Podcast appearances and mentions of peter elkind

Not only has President-elect Donald Trump chosen prominent vaccine skeptic Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to lead the Department of Health and Human Services, Trump also has said he will nominate controversial TV host Mehmet Oz to run the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, which oversees coverage for nearly half of Americans. Meanwhile, the lame-duck Congress is back in Washington with just a few weeks to figure out how to wrap up work for the year.Rachel Cohrs Zhang of Stat, Sandhya Raman of CQ Roll Call, and Riley Griffin of Bloomberg News join KFF Health News' Julie Rovner to discuss these stories and more.Also this week, Rovner interviews Sarah Varney, who has been covering a trial in Idaho challenging the lack of medical exceptions in that state's abortion ban. Plus, for “extra credit” the panelists suggest health policy stories they read this week that they think you should read, too: Julie Rovner: ProPublica's “How Lincare Became a Multibillion-Dollar Medicare Scofflaw,” by Peter Elkind. Sandhya Raman: ProPublica's “How UnitedHealth's Playbook for Limiting Mental Health Coverage Puts Countless Americans' Treatment at Risk,” by Annie Waldman. Riley Ray Griffin: The New York Times' “A.I. Chatbots Defeated Doctors at Diagnosing Illness,” by Gina Kolata. Rachel Cohrs Zhang: CNBC's “Dental Supply Stock Surges on RFK's Anti-Fluoride Stance, Activist Involvement,” by Alex Harring. Click here for a transcript of the episode. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A charming young Czech promises staggering returns. An entire country's oil industry is up for grabs. America's top investors want in. Sounds too good to be true? Damn right it is. This is a story of private jets, $20,000 dinners, and suitcases stuffed with cash. It's also a tale about the collapse of communism, the free-for-all that followed, and the birth of the oligarchs. And it's a story of plain-old human greed...of just how far the rich may go to get even richer. Viktor Kožený smooth-talked his super-wealthy Aspen neighbors and a Wall Street titan into investing huge sums of cash to snap up Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company. Host Joe Nocera and investigative journalist Peter Elkind follow the trail, beginning in the Bahamas, where the charismatic financial genius has been lying low. The Pirate of Prague is an Apple Original podcast, produced by Blanchard House. Episodes available now, follow and listen on Apple Podcasts. apple.co/pirateSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Bethany McLean joins Ravi to discuss her new book The Big Fail, a groundbreaking indictment of how greed and lack of leadership left us unprepared for a global pandemic. Bethany McLean is a journalist and contributing editor for Vanity Fair. She has co-authored multiple bestselling books, including The Smartest Guys in the Room with Peter Elkind and All the Devils Are Here with Joe Nocera. Leave us a voicemail with your thoughts on the show! 321-200-0570 Subscribe to our feed on Spotify: http://bitly.ws/zC9K Subscribe to our Substack: https://thelostdebate.substack.com/ Follow The Branch on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thebranchmedia/ Follow The Branch on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thebranchmedia Follow The Branch on Twitter: https://twitter.com/thebranchmedia The Branch website: http://thebranchmedia.org/ Lost Debate is also available on the following platforms:  Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lost-debate/id1591300785 Google: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5tZWdhcGhvbmUuZm0vTERJNTc1ODE3Mzk3Nw  Stitcher: https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-lost-debate iHeart: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-the-lost-debate-88330217/ Amazon Music: https://music.amazon.co.uk/podcasts/752ca262-2801-466d-9654-2024de72bd1f/the-lost-debate

A charming young Czech promises staggering returns. An entire country's oil industry is up for grabs. America's top investors want in. Sounds too good to be true? Damn right it is. This is a story of private jets, $20,000 dinners, and suitcases stuffed with cash. It's also a tale about the collapse of communism, the free-for-all that followed, and the birth of the oligarchs. And it's a story of plain-old human greed...of just how far the rich may go to get even richer. Viktor Kožený smooth-talked his super-wealthy Aspen neighbors and a Wall Street titan into investing huge sums of cash to snap up Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company. Host Joe Nocera and investigative journalist Peter Elkind follow the trail, beginning in the Bahamas, where the charismatic financial genius has been lying low. The Pirate of Prague is an Apple Original podcast, produced by Blanchard House. Episodes available now, follow and listen on Apple Podcasts.apple.co/pirate

A charming young Czech promises staggering returns. An entire country's oil industry is up for grabs. America's top investors want in. Sounds too good to be true? Damn right it is. This is a story of private jets, $20,000 dinners, and suitcases stuffed with cash. It's also a tale about the collapse of communism, the free-for-all that followed, and the birth of the oligarchs. And it's a story of plain-old human greed...of just how far the rich may go to get even richer. Viktor Kožený smooth-talked his super-wealthy Aspen neighbors and a Wall Street titan into investing huge sums of cash to snap up Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company. Host Joe Nocera and investigative journalist Peter Elkind follow the trail, beginning in the Bahamas, where the charismatic financial genius has been lying low. The Pirate of Prague is an Apple Original podcast, produced by Blanchard House. Episodes available now, follow and listen on Apple Podcasts.apple.co/pirate

A charming young Czech promises staggering returns. An entire country's oil industry is up for grabs. America's top investors want in. Sounds too good to be true? Damn right it is. This is a story of private jets, $20,000 dinners, and suitcases stuffed with cash. It's also a tale about the collapse of communism, the free-for-all that followed, and the birth of the oligarchs. And it's a story of plain-old human greed...of just how far the rich may go to get even richer. Viktor Kožený smooth-talked his super-wealthy Aspen neighbors and a Wall Street titan into investing huge sums of cash to snap up Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company. Host Joe Nocera and investigative journalist Peter Elkind follow the trail, beginning in the Bahamas, where the charismatic financial genius has been lying low. The Pirate of Prague is an Apple Original podcast, produced by Blanchard House. Follow and listen on Apple Podcasts.apple.co/pirateSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Chapter 1 What's The Smartest Guys in the Room"The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron" is a book written by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind. It explores the rise and fall of Enron Corporation, one of the largest energy trading companies in the world, and its subsequent bankruptcy in 2001. The book delves into the deceptive practices, corporate greed, and accounting fraud that led to the downfall of Enron, as well as the impact it had on employees and investors. Published in 2003, the book serves as a detailed account of the Enron scandal and the lessons that can be learned from it.Chapter 2 Why is The Smartest Guys in the Room Worth Read"The Smartest Guys in the Room" by Bethany McLean is worth reading for several reasons:1. In-depth analysis: The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Enron scandal, one of the biggest corporate frauds in history. McLean, a renowned financial journalist, delves into the intricate details of Enron's rise and fall, uncovering the web of deception, corruption, and misguided ambition that led to the company's demise. She dissects the complex financial maneuvers used by Enron, making it accessible for readers with little background in finance.2. Engaging storytelling: McLean's storytelling capabilities make the intricate details of the Enron scandal come alive. She weaves together multiple narratives, including interviews with former Enron employees and executives, to present a captivating and gripping narrative. This makes the book not only informative but also highly engaging, keeping readers hooked from beginning to end.3. Insight into corporate and financial practices: "The Smartest Guys in the Room" offers valuable insights into the world of corporate and financial practices. It exposes the flawed corporate culture prevalent in Enron, where greed, arrogance, and deceit were allowed to flourish. Readers gain a better understanding of the warning signs and the impact of unethical behavior, allowing them to develop a more discerning eye when it comes to assessing corporate practices in the future.4. Lessons for business and finance: The Enron scandal provides valuable lessons for both the business and finance sectors. By highlighting the failures of corporate governance, accounting practices, and regulatory oversight, McLean's book serves as a cautionary tale for those involved in corporate decision-making. It prompts readers to critically analyze the systems and structures in place within their own organizations to prevent similar breakdowns.5. Impact on society: Beyond the world of business and finance, "The Smartest Guys in the Room" exposes the consequences of corporate wrongdoing on society as a whole. The effects of Enron's collapse were far-reaching, leading to significant job losses and financial ruin for countless people. By shedding light on these broader implications, the book encourages readers to be more conscious of the societal impact of corporate actions and the importance of ethical behavior in business.Overall, "The Smartest Guys in the Room" is a meticulously researched, well-written, and thought-provoking book that offers valuable insights into the Enron scandal, corporate culture, and financial practices. It combines engaging storytelling with thorough analysis, making it a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of corporate fraud and its impact on society.Chapter 3 The Smartest Guys in the Room Summary"The Smartest Guys in the Room" by Bethany McLean is a detailed account of the Enron scandal that rocked the corporate world in the early 2000s. The book explores the rise and fall of Enron, a Texas-based energy company...

The systems that run our economy are only as good as the people running them. With hot inflation, the recent debt ceiling standoff, bank failures & scandals like FTX -- it's understandable to wonder if we couldn't find better leaders than the ones we current have in place Which is shy we're very fortunate to have Bethany McLean join us on the program today. A Slate columnist and contributing editor for Vanity Fair, Bethany worked for thirteen years as editor-at-large at Fortune, where she and fellow reporter Peter Elkind exposed the Enron scandal. She's also the nationally bestselling co-author of The Smartest Guys in the Room and All the Devils Are Here , exposés that dug deep into the global financial crisis and business ethics - which make her a perfect expert for today's topic of leadership. ************************************************* At Wealthion, we show you how to protect and build your wealth by learning from the world's top experts on finance and money. Each week we add new videos that provide you with access to the foremost specialists in investing, economics, the stock market, real estate and personal finance. We offer exceptional interviews and explainer videos that dive deep into the trends driving today's markets, the economy, and your own net worth. We give you strategies for financial security, practical answers to questions like “how to grow my investments?”, and effective solutions for wealth building tailored to 'regular' investors just like you. There's no doubt that it's a very challenging time right now for the average investor. Above and beyond the recent economic impacts of COVID, the new era of record low interest rates, runaway US debt and US deficits, and trillions of dollars in monetary and fiscal stimulus stimulus has changed the rules of investing by dangerously distorting the Dow index, the S&P 500, and nearly all other asset prices. Can prices keep rising, or is there a painful reckoning ahead? Let us help you prepare your portfolio just in case the future brings one or more of the following: inflation, deflation, a bull market, a bear market, a market correction, a stock market crash, a real estate bubble, a real estate crash, an economic boom, a recession, a depression, or another global financial crisis. Put the wisdom from the money & markets experts we feature on Wealthion into action by scheduling a free consultation with Wealthion's endorsed financial advisors, who will work with you to determine the right next steps for you to take in building your wealth. SCHEDULE YOUR FREE WEALTH CONSULTATION with Wealthion's endorsed financial advisors here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.wealthion.com/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Subscribe to our YouTube channel: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKMeK-HGHfUFFArZ91rzv5A?sub_confirmation=1⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Adam on Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://twitter.com/menlobear⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow us on Facebook: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/Wealthion-109680281218040⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ #bankingcrisis2023 #wealthinequality #financialcrisis ************************************************* IMPORTANT NOTE: The information and opinions offered in this video by Wealthion or its interview guests are for educational purposes ONLY and should NOT be construed as personal financial advice. We strongly recommend that any potential decisions and actions you may take in your investment portfolio be conducted under the guidance and supervision of a quality professional financial advisor in good standing with the securities industry. When it comes to investing, past performance is no guarantee of future results. Any historical returns, expected returns, or probability projections may not reflect actual future performance. All investments involve risk and may result in partial or total loss.

Financial fraud is a serious issue that has unfortunately cost many investors their hard-earned savings. Although technology has helped fraudsters find new ways to dupe investors, the same core themes appear again and again.From Ponzi schemes to fake investment opportunities, these scams lure investors in with promises of high returns and low risk. In reality, there's no increased reward without increased risk, and even when these plots are revealed, many people never recover what they invested.The best way to protect yourself is to be aware of the warning signs and educate yourself on the steps you can take to protect your investments. In this episode, Keith and Marcelo explore the world of financial fraud, some famous examples of these schemes, how they work, how you can safeguard your finances, and so much more!Thank you for listening!Key Topics:Why we're talking about financial fraud (1:14)Different types of financial fraud and famous examples (3:01)How Ponzi schemes work (6:24)Why the biggest Ponzi schemes are usually uncovered during market corrections (9:57)Charles Ponzi's landmark scheme in the 1920s(10:51)How Bernie Madoff kept his fraudulent scheme running for 20 years (12:10)Earl Jones's Canadian scheme targeting the elderly in the 80s and 90s (15:08)Common themes among these long-running Ponzi schemes (17:17)What the sentencing of Gary Sorenson and Milowe Brost show about the significant differences in penalties for white collar crime in Canada vs. the US (18:26)The Norbourg scandal in Montreal (19:33)The biggest reasons people keep falling for these schemes (21:09)Warning signals to be aware of to protect yourself from financial fraud (24:15)The AMF's five steps to avoid fraud (26:36)And much more!Mentioned in this Episode:● Netflix Documentary | Madoff: The Monster of Wall Street● Diana B. Henriques' Book | The Wizard of Lies: BernieMadoff and the Death of Trust● John Carreyrou's Book | Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in aSilicon Valley Startup● Movie | Norbourg● Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF)● Ontario Securities Commission ○ Investment Fraud Checklist● Canadian Securities Administrators● Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind's Book | The SmartestGuys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and...

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Alan Dershowitz takes a guess at who might be the first Jewish president  General Jack Keane worries that our military may be losing it's status as the mightiest in the world   Ruben Diaz, Jr. says the Hispanic community will remember if Democrats sink the nomination of a state judge  Peter ELkind, ProPublica author and reporter. Here is why you don't want to live too close to a cell tower Francisco Marte, Bodega and Small Business Association Founder - Shoplifting , shootings and sirens, are all part of owning a bodega in New York Dr. Peter Michalos dangers of eating too much fresh fish Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Peter Elkind, an award-winning investigative reporter, is the co-author of the national bestseller, The Smartest Guys in the Room, about the collapse of Enron. Peter is the author of "The Death Shift" about one of the most shocking and insidious cases in the history of medicine: the crimes of one nurse were hidden by a hospital for years. In 1980 Genene Jones is working the 3 to 11 PM shift in the pediatric ICU in San Antonio's county hospital. As the weeks go by, infants under her care begin experiencing unexpected complications—and dying—in alarming numbers, prompting rumors that there is a murderer among the staff. Her eight-hour shift would come to be called “the death shift.” This strange epidemic would continue unabated for more than a year, before Jones is quietly sent off—with a good recommendation—to a rural pediatric clinic.

Genene Jones.  Angel of death. Angel no, death yes. She chose the most helpless of victims. Children and infants that could not tell her secrets. She wanted the attention caring for the helpless babies in the Pediatric ICU, and she craved the chance to look like the most caring and grieving nurse, but like any true psychopath, it was all just a play.Sources for this episode: “Ohio Doctor is Acquitted of Killing Patients with Fentanyl” By Alyssa Lukpat and Michael Levenson April, 20, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/us/william-husel-ohio-doctor-murder-trial.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/20/us/william-husel-ohio-doctor-murder-trial.htmlGenene Jones: Baby Killer by Katherine RamslandThe Death Shift by Peter Elkind, August 1983 https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/the-death-shift-2/Convicted nurse's former boss continues her Kerrville practice by Kristin Gazlay The Galveston Daily News, February 26, 1984Genene Jones paints portrait of confidence by Ken Herman Fort Worth Star-Telegram, February 26, 1984Infant death probe broadens by Michael Pearson San Angelo Standard Times, March 3, 1983Judge relocates child killing trial by Michael Pearson San Angelo Standard Times August 4, 1983 For details, show notes, and pictures please visit Thearchivistpodcast.com

Bethany McLean is one of the world's most prominent financial and investigative journalists. In this episode, we revisit her masterpiece on Enron, the Wall Street darling that suddenly imploded in 2001. We focus on timeless insights and discuss charismatic leaders, breakpoints, math, narratives, lessons from a day with Buffett, and much more. For more info about the podcast, go to the episode page.—————————————Episode Chapters(00:00) Intro to Bethany McLean(05:50) Intro to Enron and The Smartest Guys in the Room (08:42) Enron vs Tesla(10:39) The characters at Enron(13:26) From math to investigative journalism(17:49) Breakpoints of frauds and market excesses(24:55) Lessons from Bethany's day with Buffett(28:06) Investigative work and story-telling(35:30) Carol Loomis, the goddess of Fortune(37:24 Leader qualities and open-mindedness (46:30) Bethany's next book (47:57) Reading habits and book recommendations—————————————Articles Mentioned20 Lessons from Enron - Niklas Sävås (2019): http://www.investingbythebooks.com/columns/2019/8/19/twenty-lessons-from-enron—————————————Books MentionedThe Smartest Guys in the Room - Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind (2003)The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority - Martin Gurri (2014)The Aristocracy of Talent - Adrian Wooldridge (2021)Dune books - Frank Herbert—————————————Movies MentionedThe Smartest Guys in the Room - Alex Gibney (2005)—————————————More on Bethany McLeanTwitter: https://twitter.com/bethanymac12Podcast, "Capitalisn't": https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/capitalisnt—————————————What is Investing by the Books?Investing by the Books was founded by Henrik Andersson, Bo Börtemark, Mats Larsson and Michael Persson. It has published hundreds of book reviews in the past 10 years and operates on a non-profit basis. Visit the website: http://www.investingbythebooks.com/Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Investbythebook—————————————What is Redeye?Redeye is a research-centered boutique investment bank from Stockholm. Founded in 1999, Redeye cultivates investors through timeless knowledge, a humble attitude, and a strong focus on quality. Visit the website: https://www.redeye.se/Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Redeye_—————————————DisclaimerNotice that the content in this podcast is not, and shall not be construed as investment advice. This information is meant to be informative and for general purposes only. For full disclaimer, visit Redeye.se

Peter Elkind tells the story of the Enron financial scandal; it's a timely refresher on that corporate disaster as the Trump Administration rolls back financial regulations.

In this episode with Noah Gift, we will be looking at unethical issues across the Big Tech industry. Companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook are employing some of the smartest people in the industry — why aren't their products thought out? Why aren't employees able to predict the unsurprising ethical issues from faulty algorithms? Noah is a Data Science Academic and Machine Learning Enthusiast. You can follow him on LinkedIn: https://bit.ly/36iKkRc This episode is brought to you by EthicsGrade, an ESG Ratings agency with a particular focus on Technology Governance, especially AI Ethics. You can find more information about EthicsGrade here: https://www.ethicsgrade.io/ You can also follow EthicsGrade on Twitter (@EthicsGrade) and LinkedIn: https://bit.ly/2JCiQOg Connect with Us: Join our Slack channel for more conversation about the big ethics issues that rise from AI: https://bit.ly/3jVdNov Follow Are You A Robot? on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook: @AreYouARobotPod Follow our LinkedIn page: https://bit.ly/3gqzbSw Check out our website: https://www.areyouarobot.co.uk/ Resources: MLops Community interview with Noah: https://bit.ly/3xp6Lji “Q: Into The Storm” Documentary: https://itsh.bo/3ACig9o The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean, Peter Elkind: https://bit.ly/3hEwJc6 “Billionaires Build” by Paul Graham: https://bit.ly/3wovRxs

This is a stomach churning episode for sure! Thank you so much for tuning in. After doing a lot of research I found most information was coming from a book called "The Death Shift" by Peter Elkind. This became my main source...as well as most other story tellers recounting Genene Jones. I highly recommend the book to my true crime lovers. This episode is about LVN Genene Jones starting with her childhood. She exhibited a lot of strange behavior but none of it quite explain what lead up to her becoming a baby killer. Thank you for listening and your continued support.

In this episode we discuss The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, Into the Raging Sea by Rachel Slade, and Montana 1948 by Larry Watson. We also discuss heart rate concerns, holiday traditions, some true crime, and other general ramblings. Don't forget to subscribe to and rate the podcast! We don't really know the point of this other than to make us feel good...but we think it helps other people find us! Also don't forget to follow us on Instagram Website coming soon! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/bourbon-bookshelf/support

Paul is an experienced, innovative and entrepreneurial Board Director and Executive who has earned a stellar reputation for achievement during a distinguished career in both the Finance and Not for Profit sector. Paul has been acknowledged for his contribution to the Banking and Investment Industry by being awarded a Senior Fellowship of the Financial Services Institute of Australasia. Paul has also been recognised for his contribution to the not for profit industry by being awarded the  Ernst & Young Social Entrepreneur of the Year in South Australia/Northern Territory and has also been awarded the Equity Trustees Australian Not for Profit CEO Award for Innovation. Paul is a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors and currently holds positions as a Non-Executive Director and Deputy Chair of FIA Ltd, Non-Executive Director AusHealth Pty Ltd, Non-Executive Director Biomebank Pty Ltd, Director of Australian Centre of Excellence for Post-Traumatic Stress, Trustee of the Pulteney Foundation Inc. and Executive Director of Australian Prostate Cancer Research Society Ltd. Paul is Chief Executive Officer of The Hospital Research Foundation Group and of its Australian affiliates: The Repat Foundation – The Road Home Inc; Australian Centre of Excellence for Post-traumatic Stress; Australian Breast Cancer Research; Kidney, Transplant and Diabetes Research Australia; The Centre for Creative Health; Cure for Stroke Australia; Parkinson's SA/NT; Laurel Palliative Care Foundation and Australian Heart Research. In today's podcast, we learn a lot about Paul's journey, the challenges he faced when he first became the CEO of the hospital Research Foundation, his innovative approach to leading a business and how he believes that mistakes are fundamental and an investment into training and development. We also discuss how he became a father for the first time at the age of 50 and how he manages his family life amongst his hectic schedule. Where to find Paul Flynn LinkedIn Profile Hospital Research FoundationBooks mentioned in this episode:The Prince by Niccolo MachiavelliMaverick by  Ricardo SemlerThe Smartest Guys in the Room by MS Bethany McLean, Peter Elkind, Joe NoceraBad Blood by John CarreyrouThe Monk Who Sold His Ferrari by Robin SharmaJoin the conversation on Synergy IQ LinkedIn, Facebook and Instagram (@synergyiq).Access SynergyIQ Website to get to know more about us. 

In this episode we catch up with dedicated Ashtangi, mother of two, and highly acclaimed jouranlist, Bethany McLean. She is also an author and contributing editor to Vanity Fair, who lives in Chicago. Bethany's gift is understanding where the bullshit is, and uncovering it. As Russell said “To put Bethany McLean in context, imagine if in Die Hard Jon McClane takes down Hans Gruber in a cowboy no due process kind of way, then its Bethany who uncovers the rampant embezzlement at Nakatomi Plaza!” Many of you might remember her from the 2012 Vanity Fair article entitled: Who's Yoga Is It Anyway? where she explored how the global Ashtanga yoga community grapples with the death of Guru, Pattabhi Jois, and the complicated response to Sonia Jones launching a chain of yoga studios under the “Jois” name. A name copyrighted and paid for, but a purchase that rankled the prickly egos of senior students who preferred their status just where it was: On Top. She co-author with Peter Elkind, the bestselling book: The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron . Her second book, which she co-authored with Joe Nocera, is called: All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. And her third book also co-authored with Joe Nocera, is Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the U.S. Mortgage Giants. Bethany has a particular talent for following the numbers, exposing illusions, and popping bubbles to reveal where the truth lays hidden. This notion is of particular interest to Harmony and Russell as the Alberta economy is on the brink of collapse as Covid-19 exposes the pitfalls of cheap money in a dead service: Fracking. Alberta prides itself as the Saudi Arabia of North America, but as Bethany says, its not just a dollar spent and a dollar earned: “It's much worse than that.” In her most recent book titled, Saudi America: The Truth About Fracking and How It's Changing the World, journalist Bethany McLean digs deep into the cycles of boom and bust that have plagued the American oil industry for the past decade, and turns an eye to the mysterious death of fracking pioneer Aubrey McClendon. Find out more about Bethany McLean and listen to her podcast Making A Killing on iTunes. As always, keep exploring my website and all my online offerings. Opening and closing music compliments of my dear friend teaching Ashtanga yoga in Eindhoven, Nick Evans with his band “dawnSong” from the album “for Morgan.” Listen to the entire album on Spotify - Simply Click Here. To purchase your own copy - Click Here. Don't forget to subscribe and leave a review ❤ and give us a 5★ rating.

On May 12, after a six-week delay caused by the pandemic, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in the epic battle by congressional committees and New York prosecutors to pry loose eight years of President Donald Trump’s tax returns. Much about the case is without precedent. Oral arguments will be publicly broadcast on live audio. The nine justices and opposing lawyers will debate the issues remotely, from their offices and homes. And the central question is extraordinary: Is the president of the United States immune from congressional — and even criminal — investigation? The arguments concern whether Trump’s accounting firm, Mazars USA, must hand over his tax returns and other records to a House committee and the Manhattan district attorney, which have separately subpoenaed them. (There will also be arguments on congressional subpoenas to two of Trump’s banks.) Trump’s accountants have been crucial enablers in his remarkable rise. And like their marquee client, they have a surprisingly colorful and tangled story of their own. It’s dramatically at odds with the image Trump has presented of his accountants as “one of the most highly respected” big firms, solemnly confirming his numbers after months of careful scrutiny. For starters, it’s only technically true to say Trump’s accounting work is handled by a large firm. In fact, Trump entrusts his taxes and planning to a tiny, secretive team of CPAs who have operated at various times from humble quarters in Queens and two Long Island office parks. That team, which has had two leaders with back-to-back multidecade terms, has been working for the Trumps since Fred Trump began using the firm back in the 1950s. It was eventually subsumed into Mazars USA, the American arm of a large international firm, through a series of mergers over decades. One theme has been consistent: partners and sometimes the firm itself have faced accusations of fraud, misconduct, and malpractice on multiple occasions, an investigation by ProPublica and WNYC has found. This story was co-published with ProPublica; visit their website to read Peter Elkind's full text story on President Trump's relationship with his accounting firm. Stay up to date with email updates about our investigations into the president’s business practices.

In a late March press briefing on the coronavirus, President Trump turned the microphone over to Mike Lindell, the founder and CEO of a company called MyPillow. Lindell — a regular on Fox News and at Trump properties, and a high-dollar donor to Republican causes — talked about how his company was pivoting from pillows to protective masks — and effusively praised the president's leadership. We've been thinking about who stands to benefit from the coronavirus bailout, and that unusual moment highlights the close links between Trump and allies who stands to benefit (often in more ways than just publicity) from the government response to the pandemic. On this episode of the show we're examining: • How the Trump family business qualifies for the two trillion dollar bailout• How businesses close to Trump are getting regulatory rollbacks and other long-sought goals• And what kind of oversight we should be expect in this new and uncertain era Check out reporter Meg Cramer's story about how businesses within the Trump Organization stand to benefit from the coronavirus bailout and Peter Elkind's reporting on how Trump Org properties are responding to the crisis. And visit our tips page to learn how to securely share what you know.  Sign up for email updates from Trump, Inc. to get the latest on WNYC and ProPublica's investigations.

Have you ever wanted to write a book and get it published? Or maybe you have already done so? If you have any interest in this field, I think you’ll like today’s interview which is with Adrian Zackheim. Adrian is the founder and publisher of Portfolio, a business book imprint at Penguin Random House.At Portfolio, Adrian has published bestselling books, such as Purple Cow by Seth Godin, Start With Why by Simon Sinek, and The Smartest Guys in the Room by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind. More recently, he published Digital Minimalism by Cal Newport, who I had on the show recently, and they have also published many of Ryan Holiday’s books, one of my favourite writers.I feel like every second great business book I read is published by Portfolio, so I was very keen to talk to Adrian about his approach to book pitching and making decisions.This is a shortish interview episode, and I think it’s a really relevant one to current and aspiring writers. I hope you enjoy it.Visit amanthaimber.com/podcast for full show notes from all episodes.Get in touch at amantha@inventium.com.auIf you are looking for more tips to improve the way you work, I write a short monthly newsletter that contains three cool things that I have discovered that help me work better, which range from interesting research findings through to gadgets I am loving. You can sign up for that at http://howiwork.co See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

(With Andrea Bernstein and Meg Cramer, WNYC, and Peter Elkind, ProPublica) Since Donald Trump’s fortunes came surging back with the success of “The Apprentice” 14 years ago, his deals have often been scrutinized for the large number of his partners who have ventured to the very edges of the law, and sometimes beyond. Those associates have included accused money launderers, alleged funders of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and a felon who slashed someone in the face with a broken margarita glass. Trump and his company have typically countered by saying they were merely licensing his name on these real estate projects in exchange for a fee. They weren’t the developers or in any way responsible. But an eight-month investigation by ProPublica and WNYC reveals that the post-millennium Trump business model is different from what has been previously reported. The Trumps were typically way more than mere licensors or bystanders in their often-troubled deals. They were deeply involved in these projects. They helped mislead investors and buyers — and they profited handsomely from it.  Patterns of deceptive practices occurred in a dozen deals across the globe, as the business expanded into international projects, and the Trumps often participated. One common pattern, visible in more than half of those transactions, was a tendency to misstate key sales numbers. In interviews and press conferences, Ivanka Trump gave false sales figures for projects in Mexico’s Baja California ; Panama City, Panama ; Toronto  and New York’s SoHo neighborhood . These statements weren’t just the legendary Trump hype; they misled potential buyers about the viability of the developments. Another pattern: Donald Trump repeatedly misled buyers about the amount (or existence) of his ownership in projects in Tampa, Florida; Panama; Baja and elsewhere. For a tower planned in Tampa, for example, Trump told a local paper in 2005 that his ownership would be less than 50 percent: “But it’s a substantial stake. I recently said I’d like to increase my stake but when they’re selling that well they don’t let you do that.” In reality, Trump had no ownership stake in the project. The Trumps often made money even when projects failed. And when they tanked, the Trumps simply ignored their prior claims of close involvement, denied any responsibility and walked away. (Projects Where A Trump Family Member Overstated Numbers and Projects Where the Trumps Suggested They Were Developers, Partners or Equity Owners - They Weren't) The cycle is exemplified in Panama City, where the Trumps were involved in a project to build a massive tower and complex known as the Trump Ocean Club . The project’s unfortunate turns included bankruptcy, then, years later, the forcible ejection of the Trump Organization from managing the hotel. There, as elsewhere, the Trump Organization disclaimed responsibility. It emphasized that it had merely licensed the Trump name to developers who handled everything from construction to marketing. “The Trump Organization was not the owner, developer or seller of the Trump Ocean Club Panama project,” it said in a statement last year. “Because of its limited role, the company was not responsible for the financing of the project and had no involvement in the sale of units.” That was false. For starters, Trump arranged financing — his promised commission: $2.2 million or more — by bringing in investment bank Bear Stearns , which issued the bonds that paid for the Panama project’s construction. Trump touted himself as a “partner” of the developer. His daughter Ivanka  briefly boasted that she had personally sold 40 units. (A broker on the project said he couldn’t remember her selling even one.) Meanwhile, Ivanka told a journalist at the time that “over 90 percent” of the Panama units had sold — and at prices five times as high as comparable buildings. Both statements were untrue. Not only were the Panama sales figures inflated, but many “purchases” turned out to be an illusion. That was no coincidence. The building’s financing depended on obtaining advance commitments from buyers, often before concrete had started pouring. But in between the sale of the bonds in 2007 and 2013, the year the building went bankrupt, buyers of 458 units in the 1,000-unit building abandoned their purchase contracts. Those buyers forfeited more than $50 million in deposits, and they never took possession of finished units. Given that the “buyers” were often shadowy shell companies or other paper entities, it was nearly impossible to discern who the actual purchasers were, let alone why they backed out. Trump licensed his name for an initial fee of $1 million. But that was just the beginning of the revenue streams, a lengthy and varied assortment that granted him a piece of everything from sales of apartment units to a cut of minibar sales, and was notable for the myriad ways in which both success and failure triggered payments to him. Consider the final accounting: In the wake of the project’s bankruptcy, a 50 percent default rate and his company’s expulsion from managing the hotel, Donald Trump walked away with between $30 million and $55 million. The Trump Organization did not respond to a long list of questions about its transactions. The White House didn’t have a comment. Trump’s licensing strategy originated with his early-2000s comeback, as “The Apprentice” propelled him to international TV stardom and restored luster to a reputation tarnished by multiple bankruptcies. As Trump put it in one promotional video  during that period, “When the first season of ‘The Apprentice’ finally finished shooting, I was able to get back to my core business, real estate, and I’ve made some really incredible deals.” That strategy is still playing out today. The Trump Organization, which pledged not to launch new projects during the Trump presidency, is aggressively pursuing existing ones, including in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia and India. Some long-assumed beliefs about Trump are being re-investigated, with surprising results. This month, The New York Times published a 13,000-word examination of how Donald’s father, the late Fred Trump, and his estate, funneled millions of dollars to his children, in possible violation of tax rules and criminal laws. With copious documentation showing that Fred directed $413 million in today’s dollars to Donald — not the single loan for $1 million, with interest, that Donald has always claimed — it exploded Trump’s long-propagated claim that he is a self-made man. This article examines another Trump claim: that his post-millennium comeback and global expansion rested on the brilliant purity of a licensing strategy that paid him millions simply for the use of his name. That, it turns out, is no truer than the notion that Donald Trump is self-made. “Development Wasn’t Our Big Forte” A Lebanese importer-exporter with expertise in the apparel industry seemed an unlikely choice as a partner for one of Donald Trump’s first international forays. Yet that’s precisely who Trump would team with to embark on a wildly ambitious construction project in a distant Central American location. Roger Khafif  divided his time between Panama, where he had become a citizen, and South Florida. He was a slick dresser who made big promises and exuded an intensity that could be viewed either as determination or stubbornness, according to people who did business with him. He had worked in the Panama Canal free-trade zone as an importer-exporter of clothing and had recently begun dabbling in real estate, documents show, via ownership interests in two Panamanian beach resorts. “Development wasn’t our big forte,” Khafif acknowledged in an interview with ProPublica. If Khafif seemed an implausible partner, Panama seemed an odd location for a project that would become a template of sorts for Trump’s international licensing deals. The country was better known as a cog in the Latin American drug trade than as a tourist destination. It was a place to turn illegal profits into useable cash. Money laundering helped fuel the proliferation of high-rises that gave Panama City its sleek, ultramodern skyline . The deal came together fast, according to Khafif. To get to Trump, he said, an associate put him in touch with a business partner of Marvin Traub, the Trump friend and former Bloomingdale’s CEO who had also brokered Trump Vodka. Traub’s consultancy got Khafif on Trump’s schedule. (Traub’s firm later sought almost $1.3 million for matchmaking, court documents show.) “We had a quick meeting,” Khafif recalled of his first encounter with Trump in New York in 2005. “Then I left. I went down to Miami, got a call the next day from Donald Trump saying they were interested in the project.” Khafif was so surprised he didn’t at first believe he was talking to Trump. Trump signed on to Khafif’s plan and decided to bestow the leading role in the project, at least as far as the Trump Organization went, on his daughter Ivanka, Khafif told Reuters. Just entering her mid-20s, she was leading a major deal for the first time. Ivanka traveled to Panama shortly after, and the agreement coalesced quickly. Khafif’s dream was audacious and grandiose. The planned complex, Ivanka claimed in a promotional video, would amass the largest square footage of any construction in all of the Americas. Fully Trumpian in its luxury and excess, the plan would call for a 69-story sail-shaped building with 1,000 condos and hotel-condo units, offices, a casino, spa, private beach, pool deck and yacht club. (When viewed from Panama Bay, the resulting edifice would look less like a sail and more like a giant lemon wedge perched on a square base.) One Monday in April 2006 in the marble atrium at Trump Tower in Manhattan, Khafif stood in a well-cut dark suit and pale pink tie  beside Trump, Ivanka and Donald Jr. to announce plans for the Trump Ocean Club’s birth. “I really think the time for Panama has come,” Trump proclaimed. Trump left multiple observers with the impression that he had an equity stake in the deal. “He said the Trump   does have a financial interest in the project but he would not disclose the amount,” reported a newsletter circulated to clients and associates, alerting them to news and investment opportunities, by the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, which would later become publicly known for sheltering wealth in offshore accounts. Marketing materials for the Panama project also implied that Trump was functioning as a developer. “I am honored to develop this extraordinary high rise with my partner Roger Khafif of the K Group,” Trump was quoted as saying in one promotional statement. Buyers believed the Trumps and their company were functioning as the project’s developers, in partnership with Khafif, according to a lawsuit later filed by dozens of buyers. But Trump did not have a penny of equity in the development, according to records of the bond sale and bankruptcy. Nor was he the actual developer, as the Trump Organization’s own statement confirmed. In Panama and elsewhere, Trump’s projects depended on outsiders’ willingness to invest. Trump claimed at the time that banks were “fighting to put up money” for the building. But there’s no evidence that was the case. His five casino and hotel bankruptcies meant financial institutions tended to shy away, and Khafif’s lack of building experience made him a risky financing prospect. (Khafif ultimately brought on the principals of a Colombian construction and design firm to deliver the necessary know-how.) Still, Trump had a card to play without which the tower would likely never have been built: his two-decade relationship with Bear Stearns. The investment bank agreed to underwrite a $220 million bond issue. Bear Stearns and Trump had worked together on a variety of endeavors. For example, two years earlier he and a Bear Stearns executive, Trump’s investment banking adviser, had launched Trump University , a non-accredited business education program that purported to teach his real estate strategies. (It later collapsed among accusations of fraud. Trump paid $25 million to settle a suit but denied wrongdoing.) And as far back as 1988, Trump paid a $750,000 civil judgment to the U.S. Department of Justice for having Bear Stearns make purchases of casino stocks in the bank’s name rather than in his. (Trump was looking to buy casinos at the time, and the Justice Department asserted that the concealed purchases violated antitrust laws.) As the bond underwriter in the Panama project, Bear Stearns played a dual role: It raised money for construction and also vouched for the soundness of the bonds it would sell. The bank was supposed to be checking that information disclosed to investors was accurate and provided a complete picture of the investment’s strengths and weaknesses. In reality, however, “the bank had significant lapses in exercising due diligence over their bond offerings” during that period, according to Gary Aguirre, an attorney and former SEC senior counsel who advocated for more accountability of Bear Stearns and other Wall Street banks involved in the financial crisis and said he researched Bear Stearns as part of that process. The bank, including a member of its Latin America group (which was involved in the Panama deal), faced multiple investigations by regulators into whether its employees in Miami and New York had improperly valued financial instruments, though they did not lead to charges, SEC records and media reports show. The bond sale barely squeaked through in November 2007. Tremors of what would become a global financial earthquake were already destabilizing markets. At the last minute, Bear Stearns postponed the offering only to reverse course a few days later. “I remember walking up Fifth Avenue and I put my arm around Roger [Khafif],” said Jack Studnicky, a lead real estate agent for the project, “and I said, ‘You are the luckiest SOB I ever met.’” This project, branded with the name of a longtime Bear Stearns client, was the only bond issue among eight at Bear Stearns at that moment that moved forward. Many investors turned up their noses at the bonds, even though Bear Stearns representatives had traveled to New York City, Miami and London to talk up the deal. Part of what drove some blue-chip corporate investors away was obvious: The bonds for the Panama project were rated “speculative” — “junk” in Wall Street parlance — reflecting what rating agencies viewed as an elevated chance of default. More risk-tolerant, and more anonymous, hedge funds and money managers proliferated among the bond buyers, making up 80 percent of initial investors. Within months of the offering, it became clear that the Trump Ocean Club would outlive its financial backer. Bear Stearns crumpled suddenly in March 2008 as creditors pounced on the heavily indebted institution. Less than six months after it delivered the money to construct the tower, Bear Stearns disappeared into the belly of J.P. Morgan. “We Needed Those Extra Sales” Trump’s connections landed financing for the Panama project, but they could take the deal only so far. The $220 million in bond proceeds wouldn’t have started flowing if Khafif’s team hadn’t satisfied a key prerequisite: Racking up “presales,” the term for purchase contracts signed while the building was under construction (and in many cases, before construction had even begun). Buyers promised to make a down payment of 30 percent, spread over four installments, and to eventually pay in full. These binding pledges served as collateral for the bond, a crucial source of value that bondholders could seize if the developers failed to pay back what they owed. Khafif and a cadre of brokers set out to move units, with what appeared to be dramatic success at first. The year Trump joined the project, 2006, the developers reported signing a whopping 585 presales contracts with prospective buyers (nearly 60 percent of the units in the building). The Moody’s credit-rating service cited the project’s rapid sales as a “positive credit characteristic.” But the project scrambled to nail enough contracts to fulfill the bank’s requirements, according to Studnicky, who worked for the project’s master brokers, International Sales Group (ISG). Over a meal in a Spanish restaurant in New York City, Khafif told Studnicky he needed “another 100 sales to make it valid” — scribbling numbers on the paper tablecloth, according to Studnicky. “It wasn’t fully collateralized, and we needed those extra sales,” he said. ISG leaned on its agents. “We knew there was a presale requirement in order to trigger the bond issue,” said Jeff Barton, another broker who worked at ISG at the time. “So there was definitely pressure.” In dealing with potential buyers, the ISG brokers communicated urgency of a much different sort: They acted as if the building were running out of units. The prices were in constant flux, keeping potential buyers off-balance. “You could never really get a straight answer in terms of what was actually available, what had actually sold and what the real price was,” said Kent Davis, who began looking to sell Ocean Club inventory soon after opening his own real estate company in Panama City in 2007. (One buyer echoed Davis’ comments. “When I invested it was ‘Oh wow, it’s almost sold out!’” said Al Monstavicius, a retired doctor who bought into the Panama tower. “I was told the units were selling real well. Well, they weren’t selling real well.”) ISG did not return messages seeking comment.  Davis said he sold a few units, splitting the commission with ISG. “I think some of their projections were exaggerated. I think the way they described how the project would ultimately be built did not come to fruition,” he said. “I think they were overpromising and, to be honest, at times I was complacent.” Just as Trump took millions upfront, financial incentives in the project were stacked to reward brokers for quick presales — rather than slow and steady contracts perhaps more likely to close once construction finished. Commissions were front-loaded to an unusual degree, Davis said. Agents making the earliest sales would receive 90 percent of their expected commissions by the time construction started, according to Barton. Only the final 10 percent was held back until closing, when the buyer had paid in full and the unit was ready to be occupied. (Davis said that brokers typically get commissions in increments in line with the percentage their clients have put in.) Even as brokers were taking cash out quickly, buyers were given time to put their money in. They anted up just 10 percent upon signing a purchase contract, according to the bond prospectus. They paid the remaining 20 percent in increments over the year after that. Khafif complained of soaring construction costs and raised prices even as brokers hustled for contracts, Studnicky said. “I kept saying I understand the problem, but if you keep pushing the prices up, people are never going to be able to close on these things,” he said. The higher prices climbed, the more the Trumps stood to pocket. Their licensing agreement gave them a base fee of 4 percent of gross sales when units closed. (This was on top of the $1 million Trump was given in advance for the use of his name.) They also received an “incentive fee”: the higher the price rose above benchmarks, the greater a proportion the Trumps earned, records show. A hotel-condominium unit that sold for $385,000, for example, would produce a payment of $20,650 — just over 5 percent — to Trump’s company. That was just the beginning. Along with the cut of sales, Trump’s 2006 licensing agreement provided the family other cash streams from the Panama project. The Trumps could take a 20 percent commission on construction costs if money was saved through Trump dealmaking, for instance. Once the hotel opened , they would pocket 17.5 percent of what hotel guests paid for their rooms, including what they spent on minibar items, internet service and even bathrobes; 4 percent for parking unit sales; and 12 percent of commercial space rentals. The Trump Organization would also receive 4 percent of the hotel’s gross revenue for managing it, plus an incentive fee equal to a fifth of the hotel’s net operating income. If everything went smoothly, according to the bond prospectus, Trump’s take would be $74 million by 2010. That sum was equivalent to about a third of the entire financing for the project. Of course, things would go less than perfectly. But Trump was protected if that happened, too. His contract created a safety net for him if prices rose so high that buyers failed to close. One provision required that two years after the first closing, developers would pay the Trumps fees for unsold units — basing the amount on the average sales prices of the units that had closed. In theory, avoiding such payments provided an incentive to sell more units; in reality, it meant that Trump would get paid whether or not units actually sold. The contract required that monthly sales and marketing reports be provided to the Trumps. It was a stipulation the Trump Organization appeared to value: In an email related to another project, Trump’s son Eric chastised business partners in the Dominican Republic  for delays in making such reports. “I am getting weekly emails from my team who requests this info on all projects for basic monitoring purposes,” Eric wrote. His sister, meanwhile, asserted her engagement with the company’s endeavors. “I’m involved in every aspect of our new construction projects,” Ivanka said in a 2008 interview. “[A] lot of what I do is get involved in the acquisition process, from sourcing the potential opportunities and then the initial due-diligence process, but then, of course, I follow the deals through to predevelopment planning, design, interior design, architectural design, sales and marketing, and, ultimately, through operations.” “Our biggest problem is not having enough inventory” Construction on the Trump Ocean Club had begun in May 2007, with customer deposits, investor money and a bridge loan tiding the developers over until the sale of bonds in November 2007. To hear the Trumps tell it, the project was a raging and immediate success, even in the face of a historic global financial and real estate crisis that erupted in 2008 and continued into 2009 and beyond. At times, the hyperbole crossed over into misrepresentation. In a November 2008 interview, Ivanka Trump bragged that she had “sold 40 units in Panama last month.” She added that “it’s a 1,000-unit building, we’ve sold over 90 percent of it.” The units, she said, had been going at a “500 percent premium to anything the luxury market has ever experienced prior to our entry.” All of that was exaggerated or outright false. When pressed by her interviewer about what she meant by “I sold 40 units,” Ivanka backed off, saying, “We did, our project,” a transcript of the interview shows. Studnicky, who was deeply involved with Ocean Club sales at the time and generally praised the Trumps, said Ivanka didn’t sell any units that he knew of. Three months after Ivanka’s comments were published, Moody’s reported that 79 percent of the building’s units were under purchase contracts. The Trump name did carry a premium, according to data filed with Panamanian securities officials. But even at its high point, it amounted to about 130 percent of what similar luxury properties fetched, not the 500 percent Ivanka claimed. Meanwhile, the Trumps used some of their glamour to encourage sales. Donald Trump himself hosted a gala for the Panama project at Mar-a-Lago where celebrity Regis Philbin dropped in. But difficulties were mounting and cash was tight. By 2009, some buyers were offered hefty discounts if they agreed to pay the full purchase price up front. (Monstavicius says he accepted such an offer, shaving $100,000 off his nearly half-million-dollar penthouse suite.) Ratings for the Ocean Club’s bonds were lowered in February 2009, but you wouldn’t have known that by listening to the Trumps. A few weeks after the downgrade, Ivanka gushed about Panama in an interview with a publication called the Latin Business Chronicle. “Given the global downturn, the fact that sales remain so robust is a testament to the product, the brand and Panama,” she said. “Our biggest problem is not having enough inventory. We only have a small percent of the building left.” The following year brought more trouble. There was another bond downgrade. One of the services that reduced its rating, Fitch, expressed concerns about the market and buyers’ “willingness and ability to close on units upon delivery.” The developers faced a $27 million construction shortfall and delays by subcontractors performing services such as millwork. Khafif and his team trimmed back some of their plans, which only irked buyers who had already committed their money. For example, buyers said square footage for some units was reduced. The location for a planned beach club was moved to a more distant spot with less cachet. And plans to have Trump manage the casino were abandoned. The issuing of the bonds hadn’t relieved pressure on the Ocean Club to move units. The developers needed to keep sales commitments and cash high or they risked defaulting on the bonds. By 2010, 25 contracts appeared in jeopardy as buyers missed payments toward their deposits. Facing pressure from multiple sides, the developers sought bondholders’ permission to make key changes to their agreement. They proposed relaxing the requirements for collateral and reducing the amount of cash they had to keep in a deposit account. In a company statement quoted in the press at the time, Newland International Properties (the entity formed by Khafif and the outside developers he partnered with) was blunt about its need: “The company believes that the proposed amendments are necessary to allow the company to continue construction.” “Nobody Ever Asked Where These Sales Were Coming From” From the beginning, the plan at the Trump Ocean Club was to draw a luxury-seeking international clientele with disposable income. With some 1,000 units to sell, brokers tapped networks of upper-crust buyers across the globe. In doing so, they netted purchasers with problematic pasts, including some with ties to organized crime and money laundering operations. ISG representatives and independent brokers fanned out to Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Dubai, China and South Africa, as well as other Latin American countries. As of mid-2007, roughly 60 percent of buyers came from outside the United States, bond documents show. (Much has been made of Trump’s buyers of Russian nationality or extraction, but the Panama sales were not tracked by nationality. Still, some were found in Moscow and, Khafif said, in Trump developments in  )  Several aspects of the Panama sales raised red flags, according to experts. For example, some buyers bought blocks of units. Purchases were typically made anonymously through shell corporations registered in Panama. That allowed some buyers to change the ownership of the unit in secret, simply by changing the ownership of the company. They often used so-called bearer shares, allowing a stake in a company to be transferred simply by passing a piece of paper. “Nobody ever asked where these sales were coming from, where the money was coming from,” said Studnicky, adding that this wasn’t unusual for such a building at the time. The purchase of multiple units and the use of bearer shares or shell companies are not illegal in themselves. But they can be hallmarks of money laundering, according to experts. “We have no idea of the people behind those companies,” said Eryn Schornick, a policy adviser for Global Witness, an international anti-corruption organization. The Panama deal, she said, bore signs of “classic money laundering.” Meanwhile, multiple buyers claimed they were promised quick profits through flips arranged by the developers, promises they say were not fulfilled. Some of those allegations began emerging in litigation even before the Trump Ocean Club opened. In late 2010, a group of buyers accused Trump, the Trump Organization, Khafif and Newland, Khafif’s development operation, of misleading them, according to a previously unreported lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court in Florida. There were 37 plaintiffs, led by an independent broker, Greg Landau. The group — including South Florida residents, a family in Brooklyn, a Massachusetts psychiatrist, a New York fashion mogul and several Russians — had bought 42 Ocean Club condominiums between 2006 and 2009. The group alleged that Khafif had offered them a sweet enticement: If they put 30 percent down, either the developer or the Trump Organization would finance the rest. Khafif, plaintiffs claimed, said Newland or the Trump Organization would manage the investment — finding new buyers so they could flip it for a big profit before construction was finished and they had to close on the property. The deal soured after some of the Ocean Club plans were trimmed (including, as noted, reducing the size of units). Buyers discovered there was no developer financing, and no buyers lined up to flip to. They went to court. Trump had “stood by silently as Khafif made the misrepresentations” in a meeting at Mar-a-Lago in 2007 aimed at attracting investors and encouraging current investors to increase their deposits, the lawsuit claimed. It also cited the marketing materials in which Trump called Khafif his “partner.” “The Trump Organization knew these representations were being made by Khafif to Landau and of the fact that Landau was expected to repeat them to other potential investors,” it alleged. “Defendants Khafif, Donald Trump, and the Trump Organization were culpable participants in the fraudulent scheme.” In an interview with ProPublica, one of those buyers described what he had expected to happen. “There was an agreement that when the hotel is built, when the building is ready, we’ll sell our apartments, our shares, and quit the project,” said Victor Masaltsev, an internet entrepreneur who lives in Moscow and invested in the Ocean Club through a Panamanian shell company that became a plaintiff in the Landau suit against Trump. Masaltsev said he was invited to visit Mar-a-Lago for an event with Trump celebrating the project, but he couldn’t make the trip. “I’ve been doing business for a long time and, you know, there’s never a 100 percent guarantee,” he said through a translator. “But I was expecting to make no less than 50 percent profit on my money.” Instead, he said, he lost his deposit. In their legal papers, the Trump Organization and Newland asserted that the complaint was “completely devoid of facts sufficient to show that Donald Trump and The Trump Organization were conducting the affairs of a ‘fraudulent scheme.’” Khafif called the lawsuit a case of “buyers’ remorse, of course.” There were “a million” such lawsuits when the financial crisis came, he added. “They tried to invent anything in order to get their money back. It wasn’t our fault.” A U.S. judge ordered the case be moved to Panamanian courts, but the parties reached a confidential settlement before that happened. Other plaintiffs, reached by ProPublica, have a surprising take on the dispute today. Three of them echoed Khafif and said the project was simply a bad investment. “It’s nothing to do with Trump,” said David Feldman, speaking outside his Brooklyn duplex. He said he did not receive any money in the settlement and added that he thought Trump was hurt by the deal, too, before declining to talk further. Landau did not respond to requests for comment, nor did Roderick Coleman, the attorney named on the lawsuit pleadings. Landau’s group wasn’t the only one to claim it was sold on an unfulfilled promise of easy flipping. One buyer from Dubai made similar claims, according to emails in the Panama Papers, a collection of documents leaked from Mossack Fonseca and shared by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. “The concept was pay the deposit and they would get it resold before completion,” a representative for the buyer wrote to a lawyer in Panama. “[T]he apartment was going to be resold for them by the agents that came from Panama to Dubai for Marketing the project.” Khafif called it another case of buyer’s remorse. “Our project was the cleanest one of them all” Unfulfilled promises weren’t the only questionable behavior alleged at the Trump Ocean Club. For example, one high-selling broker, Alexandre Ventura Nogueira , was linked to money laundering by Global Witness and a joint Reuters-NBC investigation. Nogueira confirmed in that article that some of his partners and investors on the Trump Panama project had connections to the Russian mafia. (He asserted that he had discovered those connections only after the fact.) Among the buyers Nogueira landed was a Colombian businessman who was subsequently convicted in the United States of conspiring to launder drug money. Khafif told ProPublica that he hired Nogueira because he was one of the highest-profile brokers in Panama City at the time. “That guy was very famous,” Khafif said. “We ended up suing him because he swindled the clients.” Nogueira, who was also accused of selling the same units to more than one buyer at the same time, fled Panama and described himself in the Reuters article as a “fugitive.” (He denied in that story, but could not be reached for comment for this article.) The Trump Organization denied the family knew Nogueira. But photos were published of Ivanka and her father smiling with an arm around Nogueira at events at Trump Tower and Mar-a-Lago. Project developers also seem to have made dubious presales themselves — and profitable ones at that — according to emails between bondholders and Newland obtained by ProPublica. Newland shareholders purchased some of the building’s units at below-market prices with down payments of just 5 percent. “I have never seen 8-10 percent of a 996 unit project reserved by the developers at prices as much as 70 percent less than list price (with just a 5% deposit),” asserted one email from Gary Lundgren, who now owns a sizable part of the building, to others in the project. The purchases were “not disclosed in the Bear Stearns’s bond offering circular, not disclosed in the quarterly financial disclosure, not disclosed in the annual audited financial statements,” he complained. Newland acquired some of the units by taking over ones that were in danger of default, Lundgren stated in the email, with the developers kicking in the 5 percent needed for the units to continue being counted as collateral under the bond terms. The developers resold some of the properties at higher prices, Lundgren’s email asserted, and they pocketed the difference. These resales effectively cut out bondholders from their share of the proceeds. His emails to Newland did not mention the Trumps. (In 2016, Lundgren was barred by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority from acting as a broker after he failed to respond to an information request. His filings asserted that the complaint against him, filed by someone who was not his customer, was without merit, and that Panamanian law prevented him from disclosing the records.) The insider purchases potentially violated the terms of the project’s financing. The bond prospectus required down payments of at least 30 percent, which would “protect the economics of our project.” Since sweetheart deals generated less cash — which meant less collateral for the bonds — a provision of the bond agreement restricted sales made to affiliates of the developers. And if buyers stopped making payments, they were supposed to go through a default process rather than have Newland take over their purchase. “The developers made bad judgment calls, and they justified it by their support for the project,” said Alfredo “Dino” de Angelis, of Gapstone, which advised Newland in the bankruptcy. Ultimately, he said, the developers added money to stabilize the project, enough to equal or exceed what they appear to have made by re-selling units. Khafif said that bondholders looked into the questions and “found everything was 100 percent by the book.” He said developers didn’t need to buy units and followed the rules in the bond indenture. Khafif insisted that he conducted business the right way. “Our project was the cleanest one of them all,” he said. “We had to watch out for Trump, we had to watch out for bondholders. We had to work within the indenture, or else we’d be screwed.” “Replete with misrepresentations” Ivanka Trump ’s exaggerations about the Ocean Club reflected a tactic she and her father employed repeatedly in other cases, ProPublica and WNYC found. Their statements, typically made in the midst of sales drives, tended to overstate the number of units under contract or the Trump Organization’s equity stake in projects scattered around the globe. The Trumps’ propensity to overstate sales led them, as ProPublica, WNYC and the New Yorker reported last year, to be investigated on potential felony fraud charges in one case. Ivanka had announced in June 2008 that 60 percent of the units at the SoHo  tower had been bought when in fact 15 percent had, according to an affidavit filed by a Trump partner. The Manhattan district attorney’s office considered charging the Trumps but backed off after a visit from a donor — Trump’s attorney Marc Kasowitz . (The DA, Cyrus Vance , denied he was influenced by the donation but later changed his policy and now refuses donations from lawyers with cases before him.) Similar deceptions occurred elsewhere. In a marketing video for a project in Baja, Mexico, Ivanka referred to Trump International Hotel in Toronto as one of several “sold out” properties. The Toronto tower never did sell out. It was still three-quarters empty late last year, a few months after Trump’s name was removed from the building. Trump himself also made misrepresentations. In 2006, he said the Trump Organization would be a significant equity investor in the $200 million Baja project and repeatedly portrayed himself as the project’s developer. Yet in 2008, the company admitted it was neither a developer nor an investor. In Tampa, as noted, Trump told the press he had a significant ownership stake  when he had none. Moreover, his licensing agreement contained a confidentiality provision barring “under any circumstances” that anyone reveal the agreement existed, and hence that Trump was only licensing his name. The deal never got financing and ultimately fell apart. Panama also wasn’t the only project where questions emerged about insider deals. In Tampa, Donald Trump Jr. and three executives associated with the Trump Organization arranged to buy a unit under unusually attractive terms, according to emails between the executives and the developer. As early sales on the project surged, the Trump group — which formed a company called Busy Boys Investments to handle the purchase — bargained both for a discount price and a smaller deposit than other buyers paid. “Can you confirm the deal?” asked Russell Flicker, a former Trump Organization executive vice president, in a late-2004 email to one of the Tampa developers. “(We had discussed 5% down payment, discounted price and flip rights prior to closing — are all of these on the table?) You’re the man.” The developer replied, “The deal is as you state!” The Trump group also discussed backdating documents to reduce their tax liability, according to the emails. They excitedly anticipated a quick flip that would yield a $200,000 profit — $50,000 apiece, a handsome return on the $8,604 deposit each paid. (The emails were revealed in a court case filed by unhappy buyers; their suit ultimately settled, with the buyers receiving limited refunds of their deposits.) In January 2005, Flicker forwarded an email conveying the prospect of such a windfall to his partners in the side deal: Donald Jr. and Trump Organization executive vice presidents Bernie Diamond and Jason Greenblatt, with the message: “!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” In a July 2005 email, Diamond, an attorney, explained to the others that the developer told him he would prepare a unit purchase contract “for Busy Boys to sign dated in 2004,” as well as an assignment of their contract to the proposed buyer, also “dated one year earlier.” Diamond noted, “This is good, as it will give us the best shot at capital gains treatment.” (The Tampa tower was never constructed, so the Busy Boys entity did not ultimately cash in. On behalf of Greenblatt, who is now a special representative for international negotiations in the Trump administration, a White House official said “Mr. Greenblatt complied with all applicable laws in connection with condominium purchase agreements.”) In Baja, Ivanka tried to leverage her own unit purchase to pull in other buyers. “I personally am very excited about it, I actually chose to purchase a unit in the first tower,” she said in a promotional video as she flashed a smile. She did not mention that the deposit she paid was less than half of the 30 percent other investors put in for their units, according to Univision. Univision also reported that the developers overstated the percentage of units sold and had assigned 34 units to their own executives and other related parties. Written materials became a matter of contention, as well; multiple buyers contended they were misleading. Trump had some say over such materials: Projects including Baja, Tampa, the Dominican Republic, Israel and Panama all required developers and other partners to obtain prior approval from Trump’s company before posting press releases. In some cases, the company had veto power over promotional materials in general, as well.  There were other deceptions. In marketing materials featuring a grinning image of the New York developer, potential buyers in a Trump-branded project in Toronto were shown investment projections that proved wildly optimistic, according to interviews and records from the extensive litigation that ensued. A Canadian appeals court, ruling after the Toronto deal went sour, unanimously found that estimates of profitability provided to purchasers “bore no relation to financial reality.” The panel quoted a trial judge’s findings that the projections were “deceptive” and “replete with misrepresentations of commission, of omission, and of half-truth.” (The case is still pending.) In Chicago , Trump promised discounts — some with down payments of as little as 5 percent — to friends and colleagues, only to rescind those arrangements when sales in the building picked up. Trump justified the broken promises, saying “we’re entitled” to the higher prices. Buyers who sued Trump have had mixed success. Most suits settled before trial, but Trump prevailed in cases in Las Vegas and Florida in which buyers accused his company of deception. The “Stormy Jack Daniels” The Trump Ocean Club in Panama was officially inaugurated on July 6, 2011. It was nearly a year behind schedule after cost overruns and construction delays. The Trumps had been more visible again during the final stages. Ivanka picked out design finishes, including helping deck out the “sky lobby” on the 15th floor with wood paneling, pillars and marble that echoed the ground floor entrance hall. The lobby’s “tropical color palette” was “reminiscent of indigenous flowers,” Ivanka said in one promotional video. July falls during Panama’s rainy season and a downpour swamped the city’s already-overwhelmed infrastructure on the day of the opening, turning the cramped roads near the tower into waterways. Trump had angered many Panamanians by declaring that the U.S. had “stupidly” turned over the Panama Canal “in exchange for nothing.” But the country’s then-president, Ricardo Martinelli , turned up for the ceremony nonetheless. He joined Trump, his two adult sons, Khafif, and other dignitaries to cut a ribbon  to mark the opening. Ivanka, days away from giving birth to her first child, did not attend. (In June 2018, Martinelli was extradited on corruption charges, unrelated to the Trump project, from the U.S., where he had fled in search of sanctuary. He has denied wrongdoing.) Trump was upbeat. “I think this hotel is truly magnificent,” he said, according to press reports. “You look at Panama’s skyline and you see how this one truly stands out.” The time had come for the hundreds of sales contracts that brokers had amassed over the previous five years — eventually covering about 85 percent of the building — to convert to actual sales. In the months that followed, however, it became increasingly clear that buyers were walking away in droves. Ultimately, only about half the sales contracts closed, leaving the building largely empty and developers struggling to make bond-related payments. One-bedroom units that once sold for $350,000 could be scooped up for $180,000. In November 2011, developers defaulted on a critical bond payment. The volume of people who abandoned their deposits far exceeded the ratings agencies’ worst-case predictions. Those predictions rested on the forbidding combination of tight post-crisis financing standards and the high prices that many buyers had agreed to pay. That strongly suggests that many of the remaining people who paid deposits and then vanished may not have intended to do anything more than put down enough cash to trigger the $220 million bond issuance. Newland declared bankruptcy in April 2013 in federal court in New York City, where it kept much of its cash. The Trumps agreed to reduce their fees, making concessions that bankruptcy records said would amount to $20 million over a period of years. Even after those concessions, Khafif’s company continued to run in the red in 2014 and 2015, with net losses nearing $28 million in 2014 alone, financial reports show. It missed another payment in 2015.So Trump didn’t make the $74 million he had hoped for. He appears to have walked away with between $30 million and $55 million, based on fragmentary information in his government disclosure forms, financial statements filed in Panama and estimates by observers. Khafif seems philosophical about it. At 63, he’s semiretired and travels to the U.S. and Europe often. These days, he said, his main business is laundering linens. The company, Perfect Cleaners, which Khafif called the largest industrial laundry plant in Central America, has served the Trump Ocean Club. (He did not respond to a question about his own financial outcome on the Trump project.) Khafif said his relationship with the family remains good. “I was in New York a couple months ago. I went to visit Eric Trump,” he said. “We’re fine.” The Ocean Club proved a disappointment in many respects, he said, “but life goes on. … It’s the best building in town.” As much as $120 million of the original bond was never paid back, according to one investor. Asked about that, Khafif pointed out that many investors sold their bonds — albeit at a discount — after receiving interest payments for years, allowing some to recoup much of their investment at a time when lots of people were hemorrhaging money. “It depends on how you look at it,” Khafif said. “You’re grateful at getting your money back, or you’re greedy and you want to make money when everybody lost their shirt.” Ocean Club buyers filed a host of lawsuits in Panama, complaining of the delays and changes in the building plans. The beach club was never built. A non-Trump company took over the casino. Some rooms were smaller than planned. By 2015, a new revolt was brewing, this time by Ocean Club unit owners fed up with the way the Trumps were managing the property — or more particularly, with how they were spending the building association’s money. Led by Lundgren, the owners alleged that Trump employees overspent budgets, taking excessive bonuses for themselves, and mishandled building finances, leading them to propose a steep increase in fees to owners. Trump responded by suing the condo owners, demanding up to $75 million for wrongful termination. (The litigation was settled  confidentially in 2016.) In 2017, Ithaca Capital Partners, led by Orestes Fintiklis, bought 202 of the hotel’s 369 hotel-condo units. In October of last year, his group sought to remove the Trump Organization as hotel managers — alleging in a legal action that it had mismanaged the hotel, leading to drastic drop-offs in occupancy and profits. The Trump Organization countersued, accusing Fintiklis of a “fraudulent scheme” that breached its 20-year management contract. The dispute reached a head early this year, when Fintiklis’ representatives, with a court order behind them, sought to take physical control of the building. Trump Organization employees and a group of security personnel tried to block the effort, leading to confrontations and shoving matches. Fintiklis’ group ultimately gained entry but discovered walls had been hastily erected in inconvenient places — in the middle of a hallway, in front of an elevator bank — to impede access to the building’s inner offices. Reports circulated of Trump employees shredding documents. In March of this year, the Trumps suffered the ignominy of seeing their name crowbarred off the stone wall in front of the tower . It was rebranded the Bahia Grand Panama. In late spring, the hotel, once touted as boasting stratospheric levels of luxury, was quiet, with rooms renting for the decidedly terrestrial rate of $169 a night. At the hotel bar, you could order drinks with a sardonic twist that reflected Fintiklis’ sense of humor, including the “Fire and Fury” and the “Stormy Jack Daniels.” In June, Fintiklis announced the hotel would have a new manager. “We are thrilled that our hotel will operate as a JW Marriott ,” he said in a statement, “and we believe this partnership, together with a talented team and spectacular hotel amenities, will be a success.” ### Additional reporting by Micah Hauser, Ian MacDougall, Gabriel Sandoval, Katherine Sullivan and Madeleine Varner.

The Texas Baby Murders & the nurse who killed them! Interview with author Peter Elkind. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/burl-barer/support

The "smoking gun" in the Genene Jones case came in the form of a vial of medicine. Producers Stacey Welsh and Emily Porter talk with former Kerr County District Attorney Ron Sutton and author Peter Elkind to learn more about how the case against Jones unfolded after Chelsea McClellan's 1982 death.

Peter Elkind tells the story of the Enron financial scandal; it's a timely refresher on that corporate disaster as the Trump Administration rolls back financial regulations.

The Every Student Succeeds Act was signed into law at the end of 2015 and is a major overhaul of education policy in the United States. In this episode, find out how the new law will likely lead to a massive transfer of taxpayer money into private pockets. Please support Congressional Dish: Click here to contribute with PayPal or Bitcoin Mail Contributions to: Congressional Dish 5753 Hwy 85 North #4576 Crestview, FL 32536 Thank you for supporting truly independent media! S. 1177: Every Student Succeeds Act Bill Highlights Section 4: Transition Ends previous funding programs on September 30,2016 The Statewide Accountability System created by this law will be effective starting in the 2017-2018 school year Title I: Improving basic programs operated by State and local educational agencies Funding Provides an average of $15.5 billion per year for 2017-2020 At least 7% of the funding must be reserved by States and granted to local educational agencies, who will be allowed to hire for-profit organizations for "improvement activities" States are allowed, but not required, to reserve 3% of their funding for direct student services, which includes AP courses, college courses, transportation to another school as needed, and tutoring. 50 local educational agencies will be allowed to create their own per-pupil method of distributing funds State Plans To receive funding, States must submit a peer-reviewed plan to be approved by the Secretary of Education. State plans will be available online for the public Plans will be required to include "challenging academic content standards" but the State won't be required to submit their standards to the Secretary of Education. Academic standards are only required for mathematics, reading or language arts, and science. Alternate academic standards can be developed for students with disabilities. Testing States will be required to test students in math, reading, and science and is allowed to test in any other subject. Math and reading tests are required each year from grades 3 through 8, and once in high school. Science tests will be required once during grades 3 through 5, once during grades 6 through 9, and once during grades 10 through 12. Results will be reported by race, ethnicity, wealth, disability, English proficiency status, gender, and migrant status. State and local educational agencies must include a policy that allows parents to opt their child out of mandated tests. School Choice Students can choose to attend an another public school controlled by the "local education agency" and the local education agency is allowed to pay for student transportation, but there is a funding cap. Secretary of Education's Role The Secretary of Education is prohibited from intervening or adjusting State plans The Federal Government can't force or encourage States to adopt Common Core standards. "No State shall be required to have academic standards approved or certified by the Federal Government in order to receive assistance under this Act." Accountability The State will publish a detailed annual report card on the State's educational agency's website. Local Educational Agency Plans Local educational agencies can only get Federal funding if they have State-approved plans Parents Right to Know Local educational agencies that receive Federal funds will have to provide parents with information about their kids' teachers, including if the teacher has met State qualifications for the grade level and subject and if the teacher is teaching under emergency or provisional status. Parents will also be informed if a student has been taught for 4 or more consecutive weeks by a teacher who does not meet State certification for the grade level or subject. Parents must give written consent in order for their child to participate in any mental health assessment, except for in emergencies. Children can not be forced to take a prescription medication as a condition for attending a Federally funded school. Schoolwide Programs Can be administered by for-profit providers Funds from Federal, State, and local grants can be consolidated and used to upgrade the entire educational program of schools where at least 40% of the children come from low income families. Schoolwide programs can be exempted by the Secretary of Education from regulations governing education grant programs. Activities can include mental health counseling, mentoring services, "specialized instructional support" services, college courses, activities for teachers, and preschool programs for children under 6 years old. High schools can use the money for dual enrollment of underperforming kids and can pay for teacher training, tuition and fees, books, "innovative delivery methods", and transportation to and from the program. "Targeted Assistance Schools" Can be administered by for-profit providers. Local agencies will decide the criteria that determines which kids are eligible Funds can pay for before and after school programs, summer programs, "activities", academic courses, and this law added "family support and engagement services". Children Enrolled in Private Schools Upon request, local educational agencies need to provide children in private schools with services including testing, counseling, mentoring, one-on-one tutoring, dual or concurrent enrollment, radio equipment, televisions, computer equipment, and other tech to "address their needs" "Educational services and other benefits for such private school children shall be equitable in comparison to services and other benefits or public school children..." An investigator will be employed to ensure equity for private school children and teachers A complaint and appeal process will be created for those who think the private school kids are not getting their share of money. Private school children's share of funds will be based on the number of low income children who attend private schools. Funds to private school children can be provided directly or through an "entity" or "third party contractor". State educational agencies must provide services to private school children if the local agencies don't, and they can do so by contracting with private organizations. Title II: Preparing, training, and recruiting high-quality teachers, principals, or other school leaders Creates a public or non-profit teaching academy which will award certificates or degrees equivalent to Masters degrees. The Federal funding provided is a little under half a billion per year. Contracts can be given to for profit entities for teacher testing, training, technical assistance, program administration, and mentoring. For-profit entities can also be hired by local education agencies to develop and implement processes for hiring and paying teachers. Partnerships between schools and private mental health organizations may be formed. The Federal government is prohibited from oversight Teacher and School Leader Incentive Program States, local educational agencies, and non-profit organizations will be given three year extendable grants to create and implement "performance based compensation systems" for teachers, principals and other school leaders in schools with at least 30% of students coming from low income families. Government agencies and charter schools and partner with for-profit entities Civics Courses 12 grants will be awarded to create summer school courses for 50-300 teachers that will inform them how to teach American history and civics. 100-300 junior or senior year students will also get intensive civics courses Title III: Language Instruction for English learners and immigrant students Funding Between $756 million increasing to $885 million per year through 2020. Some grant money will go to "institutions of higher education or public or private entities" for a National professional development project that will train & certify teachers, and pay for tuition, fees, and books. Process All students who may be English learners will be assessed within 30 days of enrolling in a new school. To determine how much money each State gets, data from the American Community Survey, conducted by the Department of Commerce will be used. Title IV: 21st Century Schools Funding $1.6 billion per year through 2020 Grants will be awarded to States to increase student access to education on technology, computer science, music, arts, foreign languages, civics, geography, social studies, environmental education and other experiences that contribute to a well rounded education. Local education agencies need to apply to get the money Local education agencies are allowed to partner with private entities Community Learning Centers Funding $1.1 billion per year through 2020 Purpose Private entities are eligible for 5 year grants to operate Community Learning Centers for extra education programs. State applications will be deemed approved if the Secretary of Education takes no action within 120 days. Applying entities get to decide the purpose of the Community Learning Centers they will operate and must include that information in their application. Activities can include tutoring, mentoring, financial and environmental literacy programs, nutritional education, physical education, services for the disabled, after school English learning classes, cultural programs, technology education programs, library services, parenting skills programs, drug and violence prevention programs, computer science, and career readiness programs. Charter Schools Purpose "To increase the number of high-quality charter schools available to students across the United States" "To encourage States to provide support to charter schools for facilities financing in an amount more nearly commensurate to the amount States typically provide for traditional public schools" Funding $270 million increasing to $300 million per year through 2020 Five year grants will be awarded to open and expand charter schools The Secretary of Education is required to award at least three charter school grants per year and give out every penny allocated for the first two years. Priority will go to States that give charter schools the most, including funding for facilities, free or low cost use of public buildings, or first-in-line privileges for buying public school buildings. Taxpayer funded grants will pay for hiring and paying staff, buying supplies, training, equipment, and educational materials - including development of those materials - building renovations, start up costs for transportation programs, and student and staff recruitment costs. Grant money will go towards getting loans and issuing bonds to the private sector for charter school facilities. National Activities Funding $200 million increasing to $220 million per year through 2020 Programs Grants for experimental programs Businesses will be eligible if they partner with a government organization "Full service community schools" that coordinate community services Private entities will be eligible if they partner with a government organization National activities for school safety to improve students safety during and after the school day The Secretary of Education can use contracts with private entities Awards to provide arts education Private organizations are eligible Awards to create educational programming for pre-school and elementary school aged children on television and the Internet Money will go to a public telecommunications entity that will contract with producers. Awards will to go programs for gifted students Contracts can be given to private organizations Title VIII: General Provisions Department of Education Staff Within one year of enactment (December 2016), the Secretary of Education must identify all projects that were consolidated or eliminated by ESSA and fire the number of employees who were employed administering or working on those programs. Control of Funds Removes the requirement that States provide assurances that funds will be controlled by public agencies or non-profits Military Recruiters Each local educational agency accepting Federal funds must give military recruiters the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of each high school student in the district, unless the parents have previously opted out. Opt-out process:: Parents must submit a written request to the local education agency that their child's information not be released to military recruiters without the parent's consent. Each local educational agency must notify parents of the option to opt-out of recruitment. State Opt-Out Any State that refuses Federal funds "shall not be required to carry out any of the requirements of such program." Title IX: Education for Homeless and Other Laws Creates rights to education for homeless children, which will be distributed to the public Sound Clip Sources Forum: Charter and Private Schools, Forum hosted by Senator Tim Scott (GA), February 9, 2015. Panelists: Frederick "Rick" Hess, American Enterprise Institute Ann Duplessis, Former Louisiana State Senator, Senior Vice President for Liberty Bank & Trust, President of Louisiana Federation for Children Emily Kim, Executive Vice President of Success Academy Charter Schools Timestamps and Transcripts {14:15} Rick Hess: Sitting immediately next to me, we’ve got Ann Duplessis. Ann’s a former state senator in Louisiana. She’s president of Louisiana Federation for Children, where she partners with local and national policy leaders to promote educational options. She continues to work full time while she does this, as Senior Vice President for Liberty Bank & Trust in New Orleans. Oh! She’s also the chair of the Louisiana State Board of Supervisors. Following Hurricane Katrina, it was Ann who authored a bill which allowed the state to take over the majority of schools in New Orleans Parish, which lead to the thriving charter-school movement that you see in New Orleans today. {40:50} Ann Duplessis:Unfortunately, where we are today is, this is big business. Unknown Speaker: That’s right. Duplessis: Education is big business. We are fighting money; we are fighting tradition; we are fighting people’s jobs; and so until and unless we can get past the issues that this is some tradition that we must maintain, until we can have people understand that we need to create new traditions, until we can get past that the jobs that we’re talking about are not jobs that we need to protect, if those jobs aren’t protecting our kids, we have to get past that. And unless we can get our elected officials to understand that, this will all continue to be more of a challenge. {48:00} Emily Kim-Charters: I want to give one example of a piece of paper that we really, truly dislike, and it’s—every year there is this requirement that teachers who are not certified have to send home in the backpack folder for their scholars a piece of paper saying, just wanted you to know, parents, I’m not highly qualified. So, yes, I’ve been teaching for five years, and my scholars are in the top one percent in the state of New York, but I just wanted you to know that I didn’t have that thing called highly qualified, and somebody thought that I should write you and tell you and let you know. I mean, it’s to a level that is truly, truly absurd; whereas, we would want the teacher to write home and say, look, this is what we are doing to get your scholar to the highest potential, and I’ve been doing it for five years very successfully, and this is what you need to do is bring your child to school on time, pick your child up from school on time, get the homework done, and make sure that they are motivated at school. And that’s what we’d like to do, and we have to do the other thing instead. Hearing: Expanding Educational Opportunity Through School Choice, House Education and the Workforce Committee, February 3, 2016. Watch on Youtube Witness: Gerard Robinson: American Enterprise Institute Timestamps and Transcripts {27:15} Gerard Robinson: I can tell you quite clearly that school choice is not a sound bite; it’s a social movement. From 1990 to 2015, over 40 states have introduced different types of school-choice legislation, both public and private. Video: Interview with David Brian, President & CEO of Entertainment Properties Trust, August 15, 2012 Video: Three-Minute Video Explaining the Common Core State Standards by CGCS Video Maker, 2012. Additional Reading Article: Lawsuit accuses Arizona charter schools of teaching history with religious slant by Garrett Mitchell, The Arizona Republic, September 16, 2016. Article: LA charter school abruptly closes for lack of students by Brenda Gazzar, Los Angeles Daily News, September 15, 2016. Article: Lake Forest Charter School, Liberty Bank & Trust Present 4th Annual 'Cocktails And Blues' Benefit Featuring Gina Brown, Biz New Orleans, August 31, 2016. Article: A Sea of Charter Schools in Detroit Leaves Students Adrift by Kate Zernike, New York Times, June 28, 2016. Article: Inside the Hedge Fund Infatuation with Charter Schools by Stephen Vita, Investopedia, March 9, 2016. Article: GOP Candidates Probably Can't Repeal Common Core by Lauren Camera, US News & World Report, March 4, 2016. Article: Why Education Activists Are Furious at ExxonMobil's CEO by Valerie Strauss, The Washington Post, December 29, 2015. Article: Business Gets Schooled by Peter Elkind, Fortune, December 23, 2015. Article: 10 Years After Katrina, New Orleans' All-Charter School System Has Proven a Failure by Colleen Kimmet, In These Times, August 28, 2015. Article: The Big Easy's Grand Experiment by Thomas Toch, US News & World Report, August 18, 2015. Report: Brought to You by Wal-Mart? How the Walton Family Foundation's Ideological Pursuit is Damaging Charter Schooling, American Federation of Teachers, June 2015 Article: Charter groups top unions in lobbying, campaign spending by Bill Mahoney, Eliza Shapiro, and Jessica Bakeman, Politico, February 20, 2015. Article: Who Is Profiting From Charters? The Big Bucks Behind Charter School Secrecy, Financial Scandal and Corruption by Kristin Rawls, AlterNet, January 21, 2015. Report: A Growing Movement: America's Largest Charter School Communities by the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, December 2014. Article: 120 American Charter Schools and One Secretive Turkish Cleric by Scott Beauchamp, The Atlantic, August 12, 2014. Article: A dozen problems with charter schools by Valerie Strauss, The Washington Post, May 20, 2014. Blog post: Big Profits in Not-for-Profit Charter Schools by Alan Singer, The Huffington Post, April 7, 2014. Article: Why wealthy foreigners invest in U.S. charter schools by Valerie Strauss, The Washington Post, February 15, 2013. Article: KKR Partnership Makes an Education Push by Gregory Zuckerman, The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2011. Article: U.S. Gives Charter Schools a Big Push in New Orleans by Susan Saulny, The New York Times, June 13, 2006. Article: N.O. Teachers Union Loses Its Force in Storm's Wake by Michael Hoover, Times-Picayune, March 5, 2006. Article: Students Return to Big Changes in New Orleans by Susan Saulny, The New York Times, January 4, 2006. Commentary: The Promise of Vouchers by Milton Friedman, The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2005. Additional Information OpenSecrets.org: Lobbying Information for S. 1177: Every Student Succeeds Act OpenSecrets.org: Lobbyists representing National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2015 Website: Walton Family Foundation: K-12 Education(http://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/our-impact/k12-education) Website: American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC): Education Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations

The case of San Antonio nurse Genene Jones, convicted in 1984 of murdering children in her care, and now suspected of having killed as many as 16 infants, made national headlines. A horrifying true-life medical thriller, this report by an editor of Texas Monthly is written in an understated style that adds to its impact. Despite her dismissal from a hospital post, weird medical obsessions, a history of lying and major on-the-job errors, Jones breezed from one nursing job to the next. The case has intriguing elements--a young, ambitious prosecuting D.A.; a naive, supportive close associate of the accused serial killer; a public hospital administration that suspected criminal wrongdoing but failed to notify the police and was later accused of cover-up. Elkind, who spares no one, notes with dismay that Jones could be eligible for parole as early as next year. THE DEATH SHIFT-Peter Elkind

An exposé by Fortune magazine offers new revelations on the hack attack on Sony studios at the end of 2014. A six-month investigation by Peter Elkind found that security at Sony was lax and that Sony executives had been warned multiple times before the hack occurred.

Join Nick Howe, author of Owning Model S, to catch up on the latest Tesla News. This week: 1. Nevada’s $1.3B incentive package for Tesla formally approved: http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/nevada-s-13b-incentive-package-tesla-formally-approved 2. Elon blogs about the Nevada incentives: http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/house-always-wins 3. Peter Elkind story about the Gigafactory project: http://fortune.com/inside-elon-musks-billion-dollar-gigafactory 4. Elon interview in Der Spiegel: https://magazin.spiegel.de/digital/index_SP.html#SP/2014/48/130458676 5. Audi discussed electric vehicles: http://seekingalpha.com/article/2698445-audi-confirms-300-mile-range-ev-plans-to-compete-with-tesla?uprof=45 6. Morgan Stanley cuts TSLA earnings estimates: http://www.nasdaq.com/article/tesla-tsla-shares-skid-as-morgan-stanley-cuts-estimates-analyst-blog-cm415873#ixzz3JkwCTacl 7. Tesla Stock Price: https://www.google.com/finance?cid=12607212 8. Supercharger News: http://Supercharge.info