment successfully eliminated the last enemy strongholds in the Limon area, while the 127th Regiment advanced to Lonoy, where the 1st Cavalry Division was gearing up for its westward push. Finally, the 24th Division, now under Major General Roscoe Woodruff, dispatched the 34th Regiment to launch an attack toward Tuktuk. On December 23, as aircraft bombed Palompon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 305th Regiment resumed their advance. The Americans steadily progressed along the road, successfully forcing the Takahashi Detachment to retreat to the mountains northwest of Matag-ob, where they had to fend off a series of strong night counterattacks. That same morning, the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved out from the highway, facing no resistance as they advanced west through the mountains. This initial day of marching established the pattern for the following days, with the cavalry regiments continuing to push forward through challenging terrain, encountering only sporadic resistance. Additionally, from December 23 to 26, the 34th Regiment conducted extensive patrols along the west coast of the Leyte peninsula. Meanwhile, the advance echelon of the 1st Division successfully linked up with the 68th Brigade, reaching the Bagacay sector the next day. However, the main body of the division had to carve its way through dense jungle on its way to Bagacay. The 102nd Division was also advancing toward the area south of Matag-ob, but after failing to make contact with the 35th Army or the Takahashi Detachment, its units began to retreat to Villaba in the following days. On December 24, while the 1st Battalion was boarding at Ormoc, the remainder of the 305th Regiment launched another offensive. At 1000 on 24 December the assault troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance was light and intermittent, but American progress was slow because of the rough, irregular hills in which the enemy had established positions in foxholes, spider holes, and caves. Since it was not possible to bypass these positions, the regiment had to clear each one before the advance could continue. The force received some artillery fire but a mortar platoon from Company A, 88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set up their night perimeter 500 yards short of the road bend. During the night a Japanese force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was killed. Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on December 23 to reconnoiter the terrain. At 08:00 on December 24 the two regiments started for the west coast. Throughout the march to the sea, they encountered only small parties of the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed the advance. The commanding officer of the 127th Infantry said of the hills encountered on December 24: “The morning was spent in climbing to the top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was difficult but as we later found out, the descent was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this almost straight up, everyone had to use hand holds to pull themselves up. All in all there were seven ridges from the bottom of the first descent to the first possible bivouac area.” The hills were less rugged from then on. Throughout the march both regiments also received supplies by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at the requested time and frequently there was a wide scattering of supplies. On December 25, the 1st Battalion of the former unexpectedly came across the remnants of the 1st and 57th Regiments. The Japanese forces suffered significant casualties and were compelled to disperse, but they eventually managed to reach Bacacay later that night. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment made slow progress along the Palompon road against a well-entrenched enemy. However, the crucial development was that its 1st Battalion successfully landed at Buaya without facing any opposition.  A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, 14th Corps: "The 77th Infantry Division's Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights." The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. Once again, Suzuki's plans were thoroughly disrupted. Palompon was to have been used as the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to have been established at Kompisao, but the seizure of Palompon on 25 December by the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change the location of his army headquarters. He then selected as a base of operations an area in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked Silad Bay and was about three kilometers north of Villaba. The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested and having rocky eastern and western slopes that made it "a natural fortress." From it one could command a view of Ormoc Valley to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu to the west. There were a few Filipino huts, and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the beach. The area "was admirably suited for an extended period of defensive action." General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations.  He sent orders for his retreating units to gather there instead of in Palompon. Although Suzuki anticipated being able to support 15,000 men in this self-sufficient area, an assessment of the available resources revealed that they would only last for two weeks. Consequently, the Japanese began preparations for Operation Chi-Go, which involved the amphibious movement of several units, including the 35th Army headquarters and the majority of the 1st Division, to other islands in the Visayas. At the same time, on December 26, the 34th Regiment received orders to capture San Isidro. The next day, its 1st Battalion left Calubian and moved to the high ground overlooking the port, while Companies F and G conducted amphibious landings at Gigantangan Island and Taglawigan before securing Daha. The reinforced Company G then re-embarked on the landing craft and proceeded toward the San Isidro Bay area, where they encountered heavier resistance than anticipated and were ultimately forced to retreat. At the same time that the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment was being withdrawn for an overwater movement to Palompon, the 3rd Battalion continued its advance along the road, successfully covering over 1,000 yards by December 28. That day the foremost elements of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments broke out of the mountains and reached the barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about 2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall on the following day, the 7th Cavalry was also on the west coast but farther north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered groups of the enemy, most of whom showed little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at Villaba, two and one-half miles north of Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town killed thirty-five Japanese. Additionally, the 34th Regiment launched a coordinated assault on San Isidro, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance and capturing the port. In the following days, the troops moved south along the coast, eliminating small, poorly equipped Japanese units. Looking south on December 29, the 128th Regiment reached the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays, while the 127th Regiment secured the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, completing the advance of the 32nd Division. Further south, the 3rd Battalion, 305th Regiment continued its push along the Palompon road despite strong resistance, while Company B secured the barrio of San Miguel. At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road, the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east. The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the precipitous sides of the road at a point about four miles east of Palompon, directed strong machine gun fire along the road. The Mountain Force dug in for the night on high ground overlooking the point at which its advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had halted it the previous day, and pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and capture two others intact. Meanwhile, Company C conducted a reconnaissance in force and executed an amphibious landing at Abijao, advancing 1,300 yards north to establish contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division near Villaba. By this time, most of the Japanese forces had successfully regrouped in the Villaba-Mount Canguipot area. Consequently, on December 31, Suzuki launched four strong counterattacks against the forces at Villaba; however, enemy artillery disrupted most of these assaults before elements of the 77th Division arrived to relieve the cavalrymen. With the westward advance to the coast complete, General Eichelberger's 8th Army officially took command of all units on Leyte Island, following MacArthur's announcement that organized resistance had ceased. As a result, on January 1, the 77th Division was instructed to relieve the 32nd and 24th Divisions, while the divisions of the 10th Corps moved to staging areas in preparation for upcoming operations. The 8th Army also assumed control of operations on Samar Island, which had similarly been secured against enemy forces. Units from the 1st Cavalry Division had pushed through heavy resistance to reach the strategic Taft-Wright Highway that runs through central Samar. On December 8, the cavalry successfully captured Wright, the western end of the highway, and then moved east to connect with friendly guerrilla forces advancing from Taft on the opposite coast, thereby securing control of the highway. Meanwhile, following the successful invasion of Mindoro, American forces continued their efforts on Hill Drome and Ellmore Field, with General Dunckel's troops conducting extensive patrols to locate enemy stragglers while awaiting the arrival of the 21st Regiment. The only opposition faced came from the persistent assaults of the 4th Air Army and the 1st Combined Base Force. On December 21 and 22, the 1st Resupply Echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. About twenty kamikazes attacked the convoy, so damaging two LST's that they later had to be abandoned, and inflicting lesser damage on two destroyers and a Liberty ship. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, en route to Mindoro in this convoy lost 6 men killed and 32 wounded; U.S. Navy losses were about 70 men killed or wounded; the Japanese lost 7 planes in kamikaze attacks and 3 others to shipboard antiaircraft fire. Then, from December 28 to December 30, Task Unit 18.3.15 was also attacked by kamikazes. Meanwhile, Admiral Okawachi was getting Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force ready for a hit-and-run surface attack on enemy invasion ships near San Jose, known as Operation Rei-Go. However, a proposed counter-landing on Mindoro, which was supported by Marshal Terauchi, Admiral Fukudome, and General Tominaga, faced strong opposition from General Yamashita and his 14th Area Army. The Area Army staff adamantly maintained that it would be impossible to move any sizeable forces to Mindoro but agreed to dispatch a small raiding unit to hamper enemy development of airfields in the San Jose area. On or about 24 December, an order was issued to the 8th Division to organize a task unit for this mission as soon as possible. Ultimately, a reluctant compromise was reached, allowing a small raiding unit from the 8th Division to be sent to disrupt enemy airfield development in the San Jose region. The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. It assembled at Batangas and prepared to embark for Mindoro. While this unit was being organized, Shima's warships left Camranh Bay on December 24. However, as they approached Mindoro on December 26, a lone PBY reconnaissance plane spotted them. In response, 105 aircraft were sent to conduct low-level attacks on the Japanese force.  At 19:40 the first wave of planes found the vessels just offshore. Before the wild engagement was over, the full wing strength had attacked every ship at least once. "When I saw a solid sheet of flame," reported one pilot in describing the AA, "I knew I was over the vessel." While wheeling away from the target, each pilot flashed on his running lights to avoid collision. Some planes landing in the Mindoro blackout for rearming, made as many as three strikes against the enemy vessels. Although PT boats, lurking close to shore, fired torpedoes at the silhouetted Japanese targets, only the destroyer Kiyoshimo went down, and the fleet persisted toward the beachhead, where at 22:40 it fired star shells which began an ineffective 40-minute bombardment. Only one Liberty ship, which had not sought refuge behind Ilin Island as directed, was sunk. Naval gunfire and simultaneous Japanese air attacks caused little damage at Hill, but made it difficult for the airmen aloft to land. With gasoline running short, most of the pilots made as many attacks as possible and then headed through the night and bad weather for Leyte, a flight more dangerous than the Japanese AA had been. When a full count was made, losses during the engagement totaled 26 aircraft. For the force engaged this was a heavy loss, but it was not in vain, for several Japanese survivors attributed the amazingly poor bombardment by their fleet to the aerial clawing which had demolished main batteries and killed a majority of the gun crews. Dunckel thought that without a doubt the airmen had saved the beachhead from serious losses: "The action of our Air Units on that night," he wrote, "will stand forever… as one of the most gallant deeds to be established in the traditions of American fighting men." On 26 December 1944, then with the San Jose bombardment force, Kiyoshimo was crippled by two direct bomb hits in attacks by U.S. Army bombers during the approach to Mindoro, Philippines. The ship was then finished off by a torpedo from U.S. PT-223, 145 miles south of Manila ; 82 were killed and 74 injured. The destroyer Asashimo rescued 169 survivors, including ComDesDiv 2, Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, and Lieutenant Commander Kajimoto; U.S. PT boats rescued five others.Despite this, Shima pressed on toward his target, entering the anchorage area at 23:00 to commence bombardment of San Jose. After approximately forty minutes of shelling, during which one auxiliary vessel and a PT boat were sunk, the Japanese ships withdrew northwest at high speed, still under fire from enemy planes. Although Shima's force ultimately managed to escape, the air attacks resulted in the sinking of the Kiyoshimo and damage to the Ashigara, the light cruiser Oyodo, and three destroyers, with a loss of 26 aircraft. The bombardment prevented landings at the Mindoro strips and many pilots, finding their planes running low on fuel, headed through the darkness and heavy weather toward Leyte fields only to crash on the way. Following this unsuccessful operation, on December 31, the raiding unit from the 8th Division finally crossed the Verde Island Passage by landing craft to reach Calapan in northeastern Mindoro, and then proceeded to Pinamalayan, arriving there on January 5. We must now depart from the Philippines and proceed to Bougainville to report on the preparations for a new Australian offensive.  Previously, we observed that General Savige's 2nd Corps had successfully relieved the American troops stationed at the Cape Torokina perimeter.  The Australians had now reached the conclusion that the Japanese had disbanded depleted units to reinforce others and were maintaining a well- disciplined and efficient force. They decided that, at the end of November, the force included the 38th Independent Mixed Brigade, built round the 81st Regiment, and the 6th Division with three depleted infantry regiments -13th, 23rd and 45th. Of these the 38th Brigade was believed to be chiefly concentrated at Numa Numa, with part of the 81st Regiment forward on the trail; most of the 13th Regiment was believed to be round the Jaba River-Gazelle Harbour area, with the 23rd farther south, and the 45th round Kieta on the east coast. The Allied Intelligence estimates of the whereabouts of the main Japanese forma- tions on Bougainville proved accurate. The main shortcoming was that the strength of the naval troops was underestimated. At the time of the arrival of the Aus- tralians there were about 11,000 naval men, including 3,500 civilian workers, on the island; the 87th Garrison Force, about 4,000 strong, was in the Buka area, and in the south were two strong forces of marines: the 6th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (about 2,000) and the 7th Kure Special Naval Landing Force (about 1,500). Indeed the naval forces were about as strong in fighting men as the 6th Division. The successful attack on Little George by the 9th Battalion on 29th November, six weeks before it was expected, surprised the enemy commanders and convinced them that the Australians were determined to open an offensive. Reinforcements numbering 450 were hurried into the central area (there were 2,000 troops deployed in or forward of Numa Numa) and Colonel Kaneko Atsushi of the 81st Regiment took command. A further 1,000 troops were sent from Kieta and the north to Numa Numa. Hyakutake was convinced that the attack on the Numa Numa trail would be accompanied by a landing at its eastern end with the object of severing his force. The quantity of artillery used in the attack on Little George and later Arty Hill convinced the Japanese that a determined thrust was being made. Arty Hill was defended by men of the 5th and 11th Companies of the 81st Regiment. Meanwhile the 13th Regiment was attacked on the Jaba River. Lieut-General Kanda of the 6th Division did not propose to contest the south bank of the river, considering that the crossing was merely a feint and the principal offensive would be made by sea; the main body of the defending force-1,500 men-was retained in the Mosigetta area. By January Kanda estimated that one Australian division, its name yet unknown, was south of the Jaba, with 25 guns. From 23rd to 26th November the 9th Battalion, with the 12th Field Battery and other detachments under command, took over this sector. The 9th Battalion's first task was actively to reconnoitre the Sisivie area with a view to attacking it later; and to secure ground from which such an attack could be launched. It had been believed that the main supply route from Numa Numa passed through Sisivie, but captured docu- ments and interrogation of prisoners revealed that Sisivie was merely an outpost and that the Piaterapaia area was the terminus of the enemy's line of communication; consequently the battalion's efforts were con- centrated in that direction. At 1.50 p.m. on the 24th one rifle shot was fired from Little George into the battalion's area the first shot in the Australian operations on Bougainville. On the 25th a small patrol moved stealthily to the rear of Little George and was fired on, two men being wounded. On the morning of the 29th the battery in the Doiabi Valley fired high-explosive and smoke shells on to Arty Hill, mortars fired smoke bombs on to Little George, and into the smoke a single platoon attacked. At the run the men reached the top of Little George before the Japanese emerged from shelter, opened fire with machine-guns and threw grenades. The attackers did not falter but worked their way forward in pairs, one man firing on a post while the other moved close and threw in grenades. Lieutenant Deacon, the commander, was 3 wounded but carried on. In about half an hour the position was gained. Two Australians had been killed and six wounded, of whom three remained on duty. Twenty Japanese dead lay on the hill, in- cluding a lieutenant and a sergeant. The expected enemy counter-attack was made in the evening by about 40 Japanese. It was a frontal thrust and gained no ground. Until dawn the enemy tried in vain to infiltrate. While these operations were in progress on the Numa Numa trail, the 2/8th Commando, next on the right, had taken over responsibility for the tangled mountain area rising to an altitude of 4,000 feet south and south-east of Mount Bagana, and known as the Hanemo sector. When the commando squadron took over from a company of the 164th American Regiment there had been no contact with the enemy for several weeks, and it was believed that only a handful of Japanese were in the neighbourhood. For five weeks from 24th November, when the relief was completed, a commando troop patrolled but met Japanese only twice, killing two and capturing another. By 27th December, when the 61st Battalion relieved the troop, it was considered that the area was clear and the flank of a force advancing down the coast would be safe. Additionally, Brigadier Raymond Monaghan's 29th Brigade was deployed to the southwestern edge of the perimeter, and a company from New Guinea was assigned to scout the Jaba River area. On December 3, Matthews sent a platoon to Sisivie, but the defenders were able to pin down the Australians with intense fire. After successfully repelling a strong enemy counterattack, the 9th Battalion advanced on Bawabu Ridge toward Pearl Ridge, with Matthews' C Company ordered to capture Arty Hill on December 18.  Matthews planned an attack on Arty Hill by a full company. At 7 a.m. on 18th December Major Blanch's C Company formed up on the sheltered side of George and Little George, on top of which men of a supporting company were walk- ing about nonchalantly to mislead the enemy into thinking that it was to be another uneventful day. Twelve New Zealand Corsairs at- tacked the Japanese positions; the battery of the 4th Field Regiment opened fire from its positions in the Laruma River Valley; medium machine-guns fired from Mount Deacon and Bawabu Ridge that is, from each flank-on to the reverse slope of Arty Hill at ranges up to 1,000 yards. After thirteen minutes of bombardment, the attackers advanced through the smoke along the razor-back ridge which was the only means of approach to the bare hill. Months of intermittent shelling had destroyed the bush and so loosened the soil on the steep slopes that the men had difficulty in scrambling up them. By 8.10 the leading troops were near the crest of Banyan Knoll and were meeting sharp small arms fire from Japanese in covered weapon-pits. Grenades were hurled down on them. They pressed on. Sergeant Allan, commanding the right platoon, led the way to the top of Banyan Knoll, shot a Japanese machine-gunner and himself fell dead. His men carried on up the slopes of Arty Hill. As at Little George, the attackers worked in pairs, one man covering an enemy post with fire while the other attacked from a flank with grenades. After more than an hour of close fighting the position was won and the defenders were digging in and setting up wire in preparation for the probable counter-attack. There was none: a prisoner said that there were not enough men left to attack. Five Australians were killed and 12 wounded of whom 4 remained on duty. Twenty-five Japanese dead were counted, 2 Japanese were taken prisoner, and from 10 to 20 recently-buried bodies were found. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel John McKinna's 25th Battalion began to relieve the exhausted 9th Battalion and was immediately tasked with taking Pearl Ridge, although its initial probing attacks were met with fierce resistance from the determined defenders. Meanwhile, Monaghan had deployed Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert McDonald's 15th Battalion to the Jaba River area, where they effectively cleared out enemy outposts. By the fourth week of December, the unofficial ceasefire on Bougainville had collapsed. Intense fighting erupted in two of the three main sectors, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Japanese soldiers, with their forward positions in each area being captured. The Australians were also bringing in additional reinforcements to sustain their offensive. According to Savige's strategy, Brigadier John Field's 7th Brigade was to be replaced by elements of Brigadier John Stevenson's 11th Brigade in the central sector, with orders to move south and join the rest of Major-General William Bridgeford's 3rd Division for an assault toward the Puriata River. Additionally, a strong contingent from the 11th Brigade was set to advance along the northwest coast of the island toward Soraken Harbour, aiming to push the northern enemy forces into the confined Bonis Peninsula. However, before these plans could be executed, McKinna was intent on capturing Pearl Ridge and aimed to launch one final attack with all his companies by the end of the month. Unbeknownst to the Australians, the few defenders in the area had recently received reinforcements in the form of a battalion under the direct command of Major-General Kijima Kesao, which significantly strengthened the ridge. Nevertheless, on the morning of December 30, aircraft bombarded the Japanese positions for about 40 minutes. At 08:00, the infantry advanced under the cover of artillery and machine-gun fire, with A Company facing heavy resistance just in front of Pear Hill that they could not overcome. Due to this setback on the right flank, McKinna ordered D Company to undertake a challenging climb along Pear Hill instead of the narrow spur where the attack had failed. Meanwhile, C Company made slow progress through dense brush but eventually managed to cut the enemy's track to the west. After repelling several enemy counterattacks during the night, the four companies renewed their assault on December 31. Although the march over Arty Hill and through thick underbrush was physically demanding, D Company managed to approach Pear Hill undetected. With A Company drawing enemy fire, D Company launched a powerful attack following an artillery bombardment that successfully pushed back the Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, B Company captured Baker's Brow to the west, and C Company held its position along the western track. However, by nightfall, Kijima's troops began testing the defenses established by C Company. In the early morning, the Japanese launched a fierce counterattack from the south and southeast, managing to penetrate two forward Australian positions. After an hour of intense hand-to-hand combat, the assault was ultimately repelled with the help of artillery support, and Australian patrols later found that Pearl Ridge had been abandoned by the enemy. Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, the Australians conducted mopping-up operations until the ridge was completely cleared. With control of Pearl Ridge secured, the Australians gained a strategic vantage point that allowed them to observe from one side of Bougainville to the other, aiding future operations. During the battle, the Australians suffered 10 killed and 25 wounded, while the Japanese lost 34 killed and 1 captured. Shortly after taking Pearl Ridge, the 11th Brigade assumed control of the central sector as per Savige's orders, while the rest of the 7th Brigade began moving south. In conclusion, Major-General Percy Clarkson's 33rd Division began its deployment to Morotai in late December, with Colonel Ray Cavenee's 136th Regiment landing on the island's west coast on December 22. Four days later, the regiment advanced into Japanese-controlled territory to engage Colonel Kisou's 211th Regiment, receiving support from elements of the 130th Regiment moving overland from the Doroeba Plain and the 3rd Battalion of the 137th Regiment marching from Morotai's southern coast into the interior. This coordinated effort aimed to prevent the Japanese from dispersing into smaller groups in the island's mountainous regions. On January 3, the 136th Regiment located and attacked the 211th Regiment at Hill 40, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions advancing from the southwest while the 3rd Battalion approached from the north. After two days of intense combat, the Americans successfully captured Hill 40, inflicting significant casualties on the enemy, and then began pursuing the retreating Japanese forces to the north. Two thousand yards to the north, the 3d Battalion was settling down for the night. Its march from Radja had started badly. From the beginning the battalion had been harried by the enemy. On the nights of December 26-27 and 27-28, its perimeter had been attacked viciously by an estimated enemy battalion. (The 3d Battalion of the Jap 211th Infantry. It had been detached from the 211th for a special mission to Radja to await and guide reinforcements from Halmahera. The five reinforcing barges were ambushed after slipping through the Navy PT screen, and were destroyed along with fifty tons of food and supplies.) The battalion had experienced the hardest march of its history. The jungle was more difficult than that encountered by the Pilowo column. Moreover, to join the Hill 40 battle it had to abandon trails for cross-country movements. Although the battalion had marched and fought its way forward for ten days it was still in fighting trim. The number of Japs killed and found buried along the trail indicated terrible losses for the Japs. The battalion commander, Major Ralph Pate, attributed the lack of enemy resistance during the past two days to the withdrawal of the enemy. Actually, as he learned later, the 3d Battalion, Jap 211th Infantry Regiment, had been destroyed as a military force. By January 14, when the 136th Regiment was finally withdrawn to the main perimeter, the Americans reported having killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured 10, suffering 46 men killed and 127 wounded in the process. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces captured Palompon, disrupting Japanese plans, while American troops advanced through challenging terrain, overcoming resistance and securing key locations. Japanese forces planned a counter-landing on Mindoro, but faced fierce opposition. Meanwhile, Australians advanced on Bougainville, capturing strategic positions amid heavy fighting.

In this episode, Jamie and Samar interview Peter Drakulich, co-founder of 52 Launch, a company that helps individuals bring product ideas to market. They discuss the journey of bringing product ideas to market, emphasizing the interplay of patents and market disclosure, comprehensive support services, and the value of leveraging platforms like Amazon and social media for successful product launches. They also highlight the challenges faced by independent inventors and the iterative process of product development based on consumer feedback. Tune in for expert business advice and to hear about the host of resources 52 Launch can provide.Takeaways:Evaluate market validation: identify a problem and offer a solution.Value iterative product development.Utilize platform opportunities like social media and Amazon.Understand manufacturing strategy. Commit fully or not at all.Patent protection should work in tandem with your marketing strategy.Analyze where your competition lacks and capitalize on that.

On this date in 1944, Lieutenant R. C. Hagen, United States Navy Reserve and Senior Surviving Officer of the USS Johnston, wrote a letter to John Gillis of Dunseith, detailing the death of his son, Frank, who was killed in action during the Battle of Samar in the South Pacific.

Samedi 17 septembre 2022, le corps de Romain Pizzato, un Français de 42 ans, est retrouvé sans vie dans une piscine à Djerba, en Tunisie. Cet entraîneur de ski de Barcelonnette (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) s'était fiancé discrètement quelques mois auparavant à Samar, une Tunisienne de 26 ans rencontrée dans un hôtel de l'île.La jeune femme est aujourd'hui soupçonnée du crime, ainsi que deux complices présumés. Le trio comparaît devant la justice tunisienne depuis le mois d'octobre. La mère de la victime, présente à l'audience et qui n'avait jamais vu la fiancée de son fils auparavant, se bat pour faire éclater « la vérité ».Cet épisode de Code source est raconté par Nicolas Jacquard, journaliste au service police-justice du Parisien. Écoutez Code source sur toutes les plates-formes audio : Apple Podcast (iPhone, iPad), Amazon Music, Podcast Addict ou Castbox, Deezer, Spotify.Crédits. Direction de la rédaction : Pierre Chausse - Rédacteur en chef : Jules Lavie - Reporter : Barbara Gouy - Production : Thibault Lambert, Clara Grouzis, Pénélope Gualchierotti et Clara Garnier-Amouroux - Réalisation et mixage : Pierre Chaffanjon - Musiques : François Clos, Audio Network. Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

U.S. interventions at the turn of the 20th century were numerous and widespread, including bloody operations in Cuba against the Spanish and then against the Cubans themselves, in northern China against the Boxer Rebellion, and most notably, the Balangiga massacre on the island of Samar in the Philippines. General Smedley Butler, a decorated U.S. marine, was stationed on all these fronts and was subsequently involved in invasions of Mexico, Nicaragua, and Haiti in 1915. Jonathan M. Katz, author of Gangsters of Capitalism, recounts the story of Butler and how he ultimately turned against the American war machine, describing himself as "a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism," who had propped up the pillaging of Latin America by monopolists and bankers such as J.P. Morgan. 

Last time we continued speaking about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Admiral Toyoda's Operation Sho-Go aimed to eliminate American naval forces but faced setbacks with the loss of key ships. As Japanese forces advanced, miscommunications led to disorganized attacks. Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy groups used smoke and air assaults to delay the Japanese, ultimately leading to Kurita's retreat after sustaining heavy damage from American air strikes. On October 25, a series of intense naval engagements unfolded, featuring airstrikes and kamikaze attacks. U.S. forces launched multiple strikes against Japanese carriers, inflicting significant damage but facing challenges from anti-aircraft fire and pilot fatigue. The day ended with the sinking of several Japanese vessels, including Zuikaku and Chitose, resulting in substantial casualties. Admiral Halsey attempted to intercept Kurita's forces but was too late. Despite heavy losses, including the cruiser Abukuma and numerous aircraft, Kurita's forces managed to reach safety. The battle marked a significant defeat for the Japanese, severely weakening their naval capabilities, though Kamikaze attacks prolonged the war. This episode is the Advance to Ormoc Valley  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we we covered the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf seeing the IJN basically annihilated in the waters surrounding the philippines. As the confrontation drew to a close, General Krueger's offensive was ongoing at Leyte. By October 26, General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps had successfully established two beachhead areas, gradually expanding their perimeter inland and pushing General Makino's 16th Division further into the island's interior. Following the failure of his earlier repositioning after the loss of Hindang and Burauen, Makino acknowledged that he could not prevent the loss of the eastern coastal plain. He decided to retreat his units to rear positions in the mountains west of Dagami and Burauen. Concurrently, as part of Operation TA, Admiral Mikawa successfully delivered the first reinforcements to Ormoc. Consequently, General Suzuki promptly ordered Colonel Sumitani Takayoshi's 41st Regiment to move towards Carigara and then to Jaro, where the remnants of the 33rd Regiment had fallen back to maintain the division's left flank. After capturing Hills B and C, the 24th Division resumed its westward assault on October 26. With General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division protecting General Irving's northern flank, the 34th Regiment advanced along Highway 2, reaching Santa Fe, while the 19th Regiment attempted to attack Pastrana but was halted short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. To the south, the 383rd Regiment patrolled towards San Vicente Hill amidst fierce resistance, as the 382nd Regiment attacked Tabontabon but was forced back to the Guinarona River by determined defenders. In addition, the reserve 3rd Battalion, 381st Regiment, embarked on a long march north along Highway 1 towards Tanauan but encountered enemy fire near Vigia Point. Further south, the 17th Regiment successfully advanced to a position about 600 yards south of Guinarona, while the 32nd Regiment fought persistently to reach the edge of the Buri airstrip. The following day, after fending off several light counterattacks, the 32nd finally secured the airstrip with minimal resistance. Additionally, the 17th pushed forward to a point approximately 2,200 yards south of Dagami, although they faced increased opposition from the retreating enemy. To the east, following an extensive artillery bombardment, the 382nd captured a majority of Tabontabon in a coordinated attack, with Colonel Dill's 1st and 3rd Battalions then moving northeast toward Kapahuan. Colonel Michael Halloran's 3rd Battalion pressed northward and ultimately took Tanauan without opposition before heading towards Kiling. Meanwhile, in the Catmon Hill area, after General Krueger released the remainder of the 381st Regiment to the control of the 24th Corps, General Bradley decided to deploy his reserve regiment to take control of the Labiranan Head position in preparation for an assault against Catmon hill. Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery fire since A Day, October 20. The 96th Division artillery had constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy positions in the area during the night. Starting at 21:00 on October 27, the 105-mm howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 75-mm howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 10:30 the following day. At that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the top in 50-yard bounds. After the 381st Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, attacked at 12:00 on October 28, the artillery was to fire concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced. In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Colonel Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Regiment, decided to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2nd Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383rd Regiment, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the attack by fire. Further north, Irving's push westward continued as the 34th Regiment advanced unopposed to the Mudburon River, while the 19th Regiment captured Pastrana following another heavy artillery barrage. On that day, the 171st Independent Battalion arrived after a week-long voyage from Panay, preparing to join the 41st Regiment and its sister battalion towards Carigara and Jaro. On October 28, as the 41st Regiment passed through Carigara and approached Jaro, Mikawa launched his second Operation TA convoy, consisting of three echelons. The first echelon left Manila immediately without cover, transporting the 20th Antitank Battalion. Simultaneously, preparations were underway to send the 12th Independent Regiment and the recently arrived 1st Division to Leyte. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment swiftly moved through Alangalang and advanced to the Mainit River, where they were ultimately halted by fierce Japanese resistance. Nevertheless, two companies successfully crossed the river unnoticed during a heavy rainstorm. After launching a surprise assault against the defenders, they captured a bridge over the river. At the same time, the 19th Regiment progressed to Tingib, where it established a patrol base. General Hoffman also directed his 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance toward Carigara, with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry making an overland move to San Miguel, while Troop C of the 7th Cavalry conducted an amphibious landing at Barugo, later engaging in skirmishes with Japanese forces at Carigara. To the south, after successfully fending off a vigorous counterattack, Colonel Dill's 2nd Battalion secured the Tabontabon area, enabling it to move north toward Kiling. In spite of determined opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded. The remainder of the 382nd fought their way to Digahongan before turning towards Kiling, eventually halting at Kansamada. Meanwhile, while the 383rd conducted reconnaissance toward San Vicente and the 9th Regiment began its retreat to Dagami, the 381st Regiment finally launched its assault on Catmon Hill. However, Halloran's two battalions were met with heavy gunfire from the surrounding foothills. Lastly, as the 184th Regiment patrolled toward Santa Ana, the 17th Regiment attacked toward Dagami. Despite facing strong opposition and difficult swamp conditions, they managed to push 300 yards beyond the enemy stronghold by nightfall, rolling up the defenders' eastern flank. Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes. At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills west of the town. The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located. Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter. During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami. The following day, the 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced through the 2nd Battalion to continue their northern push, successfully entering Dagami without facing significant opposition. After securing the previous headquarters of the 16th Division, the 17th Battalion spent the next two days conducting mopping-up operations and patrolling the Dagami area, effectively establishing contact with the 19th Regiment across the Binahaan River and the 382nd Regiment to the east. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion toward Abuyog, which was successfully captured by midday. By October 31, Company G had further taken control of Baybay, and the 1st Battalion had landed at Panaon to support the 21st Regiment stationed there. As a result, General Arnold's 7th Division accomplished its objective of capturing the Burauen airstrips and Dagami while linking up with the 96th Division and 10th Corps. This operation resulted in an estimated 4,211 Japanese casualties, with 19 soldiers taken prisoner, while the division incurred 322 killed, 1,064 wounded, and 21 missing. Meanwhile, on October 29, the 381st Regiment executed a tank-supported offensive and ultimately captured Catmon Hill, which would be thoroughly cleared in the following two days. At the same time, Halloran's 3rd Battalion stormed and secured Kiling, with Dill's 2nd Battalion arriving shortly thereafter. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last man." The resistance was overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San Roque. However, the remainder of the 382nd Battalion was unable to penetrate the retreating 9th Regiment towards Kiling, allowing some Japanese forces to evade complete destruction. Nevertheless, Bradley's 96th Division successfully took control of the Catmon Hill mass and the key towns of Tabontabon and Tanauan, resulting in an estimated 2,769 Japanese casualties and 6 prisoners captured, at the cost of 145 men killed, 564 wounded, and 90 missing. On October 29, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced northward, leading the charge toward Jaro. They gradually battled through Galotan and quickly captured Jaro without much resistance. The American forces moved so swiftly that Suzuki was unable to implement his strategy of using Jaro as the gathering point for the reinforcements of the 35th Army, compelling him to designate Carigara as the new rendezvous site. Due to the evident Japanese strength in the region, Hoffman ordered his units to bolster defenses in Barugo, with the remaining units of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry arriving by nightfall, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry on October 31, and the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on November 1.  At 08:00 on October 30 Colonel Newman ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Regiment to start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery. Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down. When Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have the 3rd Battalion fire on the Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position." As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. The following morning, while the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment moved toward Jaro, the 34th Battalion launched another attack and managed to reach the Yapan River. Despite their fierce assault, the heavy Japanese artillery and flanking fire once again stalled the Americans on their journey to Carigara, allowing the 41st Regiment to withdraw. At this stage, the 5th Air Force had officially set up its forward units on Leyte, tasked with achieving air superiority and attacking Japanese convoys and troop concentrations. However, as the 13th Air Force focused its primary efforts on airfields in bypassed areas. Poor weather had taken its toll on General Krueger's advance. Rainy, monsoon-like conditions confounded his engineers, and airfield construction at Tacloban and Dulag floundered. Landing conditions were still poor. Naval carrier aircraft, from damaged escort carriers, headed to both airfields instead of ditching at sea. As the Navy pilots attempted to land on Leyte, 25 out of 72 planes ended up damaged. Without suitable land-based US air power, the Japanese could continue to launch air attacks. Limited American air power did contest the skies against the Japanese, but could still only provide a minimum of close air support to the American troops. While Japanese aircraft continued to reach targets throughout Leyte, Kinkaid and Halsey's forces had to depart the Leyte region to resupply, so Kenney had to take over with his limited forces. MacArthur did persuade Halsey to maintain Task Group 38.2 in the area when he withdrew most of his fleet on October 29. Kinkaid also left ten escort carriers only by redistributing fleet supplies, but he also had to refit. Nonetheless, Ground commanders criticized Kenney's continued failure to provide close air support. During the early invasion period, naval carrier aviators had delivered direct support. For example, out of the 121 troop support missions from October 20 to 25, pilots flew 33 sorties in direct support of soldiers. With Kinkaid and Halsey's forces departed, Kenney's focus was on air superiority. He had eliminated most close air support missions until later in the campaign. As a result, the infantry had to rely on artillery. The escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, significantly diminished following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, were unable to provide support. Although Admiral Mitscher's carriers did conduct numerous strikes against Japanese shipping in the Visayas and Manila Bay in the last days of October, Task Force 38 had mostly been withdrawn by the end of the month. During the final week of October, the 4th Air Army and the newly-formed 1st Combined Base Air Force maintained a persistent campaign to support ground operations, gradually redirecting their attacks from amphibious shipping and carriers to the enemy-occupied airfields at Tacloban and Dulag.  Though Kenney's airfields still had minimal capacity, he had 34 P-38s from the 49th Fighter Group based at Morotai deployed to Tacloban Airfield on October 27. Three days later, only 20 P-38s remained, as Japanese air attacks destroyed or damaged several of the twin-tailed aircraft. In response, Kenney deployed more P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group. He also assigned six P-61s from the 421st Night Fighter Squadron to counter night attacks. Kenney later replaced them with F6Fs from VMF (N)-541, which improved night patrol and interception missions to include strikes on Japanese night convoys. Thus, Kenney's pilots, led by the elite aces Richard Bong and Thomas McGuire, started to make a difference. Additionally, bombing attacks disrupted airfield construction and caused aircraft losses since they were parked close together due to space limitations. Still, Army engineers with Filipino labor made inroads towards rendering the airfields fully operational. Pilots could now use an expanded 5,000ft runway at Tacloban on October 31. With a growing 5th Air Force presence, the Americans improved their ability to intercept bombers; as a consequence, the Japanese relied more on night attacks. This shift inflicted substantial damage and compelled the Americans to reinforce their positions. Alongside the primary air offensive targeting enemy supply shipping and airfields, Kamikaze units executed suicide attacks against enemy carriers operating off the east coast of the Philippines. Pilots, as well as aircraft of various types, were drawn from the 153d, 601st and 761st Air Groups. The initial corps used only bomb-equipped fighters. However, after the reorganizations of the Kamikaze corps, all types of aircraft were used.  A kamikaze suicide aircraft hit Intrepid on one of her port side gun positions; ten men were killed and another six were wounded, but damage was minimal. The USS Franklin had just refueled and returned to the Leyte action on 27 October, her planes concentrating on a heavy cruiser and two destroyers south of Mindoro. She was under way about 100 miles (160 km) off Samar on 30 October, when enemy bombers appeared bent on a suicide mission. Navy fighters shot down most of the Japanese planes, but six broke through the combat air patrol into Franklin's task group of four carriers defensively surrounded by a circle of about twenty escorting cruisers and destroyers. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns shot down three of the four kamikazes independently diving toward each of the four carriers; but the one targeting Franklin hit the flight deck and crashed through to the gallery deck, killing 56 men and wounding 60. As the remaining two kamikazes attacked, one was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and the second missed Franklin with two bombs before flying into the stern of Belleau Wood. Franklin was able to extinguish fires and patch the flight deck so planes could be recovered 76 minutes after the kamikaze hit. Both carriers retired to Ulithi Atoll for temporary repairs, and then Franklin proceeded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, arriving on 28 November 1944 for repairs of her battle damage.  Meanwhile, on October 30, the 20th Antitank Battalion was successfully landed at Ormoc. The following day, Mikawa dispatched his remaining two echelons: the second comprised three transports carrying the Imahori Detachment, primarily made up of Colonel Imahori Tetsusaku's 12th Independent Regiment. The third included four transports and four frigates carrying most of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu's 1st Division along with around 9,000 tons of supplies and ammunition, all under the protection of Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi's screen of six destroyers. This would be Mikawa's last convoy, as he would soon be replaced in command of the Southwest Area Fleet by Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi due to his deteriorating health. Following a smooth journey, the Imahori Detachment was quickly disembarked at Ormoc on November 1, with the remainder of the convoy arriving later that night to commence the unloading for the 1st Division. During the day, one of the transports was sent to Cebu to pick up the 35th Army Headquarters, which landed the next morning alongside Kataoka's troops. By noon on November 2, a total of 13,000 soldiers had successfully arrived, culminating in the most effective reinforcement operation of the Leyte campaign, with just one transport lost and another slightly damaged. Turning to the primary action, on November 1, two companies from the 34th Regiment were ordered to execute a broad flanking maneuver and then attack Tunga from the northeast, facing no resistance. This enabled Newman's 1st and 2nd Battalions to advance swiftly down the highway to a point approximately 1,000 yards from Sagkanan. Concerned about the enemy's considerable presence at Carigara, Sibert planned for his two divisions to launch a coordinated assault on the town the following day; however, unbeknownst to him, the disorganized Japanese forces chose to abandon the town and retreat to the mountains southwest of Capoocan. Thus, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Americans captured Carigara without opposition and promptly established a perimeter, while the 34th Regiment advanced further to Balud, where they encountered intense enemy fire. On that same day, the 382nd Regiment took control of Dagami, from which they would engage the positions of the 16th Division on Bloody Ridge over the coming days. The capture of Carigara marked the completion of the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte. Irving's 24th Division successfully achieved its objectives, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2,970 Japanese soldiers and the capture of 13 prisoners, with their own losses totaling 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing. Additionally, by October 27, Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division had killed an estimated 739 Japanese and taken 7 prisoners, incurring a loss of 40 men killed, 199 wounded, and 8 missing. The next phase of Krueger's strategy involved two offensives converging on Ormoc: one moving south through Ormoc Valley led by Sibert's 10th Corps and the other advancing north from Baybay under Hodge's 24th Corps. Initially, while certain units of the 24th Corps continued pushing west to bolster troops along Ormoc Bay and clean up in southern Leyte Valley, Sibert's forces aimed to secure control of the Carigara Bay coastline from Carigara to Pinamopoan. Simultaneously, Suzuki sent the experienced 1st Division to Carigara to launch an offensive toward Tacloban. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was considered by Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army, to be the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu, it had been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great expectations. Meanwhile the Imahori Detachment moved to the northeastern base of the heights southwest of Jaro to facilitate the assembly of the 26th Division for an impending attack on Jaro. After securing Carigara, the 68th Brigade was set to land in the north as part of the 35th Army reserve, while the 30th Division would land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and negotiate mountainous trails to Burauen to eliminate all enemy resistance in the Dulag region. As other units of the 102nd Division were moved forward using powered schooners, a reinforced company from the 364th Independent Battalion was also deployed to Albuera to secure the landing site for the 30th Division. On the morning of November 3, the 34th Regiment moved west once again and quickly seized Capoocan, just as Kataoka's vanguard was getting close. Suzuki immediately approved the emergency dispositions already taken and issued orders temporarily attaching the various reinforcement units to the 1st Division. It was impossible, however, to notify Lt. Gen. Kataoka immediately of the changed situation, and the division advance guard moved into the vicinity west of Capoocan at 0900 on 3 November to find itself unexpectedly engaged by the enemy. Badly surprised, the advance guard fell back toward Colasian with the enemy in pursuit. Meanwhile, at 1000, Lt. Gen. Kataoka reached the high ground south of Managasnas. Finding his advance guard engaged, he immediately ordered the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 20th Antitank Battalion to check the enemy advance. At the same time he dispatch ed an order to the division main body to close up at forced march. Although the defenders were initially taken by surprise, they managed to halt the enemy's progress with fierce resistance, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. It was only after artillery bombardment of the ridge parallel to the road that the 34th finally dismantled the Japanese stronghold, establishing their position for the night. Additionally, earlier in the day, Company K had conducted a reconnaissance mission using amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a location just west of Pinamopoan. However, due to heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to Capoocan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Kataoka mistakenly perceived this as a battalion-sized enemy assault, prompting him to retreat southwest and position his forces on the eastern end of a long ridge overlooking the coast, referred to as Breakneck Ridge.  Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Levte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. Following the Japanese withdrawal, the 34th quickly secured Colasian and captured Pinamopoan without opposition the next day. Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced through the town, continuing west along the highway for about 1,700 yards, stopping just short of the ridge. Anticipating a potential enemy amphibious assault via Carigara Bay, Krueger ordered Sibert to defend the Carigara area against any seaborne attack before proceeding southward. Meanwhile, as the divisions of the 10th Corps prepared defensive measures against a possible sea invasion, Colonel Miyauchi Yoshio's 57th Regiment was ordered to get ready to launch an attack from the ridge, as Kataoka believed that the enemy force could be easily cut off. As the newly-arrived 21st Regiment took over from the 34th at the Pinamopoan defenses, the Japanese forces launched an attack on a party of artillery forward observers conducting reconnaissance on OP Hill on November 5. With the artillerymen pinned down, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Weber's 3rd Battalion moved in to assist them by the afternoon, successfully securing the northern approaches to OP Hill and the undefended Corkscrew Ridge on the left. Although the Americans were able to fend off the enemy's counterattacks, intense mortar fire on November 6 ultimately compelled them to withdraw. Despite suffering heavy casualties during the battle for Breakneck Ridge, the 1st Division had nearly completed its concentration in the Cananga area and was ready to initiate a broad four-pronged assault. However, the Japanese advance through the mountainous terrain remained exceedingly slow, leaving the 57th Regiment to conduct the attack on its own. Concurrently, Irving attached the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment to the 21st Regiment and ordered the combined force to advance towards Breakneck Ridge. Consequently, Weber's troops launched an assault on Miyauchi's positions, but were completely unsuccessful in breaking through. Dissatisfied with the 21st Regiment's progress and feeling that Weber was insufficiently aggressive, Sibert replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel William Verbeck, a seasoned veteran of the Alaska Campaign. Verbeck then made an unsuccessful attempt at a wide flanking maneuver to the east but ultimately had to entrench at the edge of Breakneck Ridge by nightfall. On the same day, Colonel Chapman dispatched Company G to Hill 1525, but it lost its way and ended up considerably further east. Thats all we have for today on the Philippines front as we now need to shift over to New Britain. In October, a decision was made to deploy the 40th Division for combat in the Philippines, transferring control of the island to the Australians. This change aligned with the Australian government's intention to utilize their own troops to reclaim territory previously occupied by the Japanese during the war. As a result, General Ramsay's 5th Division began relocating to New Britain, tasked with containing and isolating the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle Peninsula. Ramsay was instructed to maintain pressure on the Japanese forces while avoiding large-scale deployments, permitted only to conduct patrols and minor raids as limited offensive actions. By late October, the 36th Battalion had assumed control at Cape Hoskins, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade slated to land at Jacquinot Bay in early November.  At this time the Japanese had posts at intervals along the south coast as far west as Awul near Cape Dampier. It was decided that the Australian southern guerilla force would be based at Lakiri, a village in the hills two days' march inland from Waterfall Bay, and in an area into which the enemy had not ventured. It possessed a good site for dropping stores from the air and, as a preliminary, some 25,000 pounds of supplies were dropped there. To give added security to the base the Australian-led native guerillas, commanded at this stage by Captain R. I. Skinner, overcame the enemy's coastwatching posts at Palmalmal and Baien, to the south-west and south-east, respectively, killing 23 and taking three prisoners. None survived at Palmalmal, but two escaped from Baien, and it was learnt later that they reached an enemy post at Milim bearing news of what had happened. The south coast group was now placed under the command of Captain Basil Fairfax-Ross, who counted with five officers, 10 Australian N.C.O's, about 140 native troops, and such native allies as could be maintained on an air delivery of 5,000 pounds of supplies a month. After the loss of Baien the Japanese reinforced their post at Milim at the south end of Wide Bay until it was 400 strong. Far to the west they retained posts at Massau and Awul and round Cape Beechey. Fairfax-Ross decided to move discreetly into the strongly-held Wide Bay area, advancing through the hills, concentrating first on winning over the natives , and using the air power available from Bougainville as his trump card . At the same time spies would be sent into the Gazelle Peninsula. In the western area also the first task was to gain information. On 5th June an American patrol from the west led by Lieutenant White of Angau attacked the Awul garrison, which withdrew inland. An Australian platoon under Lieutenant Black thereupon marched from Jacquinot Bay to Lau and Atu. In this area they found that native guerillas about 80 strong had killed 14 Japanese and 14 of their native allies. At Awul they met White and his party. It now seemed that the Japanese from the Atu-Awul area were retreating to the north coast. Guerillas were organized and at Kensina on 18th June, "after pretending to entertain a party of about 50 enemy" , the natives attacked and killed 28, losing 5 of their own men. Black's patrol, in pursuit, found the remainder of the enemy about Rang and i n an attack on 24th June killed nine, but had to withdraw after losing one native N.C.O . As they moved north and east through hostile territory other Japanese were killed. In the eastern section in this period Lieutenant Johnson was winning the support of influential natives in the mountains south-west of Wide Bay. A heavy air attack was made on the main Milim positions on the night of 17th-18th July and as a result the Japanese with- drew some men to a new position away to the west and some men right back to Lemingi in the Gazelle Peninsula. By early September the last of the Japanese stragglers on the south coast west of Wide Bay had been killed; the Japanese had heard many reports of a strong Australian base at Jacquinot Bay-reports circulated by the Australians to dissuade the enemy from advancing westward. This base, although non-existent as yet, was soon to become a reality, and from 5th to 7th September a reconnaissance party, including officers from New Guinea Force and the 5th Division, landed from the corvette Kiama and, guided by Black, examined the area. The two-platoon force reached Milim unnoticed on 12th August, and found the enemy about 150 strong. At dawn they opened an attack in three groups, one to fire on the houses in the Japanese camp, another to fire from the flank, and the third to intercept any reinforcements from the Yaret position 500 yards to the north. Unfortunately a native fired his rifle during the approach, the enemy manned his defenses, and, after a short exchange of fire, the attackers withdrew and placed ambushes across the tracks. The same day the Swan bombarded Milim. After three days of inaction on the part of the Japanese four native soldiers crawled into the enemy's position and killed three, whereafter the Japanese fired into the bush at intervals for 36 hours. This fire ceased on the 18th and soon afterwards the position was found to be abandoned; there was much booty including boats and numerous machine-guns. It was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Waitavalo. Fairfax-Ross now moved his forward base to the coast at the Mu River only 6 hours' march from Waitavalo. On 17th and 18th September Fairfax-Ross, Sampson and a platoon, reconnoitring Kamandran, became involved in a fight with a Japanese force about 100 strong. Anticipating that the enemy would retaliate in force the Australians prepared defensive positions and one platoon under Sergeant-Major Josep, an outstanding N.C.O. who had come from the New Guinea Constabulary, was placed on the hillside above Milim to give warning of an enemy advance. On the night of 28th September the Japanese did in fact advance on Milim and on towards the Australian defensive position at the Mu River. Here, however, largely because of Sergeant Ranken's cool handling of his Bren gun, they were repulsed, losing 17 killed. Next day about 200 Japanese reinforcements arrived and, in a firefight with Josep's men whose presence they had not discovered, 16 Japanese and a native ally were killed. The Australians now withdrew inland. Soon the Japanese, about 700 strong, were in their original positions round Milim, where they remained until heavy air attacks on 6th, 7th and 8th October forced them out again. By 10th October the guerilla force was again concentrated at Lakiri. Consequently, on November 4, a small convoy landed the reinforced 14th/32nd Battalion at Jacquinot Bay without  encountering any resistance. In the days following the landing, ground forces secured the Jacquinot Bay area, while a New Guinean company executed an amphibious operation to Pomio on November 6.  The 6th Brigade was gradually transferred to Cutarp, with the final units arriving on December 16. Due to shipping shortages and the low priority for reinforcing forces on New Britain, all components of the 5th Division would not advance to Jacquinot Bay until April 1945. The first echelon of the 13th Brigade arrived on November 26, while the remaining units followed by the end of December. Meanwhile, in the north, the 36th Battalion dispatched patrols to connect with Australian guerrillas at Ulamona, Ubili, and Ea Ea, aiding them in fending off an enemy advance on the Balima River by the end of November.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans were making tremendous progress in the Philippines, advancing through the Ormoc Valley. Despite the terrible odds, it seems the Japanese would not give up an inch of territory without a fight, digging their heels to the very end. Meanwhile the Australians were dealt mop up duty on New Britain and it was going equally as well.

ShowlinksJoint Sword 2024 off Taiwan.TAFFY-3 off Samar.USAF NGAD Pause.Narrow Seas, Small Navies, and Fat Merchantmen: Naval Strategies for the 1990s.USS Carney's 1 year anniversary.Debt service now greater than spending on defense.SummaryIn this episode of Midrats, Sal and Mark discuss the evolving geopolitical landscape, focusing on China's strategic maneuvers around Taiwan and the implications for US military preparedness. They explore the potential for conflict, the challenges facing the US Navy, and the need for a reevaluation of military strategy and acquisition processes. The conversation highlights the complexities of international relations and the shifting balance of power in the region. In this conversation, Mark and Sal delve into the complexities of naval strategy, fleet composition, and the lessons learned from historical engagements like Taffy 3. They discuss the limitations of wargaming, the need for modernization in naval warfare, and the challenges of military production in times of peace. The dialogue also touches on the shifting global power dynamics and the implications for military strategy, particularly in relation to Israel and the broader international community.TakeawaysThe ongoing conflict in the Red Sea highlights the complexities of modern warfare.China's maneuvers around Taiwan reflect a strategic approach to territorial claims.The use of non-military assets by China complicates international responses.The US military faces significant challenges in terms of preparedness and resources.China's strategy may involve a slow strangulation of Taiwan's economy.International recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty is dwindling.The US's military pivot to the Pacific has not been adequately supported by resources.Naval strategy must adapt to the realities of modern warfare in narrow seas.The acquisition process for military assets is slow and risk-averse.There is a pressing need for change in military development and strategy. The importance of having a diverse fleet for various combat scenarios.Historical engagements like Taffy 3 provide valuable lessons for modern naval strategy.Wargaming often fails to capture the unpredictability of real-world engagements.Smaller, well-led units can outperform larger forces under the right conditions.The U.S. Navy needs to modernize its approach to warfare and fleet composition.Production capabilities must align with wartime needs to ensure readiness.Understanding global power dynamics is crucial for effective military strategy.The international community's perception of military actions can impact alliances.Decisive action is necessary when dealing with irrational adversaries.Military strategy must evolve to address contemporary threats effectively.Sound Bites"Halloween's spooktacular, but all our shows are spooktacular.""We need to think about smaller, highly armed boats.""Wargames are limited by assumptions and math.""Taffy 3 turned around a massive Japanese force."Chapters00:00: Introduction and Context Setting01:55: China's Strategic Maneuvers Around Taiwan09:55: The Implications of China's Actions18:13: US Military Preparedness and Response26:05: Challenges in Naval Strategy and Acquisition32:07: Future of Military Development and Change Management33:47: Navigating Naval Strategy and Fleet Composition39:49: Lessons from History: The Taffy 3 Engagement45:40: The Need for Modernization in Naval Warfare52:19: Production Challenges in Military Readiness56:05: Understanding Global Power Dynamics and Military Strategy

In this episode of Email After Hours, hosts Guy Hanson and Danielle Gallant welcome Samar Owais, a seasoned email strategist and copywriter to dive into the details of email content.