Podcasts about justices ginsburg

In Season 3, Episode 3 of Notorious, we discuss campaign finance, from legal viewpoints of Justices Ginsburg and Marshall. Among the issues discussed are what it means to participate in a fair and free election and the intersection between money and its impact on free speech during a political campaign.  Guests will include Patterson Belknap Partner Alejandro H. Cruz and Patterson Belknap Associates Greg Margolis and Bonita L. Robinson. Related Resources: For a selection of Justice Ginsburg's writings, see Decisions and Dissents of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  A Selection, edited by Corey Brettschneider. For more information about Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, see www.pbwt.com. For information about becoming a guest on Notorious, email Michelle Bufano. For questions or more information about Notorious, email Jenni Dickson. Also, check out the Patterson Belknap podcast, How to Build A Nation in 15 Weeks. Related People: Michelle M. Bufano Alejandro H. Cruz Greg Margolis Bonita L. Robinson

Featuring guest speaker, Mai Ratakonda of Planned Parenthood Federation of America. In Episode 12 of Notorious, we discussed the case of Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, which addressed issues related to reproductive freedom. At issue was a Texas Law that placed restrictions on physicians and facilities performing abortions. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the provisions violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Sotomayor, and Kagan, highlighted a balancing test. The articulated balancing test considered whether the government purposes of the law at issue outweighed the burden placed on substantive due process rights. Here, the majority found that the law imposed an undue burden on abortion access. While joining in the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion. In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg bluntly stated:  "[I]t is beyond rational belief that . . . [the law at issue] could genuinely protect the health of women." Mai Ratakonda, of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, joined by Patterson Belknap attorneys, Michelle Bufano and Amy Vegari, discuss this case and Justice Ginsburg's fight for reproductive freedom. Related Resources: For a selection of Justice Ginsburg's writings, see Decisions and Dissents of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  A Selection, edited by Corey Brettschneider. For more information about Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, see www.pbwt.com. For information about becoming a guest on Notorious, email Michelle Bufano. For questions or more information about Notorious, email Jenni Dickson. Also, check out the Patterson Belknap podcast, How to Build A Nation in 15 Weeks. Related People: Mai Ratakonda Michelle Bufano Amy Vegari

Featuring Guest Speaker, Professor Rick Hasen of the University of California, Irvine. In Episode 10 of Notorious, we discussed the case of Bush v. Gore, which involved one of the closest presidential elections in United States history at that time. This case concerned the 2000 presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. After Gore won the popular vote, the election's outcome was contingent upon Florida and its twenty-five electoral votes. After Gore requested a recount of votes, the Florida Supreme Court held that the recount procedures were constitutional. In a per curium opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court, holding that the scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. The Court found that even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice because the factual record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Therefore, the scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, with this decision, Bush became the first president since Benjamin Harris in 1888 to lose the popular vote but win the general election.  Justices Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. This is one of the rare occasions where Justice Ginsburg rejected an Equal Protection Clause argument in one of her opinions.  Professor Rick Hasen, of the University of California, Irvine, joined by Patterson Belknap attorneys, Michelle Bufano and Alejandro Cruz, discuss this case and Justice Ginsburg's unique take on federalism over the Equal Protection Clause.    Related Resources: For a selection of Justice Ginsburg's writings, see Decisions and Dissents of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  A Selection, edited by Corey Brettschneider. For more information about Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, see  www.pbwt.com. For information about becoming a guest on Notorious, email Michelle Bufano. For questions or more information about Notorious, email Jenni Dickson. Also, check out the Patterson Belknap podcast, How to Build A Nation in 15 Weeks. Related People: Rick Hasen Michelle Bufano Alejandro Cruz

Tali welcomes Neal Katyal (who's argued more than 40 cases before the Supreme Court) for a conversation about the powerful legacies of Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Kagan, and Sotomayor. With Judge Amy Coney Barrett's nomination currently under consideration by the Senate, Tali also presses Neal about the essential qualities of a Supreme Court Justice, whether the size of the Court should be expanded, and most importantly, what the Court's jurisprudence means for the search for justice in local prosecution. This show is paid for by New Yorkers for Tali. To learn more about Tali's campaign for Manhattan DA, please visit http://taliforda.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

“Nothing can do men of good will more harm than apparent compromises with parties (political) that subscribe to anti–moral and anti–Democratic and anti-God forces. We must have the courage to detach our support from men (and women) who are doing evil. We must bear them no hatred, but we must break with them.”The straightforward, uncompromising words of former Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen, no longer among us. Archbishop Sheen had his own television program some decades ago. It was avidly watched by Catholics and indeed some non–Catholics as well. Sheen was powerful, straightforward, deeply concerned with right and truth and a real champion of the Roman Catholic Church. This powerful institution, not really what it once was, needs more men, more leaders, men and women for that matter to truly champion the truth, the right and all things moral. It, like all religious institutions, needs men and women like Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen.Here his profound and straightforward words again:“Nothing can do men (and women) of good will more harm than apparent compromises with parties (political) that subscribe to anti–moral and anti–Democratic and anti–God forces.”Sheen was deeply concerned with compromise. If there is truth, absolute truth, it can NOT be compromised. It is what it is, it speaks for itself, it cannot be interpreted and it must be fully observed and respected. And if, said Archbishop Sheen, there comes a political party which “subscribes” to anti–moral, anti–Democratic and anti–God forces, all Roman Catholics, and in fact all people of faith:         “MUST BREAK WITH THEM.”And there has come that time, that party in our beloved America. It is here, and it is now. They are the progressives, the radicals, the anti–Americans who continue to call themselves:         THE DEMOCRAT PARTY.Former Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson and Jimmy Carter among others would be stunned, shocked and disengaged from the conduct, beliefs, platforms and promises of the current Democrat party. That led one Catholic political pundit to state:          “This (the Democrats) is no longer your daddy's democratic party.”And is that ever an understatement. It is nothing at all, absolutely nothing like the pro American Democrats of old. Anti–Catholicism existed at the very beginning of the immigration of Catholics to America in the early 1800s. There was, to be sure and unfortunately so, considerable bias against them. Not as people are human beings, but because they were Roman Catholic. Prejudice was everywhere. But, through the decades, it ameliorated and although there were always differences between Protestant and Catholic, and of course people of other religions and faiths, and there are today, a gentle tolerance replaced hostility and animosity and those differences were confronted peacefully, with discourse and dialogue, with charitable conduct and not, NOT with hostility or political attacks. And then came Obama in 2008. Barack Hussein Obama and Joe Biden (remember him?) came to power in 2008 following the lazy years of the George W. Bush Administration with influence and control over the House and Senate, Obamacare, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT was passed and became the law, the medical law of our great country. Many think and many more know that this law as implemented was an absolute disaster and continues to be so. But the law and its nefarious provisions were aggressively implemented by Obama and company and no matter the effect, forced upon all Americans. It was supported by political untruths (if you like your present medical coverage, you can keep it) and implemented by those who were anti–capitalist and most importantly, anti–religion. They cared little or nothing about the First Amendment and the so called first freedom:         FREEDOM OF RELIGION!Obamacare mandated that employers provide contraceptives to their employees as part of medical insurance. Abortive fasciant – contraceptives were required and the right of all employees who wished to take advantage of them, so said Obama and company. The rules for such were developed by the Departments for Health and Human Services, the Labor Department and the Treasury Department. Contraceptives were required free of charge and abortion–causing drugs were fully legal and to be paid for by insurance. Many millions objected but few if any stood up. EXCEPT, of all things Catholic Nuns. These nuns were known as:         THE LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOMEin Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. When Pennsylvania tried to force these sweet little ladies, as Joe Biden calls them, to provide contraceptives and abortive fasciants to their employees, the nuns objected and refused, God bless them. They sued the once great state of Pennsylvania. They got to the Supreme Court, which took their case, the landmark case known as:LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIAThe fight was on for morality, freedom and all things pro Christian. The plaintiff LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR are a group of Catholic nuns who sacrifice all worldly possessions to care for the sick and elderly. This uncompromising Catholic group, began their fight with the government in 2011 when the Affordable Care Act required employees to cover all FDA approved contraceptives in their PRIVATE health plans. Religious groups like THE LITTLE SISTERS were not exempted even as churches were. The Sisters asked the U.S. Supreme Court to respect their right to moral and religious freedom. Again, the Supreme Court took the case. The case was heard in its own right and also as a result of the Trump Administration putting forth regulations in 2017 and 2018 which expanded EXEMPTIONS for employers with good faith objections, religious and moral based objections, founded upon the First Amendment to furnishing and paying for all such. Ministers had been exempt but not other legitimate organizations which had sincerely held moral or religious objections to the Obamacare abortive fasciant – contraceptive mandate. Now, they were under the new Trump Administration regulations. Both the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey objected and aggressively entered in to the litigation, defending their objections that no such exemption was legal or constitutional.Then came the decision from the nine Supreme Court Justices. Seven Justices, joining in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas and others, ruled that the exemptions for religious organizations and for businesses with “SINCERE MORAL” objections were in fact exempted from the mandate and could not be forced to provide the coverage required by the Affordable Care Act. With the liberal–skewing current bent of the Supreme Court, it is indeed amazing or perhaps even divinely inspired that the Court came to this conclusion and with such a large majority. Normally predictable liberal-skewing Justices Kagan and Breyer sided with the five other so called Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in favor of this exemption for religious organizations and for businesses with “sincere moral objections.” There are two liberal, ultra–liberal Supreme Court Justices who vote virtually 100% of the time for radical liberal results in virtually every case, namely Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. They often appear on record as crusaders rather than jurists. They were completely against the opinion, really the opinions of the majority seven. But the LITTLE SISTERS won, a major victory for these sweet little ladies (Biden) who really had more muscle and political clout than old Joe realized. All of us, and all organizations, and all businesses who hold these SINCERE MORAL BELIEFS should be absolutely delighted with the results and we should thank these Catholic Nuns and those who represent them for pursuing this legal victory since 2011 (9 long years), at least for now. If Biden wins the presidency and the Democrats win House and Senate, you can be certain that this exemption will be done away with either by legislation or executive order and back they go, these LITTLE SISTERS to court. The hostility on the part of DEMOCRATS for anything religious, for any beliefs or convictions sincerely and morally held is palpable and will become the full law of the land as the Democrats will. It is hard to believe that any person of faith, especially Catholic, could vote for the Democrats knowing what they stand for and what they feel about and will do to anything RELIGIOUS. These are scary times. If you like we believe in the Constitution and the freedoms of the First Amendment including and especially Freedom of Religion, you should be deeply concerned should the Democrats win. But there is a matter of six weeks to make sure that doesn't happen and to abide by the pungent and poignant words of Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen referring to anti–moral and anti–God parties and politicians, like modern day Democrats:         “WE MUST BREAK WITH THEM!”And we must break with these modern–day Democrats if we wish to preserve our First Amendment rights to Freedom of Religion. WE MUST!Today, the Catholics. Tomorrow, Evangelicals, and Jews, and perhaps finally Muslims although they would be last, and then all people of faith. It is the avowed goal of Democrats to excise religion from the public square, out of politics and out of power. It is happening and it will continue to happen, of that you can be sure. So I say to you my fellow Americans, my fellow Christians, and all people of faith, you cannot and you should not vote:         DEMOCRAT.That of course is a blunt, aggressive, highly opinionated point of view but one which I believe to be extremely accurate, based on current fact, and an understanding of what the democratic party platform will yield and what its aggressive, anti–constitutional politicians and leaders will do if in power, and especially FULL POWER. It would be the end, THE END my fellow Americans of the freedoms we have enjoyed for 240 years and so often taken for granted. THE END!So I reiterate the words of Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen with which I most fully agree describing without knowing the current Democrat Party 2020:         WE (THE PEOPLE OF FAITH) MUST BREAK WITH THEM!That means don't vote for them. That means keep them out of power and let them do no further harm to our Constitution and our religious way of life. For, under their control and power, those freedoms will be lost, and once lost:         GONE FOREVER!

On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (DHS v. Regents) was vacated in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the D.C. Circuit (Trump v. NAACP) was affirmed, and various orders of the Second Circuit (Wolf v. Vidal) were vacated, affirmed in part, or reversed in part. All the cases are remanded. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.To discuss the case, on this special panel episode, we have: Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of LawChristopher Hajec, Director of Litigation at the Immigration Reform Law InstituteMario Loyola, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise InstituteWilliam A. Stock, Partner at Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP

On July 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., a case involving a dispute over whether the government-debt exception to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’s automated-call restriction violates the First Amendment, and whether the proper remedy for any constitutional violation is to sever the exception from the remainder of the statute.By a vote of 6-3, in an opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the case, holding that The exception for calls to collect government debt from a federal ban on robocalls to cellphones violates the First Amendment, but the exception is severable from the rest of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.Justice Thomas joined the court’s opinion as to parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined as to part II.To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On July 6, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., a case involving a dispute over whether the government-debt exception to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991’s automated-call restriction violates the First Amendment, and whether the proper remedy for any constitutional violation is to sever the exception from the remainder of the statute.By a vote of 6-3, in an opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court affirmed the case, holding that The exception for calls to collect government debt from a federal ban on robocalls to cellphones violates the First Amendment, but the exception is severable from the rest of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.Justice Thomas joined the court’s opinion as to parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined as to part II.To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Dimino, Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (DHS v. Regents) was vacated in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the D.C. Circuit (Trump v. NAACP) was affirmed, and various orders of the Second Circuit (Wolf v. Vidal) were vacated, affirmed in part, or reversed in part. All the cases are remanded. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.To discuss the case, on this special panel episode, we have: Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of LawChristopher Hajec, Director of Litigation at the Immigration Reform Law InstituteMario Loyola, Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise InstituteWilliam A. Stock, Partner at Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP

On July 9, the Supreme Court released its decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed. Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, and by Justice Thomas except as to footnote 9. Justice Thomas also filed a dissent. Our group of experts joins us to discuss the decisions and implications moving forward.Featuring: -- A.J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP-- Andy Lester, Partner, Spencer Fane LLP-- Prof. Taiawagi “Tai” Helton, W. DeVier Pierson Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law

On July 9, the Supreme Court released its decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was reversed. Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh, and by Justice Thomas except as to footnote 9. Justice Thomas also filed a dissent. Our group of experts joins us to discuss the decisions and implications moving forward.Featuring: -- A.J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP-- Andy Lester, Partner, Spencer Fane LLP-- Prof. Taiawagi “Tai” Helton, W. DeVier Pierson Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law

On June 29, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International. By a vote of 5-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed. The justices held that the enforcement of a law requiring foreign affiliates of domestic groups receiving funds to fight HIV/AIDS to have a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking does not violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Our speakers will discuss the decision and its implications. To discuss the case, we have both Casey Mattox, a Senior Fellow focusing on toleration and free speech at the Charles Koch Institute, and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.

On June 29, 2020 the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International. By a vote of 5-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed. The justices held that the enforcement of a law requiring foreign affiliates of domestic groups receiving funds to fight HIV/AIDS to have a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking does not violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Our speakers will discuss the decision and its implications. To discuss the case, we have both Casey Mattox, a Senior Fellow focusing on toleration and free speech at the Charles Koch Institute, and Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate at Wiley Rein LLP.

On Monday, the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International. By a vote of 5-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed. The justices held that the enforcement of a law requiring foreign affiliates of domestic groups receiving funds to fight HIV/AIDS to have a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking does not violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Our speakers will discuss the decision and its implications. Featuring: -- Casey Mattox, Senior Fellow, Free Speech and Toleration, Charles Koch Institute-- Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate, Wiley Rein LLP

On Monday, the Supreme Court released its decision in United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International. By a vote of 5-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed. The justices held that the enforcement of a law requiring foreign affiliates of domestic groups receiving funds to fight HIV/AIDS to have a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking does not violate the First Amendment. Justice Kavanaugh's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Our speakers will discuss the decision and its implications. Featuring: -- Casey Mattox, Senior Fellow, Free Speech and Toleration, Charles Koch Institute-- Krystal B. Swendsboe, Associate, Wiley Rein LLP

On June 15, by a vote of 6-3 the Supreme Court released its decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (combined with Altitude Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.), the Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was reversed, and the case remanded (and the judgments of the Second Circuit in Altitude Express and the Sixth Circuit in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes are affirmed).Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh. To discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, President of the Committee for Justice.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On June 15, by a vote of 6-3 the Supreme Court released its decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (combined with Altitude Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.), the Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was reversed, and the case remanded (and the judgments of the Second Circuit in Altitude Express and the Sixth Circuit in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes are affirmed).Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh. To discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, President of the Committee for Justice.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

By a vote of 6-3 in yesterday's decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (combined with Altitude Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.), the Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was reversed, and the case remanded (and the judgments of the Second Circuit in Altitude Express and the Sixth Circuit in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes are affirmed). Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh. Curt Levey joins us to discuss the decision and future implications.Featuring: -- Curt Levey, President, Committee for Justice

On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (DHS v. Regents) was vacated in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the D.C. Circuit (Trump v. NAACP) was affirmed, and various orders of the Second Circuit (Wolf v. Vidal) were vacated, affirmed in part, or reversed in part. All the cases are remanded. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.Featuring: -- Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of Law-- Christopher Hajec, Director of Litigation, Immigration Reform Law Institute-- Mario Loyola, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute-- William A. Stock, Partner , Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP

On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court released its decision in the case of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. By a vote of 5-4, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (DHS v. Regents) was vacated in part and reversed in part, the judgment of the D.C. Circuit (Trump v. NAACP) was affirmed, and various orders of the Second Circuit (Wolf v. Vidal) were vacated, affirmed in part, or reversed in part. All the cases are remanded. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan in full, and by Justice Sotomayor as to all but Part IV. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Kavanaugh also filed opinions concurring on the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Our expert selection of speakers will discuss the decision and implications for the future.Featuring: -- Dr. John C. Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service and Director, Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Chapman University Fowler School of Law-- Christopher Hajec, Director of Litigation, Immigration Reform Law Institute-- Mario Loyola, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute-- William A. Stock, Partner , Klasko Immigration Law Partners, LLP

By a vote of 6-3 in yesterday's decision in Bostock v. Clayton County (combined with Altitude Inc. v. Zarda and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.), the Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was reversed, and the case remanded (and the judgments of the Second Circuit in Altitude Express and the Sixth Circuit in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes are affirmed). Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh. Curt Levey joins us to discuss the decision and future implications.Featuring: -- Curt Levey, President, Committee for Justice

The Supreme Court released the decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund on April 23, 2020. By a vote of 6-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was vacated, and the case remanded. Justice Breyer's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Alito. Justice Alito also filed a dissent.Featuring: -- Glenn Roper, Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation

The Supreme Court released the decision in County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund on April 23, 2020. By a vote of 6-3, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was vacated, and the case remanded. Justice Breyer's majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Alito. Justice Alito also filed a dissent.Featuring: -- Glenn Roper, Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation

On October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ramos v. Louisiana.In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.In a vote of 6-3, the court reversed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, 4–B–2, and 5, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined; and an opinion with respect to Part 4–A, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part 4–A. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to all but Part III–D.To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, Partner, Special Matters and Government Investigations, King & Spalding LLP.

On October 7, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Ramos v. Louisiana.In Ramos, Evangelisto Ramos was convicted of second-degree murder by the vote of 10 of 12 jurors. Challenging his conviction, Ramos argued that Louisiana’s statutory scheme permitting non-unanimous jury verdicts in non-capital felony cases violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Relying on its precedent, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Ramos’ argument. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict (in criminal cases) against the states.In a vote of 6-3, the court reversed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I, II–A, III, and IV–B–1, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kavanaugh joined; an opinion with respect to Parts II–B, 4–B–2, and 5, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined; and an opinion with respect to Part 4–A, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring as to all but Part 4–A. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to all but Part III–D.To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, Partner, Special Matters and Government Investigations, King & Spalding LLP.

On April 23, 2020, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible”. The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that eligibility for cancellation of removal of a lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence need not be one of the offenses of removal.The opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh on April 23, 2020. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On April 23, 2020, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided Barton v. Barr, a case involving a dispute over whether, for the purposes of the “stop-time rule,” a lawfully admitted permanent resident who is not seeking admission to the United States can be “render[ed] ... inadmissible”. The stop-time rule affects the discretion afforded the U.S. Attorney General to cancel the removal from the United States of a lawful permanent resident who has resided in the U.S. continuously for 7 years. Under the stop-time rule, the requisite continuous residence terminates once the alien commits any of a certain number of offenses that render the alien inadmissible to (or removable from) the United States under federal law. Thus, committing a listed offense may cause an alien to fall short of the continuous 7-year residence requirement and thereby become ineligible for cancellation of removal.Andre Martello Barton, after receiving lawful permanent resident status, was convicted in 1996 on three counts of aggravated assault, one count of criminal damage to property, and one count of firearm possession during commission of a felony, all in violation of state law. In 2007 and 2008, he was also convicted of several state law drug offenses. The federal government then initiated proceedings to remove Barton based on his various convictions. He conceded removability on the basis of his controlled substance and gun possession offenses but applied for cancellation of removal based on continuous residence. The government argued that Barton’s 1996 convictions triggered the stop-time rule, thereby disqualifying him for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge ruled in favor of the government and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Barton then petitioned for relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which rejected his argument that the stop-time rule only applies to aliens seeking admission to the United States, and therefore denied his petition.In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that eligibility for cancellation of removal of a lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime during the initial seven years of residence need not be one of the offenses of removal.The opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh on April 23, 2020. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined.To discuss the case, we have Amy Moore, Professor of Law at Belmont University College of Law.As always, the Federalist Society takes no particular legal or public policy positions. All opinions expressed are those of the speakers.

On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 6-3 that the federal Due Process Clause does not require a state to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his or her crime was morally wrong. In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Court reaffirmed its 1968 plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, declaring that criminal responsibility "is animated by complex and ever-changing ideas that are best left to the States to evaluate and reevaluate over time." The Court explained that the relationship between mental illness and criminal liability, in particular, is an ongoing dialogue between the law and psychology, and the Due Process Clause does not require that dialogue be frozen in "a rigid constitutional mold."Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.To discuss the case, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court held by a vote of 6-3 that the federal Due Process Clause does not require a state to adopt an insanity test that turns on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his or her crime was morally wrong. In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Court reaffirmed its 1968 plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, declaring that criminal responsibility "is animated by complex and ever-changing ideas that are best left to the States to evaluate and reevaluate over time." The Court explained that the relationship between mental illness and criminal liability, in particular, is an ongoing dialogue between the law and psychology, and the Due Process Clause does not require that dialogue be frozen in "a rigid constitutional mold."Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.To discuss the case, we have GianCarlo Canaparo, Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

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This is Part 2 of the interview with Captain Thomas Govan on his experience in arguing before the U.S. Supreme Court in October 2018 in the case of Vernon Madison v. State of Alabama. If you didn’t hear Part 1, please do, where we discuss an overview of the case, how Captain Govan became involved and selected to present oral argument, and the preparation he took leading up to the day of oral argument. Summary In summary for the case of Madison v. State of Alabama: The US Supreme Court held in a 5-3 decision with the State of Alabama that the 8th Amendment permits a state to execute a prisoner who no longer remembers the crime. However, the Court held that a state cannot executive rationally understand the reason for execution, whether that reason is due to psychosis or dementia, as is the case with Mr. Madison. Justice Kagan authored the Court’s majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan. The dissent included Justice Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Cavanagh had not yet taken the bench. The majority opinion followed the precedents set in the seminal cases of Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, and Panetti v. Quarterman, 2007, where the Court held the 8th Amendment prohibits executing a prisoner who lost his/her “sanity” in that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand the crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” And that there is no “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the sentence.

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nielsen v. Preap (and its companion case Wilcox v. Khoury), both of which consider the extent to which the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies to defendants who were not arrested by immigration officials immediately upon their release from criminal custody.Aliens who are arrested in order to be removed from the United States typically can seek release or parole on bond while any dispute about their removability is being resolved. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), however, creates an exception: aliens who have committed certain crimes or have a connection to terrorism must be arrested when released from custody relating to their criminal charges, and almost always held without bond until the question of removal is settled.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this mandatory detention provision to apply only when the alien is arrested immediately after release from prison. If a short period of time intervenes, the court concluded, the alien must be allowed the chance to apply for release on bond or parole.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Respondent aliens who fall within the scope of § 1226(c)(1), the Court held, can be detained even if federal officials did not arrest them immediately upon release.Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.To discuss the case, we have Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Shreck.

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nielsen v. Preap (and its companion case Wilcox v. Khoury), both of which consider the extent to which the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act applies to defendants who were not arrested by immigration officials immediately upon their release from criminal custody.Aliens who are arrested in order to be removed from the United States typically can seek release or parole on bond while any dispute about their removability is being resolved. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1), however, creates an exception: aliens who have committed certain crimes or have a connection to terrorism must be arrested when released from custody relating to their criminal charges, and almost always held without bond until the question of removal is settled.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted this mandatory detention provision to apply only when the alien is arrested immediately after release from prison. If a short period of time intervenes, the court concluded, the alien must be allowed the chance to apply for release on bond or parole.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case. Respondent aliens who fall within the scope of § 1226(c)(1), the Court held, can be detained even if federal officials did not arrest them immediately upon release.Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.To discuss the case, we have Greg Brower, Shareholder, Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber, Shreck.

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries, a case addressing the liability of a manufacturer under maritime law for injuries caused when asbestos was incorporated into their product by a third party after sale.The Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (ALS) produced equipment for United States Navy ships. Parts of the equipment required asbestos insulation and asbestos parts in order to function but the manufacturers delivered the equipment without asbestos and the Navy added it later. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries developed cancer and died after being exposed to asbestos while stationed on the ships. Their families sued manufacturer ALS in federal district court, alleging that it had negligently failed to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. ALS countered that it should not be held liable for asbestos that was added later by a third party, an argument known as the “bare metal” defense. The district court ruled in favor of ALS but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded the case, concluding that a “bare metal” manufacturer could still be held liable if it was foreseeable that the materials in question would have been used with later-added asbestos-containing materials. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether the “bare metal” defense is valid under maritime law.By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that, in the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.To discuss the case, we have Karen R. Harned, Executive Director, NFIB Small Business Legal Center.

On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries, a case addressing the liability of a manufacturer under maritime law for injuries caused when asbestos was incorporated into their product by a third party after sale.The Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (ALS) produced equipment for United States Navy ships. Parts of the equipment required asbestos insulation and asbestos parts in order to function but the manufacturers delivered the equipment without asbestos and the Navy added it later. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries developed cancer and died after being exposed to asbestos while stationed on the ships. Their families sued manufacturer ALS in federal district court, alleging that it had negligently failed to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated products. ALS countered that it should not be held liable for asbestos that was added later by a third party, an argument known as the “bare metal” defense. The district court ruled in favor of ALS but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded the case, concluding that a “bare metal” manufacturer could still be held liable if it was foreseeable that the materials in question would have been used with later-added asbestos-containing materials. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals on whether the “bare metal” defense is valid under maritime law.By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third Circuit. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that, in the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.To discuss the case, we have Karen R. Harned, Executive Director, NFIB Small Business Legal Center.

On April 1, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Bucklew v. Precythe, a case considering the standard applicable when an offender sentenced to death raises an Eighth Amendment challenge to the state’s lethal injection procedure.Petitioner Russell Bucklew was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection of a single drug, pentobarbital, by the State of Missouri. Bucklew challenged the State’s injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that regardless of whether it would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of a particular medical condition he had. The District Court dismissed his challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, applying Supreme Court precedent in Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross, remanded the case to allow Bucklew to identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure that would significantly reduce his alleged risk of pain. Bucklew eventually suggested nitrogen hypoxia, but the District Court rejected his argument for lack of evidence. A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch, the court held that Baze and Glossip govern all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain, and Bucklew’s as-applied challenge fails the Baze-Glossip test. He failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method, and even if he had there was no showing that it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined as to all but Part III. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.

On April 1, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Bucklew v. Precythe, a case considering the standard applicable when an offender sentenced to death raises an Eighth Amendment challenge to the state’s lethal injection procedure.Petitioner Russell Bucklew was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection of a single drug, pentobarbital, by the State of Missouri. Bucklew challenged the State’s injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that regardless of whether it would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of a particular medical condition he had. The District Court dismissed his challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, applying Supreme Court precedent in Baze v. Rees and Glossip v. Gross, remanded the case to allow Bucklew to identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative procedure that would significantly reduce his alleged risk of pain. Bucklew eventually suggested nitrogen hypoxia, but the District Court rejected his argument for lack of evidence. A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Gorsuch, the court held that Baze and Glossip govern all Eighth Amendment challenges alleging that a method of execution inflicts unconstitutionally cruel pain, and Bucklew’s as-applied challenge fails the Baze-Glossip test. He failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative method, and even if he had there was no showing that it would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined as to all but Part III. Justice Sotomayor also filed a dissenting opinion.To discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.

On June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, a case considering whether Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement for obtaining a retail liquor license is constitutional.In 2016, companies Total Wine and Affluere Investments, Inc. applied for licenses to own and operate liquor stores in Tennessee. Although state law imposed a two-year durational residency requirement that the entities did not meet, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) had obtained an opinion from the state attorney general that the requirement operated as a discriminatory trade restraint in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. TABC, therefore, recommended approval of the licenses, but trade association Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association (Association)--composed of in-state liquor retailers--threatened to sue TABC if the licenses were granted. TABC, therefore, sought declaratory relief on the validity of the durational residency requirement, and the case was removed to federal district court. The district court held the requirement unconstitutional, the state declined to appeal, and the licenses issued. The Association, however, pursued its objections before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the district court--though a dissenting judge argued that the Constitution’s Twenty-first Amendment granted states broad authority to regulate the in-state distribution of alcohol, and would have upheld the residency requirement. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to reconcile its Twenty-first Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause precedents.By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement applicable to retail liquor store license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justice Thomas.To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.

On June 26, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, a case considering whether Tennessee’s two-year durational residency requirement for obtaining a retail liquor license is constitutional.In 2016, companies Total Wine and Affluere Investments, Inc. applied for licenses to own and operate liquor stores in Tennessee. Although state law imposed a two-year durational residency requirement that the entities did not meet, the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) had obtained an opinion from the state attorney general that the requirement operated as a discriminatory trade restraint in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. TABC, therefore, recommended approval of the licenses, but trade association Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association (Association)--composed of in-state liquor retailers--threatened to sue TABC if the licenses were granted. TABC, therefore, sought declaratory relief on the validity of the durational residency requirement, and the case was removed to federal district court. The district court held the requirement unconstitutional, the state declined to appeal, and the licenses issued. The Association, however, pursued its objections before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the district court--though a dissenting judge argued that the Constitution’s Twenty-first Amendment granted states broad authority to regulate the in-state distribution of alcohol, and would have upheld the residency requirement. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to reconcile its Twenty-first Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause precedents.By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement applicable to retail liquor store license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justice Thomas.To discuss the case, we have Michael Bindas, Senior Attorney at the Institute for Justice.

On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a case considering whether states maintain sovereign immunity from private suits in the courts of other states. In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that judgment, concluding that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada courts to grant the FTB the same level of immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy. The Court divided equally, however, on whether to overrule its 1979 precedent Nevada v. Hall, which holds that the Constitution does not bar private suits against a State in the courts of another State. By statute, the Court was therefore required to affirm the jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court. On remand, that court instructed the trial court to enter damages against FTB in accord with the statutory cap for Nevada agencies. Thereafter the U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari to reconsider Nevada v. Hall. By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court overruled Nevada v. Hall, holding that states retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in courts of other states. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.

On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, a case considering whether states maintain sovereign immunity from private suits in the courts of other states. In the 1990s, Gilbert Hyatt moved from California to Nevada. Following an investigation and audit, however, the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) claimed that he had misstated the date of his move and therefore owed California millions in unpaid taxes, penalties and interest. Hyatt then brought a tort suit against FTB, which is a California state agency, in Nevada state court--and won a jury verdict of nearly $500 million. Although the Nevada Supreme Court set aside much of the award on appeal, it nevertheless affirmed an award of $1 million for fraud--even though a Nevada statute would have capped such damages in a similar suit against Nevada officials at $50,000. Nevada’s interest in providing adequate redress to its own citizens, the court concluded, superseded the application of any statutory cap for California’s benefit.In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that judgment, concluding that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada courts to grant the FTB the same level of immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy. The Court divided equally, however, on whether to overrule its 1979 precedent Nevada v. Hall, which holds that the Constitution does not bar private suits against a State in the courts of another State. By statute, the Court was therefore required to affirm the jurisdiction of the Nevada Supreme Court. On remand, that court instructed the trial court to enter damages against FTB in accord with the statutory cap for Nevada agencies. Thereafter the U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari to reconsider Nevada v. Hall. By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court overruled Nevada v. Hall, holding that states retain their sovereign immunity from private suits brought in courts of other states. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. To discuss the case, we have Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law at Duke University.

On January 15, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Stokeling v. United States, a case considering whether Florida’s robbery law, which requires victim resistance that is then overcome by the physical force of the offender, qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts typically apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The issue here was whether Stokeling’s Florida conviction for robbery categorically qualified as a violent felony for ACCA purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it did.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that ACCA’s elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that, like Florida’s law, requires the criminal physically to overcome the victim’s resistance. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. To discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.

On January 15, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Stokeling v. United States, a case considering whether Florida’s robbery law, which requires victim resistance that is then overcome by the physical force of the offender, qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts typically apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The issue here was whether Stokeling’s Florida conviction for robbery categorically qualified as a violent felony for ACCA purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it did.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held that ACCA’s elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that, like Florida’s law, requires the criminal physically to overcome the victim’s resistance. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. To discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.

On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-4 ruling in the case of Herrera v. Wyoming. In Herrera, the Court encountered the question of whether a portion of an 1868 treaty between the Crow, a Native American tribe which today resides on Montana reservation land, and the United States, is enforceable. In the treaty, the Crow were promised, in exchange for the tribe’s territory in Montana and Wyoming, “the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon…and peace subsists…on the borders of the hunting districts.” The State of Wyoming, in prosecution of Crow tribal member Clayvin Herrera, argued that the Tenth Circuit decision in Repsis precluded the argument of Mr. Herrera that the treaty’s hunting rights provision remains valid. In defense, Mr. Herrera argued that the Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs repudiated Repsis and the 1896 Supreme Court decision in Ward v. Race Horse.Justice Sotomayor, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch issued an opinion in favor of Mr. Herrera, and remanded for further proceedings.Join this teleforum to hear a reaction to the Herrera decision from A.J. Ferate with the Oklahoma City office of Spencer Fane. Mr. Ferate, a tribal law and appellate practitioner, represented Oklahoma oil and gas producers as amicus in the Carpenter v. Murphy case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. He also serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Federalist Society's Environmental Law and Property Rights Practice Group. Featuring: A.J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up on our website. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-4 ruling in the case of Herrera v. Wyoming. In Herrera, the Court encountered the question of whether a portion of an 1868 treaty between the Crow, a Native American tribe which today resides on Montana reservation land, and the United States, is enforceable. In the treaty, the Crow were promised, in exchange for the tribe’s territory in Montana and Wyoming, “the right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon…and peace subsists…on the borders of the hunting districts.” The State of Wyoming, in prosecution of Crow tribal member Clayvin Herrera, argued that the Tenth Circuit decision in Repsis precluded the argument of Mr. Herrera that the treaty’s hunting rights provision remains valid. In defense, Mr. Herrera argued that the Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs repudiated Repsis and the 1896 Supreme Court decision in Ward v. Race Horse.Justice Sotomayor, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch issued an opinion in favor of Mr. Herrera, and remanded for further proceedings.Join this teleforum to hear a reaction to the Herrera decision from A.J. Ferate with the Oklahoma City office of Spencer Fane. Mr. Ferate, a tribal law and appellate practitioner, represented Oklahoma oil and gas producers as amicus in the Carpenter v. Murphy case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. He also serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Federalist Society's Environmental Law and Property Rights Practice Group. Featuring: A.J. Ferate, Of Counsel, Spencer Fane LLP Teleforum calls are open to all dues paying members of the Federalist Society. To become a member, sign up on our website. As a member, you should receive email announcements of upcoming Teleforum calls which contain the conference call phone number. If you are not receiving those email announcements, please contact us at 202-822-8138.

On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., a case involving the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce contracts that delegate threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator. Archer and White Sales is a dental distributor that entered into a business agreement with Pelton and Crane, a dental equipment manufacturer. Henry Schein, Inc. is the successor-in-interest to Pelton and Crane. The business relationship grew tense, and White Sales sued Henry Schein, alleging violations of federal and state antitrust law, seeking monetary and injunctive relief. The contract provided for arbitration of any dispute, except for certain actions seeking injunctive relief. Schein asked the court to refer the matter to arbitration, but Archer and White contended that the matter was not arbitrable because it sought injunctive relief. Schein argued that an arbitrator should decide that question. The district court sided with Archer and White, finding the basis for Schein’s arbitration request to be “wholly groundless.” Schein appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, unanimously vacating the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court rejected the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. Such an exception, the Court held, is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s own precedent. On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a case considering whether an ambiguous agreement, in this case an employment contract, can provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. In 2016, a hacking scheme revealed the tax information of about 1,300 employees of Lamps Plus, Inc. Frank Varela, one of the employees affected by this hack, brought a class action suit in federal district court against the company. Lamps Plus responded by seeking to compel individual arbitration, relying on the terms of Varela’s employment contract. The district court rejected Lamps Plus’ request, instead authorizing arbitration on a classwide basis and dismissing Varela’s claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, determining that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp--that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration--did not control here because Varela’s employment agreement was ambiguous rather than silent regarding arbitration. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a vote of 5-4 reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Both Justices Breyer and Sotomayor filed dissenting opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part II.

On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc., a case involving the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce contracts that delegate threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator. Archer and White Sales is a dental distributor that entered into a business agreement with Pelton and Crane, a dental equipment manufacturer. Henry Schein, Inc. is the successor-in-interest to Pelton and Crane. The business relationship grew tense, and White Sales sued Henry Schein, alleging violations of federal and state antitrust law, seeking monetary and injunctive relief. The contract provided for arbitration of any dispute, except for certain actions seeking injunctive relief. Schein asked the court to refer the matter to arbitration, but Archer and White contended that the matter was not arbitrable because it sought injunctive relief. Schein argued that an arbitrator should decide that question. The district court sided with Archer and White, finding the basis for Schein’s arbitration request to be “wholly groundless.” Schein appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, unanimously vacating the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanding the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court rejected the “wholly groundless” exception to the general rule that courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their terms. Such an exception, the Court held, is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s own precedent. On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a case considering whether an ambiguous agreement, in this case an employment contract, can provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. In 2016, a hacking scheme revealed the tax information of about 1,300 employees of Lamps Plus, Inc. Frank Varela, one of the employees affected by this hack, brought a class action suit in federal district court against the company. Lamps Plus responded by seeking to compel individual arbitration, relying on the terms of Varela’s employment contract. The district court rejected Lamps Plus’ request, instead authorizing arbitration on a classwide basis and dismissing Varela’s claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that judgment, determining that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp--that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is silent on the availability of such arbitration--did not control here because Varela’s employment agreement was ambiguous rather than silent regarding arbitration. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and by a vote of 5-4 reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration. The Chief Justice’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. Both Justices Breyer and Sotomayor filed dissenting opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Part II.

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or strongly disagree with many positions the union takes in collective bargaining. Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year. Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or strongly disagree with many positions the union takes in collective bargaining. Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year. Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, FL, a case involving a claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment. Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina--a part of the city designated for redevelopment under the City’s new redevelopment plan that would use eminent domain to revitalize the waterfront. After hearing news of the plan, Lozman became an “outspoken critic,” and filed suit against the City in June 2006 after a special City Council emergency meeting to push through the redevelopment plan before the Governor of Florida signed a bill into law that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for private development. Later at a public City Council meeting in November 2006, Lozman began to discuss the arrest of a former county official during the public comments portion of the meeting. He was interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after exchanging words with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to leave the podium without finishing his comments, the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply, and, upon the continuance of his comments, Lozman was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence (charges later dismissed). In 2008, Lozman filed suit in federal district court against the City of Riviera Beach, claiming that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City due to Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. The jury found that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, which the District Court concluded must defeat Lozman’s First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, FL, a case involving a claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment. Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina--a part of the city designated for redevelopment under the City’s new redevelopment plan that would use eminent domain to revitalize the waterfront. After hearing news of the plan, Lozman became an “outspoken critic,” and filed suit against the City in June 2006 after a special City Council emergency meeting to push through the redevelopment plan before the Governor of Florida signed a bill into law that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for private development. Later at a public City Council meeting in November 2006, Lozman began to discuss the arrest of a former county official during the public comments portion of the meeting. He was interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after exchanging words with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to leave the podium without finishing his comments, the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply, and, upon the continuance of his comments, Lozman was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence (charges later dismissed). In 2008, Lozman filed suit in federal district court against the City of Riviera Beach, claiming that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City due to Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. The jury found that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, which the District Court concluded must defeat Lozman’s First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.

On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, a case considering whether corporations may be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”) which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability. The U.S. Supreme Court later affirmed the judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but on a different basis: the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes. In Jesner, the Second Circuit, invoking its precedent in Kiobel I--and finding nothing to the contrary in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel II decision--affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims on the grounds that the ATS does not apply to alleged international law violations by a corporation. This sharpened a split among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B-I, and II-C, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch--and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A, II-B-2, II-B-3, and III, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.

Monday, June 4th: Supremes Side With Baker! - The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Colorado baker who wouldn't make a wedding cake for a gay couple. The dissenting voices of the 7-2 decision were Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Joining today's show is Vatican insider Leo Zagami breaking down globalist intrigue and other geopolitical happenings. Also, Russian journalist and author Andrey Afanasiev explains Eastern Europe's nationalist surge. Start your week informed. Call and Tune in!

On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, a case considering whether corporations may be sued under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).Between 2004 and 2010, survivors of several terrorist attacks in the Middle East (or family members or estate representatives of the victims) filed lawsuits in federal district court in New York against Arab Bank, PLC, an international bank headquartered in Jordan. Plaintiffs alleged that Arab Bank had financed and facilitated the attacks in question, and they sought redress under, among other laws, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The district court ultimately dismissed those ATS claims based on the 2010 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”) which concluded that ATS claims could not be brought against corporations, because the law of nations did not recognize corporate liability. The U.S. Supreme Court later affirmed the judgment in Kiobel (“Kiobel II”) but on a different basis: the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes. In Jesner, the Second Circuit, invoking its precedent in Kiobel I--and finding nothing to the contrary in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel II decision--affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ATS claims on the grounds that the ATS does not apply to alleged international law violations by a corporation. This sharpened a split among the circuit courts of appeals on the issue, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute.By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B-I, and II-C, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch--and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A, II-B-2, II-B-3, and III, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. To discuss the case, we have Eugene Kontorovich, Professor of Law at Northwestern School of Law.

On February 27, 2018 the Supreme Court decided Jennings v. Rodriguez, a case involving a lawsuit by aliens challenging their continued detention under civil immigration statutes without the benefit of an individualized bond hearing as to the justification for ongoing detention.Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a drug offense and vehicular theft, and ordered removed from the country. He was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which generally requires detention of aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses until removal proceedings are resolved. In addition to challenging his removal order, however, Rodriguez also sought habeas relief in federal court in the form of a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. His case was consolidated with a related case, and after a round of litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was certified as a class to address whether aliens in situations like Rodriguez, who had been detained longer than six months pursuant to an immigration detention statute, were entitled to a hearing to assess the justification for continued detention. They argued that the immigration statutes did not justify such detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. The District Court granted the class injunctive relief along these lines and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance. The Supreme Court thereafter granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.This case was originally argued before the Supreme Court in November 2016, but the Court thereafter ordered supplemental briefing and the case was then reargued in October 2017. The supplemental briefing directed the parties to address whether the alleged bond hearing requirement extended to aliens detained while seeking admission to the United States, to criminal or terrorist aliens, and how the proposed standard of proof applied to the bond hearing.By a vote of 5-3 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the immigration provisions at issue--§§ 1225(b), 1226(a) and 1226(c) of Title 8--do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention; the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold otherwise. That court should consider the aliens’ constitutional claims on remand, but should first reexamine whether they may continue litigating as a class.Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II. The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II, and Justice Sotomayor joined only as to Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan was recused.To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.

On February 27, 2018 the Supreme Court decided Jennings v. Rodriguez, a case involving a lawsuit by aliens challenging their continued detention under civil immigration statutes without the benefit of an individualized bond hearing as to the justification for ongoing detention.Alejandro Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a drug offense and vehicular theft, and ordered removed from the country. He was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which generally requires detention of aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses until removal proceedings are resolved. In addition to challenging his removal order, however, Rodriguez also sought habeas relief in federal court in the form of a bond hearing to determine whether his continued detention was justified. His case was consolidated with a related case, and after a round of litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, was certified as a class to address whether aliens in situations like Rodriguez, who had been detained longer than six months pursuant to an immigration detention statute, were entitled to a hearing to assess the justification for continued detention. They argued that the immigration statutes did not justify such detention in the absence of an individualized bond hearing at which the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the class member’s detention remains justified. The District Court granted the class injunctive relief along these lines and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance. The Supreme Court thereafter granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.This case was originally argued before the Supreme Court in November 2016, but the Court thereafter ordered supplemental briefing and the case was then reargued in October 2017. The supplemental briefing directed the parties to address whether the alleged bond hearing requirement extended to aliens detained while seeking admission to the United States, to criminal or terrorist aliens, and how the proposed standard of proof applied to the bond hearing.By a vote of 5-3 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that the immigration provisions at issue--§§ 1225(b), 1226(a) and 1226(c) of Title 8--do not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention; the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to hold otherwise. That court should consider the aliens’ constitutional claims on remand, but should first reexamine whether they may continue litigating as a class.Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II. The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II, and Justice Sotomayor joined only as to Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined except for footnote 6. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan was recused.To discuss the case, we have Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speakers.

    Bio Sally Culley is a Partner in the law firm of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell where she primarily practices in the areas of employment and commercial litigation. Her clients include large corporations as well as smaller, local businesses. With regard to employment law, Sally represents employers, both in the public and private sector, in defending employment-related claims, including claims of discrimination, wage and hour violations, whistle-blower violations, wrongful termination, harassment, and retaliation. She also provides consulting and training services designed to help prevent such claims and minimize risk. Finally, Sally assists with the creation and enforcement of employee handbooks, severance agreements, and non-compete agreements. With regard to commercial litigation, Sally handles matters involving contract disputes, fraud, and statutory claims such as Florida's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act/Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, and RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). Sally also represents clients in commercial mortgage foreclosures and workouts, construction lien compliance and litigation, quiet title actions, bankruptcy, and collection matters. Sally also has significant experience reviewing and interpreting insurance policies, and she assists insurers with matters involving coverage and bad faith claims, evaluating such matters, and participating in litigation where necessary. She earned her J.D. from the UNC Chapel Hill School of Law and her Bachelors from Samford University from which she graduated magna cum laude. Resources Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell First Gig Economy Trial Decision: Independent Contractor by Sally Rogers Culley and Suzanne A. Singer (2018) News Roundup In political maneuver, House Republicans expose Senator Mark Warner's confidential texts The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that the House Intelligence Committee, under the leadership of Devin Nunes, leaked confidential texts in which Senator Mark Warner sought from a lawyer associated with British spy Christopher Steele, a meeting with Mr. Steele, as Mr. Warner sought to investigate Russia's interference with the 2016 presidential election. The law firm for which the lawyer, Adam Waldman, works has also represented Oleg Deripaska—a Russian oil magnate. So after the text was leaked, President Trump tweeted “Wow! – Senator Mark Warner got caught having extensive contact with a lobbyist for a Russian oligarch …” Both Mark Warner and Republican Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Richard Burr, who ostensibly wasn't in on the leak, sought a meeting with House Speaker Paul Ryan to express their overall concern about the politicization of the House Intelligence Committee. Nicholas Fandos reports in the Washington Post. Online sex trafficking bill clears House The House overwhelmingly passed the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) on Tuesday by a vote of 388-25. The bill would amend the Communications Decency Act to hold web platforms that knowingly help facilitate sex trafficking accountable. Currently, an exception to the CDA—Section 230—provides that web platforms are shielded from third-party liability for illegal content posted by their users. Opponents say the bill would erode free speech on the Internet and would ultimately not do enough to stop sex trafficking online. There's a Senate companion bill—the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (SESTA)—that the House will vote on next, which is also expected to pass. Harper Neidig reports in The Hill. Facebook polls users on how it should handle child porn Facebook conducted a strange survey in which it asked users how they should handle a “private message in which an adult man asks a 14 year old girl for sexual pictures.” The question turned on the extent to which Facebook should display the photo. Facebook says the question was a “mistake”. Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Microsoft overseas data case The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Tuesday regarding a dispute between Microsoft and the Department of Justice. The DOJ wants to be able to obtain data on Microsoft users suspected of drug trafficking. The problem is that the suspects' data are stored on a server in Ireland. Normally, the 1986 Stored Communications Act would apply, which would allow the DOJ to get a warrant. But Microsoft argues that since the data are stored overseas, the SCA doesn't apply. The court's liberal justices--namely, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor-- seemed to side with Microsoft, arguing that Congress should enact new legislation. But Justices Roberts and Alito seemed to favor an interim, judicial measure that would allow law enforcement to conduct investigations while Congress sorts it out. Amy Howe reports on SCOTUS Blog. On the net neutrality front … Democrats in both chambers introduce bill to stop net neutrality repeal Democrats in both chambers introduced bills to stop the FCC's repeal of the net neutrality rules. The Senate bill has 50 co-sponsors, with one Republican, Susan Collins. It needs 1 more vote to get through the Senate. There's also another bill in the House, that Representative Mike Doyle introduced, that's supported by 150 of representatives.  However, Donald Trump is not expected to sign off on these bills, even if they do pass. And the clock is ticking on Congress to do something by January 23rd, which is when the 60-day window closes on the Congressional Review Act process. Public Knowledge has a great primer on how the Congressional Review Act works here., which I've linked to in the show notes. Additionally, the state of Washington became the first state to pass net neutrality legislation of its own. And six more companies have decided to sue the FCC for repealing the net neutrality rules including Kickstarter, Foursquare, Etsy, Shutterstock, Expa, and Automattic. Pai to calls for new spectrum auctions FCC Chairman Ajit Pai is calling for new auctions to free up more spectrum. Pai announced at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona that he wants to free up more spectrum in the 24 and 28 GHz bands. The auction would be designed to accommodate 5G wireless. Pai proposes conducting the auction for the 28Gz band in November, and then proceed with a separate auction for the 24GHz band. Ali Breland has more at the Hill. Pai declines NRA award I reported last week that the National Rifle Association awarded FCC Chairman Ajit Pai the Charlton Heston Courage Under Fire Award. Politico now reports that Pai has turned it down. New lawsuit alleges that Google discriminated against white and Asian men  A new lawsuit filed in California's San Mateo County Superior Court alleges that Google executives actively discriminated against white and Asian men in the hiring process. But currently, whites and Asians comprise some 91% of Google's workforce. Kirsten Grind and Douglas MacMillan report in the Wall Street Journal. The Verge: Palantir has been secretly using predictive policying technology in New Orleans Ali Winston of the Verge wrote an investigative report on a secretive program carried out by Palantir, a data mining company that was seeded with funding from the CIA's venture capital firm.  Apparently, Palantir has been working with the New Orleans' police department to secretly track largely minority populations in New Orleans with an algorithm that claims to predict violence and crime. Not even the New Orleans city council admits that they were aware of the program.  Report: Sexting is on the rise among youth A new JAMA Pediatrics report finds that sexting is on the rise among tweens and teens. The study compiled data from 39 studies of 110,380 participants and found that some 27% of kids between 12 and 17 receive sexts. The average age is 15. Fifteen percent reported that they sent sexts. Beth Mole reports in Ars Technica. FCC relaxing environmental standards for 5G deployment In addition to the spectrum auction, Republican FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr last week announced that the Commission will vote on March 23rd on a measure that would relax some environmental review standards for small companies that want to deploy 5G. Carr claimed in his remarks that the proposal would remove regulatory burdens and help the U.S. remain competitive. To support relaxing these environmental standards, Carr also made unsubstantiated claims that 5G deployment would create 3 million new jobs and hundreds of billions of dollars in network investment and GDP growth. EU tells Facebook and Google to take down terror content in 1 hour The European Union released a set of voluntary guidelines for Facebook and Google to remove terrorist and other illegal content, including content that incites hatred. The guidelines provide that the companies should remove such content within one hour. Binding regulations could be forthcoming depending on how well the voluntary guidelines work. Natalia Drozdiak reports in the Wall Street Journal. Comcast wants to buy Sky for $31bn Harper Neidig reports in the Hill that Comcast now wants to buy Sky, the European broadcaster, for $31 billion. This offer is 16% higher than what Fox was offering. Disney is also a factor here, since they're making a bid for Fox's non-broadcast assets.

West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy is Now Open! 8am-9am PT/ 11am-Noon ET for our especially special Daily Specials, Smothered Benedict Wednesdays!Starting off in the Bistro Cafe, Maxine Waters smacks Steve Mnuchin for ignoring the Russia Sanctions.Then, on the rest of the menu, ex-cop and Bundy occupation militia leader, Brandon Richard Curtiss, faces 266 years in prison after stealing $87,000 from his business clients; Mike Pence was in charge of the Trump presidential transition, but his name is suspiciously absent from records of it; and, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor just sent a big signal that partisan gerrymandering is going down.After the break, we move to the Chef's Table to scrutinize West Virginia's billionaire governor and his war on anti-poverty programs; and, just days before the opening ceremony, serious health concerns hit the Winter Olympics.All that and more, on West Coast Cookbook & Speakeasy with Chef de Cuisine Justice Putnam.Bon Appetit!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"To those of us who believe that all of life is sacred every crumb of bread and sip of wine is a Eucharist, a remembrance, a call to awareness of holiness right where we are. I want all of the holiness of the Eucharist to spill out beyond church walls, out of the hands of priests and into the regular streets and sidewalks, into the hands of regular, grubby people like you and me, onto our tables, in our kitchens and dining rooms and backyards.” -- Shauna Niequist "Bread and Wine: A Love Letter to Life Around the Table with Recipes"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Show Notes & Links: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/2/7/1739393/-West-Coast-Cookbook-Speakeasy-Daily-Special-Smothered-Benedict-Wednesdays

In June 2017, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions and/or sentences: Davila v. Davis and McWilliams v. Dunn. -- The petition in Davila v. Davis involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Erick Davila was convicted in a Texas court of capital murder. Although his trial attorney had objected to one of the court’s jury instructions on intent, the court had overruled the objection. On direct appeal his appellate counsel raised various claims, but did not challenge the jury instruction ruling. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state’s highest criminal court, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. Davila then initiated a collateral attack on his conviction: he sought habeas relief in state court, but his attorney challenged neither the jury instruction ruling nor the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the alleged instructional error on direct appeal. Texas’ highest criminal court ultimately denied relief and the U.S. Supreme Court again denied cert. Davila next raised a habeas claim in federal court, alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the allegedly erroneous jury instruction on direct appeal. Although his failure to have raised that claim in his state habeas petition ordinarily constituted a fatal procedural default, Davila argued for an exception on the grounds that the failure was itself the result of ineffective assistance by his state habeas counsel. The federal district court denied Davila’s petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability for further review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, to consider whether the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel provided cause to excuse the procedural default. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not provide cause to excuse the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. -- The petition in McWilliams v. Dunn involved the scope of a state’s duty, identified by the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, to provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense, and independent from the prosecution, to effectively “assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” In 1986, James McWilliams, Jr. was convicted by an Alabama jury of capital murder. Although a state commission, convened after McWilliams’s counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation, found that he was competent to stand trial and had not been suffering from mental illness at the time of his alleged crime, his counsel had also asked for neurological and neuropsychological testing while the parties awaited sentencing. The examining doctor concluded that McWilliams had some genuine neuropsychological problems, and his attorney also received various updated mental health records just before the sentencing hearing convened. Although the attorney sought a continuance and the assistance of someone with psychological expertise to evaluate this new material, the trial court denied those requests and sentenced McWilliams to death. Alabama’s appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and his effort to obtain state postconviction relief also failed. On federal habeas review, the district court found that the requirements described in Ake had been satisfied and denied McWilliams relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that McWilliams got all the assistance to which Ake entitled him was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under the federal habeas statute. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court indicated that “Alabama’s provision of mental health assistance fell [] dramatically short of what Ake requires” and therefore concluded that the Alabama court decision affirming McWilliams’s conviction and sentence was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Although the Eleventh Circuit had alternatively held that any error by the Alabama courts lacked the “substantial and injurious effect or influence” required to warrant a grant of habeas relief, the Supreme Court indicated that the Eleventh Circuit should reconsider on remand “whether access to the type of meaningful assistance in evaluating, preparing, and presenting the defense that Ake requires would have mattered” to the outcome of McWilliams’s case. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. -- And now, to discuss the cases, we have Joseph Tartakovsy, Deputy Solicitor General for the State of Nevada.

On June 23, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Murr v. Wisconsin. In the 1960s the Murrs purchased two adjacent lots (Lots F and E), each over an acre in size, in St. Croix County, Wisconsin. In 1994 and 1995, the parents transferred the parcels to their children and the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances, with local rules then barring their separate sale or development. A decade later the Murrs sought to sell Lot E in order to fund construction work on Lot F, but the St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied a variance from the ordinance barring separate sale or development of the lots. The Murrs sued the state and county, claiming that the ordinance effected an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed, concluding that the Murrs took the properties with constructive knowledge of the resulting restrictions and had not suffered a loss in value of more than 10%. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied further review. -- The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether, in a regulatory taking case, the “parcel as a whole” concept as described in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York establishes a rule that two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings analysis purposes. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin court was correct to analyze the Murrs’ lots as a single unit and that no compensable taking had occurred. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have James S. Burling, who is Vice President of Litigation, Pacific Legal Foundation.

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Packingham v. North Carolina. Lester Packingham was convicted in 2002 of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in violation of North Carolina law, and sentenced to prison time followed by supervised release. In 2010, he was arrested after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile--which he had set up using an alias--in which he thanked God for having a parking ticket dismissed. Packingham was charged with, and convicted of, violating a North Carolina law that restricted the access of convicted sex offenders to “commercial social networking” websites. -- Packingham challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the North Carolina statute unlawfully restricted his freedom of speech and association, but the Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately rejected his claim. The website access restriction, the Court concluded, was a content-neutral, conduct-based regulation that only incidentally burdened Packingham’s speech, was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels of communication. -- By a vote of 8-0, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the North Carolina statute, which makes it a felony for a registered sex offender "to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages,” impermissibly restricts lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Ilya Shapiro, who is Senior Fellow in Constitutional Law at the Cato Institute.

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam. Simon Tam of The Slants, an Asian American rock band, applied to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office, but the application was denied. The Office claimed that the name would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent,” citing the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed to a board within the Office but was again denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, ultimately held en banc that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment on its face. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Parts I, II, and III-A of Justice Alito’s majority opinion were joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas joined except for Part II. Parts III-B, III-C, and IV of Justice Alito’s majority opinion were joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Michael R. Huston, who is Associate Attorney at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

When did we lose our capacity to respectfully engage with those who hold a different opinion than our own? Have we forgotten how to disagree without being disagreeable? It’s astounding how today, society is quick to reject perspectives that align perpendicular to our own, and quick to judge one another based solely on our differences.  Life is too short to live this way, and in this morning’s episode, we challenge you to consciously remain open to other perspectives and acknowledge that sometimes you must respectfully agree to disagree. Because when one dismisses another entirely due to a disagreement on a particular point of view, he or she may be missing out on building a great relationship.   Resources: - Depeche Mode – “People are People” - Music Video: https://youtu.be/ErnMC7xokQ8 - Lyrics: http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/depechemode/peoplearepeople.html - Friendship between Justices Ginsburg and Scalia - Article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/13/what-made-scalia-and-ginsburgs-friendship-work/?utm_term=.41b78d33f3b4

On May 1, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, which was consolidated with Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of Miami. In this case, the city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), arguing that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, thus denying the city expected property and tax revenues. -- The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect and therefore lacked standing under the statute. The court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks’ conduct was the proximate cause of the harms the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that FHA standing extends as broadly as Article III of the Constitution permits, that Miami had established Article III standing here, and that it had sufficiently alleged proximate causation. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Court held that (1) the city of Miami was an "aggrieved person" authorized to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act; and (2) the Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that the city's complaints met the FHA's proximate-cause requirement based solely on the finding that the city's alleged financial injuries were a foreseeable results of the banks' misconduct; proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”; the lower courts should define, in the first instance, the contours of proximate cause under the FHA and decide on remand how that standard applies to the city's claims for lost property-tax revenue and increased municipal expenses. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Kennedy and Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. -- To discuss the case, we have Thaya Brook Knight, who is associate director of financial regulation studies at the Cato Institute.

On March 1, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections. Plaintiffs in Bethune-Hill each resided in one of twelve newly proposed majority-minority districts for the Virginia Legislature, created to satisfy Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which requires that any new districting plan must ensure that there be no “retrogression” in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Plaintiffs argued that the new districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged districts. The district court also held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one district--District 75--the state legislature had satisfied the requirements of a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. -- On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued that the district court panel erred in a number of respects, including in determining that that race could not predominate unless its use resulted in an “actual conflict” with traditional districting criteria. Plaintiffs also argued that the use of race in drawing House District 75 was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court panel in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the district court panel had employed an incorrect legal standard to determine whether race predominated, noting that challengers are permitted to establish racial predominance in the absence of an “actual conflict” by presenting direct evidence of the legislative purpose and intent or other compelling circumstantial evidence. The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ challenge to District 75, however, determining that the legislature’s action ultimately survived strict scrutiny. -- Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. -- To discuss the case, we have Jack Park, who is Of Counsel at Strickland Brockington Lewis LLP.

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States. Travis Beckles, who had various felony convictions, was subsequently found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. As a result he was subject to an enhanced sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which deemed him a “career offender” whose firearm possession offense constituted a “crime of violence.” Applying the enhancement, the district court sentenced Beckles to 360 months’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Beckles then sought habeas relief from his enhanced sentence, arguing that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was not a “crime of violence,” and that therefore he did not qualify as a “career offender” under the Guidelines. The district court denied his petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed. -- Beckles then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and while his petition was pending the Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the residual clause part of the “crime of violence” definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act--the very same language that was applied to Beckles via the Sentencing Guidelines--was unconstitutionally vague. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment in Beckles’ case and remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the Johnson decision. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed Beckles’ enhanced sentence, reasoning that Johnson simply did not address the Sentencing Guidelines or related commentary. The Supreme Court then again granted certiorari, to “resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether Johnson’s vagueness holding applies to the residual clause in [the Guidelines.]” -- By a vote of 7-0, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that [the Guidelines’] residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Justice Thomas’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- To discuss the case, we have Carissa Hessick, who is the Anne Shea Ransdell and William Garland "Buck" Ransdell, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law.

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado. Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. Two jurors later informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that another juror made racially-biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and an alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits detailing what the allegedly biased juror had said. Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial after learning from the affidavits that the juror had suggested Pena-Rodriguez was guilty because he was Hispanic (and this juror considered Hispanic males to be sexually aggressive toward females). According to the affidavits, the juror also deemed the alibi witness not credible because, among other things, that witness was “an illegal.” The trial court denied the motion and a divided Supreme Court of Colorado ultimately affirmed, applying Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)--which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations--and finding that none of the exceptions to the rule applied. In the dissenters’ view, however, Rule 606(b) should have yielded to “the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.” -- The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. -- By a vote of 5-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, while held that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined. -- To discuss the case, we have John C. Richter, who is Partner at King & Spalding.

On June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Dietz v. Bouldin. Petitioner Rocky Dietz sued respondent Hillary Bouldin for negligence for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Bouldin removed the case to Federal District Court. At trial, Bouldin admitted liability and stipulated to damages of $10,136 for Dietz’ medical expenses. The only disputed issue remaining was whether Dietz was entitled to more. During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note asking whether Dietz’s medical expenses had been paid and, if so, by whom. Although the judge was concerned that the jury may not have understood that a verdict of less than the stipulated amount would require a mistrial, the judge, with the parties’ consent, responded only that the information being sought was not relevant to the verdict. The jury returned a verdict in Dietz’ favor but awarded him $0 in damages. After the verdict, the judge discharged the jury, and the jurors left the courtroom. Moments later, the judge realized the error in the $0 verdict and ordered the clerk to bring back the jurors, who were all in the building—including one who may have left for a short time and returned. Over the objection of Dietz’s counsel and in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, the judge decided to recall the jury. After questioning the jurors as a group, the judge was satisfied that none had spoken about the case to anyone and ordered them to return the next morning. After receiving clarifying instructions, the reassembled jury returned a verdict awarding Dietz $15,000 in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a federal district court can recall a jury it has discharged, or whether the court can remedy the error only by ordering a new trial. By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that a federal district court has a limited inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order and recall a jury in a civil case for further deliberations after identifying an error in the jury's verdict. The district court did not abuse that power here. Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kennedy joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Brad Shannon, who is Professor of Law at Florida Coastal School of Law.

On June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court decided RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that RJR conducted a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of several laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a federal statute. The alleged RICO enterprise involved the importation of illegal drugs into European countries by Colombian and Russian criminal organizations, with RJR helping to launder their drug money through a cigarette import-purchase scheme. Applying a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law, the district court dismissed The European Community’s civil RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that judgment and reinstated the RICO claim, however, concluding that various alleged predicates for RICO liability had been intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially, and that other offenses asserted sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO’s coverage. RJR subsequently obtained a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court on the following question: whether, or to what extent, RICO applies extraterritorially. -- By a vote of 4-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, which determined that the question of RICO’s extraterritorial application really divides into two questions: (1) Do RICO’s substantive prohibitions, contained in §1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries? (2) Does RICO’s private right of action, contained in §1964(c), apply to injuries that are suffered in foreign countries? On the first question, the Court held that under the facts asserted in this case, RICO’s prohibitions did apply extraterritorially. On the second question, however, the Court held that §1964(c)’s private right of action did not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and thus a private RICO plaintiff must allege and prove a domestic injury. Because in this case an earlier stipulation had resulted in waiver and dismissal of respondents’ domestic claims, the Court explained, their remaining RICO damages claims rest entirely on injury suffered abroad and must be dismissed. -- Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined in full by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and as to Parts I, II, and III by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Cory L. Andrews, who is senior litigation counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation.

On June 23, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin. This is the second time the case has come before the high court. Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas at Austin (the University) but was denied. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court (Fisher I), which held that the appellate court erred in how it applied the strict scrutiny standard, improperly deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications. On remand the Fifth Circuit again ruled in favor of the University, deeming its use of race in the admissions process narrowly tailored to a legitimate interest in achieving “the rich diversity that contributes to its academic mission.” -- On its second trip to the Supreme Court, the question was whether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement of the University’s use of racial preferences could be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause. By a vote of 4-3, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the court, which held that the race-conscious admissions program in use at the time of Fisher’s application was narrowly tailored and lawful under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- To discuss the case, we have Roger B. Clegg, who is President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity.

On June 9, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania. Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and his initial attempts to obtain state postconviction relief failed. His subsequent petition for federal habeas relief also failed. He again sought post-conviction penalty-related relief in state court and prevailed in the Court of Common Pleas on a claim of unlawful evidence suppression. On appeal, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the grant of relief and lifted the stay of execution (though a temporary reprieve was later granted by the governor for other reasons). The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Ronald Castille, who had joined the opinion reversing the grant of relief to Williams, had also been the District Attorney for Philadelphia during Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal. In that capacity, Castille had authorized his office to seek the death penalty for Williams. Williams had moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from hearing the appeal of post-conviction relief, but Castille declined to do so. -- The central question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether Justice Castille’s denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that under the Due Process Clause, where a judge has had an earlier significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision in the defendant’s case, the risk of actual bias in the judicial proceeding rises to an unconstitutional level. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Cassandra Burke Robertson, who is Professor of Law, Laura B. Chisolm Distinguished Research Scholar, and Director, Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Welch v. United States. Gregory Welch pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed, arguing that his conviction for robbery in Florida state court did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purposes of ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a robbery conviction with a lower level of force than the federal law required to qualify as a predicate offense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the minimum elements for conviction under the Florida law established a “serious risk of physical injury to another” and therefore qualified it as a predicate offense for purposes of ACCA. Welch’s subsequent attempt to obtain habeas relief from the district court was denied, and the Eleventh Circuit rejected his appeal, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari. -- The two questions before the Supreme Court are: (1) Whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)—which held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague—announced a new “substantive” rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable in an initial motion to vacate a federal prisoner’s ACCA-enhanced sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a); and (2) Whether petitioner’s conviction for robbery under Florida state law qualifies as a violent felony that supports a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that Johnson announced a new substantive rule that has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review, including Welch’s. The Court declined to address, however, whether Welch’s conviction for robbery under Florida law qualified as a predicate for purposes of the ACCA enhancement, leaving the matter to the Court of Appeals on remand. -- Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard E. Myers II, who is the Henry Brandis Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. U.S. In 2012, a grand jury indicted Luis for a variety of crimes relating to health care fraud. The government contended that she had fraudulently obtained some $45 million, and had spent all except $2 million of it. The government then initiated a civil proceeding to freeze Luis’ remaining assets, including those not traceable to the alleged fraud, to preserve them for payment of restitution and criminal penalties if she was convicted. Luis objected that the freeze violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by precluding her from using her own untainted funds--those not connected with the alleged crime--to hire counsel to defend her in her criminal case. The district court acknowledged that Luis might be unable to hire counsel of her choice but rejected her Sixth Amendment claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 11th Circuit and remanded the case. No single rationale, however, attracted the votes of five justices. Writing for a plurality, Justice Breyer delivered an opinion arguing, based on the nature of competing considerations, relevant legal tradition, and practical concerns, that Luis had a Sixth Amendment right to use her own “innocent” property to pay a reasonable fee for the assistance of counsel. The opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the Court--thereby providing a fifth vote to vacate and remand--but he did not agree with the plurality’s balancing approach and instead rested strictly on the Sixth Amendment’s text and common-law backdrop. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have John Malcolm, who is Director of the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and the Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.