Podcasts about African Continental Free Trade Area

Citizens continue to face visa restrictions and border bureaucracy from fellow African nations. Despite the African Union's push for free movement as part of the African Continental Free Trade Area, progress remains slow. So, what's holding it back? Josey Mahachi speaks to AU consultant Oluwafemi Olamuyiwa, and DW's Isaac Kaledzi in Accra.

This week we are joined on The SAF Podcast by Kwame Bekoe, AfriSAF. With over 20 years of aviation experience spanning engineering, sales, and sustainability, Kwame shares his vision for Africa as a major player in the global SAF industry. He discusses how the continent's vast agricultural residue—estimated at over 150 million tons annually—can be leveraged to produce SAF, fostering energy independence and economic growth.We examine AfriSAF's model of integrating smallholder farmers into a data-driven supply chain, using digital platforms and pilot biodigester projects to prove the value of waste-to-energy conversion. Kwame outlines how AfriSAF is targeting scalable SAF production in countries like Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia and many others. What makes this particularly compelling is how it addresses multiple challenges simultaneously. For African nations struggling with energy security, SAF production offers domestic fuel sources at potentially competitive prices – Kwame suggests Africa could be one of the few places where SAF might achieve cost parity with conventional jet fuel. For rural communities facing limited economic opportunities, these projects create meaningful employment that keeps people connected to their agricultural roots while participating in the green economy. And for a continent with the world's youngest population (averaging just 19 years old) that's projected to reach 2.5 billion people by 2050, developing sustainable industries now creates the foundation for long-term prosperity.The challenges are substantial – from infrastructure limitations to investor risk perception – but the momentum is building. With the African Continental Free Trade Area creating the world's largest open market and continental initiatives promoting easier movement across borders, the conditions for a thriving pan-African SAF industry are emerging. Through strategic partnerships with governments, airlines, and financial institutions, Africa need not just be a consumer of sustainable aviation fuel but could eventually become a significant global producer and exporter.Want to learn more about SAF development in emerging markets? Join us at SAF Investor London on May 28-29th, and you can find out more here: https://www.safinvestor.com/event/145508/saf-investor-london-2025/

Lester Kiewit speaks to political risk analyst Ziyanda Stuurman about the chances that Agoa can survive as US and SA relations sour. The foundations of the trade agreement are already in tatters as U.S President Donald Trump slaps the country with 31percent trade tariffs.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Trade policies are more than economic levers. Today they are instruments of influence, competition and – at times – conflict. We have seen how Trump's recent tariff hikes on Mexico, Canada and China have heightened geopolitical tensions.The global trade system is also undergoing a deeper transformation. Countries are diversifying supply chains and rethinking alliances. Regional trade agreements are gaining momentum. Take the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is vital for strengthening Africa's resilience. This episode takes stock of this changing global trade landscape. What direction is it heading? Are we on the brink of a new era of economic fragmentation, or can innovative trade mechanisms and agreements provide stability?GuestsSara Pantuliano (host), Chief Executive, ODI GlobalPamela Coke-Hamilton, Executive Director, International Trade Centre.Teddy Soobramanien, Chief Executive Officer, COMESA Business CouncilJodie Keane, Senior Research Fellow, ODI GlobalRelated resourcesResponding to Trump's tariffs: the EU needs a new trade weapon to protect its economic security (Insight, ODI Global)Supporting Investment and Trade in Africa (Project, ODI Global)Implementing the Digital Trade Protocol of the African Continental Free Trade Area: expected impacts, early experiences and challenges ahead (Publication, ODI Global)Remaking global trade: how does the UK measure up to the Villars Framework? (Insight, ODI Global)

Lester Kiewit speaks to Carlos Lopes, professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at UCT, and a former executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. They discuss the ways in which the African Union can reform and unite, to play a leading role globally.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Every year, powerful world leaders meet at the World Economic Forum in Davos, trade deals are struck, and international partnerships are born. But does Davos really help Africa's economic prospects, considering the continent's economic polices are rarely in the spotlight? DW talks to Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, the world's largest free trade zone.

President Cyril Ramaphosa averred on Monday that the suggestion that South Africa's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could lead to a deterioration of its relations with the US is unfounded. South Africa brought a case to the International Court of Justice, where it argued that the actions of the Israeli military in Gaza violated international law and included actions that are prohibited under the Genocide Convention, to which South Africa, Israel and many other countries are signatories. Ramaphosa wrote in his weekly letter to the nation that South Africa's application to the court was consistent not only with its obligations as a signatory to the Genocide Convention, but also the call it had always made for an inclusive negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This as US lawmakers are discussing a Bill to review the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the US amid geopolitical differences. However, Ramaphosa said South Africa's relationship with the US was characterised by "mutual respect" and a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue even on issues where countries may differ. "Even on contentious issues - such as the docking of a Russian ship in Simonstown in late 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the current conflict in Gaza - the South African and US governments have been able to share views in a frank and open manner," he said. Ramaphosa highlighted that South Africa had strong economic, political and social ties with the US. "We remember the support from the American people during our struggle for democracy. Over the last 30 years, we have had, and continue to have, a supportive, mutually beneficial and cooperative relationship between our two countries," he said. He explained that South Africa and the US have firm and expanding trade and investment ties, adding that South Africa was home to more than 600 US companies and the US was the second largest destination for South African exports. Some of the country's large companies, such as Sasol, had made significant investments in key economic sectors in the US, Ramaphosa pointed out. An important part of the economic ties between South Africa and the US is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), which grants qualifying African countries duty-free access to the US market for their exports. Ramaphosa noted that the recent Agoa Forum, held in South Africa in November last year, confirmed the value of Agoa to Africa's industrialisation and integration and to the diversification of its economies. He highlighted that the trade and investment ties that had been developed through Agoa, provide a platform for US investors to participate in the opportunities presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area. "We also welcome US participation in the Just Energy Transition Partnership alongside a growing number of other countries. South Africa has great opportunities for investment in the green economy and for the supply of critical minerals for the global energy transition," he said. Ramaphosa explained that there was great potential to further develop South Africa's relationship with the US and to find ways to work together for a more peaceful, stable and just world". He said South Africa will continue to seek firm and friendly relations with other countries "in pursuit of a better world". Meanwhile, he highlighted that South Africa has consistently called for the application of international law, condemning the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians on 7 October last year and calling for the release of hostages. He said South Africa will continue to call for an immediate ceasefire, the urgent provision of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza and meaningful negotiations towards a lasting solution.

Wayne McCurrie from FNB Wealth & Investments talks US inflation as it disappoints again. Ashburton Investments's Tlhoni Komako talks fixed income as its beating inflation by +4%. A look at the pros and cons. Absa CIB's Bohani Hlungwane on why the roll out of the African Continental Free Trade Area is urgent.

This audio is brought to you by Endress and Hauser, a leading supplier of products, solutions and services for industrial process measurement and automation. Energy Council CEO James Mackay has welcomed the decision of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy to extend the comment period for the draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2023 by a month and has also called on President Cyril Ramaphosa to use his State of the Nation Address (SoNA) to emphasise government's commitment to "open and robust debate on national energy policy". Mineral Resources and Energy Minister Gwede Mantashe used his Mining Indaba address on February 6 to announce that the IRP comment period had been extended to March 23 from February 23 to "allow maximum participation in this process". However, he refrained from initiating public hearings, which some commentators have called for given serious concerns over the assumptions and modelling used to produce the draft document. In a statement issued ahead of the SoNA, which is scheduled for February 8, Mackay stressed that national energy policy had multiple and significant impacts on all South Africans and should, thus, be fully debated and be accessible to all, including labour and communities. "Our reality is that business confidence is near historic low levels resulting in continued reluctance to make the much-needed capital investment required to grow our economy and create jobs. "It is well accepted that the majority of future energy investment will come from the private sector, so building a national energy vision that has the buy-in of the public and private sector is critical." Mackay argued that it was also important for the President to use the SoNA to acknowledge the important role of the private sector, primarily through its efforts within the National Energy Crisis Committee, to tackle the loadshedding crisis and lay the foundations for energy security and a modernised electricity supply industry. "A strong message in this regard is critical to building investor confidence that is needed to unlock economic growth and job creation." Mackay expressed optimism that the historic downward trend of Eskom's plant availability was being stabilised. But he said that there was still a need to underline accountability at Eskom ahead of Dan Marokane starting work as CEO on March 1 and following the appointment of the new National Transmission Company South Africa (NTCSA) board, ahead of its operationalisation. He added that the most important reform message in the SoNA should be the urgency of passing the Electricity Regulation Amendment Bill (ERA), which was currently before the National Assembly. "This will help lay the foundation for the long-awaited sector modernisation, including the unbundling of Eskom and the introduction of our first energy market. "A clear message on ERA will significantly improve confidence in energy policy, including the critical need for grid expansion under the new NTCSA. "This, in turn, will enable a shift in efforts to focus on efficient regulations and implementation capacity." The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition welcomed AMSA decision to defer the closure of its long-products business, noting that the move followed extensive discussions with the company since December. "Government has engaged the leadership of the firm as well as its customers and suppliers do identify concrete measures that can assist to support primary steel manufacturing in South Africa," the department said in a statement, adding that the deferral offered immediate relief to more than 1 500 workers at the Newcastle Works and its downstream customers. "The expected improvement in infrastructure spending, coupled with turnaround plans on transport logistics and commencement of trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area, will all play a positive role in strengthening both demand and supply side challenges in line with the objectives of the Steel Masterplan."

This audio is brought to you by Endress and Hauser, a leading supplier of products, solutions and services for industrial process measurement and automation. Energy Council CEO James Mackay has welcomed the decision of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy to extend the comment period for the draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2023 by a month and has also called on President Cyril Ramaphosa to use his State of the Nation Address (SoNA) to emphasise government's commitment to "open and robust debate on national energy policy". Mineral Resources and Energy Minister Gwede Mantashe used his Mining Indaba address on February 6 to announce that the IRP comment period had been extended to March 23 from February 23 to "allow maximum participation in this process". However, he refrained from initiating public hearings, which some commentators have called for given serious concerns over the assumptions and modelling used to produce the draft document. In a statement issued ahead of the SoNA, which is scheduled for February 8, Mackay stressed that national energy policy had multiple and significant impacts on all South Africans and should, thus, be fully debated and be accessible to all, including labour and communities. "Our reality is that business confidence is near historic low levels resulting in continued reluctance to make the much-needed capital investment required to grow our economy and create jobs. "It is well accepted that the majority of future energy investment will come from the private sector, so building a national energy vision that has the buy-in of the public and private sector is critical." Mackay argued that it was also important for the President to use the SoNA to acknowledge the important role of the private sector, primarily through its efforts within the National Energy Crisis Committee, to tackle the loadshedding crisis and lay the foundations for energy security and a modernised electricity supply industry. "A strong message in this regard is critical to building investor confidence that is needed to unlock economic growth and job creation." Mackay expressed optimism that the historic downward trend of Eskom's plant availability was being stabilised. But he said that there was still a need to underline accountability at Eskom ahead of Dan Marokane starting work as CEO on March 1 and following the appointment of the new National Transmission Company South Africa (NTCSA) board, ahead of its operationalisation. He added that the most important reform message in the SoNA should be the urgency of passing the Electricity Regulation Amendment Bill (ERA), which was currently before the National Assembly. "This will help lay the foundation for the long-awaited sector modernisation, including the unbundling of Eskom and the introduction of our first energy market. "A clear message on ERA will significantly improve confidence in energy policy, including the critical need for grid expansion under the new NTCSA. "This, in turn, will enable a shift in efforts to focus on efficient regulations and implementation capacity." The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition welcomed AMSA decision to defer the closure of its long-products business, noting that the move followed extensive discussions with the company since December. "Government has engaged the leadership of the firm as well as its customers and suppliers do identify concrete measures that can assist to support primary steel manufacturing in South Africa," the department said in a statement, adding that the deferral offered immediate relief to more than 1 500 workers at the Newcastle Works and its downstream customers. "The expected improvement in infrastructure spending, coupled with turnaround plans on transport logistics and commencement of trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area, will all play a positive role in strengthening both demand and supply side challenges in line with the objectives of the Steel Masterplan."

While the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area will provide advantages for South African companies, the efficiency and competitiveness of the country's logistics architecture needs to improve, which President Cyril Ramaphosa has assured will happen. In his weekly letter to the nation, the President acknowledged that the State-owned Transnet's ports and rail lines have been in operational decline, also adding extreme pressure to the country's roads, however, he said by working together, the private sector and government are seeing positive results, steered by Transnet's Freight Logistics Roadmap. "The roadmap outlines a clear set of actions to stabilise and improve Transnet's performance in the short term and to fundamentally reform the logistics system in the long term. To ensure this work receives dedicated attention, we established the National Logistics Crisis Committee, which is chaired by the Presidency and brings together all of the relevant government departments to drive a coordinated response to the logistics challenges. We have also established Corridor Recovery Teams which bring Transnet, the private sector and independent experts together to improve the performance of strategic rail and port corridors," he said. In highlighting port improvements, Ramaphosa noted that port congestion in Durban had reduced significantly from over 60 ships waiting to berth in mid-November to 12 by the end of January. The Port of Cape Town has received seven new cranes for stacking and vessel turnaround times will be improved through increased work shifts. The Freight Logistics Roadmap, meanwhile, hoped to improve logistics and allow for infrastructure investment with the help of the private sector and competition between rail and port, whilst ensuring that infrastructure was State-owned, Ramaphosa asserted. "A key milestone in this reform journey will be the implementation of 'open access' to the freight rail network, which will allow private rail operators to invest alongside Transnet Freight Rail for the first time. Another key step is the introduction of strategic partnerships in container terminals, which will enable new investment to expand port capacity and upgrade equipment. Progress has already been made with the appointment by Transnet of an international container terminal operator for the Durban Pier 2 terminal," he explained. Assurances that no jobs will be lost, while Transnet owns 51% of the terminal remain at the forefront of the partnership. Terminal management will fall to the private partner and it will contribute capital and expertise. "The process of reform takes time and there are no quick solutions to the challenges facing Transnet. However, the steps we are taking now will not only improve performance in the immediate term, but will also create a truly competitive and efficient system into the future," Ramaphosa stated.

President Cyril Ramaphosa said on Wednesday that the start of preferential trade will create great opportunities for growth and development for South Africa and many other African countries. Speaking at the launch of preferential trade under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in Durban, Ramaphosa noted that the modalities for trade in goods has moved faster than for services. Therefore, he said, there is a need for more effort in building African champions in finance, retail and telecommunications, and in expanding tourism between African countries. "That is the only way in which our economies will grow faster and sustainably," said Ramaphosa. AfCFTA was initially set to launch in 2020 and was delayed for various reasons including Covid lockdowns. Initially the agreement only applies to physical goods, including manufactured goods - such as farming equipment and processed foods - but is expected to expand to the services economy, tourism, e-commerce and logistics. Preferential trade will not only benefit the country's producers, but it will also see a huge increase in traffic through the ports, airports and land-based border posts, the President noted. African trade ministers have been finalising rules of origin of what constitutes an African product. So far, 92% of the products that nations trade with each other have been finalised. "The products made in Gauteng, Limpopo, North West, Free State, Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape will flow through these ports to markets beyond our borders. That is why, as the South African government, we are focused on implementing our Freight Logistics Roadmap to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the country's rail lines and ports," Ramaphosa said. Amid concern for Transnet's dismal operations, he highlighted that government is working closely with industry to fix State rail and port operations in the immediate term and to ensure greater investment in this infrastructure into the future. He said the levels of intra-African trade have been growing in recent years, but remain small by global standards. Intra-Africa exports are reported to stand at around 16% of Africa's total exports, compared with 55% in Asia, 49% in North America and 63% in the European Union. Ramaphosa noted that as the world moves towards green industrialisation, Africa is well positioned to use South Africa's critical minerals to leverage industrialisation on the continent. The opportunities are vast in food and beverages, in cars and trucks, in clothing and textiles, he said. He added that South Africa has the capacity to produce more of its own pharmaceutical products and medical equipment. Investment can flow to the production of chemicals, machinery and equipment, household goods and many, many more he explained. He highlighted that the continental market can help the country promote agricultural development and food security. "I thank the AfCFTA Council of Ministers and Minister Ebrahim Patel and his team, for their hard work negotiating the AfCFTA Agreement and its Protocols. This has made it possible for us to witness the start of preferential trading. Last but not least, I wish to express my appreciation to the exporters who have embraced this opportunity and have worked with us to be part of the first shipment of products under the African Continental Free Trade Area. From this quayside, and from ports, airports and border posts across the continent, a new era of growth and prosperity is being born. A great future awaits our continent and its people," Ramaphosa stated. Patel noted that African countries are mainly trading with the outside world through selling rocks and oil or raw materials and importing finished goods and capital goods. "This has left us poor, it has left us vulnerable and left us dependent. Today represents the moment when we pivot away from that model to trading with neighbours, trading with food, manufactured products with services and digital products. It is a...

The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement is hailed as the biggest free trade accord in the world. As trade agreements start taking shape on the continent, Michael Muhangi, Head of Trans-Regional Clients, Africa Regions for Business and Commercial Banking at Standard Bank Group joined Business Day TV to explore the opportunities linked to continental integration and how financial institutions need to position themselves to fund intra-Africa trade.

Landry Signé, senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at the Brookings Institution and executive director and professor of the Thunderbird School of Global Management at Arizona State University, leads the conversation about Africa on the global stage. FASKIANOS: Thank you and welcome to today's session of the Fall 2023 CFR Academic Webinar series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. And, as always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Landry Signé with us to discuss Africa on the global stage. Dr. Signé is a senior fellow in the global economy and development program and the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings Institution. He's also a professor, executive director, and the founding codirector of The Globalization 4.0 and Fourth Industrial Revolution Initiative at Arizona State University's Thunderbird School of Global Management, and distinguished fellow at Stanford University's Center for African Studies. He serves as chairman of the Global Network for Africa's Prosperity and is also the author of numerous scholarly publications and several books. His most recent is entitled, Africa's Fourth Industrial Revolution. And it was published by Cambridge University Press this summer. So, Dr. Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. I'm going to throw you a very big question, and you can take us in the direction you would like, by talking about the important challenges and opportunities facing countries across Africa. SIGNÉ: Hello, everyone. And thank you so much, Dr. Irina, for so kind an introduction. It's a pleasure to be with all of you today. So when it comes to Africa, I want to highlight a few key trends why Africa is playing such an important role in the global sphere. So the first thing that I want to share to everyone is Africa's transformation is more substantial than what most people will think. And this is for many reasons. One is that, especially pre-pandemic, trade and in and with the rest of the world have grown for about 300 percent, which exceeds the global average of a little bit less than 200 percent. So that is a key dimension to highlight. And this is also driven by the competition between emerging countries, such as, of course, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, China, and more established and industrialized nations such as the United States, France, and others. So that is one of the key trends that I want to highlight. So Africa is richer and is transforming much more than what most people will be thinking. So the second trend that I also want to highlight, why Africa is so important in the global sphere, is that by the end of this century Africa could reach about 40 percent of the global population. Listen, I said 40 percent. So this is incredible, especially as the continent represent now only about 17 percent of the global population. So that is a key dimension to take into consideration when speaking about Africa, how Africa engages with the rest of the world. A third trend that I also want to highlight is really the rise of global partnerships and the competition, as I highlighted, between emerging and established powers. So, as a matter of fact, between 2006 and 2016, for example, China trades with Africa surge with imports increasing by 233 percent, and exports increasing by about 53 percent. This is a substantial growth in engagement. And if we compare—so with Russia, for example, it was about 142 percent of change in imports from Africa and about 168 percent change in exports with Africa. So in comparison, and with the rest of the world was only about 56 percent for change in imports and 18 percent for change in export. So this is another key trend. And a country like the United States still needs to expand and to do much more in terms of those engagement. This also apply with—to the countries in the European Union in general. So another trend that I want to highlight is really the, let's say, fast urbanization that we see on the continent. So the continent will be growing from about five cities—will reach about five cities of more than ten million inhabitants, in comparison of only three in 2015. And will exceed fifteen cities of more than five million inhabitants, in comparison of about five to six in the recent year. So another point, when people speak about Africa, I want to speak about industrialization in Africa. Of course, we have to acknowledge the diversity of the continent. Some would say fifty-four member states, because we have about—those other ones recognized by the United Nations. But don't be surprised if you also hear people mentioning instead fifty-five countries, because the Western Sahara is also consider as a member of the African Union. So when speaking about industrialization, people may—some people may consider Africa as deindustrializing. But that is because they're not looking at one of the things that we call at the Brookings Institution industries without smokestacks. Those industries are important because they have similar characteristic when they compare to traditional manufacturing. And those similar characteristics include, for example, the tradability, they are labor intensive, and the store—they absorb a high quantity of moderately skilled workers. But they are also—they also have a high level of productivity. Irina, you mentioned my book on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. I want to connect, because when people speak about digitalization, innovation, they will mostly think about the Silicon Valley. They will think about some of the emerging nations—Israel, India—in addition to the U.S., of course. A key dimension to highlight is that in the 1990s New York City had more mobile phone subscribers than the entire continent of Africa, where now the continent has hundreds of millions of mobile phone subscribers. So in addition, we have disruptive innovations such as mobile banking, with M-PESA, for example, which is a digital application allow—which allow to provide banking services, digital banking services, to African citizens. This is another illustration of the important dynamics with Africa. Let me finish with about two or three additional points, and I'm looking very much forward to the conversation. I will highlight the critical importance of regional integration. We have, for example, the African Continental Free Trade Area, which was adopted in 2018, ratified by a sufficient number of country in 2019, and was officially launched in January 2021. And that is an incredible speed from the signing to the coming into force of the second-largest trade organization in the world, or let's say trade area in the world, after the World Trade Organization, of course, in terms of number of countries. So this is a key dimension. And another trend to highlight, despite some of the challenges that we see in many African countries in terms of democratic retreat. The overall trend is that African citizens want democracy. So they want accountability. But they also want democracy to deliver. And let me finish with a trend related to business. The combined consumer and business spending in Africa will reach or exceed $16 trillion U.S. dollars by 2050, and about $6.7 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. So Africa really is a place with phenomenal opportunities, despite the challenges that we see. Climate change affects Africa more than other regions, for example. Some of the most vulnerable countries in terms of state fragility. We have, as I also mentioned, some democratic recession. But despite those challenges, the continent is really growing and is really transforming at a very important pace. And I enthusiastically look forward to engaging, to answering your many questions. Thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. That was a great overview. Obviously, this is such a big topic. So now we're going to go to all of you for your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Alright, so the first question we're going to take is from Pearl Robinson. Pearl over to you. Q: Hello. Very pleased to meet you. I have a question, something I'm going to ask you to do. I'm at Tufts University. FASKIANOS: Thanks, Pearl. Q: Can you use this wonderful, optimistic introduction, and connect it with a discussion of the wave of coups in the West African Sahel? Because I find myself having to talk about both. And I thought that you began with the last decade's narrative of Africa's growth and opportunities. And today, everybody is talking about democratic decline and all of these coups in the context of everything. So I'd like you to put your talk onto an introduction for me to talk about the coup situation. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you so much for the question. So I have studied the—also the democratic situation in Africa from the—from the independence to the last decade. And one of the reasons, of course, when you have democratic interruption, there are serious reasons to be concerned. And this is mostly related to the ability of democratic governance to deliver. Typically when democracy is promoted with many of the Africans, one of the key argument which was chose is that democracy allows citizens to have a better standard of living, deliver economic outcomes, education, health, security, good governance, less corruption, among others. And many of the countries which have faced a coup are countries—when you think about Mali, we think about Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, among others—there are countries where citizen are facing serious economic—a serious economic situation, deteriorated by the pandemic, of course. They are not the only country but deteriorated by the pandemic. You also have a question—the security question in the Sahel especially, with violent extremism. But I want to put things in perspective because democratic development is a slow-moving process. And although it is very unfortunate some of the development that you are seeing in terms of coups, when you look at Africa in the long-term perspective, when I was looking, for example, in the 1980s, almost the entire continent was red. Red, meaning authoritarian. But now the majority of African countries have elections. More than half of those country have free, fair, and transparent, meaningful elections. They are able to choose their government. And this so I'd just highlight those point, to say I classify those countries—I had them in four categories. So one was the uninterrupted democracy. So the countries which once they become democracies, they remain uninterrupted democratic. And those countries are outperforming overall, economically speaking and with many of the other benefits of democracy that I've mentioned. But the countries which are interrupted are mostly the countries where democracy is not necessarily delivering wealth. But will that change the broader trend on the continent? I don't think so. So I think, yes, we have to acknowledge those challenges. We have to act vigorously to address them to reduce the negative impact. But those are not necessarily—I don't think that that makes Africa a hopeless continent, as depicted by the Economist in the early 2000s, as discussed before. I'll pause there. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take a written question from Tanisha Fazal's student Jack Drouin, and they're at the University of Minnesota: Will Africa as a whole ever compete at the same level as the United States and China in international trade and production? SIGNÉ: So the idea behind the African continental trade area is to make Africa stronger internationally when dealing with the rest of the world, while unlocking also the potential of trade within Africa. For example, when African countries trade with one another, more than 40 percent of products exported are manufactured products. Which mean that they create jobs and opportunities for young people, for women, for the economy. They accelerate industrialization. And when African countries trade with the rest of the world, about only 17 percent of those countries—of those—of the products exported are manufactured products. So the idea really behind the African Continental Free Trade Area is not just to grow African trade with—and improve countries' trading with one another. But it is also really to make Africa stronger when engaging with other countries. As a matter of fact, Africa still represents less than 3 percent of global exports. So this the reason why when I engage with some leaders, some are wondering if whether the AfCFTA was really needed. There is no doubt that the African Continental Free Trade Area was needed, because partnering and coming together to engage with them makes the continent stronger. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I've never seen so many questions. So I'm going to go next to Fordham IPED. They have their raised hand. It's the International Political Economy and Development Program at Fordham. Q: Hi. My name is Julisha. I'm a student here at Fordham in the IPED Program. And thank you for your presentation, Landry, if I may call you that—I'm sorry, Professor. My question is—and I come from the continent. My question to you is, you seem very optimistic about Africa, as we call it. But why exactly? What gives you this optimism, given the fact that different countries have varying problems, and also we've got different levels of infrastructure and productive capacities? And then also, we haven't had that much success in relation to the regional FTAs. So why optimistic specifically about this one? Should we focus more on maybe building stronger regional bodies and then come together as one consortium? SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for your question. I don't think that it is either/or. And you have to put in perspective also, again, when—I like to look at things from a historical perspective, putting things in context. And when we put things in context—again, I mentioned, for example, before, in less than a couple of decades Africa went from being a continent almost full of authoritarianism, to a continent where in perhaps the past six, seven years you have had an incredibly important number of countries which where the incumbent lost the election or was changed through an electoral process. So those are important gains not to overlook. When we also speak about poverty, for example, so we are also seeing positive—although, and I published an article at Brookings about it—why, despite the fast economic growth just before the pandemic, the continent had an important number of poverty. The key dimension here was poverty in terms of percentage of the population went down, but the continent is also growing at a fast rate, the population of the continent. So which means that even if you're in relative number you have a reduction of poverty, in absolute number we can still have an important number of poor. But if you also put that further in context, by removing—of course, you could not remove them—but by considering Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, which are countries with the highest concentration—not the highest, but an important number of poor, the picture related to poverty on the continent will be very different. Another reason of my lucid optimism is that Africa—more than 50 percent of the African—close to 60 percent of the African population is below the age of twenty-five. So what this means, that everything is possible in an incredibly short duration. You probably know what we have named the Cheetah—what George Ayittey has named the Cheetah Generation. So the generation of young Africans who are dynamic, they are innovative, in opposition to the elephant who are moving slowly. So this is also another characteristic. When you look at innovation and you look at entrepreneurship, the general entrepreneurship survey globally, when you compare Africa to the rest of the world, the percentage of optimism, of interest in innovation, in entrepreneurship, of willingness and of respect for the field is also higher in general. So, again, I understand why most people will be focusing on challenges versus opportunity. But you also know, like me, that when in 2000 the Economist wrote that article about a hopeless Africa, in 2011 they wrote another issue about Africa rising, apologizing about their previous assessment. Because six to seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies in the first decade—the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century, were located in Africa. So yes, we have numerous challenges. But most countries, which were at the level of development of many of the African countries, have also had challenges. So. yes, we have to address those challenges. And that is also part of what my work does with the Brookings Institution—identifying how to bridge the gap between the policy intentions and the implementation outcome. And a part of doing that is also to shift the mindset from looking exclusively at the challenges that Africa is facing, to also think about what are the opportunities? How can we identify those opportunities? How can we transform those opportunities into reality, into positive outcomes? Because the young generation in Africa deserve it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Dayanara Miranda, who's an undergraduate student at Lewis University: My question is, besides agricultural and mineral resources, what other markets can African countries enter to grow their economies? SIGNÉ: So, that is another extremely important question. And let me say, overall Africa—so, it depends as to whether we are speaking about the consumer spending, household consumptions, or whether we are speaking about business spending. In terms of household consumption, by 2030 the continent will receive about $2.5 trillion U.S. dollars of household consumption or consumer spending. And some of the largest sector include food and beverage because people need to eat, but also include housing, healthcare, financial services, transportation, and education. So to put things in perspective, African countries will be growing faster in some of those sectors compared to the growth of other developing economies. Now, if I also think now about the business-to-business spending, so the continent will be home of about—of more than $4 trillion U.S. dollars by 2030. Of course, the largest area for that spending will include agriculture and agri-processing. But we will also have manufacturing, construction, utilities, transportation, wholesalers, and retailers in terms of resources. So, yes, a place—Africa is an important business destination for people who are, again, open to identify opportunities and to manage the risk. Of course, have risk, but those risks also exist in Latin America, exist in the Middle East. exist in the broader—in the broader Asia, and also in the—in some of the advanced economies. So, again, I think, like, a change of mindset is important. One of the reasons why China become the first trade partner of Africa, the first investor in infrastructure amount order, is because while other countries were looking at the challenges that Africa is facing, China and other emerging countries were looking at opportunity and how to manage their risk amount order. Of course, that is not to say that the Chinese model of engagement is necessarily the right one, but it's just to say that the difference of mindset may explain why some country may be identifying more opportunities than other. But I'm also very happy to highlight the fact that recently, the U.S. administration has also been very much active—much more active in terms of engaging with Africa from an economic perspective, from an opportunity business perspective, including the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Dorian Brown Crosby. Q: Yes. Hello. Thank you, Professor Signé, for this discussion. I'm from Spelman College. And I do have a question regarding remittances. Can you speak to the current impact of remittances that those in the diaspora are sending to African countries? And how is that affecting Africa's economic trajectory? Or even speak to a specific country. Thank you. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you very much for the questions. Remittances are playing a key role in Africa. In some of the countries they are exceeding even, let's say, the official development assistance. So that is a key point to highlight. Perhaps the nuance that I want to bring is that most of the remittances are sent for consumption, for family consumptions, among others. A shift that we may want to see happen is to turn—(inaudible)—to increase perhaps those remittances, and especially the category of remittances, shifting only from consumption, for productive use, for economic use, for entrepreneurial activities, as well on the continent. But, yes, remittances are key for development. They are extremely important. They are making a difference. And I connect with that question with the notion of diaspora. The rising role of the diaspora is also one of the key trends. Of course, I didn't—I wanted to be brief in my preliminary comments, but diaspora are really playing a key role in fostering the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. They play the role of investor. You have also the remittances, as you have just mentioned. They are diplomat. In addition of the higher representation that we are also seeing of people of African origin in international organizations, whether we speak about the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Finance Corporation, among other. So there's really a trend where the diaspora playing a key role, both financially to remittances and have an increased demand, also for investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to combine two questions, two written questions, because they are along the same lines. One from Thomas at Oklahoma State University and Kihoa from Adelphi University, and it has to do with China: China's trade with—China's aid to Africa, is it purely altruistic? Should African states be receiving Chinese aid? And should Africa be giving aid to historically authoritarian regimes? And then the second question is to have you talk a little bit about the Belt and Road Initiative, and how that initiative is influencing trading partners with other Western countries. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Thank you for the important question. So let me—to further speak about China in Africa, some key trends to highlight is that, first, you have an exponential growth of exports to Africa, increase imports from Africa, substantial lending to African countries. So China is already one of those, the major lending on transport, power, and mining, the Ex-Im Bank is really leading the way in terms of loans. I do prefer to speak about development versus assistance, development finance instead of developing assistance, or on the longer term, a growing trend in terms of FDI. So China is dominating also the important investment on the continent. You have an important presence of Chinese workers, and forgot—not to forget the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which remains critical to an action of the multiplication of the of the Confucius Institutes on the continent. Despite that important presence, a key element you mentioned is that per Afrobarometer survey, African citizen still prefer the U.S. model of development to the Chinese one. So this is an important dimension that I want to highlight. And whether China is altruistic, it's important to mention when we speak about the commitment, they are not necessarily—China is a country with its own national interests. Perhaps the way of doing business is different, but they are not acting toward Africa, from my perspective, from an altruistic perspective. They're really looking to achieve interest, whether from a geopolitical dimension, economic interest to secure especially energy, power, mining, oceans, agricultural lands for food security in China, among others. And many of the other countries in the world are doing the same. So I'm not—so, of course, we are speaking more about China, but most of the countries when they're acting globally they are acting in alignment of their interests. And probably Jentleson, for example, has mentioned when we speak about the U.S. foreign policy as some of their drivers, which include what are the—of course, we have power, we have peace, we have prosperity, and we have principles. So foreign policy decisions are usually, let's say, the result of a tradeoff between either power consideration, peace consideration, or security consideration, economic consideration, and principle consideration, which could include democratic development, and, of course, humanitarian intervention, and so on. So it depends on which country we are talking about. And to just connect it to the broader Belt and Road Initiative, I think that, of course, it is part from my perspective of China ambition to become the next global power. And in my conversation with many of the African leaders, their main concern—including head of states and head of governments—so their main concern is given the gap, the infrastructure gap that we have on the content, financing gap that you have on the continent, China is providing an alternative and China is acting quickly. However, many of the leaders with whom I'm engaging will prefer to deal instead with, for example, the United States. The United States is probably acting slower than some of the other players. But this is also because of the democratic process and the compliance mechanism, among others. But despite that, I think that there are still tools which can allow to be compliant, to respect the democratic principle, but also act faster, with more agility. And we are having conversations. I testified before the Senate on some of those questions, before the House of Representatives, before the U.S. International Trade Commission, sharing perspective on how the U.S. can further leverage its strength and the alignment to advance U.S.-Africa prosperity. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next oral question from John O'Toole. Q: Well, thank you, because my question directly kind of follows off of that. So that's very fortunate. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Q: So my question was related to, like, Africa on, like, the global security scale. So, like you said, like, Russia and China are investing heavily, are—and becoming, like, major players, some might argue, in an attempt to be, like, first to market, in a way, in terms of being, like, colleagues with Africa. And you can't really pick and choose who your partners are, especially if the people you want to work with, like the United States or the EU, aren't moving as fast. But is there a concern that growing relationships with China and Russia could morph into a global security conflict? And that some African leaders might be afraid of becoming perhaps the next Lumumba where they're characterized as, you know, perhaps a communist pawn, or something? Is that part of the thought process? SIGNÉ: Thank you for the important question. So it's important to highlight a few considerations here. Typically, when many of the more established powers, whether you're speaking about France, the United States, UK, when they are engaging with many of the African countries they take into consideration the principles that I mentioned before, whether we speak about democratic principles, human rights consideration, humanitarian consideration, among other. So those are really key dimensions that are taken into consideration with more traditional African partners, although it is not uniform. So you will also have the same country which will be trading both with some of the authoritarian countries. But when doing so, they will often bring the question of democratic governance, of human rights in the conversation. And the difference there with countries such as China or Russia, is they are decoupling trade, investment, and principle quotient of democracy—democratic quotients, human rights quotients. For obvious reason, when you look also at your level of democratic development, or at the situation of human rights in your—in your countries. So now, what are the potential risk for the continent? I think that the—many of the—we have seen the presence, whether in an official capacity or in an unofficial capacity of foreign forces in Africa, including from Russia. So to what extent are they influencing the political sphere? To what extent are they fueling or contributing to fuel some of the insecurity and conflict that we have, as we say, in the Sahel? Or to what extent are they helping those country to address some of the challenges faced? I think the growing support that we have seen for Russia, or China, or for some of the emerging countries is related to a narrative, which may not always be founded, but a more appeasing and more respectful narrative that they have when engaging with some of the African countries. But that doesn't mean that they are acting in a way which better advance the interests of those countries. And African leaders are often in a complex situation where they don't necessarily—some of them, of course, will be very clear in terms of their preferences for Western countries. And others, in between, where they want to be certain that they will not be dropped, if I can use the terms. And this is because historically, even some of the best partners of the West—and we look at the case of Niger, when the military coup happened, so despite some political discourses the West was not able to do much. So those are elements which create also a certain level of insecurity on the continent. So yeah, your question is extremely important. And I think that there are risks which are associated with the—with the growing involvement of those emerging powers, like China, especially as it is shifting or has shifted from the economic quotient to a more security, military quotient and cooperation. But some of the countries with which they are cooperating, or perhaps even most of those countries in terms of military engagement, are not necessarily countries with their reputation or leaders with the reputation of—or with the best record in terms of democratic progress or in terms of human rights. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Zachary Billot, a student at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas: How will increased environmental challenges related to climate change impact institution and governmental efficacy in Africa? Can Africa be expected to transition to green energy if there isn't substantial foreign investment? SIGNÉ: Absolutely. It is extremely important. Thank you for the question. It's extremely important to highlight the consequences of climate change on the continent, especially in the fragile countries, in the fragile regions, especially also when combined with governance challenges. So many of the conflicts in the Sahel—and I publish a—I co-published a report with Brookings on the question on how—on the nexus—on the climate change-security-development nexus. So many—if climate change doesn't necessarily—the relation between climate change and conflict is not necessarily causal, but there is a strong correlation at least when it comes to exacerbating initial conditions in regions where you have poverty and where governance is already quite weak. So the question is, yes, climate change is increasing the likelihood of conflict, especially in an area where we already have bad governance, or poor performance. And how to address some of those questions? Of course, we have involved also in drafting the human development—the Sahel Human Development Report, where the topic is on using energy to unlock Africa potential to contribute to sustainable development, how we can leverage in a sustainable way. And, yes, I do believe that the continent has a path. So of course, I will not necessarily disclose the findings, because they will have to be officially launched by the United Nations Development Program later this year, early the next one. But there is a clear path for Africa to achieve a greener future, especially as the continent has, I would say, the luxury of learning from what has been done on the negative experiences of some of the advanced economies. But also on capitalizing on technology to achieve those goals. Now, you mentioned about investment. Yes, that is an area where global partners who have committed, including the United States, France, Canada, among others, to support a greener revolution, economic revolution, energy transition, industrial development on the continent also have to play their part. Of course the global community, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, among others. So Africa has the potential to achieve it, but not alone. With the collaboration of global partners, including some of the biggest polluters. FASKIANOS: Great, thank you. I'm going to go next to Alicia Hoffman. Q: Hello. How are you? I have a question regarding some previous legal agreements that were put forth between the ACP countries and the European Union. So my question is, I would like for you to highlight and discuss the role of the comprehensive legal agreements such as the Rome Agreement, that is now defunct, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement and now the post-Cotonou Agreement, which was just finalized last month, and get some of your opinions or your thoughts about the post-Cotonou Agreement in fostering the economic development of African countries. And also mitigating the issues dealing with migration and even human trafficking that kind of were not really addressed clearly in those earlier agreements, such as the Rome, and Lomé, and the Cotonou. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much for the extremely important question. So I think that to put things in context, as you mentioned, the Lomé Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement, and other agreement, when we look—again, I like to look from an historical perspective. So we clearly see that if a single agreement was almost having the impact of a magic stick, Africa will be in a different position now. So all those agreements, of course, and some of those agreements are benefiting, at least per the perspective of some of the African countries, they are benefiting more the European Union countries and France than perhaps, per se, in the absolute term, the African countries. Because many of the key players in those countries in industrial development, among others, are foreign corporations, which are originating from those countries. But let me instead speak in a in a broader perspective. I think that the responsibility for Africa's development really lie primarily with African leaders and citizens. So it's a notion that I think we should really come back to. Of course, when we discuss then the relation within Africa and the rest of the world, Africa has been historically in a situation where it was abused—from slavery, to colonization, and so on. But as you have seen in in my permanent record, I'm also part—most of my work consists not only at looking at those structural asymmetries that we can see on the continent, but at giving back the responsibility, accountability of the African leaders, despite the asymmetrical relation they may be having with some of the other part of the world, still have the power and the responsibility to better deliver for their citizens. So, yes, I think that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as I mentioned, also represents an opportunity to address some of those challenges. But, of course, some countries will—we also have the political economy of the AfCFTA, in the sense that some country—and the ones which are the most advanced, economically speaking—the most enthusiastic about accelerating the implementation. But the beauty of the AfCFTA is that they also acknowledge some of the country we may potentially be left behind and have specific growth or special and differential treatments allowing the countries with more challenges to be—to be developed. So, again, I think that, yes, it's extremely important for Africa when engaging with the European Union to really find a configuration which would unlock the industrial development of the continent, and not necessarily just rely on the primary goods, among others. FASKIANOS: So, thank you. I'm you're going next to Charlotte Langeveld, who's a lecturer at Ocean County College: To which identity do the young African people prefer to be associated with, ethnic or national identity? While national identity is superficial and ethnic is real, it has consequences for the future of the continent. SIGNÉ: So yeah, so that is probably a specific survey should be developed and in a systematic way to provide a definitive response to that question. But we have different, again, multiple belonging. Like some African citizens, especially young people, will want to be presented as African, even beyond your nation, or as global citizens. But it is clear that ethnic—the ethnicity continues to play a role on the continent, because although younger Africans speak less than the previous generation local dialects and languages, so it is important to also highlight that it is part of a broader cultural system. So I don't think that it is either/or. So if you think also about citizens of the Africa—of the European Union, are French people considering more French than European, or more European than French? I would say it probably depends, but that multiple belonging remain valid. And although the comparison is slightly different, are Californians believing that they are more Californian than American or are more American than Californian? So, but understanding also the potential implication of the question is that it is extremely important to keep—in nation-building to go beyond the questions or the notions which are dividing, to focus on the common values, and systems. So I don't think that's a problem for young people to have multiple belongings or ideas of belonging. What is—what could be a bad thing is to use those differences for discrimination, for poor governance, among others. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Kimberly Pace. Q: Hello, Landry. It's nice to see you. I have—my question is—hi, University of Alaska, Anchorage. My question is regarding women and girls. My question is, you know, given the role that violent extremism has had in Africa, what is the effect—what do you think is the effect on the economic and political opportunities for girls and women across African countries? Would love to hear your response. SIGNÉ: Absolutely. Hello, Kimberly. And so great to see you. And so I'm looking forward to following up after this session. So this is an extremely important question. There is no future of Africa without a full acknowledgement of the critical importance of women and girls, and not just economically speaking, politically speaking, in all the spheres of society. Just speaking economically, the gross domestic product of the content in some country could be increased by more than 50 percent with the full—or, about 50 percent—increase from 2 to 48, 49 percent with the full integration of women in society, in the economy, among other. So, and it is incredibly painful to see how in some countries, especially in situations of conflict, some of the first victim—the main victims, are girls, are women, or young people in as well, in general. So it is therefore extremely important, I think, to further empower women. But when you speak about empowering women, most people will think about empowering them politically, in particular. But for my conversation with many heads of state—former head of states, including President Banda or President Gurib-Fakim, so in our conversation it appear clearly that one of the best way to empower women politically is first to empower them also economically. Because when you're empowered economically you can organize a campaign, you can be a fully contributing member, and you can be independent. So, yes, addressing conflict, human rights challenges, will be a way to further protect women, because when you have war, when you have civil conflict, they are typically the most vulnerable people and they are often the one who are the most abused by a protagonist. So yeah. So I fully concur to the fact that we have to act in a more vigorous way to protect women, to create opportunities for women, and to empower women. And some of my best models, not to say most, are women. And starting with my mother, my sisters, and yeah. So I couldn't agree more with you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from William Decourt, who's at Hamilton Lugar School at Indiana University: You mentioned surveys indicating widespread support for democracy across the continent. How have you seen public opinion in Africa responding to or shaping norms of liberal governance on the continent? And has it been affected by other challenges, such as the recent coups, influence from Russian mercenaries, and perhaps from increased Chinese investment too? SIGNÉ: So, just to be certain that I understand, and thank you so much for the important questions, is also about some of the trends on the continent related to democratic support, and the overall political situations. One of the reasons, and please, Irina, feel free to engage and follow up as needed. So one of the reasons why we have seen coups, of course, some—you have to put things in context. I mentioned that before. Many of the African citizens really want democracy to deliver. And not just democracy to deliver—if you live in rural contexts. At the origin of modern states is the social contract, which require that while a citizen will be giving up some of your fundamental—some of your rights, you will receive in exchange from states basic public services and goods, including security, economic opportunities, among others. But when those are not delivered, whether in a democracy or in a nondemocratic regime, that is when you have more challenges. Which could lead in some cases to a military coup, as we have seen, because then coup leaders may justify that—may justified their action by the imperative of restoring security or bringing about economic opportunities. So I think that is a point that I first want to highlight, to insist on the fact that, yeah, so the—those surveys show that on one hand, Africans want democracy. On the other hand, they want those democracies to deliver. And sometime even in democratic countries, some leaders are not necessarily governing in the way which is aligned with accountability. And those are the reasons why some coup leaders will also be supported by some citizens as an alternative, not to restore a long-term authoritarian system, but perhaps organize a transition. But from my perspective, it's one of the reasons why I think that—for many reasons. But one of the key reasons why I think coups even in a very contested context are extremely bad is one of the best predictors of a coup is a previous coup. So once military got involved in politics, even after a successful short-term transition and return to power to the civilians, the likelihood of having another coup is high. So that is one of the reasons why I think it's very important to invest in citizen, and invest in democratic development, and also invest in making democratic countries, African democracies, African democratic countries, deliver better for their citizens. FASKIANOS: Well, Landry, we are unfortunately out of time. And I apologize to all of you who had wonderful questions, we could not possibly get to them all, and raised hands. So we will just have to continue the conversation, and organize another conversation around these important issues. But, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. We really appreciate your comments and your analysis. And you can follow Landry on X, the app formerly known as Twitter, at @LandrySigne. It's spelled S-I-G-N-E. And our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, October 25, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT) with Stephen Biddle, who's an adjunct senior fellow here at CFR and professor at Columbia University, to talk about military strategy in the contemporary world. And in the meantime, I'd encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/Careers. Please visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org. We have been posting a lot of content there in light of the Israeli-Hamas conflict. So there are a lot of resources on our homepage that I commend to all of you. And again, Landry Signé, thank you very much for being with us today. SIGNÉ: Thank you so much, Irina. And thank you so much for the wonderful questions, conversation, and to the incredible team which has put everything together. FASKIANOS: Thank you. (END)

The continent of Africa must industrialise as quickly as it can, South Africa's Trade, Industry and Competition Deputy Minister Nomalungelo Gina said on Tuesday when she presided over the signing ceremony of contracts to advance a titanium beneficiation project in KwaZulu-Natal. “Africa must catch up to other industrialised economies,” Gina stated as East China Engineering Science and Technology formalised an engineering procurement and construction contract as well as an operational and maintenance contract with Nyanza Light Metals, for the building of an 80 000 t/y titanium dioxide (Ti02) pigment plant in the Richards Bay Industrial Development Zone. “The African Continental Free Trade Area enables us to change the game. Our endowments can be beneficiated on the continent, and be exported as value added products. Nyanza Light Metals represents that direction of downstream beneficiation,” said Gina, who emphasised the need for government officials to keep on improving project speed and turnaround times for investors. “Investors are our salvation and we must be quick in sorting out regulatory blockages. This is critical for us as government because the spin-offs are far wider than corporate tax benefits. Associated with this project is vital job creation – permanent jobs – once the company operates in full after construction is completed. We will meet on the ground as we will come and do site inspection from time to time,” Gina said in acknowledging the contributions of Nyanza and the government of China. TiO2, a bulk commodity produced using ilmenite or rutile, is a white pigment used in products such as paints, industrial coatings, plastics, papers, inks, foods, medicines and toothpaste. Ilmenite and rutile are found in KwaZulu-Natal's rich mineral sands patrimony. Gina's meeting of the leadership of the East China Engineering Science and Technology earlier this year in her Department of Trade, Industry and Competition offices, coincided with her meeting Chinese Ambassador Chen Xiadong in Pretoria. At that meeting, the Deputy Minister recognised the commitment to bring value in the Nyanza partnership. “China's experience in complex projects of this nature has been emphasised, and to us, that is reassuring. Nyanza represents our pride as Africans. We want it to succeed. The journey travelled, including the raising of capital to finance, has been commendable. “The completion of Phase 1 has inspired confidence that construction deadlines will be met. Chinese people are known for project completion, either on time or ahead of schedule. I have no doubt that we will meet the set deadlines in the months that have been targeted," Gina stated. The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition has been supporting Nyanza ever since it pledged its investment during President Cyril Ramaphosa's Investment Conference five years ago. “We have been accelerating with them in navigating the path, working with our Richards Bay Industrial Development Zone and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government. “I want to commit, once again, that we want to see this project continuing uninterrupted, right to end. As government, we will protect this project. “The R4.5-billion investment represent an opportunity that South Africa and Africans can change the resource curse that Africa has been known for, which is being the net exporter of raw materials from gold, diamond, platinum, iron-ore and many more minerals, including titanium. That era belongs to the past,” said Gina.

In this podcast, Joy Impano of Gikera & Vadgama Advocates shares her insights on all things related to the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement with Africa Legal's Tom Pearson. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement, which aims to create a market for African countries to prosper by engaging in intra-continental trade, has been moving at a slow pace. While 80% of African countries endorsed the agreement last year, only eight of the 44 countries are currently using the AfCFTA to their advantage. Joy Impano, associate at Gikera & Vadgama Advocates (GVA) based in Kenya, says the AfCFTA has the potential to transform trade within the African bloc by promoting economic development, creating jobs and facilitating industrialisation on the continent. However, there have been many challenges which include non-tariff barriers such as customs delays and inadequate customs procedures, cumbersome and bureaucratic regulations, unequal bargaining power and different regulations. In addition, poor quality infrastructure such as roads, railway networks and ports were other practical impediments, says Impano, while also pointing out that these issues were being addressed. “While infrastructure remains a key problem in actualising this dream, we are seeing African countries invest a lot in infrastructure, and so we hope that, over time, this hurdle will be crossed,” she said. Impano believes that technology will play a major role in advancing the AfCTFA, especially for small- and medium enterprises. “Technology certainly can be that silver bullet that we need,” she noted. “One of the challenges the African continent is facing is poor infrastructure and so instead of transporting goods by road (to shops), you could sell them online and access a bigger platform and market. So technology can play a significant role in facilitating trade under these agreement platforms such as e-commerce. Digital payment systems can help simplify and streamline trade processes, reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency in many ways.” In the podcast Impano elaborates on the risks that the AfCFTA can pose when it comes to the economic capacity, infrastructure and competitiveness among countries. The conversation wraps up with Tom and Impano analysing the critical role that lawyers can play when it comes to resolving disputes which are bound to happen as their clients engage in more intra-African trade.

For centuries, Africa has been plundered by foreign powers, who have seized territory and reaped the benefits of profitable trade routes.Despite Africa's abundant natural resources, it remains the poorest continent.A new report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supports an African Union initiative to remove trade barriers to increase the flow of goods among African nations. It says the African Continental Free Trade Area could reduce extreme poverty.We caught up with the IMF managing director while she was in Nairobi to endorse the AU initiative. Kristalina Georgieva talks to Al Jazeera.Subscribe to our channel http://bit.ly/AJSubscribeFollow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/AJEnglishFind us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/aljazeeraCheck our website: http://www.aljazeera.com/Check out our Instagram page: https://www.instagram.com/aljazeeraenglish/@AljazeeraEnglish#Aljazeeraenglish#News

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa says e-commerce in Africa will grow by 50 per cent by 2025. The Acting Executive Secretary, UNECA, Mr Antonio Pedro, explained that investing in the capacity building would be critical to delivering on the growth of e-commerce in the continent. The acting executive secretary, says a large-scale infrastructure investment must be accompanied by viable policies and strategies both nationally and regionally, adding that digital technologies will also fuel Africa's accelerated transformation. Pedro says the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement is the framework under which Africa could ensure an African-owned transformation.This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/4090160/advertisement

Southern Africa was the hardest-hit sub-region during the COVID-19 pandemic causing regional GDP growth to contract significantly. Thus, these diverse economies are entering 2023 at various stages of economic recovery and development. A central theme for this year will be how countries in the sub-region can become less reliant on fossil fuels and investment opportunities in the renewable energy sector. South Africa is the largest emitter of greenhouse gas annually owing to its substantial coal industry but will be performing an increasingly delicate balancing act between transitioning to a green economy and trying to ensure job security for those working with fossil fuels. This shift has the potential to achieve decarbonisation commitments at a quicker pace while promoting sustainable development. Increased investments in enabling infrastructure, particularly in Namibia's high-profile green hydrogen projects, are set to support economic diversification as the Government pursues its plans to boost value-added processing and achieve export-driven growth. Equally significant is the discovery of liquified natural gas (LNG) in Mozambique. While LNG has been identified as the “cleanest” fossil fuel it is one, nevertheless. African countries are being hit the hardest by disruptions in global supply chains as an upshot of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, increasing the need to diversify exports. In Zambia where food accounts for 50% of household consumer price baskets, higher prices for foodstuffs will significantly hurt the livelihoods of a sizeable portion of the population. Moreover, considering the move toward clean energy technologies there is a growing appetite for developments in Agri-Tech industries in Southern African countries such as Namibia to develop greater agricultural productivity. The reliance on European grain imports is only highlighting the necessity for African countries to become much more self-sufficient and to engage in intra-African trade to a greater extent, the African Continental Free Trade Area has the potential to deepen this. Low vaccination rates against COVID-19 in South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, and Lesotho will continue to constrain economic recovery.

The Biden administration pledged $55 billion for food security, climate crisis and trade partnerships, in addition to a new agreement with the African Continental Free Trade Area that will give US companies access to 1.3 billion people and a market valued at $3.4 trillion. The summit is the first of its kind since 2014 under then-president Barack Obama. Meanwhile, China has been holding the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation every three years since 2000, widely seen as an essential means of advancing Chinese diplomatic and commercial interests. For nearly two decades, Beijing has ploughed funds into African infrastructure and supplied the continent with affordable consumer goods, ranging from mobile phones and solar panels to plastics. Until now, Sub-Saharan Africa has always been a low foreign-relations priority for the US, accounting for just 1.2 percent of its total two-way trade. However, western leaders have sharply criticised what they see as Beijing's reluctance to address the heavy debt burden facing many African countries. Beijing's ambassador to Washington rejected the idea ahead of the summit, citing a report that African countries owe three times more debt to Western institutions while noting that Chinese-built hospitals, highways, airports and stadiums are “everywhere” in Africa. Can Washington close the gap? As the US-China rivalry sucks the global economy and international relations into its orbit, the gap between Washington and Beijing's footprint on the African continent is stark. China-Africa trade accounts for $254 billion – four times that of US-Africa, which stands at $64.3 billion. China is also the largest provider of foreign direct investment – double the level of US FDI – and supports hundreds of thousands of African jobs. Beijing formalized commercial engagement with Africa in 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative, a well-resourced effort to build political influence and grow commercial relationships throughout the developing world through Chinese infrastructure lending, construction and resource extraction. A survey conducted earlier this year found that 76 percent of Africans aged 18-24 view China as a positive influence on their lives, compared with 72 percent for the US – further evidence that China is winning the battle for the hearts and minds of Africans. That is something US observers are starting to take note of. Released in August, the Biden administration's US-Africa strategy document highlights that with one of the world's fastest-growing populations, largest free-trade areas by geographical area and most diverse set of ecosystems, African governments, institutions, and people “will play a critical role in solving global challenges”. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/jb-muwonge/message

Africa has 83,000km of land borders. Many of these borders are a colonial hangover: arbitrarily drawn, ignoring geography, ethnic groups and political entities. But the Pan African dream of iconic presidents like Kwame Nkrumah and Thomas Sankara has yet to materialise.In this week's episode we ask is it time to rethink red lines on maps? Or do we need to concentrate on dismantling different borders? The borders holding back trade, collaboration and mindsets? In this week's episode, our host Claude Grunitzky talks to:Samba Bathily a self-made Malian businessman. He's launched ventures in over 18 African countries, including Akon Lighting Africa, a renewable energy initiative he worked on with Samba and the American-Senegalese artist Akon. Samba is also a huge champion of the African Continental Free Trade Area, a free trade agreement between 54 African countries.Mutemi Wa Kiama is an activist from Nairobi, Kenya known for campaigning against aid in the shape of international loans. He's also part of the Africans Rising initiative, a continent-wide NGO which campaigns for a fair global trading system, and action to combat climate change. Kah Walla is a Cameroonian politician and entrepreneur and was the first woman to stand for president in Cameroon in 2011. Walla hails from the Anglophone region of Cameroon, which has been affected by a separatist movement since 2016. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Mvemba is joined by Jakkie Cilliers, Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies, a South African think-tank. Jakkie and Mvemba discuss Africa's potential growth in different global scenarios, the African Continental Free Trade Area, and challenges to intra-continental trade.

The West's misconceptions about Africa are vast, particularly when it comes to the realm of business. Today we are joined by Dr. Deanne de Vries, who has worked across the continent in various capacities for over 30 years. She is currently an advisor for firms looking to enter the African market and is the author of Africa: Open for Business. In this episode, Deanne fills us in on the challenges and the exciting opportunities for doing business in Africa, sharing insights into the evolving tech and startup scenes. We discuss Africa's agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and Deanne breaks down what governments need to do to boost these industries. To hear about the community-centric focus of African business and to find out why on-the-ground integrated local presence is far more valuable than any data, tune in! Key Points From This Episode: •   The history of Deanne de Vries' work in Africa. •   The ABC of learning to do business in unfamiliar territory: Appetite, Bandwidth, and Capital. •   The evolution of the African tech scene. •   The focus of Africa's startup scene. •   The potential for French-speaking West Africa to rise in the tech sector. •   What governments can do to boost agricultural productivity in Africa. •   The importance of access to the market, in terms of agriculture. •   The challenges faced by Africa's manufacturing industry. •   Why African business can't be judged by statistics alone. •   The number one key to success for doing business in Africa. •   Deanne shares a case study to illustrate the importance of being on the ground. •   The potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area to promote business in Africa. •   The greatest Western misunderstandings about doing business in Africa. •   The challenge of data accuracy across Africa. •   What trumps data when it comes to doing business. •   The number one way to de-risk any deal in Africa. •   Deanne shares her chocolate chip cookie story. •   The impact of China's increasing presence across the continent. •   The influence of Turkey, Russia, and the UAE on Africa. •   How best to think about market entry in Africa.    Links Mentioned in Today's Episode: https://www.drdeannedevries.com/ (Dr. Deanne de Vries) https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-deanne-de-vries-582168a/ (Dr. Deanne de Vries on LinkedIn) https://www.instagram.com/drdeannedevries (Dr. Deanne de Vries on Instagram) https://www.amazon.com/Africa-Business-Discover-Continent-Opportunity/dp/B09SVTTZFS (Africa: Open for Business) https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/ (Charter Cities Institute) https://www.facebook.com/Charter-Cities-Institute-424204888015721/ (Charter Cities Institute on Facebook) https://twitter.com/CCIdotCity (Charter Cities Institute on Twitter)

The head of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development says Africa must diversify economically and become more resilient to realize its full potential. UNCTAD Secretary-General, Rebeca Grynspan says they believe that the continent must use every opportunity to achieve economic diversification through services, and it must seize the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area. She outlines the great potential which African countries have to transform their economies through services, thus supporting the continent's long-standing economic diversification goals and boosting productivity and development.

Nigeria's petroleum minister, Timipre Sylva, says funding for the project will come from Europe and that authorities are already holding talks with European firms and countries. President Muhammadu Buhari, says Nigeria is ready to fill the natural gas gaps in Europe predicated by the current Russian-Ukrainian war. Buhari says with over 200 million, mainly young people, Nigeria is ready to be the hub of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Buhari urged Portugal to consider Nigeria as a valued and trusted partner in Africa.

Alex Duys of Umthombo Wealth on markets as Naspers and Prosus have another strong day and Nampak gets a debt extension. PwC's Lullu Krugel on the economic outlook for SA for the rest of 2022. Olebogeng Ramatlhodi from Deloitte Africa on how the African Continental Free Trade Area could mitigate a worse economic impact due to Covid-19.

Today, we look at the role of Agriculture in The African Continental Free Trade Area and hurdles to be fixed for the its true potential to be realised and also Egypt's international  net falling. 

The payments, banking and financial services sectors are undergoing an unprecedented period of disruption and change. In an ever-evolving reality, collaboration is the key to survival…especially when we look at cross border transactions as Africa opens up via the African Continental Free Trade Area. Unfortunately, there are still many payment corridors all over the world which face incredibly high costs and considerable delays. A recent report by the World Bank provides an example from East Africa where, in 2021, the fee for sending 200 dollars in remittances from Tanzania to neighbouring Uganda was 23 percent for a Ugandan migrant. I cannot begin to imagine giving up nearly a quarter of my income every month just to send that money home to my family. It costs 13% of a transaction to remit money from South Africa to another country, more than double the average of the Group of 20 (G20) leading global economies, according to a 2021 World Bank report. But barriers like these are the reality for many people. And it is not just the cost of cross-border payments. These type of payments are often also slow and not transparent – and then there's the fact that they are not fully accessible for all. So what is being done to solve the challenges? Let's welcome our panel to find out Ruhling Herbst, acting Executive Head Africa Business Development at BankservAfrica; Alastair Tempest, CEO of EFSA (ECommerce Forum of SA) & Karen Nadasen, CEO of PayU South Africa

The Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board, Mr Simbi Wabote, stated that African countries must leverage the robust platform and opportunities presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement. Wabote says the agreement is key to driving home the local content narrative to achieve sustainable growth and development in Africa. He noted that the AfCFTA is Africa's move to harmonize its markets for economic integration across all 55 member states with the objective of tapping into the Gross Domestic Product of over $3 trillion.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

Kelly Parkhurst, Head of Product Design, AbsaThe adoption of FinTech in Africa has been widespread. Looking back on 2021, FinTechs in Africa overshadowed all other startups in funding, raising close to $5 billion. Robin Amlôt of IBS Intelligence speaks to Kelly Parkhurst, Head of Product Design for African financial services group Absa about how the continent can leverage the growth of FinTech to support financial inclusion and economic growth.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

On this edition of Straight Talk Africa, host Haydé Adams and her guests discuss what it takes to unlock to promise of Africa's free-trade zone. Our guests include Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area, Val Okaru-Bisant, CEO and founder of Afrocosmo Development Impact, Frank Samolis, co-chair of the International Trade Practice Group at Squire Patton Boggs and Natasha Kimani, strategy and research lead at Africa No Filter.

Agriculture is one of the key focus areas of the partnership between the EU and the African Union (AU), with the EU's focus being on facilitating a green transition in line with its Green Deal ambitions. By working together to boost safe and sustainable agri-food systems, the AU and the EU can address the challenges of nutrition and food security, environmental concerns, and economic growth.From February 17-18 at the EU-Africa Union Summit, African and European Heads of State and Government will meet to determine joint priorities for their common future. The Summit is due to include an exchange of views on common areas of cooperation in a renewed Africa-EU Partnership. The partnership agreement is expected to cover agriculture, a key sector in Africa with a large social and economic footprint.Some stakeholders argue that future agri-food partnerships between the EU and Africa, while enabling a sustainable transformation, must also be adapted to the realities of farming in Africa. Such realities include, among others: unrealised yield and the yield potential of farms; the ambition to end hunger; agriculture is predominantly smallholder led; it is more affected by climate change, disease and pests pressure not present in Europe; low technology access and use; and low investment despite governmental commitments made in the 2014 Malabo commitments. They also highlight the ongoing challenge of illicit products circulating in the market.The partnership is also being agreed against a backdrop of the newly established and evolving African Continental Free Trade Area that created the largest free trade areas in the world, measured by number of countries participating.Listen to this EURACTIV Virtual Conference to discuss how Africa can transition sustainably towards greener agriculture. Questions to be discussed include:- How can the global sustainability agenda be effectively localised? What do the localisation agendas look like for Europe and Africa respectively?- What laws, partnerships and investments are needed to unlock a sustainable transformation that empowers smallholder farmers, builds food security and contributes to livelihoods?- How can we unlock the potential of sustainable technologies?

In collaboration with the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa we look at how Sport can support the inclusive implementation of the AfCFTA. The African Continental Free Trade Area is the largest single market in the world comprising of 54 member nations as Africa looks to continue its economic growth. Recorded last year, this podcast shall focus on Women's Economic Empowerment & Gender Equality, looking at how sports can aid this and the various means and opportunities by which this can happen. Split over 2 podcasts, Part 2 will cover an excellent 40 minute round table discussion with 3 female leaders in their field. - Amy Wanday (host) - a social entrepreneur, women's advocate & founder of African Sports Network - Jean Sseninde - Former Professional Football player & now Director of Women's Football at South Sudan Football Association - Kimberly Coats - Co-Founder of Team Africa Rising All these women have and continue to break down barriers and create opportunities in difficult circumstances. We hear on their experiences and how sport can provide both an economic and social empowerment for women. Timestamp: 00:00 - 02:40 - Introduction 02:40 - 07:05 - Gender Equality & Women in Sports 07:05 - 12:05 - Jean Sseninde's work and the benefit to young girls 12:05 - 20:10 - The importance of empowering Female cyclists 20:10 - 28:15 - Overcoming cultural barriers through sport 28:15 - 37:25 - Lack of investment for women in sports 37:25 - 45:49 - What needs to done to advance women in sports

What's your New Year's resolution?+++ The gallant heroes Africa lost in 2021 +++ African Continental Free Trade Area 1 year on +++ Effects of fake news to fight against COVID +++ 2021 Sports in review by DW's Ololade Adewuyi

Ana Atallah and Clément Fouchard discuss developments in the field of international arbitration in Francophone Africa, including the official launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area and initiatives to promote international trade, access to finance, and dispute resolution on the continent, before exploring arbitral diversity in the region, a rise in local efforts to promote a culture of arbitration, and the prospect of more China-Africa disputes.

In this episode of the Solutions With David Ansara podcast, I speak to Chris Hattingh, deputy director at the Free Market Foundation, about the economic and social benefits of free trade. TIMESTAMPS (00:00) Introduction (00:44) Chris Hattingh on the economic benefits of free trade (05:02) Chris Hattingh on comparative advantage (09:21) Chris Hattingh on common criticisms of free trade (14:57) Chris Hattingh on decentralisation of economic power (17:06) Chris Hattingh on the problems with protectionism (23:02) Chris Hattingh on improving economic competitiveness (26:03) Chris Hattingh on global supply chains (30:29) Chris Hattingh on the African Continental Free Trade Area (37:59) Chris Hattingh on the social benefits of free trade (41:29) Chris Hattingh on mitigating the downsides (44:17) Conclusion

Michelle Gavin, CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies, leads a conversation on African politics and security issues.     FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR fall of 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, cfr.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Michelle Gavin with us today to talk about African politics and security issues. Ambassador Gavin is CFR's Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies. Previously, she was managing director of the Africa Center, a multidisciplinary institution dedicated to increasing understanding of contemporary Africa. From 2011 to 2014, she served as the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and as the U.S. representative to the Southern African Development Community, and prior to that, she was a special assistant to President Obama and the senior director for Africa at the National Security Council. And before going into the Obama administration, she was an international affairs fellow and adjunct fellow for Africa at CFR. So we are so delighted to have her back in our fold. So, Michelle, thank you very much for being with us. We have just seen that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken went on a trip to Africa. Maybe you could begin by talking about the strategic framework that he laid out on that trip, and then we have in just recent days—with a new variant of Omicron—seen the travel ban imposed on several African countries and what that means for the strategic vision that he laid out. GAVIN: Sure. Thank you. Well, thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. And I looked at the roster. There's so much amazing expertise and knowledge on this Zoom. I really look forward to the exchange and the questions. I know I'll be learning from all of you. But maybe just to start out to talk a little bit about Secretary Blinken's trip because I think that, in many ways, his efforts to sort of reframe U.S. engagement on the continent, trying to move away from this sort of binary major power rivalry lens that the Trump administration had been using is useful, but also exposes, really, a lot of the challenges that policymakers focused on Africa are dealing with right now. So he tried to reset the relationship in the context of a partnership, of purely acknowledging African priorities and African agency in determining what kind of development partners Africa is interested in, what kind of security partners. I think that's a very useful exercise. Then he kind of ticked through, as every official has to do in making these big framing statements as sort of broad areas of engagement and cooperation, and he talked about increasing trade, which, of course, is interesting right now with AGOA sunsetting soon, working together to combat pandemic diseases, particularly COVID, working together on climate change, where, of course, Africa has borne more consequences than many other regions of the world while contributing far less to the problem, working together on the democratic backsliding and authoritarian sort of surge that we've seen around the world and, finally, working together on peace and security. So this huge agenda, and I think what's interesting and what in many ways his trip made clear is that it's very hard to get to the first four points when the last one, the peace and security element, is in chaos. And, look, obviously, Africa's a big continent. All of us who ever engage in these conversations about Africa are always—are forever trying to provide the disclaimer, right, that there's never one African story. There's never one thing happening in this incredibly diverse continent. But it is the case that the peace and security outlook on the continent is really in bad shape, right. And so the secretary traveled to Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal. The headlines from his trip, really, were dominated by the disorder in the Horn of Africa that we're seeing right now. So you have the civil conflict in Ethiopia, which has been incredibly costly to that country in terms of lives, in terms of their economic outlook, has been characterized by atrocities of war crimes. And, I think right now, most observers are very concerned about the integrity of the Ethiopian state, its capacity to persist. Regardless of today, tomorrow, or next week's military developments, it's very hard to see a lasting and sustainable military solution to this conflict and the parties do not appear, really, amenable to a serious political negotiation. But it's not just Ethiopia, of course. It's Sudan, where we saw the tenuous military-civilian transitional government kind of fully hijacked by the military side of that equation in a coup that has been, really, rejected by so many Sudanese citizens who are still on the streets even today trying to push back against the notion of military dominance in their transition and beyond, and they are being met with violence and intimidation. And the outlook there is quite worrying. You've got border clashes between Ethiopia and Sudan. You have electoral crisis in Somalia. So the Horn, you know, is looking like a very, very tough neighborhood. And, of course, everyone is concerned about the impact on Kenya and East Africa itself, given the insurgency in Mozambique, which has more than once affected neighboring Tanzania, these bombings in Uganda and the sense of instability there. The picture is one of multiple crises, none of which come with easy fixes or purely military solutions. And then you have this kind of metastasizing instability throughout the Sahel, right, and the concern that more and more states will fall victim to extremely worrisome instability and the very costly violence. So there's a huge security agenda and we're just—we're all aware of the basic facts that it's very hard to make progress on partnerships to support democratic governance in the midst of conflict. It's very hard to come together on climate change or to fight a pandemic in the midst of these kinds of circumstances. So I think it's a really challenging picture. And just to pull a couple of these threads, on this issue of democratic backsliding the Biden administration's desire to build more solidarity among kind of like-minded countries whose democracies may take different forms but who buy into a basic set of democratic values, it's undeniable that the trend lines in Africa have been worrisome for some time and we do see a lot of these kind of democratic authoritarian states, these states where you get some of the form, some of the theater, of democracy, particularly in the form of elections, but no real capacity for citizens to hold government accountable. It's not really a kind of a demand-driven democratic process, that the fix is often in on these elections, and there is polling, right, that suggests that this is turning people off of democratic governance in general, right. If what you understand democratic governance to be is a sham election, you know, at regular intervals while you continue to be governed by a set of individuals who are not really beholden to the electorate, right, and are protecting a very small set of interests, then it's not surprising to see some waning enthusiasm. It's not that other forms of government are necessarily looking great to African populations, but I think it is notable in some of that Afrobarometer polling in places where you wouldn't expect it, right, like South Africa, where people sacrificed so much for democracy, and you really do see a real decline in enthusiasm for that form of governance. So there's a lot of work to be done there. The last thing, just because you brought it up, on the latest news about this new variant, the Omicron variant—I may be saying that wrong. It may be Omicron. Perhaps someone will correct me. And the kind of quick policy choice to institute a travel ban on a number of southern African countries. So I do think that in the context of this pandemic, right, which has been economically devastating to the continent—where the global economic downturn that occurred for Africans, too, but you had governments with very little fiscal space in which to try to offset the pain for their populations. In addition, you have had the issues of vaccine inequity, right, where it's just taken far too long to get access to vaccines for many African populations—it's still not adequate in many places—and a sort of sense that the deal initially proposed in the form of COVAX wasn't really what happened—you know, a feeling of a bait and switch—that looks like—what it looks like is disregard for African lives. And while I am really sympathetic—I used to work in government and it's crystal clear when you do that your first responsibility is the safety of the American people—these travel bans sort of fit into a narrative, right, about scapegoating, about disregard for African life that, I think, is going to make it awfully hard for this new reframing of respect and partnership, right, to really resonate. And I would just note, as a former U.S. ambassador in Botswana, that the scientists in the lab in Gaborone and the scientists in South Africa who did the sequencing and helped to alert the world to this new variant, right, were doing us all a tremendous favor. It's not at all clear that this variant started in southern Africa, right. We know that it exists on every continent right now except Antarctica. We know that samples taken in Europe before these discoveries were made in southern Africa—just tested later—showed that the variant was already there. And so it is a bit hard to explain why specifically southern Africans are banned from travel. You know, I think it's unfortunate. There are other policies that could be pursued around testing, around quarantine requirements. So I'll leave that there. I'm not a public health expert. But I think it's—I'm glad you brought it up because I think these things do really resonate and they inform how the United States is understood on the continent. They inform how Africans understand global institutions and kind of global governance to reflect or not reflect their concerns and interests. And if what the Biden administration wants is partners in this notion of democratic solidarity and partners in trying to reconstruct kind of international institutions a sense of global order, a norms-based rules-based approach to multilateral challenges, it's going to be hard to get the African buy-in that is absolutely necessary to achieve those goals when these kinds of issues continue to give the impression that Africa is an afterthought. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Michelle. That was really a great overview for us. So now we want to go to all of you. You can raise your hand—click on the raised hand icon to ask a question—and when I recognize you please unmute yourself and state your affiliation. Otherwise, you can submit a written question in the Q&A box, and if you do write a question please say what institution you're with so that I can read it and identify you properly and—great. Our first hand raised is from Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson. And let me just say, the “Zoom user,” can you please rename yourself so we know who you are? So, Dr. Nelson, over to you. Q: Good afternoon, everyone. Dr. Sherice Janaye Nelson from Southern University. I'm a political science professor in the department. And the question, I guess, I have is that we know that the African people have a history of nondemocratic governance, right? And when we look at a place like Tunisia, we know that one of the reasons in the Arab Spring that they were so successful—although often considered an Arab country, they are successful because there had been tenets of democracy that were already broiled in the society. The question I have is that to these places that do not have that institutional understanding or have even—maybe don't even have the values to align with democracy, are we foolhardy to continue to try to support democratic governance as the full-throated support versus trying to look at more of a hybrid of a sovereign situation that allows for, in many ways, a kingdom, a dictator, and et cetera, with then a democratic arm? Thank you so much. GAVIN: Thanks, Dr. Nelson. It's an interesting question, and I agree with you insofar as I think that it's really interesting to think about the kind of governance antecedents in a bunch of African countries, particularly in the pre-colonial era, right, and try to figure out how they find expression afterwards. There's no question that, you know, colonialism doesn't set the table well for democracy. There's no doubt about that. But I would say that, you know, despite the loss of faith in democratic governance that we've seen in some of the polling, you know, very consistently for a long time what you've seen is that African populations do seem to want democratic governance. They want to be able to hold their leaders accountable. They want everyone to have to abide by the law. They want basic protections for their rights. So, you know, I'm not sure that there's any society that's particularly ill-suited to that. But I do think that democracy comes in many forms and it's always particularly powerful when there is, you know, some historical resonance there. I also—you know, if we take a case like one of the world's last absolute monarchies in eSwatini right now what you see is a pretty persistent civic movement demanding more accountability and less power for the monarch, more protection for individual rights. And so, you know, I'm not—I think that people are feeling disillusioned and frustrated in many cases and you see this, too, in the enthusiasm with which several of the recent coups in West Africa have been met—you know, people pouring out into the streets to celebrate because they're frustrated with the status quo. They're interested in change. But very rarely do you see then persistent support for, say, military dictatorships or military-dominated government. So I'm not sure that the frustration means enthusiasm for some of these other governing models. People want democracy to work a lot better. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Lucy Dunderdale Cate. Q: Hi. Yes. I'm Lucy Dunderdale Cate. I'm with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I wanted to just ask you about kind of the African Union's role in this, you know, particularly and with the Biden administration, and thinking about, you know, the Horn of Africa security issues that you mentioned. Kind of where do you see that we're going and what do you see kind of for the future there? Thank you. GAVIN: Sure. Thanks for that question. I think the AU, for all of its flaws—and, you know, find me a multilateral organization that isn't flawed—is actually incredibly important. You know, for the Biden administration, which has kind of staked out this position that international institutions matter and multilateral institutions matter, they've got to work better, we can't address the threats we all face without these functioning and they may need to be modernized or updated but we need them, then the AU is a really important piece of that puzzle. And I think, you know, right now, for example, in Ethiopia that the—it's the AU's negotiator, former Nigerian President Obasanjo, who really is in the lead in trying to find some glimmer of space for a political solution, and this was a little bit late in the day in terms of AU activism on this issue and I think it's been a particularly difficult crisis for the AU to address in part because of being headquartered in Addis and sort of operating within a media and information environment in Ethiopia that is one that does not create a lot of space for divergence from the federal government's position. So I think that, in the end, right, the prospect of the collapse of a 110-million-strong country, a place that used to be an exporter of security, a major diplomatic player in the region, right, spurred AU action. But it's been a little bit—more than a little bit slow. But you have seen some pretty forward-leaning stance at the AU as well. Their response to the military coup in Sudan this fall was pretty robust and clear. Now this sort of new transitional arrangement that appears to be more palatable to much of the international community than to many Sudanese citizens is a—we're wading into murkier waters there. But I think the AU, you know, it's the only game in town. It's essential, and particularly in the Horn where the subregional organization EGAD is so incredibly weak that the AU, as a vehicle for an African expression of rules-based norms-based order, is—you know, actually its success is incredibly important to the success of this major U.S. foreign policy plank. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Rami Jackson. How much of the democratic backsliding is supported by outside powers? For example, there was a chance for a democratic movement in Chad but the French threw their weight behind Déby's son after he was shot. GAVIN: That's a great question. I think that it's, certainly, not the case that external partners or actors are always positive forces, right, for democratic governance on the continent. There's no doubt about that, and it can be France and Chad. It can be, you know, Russian machinations in Central African Republic. There's a lot. It can be some of the Gulf states in Sudan, right, who—or Egypt, who seem very comfortable with the idea of military dominance and maybe some civilian window dressing for this transition. So you're right that external actors are kind of an important piece of the puzzle. You know, I don't think that there are many situations where there is a single external actor who is capable of entirely influencing the direction of government. But there are, certainly, situations where one external actor is tremendously powerful. Chad is a great example, again. And it is something that, I think, you know, again, an administration that has staked so much of its credibility on the notion that this is something very important to them, you know, is going to have to deal with. And it's thorny, right. Foreign policy always is where you have competing priorities. You need to get important work done sometimes with actors who do not share your norms and values, and it's the messiness of trying to articulate and integrate values in a foreign policy portfolio that runs the gamut, right, from counterterrorism concerns to economic interests. But I think that those are tensions that the administration will continue to have to deal with probably a little more publicly than an administration who didn't spend much time talking about the importance of democratic governance. FASKIANOS: Great. And I just want to mention that Rami is a graduate student at Syracuse University. So I'm going to go next to a raised hand from Mojúbàolú Olufúnké Okome. I know you wrote your question, too. Q: Good afternoon. Thank you very much. Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: I wrote my question because I couldn't figure out how to name myself on the phone. You know, thank you for your presentation. When I look at democracy in Africa—I mean, this is not the first go-round—and the response by people, by citizens, to the backsliding by governments is not—it looks familiar to me because, you know, in the 1960s—from the 1960s, there were similar responses. People were dissatisfied. They welcomed authoritarian governments again and again because the government they voted for rigged elections, were also authoritarian, and they were kleptocratic. So what's different now and where's the continuity and what has changed, really, with democracy? The other thing is about this COVID—the management of the COVID situation. I also kind of see the—I think I agree with you. The way Africa is being treated looks very familiar—you know, with disdain, with disrespect, as if the lives of the people there don't matter as much. And what is it going to take, really, to change the—because, you know, if a pandemic that cannot be stopped by walls and borders is not instigating change what is it going to take to change the way in which world politics is—world politics and its governance is done? GAVIN: Fantastic questions and ones that, I think we could talk about for, you know, a week-long conference. But so I'll start from the beginning and just take a stab. I think you're absolutely right. There have been these interesting cycles when it comes to governance on the continent and I think—when I think about sort of what's different from what we were seeing in, say, toward the end of the '60s, I think it's a couple things. One is geopolitical context, right. So my hope is that what we're not doing is kind of doing a reprise of this bipolar world where we're subbing in China's authoritarian development model for a Soviet Communist model and sitting here on the other side and, you know, trying to manipulate other countries into one camp or another. I don't think we're quite there yet and I think the Biden administration is trying very hard not to wade into those waters. So I do think the geopolitical context is a bit different. I also think, you know, that where so many African states are is at—in terms of kind of the scope of their existence as independent entities is an important difference, right. So I think that in the immediate kind of post-colonial era, for an awful lot of governments the fundamental basis for their legitimacy was having—is not being a colonial administrator, not being a puppet of some external power and so the, you know, legitimacy came from liberation, from independence. In places that had terrible conflict sometimes legitimacy came from, you know, delivering some degree of security from a long-standing insecure situation. So, you know, you look at—I think that's where sort of President Museveni derived a lot of legitimacy in the late '80s and through the '90s. And I think that, you know, now, as you have these very significant young populations whose lived experience is not one of ever knowing a time pre-independence, you know, they're looking for service delivery, right. They're looking for opportunity. They're looking for job creation, and I think legitimacy is increasingly going to be derived from the ability to deliver on these priorities. And so I do think that that makes kind of the governance landscape a little bit different, too, sort of different ideas about where governing legitimacy comes from. And, you know, I think that can be manifest in really different ways. But if I had to try and, you know, grab onto that interesting idea about what's different, that's what comes to mind. In this, you know, incredibly important question about what's it going to take to recognize African states as equal players and African lives as—every bit as urgently valuable as any other, you know, I do think that as the world continues to grapple with this pandemic and with other issues that can only be resolved globally, like climate change, it will, over time, kind of force a reckoning and a rethink about what are the important states and what are not. You know, it's interesting to me, it's absolutely true that by not moving out robustly to ensure that the whole world has access to vaccines the richest countries have created opportunities for new mutations to emerge. I hesitate to say that, in some ways, in this context because it sounds like I'm positive that these emerged from Africa, and I'm not. But we do know, you know, as a basic matter of science, right, that we're not safe until everyone's safe. And so I do think that as these kinds of issues that military might and economic power cannot address alone, where it really does take global solidarity and an awful lot of multilateral cooperation, which is messy and cumbersome, right, and necessary, my hope is that that will start to change perceptions in framing. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to go next to a written question from Abbey Reynolds, who's an undergraduate student at the University of Central Florida. What steps do you think that international and regional organizations can take to preempt future attempts to derail democratic governance in the region—coups, circumvention of constitutional term letter—limits, rigged elections, et cetera? GAVIN: OK. I'm sorry. What steps should who take? I'm sorry. FASKIANOS: Multilateral—international and regional organizations. GAVIN: OK. You know, I think that in a number of cases subregional organizations have been taking steps, right—ECOWAS, certainly, in rejecting coups and suspending memberships, et cetera. I think, you know, if you look at the sort of articulated and documented principles of a lot of these organizations they're pretty good. It's really about the gulf sometimes between stated principles and practice. So, you know, I think the Southern African Development Community is sometimes guilty of this where there are—you know, there's a clear commitment in static kind of principle documents and protocols around democratic governance but you also have an absolute monarchy that's a member state of SADC. You've had, you know, significant repression in a number of states—Zimbabwe leaps to mind—that SADC doesn't have, really, anything to say about. So you can have organizations that have kind of principles and procedures. At the end of the day, organizations are made up of member states, right, who have a set of interests, and I think that, you know, how governments understand their interest in standing up for certain norms, it's—I think it's specific in many ways to those governments in those states how they derive their own legitimacy, the degree to which they feel they may be living in a glass house, and, you know, frankly, relative power dynamics. So I'm not sure. Certainly, it's always—you know, I'm a believer in multilateralism. I think from an African point of—you know, if you imagine African states trying to assert themselves on the international stage, multilateralism is really important, right, to get if it's possible, where interests align, to have as many African states speaking with one voice. It's a much more powerful message than just a couple individual states. But there are always going to be intrinsic limits. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Gary Prevost with the College of St. Benedict. And if you can unmute yourself. Q: Speaking today, actually, as honorary professor and research associate from Mandela University in South Africa. I've had several students in recent years—doctoral and master's students—study U.S. and allied counterterrorism strategies both in the Middle East and in Africa, and they've come away with a general perspective that those strategies going back several administrations have been almost solely focused on military action and that it has led them in their recommendations sections of their theses to argue that other steps must be taken if these efforts in places like Nigeria or Somalia or Mozambique or even in the Middle East, Syria, and Iraq, are to be successful they must have a changed mindset about counter terror. What's your perspective on that? GAVIN: Well, thanks for that. I wholeheartedly agree, right, and I think, you know, you'll even get plenty of military officers, right, who will say there's no way we can address some—these problems, these, you know, kind of radical violent organizations aligned to global terrorist groups with a purely military approach. It's frustrating. I'm sure it's frustrating for your students, too, because it feels like everyone keeps coming to this conclusion, and, certainly, there have been efforts to, you know, counter violent extremism, provide opportunity for young people. But we're not very good at it, right. We haven't been very good at it yet. There's still a mismatch in terms of the resources we pour into these kind of relative—these different streams of effort, right. But I think also while it's very clear in a situation like Mozambique that if you want to weaken the insurgency you need to be providing more opportunity and building more trust in a community that's been disenfranchised and alienated from the center for a very, very long time. But the how to do that, how to do that effectively and how to do it in a climate of insecurity I actually think is an incredibly difficult challenge, and there are, you know, brilliant people working on this all the time. You know, some of the best work that I've seen suggests that some of this can be done but it's an incredibly long-term undertaking and that, you know, is sometimes, I think, a difficult thing to sustain support for, particularly in a system like the United States where, you know, our appropriations cycles tend to be very short term. So people are looking for, you know, quick impact, things you can put on a bar graph quickly and say that you've done. And I think that, you know, a lot of the kind of peace building research suggests that that's—that, you know, building community trust, which is a huge part of what needs to happen, operates on a very different kind of timeline. So it's a really thorny, thorny problem and how to get—you know, how to sustain political and budgetary support for those kinds of efforts. I don't know the answer yet. I'm sure somebody really smart on—maybe on the Zoom does. FASKIANOS: I'm going to go next to Pearl Robinson at Tufts University. Q: Hello, Ambassador Gavin. First of all, I'd like to congratulate you in your new position as Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa, and that's actually—as I've been sitting here listening to this, my thought was I'd like to know if you have thought about ways in which you can use your position at the Council to help actualize forms of partnerships about policy dialogues related to Africa. You began by articulating the U.S.'s new strategic vision for Africa. That was an American statement. I haven't really heard an African statement that would be engaging with that policy dialogue. These one-on-one trips of the secretary of state and other people going to individual African countries, based on our agenda, and having one-on-one dialogue discussions, in a way, does not get towards that real notion of African agency in policy and partnership. So I'm actually wondering whether you might envision the Council playing a role and creating some kinds of policy dialogue fora that would have American(s) and Africans participating in ways that would be visible to American publics as well as African publics. So I'm suggesting that you might, you know, be uniquely well suited to have the Council play a role in actually making visible and operationalizing this concept. I just thought about this sitting here listening because what I realized was everybody talking is talking from the American side and I'm wondering if—well, my dear colleague, Olufúnké, actually was an African voice. But I think what needs to happen is there needs to be a way for this taking place maybe with African institutions, academics, civil society actors. So I just throw that out for you to think about and I'd like to hear your first response to that idea. GAVIN: So I think it's exciting and I'd love, actually, to follow up with you. I'm delighted that you're here. I heard some wonderful things about your work. I think there's always the hard part of, right, who speaks for Africa, right, because there are so many diverse African perspectives. But I don't think you're suggesting there's necessarily a unitary voice. You're talking about sort of different actors, and I would agree with you that it's always incredibly rich to have conversations. You know, I recently did a panel with Professor Ed Vitz, who is working on some—working on a paper, I think, that will eventually be a book about sort of U.S.-Africa policy and particularly interested in the kind of frame of major power rivalry. But it was such a refreshing conversation to examine that and compare notes on what we thought the flaws of that frame might be to hear his perspective on where he thought there might be advantages to be seized from it. It was wonderful, and I agree with you that the more dialogue and the more opportunity not just to sort of talk amongst ourselves in a U.S. community that cares about Africa and about U.S. policy the better. You know, I will be honest with you, I often, in a situation like the one right now, I try hard to stick to—to at least keep circling back to U.S. policy because that's where my background is and I, you know, have no desire to posit myself as speaking on behalf of Africans. That's nuts and, you know, not my role. But I do—I have spent a lot of time thinking about how the U.S. engages with the continent. And so I think it's a really interesting notion. I'd love to follow up with you. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next written question from Krista Johnston, who's a professor at Howard University. The African Continental Free Trade Area will create the largest consumer market. What are the barriers U.S. businesses investing in Africa and positioning themselves to take advantage of this new trade area and what can the Biden administration do to incentivize this kind of engagement with China? And perhaps I can tack on another question to that because we have a lot of questions—(laughs)—both raised hands—is just to talk a little bit about China's footprint in Africa as well. GAVIN: Sure. Well, so I absolutely agree that the African Continental Free Trade Area is a really incredibly promising step forward for African economic integration and that is, you know, compelling in any number of ways. I think, for example, about the very hot topic of pharmaceutical production, right. And between the Free Trade Area, the standing up of the African Medicines Agency, right, which should help to harmonize regulatory standards for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment throughout the continent, investments seem a lot more attractive, right, when you're looking at much bigger markets than any one country, even than a giant like Nigeria, can provide. So I think that there's tremendous potential here. I will go back to what I said earlier, which is that even with these positive steps, right, it's going to be really important that the peace and security parts start trending in the right direction because it's very—you know, I would say this. U.S. investors are already quite bad at assessing risk in Africa and a backdrop of instability is not going to help that situation, right, and it is, in many cases, going to make a given investment opportunity or partnership opportunity too risky for many. So, you know, there's just no way to jettison those concerns. But wholeheartedly agree it's an exciting development. If the world hadn't gotten sort of hijacked by COVID, I think we'd be talking about it a lot more. On China, you know, the Chinese engagement on the continent is a fact of life that's existed for a very long time and is not going anywhere. It is economic, it is political, it is, increasingly, cultural, and I think, you know, for a state like China that aspires to be a major global power it's entirely predictable and understandable. Do I think that there are some ways in which Chinese investment and engagement are not always beneficial to African states? I do. I have concerns, certainly, about the way China sometimes uses its influence to secure African support for Chinese positions that appear antithetical to stated values in AU documents and other(s) and I have concerns about the transparency of some of the arrangements. I have concerns as well about some of the tech standards and just sort of play for technical dominance that maybe does not have the cybersecurity interests of Africans as its top priority. All that said, I think it's really important for the United States to, you know, understand that there's no—there's nothing to be gained by constantly vilifying China's engagement, some of which has been incredibly helpful for African states hungry, particularly, for financing on major infrastructure projects, and, you know, it's a fact of life we all have to learn to deal with. I do think, you know, there's some natural tension between the Biden administration's democracy focus, right, and the very explicit and intentional efforts of China to present a different model, and I don't think that the U.S. needs to shy away from that or pretend that those differences don't exist. But I do think it's incredibly unhelpful to frame up all of U.S. policy as if it's intended to counter China as opposed to intended to find those areas in the Venn diagram of, you know, those overlaps of African interests and U.S. interests and work together on them. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Anna Ndumbi, who is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi. Please unmute yourself. Q: Thank you very much. I really appreciate the presentation. I have a quick question in regards to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is center of Africa. About three years ago, there was a new president that stepped in by the name of Félix Tshisekedi, and he decided to pass a law saying that all the secondary education should be free because, obviously, in Africa schools aren't free. And I, personally, think that maybe it wasn't really—it was something they should have probably considered before passing the law. The result of that is that you have classrooms where there were maybe twenty students and now there's, like, there could be over a hundred students in one classroom, right. So we spoke about the pandemic. When COVID hit a lot of schools were shut down. They were shut down for a long period of time, and when you look at a lot of schools in Africa they don't have the ability of giving out maybe laptops or anything like that to assist students to continue school at home. So in result of that, you see a lot of children who are really below what they should be, below the average when it comes to education, and my question with that is where do we see the future going as far as maybe having international organization(s) or United States intervene because the future is not bright when we look at education with the children or the youth. How can United Nation(s) or maybe other international organization(s) assist, especially with what happened during COVID, going forward? What does the future look like for Africa? And I'm speaking more for the Democratic Republic of Congo. How can nonprofit organization(s) or United States intervene and assist in this matter? GAVIN: Well, thank you for that, and I have followed this a little bit because it was an interesting and kind of splashy promise and initiative on the part of President Tshisekedi and it's been disappointing, I think, to see that some of the, you know, government's budget that was intended to be allocated for that appears to have found its way into a handful of individuals' accounts. But I think that, you know, the fundamental point you're making, which is that in DRC but also throughout the African continent, right, there are these vast populations of young people. It is the youngest region of the world. And if you look at it historically at how other parts of the world have dealt with youth bulges, right, investing in that human capital so that they can be drivers of innovation and economic growth has been a really powerful kind of transformational tool—for example, in Asia. And so I definitely think that you're onto something really important right now about prioritizing investing in young people and their capacity, and you're absolutely right that the disruptions of the pandemic have, in many cases, fallen most heavily on children. You know, how to tackle that, I think, is sort of—you know, I can't design a program in this moment, I'll be honest with you. But I think that you're absolutely right, it's an incredibly important and too often easily overlooked priority. You know, there have been some interesting education innovations on the continent but they're too often kind of small, not scalable, and the need is so incredibly vast. But here, again, I will be a broken record. We do have to go back to this issue that peace and security matters, right. It's very, very hard for kids to get a sustained education that's going to provide them with opportunity in a context of insecurity, which, for a lot of children in eastern Congo, is still the case. FASKIANOS: OK. We have three minutes left. I am going to—and so many questions, and I apologize that we're not going to be able to get to all of you. So I'm going to give the final question to Caleb Sannar. Q: Hi. Yes. Thank you for joining us today, Ambassador Gavin. As they said, my name is Caleb Sanner. I'm a student from the University of Wisconsin in Whitewater. My question is with the Abraham Accords the Trump administration signed the agreement with Morocco to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Following that, there was some discrepancies in the southern territory controlled by the U.N., MINURSO, and the Polisario Front, the external Saharawi government, ended up declaring war again on Morocco, resuming the war from nineteen years previously. My question is what is the Biden administration's policy on that? GAVIN: Great question. Reporters have been asking that question, too, and with great message discipline the administration continues to say is that they're supporting U.N. efforts. And so whenever they ask, are you are you going to reconsider this decision regarding recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, they respond not by answering that question but by saying they're supporting U.N. efforts. So that's the most I can report to you in—regarding that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Well, we are at the end of our time. So, Ambassador Gavin, thank you very much for being with us and, again, to all of you for your fantastic questions, and I apologize for not being able to get to all of you. But we will have to continue doing webinars on this important topic and on digging in a little bit deeper. So we will be announcing the winter-spring academic lineup next month through our academic bulletin. This is the final webinar of this semester. Good luck with your finals—(laughs)—and grading and taking the exams and all of that. I know it's a very busy and stressful time with the pandemic layered on top of all of it. If you haven't already subscribed for the bulletin, please, you can do so by emailing us at cfracademic@cfr.org. You can follow us on Twitter at @CFR_Academic. And of course, please go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. You can see on CFR.org Michelle's latest post on Africa—blog posts, so you should follow her there as well. So, again, thank you. Thanks to all of you, and happy holidays, and we look forward to reconvening in 2022.

4 part series in conversation with Bohani Hlungwane, Allen Asiimwe and Emmanuel Bensah Jr. to unpack the African Continental Free Trade Area. We ask questions on chances of smaller economies benefiting from the free trade area, facilitating payments while preserving value, working capital solutions for African SMEs, and so much more.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is a major step for Africa's role in international trade Moderator: Rem Korteweg, Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute Panellists: Katrin Kuhlmann, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law; President and Founder, New Markets Lab Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat This podcast episode was recorded on 7 October 2020 The AIG Global Trade Series 2020 examines the ongoing transformation of the world's multilateral trading system. The global trade system is at a critical inflection point, under pressure from economic nationalism and protectionism across much of the world. Yet, in Africa, trade integration is moving forward, and fast. At a time when the system is under increasing pressure, the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement has been hailed as much needed commitment to the international rules-based order. In this podcast, moderator Rem Korteweg of the Clingendael Institute is joined by Katrin Kuhlmann, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown Law; President and Founder, New Markets Lab and Wamkele Mene, Secretary General of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat. Listen as they discuss the outlook for regional trade integration in Africa, and what impact the COVID-19 pandemic is having on African economies. Can the AfCFTA live up to expectations, integrating markets and overcoming fragmentation, to deliver inclusive and sustainable growth across the continent? With Sub-Saharan Africa entering a recession for the first time in 25 years, how can global and regional trade be part of the post-pandemic recovery? And with firm leadership being shown from African leaders in the trade-sphere, should we expect a more active role for the continent at the World Trade Organization and on the global trade stage? __________ The views and opinions expressed in this podcast series are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of American International Group, Inc. or its subsidiaries or affiliates (“AIG”). Any content provided by our speakers are of their opinion and are not intended to malign any religion, ethnic group, club, organization, company, individual or anyone or anything. AIG makes no representations as to accuracy, completeness, correctness, or validity of any information provided during this podcast series and will not be liable for any errors, omissions, or delays in this information or any losses injuries, or damages arising from its use.

This week Marie-Noelle invites one of The Brenthurst Foundation's newest members, Deputy Research Director Emmanuel Owusu-Sekyere, to offer his insight into why the nascent African Continental Free Trade Area could be the key to Africa's long-term economic recovery from Covid-19, and what the continent needs to do to make it it's “saving grace”. Join the conversation on: Twitter - @BrenthurstF / Facebook - @BrenthurstFoundation / Instagram - @brenthurstfoundation

This episode looks at the promise and potential of infrastructure projects to facilitate transportation and trade on the continent. In the first half, reporter Laura Rosbrow-Telem takes listeners to the Gambia for a ride over the Senegambia Bridge, an important new gateway for Senegal and the Gambia for facilitating trade and commerce in Africa.Then in the roundtable, co-host Carol Pineau leads a conversation on how investments in roads, bridges, ports, and airports can have a dramatic impact on trade. She also delves into how the newly established African Continental Free Trade Area, the world's largest trading bloc by number of participants, will galvanize trade on the continent and help make African countries less reliant on the West for economic stimulation. Participants in this discussion include:Benedict Oramah, President of the African Export-Import BankJuliet Anammah, chair of Jumia Nigeria and head of institutional affairs for Jumia GroupAllan Kilavuka, CEO of Kenya Airways Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

We discuss the Ugandan Election, The covid Vaccination process and The African Continental Free Trade Area. Enjoy! Check us out at saveafricapod.com --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/pod-save-africa/message

On 1st January 2021, Africa began trading under African Continental Free Trade Area and today on the Fatboy Show, Ivan Ojakol the Director and Legal Lead at LECTRAD - Africa shares his expertise on the AFCFTA and how the African states stand to benefit from the agreement thereto.

Professor and Founding Co-Director of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and Globalization 4.0 at Thunderbird School of Global Management Landry Signé joins Andile Masuku and guest co-host Iginio Gagliardone for a heartfelt discussion about how the COVID-19 crisis might alter Africa's economic growth trajectory.Landry is a Senior Fellow in the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution and his passionate perspectives about the merits of democracy feature heavily in this episode. His views are coloured, in part, by the live policy-making exposure he's gleaned during advisory assignments such as serving on the Global Network on Digital Technologies for Sustainable Urbanization at the appointment of a United Nations Under Secretary-General.Using Landry's new book Unlocking Africa's Business Potential: Trends, Opportunities, Risks, and Strategies as a springboard for the conversation, the trio interrogates some of the speculation influencing Africa's collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic.Listen in to learn why, despite what's going on right now, Landry is standing by the bullish notions outlined in his book— views which, for the most part, Iginio buys into given the positive progress points the continent was posting before the whole COVID-19 nightmare set in.Questions discussed in this episode include:1) What immediately pops into Landry, Iginio and Andile's heads when they hear ‘Covid-19 and Africa?' [08:34]2) In light of what is happening in his native Italy, what does Iginio view as key learning points for South Africa, where he is currently based? [18:45]3) How should 'expert' projections shape Africa's political and economic response to Covid-19? [22:36]4) Landry unpacks insights from his new book, Unlocking Africa’s Business Potential: Trends, opportunities, risks and strategies. [42:11]5) Why would anybody consider Africa's population growth trajectory as anything but a good thing? [43:52]6) How might Africa position to become more competitive in the global economy? [45:30]7) Is Landry as bullish on Africa’s potential now as he was before the COVID-19 pandemic hit? [49:10]8) Why might Africans do well to be cautiously optimistic about the continent's recovery prospects? [51:00]9) What does Landry see as Africa's top unique selling propositions? [58:59]10) Apart from the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, what other evidence might there be of increased regional trade cooperation in Africa? [1:08:05]Image credit: Nick Romanov