Podcasts about afrobarometer

Has the shine come off the idea of democracy in parts of Africa? The continent's latest crop of military leaders seem to be enjoying immense popularity, like Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore. So are Africans prepared to live under the rule of soldiers. Or is there another way?I speak to GILLES YABI, CEO and founder of the West Africa Citizen Think Tank in Dakar. And in Johannesburg, independent political analyst, MARISA LOURENCO. We explore what could be behind the recent spate of m ilitary takeovers in Guinea, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Gabon and ask whether democratic forms of government have had their day on the continent.Both GILLES and MARISA are keen to point out that Africa is not a monolith - each country has had its own distinct circumstances that have led to military coups.Asked why these young coup leaders appear to be so popular, MARISA explains its because they represent a break with the status quo which had failed to deliver prosperity and security. GILLES makes the point that several of the countries that have experienced military coups are experiencing severe insurgencies often by violent Islamist groups. We also consider whether the ruling parties that have come to power after waging an armed struggle for independence, particularly in southern Africa, have managed to transition into parties that uphold democratic values of rule of law, strong institutions and individual freedoms.We are reminded that Afrobarometer polls regularly reveal that a majority of those surveyed are in favour Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode of GREAT POWER PODCAST, host Ilan Berman speaks with Joseph Asunka of Afrobarometer regarding political trends in Africa, and how the continent has become a vital arena of Great Power Competition between the U.S. and China. MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS EPISODE:-- Afrobarometer's African Insights 2024 flagship report (https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/african-insights-2024-democracy-at-risk-the-peoples-perspective/)BIO:Joseph Asunka has served as CEO of Afrobarometer since April 2021. He was previously program officer in the Global Development and Population program at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, where he managed a portfolio of grants that support efforts to increase transparency and accountability in fiscal governance and foster citizen participation to improve public services in developing countries. Before joining Hewlett, Joseph was a lecturer in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where he taught courses on African politics, political economy of development, research methods, and data analysis.

Africa Melane speaks to Associate Professor Piet Croucamp from North-West University about a controversial and emotional issue making global headlines. Following Donald Trump’s executive order offering refugee status to “ethnic minority Afrikaners,” thousands of white South Africans are reportedly lining up to leave — citing violent crime, economic decline, and racial discrimination. But is this really a mass exodus or a fringe movement fuelled by fear? Follow us on:CapeTalk on Facebook: www.facebook.com/CapeTalkCapeTalk on TikTok: www.tiktok.com/@capetalkCapeTalk on Instagram: www.instagram.com/capetalkzaCapeTalk on YouTube: www.youtube.com/@CapeTalk567CapeTalk on X: www.x.com/CapeTalkSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

A new survey by Afrobarometer, the Pan-African research network, says Africans are likely to prioritize their national identity over their ethnic one, or to equally feel allegiance to both. In a survey conducted across 33 countries, Afrobarometer also found that Africans have no objection to living next door to people from different ethnic backgrounds and are open to inter-ethnic marriages. Maakwe Cumanzala (Choo-mahn-zah-lah), one of the researchers, tells VOA's James Butty, only a small minority in all countries expressed allegiance to their ethnic identity.

On Daybreak Africa: The Democratic Republic of Congo's government has described the unilateral ceasefire declared by Rwanda-backed rebels in eastern DRC as “false communication,” Plus, East African leaders seek resolution to the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Chadians who worked for now-departed French troops appeal to government for jobs. A new survey by Afrobarometer says Africans are likely to prioritize their national identity over their ethnic one. Nigeria announces measures to cushion the impact of suspension of USAID support. South Sudanese are concerned about delay the establishment of a hybrid court to address war crimes. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa!

China is deeply unpopular in the U.S., UK, Japan, and most other wealthy countries, and given the politics in those regions, there's no indication that's going to change anytime soon. It's a very different story, though, in large parts of developing Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Middle East where public opinion surveys reveal generally favorable views of the Chinese. A new "poll of polls" by the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) on global public opinion about China reveals a lot more nuance about how people in the Global South feel about their countries' ties with China than what is framed in the mainstream media narratives. Andrew Chubb, a senior fellow at ASPI, led the project and joins Eric & Cobus to discuss what the data tells us about the diversity of views on China across the Global South. JOIN THE DISCUSSION: X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander | @stadenesque  Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject YouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouth Now on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.social FOLLOW CGSP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC: Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChine Arabic: عربي: www.alsin-alsharqalawsat.com | @SinSharqAwsat JOIN US ON PATREON! Become a CGSP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CGSP Podcast mug! www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouth    

Next year's presidential elections, Lilongwe demonstrations, new Afrobarometer studies, underage children voting, CAF nominations, new beverage prices, and much more! Thanks for tuning in!Let us know what you think and what we can improve on by emailing us at info@rorshok.com You can also contact us on Instagram @rorshok_malawi or Twitter @RorshokMalawiLike what you hear? Subscribe, share, and tell your buds.Underage Children Caught Registering For Elections: https://x.com/GeeLuckson/status/1864898715112346038?t=ioBhwPUxbYmzNS6j5HMTGA&s=19 Malawi Tourism Earnings Falls Significantly Behind Other SADC Countries: https://mwnation.com/neighbours-tourism-earnings-show-us-it-can-be-done/ We want to get to know you! Please fill in this mini-survey: https://forms.gle/NV3h5jN13cRDp2r66Wanna avoid ads and help us financially? Follow the link: https://bit.ly/rorshok-donateOops! It looks like we made a mistake.In 8:02, the reader should have said "Fanta." Sorry for the inconvenience!

Catherine Nzuki is joined by Joseph Asunka, PhD, CEO of Afrobarometer, the leading source of public attitude data in Africa. Together, they discuss Afrobarometer's rise, its meticulous survey research methods, and case studies showcasing the policy impact of its data in Ghana, Malawi, and Botswana. They also discuss the difficulties of conducting surveys in conflict-afflicted or fragile contexts and how Afrobarometer has contributed to the growth of survey research organizations across Africa. Joseph Asunka also highlights how big data could be a changemaker in conducting research in Africa.

FactCheck Namibië se jongste verslag sit uiteen hoe buitelandse media oor die komende algemene verkiesings berig. Dit kom na 'n Newzroom Afrika-verslag valslik beweer het dat peilings daarop dui dat Swapo 'n nederlaag in die gesig staar. Die politieke ontleder Henning Melber het opgemerk dat die Afrobarometer-opname, die enigste relevante data, 51 persent steun vir Swapo toon. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Frederico Links, die hoofnavorser by Namibia Fact Check, wat sê dat geen verkiesing-spesifieke meningspeilings bestaan nie en verskeie artikels se beriggewing is foutief.

Discussing the top 6 most corrupt institutions in Ghana.

Discussing the latest Afrobarometer report and more.

This week, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation released its 2024 Ibrahim Index of African Governance which assesses governance performance in Africa. The report, which covers the decade 2014-2023, says governance progress in Africa was halted with the deterioration of security and democracy on the continent. On the brighter side, the Index says 13 countries managed to follow a successful course of overall progress in governance over the decade. Joseph Asunka, an expert panel member of the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the CEO of the Afrobarometer, tells VOA's James Butty, the 2024 report is a sobering reminder of the threat that security crises and a shrinking environment for democracy poses for Africa's progress

Most Malawians believe vulnerable children struggle to get help, with 4 in 10 reporting child neglect and abuse as common, according to a recent Afrobarometer survey. Despite these challenges, many say the government is improving child welfare, but foster homes report rising admissions. Josey Mahachi is joined by Memory Chisenga and DW's Chimwemwe Padatha to discuss.

A new study by Afrobarometer found that popular support for democracy has declined sharply. What role can the continent's creatives play in reversing this trend? Eddy Micah Jr. talks to Dr. Kojo Pumpuni Asante, Director of Policy and Partnerships at the Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana, DW correspondent Olisa Chukwumah in Nigeria and Killa Ace, a former exiled Gambian musician.

'n Oorweldigende meerderheid Namibiërs sê hulle het nie mediesefondsdekking nie, meestal omdat hulle dit nie kan bekostig nie, volgens 'n onlangse Afrobarometer-opname. Byna twee derdes van Namibiërs dink die regering moet verseker dat alle burgers toegang het tot voldoende gesondheidsorg, selfs al moet belasting verhoog word. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Victoria Raimond, die bestuurder van korporatiewe kommunikasie by die Namibië Finansiële Instellings Toesighoudende Owerheid, Namfisa, oor waarom mediesefondspryse so hoog is.

On Daybreak Africa: The World Food Program has announced the arrival of a rare convoy of humanitarian aid into civil war-torn Sudan via a temporarily reopened border crossing with Chad. Plus, Experts call for more funding for African agriculture. Peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda are scheduled to resume this week. Liberian Police descend on opposition CDC Party Headquarters. An Afrobarometer survey says young Africans prefer democracy to any authoritarian alternative Vice President Kamala Harris accepts the nomination of the Democratic Party. We'll have analysis of some of the speeches on day four of the Democratic National Convention. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa!

The Insight - Afrobarometer's 2024 Report Highlights Growing Support for Democracy Across Africa by Radio Islam

On Daybreak Africa: Cameroon opposition and civil society blame low voter registration on President Paul Biya. Plus, a US official holds talks in Africa on the 'responsible use' of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in military operations. Peace talks between DRC and Rwanda governments are scheduled to resume in Angola's capital, Luanda, this week. An Afrobarometer survey says young Africans prefer democracy to any authoritarian alternative. Minnesota Governor Tim Walz officially accepts his nomination as Kamala Harris' running mate. Former President Bill Clinton addresses the Democratic National Convention. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa!

On Daybreak Africa: Congo's health minister says the country will receive the first vaccine doses to address its mpox outbreak next week from the United States. This, less than a week after the World Health Organization declared mpox outbreaks in Africa a global emergency. Plus, a Liberian delegation has met with the United Nations in New York on establishing a war and economic crimes court in Liberia. Afrobarometer says African youth prefer democracy to any kind of authoritarian alternative. More than 200 humanitarian aid workers were killed in 2023, according to the UN. Ghana's ruling New Patriotic Party unveils its manifesto ahead of the December 2024 general election. Tech innovations offer hope for Africa's overburdened health care. The Democratic Party National Convention has begun in the mid-western city of Chicago. We'll have live commentary and analysis from the convention floor. For these and more, tune in to Daybreak Africa

African youth prefer democracy to any kind of authoritarian alternative says Afrobarometer, the Pan-African research network. However, its latest survey says African youth are also more likely than their elders to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their respective countries. Shannon van Wyk-Khosa, Afrobarometer's Digital Portfolio Manager, tells VOA's James Butty , African youth surveyed in 39 countries are also likely to tolerate military intervention when their elected leaders abuse power

Reaksie word ontvang op die peiling deur Afrobarometer wat voorspellings doen vir die uitslae van die verkiesings. Die LPM sal moontlik die amptelike opposisie sal word. Swapo sal na beraming net meer as 50 persent van die stemme op hom verenig met die LPM wat inkom op 5,6 persent. Die IPC sal 5 persent kry en die PDM 4,9 persent. Nudo sal 3,1 persent ontvang. Graham Hopwood, direkteur van die Instituut vir Openbare Beleidsnavorsing sê partye moet op hou kla oor die peiling en hulle sokkies optrek.

--Accident de la route : 81morts depuis le début de l'année : la vitesse excessive, l'alcool et la drogue au volant, parmi les raisons !! --Selon le rapport Afrobarometer au sujet de la corruption : Une majorité pensent que certaines personnes occupant de hautes responsabilités sont impliquées dans le processus de corruption !! --- Epidémie de la variole du singe : l'agence de santé de l'Union africaine déclenche son plus haut niveau d'alerte !! Au Japon Japon: le Premier ministre Fumio Kishida confirme qu'il va quitter la tête du parti au pouvoir

Die Wêreldekonomie-bestuursindeks van 2024 wys Namibië aan as die tweede bes-bestuurde land in Afrika. Dit spog met 'n B-graad-gradering en 'n indekstelling van 69,1, deur aanwysers soos korrupsiepersepsie, oppergesag van die reg, persvryheid en politieke regte. Vertroue in politieke instellings, die president, die Nasionale Vergadering en wet-en-orde instellings het egter skerp afgeneem, volgens die jongste Afrobarometer-opname. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met die bestuurskenner Marius Kudumo gesels oor wat die regering moet doen om die publiek se vertroue te herwin.

Volgens 'n 2021 Afrobarometer-opname wou 64 persent van jongmense van 18 tot 35 jaar oud hê dat werkskepping die land se hoofprioriteit moet wees. Dit is hoogs waarskynlik dat jeugwerkloosheid sedertdien toegeneem het en politieke partye het nog nie konkrete planne voorgelê om die probleem aan te pak nie, selfs in aanloop tot die verkiesing. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met die woordvoerder van die Independent Patriots for Change, Imms Nashinge, wat sê dat werklose jeugdiges 'n begin kan maak deur vir onderhoudswerk te tender.

Die jongste amptelike statistieke toon daar is 34 persent jeugwerkloosheid in Namibië. Afrobarometer sê dis veel erger en volgens hulle jongste verslag is die jeugwerkloosheid-syfer 46 persent. Die situasie kan ook veel slegter wees, omdat die Namibië Statistieke-agentskap nog nie die jongste syfers volgens die sensus-opname bekendgemaak het nie. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met 'n plaaslike ekonoom, Joseph Sheehama, wat 'n moontlike oplossing vir die probleem noem.

Werkloosheid word gesien as die grootste probleem in Namibië, volgens die jongste Afrobarometer peiling. 'n Volle 63 persent van respondente het dit so aangedui, met onderwys wat tweede op die lys was op 25 persent, en voedseltekorte op 23 persent. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Herbert Jauch, 'n arbeidskenner, wat sê die algemene siening oor werkloosheid is nie verbasend nie.

Sowat 73 persent van Namibiërs het vanjaar nie genoeg kos nie, volgens Afrobarometer, vergeleke met 47 persent in 2017. Daar word ook verwag dat die situasie sal vererger tussen vandeesmaand en September, weens die droogte wat oeste vernietig en diere laat vrek het. Die Voedings- en Voedselsekerheidsalliansie van Namibië het hierop gesê die regering moet 'n universele inkomstetoelaag daarstel. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Renaani Musutua, die woordvoerder van die BIG-koalisie van Namibië, wat sê as daar 'n basiese inkomste-toelaag was, sou daar nie soveel mense op die drumpel van hongersnood wees nie.

Die erge droogte het oeste vernietig en diere laat vrek, en sowat 73 persent van Namibiërs het vanjaar nie genoeg kos nie, volgens Afrobarometer. In 2017 het 47 persent van die land se inwoners nie genoeg kos gehad nie. Daar word ook verwag dat die situasie sal vererger tussen vandeesmaand en September, voor die reënseisoen. Die Voedings- en Voedselsekerheidsalliansie van Namibië asook die Basic Income Grant Coalition het herhaal dat daar 'n vorm van inkomstetoelaag ingestel moet word, sodat mense ten minste bietjie kos kan koop. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met die ombudsman, Basilius Dyakugha, gesels wat sê daar behoort 'n ordentlike ondersoek gedoen word oor die beskostigbaarheid van so 'n toelaag.

'n Kwesbaarheidsevaluering en ontleding deur die Geïntegreerde Voedselsekerheid-faseklassifikasie vir Julie tot September toon dat 'n groot deel van die bevolking gekonfronteer word met verergerende voedselonsekerheid. Afrobarometer se peilings toon dat 73 persent van Namibiërs nie genoeg kos in 2024 het nie, teenoor 47 persent in 2017. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met Ben Schernick, die direkteur van die Voedings- en Voedselsekerheidsalliansie van Namibië, wat sê die regering moet 'n universele inkomstetoelaag implementeer.

Break down the Afrobarometer report on declining trust in public institutions.

Afrobarometer se jongste opname handel oor korrupsie in die land en mense se sienings daaroor. Vier-en-vyftig persent van respondente het onder andere verklaar dat hulle bewus is van korrupsie in staatsinstellings en leierskapgroepe soos staatsamptenare. Reaksie is ontvang van Mahongora Kavihuha, sekretaris-generaal van die Vakbond Kongres van Namibië, Tucna, wat sê dat korrupsie geïnstitusionaliseer en aan die orde van die dag is.

Afrobarometer se jongste opname toon dat twee derdes van Namibiërs sê korrupsie in die land word erger, hoewel hierdie mening die afgelope paar jaar aansienlik afgeneem het. Die meeste landsburger burgers sê die regering doen nie goeie werk in die bekamping daarvan nie. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met Paulus Noa, die direkteur-generaal van die Teenkorrupsie-kommissie, wat sê dit is net die publiek se persepsies en nie die werklikheid nie.

Afrobarometer se jongste opname toon dat twee derdes van Namibiërs sê korrupsie in die land word erger, hoewel hierdie mening die afgelope paar jaar aansienlik afgeneem het. Die meeste landsburger burgers sê die regering doen nie goeie werk in die bekamping daarvan nie. Lizl Stoman van Afrobarometer het meer.

Namibiërs is oorweldigend ten gunste van toegang tot voorbehoedmiddels en seksvoorligting, ongeag die betrokke persoon se ouderdom of huwelikstatus. Dit is volgens die jongste opname deur Afrobarometer, wat houdings teenoor seks, swangerskap, aborsie en ander kwessies openbaar. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Lizl Stoman, 'n navorser by die Survey Warehouse, wat van die bevindinge uiteensit.

Volgens die jongste resultate van Afrobarometer se 10de rondte van opnames oor demokrasie in Namibië, sê 57 persent van respondente dit maak nie saak of dieselfde party altyd verkiesings wen nie, solank die regering op 'n vrye en regverdige wyse deur die mense verkies word. 'n Beduidende minderheid, 39 persent, meen dit is beter in 'n demokrasie as mag soms in verkiesings van een politieke party na 'n ander hande verwissel. Sestig persent van respondente sê demokrasie is verkieslik bo enige ander politieke stelsel van regering. Agt-en-sestig persent verwerp militêre bewind, 73 persent verwerp eenman-bewind en 80 persent verwerp eenparty-bewind. Sowat sewe uit 10 burgers beskryf die land as "'n volle demokrasie", 'n daling van 11 persentasiepunte vergeleke met Afrobarometer se eerste opname in Namibië in 1999. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met die eienaar van Survey Warehouse, Christie Keulder, oor die positiewe nuus vir demokrasie.

Verskeie verslae deur siviele organisasies word gereeld gepubliseer. Die nuutste verslag is deur die Instituut vir Openbare Beleidsnavorsing, Unicef en Civic 246 oor die Ope Begrotingsopname wat die deursigtigheid van die jaarlikse begroting ondersoek. Die nuutste Afrobarometer verslag toon dat die jeug al hoe minder vertroue het in demokrasie. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Zoe Titus, die direkteur van die Namibia Media Trust, oor of hierdie opnnames en verslae enige verskil maak aan die jeug se sienswyses.

Afrobarometer se 10de meningsopname het bevind die meeste Namibiërs waardeer verkiesings. Die oorgrote meerderheid sê hulle voel geen druk om by enige politieke organisasie aan te sluit en om te kies vir wie om te stem nie. Meer as sewe uit 10 sê hulle het in die vorige verkiesing gestem. Sowat drie uit 10 respondente sê dat hulle effe bang was vir intimidasie of geweld tydens die verkiesingsveldtog. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het reaksie gekry van Frederico Links, 'n navorser by die Instituut vir Openbare Beleidsnavorsing, wat sê die ondersteuning van en vertroue in demokrasie aan die afneem.

Die Survey Warehouse in Windhoek het sy jongste Afrobarometer-opname voltooi. Dit kyk na hoe Namibiërs verkiesings sien en die stand van demokrasie beskou. Die meeste Namibiërs waardeer verkiesings, en die oorweldigende meerderheid sê hulle voel vry om by enige politieke organisasie aan te sluit en om te kies vir wie om te stem, sonder om onder druk te voel. Meer as sewe uit 10 burgers sê hulle het in die 2019 verkiesing gestem. Terwyl die meeste respondente van mening is dat die verkiesing grootliks vry en regverdig was, meld ongeveer drie uit 10 dat hulle politieke intimidasie of geweld ten minste "'n bietjie" tydens die verkiesingsveldtog gevrees het. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Christie Keulder, 'n navorser en eienaar van die Survey Warehouse, wat 'n kort uiteensetting van hul bevindings gee.

Happy episode 200 of Ufahamu Africa! We're so pleased to feature one of our favorite episode formats for the occasion - a mashup! Thanks to the Global Stage podcast for hosting our cohost Rachel Beatty Riedl for a conversation with Notre Dame graduate student Rasheed Ibrahim and Afrobarometer director Joseph Asunka about the return of military coups on the continent.It's an important conversation stemming from a panel last week at the Global Democracy Conference hosted by the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame.  Find the books, links, and articles we mentioned in this episode on our website, ufahamuafrica.com.

Afrobarometer, the Pan-African research network, has just published its latest pre-election survey of South African voters. Jan Hofmeyr, Head of Research and Policy at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, the Southern African core partner of Afrobarometer, tells VOA's James Butty, voters want the next government to address unemployment, the unreliable electricity supply, and corruption. This, as Special voting for South Africa's national and provincial elections began Monday. The South African Mail & Guardian newspaper quotes the country's electoral commission as saying the process got off to a good start.

On Daybreak Africa: South African voters voice their expectations as early voting begins for Wednesday's presidential elections. Plus, we will tell you the results of Afrobarometer's latest survey of South African voters. Zambian police say they have found a missing independent member of parliament. UN agencies warn of the deteriorating humanitarian situation for an estimated 800,000 people in city of El Fasher in Sudan's Darfur region. Thomas Sankara's brother says Burkina Faso is not ready for elections in the current environment. Biden and Trump campaign for Black votes. For this and more tune to Daybreak Africa!

Kate Lefko-Everett, Senior Project Leader for the SA Reconciliation Barometer, joins Lester to discuss the objectives and outcomes of a recent Afrobarometer telephone survey conducted ahead of the general elections to reveal that the most urgent problems South Africans want their government to address are unemployment, unreliable electricity supply, and corruption.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Africa experienced a wave of democratic unrest from 2020-23, with seven countries—Mali, Chad, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon—falling to military coups during this time. Why? Host Landry Signé and his guest Joseph Asunka. CEO of Afrobarometer, a pan-African survey research network, discuss Africans' views on democracy and governance, as well as policy recommendations for reversing the recent trends. Show notes and transcript Foresight Africa podcast is part of the Brookings Podcast Network. Subscribe and listen on Apple, Spotify, Afripods, and wherever you listen to podcasts. Send feedback email to podcasts@brookings.edu.

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The landscape of democracy in Africa is characterized by a dynamic interplay between achievements and obstacles, particularly as the continent approaches a pivotal year with numerous elections scheduled in 2024. Countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Senegal are preparing for electoral contests, underscoring a persistent belief in the electoral system as a legitimate means to select leaders and representatives. Despite this faith in democracy, there is widespread disenchantment with the efficacy and fairness of the electoral process, highlighted by incidents of voter fraud and judicial rulings overturning elections. Concerns about democracy also extend to the debate on presidential term limits and the apparent unwillingness of some incumbents to vacate office. Insights from Afrobarometer surveys reveal the African public's priorities and concerns, emphasizing issues like unemployment, economic stewardship, and healthcare. These survey findings illustrate a clear demand for democratic governance amidst dissatisfaction with how democracy currently operates, particularly in relation to corruption. Yet, amidst these challenges, there exists a sense of optimism about the future of democracy in Africa. This optimism is fueled by the continent's resilient civil society, the transformative potential of its young population, and examples of successful democratic transitions, suggesting a pathway towards more effective and representative governance.Boniface Dulani is an Associate Professor of Political science at the University of Malawi. He is also the Director of Surveys for the Afrobarometer, a pan African network of researchers who conduct surveys on governance, economy, and livelihoods. @IPORMalawiResources:Africans want more democracy, but their leaders still aren't listeningAmid rising corruption, most Africans say they risk retaliation if they speak upKey highlightsIntroduction – 00:24Democratic gains and reversals on the African continent – 04:30Reduction in political freedoms in exchange for development – 11:00The most important problems in 39 countries – 21:25Pervasive corruption and challenges in reporting corruption across various institutions – 40:15What we can expect from the coming round of elections in Africa – 52:10 HostProfessor Dan Banik (@danbanik @GlobalDevPod)Apple Google Spotify YouTubeSubscribe: https://globaldevpod.substack.com/

Although data is a powerful tool in decision-making, data collection and production in Africa have proven to miss the mark in pattern prediction. Afrobarometer is a Pan- African, non-partisan, non-profit research network with headquarters in Ghana that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society in Africa. Dr. Joseph Asunka, the CEO of Afrobarometer, speaks with Mvemba about the challenges in data collection in Africa as well as the ways Afrobarometer is building data collection methodologies for various contexts in Africa.

Across Africa, public opinion about China has been quite positive overall with favorability ratings surpassing those of other major powers, including the United States. But not in Zimbabwe, at least among the country's elites, according to a new survey.Only 37% of urban, educated Zimbabweans felt positive about China's impact on their country, significantly lower than the 63% favorability score that Afrobarometer recorded just a couple of years ago.The new poll was conducted earlier this year by William Hautungimana and Haruka Nagao, both assistant professors at Oklahoma State University in the United States. William joins Eric & Cobus from Stillwater, Oklahoma to explain why China's approval rating is comparatively low and what's fueling the skepticism about the Chinese in Zimbabwe.SHOW NOTES:The Conversation: We asked 1,000 Zimbabweans what they think of China's influence on their country − only 37% viewed it favorably: https://bit.ly/3rN8iCoJOIN THE DISCUSSION:X: @ChinaGSProject| @stadenesque | @eric_olander | @williamhautung1Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProjectYouTube: www.youtube.com/@ChinaGlobalSouthFOLLOW CAP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC:Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChineعربي: www.akhbaralsin-africia.com | @AkhbarAlSinAfrJOIN US ON PATREON!Become a CAP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CAP Podcast mug!www.patreon.com/chinaglobalsouthSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Landry Signé, senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution and executive director and professor of the Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University, leads the conversation about Africa on the global stage. FASKIANOS: Thank you and welcome to today's session of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. And, as always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Landry Signé with us to discuss Africa on the global stage. Dr. Signé is a senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings Institution. He's also a professor, executive director, and the founding codirector of The Globalization 4.0 and Fourth Industrial Revolution Initiative at Arizona State University's Thunderbird School of Global Management, and distinguished fellow at Stanford University's Center for African Studies. He serves as chairman of the Global Network for Africa's Prosperity and is also the author of numerous scholarly publications and several books. His most recent is entitled, Africa's Fourth Industrial Revolution. And it was published by Cambridge University Press this summer. So, Dr. Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. I'm going to throw you a very big question, and you can take us in the direction you would like, by talking about the important challenges and opportunities facing countries across Africa. SIGNÉ: Hello, everyone. And thank you so much, Dr. Irina, for so kind an introduction. It's a pleasure to be with all of you today. So when it comes to Africa, I want to highlight a few key trends why Africa is playing such an important role in the global sphere. So the first thing that I want to share to everyone is Africa's transformation is more substantial than what most people will think. And this is for many reasons. One is that, especially pre-pandemic, trade and in and with the rest of the world have grown for about 300 percent, which exceeds the global average of a little bit less than 200 percent. So that is a key dimension to highlight. And this is also driven by the competition between emerging countries, such as, of course, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, China, and more established and industrialized nations such as the United States, France, and others. So that is one of the key trends that I want to highlight. So Africa is richer and is transforming much more than what most people will be thinking. So the second trend that I also want to highlight, why Africa is so important in the global sphere, is that by the end of this century Africa could reach about 40 percent of the global population. Listen, I said 40 percent. So this is incredible, especially as the continent represent now only about 17 percent of the global population. So that is a key dimension to take into consideration when speaking about Africa, how Africa engages with the rest of the world. A third trend that I also want to highlight is really the rise of global partnerships and the competition, as I highlighted, between emerging and established powers. So, as a matter of fact, between 2006 and 2016, for example, China trades with Africa surge with imports increasing by 233 percent, and exports increasing by about 53 percent. This is a substantial growth in engagement. And if we compare—so with Russia, for example, it was about 142 percent of change in imports from Africa and about 168 percent change in exports with Africa. So in comparison, and with the rest of the world was only about 56 percent for change in imports and 18 percent for change in export. So this is another key trend. And a country like the United States still needs to expand and to do much more in terms of those engagement. This also apply with—to the countries in the European Union in general. So another trend that I want to highlight is really the, let's say, fast urbanization that we see on the continent. So the continent will be growing from about five cities—will reach about five cities of more than ten million inhabitants, in comparison of only three in 2015. And will exceed fifteen cities of more than five million inhabitants, in comparison of about five to six in the recent year. So another point, when people speak about Africa, I want to speak about industrialization in Africa. Of course, we have to acknowledge the diversity of the continent. Some would say fifty-four member states, because we have about—those other ones recognized by the United Nations. But don't be surprised if you also hear people mentioning instead fifty-five countries, because the Western Sahara is also consider as a member of the African Union. So when speaking about industrialization, people may—some people may consider Africa as deindustrializing. But that is because they're not looking at one of the things that we call at the Brookings Institution industries without smokestacks. Those industries are important because they have similar characteristic when they compare to traditional manufacturing. And those similar characteristics include, for example, the tradability, they are labor intensive, and the store—they absorb a high quantity of moderately skilled workers. But they are also—they also have a high level of productivity. Irina, you mentioned my book on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. I want to connect, because when people speak about digitalization, innovation, they will mostly think about the Silicon Valley. They will think about some of the emerging nations—Israel, India—in addition to the U.S., of course. A key dimension to highlight is that in the 1990s New York City had more mobile phone subscribers than the entire continent of Africa, where now the continent has hundreds of millions of mobile phone subscribers. So in addition, we have disruptive innovations such as mobile banking, with M-PESA, for example, which is a digital application allow—which allow to provide banking services, digital banking services, to African citizens. This is another illustration of the important dynamics with Africa. Let me finish with about two or three additional points, and I'm looking very much forward to the conversation. I will highlight the critical importance of regional integration. We have, for example, the African Continental Free Trade Area, which was adopted in 2018, ratified by a sufficient number of country in 2019, and was officially launched in January 2021. And that is an incredible speed from the signing to the coming into force of the second-largest trade organization in the world, or let's say trade area in the world, after the World Trade Organization, of course, in terms of number of countries. So this is a key dimension. And another trend to highlight, despite some of the challenges that we see in many African countries in terms of democratic retreat. The overall trend is that African citizens want democracy. So they want accountability. But they also want democracy to deliver. And let me finish with a trend related to business. The combined consumer and business spending in Africa will reach or exceed $16 trillion U.S. dollars by 2050, and about $6.7 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. So Africa really is a place with phenomenal opportunities, despite the challenges that we see. Climate change affects Africa more than other regions, for example. Some of the most vulnerable countries in terms of state fragility. We have, as I also mentioned, some democratic recession. But despite those challenges, the continent is really growing and is really transforming at a very important pace. And I enthusiastically look forward to engaging, to answering your many questions. Thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. That was a great overview. Obviously, this is such a big topic. So now we're going to go to all of you for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Alright, so the first question we're going to take is from Pearl Robinson. Pearl over to you. Q: Hello. Very pleased to meet you. I have a question, something I'm going to ask you to do. I'm at Tufts University. FASKIANOS: Thanks, Pearl. Q: Can you use this wonderful, optimistic introduction, and connect it with a discussion of the wave of coups in the West African Sahel? Because I find myself having to talk about both. And I thought that you began with the last decade's narrative of Africa's growth and opportunities. And today, everybody is talking about democratic decline and all of these coups in the context of everything. So I'd like you to put your talk onto an introduction for me to talk about the coup situation. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you so much for the question. So I have studied the—also the democratic situation in Africa from the—from the independence to the last decade. And one of the reasons, of course, when you have democratic interruption, there are serious reasons to be concerned. And this is mostly related to the ability of democratic governance to deliver. Typically when democracy is promoted with many of the Africans, one of the key argument which was chose is that democracy allows citizens to have a better standard of living, deliver economic outcomes, education, health, security, good governance, less corruption, among others. And many of the countries which have faced a coup are countries—when you think about Mali, we think about Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, among others—there are countries where citizen are facing serious economic—a serious economic situation, deteriorated by the pandemic, of course. They are not the only country but deteriorated by the pandemic. You also have a question—the security question in the Sahel especially, with violent extremism. But I want to put things in perspective because democratic development is a slow-moving process. And although it is very unfortunate some of the development that you are seeing in terms of coups, when you look at Africa in the long-term perspective, when I was looking, for example, in the 1980s, almost the entire continent was red. Red, meaning authoritarian. But now the majority of African countries have elections. More than half of those country have free, fair, and transparent, meaningful elections. They are able to choose their government. And this so I'd just highlight those point, to say I classify those countries—I had them in four categories. So one was the uninterrupted democracy. So the countries which once they become democracies, they remain uninterrupted democratic. And those countries are outperforming overall, economically speaking and with many of the other benefits of democracy that I've mentioned. But the countries which are interrupted are mostly the countries where democracy is not necessarily delivering wealth. But will that change the broader trend on the continent? I don't think so. So I think, yes, we have to acknowledge those challenges. We have to act vigorously to address them to reduce the negative impact. But those are not necessarily—I don't think that that makes Africa a hopeless continent, as depicted by the Economist in the early 2000s, as discussed before. I'll pause there. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take a written question from Tanisha Fazal's student Jack Drouin, and they're at the University of Minnesota: Will Africa as a whole ever compete at the same level as the United States and China in international trade and production? SIGNÉ: So the idea behind the African continental trade area is to make Africa stronger internationally when dealing with the rest of the world, while unlocking also the potential of trade within Africa. For example, when African countries trade with one another, more than 40 percent of products exported are manufactured products. Which mean that they create jobs and opportunities for young people, for women, for the economy. They accelerate industrialization. And when African countries trade with the rest of the world, about only 17 percent of those countries—of those—of the products exported are manufactured products. So the idea really behind the African Continental Free Trade Area is not just to grow African trade with—and improve countries' trading with one another. But it is also really to make Africa stronger when engaging with other countries. As a matter of fact, Africa still represents less than 3 percent of global exports. So this the reason why when I engage with some leaders, some are wondering if whether the AfCFTA was really needed. There is no doubt that the African Continental Free Trade Area was needed, because partnering and coming together to engage with them makes the continent stronger. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I've never seen so many questions. So I'm going to go next to Fordham IPED. They have their raised hand. It's the International Political Economy and Development Program at Fordham. Q: Hi. My name is Julisha. I'm a student here at Fordham in the IPED Program. And thank you for your presentation, Landry, if I may call you that—I'm sorry, Professor. My question is—and I come from the continent. My question to you is, you seem very optimistic about Africa, as we call it. But why exactly? What gives you this optimism, given the fact that different countries have varying problems, and also we've got different levels of infrastructure and productive capacities? And then also, we haven't had that much success in relation to the regional FTAs. So why optimistic specifically about this one? Should we focus more on maybe building stronger regional bodies and then come together as one consortium? SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for your question. I don't think that it is either/or. And you have to put in perspective also, again, when—I like to look at things from a historical perspective, putting things in context. And when we put things in context—again, I mentioned, for example, before, in less than a couple of decades Africa went from being a continent almost full of authoritarianism, to a continent where in perhaps the past six, seven years you have had an incredibly important number of countries which where the incumbent lost the election or was changed through an electoral process. So those are important gains not to overlook. When we also speak about poverty, for example, so we are also seeing positive—although, and I published an article at Brookings about it—why, despite the fast economic growth just before the pandemic, the continent had an important number of poverty. The key dimension here was poverty in terms of percentage of the population went down, but the continent is also growing at a fast rate, the population of the continent. So which means that even if you're in relative number you have a reduction of poverty, in absolute number we can still have an important number of poor. But if you also put that further in context, by removing—of course, you could not remove them—but by considering Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, which are countries with the highest concentration—not the highest, but an important number of poor, the picture related to poverty on the continent will be very different. Another reason of my lucid optimism is that Africa—more than 50 percent of the African—close to 60 percent of the African population is below the age of twenty-five. So what this means, that everything is possible in an incredibly short duration. You probably know what we have named the Cheetah—what George Ayittey has named the Cheetah Generation. So the generation of young Africans who are dynamic, they are innovative, in opposition to the elephant who are moving slowly. So this is also another characteristic. When you look at innovation and you look at entrepreneurship, the general entrepreneurship survey globally, when you compare Africa to the rest of the world, the percentage of optimism, of interest in innovation, in entrepreneurship, of willingness and of respect for the field is also higher in general. So, again, I understand why most people will be focusing on challenges versus opportunity. But you also know, like me, that when in 2000 the Economist wrote that article about a hopeless Africa, in 2011 they wrote another issue about Africa rising, apologizing about their previous assessment. Because six to seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies in the first decade—the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, were located in Africa. So yes, we have numerous challenges. But most countries, which were at the level of development of many of the African countries, have also had challenges. So. yes, we have to address those challenges. And that is also part of what my work does with the Brookings Institution—identifying how to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and the implementation outcome. And a part of doing that is also to shift the mindset from looking exclusively at the challenges that Africa is facing, to also think about what are the opportunities? How can we identify those opportunities? How can we transform those opportunities into reality, into positive outcomes? Because the young generation in Africa deserve it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Dayanara Miranda, who's an undergraduate student at Lewis University: My question is, besides agricultural and mineral resources, what other markets can African countries enter to grow their economies? SIGNÉ: So, that is another extremely important question. And let me say, overall Africa—so, it depends as to whether we are speaking about the consumer spending, household consumptions, or whether we are speaking about business spending. In terms of household consumption, by 2030 the continent will receive about $2.5 trillion U.S. dollars of household consumption or consumer spending. And some of the largest sector include food and beverage because people need to eat, but also include housing, healthcare, financial services, transportation, and education. So to put things in perspective, African countries will be growing faster in some of those sectors compared to the growth of other developing economies. Now, if I also think now about the business-to-business spending, so the continent will be home of about—of more than $4 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. Of course, the largest area for that spending will include agriculture and agri-processing. But we will also have manufacturing, construction, utilities, transportation, wholesalers, and retailers in terms of resources. So, yes, a place—Africa is an important business destination for people who are, again, open to identify opportunities and to manage the risk. Of course, have risk, but those risks also exist in Latin America, exist in the Middle East. exist in the broader—in the broader Asia, and also in the—in some of the advanced economies. So, again, I think, like, a change of mindset is important. One of the reasons why China become the first trade partner of Africa, the first investor in infrastructure amount order, is because while other countries were looking at the challenges that Africa is facing, China and other emerging countries were looking at opportunity and how to manage their risk amount order. Of course, that is not to say that the Chinese model of engagement is necessarily the right one, but it's just to say that the difference of mindset may explain why some country may be identifying more opportunities than other. But I'm also very happy to highlight the fact that recently, the U.S. administration has also been very much active—much more active in terms of engaging with Africa from an economic perspective, from an opportunity business perspective, including the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Dorian Brown Crosby. Q: Yes. Hello. Thank you, Professor Signé, for this discussion. I'm from Spelman College. And I do have a question regarding remittances. Can you speak to the current impact of remittances that those in the diaspora are sending to African countries? And how is that affecting Africa's economic trajectory? Or even speak to a specific country. Thank you. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you very much for the questions. Remittances are playing a key role in Africa. In some of the countries they are exceeding even, let's say, the official development assistance. So that is a key point to highlight. Perhaps the nuance that I want to bring is that most of the remittances are sent for consumption, for family consumptions, among others. A shift that we may want to see happen is to turn—(inaudible)—to increase perhaps those remittances, and especially the category of remittances, shifting only from consumption, for productive use, for economic use, for entrepreneurial activities, as well on the continent. But, yes, remittances are key for development. They are extremely important. They are making a difference. And I connect with that question with the notion of diaspora. The rising role of the diaspora is also one of the key trends. Of course, I didn't—I wanted to be brief in my preliminary comments, but diaspora are really playing a key role in fostering the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. They play the role of investor. You have also the remittances, as you have just mentioned. They are diplomat. In addition of the higher representation that we are also seeing of people of African origin in international organizations, whether we speak about the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Finance Corporation, among other. So there's really a trend where the diaspora playing a key role, both financially to remittances and have an increased demand, also for investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to combine two questions, two written questions, because they are along the same lines. One from Thomas at Oklahoma State University and Kihoa from Adelphi University, and it has to do with China: China's trade with—China's aid to Africa, is it purely altruistic? Should African states be receiving Chinese aid? And should Africa be giving aid to historically authoritarian regimes? And then the second question is to have you talk a little bit about the Belt and Road Initiative, and how that initiative is influencing trading partners with other Western countries. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you for the important question. So let me—to further speak about China in Africa, some key trends to highlight is that, first, you have an exponential growth of exports to Africa, increase imports from Africa, substantial lending to African countries. So China is already one of those, the major lending on transport, power, and mining, the Ex-Im Bank is really leading the way in terms of loans. I do prefer to speak about development versus assistance, development finance instead of developing assistance, or on the longer term, a growing trend in terms of FDI. So China is dominating also the important investment on the continent. You have an important presence of Chinese workers, and forgot—not to forget the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which remains critical to an action of the multiplication of the of the Confucius Institutes on the continent. Despite that important presence, a key element you mentioned is that per Afrobarometer survey, African citizen still prefer the U.S. model of development to the Chinese one. So this is an important dimension that I want to highlight. And whether China is altruistic, it's important to mention when we speak about the commitment, they are not necessarily—China is a country with its own national interests. Perhaps the way of doing business is different, but they are not acting toward Africa, from my perspective, from an altruistic perspective. They're really looking to achieve interest, whether from a geopolitical dimension, economic interest to secure especially energy, power, mining, oceans, agricultural lands for food security in China, among others. And many of the other countries in the world are doing the same. So I'm not—so, of course, we are speaking more about China, but most of the countries when they're acting globally they are acting in alignment of their interests. And probably Jentleson, for example, has mentioned when we speak about the U.S. foreign policy as some of their drivers, which include what are the—of course, we have power, we have peace, we have prosperity, and we have principles. So foreign policy decisions are usually, let's say, the result of a tradeoff between either power consideration, peace consideration, or security consideration, economic consideration, and principle consideration, which could include democratic development, and, of course, humanitarian intervention, and so on. So it depends on which country we are talking about. And to just connect it to the broader Belt and Road Initiative, I think that, of course, it is part from my perspective of China ambition to become the next global power. And in my conversation with many of the African leaders, their main concern—including head of states and head of governments—so their main concern is given the gap, the infrastructure gap that we have on the content, financing gap that you have on the continent, China is providing an alternative and China is acting quickly. However, many of the leaders with whom I'm engaging will prefer to deal instead with, for example, the United States. The United States is probably acting slower than some of the other players. But this is also because of the democratic process and the compliance mechanism, among others. But despite that, I think that there are still tools which can allow to be compliant, to respect the democratic principle, but also act faster, with more agility. And we are having conversations. I testified before the Senate on some of those questions, before the House of Representatives, before the U.S. International Trade Commission, sharing perspective on how the U.S. can further leverage its strength and the alignment to advance U.S.-Africa prosperity. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next oral question from John O'Toole. Q: Well, thank you, because my question directly kind of follows off of that. So that's very fortunate. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Q: So my question was related to, like, Africa on, like, the global security scale. So, like you said, like, Russia and China are investing heavily, are—and becoming, like, major players, some might argue, in an attempt to be, like, first to market, in a way, in terms of being, like, colleagues with Africa. And you can't really pick and choose who your partners are, especially if the people you want to work with, like the United States or the EU, aren't moving as fast. But is there a concern that growing relationships with China and Russia could morph into a global security conflict? And that some African leaders might be afraid of becoming perhaps the next Lumumba where they're characterized as, you know, perhaps a communist pawn, or something? Is that part of the thought process? SIGNÉ: Thank you for the important question. So it's important to highlight a few considerations here. Typically, when many of the more established powers, whether you're speaking about France, the United States, UK, when they are engaging with many of the African countries they take into consideration the principles that I mentioned before, whether we speak about democratic principles, human rights consideration, humanitarian consideration, among other. So those are really key dimensions that are taken into consideration with more traditional African partners, although it is not uniform. So you will also have the same country which will be trading both with some of the authoritarian countries. But when doing so, they will often bring the question of democratic governance, of human rights in the conversation. And the difference there with countries such as China or Russia, is they are decoupling trade, investment, and principle quotient of democracy—democratic quotients, human rights quotients. For obvious reason, when you look also at your level of democratic development, or at the situation of human rights in your—in your countries. So now, what are the potential risk for the continent? I think that the—many of the—we have seen the presence, whether in an official capacity or in an unofficial capacity of foreign forces in Africa, including from Russia. So to what extent are they influencing the political sphere? To what extent are they fueling or contributing to fuel some of the insecurity and conflict that we have, as we say, in the Sahel? Or to what extent are they helping those country to address some of the challenges faced? I think the growing support that we have seen for Russia, or China, or for some of the emerging countries is related to a narrative, which may not always be founded, but a more appeasing and more respectful narrative that they have when engaging with some of the African countries. But that doesn't mean that they are acting in a way which better advance the interests of those countries. And African leaders are often in a complex situation where they don't necessarily—some of them, of course, will be very clear in terms of their preferences for Western countries. And others, in between, where they want to be certain that they will not be dropped, if I can use the terms. And this is because historically, even some of the best partners of the West—and we look at the case of Niger, when the military coup happened, so despite some political discourses the West was not able to do much. So those are elements which create also a certain level of insecurity on the continent. So yeah, your question is extremely important. And I think that there are risks which are associated with the—with the growing involvement of those emerging powers, like China, especially as it is shifting or has shifted from the economic quotient to a more security, military quotient and cooperation. But some of the countries with which they are cooperating, or perhaps even most of those countries in terms of military engagement, are not necessarily countries with their reputation or leaders with the reputation of—or with the best record in terms of democratic progress or in terms of human rights. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Zachary Billot, a student at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas: How will increased environmental challenges related to climate change impact institution and governmental efficacy in Africa? Can Africa be expected to transition to green energy if there isn't substantial foreign investment? SIGNÉ: Absolutely. It is extremely important. Thank you for the question. It's extremely important to highlight the consequences of climate change on the continent, especially in the fragile countries, in the fragile regions, especially also when combined with governance challenges. So many of the conflicts in the Sahel—and I publish a—I co-published a report with Brookings on the question on how—on the nexus—on the climate change-security-development nexus. So many—if climate change doesn't necessarily—the relation between climate change and conflict is not necessarily causal, but there is a strong correlation at least when it comes to exacerbating initial conditions in regions where you have poverty and where governance is already quite weak. So the question is, yes, climate change is increasing the likelihood of conflict, especially in an area where we already have bad governance, or poor performance. And how to address some of those questions? Of course, we have involved also in drafting the human development—the Sahel Human Development Report, where the topic is on using energy to unlock Africa potential to contribute to sustainable development, how we can leverage in a sustainable way. And, yes, I do believe that the continent has a path. So of course, I will not necessarily disclose the findings, because they will have to be officially launched by the United Nations Development Program later this year, early the next one. But there is a clear path for Africa to achieve a greener future, especially as the continent has, I would say, the luxury of learning from what has been done on the negative experiences of some of the advanced economies. But also on capitalizing on technology to achieve those goals. Now, you mentioned about investment. Yes, that is an area where global partners who have committed, including the United States, France, Canada, among others, to support a greener revolution, economic revolution, energy transition, industrial development on the continent also have to play their part. Of course the global community, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, among others. So Africa has the potential to achieve it, but not alone. With the collaboration of global partners, including some of the biggest polluters. FASKIANOS: Great, thank you. I'm going to go next to Alicia Hoffman. Q: Hello. How are you? I have a question regarding some previous legal agreements that were put forth between the ACP countries and the European Union. So my question is, I would like for you to highlight and discuss the role of the comprehensive legal agreements such as the Rome Agreement, that is now defunct, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement and now the post-Cotonou Agreement, which was just finalized last month, and get some of your opinions or your thoughts about the post-Cotonou Agreement in fostering the economic development of African countries. And also mitigating the issues dealing with migration and even human trafficking that kind of were not really addressed clearly in those earlier agreements, such as the Rome, and Lomé, and the Cotonou. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for the extremely important question. So I think that to put things in context, as you mentioned, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement, and other agreement, when we look—again, I like to look from an historical perspective. So we clearly see that if a single agreement was almost having the impact of a magic stick, Africa will be in a different position now. So all those agreements, of course, and some of those agreements are benefiting, at least per the perspective of some of the African countries, they are benefiting more the European Union countries and France than perhaps, per se, in the absolute term, the African countries. Because many of the key players in those countries in industrial development, among others, are foreign corporations, which are originating from those countries. But let me instead speak in a in a broader perspective. I think that the responsibility for Africa's development really lie primarily with African leaders and citizens. So it's a notion that I think we should really come back to. Of course, when we discuss then the relation within Africa and the rest of the world, Africa has been historically in a situation where it was abused—from slavery, to colonization, and so on. But as you have seen in in my permanent record, I'm also part—most of my work consists not only at looking at those structural asymmetries that we can see on the continent, but at giving back the responsibility, accountability of the African leaders, despite the asymmetrical relation they may be having with some of the other part of the world, still have the power and the responsibility to better deliver for their citizens. So, yes, I think that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as I mentioned, also represents an opportunity to address some of those challenges. But, of course, some countries will—we also have the political economy of the AfCFTA, in the sense that some country—and the ones which are the most advanced, economically speaking—the most enthusiastic about accelerating the implementation. But the beauty of the AfCFTA is that they also acknowledge some of the country we may potentially be left behind and have specific growth or special and differential treatments allowing the countries with more challenges to be—to be developed. So, again, I think that, yes, it's extremely important for Africa when engaging with the European Union to really find a configuration which would unlock the industrial development of the continent, and not necessarily just rely on the primary goods, among others. FASKIANOS: So, thank you. I'm you're going next to Charlotte Langeveld, who's a lecturer at Ocean County College: To which identity do the young African people prefer to be associated with, ethnic or national identity? While national identity is superficial and ethnic is real, it has consequences for the future of the continent. SIGNÉ: So yeah, so that is probably a specific survey should be developed and in a systematic way to provide a definitive response to that question. But we have different, again, multiple belonging. Like some African citizens, especially young people, will want to be presented as African, even beyond your nation, or as global citizens. But it is clear that ethnic—the ethnicity continues to play a role on the continent, because although younger Africans speak less than the previous generation local dialects and languages, so it is important to also highlight that it is part of a broader cultural system. So I don't think that it is either/or. So if you think also about citizens of the Africa—of the European Union, are French people considering more French than European, or more European than French? I would say it probably depends, but that multiple belonging remain valid. And although the comparison is slightly different, are Californians believing that they are more Californian than American or are more American than Californian? So, but understanding also the potential implication of the question is that it is extremely important to keep—in nation-building to go beyond the questions or the notions which are dividing, to focus on the common values, and systems. So I don't think that's a problem for young people to have multiple belongings or ideas of belonging. What is—what could be a bad thing is to use those differences for discrimination, for poor governance, among others. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Kimberly Pace. Q: Hello, Landry. It's nice to see you. I have—my question is—hi, University of Alaska, Anchorage. My question is regarding women and girls. My question is, you know, given the role that violent extremism has had in Africa, what is the effect—what do you think is the effect on the economic and political opportunities for girls and women across African countries? Would love to hear your response. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Hello, Kimberly. And so great to see you. And so I'm looking forward to following up after this session. So this is an extremely important question. There is no future of Africa without a full acknowledgement of the critical importance of women and girls, and not just economically speaking, politically speaking, in all the spheres of society. Just speaking economically, the gross domestic product of the content in some country could be increased by more than 50 percent with the full—or, about 50 percent—increase from 2 to 48, 49 percent with the full integration of women in society, in the economy, among other. So, and it is incredibly painful to see how in some countries, especially in situations of conflict, some of the first victim—the main victims, are girls, are women, or young people in as well, in general. So it is therefore extremely important, I think, to further empower women. But when you speak about empowering women, most people will think about empowering them politically, in particular. But for my conversation with many heads of state—former head of states, including President Banda or President Gurib-Fakim, so in our conversation it appear clearly that one of the best way to empower women politically is first to empower them also economically. Because when you're empowered economically you can organize a campaign, you can be a fully contributing member, and you can be independent. So, yes, addressing conflict, human rights challenges, will be a way to further protect women, because when you have war, when you have civil conflict, they are typically the most vulnerable people and they are often the one who are the most abused by a protagonist. So yeah. So I fully concur to the fact that we have to act in a more vigorous way to protect women, to create opportunities for women, and to empower women. And some of my best models, not to say most, are women. And starting with my mother, my sisters, and yeah. So I couldn't agree more with you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from William Decourt, who's at Hamilton Lugar School at Indiana University: You mentioned surveys indicating widespread support for democracy across the continent. How have you seen public opinion in Africa responding to or shaping norms of liberal governance on the continent? And has it been affected by other challenges, such as the recent coups, influence from Russian mercenaries, and perhaps from increased Chinese investment too? SIGNÉ: So, just to be certain that I understand, and thank you so much for the important questions, is also about some of the trends on the continent related to democratic support, and the overall political situations. One of the reasons, and please, Irina, feel free to engage and follow up as needed. So one of the reasons why we have seen coups, of course, some—you have to put things in context. I mentioned that before. Many of the African citizens really want democracy to deliver. And not just democracy to deliver—if you live in rural contexts. At the origin of modern states is the social contract, which require that while a citizen will be giving up some of your fundamental—some of your rights, you will receive in exchange from states basic public services and goods, including security, economic opportunities, among others. But when those are not delivered, whether in a democracy or in a nondemocratic regime, that is when you have more challenges. Which could lead in some cases to a military coup, as we have seen, because then coup leaders may justify that—may justified their action by the imperative of restoring security or bringing about economic opportunities. So I think that is a point that I first want to highlight, to insist on the fact that, yeah, so the—those surveys show that on one hand, Africans want democracy. On the other hand, they want those democracies to deliver. And sometime even in democratic countries, some leaders are not necessarily governing in the way which is aligned with accountability. And those are the reasons why some coup leaders will also be supported by some citizens as an alternative, not to restore a long-term authoritarian system, but perhaps organize a transition. But from my perspective, it's one of the reasons why I think that—for many reasons. But one of the key reasons why I think coups even in a very contested context are extremely bad is one of the best predictors of a coup is a previous coup. So once military got involved in politics, even after a successful short-term transition and return to power to the civilians, the likelihood of having another coup is high. So that is one of the reasons why I think it's very important to invest in citizen, and invest in democratic development, and also invest in making democratic countries, African democracies, African democratic countries, deliver better for their citizens. FASKIANOS: Well, Landry, we are unfortunately out of time. And I apologize to all of you who had wonderful questions, we could not possibly get to them all, and raised hands. So we will just have to continue the conversation, and organize another conversation around these important issues. But, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. We really appreciate your comments and your analysis. And you can follow Landry on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @LandrySigne. It's spelled S-I-G-N-E. And our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, October 25, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT) with Stephen Biddle, who's an adjunct senior fellow here at CFR and professor at Columbia University, to talk about military strategy in the contemporary world. And in the meantime, I'd encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/Careers. Please visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org. We have been posting a lot of content there in light of the Israeli-Hamas conflict. So there are a lot of resources on our homepage that I commend to all of you. And again, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much, Irina. And thank you so much for the wonderful questions, conversation, and to the incredible team which has put everything together. FASKIANOS: Thank you. (END)

Gerry Salole is an accomplished independent consultant and was formerly the Chief Executive of the European Foundation Centre (EFC) from 2005.  Notably, Gerry stands as the Founding Chair of TrustAfrica and actively participates in the governance of the European Cultural Foundation, The Impact Trust, and the Unicredit Foundation, as a member of their respective Supervisory and Advisory Boards. His contributions also extend to the Wits Centre for Philanthropy and Social Investment, and he plays a vital role on the International Advisory Council of Afrobarometer. He also serves as the Strategic Advisor to the Africa Europe Foundation, marking the convergence of his expertise.Celebrating his exceptional achievements, Gerry Salole was honored with the coveted Annual African Philanthropy Lifetime Achievement Award in 2023. In this episode, he delves into his philanthropy journey and takes us through the intricate tapestry of his roles and experiences in both African and European foundations.

Today's Daily Friend Show with Nicholas Lorimer, Marius Roodt, and Sara Gon. They discuss a survey from Afrobarometer which says that 59% of South Africans are in favour of privatising Eskom. They also discuss the creeping threat of NHI and the power of the civil service. Check out BitVice https://rebrand.ly/bitvice Subscribe on Google Podcasts · Subscribe on Apple Podcasts · Subscribe on Spotify · Website · Facebook · Instagram · Twitter

Welcome to the Harvard Center for International Development's “Road to GEM23” Climate & Development podcast. CID's "Road to GEM23" series precedes and helps launch CID's Global Empowerment Meeting (or GEM), Growing in a Green World on May 10th and 11th. At CID, we work across a global network of researchers and practitioners to build, convene, and deploy talent to address the world's most pressing challenges. On our Road to GEM23, we strive to elevate and learn from voices from the countries on the frontlines of the climate crisis and will feature important learnings from the leaders who will be active participants at GEM23. This week, we are joined by Joseph Asunka, CEO of Afrobarometer, a pan-African survey research organization. Afrobarometer has been collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data on the views and experiences of ordinary Africans with regard to governance, democracy, the economy, and society since 1999. CID Student Ambassador Emile Giovannie Zounon, A Master of Education Candidate at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, sat down with Joseph to discuss African citizen perceptions towards climate change and governance on the continent. Read more about GEM23 here: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/gem Read more

Il progetto della Total sul più lungo oleodotto al mondo, dall'Uganda all'Oceano Indiano, incontra le opposizioni delle popolazioni locali. Viaggio tra gli sfrattati dal petrolio. Ascolta il reportage di Ilaria de BonisArma di distruzione climatica: la spesa militare accelera il collasso ambientale, ma il tema è silenziato. Di Gianni BallariniAfrobarometro. L'editoriale di Nigrizia con il direttore Giuseppe Cavallini

In this episode, Anita talks with Jason Hsu, chairman and CIO of Rayliant Global Advisors (RGA), a global investment management group that specializes in the Chinese market. We discuss the tradeoffs between investing in China and preserving the national security of Americans. Jason also shares his views on why he believes the U.S. will continue to out-innovate China.We also cover the latest on the Russia-Ukraine war, including the Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military bases and the start of the G7 sanctions on Russian oil. Next, we discuss the massive protests in China and the government's rollback of its zero Covid policy. Finally, there were two coup attempts this week; one in Peru and one in Germany. We talk about what this means for these two countries.Topics Discussed in this EpisodeJoseph Asunka's article in the Washington Post - 04:50Russia-Ukraine Update - 06:00Chinese protests and the end of the Zero Covid policy - 21:00This Week in Feckless Coups: Peru and Germany - 34:00Interview with Jason Hsu - 46:00Articles and Resources Mentioned in EpisodeJoseph Asunka and the AfrobarometerWhat do Africans want? Afrobarometer surveys reveal the top concerns (WaPo)Our Interview with JosephRussia-Ukraine Update‘Hell. Just hell': Ukraine and Russia's war of attrition over Bakhmut (FT)Russia-Iran military partnership ‘unprecedented' and growing, officials say (WaPo)Russia's using ‘dark' tankers to evade Western oil sanctions (WaPo)Chinese protests and the end of the Zero Covid policyAfter Deadly Blaze, Surge of Defiance Against China's Covid Policies (NY Times)China is dismantling its zero-covid machine (The Economist)This Week in Feckless Coups: Peru and GermanyThe bizarre far-right coup attempt in Germany, explained by an expert (Vox)Peru's President Tried to Dissolve Congress. By Day's End, He Was Arrested. (NY Times)Interview with Jason Hsu, Rayliant Global AdvisorsRayliant Global Advisors websiteTwitterFollow Us Show Website: www.kelloggsglobalpolitics.com Show Twitter: @GlobalKellogg Anita's Twitter: @arkellogg Show YouTube

The demand for democracy is higher than the supply, according to recent Afrobarometer surveys; what does this means and might it have anything to do with the recent spate of coups in West Africa and the preference for outsiders? In Marie-Noelle's chat with Joe Asunka of Afrobarometer, the two discuss African attitudes towards military rule, the 91% approval of Assimi Goita, the military leader who took over Mali in a coup and generational preferences and differences around governance. Join the conversation on: Twitter - @BrenthurstF / Facebook - @BrenthurstFoundation / Instagram - @brenthurstfoundation

‘n Politieke ontleder stem saam met die bevindinge van Ghana-gebaseerde AfroBarometer-verslag, ‘n opname oor demokrasie, regering en lewenskwaliteit. Volgens die verslag ervaar meer as 80 persent Namibiërs vryheid van uitdrukking, 90 persent voel vry om by enige politieke party van hul keuse aan te sluit of in ‘n verkiesing te stem sonder om enige druk te ervaar. Daar is kommer met 76 persent Namibiërs wat in 2014 demokrasie verkies het, gedaal het tot 55 persent in 2021. Plaaslike politieke ontleder Ndumba Kamwanyah sê aan Kosmos 94.1 Nuus gesê dat die land goed vaar in vergelyking met ander Afrika-lande, maar dat daar nog ruimte vir verbetering is.

‘n Navorser by die by die Instituut vir Openbare Beleidsnavorsing het gereageer op die Ghana-gebaseerde AfroBarometer-verslag, ‘n opname oor demokrasie, regering en lewenskwaliteit. Volgens die verslag ervaar meer as 80 persent Namibiërs vryheid van uitdrukking, 90 persent voel vry om by enige politieke party van hul keuse aan te sluit of in ‘n verkiesing te stem sonder om enige druk te ervaar. Navorser Frederico Links sê aan Kosmos 94.1 Nuus dat dit goed is om vry te voel, maar daar is diegene wat vryer is as ander. Links verwys na die gay gemeenskap in Namibië.

A recent survey titled “It takes two to Toyi – Toyi” by Afrobarometer has revealed that South Africa's level of trust towards President Cyril Ramaphosa has dropped compared to that of the former president, Jacob Zuma era. The survey shows that this attributed to mistrust of voters toward the president disappointing given that people had high expectations of him when he took office in 2019. Radio Islam International spoke with an independent writer, researcher, lecturer, and political activist, Dale T. McKinley. According to McKinley, surveys are unpredictable, unreliable, and inaccurate, and the Afrobarometer is known for its primarily wrong surveys.

Die jong parlementslid van die Landless People's Movement, Utaara Mootu stem nie saam met die jongste Afrobarometer-peiling nie. Volgens die peiling glo die meeste Afrikane dat die jeug se menings nie veel gewig dra nie en dat die siening van senior lede van die gemeenskap en ouderlinge hoog geag word. Sestig persent van Afrikane meen ouderlinge se raad is beter met net 38 persent van respondente wat sê jongmense se idees in belangrik. In Namibië is die syfer hoër op 46 persent wat meen die jeug se insette moet aandag geniet. Respondente sonder formele skoling en vroue was die minste geneig om na die jeug te luister. Mootu gee haar mening aan Kosmos 94.1 Nuus.

In this episode, Anita interviews Joseph Asunka, the CEO of Afrobarometer, about democracy in Africa. Afrobarometer is “a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that has been conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy, and society since 1999.” Before joining Afrobarometer, Asunka was previously a program officer in the Global Development and Population program at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and a lecturer in political science at UCLA.We also discuss the aftermath of Pelosi's trip to Taiwan and whether it has led to a new normal in the Taiwan Strait. We look at the specter of populism in Italy, as well as Kenya's third democratic election and what it portends for the future of East Africa. We wrap up the show by looking at the non-aligned movement and why these countries refuse to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine war.Articles and Resources Mentioned in EpisodeRyan's article in War on the RocksReviving the Petroleum Administration for War: A Case for Government-Industry Partnership (War on the Rocks)Rising US-China tensions over TaiwanXi Jinping may attack Taiwan to secure his legacy, warn Admiral Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee (The Economist)How the crisis over Taiwan will change US-China relations (The Economist)Analysis: China's sharper focus on military option for Taiwan raises risks with U.S. (Reuters)Election Roundup: Italy and KenyaCan anything stop Italy's radical right? (The Economist)Leaked manifesto: Italian right-wingers will dump Euroskepticism in bid for power (Politico)Italy's Meloni, leading in polls, says she is no threat (Reuters)Why Kenya's election is going down to the wire (The Economist)Democracy in Africa: Interview with Joseph AsunkaHow do Global South politics of non-alignment and solidarity explain South Africa's position on Ukraine? (Brookings)Follow UsShow Website: www.kelloggsglobalpolitics.comShow Twitter: @GlobalKelloggShow YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgJeUZcTUGsNwTh-us65cIAAnita's Twitter: https://twitter.com/arkelloggAnita's Website:https://www.anitakellogg.com/Anita's email: anita@kelloggsglobalpolitics.comRyan's email: ryan@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com

When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken unveiled the White House's new strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, he referenced Afrobarometer polling data to validate Washington's renewed emphasis on democracy promotion. The following day, in criticizing the new U.S. policy towards Africa, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin also used Afrobarometer data to make the case for Beijing's engagement strategy on the continent.What's interesting is that they're both right. The Afrobarometer polling data undermines the simple narratives that too often frame the discourse about how Africans view their ties with these two powers.Afrobarometer CEO Joseph Asunka joins Eric & Cobus to discuss what's behind these seemingly contradictory perspectives and which direction public opinion towards the U.S. and China is trending.SHOW NOTES:Afrobarometer: Africans welcome China's influence but maintain democratic aspirations: https://bit.ly/3Ac39FtAfrobarometer: China has invested deeply in Africa. We checked to see whether that is undermining democracy: https://bit.ly/3vSjNr2JOIN THE DISCUSSION:Twitter: @ChinaGSProject| @stadenesque | @eric_olander | @joeasunkaFacebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProjectFOLLOW CAP IN FRENCH AND ARABIC:Français: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChineعربي: www.akhbaralsin-africia.com | @AkhbarAlSinAfrJOIN US ON PATREON!Become a CAP Patreon member and get all sorts of cool stuff, including our Week in Review report, an invitation to join monthly Zoom calls with Eric & Cobus, and even an awesome new CAP Podcast mug!www.patreon.com/chinaafricaprojectSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode, we have no less than three guests with us to discuss traditional authorities in Malawi, Ghana, and Latin America. We have Dr Boniface Dulani from the University of Malawi, Afrobarometer, IPOR Malawi. John-Paul Adjadeh, Registrar at the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs under the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs in Ghana. And finally, we have Christoper Carter, an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and a Research Associate at the Center on the Politics of Development at the University of California, Berkeley. The episode offers a lively discussion on traditional authorities' impact on, for example, democracy, corruption, land management, and conflict resolution.

The office of the Vice President has fought off findings from the latest Afrobarometer report which suggest that the presidency is perceived as the second most corrupt institution in the country.

In this episode, produced in December 2021, NRGI president and CEO Suneeta Kaimal is joined by Afrobarometer CEO Joseph Asunka. Afrobarometer conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in more than 30 African countries.

Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, co-founder and board chair of Afrobarometer — the pan-African survey research network and global reference point for high-quality data on African democracy, governance, and quality of life — joins us to discuss the worsening crisis of democracy in West Africa, including that which is enveloping the region's largest country, Nigeria. He also points to some rays of hope as democracy advocates push back against this trend.E. Gyimah-Boadi is co-founder and board chair of Afrobarometer, the pan-African survey research network and global reference point for high-quality data on African democracy, governance, and quality of life. He is also co-founder and former executive director of the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, a leading independent democracy and good-governance think tank. In June 2022 he was appointed president of the board of directors of the Institute for Integrated Transitions.A former professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, he has also held faculty positions at several universities in the United States, including the American University's School of International Service, as well as fellowships at Queen Mary University; the Center for Democracy, Rule of Law and Development at Stanford University; the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy.A graduate of the University of California (Davis) and University of Ghana (Legon), Gyimah-Boadi is a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) and the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences. For his contributions to research and policy advocacy on democracy, accountable governance, and human rights, he has won a myriad of awards, including the Distinguished Africanist of the Year Award of the African Studies Association (2018); the Martin Luther King, Jr. Award for Peace and Social Justice (2017); and one of the Republic of Ghana's highest honors, the Order of Volta (2008). He was named one of New African Magazine's “100 Most Influential Africans of 2021.”

Selon un sondage de la firme Afrobarometer : la satisfaction des Mauriciens par rapport à la démocratie au plus bas La société a communiqué les résultats de sa dernière enquête d'opinion. Il ressort, selon ses conclusions, que la proportion des Mauriciens qui sont satisfaits de la démocratie a diminué. 71% des sondés estiment que la démocratie est préférable à tout autre système politique de gouvernance. Ce taux a diminué comparé à celui du dernier sondage, soit 85%.

Sondage Afrobarometer : le pays va dans la mauvaise direction pour 66% des Mauriciens alors que 29% estiment que nous allons dans la bonne direction Le sondage Afrobarometer réalisé par la firme Straconsult a été rendu public hier. Il confirme une détérioration de la situation socioéconomique dans le pays. En effet, 66% des Mauriciens sondés affirment que le pays va dans la mauvaise direction.

Utafiti uliofanywa na Afrobarometer mwaka 2019 ulionyesha kwamba zaidi ya asilimia 90 ya wananchi wa Guinea wanaona kwamba idara ya mahakama nchini humo imejaa rushwa

Nic Cheeseman is Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham and was formerly the Director of the African Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. He works on democracy, elections and development, including election rigging, political campaigning, corruption, “fake news” and executive-legislative relations. Nic is the author or editor of ten books, including Democracy in Africa (2015), Institutions and Democracy in Africa (2017), How to Rig an Election (2018), Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective (2018), and The Moral Economy of Elections in Africa (2021). Resources:Almost all of Nic's academic articles are available to download for free at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nic-Cheeseman-2 This includes his recent article on democracy in Africa, and the kind of democracy people want:  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352974495_African_Studies_Keyword_DemocracyAlso see his review of democracy in Africa in 2020: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343713587_The_State_of_Democracy_in_Africa_2020_A_Changing_of_the_Guards_or_A_Change_of_SystemsMany of Bic's blogs on democracy and elections can be found at: https://theconversation.com/profiles/nic-cheeseman-180800/articlesNic's articles and newspaper columns on African politics for the Mail & Guardian newspaper can be found here: https://mg.co.za/author/nic-cheeseman/He also writes a popular column, called "Political Capital", for the Africa Report - you can read it here: https://www.theafricareport.com/in-depth/political-capital/Many  of Nic's pieces, along with those of hundreds of other researchers, can be found on the website that he founded and co-edits: http://democracyinafrica.org/Nic Cheeseman on Twitter: @Fromagehomme  Host:Professor Dan Banik, University of Oslo, Twitter: @danbanik  @GlobalDevPod

Michelle Gavin, CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies, leads a conversation on African politics and security issues.     FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR fall of 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, cfr.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Michelle Gavin with us today to talk about African politics and security issues. Ambassador Gavin is CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies. Previously, she was managing director of the Africa Center, a multidisciplinary institution dedicated to increasing understanding of contemporary Africa. From 2011 to 2014, she served as the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and as the U.S. representative to the Southern African Development Community, and prior to that, she was a special assistant to President Obama and the senior director for Africa at the National Security Council. And before going into the Obama administration, she was an international affairs fellow and adjunct fellow for Africa at CFR. So we are so delighted to have her back in our fold. So, Michelle, thank you very much for being with us. We have just seen that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken went on a trip to Africa. Maybe you could begin by talking about the strategic framework that he laid out on that trip, and then we have in just recent days—with a new variant of Omicron—seen the travel ban imposed on several African countries and what that means for the strategic vision that he laid out. GAVIN: Sure. Thank you. Well, thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. And I looked at the roster. There's so much amazing expertise and knowledge on this Zoom. I really look forward to the exchange and the questions. I know I'll be learning from all of you. But maybe just to start out to talk a little bit about Secretary Blinken's trip because I think that, in many ways, his efforts to sort of reframe U.S. engagement on the continent, trying to move away from this sort of binary major power rivalry lens that the Trump administration had been using is useful, but also exposes, really, a lot of the challenges that policymakers focused on Africa are dealing with right now. So he tried to reset the relationship in the context of a partnership, of purely acknowledging African priorities and African agency in determining what kind of development partners Africa is interested in, what kind of security partners. I think that's a very useful exercise. Then he kind of ticked through, as every official has to do in making these big framing statements as sort of broad areas of engagement and cooperation, and he talked about increasing trade, which, of course, is interesting right now with AGOA sunsetting soon, working together to combat pandemic diseases, particularly COVID, working together on climate change, where, of course, Africa has borne more consequences than many other regions of the world while contributing far less to the problem, working together on the democratic backsliding and authoritarian sort of surge that we've seen around the world and, finally, working together on peace and security. So this huge agenda, and I think what's interesting and what in many ways his trip made clear is that it's very hard to get to the first four points when the last one, the peace and security element, is in chaos. And, look, obviously, Africa's a big continent. All of us who ever engage in these conversations about Africa are always—are forever trying to provide the disclaimer, right, that there's never one African story. There's never one thing happening in this incredibly diverse continent. But it is the case that the peace and security outlook on the continent is really in bad shape, right. And so the secretary traveled to Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal. The headlines from his trip, really, were dominated by the disorder in the Horn of Africa that we're seeing right now. So you have the civil conflict in Ethiopia, which has been incredibly costly to that country in terms of lives, in terms of their economic outlook, has been characterized by atrocities of war crimes. And, I think right now, most observers are very concerned about the integrity of the Ethiopian state, its capacity to persist. Regardless of today, tomorrow, or next week's military developments, it's very hard to see a lasting and sustainable military solution to this conflict and the parties do not appear, really, amenable to a serious political negotiation. But it's not just Ethiopia, of course. It's Sudan, where we saw the tenuous military-civilian transitional government kind of fully hijacked by the military side of that equation in a coup that has been, really, rejected by so many Sudanese citizens who are still on the streets even today trying to push back against the notion of military dominance in their transition and beyond, and they are being met with violence and intimidation. And the outlook there is quite worrying. You've got border clashes between Ethiopia and Sudan. You have electoral crisis in Somalia. So the Horn, you know, is looking like a very, very tough neighborhood. And, of course, everyone is concerned about the impact on Kenya and East Africa itself, given the insurgency in Mozambique, which has more than once affected neighboring Tanzania, these bombings in Uganda and the sense of instability there. The picture is one of multiple crises, none of which come with easy fixes or purely military solutions. And then you have this kind of metastasizing instability throughout the Sahel, right, and the concern that more and more states will fall victim to extremely worrisome instability and the very costly violence. So there's a huge security agenda and we're just—we're all aware of the basic facts that it's very hard to make progress on partnerships to support democratic governance in the midst of conflict. It's very hard to come together on climate change or to fight a pandemic in the midst of these kinds of circumstances. So I think it's a really challenging picture. And just to pull a couple of these threads, on this issue of democratic backsliding the Biden administration's desire to build more solidarity among kind of like-minded countries whose democracies may take different forms but who buy into a basic set of democratic values, it's undeniable that the trend lines in Africa have been worrisome for some time and we do see a lot of these kind of democratic authoritarian states, these states where you get some of the form, some of the theater, of democracy, particularly in the form of elections, but no real capacity for citizens to hold government accountable. It's not really a kind of a demand-driven democratic process, that the fix is often in on these elections, and there is polling, right, that suggests that this is turning people off of democratic governance in general, right. If what you understand democratic governance to be is a sham election, you know, at regular intervals while you continue to be governed by a set of individuals who are not really beholden to the electorate, right, and are protecting a very small set of interests, then it's not surprising to see some waning enthusiasm. It's not that other forms of government are necessarily looking great to African populations, but I think it is notable in some of that Afrobarometer polling in places where you wouldn't expect it, right, like South Africa, where people sacrificed so much for democracy, and you really do see a real decline in enthusiasm for that form of governance. So there's a lot of work to be done there. The last thing, just because you brought it up, on the latest news about this new variant, the Omicron variant—I may be saying that wrong. It may be Omicron. Perhaps someone will correct me. And the kind of quick policy choice to institute a travel ban on a number of southern African countries. So I do think that in the context of this pandemic, right, which has been economically devastating to the continent—where the global economic downturn that occurred for Africans, too, but you had governments with very little fiscal space in which to try to offset the pain for their populations. In addition, you have had the issues of vaccine inequity, right, where it's just taken far too long to get access to vaccines for many African populations—it's still not adequate in many places—and a sort of sense that the deal initially proposed in the form of COVAX wasn't really what happened—you know, a feeling of a bait and switch—that looks like—what it looks like is disregard for African lives. And while I am really sympathetic—I used to work in government and it's crystal clear when you do that your first responsibility is the safety of the American people—these travel bans sort of fit into a narrative, right, about scapegoating, about disregard for African life that, I think, is going to make it awfully hard for this new reframing of respect and partnership, right, to really resonate. And I would just note, as a former U.S. ambassador in Botswana, that the scientists in the lab in Gaborone and the scientists in South Africa who did the sequencing and helped to alert the world to this new variant, right, were doing us all a tremendous favor. It's not at all clear that this variant started in southern Africa, right. We know that it exists on every continent right now except Antarctica. We know that samples taken in Europe before these discoveries were made in southern Africa—just tested later—showed that the variant was already there. And so it is a bit hard to explain why specifically southern Africans are banned from travel. You know, I think it's unfortunate. There are other policies that could be pursued around testing, around quarantine requirements. So I'll leave that there. I'm not a public health expert. But I think it's—I'm glad you brought it up because I think these things do really resonate and they inform how the United States is understood on the continent. They inform how Africans understand global institutions and kind of global governance to reflect or not reflect their concerns and interests. And if what the Biden administration wants is partners in this notion of democratic solidarity and partners in trying to reconstruct kind of international institutions a sense of global order, a norms-based rules-based approach to multilateral challenges, it's going to be hard to get the African buy-in that is absolutely necessary to achieve those goals when these kinds of issues continue to give the impression that Africa is an afterthought. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Michelle. That was really a great overview for us. So now we want to go to all of you. You can raise your hand—click on the raised hand icon to ask a question—and when I recognize you please unmute yourself and state your affiliation. Otherwise, you can submit a written question in the Q&A box, and if you do write a question please say what institution you're with so that I can read it and identify you properly and—great. Our first hand raised is from Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson. And let me just say, the “Zoom user,” can you please rename yourself so we know who you are? So, Dr. Nelson, over to you. Q: Good afternoon, everyone. Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson from Southern University. I'm a political science professor in the department. And the question, I guess, I have is that we know that the African people have a history of nondemocratic governance, right? And when we look at a place like Tunisia, we know that one of the reasons in the Arab Spring that they were so successful—although often considered an Arab country, they are successful because there had been tenets of democracy that were already broiled in the society. The question I have is that to these places that do not have that institutional understanding or have even—maybe don't even have the values to align with democracy, are we foolhardy to continue to try to support democratic governance as the full-throated support versus trying to look at more of a hybrid of a sovereign situation that allows for, in many ways, a kingdom, a dictator, and et cetera, with then a democratic arm? Thank you so much. GAVIN: Thanks, Dr. Nelson. It's an interesting question, and I agree with you insofar as I think that it's really interesting to think about the kind of governance antecedents in a bunch of African countries, particularly in the pre-colonial era, right, and try to figure out how they find expression afterwards. There's no question that, you know, colonialism doesn't set the table well for democracy. There's no doubt about that. But I would say that, you know, despite the loss of faith in democratic governance that we've seen in some of the polling, you know, very consistently for a long time what you've seen is that African populations do seem to want democratic governance. They want to be able to hold their leaders accountable. They want everyone to have to abide by the law. They want basic protections for their rights. So, you know, I'm not sure that there's any society that's particularly ill-suited to that. But I do think that democracy comes in many forms and it's always particularly powerful when there is, you know, some historical resonance there. I also—you know, if we take a case like one of the world's last absolute monarchies in eSwatini right now what you see is a pretty persistent civic movement demanding more accountability and less power for the monarch, more protection for individual rights. And so, you know, I'm not—I think that people are feeling disillusioned and frustrated in many cases and you see this, too, in the enthusiasm with which several of the recent coups in West Africa have been met—you know, people pouring out into the streets to celebrate because they're frustrated with the status quo. They're interested in change. But very rarely do you see then persistent support for, say, military dictatorships or military-dominated government. So I'm not sure that the frustration means enthusiasm for some of these other governing models. People want democracy to work a lot better. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Lucy Dunderdale Cate. Q: Hi. Yes. I'm Lucy Dunderdale Cate. I'm with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I wanted to just ask you about kind of the African Union's role in this, you know, particularly and with the Biden administration, and thinking about, you know, the Horn of Africa security issues that you mentioned. Kind of where do you see that we're going and what do you see kind of for the future there? Thank you. GAVIN: Sure. Thanks for that question. I think the AU, for all of its flaws—and, you know, find me a multilateral organization that isn't flawed—is actually incredibly important. You know, for the Biden administration, which has kind of staked out this position that international institutions matter and multilateral institutions matter, they've got to work better, we can't address the threats we all face without these functioning and they may need to be modernized or updated but we need them, then the AU is a really important piece of that puzzle. And I think, you know, right now, for example, in Ethiopia that the—it's the AU's negotiator, former Nigerian President Obasanjo, who really is in the lead in trying to find some glimmer of space for a political solution, and this was a little bit late in the day in terms of AU activism on this issue and I think it's been a particularly difficult crisis for the AU to address in part because of being headquartered in Addis and sort of operating within a media and information environment in Ethiopia that is one that does not create a lot of space for divergence from the federal government's position. So I think that, in the end, right, the prospect of the collapse of a 110-million-strong country, a place that used to be an exporter of security, a major diplomatic player in the region, right, spurred AU action. But it's been a little bit—more than a little bit slow. But you have seen some pretty forward-leaning stance at the AU as well. Their response to the military coup in Sudan this fall was pretty robust and clear. Now this sort of new transitional arrangement that appears to be more palatable to much of the international community than to many Sudanese citizens is a—we're wading into murkier waters there. But I think the AU, you know, it's the only game in town. It's essential, and particularly in the Horn where the subregional organization EGAD is so incredibly weak that the AU, as a vehicle for an African expression of rules-based norms-based order, is—you know, actually its success is incredibly important to the success of this major U.S. foreign policy plank. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Rami Jackson. How much of the democratic backsliding is supported by outside powers? For example, there was a chance for a democratic movement in Chad but the French threw their weight behind Déby's son after he was shot. GAVIN: That's a great question. I think that it's, certainly, not the case that external partners or actors are always positive forces, right, for democratic governance on the continent. There's no doubt about that, and it can be France and Chad. It can be, you know, Russian machinations in Central African Republic. There's a lot. It can be some of the Gulf states in Sudan, right, who—or Egypt, who seem very comfortable with the idea of military dominance and maybe some civilian window dressing for this transition. So you're right that external actors are kind of an important piece of the puzzle. You know, I don't think that there are many situations where there is a single external actor who is capable of entirely influencing the direction of government. But there are, certainly, situations where one external actor is tremendously powerful. Chad is a great example, again. And it is something that, I think, you know, again, an administration that has staked so much of its credibility on the notion that this is something very important to them, you know, is going to have to deal with. And it's thorny, right. Foreign policy always is where you have competing priorities. You need to get important work done sometimes with actors who do not share your norms and values, and it's the messiness of trying to articulate and integrate values in a foreign policy portfolio that runs the gamut, right, from counterterrorism concerns to economic interests. But I think that those are tensions that the administration will continue to have to deal with probably a little more publicly than an administration who didn't spend much time talking about the importance of democratic governance. FASKIANOS: Great. And I just want to mention that Rami is a graduate student at Syracuse University. So I'm going to go next to a raised hand from Mojúbàolú Olufúnké Okome. I know you wrote your question, too. Q: Good afternoon. Thank you very much. Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: I wrote my question because I couldn't figure out how to name myself on the phone. You know, thank you for your presentation. When I look at democracy in Africa—I mean, this is not the first go-round—and the response by people, by citizens, to the backsliding by governments is not—it looks familiar to me because, you know, in the 1960s—from the 1960s, there were similar responses. People were dissatisfied. They welcomed authoritarian governments again and again because the government they voted for rigged elections, were also authoritarian, and they were kleptocratic. So what's different now and where's the continuity and what has changed, really, with democracy? The other thing is about this COVID—the management of the COVID situation. I also kind of see the—I think I agree with you. The way Africa is being treated looks very familiar—you know, with disdain, with disrespect, as if the lives of the people there don't matter as much. And what is it going to take, really, to change the—because, you know, if a pandemic that cannot be stopped by walls and borders is not instigating change what is it going to take to change the way in which world politics is—world politics and its governance is done? GAVIN: Fantastic questions and ones that, I think we could talk about for, you know, a week-long conference. But so I'll start from the beginning and just take a stab. I think you're absolutely right. There have been these interesting cycles when it comes to governance on the continent and I think—when I think about sort of what's different from what we were seeing in, say, toward the end of the '60s, I think it's a couple things. One is geopolitical context, right. So my hope is that what we're not doing is kind of doing a reprise of this bipolar world where we're subbing in China's authoritarian development model for a Soviet Communist model and sitting here on the other side and, you know, trying to manipulate other countries into one camp or another. I don't think we're quite there yet and I think the Biden administration is trying very hard not to wade into those waters. So I do think the geopolitical context is a bit different. I also think, you know, that where so many African states are is at—in terms of kind of the scope of their existence as independent entities is an important difference, right. So I think that in the immediate kind of post-colonial era, for an awful lot of governments the fundamental basis for their legitimacy was having—is not being a colonial administrator, not being a puppet of some external power and so the, you know, legitimacy came from liberation, from independence. In places that had terrible conflict sometimes legitimacy came from, you know, delivering some degree of security from a long-standing insecure situation. So, you know, you look at—I think that's where sort of President Museveni derived a lot of legitimacy in the late '80s and through the '90s. And I think that, you know, now, as you have these very significant young populations whose lived experience is not one of ever knowing a time pre-independence, you know, they're looking for service delivery, right. They're looking for opportunity. They're looking for job creation, and I think legitimacy is increasingly going to be derived from the ability to deliver on these priorities. And so I do think that that makes kind of the governance landscape a little bit different, too, sort of different ideas about where governing legitimacy comes from. And, you know, I think that can be manifest in really different ways. But if I had to try and, you know, grab onto that interesting idea about what's different, that's what comes to mind. In this, you know, incredibly important question about what's it going to take to recognize African states as equal players and African lives as—every bit as urgently valuable as any other, you know, I do think that as the world continues to grapple with this pandemic and with other issues that can only be resolved globally, like climate change, it will, over time, kind of force a reckoning and a rethink about what are the important states and what are not. You know, it's interesting to me, it's absolutely true that by not moving out robustly to ensure that the whole world has access to vaccines the richest countries have created opportunities for new mutations to emerge. I hesitate to say that, in some ways, in this context because it sounds like I'm positive that these emerged from Africa, and I'm not. But we do know, you know, as a basic matter of science, right, that we're not safe until everyone's safe. And so I do think that as these kinds of issues that military might and economic power cannot address alone, where it really does take global solidarity and an awful lot of multilateral cooperation, which is messy and cumbersome, right, and necessary, my hope is that that will start to change perceptions in framing. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to go next to a written question from Abbey Reynolds, who's an undergraduate student at the University of Central Florida. What steps do you think that international and regional organizations can take to preempt future attempts to derail democratic governance in the region—coups, circumvention of constitutional term letter—limits, rigged elections, et cetera? GAVIN: OK. I'm sorry. What steps should who take? I'm sorry. FASKIANOS: Multilateral—international and regional organizations. GAVIN: OK. You know, I think that in a number of cases subregional organizations have been taking steps, right—ECOWAS, certainly, in rejecting coups and suspending memberships, et cetera. I think, you know, if you look at the sort of articulated and documented principles of a lot of these organizations they're pretty good. It's really about the gulf sometimes between stated principles and practice. So, you know, I think the Southern African Development Community is sometimes guilty of this where there are—you know, there's a clear commitment in static kind of principle documents and protocols around democratic governance but you also have an absolute monarchy that's a member state of SADC. You've had, you know, significant repression in a number of states—Zimbabwe leaps to mind—that SADC doesn't have, really, anything to say about. So you can have organizations that have kind of principles and procedures. At the end of the day, organizations are made up of member states, right, who have a set of interests, and I think that, you know, how governments understand their interest in standing up for certain norms, it's—I think it's specific in many ways to those governments in those states how they derive their own legitimacy, the degree to which they feel they may be living in a glass house, and, you know, frankly, relative power dynamics. So I'm not sure. Certainly, it's always—you know, I'm a believer in multilateralism. I think from an African point of—you know, if you imagine African states trying to assert themselves on the international stage, multilateralism is really important, right, to get if it's possible, where interests align, to have as many African states speaking with one voice. It's a much more powerful message than just a couple individual states. But there are always going to be intrinsic limits. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Gary Prevost with the College of St. Benedict. And if you can unmute yourself. Q: Speaking today, actually, as honorary professor and research associate from Mandela University in South Africa. I've had several students in recent years—doctoral and master's students—study U.S. and allied counterterrorism strategies both in the Middle East and in Africa, and they've come away with a general perspective that those strategies going back several administrations have been almost solely focused on military action and that it has led them in their recommendations sections of their theses to argue that other steps must be taken if these efforts in places like Nigeria or Somalia or Mozambique or even in the Middle East, Syria, and Iraq, are to be successful they must have a changed mindset about counter terror. What's your perspective on that? GAVIN: Well, thanks for that. I wholeheartedly agree, right, and I think, you know, you'll even get plenty of military officers, right, who will say there's no way we can address some—these problems, these, you know, kind of radical violent organizations aligned to global terrorist groups with a purely military approach. It's frustrating. I'm sure it's frustrating for your students, too, because it feels like everyone keeps coming to this conclusion, and, certainly, there have been efforts to, you know, counter violent extremism, provide opportunity for young people. But we're not very good at it, right. We haven't been very good at it yet. There's still a mismatch in terms of the resources we pour into these kind of relative—these different streams of effort, right. But I think also while it's very clear in a situation like Mozambique that if you want to weaken the insurgency you need to be providing more opportunity and building more trust in a community that's been disenfranchised and alienated from the center for a very, very long time. But the how to do that, how to do that effectively and how to do it in a climate of insecurity I actually think is an incredibly difficult challenge, and there are, you know, brilliant people working on this all the time. You know, some of the best work that I've seen suggests that some of this can be done but it's an incredibly long-term undertaking and that, you know, is sometimes, I think, a difficult thing to sustain support for, particularly in a system like the United States where, you know, our appropriations cycles tend to be very short term. So people are looking for, you know, quick impact, things you can put on a bar graph quickly and say that you've done. And I think that, you know, a lot of the kind of peace building research suggests that that's—that, you know, building community trust, which is a huge part of what needs to happen, operates on a very different kind of timeline. So it's a really thorny, thorny problem and how to get—you know, how to sustain political and budgetary support for those kinds of efforts. I don't know the answer yet. I'm sure somebody really smart on—maybe on the Zoom does. FASKIANOS: I'm going to go next to Pearl Robinson at Tufts University. Q: Hello, Ambassador Gavin. First of all, I'd like to congratulate you in your new position as Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa, and that's actually—as I've been sitting here listening to this, my thought was I'd like to know if you have thought about ways in which you can use your position at the Council to help actualize forms of partnerships about policy dialogues related to Africa. You began by articulating the U.S.'s new strategic vision for Africa. That was an American statement. I haven't really heard an African statement that would be engaging with that policy dialogue. These one-on-one trips of the secretary of state and other people going to individual African countries, based on our agenda, and having one-on-one dialogue discussions, in a way, does not get towards that real notion of African agency in policy and partnership. So I'm actually wondering whether you might envision the Council playing a role and creating some kinds of policy dialogue fora that would have American(s) and Africans participating in ways that would be visible to American publics as well as African publics. So I'm suggesting that you might, you know, be uniquely well suited to have the Council play a role in actually making visible and operationalizing this concept. I just thought about this sitting here listening because what I realized was everybody talking is talking from the American side and I'm wondering if—well, my dear colleague, Olufúnké, actually was an African voice. But I think what needs to happen is there needs to be a way for this taking place maybe with African institutions, academics, civil society actors. So I just throw that out for you to think about and I'd like to hear your first response to that idea. GAVIN: So I think it's exciting and I'd love, actually, to follow up with you. I'm delighted that you're here. I heard some wonderful things about your work. I think there's always the hard part of, right, who speaks for Africa, right, because there are so many diverse African perspectives. But I don't think you're suggesting there's necessarily a unitary voice. You're talking about sort of different actors, and I would agree with you that it's always incredibly rich to have conversations. You know, I recently did a panel with Professor Ed Vitz, who is working on some—working on a paper, I think, that will eventually be a book about sort of U.S.-Africa policy and particularly interested in the kind of frame of major power rivalry. But it was such a refreshing conversation to examine that and compare notes on what we thought the flaws of that frame might be to hear his perspective on where he thought there might be advantages to be seized from it. It was wonderful, and I agree with you that the more dialogue and the more opportunity not just to sort of talk amongst ourselves in a U.S. community that cares about Africa and about U.S. policy the better. You know, I will be honest with you, I often, in a situation like the one right now, I try hard to stick to—to at least keep circling back to U.S. policy because that's where my background is and I, you know, have no desire to posit myself as speaking on behalf of Africans. That's nuts and, you know, not my role. But I do—I have spent a lot of time thinking about how the U.S. engages with the continent. And so I think it's a really interesting notion. I'd love to follow up with you. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next written question from Krista Johnston, who's a professor at Howard University. The African Continental Free Trade Area will create the largest consumer market. What are the barriers U.S. businesses investing in Africa and positioning themselves to take advantage of this new trade area and what can the Biden administration do to incentivize this kind of engagement with China? And perhaps I can tack on another question to that because we have a lot of questions—(laughs)—both raised hands—is just to talk a little bit about China's footprint in Africa as well. GAVIN: Sure. Well, so I absolutely agree that the African Continental Free Trade Area is a really incredibly promising step forward for African economic integration and that is, you know, compelling in any number of ways. I think, for example, about the very hot topic of pharmaceutical production, right. And between the Free Trade Area, the standing up of the African Medicines Agency, right, which should help to harmonize regulatory standards for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment throughout the continent, investments seem a lot more attractive, right, when you're looking at much bigger markets than any one country, even than a giant like Nigeria, can provide. So I think that there's tremendous potential here. I will go back to what I said earlier, which is that even with these positive steps, right, it's going to be really important that the peace and security parts start trending in the right direction because it's very—you know, I would say this. U.S. investors are already quite bad at assessing risk in Africa and a backdrop of instability is not going to help that situation, right, and it is, in many cases, going to make a given investment opportunity or partnership opportunity too risky for many. So, you know, there's just no way to jettison those concerns. But wholeheartedly agree it's an exciting development. If the world hadn't gotten sort of hijacked by COVID, I think we'd be talking about it a lot more. On China, you know, the Chinese engagement on the continent is a fact of life that's existed for a very long time and is not going anywhere. It is economic, it is political, it is, increasingly, cultural, and I think, you know, for a state like China that aspires to be a major global power it's entirely predictable and understandable. Do I think that there are some ways in which Chinese investment and engagement are not always beneficial to African states? I do. I have concerns, certainly, about the way China sometimes uses its influence to secure African support for Chinese positions that appear antithetical to stated values in AU documents and other(s) and I have concerns about the transparency of some of the arrangements. I have concerns as well about some of the tech standards and just sort of play for technical dominance that maybe does not have the cybersecurity interests of Africans as its top priority. All that said, I think it's really important for the United States to, you know, understand that there's no—there's nothing to be gained by constantly vilifying China's engagement, some of which has been incredibly helpful for African states hungry, particularly, for financing on major infrastructure projects, and, you know, it's a fact of life we all have to learn to deal with. I do think, you know, there's some natural tension between the Biden administration's democracy focus, right, and the very explicit and intentional efforts of China to present a different model, and I don't think that the U.S. needs to shy away from that or pretend that those differences don't exist. But I do think it's incredibly unhelpful to frame up all of U.S. policy as if it's intended to counter China as opposed to intended to find those areas in the Venn diagram of, you know, those overlaps of African interests and U.S. interests and work together on them. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Anna Ndumbi, who is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi. Please unmute yourself. Q: Thank you very much. I really appreciate the presentation. I have a quick question in regards to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is center of Africa. About three years ago, there was a new president that stepped in by the name of Félix Tshisekedi, and he decided to pass a law saying that all the secondary education should be free because, obviously, in Africa schools aren't free. And I, personally, think that maybe it wasn't really—it was something they should have probably considered before passing the law. The result of that is that you have classrooms where there were maybe twenty students and now there's, like, there could be over a hundred students in one classroom, right. So we spoke about the pandemic. When COVID hit a lot of schools were shut down. They were shut down for a long period of time, and when you look at a lot of schools in Africa they don't have the ability of giving out maybe laptops or anything like that to assist students to continue school at home. So in result of that, you see a lot of children who are really below what they should be, below the average when it comes to education, and my question with that is where do we see the future going as far as maybe having international organization(s) or United States intervene because the future is not bright when we look at education with the children or the youth. How can United Nation(s) or maybe other international organization(s) assist, especially with what happened during COVID, going forward? What does the future look like for Africa? And I'm speaking more for the Democratic Republic of Congo. How can nonprofit organization(s) or United States intervene and assist in this matter? GAVIN: Well, thank you for that, and I have followed this a little bit because it was an interesting and kind of splashy promise and initiative on the part of President Tshisekedi and it's been disappointing, I think, to see that some of the, you know, government's budget that was intended to be allocated for that appears to have found its way into a handful of individuals' accounts. But I think that, you know, the fundamental point you're making, which is that in DRC but also throughout the African continent, right, there are these vast populations of young people. It is the youngest region of the world. And if you look at it historically at how other parts of the world have dealt with youth bulges, right, investing in that human capital so that they can be drivers of innovation and economic growth has been a really powerful kind of transformational tool—for example, in Asia. And so I definitely think that you're onto something really important right now about prioritizing investing in young people and their capacity, and you're absolutely right that the disruptions of the pandemic have, in many cases, fallen most heavily on children. You know, how to tackle that, I think, is sort of—you know, I can't design a program in this moment, I'll be honest with you. But I think that you're absolutely right, it's an incredibly important and too often easily overlooked priority. You know, there have been some interesting education innovations on the continent but they're too often kind of small, not scalable, and the need is so incredibly vast. But here, again, I will be a broken record. We do have to go back to this issue that peace and security matters, right. It's very, very hard for kids to get a sustained education that's going to provide them with opportunity in a context of insecurity, which, for a lot of children in eastern Congo, is still the case. FASKIANOS: OK. We have three minutes left. I am going to—and so many questions, and I apologize that we're not going to be able to get to all of you. So I'm going to give the final question to Caleb Sannar. Q: Hi. Yes. Thank you for joining us today, Ambassador Gavin. As they said, my name is Caleb Sanner. I'm a student from the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. My question is with the Abraham Accords the Trump administration signed the agreement with Morocco to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Following that, there was some discrepancies in the southern territory controlled by the U.N., MINURSO, and the Polisario Front, the external Saharawi government, ended up declaring war again on Morocco, resuming the war from nineteen years previously. My question is what is the Biden administration's policy on that? GAVIN: Great question. Reporters have been asking that question, too, and with great message discipline the administration continues to say is that they're supporting U.N. efforts. And so whenever they ask, are you are you going to reconsider this decision regarding recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, they respond not by answering that question but by saying they're supporting U.N. efforts. So that's the most I can report to you in—regarding that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Well, we are at the end of our time. So, Ambassador Gavin, thank you very much for being with us and, again, to all of you for your fantastic questions, and I apologize for not being able to get to all of you. But we will have to continue doing webinars on this important topic and on digging in a little bit deeper. So we will be announcing the winter-spring academic lineup next month through our academic bulletin. This is the final webinar of this semester. Good luck with your finals—(laughs)—and grading and taking the exams and all of that. I know it's a very busy and stressful time with the pandemic layered on top of all of it. If you haven't already subscribed for the bulletin, please, you can do so by emailing us at cfracademic@cfr.org. You can follow us on Twitter at @CFR_Academic. And of course, please go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. You can see on CFR.org Michelle's latest post on Africa—blog posts, so you should follow her there as well. So, again, thank you. Thanks to all of you, and happy holidays, and we look forward to reconvening in 2022.

Joseph Asunka is the CEO of Afrobarometer, starting his term from April 2021. Twitter: @joeasunka Relevant links: Democracy in Africa: Demand, supply, and the ‘dissatisfied democrat' https://afrobarometer.org/publications/pp54-democracy-africa-demand-supply-and-dissatisfied-democrat

A new survey conducted by Afrobarometer has found that some South Africans believe corruption has worsened during President Cyril Ramaphosa's tenure. The Afrobarometer team, which is led by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and Plus 94 Research, interviewed 1600 adult South Africans in May and June this year.

Today's Daily Friend show with Gabriel Crouse, Marius Roodt and Nicholas Lorimer chats about a survey from Afrobarometer showing South Africans are losing faith in our institutions. They also discuss the acquisition of nuclear subs by Australia and the German and Canadian elections. Subscribe on Google Podcasts · Subscribe on Spotify · Subscribe on Apple Podcasts

Meet Zeinab Badawi, Sudanese-born British Television and Radio Journalist. Zeinab has worked extensively in the British media for four decades and is best known for her work at BBC World News TV and on BBC World Service Radio, on programs such as Hard Talk and Global Questions. Zeinab is the current chair of the Royal African Society and a director of the Royal Foundation of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge. She also serves on the advisory boards of the think tanks Afrobarometer and the Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS). Zeinab is a member of the steering committee of the Africa Europe Foundation and a trustee of BBC Media Action. She has produced and presented an acclaimed 20-part TV series on the history of Africa, reporting from over 30 countries across the continent, and speaks to Mungi about how important this project was to her. Listen to this episode to hear how Zeinab got into broadcast journalism and some of the lessons she has learned from the public figures she has interviewed, including the Dalai Lama and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Thank you to our partners at HarperCollins for their support of today's episode! We are all about supporting women on this podcast, and so are the publishers at HarperCollins. They invest in authors who are writing stories about women, for women, and by women. The novel Black Girls Must Die Exhausted is a rare find in the world of women's fiction. The book's story is centered around a successful young Black woman who seems to have it all; a great dating life, a beautiful home, and a great job. However, an unexpected fertility crisis puts the protagonist in a tailspin. If you're looking for a fall read that examines the experiences of race, contemporary womanhood, and modern relationships, pre-order or pick it up at on-sale, pick up a copy wherever books are sold!……..Visit mungingomane.coFollow Mungi on InstagramFollow The Brand is Female on Instagram

Greetings Glocal Citizens! This week we meet our first Cape Verdian guest by way of Angola and New England in the United States. She's Gemima Neves Barlow, the deputy regional director for Southern and East Africa at the National Democratic Institute base in Washington, D.C. In in her 20-year tenure at NDI, Gemima has successfully implemented a wide range of democracy programming across the African continent, especially West and Southern Africa. Starting as Program Officer for Southern and East Africa, she supported electoral integrity and political party strengthening programs in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Over the years, Gemima has expanded her technical expertise on democratic development in Africa, managing NDI's largest country programs in West Africa as a Program Director for the Central West Africa Region (Anglophone). She has also coordinated several large international election observation missions in such countries as Ghana, Nigeria, and Liberia and served in NDI offices in Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Prior to joining NDI, Gemima was a program specialist at the Africa-America Institute (AAI) designing and implementing cross-cultural exchange programs for African activists in the areas of conflict resolution, good governance, citizen engagement and human rights. For NDI and AAI respectively, she also organized and led study missions to South Africa for delegations of Iraqi women leaders and U.S. Fulbright teachers. In our conversation you'll come away with a greater understanding of the grassroots work that is necessary in supporting a strong, functioning democracy and much, much more! Where to find Gemima? www.ndi.org (https://www.ndi.org/) On LinkedIn (https://www.linkedin.com/in/gemima-barlow-5295161/) On Twitter (https://twitter.com/ndiafrica) What's Gemima reading? Black Bottom Saints (https://read.amazon.com/kp/embed?asin=B07Y89JXBZ&preview=newtab&linkCode=kpe&ref_=cm_sw_r_kb_dp_ZQR0PYVBE6G3W4YBHB67&tag=glocalcitiz0e-20) by Alice Randall Just as I Am: A Memoir (https://read.amazon.com/kp/embed?asin=B07Y89JXBZ&preview=newtab&linkCode=kpe&ref_=cm_sw_r_kb_dp_ZQR0PYVBE6G3W4YBHB67&tag=glocalcitiz0e-20) by Cicely Tyson What's Gemima watching on YouTube? Amber Ruffin (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCxej9nPf6TqFyfsiez1_P3w) Karen Brit Chic (https://www.youtube.com/user/WhereDidUGetThatNY) Angela Mashelle (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUWOuDU2xtjQwhkxt1q6Tjg) Cassie Thorpe (https://www.youtube.com/user/casscass2102) Other topics of interest: Africa-America Institute (https://www.aaionline.org/) Afrobarometer (https://afrobarometer.org/) Global Democracy Index (https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/) On Dem Tech (https://www.wired.co.uk/article/government-technology) The Arab Spring began in 2010, more than a decade ago (https://www.aljazeera.com/tag/arab-spring/) About Cape Verde (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cape_Verde) *When you click and purchase books using the links above, as an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases. Thank you for your support! Special Guest: Gemima Neves Barlow.

Some have written off radio as media with a sizeable foot in the future, but the Afrobarometer 2020 survey disputes this, saying that radio is still the most powerful source of information, reaching more people than any other medium on the continent and is likely to remain so. With the 10th anniversary of World Radio Day on February 13, #FreeSpeak host Gwen Lister talks to well-known DJ and producer at 99FM, Che Ulenga, and Levi Ngarune Katire, station manager at Omaheke (community) radio and Chairperson of the Namibia Community Broadcasters Network about their experience in this medium.

. La presidenza algerina punta al silenzio stampa per la nuova Costituzione che allontana il processo democratico. Sondaggio Afrobarometer 2020: Sempre alta, ma in calo la richiesta di partecipazione politica nel Continente africano. L'allarme dell'Ocha: nel Sahel si espande costantemente l'emergenza umanitaria

What can be done when public trust in media is severely eroded and what are the consequences for democracy? It seems this worryingly negative trend across the continent in recent years may currently be in reverse but it's too early to celebrate yet because of very complex African attitudes to freedoms, notably press freedom. This, according to findings of Afrobarometer, a Pan African series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, governance and society. #FreeSpeak host Gwen Lister sits down with researcher Christie Keulder to shed light on these issues. Keulder heads the Survey Warehouse which conducts the Namibia assessment of the Afrobarometer.

Lobby Group Afriforum wants the High Court in Cape Town to stop Parliament from debating the Constitutional Review Committee's report of amending section 25 of the Constitution to make provision for the expropriation of land without compensation. Afriforums wants a judicial review of the whole committee process. But Parliament says it will oppose the court application. Meanwhile, According to a recent survey by Afrobarometer, South African citizens want to prioritize the return of land taken from forced removals since the 1913 Land Act, because, more than a century later, the country is still struggling to redress this historical injustice and the inequality it continues to foster. Elvis Presslin spoke to Afrobarometer spokesperson Sbusiso Nkomo

Sibusiso Nkomo from the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and Afrobarometer spoke to Tsepiso Makwetla about the perceptions of systematic corruption and the corrosion of democratic culture and institutions. Mr Nkomo was speaking to Ms Makwetla at the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, EISA's 12th annual symposium, looking at 'State Capture as an obstacle to Democracy in Africa'.

In Ufahamu Africa's inaugural episode, we commemorate today's presidential inauguration in Ghana. Nana Akufo-Addo becomes Ghana's president after unseating incumbent John Dramani Mahama in the December 7, 2016 election.We chat with Dr. Kojo Asante (a senior research fellow at the Center for Democratic Development) about Ghana's 2016 elections, election observation, Afrobarometer survey data, and even fax machines. We invite you to listen and tell us what you think and what you want to hear in future episodes.  Our conversation with Dr. Kojo Asante starts at 5:53.

As the country is still coming to terms with the contents of former public protector Thuli Madonsela's state of capture report, Afrobarometer has released results of its survey which outlines people's feelings about corruption. The report shows that, though South Africans increasingly support media and citizen oversight over the government, most do not believe that elections are an effective mechanism for holding their leaders accountable. It further revealed that only a slim majority believe that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption, indicating a need for targeted empowerment efforts.