Podcasts about Ultimatum game

Modern psychology meets ancient wisdom in this thought-provoking episode of Wisdom of the Sages which asks, “Why do we cling to that which was never truly ours?” Join Raghunath and Kaustubha as they dive into intriguing parallels between the Ultimatum Game—a groundbreaking behavioral economics experiment—and the timeless teachings of the Śrīmad Bhāgavatam. Explore how Bali Maharaja's surrender to Lord Vāmanadeva reveals the illusory nature of territorial attachments and provides a new perspective to see a deeper truth: nothing in this world truly belongs to us. ✨ Key Takeaways: •⁠  ⁠What the Ultimatum Game teaches us about fairness, ego, and self-defeating decisions. •⁠  ⁠Bali Maharaja's awe-inspiring vision of Lord Vishnu's universal form. How spiritual wisdom can elevate our thinking and free us from endless conflict. Kaustubha shares about the time he and his wife were turned away at a famous Temple in South India for not being born “Hindu”.

Modern psychology meets ancient wisdom in this thought-provoking episode of Wisdom of the Sages which asks, “Why do we cling to that which was never truly ours?” Join Raghunath and Kaustubha as they dive into intriguing parallels between the Ultimatum Game—a groundbreaking behavioral economics experiment—and the timeless teachings of the Śrīmad Bhāgavatam. Explore how Bali Maharaja's surrender to Lord Vāmanadeva reveals the illusory nature of territorial attachments and provides a new perspective to see a deeper truth: nothing in this world truly belongs to us. ✨ Key Takeaways: •⁠  ⁠What the Ultimatum Game teaches us about fairness, ego, and self-defeating decisions. •⁠  ⁠Bali Maharaja's awe-inspiring vision of Lord Vishnu's universal form. How spiritual wisdom can elevate our thinking and free us from endless conflict. Kaustubha shares about the time he and his wife were turned away at a famous Temple in South India for not being born “Hindu”.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How to Give in to Threats (without incentivizing them), published by Mikhail Samin on September 13, 2024 on LessWrong. TL;DR: using a simple mixed strategy, LDT can give in to threats, ultimatums, and commitments - while incentivizing cooperation and fair[1] splits instead. This strategy made it much more intuitive to many people I've talked to that smart agents probably won't do weird everyone's-utility-eating things like threatening each other or participating in commitment races. 1. The Ultimatum game This part is taken from planecrash[2][3]. You're in the Ultimatum game. You're offered 0-10 dollars. You can accept or reject the offer. If you accept, you get what's offered, and the offerer gets $(10-offer). If you reject, both you and the offerer get nothing. The simplest strategy that incentivizes fair splits is to accept everything 5 and reject everything < 5. The offerer can't do better than by offering you 5. If you accepted offers of 1, the offerer that knows this would always offer you 1 and get 9, instead of being incentivized to give you 5. Being unexploitable in the sense of incentivizing fair splits is a very important property that your strategy might have. With the simplest strategy, if you're offered 5..10, you get 5..10; if you're offered 0..4, you get 0 in expectation. Can you do better than that? What is a strategy that you could use that would get more than 0 in expectation if you're offered 1..4, while still being unexploitable (i.e., still incentivizing splits of at least 5)? I encourage you to stop here and try to come up with a strategy before continuing. The solution, explained by Yudkowsky in planecrash (children split 12 jellychips, so the offers are 0..12): When the children return the next day, the older children tell them the correct solution to the original Ultimatum Game. It goes like this: When somebody offers you a 7:5 split, instead of the 6:6 split that would be fair, you should accept their offer with slightly less than 6/7 probability. Their expected value from offering you 7:5, in this case, is 7 * slightly less than 6/7, or slightly less than 6. This ensures they can't do any better by offering you an unfair split; but neither do you try to destroy all their expected value in retaliation. It could be an honest mistake, especially if the real situation is any more complicated than the original Ultimatum Game. If they offer you 8:4, accept with probability slightly-more-less than 6/8, so they do even worse in their own expectation by offering you 8:4 than 7:5. It's not about retaliating harder, the harder they hit you with an unfair price - that point gets hammered in pretty hard to the kids, a Watcher steps in to repeat it. This setup isn't about retaliation, it's about what both sides have to do, to turn the problem of dividing the gains, into a matter of fairness; to create the incentive setup whereby both sides don't expect to do any better by distorting their own estimate of what is 'fair'. [The next stage involves a complicated dynamic-puzzle with two stations, that requires two players working simultaneously to solve. After it's been solved, one player locks in a number on a 0-12 dial, the other player may press a button, and the puzzle station spits out jellychips thus divided. The gotcha is, the 2-player puzzle-game isn't always of equal difficulty for both players. Sometimes, one of them needs to work a lot harder than the other.] They play the 2-station video games again. There's less anger and shouting this time. Sometimes, somebody rolls a continuous-die and then rejects somebody's offer, but whoever gets rejected knows that they're not being punished. Everybody is just following the Algorithm. Your notion of fairness didn't match their notion of fairness, and they did what the Algorithm says to do in that case, but ...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How to Give in to Threats (without incentivizing them), published by Mikhail Samin on September 13, 2024 on LessWrong. TL;DR: using a simple mixed strategy, LDT can give in to threats, ultimatums, and commitments - while incentivizing cooperation and fair[1] splits instead. This strategy made it much more intuitive to many people I've talked to that smart agents probably won't do weird everyone's-utility-eating things like threatening each other or participating in commitment races. 1. The Ultimatum game This part is taken from planecrash[2][3]. You're in the Ultimatum game. You're offered 0-10 dollars. You can accept or reject the offer. If you accept, you get what's offered, and the offerer gets $(10-offer). If you reject, both you and the offerer get nothing. The simplest strategy that incentivizes fair splits is to accept everything 5 and reject everything < 5. The offerer can't do better than by offering you 5. If you accepted offers of 1, the offerer that knows this would always offer you 1 and get 9, instead of being incentivized to give you 5. Being unexploitable in the sense of incentivizing fair splits is a very important property that your strategy might have. With the simplest strategy, if you're offered 5..10, you get 5..10; if you're offered 0..4, you get 0 in expectation. Can you do better than that? What is a strategy that you could use that would get more than 0 in expectation if you're offered 1..4, while still being unexploitable (i.e., still incentivizing splits of at least 5)? I encourage you to stop here and try to come up with a strategy before continuing. The solution, explained by Yudkowsky in planecrash (children split 12 jellychips, so the offers are 0..12): When the children return the next day, the older children tell them the correct solution to the original Ultimatum Game. It goes like this: When somebody offers you a 7:5 split, instead of the 6:6 split that would be fair, you should accept their offer with slightly less than 6/7 probability. Their expected value from offering you 7:5, in this case, is 7 * slightly less than 6/7, or slightly less than 6. This ensures they can't do any better by offering you an unfair split; but neither do you try to destroy all their expected value in retaliation. It could be an honest mistake, especially if the real situation is any more complicated than the original Ultimatum Game. If they offer you 8:4, accept with probability slightly-more-less than 6/8, so they do even worse in their own expectation by offering you 8:4 than 7:5. It's not about retaliating harder, the harder they hit you with an unfair price - that point gets hammered in pretty hard to the kids, a Watcher steps in to repeat it. This setup isn't about retaliation, it's about what both sides have to do, to turn the problem of dividing the gains, into a matter of fairness; to create the incentive setup whereby both sides don't expect to do any better by distorting their own estimate of what is 'fair'. [The next stage involves a complicated dynamic-puzzle with two stations, that requires two players working simultaneously to solve. After it's been solved, one player locks in a number on a 0-12 dial, the other player may press a button, and the puzzle station spits out jellychips thus divided. The gotcha is, the 2-player puzzle-game isn't always of equal difficulty for both players. Sometimes, one of them needs to work a lot harder than the other.] They play the 2-station video games again. There's less anger and shouting this time. Sometimes, somebody rolls a continuous-die and then rejects somebody's offer, but whoever gets rejected knows that they're not being punished. Everybody is just following the Algorithm. Your notion of fairness didn't match their notion of fairness, and they did what the Algorithm says to do in that case, but ...

Plus Has Biden Been Replaced By A Deep Fake? ▶️ Apple may charge up to $20 for AI features in Apple Intelligence, including Siri enhancements and email/image generation. These could be bundled with the $19.95 Apple One subscription to boost services revenue.

We're back just a few days after our last episode to dive in to Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, a 5-4 decision about the power of the bankruptcy system to release claims against third parties.

How final is a final offer, really? Does anonymity turn nice people into jerks? And should you tell your crush that you dreamed about marrying them? SOURCES:Max Bazerman, professor of business administration at Harvard Business School.Deepak Malhotra, professor of business administration at Harvard Business School.Elon Musk, owner and C.T.O. of X Corp (formerly Twitter), C.E.O. of Space X, and C.E.O. of Tesla.John Krasinski, actor and filmmaker. RESOURCES:"Elon Musk Says Twitter Will Try to Rehire Some of Its Laid-Off Staff, and That Some of the People He Fired 'Shouldn't Have Been' Cut," by Pete Syme (Business Insider, 2023)."Read the Midnight Email Elon Musk Sent Twitter Staff Telling Them to Work 'Long Hours at High Intensity' – or Quit," by Jyoti Mann (Business Insider, 2022)."When to Use Ultimatums & When to Avoid Them," by Deepak Malhotra (Negotiation Insights Video Series, 2020)."'Take It or Leave It!' A Choice Mindset Leads to Greater Persistence and Better Outcomes in Negotiations," by Anyi Ma, Yu Yang, and Krishna Savani (Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2019)."John Krasinski Was Ready To Quit Acting Before 'The Office'," by The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (2018)."Models of the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game: A Review and Classification," by Stéphane Debove, Nicolas Baumard, and Jean-Baptiste André (Evolution and Human Behavior, 2016)."15 Rules for Negotiating a Job Offer," by Deepak Malhotra (Harvard Business Review, 2014).Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond, by Deepak Malhotra and Max Bazerman (2007)."Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game," by Martin A. Nowak, Karen M. Page, and Karl Sigmund (Science, 2000). EXTRAS:"Get Your Share of the Pie," by People I (Mostly) Admire (2022).Mrs. Miracle, by Debbie Macomber (1996).

Jared Goff and the Lions host Desmond Ridder and the 2-0 Falcons at Ford Field

Découvrez le livre NEUROSAPIENS, sorti le 26 janvier aux éditions Les Arènes !  Pour apprendre à créer rapidement et à moindre coût son podcast, c'est par ici !  Nous allons parler thunes, blé, denier, écus, fric, oseille ou encore moula. Bref, nous allons parler argent. Et oui, je sais, en France, ça ne se fait pas trop de parler argent, par conséquent je vous propose non pas UN épisode mais DEUX épisodes sur le sujet. Deux épisodes, pour la simple raison que l'argent est un sujet complexe, qui soutient notre fonctionnement économique et social, qui entoure notre passé, présent et futur, qui impacte notre personnalité, nos rêves, notre santé mentale mais aussi nos relations sociales, nos vies professionnelles et notre descendance. La première partie qui est celle d'aujourd'hui, se concentrera sur l'argent et son impact sur notre cerveau, nos comportements, nos émotions. Que se passe-t-il dans le cerveau lorsque l'argent entre en jeu ? Existent-ils des neurones de l'argent ?  Production, animation, réalisation et illustration : Anaïs Roux Instagram : https://www.instagram.com/neurosapiens.podcast/ neurosapiens.podcast@gmail.com Produit et distribué en association avec LACME Production. _________ Musique  KEEP ON GOING Musique proposée par La Musique Libre Joakim Karud - Keep On Going : https://youtu.be/lOfg0jRqaA8 Joakim Karud : https://soundcloud.com/joakimkarud ONE NIGHT AWAY Musique de Patrick Patrikios _________ Sources :  C. Tallon-Baudry et al., in PloSONE vol. 6, e28229, 2011. Breiter HC, Gollub RL, Weisskoff RM, Kennedy DN, Makris N, Berke JD, Goodman JM, Kantor HL, Gastfriend DR, Riorden JP, Mathew RT, Rosen BR, Hyman SE. Acute effects of cocaine on human brain activity and emotion. Neuron. 1997 Sep;19(3):591-611. doi: 10.1016/s0896-6273(00)80374-8. PMID: 9331351.  Sescousse G, Redouté J, Dreher JC. The architecture of reward value coding in the human orbitofrontal cortex. J Neurosci. 2010 Sep 29;30(39):13095-104. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3501-10.2010. PMID: 20881127; PMCID: PMC6633499. https://hbr.org/2015/10/what-happens-to-your-brain-when-you-negotiate-about-money Sanfey, Alan & Rilling, James & Aronson, Jessica & Nystrom, Leigh & Cohen, Jonathan. (2003). The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science (New York, N.Y.). 300. 1755-8. 10.1126/science.1082976.  Cristofori I, Harquel S, Isnard J, Mauguière F, Sirigu A. Monetary reward suppresses anterior insula activity during social pain. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2015 Dec;10(12):1668-76. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsv054. Epub 2015 May 11. PMID: 25964499; PMCID: PMC4666104.

It's hard enough to recognize that you need to change your behaviors and then to do so. How are you supposed to do it when it relates to your divorce? Kurt is a sought-after behavioral scientist and recognized leader in human motivation and behavior change. For over 20 years, Kurt has worked with global companies to apply behavioral science principles to drive change in their organizations. Today, Kurt joins Seth and Pete to talk about the challenges of behavioral change during the divorce process – and why it's important.Sometimes, it's a behavioral change that happened during the marriage that's actually leading to the divorce. Sometimes, it's recognizing a change in yourself that you need to make in order to work through issues you have that led to the divorce. And sometimes, it's changes you need to make during the divorce process that just might make the process easier. But change is hard. We all know that. So Pete and Seth talk with Kurt about how to recognize changes you might need to make, changes your ex made that you now have to deal with, and more. How do you find your own autonomy so you can make the behavioral changes you need to make? How do you deal with different dynamics? What about when child support or co-parenting is involved in the behavioral changes you need to make? And how do you deal with the challenges of what you plan versus the reality? It all involves learning to change your behavior during a period of potential great fear, loss, anger, grief, and other intense emotions. We hope in this episode that you'll find some advice as to how you can start taking those first steps.About KurtKurt is a sought-after behavioral scientist and recognized leader in human motivation and behavior change. For over 20 years, Kurt has worked with global companies to apply behavioral science principles to drive change in their organizations.He is founder and president of The Lantern Group, a communication and behavioral design agency which uses behavioral science insights to improve employee engagement and motivation. He also is the co-founder, with Tim Houlihan, of the Behavioral Grooves podcast, where they interview leading academic and business executives from around the world and explore how they apply behavioral science to their work and lives. All his work focuses on understanding ways to positively influence how people behave.Show LinksThe Lantern GroupKurt on LinkedIn, Twitter and YouTubeKurt's Podcast Behavioral Grooves (00:00) - Welcome to How to Split a Toaster (00:26) - Meet Kurt Nelson (03:23) - Behavioral Change in Divorce (06:06) - Finding Your Autonomy (10:16) - When You Don't Want the Divorce (12:17) - Ultimatum Game (13:50) - Hot Psychological Situation (17:23) - Mediation (19:13) - Different Dynamics (22:54) - Child Support Guidelines (26:07) - Sponsor: Soberlink (28:06) - Intentionally Irrational Math Language (32:27) - Plans vs. Reality (35:27) - How to Prepare Yourself (37:27) - Getting the Ball Rolling (38:58) - Managing Fear and Loss (43:00) - Moving Forward (49:48) - Kurt's Podcasts (52:13) - Wrap Up

The “logic” of the ultimatum game is simple - something is better than nothing, so you ought to accept any deal where you come out ahead, no matter how unfair that deal is. Why, then, does almost everyone reject unfair deals, even if it means sacrifice? https://youtu.be/o0MyC54j-SM

Welcome back to another episode of Clued Up and our last one for this season, ya girls can't keep up with celeb non-sense! Haha! But before we leave you for now we discuss Rey's new fave reality show Ultimatum Game and other reality faves, Chunkz signing a deal with JD, recapping our thoughts of the GRAMMYs and more! That's it for now but follow our socials to stay posted on Clued Up and what we get up to while we're away. But for now see ya later!

How the creative industry's thinking and creativity could be missing the mark a lot of the time, because the people working in it aren't truly representative of the market they are targeting. Part 1 of a fascinating interview with the Co-author of three reports that rocked the creative industry and forced it to think about why how and where it's drawing its talent from and whether it needs to be revised. Part 2 will feature Ian's work for LinkedIn and what exciting innovations we should expect. Part 3 will cover the value of research in agency growth, the Ultimatum Game and how technology is helping the research industry Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Introduction to Game Theory, Part 5: Interlude for Behavioral Economics, published by Scott Alexander. The so-called “rational” solutions to the Prisoners' Dilemma and Ultimatum Game are suboptimal to say the least. Humans have various kludges added by both nature or nurture to do better, but they're not perfect and they're certainly not simple. They leave entirely open the question of what real people will actually do in these situations, a question which can only be addressed by hard data. As in so many other areas, our most important information comes from reality television. The Art of Strategy discusses a US game show “Friend or Foe” where a team of two contestants earned money by answering trivia questions. At the end of the show, the team used a sort-of Prisoner's Dilemma to split their winnings: each team member chose “Friend” (cooperate) or “Foe” (defect). If one player cooperated and the other defected, the defector kept 100% of the pot. If both cooperated, each kept 50%. And if both defected, neither kept anything (this is a significant difference from the standard dilemma, where a player is a little better off defecting than cooperating if her opponent defects). Players chose “Friend” about 45% of the time. Significantly, this number remained constant despite the size of the pot: they were no more likely to cooperate when splitting small amounts of money than large. Players seemed to want to play “Friend” if and only if they expected their opponents to do so. This is not rational, but it accords with the “Tit-for-Tat” strategy hypothesized to be the evolutionary solution to Prisoner's Dilemma. This played out on the show in a surprising way: players' choices started off random, but as the show went on and contestants began participating who had seen previous episodes, they began to base their decision on observable characteristics about their opponents. For example, in the first season women cooperated more often than men, so by the second season a player was cooperating more often if their opponent was a woman - whether or not that player was a man or woman themselves. Among the superficial characteristics used, the only one to reach statistical significance according to the study was age: players below the median age of 27 played “Foe” more often than those over it (65% vs. 39%, p < .001). Other nonsignificant tendencies were for men to defect more than women (53% vs. 46%, p=.34) and for black people to defect more than white people (58% vs. 48%, p=.33). These nonsignificant tendencies became important because the players themselves attributed significance to them: for example, by the second season women were playing “Foe” 60% of the time against men but only 45% of the time against women (p

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Introduction to Game Theory, Part 7: Bargaining and Auctions, published by Scott Alexander. Some people have things. Other people want them. Economists agree that the eventual price will be set by supply and demand, but both parties have tragically misplaced their copies of the Big Book Of Levels Of Supply And Demand For All Goods. They're going to have to decide on a price by themselves. When the transaction can be modeled by the interaction of one seller and one buyer, this kind of decision usually looks like bargaining. When it's best modeled as one seller and multiple buyers (or vice versa), the decision usually looks like an auction. Many buyers and many sellers produce a marketplace, but this is complicated and we'll stick to bargains and auctions for now. Simple bargains bear some similarity to the Ultimatum Game. Suppose an antique dealer has a table she values at $50, and I go to the antique store and fall in love with it, believing it will add $400 worth of classiness to my room. The dealer should never sell for less than $50, and I should never buy for more than $400, but any value in between would benefit both of us. More specifically, it would give us a combined $350 profit. The remaining question is how to divide that $350 pot. If I make an offer to buy at $60, I'm proposing to split the pot "$10 for you, $340 for me". If the dealer makes a counter-offer of $225, she's offering "$175 for you, $175 for me" - or an even split. Each round of bargaining resembles the Ultimatum Game because one player proposes to split a pot, and the other player accepts or rejects. If the other player rejects the offer (for example, the dealer refuses to sell it for $60) then the deal falls through and neither of us gets any money. But bargaining is unlike the Ultimatum Game for several reasons. First, neither player is the designated "offer-maker"; either player may begin by making an offer. Second, the game doesn't end after one round; if the dealer rejects my offer, she can make a counter-offer of her own. Third, and maybe most important, neither player is exactly sure about the size of the pot: I don't walk in knowing that the dealer bought the table for $50, and I may not really be sure I value the table at $400. Our intuition tells us that the fairest method is to split the profits evenly at a price of $225. This number forms a useful Schelling point (remember those?) that prevents the hassle of further bargaining. The Art of Strategy (see the beginning of Ch. 11) includes a proof that an even split is the rational choice under certain artificial assumptions. Imagine a store selling souvenirs for the 2012 Olympics. They make $1000/day each of the sixteen days the Olympics are going on. Unfortunately, the day before the Olympics, the workers decide to strike; the store will make no money without workers, and they don't have enough time to hire scabs. Suppose Britain has some very strange labor laws that mandate the following negotiation procedure: on each odd numbered day of the Olympics, the labor union representative will approach the boss and make an offer; the boss can either accept it or reject it. On each even numbered day, the boss makes the offer to the labor union. So if the negotiations were to drag on to the sixteenth and last day of the Olympics, on that even-numbered day the boss would approach the labor union rep. They're both the sort of straw man rationalists who would take 99-1 splits on the Ultimatum Game, so she offers the labor union rep $1 of the $1000. Since it's the last day of the Olympics and she's a straw man rationalist, the rep accepts. But on the fifteenth day of the Olympics, the labor union rep will approach the boss. She knows that if no deal is struck today, she'll end out with $1 and the boss will end out with $999. She has to convince ...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Introduction to Game Theory, Part 5: Interlude for Behavioral Economics, published by Scott Alexander. The so-called “rational” solutions to the Prisoners' Dilemma and Ultimatum Game are suboptimal to say the least. Humans have various kludges added by both nature or nurture to do better, but they're not perfect and they're certainly not simple. They leave entirely open the question of what real people will actually do in these situations, a question which can only be addressed by hard data. As in so many other areas, our most important information comes from reality television. The Art of Strategy discusses a US game show “Friend or Foe” where a team of two contestants earned money by answering trivia questions. At the end of the show, the team used a sort-of Prisoner's Dilemma to split their winnings: each team member chose “Friend” (cooperate) or “Foe” (defect). If one player cooperated and the other defected, the defector kept 100% of the pot. If both cooperated, each kept 50%. And if both defected, neither kept anything (this is a significant difference from the standard dilemma, where a player is a little better off defecting than cooperating if her opponent defects). Players chose “Friend” about 45% of the time. Significantly, this number remained constant despite the size of the pot: they were no more likely to cooperate when splitting small amounts of money than large. Players seemed to want to play “Friend” if and only if they expected their opponents to do so. This is not rational, but it accords with the “Tit-for-Tat” strategy hypothesized to be the evolutionary solution to Prisoner's Dilemma. This played out on the show in a surprising way: players' choices started off random, but as the show went on and contestants began participating who had seen previous episodes, they began to base their decision on observable characteristics about their opponents. For example, in the first season women cooperated more often than men, so by the second season a player was cooperating more often if their opponent was a woman - whether or not that player was a man or woman themselves. Among the superficial characteristics used, the only one to reach statistical significance according to the study was age: players below the median age of 27 played “Foe” more often than those over it (65% vs. 39%, p < .001). Other nonsignificant tendencies were for men to defect more than women (53% vs. 46%, p=.34) and for black people to defect more than white people (58% vs. 48%, p=.33). These nonsignificant tendencies became important because the players themselves attributed significance to them: for example, by the second season women were playing “Foe” 60% of the time against men but only 45% of the time against women (p

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is Introduction to Game Theory, Part 7: Bargaining and Auctions, published by Scott Alexander. Some people have things. Other people want them. Economists agree that the eventual price will be set by supply and demand, but both parties have tragically misplaced their copies of the Big Book Of Levels Of Supply And Demand For All Goods. They're going to have to decide on a price by themselves. When the transaction can be modeled by the interaction of one seller and one buyer, this kind of decision usually looks like bargaining. When it's best modeled as one seller and multiple buyers (or vice versa), the decision usually looks like an auction. Many buyers and many sellers produce a marketplace, but this is complicated and we'll stick to bargains and auctions for now. Simple bargains bear some similarity to the Ultimatum Game. Suppose an antique dealer has a table she values at $50, and I go to the antique store and fall in love with it, believing it will add $400 worth of classiness to my room. The dealer should never sell for less than $50, and I should never buy for more than $400, but any value in between would benefit both of us. More specifically, it would give us a combined $350 profit. The remaining question is how to divide that $350 pot. If I make an offer to buy at $60, I'm proposing to split the pot "$10 for you, $340 for me". If the dealer makes a counter-offer of $225, she's offering "$175 for you, $175 for me" - or an even split. Each round of bargaining resembles the Ultimatum Game because one player proposes to split a pot, and the other player accepts or rejects. If the other player rejects the offer (for example, the dealer refuses to sell it for $60) then the deal falls through and neither of us gets any money. But bargaining is unlike the Ultimatum Game for several reasons. First, neither player is the designated "offer-maker"; either player may begin by making an offer. Second, the game doesn't end after one round; if the dealer rejects my offer, she can make a counter-offer of her own. Third, and maybe most important, neither player is exactly sure about the size of the pot: I don't walk in knowing that the dealer bought the table for $50, and I may not really be sure I value the table at $400. Our intuition tells us that the fairest method is to split the profits evenly at a price of $225. This number forms a useful Schelling point (remember those?) that prevents the hassle of further bargaining. The Art of Strategy (see the beginning of Ch. 11) includes a proof that an even split is the rational choice under certain artificial assumptions. Imagine a store selling souvenirs for the 2012 Olympics. They make $1000/day each of the sixteen days the Olympics are going on. Unfortunately, the day before the Olympics, the workers decide to strike; the store will make no money without workers, and they don't have enough time to hire scabs. Suppose Britain has some very strange labor laws that mandate the following negotiation procedure: on each odd numbered day of the Olympics, the labor union representative will approach the boss and make an offer; the boss can either accept it or reject it. On each even numbered day, the boss makes the offer to the labor union. So if the negotiations were to drag on to the sixteenth and last day of the Olympics, on that even-numbered day the boss would approach the labor union rep. They're both the sort of straw man rationalists who would take 99-1 splits on the Ultimatum Game, so she offers the labor union rep $1 of the $1000. Since it's the last day of the Olympics and she's a straw man rationalist, the rep accepts. But on the fifteenth day of the Olympics, the labor union rep will approach the boss. She knows that if no deal is struck today, she'll end out with $1 and the boss will end out with $999. She has to convince ...

Adam and Dr. Drew open the show discussing Drew's unusual reaction to the vaccine and the concerns surrounding his unexplained black eye. Adam then shows Drew a clip of a doctor testifying in the George Floyd trial who has some outside the box thoughts on the effects of smoking. Drew then pivots the conversation to a recent interview he did with an expert on spite and the guys discuss the general idea of spite and how it manifests. Please Support Our Sponsors: Sponsored by Asterra Labs. Try Asterra Labs safe, quality CBD product by shopping at asterralabs.com. Use code ADSHOW20 to receive 20% off your order today! Subscribe to the Jordan Harbinger Show AirMedcareNetwork.com/ADS PlutoTV Lifelock.com, promo code ADAM

The answers to life's biggest questions will vary widely based on one simple variable: who you ask. If you do an experiment on men, you might get a different result than when you do it on women. Rich, poor, black, white, young, old… people are diverse and you learn more when you ask your questions of a diverse audience. Joseph Henrich figured out that a lot of experiments were being done on a very homogeneous group of people… he calls those people “WEIRD.” You'll have to listen to find out why. Something else you might learn if you study a diverse group is that leaded gasoline leads to violent crime. There are a lot of steps in between those two ideas so buckle in for that ride. And lastly Dr Lautt of SciMar explains why so many researchers only use men as test subjects, and what the consequence of that is. These science stories from history shed light on the modern research being done on Type 2 Diabetes. Specifically, we highlight the work of SciMar as they examine the hormone HISS - Hepatic Insulin Sensitizing Substance - and the effect it has on glucose levels in people who are insulin resistant. www.SciMar.ca

Part IWe all know we are addicted to our phones, but can it really be a bad thing to think all the time? Yes, it can. The stories we tell ourselves trigger a little a dopamine buzz, activating part of the DMN (Default Network Mode), which means we increasingly live in our own head listening to our own stories. The problem becomes compounded when the PCC (posterior cingulate cortex) is activated, since it often signals thoughts of obsessive control, rumination, induced morality, guilt, and depression.All of these activities close off our ability to to see reality, increasingly letting us spin in a world of our own making.I had done earlier research on the "observer effect" where we literally lose the ability to observe ourselves (self-perception) when our attention was highly active or we were doing a novel task. Equally, meditation and mindfulness practice have been shown to reduce PCC activity in the brain, allowing us to reduce the narrativizing tendency of the brain.You are subject to sorrow, fear, jealousy, anger, and inconsistency. That’s the real reason you should admit that you are not wise.”~ Marcus Aurelius Part IIWhat does this mean in realistic terms?People who play the psychology test, The Ultimatum Game, often get angry or disgusted at the perceived unfairness of offers. Often blowing up just to prove a point, even though they are playing against a computer. This righteousness doesn't hurt the computer, but it does hurt the subject, proving that we will hurt ourselves to prove a point.Meditation or mindfulness practitioners seem to be able to de-couple or distance themselves from the negative emotions, taking them less personally, and thus reducing stress through empathizing with the other position. As well, they see little reward in hurting the other side, even if it is a computer.This research shows that our cultural norms, our common sense and beliefs, may be harmful to us and others, and to engage in empathy without taking things personally points towards a universal human ethic.Part IIIRyan Holiday put out a podcast that considers our addiction to thinking as a negative, harmful tendency that might be making us stupid and miserable. When we assign our role as a smart thinker, then we form opinions, not letting ourselves be open to new ideas or other people. As well, we do a disservice to those around us but thinking for them and not allowing them to take the exciting journey the world offers.We need to remain open, and empathetic, moving out of the Nietzsche stage of a camel, hording knowledge, on to the lion, slaying our values, and embody the child creator. Which is so much more fun.0:57 Dopamine and Daydreaming2:35 Give your ego a break3:26 You made your own story, and you are sticking with it4:40 Hurting yourself for the principle of the thing6:16 How do you halt your self-destruction?8:30 Your cup is already full 

YouTube Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3fG96gvgLUDavid Sloan Wilson is an American evolutionary biologist and a Distinguished Professor of Biological Sciences and Anthropology at Binghamton University. https://twitter.com/David_S_WilsonCurt Jaimungal is directing / writing an imminent documentary Better Left Unsaid http://betterleftunsaidfilm.com on the topic of "when does the left go too far?" Visit that site if you'd like to contribute to getting the film distributed (early-2021).Patreon for conversations on Theories of Everything, Consciousness, Free Will, and God: https://patreon.com/curtjaimungalHelp support conversations like this via PayPal: https://bit.ly/2EOR0M4Twitter: https://twitter.com/TOEwithCurtiTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/better-left-unsaid-with-curt-jaimungal/id1521758802Pandora: https://pdora.co/33b9lfPSpotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/4gL14b92xAErofYQA7bU4eGoogle Podcasts: https://play.google.com/music/listen?u=0#/ps/Id3k7k7mfzahfx2fjqmw3vufb44iTunes: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/better-left-unsaid-with-curt-jaimungal/id1521758802* * *00:00:00 Introduction00:01:54 Is "the West" losing its values? What are those values?00:05:24 Multi-level selection vs. Group Selection00:11:10 The political right vs left in terms of level of evolutionary selection00:12:51 Identity Politics framed in terms of group selection (plus a definition of Identity Politics)00:15:04 Why can't a propitious argument made FOR Identity Politics?00:20:05 How can we adopt a "whole Earth ethic" as a country, when others don't adopt it?00:23:47 What do humans need to behave "selflessly" when animals get along with doing so?00:28:16 Link between evolutionary theory and Buddhism00:30:00 Humans are built to cooperate in small groups (not large)00:32:49 We've selected ourselves for timidity00:38:03 A synoptic view of "This View of Life" and the need for encompassing values00:38:32 Classical economics (and some contemporary) is wrong and unadaptive00:40:44 If we've been selected for altruism, why is it difficult?00:44:54 Carl Jung and selfish acts being unselfish (because they harm you in the long-run)00:50:24 A $1000 suit isn't to look good, but to look BETTER than the guy with a $500 suit00:53:00 How good is altruism as a motivational agent for behavior? 00:55:54 Tribalism is the answer, not the problem00:57:05 Problems with Social Constructionism00:59:18 Postmodernism and David Sloan Wilson's issues with it01:03:28 Women's studies / LGBTQ studies / etc. utilizing "tribal circuitry"01:06:53 The "Ultimatum Game" in evolutionary psychology01:09:55 On this "tribal circuitry" again01:17:40 On the Nordic countries and the "homogeneity" argument01:23:58 Is communism more adaptive than capitalism?01:28:31 "Tight and loose" compared to totalitarian systems (existential security)01:31:38 Which memes are prius to liberalism?01:36:28 Are the Inuit less adapted than the White Europeans who invented centralized heating?01:42:37 Is virtue as "honesty / forthrightness / generosity" a human universal given most studies are done on Westerners?01:45:10 Is David Sloan Wilson a moral relativist?01:47:38 The effects of arcane disciplines in Universities spreading outward to the culture01:49:47 Evolutionary theory as a unifying language for the disparate fields of science01:54:05 "When does the left go too far?"01:56:18 Memes that last so long they affect our evolution01:57:26 Dawkin's concept of "gene" was problematic, and thus so is "meme"02:00:06 Jordan Peterson vs Susan Blackmore on memes and Jung02:02:10 Chomskyan grammar and Pinker's language instinct is wrong02:04:06 On Victor Huang's "innovation oasis"02:08:58 Applying Victor's Huang's concept to Curt's non-profit indiefilmTO02:14:46 Is there such a thing as biological sex?02:16:08 What's the definition of "adaptiveness" in evolution?02:17:54 David Sloan Wilson's thoughts on free will02:18:39 The "Theory of Everything" being encompassed by evolutionary theory02:20:21 His thoughts on Donald Hoffman's ideas02:24:43 Extra: On Daniel Dennett's 2nd endosymbiotic revolution02:26:57 Extra: Is history an example of humans "externalizing" their code? Computers? (via memes)Subscribe if you want more conversations on Theories of Everything, Consciousness, Free Will, God, and the mathematics / physics of each.

Onko talous olemassa ihmistä varten, tai onko ihminen olemassa taloutta varten? Vuosi 2020 on ollut vanhojen olettamusten ja suurien rakenteiden kyseenalaistamisen vuosi, ja tässä jaksossa pureudumme yhteen suureen aiheeseen; kulutusyhteiskuntaamme. Kuinka hyvin termi “kuluttaja” kuvaa oikeaa ihmistä? Mikä on hyvinvointimme sosiaalinen, kulttuurinen ja ekologinen jalanjälki? Ovatko talouden mallit ja oletukset itseään toteuttavia asioita? Näitä ja monia muita kysymyksiä, Isakin ja Williamin kanssa, tiedätte homman nimen. Ultimatum Game: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/ultimatum-game Osallistu keskusteluun Twitterissä: https://twitter.com/futucast Lyhyet klipit Instagramissa: https://www.instagram.com/futucast/ Jaksot videon kera Youtubesta: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQPojdjir3suCXQA_09P0ag Siistit nettisivut: www.futucast.com

前回と前々回、評価に対する納得感を高めるには公正さ、英語で言う「Justice」が重要であり、そこでは評価の内容そのものに関する"結果の公正"と、評価がどのようになされるかという"プロセスの公正"の２つがあるというお話をしました。本日は、これらの議論をもう一歩深めるために、ちょっとユニークなゲームをご紹介します。これは２人のプレイヤーで行うゲームです。この番組をお聞きの皆さんも想像してみて下さい。今僕の手元に１万円があります。ゲームの目的は、これを僕と皆さんの２人のプレイヤーで分け合うことです。 皆さんには分配権があるものとします。皆さんと僕、それぞれが１万円のうち幾らを貰うかについて、皆さんが自由に決めて提案することができます。例えば、１万円全部皆さんが貰い、僕はゼロだということでも結構です。もしくはその逆、あるいは、その間のどんな数字でも結構です。ただし、もう１人のプレイヤー（この場合は僕ですね）は、拒否権を持ちます。もし皆さんのご提案を僕が気に入らなければ、それを拒否することが出来るのです。分配権を持つプレイヤーの提案をもう１人のプレイヤーが拒否しなければ、提案のとおりにお金を分け合ってゲーム終了です。ただし、ここがちょっと鍵になるポイントですけれども、もし拒否権が発動された場合には、どちらのプレイヤーもお金は貰えません。 皆さんはご自分の好きな提案が出来るけれども、「いや、それ駄目だよ」「いやだよ」と言われたら、二人とも１円も貰えないということになります。さらに、基本ルールとして、提案は１回きり。つまり、受けるか受けないかという決断も１回きりです。皆さんだったらどんなご提案をされますか？ これは最後通牒ゲーム、英語だと「Ultimatum Game」といって、世界中で数多く行われてきている有名な心理実験の１つです。ちなみに、オリジナルの形式ではプレイヤー同士は見知らぬ赤の他人であり、ゲーム中に顔を合わせることもなく、更に、第三者の実験者を介して紙ベースで行うという形でやり取りをすることになります。 もしそうだとしたら、ちょっと話が変わってくるような気がしますね。やはり、お互いに顔が分かっていれば、私の方がちょっと多く貰うといけないかなと思ったりします。しかし、相手が全く知らない人で、その後もお互いのことが分からないというのであれば、ちょっと自分の取り分を多めにする、という人は多いと思います。実際、こうした「後腐れのない」状況では、分配権を得たプレイヤーの多くは、７：３から８：２で自分の取り分を相手より多くする提案をします。 しかし、自分の提案を相手にマイク越しに肉声で伝えなければならないとか、直接対面で提案しなければならないとか、あるいはもう１人のプレイヤーが自分の友人・家族である等、相手との関わりが強くなればなるほど、提案内容は50：50に近づいていく事が研究で分かっています。 知っている人とやるのにそんなには自分が多く取れない、そんなことをしたら何と思われるどうか、と思う心理が影響するわけです。一方で、提案を受ける側のプレイヤーに関しては、自分の取り分が大体30％を割り込むと、例えば今回では僕の取り分が３千円より小さい額を提案されると、途端に拒否権を発動する確率が高まると言われています。言い換えると、提案を受ける側に回った人は７：３くらいまでであれば、相手の取り分が多くてもそれを受け入れる可能性はそれなりに高いということです。 しかし、これは前回までのお話をしてきた公正という観点からやや不可解な点があることにお気付きでしょうか？　というのも、最後通牒ゲームで提案を受ける側に回ったプレイヤーは、報酬を獲得する為に費やした努力はほぼほぼゼロに等しいわけです。「自分の貢献や努力に見合った評価・報酬をヒトは公正だと感じる」という前回までにお話した理論からすれば、努力がほぼゼロなのだから、報酬、つまりゲームから得られる金額はゼロでなければ儲けものと感じてもおかしくない。しかし、実際には皆さんもご想像のとおり、もし分配権を持ったプレイヤーが９：１の提案をしたりすると、これはほぼ確実に、もう１人のプレイヤーは拒否権を発動して２人とも獲得金額がゼロになる道を選びます。言い換えると、千円貰うよりも報酬ゼロになるようにあえて選択をするということになりますので、経済合理的な判断とは言えません。 なぜあえて自分の報酬を投げ打ってまで、気にくわない提案を拒否するのか。これを考えていくと、一見合理的に思われるはずの評価が当事者から思わぬ反発をされるといったケースに通じる、人間心理を垣間見ることができます。次回はその点について解説して参りますので、どうぞお楽しみに。 今日のまとめです。ある金額を２人のプレイヤーで分け合う最後通牒ゲームという心理実験があります。プレイヤーは何の元手をかけずにお金を貰えるので、どんな金額であっても提示された分配の提案を受け入れることが、本来合理的な判断となるはずですが、実際には３割未満の分け前を提案されると多くの人が拒否権を発動してあえて獲得金額がゼロとなる道を選びます。この興味深い行動パターンの背景と組織における評価への影響について次回お話します。

------------------Support the channel------------ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thedissenter SubscribeStar: https://www.subscribestar.com/the-dissenter PayPal: paypal.me/thedissenter PayPal Subscription 1 Dollar: https://tinyurl.com/yb3acuuy PayPal Subscription 3 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ybn6bg9l PayPal Subscription 5 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/ycmr9gpz PayPal Subscription 10 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y9r3fc9m PayPal Subscription 20 Dollars: https://tinyurl.com/y95uvkao ------------------Follow me on--------------------- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thedissenteryt/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDissenterYT Anchor (podcast): https://anchor.fm/thedissenter Dr. Herbert Gintis is External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. He and Professor Robert Boyd (Anthropology, UCLA) headed a multidisciplinary research project that models such behaviors as empathy, reciprocity, insider/outsider behavior, vengefulness, and other observed human behaviors not well handled by the traditional model of the self-regarding agent. Professor Gintis is also author of several books including Game Theory Evolving, The Bounds of Reason, A Cooperative Species, Game Theory in Action, and Individuality and Entanglement and also coeditor, with Joe Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, and Ernst Fehr, of Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-scale Societies, and with Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr of Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: On the Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. This interview is based on Chapter 3 (Game Theory and Human Behavior) of The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. In this episode, we talk about altruism and self-interest, as revealed through lab and field studies of human behavior. First, we discuss what is rationality, the literature on human biases and heuristics and why that does not show that humans are irrational. We talk about the difference between self-interested and self-regarding behavior. Then, we get into how we can use game theory to study human sociality, and the aspects of it we can learn about through different game designs, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Public Goods Game, and the Ultimatum Game. Finally, we talk about how we can make sense of the interplay between people's social dynamics and their culture; the phenomenon of gene-culture coevolution; and the role cultural group selection might have played in the evolution of certain aspects of our sociality, like altruism and strong reciprocity. -- Follow Dr. Gintis' work: Personal Website: https://people.umass.edu/gintis/ Books: https://tinyurl.com/y6ot643p -- A HUGE THANK YOU TO MY PATRONS: KARIN LIETZCKE, ANN BLANCHETTE, SCIMED, PER HELGE HAAKSTD LARSEN, LAU GUERREIRO, RUI BELEZA, ANTÓNIO CUNHA, CHANTEL GELINAS, JERRY MULLER, FRANCIS FORDE, HANS FREDRIK SUNDE, BRIAN RIVERA, ADRIANO ANDRADE, YEVHEN BODRENKO, SERGIU CODREANU, ADAM BJERRE, ŁUKASZ STAFINIAK, AIRES ALMEIDA, BERNARDO SEIXAS, HERBERT GINTIS, RUTGER VOS, RICARDO VLADIMIRO, BO WINEGARD, JOHN CONNORS, ADAM KESSEL, AND VEGA GIDEY! A SPECIAL THANKS TO MY PRODUCERS, YZAR WEHBE, ROSEY, AND JIM FRANK!

Bonus August 22, 2019: Discuss Ultimatum Game by Bethel Church Kelowna

Game theory is a very popular theory in economics that in part seeks to understand the effect of events based on not only personal actions but also the actions of others. John Nash is credited with beginning the use and popularization of game theory, The ultimatum game is an economic game in which two parties become involved in a transaction - the transaction is a one off transaction. The parties are only brought together one time - party a is offered a sum of money - say $100,000.00. Party A decides how the money will be split between A and B, the catch is that party B gets to decide. If party B accepts the offer then the transaction is completed if party B declines then neither gets any money. From an economically rational perspective as long as party B gains - even if it is a single dollar it is a good deal for both parties. How often do you think Party B would agree to a single dollar? This podcast is about developing empathy, learning how to negotiate based on interests and not power and how the Ultimatum game demonstrates that. This podcast was inspired by a series of lectures by Professor Seth Freeman available on Amazon Reach out to us via panning@sharpstonegroup.com Randy Haas https://www.linkedin.com/in/rghaas/ Jason Leger https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-leger-9a6868a/ presented by the www.sharpstonegroup.com --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/leadersquarry/support

In the Bilingual Decision Making podcast series, Dr. Z (Zachary S. Brooks) covers an introduction to bilingual decision making, his dissertation topic, then eight additional topics. They include ethical problems, the cognitive reflection test, study abroad and cultural appreciation, conjunction fallacy and regret, the truth-effect, cultural bias and emotions, second language reading, and the ultimatum game. The post Podcast 09: Bilingual Decision Making Podcast: Ultimatum Game appeared first on Dr. Z Podcasts.

This week, Michael and Vanessa discuss Mike's upcoming guest lecture at a local university and how he intends to use The Ultimatum Game.

We are living in unprecedented economic times - a whole generation will be worse off than their parents - what went wrong?! Economist Rob Levy sorts the myths from the money and explains why "a lot of economics is balls". Get your tenners ready for our irrational Ultimatum Game and find out why government austerity is very different from personal jam-induced debt - Matilda even learns a new word, profligate. Try using that in conversation. Mixtape Songs: 1. Who's Loving You by Jackson 5 2. As by Stevie Wonder 3. Don't Get Me Wrong by The Pretenders 4. Sun's Gonna Shine Again by Ray Charles 5. On And On by Longpigs 6. And Your Bird Can Sing by The Beatles http://ecnmy.org/ https://datadrivenecon.wordpress.com/ #science #mixtape #economics #economy #data #ultimatum #game #macro #micro #experiment

Herbert Gintis is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University of Massachusetts and visiting Professor at Central European University. He is known for his theoretical contributions to sociobiology, especially altruism, cooperation, epistemic game theory and gene-culture co-evolution. Herbert has a B.A and M.A in Mathematics but switched his PhD program at Harvard from mathematics to economics. Professor Gintis was part of a group of economists who developed their ideas on a new economics which encompassed issues of alienation of labor, racism, sexism, and imperialism. Herbert has worked extensively with economist Samuel Bowles, writing their landmark book, Schooling in Capitalist America. One of Herbert’s latest books The Bounds of Reason emphasises the unification of economic theory with sociobiology and other behavioral sciences which, in the words of Nobel Prize-winning economist, Vernon L. Smith, “is firmly in the revolutionary tradition of David Hume (Convention) and Adam Smith (Sympathy)”. In the episode you will learn: about the importance of trans-disciplinary research and collaboration. why economics is not the only social science that explains human behavior. how biology, economics and sociology explain the behaviour of humans in different ways and which discipline is correct? about the Ultimatum Game and how it shows the cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour of humans. about the morality of humans and how we reciprocate kindness with kindness and unkindness with unkindness. why reciprocity makes humans so successful as a species. why some species have a symbiotic relationship with other species, which is not the same as reciprocity. how we can fit all the human feelings together to form a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding human behavior. why we always need a system to punish free-riders and non-cooperators. how the future structure of the University can be seen at Arizona State University today. why we need a new generation of thinkers and research centres who are trans-disciplinary. what projects Professor Herbert Gintis is working on right now. why morality controls politics and your vote will not make a difference. how Herbert gets things done in terms of writing books and journal articles. about Herbert’s disagreement with Nassim Nicholas Taleb. why Herbert believes that macroeconomics is wrong and is in agreement with Taleb on that issue. and much much more. Links mentioned in this episode: economicrockstar.com/herbertgintis economicrockstar.com/bluehost audiobooks.com/rockstar Subscribe now on iTunes and get access to the complete list of Economic Rockstar episodes.

V tomto podcaste budeme hovoriť o tom, či a nakoľko to majú pekní ľudia v živote ľahšie, o vhodnosti surovej BARF stravy pre našich psíkov a o tom, či raz budeme nabíjať zariadenia zbytkovým WiFi signálom. TémyZdroje Intro Majú to pekní ľudia v živote ľahšie? Mali by sme kŕmiť domáce zvieratá surovou stravou? Môžme nabíjať zariadenia zbytkovým WiFi signálom? Fakt alebo fikcia Outro The undermining effect of facial attractiveness on brain responses to fairness in the Ultimatum Game: an ERP study Here's More Evidence That Good-Looking People Can Get Away With Anything FDA & CDC find raw pet food unpalatable Powering the Next Billion Devices with Wi-Fi A camera has successfully been powered using spare Wi-Fi signals France Loses Enthusiasm for Nuclear Power Is marriage good or bad for the figure? Using muons from cosmic rays to find fraying infrastructure

Dave and Tamler discuss a new study that, according to Tamler, offers decisive support for restorative approaches to criminal punishment (the only problem is he didn't read past the introduction). And speaking of justice, we talk about "White Bear"--the most disturbing episode of the UK series Black Mirror that doesn’t involve sex with a non-kosher animal.  (Note: Massive spoilers for this episode of BM--watch before listening.  Available on netflix, amazon prime.)LinksBlack Mirror, "White Bear" episode [imdb.com]Ultimatum Game [wikipedia.org]Justice Porn [reddit.com]Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137-140.FeldmanHall, O., Sokol-Hessner, P., Van Bavel, J. J., & Phelps, E. A. (2014). Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself. Nature Communications, 5.

Although a substantial literature is developing regarding the effects of stress on decision-making (cf. Mather & Lighthall, 2012), the literature on stress and social decision-making is still in the beginning stage. The present research extends this new literature by examining the mediating and moderating factors of the effect of stress on social decision-making. Furthermore, a novel aspect of the research is its effort to connect the information-processing and functional perspectives, with regard to the acute stress response. Dual-mode theories state that emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing, occurs early during information processing (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and is associated with stimulus-driven behaviors (Mischel & Metcalfe, 1999). Therefore, an intensification of emotional processing and inhibition of cognitive control processes may lead to an earlier and more stimulus-driven initiation of behavioral responses than under normal circumstances. Moreover, such quick, automatic behavioral responses to environmental stimuli may be particularly useful during an acute stress response in that such responses could help prevent disturbances to homeostasis (Nesse, 2005). In order to facilitate such quick, automatic behavioral responses, emotional processing may be intensified and cognitive processing inhibited, during an acute stress response. In support of this notion, empirical findings show that acute stress increases emotion-related phenomena, such as reward salience (cf. Mather & Lighthall, 2012) and emotional learning (Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008). However, in a social decision-making context, such enhancement of emotional processing may negatively affect the social interactions, such that negative emotions from perceived unfairness may be amplified when people are undergoing an acute stress response. More specifically, in the context of an Ultimatum Game, people who are stressed may reject more unfair offers than people under normal conditions. This research tested this main hypothesis, and examined emotions and trait emotion regulation tendencies as mediating and moderating factors, respectively, of the relationship between acute stress and Ultimatum Game rejections. These arguments are elaborated in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation. In two experiments, participants played the Ultimatum Game as the Responder after completing a stress or control task. The Cold Pressor Test was used as the stress induction method. Before and after the Ultimatum Game, participants completed state emotion ratings as well as trait emotion regulation questionnaires. Results from Experiment 1 showed a successful stress induction, indicated by higher cortisol levels in the stress, relative to control, group. Moreover, Experiment 1 revealed a significant Stress x Amount interaction, with stress having an effect on rejections of unfair offers, in comparison to fair offers. However, the emotion and emotion regulation results did not indicate the expected pattern, with emotions being uncorrelated with fair, nor unfair offers, and emotion regulation being associated with reduced rejections of fair, but not unfair, offers. In Experiment 2, an experimental manipulation designed to influence negative emotions, namely partner type, was employed. Results did not replicate the results of the first experiment, but unexpected results were found involving partner type and negative emotions, namely that participants who played with human partners, relative to those who played with computer partners, rejected more unfair offers and that negative emotions were positively correlated with rejections of fair and unfair offers. The experiments and their results are described in Chapter 4. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these results, but they do offer a starting point for interesting future research questions. Chapter 5 discusses some implications as well as limitations of the present research.

Where do we get our sense of justice and fairness from? Is it hardwired in us? Are we nakedly self-interested creatures, or are we, at least partially, altruistic? These are questions philosophers - from Plato to Hobbes, from Rousseau to David Hume - have pondered for hundreds of years. And a famous game invented by economists- called The Ultimatum Game - may help provide some of the answers. All this is up for discussion and debate this week in The Philosopher's Arms. Welcome to the Philosopher's Arms - a place where philosophical ideas, logical dilemmas and the real world meet for a chat and a drink. Each week Matthew Sweet takes a thought experiment with philosophical pedigree and asks why it matters in the everyday world. En route we'll learn about the thinking of such luminaries as Aristotle, Hume, Kant and John Stuart Mill. And all recorded in a pub in front of a live audience, ready to tap their glasses and demand clarity. Questions we might confront along the way include: should the government put Prozac in the water supply? How should I treat my daughter if it turns out she's a robot? And is there anything morally wrong with having sex with a supermarket chicken? These will lead us into discussions about the treatment of mental illness, the structure of financial markets, and subjects as varied as happiness, infidelity and homosexuality. Our assumptions and intuitions will be challenged and, perhaps, undermined. Producer: David Edmonds.

Thousands of studies in psychology rely on data from North American undergraduates. Can we really conclude anything about the "human" mind from such a limited sample-- especially since Westerners are probably more different from the rest of the world's population than any other group?  We talk about Joseph Henrich and colleagues' critique of the behavioral sciences in their paper "The WEIRDEST People in the World."    David offers a defense of psychology, arguing that it's usually not the goal of lab studies to generalize findings to all humans in the first place.  Also, Tamler  gives a brief, heartfelt, completely non-awkward rant about monkey torturer Harry Harlow and David defends the practice of electrocuting baby monkeys for no reason. LinksThe Gods Must Be Crazy [IMDB.com]Bushmen [wikipedia.org]Homo Economicus [wikipedia.org]The Ultimatum Game [wikipedia.org]Müller-Lyer illusion [wikipedia.org]We aren't the world [psmag.com]Harlow studies [wikipedia.org]Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010).The weirdest people in the world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61-83.Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review, 73-78.Mook, D.G. (1983). In Defense of External Invalidity. American Psychologist, 38,379-387. 

In this episode, Geoff explores the Ultimatum Game, which is used by social scientists to explore human concepts of fairness, competition, and cooperation.

A recent study shows that when faced with a decision, it's best to take some time--relax and cool off--so logical thinking can guide us to the best choice. Christie Nicholson reports

The ultimatum game is an economics experiment that provides insight into the human psyche. Check out our HowStuffWorks podcast to learn about the rules to the ultimatum game. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://news.iheart.com/podcast-advertisers

The ultimatum game is an economics experiment that provides insight into the human psyche. Check out our HowStuffWorks podcast to learn about the rules to the ultimatum game. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://news.iheart.com/podcast-advertisers

Γεια σου χιονισμένη Αθήνα! Μεγάλα θέματα αυτή την εβδομάδα: hands-on με το νέο Macbook Air, ολική έκλειψη σελήνης την Τετάρτη, και μερικές πρωτότυπες τεχνολογικές εμπειρίες. Ζωντανή συζήτηση παρέα με τους Reza και Scott για το πρόσφατο - εκπληκτικό - επεισόδιο του Lost 4.03 . Επίσης θα δούμε πώς η θεωρία παιγνίων δείχνει κάποια πράγματα για την ανθρώπινη ευτυχία και τρόπο σκέψης.Download MP3: Episode 11 (1:05:56, 91MB)Podcast feed: click hereComments: timaras@gmail.comShownotesCover Art: Θέα προς το LA, από το Griffith ObservatoryNews:- Τα blogs ως μέσο ενημέρωσης για το χιόνι- Κουναλάκη, ξύλο που θα το φας (μέσω νυστέρι blog)- Ολική έκλειψη σελήνης- Τα Oscar αυτή την εβδομάδα - και η αγωνία κορυφώνεταιΣχόλια:- Live Opera in High Definition! (Met in HD Live)- Περίεργο 10.2 ηχητικό demo από τον Tom Holman- Hands-on εντυπώσεις με το Macbook Air- Lost: Θα έχουμε 7+6 επεισόδια φέτος. Σχολιασμός του 4.03 επεισοδίου με τον Reza και τον Scott.Φυσική:Game theory (θεωρία παιγνίων). Το δίλημμα του φυλακισμένου, Ultimatum Game. Πώς τα παιχνίδια αυτά δείχνουν κάτι για την ανθρώπινη ψυχολογία και τρόπο σκέψης - ίσως και μια εξήγηση για την αναζήτηση της ευτυχίας!Music:- My Little Thief The Good Luck Joes- Right Here, Right Now sheri miller- This is the love we have Toni Kopra- Φινάλε: Bizet, from Carmen