Podcasts about Spanish Civil War

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On this episode of #TheGlobalExchange, Colin Robertson sits down with John Parisella and Bruce Stokes to talk about Canada-US relations as we commence formal negotiations over the renewal, revision or repudiation of the North American trade agreement – CUSMA, USMCA or T-MEC.  // Participants' bios: - John Parisella served as Chief of Staff to Quebec Premiers Robert Bourassa and Jean Charest and then as Quebec Delegate General in New York City. - Bruce Stokes is Visiting Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. // Host bio: Colin Robertson is a former diplomat and Senior Advisor to the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. // Reading Recommendations: - "The Spanish Civil War" by Hugh Thomas - "Team of Rivals" by Doris Goodwin // Music Credit: Drew Phillips | Producer: Jordyn Carroll // Release date: June 04, 2026

Elena Poniatowska, Mexico's most celebrated journalist and one of the most significant literary voices in the Spanish-speaking world, argues in this conversation that the crisis of contemporary journalism is inseparable from the collapse of critical reading—and that both are symptoms of a deeper cultural abandonment. Born in Paris in 1932 to a French-Polish father and Mexican mother, Poniatowska contends that her formation as a writer was shaped by displacement, by learning to listen to those rendered voiceless by history, and by understanding that journalism must be an act of solidarity before it is anything else. Widely credited with helping to establish the genre of testimonio in Latin American letters, she transformed the voices of the marginalised into literature that forced an entire nation to confront its own silence. She maintains that her landmark work La Noche de Tlatelolco was not a journalistic achievement but a moral obligation, and reflects on her decision to refuse the Xavier Villaurrutia Prize, asking who would award the dead. Poniatowska insists that the greatest threat to literature and journalism today is not artificial intelligence but the disappearance of patience—the willingness to sit with a text, a story, or a life long enough for meaning to emerge. At 94, she affirms her belief in the innate goodness of human beings as not a sentiment but a necessity.Elena Poniatowska, la periodista más célebre de México y una de las voces literarias más significativas del mundo hispanohablante, sostiene en esta conversación que la crisis del periodismo contemporáneo es inseparable del colapso de la lectura crítica—y que ambos son síntomas de un abandono cultural más profundo. Nacida en París en 1932 de padre franco-polaco y madre mexicana, Poniatowska afirma que su formación como escritora estuvo marcada por el desplazamiento, por aprender a escuchar a quienes la historia había silenciado, y por comprender que el periodismo debe ser ante todo un acto de solidaridad. Ampliamente reconocida por haber contribuido a establecer el género del testimonio en las letras latinoamericanas, transformó las voces de los marginados en literatura que obligó a una nación entera a confrontar su propio silencio. Sostiene que su obra emblemática La Noche de Tlatelolco no fue un logro periodístico sino una obligación moral, y reflexiona sobre su decisión de rechazar el Premio Xavier Villaurrutia, preguntando quién iba a premiar a los muertos. Poniatowska insiste en que la mayor amenaza para la literatura y el periodismo hoy no es la inteligencia artificial sino la desaparición de la paciencia—la disposición a permanecer con un texto, una historia o una vida el tiempo suficiente para que emerja el significado. A los 94 años, reafirma su creencia en la bondad innata de los seres humanos no como un sentimiento sino como una necesidad.English transcript:SAVAGE MINDS — Elena PoniatowskaJulian Vigo (00:00:15):Welcome to Savage Minds.Julian Vigo (00:00:26):I am your host, Julian Vigo.Julian Vigo (00:00:30):Today's guest is Elena Poniatowska Amor,Julian Vigo (00:00:33):daughter of a French father of Polish origin, Jean E.Julian Vigo (00:00:37):Poniatowski, and Mexican mother Paula Amor.Julian Vigo (00:00:41):She was born in Paris in 1932.Julian Vigo (00:00:46):She has practiced journalism since 1953 at the newspapers El Día, Excélsior, Novedades, and La Jornada.Julian Vigo (00:00:57):She is the first woman to receive the National Journalism Prize.Julian Vigo (00:01:02):Among her works is La Noche de Tlatelolco,Julian Vigo (00:01:05):a classic since its publication, for which she was awarded the Xavier Villaurrutia Prize,Julian Vigo (00:01:12):which she refused, asking who was going to award the dead.Julian Vigo (00:01:17):Her novels and stories include La Flor de Lis,Julian Vigo (00:01:20):De Noche Vienes and Tlapalería,Julian Vigo (00:01:24):Paseo de la Reforma,Julian Vigo (00:01:26):Hasta No Verte Jesús Mío,Julian Vigo (00:01:28):The Life of a Mexican Soldadera,Julian Vigo (00:01:31):Querido Diego Te Abraza Quiela, Tinísima, winner of the Mazatlán Prize in 1992, La Piel del Cielo,Julian Vigo (00:01:40):winner of the Alfaguara Novel Prize in 2001, and El Tren Pasa Primero,Julian Vigo (00:01:48):about the lives of Mexican railway workers,Julian Vigo (00:01:52):winner of the Rómulo Gallegos International Novel Prize in 2007. Leonora won the Premio Biblioteca Breve Seix Barral in 2011. El Universo o Nada (2013) is the biography ofJulian Vigo (00:02:07):astrophysicist Guillermo Haro. Ondas de la Niña Mala is her first poetry collection, andJulian Vigo (00:02:14):her children's books include Boda en Chimalistac, La Vendedora de Nubes,Julian Vigo (00:02:20):El Burro que Metió la Pata, Sansimonsi, illustrated by Rafael Barajas el Fisgón, and ElJulian Vigo (00:02:27):Niño Estrellero by Fernando Robles, and El Charito Cantor by Osvaldo Hernández.Julian Vigo (00:02:34):Her most recent novel, El Amante Polaco, portrays the last king of Poland, Stanisław AugustJulian Vigo (00:02:41):Poniatowski. Translated into 20 languages. Gabi Brimmer and Las Mil y Una, the story ofJulian Vigo (00:02:48):Paulina,Julian Vigo (00:02:49):address social issues.Julian Vigo (00:02:52):After receiving honorary doctorates from UNAM and UAM,Julian Vigo (00:02:57):she was awarded them from the University of Puebla,Julian Vigo (00:03:01):Sonora, Estado de México,Julian Vigo (00:03:04):Guerrero,Julian Vigo (00:03:06):Chiapas, and Puerto Rico.Julian Vigo (00:03:09):She also received honorary degrees from the New School for Social Research in New York,Julian Vigo (00:03:13):Manhattanville College, and Florida Atlantic University in the United States, and fromJulian Vigo (00:03:19):Paris 8,Julian Vigo (00:03:19):La Sorbonne, and Pau-Pyrénées, as well as the Maria Moors Cabot Prize for Journalism atJulian Vigo (00:03:27):Columbia University, New York, in 2004, and from the Universidad Complutense, Madrid, inJulian Vigo (00:03:32):2015.Julian Vigo (00:03:34):She received the French Legion of Honour at the rank of Officer, the Gabriela Mistral Prize from Chile, and inJulian Vigo (00:03:41):2006, the Courage Award from the International Women's Media Foundation.Julian Vigo (00:03:43):In 2013 she was awardedJulian Vigo (00:03:49):the Miguel de Cervantes Prize for literature in the Spanish language, and she received theJulian Vigo (00:03:55):Belisario Domínguez Medal in 2022.Julian Vigo (00:03:58):This is the highest honour granted by the Senate of the Mexican Republic, along with theJulian Vigo (00:04:05):Carlos Fuentes International Prize for Literary Creation in the Spanish Language in 2023.(00:04:12):I welcome Elena Poniatowska to Savage Minds.Julian Vigo (00:04:19):I wanted to begin with a memory I have of you.Julian Vigo (00:04:22):In 1993,Julian Vigo (00:04:25):I think,Julian Vigo (00:04:27):or 94 —Julian Vigo (00:04:28):one of those two years —Julian Vigo (00:04:29):I was in Puebla,Julian Vigo (00:04:31):Cholula,Julian Vigo (00:04:32):teaching at the Universidad de las Américas.Julian Vigo (00:04:35):Yes.Julian Vigo (00:04:36):And you came to give a talk at an observatory — I believe it was Tonantzintla.Elena Poniatowska (00:04:44):Yes, of course.Elena Poniatowska (00:04:46):Yes, I remember it, andJulian Vigo (00:04:49):you made a great impression on me that day. But I must confess that your entire life's work made a great impression on me — not only on me. I wanted to begin with your formation, your life, because you were born in France andJulian Vigo (00:05:12):how do you remember your childhood in France, and what elements of that world did you bring with you when you arrived in Mexico in 1942?Elena Poniatowska (00:05:21):Well, thank you very much for your interest.Elena Poniatowska (00:05:29):I can tell you that I was born in 1932 in Paris, France, because my mother Paula Amor marriedElena Poniatowska (00:05:42):Juan Poniatowski, who held a noble title — that of prince —Elena Poniatowska (00:05:54):because the last king of Poland was Stanisław Poniatowski, who was, I believe, one ofElena Poniatowska (00:06:07):the lovers —Elena Poniatowska (00:06:09):one of the younger lovers of the Empress of Russia, Catherine the Great.Elena Poniatowska (00:06:21):My mother was a woman born also in Paris, of Mexican origin, who leftElena Poniatowska (00:06:32):France because of the Mexican RevolutionElena Poniatowska (00:06:36):and went to live with her parents — Pablo Amor and Elena Iturbe de Amor — inElena Poniatowska (00:06:49):Biarritz, and they later moved to Paris. My mother always spoke Spanish with a French accent. She had two sisters who also lived in France for a long time,Elena Poniatowska (00:07:07):and they were rather Frenchified. She met my father Jean Poniatowski in Paris andElena Poniatowska (00:07:20):married him, and I was born in 1932 in Paris.Elena Poniatowska (00:07:25):I would like to knowJulian Vigo (00:07:31):more about this experience, because as you probably know — especially Americans and Canadians — they think everyone wants to come to their countries. But something they don't know until they travel is that in Mexico, Honduras, and all of Latin America there is a great deal of immigration, people from every country in the world. Why not?Elena Poniatowska (00:08:01):Her mother was in France; my mother was Mexican, born in France. Her family — she had a grandmother, my mother's great-grandmother, who was Russian, and in general her father was educated in England, so they wereElena Poniatowska (00:08:29):Mexicans — Amor is a Mexican surname — but they were very closely tied to Europe. For my mother, living in Europe was very natural becauseElena Poniatowska (00:08:49):she first attended a boarding school in Switzerland, in Lausanne,Elena Poniatowska (00:08:56):and then was in Paris. At a Rothschild ball she met my father JuanElena Poniatowska (00:09:07):Poniatowski and married him in 1931,Elena Poniatowska (00:09:17):or perhaps at the beginning of 1932, because I was born on the 19th of May 1932.Elena Poniatowska (00:09:29):My sister was born in 1933.Julian Vigo (00:09:34):As a child who spoke French and had to learn Spanish, in what way did language become your first tool for survival?Elena Poniatowska (00:09:47):Well, I also know English and French. Language, for me — learning Spanish in Mexico — was obviously about communicating with people in the streetElena Poniatowska (00:09:56):and with friends at school. But French remained my mother tongue, andElena Poniatowska (00:10:03):later I dedicated myself to speaking Spanish with the people at home, with the MexicansElena Poniatowska (00:10:14):I met at school.Elena Poniatowska (00:10:23):Curiously, I attended an English school called the Windsor School, but I learned SpanishJulian Vigo (00:10:38):in the street — one always learns Spanish better in the street. You learn so much from people in Mexico. I found people very warm and open. On the other hand, for Mexicans in my country, it's not the same at all.Julian Vigo (00:10:59):What was the first moment you felt that writing was the only possible way to understand the Mexico around you?Elena Poniatowska (00:11:11):Well, I would never say it was the only possible way.Elena Poniatowska (00:11:17):I think that at twenty,Elena Poniatowska (00:11:22):twenty-one years old, returning from studying at a convent of nuns, I had theElena Poniatowska (00:11:30):good fortune to be able to start writing at a newspaper called, at that time,Elena Poniatowska (00:11:42):Excelsior.Elena Poniatowska (00:11:43):They asked me to submit a daily article,Elena Poniatowska (00:11:48):an interview,Elena Poniatowska (00:11:51):a chronicle, and I did so with enormous enthusiasm and great pleasure, because it allowed meElena Poniatowska (00:12:00):to know Mexico much better, and also to meet great figures of Mexico such asElena Poniatowska (00:12:09):Diego Rivera,Elena Poniatowska (00:12:11):José Clemente Orozco, actresses like Dolores del Río and María Félix, architects likeElena Poniatowska (00:12:20):Luis Barragán, and writers — even writers of my own generation, or slightlyElena Poniatowska (00:12:31):older than me — such as Juan Rulfo,Elena Poniatowska (00:12:38):Rosario Castellanos, Carlos Fuentes, and of course Octavio Paz.Julian Vigo (00:12:46):What a rich life! María Félix — what a figure!Julian Vigo (00:12:52):How was your experience beginning in journalism in the early 1950s in a predominantly male environment?Elena Poniatowska (00:13:05):Well, I was truly very lucky, because people were very kind andElena Poniatowska (00:13:14):even affectionate towards me. No one ever refused me an interview. I was able to reach Alfonso Reyes, Octavio Paz,Elena Poniatowska (00:13:25):the great architect Luis Barragán, José Vasconcelos the philosopher, and all were veryElena Poniatowska (00:13:40):kind and cordial with me, as were important actors like Ignacio LópezElena Poniatowska (00:13:51):Tarso,Elena Poniatowska (00:13:52):and of course those I already mentioned — Dolores del Río, María Félix — and singers, and also many visitors who came from Europe, the United States, or Latin America to perform in Mexico.Elena Poniatowska (00:14:20):Did you know El Indio Fernández?Elena Poniatowska (00:14:23):Yes,Elena Poniatowska (00:14:24):of course —Elena Poniatowska (00:14:25):I interviewed him,Elena Poniatowska (00:14:26):I knew El Indio Fernández, who by ten in the morning was already offering me a tequila, whichElena Poniatowska (00:14:35):I did not drink, as I'm not accustomed to drinking. And also many otherElena Poniatowska (00:14:47):famous actors of that era, like the comedian Cantinflas, whoseJulian Vigo (00:14:56):real name was Mario Moreno. Cantinflas — I know his work. Wow. And you were in Mexico during the same period as Luis Buñuel?Elena Poniatowska (00:15:06):Yes, I ended up with Luis Buñuel — yes, we had a great friendshipElena Poniatowska (00:15:15):because out of affection he came to have lunch at my house several times, so I saw him on manyElena Poniatowska (00:15:24):occasions. We even went together to the prison of Lecumberri to visit, for example, aElena Poniatowska (00:15:33):Colombian who had committed an offence and was imprisoned — his name wasElena Poniatowska (00:15:42):Álvaro Mutis.Julian Vigo (00:15:45):And you have lived through and narrated great social transformations.Julian Vigo (00:15:51):Do you think that today's digital democratisation of public opinion helps social justice, or does it rather dilute real struggles into mere narratives of identity and likes?Elena Poniatowska (00:16:08):Well, I think the Mexican Revolution,Elena Poniatowska (00:16:15):led by a man like Emiliano Zapata, was extraordinary in redistributing the lands and haciendas of Mexico and in giving all MexicansElena Poniatowska (00:16:32):access to better education, better formation, a better life. I consider thatElena Poniatowska (00:16:46):Emiliano Zapata was one of the great heroes of Mexico, even though he personally took away the haciendas of my grandparents, the Amors and the Iturbes.Julian Vigo (00:17:06):What did you learn from the great intellectuals of your youth?Julian Vigo (00:17:08):You mentioned Juan Rulfo, Alfonso Reyes, and many others.Julian Vigo (00:17:15):What influenced your decision to dedicate your life to letters?Elena Poniatowska (00:17:20):No, they did not influence my decision to dedicate myself to letters.Elena Poniatowska (00:17:26):I met them later.Elena Poniatowska (00:17:30):I began as a journalist, a modest journalist, at the newspaper Excelsior in 1953 —Elena Poniatowska (00:17:42):I think 1952 or 1953. Very young. I had come from an education at a convent of nuns inElena Poniatowska (00:17:53):Philadelphia, and I decidedElena Poniatowska (00:17:57):to write chronicles and interviews to get to know Mexico better. I came to know those figures through my work as a journalist, and because I could question themElena Poniatowska (00:18:14):in the language I knew and had learned as a child — at ten years old — which is Spanish. My other languages until then had beenElena Poniatowska (00:18:22):English,Elena Poniatowska (00:18:27):and French, which is my mother tongue.Julian Vigo (00:18:32):You are known for the testimonio.Julian Vigo (00:18:36):At what exact point did you feel that traditional fiction was not sufficient to capture Mexican reality?Elena Poniatowska (00:18:47):As I mentioned, I began by engaging with many valuable MexicansElena Poniatowska (00:18:54):who received me in their homes, gave me their opinions. At the same time as I received what they wished to give me,Elena Poniatowska (00:19:04):I observed how their homes were, how they treated the people around them — their wives, their children, their servants — and all of that helped meElena Poniatowska (00:19:22):to know Mexico better. I also spent a great deal of time in the streets — that is, with the poorest people, whom I was able to reachElena Poniatowska (00:19:34):through my own nature and also with the help of a great Mexican illustrator, Alberto Beltrán. In the street he made sketches of everything the Mexicans did — the newspaper vendors,Elena Poniatowska (00:19:59):the taco sellers,Elena Poniatowska (00:20:03):the women making corn tortillas by hand,Elena Poniatowska (00:20:12):the bakeries, and then the hardware stores where everything was sold — from nails toElena Poniatowska (00:20:22):cleaning cloths — and all of that was a very vital andElena Poniatowska (00:20:32):generous apprenticeship in learning to see the lives of working Mexicans.Julian Vigo (00:20:40):But it is an art — to be able to listen to people, to their voices.Julian Vigo (00:20:53):How did you learn to listen to the voice of the other?Elena Poniatowska (00:20:58):Well, I think it is a natural inclination.Elena Poniatowska (00:21:03):It is not learned.Elena Poniatowska (00:21:05):It is not forced.Elena Poniatowska (00:21:06):It is a way of being.Elena Poniatowska (00:21:10):I am far more interestedElena Poniatowska (00:21:11):in speaking of what others do, how they do it, and who they are, than in speaking of myself, my sensations, my emotions. And I have done this from a very young age, so it has become a habit — it is part of my daily life.Julian Vigo (00:21:36):Do you believe that the testimonio is essentially an act of political resistance?Elena Poniatowska (00:21:44):I think so.Elena Poniatowska (00:21:45):It helps enormously to know the thinking of those who have no power, who are not in power, who do not consider themselves political, who are not leaders — although I did have the great privilege of interviewing leaders and very important figures in Mexico,Elena Poniatowska (00:22:14):such as, for example, the Spanish refugee of the Civil War, Luis Buñuel.Julian Vigo (00:22:26):And how was the process of gathering the voice of Jesusa Palancares?Julian Vigo (00:22:32):How long did it take you to absorb her story?Elena Poniatowska (00:22:38):Well, it was a privilege. I heard her — she was doing laundry in a popular building, a building where many Mexicans lived who had noElena Poniatowska (00:22:56):economic resources. Everything she said caught my attention enormously. I approached her and asked if I could visit her at her home,Elena Poniatowska (00:23:13):which was a very poor house, obviously far from the area where I lived. And so I went toElena Poniatowska (00:23:26):see her once a week. We became friends, and she began telling me her life. And that is howElena Poniatowska (00:23:36):the novel Hasta No Verte Jesús Mío came about. When it was published,Elena Poniatowska (00:23:43):she asked me to give her ten copies to give to her friends —Elena Poniatowska (00:23:52):the bricklayers or the people she had worked with.Julian Vigo (00:24:00):And why did she choose the testimonial genre for Hasta No Verte Jesús Mío?Julian Vigo (00:24:09):It is one of the testimonial novels because —Elena Poniatowska (00:24:16):She didn't really choose it — she didn't. It was I who gathered her words andElena Poniatowska (00:24:27):assembled them in the best way I could. But she did not choose it.Elena Poniatowska (00:24:34):She could not read or write. She did not know how to read or write. But she asked for the books, and I — the cover of the book, what goes on the outside, is the Santo Niño de Atocha, a small Christ child that she liked.Julian Vigo (00:25:08):And I saw it in the street, and so I put it there so she would be happy. But I was asking you about the testimonial genre — in 1969 it was not a common thing in literature.Julian Vigo (00:25:26):How was this novel received?Julian Vigo (00:25:30):I wonder if people were confused.Julian Vigo (00:25:32):Is it a true story or is it fiction?Elena Poniatowska (00:25:35):No, it was very well received. The book was greatly liked.Elena Poniatowska (00:25:41):Immediately many editions came out and it was translated into English and French.Julian Vigo (00:25:51):And I wonder if at that time — less so today — people were confused because they did not know if it was a completely real story or partly real. Because the novel Hasta No Verte Jesús Mío was categorised as a novel.Elena Poniatowska (00:26:16):Yes, that's right, that is what it was.Elena Poniatowska (00:26:19):It is a novel based on a character — a woman who was in the Mexican Revolution, the life of a soldadera. To what extent is Jesusa an invented character or a real woman? I have said it, I have written it many times: Jesusa is a real character. After that I wroteElena Poniatowska (00:26:49):other books about other women who were also real characters. I had the joy of knowing Jesusa in person, but for example Tina Modotti, the main character ofElena Poniatowska (00:27:08):the novel Tinísima, I did not know. And other novels about other women and other characters I also did not know.Julian Vigo (00:27:22):What lessons about the resilience of Mexican women did you learn from Jesusa that remain relevant today?Elena Poniatowska (00:27:31):All the women in Mexico whom I see and engage with and encounter in the streetElena Poniatowska (00:27:41):and who come to my house — they are women who have known how to struggle and continue to struggle. For example, one woman, Rosario Ibarra de Piedra, whose son was disappeared, and who searched all of Mexico — she is obviously one of the heroines who has most caught my attention.Julian Vigo (00:28:10):And especially in recent years — almost thirty years — the femicides and the disappearances of men and women. You are still fighting for your society, and I think literary words have the power to carry reality forward. I am thinking of La Noche de Tlatelolco — that was the first book of yours I read. It is incredible. I have no words. Thank you. It is one of the best books of the twentieth century, and I teach it. It is astonishing. Can you speak about why you began that work, and also for those listening now who do not know the history of what happened in Mexico?Elena Poniatowska (00:29:03):Well, in general I can tell you that I received letters from a prisoner in the jail — Jesús Sánchez García — and I began going to Lecumberri, which was called the Black Palace of Lecumberri. It was no palace — it was a prison with bars and cells. I asked permission from the prison director — I believe his name was Martín del Campo — and he gave it to me. That is how I went to gather life stories from men, and later, at the women's prison, from women who had nothing to do with my own life, who bore no resemblance to what I hadElena Poniatowska (00:30:03):lived or what I would go on to live.Elena Poniatowska (00:30:16):That was an enormous enrichment for me, and a knowledge of an unknown Mexico that also helped me understand MexicoElena Poniatowska (00:30:31):— a Mexico to which I owe a great deal.Elena Poniatowska (00:30:35):I think that everything I am I owe to the voice, and to the gift of their voice, that the poorest Mexicans gave me — those I was able to approach over years and years,Elena Poniatowska (00:30:52):going to the prison and sometimes going to their own very poor homes, called vecindades, which were located in the very neighbourhoods where the prisons were.Julian Vigo (00:31:11):How did you manage the pain and trauma of the testimonies you heard while assembling the book?Elena Poniatowska (00:31:22):Pain is not managed. To manage something is to seek something. Pain is simply assumed and lived. So the pain is in the words written in the book.Julian Vigo (00:31:46):And why did you choose the technique of a collage of voices rather than a linear, chronological narrative for this book?Elena Poniatowska (00:31:57):I have many other books that speak even of personal stories — books that contain much of biography.Julian Vigo (00:32:13):Yes, but it is very interesting how you wove those narratives together in this book. It is very beautiful, in fact.Julian Vigo (00:32:24):Was there any moment during the writing of La Noche de Tlatelolco when you felt fear or censorship?Elena Poniatowska (00:32:33):Well, there was always the dread of entering terrain unknown to me.Elena Poniatowska (00:32:40):Ultimately, I was educated —Elena Poniatowska (00:32:45):I spent time in the United States at a convent to be educated, not to become a nun — it was called the Sacred Heart Convent.Elena Poniatowska (00:33:03):When I came out I was speaking English. My mother tongue is French. And when I left there, my strongest desire was truly to know Mexico — the country I had arrived in at the age of ten, but in which I had received an educationElena Poniatowska (00:33:30):in both English and French, not in Spanish.Julian Vigo (00:33:36):More than fifty years later, what impact do you think that book has on the collective memory of young Mexicans today?Elena Poniatowska (00:33:48):Well, I think that is a question that should be put to them.Elena Poniatowska (00:33:55):What I can say is that I have receivedElena Poniatowska (00:33:59):a great deal of affection from young people — many come to find me at my home, and I give lectures and talks with some frequency. Remember that I am already 94 years old and have lost the use of my left eye, which prevents me from seeing well. So within my limitations,Elena Poniatowska (00:34:27):I remain in contact with the people who want to see me, which for me produces great enthusiasm and which I experience as great support.Julian Vigo (00:34:42):The book you wrote is something very specific — evidently about Mexico — but it is still a book with which everyone can identify. If we look around today, where there are acts of political repression in almost every country in the world in one form or another — and I know your books are translated into many languages — I wonder whether the power of La Noche de Tlatelolco came from the form of the narration itself, not only from the fact that you confronted the government, the police, and justice. You narrated a story of the people seeking justice, yes, but literature itself was also seeking truth within its pages. There are wars everywhere, there is too much sadness. After the lockdown — which was less bad in Mexico than here in Italy — we are living through a very difficult moment. Do you sometimes think of this book as a model for dialogue, for collaboration, for moving forward together, the people united?Elena Poniatowska (00:36:09):Well, what I love about this book is that it has so many voices — many voices gathered from mothers of families, from children of political prisoners. For me it was a great learning experience to go to the prison in Mexico and see a world I did not know, to be accepted in that world, to go frequently to hear and gather the voices of political prisoners and of young people whoElena Poniatowska (00:36:52):didn't even have strong political ideas but were imprisoned because they had stolen something in a market. It meant entering a world I was completely unfamiliar with,Elena Poniatowska (00:37:13):to which I did not belong. And it was an enormous lesson — a very generous lesson — in how the lives of others can be. That is what I have dedicated myself to over many years, because I remain a journalist and continue writing about disasters such asElena Poniatowska (00:37:39):not only the massacre of the 2nd of October, but what the earthquake of 1985 meant for Mexico and the loss, for many Mexicans, of their families and their homes.Julian Vigo (00:37:59):Yes. You documented the earthquake of ‘85 — a moment when the Mexican government was completely paralysed and it was civil society that took control to rescue the city.Julian Vigo (00:38:15):Do you believe that peoples are still alone in the face of tragedy, or is that organic solidarity you described an invincible force?Elena Poniatowska (00:38:29):Yes,Elena Poniatowska (00:38:29):of course.Elena Poniatowska (00:38:30):I believe — that is why I believe in the invincible force of Mexicans, who help and support each other, who run to answer a cry for help. They are the ones who save themselves by saving others. I believe in that truth. It is a truth I lived, that I witnessed,Elena Poniatowska (00:38:57):and for me it is a lesson, a way of life.Julian Vigo (00:39:03):Does it reflect the structural abandonment of the seamstresses, the inhabitants, those who live in vecindades, and the poorest?Julian Vigo (00:39:13):How did you manage, in the midst of the chaos, the dust, and the mourning of those days, to earn the trust of people so that they would share their most painful and raw testimonies?Elena Poniatowska (00:39:30):Well, I have two physical advantages.Elena Poniatowska (00:39:32):I am small in stature. I frighten no one. No one is afraid of me. I can go anywhere. I am not someone who imposes anything at all, and I know how to listen. So by listening to others' voices, I gather them, I keep them, I memorise them,Elena Poniatowska (00:40:03):and then I put them on paper.Elena Poniatowska (00:40:06):That is the most solitary and difficult moment — writing about what happens to others,Elena Poniatowska (00:40:21):their sorrows,Elena Poniatowska (00:40:22):their joys,Elena Poniatowska (00:40:24):their defeats and also their triumphs —Elena Poniatowska (00:40:28):and making books and articles from them. Because I am also a journalist sinceElena Poniatowska (00:40:38):1953. I am now 94 years old.Julian Vigo (00:40:47):You're listening to Savage Minds.Julian Vigo (00:40:49):If you're enjoying the show, take a second to subscribe at savageminds.co.Julian Vigo (00:40:54):Feel free to comment below or drop us a line to share your thoughts.Julian Vigo (00:40:59):Support independent media today.Julian Vigo (00:41:01):Now, let's get back to it.Julian Vigo (00:41:15):Many consider that the earthquake of ‘85 not only brought down buildings but also toppled the myth of the Mexican State's absolute control — marking the true birth of modern citizenship in the country.Julian Vigo (00:41:33):From your perspective as a chronicler —Elena Poniatowska (00:41:40):I think Mexicans have always had enormous character and enormous capacity to defend themselvesElena Poniatowska (00:41:49):in spite of their own poverty, or in spite of the total absence of outside help.Elena Poniatowska (00:42:02):There was in Mexico a Mexican Revolution,Elena Poniatowska (00:42:08):a country conquered by very cruel conquerors, and yet the country has continued to forge ahead and has continued to demonstrate its bravery and courage in allElena Poniatowska (00:42:28):circumstances — one of which was, for example, the earthquake, in which the neighbours themselvesElena Poniatowska (00:42:37):helped each other before the State or the so-called government did anything.Elena Poniatowska (00:42:46):So I think it is a country with many very brave men, women, and children who save themselves, who know how to look after themselves.Elena Poniatowska (00:43:03):Of course there are people who don't know how to do it, and there are people who sometimes end upElena Poniatowska (00:43:12):in prison or in hospital. But in general Mexico is a country of very solidary people, people who help each other and defend themselves.Julian Vigo (00:43:31):What I love about your books in general is that you give voice — you shed light on the lives that are forgotten.Julian Vigo (00:43:42):Do you feel that in this book, for example, or in Nadie Me Verá Llorar, the author's voice becomes more present or closer to her characters than in your earlier works?Elena Poniatowska (00:43:56):No,Elena Poniatowska (00:43:57):I think that element is present in all my works — in Hasta No Verte Jesús Mío, in the book about the 2nd of October, in the earthquake — and it is always present in everything I still do at the newspaper where I work. I am in a certain way a chronicler and aElena Poniatowska (00:44:21):participant in the lives of other Mexicans.Julian Vigo (00:44:27):And I also notice that many of your works are about women — Tinísima, the life of Tina Modotti, a woman who lived so many lives in one. Leonora. And I wanted to ask — before we get to those books — about Querido Diego Te Abraza Quiela. Why did you choose that subject? Not only Diego Rivera but his first wife.Elena Poniatowska (00:44:59):I was moved to learn that in Paris, Angelina Beloff had gone to Mexico to seeElena Poniatowska (00:45:12):Diego Rivera, whom she had supported in Paris. He had lived with her and had livedElena Poniatowska (00:45:22):off her, because she was the one with a salary. He was a very young painter withoutElena Poniatowska (00:45:33):money, without resources. She helped him. And when she went to Mexico, she had also hadElena Poniatowska (00:45:42):the only male child that Diego Rivera ever had, who died of cold in Paris. And when she decided to go to Mexico — in a sense, to get to know the country of her lover — she decided to go to the Palacio de Bellas Artes because she knew that heElena Poniatowska (00:46:11):would be there. And he walked right past her — past the seat, one of those red velvet seats in the Palacio de Bellas Artes, called butacas, in which she was sitting — he walked past and did not even recognise her.Elena Poniatowska (00:46:40):That story struck me deeply, and that is why I decided to write the small book —Elena Poniatowska (00:46:55):it is not a very long book —Elena Poniatowska (00:46:58):called Querido Diego, Te Abraza Quiela.Julian Vigo (00:47:00):In Tinísima, what was it that drew you to the life of Tina Modotti?Elena Poniatowska (00:47:08):In reality it came from a request to make a film. The cinematographerElena Poniatowska (00:47:17):Gabriel Figueroa told me that a film was going to be made about Tina Modotti, the Italian woman who had been in Mexico. So I began interviewing all the people who had knownElena Poniatowska (00:47:38):Tina Modotti. And even when I was invited to France for a conference, I had theElena Poniatowska (00:47:47):opportunity to go to Udine in Italy to meet and get to know the siblings of Tina Modotti —Elena Poniatowska (00:48:00):to see them, interview them, speak with them.Elena Poniatowska (00:48:05):Then when I was told that the film about Tina Modotti in Mexico was no longer going to be made because there was no money, I — who had gone at my own expense to that conference in France and another writers' conference inElena Poniatowska (00:48:37):Italy — decided to launch into writing the novel called Tinísima, because I hadElena Poniatowska (00:48:48):interviewed many old communists whom I had gone to visitElena Poniatowska (00:48:56):in their various homes — generally very modest, very poor homes.Elena Poniatowska (00:49:03):I did not want to let them down, and so the novel Tinísima was published.Julian Vigo (00:49:10):And to what extent does Tina Modotti represent the struggle of the woman artist in the twentieth century?Elena Poniatowska (00:49:19):To the extent that she commits herself —Elena Poniatowska (00:49:23):she takes photographs of Mexico alongside Edward Weston, and then goes alongsideElena Poniatowska (00:49:33):Commander Carlos of the Fifth Regiment to Spain — she goes to the Spanish Civil War and becomes a nurse, caring evenElena Poniatowska (00:49:52):on the ground for the bodies that had fallen on the earth before taking them to the Red Cross — giving them first aid and dedicating herself to saving lives,Elena Poniatowska (00:50:08):or helping to save lives. I believe that many soldiers did not die thanks to the care of this womanElena Poniatowska (00:50:19):who was in the trench following the doctors.Julian Vigo (00:50:25):You have said that the writer must be a bridge.Julian Vigo (00:50:29):Between what worlds do you think it is most necessary to build bridges — or should we be breaking bridges today?Elena Poniatowska (00:50:38):No, I think one should never break a bridge, for anything.Elena Poniatowska (00:50:42):I think one mustElena Poniatowska (00:50:45):communicate — that the most important thing in the life of any human being is dialogue. Peoples too must dialogue with others in order to know each other. I think Mexico must have a dialogue with the United States, and that many Mexicans who have returned fromElena Poniatowska (00:51:09):the United States because TrumpElena Poniatowska (00:51:12):did not want to receive them, has rejected them — well, they nevertheless had, with another nation or with the inhabitants of another nation, knowledge and dialogue.Elena Poniatowska (00:51:28):And that I believe is what is called,Elena Poniatowska (00:51:34):within Catholicism if you like, or within any religion by whatever name it may be called — that is human fraternity. The otherElena Poniatowska (00:51:50):is the one who exists and who awaits you and whom you must help, because perhapsElena Poniatowska (00:51:58):one day you will need him to extend a hand to you.Julian Vigo (00:52:05):Trump is certainly a character, but I see the situation as too tragic for Americans — the United States, still my country — because the reality is that a large part of the Western world has absolutely no idea of the immense cultural, intellectual, and spiritual richness of Mexico.Julian Vigo (00:52:30):For me, it's not only Trump —Julian Vigo (00:52:32):but Americans, Canadians, etc.Julian Vigo (00:52:35):know nothing about the sharpest chroniclers of this country. If you had to open the eyes of an international audience completely unaware of Mexico's depth, what would you say is the most valuable treasure of Mexican identity that the rest of the world is missing?Elena Poniatowska (00:53:01):Well, I must say that many North Americans have come and written about Mexico — anthropologists and sociologists. We have Oscar LewisElena Poniatowska (00:53:17):and many others who have written about the poorest Mexicans, starting in Tepoztlán, a city near Mexico City, following them to the vecindades in the city where they took refuge and found very modest work. So yes, there have been North AmericansElena Poniatowska (00:53:44):who have written about the richness and beauty of Mexico, and their books areElena Poniatowska (00:53:53):translated into Spanish and are admired and appreciated by Mexicans who are grateful that attention is paid to them. So one cannot say that no one who has come from outside has cared about Mexico — in archaeology, in anthropology, as well as figures like Frances Toor, who was a North American woman who created a magazineElena Poniatowska (00:54:39):called Mexico Today and wrote extensively about Mexican customs and lived in Taxco.Elena Poniatowska (00:54:41):For example, a certain William Spratling enriched himself personally but helped many Mexicans inElena Poniatowska (00:54:51):Taxco to learn how to work silver and sell silver. And still today many foreigners and tourists go to buy silver objectsElena Poniatowska (00:55:10):that come from a mine discovered by foreigners — and clearly alsoElena Poniatowska (00:55:20):plundered, one might say, by foreigners.Julian Vigo (00:55:30):Because not everything is entirely good or entirely bad. But I was referring to the fact that — as you know, having been in the United States and many other countries — Trump and far too many people insufficiently educated about Mexico think that all Mexicans want to invade the United States. But the reality is otherwise. In Mexico there was a great cinematic tradition, for example. Mexican cinema has greatly influenced Hollywood — not only today but throughout history. The Oscar statuette itself was modelled on the body of El Indio Fernández. People do not know the depth of Mexican philosophy. I am thinking of Sor Juana, who contributed so much to poetry, theatre, even science — if we think of her letter to Sor Filotea, who was actually Manuel Fernández de Puebla. That dialogue was very important. Western feminists know nothing of these exchanges between those two figures. But for me Mexico has an enormous and very important force in the history of philosophy, science, and feminism. And I am thinking of Octavio Paz's book on Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, called Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, or The Traps of Faith. You knew Paz closely. Did you have conversations with him about his perspective on this book — especially regarding the power dynamics of the Church and the silencing she suffered as an intellectual woman?Elena Poniatowska (00:58:09):No, but I think you are mixing very many topics into one question, and it isElena Poniatowska (00:58:18):difficult to answer you because you are speaking of very diverse things that evenElena Poniatowska (00:58:27):happened in different centuries.Elena Poniatowska (00:58:30):Sor Juana — there have always been in Mexico,Elena Poniatowska (00:58:34):before Octavio Paz, people who dedicated themselves to reading,Elena Poniatowska (00:58:40):studying, and getting to know Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz.Elena Poniatowska (00:58:45):I will not add more names to those you mentioned, but there are many studies and many Sor Juana scholars in Mexico, as well as at the University of SantaElena Poniatowska (00:59:01):Barbara, California, in Paris, in France —Elena Poniatowska (00:59:04):there are many studies on the great figures of Mexico — not only The Traps of Faith by the Mexican poet Octavio Paz. So these are studies that will continue and do continue. In California, for example, Sara Poot HerreraElena Poniatowska (00:59:32):is dedicated to studying Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, along with many other scholars — I don't know if she is still living — whose name was Rivers. All of these are studies that have been carried out in Mexico and outside Mexico.Julian Vigo (00:59:55):No, I was asking specifically about Paz's book because you knew him and —Elena Poniatowska (01:00:03):I knew him,Elena Poniatowska (01:00:04):I admired him, and I also wrote about him. I have a book about him. I admired him,Elena Poniatowska (01:00:12):I knew him, his poetry dazzled me. And he is a man whom I have admired since getting to know him, and whom I also hold with affection.Julian Vigo (01:00:29):I asked about your relationship with him because sometimes it happens to me too — with other writers — one asks or someone asks me, “Why did you do that?” It is a dialogue. Because that book, The Traps of Faith, had something very important — not only for Mexico but it placed the image of Sor Juana before the world. Many people began to ask who this nun was because it is very important. I was asking about the presentation Paz gave of her — whether you had any dialogues with Paz from your own perspective.Elena Poniatowska (01:01:20):Well, yes, of course. But there were others who also spoke at great length about Sor Juana de la Cruz — other Mexicans before Octavio Paz, other Mexicans who, for example, also concerned themselves with indigenous peoples, such as a priest — Ángel María Garibay — who was also a Sor Juana scholar. So there are many studies on Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and there are Sor Juana scholars in Santa Bárbara, for example, such as Doctor Sara Poot Herrera and others — a woman by the name of Rivers and many more.Julian Vigo (01:02:16):You have dedicated your life to listening and giving voice to those who have none, through the chronicle and literature.Julian Vigo (01:02:26):Today,Julian Vigo (01:02:27):with social media,Julian Vigo (01:02:28):it seems that everyone has a platform for opinions.Julian Vigo (01:02:32):But are we really listening?Julian Vigo (01:02:36):What happens to the power of the word when it becomes a constant noise, as in social media?Elena Poniatowska (01:02:45):I don't know.Elena Poniatowska (01:02:46):I suppose it loses efficacy.Elena Poniatowska (01:02:49):But that depends on the activity of each human being.Elena Poniatowska (01:02:58):There are people — elderly people, for example, people already old — for whom life,Elena Poniatowska (01:03:08):even in institutions, in care homes, means turning the television on from morning until night and being entertained — that is, entertained without making the least effort of criticism or thought in front ofElena Poniatowska (01:03:29):the television.Elena Poniatowska (01:03:31):I have seen that this has been very important in keeping the elderly calm andElena Poniatowska (01:03:41):allowing them to die little by little in institutions called health facilities, where they have thisElena Poniatowska (01:03:52):constant and rather sad entertainment. ButElena Poniatowska (01:03:59):as they say in Mexico: no hay de otra — there is no other option, or no other option has been found, or there are not enough people willing to dedicate themselves to attending to and caring for others. So I see it as an end of lifeElena Poniatowska (01:04:28):for an individual who was once a thinking individual, who knew how to act,Elena Poniatowska (01:04:37):who knew how to elevate himself,Elena Poniatowska (01:04:41):to become a better human being. And I find it sad.Julian Vigo (01:04:46):Today, and for twenty years now, I have noticed as a university professor that students are reading less and less. Today, with so-called artificial intelligence — so-called because intelligence it is not — students are not reading. How can literature or journalism restore the true value and depth of words when we are in a world full of social media, opinions, and videos of a cat doing something funny?Elena Poniatowska (01:05:31):Your question is very difficult because I don't have the answer.Elena Poniatowska (01:05:37):What I can say is that ultimately it depends on the teachers.Elena Poniatowska (01:05:44):It depends on students having a good teacher,Elena Poniatowska (01:05:49):because even I have seen in classes —Elena Poniatowska (01:05:54):in different classes —Elena Poniatowska (01:05:57):that many young people continue looking at their phones while the teacher is writing onElena Poniatowska (01:06:07):the board, or speaking, or giving a class.Elena Poniatowska (01:06:13):So we shall see whether the destiny of young people will depend on what theyElena Poniatowska (01:06:21):learn from their phone. I don't have a phone —Elena Poniatowska (01:06:27):I never bought one,Elena Poniatowska (01:06:28):never got one. Or whether they will be able to go beyond themselvesElena Poniatowska (01:06:37):and beyond above all what the phone wants to give you or teach you or not teach youElena Poniatowska (01:06:46):or distract you from — because ultimately it is a distraction. Yes.Julian Vigo (01:06:53):Writing something to share — in quotation marks — they are sharing nothing in the end. I have noticed that many people are sharing articles they have not read. Young people are embracing identity politics and cancel cultureJulian Vigo (01:07:16):in the absence of any engagement with material reality today.Julian Vigo (01:07:21):That is my fear —Julian Vigo (01:07:23):that the millennials,Julian Vigo (01:07:26):this generation of thirty-year-olds,Julian Vigo (01:07:31):are fixated on pronounsJulian Vigo (01:07:36):but do nothing to help their neighbour.Julian Vigo (01:07:41):They do nothing to fight for living wages.Elena Poniatowska (01:07:46):Well, not all of them.Elena Poniatowska (01:07:49):It's a generalisation, of course.Elena Poniatowska (01:07:54):But I think you are right.Elena Poniatowska (01:07:58):It is a generalisation, because in any case there are human beings who live for others.Julian Vigo (01:08:08):We are in two camps today, because during the lockdown I noticed that many people — even on the right — were fighting for the poor in the United States, where I published. I could not publish a single article questioning the lockdown. That is when I started Savage Minds, because I was asking: what is happening? I no longer recognise this world in which the left is pushing people not to speak. We weren't talking about the lockdown, and the right was speaking very openly. And I see that politically, left and right — there is no longer that dichotomy, so to speak.Elena Poniatowska (01:09:02):Yes,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:03):I thank you greatly for your interest and I thank you enormously for this conversation. I feel animated,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:11):I feel glad to hear what you are saying.Elena Poniatowska (01:09:19):But I do feel that,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:22):as you say,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:23):the speed,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:26):the pace of all events,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:29):the television —Elena Poniatowska (01:09:32):it sets critical thinking and reflection on events to one side,Elena Poniatowska (01:09:41):because everything must be immediate, mustn't it?Elena Poniatowska (01:09:46):That is to say, everything ends in a second. Even the deepest interests sometimes last onlyElena Poniatowska (01:09:56):a few — one might even think, as we say in Mexico,Elena Poniatowska (01:10:01):un ratito — just a little while. There is no continuity in ideas orElena Poniatowska (01:10:12):even in purposes. There is something we all know called habit, and each personElena Poniatowska (01:10:21):lives according to the habits they have established in order to keep going —Elena Poniatowska (01:10:28):to keep existing, if you will. To make it to night, fall asleep, and know that you will wake the following day. Or perhaps you won't wake, because — well, for example, IElena Poniatowska (01:10:45):am a person of 94 years old and I have no certainty that I will see the following morning. ButElena Poniatowska (01:10:55):what I do believe is thatElena Poniatowska (01:10:58):I believe in the innate goodness of every human being.Elena Poniatowska (01:11:03):I have to believe in it, because I need that hope.(01:12:02): Get full access to Savage Minds at www.savageminds.co/subscribe

3 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13Karl Dahl is an author specializing in the Spanish Civil War and historical "fiction."Karl and Pete did a brief series that provides a summary of the events leading up to, during, and following the Spanish Civil War. This includes the recent Livestream Q&A.Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

7 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13These are the episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War plus the episode reading chapter 7 of The Last Crusdae.Correcting the Narrative on the Spanish Civil WarRight-Wing Factional Unity in the Spanish Civil WarThe Weaponry of the Spanish Civil WarPete Reads Warren H Carroll's 'The Last Crusade' Part 7The 'Left' Factions of the Spanish Civil War Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

4 Hours and 52 MinutesPG-13These are continuing episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War.Episode 1286: Learning from the Martyrdom of José Calvo Sotelo w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1291: Women in the Spanish Civil War w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1322 and 1323: The Spanish Civil War - Radicalizing a Moderate Socialist w/ Karl Dahl and MorghurFaction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

You are not an algorithm. You are not a data point. You are a son of God and no machine can replicate that. The Pope just put the full weight of the Church behind that statement, and this week's good news is stacked.Five stories. Five reasons to walk into your weekend fired up.On Pentecost Sunday, Pope Leo XIV released his first encyclical: Magnifica Humanitas (Magnificent Humanity). Forty-two thousand words. The Church's first major teaching document on artificial intelligence. He signed it on the 135th anniversary of Rerum Novarum. Now he is addressing the machines again. Eighty martyrs of the Spanish Civil War killed between 1936 and 1937 for no reason other than their faith, are officially on the path to beatification. They died forgiving their executioners. Meet Pedro Ballester, born in Manchester in 1996, chemical engineering student at Imperial College London, Opus Dei member, diagnosed with advanced bone cancer at 18, dead at 21, and the Diocese of Salford just formally opened his cause for canonization. Pope Leo launches a new catechesis series on Vatican II's constitution on the sacred liturgy, and invites the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church to St. Peter's Square as a sign of unity and a prayer toward full communion.

Although Russia claims to be waging a war against the so-called West, no other country has officially deployed its military to fight alongside Ukraine. Instead, thousands of individuals from across the globe have made the personal choice to join the Ukrainian defense. Who are these foreign volunteers risking their lives to fight the Russian invasion? What motivates them? What challenges do they face, both on the front lines and back home? How can international military cooperation be improved? You are listening to the Explaining Ukraine podcast. *** Explaining Ukraine is a podcast by UkraineWorld, an English-language media outlet run by Internews Ukraine. Host: Volodymyr Yermolenko, a Ukrainian philosopher, chief editor of UkraineWorld, and president of PEN Ukraine. Guest: Colin Freeman, freelance foreign affairs reporter for the Daily Telegraph. Colin has reported widely on British fighters in Ukraine. *** Listen on various platforms: https://li.sten.to/explaining-ukraine UkraineWorld: https://ukraineworld.org/en *** SUPPORT: You can support our work on https://www.patreon.com/c/ukraineworld Your help is crucial, as we rely heavily on crowdfunding. You can also contribute to our volunteer missions to frontline areas in Ukraine, where we deliver aid to both soldiers and civilians. Donations are welcome via PayPal at: ukraine.resisting@gmail.com. *** CONTENTS: 00:03 Intro. The topic of the episode 01:43 Why studying the involvement of foreign soldiers in the Russian-Ukrainian war? 04:11 How many foreign soldiers are estimated to have fought for Ukraine, and why is it so difficult to get exact figures? 06:23 Do European governments encourage their citizens to fight in Ukraine, and how does their stance compare to Russia's recruitment of foreign fighters? 08:56 What is the primary motivation of foreign volunteers for fighting given their modest salary? 09:47 What different types of foreign volunteers exist, from professional soldiers seeking combat experience to "war tourists," and how useful were they on the battlefield? 14:08 Was the initial attempt to integrate foreign fighters through the International Legion largely a success or failure - or both? 15:29 What specific bureaucratic and logistical problems did the Ukrainian army face in integrating foreign volunteers, including language barriers and lack of preparation? 20:11 Why are home governments, like the British, seemingly hesitant to tap into the combat experience of their citizens returning from Ukraine? 26:54 Does the current "blindness" of European governments to this unique combat experience echo historical parallels, like the Spanish Civil War, with potential cultural and military consequences? 30:18 If Ukraine needs more soldiers, how can it improve its recruitment and integration of foreign volunteers to avoid the mistakes of 2022? 34:43 What crucial lessons should European militaries and governments learn from the foreign fighters' experiences in Ukraine for future conflicts?

SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW-5-25-2026.1789 NEW YORK.Guest Author Josh Ireland discusses his book The Death of Trotsky: The True Story of the Plot to Kill Stalin's Greatest Enemy. The Russian Revolution began with Bolshevik fanatics using violence to impose their will on the masses. Irelandexplains the emerging rivalry between Trotsky and Stalin amidst the brutal purge of original revolutionaries. (1/16)In The Death of Trotsky, Josh Ireland describes how the intellectual Trotsky and bureaucratic Stalin competed for power following Lenin's death. Stalin maneuvered patiently to isolate Trotsky, who missed Lenin's funeral while recovering from a mysterious and poorly timed illness. (2/16)Josh Ireland explains that Trotsky was expelled from the Politburo after labeling Stalin the "gravedigger of the revolution." He began a global exile, eventually finding sanctuary in Mexico at the invitation of muralist Diego Rivera. (3/16)Josh Ireland details how, in Mexico, Trotsky faced constant threats from Stalin's assassins. Despite the fortified walls of his compound, the NKVD relentlessly monitored his correspondence and successfully infiltrated his inner circle with undercover agents. (4/16)Josh Ireland recounts how the Mercader family, led by the radicalized Caridad, was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War. Her son Ramon was trained as a ruthless agent capable of carrying out high-stakes assassinations. (5/16)Josh Ireland describes how Ramon Mercader seduced Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky's inner circle under a false identity. Meanwhile, a chaotic machine-gun raid by Stalinist gunmen failed to kill Trotsky, leading to even tighter security measures. (6/16)Josh Ireland recounts how Ramon Mercader used a mountaineer's ice pick to fatally wound Trotsky inside his study. Captured by guards, Ramon maintained a web of lies to conceal his true role as a Soviet operative. (7/16)Josh Ireland explains that following Trotsky's death, Ramon served twenty years in a Mexican prison before returning to Moscow as a hero. Trotsky's wife, Natalia, lived a diminished final chapter after losing her entire family. (8/16)Guest Author Edward J. Larson discusses his book Declaring Independence: Why 1776 Matters. The unprovoked burning of Norfolk, Virginia, by the Royal Navy in January 1776 served as a catalyst for independence. This violence convinced many colonists that reconciliation with the British Crown was impossible. (9/16)In Declaring Independence, Edward J. Larson describes how Henry Knox executed a daring winter transport of heavy artillery from Fort Ticonderoga to Boston. This logistical feat allowed Washington to fortify Dorchester Heights, forcing the British to evacuate the city. (10/16)Edward J. Larson recounts how Washington attempted to defend New York against a massive British armada. The Howe brothers tried to negotiate a peace deal, but American commitment to independence remained firm despite the overwhelming force. (11/16)Edward J. Larson explains that George Mason drafted the Virginia Declaration of Rights while Washington realized he must preserve his army through retreat. The revolution shifted toward establishing independent state governments based on popular sovereignty. (12/16)Edward J. Larson details how, during a grueling retreat through New Jersey, Thomas Paine's The American Crisisrevitalized colonial spirits. British and Hessian atrocities against civilians further alienated the population and strengthened the resolve for independence. (13/16)Edward J. Larson recounts how Abigail Adams urged her husband to "remember the ladies" during the debates over independence. Revolutionary ideals of equality began to raise significant questions regarding the status of women and enslaved people. (14/16)Edward J. Larson describes how Washington led a desperate Christmas crossing of the Delaware River to surprise the Hessians at Trenton. The subsequent victory at Princeton provided the moral triumph needed to sustain the struggling Continental Army. (15/16)Edward J. Larson explains that the formal signing of the Declaration of Independence marked a permanent break with monarchy. New state constitutions prioritized popular sovereignty, establishing the rule of law as the foundation of the Republic. (16/16)

Josh Ireland recounts how the Mercader family, led by the radicalized Caridad, was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War. Her son Ramon was trained as a ruthless agent capable of carrying out high-stakes assassinations. (5/16)1907

Elwood and Stephen venture into Pan's Labyrinth to look at the film which many consider to Guillermo Del Toro's breakout film as set against the backdrop of the Spanish Civil War a young girl Ofelia meets a mysterious Faun who informs her that she is actually the princess of the underworld and now requires her to complete three tasks to be able to return to her kingdom.

4 Hours and 39 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.This is the complete audio of a short series Thomas777 did on the Spanish Civil War.Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

We're getting so close to our 200th episode, but first, we have a book club episode for you. In Episode 198, we're talking about Gen's pick—Orwell's Roses by Rebecca Solnit.Show NotesThis book felt extremely relevant to everything happening in the world these days, like oof.Truly so many topics were covered in this book! The rise of Communism and the Soviet Union, the Spanish Civil War, the Carboniferous Era, coal mining, rose production in Colombia, and actually so much more. What a ride.Rebecca Solnit, we are so impressed with the structuring of this book.You can read Orwell's essay, "Politics and the English Language," on the Orwell Foundation website and it is very much worth the read. Don't be surprised if Gen picks Nineteen Eighty-Four as a future book club read.If you follow us on Instagram, you may know that we've fallen down the romance rabbit hole, so we decided that our next episode would be all about the romance genre.After that, it's time for our 200th episode! We still can't believe it. Our next book club book is Jette's pick, and we're following the romance train still with In Her Own League by Liz Tomforde, which is a spin off of the extremely popular Windy City series. Other Books and Media MentionedThe Giver by Lois LowryThe Trotsky (2009)By George Orwell:Nineteen Eighty-FourAnimal FarmDown and Out in Paris and LondonHomage to CataloniaBy Rebecca Solnit:Men Explain Things to MeHope In the DarkA Field Guide to Getting LostThe Beginning Comes After the End

4 Hours and 52 MinutesPG-13These are continuing episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War.Episode 1286: Learning from the Martyrdom of José Calvo Sotelo w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1291: Women in the Spanish Civil War w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1322 and 1323: The Spanish Civil War - Radicalizing a Moderate Socialist w/ Karl Dahl and MorghurFaction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

3 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13Karl Dahl is an author specializing in the Spanish Civil War and historical "fiction."Karl and Pete did a brief series that provides a summary of the events leading up to, during, and following the Spanish Civil War. This includes the recent Livestream Q&A.Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

7 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13These are the episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War plus the episode reading chapter 7 of The Last Crusdae.Correcting the Narrative on the Spanish Civil WarRight-Wing Factional Unity in the Spanish Civil WarThe Weaponry of the Spanish Civil WarPete Reads Warren H Carroll's 'The Last Crusade' Part 7The 'Left' Factions of the Spanish Civil War Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

Jon Herold sits down with Adrian and Cristina of Rise Attire for one of the most unexpectedly moving episodes yet. What started as a desperate prayer into the internet void during the chaos of 2020 turned into a business, a marriage, and a movement. Adrian and Cristina share how they met across state lines, got deplatformed by both Shopify and GoFundMe in back to back gut punches, and turned a live DJ dance party on Pilled into a surprise on camera proposal and a crowdfunded comeback. They dig into the real cost of staying made in America, the advertising blackout that censors their brand across every major platform, and their expansion through Rise INTL. Plus, they share jaw dropping family histories rooted in surviving Soviet camps, Nazi concentration camps, and the Spanish Civil War, and two new film projects that are pushing the info war into a new creative frontier. This is the love story nobody expected.

The story of Franco's rise to power and the painful, repressive regime he oversaw is fundamentally interlinked with that of the Spanish Civil War. A brutal three-year conflict that laid bare the ideological divisions of interwar Europe, it drew support from fascist governments across the continent. But it also inspired socialists from around the world to fight for the democratic, republican government, and to oppose the rising tide of fascism wherever and however they could.    What caused Spain's military to turn against the country's civilian government in 1936? Why did a national civil war attract such international attention? And what ramifications does the conflict still have in modern Spain? This is a Short History Of the Spanish Civil War. A Noiser podcast production. Hosted by John Hopkins. With thanks to Peter Anderson, Professor of Twentieth-Century Spanish History at the University of Leeds. Written by Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow | Produced by Kate Simants | Production Assistant: Chris McDonald | Exec produced by Katrina Hughes | Sound supervisor: Tom Pink | Sound design by Oliver Sanders | Assembly edit by Anisha Deva | Compositions by Oliver Baines, Dorry Macaulay, Tom Pink | Mix & mastering: Cody Reynolds-Shaw | Fact Check: Sean Coleman Unlock the next two episodes of Short History Of… right now by subscribing to Noiser+. You'll also get ad-free listening and early access to shows across the Noiser podcast network, including Real Survival Stories and Sherlock Holmes Short Stories. Just click the subscription banner at the top of the feed, or head to www.noiser.com/subscriptions to get started. ⁠A Short History of Ancient Rome⁠ - the debut book from the Noiser Network is out now! Discover the epic rise and fall of Rome like never before. Pick up your copy now at your local bookstore or visit ⁠⁠noiser.com/books⁠⁠ to learn more. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

4 Hours and 39 MinutesPG-13Thomas777 is a revisionist historian and a fiction writer.This is the complete audio of a short series Thomas777 did on the Spanish Civil War.Thomas' SubstackRadio Free Chicago - T777 and J BurdenThomas777 MerchandiseThomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 1"Thomas' Book "Steelstorm Pt. 2"Thomas on TwitterThomas' CashApp - $7homas777Pete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

Gaslit Nation presents an Instagram Live discussion recorded over the weekend with the acclaimed illustrator Brahm Revel, the artist of Mrs. Orwell. Brahm is based in Barcelona, where Eileen and Eric Blair (aka George Orwell), spent their honeymoon fighting fascists in the Spanish Civil War. Eileen was holed up in the Hotel Continental, which still exists, where Stalin's agents searched her hotel room, stealing Orwell's Spain diaries and other papers, which are believed to be somewhere in Moscow to this day. We're celebrating freedom fighters, past and present, tonight at Powerhouse Arena in DUMBO, Brooklyn at 7pm ET, for the launch of Mrs. Orwell. Patreon supporters get in free! Russian mafia expert Olga Lautman will be there, and so will the good folks of Razom for Ukraine and the Media and Democracy Project, co-sponsors of the event, because the Orwells would have been fans. So come and get a Mrs. Orwell tote bag, meet other Gaslit Nation listeners, and celebrate the defeat of Orban, MAGA, and the Kremlin in Hungary.  Enjoy this conversation with Brahm about the creative process that went into the making of Mrs. Orwell and why the story matters for us today, in an age that needs our own creativity and defiance. Today's Gaslit Nation Salon is still on for today at 4pm so join us via the link posted on Patreon.com/Gaslit!  Join our community of listeners and get bonus shows, ad free listening, group chats with other listeners, ways to shape the show, invites to exclusive events like our Monday political salons at 4pm ET over Zoom, and more! Discounted annual memberships are available. Become a Democracy Defender at Patreon.com/Gaslit

To those who could not join our launch party for Mrs. Orwell tonight, we've made you a play list from the event. It opens with a British Pathé newsreel of what to do in an air raid; Edward R. Murrow reporting from London on the Blitz; a popular war-time show "Gert & Daisy";  Flanagan and Allen's "Run Rabbit Run," and "Ay Carmela!" one of the most popular songs of the Spanish Civil War, which Eileen and Eric Blair would have heard throughout their time in Spain. We're going to play this audio at the start of tonight's event, to connect the global war of fascism vs. democracy back then to today, as Ukraine faces the same daily bombardment as Europe did under Hitler.     

As war flares across the Middle East, and conflicts rage in other parts of the world, it is often said that women and girls are the hardest hit by war. But what does that actually mean in practice? What are the key statistics that tell us how conflicts impact women? And what role are women playing in peace processes too? Datshiane Navanayagam speaks to two women who look at how war shapes women's lives. Idil Absiye is a policy advisor on Women, Peace and Security at the United Nations, and is based in Kenya. Dr Laura Muñoz-Encinar is an archaeologist and forensic anthropologist at the Spanish National Research Council. Her main focus is the Spanish Civil War, a conflict from almost a century ago that offers many lessons for today. Producer: Hannah Sander(Image: (L) Laura Muñoz-Encinar, credit Laura Muñoz-Encinar. (R) Idil Absiye, credit Idil Absiye.)

Greg Jenner is joined in medieval Spain by historian Professor Nora Berend and comedian Toussaint Douglass to learn about the colourful life and afterlife of the warrior known as El Cid. El Cid – real name Rodrigo Díaz – was a mercenary in eleventh-century Spain who fought for both Christian kings and Muslim rulers before setting himself up as ruler of Valencia. This episode explores his dramatic life in the period before religious divisions were key on the Iberian Peninsula, and an ambitious warrior might fight for whoever would pay him. It then traces the legend that grew up around him after his death, taking in the medieval romances written about El Cid, the surprising role his bones played in the Napoleonic wars, his appropriation by General Franco after the Spanish Civil War, and even the classic Hollywood film starring Charlton Heston and Sophia Loren.If you're a fan of legendary but mysterious figures from the past, medieval romances, and the use and misuse of history for political purposes, you'll love our episode on El Cid. If you want to learn more about other historical events mentioned in this episode, listen to our episodes on al-Andalus and Young Napoleon. And for more from Toussaint Douglass, check out our episodes on Frederick Douglass and the Causes of the British Civil Wars.You're Dead To Me is the comedy podcast that takes history seriously. Every episode, Greg Jenner brings together the best names in history and comedy to learn and laugh about the past. Hosted by: Greg Jenner Research by: Adam Simcox Written by: Adam Simcox, Dr Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow, Dr Emma Nagouse, and Greg Jenner Produced by: Dr Emmie Rose Price-Goodfellow and Greg Jenner Audio Producer: Steve Hankey Production Coordinator: Gill Huggett Senior Producer: Dr Emma Nagouse Executive Editor: Philip Sellars

We continue our study of the second volume from The Whole Truth About Fatima.Please support the Our Lady of Fatima Podcast:http://buymeacoffee.com/TerenceMStantonLike and subscribe on YouTube:https://m.youtube.com/@OurLadyOfFatimaPodcastFollow us on X:@FatimapodcastThank you!

Giles Tremlett is a biographer, a narrative historian, and a journalist based in Madrid, Spain. He was born in Plymouth, England, in 1962, but since graduating from Oxford University has almost continuously lived in Spain. His latest book is titled "El Generalísimo," a biography of the late Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Supported by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, Franco rose to power by defeating the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War that lasted from 1936 to 1939. He then controlled the Spanish government until his death in 1975. He was a strong supporter of national Catholicism and a strong opponent of democracy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Giles Tremlett is a biographer, a narrative historian, and a journalist based in Madrid, Spain. He was born in Plymouth, England, in 1962, but since graduating from Oxford University has almost continuously lived in Spain. His latest book is titled "El Generalísimo," a biography of the late Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Supported by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, Franco rose to power by defeating the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War that lasted from 1936 to 1939. He then controlled the Spanish government until his death in 1975. He was a strong supporter of national Catholicism and a strong opponent of democracy. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Joana Masó joins the podcast to talk about the life and work of Francesc Tosquelles. Tosquelles was a radical psychiatrist, veteran of the Spanish Civil War, and a hugely influential figure in the lives of figures such as  Frantz Fanon, Felix Guattari and Jean Oury. Joana explains how his life unfoleded and developed, from the co-operatives of Catalonia, to resisting nazi occupation in France, to his relatioship with other parts of the radical psychiatry movement.     Joana Masó is a professor of French literature at the University of Barcelona. She is a researcher with the UNESCO Chair on Women, Development and Cultures, and works at the intersection of literature, critical thinking, contemporary art, and curating exhibitions. She has co-edited Jacques Derrida's text on aesthetics, Thinking Out of Sight: Writings on the Art of the Visible (University of Chicago Press, 2020), and on architecture, in French, Les arts de l'espace: Écrits et interventions sur l'architecture (La Différence, 2015). She has also coedited Hélène Cixous's essays dedicated to art, Poetry in Painting: Writings on Contemporary Arts and Aesthetics (Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Since 2017, she has led the research project “The Forgotten Legacy of Tosquelles” at the University of Barcelona, under the ADHUC—Research Center for Theory, Gender, Sexuality. She has published Tosquelles. Healing Institutions (Semiotext(e) and Divided, 2026), and Tosquelles. Avant-garde psychiatry, Radical Politics and Art (2024), the American Folk Art Museum in New York exhibition catalogue.  SUPPORT: www.buymeacoffee.com/redmedicineSoundtrack by Mark PilkingtonTwitter: @red_medicine__www.redmedicine.substack.com/

4 Hours and 52 MinutesPG-13These are continuing episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War.Episode 1286: Learning from the Martyrdom of José Calvo Sotelo w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1291: Women in the Spanish Civil War w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1322 and 1323: The Spanish Civil War - Radicalizing a Moderate Socialist w/ Karl Dahl and MorghurFaction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

7 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13These are the episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War plus the episode reading chapter 7 of The Last Crusdae.Correcting the Narrative on the Spanish Civil WarRight-Wing Factional Unity in the Spanish Civil WarThe Weaponry of the Spanish Civil WarPete Reads Warren H Carroll's 'The Last Crusade' Part 7The 'Left' Factions of the Spanish Civil War Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

3 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13Karl Dahl is an author specializing in the Spanish Civil War and historical "fiction."Karl and Pete did a brief series that provides a summary of the events leading up to, during, and following the Spanish Civil War. This includes the recent Livestream Q&A.Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

In this week's special Easter episode of The Learning Curve, co-hosts Prof. Albert Cheng of the University of Arkansas and Center for Strong Public Schools' Alisha Searcy speak with Dutch art historian Gijs van Hensbergen, author of Gaudí: A Biography and The Sagrada Familia: Gaudí's Heaven on Earth. They discuss the life, faith, and enduring legacy of Antoni Gaudí and his masterpiece, the Sagrada Família. Mr. van Hensbergen reflects on Gaudí's upbringing in Catalonia, where deep Catholic devotion, modern artistic dynamism, and the natural landscape shaped his unique architectural philosophy. He explores how Barcelona's Modernisme movement, alongside avant-garde artists like Salvador Dalí and Joan Miró, fostered Gaudí's distinctive blend of Neo-Gothic, Art Nouveau, and organic design. He highlights Gaudí's vision of the Sagrada Família as a “stone Bible,” uniting theology, geometry, and nature-inspired engineering. Mr. van Hensbergen also discusses the Nativity, Passion, and Glory façades, each representing key moments in the life of Jesus Christ, and the challenges of continuing construction after the destruction of Gaudí's plans and models during the Spanish Civil War. In closing, Mr. van Hensberger reflects on Gaudí's lasting influence and the spiritual and artistic significance of his work, by reading a passage from Gaudí: A Biography.

Wherein I try and contextualize the conflict from the viewpoint of the Anarchists.    Bibliography for this episode:    Evans, Danny Revolution and the State: Anarchism in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 AK Press 2020 Guillamon, Agustin Ready for Revolution: The CNT Defense Committees in Barcelona 1933-38 AK Press 2014 Guillamon, Agustin Insurrection: The Bloody Events of May 1937 in Barcelona AK Press 2020   Questions? Comments? Email me at peaceintheirtime@gmail.com

Political violence during Spain's Second Republic period (1931-1936) was one of the primary causes of the Spanish Civil War. What was the role of Spain's largest militarized police force, the Civil Guard, in this violence? In this episode, Historias host Bretton Rodriguez interviews Historias host Foster Chamberlin about his new book Uncivil Guard: Policing, Military Culture, and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War to find out. They explore the origins of the organizational culture of the Civil Guard going back to the mid-19th century, the relations between civil guards and local townspeople, incidents of political violence involving the Civil Guard during the Second Republic, and the role of the Asturias rebellion of 1934 in shifting civil guards' attitudes towards the public.

PREVIEW FOR LATER: Josh Ireland discusses Ramon, the ideological assassin of Leon Trotsky, whose worldview was forged during the Spanish Civil War. Influenced by Stalinist doctrine, Ramon viewed Trotskyists as dangerous as fascists. Despite his competence, his political naivety led him to become a dedicated Soviet tool abroad. (1)1937 MEXICO CITY

9. The Revolutionary Background of the Mercader Family Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ireland details the radicalization of the Mercader family, led by the charismatic Caridad. He explains how her son Ramon was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War for future espionage. (9)1921 MOSCOW RED GUARD

SHOW SCHEDULE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 3-27-2026.1925 STALIN AND TROTSKY, MOSCOW1. Iran's Nuclear Status and the NPT Framework Guest: Henry Sokolski Summary: Sokolski analyzes Iranian hardliners' threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He explores the military risks of targeting nuclear sites like Dimona and the strategic complexities of attacking national electric grids. (1)2. Taiwanese Nuclear Policy and Barksdale Drone Incursions Guest: Henry Sokolski Summary: Taiwan considers restarting nuclear plants to mitigate energy desperation. Meanwhile, jam-resistant drone swarms at Barksdale Air Force Base suggest potential Chinese interference intended to delay American responses to nuclear-related operations. (2)3. The SAVE Act and the Debate Over Voter Eligibility Guest: Richard Epstein Summary: Epstein discusses the SAVE Act, which requires documentary proof of citizenship for voting. He weighs the balance between preventing election fraud and the potential burdens placed on legitimate voters by strict identification. (3)4. The Removal Dispute of Judge Pauline Newman Guest: Richard Epstein Summary: Epstein critiques the suspension of 98-year-old Judge Pauline Newman, arguing her colleagues lack cause for removal. He characterizes the move as "manipulative shenanigans" driven by internal politics rather than intellectual incompetence. (4)5. Gas Prices and the Start of Pennsylvania Trout Season Guest: Jim McTague Summary: McTague highlights rising fuel costs and a slowing retail economy in Lancaster County. He contrasts the "amateur hour" of opening day trout fishing with the tranquil, native-stocked streams of Central Pennsylvania. (5)6. Italian Soccer Pressure and Meloni's Cabinet Reshuffle Guest: Lorenzo Fiori Summary: Fiori previews the Azzurri's high-stakes match against Wales and explains Prime Minister Meloni's firing of controversial officials. He also stresses the importance of authentic Parmesan and the beauty of Sardinian heritage. (6)7. NASA Restructuring and the Pivot to a Moon Base Guest: Bob Zimmerman Summary: NASA's new administrator pauses the Lunar Gateway to focus on building a permanent lunar base by 2033. Zimmerman contrasts these government plans with the rapid commercial success and valuation of SpaceX. (7)8. Observing Comet Nuclei and the Outer Planets Guest: Bob Zimmerman Summary: Astronomers witness a rare reversal in a comet's rotation as its nucleus sublimates. Zimmerman reviews new imagery of Saturn and Neptune, arguing for more orbiters to explore the solar system's significant "gaps". (8)9. The Revolutionary Background of the Mercader Family Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ireland details the radicalization of the Mercader family, led by the charismatic Caridad. He explains how her son Ramon was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War for future espionage. (9)10. Infiltrating Trotsky's Compound Through Seduction Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ramon Mercader seduces Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky's fortress in Mexico City. Despite the heavy guard and fortifications, Ramon gains the trust of the household by posing as a politically disinterested playboy. (10)11. Planning the Assassination with a Mountaineer's Ice Pick Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Following a failed armed raid, the NKVD tasks Ramon with murdering Trotsky. They select an ice pick for the attack to ensure a silent kill that carries a brutal, symbolic impact. (11)12. The Aftermath of Trotsky's Death and the Assassin's Legacy Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Trotsky dies a day after the attack, while Ramon serves twenty years in a Mexican prison. Caridad lives her final years in bitter exile, and Stalin barely registers the mission's success. (12)13. Vegas Transformation: Sports, Tech, and Nuclear History Guest: Jeff Bliss Summary: Bliss explores the Las Vegas strip's evolution into a sports capital and the introduction of Zooks robo-taxis. He notes the area's grim history with atmospheric nuclear testing and resulting radiation claims. (13)14. Political Turmoil and the Homeless Crisis in Los Angeles Guest: Jeff Bliss Summary: Bliss reports on the visual horrors of homeless encampments and the political pressure on Mayor Karen Bass. He also examines the "jungle primary" system and stalled recovery in Pacific Palisades. (14)15. The Enlightenment Foundations of American Civic Education Guest: Jacob Howland Summary: Howland discusses Thomas Jefferson's focus on applied science and the role of liberal education in a republic. He emphasizes Eva Brann's belief that classroom seminars cultivate the habits necessary for civil debate. (15)16. The Crisis of Activism in Modern Higher Education Guest: Jacob Howland Summary: Howland critiques universities for prioritizing the training of social activists over traditional knowledge transmission. He argues that regarding the professorship as a political podium cheats students of a real, broad education. (16)

As we navigate a world of "alternative facts" and corporate-state surveillance, George Orwell's life, times, and pain, transformed into enduring art, like 1984, show us how to be defiant today. Resistance begins in the mind.  This week, we're joined by British critic Dorian Lynskey, author of The Ministry of Truth: The Biography of George Orwell's 1984, to trace the biography of a nightmare. The Orwellian slogan "2+2=5" was taken from Soviet propaganda. Orwell reviewed Assignment in Utopia by Eugene Lyons, an American reporter who confesses in the chapter "The Press Corps Conceals a Famine," to joining with other influential foreign correspondents in Moscow to label Gareth Jones a liar in their articles in exchange for access to the Soviet regime. Lyons and Orwell are both characters in Andrea's film Mr. Jones.  The trauma of 1984 started during the Spanish Civil War, alongside his wife, Eileen Blair, the unsung hero who saved his life and helped him find his voice as an artist, to break through the lies. In Catalonia, Eileen and Eric Blair watched Stalin-backed communists turn a socialist revolution into a paranoid police state. It was here, nearly killed by the "Soviet myth," that they realized nowhere is immune: lies and conformity keep people complacent as the sadists consolidate power.  Orwell's message is clear for us today: in an era of state-sponsored lies, holding onto your humanity is the ultimate act of defiance. Join us to celebrate the power of art and defiance at the book launch of Mrs. Orwell, Andrea's inspiring new graphic novel, illustrated by the genius Brahm Revel. When: April 13 Where: PowerHouse Books Arena, DUMBO, Brooklyn Details here: https://powerhousearena.com/events/book-launch-mrs-orwell-by-andrea-chalupa-in-conversation-with-nomiki-konst/ Patreon Supporters: You and your guests get in free and receive a complimentary book! Just message us through Patreon to claim yours. Not a member yet? Join our community at Patreon.com/Gaslit. We couldn't make this show without you–see you there! Show Notes: Our opening song was "Ride at Dawn" by Deena Marie. Check out her GoFundMe here to help her produce her next album: https://gofund.me/623a9c9b1 IG: @deenamariedmt Spotify: Listen hereApple Music: Listen hereTikTok: @deenamariedmt YouTube: Watch here The Ministry of Truth: The Biography of George Orwell's 1984  https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/580453/the-ministry-of-truth-by-dorian-lynskey/   33 Revolutions per Minute: A History of Protest Songs, from Billie Holiday to Green Day https://www.harpercollins.com/products/33-revolutions-per-minute-dorian-lynskey?variant=32210443141154  EVENTS AT GASLIT NATION: New! There's now a California Signal Group for Gaslit Nation listeners to find each other and connect in that state. Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit  The Gaslit Nation Outreach Committee discusses how to talk to the MAGA cult: Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit  Minnesota Signal group for Gaslit Nation listeners in the state to find each other. Join us on Patreon.  Vermont Signal group for Gaslit Nation listeners in the state to find each other. Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit  Arizona-based listeners launched a Signal group for others in the state to connect. Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit  Indiana-based listeners launched a Signal group for others in the state to join. Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit  Florida-based listeners are going strong meeting in person. Be sure to join their Signal group. Join us on Patreon.com/Gaslit   Gaslit Nation Salons take place Mondays 4pm ET over Zoom and are recorded and shared on Patreon.com/Gaslit for our community

77 MinutesPG-13Karl Dahl is an author specializing in the Spanish Civil War and historical "fiction."Karl joins me to talk about the Joe Kent resignation and the information and opinions he's shared since.Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

In Uncivil Guard: Policing, Military Culture, and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War (Louisiana State UP, 2025), Foster Chamberlin evaluates the role of militarized police forces in the political violence of interwar Europe by tracing the evolution of one such group, Spain's Civil Guard, culminating in the country's turbulent Second Republic period of 1931–1936. As his analysis shows, political violence provided the main justification for the military coup attempt that began the Spanish Civil War, and the Civil Guard was the most violent institution in the country at that time. Discovering how this police force, which was supposed to maintain order, became a principal contributor to the violence of the republic proves key to understanding the origins of the Civil War. By tracing the institution's founding in the mid-nineteenth century, and moving through case studies of episodes of political violence involving the group, Chamberlin concludes that the Civil Guard had an organizational culture that made it prone to violent actions because of its cult of honor, its distance from the people it policed, and its almost entirely military training. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In Uncivil Guard: Policing, Military Culture, and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War (Louisiana State UP, 2025), Foster Chamberlin evaluates the role of militarized police forces in the political violence of interwar Europe by tracing the evolution of one such group, Spain's Civil Guard, culminating in the country's turbulent Second Republic period of 1931–1936. As his analysis shows, political violence provided the main justification for the military coup attempt that began the Spanish Civil War, and the Civil Guard was the most violent institution in the country at that time. Discovering how this police force, which was supposed to maintain order, became a principal contributor to the violence of the republic proves key to understanding the origins of the Civil War. By tracing the institution's founding in the mid-nineteenth century, and moving through case studies of episodes of political violence involving the group, Chamberlin concludes that the Civil Guard had an organizational culture that made it prone to violent actions because of its cult of honor, its distance from the people it policed, and its almost entirely military training. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In Uncivil Guard: Policing, Military Culture, and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War (Louisiana State UP, 2025), Foster Chamberlin evaluates the role of militarized police forces in the political violence of interwar Europe by tracing the evolution of one such group, Spain's Civil Guard, culminating in the country's turbulent Second Republic period of 1931–1936. As his analysis shows, political violence provided the main justification for the military coup attempt that began the Spanish Civil War, and the Civil Guard was the most violent institution in the country at that time. Discovering how this police force, which was supposed to maintain order, became a principal contributor to the violence of the republic proves key to understanding the origins of the Civil War. By tracing the institution's founding in the mid-nineteenth century, and moving through case studies of episodes of political violence involving the group, Chamberlin concludes that the Civil Guard had an organizational culture that made it prone to violent actions because of its cult of honor, its distance from the people it policed, and its almost entirely military training. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

Stalinism on Trial: Communism and Republican Justice in the Spanish Civil War (Liverpool University Press, 2025) is a history of Communism and anti-Communism in the Spanish Civil War. It uses newly available archival material to reassess Soviet intervention in Spain and reappraise the role of Premier Juan Negrín. How did the Soviet operation affect attempts to rebuild the Republican justice system that the war had shattered? How did Negrín use the courts to combat wartime espionage and treason in the era of the Soviet mass repressions? How did wartime trials communicate politics, both domestic and international? Finally, how have Cold War politics distorted our understanding of Communism in the Spanish Civil War? Stalinism on Trial traces the Republic's tribunals through revolution and war, focusing in particular on the prosecution and "show trial" of the anti-Stalin Marxist party, POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), in whose militia George Orwell served. This small party was thrown onto centre stage when police arrested its leadership on suspicion of espionage and its leader, Andreu Nin, disappeared while in police custody. The ensuing prosecution and dramatic courtroom trial highlighted the contradictions of Soviet intervention in Spain. It also illustrated the disastrous impact that western anti-Communism and appeasement had on Spain's war effort. The book is at once a penetrating microhistory of the POUM's prosecution and an expansive transnational history of antifascism in interwar Europe. Jonathan Sherry is a historian and writer who holds a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Last time we spoke about the end of the battle of khalkin gol. In the summer of 1939, the Nomonhan Incident escalated into a major border conflict between Soviet-Mongolian forces and Japan's Kwantung Army along the Halha River. Despite Japanese successes in July, Zhukov launched a decisive offensive on August 20. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the river, unleashing over 200 bombers and intense artillery barrages that devastated Japanese positions. Zhukov's northern, central, and southern forces encircled General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, supported by Manchukuoan units. Fierce fighting ensued: the southern flank collapsed under Colonel Potapov's armor, while the northern Fui Heights held briefly before falling to relentless assaults, including flame-throwing tanks. Failed Japanese counterattacks on August 24 resulted in heavy losses, with regiments shattered by superior Soviet firepower and tactics. By August 25, encircled pockets were systematically eliminated, leading to the annihilation of the Japanese 6th Army. The defeat, coinciding with the Hitler-Stalin Pact, forced Japan to negotiate a ceasefire on September 15-16, redrawing borders. Zhukov's victory exposed Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare, influencing future strategies and deterring further northern expansion.   #192 The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Despite the fact this technically will go into future events, I thought it was important we talk about a key moment in Sino history. Even though the battle of changkufeng and khalkin gol were not part of the second sino-Japanese war, their outcomes certainly would affect it.  Policymaking by the Soviet Union alone was not the primary factor in ending Moscow's diplomatic isolation in the late 1930s. After the Munich Conference signaled the failure of the popular front/united front approach, Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, and Poland's Józef Beck unintentionally strengthened Joseph Stalin's position in early 1939. Once the strategic cards were in his hands, Stalin capitalized on them. His handling of negotiations with Britain and France, as well as with Germany, from April to August was deft and effective. The spring and summer negotiations among the European powers are well documented and have been examined from many angles. In May 1939, while Stalin seemed to have the upper hand in Europe, yet before Hitler had signaled that a German–Soviet agreement might be possible, the Nomonhan incident erupted, a conflict initiated and escalated by the Kwantung Army. For a few months, the prospect of a Soviet–Japanese war revived concerns in Moscow about a two-front conflict. Reviewing Soviet talks with Britain, France, and Germany in the spring and summer of 1939 from an East Asian perspective sheds fresh light on the events that led to the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact and, more broadly, to the outbreak of World War II. The second week of May marked the start of fighting at Nomonhan, during which negotiations between Germany and the USSR barely advanced beyond mutual scrutiny. Moscow signaled that an understanding with Nazi Germany might be possible. Notably, on May 4, the removal of Maksim Litvinov as foreign commissar and his replacement by Vyacheslav Molotov suggested a shift in approach. Litvinov, an urbane diplomat of Jewish origin and married to an Englishwoman, had been the leading Soviet proponent of the united-front policy and a steadfast critic of Nazi Germany. If a settlement with Hitler was sought, Litvinov was an unsuitable figure to lead the effort. Molotov, though with limited international experience, carried weight as chairman of the Council of Ministers and, more importantly, as one of Stalin's closest lieutenants. This personnel change seemed to accomplish its aim in Berlin, where the press was instructed on May 5 to halt polemical attacks on the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. On the same day, Karl Schnurre, head of the German Foreign Ministry's East European trade section, told Soviet chargé d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that Skoda, the German-controlled Czech arms manufacturer, would honor existing arms contracts with Russia. Astakhov asked whether, with Litvinov's departure, Germany might resume negotiations for a trade treaty Berlin had halted months earlier. By May 17, during discussions with Schnurre, Astakhov asserted that "there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for enmity between the two countries," and that Britain and France's negotiations appeared unpromising. The next day, Ribbentrop personally instructed Schulenburg to green-light trade talks. Molotov, however, insisted that a "political basis" for economic negotiations had to be established first. Suspicion remained high on both sides. Stalin feared Berlin might use reports of German–Soviet talks to destabilize a potential triple alliance with Britain and France; Hitler feared Stalin might use such reports to entice Tokyo away from an anti-German pact. The attempt to form a tripartite military alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan foundered over divergent aims: Berlin targeted Britain and France; Tokyo aimed at the Soviet Union. Yet talks persisted through August 1939, with Japanese efforts to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alignment continually reported to Moscow by Richard Sorge. Hitler and Mussolini, frustrated by Japanese objections, first concluded the bilateral Pact of Steel on May 22. The next day, Hitler, addressing his generals, stressed the inevitability of war with Poland and warned that opposition from Britain would be crushed militarily. He then hinted that Russia might "prove disinterested in the destruction of Poland," suggesting closer ties with Japan if Moscow opposed Germany. The exchange was quickly leaked to the press. Five days later, the first pitched battle of the Nomonhan campaign began. Although Hitler's timing with the Yamagata detachment's foray was coincidental, Moscow may have found the coincidence ominous. Despite the inducement of Molotov's call for a political basis before economic talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop did not immediately respond. On June 14, Astakhov signaled to Parvan Draganov, Bulgaria's ambassador in Berlin, that the USSR faced three options: ally with Britain and France, continue inconclusive talks with them, or align with Germany, the latter being closest to Soviet desires. Draganov relayed to the German Foreign Ministry that Moscow preferred a non-aggression agreement if Germany would pledge not to attack the Soviet Union. Two days later, Schulenburg told Astakhov that Germany recognized the link between economic and political relations and was prepared for far-reaching talks, a view echoed by Ribbentrop. The situation remained tangled: the Soviets pursued overt talks with Britain and France, while Stalin sought to maximize Soviet leverage. Chamberlain's stance toward Moscow remained wary but recognized a "psychological value" to an Anglo–Soviet rapprochement, tempered by his insistence on a hard bargain. American ambassador William C. Bullitt urged London to avoid the appearance of pursuing the Soviets, a view that resonated with Chamberlain's own distrust. Public confidence in a real Anglo–Soviet alliance remained low. By July 19, cabinet minutes show Chamberlain could not quite believe a genuine Russia–Germany alliance was possible, though he recognized the necessity of negotiations with Moscow to deter Hitler and to mollify an increasingly skeptical British public. Despite reservations, both sides kept the talks alive. Stalin's own bargaining style, with swift Soviet replies but frequent questions and demands, often produced delays. Molotov pressed on questions such as whether Britain and France would pledge to defend the Baltic states, intervene if Japan attacked the USSR, or join in opposing Germany if Hitler pressured Poland or Romania. These considerations were not trivial; they produced extended deliberations. On July 23, Molotov demanded that plans for coordinated military action among the three powers be fleshed out before a political pact. Britain and France accepted most political terms, and an Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow on August 11. The British commander, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket-Ernle-Erle-Drax, conducted staff talks but could not conclude a military agreement. The French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could sign but not bind his government. By then, Hitler had set August 26 as the date for war with Poland. With that looming, Hitler pressed for Soviet neutrality, or closer cooperation. In July and August, secret German–Soviet negotiations favored the Germans, who pressed for a rapid settlement and made most concessions. Yet Stalin benefited from keeping the British and French engaged, creating leverage against Hitler and safeguarding a potential Anglo–Soviet option as a fallback. To lengthen the talks and avoid immediate resolution, Moscow emphasized the Polish issue. Voroshilov demanded the Red Army be allowed to operate through Polish territory to defend Poland, a demand Warsaw would never accept. Moscow even floated a provocative plan: if Britain and France could compel Poland to permit Baltic State naval operations, the Western fleets would occupy Baltic ports, an idea that would have been militarily perilous and diplomatically explosive. Despite this, Stalin sought an agreement with Germany. Through Richard Sorge's intelligence, Moscow knew Tokyo aimed to avoid large-scale war with the USSR, and Moscow pressed for a German–Soviet settlement, including a nonaggression pact and measures to influence Japan to ease Sino–Japanese tensions. On August 16, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to urge Molotov and Stalin toward a nonaggression pact and to coordinate with Japan. Stalin signaled willingness, and August 23–24 saw the drafting of the pact and the collapse of the Soviet and Japanese resistance elsewhere. That night, in a memorandum of Ribbentrop's staff, seven topics were summarized, with Soviet–Japanese relations and Molotov's insistence that Berlin demonstrate good faith standing out. Ribbentrop reiterated his willingness to influence Japan for a more favorable Soviet–Japanese relationship, and Stalin's reply indicated a path toward a détente in the East alongside the European agreement: "M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."  Second, the assertion that the Soviet Union was prepared for and unafraid of war with Japan is an overstatement, though Stalin certainly had grounds for optimism regarding the battlefield situation and the broader East Asian strategic balance. It is notable that, despite the USSR's immediate diplomatic and military gains against Japan, Stalin remained anxious to conceal from Tokyo any peace initiative that originated in Moscow. That stance suggests that Tokyo or Hsinking might read such openness as a sign of Soviet weakness or confidence overextended. The Japanese danger, it would seem, did not disappear from Stalin's mind. Even at the height of his diplomatic coup, Stalin was determined not to burn bridges prematurely. On August 21, while he urged Hitler to send Ribbentrop to Moscow, he did not sever talks with Britain and France. Voroshilov requested a temporary postponement on the grounds that Soviet delegation officers were needed for autumn maneuvers. It was not until August 25, after Britain reiterated its resolve to stand by Poland despite the German–Soviet pact, that Stalin sent the Anglo–French military mission home. Fortified by the nonaggression pact, which he hoped would deter Britain and France from action, Hitler unleashed his army on Poland on September 1. Two days later, as Zhukov's First Army Group was completing its operations at Nomonhan, Hitler faced a setback when Britain and France declared war. Hitler had hoped to finish Poland quickly in 1939 and avoid fighting Britain and France until 1940. World War II in Europe had begun. The Soviet–Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the sole, nor even the principal, factor prompting Stalin to conclude an alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a European war that could fracture the major capitalist powers might have been reason enough. Yet the conflict with Japan in the East was also a factor in Stalin's calculations, a dimension that has received relatively little attention in standard accounts of the outbreak of the war. This East Asian focus seeks to clarify the record without proposing a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy; rather, it adds an important piece often overlooked in the "origins of the Second World War" puzzle, helping to reduce the overall confusion. The German–Soviet agreement provided for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland soon after Germany's invasion. On September 3, just forty-eight hours after the invasion and on the day Britain and France declared war, Ribbentrop urged Moscow to invade Poland from the east. Yet, for two more weeks, Poland's eastern frontier remained inviolate; Soviet divisions waited at the border, as most Polish forces were engaged against Germany. The German inquiries about the timing of the Soviet invasion continued, but the Red Army did not move. This inactivity is often attributed to Stalin's caution and suspicion, but that caution extended beyond Europe. Throughout early September, sporadic ground and air combat continued at Nomonhan, including significant activity by Kwantung Army forces on September 8–9, and large-scale air engagements on September 1–2, 4–5, and 14–15. Not until September 15 was the Molotov–Togo cease-fire arrangement finalized, to take effect on September 16. The very next morning, September 17, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier into a country collapsed at its feet. It appears that Stalin wanted to ensure that fighting on his eastern flank had concluded before engaging in Western battles, avoiding a two-front war. Through such policies, Stalin avoided the disaster of a two-front war. Each principal in the 1939 diplomatic maneuvering pursued distinct objectives. The British sought an arrangement with the USSR that would deter Hitler from attacking Poland and, if deterred, bind Moscow to the Anglo–French alliance. Hitler sought an alliance with the USSR to deter Britain and France from aiding Poland and, if they did aid Poland, to secure Soviet neutrality. Japan sought a military alliance with Germany against the USSR, or failing that, stronger Anti-Comintern ties. Stalin aimed for an outcome in which Germany would fight the Western democracies, leaving him freedom to operate in both the West and East; failing that, he sought military reassurance from Britain and France in case he had to confront Germany. Of the four, only Stalin achieved his primary objective. Hitler secured his secondary objective; the British and Japanese failed to realize theirs. Stalin won the diplomatic contest in 1939. Yet, as diplomats gave way to generals, the display of German military power in Poland and in Western Europe soon eclipsed Stalin's diplomatic triumph. By playing Germany against Britain and France, Stalin gained leverage and a potential fallback, but at the cost of unleashing a devastating European war. As with the aftermath of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly after hostilities ceased at Nomonhan. The Molotov–Togo agreement of September 15 and the local truces arranged around Nomonhan on September 19 were observed scrupulously by both sides. On October 27, the two nations settled another long-standing dispute by agreeing to mutual release of fishing boats detained on charges of illegal fishing in each other's territorial waters. On November 6, the USSR appointed Konstantin Smetanin as ambassador to Tokyo, replacing the previous fourteen-month tenure of a chargé d'affaires. Smetanin's first meeting with the new Japanese foreign minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, in November 1939 attracted broad, favorable coverage in the Japanese press. In a break with routine diplomatic practice, Nomura delivered a draft proposal for a new fisheries agreement and a memo outlining the functioning of the joint border commission to be established in the Nomonhan area before Smetanin presented his credentials. On December 31, an agreement finalizing Manchukuo's payment to the USSR for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached, and the Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention was renewed for 1940. In due course, the boundary near Nomonhan was formally redefined. A November 1939 agreement between Molotov and Togo established a mixed border commission representing the four parties to the dispute. After protracted negotiations, the border commission completed its redemarcation on June 14, 1941, with new border markers erected in August 1941. The resulting boundary largely followed the Soviet–MPR position, lying ten to twelve miles east of the Halha River. With that, the Nomonhan incident was officially closed.  Kwantung Army and Red Army leaders alike sought to "teach a lesson" to their foe at Nomonhan. The refrain recurs in documents and memoirs from both sides, "we must teach them a lesson." The incident provided lessons for both sides, but not all were well learned. For the Red Army, the lessons of Nomonhan intertwined with the laurels of victory, gratifying but sometimes distracting. Georgy Zhukov grasped the experience of modern warfare that summer, gaining more than a raised profile: command experience, confidence, and a set of hallmarks he would employ later. He demonstrated the ability to grasp complex strategic problems quickly, decisive crisis leadership, meticulous attention to logistics and deception, patience in building superior strength before striking at the enemy's weakest point, and the coordination of massed artillery, tanks, mechanized infantry, and tactical air power in large-scale double envelopment. These capabilities informed his actions at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and ultimately Berlin. It is tempting to wonder how Zhukov might have fared in the crucial autumn and winter of 1941 without Nomonhan, or whether he would have been entrusted with the Moscow front in 1941 had he not distinguished himself at Nomonhan. Yet the Soviet High Command overlooked an important lesson. Despite Zhukov's successes with independent tank formations and mechanized infantry, the command misapplied Spanish Civil War-era experience by disbanding armored divisions and redistributing tanks to infantry units to serve as support. It was not until after Germany demonstrated tank warfare in 1940 that the Soviets began reconstituting armored divisions and corps, a process still incomplete when the 1941 invasion began. The Red Army's performance at Nomonhan went largely unseen in the West. Western intelligence and military establishments largely believed the Red Army was fundamentally rotten, a view reinforced by the battlefield's remoteness and by both sides' reluctance to publicize the defeat. The Polish crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe drew attention away from Nomonhan, and the later Finnish Winter War reinforced negative Western judgments of Soviet military capability. U.S. military attaché Raymond Faymonville observed that the Soviets, anticipating a quick victory over Finland, relied on hastily summoned reserves ill-suited for winter fighting—an assessment that led some to judge the Red Army by its performance at Nomonhan. Even in Washington, this view persisted; Hitler reportedly called the Red Army "a paralytic on crutches" after Finland and then ordered invasion planning in 1941. Defeat can be a stronger teacher than victory. Because Nomonhan was a limited war, Japan's defeat was likewise limited, and its impact on Tokyo did not immediately recalibrate Japanese assessments. Yet Nomonhan did force Japan to revise its estimation of Soviet strength: the Imperial Army abandoned its strategic Plan Eight-B and adopted a more defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. An official inquiry into the debacle, submitted November 29, 1939, recognized Soviet superiority in materiel and firepower and urged Japan to bolster its own capabilities. The Kwantung Army's leadership, chastened, returned to the frontier with a more realistic sense of capability, even as the Army Ministry and AGS failed to translate lessons into policy. The enduring tendency toward gekokujo, the dominance of local and mid-level officers over central authority, remained persistent, and Tokyo did not fully purge it after Nomonhan. The Kwantung Army's operatives who helped drive the Nomonhan episode resurfaced in key posts at Imperial General Headquarters, contributing to Japan's 1941 decision to go to war. The defeat of the Kwantung Army at Nomonhan, together with the Stalin–Hitler pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, triggered a reorientation of Japanese strategy and foreign policy. The new government, led by the politically inexperienced and cautious General Abe Nobuyuki, pursued a conservative foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Chongqing left the Chinese war at a stalemate: the Japanese Expeditionary Army could still inflict defeats on Chinese nationalist forces, but it had no viable path to a decisive victory. China remained Japan's principal focus. Still, the option of cutting Soviet aid to China and of moving north into Outer Mongolia and Siberia was discredited in Tokyo by the August 1939 double defeat. Northward expansion never again regained its ascendancy, though it briefly resurfaced in mid-1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany's alliance with the USSR during Nomonhan was viewed by Tokyo as a betrayal, cooling German–Japanese relations. Japan also stepped back from its confrontation with Britain over Tientsin. Tokyo recognized that the European war represented a momentous development that could reshape East Asia, as World War I had reshaped it before. The short-lived Abe government (September–December 1939) and its successor under Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (December 1939–July 1940) adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the European war. That stance shifted in the summer of 1940, however, after Germany's successes in the West. With Germany's conquest of France and the Low Countries and Britain's fight for survival, Tokyo reassessed the global balance of power. Less than a year after Zhukov had effectively blocked further Japanese expansion northward, Hitler's victories seemed to open a southern expansion path. The prospect of seizing the resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch, French, and British and, more importantly, resolving the China problem in Japan's favor, tempted many in Tokyo. If Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek, channeled through Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Burma could be cut off, some in Tokyo believed Chiang might abandon resistance. If not, Japan could launch new operations against Chiang from Indochina and Burma, effectively turning China's southern flank. To facilitate a southward advance, Japan sought closer alignment with Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka brought Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in the hope of neutralizing the United States, and concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union to secure calm in the north. Because of the European military situation, only the United States could check Japan's southward expansion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared determined to do so and confident that he could. If the Manchurian incident and the Stimson Doctrine strained U.S.–Japanese relations, and the China War and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek deepened mutual resentment, it was Japan's decision to press south against French, British, and Dutch colonies, and Roosevelt's resolve to prevent such a move, that put the two nations on a collision course. The dust had barely settled on the Mongolian plains following the Nomonhan ceasefire when the ripples of that distant conflict began to reshape the broader theater of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The defeat at Nomonhan in August 1939, coupled with the shocking revelation of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, delivered a profound strategic blow to Japan's imperial ambitions. No longer could Tokyo entertain serious notions of a "northern advance" into Soviet territory, a strategy that had long tantalized military planners as a means to secure resources and buffer against communism. Instead, the Kwantung Army's humiliation exposed glaring deficiencies in Japanese mechanized warfare, logistics, and intelligence, forcing a pivot southward. This reorientation not only cooled tensions with the Soviet Union but also allowed Japan to redirect its military focus toward the protracted stalemate in China. As we transition from the border clashes of the north to the heartland tensions in central China, it's essential to trace how these events propelled Japan toward the brink of a major offensive in Hunan Province, setting the stage for what would become a critical confrontation. In the immediate aftermath of Nomonhan, Japan's military high command grappled with the implications of their setback. The Kwantung Army, once a symbol of unchecked aggression, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture along the Manchurian-Soviet border. The ceasefire agreement, formalized on September 15-16, 1939, effectively neutralized the northern front, freeing up significant resources and manpower that had been tied down in the escalating border skirmishes. This was no small relief; the Nomonhan campaign had drained Japanese forces, with estimates of over 18,000 casualties and the near-total annihilation of the 23rd Division. The psychological impact was equally severe, shattering the myth of Japanese invincibility against a modern, mechanized opponent. Georgy Zhukov's masterful use of combined arms—tanks, artillery, and air power—highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities, prompting internal reviews that urged reforms in tank production, artillery doctrine, and supply chains. Yet, these lessons were slow to implement, and in the short term, the primary benefit was the opportunity to consolidate efforts elsewhere. For Japan, "elsewhere" meant China, where the war had devolved into a grinding attrition since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The capture of Wuhan, a major transportation hub and temporary capital of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, had been hailed as a turning point. Japanese forces, under the command of General Shunroku Hata, had pushed deep into central China, aiming to decapitate Chinese resistance. However, Chiang's strategic retreat to Chongqing transformed the conflict into a war of endurance. Nationalist forces, bolstered by guerrilla tactics and international aid, harassed Japanese supply lines and prevented a decisive knockout blow. By mid-1939, Japan controlled vast swaths of eastern and northern China, including key cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, but the cost was immense: stretched logistics, mounting casualties, and an inability to fully pacify occupied territories. The Nomonhan defeat exacerbated these issues by underscoring the limits of Japan's military overextension. With the northern threat abated, Tokyo's Army General Staff saw an opening to intensify operations in China, hoping to force Chiang to the negotiating table before global events further complicated the picture. The diplomatic fallout from Nomonhan and the Hitler-Stalin Pact further influenced this shift. Japan's betrayal by Germany, its nominal ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact—fostered distrust and isolation. Tokyo's flirtations with a full Axis alliance stalled, as the pact with Moscow revealed Hitler's willingness to prioritize European gains over Asian solidarity. This isolation prompted Japan to reassess its priorities, emphasizing self-reliance in China while eyeing opportunistic expansions elsewhere. Domestically, the Hiranuma cabinet collapsed in August 1939 amid the diplomatic shock, paving the way for the more cautious Abe Nobuyuki government. Abe's administration, though short-lived, signaled a temporary de-escalation in aggressive posturing, but the underlying imperative to resolve the "China Incident" persisted. Japanese strategists believed that capturing additional strategic points in central China could sever Chiang's lifelines, particularly the routes funneling aid from the Soviet Union and the West via Burma and Indochina. The seismic shifts triggered by Nomonhan compelled Japan to fundamentally readjust its China policy and war plans, marking a pivotal transition from overambitious northern dreams to a more focused, albeit desperate, campaign in the south. With the Kwantung Army's defeat fresh in mind, Tokyo's Imperial General Headquarters initiated a comprehensive strategic review in late August 1939. The once-dominant "Northern Advance" doctrine, which envisioned rapid conquests into Siberia for resources like oil and minerals, was officially shelved. In its place emerged a "Southern Advance" framework, prioritizing the consolidation of gains in China and potential expansions into Southeast Asia. This pivot was not merely tactical; it reflected a profound policy recalibration aimed at ending the quagmire in China, where two years of war had yielded territorial control but no decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Central to this readjustment was a renewed emphasis on economic and military self-sufficiency. The Nomonhan debacle had exposed Japan's vulnerabilities in mechanized warfare, leading to urgent reforms in industrial production. Tank manufacturing was ramped up, with designs influenced by observed Soviet models, and artillery stockpiles were bolstered to match the firepower discrepancies seen on the Mongolian steppes. Logistically, the Army General Staff prioritized streamlining supply lines in China, recognizing that prolonged engagements demanded better resource allocation. Politically, the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, installed in September 1939, adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward Europe but aggressively pursued diplomatic maneuvers to isolate China. Efforts to negotiate with Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in Nanjing intensified, aiming to undermine Chiang's legitimacy and splinter Chinese resistance. Japan also pressured Vichy France for concessions in Indochina, seeking to choke off aid routes to Chongqing. War plans evolved accordingly, shifting from broad-front offensives to targeted strikes designed to disrupt Chinese command and supply networks. The China Expeditionary Army, under General Yasuji Okamura, was restructured to emphasize mobility and combined arms operations, drawing partial lessons from Zhukov's tactics. Intelligence operations were enhanced, with greater focus on infiltrating Nationalist strongholds in central provinces. By early September, plans coalesced around a major push into Hunan Province, a vital crossroads linking northern and southern China. Hunan's river systems and rail lines made it a linchpin for Chinese logistics, funneling men and materiel to the front lines. Japanese strategists identified key urban centers in the region as critical objectives, believing their capture could sever Chiang's western supply corridors and force a strategic retreat. This readjustment was not without internal friction. Hardliners in the military lamented the abandonment of northern ambitions, but the reality of Soviet strength—and the neutrality pacts that followed—left little room for debate. Economically, Japan ramped up exploitation of occupied Chinese territories, extracting coal, iron, and rice to fuel the war machine. Diplomatically, Tokyo sought to mend fences with the Soviets through the 1941 Neutrality Pact, ensuring northern security while eyes turned south. Yet, these changes brewed tension with the United States, whose embargoes on scrap metal and oil threatened to cripple Japan's ambitions. As autumn approached, the stage was set for a bold gambit in central China. Japanese divisions massed along the Yangtze River, poised to strike at the heart of Hunan's defenses. Intelligence reports hinted at Chinese preparations, with Xue Yue's forces fortifying positions around a major provincial hub. The air thickened with anticipation of a clash that could tip the balance in the interminable war—a test of Japan's revamped strategies against a resilient foe determined to hold the line. What unfolded would reveal whether Tokyo's post-Nomonhan pivot could deliver the breakthrough so desperately needed, or if it would merely prolong the bloody stalemate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident saw Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeat Japan's Kwantung Army at Khalkin Gol, exposing Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare. This setback, coupled with the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact, shattered Japan's northern expansion plans and prompted a strategic pivot southward. Diplomatic maneuvers involving Stalin, Hitler, Britain, France, and Japan reshaped alliances, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941. Japan refocused on China, intensifying operations in Hunan Province to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.   

3 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13Karl Dahl is an author specializing in the Spanish Civil War and historical "fiction."Karl and Pete did a brief series that provides a summary of the events leading up to, during, and following the Spanish Civil War. This includes the recent Livestream Q&A.Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

7 Hours and 53 MinutesPG-13These are the episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War plus the episode reading chapter 7 of The Last Crusdae.Correcting the Narrative on the Spanish Civil WarRight-Wing Factional Unity in the Spanish Civil WarThe Weaponry of the Spanish Civil WarPete Reads Warren H Carroll's 'The Last Crusade' Part 7The 'Left' Factions of the Spanish Civil War Faction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

4 Hours and 52 MinutesPG-13These are continuing episodes concentrating on specific aspects of the Spanish Civil War.Episode 1286: Learning from the Martyrdom of José Calvo Sotelo w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1291: Women in the Spanish Civil War w/ Karl DahlEpisode 1322 and 1323: The Spanish Civil War - Radicalizing a Moderate Socialist w/ Karl Dahl and MorghurFaction: With the CrusadersKarl's SubstackKarl's MerchPete and Thomas777 'At the Movies'Support Pete on His WebsitePete's PatreonPete's SubstackPete's SubscribestarPete's GUMROADPete's VenmoPete's Buy Me a CoffeePete on FacebookPete on TwitterBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-pete-quinones-show--6071361/support.

Last time we spoke about General Zhukov's arrival to the Nomohan incident. The Kwantung Army's inexperienced 23rd Division, under General Komatsubara, suffered heavy losses in failed offensives, including Colonel Yamagata's assault and the annihilation of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma's detachment, resulting in around 500 Japanese casualties. Tensions within the Japanese command intensified as Kwantung defied Tokyo's restraint, issuing aggressive orders like 1488 and launching a June 27 air raid on Soviet bases, destroying dozens of aircraft and securing temporary air superiority. This provoked Moscow's fury and rebukes from Emperor Hirohito. On June 1, Georgy Zhukov, a rising Red Army tactician and tank expert, was summoned from Minsk. Arriving June 5, he assessed the 57th Corps as inadequate, relieved Commander Feklenko, and took charge of the redesignated 1st Army Group. Reinforcements included mechanized brigades, tanks, and aircraft. Japanese intelligence misread Soviet supply convoys as retreats, underestimating Zhukov's 12,500 troops against their 15,000. By July, both sides poised for a massive clash, fueled by miscalculations and gekokujo defiance.   #190 Zhukov Unleashes Tanks at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. At 4:00 a.m. on July 1, 15,000 heavily laden Japanese troops began marching to their final assembly and jump-off points. The sun rose at 4:00 a.m. and set at 9:00 p.m. that day, but the Japanese advance went undetected by Soviet/MPR commanders, partly because the June 27 air raid had temporarily cleared Soviet reconnaissance from the skies. On the night of July 1, Komatsubara launched the first phase. The 23rd Division, with the Yasuoka Detachment, converged on Fui Heights, east of the Halha River, about eleven miles north of its confluence with the Holsten. The term "heights" is misleading here; a Japanese infantry colonel described Fui as a "raised pancake" roughly one to one-and-a-half miles across, about thirty to forty feet higher than the surrounding terrain. For reasons not fully explained, the small Soviet force stationed on the heights was withdrawn during the day on July 1, and that night Fui Heights was occupied by Komatsubara's forces almost unopposed. This caused little stir at Zhukov's headquarters. Komatsubara bided his time on July 2.   On the night of July 2–3, the Japanese achieved a brilliant tactical success. A battalion of the 71st Infantry Regiment silently crossed the Halha River on a moonless night and landed unopposed on the west bank opposite Fui Heights. Recent rains had swollen the river to 100–150 yards wide and six feet deep, making crossing difficult for men, horses, or vehicles. Combat engineers swiftly laid a pontoon bridge, completing it by 6:30 a.m. on July 3. The main body of Komatsubara's 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (23rd Division) and the 26th Regiment (7th Division) began a slow, arduous crossing. The pontoon bridge, less than eight feet wide, was a bottleneck, allowing only one truck at a time. The attackers could not cross with armored vehicles, but they did bring across their regimental artillery, 18 x 37-mm antitank guns, 12 x 75-mm mountain guns, 8 x 75-mm field guns, and 4 x 120-mm howitzers, disassembled, packed on pack animals, and reassembled on the west bank. The crossing took the entire day, and the Japanese were fortunate to go without interception. The Halha crossing was commanded personally by General Komatsubara and was supported by a small Kwantung Army contingent, including General Yano (deputy chief of staff), Colonel Hattori, and Major Tsuji from the Operations Section. Despite the big air raid having alerted Zhukov, the initial Japanese moves from July 1–3 achieved complete tactical surprise, aided by Tsuji's bold plan. The first indication of the major offensive came when General Yasuoka's tanks attacked predawn on July 3. Yasuoka suspected Soviet troops south of him attempting to retreat across the Halha to the west bank, and he ordered his tanks to attack immediately, with infantry not yet in position. The night's low clouds, no moon, and low visibility—along with a passing thunderstorm lighting the sky—made the scene dramatic. Seventy Japanese tanks roared forward, supported by infantry and artillery, and the Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment found itself overwhelmed. Zhukov, hearing of Yasuoka's assault but unaware that Komatsubara had crossed the Halha, ordered his armor to move northeast to Bain Tsagan to confront the initiative. There, Soviet armor clashed with Japanese forces in a chaotic, largely uncoordinated engagement. The Soviet counterattacks, supported by heavy artillery, halted much of the Japanese momentum, and by late afternoon Japanese infantry had to dig in west of the Halha. The crossing had been accomplished without Soviet reconnaissance detecting it in time, but Zhukov's counterattacks, the limits of Japanese armored mobility across the pontoon, and the heat and exhaustion of the troops constrained the Japanese effort. By the afternoon of July 3, Zhukov's forces were pressing hard, and the Japanese momentum began to stall. Yasuoka's tanks, supported by a lack of infantry and the fatigue and losses suffered by the infantry, could not close the gap to link with Komatsubara's forces. The Type 89 tanks, designed for infantry support, were ill-suited to penetrating Soviet armor, especially when faced with BT-5/BT-7 tanks and strong anti-tank guns. The Type 95 light tanks were faster but lightly armored, and suffered heavily from Soviet fire and air attacks. Infantry on the western bank struggled to catch up with tanks, shot through by Soviet artillery and armor, while the 64th Regiment could not keep pace with the tanks due to the infantry's lack of motorized transport. By late afternoon, Yasuoka's advance stalled far short of the river junction and the Soviet bridge. The infantry dug in to withstand Soviet bombardment, and the Japanese tank regiments withdrew to their jump-off points by nightfall. The Japanese suffered heavy losses in tanks, though some were recovered and repaired; by July 9, KwAHQ decided to withdraw its two tank regiments from the theater. Armor would play no further role in the Nomonhan conflict. The Soviets, by contrast, sustained heavier tank losses but began to replenish with new models. The July offensive, for Kwantung Army, proved a failure. Part of the failure stemmed from a difficult blend of terrain and logistics. Unusually heavy rains in late June had transformed the dirt roads between Hailar and Nomonhan into a mud-filled quagmire. Japanese truck transport, already limited, was so hampered by these conditions that combat effectiveness suffered significantly. Colonel Yamagata's 64th Infantry Regiment, proceeding on foot, could not keep pace with or support General Yasuoka's tanks on July 3–4. Komatsubara's infantry on the west bank of the Halha ran short of ammunition, food, and water. As in the May 28 battle, the main cause of the Kwantung Army's July offensive failure was wholly inadequate military intelligence. Once again, the enemy's strength had been seriously underestimated. Moreover, a troubling realization was dawning at KwAHQ and in the field: the intelligence error was not merely quantitative but qualitative. The Soviets were not only more numerous but also far more potent than anticipated. The attacking Japanese forces initially held a slight numerical edge and enjoyed tactical surprise, but the Red Army fought tenaciously, and the weight of Soviet firepower proved decisive. Japan, hampered by a relative lack of raw materials and industrial capacity, could not match the great powers in the quantitative production of military materiel. Consequently, Japanese military leaders traditionally emphasized the spiritual superiority of Japan's armed forces in doctrine and training, often underestimating the importance of material factors, including firepower. This was especially true of the army that had carried the tactic of the massed bayonet charge into World War II. This "spiritual" combat doctrine arose from necessity; admitting material superiority would have implied defeat. Japan's earlier victories in the Sino-Japanese War, Russo-Japanese War, the Manchurian incident, and the China War, along with legendary medieval victories over the Mongol hordes, seemed to confirm the transcendent importance of fighting spirit. Only within such a doctrine could the Imperial Japanese Army muster inner strength and confidence to face formidable enemies. This was especially evident against Soviet Russia, whose vast geography, population, and resources loomed large. Yet what of its spirit? The Japanese military dismissed Bolshevism as a base, materialist philosophy utterly lacking spiritual power. Consequently, the Red Army was presumed to have low morale and weak fighting effectiveness. Stalin's purges only reinforced this belief. Kwantung Army's recent experiences at Nomonhan undermined this outlook. Among ordinary soldiers and officers alike, from the 23rd Division Staff to KwAHQ—grim questions formed: Had Soviet materiel and firepower proven superior to Japanese fighting spirit? If not, did the enemy possess a fighting spirit comparable to their own? To some in Kwantung Army, these questions were grotesque and almost unthinkable. To others, the implications were too painful to face. Perhaps May and July's combat results were an aberration caused by the 23rd Division's inexperience. Nevertheless, a belief took hold at KwAHQ that this situation required radical rectification. Zhukov's 1st Army Headquarters, evaluating recent events, was not immune to self-criticism and concern for the future. The enemy's success in transporting nearly 10,000 men across the Halha without detection—despite heightened Soviet alert after the June 27 air raid—revealed a level of carelessness and lack of foresight at Zhukov's level. Zhukov, however, did not fully capitalize on Komatsubara's precarious position on July 4–5. Conversely, Zhukov and his troops reacted calmly in the crisis's early hours. Although surprised and outnumbered, Zhukov immediately recognized that "our trump cards were the armored detachments, and we decided to use them immediately." He acted decisively, and the rapid deployment of armor proved pivotal. Some criticized the uncoordinated and clumsy Soviet assault on Komatsubara's infantry on July 3, but the Japanese were only a few hours' march from the river junction and the Soviet bridge. By hurling tanks at Komatsubara's advance with insufficient infantry support, Mikhail Yakovlev (11th Tank Brigade) and A. L. Lesovoi (7th Mechanized Brigade) incurred heavy losses. Nonetheless, they halted the Japanese southward advance, forcing Komatsubara onto the defensive, from which he never regained momentum. Zhukov did not flinch from heavy casualties to achieve his objectives. He later told General Dwight D. Eisenhower that if the enemy faced a minefield, their infantry attacked as if it did not exist, treating personnel mine losses as equal to those that would have occurred if the Germans defended the area with strong troops rather than minefields. Zhukov admitted losing 120 tanks and armored cars that day—a high price, but necessary to avert defeat. Years later, Zhukov defended his Nomonhan tactics, arguing he knew his armor would suffer heavy losses, but that was the only way to prevent the Japanese from seizing the bridge at the river confluence. Had Komatsubara's forces advanced unchecked for another two or three hours, they might have fought through to the Soviet bridge and linked with the Yasuoka detachment, endangering Zhukov's forces. Zhukov credited Yakovlev, Lesovoi, and their men with stabilizing the crisis through timely and self-sacrificing counterattacks. The armored car battalion of the 8th MPR Cavalry Division also distinguished itself in this action. Zhukov and his tankmen learned valuable lessons in those two days of brutal combat. A key takeaway was the successful use of large tank formations as an independent primary attack force, contrary to then-orthodox doctrine, which saw armor mainly as infantry support and favored integrating armor into every infantry regiment rather than maintaining large, autonomous armored units. The German blitzkrieg demonstrations in Poland and Western Europe soon followed, but, until then, few major armies had absorbed the tank-warfare theories championed by Basil Liddell-Hart and Charles de Gaulle. The Soviet high command's leading proponent of large-scale tank warfare had been Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. His execution in 1937 erased those ideas, and the Red Army subsequently disbanded armored divisions and dispersed tanks among infantry, misapplying battlefield lessons from the Spanish Civil War. Yet Zhukov was learning a different lesson on a different battlefield. The open terrain of eastern Mongolia favored tanks, and Zhukov was a rapid learner. The Russians also learned mundane, but crucial, lessons: Japanese infantry bravely clambering onto their vehicles taught Soviet tank crews to lock hatch lids from the inside. The BT-5 and BT-7 tanks were easily set aflame by primitive hand-thrown firebombs, and rear deck ventilation grills and exhaust manifolds were vulnerable and required shielding. Broadly, the battle suggested to future Red Army commander Zhukov that tank and motorized troops, coordinated with air power and mobile artillery, could decisively conduct rapid operations. Zhukov was not the first to envision combining mobile firepower with air and artillery, but he had rare opportunities to apply this formula in crucial tests. The July offensive confirmed to the Soviets that the Nomonhan incident was far from a border skirmish; it signaled intent for further aggression. Moscow's leadership, informed by Richard Sorge's Tokyo network, perceived Japan's renewed effort to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alliance as a dangerous possibility. Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov began indicating to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Adolf Hitler that Berlin's stance on the Soviet–Japanese conflict would influence Soviet-German rapprochement considerations. Meanwhile, Moscow decided to reinforce Zhukov. Tens of thousands of troops and machines were ordered to Mongolia, with imports from European Russia. Foreign diplomats traveling the Trans-Siberian Railway reported eastbound trains jammed with personnel and matériel. The buildup faced a major bottleneck at Borzya, the easternmost railhead in the MPR, about 400 miles from the Halha. To prevent a logistics choke, a massive truck transport operation was needed. Thousands of trucks, half-tracks, gun-towing tractors, and other vehicles were organized into a continuous eight-hundred-mile, five-day shuttle run. The Trans-Baikal Military District, under General Shtern, supervised the effort. East of the Halha, many Japanese officers still refused to accept a failure verdict for the July offensive. General Komatsubara did not return to Hailar, instead establishing a temporary divisional HQ at Kanchuerhmiao, where his staff grappled with overcoming Soviet firepower. They concluded that night combat—long a staple of Japanese infantry tactics—could offset Soviet advantages. On July 7 at 9:30 p.m., a thirty-minute Japanese artillery barrage preceded a nighttime assault by elements of the 64th and 72nd Regiments. The Soviet 149th Infantry Regiment and supporting Mongolian cavalry were surprised and forced to fall back toward the Halha before counterattacking. Reinforcements arrived on both sides, and in brutal close-quarters combat the Japanese gained a partial local advantage, but were eventually pushed back; Major I. M. Remizov of the 149th Regiment was killed and later posthumously named a Hero of the Soviet Union. Since late May, Soviet engineers had built at least seven bridges across the Halha and Holsten Rivers to support operations. By July 7–8, Japanese demolition teams destroyed two Soviet bridges. Komatsubara believed that destroying bridges could disrupt Soviet operations east of the Halha and help secure the border. Night attacks continued from July 8 to July 12 against the Soviet perimeter, with Japanese assaults constricting Zhukov's bridgehead while Soviet artillery and counterattacks relentlessly pressed. Casualties mounted on both sides. The Japanese suffered heavy losses but gained some positions; Soviet artillery, supported by motorized infantry and armor, gradually pushed back the attackers. The biggest problem for Japan remained Soviet artillery superiority and the lack of a commensurate counter-battery capability. Japanese infantry had to withdraw to higher ground at night to avoid daytime exposure to artillery and tanks. On the nights of July 11–12, Yamagata's 64th Regiment and elements of Colonel Sakai Mikio's 72nd Regiment attempted a major assault on the Soviet bridgehead. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Japanese managed to push defenders back to the river on occasion, but Soviet counterattacks, supported by tiresome artillery and armor, prevented a decisive breakthrough. Brigade Commander Yakovlev of the 11th Armored, who led several counterattacks, was killed and later honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union; his gun stands today as a monument at the battlefield. The July 11–12 action marked the high-water mark of the Kwantung Army's attempt to expel Soviet/MPR forces east of the Halha. Komatsubara eventually suspended the costly night attacks; by that night, the 64th Regiment had suffered roughly 80–90 killed and about three times that number wounded. The decision proved controversial, with some arguing that he had not realized how close his forces had come to seizing the bridge. Others argued that broader strategic considerations justified the pause. Throughout the Nomonhan fighting, Soviet artillery superiority, both quantitative and qualitative, became painfully evident. The Soviet guns exacted heavy tolls and repeatedly forced Japanese infantry to withdraw from exposed positions. The Japanese artillery, in contrast, could not match the Red Army's scale. By July 25, Kwantung Army ended its artillery attack, a humiliating setback. Tokyo and Hsinking recognized the futility of achieving a decisive military victory at Nomonhan and shifted toward seeking a diplomatic settlement, even if concessions to the Soviet Union and the MPR were necessary. Kwantung Army, however, opposed negotiations, fearing it would echo the "Changkufeng debacle" and be read by enemies as weakness. Tsuji lamented that Kwantung Army's insistence on framing the second phase as a tie—despite heavy Soviet losses, revealed a reluctance to concede any territory. Differences in outlook and policy between AGS and Kwantung Army—and the central army's inability to impose its will on Manchukuo's field forces—became clear. The military establishment buzzed with stories of gekokujo (the superiority of the superior) within Kwantung Army and its relations with the General Staff. To enforce compliance, AGS ordered General Isogai to Tokyo for briefings, and KwAHQ's leadership occasionally distanced itself from AGS. On July 20, Isogai arrived at General Staff Headquarters and was presented with "Essentials for Settlement of the Nomonhan Incident," a formal document outlining a step-by-step plan for Kwantung Army to maintain its defensive position east of the Halha while diplomatic negotiations proceeded. If negotiations failed, Kwantung Army would withdraw to the boundary claimed by the Soviet Union by winter. Isogai, the most restrained member of the Kwantung Army circle, argued against accepting the Essentials, insisting on preserving Kwantung Army's honor and rejecting a unilateral east-bank withdrawal. A tense exchange followed, but General Nakajima ended the dispute by noting that international boundaries cannot be determined by the army alone. Isogai pledged to report the General Staff's views to his commander and take the Essentials back to KwAHQ for study. Technically, the General Staff's Essentials were not orders; in practice, however, they were treated as such. Kwantung Army tended to view them as suggestions and retained discretion in implementation. AGS hoped the Essentials would mollify Kwantung Army's wounded pride. The August 4 decision to create a 6 Army within Kwantung Army, led by General Ogisu Rippei, further complicated the command structure. Komatsubara's 23rd Division and nearby units were attached to the 6 Army, which also took responsibility for defending west-central Manchukuo, including the Nomonhan area. The 6 Army existed largely on paper, essentially a small headquarters to insulate KwAHQ from battlefield realities. AGS sought a more accountable layer of command between KwAHQ and the combat zone, but General Ueda and KwAHQ resented the move and offered little cooperation. In the final weeks before the last battles, General Ogisu and his small staff had limited influence on Nomonhan. Meanwhile, the European crisis over German demands on Poland intensified, moving into a configuration highly favorable to the Soviet Union. By the first week of August, it became evident in the Kremlin that both Anglo-French powers and the Germans were vying to secure an alliance with Moscow. Stalin knew now that he would likely have a free hand in the coming war in the West. At the same time, Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in Tokyo, correctly reported that Japan's top political and military leaders sought to prevent the escalation of the Nomonhan incident into an all-out war. These developments gave the cautious Soviet dictator the confidence to commit the Red Army to large-scale combat operations in eastern Mongolia. In early August, Stalin ordered preparations for a major offensive to clear the Nomonhan area of the "Japanese samurai who had violated the territory of the friendly Outer Mongolian people." The buildup of Zhukov's 1st Army Group accelerated still further. Its July strength was augmented by the 57th and 82nd Infantry Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 212th Airborne Brigade, numerous smaller infantry, armor, and artillery units, and two Mongolian cavalry divisions. Soviet air power in the area was also greatly strengthened. When this buildup was completed by mid-August, Zhukov commanded an infantry force equivalent to four divisions, supported by two cavalry divisions, 216 artillery pieces, 498 armored vehicles, and 581 aircraft. To bring in the supplies necessary for this force to launch an offensive, General Shtern's Trans-Baikal Military District Headquarters amassed a fleet of more than 4,200 vehicles, which trucked in about 55,000 tons of materiel from the distant railway depot at Borzya. The Japanese intelligence network in Outer Mongolia was weak, a problem that went unremedied throughout the Nomonhan incident. This deficiency, coupled with the curtailment of Kwantung Army's transborder air operations, helps explain why the Japanese remained ignorant of the scope of Zhukov's buildup. They were aware that some reinforcements were flowing eastward across the Trans-Siberian Railway toward the MPR but had no idea of the volume. Then, at the end of July, Kwantung Army Intelligence intercepted part of a Soviet telegraph transmission indicating that preparations were under way for some offensive operation in the middle of August. This caused a stir at KwAHQ. Generals Ueda and Yano suspected that the enemy planned to strike across the Halha River. Ueda's initial reaction was to reinforce the 23rd Division at Nomonhan with the rest of the highly regarded 7th Division. However, the 7th Division was Kwantung Army's sole strategic reserve, and the Operations Section was reluctant to commit it to extreme western Manchukuo, fearing mobilization of Soviet forces in the Maritime Province and a possible attack in the east near Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army commander again ignored his own better judgment and accepted the Operations Section's recommendation. The main strength of the 7th Division remained at its base near Tsitsihar, but another infantry regiment, the 28th, was dispatched to the Nomonhan area, as was an infantry battalion from the Mukden Garrison. Earlier, in mid-July, Kwantung Army had sent Komatsubara 1,160 individual replacements to make up for casualties from earlier fighting. All these reinforcements combined, however, did little more than replace losses: as of July 25, 1,400 killed (including 200 officers) and 3,000 wounded. Kwantung Army directed Komatsubara to dig in, construct fortifications, and adopt a defensive posture. Colonel Numazaki, who commanded the 23rd Division's Engineer Regiment, was unhappy with the defensive line he was ordered to fortify and urged a slight pullback to more easily defensible terrain. Komatsubara, however, refused to retreat from ground his men had bled to take. He and his line officers still nourished hope of a revenge offensive. As a result, the Japanese defensive positions proved to be as weak as Numazaki feared. As Zhukov's 1st Army Group prepared to strike, the effective Japanese strength at Nomonhan was less than 1.5 divisions. Major Tsuji and his colleagues in the Operations Section had little confidence in Kwantung Army's own Intelligence Section, which is part of the reason why Tsuji frequently conducted his own reconnaissance missions. Up to this time it was gospel in the Japanese army that the maximum range for large-scale infantry operations was 125–175 miles from a railway; anything beyond 200 miles from a railway was considered logistically impossible. Since Kwantung Army had only 800 trucks available in all of Manchukuo in 1939, the massive Soviet logistical effort involving more than 4,200 trucks was almost unimaginable to the Japanese. Consequently, the Operations Staff believed it had made the correct defensive deployments if a Soviet attack were to occur, which it doubted. If the enemy did strike at Nomonhan, it was believed that it could not marshal enough strength in that remote region to threaten the reinforced 23rd Division. Furthermore, the 7th Division, based at Tsitsihar on a major rail line, could be transported to any trouble spot on the eastern or western frontier in a few days. KwAHQ advised Komatsubara to maintain a defensive posture and prepare to meet a possible enemy attack around August 14 or 15. At this time, Kwantung Army also maintained a secret organization codenamed Unit 731, officially the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Unit 731 specialized in biological and chemical warfare, with main facilities and laboratories in Harbin, including a notorious prison-laboratory complex. During the early August lull at Nomonhan, a detachment from Unit 731 infected the Halha River with bacteria of an acute cholera-like strain. There are no reports in Soviet or Japanese accounts that this attempted biological warfare had any effect. In the war's final days, Unit 731 was disbanded, Harbin facilities demolished, and most personnel fled to Japan—but not before they gassed the surviving 150 human subjects and burned their corpses. The unit's commander, Lieutenant General Ishii Shiro, kept his men secret and threatened retaliation against informers. Ishii and his senior colleagues escaped prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials by trading the results of their experiments to U.S. authorities in exchange for immunity. The Japanese 6th Army exerted some half-hearted effort to construct defensive fortifications, but scarcity of building materials, wood had to be trucked in from far away—helped explain the lack of enthusiasm. More importantly, Japanese doctrine despised static defense and favored offense, so Kwantung Army waited to see how events would unfold. West of the Halha, Zhukov accelerated preparations. Due to tight perimeter security, few Japanese deserters, and a near-absence of civilian presence, Soviet intelligence found it hard to glean depth on Japanese defensive positions. Combat intelligence could only reveal the frontline disposition and closest mortar and artillery emplacements. Aerial reconnaissance showed photographs, but Japanese camouflage and mock-ups limited their usefulness. The new commander of the 149th Mechanized Infantry Regiment personally directed infiltration and intelligence gathering, penetrating Japanese lines on several nights and returning crucial data: Komatsubara's northern and southern flanks were held by Manchukuoan cavalry, and mobile reserves were lacking. With this information, Zhukov crafted a plan of attack. The main Japanese strength was concentrated a few miles east of the Halha, on both banks of the Holsten River. Their infantry lacked mobility and armor, and their flanks were weak. Zhukov decided to split the 1st Army Group into three strike forces: the central force would deliver a frontal assault to pin the main Japanese strength, while the northern and southern forces, carrying the bulk of the armor, would turn the Japanese flanks and drive the enemy into a pocket to be destroyed by the three-pronged effort. The plan depended on tactical surprise and overwhelming force at the points of attack. The offensive was to begin in the latter part of August, pending final approval from Moscow. To ensure tactical surprise, Zhukov and his staff devised an elaborate program of concealment and deception, disinformation. Units and materiel arriving at Tamsag Bulak toward the Halha were moved only at night with lights out. Noting that the Japanese were tapping telephone lines and intercepting radio messages, 1st Army Headquarters sent a series of false messages in an easily decipherable code about defensive preparations and autumn-winter campaigning. Thousands of leaflets titled "What the Infantryman Should Know about Defense" were distributed among troops. About two weeks before the attack, the Soviets brought in sound equipment to simulate tank and aircraft engines and heavy construction noises, staging long, loud performances nightly. At first, the Japanese mistook the sounds for large-scale enemy activity and fired toward the sounds. After a few nights, they realized it was only sound effects, and tried to ignore the "serenade." On the eve of the attack, the actual concentration and staging sounds went largely unnoticed by the Japanese. On August 7–8, Zhukov conducted minor attacks to expand the Halha bridgehead to a depth of two to three miles. These attacks, contained relatively easily by Komatsubara's troops, reinforced Kwantung Army's false sense of confidence. The Japanese military attaché in Moscow misread Soviet press coverage. In early August, the attaché advised that unlike the Changkufeng incident a year earlier, Soviet press was largely ignoring the conflict, implying low morale and a favorable prognosis for the Red Army. Kwantung Army leaders seized on this as confirmation to refrain from any display of restraint or doubt, misplaced confidence. There were, however, portents of danger. Three weeks before the Soviet attack, Colonel Isomura Takesuki, head of Kwantung Army's Intelligence Section, warned of the vulnerability of the 23rd Division's flanks. Tsuji and colleagues dismissed this, and General Kasahara Yukio of AGS also went unheeded. The "desk jockey" General Staff officers commanded little respect at KwAHQ. Around August 10, General Hata Yuzaburo, Komatsubara's successor as chief of the Special Services Agency at Harbin, warned that enemy strength in the Mongolian salient was very great and seriously underestimated at KwAHQ. Yet no decisive action followed before Zhukov's attack. Kwantung Army's inaction and unpreparedness prior to the Soviet offensive appear to reflect faulty intelligence compounded by hubris. But a more nuanced explanation suggests a fatalistic wishful thinking rooted in the Japanese military culture—the belief that their spiritual strength would prevail, leading them to assume enemy strength was not as great as reported, or that victory was inevitable regardless of resources. Meanwhile, in the rational West, the Nazi war machine faced the Polish frontier as Adolf Hitler pressed Stalin for a nonaggression pact. The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact would neutralize the threat of a two-front war for Germany and clear the way for Hitler's invasion of Poland. If the pact was a green light, it signaled in both directions: it would also neutralize the German threat to Russia and clear the way for Zhukov's offensive at Nomonhan. On August 18–19, Hitler pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow to seal the pact. Thus, reassured in the West, Stalin dared to act boldly against Japan. Zhukov supervised final preparations for his attack. Zhukov held back forward deployments until the last minute. By August 18, he had only four infantry regiments, a machine gun brigade, and Mongolian cavalry east of the Halha. Operational security was extremely tight: a week before the attack, Soviet radio traffic in the area virtually ceased. Only Zhukov and a few key officers worked on the plan, aided by a single typist. Line officers and service chiefs received information on a need-to-know basis. The date for the attack was shared with unit commanders one to four days in advance, depending on seniority. Noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers learned of the offensive one day in advance and received specific orders three hours before the attack.   Heavy rain grounded Japanese aerial reconnaissance from August 17 to midday on the 19th, but on August 19 Captain Oizumi Seisho in a Japanese scout plane observed the massing of Soviet forces near the west bank of the Halha. Enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the river in dispersed formations, with no new bridges but pontoon stocks spotted near the river. Oizumi sent a warning to a frontline unit and rushed back to report. The air group dispatched additional recon planes and discovered that the Japanese garrison on Fui Heights, near the northern end of Komatsubara's line, was being encircled by Soviet armor and mechanized infantry—observed by alarmed Japanese officers on and near the heights. These late discoveries on August 19 were not reported to KwAHQ and had no effect on the 6th Army and the 23rd Division's alertness on the eve of the storm. As is common in militaries, a fatal gap persisted between those gathering intelligence and those in a position to act on it. On the night of August 19–20, under cover of darkness, the bulk of the Soviet 1st Army Group crossed the Halha into the expanded Soviet enclave on the east bank.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. By August, European diplomacy left Moscow confident in a foothold against Germany and Britain, while Sorge's intelligence indicated Japan aimed to avoid a full-blown war. Stalin ordered a major offensive to clear Nomonhan, fueling Zhukov's buildup in eastern Mongolia. Kwantung Army, hampered by limited logistics, weak intelligence, and defensive posture, faced mounting pressure. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Nomohan incident. On the fringes of Manchuria, the ghosts of Changkufeng lingered. It was August 1938 when Soviet and Japanese forces locked in a brutal standoff over a disputed hill, claiming thousands of lives before a fragile ceasefire redrew the lines. Japan, humiliated yet defiant, withdrew, but the Kwantung Army seethed with resentment. As winter thawed into 1939, tensions simmered along the Halha River, a serpentine boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia. Major Tsuji Masanobu, a cunning tactician driven by gekokujo's fire, drafted Order 1488: a mandate empowering local commanders to annihilate intruders, even luring them across borders. Kwantung's leaders, bonded by past battles, endorsed it, ignoring Tokyo's cautions amid the grinding China War. By May, the spark ignited. Mongolian patrols crossed the river, clashing with Manchukuoan cavalry near Nomonhan's sandy hills. General Komatsubara, ever meticulous, unleashed forces to "destroy" them, bombing west-bank outposts and pursuing retreats. Soviets, bound by pact, rushed reinforcements, their tanks rumbling toward the fray. What began as skirmishes ballooned into an undeclared war.   #189 General Zhukov Arrives at Nomohan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Though Kwantung Army prided itself as an elite arm of the Imperial Japanese Army, the 23rd Division, formed less than a year prior, was still raw and unseasoned, lacking the polish and spirit typical of its parent force. From General Michitaro Komatsubara downward, the staff suffered a collective dearth of combat experience. Intelligence officer Major Yoshiyasu Suzuki, a cavalryman, had no prior intel background. While senior regimental commanders were military academy veterans, most company and platoon leaders were fresh reservists or academy graduates with just one or two years under their belts. Upon arriving in Manchukuo in August 1938, the division found its Hailar base incomplete, housing only half its troops; the rest scattered across sites. Full assembly at Hailar occurred in November, but harsh winter weather curtailed large-scale drills. Commanders had scant time to build rapport. This inexperience, inadequate training, and poor cohesion would prove costly at Nomonhan. Japan's army held steady at 17 divisions from 1930 to 1937, but the escalating China conflict spurred seven new divisions in 1938 and nine in 1939. Resource strains from China left many under-equipped, with the 23rd, stationed in a presumed quiet sector, low on priorities. Unlike older "rectangular" divisions with four infantry regiments, the 23rd was a modern "triangular" setup featuring the 64th, 71st, and 72nd. Materiel gaps were glaring. The flat, open terrain screamed for tanks, yet the division relied on a truck-equipped transport regiment and a reconnaissance regiment with lightly armored "tankettes" armed only with machine guns. Mobility suffered: infantry marched the final 50 miles from Hailar to Nomonhan. Artillery was mostly horse-drawn, including 24 outdated Type 38 75-mm guns from 1907, the army's oldest, unique to this division. Each infantry regiment got four 37-mm rapid-fire guns and four 1908-era 75-mm mountain guns. The artillery regiment added 12 120-mm howitzers, all high-angle, short-range pieces ill-suited for flatlands or anti-tank roles. Antitank capabilities were dire: beyond rapid-fire guns, options boiled down to demolition charges and Molotov cocktails, demanding suicidal "human bullet" tactics in open terrain, a fatal flaw against armor. The division's saving grace lay in its soldiers, primarily from Kyushu, Japan's southernmost main island, long famed for hardy warriors. These men embodied resilience, bravery, loyalty, and honor, offsetting some training and gear deficits. Combat at Nomonhan ramped up gradually, with Japanese-Manchukuoan forces initially outnumbering Soviet-Mongolian foes. Soviets faced severe supply hurdles: their nearest rail at Borzya sat 400 miles west of the Halha River, requiring truck hauls over rough, exposed terrain prone to air strikes. Conversely, Hailar was 200 miles from Nomonhan, with the Handagai railhead just 50 miles away, linked by three dirt roads. These advantages, plus Europe's brewing Polish crisis, likely reassured Army General Staff and Kwantung Army Headquarters that Moscow would avoid escalation. Nonetheless, Komatsubara, with KwAHQ's nod, chose force to quash the Nomonhan flare-up. On May 20, Japanese scouts spotted a Soviet infantry battalion and armor near Tamsag Bulak. Komatsubara opted to "nip the incident in the bud," assembling a potent strike force under Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata of the 64th Infantry Regiment. The Yamagata detachment included the 3rd Battalion, roughly four companies, 800 men, a regimental gun company, three 75-mm mountain guns, four 37-mm rapid-fires, three truck companies, and Lieutenant Colonel Yaozo Azuma's reconnaissance group, 220 men, one tankette, two sedans, 12 trucks. Bolstered by 450 local Manchukuoan troops, the 2,000-strong unit was tasked with annihilating all enemy east of the Halha. The assault was set for May 22–23. No sooner had General Komatsubara finalized this plan than he received a message from KwAHQ: "In settling the affair Kwantung Army has definite plans, as follows: For the time being Manchukuoan Army troops will keep an eye on the Outer Mongolians operating near Nomonhan and will try to lure them onto Manchukuoan territory. Japanese forces at Hailar [23rd Division] will maintain surveillance over the situation. Upon verification of a border violation by the bulk of the Outer Mongolian forces, Kwantung Army will dispatch troops, contact the enemy, and annihilate him within friendly territory. According to this outlook it can be expected that enemy units will occupy border regions for a considerable period; but this is permissible from the overall strategic point of view". At this juncture, Kwantung Army Headquarters advocated tactical caution to secure a more conclusive outcome. Yet, General Michitaro Komatsubara had already issued orders for Colonel Takemitsu Yamagata's assault. Komatsubara radioed Hsinking that retracting would be "undignified," resenting KwAHQ's encroachment on his authority much as KwAHQ chafed at Army General Staff interference. Still, "out of deference to Kwantung Army's feelings," he delayed to May 27 to 28. Soviet air units from the 57th Corps conducted ineffective sorties over the Halha River from May 17 to 21. Novice pilots in outdated I 15 biplanes suffered heavily: at least 9, possibly up to 17, fighters and scouts downed. Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov halted air ops, aiding Japanese surprise. Yamagata massed at Kanchuerhmiao, 40 miles north of Nomonhan, sending patrols southward. Scouts spotted a bridge over the Halha near its Holsten junction, plus 2 enemy groups of ~200 each east of the Halha on either Holsten side and a small MPR outpost less than a mile west of Nomonhan. Yamagata aimed to trap and destroy these east of the river: Azuma's 220 man unit would drive south along the east bank to the bridge, blocking retreat. The 4 infantry companies and Manchukuoan troops, with artillery, would attack from the west toward enemy pockets, herding them riverward into Azuma's trap. Post destruction, mop up any west bank foes near the river clear MPR soil swiftly. This intricate plan suited early MPR foes but overlooked Soviet units spotted at Tamsag Bulak on May 20, a glaring oversight by Komatsubara and Yamagata. Predawn on May 28, Yamagata advanced from Kanchuerhmiao. Azuma detached southward to the bridge. Unbeknownst, it was guarded by Soviet infantry, engineers, armored cars, and a 76 mm self propelled artillery battery—not just MPR cavalry. Soviets detected Azuma pre dawn but missed Yamagata's main force; surprise was mutual. Soviet MPR core: Major A E Bykov's battalion roughly 1000 men with 3 motorized infantry companies, 16 BA 6 armored cars, 4 76 mm self propelled guns, engineers, and a 5 armored car recon platoon. The 6th MPR Cavalry Division roughly 1250 men had 2 small regiments, 4 76 mm guns, armored cars, and a training company. Bykov arrayed north to south: 2 Soviet infantry on flanks, MPR cavalry center, unorthodox, as cavalry suits flanks. Spread over 10 miles parallel to but east of the Halha, 1 mile west of Nomonhan. Reserves: 1 infantry company, engineers, and artillery west of the river near the bridge; Shoaaiibuu's guns also west to avoid sand. Japanese held initial edges in numbers and surprise, especially versus MPR cavalry. Offsets: Yamagata split into 5 weaker units; radios failed early, hampering coordination; Soviets dominated firepower with self propelled guns, 4 MPR pieces, and BA 6s, armored fighters with 45 mm turret guns, half track capable, 27 mph speed, but thin 9 mm armor vulnerable to close heavy machine guns. Morning of May 28, Yamagata's infantry struck Soviet MPR near Nomonhan, routing lightly armed MPR cavalry and forcing Soviet retreats toward the Halha. Shoaaiibuu rushed his training company forward; Japanese overran his post, killing him and most staff. As combat neared the river, Soviet artillery and armored cars slowed Yamagata. He redirected to a low hill miles east of the Halha with dug in Soviets—failing to notify Azuma. Bykov regrouped 1 to 2 miles east of the Halha Holsten junction, holding firm. By late morning, Yamagata stalled, digging in against Soviet barrages. Azuma, radio silent due to faults, neared the bridge to find robust Soviet defenses. Artillery commander Lieutenant Yu Vakhtin shifted his 4 76 mm guns east to block seizure. Azuma lacked artillery or anti tank tools, unable to advance. With Yamagata bogged down, Azuma became encircled, the encirclers encircled. Runners reached Yamagata, but his dispersed units couldn't rally or breakthrough. By noon, Azuma faced infantry and cavalry from the east, bombardments from west (both Halha sides). Dismounted cavalry dug sandy defenses. Azuma could have broken out but held per mission, awaiting Yamagata, unaware of the plan shift. Pressure mounted: Major I M Remizov's full 149th Regiment recent Tamsag Bulak arrivals trucked in, tilting odds. Resupply failed; ammo dwindled. Post dusk slackening: A major urged withdrawal; Azuma refused, deeming retreat shameful without orders, a Japanese army hallmark, where "retreat" was taboo, replaced by euphemisms like "advance in a different direction." Unauthorized pullback meant execution. Dawn May 29: Fiercer Soviet barrage, 122 mm howitzers, field guns, mortars, armored cars collapsed trenches. An incendiary hit Azuma's sedan, igniting trucks with wounded and ammo. By late afternoon, Soviets closed to 50 yards on 3 fronts; armored cars breached rear. Survivors fought desperately. Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Azuma led 24 men in a banzai charge, cut down by machine guns. A wounded medical lieutenant ordered escapes; 4 succeeded. Rest killed or captured. Komatsubara belatedly reinforced Yamagata on May 29 with artillery, anti tank guns, and fresh infantry. Sources claim Major Tsuji arrived, rebuked Yamagata for inaction, and spurred corpse recovery over 3 nights, yielding ~200 bodies, including Azuma's. Yamagata withdrew to Kanchuerhmiao, unable to oust foes. Ironically, Remizov mistook recovery truck lights for attacks, briefly pulling back west on May 30. By June 3, discovering the exit, Soviet MPR reoccupied the zone. Japanese blamed:  (1) poor planning/recon by Komatsubara and Yamagata,  (2) comms failures,  (3) Azuma's heavy weapon lack. Losses: ~200 Azuma dead, plus 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing from main force, total 500, 25% of detachment. Soviets praised Vakhtin for thwarting pincers. Claims: Bykov 60 to 70 casualties; TASS 40 killed, 70 wounded total Soviet/MPR. Recent Russian: 138 killed, 198 wounded. MPR cavalry hit hard by Japanese and friendly fire. Soviet media silent until June 26; KwAHQ censored, possibly misleading Tokyo. May 30: Kwantung Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai assured AGS of avoiding prolongation via heavy frontier blows, downplaying Soviet buildup and escalation. He requested river crossing gear urgently.   This hinted at Halha invasion (even per Japanese borders: MPR soil). AGS's General Gun Hashimoto affirmed trust in localization: Soviets' vexations manageable, chastisement easy. Colonel Masazumi Inada's section assessed May 31: 1. USSR avoids expansion.  2. Trust Kwantung localization.  3. Intervene on provocative acts like deep MPR air strikes. Phase 1 ended: Kwantung called it mutual win loss, but inaccurate, Azuma destroyed, heavy tolls, remorse gnawing Komatsubara. On June 1, 1939, an urgent summons from Moscow pulled the young deputy commander of the Byelorussian Military District from Minsk to meet Defense Commissar Marshal Kliment Voroshilov. He boarded the first train with no evident concern, even as the army purges faded into memory. This rising cavalry- and tank-expert, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, would later help defend Moscow in 1941, triumph at Stalingrad and Kursk, and march to Berlin as a Hero of the Soviet Union.Born in 1896 to a poor family headed by a cobbler, Zhukov joined the Imperial Army in 1915 as a cavalryman. Of average height but sturdy build, he excelled in horsemanship and earned the Cross of St. George and noncommissioned status for bravery in 1916. After the October Revolution, he joined the Red Army and the Bolshevik Party, fighting in the Civil War from 1918 to 1921. His proletarian roots, tactical skill, and ambition propelled him: command of a regiment by 1923, a division by 1931. An early advocate of tanks, he survived the purges, impressing superiors as a results-driven leader and playing a key role in his assignment to Mongolia. In Voroshilov's office on June 2, Zhukov learned of recent clashes. Ordered to fly east, assess the situation, and assume command if needed, he soon met acting deputy chief Ivan Smorodinov, who urged candid reports. Europe's war clouds and rising tensions with Japan concerned the Kremlin. Hours later, Zhukov and his staff flew east. Arriving June 5 at Tamsag Bulak (57th Corps HQ), Zhukov met the staff and found Corps Commander Nikolai Feklenko and most aides clueless; only Regimental Commissar M. S. Nikishev had visited the front. Zhukov toured with Nikishev that afternoon and was impressed by his grasp. By day's end, Zhukov bluntly reported: this is not a simple border incident; the Japanese are likely to escalate; the 57th Corps is inadequate. He suggested holding the eastern Halha bridgehead until reinforcements could enable a counteroffensive, and he criticized Feklenko. Moscow replied on June 6: relieve Feklenko; appoint Zhukov. Reinforcements arrived: the 36th Mechanized Infantry Division; the 7th, 8th, and 9th Mechanized Brigades; the 11th Tank Brigade; the 8th MPR Cavalry Division; a heavy artillery regiment; an air wing of more than 100 aircraft, including 21 pilots who had earned renown in the Spanish Civil War. The force was redesignated as the First Army Group. In June, these forces surged toward Tamsag Bulak, eighty miles west of Halha. However, General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23rd Division and the Kwantung Army Headquarters missed the buildup and the leadership change, an intelligence failure born of carelessness and hubris and echoing May's Azuma disaster, with grave battlefield consequences. Early June remained relatively quiet: the Soviet MPR expanded the east-bank perimeter modestly; there was no major Japanese response. KwAHQ's Commander General Kenkichi Ueda, hoping for a quick closure, toured the Fourth Army from May 31 to June 18. Calm broke on June 19. Komatsubara reported two Soviet strikes inside Manchukuo: 15 planes hit Arshan, inflicting casualties on men and horses; 30 aircraft set fire to 100 petroleum barrels near Kanchuerhmiao. In fact, the raids were less dramatic than described: not on Kanchuerhmiao town (a 3,000-person settlement, 40 miles northwest of Nomonhan) but on a supply dump 12 miles south of it. "Arshan" referred to a small village near the border, near Arshanmiao, a Manchukuoan cavalry depot, not a major railhead at Harlun Arshan 100 miles southeast. The raids were strafing runs rather than bombs. Possibly retaliation for May 15's Japanese raid on the MPR Outpost 7 (two killed, 15 wounded) or a response to Zhukov's bridgehead push. Voroshilov authorized the action; motive remained unclear. Nonetheless, KwAHQ, unused to air attacks after dominating skies in Manchuria, Shanghai (1932), and China, was agitated. The situation resembled a jolt akin to the 1973 North Vietnamese strike on U.S. bases in Thailand: not unprovoked, but shocking. Midday June 19, the Operations Staff met. Major Masanobu Tsuji urged swift reprisal; Colonel Masao Terada urged delay in light of the Tientsin crisis (the new Japanese blockade near Peking). Tsuji argued that firmness at Nomonhan would impress Britain; inaction would invite deeper Soviet bombardments or invasion. He swayed Chief Colonel Takushiro Hattori and others, including Terada. They drafted a briefing: the situation was grave; passivity risked a larger invasion and eroded British respect for Japanese might. After two hours of joint talks, most KwAHQ members supported a strong action. Tsuji drafted a major Halha crossing plan to destroy Soviet MPR forces. Hattori and Terada pressed the plan to Chief of Staff General Rensuke Isogai, an expert on Manchukuo affairs but not operations; he deferred to Deputy General Otozaburo Yano, who was absent. They argued urgency; Isogai noted delays in AGS approval. The pair contended for local Kwantung prerogative, citing the 1937 Amur cancellation; AGS would likely veto. Under pressure, Isogai assented, pending Ueda's approval. Ueda approved but insisted that the 23rd Division lead, not the 7th. Hattori noted the 7th's superiority (four regiments in a "square" arrangement versus the 23rd's three regiments, with May unreliability). Ueda prioritized Komatsubara's honor: assigning another division would imply distrust; "I'd rather die." The plan passed on June 19, an example of gekokujo in action. The plan called for reinforcing the 23rd with: the 2nd Air Group (180 aircraft, Lieutenant General Tetsuji Gigi); the Yasuoka Detachment (Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoka: two tank regiments, motorized artillery, and the 26th Infantry of the 7th). Total strength: roughly 15,000 men, 120 guns, 70 tanks, 180 aircraft. KwAHQ estimated the enemy at about 1,000 infantry, 10 artillery pieces, and about 12 armored vehicles, expecting a quick victory. Reconnaissance to Halha was curtailed to avoid alerting the Soviets. Confidence ran high, even as intel warned otherwise. Not all leaders were convinced: the 23rd's ordnance colonel reportedly committed suicide over "awful equipment." An attaché, Colonel Akio Doi, warned of growing Soviet buildup, but operations dismissed the concern. In reality, Zhukov's force comprised about 12,500 men, 109 guns, 186 tanks, 266 armored cars, and more than 100 aircraft, offset by the Soviets' armor advantage. The plan echoed Yamagata's failed May 28 initiative: the 23rd main body would seize the Fui Heights (11 miles north of Halha's Holsten junction), cross by pontoon, and sweep south along the west bank toward the Soviet bridge. Yasuoka would push southeast of Halha to trap and destroy the enemy at the junction. On June 20, Tsuji briefed Komatsubara at Hailar, expressing Ueda's trust while pressing to redeem May's failures. Limited pontoon capacity would not support armor; the operation would be vulnerable to air power. Tsuji's reconnaissance detected Soviet air presence at Tamsag Bulak, prompting a preemptive strike and another plan adjustment. KwAHQ informed Tokyo of the offensive in vague terms (citing raids but withholding air details). Even this caused debate; Minister Seishiro Itagaki supported Ueda's stance, favoring a limited operation to ease nerves. Tokyo concurred, unaware of the air plans. Fearing a veto on the Tamsag Bulak raid (nearly 100 miles behind MPR lines), KwAHQ shielded details from the Soviets and Tokyo. A June 29–30 ground attack was prepared; orders were relayed by courier. The leak reached Tokyo on June 24. Deputy Chief General Tetsuzo Nakajima telegrammed three points: 1) AGS policy to contain the conflict and avoid West MPR air attacks;  2) bombing risks escalation;  3) sending Lieutenant Colonel Yadoru Arisue on June 25 for liaison. Polite Japanese diplomatic phrasing allowed Operations to interpret the message as a suggestion. To preempt Arisue's explicit orders, Tsuji urged secrecy from Ueda, Isogai, and Yano, and an advanced raid to June 27. Arisue arrived after the raid on Tamsag Bulak and Bain Tumen (deeper into MPR territory, now near Choibalsan). The Raid resulted in approximately 120 Japanese planes surprising the Soviets, grounding and destroying aircraft and scrambling their defense. Tsuji, flying in a bomber, claimed 25 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 100 in the air. Official tallies reported 98 destroyed and 51 damaged; ground kills estimated at 50 to 60 at Bain Tumen. Japanese losses were relatively light: one bomber, two fighters, one scout; seven dead. Another Japanese bomber was shot down over MPR, but the crew was rescued. The raid secured air superiority for July.   Moscow raged over the losses and the perceived failure to warn in time. In the purge era, blame fell on suspected spies and traitors; Deputy Mongolian Commander Luvsandonoi and ex-57th Deputy A. M. Kushchev were accused, arrested, and sent to Moscow. Luvsandonoi was executed; Kushchev received a four-year sentence, later rising to major general and Hero. KwAHQ celebrated; Operations notified AGS by radio. Colonel Masazumi Inada rebuked: "You damned idiot! What do you think the true meaning of this little success is?" A withering reprimand followed. Stunned but unrepentant, KwAHQ soon received Tokyo's formal reprimand: "Report was received today regarding bombing of Outer Mongolian territory by your air units… . Since this action is in fundamental disagreement with policy which we understood your army was taking to settle incident, it is extremely regretted that advance notice of your intent was not received. Needless to say, this matter is attended with such farreaching consequences that it can by no means be left to your unilateral decision. Hereafter, existing policy will be definitely and strictly observed. It is requested that air attack program be discontinued immediately" By Order of the Chief of Staff  By this time, Kwantung Army staff officers stood in high dudgeon. Tsuji later wrote that "tremendous combat results were achieved by carrying out dangerous operations at the risk of our lives. It is perfectly clear that we were carrying out an act of retaliation. What kind of General Staff ignores the psychology of the front lines and tramples on their feelings?" Tsuji drafted a caustic reply, which Kwantung Army commanders sent back to Tokyo, apparently without Ueda or other senior KwAHQ officers' knowledge: "There appear to be certain differences between the Army General Staff and this Army in evaluating the battlefield situation and the measures to be adopted. It is requested that the handling of trivial border-area matters be entrusted to this Army." That sarcastic note from KwAHQ left a deep impression at AGS, which felt something had to be done to restore discipline and order. When General Nakajima informed the Throne about the air raid, the emperor rebuked him and asked who would assume responsibility for the unauthorized attack. Nakajima replied that military operations were ongoing, but that appropriate measures would be taken after this phase ended. Inada sent Terada a telegram implying that the Kwantung Army staff officers responsible would be sacked in due course. Inada pressed to have Tsuji ousted from Kwantung Army immediately, but personnel matters went through the Army Ministry, and Army Minister Itagaki, who knew Tsuji personally, defended him. Tokyo recognized that the situation was delicate; since 1932, Kwantung Army had operated under an Imperial Order to "defend Manchukuo," a broad mandate. Opinions differed in AGS about how best to curb Kwantung Army's operational prerogatives. One idea was to secure Imperial sanction for a new directive limiting Kwantung Army's autonomous combat actions to no more than one regiment. Several other plans circulated. In the meantime, Kwantung Army needed tighter control. On June 29, AGS issued firm instructions to KwAHQ: Directives: a) Kwantung Army is responsible for local settlement of border disputes. b) Areas where the border is disputed, or where defense is tactically unfeasible, need not be defended. Orders: c) Ground combat will be limited to the border region between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia east of Lake Buir Nor. d) Enemy bases will not be attacked from the air. With this heated exchange of messages, the relationship between Kwantung Army and AGS reached a critical moment. Tsuji called it the "breaking point" between Hsinking and Tokyo. According to Colonel Inada, after this "air raid squabble," gekokujo became much more pronounced in Hsinking, especially within Kwantung Army's Operations Section, which "ceased making meaningful reports" to the AGS Operations Section, which he headed. At KwAHQ, the controversy and the perception of AGS interference in local affairs hardened the resolve of wavering staff officers to move decisively against the USSR. Thereafter, Kwantung Army officers as a group rejected the General Staff's policy of moderation in the Nomonhan incident. Tsuji characterized the conflict between Kwantung Army and the General Staff as the classic clash between combat officers and "desk jockeys." In his view, AGS advocated a policy of not invading enemy territory even if one's own territory was invaded, while Kwantung Army's policy was not to allow invasion. Describing the mindset of the Kwantung Army (and his own) toward the USSR in this border dispute, Tsuji invoked the samurai warrior's warning: "Do not step any closer or I shall be forced to cut you down." Tsuji argued that Kwantung Army had to act firmly at Nomonhan to avoid a larger war later. He also stressed the importance, shared by him and his colleagues, of Kwantung Army maintaining its dignity, which he believed was threatened by both enemy actions and the General Staff. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, the Kwantung Army launched its July offensive. The success of the 2nd Air Group's attack on Tamsag Bulak further inflated KwAHQ's confidence in the upcoming offensive. Although aerial reconnaissance had been intentionally limited to avoid alarming or forewarning the enemy, some scout missions were flown. The scouts reported numerous tank emplacements under construction, though most reports noted few tanks; a single report of large numbers of tanks was downplayed at headquarters. What drew major attention at KwAHQ were reports of large numbers of trucks leaving the front daily and streaming westward into the Mongolian interior. This was interpreted as evidence of a Soviet pullback from forward positions, suggesting the enemy might sense the imminent assault. Orders were issued to speed up final preparations for the assault before Soviet forces could withdraw from the area where the Japanese "meat cleaver" would soon dismember them. What the Japanese scouts had actually observed was not a Soviet withdrawal, but part of a massive truck shuttle that General Grigori Shtern, now commander of Soviet Forces in the Far East, organized to support Zhukov. Each night, Soviet trucks, from distant MPR railway depots to Tamsag Bulak and the combat zone, moved eastward with lights dimmed, carrying supplies and reinforcements. By day, the trucks returned westward for fresh loads. It was these returning trucks, mostly empty, that the Japanese scouts sighted. The Kwantung interpretation of this mass westbound traffic was a serious error, though understandable. The Soviet side was largely ignorant of Japanese preparations, partly because the June 27 air raid had disrupted Soviet air operations, including reconnaissance. In late June, the 23rd Division and Yasuoka's tank force moved from Hailar and Chiangchunmiao toward Nomonhan. A mix of military and civilian vehicles pressed into service, but there was still insufficient motorized transport to move all troops and equipment at once. Most infantry marched the 120 miles to the combat zone, under a hot sun, carrying eighty-pound loads. They arrived after four to six days with little time to recover before the scheduled assault. With Komatsubara's combined force of about 15,000 men, 120 guns, and 70 tanks poised to attack, Kwantung Army estimated Soviet-MPR strength near Nomonhan and the Halha River at about 1,000 men, perhaps ten anti-aircraft guns, ten artillery pieces, and several dozen tanks. In reality, Japanese air activity, especially the big raid of June 27, had put the Soviets on alert. Zhukov suspected a ground attack might occur, though nothing as audacious as a large-scale crossing of the Halha was anticipated. During the night of July 1, Zhukov moved his 11th Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Brigade, and 24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (36th Division) from their staging area near Tamsag Bulak to positions just west of the Halha River. Powerful forces on both sides were being marshaled with little knowledge of the enemy's disposition. As the sun scorched the Mongolian steppes, the stage was set for a clash that would echo through history. General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, bolstered by Yasuoka's armored might and the skies commanded by Gigi's air group, crept toward the Halha River like a predator in the night. Fifteen thousand Japanese warriors, their boots heavy with dust and resolve, prepared to cross the disputed waters and crush what they believed was a faltering foe. Little did they know, Zhukov's reinforcements, tanks rumbling like thunder, mechanized brigades poised in the shadows, had transformed the frontier into a fortress of steel. Miscalculations piled like sand dunes: Japanese scouts mistook supply convoys for retreats, while Soviet eyes, blinded by the June raid, underestimated the impending storm. Kwantung's gekokujo spirit burned bright, defying Tokyo's cautions, as both sides hurtled toward a brutal reckoning. What began as border skirmishes now threatened to erupt into full-scale war, testing the mettle of empires on the edge. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Patrols in May led to failed Japanese offensives, like Colonel Yamagata's disastrous assault and the Azuma detachment's annihilation. Tensions rose with air raids, including Japan's June strike on Soviet bases. By July, misjudged intelligence set the stage for a major confrontation, testing imperial ambitions amid global war clouds.

Peter Stansky explains that George Orwell's time as a colonial police officer in Burma fueled his growing anti-imperialism and decision to become a writer, while fighting in the Spanish Civil War solidified his identity as a democratic socialist and staunch anti-communist after witnessing Soviet betrayals.

Minnesotan community member Maryam Mohamad joins us to talk about the killing of Renee Nicole Good and the siege of Minneapolis by ICE and the DHS. We talk about the events and prosecutions that put the Somali community in the crosshairs, the regime's attempt to spin this execution as self-defense, Border Patrol and ICE's recent history of excessive force, and the predictably weak response from Democratic electeds. Maryam also talks about the Minneapolis and Somali community's reactions to these horrors and their unwillingness to take this lying down. Follow Maryam on twitter @messyventura Just a few more days to buy the 2nd printing of ¡No Pasarán!: Matt Christman's Spanish Civil War over at chapotraphouse.store Year Zero: A Chapo Trap House Comics Anthology is also 15% off at badegg.co. Through end of year purchases of the book also include a free digital version of the comic. The digital version is also available through GlobalComix. Follow the new Chapo Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/chapotraphousereal/ And Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/chapotraphousereal.bsky.social