Podcasts about smartest guys

Bethany McLean, previously was editor at large with Fortune Magazine and is currently a writer for Vanity Fair. She has coauthored multiple books including The Smartest Guys in the Room and her most recent titled The Big Fail. On the podcast we discuss the Enron scandal, how Nvidia is different from Enron, 2008 GFC, private equity, the term PRIVATE CREDIT, and much more. PLEASE SUBSCRIBE LIKE AND SHARE THIS PODCAST!!!    Video Version of Show Rumble- https://rumble.com/v53dbh7-coffee-and-a-mike-episode-with-bethany-mclean-private-credit.html   Follow Bethany Twitter/X- https://x.com/bethanymac12 Website- https://www.vanityfair.com/contributor/bethany-mclean   Follow Me Twitter/X- https://twitter.com/CoffeeandaMike Instagram- https://www.instagram.com/coffeeandamike/ Facebook- https://www.facebook.com/CoffeeandaMike/ Truth Social- https://truthsocial.com/@coffeeandamike Gettr- https://gettr.com/user/coffeeandamike Rumble- https://rumble.com/search/all?q=coffee%20and%20a%20mike Apple Podcasts- https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/coffee-and-a-mike/id1436799008     Support My Work Venmo- https://venmo.com/code?user_id=3570365208987017385&created=1658667789.4661531&printed=1 Website- www.coffeeandamike.com Email- info@coffeeandamike.com   Sponsors Independence Ark Natural Farming- https://www.independenceark.com/

Law. Ethics. Morality. Character.What do these words mean, and why are they important in the profession of arms. That is the subject of this week's Midrats.We have just the right person to dig in to this topic, returning to Midrats, Dr. Pauline Shanks-Kaurin.Professor Shanks-Kaurin is the Admiral James B. Stockdale Chair in Professional Military Ethics at the Naval War College. She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Temple University and specializes in military ethics, “just war theory” and philosophy of law and applied ethics. She is author of “On Obedience: Contrasting Philosophies for Military, Community and Citizenry” and “Achilles Goes Asymmetrical: The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare.” She served as a contributor for The Strategy Bridge and has published in War on the Rocks, Real Clear Defense, The Wavell Room, Grounded Curiosity, Newsweek and Just Security.Showlinks:Reviewing The Character Gap: 2021 review at The Strategy Bridge of, The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, by Christian B. Miller.The Smartest Guys in the Room.Ethics: Starting at the Beginning: 2018 article in The Wavell Room.High Noon.The Cruel Sea.Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to VietnamFat Leonard: How One Man Bribed, Bilked, and Seduced the U.S. NavyWith the Old BreedMy Helmet for a Pillow

Bethany McLean, author of best-selling books including, "The Smartest Guys in the Room", and "All the Devils are Here", climbs back aboard to The Express after receiving the SABEW Distinguished Achievement Award, to talk about how she broke open some of the biggest business stories of the past thirty years. From Enron to Elon Musk's SolarCity, Bethany talks about how she developed her sense of wrongdoing, her battles challenging the Power and the Powerful, and whether America's style of capitalism can be saved. LINKS FOR SHOW NOTES https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equityriskpremium.asp https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2024/calpers-will-increase-private-markets-investments https://www.investopedia.com/what-to-expect-in-the-markets-this-week-8635421 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/inside-high-speed-business-cycle-private-equity-prepares/id1529322197?i=1000500819175 https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/authors/229011/bethany-mclean/ https://www.capitalisnt.com/ https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/failuretodeliver.asp https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nakedshorting.asp

Bethany McLean, author of best-selling books including, "The Smartest Guys in the Room", and "All the Devils are Here", climbs back aboard to The Express after receiving the SABEW Distinguished Achievement Award, to talk about how she broke open some of the biggest business stories of the past thirty years. From Enron to Elon Musk's SolarCity, Bethany talks about how she developed her sense of wrongdoing, her battles challenging the Power and the Powerful, and whether America's style of capitalism can be saved. LINKS FOR SHOW NOTES https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equityriskpremium.asp https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2024/calpers-will-increase-private-markets-investments https://www.investopedia.com/what-to-expect-in-the-markets-this-week-8635421 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/inside-high-speed-business-cycle-private-equity-prepares/id1529322197?i=1000500819175 https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/authors/229011/bethany-mclean/ https://www.capitalisnt.com/ https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/failuretodeliver.asp https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nakedshorting.asp

Working in corporate as a man of color is wild. Oftentimes, we are told to make ourselves smaller, brush off microaggressions, and accept sandbagging in the workplace. It gets to a point where you can't put 110% into your work because you have to put so much effort into appeasing a hostile work environment. Eventually, you get to a point where you have to make a choice - stick it out or leave for something better.  Jeff Lapaix is a Bronx-born creative marketing strategist and producer with over 10 years of experience across sports and news. He's also the founder of The Smartest Guys in the Room, a podcast platform that sets out to redefine what it means to be “smart” by celebrating creatives and changemakers, and the impact they're making on communities across NYC. He's the co-writer + voice behind the lip-syncing comedic duo “Juan Bago & O” In this week's episode, Jeff talks about his time in a hostile corporate environment as a creative man of color. From having his ideas stolen and a socially enforced office uniform, Jeff has had to navigate cutthroat company culture. And while many of his colleagues would kill to be in his spot, he was starting to see through the name-brand prestige. It wasn't until he started withholding the details of his amazing ideas that he decided enough was enough. Tune in to hear how he got out and what he's doing now as a creative strategist.  Follow Jeff on:  LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jefflapaix/  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thesmartestpod  The Smartest Guys in the Room Podcast: https://www.youtube.com/@thesmartestpod  Follow Pabel on: Website: https://plurawl.com/  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/plurawl/  TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@plurawl  LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/pabelmartinez/  To book a speaking engagement email hola@plurawl.com Podcast production for this episode was provided by CCST. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bethany McLean joins Ravi to discuss her new book The Big Fail, a groundbreaking indictment of how greed and lack of leadership left us unprepared for a global pandemic. Bethany McLean is a journalist and contributing editor for Vanity Fair. She has co-authored multiple bestselling books, including The Smartest Guys in the Room with Peter Elkind and All the Devils Are Here with Joe Nocera. Leave us a voicemail with your thoughts on the show! 321-200-0570 Subscribe to our feed on Spotify: http://bitly.ws/zC9K Subscribe to our Substack: https://thelostdebate.substack.com/ Follow The Branch on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/thebranchmedia/ Follow The Branch on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thebranchmedia Follow The Branch on Twitter: https://twitter.com/thebranchmedia The Branch website: http://thebranchmedia.org/ Lost Debate is also available on the following platforms:  Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lost-debate/id1591300785 Google: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcy5tZWdhcGhvbmUuZm0vTERJNTc1ODE3Mzk3Nw  Stitcher: https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/the-lost-debate iHeart: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-the-lost-debate-88330217/ Amazon Music: https://music.amazon.co.uk/podcasts/752ca262-2801-466d-9654-2024de72bd1f/the-lost-debate

Welcome to a brand new episode of the ¿Quién Tú Eres? podcast, where we explore the conflict we often face between "professionalism" & being our authentic selves. This week's guest is Oscar Enrique Martinez. Oscar Martinez is a creative and content marketer with over 14 years of experience working with both brands and agencies. As a natural connector, Oscar is a problem solver with a passion for storytelling through the lens of culture and authenticity. You've probably seen his work online as a comedic actor/producer, and he's best known as the other half of the music parody duo Juan Bago and O. After his time in the comedy world, O actually took his talents to the stage, starring in off-Broadway plays and joining the cast of Latino sketch comedy group Room 28. He is now the Cultural Partnerships and Activations Lead on the Global Brand Activations Team at Vistaprint. In this week's episode, Oscar tells us how his rebellious nature shaped his creative career and how he had the courage to leave a “stable” career behind. He was always encouraged to pursue a government job and a pension. But he knew that kind of career wouldn't make him happy. Fast forward a few years, and Oscar is a viral sensation. He's worked with the Billboard Awards, is a host on the Smartest Guys in the Room podcast, and has performed with comedy sketches around the world. Listen to hear how Oscar took a leap of faith and became his most authentic self. Follow Oscar on:  Website: https://www.dotsav.co/about  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/justwatcho/?hl=en  The Smartest Guys in the Room Podcast: https://www.youtube.com/@thesmartestpod/videos  Follow Pabel on: Website: https://plurawl.com/  Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/plurawl/  TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@plurawl  LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/plurawl/  Keep up with the podcast:  Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/quientueres/message  Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/quientueres/support Our AI-Powered Journaling App is Ready to Test! Sign Up for a Focus Group here: https://calendly.com/plurawl/app-user-feedback?mc_cid=976e6dd2a0&month=2023-10  Podcast production for this episode was provided by CCST. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Subscribe to The Realignment to access our exclusive Q&A episodes and support the show: https://realignment.supercast.com/REALIGNMENT NEWSLETTER: https://therealignment.substack.com/PURCHASE BOOKS AT OUR BOOKSHOP: https://bookshop.org/shop/therealignmentEmail Us: realignmentpod@gmail.comFoundation for American Innovation: https://www.thefai.org/posts/lincoln-becomes-faiBethany McLean, co-author of The Big Fail: and co-host of the Capitalisn't podcast, joins The Realignment. Marshall and Bethany discuss how her exploration of COVID America fits into the story of her previous exposés, The Smartest Guys in the Room and All the Devils Are Here, the impact of snarled supply chains, school closures, and poorly evaluated mask mandates, and why she believes capitalism has jumped the rails in the 21st century.

Bloomberg Radio host Barry Ritholtz speaks to Bethany McLean, a writer for Vanity Fair and coauthor of The Smartest Guys in the Room. She was previously editor at large of Fortune and spent three years working at Goldman Sachs. Her latest book, The Big Fail, was coauthored with Joe Nocera. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Episode 509: Shaan Puri (https://twitter.com/ShaanVP) and Sam Parr (https://twitter.com/theSamParr) dive into the white collar crimes of Steve Cohen, the pros and cons of working 100 hours a week, and how to play the right game as a founder, investor, or asset manager. Want to see more MFM? Subscribe to our YouTube channel here. Want MFM Merch? Check out our store here. Want to see the best clips from MFM? Subscribe to our clips channel here. — Check Out Sam's Stuff: • Hampton - https://www.joinhampton.com/ • Ideation Bootcamp - https://www.ideationbootcamp.co/ • Copy That - https://copythat.com/ Check Out Shaan's Stuff: • Try Shepherd Out - https://www.supportshepherd.com/ • Shaan's Personal Assistant System - http://shaanpuri.com/remoteassistant • Power Writing Course - https://maven.com/generalist/writing • Small Boy Newsletter - https://smallboy.co/ • Daily Newsletter - https://www.shaanpuri.com/ — Show Notes: (0:00) Intro (2:00) Steve Cohen's $19b insider trading empire (12:30) 996 Work Culture (20:00) Sam and Shaan's daily work schedules (24:00) Best Career Advice: Stuff the "Other" column (30:30) Law and Crime acquired for 9-figures (40:00) Tyler Hogge on sardines and tech valuations (44:00) Profit is a hypothesis. Cash is s fact (49:00) Know what game you're paying  (53:00) Inside the weird world of Bryan Johnson — Links: • Black Edge: https://tinyurl.com/j5646dbd • GLG Insights - https://glginsights.com/ • Sapiens - https://www.ynharari.com/book/sapiens-2/ • Abrams Media - https://dan-abrams.com/projects/ • Soap Hub - https://soaphub.com/ • Margin of Safety - https://tinyurl.com/5etkzb7t • Tyler Hogge article - https://tinyurl.com/4wmjnmfm • The Smartest Guys in the Room - https://tinyurl.com/2jec5z23 • Blueprint | Bryan Johnson - https://blueprint.bryanjohnson.co/ Past guests on My First Million include Rob Dyrdek, Hasan Minhaj, Balaji Srinivasan, Jake Paul, Dr. Andrew Huberman, Gary Vee, Lance Armstrong, Sophia Amoruso, Ariel Helwani, Ramit Sethi, Stanley Druckenmiller, Peter Diamandis, Dharmesh Shah, Brian Halligan, Marc Lore, Jason Calacanis, Andrew Wilkinson, Julian Shapiro, Kat Cole, Codie Sanchez, Nader Al-Naji, Steph Smith, Trung Phan, Nick Huber, Anthony Pompliano, Ben Askren, Ramon Van Meer, Brianne Kimmel, Andrew Gazdecki, Scott Belsky, Moiz Ali, Dan Held, Elaine Zelby, Michael Saylor, Ryan Begelman, Jack Butcher, Reed Duchscher, Tai Lopez, Harley Finkelstein, Alexa von Tobel, Noah Kagan, Nick Bare, Greg Isenberg, James Altucher, Randy Hetrick and more. — Other episodes you might enjoy: • #224 Rob Dyrdek - How Tracking Every Second of His Life Took Rob Drydek from 0 to $405M in Exits • #209 Gary Vaynerchuk - Why NFTS Are the Future • #178 Balaji Srinivasan - Balaji on How to Fix the Media, Cloud Cities & Crypto • #169 - How One Man Started 5, Billion Dollar Companies, Dan Gilbert's Empire, & Talking With Warren Buffett • ​​​​#218 - Why You Should Take a Think Week Like Bill Gates • Dave Portnoy vs The World, Extreme Body Monitoring, The Future of Apparel Retail, "How Much is Anthony Pompliano Worth?", and More • How Mr Beast Got 100M Views in Less Than 4 Days, The $25M Chrome Extension, and More

EPISODE 1794: In this KEEN ON show, Andrew talks to the co-author of THE BIG FAIL, Bethany McLean, about what the Covid pandemic reveals about American healthcare, innovation and capitalismBethany McLean is a writer for Vanity Fair and the coauthor of The Smartest Guys in the Room. She was previously editor at large of Fortune and spent three years working at Goldman Sachs. She lives in Chicago.Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting KEEN ON, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy show. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children.

Zeke Faux, author of the new bestseller, Number Go Up: Inside Crypto's Wild Rise and Staggering Fall is Jen's guest today.  Of all the books, and scholarly articles, and news stories, and blog posts, and legal complaints and, you get the idea…  on crypto, Number Go Up is truly the first one to pull everything together in one place. And that result is something immensely entertaining and informative. And to be clear, this is not a condemnation of those other works, readers can learn so much from. Instead, it's an expression of high praise for what Zeke has accomplished here. If name-dropping is helpful for you in judging the strength of a book, then let me throw out a few who have heaped praise on Number Go Up.  Evan Osnos National Book Award–winning author of Age of Ambition said: “This book is ludicrously compelling. I, quite literally, couldn't put it down—and I don't even care about crypto.” Matt Levine, the Money Stuff columnist said: “This book is what happens when the funniest financial journalist in America takes on the funniest story in modern finance. The results are as darkly hilarious as you could hope for.” Bethany McLean, author of The SMartest Guys in the Room (that was made into a brilliant documentary said “Essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the mass delusion that was crypto.” Contact Booked Up: You can email Jen & the Booked Up team at: BOOKEDUP@POLITICON.COM or by writing to:  BOOKED UP  P.O. BOX 147 NORTHAMPTON, MA 01061 Get More from Zeke Faux Twitter| Website | Author of NUMBER GO UP Get More from Jen Taub: Twitter| Money & Gossip  Substack | Author of BIG DIRTY MONEY 

For the first episode of Season 3, I'm talking about Enron and the company's spectacular rise and even more spectacular fall. It's a story about how creativity can sometimes mean stupidity, how culture impacts a company's survival, how hiring decisions matter, how ideas mutate, and how companies that put stock price and profits above all else can easily be the architects of their own demise. And--how blind people can be about a lot of things if what they are doing is making money. Who was responsible for Enron? What were the major causes of its bankruptcy? Who spoke up, and who listened (or didn't?) And what insurance responds when half of your executives are being criminally charged, and the shareholders and creditors are suing everyone they can think of? Join me to find out! Selected Sources and Links: 1.       Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (2005) - IMDb 2.       Guest Post: D&O What to Know: A Guide to the Evolution of Directors and Officers Insurance from 1933 to the Present | The D&O Diary (dandodiary.com) 3.       https://nypost.com/2001/12/13/oh-boies-this-is-bad-ex-enron-cfo-hires-top-defense-lawyer/ 4.       The defendants of the Enron era and their cases (chron.com) 5.       Enron Executives: What Happened, and Where Are They Now? (investopedia.com) 6.       SKILLING v. UNITED STATES (cornell.edu) 7.       ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP V. UNITED STATES (cornell.edu) 8.       Enron: Annual Reports (enroncorp.com) 9.       Enron: The Good, The Bad, The Lessons, Lori Zulaf, Peter Grierson, International Business & Economics Research Journal, Volume 1, Number 11 10.   Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure, Anthony H. Catanach Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Vol 48, Villanova Law Review, 2003 11.   The Other Enron Story, Toni Mack, Forbes, October 14, 2002 12.   Is Enron Overpriced? Bethany McLean, Fortune, March 5, 2001 13.   Monster Mess, Bethany McLean, Fortune, February 4, 2002 14.   Hidden Risks, Toni Mack, Forbes, May 24, 1993 15.   Why Enron Went Bust, Bethany McLean, Fortune, December 24, 2001 Sources with Paywall: 1.       Timeline: A chronology of Enron Corp. - The New York Times (nytimes.com) 2.       Disgraced Ex-Enron CFO warns D&O insurers on fraud risk (insuranceinsider.com) Books: 1.       The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron: McLean, Bethany, Elkind, Peter, Nocera, Joe: 9781591846604: Amazon.com: Books 2.       Conspiracy of Fools: A True Story: Eichenwald, Kurt: 9780767911795: Amazon.com: Books 3.       The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Executives: Eisinger, Jesse: 9781501121371: Amazon.com: Books 4.       Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron: Swartz, Mimi, Watkins, Sherron: 9780767913683: Amazon.com: Books 5.       Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation: Baker, Tom, Griffith, Sean J.: 9780226035154: Amazon.com: Books 6.       A Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals: From Enron to Reform: Markham, Jerry W: 9780765615831: Amazon.com: Books Music Credits: ·         Boulangerie by Jeremy Sherman, courtesy of NeoSounds: Boulangerie, LynneMusic | NeoSounds music library Contact Me: Website: https://insurancevshistory.libsyn.com Contact me!  Email: insurancevshistory@gmail.com Instagram: @ insurancevshistory Facebook:  Insurance vs History | Facebook

Chapter 1 What's The Smartest Guys in the Room"The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron" is a book written by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind. It explores the rise and fall of Enron Corporation, one of the largest energy trading companies in the world, and its subsequent bankruptcy in 2001. The book delves into the deceptive practices, corporate greed, and accounting fraud that led to the downfall of Enron, as well as the impact it had on employees and investors. Published in 2003, the book serves as a detailed account of the Enron scandal and the lessons that can be learned from it.Chapter 2 Why is The Smartest Guys in the Room Worth Read"The Smartest Guys in the Room" by Bethany McLean is worth reading for several reasons:1. In-depth analysis: The book provides a comprehensive analysis of the Enron scandal, one of the biggest corporate frauds in history. McLean, a renowned financial journalist, delves into the intricate details of Enron's rise and fall, uncovering the web of deception, corruption, and misguided ambition that led to the company's demise. She dissects the complex financial maneuvers used by Enron, making it accessible for readers with little background in finance.2. Engaging storytelling: McLean's storytelling capabilities make the intricate details of the Enron scandal come alive. She weaves together multiple narratives, including interviews with former Enron employees and executives, to present a captivating and gripping narrative. This makes the book not only informative but also highly engaging, keeping readers hooked from beginning to end.3. Insight into corporate and financial practices: "The Smartest Guys in the Room" offers valuable insights into the world of corporate and financial practices. It exposes the flawed corporate culture prevalent in Enron, where greed, arrogance, and deceit were allowed to flourish. Readers gain a better understanding of the warning signs and the impact of unethical behavior, allowing them to develop a more discerning eye when it comes to assessing corporate practices in the future.4. Lessons for business and finance: The Enron scandal provides valuable lessons for both the business and finance sectors. By highlighting the failures of corporate governance, accounting practices, and regulatory oversight, McLean's book serves as a cautionary tale for those involved in corporate decision-making. It prompts readers to critically analyze the systems and structures in place within their own organizations to prevent similar breakdowns.5. Impact on society: Beyond the world of business and finance, "The Smartest Guys in the Room" exposes the consequences of corporate wrongdoing on society as a whole. The effects of Enron's collapse were far-reaching, leading to significant job losses and financial ruin for countless people. By shedding light on these broader implications, the book encourages readers to be more conscious of the societal impact of corporate actions and the importance of ethical behavior in business.Overall, "The Smartest Guys in the Room" is a meticulously researched, well-written, and thought-provoking book that offers valuable insights into the Enron scandal, corporate culture, and financial practices. It combines engaging storytelling with thorough analysis, making it a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of corporate fraud and its impact on society.Chapter 3 The Smartest Guys in the Room Summary"The Smartest Guys in the Room" by Bethany McLean is a detailed account of the Enron scandal that rocked the corporate world in the early 2000s. The book explores the rise and fall of Enron, a Texas-based energy company...

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Alex Gibney is a documentarian and film maker whose body of work includes 'Enron, The Smartest Guys in the Room', 'Taxi to the Dark Side', which won an Oscar, 'Going Clear: Scientology and the Prison of Belief', 'The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley' (about Elizabeth Holmes), 'The Forever Prisoner', and most recently, 'Boom! Boom! The World Vs Boris Becker'. He has an Academy Award, multiple Emmys, a Grammy, a couple of Peabody Awards, and Writer's Guild of America Awards. Gibney is also President of Jigsaw Productions, which produces independent films, documentaries, and television series. He's currently in the early stages of production for his next film, 'Musk'

The systems that run our economy are only as good as the people running them. With hot inflation, the recent debt ceiling standoff, bank failures & scandals like FTX -- it's understandable to wonder if we couldn't find better leaders than the ones we current have in place Which is shy we're very fortunate to have Bethany McLean join us on the program today. A Slate columnist and contributing editor for Vanity Fair, Bethany worked for thirteen years as editor-at-large at Fortune, where she and fellow reporter Peter Elkind exposed the Enron scandal. She's also the nationally bestselling co-author of The Smartest Guys in the Room and All the Devils Are Here , exposés that dug deep into the global financial crisis and business ethics - which make her a perfect expert for today's topic of leadership. ************************************************* At Wealthion, we show you how to protect and build your wealth by learning from the world's top experts on finance and money. Each week we add new videos that provide you with access to the foremost specialists in investing, economics, the stock market, real estate and personal finance. We offer exceptional interviews and explainer videos that dive deep into the trends driving today's markets, the economy, and your own net worth. We give you strategies for financial security, practical answers to questions like “how to grow my investments?”, and effective solutions for wealth building tailored to 'regular' investors just like you. There's no doubt that it's a very challenging time right now for the average investor. Above and beyond the recent economic impacts of COVID, the new era of record low interest rates, runaway US debt and US deficits, and trillions of dollars in monetary and fiscal stimulus stimulus has changed the rules of investing by dangerously distorting the Dow index, the S&P 500, and nearly all other asset prices. Can prices keep rising, or is there a painful reckoning ahead? Let us help you prepare your portfolio just in case the future brings one or more of the following: inflation, deflation, a bull market, a bear market, a market correction, a stock market crash, a real estate bubble, a real estate crash, an economic boom, a recession, a depression, or another global financial crisis. Put the wisdom from the money & markets experts we feature on Wealthion into action by scheduling a free consultation with Wealthion's endorsed financial advisors, who will work with you to determine the right next steps for you to take in building your wealth. SCHEDULE YOUR FREE WEALTH CONSULTATION with Wealthion's endorsed financial advisors here: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.wealthion.com/⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Subscribe to our YouTube channel: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKMeK-HGHfUFFArZ91rzv5A?sub_confirmation=1⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow Adam on Twitter: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://twitter.com/menlobear⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Follow us on Facebook: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.facebook.com/Wealthion-109680281218040⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ #bankingcrisis2023 #wealthinequality #financialcrisis ************************************************* IMPORTANT NOTE: The information and opinions offered in this video by Wealthion or its interview guests are for educational purposes ONLY and should NOT be construed as personal financial advice. We strongly recommend that any potential decisions and actions you may take in your investment portfolio be conducted under the guidance and supervision of a quality professional financial advisor in good standing with the securities industry. When it comes to investing, past performance is no guarantee of future results. Any historical returns, expected returns, or probability projections may not reflect actual future performance. All investments involve risk and may result in partial or total loss.

Today's guests are Jim Chanos, famed short-seller and founder of Kynikos Associates, and Bethany McLean, contributing editor at Vanity Fair and the author of multiple books, including The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron. In today's episode, Jim & Bethany cover all aspects of fraud.  They share where we are in both the financial cycle and the fraud cycle, why we continue to see frauds since they first connected about Enron over 20 years ago, and the thin line between a visionary and a fraudster. We discuss the anti-short seller rhetoric that  pops up every few months, the impact of social media on the rise and fall of companies, and the impact of stock-based compensation and adjusted earnings.  As we wind down, Jim shares his concerns about the commercial real estate sector, and Bethany gives a preview of her book releasing this October.   ----- Follow Meb on Twitter, LinkedIn and YouTube For detailed show notes, click here To learn more about our funds and follow us, subscribe to our mailing list or visit us at cambriainvestments.com ----- Today's episode is sponsored by Farmland LP. Farmland LP is one of the largest investment funds in the US focused on converting chemical-based conventional farmland to organic, sustainably-managed farmland using a value-add commercial real estate strategy in the agriculture sector. Since 2009, they have built a 15,000-acre portfolio representing over $200M in AUM. Today's episode is sponsored by The Idea Farm. The Idea Farm gives you access to over $100,000 worth of investing research, the kind usually read by only the world's largest institutions, funds, and money managers. Subscribe for free here. 

Bethany McLean (@bethanymac12), author and journalist, joins Julia La Roche on episode 66 to revisit some notorious corporate failures and discuss fraud. Bethany is the author of The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron and All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. She has also written two mini books, Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the US Mortgage Giants and Saudi America: The Truth About Fracking and How It's Changing the World. She also serves on the board of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago. She's a 1992 graduate of Williams College. 0:00 Background and path to journalism  1:47 Goldman Sachs to fact-checking at Fortune  4:15 Writing about investing  5:45 Another side to stories  6:37 Enron  9:20 Reporting the Enron story  14:45 Lessons from Enron  15:20 Do you own homework  18:00 Emotion in business  20:00 Short-selling  23:11 Do your own homework  24:19 Valeant stock battle  26:10 Legal fraud  30:38 A thin line between a fraudster and a visionary  33:15 World of business is crazier than ever before  37:45 Golden age of fraud?  41:03 Venture capital and private equity's reliance on low-interest rates  43:43 A different environment  44:44 Curiosity covering corporate failures  47:00 Can greed be eliminated?  48:48 Banking crisis  49:55 State of journalism 

In this episode of the Business Broken to Smokin' Podcast:  Lodestone True North's Head Coach Mark Whitmore interviews business coach Preston True https://www.gettpafit.com/  About Preston:  After 25 years of managing and owning entrepreneurial businesses, Preston has lived through some of the brightest days and darkest nights. He's learned owning and operating a business requires a new level of fitness well beyond the day you started it. The stamina required to scale rocky peaks, navigate dark valleys and reach your pinnacle is not achieved without the right people, purpose, playbook and performance. 0:00 Intro 4:13 Movie reference - Peanut Butter Falcon https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4364194/  5:39 Podcast reference - The Real Ones, Jon Burnthal  https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/real-ones-with-jon-bernthal/id1610616073 6:19 Shoutout to Jeremy Radabaugh  https://agents.allstate.com/jeremy-d-radabaugh-morgantown-wv.html 7:17 Preston's Desert Island Movies… Spanish Prisoner with Steve Martin https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120176/ The Smartest Guys in the Room https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1016268/plotsummary/ The Terminal List TV series and book by Jack Carr https://www.imdb.com/title/tt11743610/ 11:46 Mark's Desert Island Movies… Saving Private Ryan https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120815/ The Last Samurai https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0325710/ Gladiator https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0172495/ Gran Torino https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1205489 19:14 Shoutout to Greg Cleary https://gregorycleary.com/ 22:02 Shoutout to Pinnacle https://pinnaclebusinessguides.com 23:01 Why are you a business coach 24:53 “Light is one of the most powerful antiseptics” 27:02 Podcast reference: Lex Fridman Podcast https://youtu.be/8EguLJgkc54 Empathy vs. Sympathy 29:09 Shoutout to Tip Quilter https://tipquilter.com/ 29:55 Breaking down the Hero's Journey model by Joseph Campbell 34:02 The difference between coaching, teaching, advising, consulting, implementor, mentor, guide, etc… 38:49 Role as a mentor 40:32 “I am going to help you delete chaos, earn more, and fall back in love with your business.” 49:31 Pathway to mastery… 51:21 What are you resigned or attached about? 57:50 Patrick Lencioni reference 59:22 Helping clients out of the weeds… 1:01:32 Sometimes getting in the weeds is recreating the past… 1:03:01 What can create as opposed to what we can predict… 1:04:27 J. F. Kennedy, putting a man on the moon… 1:05:46 Let's paint a picture of what we'll look like in the future 1:08:42 DTO - Define The Opposite 1:11:11 Dan Sullivan quote… ”Always make your future bigger than your past” 1:14:50 A coach is your inside voice that has empathy and invites challenge… 1:24:57 Dealing with head trash 1:28:26  20 mile march, Jim Collins Great by Choice book: https://www.jimcollins.com/concepts/twenty-mile-march.html 1:31:47 Father Mark Livingston… 1:32:47 The Dazzling Dud 1:34:00 Preston's own Planner/Journal 1:38:07 Shoutout to Brandon Kenney 1:41:54 Stewardship… “The conducting, supervising, or managing of something. Especially : the careful and responsible management of something entrusted to one's care” 1:45:51 As parents we are cultural activators 1:50:36 “Become the leader your people deserve.” 1:51:36 Work/Life balance… 1:56:54 What's the game I'm actually playing? 1:59:32 Mark's speech… *** Credits *** Music - Theme from Sanford and Son, by Quincy Jones Website: https://www.lodestonetruenorth.comWebsite: https://www.bigeasydesk.comLinkedIn Book Club Group: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/14158790/  LinkedIn Mark: https://www.linkedin.com/in/mark-whitmore-lodestone/LinkedIn Lodestone: https://www.linkedin.com/company/lodestone-true-northLodestone Online Courses: https://lodestone.thinkific.com Podcast:YouTube (video)https://youtube.com/@lodestonetruenorth Spotify (video or audio)https://open.spotify.com/show/3QCsZ7fyKr4z804oTac3FUApple Podcasts (audio)https://apple.co/3O4uv4H Other Podcast Platforms https://lodestonetruenorth.com/podcast/

Peter Elkind, an award-winning investigative reporter, is the co-author of the national bestseller, The Smartest Guys in the Room, about the collapse of Enron. Peter is the author of "The Death Shift" about one of the most shocking and insidious cases in the history of medicine: the crimes of one nurse were hidden by a hospital for years. In 1980 Genene Jones is working the 3 to 11 PM shift in the pediatric ICU in San Antonio's county hospital. As the weeks go by, infants under her care begin experiencing unexpected complications—and dying—in alarming numbers, prompting rumors that there is a murderer among the staff. Her eight-hour shift would come to be called “the death shift.” This strange epidemic would continue unabated for more than a year, before Jones is quietly sent off—with a good recommendation—to a rural pediatric clinic.

Podcast: The Lunar Society (LS 37 · TOP 2.5% )Episode: [Best] Bethany McLean - Enron, FTX, 2008, Musk, Frauds, & VisionariesRelease date: 2022-12-21This was one of my favorite episodes ever.Bethany McLean was the first reporter to question Enron's earnings, and she has written some of the best finance books out there. We discuss:* The astounding similarities between Enron & FTX,* How visionaries are just frauds who succeed (and which category describes Elon Musk),* What caused 2008, and whether we are headed for a new crisis,* Why there's too many venture capitalists and not enough short sellers,* And why history keeps repeating itself.McLean is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair (see her articles here) and the author of The Smartest Guys in the Room, All the Devils Are Here, Saudi America, and Shaky Ground.Watch on YouTube. Listen on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or your favorite podcast platform.Follow McLean on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes. If you enjoyed this episode, please share. Helps out a ton.Timestamps(0:04:37) - Is Fraud Over? (0:11:22) - Shortage of Shortsellers(0:19:03) - Elon Musk - Fraud or Visionary?(0:23:00) - Intelligence, Fake Deals, & Culture(0:33:40) - Rewarding Leaders for Long Term Thinking(0:37:00) - FTX Mafia?(0:40:17) - Is Finance Too Big?(0:44:09) - 2008 Collapse, Fannie & Freddie(0:49:25) - The Big Picture(1:00:12) - Frackers Vindicated?(1:03:40) - Rating Agencies(1:07:05) - Lawyers Getting Rich Off Fraud(1:15:09) - Are Some People Fundamentally Deceptive?(1:19:25) - Advice for Big Picture ThinkersTranscriptThis transcript was autogenerated and thus may contain errors.Dwarkesh Patel: the rapid implosion of a company worth tens of billions of dollars. Insider dealing and romantic entanglements between sister companies, a politically generous c e o, who is well connected in Washington, the use of a company's own stock as its collateral, the attempt, the short-lived attempt to get bought out by a previous competitor, and the fraudulent abuse of mark to market account.[00:01:00] We are not talking about ftx, we are talking about Enron, which my guest today, Bethany McClean, uh, first broke the story of and has written an amazing and detailed book about, uh, called The Smartest Guys in the Room. And she has also written, uh, a book about the housing crisis. All the devils are here, a book about Fannie and Freddy Shaky Ground, and a book about fracking Saudi America, all of which we'll get into.She's, in my opinion, the best finance nonfiction writer out there, and I'm really, really excited to have this conversation now. So, Bethany, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. Bethany McLean: Thank you so much for the, for the probably Undeserved Conference, for having me on the show. Dwarkesh Patel: My first question, what are the odds that Sbf read the smartest guys in the room and just followed it as a playbook, given the similarities there?Bethany McLean: You, you know, I, I love that idea. I have to, I have to admit, I guess I love that idea. I don't know. That would make me responsible for what, for what happened, . So maybe I don't love that idea. L let me take that back . [00:02:00] Anyway, but I, I, I actually think that, that, that even if he had read the book, it would never have occurred to him that, that there was a similarity because self-delusion is such a, Strong component of all of these stories of business gone wrong.It's very rare that you have one of the characters at the heart of this who actually understands what they're doing and understands that they're moving over into the dark side and thinks about the potential repercussions of this and chooses this path. Anyway, that's usually not the way these stories go.So it's entirely possible that Sbf studied Enron, knew all about it, and never envisioned that there were any similarities between that and what he was doing. Dwarkesh Patel: Oh, that's a fascinating, um, which I guess raises the question of what are we doing when we're documenting and trying to learn from books like yours?If somebody who is a, about to commit the same exact kind of thing can read that book and not realize that he's doing the same exact thing, is there something that just [00:03:00] prevents us from learning the lessons of history that we, we can never just, uh, get the analogy right, and we're just guided by our own delusions.Bethany McLean: Wasn't there a great quote that history rhymes, but it doesn't repeat. I'm Yeah. Relying on who it is who said that, but I think that's, that's absolutely true. Oh, I think it's important for all of us, those of us who are not gonna find ourselves at the center of, uh, giant fraud or, so, I hope, I think my time for that has passed.Maybe not you, but, um, I think it's important for all of us to understand what went wrong. And I, I do think these, I do think just there, there's a great value and greater understanding of the world without necessarily a practical payoff for it. So I think when something goes wrong on a massive societal level, it's really important to try to, to try to explain it.Human beings have needed narrative since the dawn of time, and we need narrative all, all, all the more now we need, we need to make sense of the world. So I like to believe. Process of making, trying to make sense of the world. , um, [00:04:00] has a value in, in and of itself. Maybe there is small, some small deterrence aspect to it in that I often think that if people understand more the process by which things go go wrong, that it isn't deliberate, that it's not bad people setting out to do bad things.It's human beings, um, at first convincing themselves even that they're doing the right thing and then ending up in a situation that they, they never meant to be in. And maybe on the margin that does, maybe on the margin that does, that does help because maybe it has deterred some people who, who would've started down that path, but for the fact that they now see that that's the, that's the usual path.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. That actually raises the next question I wanted to ask you. Bern Hobart, uh, he's a finance writer as well. He wrote a blog post, um, about, uh, I mean this was before FTX obviously, and he was talking about Enron and he said in the end, it actually looks like we fixed the precise problem. Enron represented.Nobody I know solely looks at gap [00:05:00] financials. Everybody ultimately models based on free cash flow, we're much more averse to companies that set up a deliberate conflict of interest between management and shareholders. And I guess there's a way in which you can read that and say, oh, it doesn't FTX prove I'm wrong.But, you know, there's another way you can look at it is that FTX deliberately set up outside the us. So there's a story to be told that actually we learned the lessons of Enron and, you know, uh, so remains obviously worked. Uh, that's why, you know, they were in The Bahamas and we haven't seen the scale fraud of that scale in, you know, the continental United States.Um, do, do you think that the FTX saga and I guess the absence of other frauds of that scale in America shows that. The regulations and this changed business and investment practices in the aftermath of Enron have actually. Bethany McLean: Well, I think they've probably worked in narrowly, written in, in the way in which the writer you quoted articulated, I think it would be very hard for the cfo, F O of a publicly traded company to set up other private [00:06:00] equity firms that he ran, that did all their business with his company.Because everybody would say That's Enron and it would be completely. On the nose. And so, and Sarbanes Oxley in the sense of, in the sense of helping to reign in corporate fraud of the sort that was practiced by Enron, which was this abuse of very specific accounting rules. Um, I think I, I, I think that worked.But you know, you say there hasn't been fraud on a scale like Enron up until perhaps f ftx, but you're forgetting the global financial crisis. Yeah. And then the end, the line between what happened at Enron. and, and what happened in the global financial crisis. It's not a matter of black and white. It's not a matter of, one thing was clear cut fraud and one thing great.We love these practices. Isn't this fantastic? This is the way we want business to operate. They're both somewhere in the murky middle. You know, a lot of what happened at Enron wasn't actually outright fraud. I've coined this phrase, legal fraud to describe, um, to describe what it is that, that, that, that happened at Enron.And a lot of what [00:07:00] happened in the global financial crisis was legal, hence the lack of prosecutions. But it's also not behavior that that leads to a healthy market or mm-hmm. , for that matter, a a a a healthy society. And so there's a reason that you had Sarbanes Oxley and what was it, eight short, short years later you had Dodd-Frank and so Riri broadly.I'm not sure Sarbanes actually did that much good. And what I mean by that is when President George Bush signed it into law in the Rose Garden, he gave this speech about how investors were now protected and everything was great and your, your ordinary investors could take comfort that the laws were meant to protect them from wrongdoing.And you compare that to the speech that President Barack Obama gave eight years later when he signed Don Frank into law in the Rose Garden. And it's remarkably similar that now ordinary investors can count on the rules and regulations keeping themself from people who are prey on their financial wellbeing.[00:08:00] And I don't think it was, it's, it's true in either case because our markets, particularly modern markets move and evolve so quickly that the thing that's coming out of left field to get you is never gonna be the thing you are protecting against. Mm. . Dwarkesh Patel: , but given the fact that Enron, as you say, was committing legal fraud, is it possible that the government, um, when they prosecuted skilling and Fastow and lay, they in fact, We're not, uh, they, they prosecuted them to a greater extent than the law as written at the time would have warranted.In other words, were, uh, was there something legally invalid in the, in this, in the quantity of sentence that they got? Is it possible? Bethany McLean: So that's a really, it, it's, it's a, I I get what you're asking. I think it's a really tricky question because I think in absolute terms, um, Enron needed to be prosecuted and needed to be prosecuted aggressively.And while I say it was legal fraud, that is for the most part, there was actually real fraud around, around, uh, but it's on the margin. It doesn't [00:09:00] entire, it doesn't explain the entirety of Enron's collapse. Much of what they did was using and abusing the accounting rules in order to create an appearance of economic reality.Nothing to do with actual, with actual reality. But then there was actual fraud in the sense that Andy Fasta was stealing money from these partnerships to benefit himself. And they were, if you believe, the core tenant of the prosecution, which was their, this agreement called Global Galactic that was signed by, that was between Andy fau and Jeff Skilling, where Jeff agreed that Andy's partnerships would never lose money.Then that invalidated all of the, all of the accounting, and that's the chief reason that that. That skilling was, was, was convicted, um, was that the jury believed the existence of this, of this, of this agreement that in, um, one set of insider stock sales, which, which we can talk about, which was also a really key moment relative to the, so in absolute terms, I don't know, it's, it's hard for me to, to say there was [00:10:00] such, Enron was such a, to a degree that is still surprising to me, such a, a watershed moment in our, in our country, far beyond business itself.it, it, it caused so much insecurity that about our retirements, our retirement assets safe. Can you trust the company where you work? That I think the government did, did have to prosecute aggressively, but relative to the financial crisis where a lot of people made off with a lot of money and never had to give any of it back, does it seem fair that, that, that Jeff Skilling went to jail for over a decade and no one involved in a major way in the financial crisis paid any price whatsoever?People didn't even really have to give up that much of the money they made then. Then it seems a little bit unfair. Yes, so I think it's, it's an absolute versus a relative Dwarkesh Patel: question. Yeah. Yeah. By the way, who do you think made more money? Um, the investment banks, uh, like, uh, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, um, from doing, [00:11:00] providing their services to Enron as the stock was going up, or Jim Chanos from shorting the stock?In absolute terms, who made more money? Bethany McLean: Oh, I think the investment banks for sure. I mean, they made, they made so much money in investment banking fees from, from, from Enron. But, you know, it's a good question. . , it's a good question actually, because I think Jim made a lot of money too, so, Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I, I, you've spoken about, I guess the usefulness and the shortage of short sellers des a sort of, uh, corrective on irrational exuberance.And I'm curious why you think that shortage exists in the first place. Like, if you believe in the efficient market hypothesis, you should think that, you know, if some company has terrible financials and implausible numbers, then people would be lining up to short it. And then you would never have a phenomenon like Enron.And so it's, it's, you know, it's so odd that you can. , you know, reporters who are basically ahead of the market in terms of predicting what's gonna happen. Uh, well, uh, how do you square that with like the efficient [00:12:00] market hypothesis? Well, do you Bethany McLean: believe in the efficient market hypothesis, ? Dwarkesh Patel: I, I, I'd like to, but I'm like trying to , trying to wrap my head around Enron.Bethany McLean: I, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm not sure how you. Can, unless you, unless you adopt Warren Buffett's point of view, and I'm gonna mangle the quote because, uh, but, but it's that the market in the short term is a voting machine in the long term. It's a weighing machine, right? Mm-hmm. , or is it the other way around? . Anyway, but the idea is that the market may be very efficient for a long, very inefficient, for a long period of time.But, but it does actually, rationality does actually work in, in, in the end. And I think I might believe that, but isn't it John Maynard Cas who said the market can remain irrational for a lot longer than you can remain solvent. And so I think that's true too. I think believing that the market is efficient and rational in the short term is just obviously wrongUm, but back to your question about short sellers, which is, which is interesting, you know, I think part of it is that there is still this, um, there certainly was a couple of [00:13:00] decades ago, and I think it still exists, this idea that. Owning stocks is Mom, American, and apple pie in shorting stocks somehow is bad and evil and rooting, rooting against America.And I remember going back to the Enron days, someone, people criticizing me, even other people in the press saying, but you took a tip from a short seller. They're biased. And I. , I would say. But, but, but wait, the analysts who have buy ratings on stocks and the portfolio managers who own those stocks, they're biased too.They want the stocks to go up. Everybody's biased. So the trick as a journalist is getting information from all sides and figuring out who you think is right and what makes sense. But it's not avoiding anybody with any bias. But it was really interesting that people saw the bias on the part of short sellers and did not see it on the part of, of, of Longs.And I think there is that preconception that exists broadly, that somehow you are doing something wrong and you're somehow rooting for a company's failure. And that this is, I don't know, anti-American if you, if, if you [00:14:00] short a stock. And so I think that's part of why there's, there's, there's a shortage of shortage of, of, of short sellers.Um, I think also, I mean, we've had. Incredible, unprecedented bull market for the last four decades as a result of falling interest rates, and especially in the decade before the pandemic hit, it was very, very difficult to make money shorting anything because everything went to the moon. Didn't matter if its numbers were good, if it was eventually unmasked to be somewhat fraudulent, , it stocks just went to the moon anyway.The riskier the better. And so it is only diehard short sellers that have managed to stick it out . Yeah, and I think, I think lastly, Jim Chano said this to me once, and I, I think it's true that he could find, dozens of people who were skilled enough to come, smart enough to come work for him.There's no shortage of that. People who are technically skilled and really smart, but being able to be contrarian for a long period of time, especially when the market is going against you, is a different sort [00:15:00] of person. It that it requires a completely different mindset to have everybody in the world saying, you're wrong to be losing money because the stock is continuing to go up and to be able to hold fast to your conviction.And I think that's another, uh, part of the explanation for why there are fewer short sellers. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah, and that raised an interesting question about. Uh, venture capital, for example, where, or private markets in general? Um, at least in the public markets, there's shorting maybe in shortage, but it, it is a possible mechanism, whereas, uh, I'm a programmer.So, you know, if, if like a one guy thinks the company's worth a hundred million dollars and everybody else thinks it's not, you know, the company will still be, uh, the price will still be said by the, you know, the person who's a believer. Um, does that increase the risk of some sort of bubble in venture capital and in technology?Um, and I guess in private markets generally, if they're, they're not public, is that something you worry about that they're, they will be incredible bubbles built up if there's a lot of money that's floating around in these Bethany McLean: circles. . Well, I think we're seeing that now, [00:16:00] right? And I don't think it's a coincidence that FTX and Theranos were not publicly traded companies, right?Mm-hmm. . Um, there's a certain sort of, uh, black box quality to these companies because people aren't charting them and aren't, aren't, and aren't, you know, whispering to journalists about that. That there's something wrong here and there aren't publicly available financials for people to dig through and look, look, and look at the numbers.So now I don't think that's a coincidence. And I do think this gigantic move into private assets has been, um, probably not great for the, for the, for the, for the. for the, for the safety of the system. And you'd say, well, it's just institutional investors who can afford to lose money who are losing money.But it's really not because institutional investors are just pension fund money. Mm-hmm. and in some cases now mutual fund money. So that distinction that the people who are investing in this stuff can afford to lose it is not really true. Um, so I don't, I don't like that rationalization. I think we're gonna see how that plays out.There was [00:17:00] just a really good piece in the Economist about private equity marks on their portfolio companies and how they are still looked to be much higher than what you would think they should be given the carnage in the market. And so all of what, what actually things are really worth in private markets, both for venture capital firms and for private equity firms, Is absent another, another bubble starting, starting in the markets.I think we're gonna see how that plays out over, over the next year. And it might be a wake up call for, for a lot of people. Um, you know, all that, all that said, it's an interesting thing because investors have been very complicit in this, right? In the sense that a lot of investors are absolutely delighted to have prep, to have their, their private, um, their private investments marked at a high level.They don't have to go to the committee overseeing the investments and say, look, I lost 20% of your money the way they might, um, if, if the numbers were public. And so that the ability of these of private investors to smooth as they call it, the, the, the returns is, is it's [00:18:00] been, it's been part of the appeal.It hasn't been a negative, it's been a positive. And so I would say that investors who wanted this moving are. Art might be getting what they deserve except for the pointing made earlier that it isn't, it isn't their money. It's, it's the money of, of teachers and firefighters and individual investors a around the country, and that's, that's problematic.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Being in the world of technology and being around people in it has. made me, somewhat shocked when I read about these numbers from the past. For example, when I'm reading your books and they're detailing things that happened in the nineties or the two thousands, and then you realize that the salary that Hank Paulson made a c e o of Goldman, or that skilling made as, you know, um, c e o of Enron, you know, I, it's like I have friends who are my age, like 22 year olds who are raising seed rounds, , that are as big as like these people's salaries.And so it just feels like the, these books were, you have $50 billion frauds or, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars of collapse and the individuals there, um, it just feels like they, it's missing a few zeros, uh, [00:19:00] because of the delusion of the private markets. But, um, but speaking of short sellers and speaking of private equity, um, I think it'd be interesting to talk about sbf.So, you know, your 2018 Vanity Fair article I thought was really interesting about, you know, sbf factory in Buffalo H How, how do you think back on Tesla and sbf now, given the fact that. The stock did continue to rise afterwards, and the factory, I believe, was completed and it's, I hired the 1500 or so people that had promised New York State, uh, is sbf just a fraud?Who can pull it off? And so he's a visionary. How, how do you think about sbf in the aftermath? Bethany McLean: So I don't think that's right about Buffalo and I have to look, but I don't think they ended up, I mean, the Solar City business that Tesla has pretty much collapsed. I don't think people haven't gotten their roofs.There was just a piece about how they're canceling some of their roof installations. So sbf has repeatedly made grand visions about that business that haven't played out. And I will check this for you post the podcast, but I don't think [00:20:00] if there is employment at that factory in, in Buffalo, it's not because they're churn out solar, solar, solar products that are, that are, that are doing.What was originally promised. So I guess I, I think about that story in a, in a couple of ways. It definitely, um, it was not meant to be a piece about Tesla. It was meant to be a piece that shown a little bit of light on how sbf operates and his willingness to flout the rules and his reliance on government subsidies, despite the fact that he, um, presents himself as this libertarian free, free, free market free marketeer, and his willingness to lie to, to, to, on some level enrich himself, which also runs counter to the Elon sbf narrative that he doesn't care about making money for, for himself.Because the main reason for Teslas to by Solar City was that Solar City had the main reason, was it Tes, that was, that Solar City had, that, that sbf and his, and his and his relatives had extended the these loans to Solar City that were gonna go. [00:21:00] There were gonna be lo all the money was gonna be lost at Solar City when bankrupt.And by having Tesla buy it, sbf was able to bail himself out, um, as, as as well. And I also think a good reason for the, for the, for, and it brings us to the present time, but a reason for the acquisition was that sbf knows that this image of himself as the invincible and vulnerable who can always raise money and whose companies always work out in the end, was really important.And if Solar City had gone bankrupt, it would've cast a big question mark over over sbf, over over the sbf narrative. And so I think he literally couldn't afford to let Solar City go bankrupt. Um, all of that said, I have, I have been, and was I, I was quite skeptical of Tesla and I thought about it in, in, in, in.And I always believed that the product was great. I just, mm-hmm. wasn't sure about the company's money making potential. And I think that, that, it's something I started thinking about, um, background, the Solar City time, maybe earlier, but this line, something I've talked about [00:22:00] before. But this line between a visionary and a fraudster.You know, you think that they're on two opposite ends of the spectrum, but in reality they're where the ends of the circle meet. Characteristics of one. One has that many of the characteristics of the other. And sometimes I think the only thing that really separates the two is that the fraudster is able to keep getting mo raising money in order to get through the really difficult time where he or she isn't telling the truth.And then they, that person goes down in history as a visionary. Um, but because no one ever looks back to the moment in time when they were lying, the fraudster gets caught in the middle. Um, so Enron's Lo lost access to to the capital markets lost AC access to funding as the market collapsed after the.com boom.And people began to wonder whether skilling was telling the truth about Enron's broadband business. And then there were all the disclosures about Andy fasa partnerships if Enron had been able to continue raising money, Business of Enron's called Enron Broadband might well have been Netflix. It was Netflix ahead of its time.So Enron just got caught in the middle and all [00:23:00] the fraud, all the fraud got exposed . Um, but that's not because Jeff Skilling wasn't a visionary who had really grand plans for, for, for, for the future. So I think sbf falls somewhere in that spectrum of, of, of fraudster and visionary. And what's gonna be really interesting why I said that this, we bring it to the present time about what happens to the mu narrative.If something fails is what happens. Yeah. Is as the world watch watches Twitter implode, um, what does that mean then for the Elon sbf narrative overall? Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Um, going back to the Smartest Guys is the Room, the title obviously suggests something about. The, I guess in general, the ability and the likelihood of very smart people committing fraud or things of that sort.Um, but you know, Begar Jones has this book called Hi Mind, where he talks about how the smarter people are more likely to cooperate in prisoners dilemma type situations. They have longer time preference. And one of the things you've written about is the problem in corporate America is people having shorter, [00:24:00] um, uh, you know, doing two too big time discounting.So, uh, given that trend we see in general of greater Cooperativeness, um, and other kinds of traits of more intelligent people, do you think the reason we often find people like S B F and skilling running big frauds just by being very intelligent, is it just that on, on average smarter people, maybe less likely to commit fraud, but when they do commit fraud, they do it at such garat scales and they're able to do it at such gar scales that it just brings down entire empires?How, how, how do you think about the relationship between intelligence and fraud? . Bethany McLean: That's interesting. Um, I'm not sure I know a coherent answer to that. Um, smartest guys in the room as a title was a little bit tongue in cheek. It wasn't meant to say, these guys actually are the smartest guys in the room. It was, it, it was a little bit, it was a little bit ironic, but that doesn't take away from the really good question that you asked, which is what, what, what is that relationship?I, I mean, I think if you look at the history of corporate fraud, you are not going to find unintelligent people having [00:25:00] been the masterminds behind this. You're gonna find really, really, really smart, even brilliant people having, having, having been, been behind it, maybe some at part of that is this linkage between the visionary and the fraud star that so many of these, of these corporate frauds are people who have qualities of the visionary and to.The qualities of, of a visionary, you have to have a pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty high intelligence. Um, and I do think so many of these stories are, are about then self delusion. So I don't think smart people are any less likely to suffer from self delusion than dumb people. And they're probably more likely to, because you can rationalize, you know, the smart person's ability to rationalize just about anything they wanna rational rationalize is pretty profound.Whereas perhaps someone who doesn't have quite the same, the same brain power isn't gonna be able to create a narrative under which their actions are blameless and they're doing the right thing. So I think sometimes, so maybe there is some sort of relationship [00:26:00] there that somebody more qualified than I am would have to study between smart people's ability to, to, to rationalize just about anything as a way of, as part of the path to self delusion and part of the path by which these things happen.Yeah, that's completely, that's completely , that's Bethany theory. There's absolutely nothing to back that . I'm just Dwarkesh Patel: well clear. Let's do some more speculation. So, um, one of the things, uh, John Ray talked about in his testimony, um, was it two days ago where he said that, you know, FTX had done $5 billion of investments and deals in the last year, and most of those investments were worth a fraction of the value that FTX paid for them.And we see this also in, obviously in Enron, right? With, uh, broadband and with, um, ul, or is that how pronounce it, but basically their international department. Yeah. Um, what is this, uh, this obsession with deal making for its own sake? Is that to appease investors and make them think a lot's going on, is that because of [00:27:00] the hubris of the founder, of just wanting to set up a big empire as fast as possible, even if you're getting a bad sticker price?What, why do we see this pattern of just, you know, excessive deal making for its own sake? Bethany McLean: That's an interesting question too. I'm not sure that that's, um, limited to companies that go splat dramatically. There's a lot of, a lot of deal making in, in corporate America has that same frenzied quality. Um, I haven't seen an updated study on, on this in a, in a long time, but, you know, I began my career working as an analyst in an m and a department at at at Goldman Sachs.And. Definitely deals are done for the sake of doing deals. And I once joked that synergies are kind of like UFOs. A lot of people claim to have seen them, but there's no proof that they actually exist. , and again, I haven't seen an updated study on, on, on this, but there was one years back that showed that most m and a transactions don't result in increased value for shareholders.And most synergies, most promised synergies never materialize. [00:28:00] Just getting bigger for the sake of getting bigger and doing deals for the short term value of showing Wall Street a projection. That earnings are gonna be so much higher even after the cost of the debt that you've taken on. And that they're these great synergies that are gonna come about from, from combining businesses.So I don't know that either the frenzy deal doing or deal doing deals gone wrong is, um, solely limited to people who are committing fraud. , I think it's kinda across the spectrum. , . Dwarkesh Patel: Um, um, well one, one thing I find interesting about your books is how you detail that. And correct me if this is the wrong way to read them, but that, uh, incentives are not the only thing that matter.You know, there there's this perception that, you know, we've set up bad incentives for these actors and that's why they did bad things. But also, um, the power of one individual to shape a co co company's culture and the power of that culture to enable bad behavior, whether scaling at Enron or with Clarkson Right at Moody's.Yeah. Um, is that a good, good way of reading your books or how, how do you think [00:29:00] about the relative importance of culture and incentive? Bethany McLean: I think that's really fair. But incentives are part of culture, right? If, if you've set up a culture where, where how you're valued is what you get paid, I think it's a little, it's a little difficult to separate those two things out because, because the, the incentives do help make the culture, but for sure culture is incredibly, um, incredibly compelling.I've often thought and said that if I had, when I was leaving my short lived career in investment banking, if I had, if I had gotten in some of the head hunters I was talking to, if one of them had said, there's this great, really energetic, interesting energy company down in Houston, , why don't interview there?If I had gone there, would I have been a whistleblower or would I have been a believer? And I'd like to believe I would've been a whistleblower, but I think it's equally likely that I would've been a believer. Culture is so strong. It creates this. What's maybe a miasma that you can't see outside?I remember a guy I talked to who's a trader at Enron, really smart guy, and he [00:30:00] was like, after the, after the bankruptcy, he said, of course, if we're all getting paid based on creating reported earnings and there's all this cash going out the door in order to do these deals that are creating reported earnings, and that's the culture of the entire firm, of course it's not gonna work economically.He said, I never thought about it. . It just didn't, it didn't, it didn't occur to me. And I think the more compelling the CEO o the more likely you are to have that kind of mass delusion. I mean, there's a reason cult exist, right? . We, we are as human beings, remarkably susceptible to.Visionary leaders. It's just, it's the way the human brain is wired. We, we wanna believe, and especially if somebody has the ability to put a vision forward, like Jeff Gilling did at Enron, like Elizabeth Holmes did it Theranos like SPF F did, where you feel like you are in the service of something greater by helping this, vision, , actualize then, then you're, particularly susceptible.And I think that is the place where [00:31:00] incentives don't quite explain things. That is, there is this very human desire to matter, to do something important. Mm-hmm to be doing something that's gonna change the world. And when somebody can tap into that desire in people that feeling that what you're doing isn't just work in a paycheck and the incentives you have, but I mean, I guess it is part of the incentive, but that you're part of some greater good.That's incredibly powerful. Yeah. Dwarkesh Patel: It's what we all speaking of. We all wanna matter. . Yeah. Speaking of peoples psychology, uh, crime and punishment, underrated or overrated as a way to analyze the psychology of people like scaling and S B F or maybe SBF specifically because of the utilitarian nature of SB F'S crime?Um, Bethany McLean: I think it's, I think it's underrated, overrated. I'm not sure anybody. , I'm not sure anybody has ever proven that jail sentences for white collar criminals do anything to deter subsequent white collar crime. Mm-hmm. , and I think one part of this is the self delusion that I've, that I talked about. Nobody thinks, [00:32:00] oh, I'm doing the same thing as Jeff Skilling did at Enron, and if I, and if I do this, then I too might end up in jail.Therefore, I don't wanna do this. I just don't think that's the way the, the, the, the, the thought process works. I think Elizabeth Holmes at Theranos, probably for the most part, convinced herself that this was going to work, and that if you just push forward and push hard enough and keep telling people what they wanna hear and keep being able to raise money, it's gonna work.You know, if. . If, if you pause to think, well, what if it doesn't work and I've lied and I go to jail, then, then you'd stop right, right then and there. So I think that, I think that, that I'm, I'm not, I'm not sure it's much of a deterrent. I remember, and partly I'm, I'm biased because I remember a piece, my co-author Peter Alkin, and I wrote out right after Jess Gilling and Kenley were, were convicted and can lay, we're we're convicted.And we wrote a piece for Fortune in which we said that the entire world has changed. Now that corporate executives are, um, are, are put on high alert that behavior in the gray area will no longer be tolerated and that it will be aggressively prosecuted. And this was spring of [00:33:00] 2006 and the events that caused the global financial crisis were pretty well underway.It didn't. Do much to prevent the global financial crisis. Mm-hmm. , Enron's, Enron's jail time, didn't do anything to present, prevent, Elizabeth Holmes doesn't seem to have done anything to change what Sbf was doing. So I just, I, I just, I'm, I'm, I'm not sure, I'm sure a psychologist or somebody who specializes in studying white color crime could probably make a argument that refutes everything I said and that shows that has had a deterring effect.But I just, I just don't think that people who get themselves into this situation, con, con, consciously think, this is what I'm doing. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Um, speaking of other incentives, stock options, uh, you've spoken about how that creates short-term incentives for the executives who are making decisions. If you wanted to set up an instrument that aligned an executive or a leader's compensation with the long-term performance of a company, what would that look like?W would you have the options of less than 10 years instead of a [00:34:00] year? H how would you design it? How do you usually design a compensation scheme to award long-term thinking? Bethany McLean: If I could do that, I should ru rule the world . I think that very sweet. I think that is one of the really tough, um, problems confronting boards or anybody who is determining anybody who's determining stock options and that almost anybody who's determining compensation and that most compensation schemes seem to have really terrible unintended consequences.They look really good on paper. And then as they're implemented, it turns out that there was a way in which they accomplished exactly the opposite of, uh, thing the people who designing them wanted, wanted them to accomplish. I mean, if you think back to the advent of stock options, what could sound better?Right. Giving management a share of the company such that if, if, if shareholders did well, that they'd do well, nobody envisioned the ways in which stock options could be repriced. The ways in which meeting earnings targets could lead to gaming the ways in which the incentive of stock-based [00:35:00] compensation could lead to people trying to get anything they could in order to get the stock price higher and cash out when they're, as soon as their stock options vested.So, and even there was, there was, the whole valiant saga was fascinating on this front because the people who designed Mike Pearson's compensation package as ceo e o Valiant, they were convinced that this was absolutely the way to do it. And he got bigger and bigger, um, stock option incentives for hitting certain, for having the stock achieve certain levels.But of course, that creates this incredible bias to just get the stock to go up no matter, no matter what else you do. Um, it does seem to me that vesting over the long term is. is, is a much better way to go about things. But then do you create incentives for people to play games in order to get the stock lower at, at various points where there's about to be a stock optional board so they have a better chance of having directions be, be worth, be worth something over the long term.And do you, particularly on Wall Street there is this, or in firms where this sort of stuff matters the most? There [00:36:00] is this, there was this clearing out of dead wood that happened where people got paid and they got outta the way and made way for younger people. And I don't know, it was a harsh culture, but maybe it made sense on some level.And now at least I've been told with much longer vesting periods, you have people who don't wanna let go. And so you have more of a problem with people who should have retired, stick sticking around instead of in, in, instead of clearing out. And then it also becomes a question, How much money is, is enough.So if somebody is getting millions of dollars in short-term compensation and then they have a whole bunch more money tied up in long-term compensation, do the long-term numbers matter? At what point do they, do they, do they really matter? I mean, if you gave me $5 million today, I'm not so sure I'd really care if I were getting another $5 million in 10 years.Right. ? Yeah. So, so I think all of that is, is it, it's, I'm not, I'm not sure there's a perfect compensation system. All things considered though, I think longer term is, is probably better, [00:37:00] but. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah, I didn't think about that downside of the long investing period. That's so interesting there. I guess there is no free lunch.Uh, so with Enron, um, it, it was clear that there was a lot of talent at the firm and that you had these companies and these trading firms launch at the aftermath by people who left Enron, kinder Morgan and John Arnold's, um, uh, Sintas, uh, that were wildly profitable and did well. Do you think we'll see the same thing with FTX, that while Sbf himself and maybe the, his close cadre were frauds, there actually was a lot of great trading and engineering talent there that are gonna start these very successful firms in the aftermath.Bethany McLean: That's, that's interesting. And just, just for the sake of clarification, kinder Morgan was actually started years before Enron's collapsed, when Rich Kinder, who was vying with Jeffs skilling in a sense, to become Chief Operating Officer. Um, Ken Lay, picked Jeffs skilling and Kinder left. Mm-hmm. and took a few assets and went to create Kinder, kinder Morgan.But your overall point, I'm just clarifying your overall point holds, there were a lot of people who [00:38:00] left Enron and went on to do, to have pretty, pretty remarkable careers. I think the answer with ftx, I bet there will be some for sure. But whether they will be in the crypto space, I guess depends on your views on the long-term viability of, of, of the crypto space.And I have never , it's funny is crypto exploded over the last couple of years. I was, I've been working on this book about the pandemic and it's been busy and difficult enough that I have not lifted my head to, to think about much else. And I always thought, I don't get it. I don't understand , I mean, I understand the whole argument about the blockchain being valuable for lots of transactions and I, I get that, but I never understood crypto itself and I thought, well, I just need to, as soon as this book is done, I just need to put a month into understanding this because it's obviously an important, important enough part of our world that I need to figure it out.So now I think, oh, Okay, maybe I didn't understand it for a reason and maybe, um, maybe there isn't anything to understand and I've just saved myself a whole life of crime because it's all gone. And you have [00:39:00] people like Larry Fink at BlackRock saying, whole industry is gonna implode. It's done. And certainly with the news today, this morning of finances auditor basically saying We're out.Um, I, I don't, I don't know how much of it was, how much of it was, is, was a Ponzi scheme. You might know better than I do. And so I don't know what's left after this whole thing implodes. It's a little bit like, there is an analogy here that when Enron imploded, yes, a lot of people went on to start other successful businesses, but the whole energy trading business is practiced by kind of under capitalized, um, um, energy firms went away and that never came back.Yeah. And so I, I, I don't, I don't know, I'm, it'll be, I, I don't know. What do you. The Dwarkesh Patel: time to be worried will be when Bethany McLean writes an article titled Is Bitcoin Overvalued for the Audience. My Moments on That ? Yeah, for the audience that, that was, I believe the first skeptical article about Enron's, um, stock price.Yeah. Uh, and it was titled [00:40:00] Is Enron Overvalued. In aftermath understated, , title. But , Bethany McLean: , I joked that that story should have won, won, won awards for the NICU title and business journalism history. , given that the company was bankrupt six months later was overpricedDwarkesh Patel: Um, uh, well, let me ask a bigger question about finance in general. So finance is 9% of gdp, I believe. How much of that is the productive use and thinking and allocation of the, uh, the capital towards their most productive ends? And how much of that is just zero sum or negative sum games? Um, if, if you had to break that down, like, is 9% too high, do you think, or is it just.I think it's Bethany McLean: too high. I have no idea how to think about breaking it down to what the proper level should be. But I think there are other ways to think about how you can see that in past decades it hasn't been at the right level when you've had all sorts of smart kids. Um, Leaving, leaving business school and leaving college and heading into [00:41:00] finance and hedge funds and private equity is their career of choice.I think that's a sign that that finance is too big when it's sucking up too much of, of, of the talent of the country. Um, and when the rewards for doing it are so disproportionate relative to the rewards of of, of doing other things. Um, the counter to that is that there've also been a lot of rewards for starting businesses.And that's probably, I think, how you want it to be in a, in a product. In a productive economy. So I think the number is, is too high. I don't know how to think about what it should be other than what a, actually, a former Goldman Sachs partner said this to me when I was working on all the devils are here, and she said that finance is supposed to be like the, the substrata of our world.It's supposed to be the thing that enables other things to happen. It's not supposed to be the world itself. So the, the role of a financial system is to enable businesses to get started, to provide capital. That's what it's supposed to be. It's the lubricant that enables business, but it's not supposed to be the thing itself.Right. And it's become the thing itself. [00:42:00] You've, you've, you've, you've, you've got a problem. Um, um, and I think the other, Dwarkesh Patel: there's your article about crypto , that paragraph right there. . Bethany McLean: There you go. That's, that's a good, um, and I think, I think the other way, you, you, you can see, and perhaps this is way too simplistic, but the other way I've thought about it is that how can it be if you can run a hedge fund and make billions of dollars from, and have five people, 10 people, whatever it is, versus starting a company that employs people mm-hmm.and changes a neighborhood and provides jobs and, you know, provides a product that, that, that, that, that improves people's lives. It, it is a shame that too much of the talent and such a huge share of the financial rewards are going to the former rather than the latter. And that just can't mean good things for the future.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. And I, you know, when people criticize technology, for example, for the idea that, you know, these people who would've been, I don't know, otherwise teachers or something, they're, you know, making half a million dollars at Google. [00:43:00] Um, and I think like when I was in India, people were using Google Maps to get through the streets in Mumbai, which is, which is unimaginable to me before going there that, you know, you would be able to do that with, um, a service built out of Silicon Valley.And so, Yeah, I think that actually is a good allocation of capital and talent. I, I'm not, I'm not sure about finance. Um, yeah, Bethany McLean: I think I, I, I agree with you. I think there are other problems with Google and with the, the social media giants, but, but they are real businesses that employ people, that make products that have had, uh, huge.Um, impact on on, on people's, on people's lives. So in, in that sense, it's very different than a private equity firm, for instance, and especially private equity, even more so than hedge funds draws my ire. Mm-hmm. , because I think one of the reasons they, that it, they've been able to make part of the financialization of our economy has been due to super, super low interest rates and low interest rates that have enabled so many people to make so much money in finance are not, they're just a gift.It wasn't because these people were uniquely smart, they just [00:44:00] found themselves in a great moment in time. And the fact that they now think they're really smart because money makes me crazy. Dwarkesh Patel: Um, are Fanny and Freddy America special purpose entities? Are they our Alameda? It's just the way we hide our debt and uh, that's interesting.Yeah. Bethany McLean: Well, I guess we, you know what? I don't know anymore because, so I last wrote about them when was it in 2016 and I don't know now. No, you're right. Their, their debt is still off, off, off balance sheet. So Yeah, in a lot of ways they, they were. . I would argue though that the old Fanny and Freddy were structured more honestly than, than the new Fanny and Freddy, that it really is conservatorship that have made them, um, that have made them America's off balance sheet entities, because at least when they were their own independent entities.Yes, there was this odd thing known as the implicit guarantee, which is when you think about, back to your point about efficient markets, how can you possibly believe there's an as such a thing as an efficient market when their [00:45:00] Fanny and Freddy had an implicit guarantee, meaning it wasn't real. There was no place where it was written down that the US government would bail Fanny and Freddie out in a crisis, and everybody denied that it existed and yet it did exist.Yeah. Dwarkesh Patel: No, but we, I feel like that confirms the official market hypothesis, right? The, the market correctly, they thought that mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddy would have governments. Uh, okay, okay. You might be father Bethany McLean: and they did . You might be right. I, I, I think what I was getting at you, you might be right.I think what I was getting at is that it is such a screwed up concept. I mean, how can you possibly, when I first, when people were first explaining this to me, when I first read about Fanny and Freddie, I was like, no, no, wait. This is American capitalism . This is, no, wait. What? I don't, I don't understand . Um, um, so yeah, but I, I, I, I think that Fanny and Freddie, at least with shareholders that were forced to bear some level of, of the risks were actually a more honest way of going about this whole screwed up American way of financing mortgages than, than the current setup is.Dwarkesh Patel: What [00:46:00] is the future of these firms? Or are they just gonna say in conservatorship forever? Or is there any developments there? Well, what's gonna happen to them? Bethany McLean: The lawsuit, the latest lawsuit that could have answered that in some ways ended in a mistrial. Um, I don't think, I don't, I don't think unfortunately anybody in government sees any currency in, and I mean, currency in the broad sense, not in the literal sense of money in, in taking this on.And unfortunately, what someone once said to me about it, I think remains true and it's really depressing, but is that various lawmakers get interested in Fannie and Freddy. They engage with it only to figure out it's really, really goddamn complicated. Mm-hmm. and that, and that any kind of solution is gonna involve angering people on one side of the aisle or another and potentially angering their constituent constituents.And they slowly back away, um, from doing anything that could, that, that could affect change. So I think we have a really unhealthy situation. I don't think it's great for these two [00:47:00] entities to be in conservatorship, but at this point, I'm not sure it's gonna change. Dwarkesh Patel: Yep. Speaking of debt and mortgages, um, so total household debt in the United States has been, uh, climbing recently after it's, it's like slightly d decline after 2008, but I think in quarter three alone it increased 350 billion and now it's at 16.5 trillion.Uh, the total US household debt, should we worried about this? Are, are, are we gonna see another sort of collapse because of this? Or what, what should we think about this? Bethany McLean: I don't know. I don't know how to think about that because it's too tied up in other things that no one knows. Are we going to have a recession?How severe is the recession going to be? What is the max unemployment rate that we're gonna hit if we do, if we do have a recession? And all of those things dictate how to, how to think about that number. I. Think consumer debt is embedded in the bowels of the financial system in the same way mortgages were.And in the end, the, the, the [00:48:00] problem with the financial crisis of 2008, it wasn't the losses on the mortgages themselves. It was the way in which they were embedded in the plumbing of the financial system. Mm-hmm. and ways that nobody understood. And then the resulting loss of confidence from the fact that nobody had understood that slash lies had been told about, about that.And that's what caused, that's what caused everything to, to collapse. Consumer debt is a little more visible and seeable and I, I don't think that it has that same, um, that same opaque quality to it that, that mortgage backed securities did. I could be, I could be wrong. I haven't, I haven't, I haven't dug into it enough, enough to understand enough to understand that.But you can see the delinquencies starting to climb. Um, I mean, I guess you could on, on, on mortgages as well, but there was this, there was this profound belief with mortgages that since home prices would never decline, there would never be losses on these instruments because you could always sell the underlying property for more than you had [00:49:00] paid for it, and therefore everything would be fine.And that's what led to a lot of the bad practices in the industry is that lenders didn't think they had to care if they were screwing the home buyer because they always thought they could take the home back and, and, and, and, and make more money on it. And consumer debt is, is unsecured. And so it's, it's, it's different.I think people think about it differently, but I'd have. I'd have to, I'd have to do some more homework to understand where consumer debt sits in the overall architecture of the financial industry. Dwarkesh Patel: I, I, I'm really glad you brought up this theme about what does the overall big picture look like? I feel like this is the theme of all your books that people will be, So obsessed with their subsection of their job or, or that ar area that they won't notice that, um, broader trends like the ones you're talking about.And in Enron it's like, why, why, why do we have all these special purpose entities? What is the total debt load of Enron? Um, or with the, you know, mortgage back securities a similar kind of thing, right? What, what, uh, maybe they weren't correlated in the past, [00:50:00] but what's that? Do we really think that there's really no correlation, um, uh, between, uh, delinquencies across the country?Um, so that, that kind of big picture, think. Whose job is that today? Is it journalists? Is it short sellers? Is it people writing on ck? Who's doing that? Is it anybody's job? Is, is it just like, uh, an important role with nobody assigned to it? Bethany McLean: I think it's the latter. I think it's an important role with nobody, with nobody assigned to it, and there there is a limit.I mean, , I hate to say this, it is not, uh, um, it is not an accident that many of my books have been written. That's probably not fair. It's not true of my book un fracking, but that some of my books have been written after the calamity happened. So they weren't so much foretelling the calamity as they were unpacking the calamity after it happened, which is a different role.And as I said at the start of our conversation, I think an important one to explain to people why this big, bad thing took, took place. But it's not prediction, I don't know, as people that were very good at, at prediction, um, they tried [00:51:00] to set up, what was it called? In the wake of the global financial crisis, they established this thing called fsoc, and now I'm forgetting what the acronym stands for.Financial Security Oversight Committee. And it's supposed to be this, this body that does think about these big picture. That thinks about the ways, the ways an exam, for example, in which mortgage backed securities were, um, were, were, were, were, were, were, were repopulating through the entire financial system and ways that would be cause a loss to be much more than a loss.That it wouldn't just be the loss of money and that security, it would echo and magnify. And so that there are people who are supposed to be thinking about it. But I think, I think it's, it's, it's really hard to see that and. In increasingly complex world, it's even, it's even harder than it was before, because the reverberations from things are really hard to map out in, in, in advance, and especially when some part of those reverberations are a loss of confidence, then all bets [00:52:00] are off because when confidence cracks, lots of things fall apart.But how do you possibly analyze in any quantitative way the the risk that that confidence will collapse? Mm-hmm. . So I think it's, I think, I think, I think it's difficult. That said, and of course I am talking my own book here, I don't think that the lack of the, the increased financial problems of journalism really help matters in that respect, because in an ideal world, you want a lot of people out there writing and thinking about various pieces of this, and then maybe somebody can come along and see the.Pieces and say, oh my God, there's this big picture thing here that we all need to be thinking about. But there's, there's a kind of serendipity in the ability to do that one, that one that the chances, I guess the best way to say that is the chances of that serendipity are dramatically increased by having a lot of people out there doing homework, um, on the various pieces of the puzzle.And so I think in a world, particularly where local news has been decimated mm-hmm. , um, the [00:53:00] chances of that sort of serendipity are, are definitely lower. And people may think, oh, it doesn't matter. We still got national news. We've got the Washington Post, we've got the Wall Street Journal, we've got the New York Times.Um, I would love to have somebody do a piece of analysis and go back through the New York Times stories and see how many were sparked by lp, a piece in the local paper that maybe you wouldn't even notice from reading the New York Times piece, because it'd be in like the sixth paragraph that, oh yeah, credit should go to this person at this local paper who started writing about this.But if you no longer have the person at the local paper who started writing about this, You know, it's, it's, it's, it's less likely that the big national piece gets written. And I think that's a part of the implosion of local news, that people, a part of the cost of the implosion of local news that people don't really understand the idea that the national press functions at, at the same level, um, without local news is just not true.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. And, but even if you have the local news, and I, that's a really important point, but even if you have that local news, there still has to be somebody whose job it is to synthesize it all together. And [00:54:00] I'm curious, what is the training that requires? So you, I mean, your training is, you know, math and English major and then working at working in investment banking.Um, is that the, uh, I mean, obviously the anecdotal experience then equals one, seems that that's great training for synthesizing all these pieces together. But what is the right sort of education for somebody who is thinking about the big picture? Bethany McLean: I, I don't, I don't know.And there may be, there may be, there are probably multiple answers to that question, right? There's probably no one, one right answer for me. In, in the end. My, my math major has proven to be pivotal. Even though , my mother dug up these, um, my, my parents were moving and so my mother was going through all her stuff and she dug up these, some my math work from, from college.Literally, if it weren't for the fact that I recognized my own handwriting, I would not recognize these pages on pages of math formula and proofs. And they're like, get gibberish to me now. So , but I, but I still think that math has, so I do not wanna exaggerate my mathematical ability at this stage of [00:55:00] the game.It's basically no. But I do think that doing math proofs any kind of formal, any kind of training and logic is really, really important because the more you've been formally trained in logic, the more you realize when there are piece is missing and when something isn't quite, isn't quite adding on, it just forces you to think in, in a way that is, that in a way that connects the dots.Um, because you know, if you're moving from A to B and B doesn't follow a, you, you understand that B doesn't follow a And I think that that, that, that kind of training is, is really, really important. It's what's given. , whatever kind of backbone I have as a journalist is not because I like to create controversy and like to make people mad.I actually don't. It's just because something doesn't make sense to me. And so maybe it doesn't make sense to me because I'm not getting it, or it doesn't make sense to me because B doesn't actually follow, follow away, and you're just being told that it does. And so I think that, I think that training is, is really, really important.Um, I also have, have often thought [00:56:00] that another part of training is realizing that basic rule that you learned in kindergarten, which is, um, you know, believe your imagination or you know, your imagine follow your imagination. Because the truth is anything can happen. And I think if you look at business history over the last couple of decades, it will be the improbable becoming probable.Truth over and over and over again. I mean, the idea that Enron could implode one of the biggest, supposedly most successful companies in corporate America could be bankrupt within six months. The, from its year, from its stock price high. The idea that the biggest, most successful, um, financial institutions on wall, on Wall Street could all be crumbling into bankruptcy without the aid of the US government.The idea that a young woman with no college degree and no real experience in engineering could create, uh, uh, um, could create a machine that was going to revolutionize blood testing and land on the cover of every business magazine, and that this [00:57:00] whole thing could turn out to be pretty much a fraud. The entire idea of ftx, I mean, over and over again, these things have happened.Forget Bernie Madoff if you had told people a year ago that FTX was gonna implode six months ago, three months ago, people would've been like, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. And so I think just that, that, that, that knowledge that the improbable happens over and over again is also a really fundamental, fundamentally important.Dwarkesh Patel: If we're con continuing on the theme of ftx, I, I interviewed him about four or five months ago.Wow. And this is one of these interviews that I'm really, I'm, I don't know if embarrass is the right word, but I knew things then that I could have like asked, poked harder about. But it's also the kind of thing where you look back in retrospect and you're. If it had turned out well, it's, it's not obvious what the red flags are.Um, while you're in the moment, there's things you can look back at the story of Facebook and how, you know, Marcus Zuckerberg acted in the early days of Facebook and you could say, if the th

Podcast: Dwarkesh Podcast Episode: Bethany McLean - Enron, FTX, 2008, Musk, Frauds, & VisionariesRelease date: 2022-12-21This was one of my favorite episodes ever.Bethany McLean was the first reporter to question Enron's earnings, and she has written some of the best finance books out there.We discuss:* The astounding similarities between Enron & FTX,* How visionaries are just frauds who succeed (and which category describes Elon Musk),* What caused 2008, and whether we are headed for a new crisis,* Why there's too many venture capitalists and not enough short sellers,* And why history keeps repeating itself.McLean is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair (see her articles here and the author of The Smartest Guys in the Room, All the Devils Are Here, Saudi America, and Shaky Ground.Watch on YouTube. Listen on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or your favorite podcast platform.Follow McLean on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:04:37) - Is Fraud Over?(0:11:22) - Shortage of Shortsellers(0:19:03) - Elon Musk - Fraud or Visionary?(0:23:00) - Intelligence, Fake Deals, & Culture(0:33:40) - Rewarding Leaders for Long Term Thinking(0:37:00) - FTX Mafia?(0:40:17) - Is Finance Too Big?(0:44:09) - 2008 Collapse, Fannie & Freddie(0:49:25) - The Big Picture(1:00:12) - Frackers Vindicated?(1:03:40) - Rating Agencies(1:07:05) - Lawyers Getting Rich Off Fraud(1:15:09) - Are Some People Fundamentally Deceptive?(1:19:25) - Advice for Big Picture Thinkers Get full access to Dwarkesh Podcast at www.dwarkeshpatel.com/subscribe

This was one of my favorite episodes ever.Bethany McLean was the first reporter to question Enron's earnings, and she has written some of the best finance books out there. We discuss:* The astounding similarities between Enron & FTX,* How visionaries are just frauds who succeed (and which category describes Elon Musk),* What caused 2008, and whether we are headed for a new crisis,* Why there's too many venture capitalists and not enough short sellers,* And why history keeps repeating itself.McLean is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair (see her articles here) and the author of The Smartest Guys in the Room, All the Devils Are Here, Saudi America, and Shaky Ground.Watch on YouTube. Listen on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or your favorite podcast platform.Follow McLean on Twitter. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes. If you enjoyed this episode, please share. Helps out a ton.Timestamps(0:04:37) - Is Fraud Over? (0:11:22) - Shortage of Shortsellers(0:19:03) - Elon Musk - Fraud or Visionary?(0:23:00) - Intelligence, Fake Deals, & Culture(0:33:40) - Rewarding Leaders for Long Term Thinking(0:37:00) - FTX Mafia?(0:40:17) - Is Finance Too Big?(0:44:09) - 2008 Collapse, Fannie & Freddie(0:49:25) - The Big Picture(1:00:12) - Frackers Vindicated?(1:03:40) - Rating Agencies(1:07:05) - Lawyers Getting Rich Off Fraud(1:15:09) - Are Some People Fundamentally Deceptive?(1:19:25) - Advice for Big Picture ThinkersTranscriptThis transcript was autogenerated and thus may contain errors.Dwarkesh Patel: the rapid implosion of a company worth tens of billions of dollars. Insider dealing and romantic entanglements between sister companies, a politically generous c e o, who is well connected in Washington, the use of a company's own stock as its collateral, the attempt, the short-lived attempt to get bought out by a previous competitor, and the fraudulent abuse of mark to market account.[00:01:00] We are not talking about ftx, we are talking about Enron, which my guest today, Bethany McClean, uh, first broke the story of and has written an amazing and detailed book about, uh, called The Smartest Guys in the Room. And she has also written, uh, a book about the housing crisis. All the devils are here, a book about Fannie and Freddy Shaky Ground, and a book about fracking Saudi America, all of which we'll get into.She's, in my opinion, the best finance nonfiction writer out there, and I'm really, really excited to have this conversation now. So, Bethany, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. Bethany McLean: Thank you so much for the, for the probably Undeserved Conference, for having me on the show. Dwarkesh Patel: My first question, what are the odds that Sbf read the smartest guys in the room and just followed it as a playbook, given the similarities there?Bethany McLean: You, you know, I, I love that idea. I have to, I have to admit, I guess I love that idea. I don't know. That would make me responsible for what, for what happened, . So maybe I don't love that idea. L let me take that back . [00:02:00] Anyway, but I, I, I actually think that, that, that even if he had read the book, it would never have occurred to him that, that there was a similarity because self-delusion is such a, Strong component of all of these stories of business gone wrong.It's very rare that you have one of the characters at the heart of this who actually understands what they're doing and understands that they're moving over into the dark side and thinks about the potential repercussions of this and chooses this path. Anyway, that's usually not the way these stories go.So it's entirely possible that Sbf studied Enron, knew all about it, and never envisioned that there were any similarities between that and what he was doing. Dwarkesh Patel: Oh, that's a fascinating, um, which I guess raises the question of what are we doing when we're documenting and trying to learn from books like yours?If somebody who is a, about to commit the same exact kind of thing can read that book and not realize that he's doing the same exact thing, is there something that just [00:03:00] prevents us from learning the lessons of history that we, we can never just, uh, get the analogy right, and we're just guided by our own delusions.Bethany McLean: Wasn't there a great quote that history rhymes, but it doesn't repeat. I'm Yeah. Relying on who it is who said that, but I think that's, that's absolutely true. Oh, I think it's important for all of us, those of us who are not gonna find ourselves at the center of, uh, giant fraud or, so, I hope, I think my time for that has passed.Maybe not you, but, um, I think it's important for all of us to understand what went wrong. And I, I do think these, I do think just there, there's a great value and greater understanding of the world without necessarily a practical payoff for it. So I think when something goes wrong on a massive societal level, it's really important to try to, to try to explain it.Human beings have needed narrative since the dawn of time, and we need narrative all, all, all the more now we need, we need to make sense of the world. So I like to believe. Process of making, trying to make sense of the world. , um, [00:04:00] has a value in, in and of itself. Maybe there is small, some small deterrence aspect to it in that I often think that if people understand more the process by which things go go wrong, that it isn't deliberate, that it's not bad people setting out to do bad things.It's human beings, um, at first convincing themselves even that they're doing the right thing and then ending up in a situation that they, they never meant to be in. And maybe on the margin that does, maybe on the margin that does, that does help because maybe it has deterred some people who, who would've started down that path, but for the fact that they now see that that's the, that's the usual path.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. That actually raises the next question I wanted to ask you. Bern Hobart, uh, he's a finance writer as well. He wrote a blog post, um, about, uh, I mean this was before FTX obviously, and he was talking about Enron and he said in the end, it actually looks like we fixed the precise problem. Enron represented.Nobody I know solely looks at gap [00:05:00] financials. Everybody ultimately models based on free cash flow, we're much more averse to companies that set up a deliberate conflict of interest between management and shareholders. And I guess there's a way in which you can read that and say, oh, it doesn't FTX prove I'm wrong.But, you know, there's another way you can look at it is that FTX deliberately set up outside the us. So there's a story to be told that actually we learned the lessons of Enron and, you know, uh, so remains obviously worked. Uh, that's why, you know, they were in The Bahamas and we haven't seen the scale fraud of that scale in, you know, the continental United States.Um, do, do you think that the FTX saga and I guess the absence of other frauds of that scale in America shows that. The regulations and this changed business and investment practices in the aftermath of Enron have actually. Bethany McLean: Well, I think they've probably worked in narrowly, written in, in the way in which the writer you quoted articulated, I think it would be very hard for the cfo, F O of a publicly traded company to set up other private [00:06:00] equity firms that he ran, that did all their business with his company.Because everybody would say That's Enron and it would be completely. On the nose. And so, and Sarbanes Oxley in the sense of, in the sense of helping to reign in corporate fraud of the sort that was practiced by Enron, which was this abuse of very specific accounting rules. Um, I think I, I, I think that worked.But you know, you say there hasn't been fraud on a scale like Enron up until perhaps f ftx, but you're forgetting the global financial crisis. Yeah. And then the end, the line between what happened at Enron. and, and what happened in the global financial crisis. It's not a matter of black and white. It's not a matter of, one thing was clear cut fraud and one thing great.We love these practices. Isn't this fantastic? This is the way we want business to operate. They're both somewhere in the murky middle. You know, a lot of what happened at Enron wasn't actually outright fraud. I've coined this phrase, legal fraud to describe, um, to describe what it is that, that, that, that happened at Enron.And a lot of what [00:07:00] happened in the global financial crisis was legal, hence the lack of prosecutions. But it's also not behavior that that leads to a healthy market or mm-hmm. , for that matter, a a a a healthy society. And so there's a reason that you had Sarbanes Oxley and what was it, eight short, short years later you had Dodd-Frank and so Riri broadly.I'm not sure Sarbanes actually did that much good. And what I mean by that is when President George Bush signed it into law in the Rose Garden, he gave this speech about how investors were now protected and everything was great and your, your ordinary investors could take comfort that the laws were meant to protect them from wrongdoing.And you compare that to the speech that President Barack Obama gave eight years later when he signed Don Frank into law in the Rose Garden. And it's remarkably similar that now ordinary investors can count on the rules and regulations keeping themself from people who are prey on their financial wellbeing.[00:08:00] And I don't think it was, it's, it's true in either case because our markets, particularly modern markets move and evolve so quickly that the thing that's coming out of left field to get you is never gonna be the thing you are protecting against. Mm. . Dwarkesh Patel: , but given the fact that Enron, as you say, was committing legal fraud, is it possible that the government, um, when they prosecuted skilling and Fastow and lay, they in fact, We're not, uh, they, they prosecuted them to a greater extent than the law as written at the time would have warranted.In other words, were, uh, was there something legally invalid in the, in this, in the quantity of sentence that they got? Is it possible? Bethany McLean: So that's a really, it, it's, it's a, I I get what you're asking. I think it's a really tricky question because I think in absolute terms, um, Enron needed to be prosecuted and needed to be prosecuted aggressively.And while I say it was legal fraud, that is for the most part, there was actually real fraud around, around, uh, but it's on the margin. It doesn't [00:09:00] entire, it doesn't explain the entirety of Enron's collapse. Much of what they did was using and abusing the accounting rules in order to create an appearance of economic reality.Nothing to do with actual, with actual reality. But then there was actual fraud in the sense that Andy Fasta was stealing money from these partnerships to benefit himself. And they were, if you believe, the core tenant of the prosecution, which was their, this agreement called Global Galactic that was signed by, that was between Andy fau and Jeff Skilling, where Jeff agreed that Andy's partnerships would never lose money.Then that invalidated all of the, all of the accounting, and that's the chief reason that that. That skilling was, was, was convicted, um, was that the jury believed the existence of this, of this, of this agreement that in, um, one set of insider stock sales, which, which we can talk about, which was also a really key moment relative to the, so in absolute terms, I don't know, it's, it's hard for me to, to say there was [00:10:00] such, Enron was such a, to a degree that is still surprising to me, such a, a watershed moment in our, in our country, far beyond business itself.it, it, it caused so much insecurity that about our retirements, our retirement assets safe. Can you trust the company where you work? That I think the government did, did have to prosecute aggressively, but relative to the financial crisis where a lot of people made off with a lot of money and never had to give any of it back, does it seem fair that, that, that Jeff Skilling went to jail for over a decade and no one involved in a major way in the financial crisis paid any price whatsoever?People didn't even really have to give up that much of the money they made then. Then it seems a little bit unfair. Yes, so I think it's, it's an absolute versus a relative Dwarkesh Patel: question. Yeah. Yeah. By the way, who do you think made more money? Um, the investment banks, uh, like, uh, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, um, from doing, [00:11:00] providing their services to Enron as the stock was going up, or Jim Chanos from shorting the stock?In absolute terms, who made more money? Bethany McLean: Oh, I think the investment banks for sure. I mean, they made, they made so much money in investment banking fees from, from, from Enron. But, you know, it's a good question. . , it's a good question actually, because I think Jim made a lot of money too, so, Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. I mean, I, I, you've spoken about, I guess the usefulness and the shortage of short sellers des a sort of, uh, corrective on irrational exuberance.And I'm curious why you think that shortage exists in the first place. Like, if you believe in the efficient market hypothesis, you should think that, you know, if some company has terrible financials and implausible numbers, then people would be lining up to short it. And then you would never have a phenomenon like Enron.And so it's, it's, you know, it's so odd that you can. , you know, reporters who are basically ahead of the market in terms of predicting what's gonna happen. Uh, well, uh, how do you square that with like the efficient [00:12:00] market hypothesis? Well, do you Bethany McLean: believe in the efficient market hypothesis, ? Dwarkesh Patel: I, I, I'd like to, but I'm like trying to , trying to wrap my head around Enron.Bethany McLean: I, I'm, I'm, I'm, I'm not sure how you. Can, unless you, unless you adopt Warren Buffett's point of view, and I'm gonna mangle the quote because, uh, but, but it's that the market in the short term is a voting machine in the long term. It's a weighing machine, right? Mm-hmm. , or is it the other way around? . Anyway, but the idea is that the market may be very efficient for a long, very inefficient, for a long period of time.But, but it does actually, rationality does actually work in, in, in the end. And I think I might believe that, but isn't it John Maynard Cas who said the market can remain irrational for a lot longer than you can remain solvent. And so I think that's true too. I think believing that the market is efficient and rational in the short term is just obviously wrongUm, but back to your question about short sellers, which is, which is interesting, you know, I think part of it is that there is still this, um, there certainly was a couple of [00:13:00] decades ago, and I think it still exists, this idea that. Owning stocks is Mom, American, and apple pie in shorting stocks somehow is bad and evil and rooting, rooting against America.And I remember going back to the Enron days, someone, people criticizing me, even other people in the press saying, but you took a tip from a short seller. They're biased. And I. , I would say. But, but, but wait, the analysts who have buy ratings on stocks and the portfolio managers who own those stocks, they're biased too.They want the stocks to go up. Everybody's biased. So the trick as a journalist is getting information from all sides and figuring out who you think is right and what makes sense. But it's not avoiding anybody with any bias. But it was really interesting that people saw the bias on the part of short sellers and did not see it on the part of, of, of Longs.And I think there is that preconception that exists broadly, that somehow you are doing something wrong and you're somehow rooting for a company's failure. And that this is, I don't know, anti-American if you, if, if you [00:14:00] short a stock. And so I think that's part of why there's, there's, there's a shortage of shortage of, of, of short sellers.Um, I think also, I mean, we've had. Incredible, unprecedented bull market for the last four decades as a result of falling interest rates, and especially in the decade before the pandemic hit, it was very, very difficult to make money shorting anything because everything went to the moon. Didn't matter if its numbers were good, if it was eventually unmasked to be somewhat fraudulent, , it stocks just went to the moon anyway.The riskier the better. And so it is only diehard short sellers that have managed to stick it out . Yeah, and I think, I think lastly, Jim Chano said this to me once, and I, I think it's true that he could find, dozens of people who were skilled enough to come, smart enough to come work for him.There's no shortage of that. People who are technically skilled and really smart, but being able to be contrarian for a long period of time, especially when the market is going against you, is a different sort [00:15:00] of person. It that it requires a completely different mindset to have everybody in the world saying, you're wrong to be losing money because the stock is continuing to go up and to be able to hold fast to your conviction.And I think that's another, uh, part of the explanation for why there are fewer short sellers. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah, and that raised an interesting question about. Uh, venture capital, for example, where, or private markets in general? Um, at least in the public markets, there's shorting maybe in shortage, but it, it is a possible mechanism, whereas, uh, I'm a programmer.So, you know, if, if like a one guy thinks the company's worth a hundred million dollars and everybody else thinks it's not, you know, the company will still be, uh, the price will still be said by the, you know, the person who's a believer. Um, does that increase the risk of some sort of bubble in venture capital and in technology?Um, and I guess in private markets generally, if they're, they're not public, is that something you worry about that they're, they will be incredible bubbles built up if there's a lot of money that's floating around in these Bethany McLean: circles. . Well, I think we're seeing that now, [00:16:00] right? And I don't think it's a coincidence that FTX and Theranos were not publicly traded companies, right?Mm-hmm. . Um, there's a certain sort of, uh, black box quality to these companies because people aren't charting them and aren't, aren't, and aren't, you know, whispering to journalists about that. That there's something wrong here and there aren't publicly available financials for people to dig through and look, look, and look at the numbers.So now I don't think that's a coincidence. And I do think this gigantic move into private assets has been, um, probably not great for the, for the, for the, for the. for the, for the safety of the system. And you'd say, well, it's just institutional investors who can afford to lose money who are losing money.But it's really not because institutional investors are just pension fund money. Mm-hmm. and in some cases now mutual fund money. So that distinction that the people who are investing in this stuff can afford to lose it is not really true. Um, so I don't, I don't like that rationalization. I think we're gonna see how that plays out.There was [00:17:00] just a really good piece in the Economist about private equity marks on their portfolio companies and how they are still looked to be much higher than what you would think they should be given the carnage in the market. And so all of what, what actually things are really worth in private markets, both for venture capital firms and for private equity firms, Is absent another, another bubble starting, starting in the markets.I think we're gonna see how that plays out over, over the next year. And it might be a wake up call for, for a lot of people. Um, you know, all that, all that said, it's an interesting thing because investors have been very complicit in this, right? In the sense that a lot of investors are absolutely delighted to have prep, to have their, their private, um, their private investments marked at a high level.They don't have to go to the committee overseeing the investments and say, look, I lost 20% of your money the way they might, um, if, if the numbers were public. And so that the ability of these of private investors to smooth as they call it, the, the, the returns is, is it's [00:18:00] been, it's been part of the appeal.It hasn't been a negative, it's been a positive. And so I would say that investors who wanted this moving are. Art might be getting what they deserve except for the pointing made earlier that it isn't, it isn't their money. It's, it's the money of, of teachers and firefighters and individual investors a around the country, and that's, that's problematic.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Being in the world of technology and being around people in it has. made me, somewhat shocked when I read about these numbers from the past. For example, when I'm reading your books and they're detailing things that happened in the nineties or the two thousands, and then you realize that the salary that Hank Paulson made a c e o of Goldman, or that skilling made as, you know, um, c e o of Enron, you know, I, it's like I have friends who are my age, like 22 year olds who are raising seed rounds, , that are as big as like these people's salaries.And so it just feels like the, these books were, you have $50 billion frauds or, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars of collapse and the individuals there, um, it just feels like they, it's missing a few zeros, uh, [00:19:00] because of the delusion of the private markets. But, um, but speaking of short sellers and speaking of private equity, um, I think it'd be interesting to talk about sbf.So, you know, your 2018 Vanity Fair article I thought was really interesting about, you know, sbf factory in Buffalo H How, how do you think back on Tesla and sbf now, given the fact that. The stock did continue to rise afterwards, and the factory, I believe, was completed and it's, I hired the 1500 or so people that had promised New York State, uh, is sbf just a fraud?Who can pull it off? And so he's a visionary. How, how do you think about sbf in the aftermath? Bethany McLean: So I don't think that's right about Buffalo and I have to look, but I don't think they ended up, I mean, the Solar City business that Tesla has pretty much collapsed. I don't think people haven't gotten their roofs.There was just a piece about how they're canceling some of their roof installations. So sbf has repeatedly made grand visions about that business that haven't played out. And I will check this for you post the podcast, but I don't think [00:20:00] if there is employment at that factory in, in Buffalo, it's not because they're churn out solar, solar, solar products that are, that are, that are doing.What was originally promised. So I guess I, I think about that story in a, in a couple of ways. It definitely, um, it was not meant to be a piece about Tesla. It was meant to be a piece that shown a little bit of light on how sbf operates and his willingness to flout the rules and his reliance on government subsidies, despite the fact that he, um, presents himself as this libertarian free, free, free market free marketeer, and his willingness to lie to, to, to, on some level enrich himself, which also runs counter to the Elon sbf narrative that he doesn't care about making money for, for himself.Because the main reason for Teslas to by Solar City was that Solar City had the main reason, was it Tes, that was, that Solar City had, that, that sbf and his, and his and his relatives had extended the these loans to Solar City that were gonna go. [00:21:00] There were gonna be lo all the money was gonna be lost at Solar City when bankrupt.And by having Tesla buy it, sbf was able to bail himself out, um, as, as as well. And I also think a good reason for the, for the, for, and it brings us to the present time, but a reason for the acquisition was that sbf knows that this image of himself as the invincible and vulnerable who can always raise money and whose companies always work out in the end, was really important.And if Solar City had gone bankrupt, it would've cast a big question mark over over sbf, over over the sbf narrative. And so I think he literally couldn't afford to let Solar City go bankrupt. Um, all of that said, I have, I have been, and was I, I was quite skeptical of Tesla and I thought about it in, in, in, in.And I always believed that the product was great. I just, mm-hmm. wasn't sure about the company's money making potential. And I think that, that, it's something I started thinking about, um, background, the Solar City time, maybe earlier, but this line, something I've talked about [00:22:00] before. But this line between a visionary and a fraudster.You know, you think that they're on two opposite ends of the spectrum, but in reality they're where the ends of the circle meet. Characteristics of one. One has that many of the characteristics of the other. And sometimes I think the only thing that really separates the two is that the fraudster is able to keep getting mo raising money in order to get through the really difficult time where he or she isn't telling the truth.And then they, that person goes down in history as a visionary. Um, but because no one ever looks back to the moment in time when they were lying, the fraudster gets caught in the middle. Um, so Enron's Lo lost access to to the capital markets lost AC access to funding as the market collapsed after the.com boom.And people began to wonder whether skilling was telling the truth about Enron's broadband business. And then there were all the disclosures about Andy fasa partnerships if Enron had been able to continue raising money, Business of Enron's called Enron Broadband might well have been Netflix. It was Netflix ahead of its time.So Enron just got caught in the middle and all [00:23:00] the fraud, all the fraud got exposed . Um, but that's not because Jeff Skilling wasn't a visionary who had really grand plans for, for, for, for the future. So I think sbf falls somewhere in that spectrum of, of, of fraudster and visionary. And what's gonna be really interesting why I said that this, we bring it to the present time about what happens to the mu narrative.If something fails is what happens. Yeah. Is as the world watch watches Twitter implode, um, what does that mean then for the Elon sbf narrative overall? Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Um, going back to the Smartest Guys is the Room, the title obviously suggests something about. The, I guess in general, the ability and the likelihood of very smart people committing fraud or things of that sort.Um, but you know, Begar Jones has this book called Hi Mind, where he talks about how the smarter people are more likely to cooperate in prisoners dilemma type situations. They have longer time preference. And one of the things you've written about is the problem in corporate America is people having shorter, [00:24:00] um, uh, you know, doing two too big time discounting.So, uh, given that trend we see in general of greater Cooperativeness, um, and other kinds of traits of more intelligent people, do you think the reason we often find people like S B F and skilling running big frauds just by being very intelligent, is it just that on, on average smarter people, maybe less likely to commit fraud, but when they do commit fraud, they do it at such garat scales and they're able to do it at such gar scales that it just brings down entire empires?How, how, how do you think about the relationship between intelligence and fraud? . Bethany McLean: That's interesting. Um, I'm not sure I know a coherent answer to that. Um, smartest guys in the room as a title was a little bit tongue in cheek. It wasn't meant to say, these guys actually are the smartest guys in the room. It was, it, it was a little bit, it was a little bit ironic, but that doesn't take away from the really good question that you asked, which is what, what, what is that relationship?I, I mean, I think if you look at the history of corporate fraud, you are not going to find unintelligent people having [00:25:00] been the masterminds behind this. You're gonna find really, really, really smart, even brilliant people having, having, having been, been behind it, maybe some at part of that is this linkage between the visionary and the fraud star that so many of these, of these corporate frauds are people who have qualities of the visionary and to.The qualities of, of a visionary, you have to have a pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty high intelligence. Um, and I do think so many of these stories are, are about then self delusion. So I don't think smart people are any less likely to suffer from self delusion than dumb people. And they're probably more likely to, because you can rationalize, you know, the smart person's ability to rationalize just about anything they wanna rational rationalize is pretty profound.Whereas perhaps someone who doesn't have quite the same, the same brain power isn't gonna be able to create a narrative under which their actions are blameless and they're doing the right thing. So I think sometimes, so maybe there is some sort of relationship [00:26:00] there that somebody more qualified than I am would have to study between smart people's ability to, to, to rationalize just about anything as a way of, as part of the path to self delusion and part of the path by which these things happen.Yeah, that's completely, that's completely , that's Bethany theory. There's absolutely nothing to back that . I'm just Dwarkesh Patel: well clear. Let's do some more speculation. So, um, one of the things, uh, John Ray talked about in his testimony, um, was it two days ago where he said that, you know, FTX had done $5 billion of investments and deals in the last year, and most of those investments were worth a fraction of the value that FTX paid for them.And we see this also in, obviously in Enron, right? With, uh, broadband and with, um, ul, or is that how pronounce it, but basically their international department. Yeah. Um, what is this, uh, this obsession with deal making for its own sake? Is that to appease investors and make them think a lot's going on, is that because of [00:27:00] the hubris of the founder, of just wanting to set up a big empire as fast as possible, even if you're getting a bad sticker price?What, why do we see this pattern of just, you know, excessive deal making for its own sake? Bethany McLean: That's an interesting question too. I'm not sure that that's, um, limited to companies that go splat dramatically. There's a lot of, a lot of deal making in, in corporate America has that same frenzied quality. Um, I haven't seen an updated study on, on this in a, in a long time, but, you know, I began my career working as an analyst in an m and a department at at at Goldman Sachs.And. Definitely deals are done for the sake of doing deals. And I once joked that synergies are kind of like UFOs. A lot of people claim to have seen them, but there's no proof that they actually exist. , and again, I haven't seen an updated study on, on, on this, but there was one years back that showed that most m and a transactions don't result in increased value for shareholders.And most synergies, most promised synergies never materialize. [00:28:00] Just getting bigger for the sake of getting bigger and doing deals for the short term value of showing Wall Street a projection. That earnings are gonna be so much higher even after the cost of the debt that you've taken on. And that they're these great synergies that are gonna come about from, from combining businesses.So I don't know that either the frenzy deal doing or deal doing deals gone wrong is, um, solely limited to people who are committing fraud. , I think it's kinda across the spectrum. , . Dwarkesh Patel: Um, um, well one, one thing I find interesting about your books is how you detail that. And correct me if this is the wrong way to read them, but that, uh, incentives are not the only thing that matter.You know, there there's this perception that, you know, we've set up bad incentives for these actors and that's why they did bad things. But also, um, the power of one individual to shape a co co company's culture and the power of that culture to enable bad behavior, whether scaling at Enron or with Clarkson Right at Moody's.Yeah. Um, is that a good, good way of reading your books or how, how do you think [00:29:00] about the relative importance of culture and incentive? Bethany McLean: I think that's really fair. But incentives are part of culture, right? If, if you've set up a culture where, where how you're valued is what you get paid, I think it's a little, it's a little difficult to separate those two things out because, because the, the incentives do help make the culture, but for sure culture is incredibly, um, incredibly compelling.I've often thought and said that if I had, when I was leaving my short lived career in investment banking, if I had, if I had gotten in some of the head hunters I was talking to, if one of them had said, there's this great, really energetic, interesting energy company down in Houston, , why don't interview there?If I had gone there, would I have been a whistleblower or would I have been a believer? And I'd like to believe I would've been a whistleblower, but I think it's equally likely that I would've been a believer. Culture is so strong. It creates this. What's maybe a miasma that you can't see outside?I remember a guy I talked to who's a trader at Enron, really smart guy, and he [00:30:00] was like, after the, after the bankruptcy, he said, of course, if we're all getting paid based on creating reported earnings and there's all this cash going out the door in order to do these deals that are creating reported earnings, and that's the culture of the entire firm, of course it's not gonna work economically.He said, I never thought about it. . It just didn't, it didn't, it didn't occur to me. And I think the more compelling the CEO o the more likely you are to have that kind of mass delusion. I mean, there's a reason cult exist, right? . We, we are as human beings, remarkably susceptible to.Visionary leaders. It's just, it's the way the human brain is wired. We, we wanna believe, and especially if somebody has the ability to put a vision forward, like Jeff Gilling did at Enron, like Elizabeth Holmes did it Theranos like SPF F did, where you feel like you are in the service of something greater by helping this, vision, , actualize then, then you're, particularly susceptible.And I think that is the place where [00:31:00] incentives don't quite explain things. That is, there is this very human desire to matter, to do something important. Mm-hmm to be doing something that's gonna change the world. And when somebody can tap into that desire in people that feeling that what you're doing isn't just work in a paycheck and the incentives you have, but I mean, I guess it is part of the incentive, but that you're part of some greater good.That's incredibly powerful. Yeah. Dwarkesh Patel: It's what we all speaking of. We all wanna matter. . Yeah. Speaking of peoples psychology, uh, crime and punishment, underrated or overrated as a way to analyze the psychology of people like scaling and S B F or maybe SBF specifically because of the utilitarian nature of SB F'S crime?Um, Bethany McLean: I think it's, I think it's underrated, overrated. I'm not sure anybody. , I'm not sure anybody has ever proven that jail sentences for white collar criminals do anything to deter subsequent white collar crime. Mm-hmm. , and I think one part of this is the self delusion that I've, that I talked about. Nobody thinks, [00:32:00] oh, I'm doing the same thing as Jeff Skilling did at Enron, and if I, and if I do this, then I too might end up in jail.Therefore, I don't wanna do this. I just don't think that's the way the, the, the, the, the thought process works. I think Elizabeth Holmes at Theranos, probably for the most part, convinced herself that this was going to work, and that if you just push forward and push hard enough and keep telling people what they wanna hear and keep being able to raise money, it's gonna work.You know, if. . If, if you pause to think, well, what if it doesn't work and I've lied and I go to jail, then, then you'd stop right, right then and there. So I think that, I think that, that I'm, I'm not, I'm not sure it's much of a deterrent. I remember, and partly I'm, I'm biased because I remember a piece, my co-author Peter Alkin, and I wrote out right after Jess Gilling and Kenley were, were convicted and can lay, we're we're convicted.And we wrote a piece for Fortune in which we said that the entire world has changed. Now that corporate executives are, um, are, are put on high alert that behavior in the gray area will no longer be tolerated and that it will be aggressively prosecuted. And this was spring of [00:33:00] 2006 and the events that caused the global financial crisis were pretty well underway.It didn't. Do much to prevent the global financial crisis. Mm-hmm. , Enron's, Enron's jail time, didn't do anything to present, prevent, Elizabeth Holmes doesn't seem to have done anything to change what Sbf was doing. So I just, I, I just, I'm, I'm, I'm not sure, I'm sure a psychologist or somebody who specializes in studying white color crime could probably make a argument that refutes everything I said and that shows that has had a deterring effect.But I just, I just don't think that people who get themselves into this situation, con, con, consciously think, this is what I'm doing. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. Um, speaking of other incentives, stock options, uh, you've spoken about how that creates short-term incentives for the executives who are making decisions. If you wanted to set up an instrument that aligned an executive or a leader's compensation with the long-term performance of a company, what would that look like?W would you have the options of less than 10 years instead of a [00:34:00] year? H how would you design it? How do you usually design a compensation scheme to award long-term thinking? Bethany McLean: If I could do that, I should ru rule the world . I think that very sweet. I think that is one of the really tough, um, problems confronting boards or anybody who is determining anybody who's determining stock options and that almost anybody who's determining compensation and that most compensation schemes seem to have really terrible unintended consequences.They look really good on paper. And then as they're implemented, it turns out that there was a way in which they accomplished exactly the opposite of, uh, thing the people who designing them wanted, wanted them to accomplish. I mean, if you think back to the advent of stock options, what could sound better?Right. Giving management a share of the company such that if, if, if shareholders did well, that they'd do well, nobody envisioned the ways in which stock options could be repriced. The ways in which meeting earnings targets could lead to gaming the ways in which the incentive of stock-based [00:35:00] compensation could lead to people trying to get anything they could in order to get the stock price higher and cash out when they're, as soon as their stock options vested.So, and even there was, there was, the whole valiant saga was fascinating on this front because the people who designed Mike Pearson's compensation package as ceo e o Valiant, they were convinced that this was absolutely the way to do it. And he got bigger and bigger, um, stock option incentives for hitting certain, for having the stock achieve certain levels.But of course, that creates this incredible bias to just get the stock to go up no matter, no matter what else you do. Um, it does seem to me that vesting over the long term is. is, is a much better way to go about things. But then do you create incentives for people to play games in order to get the stock lower at, at various points where there's about to be a stock optional board so they have a better chance of having directions be, be worth, be worth something over the long term.And do you, particularly on Wall Street there is this, or in firms where this sort of stuff matters the most? There [00:36:00] is this, there was this clearing out of dead wood that happened where people got paid and they got outta the way and made way for younger people. And I don't know, it was a harsh culture, but maybe it made sense on some level.And now at least I've been told with much longer vesting periods, you have people who don't wanna let go. And so you have more of a problem with people who should have retired, stick sticking around instead of in, in, instead of clearing out. And then it also becomes a question, How much money is, is enough.So if somebody is getting millions of dollars in short-term compensation and then they have a whole bunch more money tied up in long-term compensation, do the long-term numbers matter? At what point do they, do they, do they really matter? I mean, if you gave me $5 million today, I'm not so sure I'd really care if I were getting another $5 million in 10 years.Right. ? Yeah. So, so I think all of that is, is it, it's, I'm not, I'm not sure there's a perfect compensation system. All things considered though, I think longer term is, is probably better, [00:37:00] but. Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah, I didn't think about that downside of the long investing period. That's so interesting there. I guess there is no free lunch.Uh, so with Enron, um, it, it was clear that there was a lot of talent at the firm and that you had these companies and these trading firms launch at the aftermath by people who left Enron, kinder Morgan and John Arnold's, um, uh, Sintas, uh, that were wildly profitable and did well. Do you think we'll see the same thing with FTX, that while Sbf himself and maybe the, his close cadre were frauds, there actually was a lot of great trading and engineering talent there that are gonna start these very successful firms in the aftermath.Bethany McLean: That's, that's interesting. And just, just for the sake of clarification, kinder Morgan was actually started years before Enron's collapsed, when Rich Kinder, who was vying with Jeffs skilling in a sense, to become Chief Operating Officer. Um, Ken Lay, picked Jeffs skilling and Kinder left. Mm-hmm. and took a few assets and went to create Kinder, kinder Morgan.But your overall point, I'm just clarifying your overall point holds, there were a lot of people who [00:38:00] left Enron and went on to do, to have pretty, pretty remarkable careers. I think the answer with ftx, I bet there will be some for sure. But whether they will be in the crypto space, I guess depends on your views on the long-term viability of, of, of the crypto space.And I have never , it's funny is crypto exploded over the last couple of years. I was, I've been working on this book about the pandemic and it's been busy and difficult enough that I have not lifted my head to, to think about much else. And I always thought, I don't get it. I don't understand , I mean, I understand the whole argument about the blockchain being valuable for lots of transactions and I, I get that, but I never understood crypto itself and I thought, well, I just need to, as soon as this book is done, I just need to put a month into understanding this because it's obviously an important, important enough part of our world that I need to figure it out.So now I think, oh, Okay, maybe I didn't understand it for a reason and maybe, um, maybe there isn't anything to understand and I've just saved myself a whole life of crime because it's all gone. And you have [00:39:00] people like Larry Fink at BlackRock saying, whole industry is gonna implode. It's done. And certainly with the news today, this morning of finances auditor basically saying We're out.Um, I, I don't, I don't know how much of it was, how much of it was, is, was a Ponzi scheme. You might know better than I do. And so I don't know what's left after this whole thing implodes. It's a little bit like, there is an analogy here that when Enron imploded, yes, a lot of people went on to start other successful businesses, but the whole energy trading business is practiced by kind of under capitalized, um, um, energy firms went away and that never came back.Yeah. And so I, I, I don't, I don't know, I'm, it'll be, I, I don't know. What do you. The Dwarkesh Patel: time to be worried will be when Bethany McLean writes an article titled Is Bitcoin Overvalued for the Audience. My Moments on That ? Yeah, for the audience that, that was, I believe the first skeptical article about Enron's, um, stock price.Yeah. Uh, and it was titled [00:40:00] Is Enron Overvalued. In aftermath understated, , title. But , Bethany McLean: , I joked that that story should have won, won, won awards for the NICU title and business journalism history. , given that the company was bankrupt six months later was overpricedDwarkesh Patel: Um, uh, well, let me ask a bigger question about finance in general. So finance is 9% of gdp, I believe. How much of that is the productive use and thinking and allocation of the, uh, the capital towards their most productive ends? And how much of that is just zero sum or negative sum games? Um, if, if you had to break that down, like, is 9% too high, do you think, or is it just.I think it's Bethany McLean: too high. I have no idea how to think about breaking it down to what the proper level should be. But I think there are other ways to think about how you can see that in past decades it hasn't been at the right level when you've had all sorts of smart kids. Um, Leaving, leaving business school and leaving college and heading into [00:41:00] finance and hedge funds and private equity is their career of choice.I think that's a sign that that finance is too big when it's sucking up too much of, of, of the talent of the country. Um, and when the rewards for doing it are so disproportionate relative to the rewards of of, of doing other things. Um, the counter to that is that there've also been a lot of rewards for starting businesses.And that's probably, I think, how you want it to be in a, in a product. In a productive economy. So I think the number is, is too high. I don't know how to think about what it should be other than what a, actually, a former Goldman Sachs partner said this to me when I was working on all the devils are here, and she said that finance is supposed to be like the, the substrata of our world.It's supposed to be the thing that enables other things to happen. It's not supposed to be the world itself. So the, the role of a financial system is to enable businesses to get started, to provide capital. That's what it's supposed to be. It's the lubricant that enables business, but it's not supposed to be the thing itself.Right. And it's become the thing itself. [00:42:00] You've, you've, you've, you've, you've got a problem. Um, um, and I think the other, Dwarkesh Patel: there's your article about crypto , that paragraph right there. . Bethany McLean: There you go. That's, that's a good, um, and I think, I think the other way, you, you, you can see, and perhaps this is way too simplistic, but the other way I've thought about it is that how can it be if you can run a hedge fund and make billions of dollars from, and have five people, 10 people, whatever it is, versus starting a company that employs people mm-hmm.and changes a neighborhood and provides jobs and, you know, provides a product that, that, that, that, that improves people's lives. It, it is a shame that too much of the talent and such a huge share of the financial rewards are going to the former rather than the latter. And that just can't mean good things for the future.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. Yeah. And I, you know, when people criticize technology, for example, for the idea that, you know, these people who would've been, I don't know, otherwise teachers or something, they're, you know, making half a million dollars at Google. [00:43:00] Um, and I think like when I was in India, people were using Google Maps to get through the streets in Mumbai, which is, which is unimaginable to me before going there that, you know, you would be able to do that with, um, a service built out of Silicon Valley.And so, Yeah, I think that actually is a good allocation of capital and talent. I, I'm not, I'm not sure about finance. Um, yeah, Bethany McLean: I think I, I, I agree with you. I think there are other problems with Google and with the, the social media giants, but, but they are real businesses that employ people, that make products that have had, uh, huge.Um, impact on on, on people's, on people's lives. So in, in that sense, it's very different than a private equity firm, for instance, and especially private equity, even more so than hedge funds draws my ire. Mm-hmm. , because I think one of the reasons they, that it, they've been able to make part of the financialization of our economy has been due to super, super low interest rates and low interest rates that have enabled so many people to make so much money in finance are not, they're just a gift.It wasn't because these people were uniquely smart, they just [00:44:00] found themselves in a great moment in time. And the fact that they now think they're really smart because money makes me crazy. Dwarkesh Patel: Um, are Fanny and Freddy America special purpose entities? Are they our Alameda? It's just the way we hide our debt and uh, that's interesting.Yeah. Bethany McLean: Well, I guess we, you know what? I don't know anymore because, so I last wrote about them when was it in 2016 and I don't know now. No, you're right. Their, their debt is still off, off, off balance sheet. So Yeah, in a lot of ways they, they were. . I would argue though that the old Fanny and Freddy were structured more honestly than, than the new Fanny and Freddy, that it really is conservatorship that have made them, um, that have made them America's off balance sheet entities, because at least when they were their own independent entities.Yes, there was this odd thing known as the implicit guarantee, which is when you think about, back to your point about efficient markets, how can you possibly believe there's an as such a thing as an efficient market when their [00:45:00] Fanny and Freddy had an implicit guarantee, meaning it wasn't real. There was no place where it was written down that the US government would bail Fanny and Freddie out in a crisis, and everybody denied that it existed and yet it did exist.Yeah. Dwarkesh Patel: No, but we, I feel like that confirms the official market hypothesis, right? The, the market correctly, they thought that mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddy would have governments. Uh, okay, okay. You might be father Bethany McLean: and they did . You might be right. I, I, I think what I was getting at you, you might be right.I think what I was getting at is that it is such a screwed up concept. I mean, how can you possibly, when I first, when people were first explaining this to me, when I first read about Fanny and Freddie, I was like, no, no, wait. This is American capitalism . This is, no, wait. What? I don't, I don't understand . Um, um, so yeah, but I, I, I, I think that Fanny and Freddie, at least with shareholders that were forced to bear some level of, of the risks were actually a more honest way of going about this whole screwed up American way of financing mortgages than, than the current setup is.Dwarkesh Patel: What [00:46:00] is the future of these firms? Or are they just gonna say in conservatorship forever? Or is there any developments there? Well, what's gonna happen to them? Bethany McLean: The lawsuit, the latest lawsuit that could have answered that in some ways ended in a mistrial. Um, I don't think, I don't, I don't think unfortunately anybody in government sees any currency in, and I mean, currency in the broad sense, not in the literal sense of money in, in taking this on.And unfortunately, what someone once said to me about it, I think remains true and it's really depressing, but is that various lawmakers get interested in Fannie and Freddy. They engage with it only to figure out it's really, really goddamn complicated. Mm-hmm. and that, and that any kind of solution is gonna involve angering people on one side of the aisle or another and potentially angering their constituent constituents.And they slowly back away, um, from doing anything that could, that, that could affect change. So I think we have a really unhealthy situation. I don't think it's great for these two [00:47:00] entities to be in conservatorship, but at this point, I'm not sure it's gonna change. Dwarkesh Patel: Yep. Speaking of debt and mortgages, um, so total household debt in the United States has been, uh, climbing recently after it's, it's like slightly d decline after 2008, but I think in quarter three alone it increased 350 billion and now it's at 16.5 trillion.Uh, the total US household debt, should we worried about this? Are, are, are we gonna see another sort of collapse because of this? Or what, what should we think about this? Bethany McLean: I don't know. I don't know how to think about that because it's too tied up in other things that no one knows. Are we going to have a recession?How severe is the recession going to be? What is the max unemployment rate that we're gonna hit if we do, if we do have a recession? And all of those things dictate how to, how to think about that number. I. Think consumer debt is embedded in the bowels of the financial system in the same way mortgages were.And in the end, the, the, the [00:48:00] problem with the financial crisis of 2008, it wasn't the losses on the mortgages themselves. It was the way in which they were embedded in the plumbing of the financial system. Mm-hmm. and ways that nobody understood. And then the resulting loss of confidence from the fact that nobody had understood that slash lies had been told about, about that.And that's what caused, that's what caused everything to, to collapse. Consumer debt is a little more visible and seeable and I, I don't think that it has that same, um, that same opaque quality to it that, that mortgage backed securities did. I could be, I could be wrong. I haven't, I haven't, I haven't dug into it enough, enough to understand enough to understand that.But you can see the delinquencies starting to climb. Um, I mean, I guess you could on, on, on mortgages as well, but there was this, there was this profound belief with mortgages that since home prices would never decline, there would never be losses on these instruments because you could always sell the underlying property for more than you had [00:49:00] paid for it, and therefore everything would be fine.And that's what led to a lot of the bad practices in the industry is that lenders didn't think they had to care if they were screwing the home buyer because they always thought they could take the home back and, and, and, and, and make more money on it. And consumer debt is, is unsecured. And so it's, it's, it's different.I think people think about it differently, but I'd have. I'd have to, I'd have to do some more homework to understand where consumer debt sits in the overall architecture of the financial industry. Dwarkesh Patel: I, I, I'm really glad you brought up this theme about what does the overall big picture look like? I feel like this is the theme of all your books that people will be, So obsessed with their subsection of their job or, or that ar area that they won't notice that, um, broader trends like the ones you're talking about.And in Enron it's like, why, why, why do we have all these special purpose entities? What is the total debt load of Enron? Um, or with the, you know, mortgage back securities a similar kind of thing, right? What, what, uh, maybe they weren't correlated in the past, [00:50:00] but what's that? Do we really think that there's really no correlation, um, uh, between, uh, delinquencies across the country?Um, so that, that kind of big picture, think. Whose job is that today? Is it journalists? Is it short sellers? Is it people writing on ck? Who's doing that? Is it anybody's job? Is, is it just like, uh, an important role with nobody assigned to it? Bethany McLean: I think it's the latter. I think it's an important role with nobody, with nobody assigned to it, and there there is a limit.I mean, , I hate to say this, it is not, uh, um, it is not an accident that many of my books have been written. That's probably not fair. It's not true of my book un fracking, but that some of my books have been written after the calamity happened. So they weren't so much foretelling the calamity as they were unpacking the calamity after it happened, which is a different role.And as I said at the start of our conversation, I think an important one to explain to people why this big, bad thing took, took place. But it's not prediction, I don't know, as people that were very good at, at prediction, um, they tried [00:51:00] to set up, what was it called? In the wake of the global financial crisis, they established this thing called fsoc, and now I'm forgetting what the acronym stands for.Financial Security Oversight Committee. And it's supposed to be this, this body that does think about these big picture. That thinks about the ways, the ways an exam, for example, in which mortgage backed securities were, um, were, were, were, were, were, were, were repopulating through the entire financial system and ways that would be cause a loss to be much more than a loss.That it wouldn't just be the loss of money and that security, it would echo and magnify. And so that there are people who are supposed to be thinking about it. But I think, I think it's, it's, it's really hard to see that and. In increasingly complex world, it's even, it's even harder than it was before, because the reverberations from things are really hard to map out in, in, in advance, and especially when some part of those reverberations are a loss of confidence, then all bets [00:52:00] are off because when confidence cracks, lots of things fall apart.But how do you possibly analyze in any quantitative way the the risk that that confidence will collapse? Mm-hmm. . So I think it's, I think, I think, I think it's difficult. That said, and of course I am talking my own book here, I don't think that the lack of the, the increased financial problems of journalism really help matters in that respect, because in an ideal world, you want a lot of people out there writing and thinking about various pieces of this, and then maybe somebody can come along and see the.Pieces and say, oh my God, there's this big picture thing here that we all need to be thinking about. But there's, there's a kind of serendipity in the ability to do that one, that one that the chances, I guess the best way to say that is the chances of that serendipity are dramatically increased by having a lot of people out there doing homework, um, on the various pieces of the puzzle.And so I think in a world, particularly where local news has been decimated mm-hmm. , um, the [00:53:00] chances of that sort of serendipity are, are definitely lower. And people may think, oh, it doesn't matter. We still got national news. We've got the Washington Post, we've got the Wall Street Journal, we've got the New York Times.Um, I would love to have somebody do a piece of analysis and go back through the New York Times stories and see how many were sparked by lp, a piece in the local paper that maybe you wouldn't even notice from reading the New York Times piece, because it'd be in like the sixth paragraph that, oh yeah, credit should go to this person at this local paper who started writing about this.But if you no longer have the person at the local paper who started writing about this, You know, it's, it's, it's, it's less likely that the big national piece gets written. And I think that's a part of the implosion of local news, that people, a part of the cost of the implosion of local news that people don't really understand the idea that the national press functions at, at the same level, um, without local news is just not true.Dwarkesh Patel: Yeah. And, but even if you have the local news, and I, that's a really important point, but even if you have that local news, there still has to be somebody whose job it is to synthesize it all together. And [00:54:00] I'm curious, what is the training that requires? So you, I mean, your training is, you know, math and English major and then working at working in investment banking.Um, is that the, uh, I mean, obviously the anecdotal experience then equals one, seems that that's great training for synthesizing all these pieces together. But what is the right sort of education for somebody who is thinking about the big picture? Bethany McLean: I, I don't, I don't know.And there may be, there may be, there are probably multiple answers to that question, right? There's probably no one, one right answer for me. In, in the end. My, my math major has proven to be pivotal. Even though , my mother dug up these, um, my, my parents were moving and so my mother was going through all her stuff and she dug up these, some my math work from, from college.Literally, if it weren't for the fact that I recognized my own handwriting, I would not recognize these pages on pages of math formula and proofs. And they're like, get gibberish to me now. So , but I, but I still think that math has, so I do not wanna exaggerate my mathematical ability at this stage of [00:55:00] the game.It's basically no. But I do think that doing math proofs any kind of formal, any kind of training and logic is really, really important because the more you've been formally trained in logic, the more you realize when there are piece is missing and when something isn't quite, isn't quite adding on, it just forces you to think in, in a way that is, that in a way that connects the dots.Um, because you know, if you're moving from A to B and B doesn't follow a, you, you understand that B doesn't follow a And I think that that, that, that kind of training is, is really, really important. It's what's given. , whatever kind of backbone I have as a journalist is not because I like to create controversy and like to make people mad.I actually don't. It's just because something doesn't make sense to me. And so maybe it doesn't make sense to me because I'm not getting it, or it doesn't make sense to me because B doesn't actually follow, follow away, and you're just being told that it does. And so I think that, I think that training is, is really, really important.Um, I also have, have often thought [00:56:00] that another part of training is realizing that basic rule that you learned in kindergarten, which is, um, you know, believe your imagination or you know, your imagine follow your imagination. Because the truth is anything can happen. And I think if you look at business history over the last couple of decades, it will be the improbable becoming probable.Truth over and over and over again. I mean, the idea that Enron could implode one of the biggest, supposedly most successful companies in corporate America could be bankrupt within six months. The, from its year, from its stock price high. The idea that the biggest, most successful, um, financial institutions on wall, on Wall Street could all be crumbling into bankruptcy without the aid of the US government.The idea that a young woman with no college degree and no real experience in engineering could create, uh, uh, um, could create a machine that was going to revolutionize blood testing and land on the cover of every business magazine, and that this [00:57:00] whole thing could turn out to be pretty much a fraud. The entire idea of ftx, I mean, over and over again, these things have happened.Forget Bernie Madoff if you had told people a year ago that FTX was gonna implode six months ago, three months ago, people would've been like, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. And so I think just that, that, that, that knowledge that the improbable happens over and over again is also a really fundamental, fundamentally important.Dwarkesh Patel: If we're con continuing on the theme of ftx, I, I interviewed him about four or five months ago.Wow. And this is one of these interviews that I'm really, I'm, I don't know if embarrass is the right word, but I knew things then that I could have like asked, poked harder about. But it's also the kind of thing where you look back in retrospect and you're. If it had turned out well, it's, it's not obvious what the red flags are.Um, while you're in the moment, there's things you can look back at the story of Facebook and how, you know, Marcus Zuckerberg acted in the early days of Facebook and you could say, if the thing fell apart, that this is why, or, you know, this is a red flag. So [00:58:00] I have a hard time thinking about how I should have done that interview.B

The Value Perspective with Bethany McLean We're very excited about our guest this week on the Value Perspective podcast. Bethany McLean is a financial journalist who was contacted by the short seller Jim Chanos when working for Fortune Magazine and advised to look into a company called Enron. Bethany's column entitled ‘Is Enron overpriced?' was published in 2001, starting the unravelling of the company and she went on to write a book entitled The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron. She is also author of the titles Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the US Mortgage Giants, All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis, and Saudi America: The Truth About Fracking and How It's Changing the World. Bethany has also been working at Vanity Fair as a contributor for over a decade now and has pretty much covered all of the famous corporate frauds for the last twenty years. Her background is as a mathematician and she started her career at Goldman Sachs as part of their M&A department. Our conversation references a previous Value Perspective podcast with Carson Block, exploring the nature of the people who are committing these frauds; the difference between the visionary and the fraudster; what is needed on the other side of the ledger to uncover these frauds and withstand the pressure from believers; and finally the role of short sellers in today's markets. Please enjoy. NEW EPISODES: We release main series episodes every two weeks on Mondays. You can subscribe via Podbean or use this feed URL (https://tvpschroders.podbean.com/feed.xml) in Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts and other podcast players. GET IN TOUCH: send us a tweet: @TheValueTeam  Important information. This podcast is for investment professionals only. This information is not an offer, solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell any financial instrument or to adopt any investment strategy. Any data has been sourced by us and is provided without any warranties of any kind. It should be independently verified before further publication or use. Third party data is owned or licenced by the data provider and may not be reproduced, extracted or used for any other purpose without the data provider's consent. Neither we, nor the data provider, will have any liability in connection with the third party data. Reliance should not be placed on any views or information in the material when taking individual investment and/or strategic decisions. Any references to securities, sectors, regions and/or countries are for illustrative purposes only. The views and opinions contained herein are those of individual to whom they are attributed, and may not necessarily represent views expressed or reflected in other communications, strategies or funds. The value of investments and the income from them may go down as well as up and investors may not get back the amounts originally invested. Exchange rate changes may cause the value of any overseas investments to rise or fall. Past Performance is not a guide to future performance and may not be repeated. The forecasts included should not be relied upon, are not guaranteed and are provided only as at the date of issue. Our forecasts are based on our own assumptions which may change.

Use code GUIDANCE250 to get $250 off tickets to Blockworks' London Digital Asset Summit: https://blockworks.co/events/digital-asset-summit-2022-london/ -- On today's episode of Forward Guidance, Jack interviews prolific author and journalist, Bethany McLean. McLean's known most prominently for her 2003 book, The Smartest Guys in The Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron. With her coverage of financial scandals in the early 2000s, no one is better equipped for today's discussion about fraud, loopholes, and more.  McLean interprets the seismic disruptions in the housing and energy market through her prior work on mortgage-securitizing giant Fannie Mae and on the American shale revolution. McLean argues that financial crimes always require the complicity of the victim, and contends that anyone who thinks they can predict the energy markets or inflation is sorely mistaken. -- Follow Bethany McLean on Twitter: https://twitter.com/bethanymac12 Follow Jack Farley on Twitter: https://twitter.com/JackFarley96 Follow Blockworks on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Blockworks_ __ Get top market insights and the latest in crypto news. Subscribe to Blockworks Daily Newsletter: https://blockworks.co/newsletter/ -- (00:00) Introduction (00:31) How Was The Enron Fraud Allowed To Happen? (12:18) The Rise of Legal Fraud (19:07) Dotcom Bubble 2.0 and Private Equity (23:53) The Housing, Mortgage, and Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) Markets (31:55) Inflation And The (Reverse) Wealth Effect (34:34) The Energy Crisis (46:00) Green Energy (48:20) McLean's New Book (49:26) Fictitious Billionaires And Other Hangovers From The 2020 Money Printing Bonanza -- Disclaimer: Nothing discussed on Forward Guidance should be considered as investment advice. Please always do your own research & speak to a financial advisor before thinking about, thinking about putting your money into these crazy markets.

Intro- 00:00 New Comics- 09:05 Batman: One Bad Day: The Riddler #1 Avengers 1,000,000 BC #1 The Last Shadowhawk #1 AXE: Death to the Mutants #1 Kingdom Come: Deliverance #1 Ms Marvel & Moon Knight #1 Batman/Superman: World's Finest #6 Hulk #8 Newthink #3 Batman: The Knight #8 Daredevil #2 Above Snakes #2 Black Adam #3 Strange #5 Dark Spaces: Wildfire #2 Savage Avengers #4 The Brother of all Men #2 X-Men ‘92: House of XCII #4 Seven Sons #3 Do a Powerbomb #3 Crossover: 3D Special #1 Fantastic Four new creative team- 01:06:19 She Hulk episode 1- 01:11:05 Film Flashback: The Adventures of Pluto Nash- 01:22:37

What is viral marketing? How can you make your brand go viral? What are the benefits? The risks? How does going viral impact your brand and ultimately your bottom line? Known as the Viral Marketing Queen, Katya Varbanova is a viral content creator and social media marketing strategist who helps entrepreneurs grow & monetize massive audiences online.  As the founder of Viral Marketing Stars® she teaches clients how to make $20k+ per month selling digital information products. Katya has helped more than 10,000 paying customers, enabling many to go viral, secure TEDx Talks, attract book deals, and gain mainstream recognition for their work. She has spoken on stages across the world, reached more than 100K followers through her social media channels, and appeared in traditional media, including CNN International, Forbes, Entrepreneur, and The Smartest Guys in Marketing. Katya has worked for over 10 years in marketing, sales and brand management, handling accounts for Santander, Hewlett Packard, Dell and Superdry. We talk about:[2:20] How Katya got into business and entrepreneurship[4:30] What gives Katya the confidence to build her brand and business[10:20] Katya's opinion of ‘virality' and content that actually works[17:50] How Katya makes content creation effortless for you[22:10] Tips to creating reels and TikToks consistently [26:35] How to measure and evaluate your bottom line[30:35] What Katya wishes everyone knew about entrepreneurshipResources mentioned in episode:Psychology in Seattlewww.5minutereels.com  Connect with Katya here:Instagram: www.instagram.com/theofficialkatyaTwitter: https://www.twitter.com/_officialkatyaFacebook: https://www.facebook.com/facebook.com/theofficialkatya www.katya.com Connect with Kaye here:Brand Personality Quiz: https://www.kayeputnam.com/brandality-quiz/https://www.youtube.com/user/marketingkayehttps://www.facebook.com/marketingkaye/https://www.kayeputnam.com/

This week's episode is jam-packed with content, as the Baseball Gods have been very good to Ron, Elliott, and Pete. Tony La Russa beclowns himself, Joe Maddon gets fired, and the first rivalry series of 2022 wraps with the Cards taken two out of three from the Cubs. Right on cue, they proceed to get swept by the Rays, but all is right in Ron's world, because BroNeill is back in the lineup! The Team also explores the big questions this week: Who is more annoying to the opposing fans: Christopher Morel or Brandon Donovan? Is Ian Happ in his final weeks as a Cub? And does Pete hate Happ more than Ron hates O'Neill? This week's final segment – as always – is for the pop culture nerds. It was bound to happen under Disney, as this week's episode of Obi-Wan Kenobi was terrible. If only we had known that you can hide a small human under a coat and nobody would notice, we could have gotten away so much more as kids. Follow us on Twitter, GETTR, and Instagram. Like us on Facebook. Check out Gateway City Sports.

“Hard times create strong men. Strong men create good times. Good times create weak men. And, weak men create hard times.” ― G. Michael Hopf, Those Who Remain Today we will discuss how down markets lead to brighter days. It is a normal cycle. Resources Mentioned: The Bitcoin Standard - https://amzn.to/3uVaXra (https://amzn.to/3uVaXra) (affiliate link) The Smartest Guys in the Room (Enron Documentary) - https://youtu.be/-w6duQhWuVk (https://youtu.be/-w6duQhWuVk) Newsletter + Free NFTs: https://niftybusinessweek.com/ (https://NiftyBusinessweek.com/) Twitter @TropicVibes: https://twitter.com/TropicVibes (https://twitter.com/TropicVibes) Email: mail[at]niftybusiness.co NFT 101 Episodes: https://niftybusiness.co/episode/web-3-0-explain-so-simple-even-congress-should-understand (#36 - Web 3.0 Explained) https://niftybusiness.co/episode/10-reason-to-buy-nfts-besides-making-money (#30 - 10 Reasons to Buy NFTs) https://niftybusiness.co/episode/nifty-words-nft-verbiage (#7 - NFT Words & Verbiage) https://niftybusiness.co/episode/nifty-words-nft-verbiage-part-ii (#47 - NFT Words & Verbiage Part II) https://niftybusiness.co/episode/nifty-words-nft-verbiage-part-iii (#97 - NFT Words & Verbiage Part III) *Recommended Reading: The 10 Best-Ever Anxiety Management Techniques: https://amzn.to/3vTgVud (https://amzn.to/3vTgVud) The Bitcoin Standard: https://amzn.to/3KS52ZR (https://amzn.to/3KS52ZR) *Amazon affiliate links

(3/31/22) "The Smartest Guys in The Room," the story of Enron and Video streaming juxtaposed with the launch Tuesday of CNN+; why a market correction is needed to work off excesses. It's a good time to be an agnostic: Neither Bull or Bear. So how many times will the Fed raise rates (before something gets broken)? The Carbon Credits scam and "green gas premiums; the adverse consequences from the quest for "green" energy. How to capture pig gas (ew).Market fundamentals & Valuations; buying value stocks now. SEG-1: Enron to CNN+, Market Commentary: Correction Needed SEG-2: Markets Move into April: A Good Time to Be Agnostic SEG-3: It's Not Easy Being Green: The Carbon Credit Scam SEG-4: Market Fundamentals & Buying Value Stocks Now Hosted by RIA Advisors' Chief Investment Strategist Lance Roberts, CIO, w Portfolio Manager, Michael Lebowitz, CFA -------- Watch today's show on our YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDzMYWFn4kI&list=PLVT8LcWPeAugpcGzM8hHyEP11lE87RYPe&index=1 -------- Our Latest "Three Minutes on Markets & Money: Will Markets Continue Their Bullish March?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OezBEZymMI&list=PLVT8LcWPeAujOhIFDH3jRhuLDpscQaq16&index=1 -------- Our previous show, "The Biggest Risk to markets Now" is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhDFG8PrOM0&list=PLVT8LcWPeAugpcGzM8hHyEP11lE87RYPe&index=1&t=2s -------- Articles mentioned in this podcast: https://realinvestmentadvice.com/fed-liquidity-drain-is-coming https://realinvestmentadvice.com/bear-squeeze-or-return-of-the-bull/ https://realinvestmentadvice.com/bailouts-and-the-demise-of-capitalism-and-free-markets/ -------- Get more info & commentary: https://realinvestmentadvice.com/newsletter/ -------- SUBSCRIBE to The Real Investment Show here: http://www.youtube.com/c/TheRealInvestmentShow -------- Visit our Site: www.realinvestmentadvice.com Contact Us: 1-855-RIA-PLAN -------- Subscribe to RIA Pro: https://riapro.net/home -------- Connect with us on social: https://twitter.com/RealInvAdvice https://twitter.com/LanceRoberts https://www.facebook.com/RealInvestmentAdvice/ https://www.linkedin.com/in/realinvestmentadvice/ #MarketCorrection #Inflation #Quarter_End_Selling #Enron #CNN+ #CarbonCredit #Markets #Money #Investing

(3/31/22) "The Smartest Guys in The Room," the story of Enron and Video streaming juxtaposed with the launch Tuesday of CNN+; why a market correction is needed to work off excesses. It's a good time to be an agnostic: Neither Bull or Bear. So how many times will the Fed raise rates (before something gets broken)? The Carbon Credits scam and "green gas premiums; the adverse consequences from the quest for "green" energy. How to capture pig gas (ew).Market fundamentals & Valuations; buying value stocks now. SEG-1: Enron to CNN+, Market Commentary: Correction Needed SEG-2: Markets Move into April: A Good Time to Be Agnostic SEG-3: It's Not Easy Being Green: The Carbon Credit Scam SEG-4: Market Fundamentals & Buying Value Stocks Now Hosted by RIA Advisors' Chief Investment Strategist Lance Roberts, CIO, w Portfolio Manager, Michael Lebowitz, CFA -------- Watch today's show on our YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDzMYWFn4kI&list=PLVT8LcWPeAugpcGzM8hHyEP11lE87RYPe&index=1 -------- Our Latest "Three Minutes on Markets & Money: Will Markets Continue Their Bullish March?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OezBEZymMI&list=PLVT8LcWPeAujOhIFDH3jRhuLDpscQaq16&index=1 -------- Our previous show, "The Biggest Risk to markets Now" is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhDFG8PrOM0&list=PLVT8LcWPeAugpcGzM8hHyEP11lE87RYPe&index=1&t=2s -------- Articles mentioned in this podcast: https://realinvestmentadvice.com/fed-liquidity-drain-is-coming https://realinvestmentadvice.com/bear-squeeze-or-return-of-the-bull/ https://realinvestmentadvice.com/bailouts-and-the-demise-of-capitalism-and-free-markets/ -------- Get more info & commentary: https://realinvestmentadvice.com/newsletter/ -------- SUBSCRIBE to The Real Investment Show here: http://www.youtube.com/c/TheRealInvestmentShow -------- Visit our Site: www.realinvestmentadvice.com Contact Us: 1-855-RIA-PLAN -------- Subscribe to RIA Pro: https://riapro.net/home -------- Connect with us on social: https://twitter.com/RealInvAdvice https://twitter.com/LanceRoberts https://www.facebook.com/RealInvestmentAdvice/ https://www.linkedin.com/in/realinvestmentadvice/ #MarketCorrection #Inflation #Quarter_End_Selling #Enron #CNN+ #CarbonCredit #Markets #Money #Investing

Three Things I Learned In Saas, Sports, Tech and Live Events: 1. Entrepreneurship doesn't mean freedom like people think it does. The vast majority of those who intend to "be their own boss" one day overwhelmingly cite freedom as a reason. And there is a lot of freedom. But not nearly as much as most believe. Unless independently wealthy already, you'll still have banks, customers, the IRS, local government, and on and on who make demands of you, your time, and your calendar. Not to mention staff. Guess who covers when there are no shows? This Xanadu idea of being able to cruise in and out whenever you like? Not real. At all. In fact, you will have far less free time than you do if you work for someone else who provides holidays and vacation where you can turn off. Freedom of ideas, of purpose, of what to pursue? Absolutely. And those freedoms are what make it all worth it. But the freedom many imagine of cutting out on a Wednesday to hit the lake with some friends and unplug. Not at all. There's no unplugging. Nearly ever. 2. The Personal Guaranty is the least of your worries. Saw this great tweet the other day and thought back to our early days and the fear we had when we had to personally guarantee (financially) our loans, bank accounts, credit cards etc. Yeah, that S-Corp protects us from lawsuits and damages, but good luck getting a loan on a business with no revenue without staking your personal resources as collateral. We're not all Marc Benioff getting $2.5 mil from Larry Ellison on day one and keeping our jobs. In the end, the risk of a guaranty is a terrific harbinger of an entrepreneurs resolve. Trust me from someone who's done it and gotten as close to broke as it comes - that financial guarantee is the least of your worries. The mental, social and physical guaranty….much more demanding. 3. "What do i care about the law? Ain't I got the power?" Rockefeller had a number of 'ends justify the means' quotes and the "Battle for Uber" (or "Bad Blood" or "Smartest Guys in the Room" or "Billions" or or or) reminds us people will do just about anything to look out for themselves. And if it works? The confirmation bias goes through the roof and the justifications get even broader. When we ask start-ups we advise what they'll do if the incumbent plays dirty, they usually answer with "they wont. It's illegal. And if they do, we'll sue them." Trust me from experience kids, they don't care about the law and that lawsuit takes 2 to 4 years these days. Better have the stomach for it. (And if you do, have at it….it's a hell of a ride!)

Vanity Fair contributing editor Bethany McLean is one of the world's most respected financial journalists. She has written for Slate and Fortune, where she published a 2001 article critical of the Wall Street darling Enron, helping to eventually expose the company as a fraud. She is the author of The Smartest Guys in the Room, also about the Enron scandal, All the Devils Are Here, about the 2008 financial crisis, and Saudi America, about fracking's impact on the U.S. economy. On this episode, she speaks with Jon about her upcoming book on the impact of Covid on the economy, how a background in math and a prior career as a Goldman Sachs analyst has made her a stronger journalist, and why investors are still putting their faith in CEOs with "big personalities" and a seeming knack for breaking things.

In early 2001, Bethany McLean, at the time a reporter for Fortune magazine, asked the question in an article: "How does Enron make its money?" McLean's reporting, and the reporting of others, led to inquiries that were put to the Enron management. Within a few months, the company was bankrupt. Bethany McLean's subsequent book, "The Smartest Guys in the Room," became a bestseller and a successful documentary. In January 2022, she wrote about her reaction to the Theranos saga. In an essay about the trial of Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes, she wrote, "For those who believe she was guilty of a great crime, it's a disappointing verdict." She joined us to talk about it.    Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bethany McLean is one of the world's most prominent financial and investigative journalists. In this episode, we revisit her masterpiece on Enron, the Wall Street darling that suddenly imploded in 2001. We focus on timeless insights and discuss charismatic leaders, breakpoints, math, narratives, lessons from a day with Buffett, and much more. For more info about the podcast, go to the episode page.—————————————Episode Chapters(00:00) Intro to Bethany McLean(05:50) Intro to Enron and The Smartest Guys in the Room (08:42) Enron vs Tesla(10:39) The characters at Enron(13:26) From math to investigative journalism(17:49) Breakpoints of frauds and market excesses(24:55) Lessons from Bethany's day with Buffett(28:06) Investigative work and story-telling(35:30) Carol Loomis, the goddess of Fortune(37:24 Leader qualities and open-mindedness (46:30) Bethany's next book (47:57) Reading habits and book recommendations—————————————Articles Mentioned20 Lessons from Enron - Niklas Sävås (2019): http://www.investingbythebooks.com/columns/2019/8/19/twenty-lessons-from-enron—————————————Books MentionedThe Smartest Guys in the Room - Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind (2003)The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority - Martin Gurri (2014)The Aristocracy of Talent - Adrian Wooldridge (2021)Dune books - Frank Herbert—————————————Movies MentionedThe Smartest Guys in the Room - Alex Gibney (2005)—————————————More on Bethany McLeanTwitter: https://twitter.com/bethanymac12Podcast, "Capitalisn't": https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/capitalisnt—————————————What is Investing by the Books?Investing by the Books was founded by Henrik Andersson, Bo Börtemark, Mats Larsson and Michael Persson. It has published hundreds of book reviews in the past 10 years and operates on a non-profit basis. Visit the website: http://www.investingbythebooks.com/Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Investbythebook—————————————What is Redeye?Redeye is a research-centered boutique investment bank from Stockholm. Founded in 1999, Redeye cultivates investors through timeless knowledge, a humble attitude, and a strong focus on quality. Visit the website: https://www.redeye.se/Follow on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Redeye_—————————————DisclaimerNotice that the content in this podcast is not, and shall not be construed as investment advice. This information is meant to be informative and for general purposes only. For full disclaimer, visit Redeye.se

On Thursdays Houston Matters: We learn what the job market in Houston might look like next year from the Greater Houston Partnership. Also this hour: We reflect on the lessons learned from the collapse of Enron 20 years later with journalist Bethany McLean, co-author of the book The Smartest Guys in the Room. Plus: We listen back to a conversation with the late Broadway composer and lyricist Stephen Sondheim, who passed away last week. And local food writers discuss Houston's best new restaurants of 2021 in this month's installment of The Full Menu.

My people!! Welcome back to another pre-holiday laughter therapy session with The Smartest Guys in the Room, we're glad you made it. In this episode, we're talking Great Resignation and quitting our jobs. We also got the homie, the multi-talented rapper/comedian TYRXNE to stop by The Chophouse and talk about his secret to viral tiktoks and his new sophomore album: FIRE STARTER. Check it out here or on our YouTube channel!! 

The Dad Bros are back and are exploring alternative options for staying in touch. Josh tries to avoid sharing television shows with other family members. During the Drink of the Show, the boys talk briskets and beef cooking tips. Jon's freezer fails and right to repair is discussed. Don't buy new Cars. William Shatter is... The post Ep 511 – Not the Smartest Guys in the Room appeared first on Dad Bros.

In this week's episode, Mark and I kick things off with a cool bit of financial history: Goldman's buy rating of Enron three weeks before it collapsed. I love this piece because it opened the door to chatting about one of my favorite documentaries of all time, "The Smartest Guys in the Room." Mark of course was around at the time and knew folks involved on the short side, so it was particularly interesting to get his take here. That conversation segwayed into a discussion of Tesla, and the thin line between visionary and fraud (shout out Bethany McLean). Mark and I somewhat disagreed on this, but I respect his opinion and I think we aligned by the end. Next we covered one of the more interesting trends happening in America today: everyone is quitting their jobs! We got into why that might be happening, which led to a discussion of the hustle and grit of China compared to the contemporary US. Finally we kicked things off with our two stories of the week: 1. The launch of the bitcoin futures ETF 2. Coinbase's NFT marketplace For the full discussion on these last two items, you're gonna have to watch the video yourself :) -- Ledger: This episode is brought to you by Ledger, your secure gateway to buy, exchange and grow your crypto. Combine a Ledger hardware wallet with the Ledger Live app to access all your favorite crypto services & DApps from one place. All that with the best security. Visit https://onthemargin.link/ledger and make your crypto journey easier and safer. Coinbase Prime: On The Margin is supported by Coinbase Prime, an integrated solution that provides advanced multi-venue trading, custody, and prime services for institutions. For more information go to https://onthemargin.link/coinbase -- Meet with investors and financial industry leaders at the Digital Asset Summit in London, November 15 & 16. For a limited time, use code YOUTUBE for £75 off your tickets. https://blockworks.co/events/das-london/

An interview with Bethany McLean, author of "Saudi America: The Truth About Fracking and How It's Changing the World," published by Columbia Global Reports in 2018. She is also the co-author of "The Smartest Guys in the Room," the acclaimed investigation of Enron published in 2003 and made into a documentary in 2005. This interview was conducted on June 21, 2021.

Greg takes time to explain capitalism and Marxism, as well as give some history on these ways of thought. RD breaks down some Biblical texts showing that the means of production ultimately is owned by God, and we are stewards of this. Greg references the 2015 movie The Big Short, and RD references the book The Smartest Guys in the Room. Greg brings up a quote from Animal Farm, and discusses antitrust laws.Finally, Greg and RD talk about Acts 2 and sharing things as Believers.  Greg and RD will be hosting a live Off Stage Q&A on Thursday, May 20, in Fellowship's student center. Doors will open at 6:30 pm, and the Q&A will begin at 7 pm. Send your questions to offstage@fellowshipknox.org For more information on this podcast, visit podcast.fellowshipknox.org 

The Fly (1986) d. David Cronenberg Starring: Jeff Goldblum Geena Davis John Getz  This week on Total Movie Recall, Steve and Ryan enter the telepod together and come out as a new, single entity — the Brundlehost. They get sentimental revisiting the powerful tragedy of David Cronenberg's The Fly, and Ryan acts like he's the first person to ever notice that Geena Davis is one of the great beauties of our time, and Steve tries to break down particle physics and quantum mechanics so even a dumb Philistine like Ryan can understand it. Join us as we transform and leave our frail, useless flesh behind, but watch your step — that's my ear you're standing on. When scientist Seth Brundle (Jeff Goldblum) completes his teleportation device, he decides to test its abilities on himself. Unbeknownst to him, a housefly slips in during the process, leading to a merger of man and insect. Initially, Brundle appears to have undergone a successful teleportation, but the fly's cells begin to take over his body. As he becomes increasingly fly-like, Brundle's girlfriend (Geena Davis) is horrified as the person she once loved deteriorates into a monster. Things discussed in the show: Vomit porn The Sims The Laundromat (Steven Soderbergh, Gary Oldman, Antonio Banderas, AJ Meijer, Meryl Streep) Pedro Almodovar Antonio Banderas and his new acting school in Spain The Big Short (Adam McKay, Christian Bale, Steve Carell, Ryan Gosling) Enron: the Smartest Guys in the Room (Alex Gibney) Bill and Ted Face the Music (Dean Parisot, Chris Matheson, Ed Solomon, Keanu Reeves, Alex Winter, Samara Weaving) Sex, Lies and Videotape Sequel (Steven Soderbergh) Farris Bueller's Day Off (John Hughes, Matthew Broderick, Alan Ruck, Mia Sara) Brian Henson / The Center for Puppetry Arts / Jim Henson Studios in Hollywood / Improv with Puppets - Puppet Up Meet the Feebles (Peter Jackson, Danny Mulheron, Donna Akersten, Stuart Devenie) Ace Ventura: Pet Detective (Tom Shadyac, Jim Carrey, Courteney Cox, Sean Young) Jim Carrey's episode of Comedians in Cars getting Coffee (Jerry Seinfeld) Last Week Tonight with John Oliver Jelle's Marbles Runs F1 Racing Marble Madness Deathrace 2000 (Paul Bartel, David Carradine, Sylvester Stallone, Simone Griffeth) Deathrace 2050 (G.J. Echternkamp, Manu Bennett, Malcolm McDowell, Marci Miller) David Carradine's erotic death Fast Five (Justin Lin, Vin Diesel, Paul Walker, Dwayne Johnson) Senna (documentary) Ford v. Ferrari (James Mangold, Matt Damon, Christian Bale, Jon Bernthal) Speed Racer (Lana Wachowski, Lilly Wachowski, Emile Hirsch, Matthew Fox, Christina Ricci) Jupiter Ascending (Channing Tatum, Mila Kunis, Eddie Redmayne) Redline (Takeshi Koike, Takuya Kimura, Yû Aoi, Tadanobu Asano) Madhouse - Japanese Movie Studio Ninja Scroll (Yoshiaki Kawajiri, Kôichi Yamadera, Emi Shinohara, Takeshi Aono) Akira (Katsuhiro Ôtomo, Mitsuo Iwata, Nozomu Sasaki, Mami Koyama) Hayao Miyazaki Dragon Ball Z The Mighty Ducks (Stephen Herek, Emilio Estevez, Joss Ackland, Lane Smith) Dungeons & Dragons Monster of the Week / Powered by the Apocalypse Body Horror Crash (James Spader, Holly Hunter, Elias Koteas) Videodrome (James Woods, Debbie Harry, Sonja Smits) eXistenZ (Jude Law, Jennifer Jason Leigh, Ian Holm) History of Violence (Viggo Mortensen, Maria Bello, Ed Harris) Eastern Promises (Naomi Watts, Viggo Mortensen, Armin Mueller-Stahl) Dead Ringers (Jeremy Irons, Geneviève Bujold, Heidi von Palleske) The Museum of Surgical Science in Chicago Thor Ragnorok (Taika Waititi, Chris Hemsworth, Tom Hiddleston, Cate Blanchett) The French Dispatch (Wes Anderson, Elisabeth Moss, Willem Dafoe, Timothée Chalamet) Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, Philip K. Dick, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Sharon Stone, Michael Ironside) Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, Peter Weller, Nancy Allen, Dan O'Herlihy) Starship Troopers (Paul Verhoeven, Robert A. Heinlein, Casper Van Dien, Denise Richards, Dina Meyer) Earth Girls are Easy (Julien Temple, Geena Davis, Jeff Goldblum, Jim Carrey) Glow (Liz Flahive, Carly Mensch, Alison Brie, Marc Maron, Betty Gilpin) The Long Kiss Goodnight (Renny Harlin, Geena Davis, Samuel L. Jackson, Yvonne Zima) Real life teleportation Ghostbusters (Ivan Reitman, Dan Aykroyd, Harold Ramis, Bill Murray, Sigourney Weaver) The Fly deleted scene with baboon cat hybrid Elon Musk and Grime's baby X Æ A-12 Rosemary's Baby (Roman Polanski, Mia Farrow, John Cassavetes, Ruth Gordon) Next Week: The Devil and Daniel Johnston

In March 2001, Bethany McLean made history by raising questions about Enron's financials in a Fortune article. This was before Enron went bankrupt, its officials jailed, and its accountants investigated, before its jaw-dropping level of corruption and greed was documented in The Smartest Guys in the Room, a book Bethany co-authored, and further disclosed in the ensuing documentary. Bethany tells us about her career, how that article thrust her into the limelight, how perseverance and not being automatically good at something can help you, and some thoughts on business reporting and ethics in today's world. A must-listen.8/10 Episodes on Journalism and JournalistsThe infamous article:https://www.webcitation.org/5tZ26rnac?url=http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/13/news/companies/enronoriginal_fortune/index.htmFollow Bethany on Twitter:@bethanymac12Thoughts? Comments? Potshots? Contact the show at:https://www.discreetguide.com/Follow the host on Twitter:@DiscreetGuideThe host on LinkedIn:https://www.linkedin.com/in/jenniferkcrittenden/

On this week's episode, Dan speaks with Bethany McLean, author of the "The Smartest Guys in the Room" the story of the scandalous and unexpected fall of Enron. Before their epic collapse, Bethany was one of the first in the financial media investigating the red flags around the company. In early 2001, she wrote an article in Fortune Magazine, titled "Is Enron Overpriced?" Bethany even lets Dan in on an industry that could be seeing bankruptcies in the coming years. The two also touch on the Coronavirus, and the reason there's so much uncertainty. Bethany admits "there's a lot that we just don't know" but ends the episode on a very positive tone. Enjoy.

The Smartest Guys in the room talk about literally every damn thing in this episode, from actor horses and hand modeling to the loss of an icon.

On today's show, Chris sits down with Bethany McLean for a wide-ranging interview, spanning growing up on the Iron Range in Minnesota, to her career as a business writer and how her time in the heady days of business magazines built her skepticism of the corporate world, and led her to be one of the premier chroniclers of corporate malfeasance. Then, we hear Just One Thing about a company who's helping their employees achieve that ever-elusive work-life balance. Chris also talks villains, both on the screen and in the boardroom. Read Bethany at Vanity Fair, watch her on CNBC, or go buy her books. Bethany McLean is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair. She is also a columnist at Yahoo Finance and a contributor to CNBC. Her two books are the The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron and All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis. She lives in Chicago. She has also written two mini books, Shaky Ground: The Strange Saga of the US Mortgage Giants and Saudi America: The Truth About Fracking and How It's Changing the World. 

The Singularity Podcast 47: The Smartest Guys In The Room (4/4/19) Once again in 2019 the issue of deregulation is a hot button issue in American politics...and it is the main topic of discussion in this episode 47 of the Singularity Podcast...also discussed is probably the worst example of corporate overstepping gone amuck in recent American history...So grab yourself a cup of coffee and relax for a little while...and join Mike Bostwick as he talks a little bit about the war of ideology between Ralph Nader and Ronald Reagan and how 30 years later that war was connected to the now infamous (and almost entirely forgotten) story of ENRON...A parable for the modern age..

Investigative journalist Bethany Mclean explains how large parts of the banking system are still "profoundly corrupt." The author of "The Smartest Guys in the Room" - about the Enron scandal - weighs in on the Wells Fargo scam, the actions of James Comey and how our government's regulation of Wall Street is losing much of its muscle under the Trump administration.