Podcasts about southern african development community

“It could not by itself stop the advance of M23 without a strong Congolese army. And my sense is that it was not SADC that failed, but the Congolese army that failed.” Since December 2023, troops from SADC - the Southern African Development Community - have been taking part in a mission in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo tasked with supporting the Congolese army and protecting civilians and infrastructure. They included soldiers from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa.But then in January, rebels from the M23 group made lightning advances across the region – taking key towns including the capital Goma. A number of SADC troops were killed in the fighting. And last week, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa announced a ‘phased withdrawal'.So is this a sign that the mission has failed? And what will it mean for the government and people of the DRC? Presenter: Alan @kasujja Guests: Rear Admiral (JG) Prince Tshabalala, Thierry Bashala (businessman) and Dr. Claude Kabemba, the CEO of Southern Africa Resource Watch.

On Daybreak Africa: South Sudan has arrested at least twenty-two officials linked to the country's vice president since violent clashes broke out in the northeast last month, threatening the country's fragile peace, Human Rights Watch said. Plus, The Southern African Development Community announces the withdrawal of its troops from eastern DRC. Kenya vows to rescue chiefs abducted by Al-Shabab militants more than a month ago. Tropical Cyclone Jude causes no deaths but heavy damage in Malawi and Mozambique. Angolan airport authorities deport Tanzanian political leaders. We will hear about the journey of a South Sudanese refugee woman from Khartoum to Port Sudan. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa!

Leaders of the Southern African Development Community and the East Africa Community are meeting Friday and Saturday to discuss the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC is a member of both the SADC and the EAC, while Rwanda is a member of only the East African Community. SADC and the EAC have both put forth separate mediation efforts – the Nairobi Peace Process and the Luanda Peace Process. Professor Sipho Seepe, a political analyst and former deputy Vice Chancellor for Institutional Support at the University of Zululand, explains the two approaches to VOA's James Butty

On Daybreak Africa: France will hand back to Ivory Coast its only military base in the west African country in a ceremony on February 20, sources with knowledge of the talks told the French News Agency. The move follows the forced departure of its troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where military-led governments hostile to the former colonial ruler have seized power in recent years. Plus, the UN Secretary General makes a personal appeal for peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Meanwhile, leaders of the Southern African Development Community and the East Africa Community meet Friday to discuss the conflict in eastern DRC. Senegal plans to rename public places once named after French colonial figures. Some NGOs that work with HIV-positive communities in South Africa are in limbo, after Washington puts a 90-day freeze on aid. Darfuri women face sexual violence in war and refuge. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa!

The M23 rebels who seized the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo city of Goma last week have announced a unilateral ceasefire effective today (February 4). In a statement Monday, the M23 said the ceasefire was for humanitarian purposes. The group denied that it was planning to capture the town of Bukavu or other parts of DRC. Meanwhile, Kenyan President William Ruto says DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame have agreed to attend a joint East African Community and Southern African Development Community summit this weekend. Reporter Al Katanty Sabiti Djaffar in Goma talks to VOA'S James Butty about these developments

The Southern African Development Community held an extraordinary summit of heads of state in Zimbabwe on Wednesday to discuss the post-election violence in Mozambique and the conflict in eastern DRC. Columbus Mavhunga reports from Mount Hampden just outside the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, which is chairing the 16-nation group

In the third episode of the governance building block we move on to the discussion of legal frameworks and social protection. How can legal provisions of participation, access to information, transparency and equality be leveraged to include those workers into social protection systems? What are the main legal frameworks? How does administrative justice work for this end and how it can be used a tool for informal workers in their advocacy efforts? To help us understand these questions we invited Pamhidzai Bamu. Pamhi holds a masters and a PhD in Labour Law from the University of Cape Town. She is currently the President of the African Labour Law Society. She has consulted for the International Labour Organisation and the Southern African Development Community on various projects. She is currently the Africa Coordinator of WIEGO's Law Programme. *** References Social Protection for Self-Employed Informal Workers in Sub-Saharan Africa: A rights-based assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis https://www.wiego.org/publications/social-protection-self-employed-informal-workers-sub-saharan-africa-rights-based R202 - Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202) https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3065524 C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights *Our theme music is Focus from AA Aalto (Creative Commons)

Post-election unrest in Mozambique is expected to be on the agenda at the coming Southern African Development Community's extraordinary Heads of State Summit. Regional leaders are expected to address the scores of civilian fatalities and injuries since the ruling Frelimo party declared Daniel Chapo president with over 70 percent of the vote in the October 9 election. Vicky Stark report

Observers have begun arriving in Botswana to monitor activities ahead of the October 30 general election. On Tuesday, the Southern African Development Community, or SADC, officially launched its mission with a call for peaceful elections. From Gaborone, Mqondisi Dube reports

China, Zimbabwe sign agreements to deepen cooperation, cement tiesChina and Zimbabwe released a joint statement on Tuesday to intensify and upgrade their comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation and build a high-level community with a shared future as part of their efforts to strengthen ties.The statement came as President Xi Jinping rolled out the red carpet for visiting Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Tuesday. Mnangagwa is on a nine-day state visit to China, which started on Aug 29, and he will also attend the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation this week.The two presidents witnessed the signing of multiple documents on bilateral cooperation in areas such as Belt and Road cooperation, the Global Development Initiative and avocado exports to China.During their talks, Xi emphasized the deep-rooted traditional friendship between China and Zimbabwe, noting the significant progress in political mutual trust and fruitful cooperation between the two nations.He called on the two countries to build a "five-star ironclad" cooperation framework with pillars in politics, the economy and trade, security, culture and international coordination to foster a high-level China-Zimbabwe community with a shared future.China supports Zimbabwe in safeguarding its sovereignty, security and development interests, and opposes external interference and illegal sanctions, Xi said.The nation is willing to further align its development strategy with that of Zimbabwe, and expand mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as investment, trade, infrastructure, energy and minerals, clean energy and the digital economy, to help Zimbabwe and Africa enhance their capacity for independent development, he added.Xi congratulated Zimbabwe on assuming the chairmanship of the Southern African Development Community, and said that China is willing to strengthen international coordination with Zimbabwe, uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and work together to defend international fairness and justice.He reiterated China's commitment to viewing relations with African countries as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, saying that China supports African countries in pursuing an independent development path and Africa becoming a significant player in the development of global politics, the economy and civilization.Noting that FOCAC is the most important platform and mechanism for enhancing solidarity and cooperation between China and Africa, Xi expressed China's willingness to work with African countries to make the 2024 FOCAC Summit a milestone event in China-Africa relations in clarifying the direction and path for both sides to advance toward modernization.Mnangagwa spoke of his visit to the cities of Shaoshan, Xiangtan and Changsha in Hunan province, Shenzhen in Guangdong province and Nanjing in Jiangsu province before he headed to Beijing, and commended China's remarkable development achievements.He praised China's ongoing reforms unveiled at the third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in July, saying that the reform measures will not only further improve the well-being of the Chinese people, but also have a significant bearing on the future of the Global South and even humanity as a whole.China's assistance and cooperation have benefited the Zimbabwean people, creating new highlights in the friendship between Zimbabwe and China in the new era, he said.He said that Zimbabwe appreciates China's just stance on international affairs, and its constructive role in regional conflicts such as the Ukraine crisis and the Palestine-Israel conflict.He also reiterated his country's commitment to the one-China policy, and said that Zimbabwe is ready to continue working as a close friend of China in southern Africa.Sino-Nigerian relations elevated to comprehensive strategic partnershipPresident Xi Jinping called on China and Nigeria to enhance strategic mutual trust, better align development strategies and promote people-to-people exchanges as the two countries announced on Tuesday the elevation of their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership.The announcement was jointly made by Xi and Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, who is in Beijing for the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and a state visit.During their meeting at the Great Hall of the People, Xi said the two countries have always respected each other as equals and have pursued strength through unity and engaged in win-win cooperation since the establishment of diplomatic ties more than half a century ago.In recent years, a large number of exemplary cooperation projects with strategic importance have been implemented between China and Nigeria under the FOCAC framework, he said."I am willing to work together with Mr President to fully leverage the exemplary role of the China-Nigeria relationship and jointly promote new and greater development in relations between the two countries as well as between China and Africa," Xi told Tinubu.Nigeria is China's second-largest export market in Africa and is also a major investment destination and a major trading partner of China on the continent.Over the years, Chinese companies have constructed many signature projects in Nigeria, including the Lekki Deep Sea Port, the largest seaport in the country and one of the biggest in West Africa.As the two countries join hands to realize their respective modernization through high-quality cooperation, Xi stressed the necessity to promote integrated development between infrastructure, energy, mining and industries, and called for efforts to foster new growth points for cooperation in the digital economy, new energy and other areas.It is also hoped that Nigeria will ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and projects in the African country, he said.Xi said China supports Nigeria in combating terrorism, maintaining regional stability and playing a greater role in international and regional affairs. Furthermore, China will enhance multilateral coordination with Nigeria to jointly safeguard the interests of developing countries, he added.Noting that FOCAC is not only an effective mechanism for promoting China-Africa practical cooperation but also a banner of South-South cooperation, Xi said China is willing to take the summit as an opportunity to inject new momentum into the development of China-Africa relations in the new era.Tinubu said that deepening economic cooperation and developing the comprehensive strategic partnership between Nigeria and China are crucial for the future development of his country.Nigeria, which has the largest population in Africa, hopes to become China's largest trade and investment partner on the continent and welcomes more investment from Chinese companies, and also hopes to expand mutually beneficial cooperation in such areas as agriculture and manufacturing, he said.This will assist Nigeria and West Africa in their modernization efforts and effectively alleviate poverty, the Nigerian president said, adding that his country will provide a secure environment for achieving this objective.Tinubu also thanked China for providing important training opportunities for young people in Nigeria and expressed readiness to deepen people-to-people exchanges.After their talks, the two heads of state witnessed the signing of multiple cooperation documents related to the Belt and Road, applications of the Beidou Navigation Satellite System, peanut exports to China and other matters.

The United Nations' Human Rights Office has joined calls for Zimbabwe's government to release more than 100 activists detained ahead of the coming Southern African Development Community summit. Columbus Mavhunga reports from Harare, Zimbabwe, where opposition groups are welcoming the human rights office's call while the government digs in

“We spoke to relatives of a boy who was seen carrying ammunition. The relatives say this boy had been kidnapped during a January attack in another village. The uncle and aunt of the boy were shocked to see how much confidence he showed operating as a child soldier” – Zenaida Machado, Human Rights Watch In today's episode, Alan Kasujja revisits the conflict in Mozambique because it's now emerged that insurgents are using children in their operations. Human Rights Watch says youngsters, some as young as 13, were recently ordered to raid and loot the town of Macomia, in Cabo Delgado province. The recruitment and use of children as soldiers is a war crime. Alan attempts to understand why the Southern African Development Community, despite deploying troops to Mozambique, is failing to quell the violence. Also, with these soldiers withdrawing from Cabo Delgado, how will it affect local communities?

Zambia says it has called on two regional bodies — the African Union and Southern African Development Community — to mediate talks with neighboring Zimbabwe after its president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, appealed to Russia's Vladimir Putin for protection from what he described as militarily menacing, a description that Zambian officials reject. Columbus Mavhunga reports from Harare

The Eastern, Northern and Western Cape provinces have agreed to team up in a bid to position South Africa as a global hub for the production of green hydrogen and derivative products, as well as to produce the components required in the green hydrogen value chain, ahead of the finalisation of the long-awaited Green Hydrogen Commercialisation Strategy. The three coastal provinces are all playing host to potential multi-billion rand green-hydrogen projects and have been working separately on strategies and roadmaps in an effort to capture the jobs, growth and industrialisation opportunities that could flow should the projects materialise. However, the three provincial administrations have also decided that there is greater potential to advance the opportunity through cooperation rather than competition, particularly in the areas of infrastructure, skills development, trade and investment promotion, as well as on the development of supportive policy and regulation. They are also open to extending this cooperation into the region, including to green-hydrogen aspirant Namibia, in an effort to create a Southern African Development Community hydrogen corridor. The areas of collaboration have been formalised into a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that will be signed at South Africa's second Green Hydrogen Summit under way in Cape Town. The trilateral MoU follows on from a similar agreement announced in 2022 between the Western Cape and Northern Cape governments, which have both since also advanced with their individual strategies. The Western Cape government is aiming to developed Saldanha Bay, which is an established deep water port and industrial hub, into a production centre for green hydrogen and derivatives such as green direct reduced iron, which could be manufactured at the currently mothballed Saldanha Steel Works, as well as bunkering fuel for the shipping industry. The province also envisages the Atlantis Special Economic Zone becoming a key production centre for components used in the green-hydrogen value chain, including wind, solar and electrolyser components. Green hydrogen is produced by using renewable electricity in an electrolyser to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. The clean energy carrier and the derivative products are seen as becoming increasingly important in assisting those sectors that are unable to decarbonise directly using renewable electricity, such as steel, petrochemicals, fertilisers, cement, as well as long-haul land, sea and air transportation. The Northern Cape has also finalised its Green Hydrogen Roadmap, which indicates that between $300- and $500-billion of green hydrogen production and value-chain investment could be directed the way of the province, which has abundant sun, wind and land, by 2050. There are several projects already being progressed in the province, which also views the proposed greenfield port of Boegoebaai, located just south of the Namibian border, as potentially emerging as a flagship future production and export hub. In the Eastern Cape, the strategy will be implemented primarily in the Coega Special Economic Zone, where Hive Hydrogen is considering a 1.07 GW investment to produce green hydrogen and green ammonia for export. The MoU and the provincial strategies are said to be in line with the draft Green Hydrogen Commercialisation Strategy, which has been under development since 2021 but which has not yet been approved by government. Speaking at the launch of the summit, Electricity Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa indicated that he did not expect the strategy to meet with any resistance from Cabinet once it was presented for approval, but provided no definitive timeframe for its consideration by the executive. Industrial Development Corporation COO Joanne Bate, who is also leading the panel established by Trade, Industry and Competition Minister Ebrahim Patel to oversee the finalisation of the strategy, indicated that its formulation was well advanced. Bate reporte...

*) UN condemns Israel's Jenin raid, urges to respect international law The head of the UN has strongly condemned Israeli violence and its excessive use of force in the occupied West Bank city of Jenin. "Israel's air strikes and ground operations in a crowded refugee camp were the worst violence in the West Bank in many years," Antonio Guterres told reporters at UN headquarters in New York on Thursday. Guterres demanded that Israel abide by its obligations under international law, including a duty to exercise restraint and use proportional force. *) Türkiye urges Sweden to put its anti-terror law into practice Sweden's legislative changes in line with a memorandum signed in Madrid last year should be reflected in practice, the Turkish foreign minister said. Following the fifth meeting of a permanent joint mechanism between Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden in Belgium, Hakan Fidan said "It is imperative that countries wishing to join NATO take a firm stand on the fight against terrorism." Sweden could not prevent provocations, which affects Ankara's stance, he said, referring to the recent desecration of the Quran in Stockholm. *) DRC mulls security pact with South Africa to counter militias Democratic Republic of the Congo's President Felix Tshisekedi said that he was planning to sign a security agreement with South Africa. In a news conference with the South African President, in the capital Kinshasa, Tshisekedi explained that the accord could take the form of a mutual-defence pact. The Congolese president highlighted the mutual defence pact of the Southern African Development Community as a potential model. *) Zelenskyy says Ukraine's offensive 'not fast' but 'we advance' Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has said that Kiev wanted "honesty" in ties with NATO as he spoke ahead of a key summit of the Western military bloc. "We need honesty in our ties," Zelenskyy told reporters alongside Czech President Petr Pavel, speaking ahead of a key summit in Vilnius. He said it was time to demonstrate "the courage and strength of this alliance." And finally… *) Turkish wunderkind Arda Guler joins Real Madrid on 6-year contract 18-year-old Arda Guler has moved to Real Madrid from Turkish football club Fenerbahce on a six-year contract, the Spanish club confirmed. The Spanish powerhouse also said that the player would be introduced to the media on Friday at Real Madrid City, the club's training ground in Valdebebas. Fenerbahce stated on the Turkish Public Disclosure Platform that Real Madrid would pay a 21.7 million dollars transfer fee to buy Guler.

The strategic role of platinum group metals (PGMs) in the creation of a hydrogen economy is the key supporting element of the just energy transition investment plan unveiled by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection researcher Dr Nqobile Xaba emphasises in an op-ed. Given the criticality of PGMs in achieving global net-zero emission targets, Xaba questions the sufficiency of South Africa's gearing to leverage off its PGM endowment. Green hydrogen electrolysers and fuel cells are poised to increase demand for PGMs, which are used in electrolysers to separate water into hydrogen and oxygen, and in fuel cells to generate electricity from the hydrogen, with both playing key decarbonisation roles. Emphasised by Xaba is that green hydrogen technologies will likely not be fully implemented until this cleanest form of hydrogen can be produced competitively. To that end, the procurement of wind and solar renewables needs to be accelerated, along with development of infrastructure, including hydrogen distribution and storage infrastructure. The basis of South Africa's Hydrogen Society Roadmap is the use of hydrogen and hydrogen technologies to promote economic development and as South Africa moves to implement the roadmap's strategies, it has the potential to become a participant and scientific thought leader in the emerging global hydrogen system. Because South Africa will be competing for the same markets with other countries in the Southern African Development Community, Xaba emphasises that an acceleration of pace is needed by South Africa to ensure that it derives optimum benefit from green hydrogen export opportunity. Xaba contends that current policies do not adequately factor in the availability of materials for both the renewable energy transition and the adoption of the circular economy. To realise the green hydrogen ambitions outlined in the just energy transition investment plan, she highlights the need for South Africa to build mineral beneficiation value chains to meet hydrogen economy requirements. “South Africa should ensure that it retains its competitiveness in the PGM sector for its economic sustenance and for its low carbon transition strategies. This can be done through the creation of a thriving hydrogen economy,” says Xaba in advocating: PGM beneficiation through catalyst development for fuel cell and electrolyser applications to ensure that mineral value addition occurs in South Africa; support to enable South Africa's research and development efforts to be channelled towards product commercialisation; and an enabling environment for a thriving hydrogen economy, with both the Presidential Climate Commission's framework for a just transition and the Hydrogen Society Roadmap setting out implementation steps. In addition, South Africa's mineral beneficiation strategy provides a framework, she says, for using mineral endowments to support the overall competitiveness of the economy and promoting greenness. The creation of an enabling environment must, in her view, include funding support for research and development, and skills development programmes to ensure that there will be a capable hydrogen economy workforce. “It must also include science diplomacy initiatives that ensure engagement with international partners and facilitate the deployment of hydrogen technology demonstration prototypes of fuel cells and electrolysers for energy needs,” she adds. These need to be rolled out across the country to support service delivery meaningfully, and to encourage engagement with the new technologies. Connecting all these requirements should be a strong government, research institution, the private sector and civil society partnership. “These partnerships are critical in ensuring that projects succeed, a common vision is maintained, and that South Africa's hydrogen economy is guided by the just transition framework,” Xaba concludes.

Latest news from Sedibelo Platinum Mines in North West province is that the company's Pilanesberg platinum mines situated in the Bushveld Complex, 207 km west of Johannesburg, will not only have abundant solar power on site plus a world-first smelterless processing technology that consumes 82% – yes, 82% – less electricity than conventional platinum group metals (PGMs) smelters, but it will also be powered by wind energy. “We have committed now to a wind project. We have signed the contract,” Pallinghurst Group managing partner and cofounder Arne Frandsen confirmed to Mining Weekly in a Zoom interview. (Also watch attached Creamer Media video.) The company has secured an allocation of off-site wind power to augment already announced on-site solar. In a mining investment world increasingly dominated by environmental social and governance (ESG) demands, the resolve of Sedibelo Platinum Mines to be a green platinum group metals producer was firmed up last year by the timely first-of-a-kind appointment of a chief ESG officer. “As you know we have Lael Bethlehem as our chief ESG officer. She is in charge of our renewable energy drive, and she has some very interesting prospects for solar on our site and I'm really excited about that. “The first solar step will be of significant size, and I like the combination of solar and wind because quite often when the sun is not shining, the wind is blowing and it's a very good combination. It is also about showing clear intent, which is to ensure we can produce the greenest ounce of PGM available.” Frandsen emphasised. Frandsen chairs the Sedibelo Platinum Mines Limited in South Africa's North West, as well as leading the New York- and Toronto-listed Nouveau Monde Graphite, which operates out of Quebec. He has spent years co-developing a strategy to deliver a zero-carbon battery grade graphite mine in Canada, and in South Africa, he's overseeing the expansion of Sedibelo's Pilanesberg platinum group metals (PGMs) mine, which is also commissioning new smelterless technology on site right now amid a decade of research, development and plant piloting. Sedibelo launched its involvement with Kell at its launch at the premises of the South Africa's State-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) ten years ago. Sedibelo shares an interest in Kell with the IDC and founder Keith Liddell, who conceived the smelterless concept many years ago, when working at South Africa's State-owned mineral research organisation Mintek, in Malibongwe Drive, Randburg, Gauteng. “We've done all the testing, all of the development together, and the key thing for Sedibelo, as the user, is to have it up and running as soon as practically possible. “We are also a co-owner of the technology within the Southern African Development Community and it's also about our bigger strategy. “We don't want this magic potion for ourselves alone. As you know, we are talking about nearly 90% of the world's PGMs being in our beautiful part of the world and that means this has to be the home for Kell in respect of PGMs,” is the sharing sentiment expressed by Frandsen. “At the end of the day, it's all about doing the right thing, being sustainable and being responsible in the way that we use our electricity.” Kell's carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from concentrate to final refined metals are only 19% of the CO2 emissions caused by the current smelting and refining route. Mining Weekly: Is the introduction of green hydrogen at Sedibelo much further off? Frandsen: No, it's not much further off. We have committed, as a company, to that vision. We have a team that is looking at the green hydrogen initiatives and, for sure, we want to be right in the middle of the entire hydrogen highway concept that is that is being introduced. This is going to be very important and not only for the mining industry but for South Africa and neighbouring countries as well. The Pallinghurst Group now has within its fold all the key elements needed for lithium-...

The European Union announced that it is providing additional support to the African military mission in Mozambique in the form of $15m which will go towards the Southern African Development Community mission to Mozambique. The EU says the money will go towards peacebuilding and will focus on the capacity building of police and correctional services officers, women and youth empowerment, and dialogue with civic leaders tailored towards good governance and the rule of law". The EU says with this money, it will join Mozambican and international efforts to restore peace, safety and security in the North of Mozambique.

Ambassador John E. Lange (https://unfoundation.org/who-we-are/our-people/john-e-lange/) is Senior Fellow, Global Health Diplomacy, at the United Nations Foundation, a charitable organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that supports the United Nations and its activities. Ambassador Lange has extensive leadership experience in global health issues and longstanding involvement in United Nations affairs, focusing on issues related to global health security and the work of the World Health Organization. He also serves as the Chair of the Leadership Team of the Measles & Rubella Initiative. Ambassador Lange worked from 2009-2013 at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, where he engaged in high-level advocacy with governments and international organizations to advance the Gates Foundation's global health and development goals in Africa. In 2012, he was the founding Co-Chair of the Polio Partners Group, the broad group of stakeholders in the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, and served in that role for a four-year term. Ambassador Lange had a distinguished 28-year career in the Foreign Service at the U.S. Department of State, where he was a pioneer in the field of global health diplomacy and a leader in pandemic preparedness and response. He served as the Special Representative on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (2006-2009); Deputy Inspector General; Deputy U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator at the inception of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; and Associate Dean for Leadership and Management at the Foreign Service Institute, where he directed the Senior Seminar, the federal government's highest-level civilian/military joint training program. He was the U.S. Ambassador to Botswana and Special Representative to the Southern African Development Community (1999-2002), where he oversaw operations of seven U.S. Government agencies and made HIV/AIDS his signature issue. Ambassador Lange headed the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, as Charge d'Affaires during the August 7, 1998, Al-Qaeda bombing, for which he received the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award for "skilled leadership" and "extraordinary courage." From 1991 to 1995, while at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, Ambassador Lange managed U.S. humanitarian and refugee assistance channeled through international organizations. He also had tours of duty in the State Department Bureaus of African Affairs, Western Hemisphere Affairs and Management in Washington and at U.S. Embassies in Lomé, Togo; Paris, France; and Mexico City, Mexico. Prior to joining the diplomatic service in 1981, he worked for five years at the United Nations Association of the USA in New York. Ambassador Lange is the author of a case study in the book, Negotiating and Navigating Global Health: Case Studies in Global Health Diplomacy (2012), that describes the international negotiations on sharing of pandemic influenza viruses and access to vaccines when he led the U.S. delegation. He has delivered lectures on pandemics and other global health issues at Chatham House, London; the Council on Foreign Relations, New York; and numerous other venues. He has written numerous journal and magazine articles and blogs on the Dar es Salaam Embassy bombing, leadership in a crisis, humanitarian assistance, pandemic preparedness and response, and other global health issues. 

South Africa plans to end most special permits for foreigners as it revamps its immigration policies to manage an influx of economic migrants. The government announced that a special dispensation allowing Zimbabweans to live and work in South Africa will expire at the end of this year, while similar concessions for about 90 000 people from neighbouring Lesotho will expire in 2023 and won't be extended, Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi said. Permits for Angolan residents were terminated in August 2021. “We are not targeting” any particular nationality, Motsoaledi, 64, said in an interview in Bloomberg's Johannesburg office. Many “economic migrants” abused the nation's asylum provisions by falsifying reasons for leaving their countries, he said, adding that implementing sovereign laws wasn't xenophobic. Africa's most industrialized nation has been a magnet for people seeking better economic opportunities from across the continent, particularly from the Southern African Development Community countries. Arrivals ballooned in 2008 as the global financial crisis combined with an economic collapse in Zimbabwe triggered mass migration, the minister said. That year as many as 227 000 people from Zimbabwe moved to its southern neighbour, according to Motsoaledi, a medical doctor by profession. Many were given permits, which were extended until 2021. South Africa is grappling with a 33.9% unemployment rate -- the highest on a list of 82 nations monitored by Bloomberg -- and its economy is stuck in its longest downward cycle since World War II. The country of about 60.6-million people is home to almost 4-million migrants, according to government data. The presence of foreigners in South Africa has sparked resentment among some locals, who see them as competitors for scarce jobs, health care and housing, and the country has been wracked by intermittent xenophobic violence. A video circulating on social media this week showed Phophi Ramathuba, the head of the health department in Limpopo province, which borders Zimbabwe, reprimanding a Zimbabwean patient for seeking treatment in South African. Residents from the neighbouring country put a “huge strain” on Limpopo's medical facilities, she said on the clip. Divisive Issue “Nobody will be denied medical service,” Ramathuba, a member of the ruling African National Congress, later told News24, while reiterating that she stood by her comments. The South African Medical Association said it “deplores the manner” Ramathuba chose to address the challenges facing the health care system. Public hospitals and clinics are struggling to meet the needs of citizens “and reduce backlogs due to unpredictably high number of undocumented migrants” seeking care in the country,” South Africa's Department of Health said in a statement, responding to the Ramathuba's comments. As South Africa heads into the 2024 general elections, the presence of foreign nationals in the country has become a divisive point, with some parties positioning their electoral propositions around reducing their numbers. At a recent ANC policy conference. it was proposed that South Africa withdraw from the 1951 United Nations convention on refugees. The convention constrained the government's ability to deal with the migration crisis and “a new instrument,” needs be adopted, the party said. Meanwhile, the end of the Zimbabwean exemption permit has spurred legal action against the government challenging its constitutionality. About 178 000 citizens who were issued the permits have until December 31 to apply for a regular visa or leave South Africa. So far, 6 000 Zimbabwean Exemption Permit holders have asked the Department of Home Affairs not to terminate their documents, according to the Daily Maverick.

Last month, an extensive spatial biodiversity assessment, prioritization, and planning project got underway in 4 Southern African Development Community countries. This may not sound like the most exciting of projects, but it is a crucial one. The mapping of ecosystems in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Malawi will help these countries to improve their environmental planning and monitoring of indigenous species and ecosystems. In this week's edition of Being Green, Glynis Crook speaks to Ghislain Reb, head of the infrastructure and environmental team at the Agence Française de Développement, which is one of the co-sponsors of the project.

Last month, an extensive spatial biodiversity assessment, prioritization, and planning project got underway in 4 Southern African Development Community countries. This may not sound like the most exciting of projects, but it is a crucial one. The mapping of ecosystems in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Malawi will help these countries to improve their environmental planning and monitoring of indigenous species and ecosystems. In this week's edition of Being Green, Glynis Crook speaks to Ghislain Reb, head of the infrastructure and environmental team at the Agence Française de Développement, which is one of the co-sponsors of the project.

BMW Group South Africa (BMW SA) has added 16 African countries to its existing portfolio of 30 export countries, including Senegal, Nigeria, Angola, Kenya and Ethiopia. BMW SA produces the BMW X3 sports activity vehicle (SAV) at the Rosslyn plant, in Tshwane. The plant has produced vehicles since 1968, and was established as the premium car maker's first production facility outside Germany. Rosslyn started production of the BMW X3 in April 2018, following a R6.2-billion investment and after almost 35 years of BMW 3 Series production. More than 300 000 BMW X3s have been produced at the plant since 2018. The facility currently produces the third generation X3, and is able to manufacture up to 75 000 units a year, of which 96% is exported. The X3s for the newly allocated African markets were previously sourced from the German group's Spartanburg plant, in the US. “The BMW X3 remains a crucial vehicle in our global production network and now, with exports to 16 African markets, it is also critical to our success on our continent,” says BMW Group Rosslyn plant director Johan Mouton. “Ours has been a long-term commitment to the development of this company and the communities it has served for close to 50 years. As such, we are honoured to have the opportunity to build BMW X3s in Africa, for Africa, too.” “The addition of 16 key export markets is further evidence of the increased trade relations within the Southern African Development Community and the broader African Continental Free Trade Agreement region,” adds BMW SA and sub-Saharan Africa CEO Peter van Binsbergen. “We all have a role to play in encouraging stronger trade relations on the continent, and I am especially proud of the BMW X3's ambassador role – both for the BMW Group and South Africa.”

There is insufficient demand for gas in the power sector to “anchor” demand for the fuel in the broader South African energy sector, as gas will have only a limited peaking support role in a system transitioning from coal to renewables, analysis by Meridian Economics shows. Presented by Meridian's Adam Roff this week, the analysis notes that gas-to-power's anchor role was based on a position taken in the 2012 National Development Plan (NDP) that large-scale gas would be required to balance the “potentially higher costs” of variable renewable energy. The NDP predated the “plunge” in the cost of wind and solar photovoltaic technologies, which have since emerged as the lowest-cost generation options. “Gas was a viable alternative to coal, until a more viable alternative emerged,” Roff explained during a webinar hosted to discuss ‘The Role of Natural Gas as a Transitionary Fuel in Southern Africa'. He warned that ignoring these new realities would prove costly, as its modelling showed that operating the 3 GW gas-to-power fleet included in the Integrated Resource Plan at a capacity factor of 50% to 55% would cost R5.7-billion more every year to produce 14.5 TWh, than deploying such plants as peakers, with a capacity factor of between 3% and 5%, in support of renewable generators. Yearly emissions from the large-scale solution would also be far higher at 7.6-million tons, than the 1.1-million tons that would be produced from the peakers. This emission differential, Roff said, had become increasingly important in light of South Africa's updated Nationally Determined Contribution and aspiration to net zero emissions by 2050, which sets it on a decarbonisation trajectory that reduced the country's carbon space by between 30% and 50% relative to its previous commitment. Based on a peaker production profile, Meridian estimates that South Africa's total gas demand from the power sector will be between 25 PJ and 40 PJ by 2030, and that only if all new and existing peaker plants, including Eskom and private open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs), are switched over to gas. “This raises questions about the viability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) contracting, given that LNG suppliers typically require larger volumes.” Meridian argues that South Africa should, therefore, adopt a cautious approach to gas, which is “no longer a transition fuel in the power sector” or a “rational replacement for coal”. Gas could possibly replace some diesel at the OCGTs “on a path to hydrogen or other emission-free peaking technology”, but gas storage would have to be considered given that the volumes would be below the level required for regular LNG shipments. Speaking during the same webinar, Boston Consulting Group's Kesh Mudaly reported that an analysis it conducted for the National Business Initiative (NBI) concluded that gas would be required during the transition, but only in limited volumes in the electricity sector. The NBI study shows that South Africa's yearly gas demand could be between 230 PJ and 550 PJ by 2030, with much of that demand arising from the synthetic fuels sector, which is keen to displace coal with gas. The analysis concludes that South Africa should opt for flexible and short payback LNG infrastructure to support a faster scale-up of renewables, but with a view to replacing gas with batteries and green hydrogen from 2030 onwards. There were, however, likely to be benefits in switching the existing peaker plants from diesel to gas, which could yield cost savings of between R14-billion and R28-billion against capital expenditure and stranded-asset costs of about R10-billion. African International Advisors' Henry Gilfillan, who is working on a gas master plan for the Southern African Development Community, urged South Africa to adopt a regional perspective to the transition when assessing a role for gas in that transition. He argued that low-cost gas-to-power projects built in northern Mozambique, for instance, could be unlocked through an in...

In this episode we speak to Ms. Viola Sawere is the Regional Trade in Services Expert at the  Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat. She is also a trade consultant and expert on regional integration policy, international trade policy, private sector development and multi- stakeholder dialogues. She speaks to us about trade barriers affecting the Africa in economy. The trade reforms and policies for regional integration in Sub-saharan region  that are in place to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and more…  

Communications and Digital Technologies' Minister, Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, has expressed confidence in the country's launch of its own Communication Satellite into orbit. A commission established by President Cyril Ramaphosa previously recommended that government build and launch a geostationary telecommunications satellite, which would offer its services to the entire Southern African Development Community region. Ntshavheni says they are targeting the end of this financial year to finalise the revised proposal of the country's own satellite

Michelle Gavin, CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies, leads a conversation on African politics and security issues.     FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR fall of 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, cfr.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Michelle Gavin with us today to talk about African politics and security issues. Ambassador Gavin is CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies. Previously, she was managing director of the Africa Center, a multidisciplinary institution dedicated to increasing understanding of contemporary Africa. From 2011 to 2014, she served as the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and as the U.S. representative to the Southern African Development Community, and prior to that, she was a special assistant to President Obama and the senior director for Africa at the National Security Council. And before going into the Obama administration, she was an international affairs fellow and adjunct fellow for Africa at CFR. So we are so delighted to have her back in our fold. So, Michelle, thank you very much for being with us. We have just seen that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken went on a trip to Africa. Maybe you could begin by talking about the strategic framework that he laid out on that trip, and then we have in just recent days—with a new variant of Omicron—seen the travel ban imposed on several African countries and what that means for the strategic vision that he laid out. GAVIN: Sure. Thank you. Well, thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. And I looked at the roster. There's so much amazing expertise and knowledge on this Zoom. I really look forward to the exchange and the questions. I know I'll be learning from all of you. But maybe just to start out to talk a little bit about Secretary Blinken's trip because I think that, in many ways, his efforts to sort of reframe U.S. engagement on the continent, trying to move away from this sort of binary major power rivalry lens that the Trump administration had been using is useful, but also exposes, really, a lot of the challenges that policymakers focused on Africa are dealing with right now. So he tried to reset the relationship in the context of a partnership, of purely acknowledging African priorities and African agency in determining what kind of development partners Africa is interested in, what kind of security partners. I think that's a very useful exercise. Then he kind of ticked through, as every official has to do in making these big framing statements as sort of broad areas of engagement and cooperation, and he talked about increasing trade, which, of course, is interesting right now with AGOA sunsetting soon, working together to combat pandemic diseases, particularly COVID, working together on climate change, where, of course, Africa has borne more consequences than many other regions of the world while contributing far less to the problem, working together on the democratic backsliding and authoritarian sort of surge that we've seen around the world and, finally, working together on peace and security. So this huge agenda, and I think what's interesting and what in many ways his trip made clear is that it's very hard to get to the first four points when the last one, the peace and security element, is in chaos. And, look, obviously, Africa's a big continent. All of us who ever engage in these conversations about Africa are always—are forever trying to provide the disclaimer, right, that there's never one African story. There's never one thing happening in this incredibly diverse continent. But it is the case that the peace and security outlook on the continent is really in bad shape, right. And so the secretary traveled to Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal. The headlines from his trip, really, were dominated by the disorder in the Horn of Africa that we're seeing right now. So you have the civil conflict in Ethiopia, which has been incredibly costly to that country in terms of lives, in terms of their economic outlook, has been characterized by atrocities of war crimes. And, I think right now, most observers are very concerned about the integrity of the Ethiopian state, its capacity to persist. Regardless of today, tomorrow, or next week's military developments, it's very hard to see a lasting and sustainable military solution to this conflict and the parties do not appear, really, amenable to a serious political negotiation. But it's not just Ethiopia, of course. It's Sudan, where we saw the tenuous military-civilian transitional government kind of fully hijacked by the military side of that equation in a coup that has been, really, rejected by so many Sudanese citizens who are still on the streets even today trying to push back against the notion of military dominance in their transition and beyond, and they are being met with violence and intimidation. And the outlook there is quite worrying. You've got border clashes between Ethiopia and Sudan. You have electoral crisis in Somalia. So the Horn, you know, is looking like a very, very tough neighborhood. And, of course, everyone is concerned about the impact on Kenya and East Africa itself, given the insurgency in Mozambique, which has more than once affected neighboring Tanzania, these bombings in Uganda and the sense of instability there. The picture is one of multiple crises, none of which come with easy fixes or purely military solutions. And then you have this kind of metastasizing instability throughout the Sahel, right, and the concern that more and more states will fall victim to extremely worrisome instability and the very costly violence. So there's a huge security agenda and we're just—we're all aware of the basic facts that it's very hard to make progress on partnerships to support democratic governance in the midst of conflict. It's very hard to come together on climate change or to fight a pandemic in the midst of these kinds of circumstances. So I think it's a really challenging picture. And just to pull a couple of these threads, on this issue of democratic backsliding the Biden administration's desire to build more solidarity among kind of like-minded countries whose democracies may take different forms but who buy into a basic set of democratic values, it's undeniable that the trend lines in Africa have been worrisome for some time and we do see a lot of these kind of democratic authoritarian states, these states where you get some of the form, some of the theater, of democracy, particularly in the form of elections, but no real capacity for citizens to hold government accountable. It's not really a kind of a demand-driven democratic process, that the fix is often in on these elections, and there is polling, right, that suggests that this is turning people off of democratic governance in general, right. If what you understand democratic governance to be is a sham election, you know, at regular intervals while you continue to be governed by a set of individuals who are not really beholden to the electorate, right, and are protecting a very small set of interests, then it's not surprising to see some waning enthusiasm. It's not that other forms of government are necessarily looking great to African populations, but I think it is notable in some of that Afrobarometer polling in places where you wouldn't expect it, right, like South Africa, where people sacrificed so much for democracy, and you really do see a real decline in enthusiasm for that form of governance. So there's a lot of work to be done there. The last thing, just because you brought it up, on the latest news about this new variant, the Omicron variant—I may be saying that wrong. It may be Omicron. Perhaps someone will correct me. And the kind of quick policy choice to institute a travel ban on a number of southern African countries. So I do think that in the context of this pandemic, right, which has been economically devastating to the continent—where the global economic downturn that occurred for Africans, too, but you had governments with very little fiscal space in which to try to offset the pain for their populations. In addition, you have had the issues of vaccine inequity, right, where it's just taken far too long to get access to vaccines for many African populations—it's still not adequate in many places—and a sort of sense that the deal initially proposed in the form of COVAX wasn't really what happened—you know, a feeling of a bait and switch—that looks like—what it looks like is disregard for African lives. And while I am really sympathetic—I used to work in government and it's crystal clear when you do that your first responsibility is the safety of the American people—these travel bans sort of fit into a narrative, right, about scapegoating, about disregard for African life that, I think, is going to make it awfully hard for this new reframing of respect and partnership, right, to really resonate. And I would just note, as a former U.S. ambassador in Botswana, that the scientists in the lab in Gaborone and the scientists in South Africa who did the sequencing and helped to alert the world to this new variant, right, were doing us all a tremendous favor. It's not at all clear that this variant started in southern Africa, right. We know that it exists on every continent right now except Antarctica. We know that samples taken in Europe before these discoveries were made in southern Africa—just tested later—showed that the variant was already there. And so it is a bit hard to explain why specifically southern Africans are banned from travel. You know, I think it's unfortunate. There are other policies that could be pursued around testing, around quarantine requirements. So I'll leave that there. I'm not a public health expert. But I think it's—I'm glad you brought it up because I think these things do really resonate and they inform how the United States is understood on the continent. They inform how Africans understand global institutions and kind of global governance to reflect or not reflect their concerns and interests. And if what the Biden administration wants is partners in this notion of democratic solidarity and partners in trying to reconstruct kind of international institutions a sense of global order, a norms-based rules-based approach to multilateral challenges, it's going to be hard to get the African buy-in that is absolutely necessary to achieve those goals when these kinds of issues continue to give the impression that Africa is an afterthought. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Michelle. That was really a great overview for us. So now we want to go to all of you. You can raise your hand—click on the raised hand icon to ask a question—and when I recognize you please unmute yourself and state your affiliation. Otherwise, you can submit a written question in the Q&A box, and if you do write a question please say what institution you're with so that I can read it and identify you properly and—great. Our first hand raised is from Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson. And let me just say, the “Zoom user,” can you please rename yourself so we know who you are? So, Dr. Nelson, over to you. Q: Good afternoon, everyone. Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson from Southern University. I'm a political science professor in the department. And the question, I guess, I have is that we know that the African people have a history of nondemocratic governance, right? And when we look at a place like Tunisia, we know that one of the reasons in the Arab Spring that they were so successful—although often considered an Arab country, they are successful because there had been tenets of democracy that were already broiled in the society. The question I have is that to these places that do not have that institutional understanding or have even—maybe don't even have the values to align with democracy, are we foolhardy to continue to try to support democratic governance as the full-throated support versus trying to look at more of a hybrid of a sovereign situation that allows for, in many ways, a kingdom, a dictator, and et cetera, with then a democratic arm? Thank you so much. GAVIN: Thanks, Dr. Nelson. It's an interesting question, and I agree with you insofar as I think that it's really interesting to think about the kind of governance antecedents in a bunch of African countries, particularly in the pre-colonial era, right, and try to figure out how they find expression afterwards. There's no question that, you know, colonialism doesn't set the table well for democracy. There's no doubt about that. But I would say that, you know, despite the loss of faith in democratic governance that we've seen in some of the polling, you know, very consistently for a long time what you've seen is that African populations do seem to want democratic governance. They want to be able to hold their leaders accountable. They want everyone to have to abide by the law. They want basic protections for their rights. So, you know, I'm not sure that there's any society that's particularly ill-suited to that. But I do think that democracy comes in many forms and it's always particularly powerful when there is, you know, some historical resonance there. I also—you know, if we take a case like one of the world's last absolute monarchies in eSwatini right now what you see is a pretty persistent civic movement demanding more accountability and less power for the monarch, more protection for individual rights. And so, you know, I'm not—I think that people are feeling disillusioned and frustrated in many cases and you see this, too, in the enthusiasm with which several of the recent coups in West Africa have been met—you know, people pouring out into the streets to celebrate because they're frustrated with the status quo. They're interested in change. But very rarely do you see then persistent support for, say, military dictatorships or military-dominated government. So I'm not sure that the frustration means enthusiasm for some of these other governing models. People want democracy to work a lot better. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Lucy Dunderdale Cate. Q: Hi. Yes. I'm Lucy Dunderdale Cate. I'm with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I wanted to just ask you about kind of the African Union's role in this, you know, particularly and with the Biden administration, and thinking about, you know, the Horn of Africa security issues that you mentioned. Kind of where do you see that we're going and what do you see kind of for the future there? Thank you. GAVIN: Sure. Thanks for that question. I think the AU, for all of its flaws—and, you know, find me a multilateral organization that isn't flawed—is actually incredibly important. You know, for the Biden administration, which has kind of staked out this position that international institutions matter and multilateral institutions matter, they've got to work better, we can't address the threats we all face without these functioning and they may need to be modernized or updated but we need them, then the AU is a really important piece of that puzzle. And I think, you know, right now, for example, in Ethiopia that the—it's the AU's negotiator, former Nigerian President Obasanjo, who really is in the lead in trying to find some glimmer of space for a political solution, and this was a little bit late in the day in terms of AU activism on this issue and I think it's been a particularly difficult crisis for the AU to address in part because of being headquartered in Addis and sort of operating within a media and information environment in Ethiopia that is one that does not create a lot of space for divergence from the federal government's position. So I think that, in the end, right, the prospect of the collapse of a 110-million-strong country, a place that used to be an exporter of security, a major diplomatic player in the region, right, spurred AU action. But it's been a little bit—more than a little bit slow. But you have seen some pretty forward-leaning stance at the AU as well. Their response to the military coup in Sudan this fall was pretty robust and clear. Now this sort of new transitional arrangement that appears to be more palatable to much of the international community than to many Sudanese citizens is a—we're wading into murkier waters there. But I think the AU, you know, it's the only game in town. It's essential, and particularly in the Horn where the subregional organization EGAD is so incredibly weak that the AU, as a vehicle for an African expression of rules-based norms-based order, is—you know, actually its success is incredibly important to the success of this major U.S. foreign policy plank. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Rami Jackson. How much of the democratic backsliding is supported by outside powers? For example, there was a chance for a democratic movement in Chad but the French threw their weight behind Déby's son after he was shot. GAVIN: That's a great question. I think that it's, certainly, not the case that external partners or actors are always positive forces, right, for democratic governance on the continent. There's no doubt about that, and it can be France and Chad. It can be, you know, Russian machinations in Central African Republic. There's a lot. It can be some of the Gulf states in Sudan, right, who—or Egypt, who seem very comfortable with the idea of military dominance and maybe some civilian window dressing for this transition. So you're right that external actors are kind of an important piece of the puzzle. You know, I don't think that there are many situations where there is a single external actor who is capable of entirely influencing the direction of government. But there are, certainly, situations where one external actor is tremendously powerful. Chad is a great example, again. And it is something that, I think, you know, again, an administration that has staked so much of its credibility on the notion that this is something very important to them, you know, is going to have to deal with. And it's thorny, right. Foreign policy always is where you have competing priorities. You need to get important work done sometimes with actors who do not share your norms and values, and it's the messiness of trying to articulate and integrate values in a foreign policy portfolio that runs the gamut, right, from counterterrorism concerns to economic interests. But I think that those are tensions that the administration will continue to have to deal with probably a little more publicly than an administration who didn't spend much time talking about the importance of democratic governance. FASKIANOS: Great. And I just want to mention that Rami is a graduate student at Syracuse University. So I'm going to go next to a raised hand from Mojúbàolú Olufúnké Okome. I know you wrote your question, too. Q: Good afternoon. Thank you very much. Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: I wrote my question because I couldn't figure out how to name myself on the phone. You know, thank you for your presentation. When I look at democracy in Africa—I mean, this is not the first go-round—and the response by people, by citizens, to the backsliding by governments is not—it looks familiar to me because, you know, in the 1960s—from the 1960s, there were similar responses. People were dissatisfied. They welcomed authoritarian governments again and again because the government they voted for rigged elections, were also authoritarian, and they were kleptocratic. So what's different now and where's the continuity and what has changed, really, with democracy? The other thing is about this COVID—the management of the COVID situation. I also kind of see the—I think I agree with you. The way Africa is being treated looks very familiar—you know, with disdain, with disrespect, as if the lives of the people there don't matter as much. And what is it going to take, really, to change the—because, you know, if a pandemic that cannot be stopped by walls and borders is not instigating change what is it going to take to change the way in which world politics is—world politics and its governance is done? GAVIN: Fantastic questions and ones that, I think we could talk about for, you know, a week-long conference. But so I'll start from the beginning and just take a stab. I think you're absolutely right. There have been these interesting cycles when it comes to governance on the continent and I think—when I think about sort of what's different from what we were seeing in, say, toward the end of the '60s, I think it's a couple things. One is geopolitical context, right. So my hope is that what we're not doing is kind of doing a reprise of this bipolar world where we're subbing in China's authoritarian development model for a Soviet Communist model and sitting here on the other side and, you know, trying to manipulate other countries into one camp or another. I don't think we're quite there yet and I think the Biden administration is trying very hard not to wade into those waters. So I do think the geopolitical context is a bit different. I also think, you know, that where so many African states are is at—in terms of kind of the scope of their existence as independent entities is an important difference, right. So I think that in the immediate kind of post-colonial era, for an awful lot of governments the fundamental basis for their legitimacy was having—is not being a colonial administrator, not being a puppet of some external power and so the, you know, legitimacy came from liberation, from independence. In places that had terrible conflict sometimes legitimacy came from, you know, delivering some degree of security from a long-standing insecure situation. So, you know, you look at—I think that's where sort of President Museveni derived a lot of legitimacy in the late '80s and through the '90s. And I think that, you know, now, as you have these very significant young populations whose lived experience is not one of ever knowing a time pre-independence, you know, they're looking for service delivery, right. They're looking for opportunity. They're looking for job creation, and I think legitimacy is increasingly going to be derived from the ability to deliver on these priorities. And so I do think that that makes kind of the governance landscape a little bit different, too, sort of different ideas about where governing legitimacy comes from. And, you know, I think that can be manifest in really different ways. But if I had to try and, you know, grab onto that interesting idea about what's different, that's what comes to mind. In this, you know, incredibly important question about what's it going to take to recognize African states as equal players and African lives as—every bit as urgently valuable as any other, you know, I do think that as the world continues to grapple with this pandemic and with other issues that can only be resolved globally, like climate change, it will, over time, kind of force a reckoning and a rethink about what are the important states and what are not. You know, it's interesting to me, it's absolutely true that by not moving out robustly to ensure that the whole world has access to vaccines the richest countries have created opportunities for new mutations to emerge. I hesitate to say that, in some ways, in this context because it sounds like I'm positive that these emerged from Africa, and I'm not. But we do know, you know, as a basic matter of science, right, that we're not safe until everyone's safe. And so I do think that as these kinds of issues that military might and economic power cannot address alone, where it really does take global solidarity and an awful lot of multilateral cooperation, which is messy and cumbersome, right, and necessary, my hope is that that will start to change perceptions in framing. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to go next to a written question from Abbey Reynolds, who's an undergraduate student at the University of Central Florida. What steps do you think that international and regional organizations can take to preempt future attempts to derail democratic governance in the region—coups, circumvention of constitutional term letter—limits, rigged elections, et cetera? GAVIN: OK. I'm sorry. What steps should who take? I'm sorry. FASKIANOS: Multilateral—international and regional organizations. GAVIN: OK. You know, I think that in a number of cases subregional organizations have been taking steps, right—ECOWAS, certainly, in rejecting coups and suspending memberships, et cetera. I think, you know, if you look at the sort of articulated and documented principles of a lot of these organizations they're pretty good. It's really about the gulf sometimes between stated principles and practice. So, you know, I think the Southern African Development Community is sometimes guilty of this where there are—you know, there's a clear commitment in static kind of principle documents and protocols around democratic governance but you also have an absolute monarchy that's a member state of SADC. You've had, you know, significant repression in a number of states—Zimbabwe leaps to mind—that SADC doesn't have, really, anything to say about. So you can have organizations that have kind of principles and procedures. At the end of the day, organizations are made up of member states, right, who have a set of interests, and I think that, you know, how governments understand their interest in standing up for certain norms, it's—I think it's specific in many ways to those governments in those states how they derive their own legitimacy, the degree to which they feel they may be living in a glass house, and, you know, frankly, relative power dynamics. So I'm not sure. Certainly, it's always—you know, I'm a believer in multilateralism. I think from an African point of—you know, if you imagine African states trying to assert themselves on the international stage, multilateralism is really important, right, to get if it's possible, where interests align, to have as many African states speaking with one voice. It's a much more powerful message than just a couple individual states. But there are always going to be intrinsic limits. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Gary Prevost with the College of St. Benedict. And if you can unmute yourself. Q: Speaking today, actually, as honorary professor and research associate from Mandela University in South Africa. I've had several students in recent years—doctoral and master's students—study U.S. and allied counterterrorism strategies both in the Middle East and in Africa, and they've come away with a general perspective that those strategies going back several administrations have been almost solely focused on military action and that it has led them in their recommendations sections of their theses to argue that other steps must be taken if these efforts in places like Nigeria or Somalia or Mozambique or even in the Middle East, Syria, and Iraq, are to be successful they must have a changed mindset about counter terror. What's your perspective on that? GAVIN: Well, thanks for that. I wholeheartedly agree, right, and I think, you know, you'll even get plenty of military officers, right, who will say there's no way we can address some—these problems, these, you know, kind of radical violent organizations aligned to global terrorist groups with a purely military approach. It's frustrating. I'm sure it's frustrating for your students, too, because it feels like everyone keeps coming to this conclusion, and, certainly, there have been efforts to, you know, counter violent extremism, provide opportunity for young people. But we're not very good at it, right. We haven't been very good at it yet. There's still a mismatch in terms of the resources we pour into these kind of relative—these different streams of effort, right. But I think also while it's very clear in a situation like Mozambique that if you want to weaken the insurgency you need to be providing more opportunity and building more trust in a community that's been disenfranchised and alienated from the center for a very, very long time. But the how to do that, how to do that effectively and how to do it in a climate of insecurity I actually think is an incredibly difficult challenge, and there are, you know, brilliant people working on this all the time. You know, some of the best work that I've seen suggests that some of this can be done but it's an incredibly long-term undertaking and that, you know, is sometimes, I think, a difficult thing to sustain support for, particularly in a system like the United States where, you know, our appropriations cycles tend to be very short term. So people are looking for, you know, quick impact, things you can put on a bar graph quickly and say that you've done. And I think that, you know, a lot of the kind of peace building research suggests that that's—that, you know, building community trust, which is a huge part of what needs to happen, operates on a very different kind of timeline. So it's a really thorny, thorny problem and how to get—you know, how to sustain political and budgetary support for those kinds of efforts. I don't know the answer yet. I'm sure somebody really smart on—maybe on the Zoom does. FASKIANOS: I'm going to go next to Pearl Robinson at Tufts University. Q: Hello, Ambassador Gavin. First of all, I'd like to congratulate you in your new position as Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa, and that's actually—as I've been sitting here listening to this, my thought was I'd like to know if you have thought about ways in which you can use your position at the Council to help actualize forms of partnerships about policy dialogues related to Africa. You began by articulating the U.S.'s new strategic vision for Africa. That was an American statement. I haven't really heard an African statement that would be engaging with that policy dialogue. These one-on-one trips of the secretary of state and other people going to individual African countries, based on our agenda, and having one-on-one dialogue discussions, in a way, does not get towards that real notion of African agency in policy and partnership. So I'm actually wondering whether you might envision the Council playing a role and creating some kinds of policy dialogue fora that would have American(s) and Africans participating in ways that would be visible to American publics as well as African publics. So I'm suggesting that you might, you know, be uniquely well suited to have the Council play a role in actually making visible and operationalizing this concept. I just thought about this sitting here listening because what I realized was everybody talking is talking from the American side and I'm wondering if—well, my dear colleague, Olufúnké, actually was an African voice. But I think what needs to happen is there needs to be a way for this taking place maybe with African institutions, academics, civil society actors. So I just throw that out for you to think about and I'd like to hear your first response to that idea. GAVIN: So I think it's exciting and I'd love, actually, to follow up with you. I'm delighted that you're here. I heard some wonderful things about your work. I think there's always the hard part of, right, who speaks for Africa, right, because there are so many diverse African perspectives. But I don't think you're suggesting there's necessarily a unitary voice. You're talking about sort of different actors, and I would agree with you that it's always incredibly rich to have conversations. You know, I recently did a panel with Professor Ed Vitz, who is working on some—working on a paper, I think, that will eventually be a book about sort of U.S.-Africa policy and particularly interested in the kind of frame of major power rivalry. But it was such a refreshing conversation to examine that and compare notes on what we thought the flaws of that frame might be to hear his perspective on where he thought there might be advantages to be seized from it. It was wonderful, and I agree with you that the more dialogue and the more opportunity not just to sort of talk amongst ourselves in a U.S. community that cares about Africa and about U.S. policy the better. You know, I will be honest with you, I often, in a situation like the one right now, I try hard to stick to—to at least keep circling back to U.S. policy because that's where my background is and I, you know, have no desire to posit myself as speaking on behalf of Africans. That's nuts and, you know, not my role. But I do—I have spent a lot of time thinking about how the U.S. engages with the continent. And so I think it's a really interesting notion. I'd love to follow up with you. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next written question from Krista Johnston, who's a professor at Howard University. The African Continental Free Trade Area will create the largest consumer market. What are the barriers U.S. businesses investing in Africa and positioning themselves to take advantage of this new trade area and what can the Biden administration do to incentivize this kind of engagement with China? And perhaps I can tack on another question to that because we have a lot of questions—(laughs)—both raised hands—is just to talk a little bit about China's footprint in Africa as well. GAVIN: Sure. Well, so I absolutely agree that the African Continental Free Trade Area is a really incredibly promising step forward for African economic integration and that is, you know, compelling in any number of ways. I think, for example, about the very hot topic of pharmaceutical production, right. And between the Free Trade Area, the standing up of the African Medicines Agency, right, which should help to harmonize regulatory standards for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment throughout the continent, investments seem a lot more attractive, right, when you're looking at much bigger markets than any one country, even than a giant like Nigeria, can provide. So I think that there's tremendous potential here. I will go back to what I said earlier, which is that even with these positive steps, right, it's going to be really important that the peace and security parts start trending in the right direction because it's very—you know, I would say this. U.S. investors are already quite bad at assessing risk in Africa and a backdrop of instability is not going to help that situation, right, and it is, in many cases, going to make a given investment opportunity or partnership opportunity too risky for many. So, you know, there's just no way to jettison those concerns. But wholeheartedly agree it's an exciting development. If the world hadn't gotten sort of hijacked by COVID, I think we'd be talking about it a lot more. On China, you know, the Chinese engagement on the continent is a fact of life that's existed for a very long time and is not going anywhere. It is economic, it is political, it is, increasingly, cultural, and I think, you know, for a state like China that aspires to be a major global power it's entirely predictable and understandable. Do I think that there are some ways in which Chinese investment and engagement are not always beneficial to African states? I do. I have concerns, certainly, about the way China sometimes uses its influence to secure African support for Chinese positions that appear antithetical to stated values in AU documents and other(s) and I have concerns about the transparency of some of the arrangements. I have concerns as well about some of the tech standards and just sort of play for technical dominance that maybe does not have the cybersecurity interests of Africans as its top priority. All that said, I think it's really important for the United States to, you know, understand that there's no—there's nothing to be gained by constantly vilifying China's engagement, some of which has been incredibly helpful for African states hungry, particularly, for financing on major infrastructure projects, and, you know, it's a fact of life we all have to learn to deal with. I do think, you know, there's some natural tension between the Biden administration's democracy focus, right, and the very explicit and intentional efforts of China to present a different model, and I don't think that the U.S. needs to shy away from that or pretend that those differences don't exist. But I do think it's incredibly unhelpful to frame up all of U.S. policy as if it's intended to counter China as opposed to intended to find those areas in the Venn diagram of, you know, those overlaps of African interests and U.S. interests and work together on them. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Anna Ndumbi, who is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi. Please unmute yourself. Q: Thank you very much. I really appreciate the presentation. I have a quick question in regards to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is center of Africa. About three years ago, there was a new president that stepped in by the name of Félix Tshisekedi, and he decided to pass a law saying that all the secondary education should be free because, obviously, in Africa schools aren't free. And I, personally, think that maybe it wasn't really—it was something they should have probably considered before passing the law. The result of that is that you have classrooms where there were maybe twenty students and now there's, like, there could be over a hundred students in one classroom, right. So we spoke about the pandemic. When COVID hit a lot of schools were shut down. They were shut down for a long period of time, and when you look at a lot of schools in Africa they don't have the ability of giving out maybe laptops or anything like that to assist students to continue school at home. So in result of that, you see a lot of children who are really below what they should be, below the average when it comes to education, and my question with that is where do we see the future going as far as maybe having international organization(s) or United States intervene because the future is not bright when we look at education with the children or the youth. How can United Nation(s) or maybe other international organization(s) assist, especially with what happened during COVID, going forward? What does the future look like for Africa? And I'm speaking more for the Democratic Republic of Congo. How can nonprofit organization(s) or United States intervene and assist in this matter? GAVIN: Well, thank you for that, and I have followed this a little bit because it was an interesting and kind of splashy promise and initiative on the part of President Tshisekedi and it's been disappointing, I think, to see that some of the, you know, government's budget that was intended to be allocated for that appears to have found its way into a handful of individuals' accounts. But I think that, you know, the fundamental point you're making, which is that in DRC but also throughout the African continent, right, there are these vast populations of young people. It is the youngest region of the world. And if you look at it historically at how other parts of the world have dealt with youth bulges, right, investing in that human capital so that they can be drivers of innovation and economic growth has been a really powerful kind of transformational tool—for example, in Asia. And so I definitely think that you're onto something really important right now about prioritizing investing in young people and their capacity, and you're absolutely right that the disruptions of the pandemic have, in many cases, fallen most heavily on children. You know, how to tackle that, I think, is sort of—you know, I can't design a program in this moment, I'll be honest with you. But I think that you're absolutely right, it's an incredibly important and too often easily overlooked priority. You know, there have been some interesting education innovations on the continent but they're too often kind of small, not scalable, and the need is so incredibly vast. But here, again, I will be a broken record. We do have to go back to this issue that peace and security matters, right. It's very, very hard for kids to get a sustained education that's going to provide them with opportunity in a context of insecurity, which, for a lot of children in eastern Congo, is still the case. FASKIANOS: OK. We have three minutes left. I am going to—and so many questions, and I apologize that we're not going to be able to get to all of you. So I'm going to give the final question to Caleb Sannar. Q: Hi. Yes. Thank you for joining us today, Ambassador Gavin. As they said, my name is Caleb Sanner. I'm a student from the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. My question is with the Abraham Accords the Trump administration signed the agreement with Morocco to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Following that, there was some discrepancies in the southern territory controlled by the U.N., MINURSO, and the Polisario Front, the external Saharawi government, ended up declaring war again on Morocco, resuming the war from nineteen years previously. My question is what is the Biden administration's policy on that? GAVIN: Great question. Reporters have been asking that question, too, and with great message discipline the administration continues to say is that they're supporting U.N. efforts. And so whenever they ask, are you are you going to reconsider this decision regarding recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, they respond not by answering that question but by saying they're supporting U.N. efforts. So that's the most I can report to you in—regarding that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Well, we are at the end of our time. So, Ambassador Gavin, thank you very much for being with us and, again, to all of you for your fantastic questions, and I apologize for not being able to get to all of you. But we will have to continue doing webinars on this important topic and on digging in a little bit deeper. So we will be announcing the winter-spring academic lineup next month through our academic bulletin. This is the final webinar of this semester. Good luck with your finals—(laughs)—and grading and taking the exams and all of that. I know it's a very busy and stressful time with the pandemic layered on top of all of it. If you haven't already subscribed for the bulletin, please, you can do so by emailing us at cfracademic@cfr.org. You can follow us on Twitter at @CFR_Academic. And of course, please go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. You can see on CFR.org Michelle's latest post on Africa—blog posts, so you should follow her there as well. So, again, thank you. Thanks to all of you, and happy holidays, and we look forward to reconvening in 2022.

People's united democratic movement secretary general Wandile Dludlu reacted to the deployment of envoys to eSwatini by Southern African Development Community countries to quell the unrest that saw one person killed and at least 80 people injured by security forces in the latest wave of pre-democracy protests. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Thulani Rudolf Maseko is my guest in this episode, and we discuss the intervention of the international community in Swaziland amidst the country's political unrest. He also gives a high-level constitutional opinion and on the democratization of the country. Thulani is an experienced human rights lawyer with a passion for the rule of law. He holds a Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratization in Africa from the University of Pretoria, Centre for Human Rights. He holds a Hubert Humphrey Fellowship in Leadership from the American University Washington College of Law where he obtained a Master's Degree in International Legal Studies. He holds a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Swaziland. Thulani is a founder member of Lawyers for Human Rights (Swaziland) and has worked for the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) for several years as a consultant based in Swaziland. He has worked as an attorney in private practice for the last twenty-one years focusing mostly on human rights and constitutional litigation. In 2018, he was elected to be the Secretary of the Law Society of Swaziland for a period of two years. He has represented a number of the pro-democracy activists who constantly face prosecution and persecution by the State in the courts of Swaziland. He, himself, is a victim of abuse of power and authority, spent two years in prison before he was acquitted on appeal. On 18 March 2014, Thulani was jailed for contempt of court after criticizing Swaziland's judicial system. In August 2014, Maseko wrote to US President Barack Obama from prison, seeking his intervention ahead of the 2014 United States–Africa Leaders' Summit. Maseko was released from prison on 30 July 2015. He had been declared a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. Some highlights from our conversation: Whether trust should be placed on the international community to intervene and help Swaziland to democratize. Southern African Development Community's fact-finding mission in Swaziland. Swaziland political groups and civil society's submission to SADC Troika: The king and government must ensure that the process of dialogue includes all the players in Swaziland; a commitment to total unbanning of political parties; consideration for setting up an interim government; the process must give results to an adoption of a new democratic constitution; and the new constitution must ensure, going forward, the country is governed under a multiparty dispensation grounded on the rule of law. Historical background of the drafting process of the constitution and the intent of the drafters on the powers of the king. Everything that Swazi's do is informed by the wishes and whims of the monarch. The constitution was not intended to bind the king – a fundamental problem faced by all Swazis. For the people to merely elect their own prime minister without fundamentally changing the structure of the organs of the state would not give Swazi democracy. Human rights perspective on the king's speech, in particular: “Everything thing in Swaziland belongs to the king.” --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/mpilo-nkambule/support

This week we are excited to share a special episode on Africa Day. Celebrated annually on 25 May, Africa Day commemorates the 1963 founding of the African Union. Lisa Sharland speaks to Ambassador Martin Kimani, the new permanent representative of Kenya to the United Nations. They discuss Kenya’s role on the UN Security Council, engaging in multilateralism via Zoom and counter-terrorism. Brendan Nicholson speaks to Australia’s High Commissioner to South Africa Ms Gita Kamath about Australia’s economic ties with South Africa, the impact of Covid-19 on the region and the effectiveness of groupings such as the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union as unifying forces. In November last year, the Ethiopian government launched a military offensive in the country’s northern Tigray region. ASPI Research Intern Khwezi Nkwanyana speaks to the Director of Horn of Africa at Human Rights Watch, Laetitia Bader, about the ongoing humanitarian crisis, its geopolitical implications for neighbouring countries and the responses from different multilateral institutions. Guests (in order of appearance): Lisa Sharland: https://www.aspi.org.au/bio/lisa-sharland Ambassador Martin Kimani: https://www.un.int/kenya/staff/amb-martin-kimani Brendan Nicholson: https://www.aspi.org.au/bio/brendan-nicholson Ms Gita Kamath: https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/our-people/homs/Pages/high-commissioner-to-south-africa Khwezi Nkwanyana: https://www.aspi.org.au/bio/khwezi-nkwanyana Laetitia Bader: https://www.hrw.org/about/people/laetitia-bader Image: Flag of the African Union - via WikiPedia Music: "Beyond" by Patrick Patrikios via the YouTube Audio Library

Analyzing the conditions which dictate the systems and institutions which also perpetuate inequities require the ability to identify and map. It requires the science and art of identifying genealogy. It requires the necessity to map memory-to [re]member. But not simply for remembrance. African/a peoples oscillate between variations of a peculiar aversion to history or wanting to know everything about history, specific African/a history. But few understand the purpose of history or its use as a tool for organizing. Today, we will listen to a conversation I recently had with Obi Egbuna Jr., where we explore the question [in phase one of a series of conversations] which asks: How can history be a tool for organizing? It is one thing to know bits and pieces of historical content, but a historical consciousness not being cultivated into a critical consciousness is without purpose. The notion of a tree without roots is often given as axiom to grounding African/a peoples on the path to learning history. But what is important to engage is the question for what? To what ends? For what purpose? Knowing your roots [i.e. history] does not necessitate purpose [unorganized information is not knowledge. Knowledge is only power when organized, intentionally organized]. To move to the next level of historical consciousness, is to evolve it into a critical Africana consciousness. Association is not enough to be considered a functional component of a movement and proximity does not guarantee contribution. One has to struggle with ideas through practice, crafting this into a praxis for expressed objective[s] in order to find continuity with the past, to understanding the present, ultimately leading to creating a future. Obi Egbuna Jr., was born in London, England, and raised in Washington, DC, spending time in Nigeria. Obi is a founding member of the Pan-African Liberation Organization (PALO), established in Washington, D.C., from 1990-2007. In addition to organizing and speaking engagements, Obi is a journalist, African/a history teacher and playwright. Obi is correspondent to The Herald, Zimbabwe's national newspaper, and the first US correspondent in the country's 32 years as an independent nation. Obi has taught African History at Roots Public Charter School since 1990 and has also taught at Ujamaa Shule and Northwestern High School in Prince George's County. He is the current African History teacher for the Sankofa Homeschool Collective as well as holds community-based African History Classes. Obi is a founding member and executive director of Mass Emphasis Children's History and Theater Company (2012). He has written several resolutions and appeals to the United Nations, World Health Organization, and Southern African Development Community covering a wide range of issues, ranging from HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe to police brutality in the United. Obi has also organized around calling for the unconditional and immediate lifting of US-EU sanctions on Zimbabwe that went to the White House, U.S. Senate and Congress. Lastly, in addition to forging his own path, Obi worked directly with Kwame Ture the last 8 years of his life and is the son of Obi Egbuna Sr, who was a Nigerian-born novelist, playwright and political activist, leading member of the Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA) and the British Black Power/Black Panther Movement. Our show was produced today in solidarity with the native, indigenous, African, and Afro-descended communities at Standing Rock; Venezuela; Cooperation Jackson in Jackson, Mississippi; Brazil; the Avalon Village in Detroit; Colombia; Kenya; Palestine; South Africa; and Ghana; and other places who are fighting for the protection of our land for the benefit of all people. Enjoy the program! For more: https://battlecubazim.wordpress.com/word-from-the-producers/obi-egbuna-jr/

In this edition of Straight Talk Africa host Shaka Ssali has an in-depth conversation with Dr. Stergomena Lawrence Tax, Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC commemorates its 40th year and Dr. Tax outlines the achievements the organization has made over the last four decades, and her vision for SADC as her tour of duty comes to an end. 

A three-day meeting of Southern African Development Community defence and security chiefs aimed at curbing rhino poaching is underway at the Kruger National Park. Among other things the countries in the SADC region are working on standardising their laws in dealing with rhino poaching. Mthobisi Mkhaliphi reports

TOP STORIES ON AFRICA RISE AND SHINE THIS HOUR... *** Southern African Development Community gives Lesotho an ultimatum... *** Drought in Zimbabwe threatens the well-being of around four million people... *** Concerns over humanitarian situation in Africa's Sahel region...... *** In Economics: Rwanda's Central bank leaves repo rate unchanged... *** And In Sports: Top Kenyan athletes prepare for Olympic trials....

TOP STORIES ON AFRICA RISE AND SHINE THIS HOUR... *** South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa is in Lesotho on a SADC Troika fact finding mission on the killing of former army commander Maaparankoe Mahao.... *** The UN says the food security situation in the Southern African Development Community remains serious......