Podcasts about Sahel

Ou étiez vous le 20 octobre 2022 ?  Au Tchad, partenaire privilégié de la France au Sahel, c'est une date dont tout le monde se souvient. Ce jour-là, au moins cinquante personnes sont mortes lors de manifestations, pour la plupart des jeunes qui réclamaient à l'homme fort du pays, le général Mahamat Idriss Debi, la tenue d'élections libres. C'étaient les pires violences depuis des décennies. La veille, des centaines de personnes soupçonnées de vouloir participer à ces manifestations interdites avaient été arrêtées pour être transférées vers une prison au cœur du désert. Certaines auraient subi des tortures, d'autres n'en sont pas revenues. Une équipe de l'AFP a pu recueillir les témoignages de plusieurs prisonniers, et je tiens à vous prévenir,  ils sont durs.   Sur le Fil revient sur ces événements avec un des correspondants qui a mené l'enquête, Thomas Gropallo et avec l'anthropologue tchadien Remadji Honaithi.  Pour lui, la France, alliée du régime, doit davantage s'impliquer pour faciliter une transition démocratique.  Sur le terrain: Laura Diab et Ali Abba Kaya.  Réalisation: Michaëla Cancela-Kieffer. Sur le Fil est le podcast quotidien de l'AFP. Vous avez des commentaires ? Ecrivez-nous à podcast@afp.com ou sur notre compte Instagram. Vous pouvez aussi nous envoyer une note vocale par Whatsapp au + 33 6 79 77 38 45.  Si vous aimez, abonnez-vous, parlez de nous autour de vous et laissez-nous plein d'étoiles sur votre plateforme de podcasts préférée pour mieux faire connaître notre programme !

Tous les jours, les journalistes et correspondants de RFI ainsi que des spécialistes répondent à vos questions sur l'actualité.   Mali : suite à la visite du premier ministre burkinabè à Bamako, quelle coopération entre les deux Etats pour lutter contre le djihadisme ? Par Serge Daniel, correspondant régional pour le Sahel basé à Dakar Football : retraite internationale de Raphaël Varane, à 29 ans. Par Antoine Grognet, journaliste au service sport de RFI Royaume-Uni : comment sortir de la crise économique ? Par Dominique Baillard, journaliste au service économie, chroniqueuse d'Aujourd'hui l'éco sur RFI Guinée : Mamadou Billo Bah de la FNDC placé sous mandat de dépôt. Avec Fabien Offner, chercheur au bureau Afrique de l'Ouest et Afrique Centrale d'Amnesty International   * Par téléphone : de France : 09 693 693 70 de l'étranger : 33 9 693 693 70 * Par WhatsApp : +33 6 89 28 53 64 N'OUBLIEZ PAS DE NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOTRE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE (avec l'indicatif pays). Pour nous suivre : * Facebook : Rfi appels sur l'actualité * Twitter : @AppelsActu

Le 15 août 2022, poussés dehors par la junte au pouvoir à Bamako, les derniers soldats de l'opération Barkhane quittaient le territoire malien. Un départ en catimini après 9 ans sur place à combattre les groupes armés jihadistes. Nouvel affront pour Paris : le 24 janvier 2023, la junte burkinabè demandait le retrait sous un mois des forces spéciales françaises de l'opération Sabre stationnées au Burkina Faso... Mali, Burkina : deux pays dont une large partie du territoire est désormais aux mains de la mouvance jihadiste, deux pays dirigés par des putschistes, deux pays déchirés par les conflits communautaires, deux pays où Moscou avance ses pions via les mercenaires de Wagner.  Quelles sont les leçons à tirer de cette guerre «anti-terroriste» menée par Barkhane au Sahel pendant 9 ans ? Pourquoi cette montée du sentiment anti-français dans la région ? Est-ce un épiphénomène ou le signe qu'une page se tourne, que l'Afrique veut désormais être maîtresse de son destin et de ses alliances, même si elles déplaisent aux Occidentaux. Dans ce contexte, quelle stratégie à présent pour la France au Sahel et y a-t-elle encore un rôle à jouer ?      Trois invités  - Rémi Carayol, journaliste indépendant, auteur de «Le mirage sahélien», aux éditions La Découverte    - Oswald Padonou, professeur à l'École Nationale Supérieure des Armées, au Bénin - Elie Tenenbaum, directeur du Centre des Études de sécurité de l'IFRI, l'Institut Français de Relations Internationales. Co-auteur avec Marc Hecker de «La guerre de vingt ans. Djihadisme et contre-terrorisme au XXIème siècle», paru chez Robert Laffont en 2021, sorti en poche en 2022 augmenté d'une préface actualisée.    

Au menu de l'actualité :Les médicaments contrefaits tuent des centaines de milliers de personnes dans les pays du Sahel, alerte l'ONUDC.Il est urgent de restaurer les zones humides : c'est le thème de la journée mondiale cette année.Au Mali, un projet de stockage des armes légères et de petits calibres vient d'être lancé par l'ONU. Présentation : Florence Westergard

Tous les jours, les journalistes et correspondants de RFI ainsi que des spécialistes répondent à vos questions sur l'actualité.   Tchad : Human Right Watch appelle à une enquête internationale. Par Esdras Ndikumana, journaliste au service international de RFI. Iyad Ag Ghaly : l'homme le plus recherché du Sahel réapparaît. Par Wassim Nasr, journaliste à France 24, spécialiste des mouvements jihadistes. Astronomie : une comète bientôt visible à l'oeil nu. Par Simon Rozé, journaliste au service Sciences de RFI. Grande muraille verte : les ambitions du président de la COP15. Par Alain-Richard Donwahi, président de la COP15 désertification. * Par téléphone : de France : 09 693 693 70 de l'étranger : 33 9 693 693 70 * Par WhatsApp : +33 6 89 28 53 64 N'OUBLIEZ PAS DE NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOTRE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE (avec l'indicatif pays). Pour nous suivre : * Facebook : Rfi appels sur l'actualité * Twitter : @AppelsActu

Mentre il ministro Sergej Lavrov si trova in Eritrea, le truppe francesi si preparano a lasciare il Burkina Faso lasciando campo libero al presidio della Wagner. Ne abbiamo parlato con Ouldelul Kelati Dirar, professore di Storia e Istituzioni dell'Africa all'Università di Macerata, e con Edoardo Baldaro, ricercatore presso L'Université Libre de Bruxelles.

EXPERTS FRANÇOIS CLEMENCEAU Rédacteur en chef international - « Le Journal du Dimanche » GUILLAUME ANCEL Ancien officier de l'armée française DAPHNÉ BENOIT Correspondante Défense - « AFP » PAUL GOGO Correspondant en Russie Après le Mali, le Burkina Faso vient de demander à l'armée française de quitter son territoire. Arrivée au pouvoir à la suite d'un coup d'Etat, le 30 septembre 2022, le deuxième en huit mois, la junte burkinabée dénonce l'accord qui permet aux forces spéciales françaises d'être présentes dans le pays pour lutter contre les groupes jihadistes. Ouagadougou dit notamment vouloir diversifier ses partenaires et envisagerait un rapprochement avec… Moscou. Paris a répondu attendre des clarifications de la part du président de transition, le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré. Le Burkina Faso héberge actuellement un contingent de près de 400 hommes de la force française « Sabre ». Ce scénario rappelle celui de Bamako, dans un contexte qui a vu depuis le putsch de septembre, les manifestations contre la présence militaire française se multiplier à Ouagadougou sur fond de désinformation qui émanerait d'organisations financées par Moscou, avec un objectif : faire de la Russie la puissance d'influence au Sahel à la place de la France. Des dessins animés de propagande russe circulent ainsi sur les réseaux sociaux. Dans l'un d'eux, on peut voir des soldats français représentés en zombies et en serpents, se présentant comme des « démons de Macron ». De l'autre côté, les mercenaires du groupe russe Wagner, eux, sont dépeints comme des libérateurs. Véritable cheval de Troie de l'influence de la Russie sur le continent africain, les hommes de Wagner, un groupe paramilitaire russe sans existence légale, ont été signalés au Burkina Faso mais leur présence n'est pas confirmée. Ils sont en revanche désormais bien implantés au Mali ainsi qu'en Centrafrique. Dans ce dernier pays, les mercenaires russes, proches de Vladimir Poutine, « intimident et harcèlent les civils », créant un climat de peur. À tel point que, selon l'ONU, les victimes des violences de ces paramilitaires sont terrifiées à l'idée de saisir la justice par crainte de représailles. Wagner, une armée de l'ombre qui vient d'être classée par les Etats-Unis « organisation criminelle transnationale », sème la violence partout sur la planète depuis 2013. Avec souvent une même méthode pour s'implanter dans un pays : assurer la sécurité des pouvoirs en place en échange d'une prise de contrôle des mines d'or et de diamant. Avec derrière ces juteux contrats : Evgueni Prigojine. Surnommé le « cuisinier de Vladimir Poutine », le patron de Wagner est sorti de l'ombre pendant la guerre en Ukraine. Il a reconnu en septembre dernier avoir fondé le groupe de mercenaires et il multiplie depuis les apparitions dans les médias ainsi que sur le front ukrainien où ses hommes sont présents. Des déclarations et une omniprésence qui questionnent sur les ambitions de l'homme devenu milliardaire, qui n'a pas hésité ces derniers temps à critiquer l'efficacité de l'armée russe. Alors Evgueni Prigojine serait-il en train de concurrencer son ami Vladimir Poutine ? Quelles sont les ambitions du patron de Wagner ? Que se passe-t-il au Burkina Faso ? Comment les hommes de Wagner sont-ils devenus incontournables en Afrique ? Enfin si RT France ferme, la chaîne russe est très active en Afrique. Quelle est sa stratégie sur le continent africain ? DIFFUSION : du lundi au samedi à 17h45 FORMAT : 65 minutes PRÉSENTATION : Caroline Roux - Axel de Tarlé REDIFFUSION : du lundi au vendredi vers 23h40 RÉALISATION : Nicolas Ferraro, Bruno Piney, Franck Broqua, Alexandre Langeard, Corentin Son, Benoît Lemoine PRODUCTION : France Télévisions / Maximal Productions Retrouvez C DANS L'AIR sur internet & les réseaux : INTERNET : francetv.fr FACEBOOK : https://www.facebook.com/Cdanslairf5 TWITTER : https://twitter.com/cdanslair INSTAGRAM : https://www.instagram.com/cdanslair/

Danny and Derek welcome Lamin Keita, PhD candidate in political science at Northwestern University, and Alex Thurston, assistant professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, for a discussion on the situation in the Sahel, namely Mali and Burkina Faso. They talk about the 2022 coups in each country, the role of jihadist conflicts in the region, where the respective junta governments currently stand, the role of the United States in the coups and the Sahel in general, and more.Note: This discussion was recorded before the expulsion of French troops by Burkina Faso.Check out Alex's work at Sahel Blog, the issue of Middle East Report he guest edited, and his book Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel!Check out Lamin's AfroSaharo Research Network! This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.americanprestigepod.com/subscribe

Les autorités burkinabè ont confirmé, ce lundi 23 janvier 2023, mettre fin à l'accord qui permet aux soldats français d'être présents au Burkina Faso. Les 400 éléments des forces spéciales engagés dans la lutte contre le terrorisme au Sahel ont un mois pour quitter le pays. Que vous inspire cette décision ? Comment analysez-vous la volonté du capitaine Traoré de se tourner vers d'autres partenaires ? Vos réactions nous intéressent. * Par téléphone : de France : 09 693 693 70 de l'étranger : 33 9 693 693 70 * Par WhatsApp : +33 6 89 28 53 64 N'OUBLIEZ PAS DE NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOTRE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE (avec l'indicatif pays). Pour nous suivre : * Facebook : Rfi appels sur l'actualité * Twitter : @AppelsActu

durée : 00:04:00 - Le monde d'après - par : Jean Marc FOUR - Le gouvernement du Burkina Faso demande le départ des troupes françaises stationnées dans le pays. Après le Mali, c'est un nouveau revers pour Paris dans une région du monde, le Sahel, où la présence russe, à l'inverse, se renforce. Et la contagion pourrait se poursuivre.

durée : 00:04:00 - Le monde d'après - par : Jean Marc FOUR - Le gouvernement du Burkina Faso demande le départ des troupes françaises stationnées dans le pays. Après le Mali, c'est un nouveau revers pour Paris dans une région du monde, le Sahel, où la présence russe, à l'inverse, se renforce. Et la contagion pourrait se poursuivre.

durée : 00:15:56 - Les Enjeux internationaux - par : Baptiste Muckensturm - Plusieurs centaines de personnes ont manifesté vendredi 20 janvier à Ouagadougou contre la présence française au Burkina Faso... - invités : Niagalé Bagayoko Docteure en science politique, diplômée de l'Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP) de Paris et spécialiste des politiques internationales de sécurité et de la réforme des systèmes de sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest

Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped. My guest today is Charlie Robertson, who is the chief economist of Renaissance Capital - a global investment bank - and in this episode we talked about the subject of Charlie's new book, "The Time-Travelling Economist''. The book explores the connection between education, electricity, and fertility to economic development. The thrust of the book's argument is that no poor country can escape poverty without education, and that electricity is an important factor for investors looking to build businesses. It also explains that a low fertility rate helps to increase household savings. Charlie argues, with a lot of data and historical parallels, that countries need at least a 70-80% adult literacy rate (defined as being able to read and write four sentences in any language) and cheap electricity (an average of 300 - 500 kWh per capita) in order to industrialize and grow their economies rapidly. Small(er) families (3 children per woman) mean households are able to save more money, which can improve domestic investments by lowering interest rates - otherwise countries may repeatedly stumble into debt crises. We also discussed how increasing education can lead to higher domestic wages, but that this is usually offset by a large increase in the working-age population - and other interesting implications of Charlie's argument.TRANSCRIPTTobi;The usual place I would start with is what inspired you to write it. You mentioned in the book that it was an IMF paper that sort of started your curiosity about the relationship between education, electricity, fertility, and economic development. Generally. So, what was the Eureka moment?Charlie;Yeah, the eureka moment actually came in Kenya, um, because I'd already done a lot of work showing how important education was. It's the most important, no country escapes poverty without education. So I'd already made that clear and there wasn't much debate about that. Perhaps there was a debate about why some countries have gone faster than others, but there wasn't much debate about that. The second thing I was very clear on was electricity, which kept on coming up in meetings across Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, [at] a number of countries, people kept on talking about the importance of electricity. But the eureka moment came when somebody pointed out to me that Kenya, where I was at the time, couldn't afford to build huge excess capacity of electricity, which I was arguing you need to have. You need to have too much electricity, so that it's cheap and it's reliable.And then investors come in and say, "great! I've got cheap educated labour, and I've got cheap reliable electricity. I've got the human capital and the power I need, that then enables me to invest and build a business here." And the question then was, well, why was it so expensive in Kenya but so cheap in China? Why was the cost of borrowing so high in Nigeria but so cheap in Morocco or Mauritius? And when I was trying to work out where did the savings come from in China, uh, well I was looking globally, but China's the best example of economic success and development success we've seen in the last 50 years. Over half the answer came from this IMF paper saying, actually it came from their low fertility rate. That's over half of the rise in household savings, which are massive in China, came about because the fertility rate had fallen so dramatically.And I then thought, could this possibly be true for other countries as well? Could this help explain why interest rates are so high in Nigeria or Kenya and so low elsewhere? And the answer is yes. So this book, The Time Travelling Economist is bringing all of these three things together - the fertility rate, the education rate, and electricity - to say not just how countries develop, cause I think I've answered that, but when they develop. Because once we know those three factors are key, we can then work out the when. Not just in the past [of] countries, but also in the future. Um, so that's where this came from.Tobi;I mean, we're going to be talking about each of those factors over the course of this conversation, but another question...some would say boring question, but I know how development economists and economists generally always try to defend their turf, you know, around issues like these. So, has anybody like taking you to task on the causal link between these three factors and development? And how would you defend yourself against that were it to be asked?Charlie;I haven't found anyone yet who's argued successfully against these points. Um, the closest criticism I get, and just to say, you know, this book came about off the back of three key reports I did in 2017 on education, 2018 on electricity, and 2019 on fertility and savings. So I've now been talking about these ideas for three to five years. The book only came out in July, 2022, bringing them all together. But in five years I haven't had pushback other than people ask, "is it not correlated?" You know, "is it not perhaps economic growth leads fertility declines or boosts savings?" And I think I show really clearly in the data that "no." Um, the fertility declines give us the growth. You don't get growth without adult literacy of at least 40%, you certainly don't get industrialization until literacy is at 70 to 80.So, you know, I'm looking at the data and I think it's pretty crystal clear that you've gotta get these other things right first before your economy can take off. And I can't find any counter-examples. Except, I mean there's the inevitable few, those countries like Qatar or Kuwait with huge amounts of energy exports per capita or diamonds in Botswana's case. And there you don't have to get everything right before you get wealthier because you just happen to be lucky to have huge amounts of energy exports per person and a very small population. But they are a bit of an exception. I think you could probably argue that they do grow first before they get everything else right. But for the vast majority of the planet and all countries in history, it's the other way around. You gotta get education, power, fertility rates in the right place to take off.Tobi;So I mean, getting into the weeds, let's look at education first. Before your book, personally for me, and I should say what I really like about your book is, it's well written, it's an interesting read. It comes across as a bit less analytical, which is what you get from the standard development literature, you know, and I think that's partly because you are writing about a lot of the countries that you have also worked in and interacted with a lot of these factors. So it really gives it a first-hand experience kind of narrative. So I like that very much. So prior to your book, if someone were to ask me about the relationship between education and economic development or catch-up growth, generally, the reference usually goes to Studwell's big claim, Joe Studwell, that: Yeah. You don't really need a super high level of education metrics for a country to industrialize because the standard explanation is that how a relatively poor country starts industrializing is from the low-skill, uh, labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing jobs, that you don't need a high level of education and skill for you to be able to do that.So what I wanna work out here is what is the transmission mechanism between adult literacy and industrialization the way you've, like, clearly analyzed in your book?Charlie;Well, thank you very much for saying it was nicely written, I appreciate that. I wanted to try and make it as accessible as possible. Yeah, I think Joe Studwell's books are really good and I think he's right that you don't need a high level of education to do that first step out of rural poverty, subsistence farming into a textile mill. I think what's interesting is how many people writing about development forget how important just adult literacy actually is, because we've taken [it] so much for granted. So Adam Smith, who wrote The Wealth of Nations, the father of economics back in the 18th century in Scotland, he didn't make a big deal about adult literacy driving growth. And more recently, you know, people like Dani Rodrik have echoed exactly that saying you don't need any great education to work in a textile mill. You just need to be dextrous with your fingers. Which is almost exactly actually what Adam Smith said 250 years ago. And I was sympathetic to that, but I then kept on seeing in the data, well, first of all, I found this theory written in the sixties that said that no country has industrialized even to that first basic level of textiles without adult literacy being about 70 to 80% of the population. Which means basically all adults, all men, plus well over half the female population as well. And this was the theory written in the sixties and when I looked at the data, it was proven right and I couldn't quite understand why - if you just need dextrous fingers to work in a textile mill, why would there be that link? And I ended up talking to a guy who ran Levi's factories in Asia in the 1980s and he said, “Charlie, just think about it.”You've got this box of Levi's jeans coming down the conveyor belt. Do you put that box onto the truck labelled United States or that truck labelled Europe for export? And if you can't read and write, you won't even get that right. So the adult literacy thing I think is overlooked. People are focusing on secondary school, high school education, how much [many] university graduates a country needs and they do need graduates too. But until you get to that 70 to 80% adult literacy, textile mills don't go to a country. And we can see that they did go to China in the nineties when they got to adult literacy of 70%. They are in Southeast Asia. They're in Bangladesh since education hit about 70 to 80% in the last 10 to 15 years. But they're not big in sub-Saharan Africa, or at least in parts of Nigeria or the Sahel or West Africa because the education levels still aren't there yet. So, you know, I looked as far back as I could go to the 19th century and even the first non-European country to take off, Japan, had an adult literacy rate of about 70% by 1900 and 20 years later, they had a thriving textile industry. The education always comes first. And Korea copied that Japan model in the 1950s and sixties, Taiwan, Hong Kong, all the rest [of] Southeast Asia's followed. Now, South Asia's doing it and luckily it's spreading across Africa too. But the adult literacy is the first essential step.Tobi;One possible objection. And I haven't seen this anywhere, but I couldn't really get it out of my mind while I was reading that part of the book is that some will argue that increasing education also increases domestic wages and that is really a problem for industrializing. And, if I recall, one particular point that the anonymous economic historian on Twitter, Pseudoerasmus, made particularly about Asia, is they were able to combine a very high adult literacy rate - a measure which you use is completion of secondary education…Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;With very unusually low domestic wages. What role do wages play in your analysis?Charlie;I think that's the norm actually. It connects to the fertility thing. And I'm not sure if you want to jump there just yet, but what tends to happen when you've educated your population is that the fertility rate drops a lot. And when that happens, the number of people who have to stay at home looking after 5, 6, 7 children goes down a lot too. Women can go into the workforce and of course cause you've got the education, right? Those women are educated so they can join the industrial workforce as well. So very roughly, if we say there's a hundred people in Nigeria, 50 kids and 50 adults, let's say 25 of the adults have to be staying at home to look after 50 kids, you're talking 25% of the population can go out and work of the overall population. You go to Asia today and it's more like 70% adults, say 30% of kids.So you need maybe 15% of adults to stay at home. And you end up with something like 85% of the whole population can go out to work instead of 25%. Now, the consequence of that is a massive rise in the working-age population. And I think that that keeps industrial wages low for a few generations, in fact. Or at least three decades. Probably 40 years, where the education's come through, the fertility rates come down, you've got this huge excess supply of labour, which is then joining the industrial workforce and getting jobs. But because there keeps on being more people joining that workforce, it keeps wages relatively low. Now, what eventually happens then after a few decades is that that big increase in the workforce stops increasing as fast. We've seen this in China in the last 20 years. So, 20 years ago China's per capita GDP was about fifteen hundred dollars, $1,500.Whereas now, now the population has stopped growing. Working age population's shrinking. It's gone up to over $11,500. It's gone up tenfold. So the big reward for industrialization comes later. And we had this in Europe of course in the 19th century, you know, wages were pretty awful and industrial working was pretty awful experience in the 19th century. I mean it paid slightly better than rural subsistence farming, which is why people came to the cities. But London was a horrible place for the vast majority of people. And the industrial workhouses were terrible places as well. And that lasted for generations. It's only when that big population, kind of, boom stories started to shift that labour eventually got any bargaining power. Cause when there was too much labour coming into the market, they had no bargaining power with the factory owners. It wasn't until the 1870s that the trade unions became legal in, say, the United States. Because up till then, you know, "you join a union, I fire you," you know, could be what the factory owner would say in the United States, cause there's always gonna be another person I can employ. But once the workforce starts to gain a bit of bargaining power, cause it's not expanding quite so fast, then finally wages start to pick up. So I think what's happened in Asia is pretty normal and will probably be the experience that we've seen across Africa as well.Tobi;Inevitably this will take us into what it means to be educated, really. Because a lot of countries, I mean it's pretty much standard - they say, Oh yeah, we want invest in education. Um, we know it is important for human capital. We know how important it is to have an educated population and all that. You talked about some data challenges also for some countries in your book. So what I wanna ask here is what exactly does it mean to be educated in the sense that you are talking about in the book?Charlie;Yeah, this is a really fair question. Why am I talking about adult literacy? The definition is can you read and write four sentences in any language? Sentences like "farming is hard work." So it's not a very high threshold and I wouldn't argue, I don't think you would, that it's highly educated. It's just educated enough to put that box of jeans onto the right truck when it's going to America or Europe. But all that's doing then is taking your country's per capita GDP from your per person kind of wealth from say $500 a year, a thousand dollars a year to the kind of two, $3,000 a year level. It doesn't mean you've got the education levels you need to get to the $10,000 per capita GDP level growth or 20 or 50 or even a hundred. Um, to get to the 10,000 level, I think you probably need very good secondary school education as well.And to get to the $20,000 per capital GDP level, you're talking a lot of graduates coming out of university and you need to have that education then spreading throughout the population, both broadening and deeper education as well. And that is a process that takes decades. I mean I focused quite a bit on Korea because it was one of the most successful models and then China came along and did it even faster. But what Korea prioritized in the 1950s was getting that adult literacy rate from 35% or so, too low even to grow sustainably, to about 90% they said by 1960. So in about 10 or 15 years they got it from 35 to 90 and that was enough then to have textile mills do really well in the 1960s and they became a manufacturing country, an industrialized country by the early 1970s.But already then the government said, right, we need more engineers, we need graduates coming out of university to do heavy industry, to do cars, shipbuilding. But Korea had no cars or shipbuilding at the time, nothing significant. So they were changing the university focus from, kind of, the arts or law towards engineering and the sciences before they had the economic sectors that they were trying to promote. And then about 10 to 20 years later, all these graduates were then in the economy and ready to start up companies like Deawoo, Hyundai, Kia, Samsung. And they started small obviously in the 1980s and early nineties. But this kind of sequential thinking about it meant that Korea kept on having the right human capital at every stage of development. So my book's trying to focus on, you know, why hasn't Pakistan got all the textile factories?Why does Bangladesh have them? Why doesn't Nigeria have them? Why does Vietnam have them? And this is saying first you've gotta get that sequencing right of everybody ideally being literate, everybody having had school up to 11 years old and come out with a good standard of education. On the quality issue you just raised, the problem here is a couple of things. So I mean firstly people sometimes just make up the data and say, yes, my population is literate when it's not. But secondly, when you try and kind of shoehorn a hundred kids into one class to say, you know, they're all going to school now, but you've only got one teacher, you are not coming out with a good education at all. You might not even be coming out literate at all. So that, you know, I'm also trying to warn that governments can't do this on the cheap. Or not completely. They have to take it seriously and say, look, we actually need to make sure everyone really is coming out able to read and write. It's not just trying to tick a box to say everyone's at school.Tobi;Hopefully, we'll circle back to policy questions around this later. Let's talk briefly about electricity, which as you say, once you start investigating these factors, then you start teasing out what's what for each country. And the way you introduce that is [that] there are some countries with very high adult literacy rates but still weren't getting the benefits - like [the] Philippines, which was your example in the book. And it turns out what was missing in that particular case was electricity generation. But first I want you to make one distinction for me quite quickly. Cause it's funny, I was reading David Pilling's brief coverage of your book in the FT and he talked about the fertility part being controversial and I wonder that people miss the obvious controversy in electricity, but we'll get to that. So, now, is it really about investment in electricity that is often missing in countries that can't quite manage to get it right or the way their electricity market is structured? I know you are quite familiar with Nigeria and it's really a big, big, big debate that we've been having for, I don't know, like 20 years. So, some people will say you need very large upfront investment, possibly by the government, in generating capacity transmission, machinery and co. We argue, oh no, you really need to restructure the electricity market first. People have to pay for what they use. You need to restructure the tariff system, blah blah blah, blah, blah. What are your thoughts?Charlie;Um, big issues. And there is a debate. There're so many debates about this actually. There's the debate about whether you need a big national grid, big national generation and distribution companies or whether you can have localized electricity. Um, you are getting a couple of points though that I think it's easier to say some answers to. And one of them was to do with getting people to actually pay their bills. Certainly a problem in Nigeria, apparently, you know, discos will say that because there hasn't been good metering and despite privatization that those meters have not been rolled out. I know the government's promising to roll it out to all 10 million account holders now, but because there hasn't been metering, you can't charge necessarily the fair price for the amount of electricity people have used. So then people don't wanna pay. So then the discos are losing money, then they can't pay the generators and this then becomes a problem.And I think there is a case to say that if the generators can sell some power directly to some big companies, that could be one way around part of the problem. So in a place like Lagos, very similar to the Philippines in the 20th century, good educated population just held back by a lack of cheap reliable power. You know, I think if Lagos could have its own electricity story, it would be a phenomenally successful economy. It should be over the next three or four decades. So there is a case about how you structure this. But I found two or three things interesting when I was looking into this issue in 2018. And the first was just clarifying that it really is electricity that people need more than say transport infrastructure. You know, this is a survey the world bank had done and the only countries where they've said transport infrastructure was the bigger problem was countries where there wasn't an electricity problem because there's so much of it.So countries, where there's a load of electricity, say yes we need more transport infrastructure, but everybody else says we have to have the electricity first. So then it's a question of how do you roll that out in a way that makes money and supports development? And there is a... I think, a problem at the moment with well-meaning policies from people like the United Nations or the African Development Bank saying everybody should have access to electricity. But my point in the book is, and Adam Smith said the same thing in the 18th century, you want your infrastructure to be making money not losing money. You need to make sure that if you're going to supply people with a road or a bridge or electricity, that they can pay for it. And if you start building stuff that loses you money because people can't pay their bills, then you'll end up with an uneconomic electricity system which can't function properly and can't give industry what it needs.And what I try to emphasize in this is that every country from America and France in the 1920s to Turkey in the 1960s or seventies to Korea in the 1970s, every country has said, okay, let's make sure we've got electricity for industry first. Profitable, makes money, and then households over time? Yeah, okay, we'll connect them over time, but only when they can start affording to pay for electricity. It's not another subsidy that governments can't afford, we just can't do that. [This] is what every other country's done. But at the moment I do see this pressure for electricity systems to try and roll out universal access and so, in places like Kenya that's putting the whole electricity system under financial pressure because it's hurting their profits. And if you're trying to roll out cheap electricity to households, well how do you pay for that?Well, government subsidies partly, but the other way to pay for it is to make industry pay a high price. But if you're making industry pay a high price industry won't come. They'll go to Asia; where they get a low price for electricity. They're not going to go to somewhere that's got a high price. Cause no company's gonna say, I just wanna subsidize households getting electricity. Companies are coming to build stuff in countries because they'll make a good profit from doing so. So I think you've raised a number of issues there, you know, is localized electricity good, and so on? You know, what should you be prioritizing first - industry or households? And there's a whole host of issues. But I hope I've answered that.Tobi;Actually, that's the controversy I was referring to at the beginning of that question because the background that is, it'll be a very, very tough sell in the current political climate, for example in Nigeria, for any person aspiring to public office to make this argument that you have to power industry first. What it's going to sound like is: you are just trying to prioritize the rich and trying to exclude some people from what, like you said, has come to be framed as a universal basic right. You talk to a lot of small businesses, even individuals, like you mentioned with the World Bank Survey, the importance of electricity is so paramount on everybody's mind that if there's stable electricity, I can start X and Y businesses. I could make money and, I mean, no one needs the government for anything else. Just give us electricity.Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;So my point is practically… thinking about this practically, how do you think a sensible government that is not trying to bankrupt itself prematurely can manage this situation?Charlie;Well, I think it's hard work. Um, how did the Koreans do it in the sixties or the seventies or the eighties? They gave you no right to protest - military government. How did the communists do so well at getting this industry first, households later? How did they get it right in China or Russia? Same thing. You've got no rights to protest. "Your interests don't matter, we're thinking 10 to 20 years ahead how to make our country better off and how to make everyone better off. So you suffer now because we are gonna prioritize business." So that is one model. I'm not recommending it, I'm just saying it is a model that can be done. The other way is to allow it to be done by the private sector. And if you let the private sector roll out electricity, they will not supply electricity to people who won't pay their bills.And that is the story that you saw in western Europe, it's the story you saw in the States, and to some extent you're seeing actually in Kenya. There's quite an interesting company there called M-KOPA. And M-KOPA will sell you, well, they'll lend you, they'll lease you, a solar panel, a little one that you can put on your - actually, a friend of mine was showing it to me the other day in Uganda...they put it on the straw roof of the mud hut and that solar panel, you pay a monthly fee and after about 18 months you've paid for the panel, you've also got energy during that time enough to supply a mobile phone and so on, lights a little bit, and then it's yours and that's effectively privatizing that rural distribution story. But I think the difficulty is that politicians find it really hard to do this.And part of what I'm writing about in the book is how really hard it is for governments in a country with no savings, big population growth, to constantly meet all of the different demands. With huge population growth you're having to build new schools all the time, you have to hire even more teachers all the time. You've got population pressure, maybe, causing clashes over agricultural land like the Fulani herdsman in Central Nigeria, Northern Nigeria as well. And all of these pressures are on you all of the time. And there's constant demand to spend more on bridges, on hospitals, on education, on security. And what you can't afford to be doing is making a loss. And so I think what politicians need to do is say, we've gotta sequence this right. The same thing as with education. It's no good having a million university graduates if a country isn't literate enough to have an industrial base, you've gotta have the literacy first.And equally, it's no good having electricity rolled out to every household when there are no factories for people to go and get the jobs they need to be able to pay the electricity bill. And it's not easy. I, I totally understand it's not an easy situation for anyone to be in. The difficulty is [that] because it's not easy, too many political leaders will take what appears to be the easy option of saying, "I tell you what, let's just go and borrow a load of dollars offshore. Nigeria's going to go and issue a lot of dollar debt and we'll use that to try and sort these problems out." Kenya's done the same, Ghana's done the same, Pakistan's done the same. And the risk then is that you end up in default situations. So that feeds into one of the other chapters in the book as well.But I think it's very difficult. I think realistically governments need to say, what can we do here? And this is how long it's going to take. And it's going to be not a five-year story, it's going be a 20-year story, a 30-year story to get it right. And people, sadly, need to be patient, which is hard; when for generations people have been waiting for things to get much, much better and little progress has been made, relatively little progress has been made compared to Asia and that causes a lot of political frustration. I think.Tobi;I mean, speaking about Asia and I mean your point about taking away the right to protest, I think Africa and Nigeria sort of missed that window when we had military governments everywhere. So, uh, let me give you one experience I've had in trying to discuss your book with friends. So I get two reactions to the fertility section.It's almost automatic, you know, when you discuss fertility being at a certain level and I try to, you know, successfully argue your point, you get two strands of reactions in my experience, one goes immediately to the China issue - the one-child policy; that, "oh, so are you trying to say we should do what China did?" The other slightly more technical objection I get goes to the relationship between population growth and economic growth that is quite pervasive in the growth literature. Did you also experience that while writing the book and debating with colleagues?Charlie;Now I'll take each point in turn. Um, the China one-child policy story helps explain this massive rise in Chinese savings and then their very strong growth. What I'm trying to show in the book, of course, is that every rich country has seen a fertility decline. And what I'm arguing is probably the right sort of level for countries to aim for is about two to three kids on average. I don't care if people have five kids or one kid, it's just as a country the average of two to three kids is consistent with a very high, well, a big jump in the level of sayings. And with those savings, you can then industrialize and grow, and grow fast. Um, China I think actually made a mistake. I think China got it wrong by going for the one-child policy because they kind of turbocharged that story, that story that every rich country has got, of lower fertility, it took a really long time in Europe. I mean it took a really, really long time in Europe and that's why Europe had the slowest growth of any industrial revolution. It was done faster by the communism [they had] in Russia and they did faster growth and we've done even faster in China. But the consequence of this one-child policy and what the Chinese have discovered is it's bloody hard to get the fertility rate back up again once you've had one kid. I was talking to a Chinese professor on a plane back from Asia once and she was saying all of her friends, they can't get married, they can't stay married. They get married and they can't stay married because they're all used to being a one-child kind of princess or prince in the family who gets everything they want and then they try married life and they discover as you might well know, that you never get everything you want in a marriage, and you have to compromise.And it's certainly created a problem now that China can't get the kids, they can't raise the fertility level and it's not just China that's discovered that once you've got a low fertility rate, too low, I think of one, you have a problem raising it. Again, Italy's had the same problem, Iran, uh, Russia. So I think China did it too fast. And you certainly don't need to do it and loads of other countries show you that just aiming for that two to three kids figure really helps your economy and gets you onto the path to being middle-income and then a rich country. So I don't think you need to do the China one child. No. Um, the second issue, the population growth versus economic growth. What I show, what we did in this was we looked back at every country's growth rate since 1960 and I compared the per capita GDP growth, the per personal growth of an economy, it's the best way to measure how well an economy itself is really doing. And I compared that growth rate against the share of adults to kids that I was talking to you about a little earlier.Tobi;Yeah.Charlie;And where it's 50-50 roughly, between adults and kids, per capita GDP grows at 1% and that was the story of Asia in the sixties and seventies. It's still the story for a good number of countries including Nigeria today. So per capita GDP growth is about 1% when half your population can't work because they're kids. But once you get two-thirds of the population being adults, your average per capita growth in lower-income countries by half of America's wealth level, so not even lower-income, lower or middle-income countries, your per capita growth, and it averages three to 5% a year. So the structure of your population tells you what your per capita GDP growth is. So it's just... I can't see that there's any other way to explain this than you've gotta get that fertility rate down first before you can start to get the high per capita GDP growth. Um, and it's connected to the savings, of course; cause once you've got two kids instead of six, you're saving money in the bank, the bank starts to have more cash to lend out. There's more money for lending for investment. The government can borrow more cheaply so it can build infrastructure, roads and rail, electricity and cheap electricity cause interest rates are low cause the savings are high because most families are able to put some money aside at the end of the week. But that doesn't happen when 50% of the population are kids. They're not earning any money, they're not saving anything and the poor parents are trying to manage to feed five, six kids on average. You know, they've got nothing left at the end of the week to put into a bank.So the bank's got no cash. So interest rates are really high cause there's no money in the bank. Um, so money's really expensive. So the government can't afford to invest in infrastructure and if it does build electricity it has to charge a lot of money cause it's having to pay a lot of interest on the debt it's taken on. So to me, I've yet to find someone demolish the argument and uh, you know, it could happen.Tobi;Yeah.Charlie;But so far it seems you've got to get the fertility rate down first if you want to get fast growth. Now if you don't want to grow at three, four, 5% a year, you could do it really slowly like Europe did and you grow at say, one and a half, two, eventually, you get from European farming in 1800 to factories that are producing not great stuff by 1900, a hundred years later. But when I'm looking at Nigeria today, I don't want Nigeria to be waiting a hundred years to be doing what Europe took a hundred years to do. I also don't think the Chinese model of it taking 30 years, 20, 30 years but then having a population problem of being too old, I don't think that's the right solution either. But there's somewhere in between. At the moment though, Nigeria's on that long growth story, it's not yet ready for the faster growth storyTobi;On the China question, um, thinking about your answer there, is extremely low fertility or what they say "fertility below the replacement rate" a feature of the kind of explosive growth 30, 35, 40-year trajectory that we've seen in Asia. Because if you look at Korea, Korea even have worse demographic numbers than China and there was no draconian population policy, but it's kind of gone through this explosive growth phase that is even faster and bigger than China's.Charlie;Well, it's been going on for longer. So what the Koreans got right was they raised their adult literacy rate to, you know, they said about 90% by 1960. China, despite being communist and communists tend to say they really appreciate education, didn't get to over 70% literacy until 1990, sometime in the early 1990s, which is 25, 35 years later than Korea. Uh, so Korea was already booming in 1970 at a time when China was having the catastrophic mistakes of the cultural revolution and really bad growth and people feared mass famine. Well many, many did die in China in the sixties. So what I would argue is that Korea had a slower fertility decline and the growth rates were not as fast as China's but they've been growing for 50, 60 years already. So Korea's two to three times richer than China is today. But as you say, they're so ageing that they're gonna be the oldest country in the world by 2030.And what's gonna get interesting then, and I can't really answer this in the book cause we haven't seen it yet, but what's interesting about Korea and we're going to have to watch it carefully, is that you are going to end up with, not 70% adults and 30% kids, it'll be less and less working-age adults, maybe 60%, I dunno maybe eventually 50% and it'll be 50% kids and old age pensioners who can't work. And my guess is that Korean growth is going to slow back to about the 1% per capita growth that Nigeria's got at the moment because Korea's going to be too old. You know, and that's not something that I think people should be thinking about or worrying about. [People should be thinking about] Pakistan, East Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa at the moment. It's [Korea is] just not a...you know, that's a problem to worry about in 50, 60 years. But it is going to be interesting to watch what does happen to growth in really old countries. Um, can pensioners actually still do work? You know, maybe they end up retiring at 70 or 75 or 80, I dunno. It's gonna be quite interesting to see.Tobi;So I mean the question then is, uh, for countries that have fertility rates that are higher than what you described in the book.Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;It then becomes how do we get it to the point where domestic savings start going up, interest rate for the domestic investment environment then benefits from that virtuous cycle. You talked about access to uh, reproductive interventions like contraception, also education, which takes us to where we started this conversation from, especially the education of women and girls, generally. I was taking a look at David Le Bris recently where he was talking about equality between siblings and inequality between siblings and how it affects the overall capital formation, whether it's physical capital or human capital in the society. So my question then is, do you see individual sort of personalized household decision-making affecting this more or it is sort of a national policy thing?Charlie;When it's something as important as family, you know, the individual decisions matter a huge amount. And as I said earlier, I've got no issues with anyone doing what they choose to do. But that big family story, I was just talking to a former minister, actually, of a... former finance minister of a country and he's got five kids, he's saying that he's been able to help fund them go to university, but he can't afford to help them buy a house cause he just hasn't got the cash. And I thought that was a really interesting example of even in a wealthier country, you know, it still matters how big that family is. You know, when I looked into this on how do you get the fertility rate down and there's been quite a lot written about it. I don't have a magic or a single answer, but the theories are first: girls if they're staying at school until they're 18, versus girls who leave school at 13. If you leave school at 13, perhaps you have your first kid at 14, maybe a second kid at 17, third kid at 20. But if you stay at school until you're 18, perhaps the first kid's at 20. So already you've reduced the fertility rate by two just by keeping girls at school. And the key figure, but just kind of remind, well tell people is the key figure is at about three to four kids per woman on average, the banking system has got deposits cash in it of about 35% of GDP, at four to five kids, it's around 30, 25 to 30. At five to six kids, which is where Nigeria is, it's about 20% of GDP. Um, so 20, 30, you know, these sort of levels. If you get to two to three kids though, if you get it below three kids, it more than doubles to about 60% of GDP.That's when banks suddenly have loads of cash. When banks have got loads of cash, there's loads of lending, suddenly access to finance isn't a problem anymore. So how do you get it below three kids? So you educate girls, there's an incentive when women are educated for them to work cause they can start to make decent money in a textile factory that you can't do unless you've got that literacy. Um, the government just telling people that low fertility is a good thing is shown to have some success. From Indonesia to India, these kinds of government campaigns suggesting lower fertility rates have made a difference. The third thing, which really surprised me cause it's such a strong correlation, is [to] stop kids [from] dying. And I was pretty upset, actually, to see the numbers where, for Nigeria, you've got a 10% chance, just over a 10% chance of dying before the age of five because you're born in Nigeria. And when I was comparing that to Covid - which the world spent, what, trillions trying to fight - with a fatality rate of about one or 2%, you think of those with more than a 10% chance of dying just before the age of five in Nigeria. Anyway, it's kind of shockingly high, but when you have such a high chance of losing a child, you tend to have more children and the correlation is really quite strong. So, if you can try and address infant, [and] young child mortality rates, which doesn't cost that much, you can see countries with Nigeria's wealth level that have a mortality rate of not over 10%, but five or even 3%. And usually, countries with such a low mortality rate then have a much lower fertility rate as well. So, people tend to have less kids when they are more confident that all their kids are going to survive childhood. So, some investment in basic healthcare for children, education of girls, contraception availability, yes it does help, and government information campaigns. You put those things together and then you get a country like Bangladesh. Bangladesh which had the same population as Nigeria about 15 years ago. But today Nigeria's got tens of millions more. But Bangladesh is growing as fast as India. Bangladesh's per capita GDP is over $2,000. And it keeps on growing at six, seven, 8% every year. Because they have on average two kids per woman, they've got savings, they don't have much foreign debt because they don't need to borrow dollars from abroad to fund their growth, because they've got their own savings, because the fertility rate is low. Muslim Bangladesh: tremendous success story over the last two or three decades.Tobi;You sort of made allowances for countries that can't quite get their savings right up to the levels where they can get the desired domestic savings and really positively affect their investment environment in a big way. And you talked about debt in the book, which would be familiar to anybody that's been in the new cycle about Nigeria currently, which is that government revenue has collapsed. Debt servicing is rapidly approaching a hundred percent of what the government can collect. And it's only a matter of time before we are talking about a debt crisis. But, like you said, a debt crisis is, like, unavoidable if you're trying to grow and you don't have to requisite domestic savings to sort of mitigate that. But this inevitably brings in the question of debt restructuring which, again, some would also argue does not help you grow. So, in terms of just the sheer macroeconomics management of this, how do you go about it?Charlie;It's tough. The book's arguing, obviously, that a whole chunk of this stuff is really long term. You got to get the education right. So, you've got to have enough teachers and that takes, well, at best Korea did it in 15, 20 years. But even if you've got the education, then you've got to get the fertility rate down. And that takes at best 10 years to get it down by about two kids per woman. Nigeria's at 5.3 kids or so at the moment. It needs to be below three to have the local savings. So, we're talking at least 15 years, even if every priority was made today to try and improve education, do all this reproductive education and so on. So, the governments then have the choice of what do you do? I mean, if you're going to wait 15 years, you can grow at 1% a year per person. But you'll find the population is getting pretty cross because you've got all these other countries in the world growing at three, four, 5% per person every year. You know, why is my country growing at one [percent]? So, the politicians then...[it] becomes so attractive to go out and borrow and, you know, every country, not every single one, but the vast majority of debt defaults in the second half of the 20th century were in high fertility countries. The fertility rate I think was around, on average, five - five kids per woman was the average fertility rate in countries that defaulted in the second half of the 20th century. Wherever they were in the world. A lot of them were in Latin America in the debt crisis of 1980s. So firstly, debt crises are really common in high fertility countries because governments say I want to speed up my growth and they borrow when the markets let them.And we've certainly seen that in Africa in the last 10 years too. And then they borrow too much and then they go into default and then they can lose maybe a decade. And that is what happened in Latin America in the 1980s. But the alternative is to only grow at 1% a year. And yeah, you can avoid debt default. I'm not saying every high fertility country defaults. I'm saying almost all the countries that have defaulted are high fertility. So, you can settle for the low growth but if you don't want to settle for the low growth, the debt becomes a very attractive way to try and get faster growth. But it causes a problem. I end up finding roughly two other ways that you can try.Tobi;Okay.Charlie;And grow faster. Is it okay to jump on to those?Tobi;Yeah, go ahead please.Charlie;Yeah. First is to try and bring in as much foreign investment as you can. Cause you haven't got enough local savings, you don't want to take on too much debt cause eventually you'll default. So, you can try and make yourself very attractive for foreign investors. Foreign direct investors. The only problem with that model is that those foreign direct investors do also want their cheap electricity and the good infrastructure that unfortunately high fertility countries haven't got the money to pay for. So, it's difficult to get in a lot of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment in China, I was just reading a really good book by David Lubin, who's the chief economist of Citi for Emerging Markets and he did a book called Dance of the Trillions. Highly recommend, it's brilliant on emerging markets. And he says FDI suddenly started in China in the 1990s. Now, I know why. My book is explaining why I think, which is you finally had a literate population, 70% literacy and you also had the low fertility rate. So, you had the high savings, you had the good infrastructure. But the FDI didn't come 10 years before into China. It only really picked up in the 1990s. So, the point of then is, I mean yeah, try and get some [FDI] if you can, but the last option that I can see other than to just, perhaps, try to go full Stalinist, kind of communist, take control of every part of the economy. But even that still education and low fertility really helps... Um, the last option which any country can do is to run a current account surplus, I think. Have a currency level that's so cheap that you are running a trade surplus. A current account surplus, which is obviously trade plus services and remittances and so on.If you've got a surplus on that current account, you are bringing dollars into the economy and those dollars help reduce interest rates. And Nigeria saw that actually in 2005, six, seven and eight when the oil price was booming. Nigeria had that flood of dollars coming into the economy. Interest rates were really low below inflation and investment was relatively cheap and easy to finance. Now it's a problem to manage when it's a commodity-driven boom because commodities then bust. So, all that flood of money that came in suddenly disappeared again, you know, once the oil price collapsed there wasn't that current account surplus anymore. But if you run a cheap currency policy to make sure you always run a current account surplus, then that helps give you that supply of savings that you can then use to start investing. So that seems to me one of the few ways that a low-income country that's got not enough local savings, doesn't want to wait forever until its fertility rate's down [and] low enough to build the domestic savings, this is one way that looks sustainable that can bring in some foreign cash to help support growth.Tobi;But one minor aside on FDI and you can really correct me here if I'm wrong, wouldn't that really be a bit unstable? Because if you have loads of FDI, if other indicators are really working in your favour and at the slightest hint of a crisis, all that money then flows out.Charlie;Yeah. Well, I'll just differentiate between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. And, again, David Lubin's book is very good on this because the Washington consensus, which is this set of policies that were drawn up by policy makers around 1989, 1990, it said countries should welcome foreign direct investment. Building factories that it's pretty hard to move out of the country, that that should be welcomed. But when the original guys who drew up the Washington Consensus wrote down the kind of 10 principles, they weren't that keen on foreign portfolio investment. This is the hot money that will include a lot of my investors who will come in and buy shares in companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange and might come in and buy bonds. And I think it's fair to say that that money can leave in times of trouble and doesn't really support...isn't necessarily as supportive [of growth] and that money we count on the capital account because it is foreign capital.What I was talking about on the current account surplus was obviously the trade surplus, the remittances, the services and so on. So, I think it's more debatable. I think a number of countries have restricted foreign portfolio flows into equity market or the bond market. And if they've got other things going for them, like a low fertility rate, they can kind of get away with that. Um, what I'm highlighting is that for some countries they just don't have that choice. And when America was short of capital in the 19th century, it was British capital that went over and built their railways, that bought all the shares in their infrastructure companies. The Brits owned America for much of the 19th century and then the French actually owned most of Russia. Uh, the railways and the ports and some of the industry, the coal mines [were] very significantly owned by French investors, portfolio funds, and portfolio guys are there to make money as well. You know, they're there to make profit and if you're making good profit, five, 10% a year or whatever sitting in Nigerian equity market, people will stay, and it won't leave. They'll be happy to stay there for many, many years as people are and have been doing in India, actually, since India's education fertility and electricity numbers have all come together in the last 10 years in a really good way. Foreign portfolio guys are saying, "Hey, we wanna put our money into the Indian stock market too." And Indian shares are pretty expensive right now because of that. But the money doesn't want to leave. It'll leave when policy mistakes are made but fundamentally doesn't want to leave. However, I don't deny that there is a reasonable argument you can make to say we're going to choose foreign direct investment, we're going to be more restrictive on foreign portfolio investment. Because that can be more volatile. It can leave quicker. And I wouldn't argue with that. Well, I mean we could debate it, but I think it's harder to prove that you must have foreign portfolio investments to thrive. I think the current account surplus is a better policy choice because it's in your control. Foreign portfolio investors and what they do, that's not in your control.Tobi;One question that stayed with me throughout your book, which is a bit silent in the book itself, maybe it's implied, you can tell me, is that it's really difficult to find a country at any particular point where all these three factors align at the same time. Where you have the requisite adult literacy rate, electricity and fertility, they rarely align at the same point in time in the history of any one country. Because your book did not really distinguish between any particular political preference or institutional arrangements, which I like that, but what institutional arrangement favours the consistency for all these factors to sort of come together, uh, in the economic history basically of a country. Because we know that political leaders tend to favour what benefits their ambition at any particular point in time, you know? And a lot of these things are investments that do pay off in the long run, you know? Like we talked about on savings, a lot of political leaders would want to borrow a lot of money and then leave the debt crisis to the next administration.Charlie;Yeah. Yeah. Happens a lot.Tobi;Yeah. You know, and so many other things, whether you are investing in electricity or education or whatever, they don't really want to do the hard work. They want to do the easy stuff and just leave it to the next guy.So, what institutional arrangements have you found in your observation and study of this that favours the patient consistent build-up to the alignment of these three factors?Charlie;I think it's really, um, it's kind of interesting actually because in each chapter I try and say which countries are at the right place for industrialization, education, which countries are at the right place for electricity, and which countries are at the right place for fertility. Perhaps I didn't properly bring that together in one chapter at the end to say, "so, who's the fast growth story?" But right now, the countries that have brought them together are Vietnam, India, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and I think those five countries, Morocco actually six, um, those six countries should be the countries that will show the really good growth for the next 30 to 40 years. Um it's going to be great. And I'm then trying to highlight who's closest to joining them on a 10 year view. Um, Pakistan and Egypt both got big debt problems right now, but five to 10 years they could be joining that group as well and Ghana and actually Kenya and I would argue southern Nigeria could be, could be there in the 2030s.Um, so I am trying to say when they come together. The question you are asking, though, about institutions or perhaps leadership and so on, I think is a really important one because I guess this book in lots of ways is an argument against Why Nations Fail, which was a really interesting book; and [it] said it is all about institutions and the right institutions and that's why if you walk a kilometre across the US border into Mexico, things are run so very differently. It's got to be the institutions, that book argues, that makes the difference between a country succeeding or not. And what I'm arguing is that I don't think that's true. I think you appear to have the good institutions when everything else is running well and you appear to have the terrible institutions when you don't have the education or you don't have the electricity or you don't have the low fertility or worst of all, you haven't got any of them.So, a country that hasn't got any of them, like Niger, Chad, Somalia, you know, these are countries in a terrible place. But I'm saying that they can't have good institutions cause there's no money in the economy, there are not enough educated people in the economy. There's just no way that you're going to get a good setup in those countries. And actually, even at the beginning when, at the first 10 years or so, when you've got these things all coming together, you still don't think the institutions are good. You know, you go to India today, people don't think, "wow, this is a brilliantly run civil service. It's so uncorrupt[ed]." Such wonderful institutions everywhere. They don't say that. They don't say that about Philippines' Duterte, the president who's been just recently retired, by people who were worried the institutions found it difficult to control his populism. And yet Philippines boomed under Duterte, and India's boomed under Modi and countries like Korea boomed even with a level of corruption that means in the last 10 years we've seen four presidents go to jail for corruption.Um, so I argue that the better institutions come afterwards and that's why four presidents have gone to jail in Korea because they're now getting the institutions better. And I read a really good book about why democracies die by some American academics about three or four years ago now. I recommend it. And they pointed out that Latin America, across Latin America, they just copied the American institutions. They said, look, what's working in the Americas is North America. It's United States, they've got it right. Let's copy their institutions, we'll put them into my country, be it Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, whoever. And then they discovered that actually if the human capital is not as advanced, people will undermine the institutions. And you arguably saw Trump try it in the United States itself, but the human capital and the rest of the place was good enough to stop him from going too far.This is all debatable stuff, but you know, this is... So, I think the institutions do work when everything else has been working for some time and before then it's very hard to argue that the institutions work or can make a huge difference. I think the fundamental economic reality of are you growing at 1% a year or three to 5% a year per capita? That isn't about the institutions. Having said all of that? I think there's no doubt that you can have, if you're lucky, very lucky, really good leadership. A leader like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, who has got vision, understands or is lucky, but he prioritized education and all the rest, who gets it right and takes the country onto a new path. When I think of some of the most obvious successes, a lot of them are small Singapore, Hong Kong, even Taiwan really.And maybe it's just tougher to do it in a country the size of Nigeria with over 200 million people or, or uh, India with over a billion, which is why it took India so long or Brazil. But I remember even the French president, Charles de Gaulle, I think in the sixties or seventies said, "how is it possible to govern a country with 350 types of cheese?".Um, and in India you'd say, "how can you govern a country of over a billion people with that many different dialects, different customs, different local cultures?" Um, and it is hard, but once you get these fundamentals of education, electricity and fertility right, suddenly, it looks like you can govern well. So, I want to think there is a role for good leadership, um, and it can make a difference and it does help. I just think history's telling us over the last 300 years that we can't count on luck and that lucky guy who happens to be the right leader to come in, sometimes woman who can come in, and push reform in the right way. What we can count on is that if you get the education, electricity and fertility numbers right, you will get out of poverty, you will get better off and your kids will have a much, much better future and your grandchildren even more so.So, I think that's probably one area [where] my book differs from many in the last 10, 15 years is saying, "I don't think it is so much about the things that we all like to pay attention to [like] who's going to win the next election and what are their different policies going to be?" And you know, most of the time I'm arguing it doesn't really make as much difference as we'd like to think.Tobi;Now, another point that came in the later chapters in the book, which I found interesting, and which is quite also a bit of a political issue right now, surrounds migration. Uh, a lot of Nigerians are leaving, I mean it's become even a social media trend and meme - "who is...Charlie;The Japa trend.Tobi;Who is leaving next, uh, yeah, yeah, Japa. So, like, who is leaving next, you know? Right. But you argued in the book that as countries grow richer, there will be more migration not less because what you often hear is that the reason why people are living is because the country is so bad and they're looking for a way to make better lives for themselves, which is true anyway. So, and that the way to really stop this migration wave is if you can improve the domestic economy and then suddenly you see a drop, but you are saying no, um, we are actually going to see more migration as countries grow richer. Now, how do you suppose that this can be resolved with the current, should I say, political environment in Europe and to some extent in America that is increasingly seeing migration from poorer countries as a problem, right? Is it a case of as countries grow richer, then the migration demographic just, sort of, changes to more educated people leaving and less tension and political rancour about migration?Charlie;Um, I doubt, I mean, I doubt that these political problems about immigration in Europe and The States are going to disappear. Cause we've seen election results just in the last two, three weeks in Italy with the far right becoming dominant, in Sweden as well. Where they took in a huge amount of, I think, it was Syrian refugees and before that Somalian refugees. Um, and you're trying to integrate people coming from a country with very low adult literacy into, particularly in Somalia's case, into a country like Sweden, which had a hundred percent, nearly a hundred percent adult literacy already by 1900. That's an integration process that takes generations. As America's still struggling 150 years after civil war, still struggling to manage integration. So, I think that political problem is going to carry on, but it is going to get more acute for Europe, um, and eventually United States because Europe is this aging old continent that hasn't got enough people.I was in Germany two weeks ago and there, there was a surprising number of industrialists saying "we must have a much more open border situation." I said, well, you know, that'll be really interesting to see if you do that because the backlash that we're seeing elsewhere says there is a limit to what countries politics seem ready to accept. And, I think, I even think the Brexit vote was about that. It was about the East European migration into the UK, which had the most open approach to east European countries from Poland and Hungary and Czech coming to the UK. Every other country in Europe kept in a border, well, restrictions, but the UK didn't. And I think that backfired on the UK when it had a Brexit vote that said, "oh, we have too many Polish people eating sausage in our supermarkets. And I, I, yeah, I mean really people cared.I don't understand it. I love the variety obviously, but while I don't understand, while I don't feel the same, [some] people do. So, I think that's the political problem. And even educated people who are needed by the economy might find it hard to integrate, say, beyond the bigger urban centres. I was really shocked when I was writing the book and I was looking at what happens when you've got an educated population but a high fertility rate. What happens across history is people leave. Cause there aren't enough jobs at home. Cause the fertility rate's so high, there's thousands, millions of people coming into the workforce. The savings aren't there to help create the jobs. So, they leave and it's the Philippines, you know, in the 20th century, it's Pakistanis now, where a number of people are well educated, not everyone sadly. But 150 years ago, it was Ireland, and it was Norway, and they were sending their excess population to America, and it caused huge controversy.There was, you know, rioting between, kind of, the Italian immigrants and the Irish immigrants in New York. T

Tous les jours, les journalistes et correspondants de RFI ainsi que des spécialistes répondent à vos questions sur l'actualité.   Côte d'Ivoire-Mali : vers un réchauffement des relations ? Par Serge Daniel, correspondant régional pour le Sahel de RFI. Nigeria : l'élection présidentielle est-elle menacée par l'insécurité ? Par Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, directeur de recherches à l'IRD, l'Institut de recherches pour le développement, auteur d'Un djihad sans foi ni loi. Ou la guerre contre le terrorisme à l'épreuve des réalités africaines, aux éditions Presses universitaires françaises, paru en octobre 2022. Afrique : pourquoi les prix du carburant augmentent ? Par Bareja Youmssi, expert en pétrole et mines, enseignant chercheur à l'Université de Capetown.       * Par téléphone : de France : 09 693 693 70 de l'étranger : 33 9 693 693 70 * Par WhatsApp : +33 6 89 28 53 64 N'OUBLIEZ PAS DE NOUS COMMUNIQUER VOTRE NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE (avec l'indicatif pays). Pour nous suivre : * Facebook : Rfi appels sur l'actualité * Twitter : @AppelsActu

On this week's Hold Your Fire! Richard Atwood is joined by Comfort Ero, Crisis Group's president and CEO, and Stephen Pomper, chief of policy, to reflect on 2022 and look ahead to 2023. They talk through “10 Conflicts to Watch”, Crisis Group's yearly flagship commentary co-published with Foreign Policy magazine. They discuss Russia's war in Ukraine, its global ramifications and what it says about global affairs today. They also take a look at other flashpoints on the list, which this year includes Ukraine, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Iran, Yemen, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sahel, Haiti, Pakistan and Taiwan. Lastly, they talk about how we put the list together and, despite a generally gloomy and unsettling year, where we can look for signs of hope. For more information, check out our flagship commentary, by Comfort Ero and Richard Atwood, with Foreign Policy magazine: “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023” you can also check out Crisis Group's Twitter thread 10 Reasons For Hope in 2023. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode, Alex starts by discussing how Joe Biden's woes are getting worse; Merrick Garland has opened up a special counsel investigation into Biden's mishandling of classified documents while he was vice president. Alex worries that this is a political nightmare that will allow moderate Republicans to defend Donald Trump. For the rest of the episode, Alex takes a deep dive into the issues in the Sahel. The region has seen a troubling mix of growing extremism (like the Islamic State), climate crises, and food insecurity. This mix of factors has created a socio-political climate that is perfect for coups, authoritarianism, and a cycle of violence. Alex goes into some of the examples in the region and why they could impact everyone. 

Au menu de l'actualité :L'ONU inquiète de l'impact des nouvelles mesures de contrôle à la frontière des Etats-Unis avec le MexiqueAfrique de l'Ouest et Sahel : l'ONU note des avancées positives pour les transitions politiquesL'Ouganda déclare la fin de l'épidémie d'Ebola. Présentation : Jérôme Bernard

Religion is integral to how many of us live our lives. It also plays a part in how politicians and lawmakers govern us. Is this a good thing? Or can it lead to conflict and oppression?Dr Bakary Sambe, the director of the Timbuktu Institute, researches and finds solutions for religion and security issues in the Sahel region.Dr James Wuye, a pastor from Northern Nigeria, lost his hand fighting Muslims. He has since founded the Interfaith Mediation Centre which works on tolerance. Harrison Mumia may be Kenya's most famous atheist. He founded the Atheists in Kenya society. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Sans surprise, Les Républicains devraient voler au secours de la majorité relative d'Emmanuel Macron à l'Assemblée nationale pour voter la réforme des retraites, en France. Selon leurs conditions. Dans un entretien au Journal du Dimanche, le président du parti de droite Les Républicains déclare souhaiter « pouvoir voter une réforme juste qui sauve (le) système de retraite par répartition » en France. Éric Ciotti veut que « les petites retraites soient considérablement revalorisées » et pose d'autres conditions au gouvernement, sur les « carrières longues » notamment. Selon le journal l'Opinion, l'âge légal de départ à la retraite sera porté à 64 ans « au rythme de trois mois par génération » afin d'y arriver « pour les personnes nées à partir de 1968 ». Et Le Parisien Dimanche précise que le texte sera présenté dans le cadre d'un « projet de loi de financement de la Sécurité sociale rectificative ». La messe est-elle dite ? Pas sûr… Dans ce-même journal, le secrétaire général du syndicat de salariés CFDT met en garde Élisabeth Borne. « Attention, Madame la Première ministre, prévient Laurent Berger (…) même avec des mesures positives sur les carrières longues ou la pénibilité, on reste opposé à la réforme avec une mesure d'âge. Il n'y aura pas de deal avec la CFDT », martèle encore Laurent Berger dans Le Parisien Dimanche. Après Serval puis Barkhane, la France dans les sables du Sahel 11 janvier 2013, c'était il y a dix ans, la France déclenchait l'opération militaire Serval. Dix ans après, la France « se cherche au Sahel ». C'est en résumé l'avis du Journal du Dimanche. Lequel hebdomadaire, d'une formule des plus hardies sous ces caniculaires latitudes, qualifie de « polaire » le climat actuel entre la France et le Burkina Faso ! À tel point qu'en écho à la revue Afrique Intelligence, Le JDD évoque à son tour le possible « départ » de « la force Sabre à Ouagadougou ».  Justement, faut-il fermer les bases militaires françaises en Afrique ? Pour l'hebdomadaire Valeurs Actuelles, il n'en est pas question. « Courage fuyons, fulmine ce magazine ! Invoquant l'échec malien, des voix au sein de l'exécutif plaident pour la fermeture de nos bases africaines ». Alors, Valeurs Actuelles met en garde. « En abandonnant son rôle historique de pourvoyeur de sécurité, plutôt que de chercher à le réinventer, la France perdrait le dernier plan intact de son influence sur le continent au moment où ses compétiteurs s'y bousculent ». Effervescence à l'arsenal Et aussi au moment où, sous l'effet de la guerre en Ukraine, l'heure est au réarmement mondial. Russie, États-Unis, Chine, Inde, Europe, cette guerre « a remis les armées et l'industrie militaire de la planète au centre du jeu », s'alarme Marianne. « Simple poussée de fièvre ou branle-bas de combat avant la catastrophe », se demande cet hebdomadaire ? Évoquant un éventuel nouveau conflit, Marianne se demande ce que les Européens feraient « si la Turquie attaquait la Grèce ? (…) Que se passerait-il si le "Reis" décidait de prendre un bout d'îlot ? Erdogan pourrait jouer de sa position centrale aujourd'hui : outre son poids diplomatique dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne, n'oublions pas que celui dont le pays pourvoit l'Ukraine en drones possède aujourd'hui la deuxième armée de l'Otan. Un petit coup de canif chez nos amis hellènes administré par Erdogan susciterait sans doute, chez les Européens, quelques déclarations martiales, mais cela n'irait pas beaucoup plus loin... jusqu'au prochain îlot », conjecture Marianne. La grande lessive Un anniversaire pour conclure, le soixantième d'une création connue dans le monde entier, une création made in France : les pictogrammes des vêtements et du linge de maison qui fournissent les conseils de lavage… 1963-2023, cela fait bien soixante ans que le très français Groupement international d'étiquetage pour l'entretien des textiles, basé à Paris, a créé ces cinq symboles, « un cuvier pour le lavage à la main, un triangle pour le blanchiment, un carré pour le séchage en machine, un fer pour le repassage et un cercle pour le nettoyage professionnel », signale Les Échos Week-End. Certains pays, comme les États-Unis ou l'Australie, font, certes, de la résistance, mais « les cinq symboles ont depuis conquis la planète », souligne cet hebdomadaire économique. Selon un sondage Ipsos de 2021 cité par ce magazine, si 14% seulement des Français savent ce que signifie le pictogramme « cercle », 9 Français sur 10 « reconnaissent le "picto" cuvier » rapporte en orfèvre Les Échos Week-End. Qu'on le lave ou non en famille, le linge sale a ses symboles, et ils sont français. Cocorico !

Pierre-Édouard Deldique reçoit dans «Une semaine d'actualité» Seidik Abba, journaliste, spécialiste de l'Afrique, et en particulier du Sahel, président du Centre international de réflexions et d'études sur le Sahel qui vient d'être créé.

Burkina Faso, Mali und Niger: Das sind drei Krisenstaaten in der sogenannten Sahel-Zone. Hier versuchen westliche Alliierte schon seit Jahren, für Stabilität zu sorgen. Bisher ohne Erfolg. In Burkina Faso und Mali herrscht nach Umstürzen das Militär. Der Westen konzentriert sich nun auf das letzte Land, das in diesem Teil der Sahel-Zone noch eine gewählte Regierung hat - Niger. Doch auch Russland ist hier aktiv und findet viel Zuspruch. Die Probleme in den drei Ländern sind ähnlich. Die prekäre Sicherheitslage, die Armut und der Klimawandel destabilisieren die ganze Region über Grenzen hinweg und das zeigt sich vor allem da, wo Burkina Faso, Mali und Niger ein Dreiländereck bilden.

Les yeux se tournent tout d'abord vers le Mali, où on attend toujours la libération des 46 militaires ivoiriens. Lors de ses vœux à la Nation, le colonel Assimi Goita n'a rien dit sur cette affaire. Pas un mot. Pour sa part, rapporte notamment Fraternité Matin à Abidjan, le président Ouattara, lors de son message à la Nation, a affirmé : « ils fouleront bientôt le sol ivoirien. » Rappelons que ces 46 soldats ivoiriens, accusés par Bamako d'être des mercenaires, ont été condamnés vendredi à des peines très lourdes : vingt ans de prison. « Étonnant verdict, commente WakatSéra au Burkina Faso, puisqu'au regard des derniers pourparlers, avec tous les signaux de bonne volonté manifestés lors de la visite de la délégation ivoirienne en terre malienne fin décembre, même les observateurs les plus sceptiques se mettaient à rêver sérieusement que les militaires ivoiriens avaient toutes les chances de fêter la nouvelle année en famille. Que nenni ! (…) Le colonel Assimi Goita fait preuve d'une inflexibilité des plus déroutantes, au mépris des relations séculaires de bonne entente entre les peuples maliens et ivoiriens. » L'Afrique de l'Ouest en mauvaise posture  Au-delà de cette affaire, l'année 2023 paraît bien mal engagée en Afrique de l'Ouest… C'est du moins l'opinion de Ledjely en Guinée : « en proie à toutes sortes de convulsions et de périls, la sous-région est à la croisée des chemins. Le bien et le mal s'y livrent une bataille féroce, à travers le terrorisme rampant et ceux qui le combattent. La démocratie y est également de plus en plus menacée par le retour en grâce du pouvoir kaki et des leaders qui se veulent providentiels. Une tendance si séduisante que la CEDEAO a bien du mal à se faire entendre auprès d'une opinion publique désabusée par une classe politique manipulatrice. Sans oublier, note encore Ledjely, que cette partie du continent africain est devenue le nouveau champ de bataille de l'affrontement géopolitique que se livrent l'Occident et la Russie. Et comme si tout cela ne suffisait pas, il y a que le Sénégal, cette belle exception dans la zone francophone notamment, s'amuse désormais à jouer avec le feu de la tentation du troisième mandat. Les perspectives paraissent donc bien sombres. » Contagion ? Analyse similaire pour le chef du département Défense et Sécurité du G5 Sahel, le général mauritanien Mohamed Znagui Ould Sid Ahmed Ely, interrogé par Le Point Afrique. « La situation sécuritaire au Sahel est préoccupante, affirme-t-il. Les attaques terroristes sont récurrentes, les populations civiles sont ciblées, les conflits interethniques apparaissent partout, les milices sont légion et le nombre de réfugiés ne cesse d'augmenter d'année en année. » Et « autour du Sahel, la situation n'incite pas (non plus) à l'optimisme, poursuit-il. Le conflit en Libye n'est pas résolu, le Soudan renoue avec les rébellions et l'insécurité, la Somalie demeure en déliquescence, la Centrafrique ne tient que par la présence coûteuse de milices étrangères. Au Nigeria et au Cameroun, Boko Haram cède de plus en plus la place à l'État islamique au Grand Sahara, lequel gagne du terrain vers le nord et l'ouest. Ajoutez à cela que les États côtiers se sentent de plus en plus menacés… » Des scrutins très scrutés… Enfin, Jeune Afrique se penche sur les échéances électorales à venir au cours de cette année 2023… « Des législatives, des municipales, un référendum et, surtout, sept présidentielles… » Notamment, « celles des deux géants, Nigeria et RD Congo, plus de 300 millions d'habitants à eux deux, et presque autant d'incertitudes quant à l'identité du successeur de Muhammadu Buhari et aux capacités de Félix Tshisekedi à obtenir un second mandat. Même imprévisibilité à Madagascar, où nul ne peut encore prédire le résultat (en octobre) de la répétition d'un étonnant scénario qui verrait le président sortant affronter dans les urnes deux de ses prédécesseurs. Quant au Liberia, poursuit le site panafricain, il faudra à George Weah beaucoup de pédagogie pour convaincre ses concitoyens qu'ils ne se sont pas trompés de casting en le sélectionnant il y a cinq ans, tant son bilan est controversé. Enfin, pointe encore Jeune Afrique, la réélection d'Ali Bongo Ondimba au Gabon et celle d'Emmerson Mnangagwa au Zimbabwe sont plus que probables – même s'il conviendra de surveiller la régularité du processus pour l'une, et les risques de répression des contestations pour l'autre. »

Em um tema em que as más notícias se transformaram na regra nos últimos anos, 2022 trouxe uma série de alertas particularmente flagrantes sobre a emergência climática – mas também sobre as incoerências entre o discurso e as práticas para combater as mudanças do clima. Já em fevereiro, a guerra na Ucrânia levou a Europa para um cenário de incertezas sobre o futuro do abastecimento de gás natural russo, até então crucial para países como a Alemanha, a Hungria e a Eslováquia. Mas como a transição energética rumo ao fim dos combustíveis fósseis está mais lenta do que deveria, diversos países não viram outra alternativa a não ser ativar as usinas a carvão, as mais nocivas para o meio ambiente. Face ao risco de apagões e de ficar sem aquecimento nos meses de frio, os europeus deixaram de lado os compromissos ambientais e as promessas de acabar com as centrais a carvão até 2030. Estas usinas respondem por mais de 40% das emissões mundiais de gases de efeito estufa, que provocam o aquecimento global. Até os países menos dependentes do gás, como a França, dona da mais vasta rede de usinas nucleares da Europa, também não conseguiram evitar o retrocesso. Para Neil Makaroff, coordenador da seção Europa da Rede Ação pelo Clima, hub de organizações ambientais francesas, o contexto geopolítico deveria representar uma oportunidade para o bloco: "Diante da crise exacerbada pela guerra na Ucrânia, a energia nuclear pode parecer uma solução, ao não emitir CO2. Mas não podemos esquecer que para construir uma central nuclear, precisamos de 15 a 20 anos. Por demorar tanto, essa opção não atende aos nossos objetivos climáticos até 2030, de reduzir pelo menos 55% das nossas emissões até o fim da década”, explica. “A única solução facilmente aplicável e barata são as energias renováveis, eólica, solar e biogás. Elas precisam decolar para substituir o gás, o petróleo, mas também o carvão russos." Calorão mais cedo, intenso e persistente Na sequência, como um golpe de ironia do destino, o verão castigou os europeus com temperaturas historicamente elevadas, as segundas mais altas desde o início das medições, em 1900. Os termômetros começaram a subir já em maio, algo totalmente excepcional. Privada de gás, a Europa passou a conviver também com racionamento de água e com incêndios florestais fora de controle, levando a graves prejuízos agrícolas. Em dois meses, a França teve 33 dias de calor além dos padrões. O agricultor francês David Peschard, instalado em Loir-et-Cher, na região central do país, jamais tinha vivido uma situação parecida. “Algumas plantações não estão recebendo água suficiente. Podemos ser otimistas e achar que é apenas uma fase e que voltaremos a períodos mais úmidos. Mas, se enfrentarmos essa situação com frequência, será necessário nos adaptarmos rapidamente”, observa. “Infelizmente, temos uma lição a aprender, e estamos aprendendo muito lentamente. O milho, por exemplo, está condenado a nã ser mais cultivado na nossa região", lamenta. No continente africano, a seca prolongada nas regiões do Sahel e do Chifre da África, além de países como Quênia e Nigéria, acentuou a insegurança alimentar. O Unicef alerta que mais de 20 milhões de crianças africanas chegaram ao fim do ano sob a ameaça da fome e da sede devido às mudanças climáticas, à falta de cereais, aos conflitos e à inflação mundial. Paquistão sob a água A elevação das temperaturas globais também leva ao aumento dos fenômenos extremos como enchentes, que devastaram o Paquistão em agosto. O país teve um terço de seu território inundado, com 33 milhões de pessoas atingidas. As chuvas de 2022 foram quase três vezes mais fortes do que a média dos últimos 30 anos, segundo levantamento da ONU. Em seguida, veio o outono mais quente registrado em décadas na Europa – para mostrar, mais uma vez, que algo está errado com o clima do planeta. Em outubro, os termômetros marcaram de 3 a 7 graus acima do normal para a estação. Em entrevista ao Planeta Verde, o economista ambiental Matthieu Glachant avaliou que, em relação à tomada de consciência sobre o problema, haverá um antes e um depois de 2022. "Eu acho que foi importante o que aconteceu porque, do nada, a mudança climática se transformou em uma experiência pessoal. Há muito tempo, conhecemos os relatórios do IPCC que nos alertavam sobre tudo isso – até que chegamos no momento em que as previsões se realizaram diante dos nossos olhos”, constatou. "Acho que isso provocará um verdadeiro impacto nos cidadãos e, por consequência, nos políticos." No Brasil, foco no desmatamento Já no Brasil, na área ambiental, foram os recordes de desmatamento e queimadas, sempre atualizados para pior durante o governo de Jair Bolsonaro, que continuaram a ocupar as manchetes no país e internacionais. Meses como setembro e outubro foram os piores registrados em 12 e sete anos, respectivamente. No período de um ano, 11,6 mil km² da Amazônia foram desmatados, o segundo pior índice desde 2009, de acordo com dados do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (Inpe). “O desmatamento está crescente nos últimos quatro anos e está se propagando por lugares onde não ocorria antes. A gente não via fogo em grandes quantidades na região de Lábrea, por exemplo, ou no sul do Amazonas. Não era um tema naquela região”, apontou Tasso Azevedo, coordenador-geral do Mapbiomas, plataforma de referência no monitoramento de queimadas. “É um crescimento consistente que é resultado dos sinais que são dados no nível federal que, no fundo, diz que vai acabar com as punições e vai reinar a impunidade em relação aos crimes ambientais.” Esse quadro tem consequências não só para o clima, mas também para a economia. Em 2022 o Brasil deu um passo a mais rumo à perda de mercados para as suas exportações de matérias-primas, em represália à política ambiental destrutiva. Em dezembro, a União Europeia chegou a um acordo sobre uma nova lei para proibir a compra de produtos oriundos de áreas de florestas desmatadas ilegalmente. A medida atinge em cheio alguns dos carros-chefes do comércio internacional brasileiro, como a carne, a soja e a madeira. “É uma legislação muito bem-vinda e esperada por toda a comunidade de cientistas e socioambientalistas. De forma transversal, vejo que o grande impacto vai ser minar a pressão de especulação de terras no Brasil”, disse o cientista de uso da terra Tiago Reis, coordenador na América do Sul da Trase, uma iniciativa internacional especializada em rastrear a origem e o destino das matérias-primas no comércio mundial. “De 90 a 99% do desmatamento global de 2015 a 2019 foi para a agropecuária. Mas de 35 a 55% desse desmatamento foi improdutivo, ou seja, ele foi motivado pela perspectiva de lucro com a venda da terra, de olho nos preços futuros das commodities agropecuárias. Quando a UE define que não vai importar produtos de áreas desmatadas, ela está dizendo que essa terra não vai mais valer tanto assim, já que vai encontrar restrições de mercado”, salientou Reis. Neste contexto, a eleição de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, em outubro, foi a melhor noticia ambiental do ano para o Brasil. Em sua primeira viagem internacional após o pleito, Lula foi à Conferência do Clima da ONU em Sharm el-Sheikh, no Egito (COP27), anunciar ao mundo o seu comprometimento com a preservação da maior floresta tropical do planeta. “Não há segurança climática para o mundo sem uma Amazônia protegida. Não mediremos esforços para zerar o desmatamento e a degradação de nossos biomas até 2030”, ressaltou. “Os crimes ambientais, que cresceram de forma assustadora durante o governo que está chegando ao fim, serão agora combatidos sem trégua.” Outra boa notícia para o país foi a eleição de duas deputadas indígenas, Sônia Guajajara e Célia Xacriabá, importantes defensoras das causas dos povos originários. “Estaremos juntas, comprometidas com a bancada do cocar, para fortalecer o futuro Ministério dos Povos Indígenas [a ser chefiado por Guajajara]. Se nós somos a solução número 1 para conter as mudanças climáticas, como afirma a própria ONU, nós queremos e precisamos marcar presença nos outros ministérios: no Meio Ambiente, na Cultura, na Educação”, afirmou Célia à RFI, em uma conversa em Sharm el Sheikh. “Nós chegamos para ‘mulherizar' e ‘indigenizar' a política, porque onde existe indígena, existe floresta.” COP27 tem avanço para países pobres, mas falha em responder à altura os desafios A conferência ambiental mais importante do ano ocorreu em novembro. O evento resultou na decisão de criar um financiamento específico para os países em desenvolvimento serem compensados, com recursos das nações desenvolvidas, pelas perdas e danos já sofridos devido às mudanças do clima – uma demanda história dos países pobres. Por outro lado, a conferência, abalada pelos efeitos da guerra na Ucrânia e realizada em um país que deixa a desejar na pasta ambiental, falhou ao paralisar os esforços por reduções de emissões de CO2 e encaminhar a diminuição do uso de combustíveis fosseis. Nos dois aspectos, essenciais para o cumprimento do Acordo de Paris, o texto final da COP27 apenas manteve o que já havia sido acordado na conferência anterior, em Glasgow.

2023 será el año que pondrá a prueba los límites individuales y colectivos. Unos límites que, según el informe ‘El mundo en 2023: diez temas que marcarán la agenda internacional’ que ha elaborado el CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, pasan por la inflación, la seguridad alimentaria, la crisis energética, la competición geopolítica global, la descomposición de los sistemas de seguridad y gobernanza internacional y la capacidad colectiva para responder a todo ello. El último podcast del año lo dedicamos a hablar sobre lo que ocurrirá en 2023 con Pol Morillas, director del CIDOB; Carme Colomina y Carmen Claudin, investigadoras sénior del CIDOB; Viviane Ogou, especialista en relaciones entre la Unión Europa, África y el Sahel; Inés Arco, investigadora del CIDOB especializada en Ásia Oriental y China; Agus Morales, director de 5W, y Maribel Izcue, redactora jefa de 5W. Como siempre, un podcast de Raül Flores y Núria Jar. El montaje musical es de ROAD AUDIO.

Tout d'abord au Burkina Faso, un « Noël de sang : un drame de plus, un drame de trop ! », s'exclame WakatSéra. Dimanche 25 décembre, relate le journal, « sur la RN 4, axe Fada-Kantchari, un minibus de transport en commun a heurté une mine. Le bilan est catastrophique : 10 morts, 5 blessés, sans compter les passagers portés disparus ». Pourtant, soupire WakatSéra, « ces derniers temps, les Burkinabè avaient l'impression qu'ils bénéficiaient comme d'une bouffée d'oxygène, au regard des prouesses récentes des Forces de défenses et de sécurité et des Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie […]. La reprise, dans la province du Mouhoun, de Solenzo, ville restée de longs jours sous le joug et la férule des terroristes, en est, pour l'instant, l'illustration emblématique. Mais les faits sont têtus !, pointe WakatSéra. Il faut se rendre à l'évidence : les terroristes qui écument le Burkina peuvent être sonnés et groggy par endroits, mais force est de reconnaitre qu'ils n'ont pas abdiqué ». ►À lire aussi : Au Burkina Faso, au moins dix passagers d'un bus tués par l'explosion d'une mine artisanale Démonstration de force dans le nord-est du Mali Au Mali, à présent, « les jihadistes affichent leur force » : c'est du moins ce qu'affirme Le Monde Afrique. « À l'offensive depuis mars dans la région de Ménaka puis dans celle de Gao, dans le nord-est du pays, l'État islamique dans le grand Sahara a publié, récemment, une vidéo de près de dix minutes mettant en scène sa capacité de frappe. Des centaines d'hommes armés de fusils d'assaut ou de lance-roquettes en rangs serrés, quelques pick-up équipés de mitrailleuses lourdes, des motos par dizaines […]. Preuve, estime Le Monde Afrique, que les mouvements jihadistes peuvent désormais rassembler leurs unités, en temps normal dispersées par petits groupes d'une trentaine de combattants, sans crainte de frappes aériennes. » Commentaire d'une source officielle française, citée par le journal : « le coup de com' est réussi. Comme il n'est plus question pour nous d'intervenir au Mali, ils peuvent désormais y faire ce qu'ils veulent. Du temps de Barkhane, cela aurait été impossible. » Et Le Monde Afrique d'affirmer en outre que « les forces armées maliennes et le millier de mercenaires russes présents dans le pays ne mènent aucune opération militaire d'envergure dans cette zone du Nord-est ». Expulsion de la coordinatrice de l'ONU au Burkina Faso À ces tensions sécuritaires s'ajoutent aussi des tensions diplomatiques. Et on revient au Burkina Faso avec la récente expulsion par les autorités militaires de la coordinatrice des Nations unies sur place, Barbara Manzi. Les militaires au pouvoir lui reprochent d'avoir jeté le discrédit sur le pays en appelant à l'évacuation des familles du personnel des Nations unies au Burkina et également d'avoir des liens avec des chefs terroristes. Commentaire de L'Observateur Paalga : « cet incident inédit dans les annales de la diplomatie du Burkina Faso intervient dans un contexte où bon nombre de nos partenaires, occidentaux en l'occurrence, ne sont plus en odeur de sainteté avec une frange de la population et même des plus hautes autorités. (…) Tout cela, sur fond de rapprochement à petits pas avec la Russie de Poutine. […] On a le sentiment que le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré marche doucettement, mais résolument sur les pas du colonel Assimi Goïta du Mali. » Autre son de cloche pour Le Pays : « Barbara Manzi a elle-même donné des verges pour se faire flageller. Non seulement en raison d'une attitude qui frise à la fois la condescendance et le mépris, mais aussi en raison d'une collaboration dont la franchise est sujette à caution. Son expulsion est donc perçue comme un coup de sang à la hauteur des griefs à elle reprochés. De ce point de vue, on ne peut pas faire le reproche aux autorités burkinabè d'avoir pris leurs responsabilités. » Lâcher la bride ? « Mali, Guinée, Burkina… Comment sortir de l'impasse ? », s'interroge pour sa part Jeune Afrique. « Face au blocage total de la situation politique à Bamako, Conakry et Ouaga, une seule solution, affirme le site panafricain : faire preuve de pragmatisme et tendre la main aux pouvoirs putschistes locaux […]. Ne plus ostraciser les autorités de ces trois pays, de les traiter donc comme des dirigeants "normaux" en réintégrant le Mali, le Burkina et la Guinée dans toutes les instances sous-régionales, mais aussi de leur lâcher la bride localement, en les laissant mener leurs réformes et plus largement leur politique. Bref, de les réintégrer dans le concert des nations africaines et de leur faire confiance. Non sans contrepartie, estime encore Jeune Afrique. Ils devront enfin accepter de prendre des engagements, ou de respecter ceux déjà pris, à commencer par celui de ne pas aller au-delà de 2024 pour rendre le pouvoir aux civils à travers des élections libres et transparentes. »

EXPERTS PASCAL BONIFACE Directeur de l'IRIS Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques GUILLAUME PERRIER Journaliste au service international – « Le Point » Auteur de « Les loups aiment la brume » RAPHAËLLE BACQUÉ Grand reporter – « Le Monde » ÉVELYNE SIRE-MARIN Magistrate honoraire Membre du bureau de la Ligue des droits de l'Homme « Ce n'est pas un fait divers ». Jean-Luc Mélenchon a ainsi titré une note sur son blog publiée ce lundi 26 décembre. Il demande au parquet antiterroriste de se saisir après la fusillade de la rue d'Enghien à Paris, qui a fait trois morts le 23 décembre. Un homme de 69 ans y a ouvert le feu devant un centre culturel kurde avant de reconnaître en garde à vue sa volonté de tuer des étrangers. L'auteur présumé était déjà connu de la police et de la justice, notamment pour une attaque au sabre dans un camps de migrants dans le 12e arrondissement en 2021. Placé en détention provisoire pendant un an, il venait d'être libéré et placé sous contrôle judiciaire avec interdiction de détenir une arme. Mais si le parquet de Paris a ouvert une enquête pour assassinat, le parquet national antiterroriste ne s'est pas saisi de l'affaire, ce qui suscite l'incompréhension de nombreux représentants de la communauté kurde en France. Des manifestations en hommage aux victimes ont eu lieu ce week-end à Paris, mais aussi dans plusieurs autres villes comme à Marseille. Parfois émaillées de violence, ces rassemblements ont aussi rappelé que cette nouvelle attaque a eu lieu presque 10 ans jour pour jour après l'assassinat à Paris de trois militantes kurdes. Celles-ci étaient proches du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), considérée comme une organisation terroriste par la Turquie, l'Union européenne et les États-Unis. Ce dimanche 25 décembre justement, un conseiller d'Erdogan a incriminé le PKK. « Maintenant, ils brûlent les rues de Paris. Allez-vous toujours garder le silence ? », a-t-il lancé aux autorités françaises. Après l'attentat perpétré le 13 novembre à Istanbul, le président turc crie vengeance et veut attaquer les Kurdes en Syrie. Il y a deux semaines, il a aussi demandé à Vladimir Poutine de « nettoyer » le nord de la Syrie des forces kurdes. Fragilisé à quelques mois de la présidentielle turque, Erdogan semble surtout vouloir jouer sur la fibre nationaliste et faire preuve d'autoritarisme sur la scène internationale. Qu'en est-il plus largement de la menace terroriste sur notre territoire ? « Il y a une menace terroriste extrêmement importante dans notre pays », rappelait le 14 décembre dernier le ministre de l'Intérieur Gérald Darmanin. 39 attentats islamistes auraient ainsi été déjoués depuis 2017. Une menace qui toucherait aussi les écoles, où la sécurité est particulièrement renforcée depuis l'assassinat il y a deux ans de Samuel Paty. Le terrorisme gagne aussi du terrain au Sahel depuis le départ de l'armée française. Alors, comment analyser la fusillade de vendredi dernier contre des Kurdes ? Faut-il y voir, comme le suggèrent les Kurdes réfugiés en France, l'ombre de la Turquie ? À quoi joue Erdogan vis à vis de cette communauté ? Comment être plus efficace dans la lutte contre le terrorisme islamiste ? DIFFUSION : du lundi au samedi à 17h45FORMAT : 65 minutes PRÉSENTATION : Caroline Roux - Axel de Tarlé REDIFFUSION : du lundi au vendredi vers 23h40 RÉALISATION : Nicolas Ferraro, Bruno Piney, Franck Broqua, Alexandre Langeard, Corentin Son, Benoît Lemoine PRODUCTION : France Télévisions / Maximal Productions Retrouvez C DANS L'AIR sur internet & les réseaux : INTERNET : francetv.fr FACEBOOK : https://www.facebook.com/Cdanslairf5 TWITTER : https://twitter.com/cdanslair INSTAGRAM : https://www.instagram.com/cdanslair/

This podcast hosted by Arezki Daoud of MEA Risk LLC focuses on some of the most important events in North Africa and the Sahel that we are monitoring as of Friday, 23rd of December 2022. So this is a sort of week in review. This week was dominated by a couple of big events, the first is the political stalemate in Tunisia, and the second is about the collapse of the peace deal that was signed some 7 years ago by the government of Mali and rebel groups in the north. Each of these events are harbingers of more problems ahead.

Cette semaine, le Club RFI, dans le cadre de son atelier littéraire interactif «L'écume des mots» Djaïli Amadou Amal, auteure du roman «Cœur du Sahel», paru aux éditions Collas Emmanuelle. Djaïli Amadou Amal, répond aux questions des élèves et membres du Club RFI Dakar. Ils ont travaillé sur le roman de l'écrivaine camerounaise. Djaïli Amadou Amal est lauréate du prix de la Meilleure auteure africaine (2019), du prix Orange du livre en Afrique (2019). Elle a remporté le prix Goncourt des lycéens pour Les Impatientes (2020). L'écrivaine a reçu, le 28 novembre 2022, le titre de docteur Honoris Causa, une distinction prestigieuse décernée par l'université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris. Avec la participation de : Ahmadou Ndiay (enseignant et coordonnateur de l'atelier littéraire à Dakar), Séynabou Amar, Fatimata Diagne, Marième Kébé, Mariama Sow, Ousseynou Diop et Mouahamed Ndiaga Diop. L'atelier littéraire des Clubs RFI «L'écume des mots» permet aux jeunes de dialoguer avec un écrivain autour de son œuvre et de partager ainsi le goût de la lecture et de l'écriture. « Écrire, c'est lire en soi pour écrire en l'autre », Robert Sabatier. Présentation : Myriam Guilhot et Éric Amiens. Musiques : «Amal Hayati», Oum Kalthoum et «Eva» Angelique Kidjo. Réalisation : Cécile Bonici. Écoutez la version longue :  

Shirika la afya la Umoja wa Mataifa duniani WHO limesema mwaka 2022 umegubikwa na changamoto lukuki za kiafya , kuanzia janga la COVID-19, Ebola, Mpoxy hadi vita vilivyokatili na kujeruhi wengi hata hivypo linasema kuna matumaini kwa mwaka ujao, yapi?Taarifa ya tathmini ya kiafya ulimwenguni iliyotolewa leo na WHO nchini Geneva Uswisi imeeleza mwaka 2022, umeendelea kushuhudia uwepo wa janga la COVID-19 pamoja na mlipuko wa ugonjwa wa Mpox hapo awali ikifahamika kama Monkeypox ambao ulienea kwa kasi katika nchi mbalimbali duniani.Katika pembe ya Afrika na Ukanda wa Sahel nchi nyingi zimekabiliwa na milipuko ya kipindupindu, utapiamlo na magonjwa mengine nyemelezi kutokana na ukameWananchi wa Ethiopia na Ukraine wamekabiliwa na kifo na uharibifu unaoletwa na vita. Ebola ilipiga hodi nchini Uganda, na mafuriko makubwa nchini Pakistan yameweka mzigo mkubwa kwenye sekta ya afya yan chi hiyo.Bila kutaja matishio mengine mengi kwa afya ambayo watu hukabiliana nayo mwaka hadi mwaka, magonjwa yatokanayo na mazingira, bidhaa wanazotumia, maeneo wanayoishi na kufanya kazi, na ukosefu wao wa ufikiaji wa huduma muhimu za afya.Hata hivyo Pamoja na changamoto zote hizi, mwaka unamalizika kwa matumaini, kwani wagonjwa wa COVID-19 na Mpox wameendelea kupungua, huku kukiwa hakuna mgonjwa hata mmoja wa Ebola kuripotiwa tangu tarehe 27 mwezi uliopita wa Novemba.WHO imeeeleza ina matumaini kwamba kila moja ya dharura hizi itatangazwa imemalizika mwaka ujao.Hata hivyo ugonjwa wa malaria bado unatesa wananchi wengi duniani lakini kuna juhudi zinafanyika kila mahali kuhakikisha hakuna ongezeko Zaidi na ingawa idadi ya wagonjwa imeongezeka lakini kasi ya wagonjwa imepungua ikilinganisha na miaka uliyopita.Juhudi nyingine zinazofanyw ana WHO ni Pamoja na kutoa ripoti za kina za kimataifa  na miongozo kwa serikali katika maeneo mbalimbali ikiwemo jinsi ya kubadilisha huduma za afya ya akili, kuongeza viwango vya mazoezi ya mwili, na kuzuia magonjwa ya kinywa ambayo yanaathiri karibu nusu ya idadi ya watu ulimwenguni.

durée : 00:58:26 - Cultures Monde - par : Mélanie Chalandon - En février 2022, la France annonce la fin officielle de neuf ans de présence militaire au Sahel. Alors que l'année marque une nouvelle recrudescence des tensions dans la région - intensification des attaques jihadistes, coup d'Etat au Burkina - quelles conséquences du départ de Barkhane ? - invités : Rémi Carayol Journaliste indépendant (« Mediapart », « Afrique XXI », « Le monde diplomatique »); Alain Antil Directeur du centre Afrique subsaharienne à l'IFRI, enseignant à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lille et à Paris I Sorbonne; Charline Rangé Géographe et chercheuse associée au laboratoire PRODIG

Le sommet États-Unis – Afrique s'est tenu à Washington la semaine dernière. Cinquante délégations africaines s'y sont rendues. Le Niger, que les Américains considèrent comme un pays clé dans leur engagement au Sahel, était présent. Le ministre nigérien des Affaires étrangères, Hassoumi Massaoudou, est l'invité de RFI. Quel regard le pays porte-t-il sur les propos du président du Ghana concernant une éventuelle présence du groupe de mercenaires russes Wagner au Burkina Faso ? Quelle coopération avec les États-Unis en matière de sécurité ? RFI : Le président américain a annoncé 55 milliards de dollars de financement pour l'Afrique. Il va plaider pour un siège de l'Afrique au G20. Ce sont les deux grosses annonces du sommet États-Unis – Afrique. Est-ce que c'est assez ? Hassoumi Massaoudou : Le premier bilan, c'est d'abord que ce sommet se tienne, parce que c'est le retour des États-Unis. Il n'y a pas si longtemps, les États-Unis avaient mis une cloche sur l'Afrique. Et aujourd'hui, nous apprécions le fait que l'administration Biden s'intéresse à l'Afrique, mette l'Afrique à son agenda, et s'engage à ce niveau-là. Je trouve cela très appréciable et nous sommes très satisfaits. Après les engagements des États-Unis, attendez-vous du concret, comme le font d'autres pays – la Chine par exemple – en Afrique ? Je suis très confiant dans la suite à donner à cet engagement vu la personnalité qui a été désignée, il s'agit de M. Johnnie Carson, le sous-secrétaire Afrique au temps de l'administration Obama. Sa silhouette hantait les sommets de l'Union africaine. Je pense que ce choix est déjà un manifeste pour nous amener à croire que cet engagement sera suivi de faits. Qu'allez-vous dire à vos autres partenaires, la Chine, la Russie, la Turquie par exemple après ce sommet ? La Chine, c'est un partenaire économique pour nous. La Turquie aussi. La Russie, pas vraiment. La Russie n'est pas très présente en Afrique au plan économique. Sa présence, malheureusement ces derniers temps [se fait] de manière quasi-criminelle avec une société de mercenaires. Je ne mets pas d'intervention dans notre région, de la Chine au même plan que celle de la Russie. Par contre, avec les États-Unis, nous partageons des valeurs communes. Nous apprécions davantage l'engagement des États-Unis en Afrique. ►À lire aussi : Sept choses à savoir sur les relations Afrique/États-Unis: une mise en perspective Ce faisant, qu'allez-vous dire à la Chine ?  Elle est la bienvenue, nous avons de bons rapports avec la Chine. Nous considérons que la présence de la Chine au Niger est bénéfique. Par exemple, l'exploitation du pétrole par la Chine au Niger est positive, parce qu'il n'y avait personne. Par conséquent, nous sommes tout à fait à l'aise dans notre relation avec la Chine et nous accueillons très, très bien cet engagement américain, qui chez nous est déjà un fait. Aujourd'hui, le niveau d'engagement américain sur le plan sécuritaire est très élevé. Son niveau d'engagement sur le plan de l'aide publique au développement est le plus élevé, il n'a rien à voir avec l'engagement de la Chine. Les noms de la Chine, de la Russie, n'ont pas été vraiment prononcés par le président Biden pendant ce sommet. Mais on sent que c'est aussi un sommet pour reprendre du terrain en Afrique. Est-ce que, à un moment donné, les Américains demandent aux Africains un engagement ? Je n'ai pas senti de demande d'engagement autre de la part des États-Unis. Mais nous sommes engagés sur des valeurs avec les États-Unis. Et nous assumons de manière sereine et à l'aise ce choix d'amitié avec les États-Unis, la France et les pays occidentaux. Évidemment, ces valeurs, nous les partageons avec ceux-ci, pas avec ceux-là. Néanmoins, nous accueillons les investissements, d'où qu'ils viennent notamment de la Chine et de la Turquie. Le président du Ghana a évoqué la société Wagner dans un entretien avec Antony Blinken, le secrétaire d'État américain. Nana Akufo-Addo a dit que les hommes de Wagner peuvent maintenant s'implanter au Burkina, et qu'une mine, située juste à la frontière avec le Ghana, peut être exploitée par Wagner. Vous confirmez cette information ? Je ne peux pas confirmer, certainement qu'il a plus d'informations que moi. En ce qui me concerne, je ne l'ai pas encore, mais je pense que c'est une information vraisemblable. Vous partagez une frontière avec le Burkina. Le fait qu'il puisse y avoir prochainement des éléments de Wagner à votre frontière, vous inquiète-t-il ? Évidemment, que ça nous inquiète parce que nous n'acceptons pas des mercenaires dans notre espace. Nous l'avons déjà dit à plusieurs reprises, c'est condamné par la loi internationale. Et deuxièmement, nous voyons bien le rôle négatif que cela joue, donc nous considérons que c'est une menace pour la démocratie et pour les institutions de la région. Le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré est allé en déplacement à l'étranger mais il ne s'est pas rendu au Niger. Pourtant, vous êtes des pays très proches. Pour vous, il montre clairement les choix de ses nouvelles alliances et vous n'en faites pas partie ? Pour le moment, sa trajectoire n'est pas celle que nous souhaitons. C'est pour ça que j'appelle les autorités burkinabè à se ressaisir, à venir dans cet espace-là, conformément aux engagements qu'ils ont pris avec la Cedeao et à avoir des relations sereines avec leurs voisins. C'est notre souhait, c'est notre appel. Mais vous avez des relations avec le Burkina, vous avez des échanges ? Là, non. On avait commencé à avoir une coopération militaire avec l'armée burkinabè, avant le coup d'État, mais jusqu'ici, nous sommes dans une situation d'attente. Les relations sont revenues à un niveau zéro. Mais le Burkina occupe encore une place plus centrale que le Mali. Si le Burkina s'effondre et malheureusement les signes sont là annonciateurs, c'est carrément le golfe de Guinée qui est menacé. Donc, par conséquent, c'est une situation très sérieuse à prendre avec beaucoup d'inquiétude. Il faut que la Cedeao considère que le Burkina est une préoccupation majeure numéro un, aujourd'hui, pour notre espace. ► À lire aussi : Au Burkina Faso, le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré officiellement investi président de la transition Revenons sur l'engagement américain au Niger, qu'y font les forces américaines ? Elles font beaucoup de choses. Premièrement, il y a la base aérienne d'Agadez. Une base de drones qui renseigne sur tout ce qu'il se passe dans cet espace ; deuxièmement, sur le plan militaire, ce sont les premiers formés, les bataillons des forces spéciales ; troisièmement, les États-Unis nous équipent de manière considérable : en forces blindées, en matériel de communication, en avions, qui nous permettent de projeter des forces d'un point à un autre. Donc, les États-Unis sont pour nous un allié important dans la lutte contre le terrorisme à travers ses formes multiples de soutien. Les drones à Agadez, font-ils uniquement du renseignement ? Pour le moment, ils ne font que du renseignement, oui. Ce ne sont pas encore des drones tueurs. Nous, nous avons acheté des drones de combat avec la Turquie que nous allons utiliser. Mais pour le moment, la fonction essentielle, c'est du renseignement et nous en sommes extrêmement satisfaits. La France est engagée aussi, elle est basée au Niger. Est-ce que les contours de cette nouvelle force française au Niger, sont maintenant définis et clairs ? C'est clair. La France, non seulement fait la même chose que les autres, en formant nos forces, en nous équipant aussi, mais là, c'est le seul pays avec lequel nous avons également un partenariat de combat. Les forces françaises basées au Niger combattent aux côtés des forces nigériennes, sous commandement nigérien, les jihadistes. Ça se passe sous un format qui est un peu différent du format de Barkhane, avec des grandes unités et ça se passe bien. Au niveau des effectifs, cela donne quoi ? Les effectifs, ce n'est pas très important en réalité. Ce qui est important, c'est la nature du partenariat et les résultats. Les effectifs sont élastiques en fonction de nos besoins. Mais ils ont augmenté ? Avant, il n'y avait pas de partenariat de combat. Les forces françaises combattaient au Mali. On avait à la base aérienne de Niamey des forces aériennes de soutien. Maintenant, on a des forces combattantes au Niger, ce qui marque une différence par rapport à la situation d'avant. Du reste, nous avons posé la question à l'Assemblée nationale, il y a eu un vote. Donc par conséquent, nous le faisons en accord avec le peuple nigérien et ce qui nous importe, c'est le résultat. Il y a pourtant des demandes, dans la société civile, de manifestations – qui sont souvent refusées d'ailleurs – contre la présence des forces françaises au Niger. Le peuple nigérien n'est pas unanimement favorable à cette présence. Ils sont tout à fait marginaux. Pourquoi parfois est-ce que nous interdisons ces manifestations ? La première fois qu'on les a laissé manifester - d'abord, ils n'étaient pas nombreux – mais on n'a vu que des drapeaux russes. Nous n'acceptons pas que chez nous, voyant ce qu'il se passe ailleurs, que quelques groupuscules donnent l'impression à l'opinion internationale que le peuple nigérien appelle la Russie à venir. Soyons sérieux. Donc, nous n'accepterons pas ça. Ceux qui s'y opposent disent aussi qu'ils sont nombreux… Ils sont nombreux, mais ils n'osent pas dire qu'ils sont majoritaires. Mais je ne pense pas que nous allons les laisser défiler avec des drapeaux russes pour donner l'impression qu'il y a une revendication de ce genre-là par rapport à une organisation criminelle de mercenaires de Wagner. Ça, nous n'accepterons pas ça. Un dernier mot sur l'affaire de Tamou. La société civile a parlé de dizaines de morts, dont des civils. Où en est l'enquête de votre côté ? L'enquête, certainement qu'elle est en cours. Je ne suis pas très près de cette question, mais je pense que les juridictions continuent l'enquête. Vous n'avez pas d'autres éléments sur ce qu'il s'est passé à Tamou ? Non non, je n'en ai pas d'autres, non. Mais une enquête étant ouverte, j'attends les résultats de l'enquête.

Invité par Emmanuel Macron pour voir la demi-finale et la finale, Thibault, un militaire blessé au Sahel, a vécu la fin de la compétition de l'intérieur.

Le Soldat Thibaut ancien membre des forces spéciales a perdu ses deux jambes au Sahel. Il a accompagné Emmanuel Macron lors de ses deux déplacements pour la demi-finale et la finale de la Coupe du Monde. Il était dans les vestiaires avec les joueurs. Il témoigne pour la première fois au micro de Marion Calais à partir de 18h15 dans RTL Soir

"TF Delta was an avant garde Army think tank designed to explore high performing organizations.  The question was 'What is the difference that makes a difference?'" That is; What was it made high performing organizations different from their contemporaries? The idea was to move from generally reactive (most of the military), and proactive (what many strived for) to truly high performing units. " - COL(Ret) John B. Alexander http://johnbalexander.com/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_B._AlexanderDr. John Alexander has been a leading advocate for the development of non-lethal weapons since he created renewed interest in the field starting in 1989. In 2003 he served as a mentor to Afghan Ministry of Defense senior officials through the Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan, (Coalition Forces) Kabul. He has traveled to all eight (yes, 8) of the continents on Earth. He trekked the remote areas of Tibet including the Mount Everest Base Camp, went to Timbuktu in the Sahel in West Africa, tracked gorillas in Rwanda, met shamans in the Amazon, Mongolia and voodoo witch doctors in Togo and Benin, traveled across cartel controlled areas of Central America, visited ancient temples in Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia.  In New Guinea, he witnessed the emergence of stone-aged tribes people who still practice cannibalism on occasion, and in 2014 was swimming in the open ocean with humpback whales in the Kingdom of Tonga. In 2015 we attended Kumbh Mela in Nashik India, visited Bali and Borobudur in Indonesia and was diving on the Great Barrier Reef off Australia. In 2016 a highlight was diving with Great White Sharks off Isle de Guadalupe, Mexico. He entered the US Army as a private in 1956 and rose through the ranks to sergeant first class, attended OCS, and was a colonel of Infantry in 1988 when he retired. During his varied career, he held many key positions in special operations, intelligence, and research and development.  From 1966 through early 1969 he commanded Special Forces “A” Teams in Vietnam and Thailand.  His last military assignment was as Director, Advanced System Concepts Office, U.S. Army Laboratory Command.  After retiring from the Army, Dr. Alexander joined Los Alamos National Laboratory where he was instrumental in developing the concept of Non-Lethal Defense.  As a program manager, he conducted non-lethal warfare briefings at the highest levels of government including the White House Staff, National Security Council, Members of Congress, Director of Central Intelligence, and senior Defense officials. He also met with heads of industry, presented at academic institutions, including Columbia, Harvard and MIT. In 2004 he was invited to address the German Bundestag. In 2005 he went to The Hague and addressed international delegates to the Chemical Warfare Convention. Later his civilian U.S. Government position afforded him Senior Executive Service (SES) equivalency.  Dr. Alexander organized and chaired six major conferences on non-lethal warfare and served as a US delegate to several NATO studies on the topic.  As a member of the first Council on Foreign Relations non-lethal warfare study, he was instrumental in influencing the report that is credited with causing the Department of Defense to create a formal Non-Lethal Weapons Policy in July 1996.  He was a distinguished guest lecturer at several DOD universities and has advised the CIA, US Special Operations Command, and the National Intelligence Council.  Dr. Alexander wrote the seminal material on non-lethal warfare.  He published articles in Harvard International Review, Jane's International Defense Review, The Boston Globe, The Futurist, The Washington Post, and several other journals. He has appeared frequently on television including Dateline, Fox News, Larry King, CNN, MSNBC, Newsweek, and other U