Podcasts about tatmadaw

Episode #340: Having taught at Payap University in Chiang Mai from 2016–2022, Tony Waters mentored doctoral students grappling with Myanmar's long history of war, repression, and foreign interference. His students' pride in their cultures, alongside their questioning of the country's fragmentation, helped shape his own understanding of Myanmar's deeper crises and multi-layered history.One dissertation, exploring Ne Win's Burmanization policy, particularly influenced his thinking. It traced the policy's roots to the CIA's Cold War counterinsurgency training, and its evolution into the Tatmadaw's brutal Four Cuts strategy. Waters further critiques how America's anti-Communist strategies, enacted covertly by the CIA, indirectly empowered the expansion of the drug trade.Waters argues that Myanmar's ethnic militias are not reflective of any cultural deficiencies, as some outsiders have implied, but rather rational responses to the absence of a stable, inclusive state. He is also sharply critical of the Western aid sector, particularly USAID, for prioritizing donor interests over local needs, and perpetuating cycles of ineffective development. Skeptical of post-coup “political dialogue” initiatives, Waters asserts that the military junta is structurally incapable of genuine negotiation.Ultimately, he frames Myanmar's continued suffering as the product of Great Power rivalries, stating that as long as China and the U.S. treat the country as a Cold War playground, real change remains elusive. Waters concludes by stressing the nuance required to better understand and engage in Myanmar, “I'm not looking for good and evil, I'm [just] looking for the story and trying to understand the processes.”

Presque quatre ans après le coup d'État militaire qui a renversé le gouvernement élu, ce grand pays d'Asie orientale sombre dans la guerre civile, le chaos social et l'une des pires crises humanitaires de son histoire. Pourtant, les insurrections armées progressent. Cyril Payen, peut-on, d'ores-et-déjà, parler d'un tournant ? Ce qui est certain, c'est que la longue marche vers la victoire contre la dictature militaire a commencé avec, pour horizon, l'année 2025. Organisée et structurée, l'opposition pro-démocratique civile et armée opère une montée en puissance qui semble de plus en plus implacable, et ce aux quatre coins de cet immense territoire, carrefour entre l'Asie du Sud-Est et l'Inde.Le pouvoir central perd du terrainSelon le gouvernement parallèle, né clandestinement après le coup d'État de février 2021, près des deux tiers du pays ne sont plus contrôlés par le pouvoir central, alors que régions et garnisons militaires tombent une à une, du lointain état d'Arakan à la frontière, du Bangladesh aux sanctuaires de la guérilla kachin aux confins du Triangle d'Or, sans oublier les traditionnels bastions karens, plein est, sur la frontière thaïlandaise où, symbole parmi les symboles, l'ancien quartier général de Manerplaw, tombé en 1994, a été repris cette semaine.Signe des temps : un an après être officiellement passé d'une tactique de guérilla à une offensive conventionnelle tous azimuts, une grande partie des responsables du NUG, le Gouvernement d'union nationale, a annoncé sortir de la clandestinité pour rejoindre la Birmanie dès janvier 2025.À lire aussiBirmanie: la junte militaire au pouvoir continue de subir les revers des groupes rebellesUne grande fébrilité dans la junte militaire et chez ses alliésDu côté de la Tatmadaw, l'armée birmane, il y a bien entendu les pertes, de plus en plus importantes, qui permettent aux rebelles de se constituer d'impressionnants arsenaux, mais il y a aussi les défections. Sentant le vent tourner ou écœurés par les méthodes d'une armée souvent accusée d'être en guerre contre sa propre population, des milliers de soldats sont passés dans le camp des rebelles, et de vastes purges ont eu lieu au sein d'un état-major que l'on sait infiltré par les insurgés.Plus isolés que jamais, les chefs de la junte birmane ne survivent que grâce à leurs parrains chinois, russes ou nord-coréens, pour ne citer que les plus visibles, l'indifférence coupable de la communauté internationale faisant le reste. Mais là aussi, la nervosité du gouvernement chinois face à l'instabilité chez le voisin birman, ou les déboires de Moscou au Proche-Orient, pourraient faire changer les orientations de cette guerre par procuration asiatique.À lire aussiBirmanie: l'impossible démocratieLe chef de l'armée putschiste dans le collimateur de la CPILes soucis, c'est bien connu, volant souvent en escadrille, le karma politique du chef de la junte militaire s'est encore un peu plus assombri le 27 novembre 2024, à des milliers de kilomètres de son bunker de Naypidaw, à La Haye où siège la Cour pénale internationale.Premier mandat d'arrêt requis par le procureur : le vieux dossier du massacre de la minorité musulmane des rohingyas est exhumé. Le général Min Aung Hlaing y est accusé de crimes, de déportation et de persécutions, des actes qualifiés de crimes contre l'humanité. Les premières audiences pourraient avoir lieu en 2025. Une année donc décisive pour le destin pro-démocratique de la Birmanie.À lire aussiBirmanie, le rêve d'une union fédérale gagne du terrain

The armed conflict in Myanmar is escalating. Ethnic armed groups have captured key towns and regions, and the country's military – known as the Tatmadaw – are employing increasingly brutal tactics, including heavy weapons and airstrikes.Caught in the middle, civilians are bearing the brunt.Against this background, UN News' Vibhu Mishra spoke with Nicholas Koumjian, head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which monitors and collects evidence of crimes in the country.He said as violence intensifies, new actors and alliances are emerging – and it's incumbent on the international community to act.Established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018, the IIMM is mandated to collect and preserve evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law and prepare files for criminal prosecution.Previous interviews with IIMM:Myanmar: Technology key to aid war crimes investigationsMyanmar citizens show ‘great desire' for justice: Investigative Mechanism chiefFor head of Myanmar Mechanism, time is of the essence for accountability

Episode #271: During the anti-military protests of 1988, the man known as Monkey was just an observer. A friend asked him, “Are you a man? If you are a man, why do you just sit and look?”However, over the next 9 years, Monkey had the misfortunate of becoming more personally acquainted with the terror of the Tatmadaw, which regularly brought death and destruction to his community in Karenni state. When he reached his breaking point, he joined a Karenni resistance group, but he found that he was still looking for something more.His prayers found an answer in 1997, when he came into contact with David Eubank, the American missionary who founded the Free Burma Rangers (FBR). Monkey took advantage of their tutorials in basic medical aid as well as photojournalism. While their mobile medical clinic provided relief, Monkey conducted interviews and filmed footage to document the Tatmadaw's ongoing atrocities. Monkey eventually became an FBR trainer both in Myanmar and abroad. Although the Christian faith animates much of the work that Monkey and the wider FBR team do, they do not limit their service to Christian communities.Since the coup, Monkey and the FBR team have more than had their hands full in training the many Burmese youths who have flocked to their camps. Monkey is primarily charged with teaching them photojournalism. “We want the world to know what is happening in Burma,” he explains.As bad as the current times are, Monkey sees an opportunity for a degree of unity and solidarity that he has never before witnessed in his country. Still, he has seen too much to naively assume that disparate groups banding together could be enough to stand up against the Burmese military's cruelty and inhumanity that knows no bounds. This is largely why he is so focused on raising awareness through photojournalism, so that the story of what is really happening in Myanmar gets out.

Pour la sixième fois consécutive depuis le putsch du 1er février 2021, la junte militaire birmane vient de prolonger de six mois l'état d'urgence alors que le pays continue de sombrer dans une guerre civile à huis clos. Cependant, l'insurrection pro-démocratie continue de gagner du terrain sur plusieurs fronts. Décryptage des raisons d'une telle progression.  Il y a dix jours, le général putschiste Min Aung Hlaing s'autoproclamait président. Dans une nation tenue d'une main de fer par ce général, dont la fuite en avant a plongé l'une des jeunes et prometteuses démocraties d'Asie orientale vers les heures les plus sombres de l'autarcie et de la violence politique, la population birmane a fini par comprendre et à s'y résigner, dans le sang et les larmes : elle ne pourra compter que sur elle-même pour maintenir la flamme démocratique dans son pays. En effet, selon l'ONU : « La situation des droits de l'Homme [est] devenue en Birmanie un cauchemar sans fin, loin des regards de la politique mondiale ».Le peuple birman, qui a enduré sept décennies d'une succession de dictatures militaires depuis son indépendance, a décidé d'entrer en résistance, coûte que coûte. Alors que les premiers manifestants étaient abattus par les forces de sécurité dans les rues des grandes villes de Birmanie, trois semaines après le coup d'État de 2021, prélude à un bain de sang et à une répression féroce contre lesquels la communauté internationale a mollement réagi, une partie des élus, députés, activistes encore libres ont choisi la clandestinité afin d'organiser la rébellion. D'abord politiquement puis militairement, en s'alliant aux dizaines de guérillas ethniques actives aux quatre coins de cet immense pays bordant entre autres l'Inde, la Chine, le Bangladesh et la Thaïlande.  Depuis octobre dernier et le déclenchement de l'Opération 1027, d'audacieuses offensives armées menées par une coalition de volontaires et de guérilleros au nord, à l'ouest et au sud du pays ont provoqué la chute de dizaines de villes, l'arrestation, la fuite ou la reddition de centaines de soldats gouvernementaux et ont fait renaître l'espoir.  À lire aussiBirmanie: premiers revers pour la junte militaireÉtat des lieux des rapports de force dans les soutiens internationaux Sur la scène diplomatique, la contre-offensive, elle aussi, a commencé. Le gouvernement de l'ombre, formé sur les ruines de l'après-putsch, s'est organisé. Zin Mar Aung, ancienne prisonnière politique et infatigable ministre des Affaires étrangères de ce pouvoir parallèle birman, multiplie les appels à la communauté internationale : « Non seulement vous ne nous fournissez pas d'armes, martèle-t-elle, mais nous ne recevons aucune aide humanitaire... Si nous perdons la guerre, le monde démocratique sera, lui aussi, perdant. » Dont acte.De son côté, le régime militaire, honni par l'ensemble de la population, acculé sur plusieurs fronts, fait aussi l'objet d'une batterie de sanctions internationales. Mais là encore, tout ne semble pas joué, tant politiquement que militairement. Pourvoyeurs d'armes et de précieuses technologies militaires, la Russie, la Chine ou la Corée du Nord sont encore les garants de la survie de la Tatmadaw, l'armée birmane. Idem au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU où les vétos alliés de la junte empêchent tout vote décisif. Mais la Chine, inquiète pour la sécurité à sa frontière et déterminée à jouer un rôle croissant sur la scène mondiale, est en train, peu à peu, de lâcher les généraux putschistes birmans, un tournant sans doute décisif.Le rêve d'une Fédération birmane est-il enfin à portée de main, comme le souhaitent le gouvernement de résistance et les 135 minorités ethniques ? Rien n'est moins sûr dans un pays où le facteur ethnique a toujours été le point de discorde et le préambule aux conflits armés. Les minorités ont toujours été considérées comme des citoyens de seconde zone, bien qu'elles représentent les deux tiers de la population et concentrent sur leurs territoires la plupart des immenses richesses et matières premières du pays. C'est là aussi le grand défi de la Birmanie. Que le jour vienne où elle parvienne à s'unifier dans la paix.  À lire aussiBirmanie: des rebelles prennent le contrôle d'une ville de l'Ouest, les Rohingyas paient un lourd tribut

Content warning for discussion of genocide, torture, mutilation, rape, and slavery Hey, Hi, Hello, this is the History Wizard and welcome back for Day 14 of Have a Day w/ The History Wizard. Thank you to everyone who tuned in for Day 13 last week, and especially thank you to everyone who rated and/or reviewed the podcast. I hope you all learned something last week and I hope the same for this week. This week marks the 5th part of our mini series of currently ongoing genocides and humanitarian crises. Episode 2 was on Palestine, Episode 11 was on Congo, episode 12 was on Sudan, episode 13 was on Xinjiang, and today's episode will talk about the genocide of the Rohingya people of Myanmar. It's officially the end of week 2! We made it. Congratulations one and all on surviving 2 weeks worth of weeks. As a gift for you all we're going to visit the Alchemist's Table. Today;s libation is called Prohibition Sweet Tooth. It's 1.5 ounces each of Redemption Bourbon and Creme de Cacao, followed by .75 oz of Frangelico. Shake well and pour over ice. Officially the Rohingya genocide began around 2016 and continues to this day, but as we know from every other episode we've had so far, genocide's don't just pop up out of nowhere all of the sudden. There is context, there is a roadmap of hindsight that we can follow back to, if not a starting point at least a starting line. So, first, let's talk about Myanmar. There have been homonid species living on Myanmar for about 750,000 years, first in the form of Homo erectus and then Homo sapiens starting around 25,000 years ago. Then a whole lot of history happened that, while fascinating and important, isn't strictly relevant to what we're going to discuss today. Starting on January 1, 1886 Myanmar (then called Burma) was officially annexed by the British Empire under the control of the British East India Company. Burma would remain under British rule until 1948. Burma was officially declared an independent state by an act of Parliament, specifically the Burma Independence Act 1947. Burma then remained under a civilian government until 1962, at which point it was overthrown in a coup detat and Burma (which became Myanmar officially in 1989) has been under military rule since then. Between 1962 and 1974, Myanmar was ruled by a revolutionary council headed by the general. Almost all aspects of society (business, media, production) were nationalised or brought under government control under the Burmese Way to Socialism, which combined Soviet-style nationalisation and central planning. A long series of anti-government protests resulted in a popular uprising in 1988, sometimes called the 8888 Uprising. This would lead directly to the renaming of the country from Burma to Myanmar and the country's first free, multiparty elections in 30 years. So, as you can see Myanmar has had an interesting and contentious history born of a desire for a strong sense of national unity, stability, and growth. It was the instability of the civilian government, the lack of growth, the skyrocketing crime rates, and the fear of the disintegration of Burma into several smaller nations that would lead to the 1962 coup after all. When your country has such a strong, almost rabid desire for unity and strength and national identity it always goes hand in hand with a desire for a homogenous society. The Germans in World War 2 felt it. The Ottomans in World War 1 felt it. It's what nations who fear their own collapse DO. They look for the divisive elements, the ones who don't fit the majority mold and they say “Hey, these people won't fall in line. They're dividing out country, threatening it with their different religion, culture, values, etc. We can solve all of our problems, save our country if we just… get rid of them”. Myanmar is a Buddhist majority country, by an overwhelming margin. According to the 2014 Myanmar census 90% of the country's population (of about 56 million) is Buddhist. 6.3% is Christian and just over 2% is Muslim. The Rohingya people, the subjects of our episode for today and Mulsim, so let's dive back and take a look at the history of Muslim persecution in Myanmar. The first Muslim documented in Burmese history (recorded in the Glass Palace Chronicle) was Byat Wi during the reign of Mon, a Thaton king, circa 1050 AD. The two sons of Byat Wi's brother Byat Ta, known as Shwe Byin brothers, were executed as children either because of their Islamic faith, or because they refused forced labor. Throughout the premodern era various restrictions were placed on Muslim communities in Burma. The Burmese king Bayinnaung banned Islamic ritual slaughter, thereby prohibiting Muslims from consuming halal meals of goats and chicken. He also banned Eid al-Adha and Qurbani, regarding killing animals in the name of religion as a cruel custom. Burma having largely adopted Buddhism by the 12th century CE. Although, in a strange, cruel, and somewhat ironic twist King Bodawpaya from 1782–1819 arrested four prominent Burmese Muslim Imams from Myedu and killed them in Ava, the capital, after they refused to eat pork. According to the Myedu Muslim and Burma Muslim version, Bodawpaya later apologized for the killings and recognised the Imams as saints. During the "Burma for Burmese" campaign in the late 1930s, a violent demonstration took place in Surti Bazaar, a Muslim area. When the police, who were ethnically Indian (there was a lot of anti-Indian sentiment in Burma in the 1930s, and because most Indian people living in Burma were Muslim, this also affected Muslim Burmese people), tried to break up the demonstration, three monks were injured. Images of monks being injured by ethnically Indian policemen were circulated by Burmese newspapers, provoking riots. Muslim properties, including shops and houses were looted. According to official sources, 204 Muslims were killed and over 1,000 were injured. 113 mosques were damaged. Panglong, a Chinese Muslim town in British Burma, was entirely destroyed by the Japanese invaders in the Japanese invasion of Burma in World War 2. And, after the 1962 coup all Muslim troops were expelled from the Army.  And, of course, we need to talk about the 1997 Mandalay Riots. Mandalay is the second largest city in Myanmar. a mob of 1,000–1,500 Buddhist monks and others shouted anti-Muslim slogans as they targeted mosques, shop-houses, and vehicles that were in the vicinity of mosques for destruction. Looting, the burning of religious books, acts of sacrilege, and vandalizing Muslim-owned establishments were also common. At least three people were killed and around 100 monks arrested. The unrest in Mandalay allegedly began after reports of an attempted rape of a girl by Muslim men, though there's no way to know if that story is true or not. In 2001, anti-Muslim pamphlets, most notably The Fear of Losing One's Race, were widely distributed by monks. Many Muslims feel that this exacerbated the anti-Muslim feelings that had been provoked by the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan. (The Buddhas are two giant statues in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan that daye from about the 6th century CE, they have long been considered a holy site by Buddhists and they were destroyed by the Talbian in 2001). And that's why on 15 May 2001, anti-Muslim riots broke out in Taungoo, Pegu division, resulting in the deaths of about 200 Muslims, in the destruction of 11 mosques and the setting ablaze of over 400 houses. On 15 May, the first day of the anti-Muslim uprisings, about 20 Muslims who were praying in the Han Tha mosque were killed and some were beaten to death by the pro-junta forces. Now, something that we need to discuss before I forget to is that since 1982 the Rohingya have been denied voting rights and citizenship within Myanmar thanks to the 1982 Citizenship Law. The law created three categories of citizenship: the first category applied to ethnic Burmans and members of the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Arakan Buddhists, Shan, and any other ethnic group present in Myanmar prior to 1823 (though they did not include Rohingya Muslims, rendering them stateless), granted them full citizenship. The second category granted partial “associate” citizenship to the children of mixed marriages where one parents fell into the first category, as well as to individuals who had lived in Myanmar for five consecutive years, or to individuals who lived in Myanmar for eight out of the ten years prior to independence. Associate citizens could earn an income, but could not serve in political office. The third category applied to the offspring of immigrants who arrived in Myanmar during the period of British colonial rule. When we look at the state of Myanmar during the 20th century we can very clearly see Levels 3 and 4 of the Pyramid of Hate. The Pyramid of Hate was created in the mid aughts and was based on the Alport Scale of Prejudice created by psychologist Gordon Alport in the 1950s. Simply put the five levels, going from bottom to top are thoughts, words, discriminatory policy, violence towards individuals because of their membership to the group and violence against the cultural markers of the group, and finally genocide. Myanmar, very obviously has and had discriminatory policy and violence towards individuals and their cultural markers. Massacres, riots, burning Qurans and mosques all fit under level 4. But, of course, things can and did get worse. There was the 2012 Rakhine State riots. Sectarian violence erupted between the Rakhine ethnic group and the Rohingya and ended with most of the Rohingya population of Sittwe, the capital of the Rakhine State being expelled. Over the course of the riots that lasted most of June and erupted again in October a little over 160 people were killed and over 100,000 Rohingya were displaced. We are now in our time of rapid escalation of violence as the next major anti Rohingya event would occur in March of 2013. But before we talk about the 2013 riots we need to talk about the 969 Movement. The 969 is a violently Islamophobic Buddhist Nationalist organization founded and run by Ashin Wirathu. Time for a slight diversion for a fun fact: The three digits of 969 "symbolize the virtues of the Buddha, Buddhist practices and the Buddhist community". The first 9 stands for the nine special attributes of the Buddha and the 6 for the six special attributes of his Dharma, or Buddhist Teachings, and the last 9 represents the nine special attributes of Buddhist Sangha (monastic community). Those special attributes are the Three Jewels of the Buddha. Wirathu claims that he does not advocate for violence against Muslims and that all he wants is peace, and yet in a Time magazine article he had this to say: "You can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog", Wirathu said, referring to Muslims. "If we are weak", he said, "our land will become Muslim". The 2013 riots were particularly brutal. One incident involved several Muslim teenagers dragging a Buddhist man off of his bike and setting him on fire. As well as the deadliest incident of the riot which occurred when a Buddhist mob attacked and torched the Mingalar Zayone Islamic Boarding School. While outnumbered security forces stood by, rioters armed with machetes, metal pipes, chains, and stones killed 32 teenage students and four teachers. Now, while 2016 would be the “official” start of the genocide we would be remiss if we skipped over the 2015 refugee crisis. In 2015, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas in Myanmar and Bangladesh fled from religious persecution and continued denial of basic rights in their home countries by means of boat travel, often through previously existing smuggling routes among the Southeast Asian waters. Many Rohingyas fled to Indonesia and Malaysia, which both adopted a stance open to acceptance of the Rohingya refugees still at sea in mid-May. And now we're at the genocide itself, though before we do that, let's take a look at that the US State Department had to say about Myanmar and Rakhine shortly before the shit hit the fan. The situation in Rakhine State is grim, in part due to a mix of long-term historical tensions between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities, socio-political conflict, socio-economic underdevelopment, and a long-standing marginalisation of both Rakhine and Rohingya by the Government of Burma. The World Bank estimates Rakhine State has the highest poverty rate in Burma (78 per cent) and is the poorest state in the country. The lack of investment by the central government has resulted in poor infrastructure and inferior social services, while lack of rule of law has led to inadequate security conditions. Members of the Rohingya community in particular reportedly face abuses by the Government of Burma, including those involving torture, unlawful arrest and detention, restricted movement, restrictions on religious practice, and discrimination in employment and access to social services. In 2012, the intercommunal conflict led to the death of nearly 200 Rohingya and the displacement of 140,000 people. Throughout 2013–2015 isolated incidents of violence against Rohingya individuals continued to take place. In 2016 a Rohingya resistance group known as Harakah al-Yaqin formed and attacked several border police posts leaving 9 officers dead and looting as many munitions as they could. In response to this the government of Myanmar immediately began cracking down on all Rohingya people as quickly and viscously as they could. In the initial operation, dozens of people were killed, and many were arrested. Casualties increased as the crackdown continued. Arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial killings, gang rapes, brutalities against civilians, and looting were carried out. Media reports stated hundreds of Rohingya people had been killed by December 2016, and many had fled Myanmar as refugees to take shelter in the nearby areas of Bangladesh. Those who fled Myanmar to escape persecution reported that women had been gang raped, men were killed, houses were torched, and young children were thrown into burning houses. Boats carrying Rohingya refugees on the Naf River were often gunned down by the Burmese military. In a report published in March 2024, the IIMM stated the military had in a "systematic and coordinated" manner "spread material designed to instil fear and hatred of the Rohingya minority". The report found military was used dozens of seemingly unrelated Facebook pages to spread hate speech against the Rohingya prior before the 2017 Rohingya genocide. This is similar in intent to the use of radio stations to spread constant anti Tutsi propaganda during the Rwandan genocide, though obviously as information technology advances methods get more sophisticated. Though I hesitate to call Facebook sophisticated.. In August 2018, a study estimated that more than 24,000 Rohingya people were killed by the Burmese military and local Buddhists since the "clearance operations" which had started on 25 August 2017. The study also estimated that over 18,000 Rohingya Muslim women and girls were raped, 116,000 Rohingyans were beaten, and 36,000 Rohingyans were thrown into fires. It was also reported that at least 6,700 to 7,000 Rohingya people including 730 children were killed in the first month alone since the crackdown started. In September 2018, the U.N. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar released a report stating that at least 392 Rohingya villages in Rakhine State had been razed to the ground since 25 August 2017. Earlier, Human Rights Watch in December 2017 said it had found that 354 Rohingya villages in Rakhine state were burnt down and destroyed by the Myanmar military. In November 2017, both the UN officials and the Human Rights Watch reported that the Armed Forces of Myanmar had committed widespread gang rapes and other forms of sexual violence against the Rohingya Muslim women and girls for the prior three months. HRW stated that the gang rapes and sexual violence were committed as part of the military's ethnic cleansing campaign while Pramila Patten, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, said that the Rohingya women and girls were made the "systematic" target of rapes and sexual violence because of their ethnic identity and religion. In February 2018, it was reported that the Burmese military bulldozed and flattened the burnt Rohingya villages and mass graves in order to destroy the evidence of atrocities committed. These villages were inhabited by the Rohingya people before they were burnt down by the Burmese military during the 2017 crackdown. Since the 25 August incident, Myanmar blocked media access and the visits of international bodies to Rakhine State. Rakhine State has been called an information black hole. According to the Mission report of OHCHR (released on 11 October 2017 by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), the Burmenese military began a "systematic" process of driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar in early August 2017. The report noted that "prior to the incidents and crackdown of 25 August, a strategy was pursued to": Arrest and arbitrarily detain male Rohingyas between the ages of 15–40 years; Arrest and arbitrarily detain Rohingya opinion-makers, leaders and cultural and religious personalities; Initiate acts to deprive Rohingya villagers of access to food, livelihoods and other means of conducting daily activities and life; Commit repeated acts of humiliation and violence prior to, during and after 25 August, to drive out Rohingya villagers en masse through incitement to hatred, violence, and killings, including by declaring the Rohingyas as Bengalis and illegal settlers in Myanmar; Instill deep and widespread fear and trauma – physical, emotional and psychological, in the Rohingya victims via acts of brutality, namely killings, disappearances, torture, and rape and other forms of sexual violence. In addition to the massive and horrific amounts of violence that are occuring, even now, inside Myanmar there is also the refugee crisis we mentioned earlier. There are over 700,000 Rohingya people who have been displaced from their homes and are living in refugee camps in surrounding countries. Most fled to Bangladesh while others escaped to India, Thailand, Malaysia, and other parts of South and Southeast Asia. On 12 September 2018, the OHCHR Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar published its report to the United Nations Human Rights Council. Following 875 interviews with victims and eyewitnesses since 2011, it concluded that "the [Burmese] military has consistently failed to respect international human rights law and the international humanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution." Even before the most recent incident of mass Rohingya displacement began in 2011, the report found that the restrictions on travel, birth registration, and education resulting from Rohingya statelessness violated the Rohingya people's human rights. During the mass displacement of almost 725,000 Rohingya by August 2018 to neighbouring Bangladesh, as a result of persecution by the Tatmadaw, the report recorded "gross human rights violations and abuses" such as mass rape, murder, torture, and imprisonment. It also accused the Tatmadaw of crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. The mission report recommended that six Burmese generals in the Tatmadaw stand trial in an international tribune for atrocities committed against the Rohingya. Despite all this the UN refuses to do anything substantive. Instead they are still trying to cooperate with the Tatmadaw and convince them to stop committing genocide. The UN has always been a useless tool of appeasement, Western imperialism, and white supremacy that refuses to hold anyone accountable. Of course, if the UN held genocidal regimes accountable they'd have to arrest the entire permanent Security Council so, the lack of accountability isn't surprising. It's why cops don't arrest other cops. You may have noticed that the dates in this episode stop after 2018, you also might remember that Myanmar has been called an information black hole. The genocide is still ongoing, nothing has gotten better and it's probably gotten worse, but getting verifiable information out of Myanmar is all but impossible at this point. Keep Myanmar in your sight. That's it for this week folks. No new reviews, so let's get right into the outro. Have a Day! w/ The History Wizard is brought to you by me, The History Wizard. If you want to see/hear more of me you can find me on Tiktok @thehistorywizard or on Instagram @the_history_wizard. Please remember to rate, review, and subscribe to Have a Day! On your pod catcher of choice. The more you do, the more people will be able to listen and learn along with you. Thank you  for sticking around until the end and, as always, Have a Day, and Free Rakhine.    

As the long burning genocide against the Rohingya continues to unfold with recent conflagrations of violence in Rakhine State, we are joined on Speaking Out of Place today with prominent Rohingya advocate and writer Nay San Lwin and veteran journalist Chris Gunness, now with the Myanmar Accountability Project.They take us through recent disturbing developments in the area and the present perils facing the Rohingya. They discuss the pervasive failings of international institutions and the relationship between the Gaza and Rohingya genocides, and also, together, envision what a just future might look like and require.Chris Gunness covered the 1988 democracy uprising for the BBC in what was then Burma. After a 23-year career at the BBC, he joined the United Nations as Director of Strategic Communications and Advocacy in the Middle East. In 2019 he left the UN and returned to London. He founded the Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP) in 2021.Nay San Lwin is a Rohingya activist and blogger. For the past 18 years, since his departure from Myanmar, he has been documenting human rights violations and the military campaigns of the Tatmadaw in Arakan State of Myanmar. He is a prolific commentator on Rohingya issues on radio, television channels and other mainstream media outlets. He is a co-founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition.

Episode #232: Kasit Piromya exemplifies a life dedicated to the service of his country and human rights. From a long-standing career as a Thai diplomat to a post-retirement shift into politics, Piromya has transitioned into a vocal advocate for democracy and civil liberties. With an unfiltered candor rare among politicians, he recently lambasted the Thai government's cozy relationship with Myanmar's military and their complicit role in illicit border activities.During this podcast episode, he underscores the stark disconnect between Thailand's historic benevolence towards refugees and its current government's cold stance towards the Burmese seeking shelter. He implores the Thai government to return to humanitarian policies, envisioning a proactive role for Thailand in aiding distressed neighbors rather than succumbing to economic entanglements with Myanmar's junta. His critique doesn't spare regional bodies like ASEAN, challenging them to sanction Myanmar's military and to ensure aid reaches the people, not the oppressors.Piromya has a direct message to those listening from inside the revolution: “To all my Myanmar friends, I think you have to be encouraged. Now, by your own efforts, congratulations, you have denied the outright victory of the Tatmadaw. They have failed in the coup d'état, and they now on the defensive side.”

On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d'etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People's Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. China's approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China's decision-making approach to the conflict. For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow.  Timestamps[02:07] China's Interest in the Myanmar Conflict[05:48] China's Engagement with Parties in Myanmar[12:48] Impact of China's Brokered Ceasefires [20:30] Credibility of China in Southeast Asia[25:15] Myanmar in the US-China Relationship

Episode #165: Toe Zaw Latt, a journalist currently with Mizzima talks with us about access to communications in Myanmar.Before the arrival of mobile phones and internet in the country, one of the few options for communication was the telephone, when whole apartment complexes or entire villages might have to make do with only one or two. A private phone line was usually possible just for senior military figures or their cronies. Because the military actively monitored phone use, the Burmese teashop took on an outsized role as a workaround communications hub.The internet arrived in Myanmar in the early 2000s, and within a decade, the Burmese online space had exploded to about 30 million users. General Min Aung Hlaing understood the danger that such free access to information posed to his plans to take over the country, and on the morning of the coup, he suddenly closed down all the country's mobile networks and blocked the signals of independent media. The military has tried to monitor communications as much as possible, putting up firewalls to prevent access to sites they consider dangerous or provocative.They also employ rolling blackouts that severely restrict access to news, coupled with massive, targeted disinformation campaigns to further confuse people. Activists have had to fall back on more old-fashioned strategies such as shortwave radio, as well as human carriers.Toe Zaw Latt believes there is one communication tool that would have a dramatic impact on the fortunes of the democracy movement: Starlink, the satellite internet technology developed by Elon Musk. The military would have no control over this network, so Starlink would truly be a game-changer: communities could be warned before violent military assault, it could also help in organizing humanitarian missions on the ground, and provide life-saving access to medicine and food.Finally, Toe Zaw Latt says that the Tatmadaw is most afraid of its own soldiers getting access to the internet. Getting uncensored information is the impetus for many defections. So providing internet to those still serving could open the floodgates of soldiers ready to put down their weapons.

The Myanmar coup on February 1, 2021 shocked the world, and ended an opening that had fostered hopes for democratization and economic development. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, reversed a decade's worth of changes, and sparked a civil conflict that has continued for two years since the coup. Why did the military launch a coup? What reasons do the Tatmadaw give for seizing such a central role in the country's affairs? Oliver Slow, a reporter who was based in Myanmar over the past decades, shares his on-the-ground experiences in his recent book Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar's Military Must Go Back to the Barracks (Bloomsbury, 2023) In this interview, Oliver and I talk about his history in Myanmar, how the military grew to see itself as the protectors of Myanmar–despite what the people think–and the complicated conflict in Rakhine State. Oliver Slow is an award-winning multimedia journalist. Previously based in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, he's recently returned to the United Kingdom, where he works for the BBC. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Return of the Junta. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The Myanmar coup on February 1, 2021 shocked the world, and ended an opening that had fostered hopes for democratization and economic development. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, reversed a decade's worth of changes, and sparked a civil conflict that has continued for two years since the coup. Why did the military launch a coup? What reasons do the Tatmadaw give for seizing such a central role in the country's affairs? Oliver Slow, a reporter who was based in Myanmar over the past decades, shares his on-the-ground experiences in his recent book Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar's Military Must Go Back to the Barracks (Bloomsbury, 2023) In this interview, Oliver and I talk about his history in Myanmar, how the military grew to see itself as the protectors of Myanmar–despite what the people think–and the complicated conflict in Rakhine State. Oliver Slow is an award-winning multimedia journalist. Previously based in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, he's recently returned to the United Kingdom, where he works for the BBC. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Return of the Junta. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/southeast-asian-studies

The Myanmar coup on February 1, 2021 shocked the world, and ended an opening that had fostered hopes for democratization and economic development. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, reversed a decade's worth of changes, and sparked a civil conflict that has continued for two years since the coup. Why did the military launch a coup? What reasons do the Tatmadaw give for seizing such a central role in the country's affairs? Oliver Slow, a reporter who was based in Myanmar over the past decades, shares his on-the-ground experiences in his recent book Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar's Military Must Go Back to the Barracks (Bloomsbury, 2023) In this interview, Oliver and I talk about his history in Myanmar, how the military grew to see itself as the protectors of Myanmar–despite what the people think–and the complicated conflict in Rakhine State. Oliver Slow is an award-winning multimedia journalist. Previously based in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, he's recently returned to the United Kingdom, where he works for the BBC. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Return of the Junta. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

The Myanmar coup on February 1, 2021 shocked the world, and ended an opening that had fostered hopes for democratization and economic development. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, reversed a decade's worth of changes, and sparked a civil conflict that has continued for two years since the coup. Why did the military launch a coup? What reasons do the Tatmadaw give for seizing such a central role in the country's affairs? Oliver Slow, a reporter who was based in Myanmar over the past decades, shares his on-the-ground experiences in his recent book Return of the Junta: Why Myanmar's Military Must Go Back to the Barracks (Bloomsbury, 2023) In this interview, Oliver and I talk about his history in Myanmar, how the military grew to see itself as the protectors of Myanmar–despite what the people think–and the complicated conflict in Rakhine State. Oliver Slow is an award-winning multimedia journalist. Previously based in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, he's recently returned to the United Kingdom, where he works for the BBC. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Return of the Junta. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an associate editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review

Episode #157: In 1995, Burmese assaults into Karen territory created thousands of refugees who fled to Thai refugee camps, including Eh Nay Thaw's family. He spent the next ten years in a refugee camp before being resettled in the United States.Eh Nay Taw's years in the camps were quite painful, but he realizes the necessity of coming to grips with that experience. He says, “Part of my goal is advocating for the Karen people and other ethnic groups that are persecuted by the Burmese military regime,” and for this he needs to be able to revisit and retell sometimes horrific stories.Growing up, his hatred of the Tatmadaw extended to a mistrust of the entire Bamar ethnicity. It was only after arriving in America that he was able to move on from his deep-rooted hatred. “It took a long time to convince myself that Burmese people are not to be blamed, but instead the military junta, those in power.” But he also realized he had his own inner work to do. “If somebody still hates others based on their race or ethnicity, it tells me that that person hasn't healed him or herself yet… I [had to] learn to forgive my former perpetrators.”Eh Nay Taw also thinks a lot about what constitutes Karen identity, and is concerned with how splintered the Karen community has become. This older generation has long viewed politics as a zero-sum game, in which one emphasizes one's own group over others. Further impacting “Karen identity” is that so many are now growing up in the diaspora, without a firm connection to their ancestral homeland. But he is hopeful with the younger generation who have joined in solidarity against the military with other ethnic groups and even the Bamar majority. And he sees the Bamar evolving as well, towards more understanding of and solidarity with Myanmar's ethnic minorities. He says, “I'm cautiously optimistic about the future of Burma.”

Episode #156: Even two years after the coup, the Tatmadaw continues its campaign of terror, disrupting communities, causing a massive refugee problem and destroying the country's infrastructure. And because the military looks for loyalty rather than competence in choosing personnel, it has led to incompetent economic managers heading the country's banks. Not surprisingly, the result is the effective collapse of the country's economy. This is the subject of today's episode with Zach Abuza, a professor at the National War College and specialist of Southeast Asian security and politics.Abuza also expresses a fear about the proposed upcoming elections, which are most likely to be a sham. He believes that any election will result in at least some part of the international community accepting military rule in Myanmar, putting the NLD between a rock and a hard place: If they boycott the election, the narrative will be that they refuse to participate in democracy; and if they participate, the election will be rigged against them. Addressing the hypocrisy of pro-democracy countries failing to support democratic efforts in Myanmar, Abuza says that, at the end of the day, a country's support is largely one of self-interest. Most nations in the West have limited trade and investments in Myanmar, and so intervention is not an economic or political priority for so-called champions of democracy. Plus, without a figure like Aung San Suu Kyi, the NUG lacks someone who can command the attention of Western policymakers. And while Abuza is sure that PDFs will never defeat the military through combat, he asserts that the Tatmadaw will soon realize they do not have the necessary manpower or resources needed to win the war, which will result in increasing defections. However, in the meantime, Abuza emphasizes that in spite of the long pent-up desire to forcefully redress past wrongs caused by the military, the NUG must maintain a moral high ground. Yet Abuza emphasizes that the military's mentality will not allow them to back down gracefully. High-level military leaders, led by General Min Aung Hlaing, are “are surrounded by sycophants who tell them what they want to hear. They're happy to rule the country and run it into the ground because they think it is their birthright to do so.”

Episode #152: Kristina Simion's book, Rule of Law Intermediaries, looks at the complex transition period of the 2010s in Myanmar, when dramatic changes were sweeping across the country. Simion notes how even though real substantive change actually didn't take place, there remained a sense of optimism that finally there would be some pathway leading out from under the military's half century of oppression.Simion weaves her narrative primarily through the perspective of the “rule of law.” While development actors usually see transformational rule of law policies as way to help create a more equitable society, many Burmese actually felt quite differently. They were generally suspicious after decades of oppressive military rule, when “the law was always seen as a tool from the rulers to oppress the population.” Ironically, military figures delighted in the concept, which they took to mean “law and order,” and which they appropriated to justify their stranglehold on individual freedoms and liberties.In trying to better understand the exploitative nature of military rule, Simion examines the system they inherited from the colonial period. The British imposed less a legal system than a type of “regulated control and brutality.” Many colonial laws, including the more restrictive ones, stayed on the books after independence, and the Tatmadaw later operationalized them to justify and strengthen their oppression—and which they have once again resorted to since the coup.Simion's study also centered on the “intermediary.” During the transition period, with the lack of formal systems yet in place, the rush of foreign development actors who flooded into the country needed to rely on personal contacts—intermediaries—to get their projects off the ground. Intermediaries not only guided conversations, but were responsible for finding the appropriate personal connections and making necessary introductions, etc. Simion wryly notes that it begs the question of who was actually leading the projects!Since the coup, Simion has been impressed with how activists have shown a keen interest in the rule of law and transitional justice mechanisms. Incredibly, even as they are resisting the Tatmadaw and simply trying to survive, many are taking virtual classes with Simion on these complex yet important topics. She conducts training courses with people hiding in the jungle who want to learn more about principles for lawmaking, and tutors others about Constitutional reform, who are already looking ahead to ensure that ethnic minorities are protected in a new, post-Tatmadaw Myanmar.

Episode #147: Many years ago, Jesse Phenow signed up to be a volunteer at a resettlement organizing, initially thinking he would be “the friend and ally and welcomer that that they've been needing.'” But he found something quite different! “This family didn't need me; in fact, in a lot of ways, I was the welcomed, not the welcomer. That family's posture and sense of welcome was something that I desperately needed, and hadn't really experienced before.” Jesse was completely taken not only with the sense of hospitality of the Karen family he met, but also their savvy, gritty resilience.While in college, Jesse took what would be his first of many trips to Karen refugee camps, and he chose to write his senior thesis on the Karen Revolution, which filled with a much deeper sense of the people and their complex history.After graduation he moved to Minneapolis, where he worked in an office providing mental health services to immigrant communities. “There's a lot of trauma,” he acknowledges. “There's not a Karen person in Minnesota who doesn't have a story about a family member or a friend being harmed, raped, killed, tortured, or a village burned.”Jesse bought and renovated an older building nearby, which he transformed it into a communal space called “The Urban Village.” Its goal is to support Karen and Karenni youth struggling with their sense of identity. “We're hearing from elders a genuine fear around a growing disconnect between them and their kids,” Jesse says. “Our hope is that that connection really starts with a connection to themselves and to their identity, whatever they come to believe that to be, but that they feel a sense of connection.”The aftermath of the coup has exposed an additional manifestation of the generation gap. While the elder generation had to survive near constant assaults from the Tatmadaw, the latter do not have that personal experience, and their different perspectives strongly shape their outlook and sense of possibility.Even since the coup, Jesse has continued his relief trips supporting health and education projects back in Burma and around the border regions. While there, he also helps to document the on-going situation, and interviews elders with the aim of building a historical archive. As tumultuous and challenging as the last two years have been, he says, “The entire country is really fighting back, and I think this type of unity probably hasn't been seen before.”

Episode #145: Calvin Khoe, the Co-Director of Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), speaks with us about ASEAN's and Indonesia's in role in the Myanmar conflict.Khoe emphasizes the importance of allowing ASEAN to lead detailed, closed-door conversations with a wide range of actors within Myanmar, and that it shouldn't be rushed by outside parties. He criticizes Westerners who he feels are unfamiliar with ASEAN's protocols (and Asian culture in general) and who push too aggressively for progress.To Khoe, the need for private dialogue also informs his perhaps controversial opinion that it is inappropriate even to publicly chastise the Tatmadaw for its many serious human rights infractions, and that such matters should only be addressed by using soft language with them in private. And perhaps even more controversially, he insists that discussions on the future of the country must involve the SAC, as well as the NUG and various EAOs. This is because he feels that all parties have a seat at the table in looking at the future of the country, and he hopes Indonesia can be seen as a “big brother” member of ASEAN that could facilitate this kind of discussion.Addressing concerns that the military-led elections proposed this year would likely not be free and fair, and thus provide a false legitimacy to the junta, Khoe argues that he does not see any better option for resolving the conflict, and adds that ASEAN and Indonesia could help oversee any elections.Khoe explains how ASEAN and Southeast Asian nations view the role of the military within their respective countries. Most Southeast Asian countries have strong militaries, and Khoe believes that outside countries do not appreciate the local context and history of the region, and the traditional role that militaries play in that part of the world. This is also why he insists that the Tatmadaw does have a role in deciding the future of the country, in spite of the widespread violence they have perpetuated in these past two years.

Episode #145: Who am I?” Valerie remembers asking herself this question while sitting in a meditation hall at Aung Lan Monastery late one evening. “Why are we seeking and loving so much about having this attraction and attachments? What is going on? And so, that's how I started out.”Born in Myanmar to a Chinese Muslim family and a later convert to Buddhism, Valerie eventually relocated to California. There she became involved in the beauty pageant circuit and modeled, and was employed as manager of a commercial lending bank. But when an acquaintance she was due to meet suddenly died, her life priorities were shaken and she decided to attend a meditation course in the Thae Ingu tradition.Her first retreat was excruciating. The pain at one point became so severe she began to fear she was dying. But she was determined and eventually became able to detach from her pain. Her mind sharpened, she delighted in the subtle detail that only a penetrative mind is able to reach. She began to sit for longer and longer periods, examining the origin of suffering and the identification with body, and the conditionality of self. The course had a profound effect on Valerie, as she discovered when she returned home. She stopped modeling, and in fact barely attended to her appearance at all, which led to interventions from management at her bank and alarmed her friends.Then the military coup in Myanmar happened. And as deep as her spiritual journey had taken her, Valerie also found herself unable to sit at all following the coup because of the horrors being perpetrated by the Tatmadaw. Valerie became involved with the democracy movement and began to question her practice in light of the military's brutality. While fully aware that the ultimate cause of suffering is inside, Valerie also feels strongly that seeking out a peaceful inner life is not possible in the wake of the excruciating harm the military is inflicting on the Burmese people. Valerie felt compelled to choose between prioritizing spiritual or worldly liberation, and temporarily has chosen the latter. Her reasoning is that the singular cause of so much intense suffering on the outside needs to be taken care of in the short term before conditions can again arise that support widespread meditation practice in the future, when peace eventually does return to the Golden Land.For now, her present pathway is clear. “We will try to support those people who are inside the country and fighting for the people, who are fighting for fairness, and fighting for the truth.”

This week on the show, we look at the crisis in Myanmar. February 1st marks the two-year anniversary of the coup d'état by the armed forces, the Tatmadaw, who in February 2021 overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Since then, the country has descended into a brutal and complex civil war. Our panel look at the state of the country and its people two years on. Can Myanmar hold together, can democracy ever be restored and is the world ignoring a major humanitarian crisis in the making? Joining Bronwen Maddox are two journalists who have covered Myanmar extensively. Sebastian Strangio is an author and the Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat and Ali Fowle, a freelance journalist with Al Jazeera and the BBC. Joining them in the studio are Ben Bland, the Director of the Asia-Pacific programme, and Rashmin Sagoo, the Director of Chatham House's International Law Programme. Read our expertise: National security and transatlantic unity top Biden's agenda The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress The World Today - February & March 2023 Subscribe to Independent Thinking wherever you get your podcasts. Please listen, rate, review and subscribe. Presented by Bronwen Maddox. Produced by John Pollock. Sound by Abdul Boudiaf and Robin Gardner.

Episode #144: In October 2007, Bobo witnessed uniformed soldiers beating Buddhist monks on the streets of Yangon. That experience radically changed the trajectory of his life.Bobo realized that any success or security he could accrue on an individual level through education and a profession could be snatched away without warning as long as the corrupt and cruel military regime remained in charge. He soon joined Generation Wave, an underground collective formed following the uprising in 2007. The work was dangerous and has put Bobo in the crosshairs since he was a teenager.Following the military coup in 2021, Bobo began working to help mobilize the populace into action with massive nonviolent protests and strikes in key sectors. As the nonviolent protests continued, the military began using live munitions. Being an organization committed to nonviolent resistance, Generation Wave has had to be creative in their approach.Yet while Generation Wave, itself, has been steadfastly committed to peaceful forms of opposition, there is an understanding that each part of the movement is equally needed in order to counter the Tatmadaw: nonviolent action, armed resistance, the Civil Disobedience Movement, sanctions from the West, recognition of the NUG, etc.For the foreseeable future, Bobo is doing all he can at a personal level to play this role himself, pushing aside any thought of the toll it's taking. “I don't want to be there,” he admits wearily. “I want to live very peacefully, and to have fun with friends and with my family. I want a normal life like other people, of course. But now all my energy and all my commitment are for the revolution and for the movement.”

Episode #142: “What must a government do to be worthy of recognition?” This is a question that Philipp Annawitt poses in a recent The Diplomat article, and discusses with Insight Myanmar Podcast vis-à-vis the NUG and its allies.The concept of “legitimacy” has evolved in the past couple of centuries century. Considering the various strands of “legitimacy” standards in present-day Myanmar, Annawitt emphatically states that the military junta meets none of them. In contrast, he points out that the NUG (and its allies) carries out many of the commonly accepted, functional duties of a government in those areas of the country not under Tatmadaw control, and has even overseen security for civilians and administered justice in safe areas inside the country.But not only have few nations recognized the NUG as Myanmar's legitimate government, it has hardly shown even modicum of support, especially in the face of the junta's obvious abuses and demonstrable inability to govern well. Annawitt calls this out as indefensible. The robust Burmese diaspora communities around the world have been more than doing their part to keep the NUG afloat. This connects to the unique and amazing spirit of collective sacrifice that characterizes the NUG, which includes tens of thousands of civil servants volunteering their time. Moreover, Annawaitt finds that this spirit of sacrifice becomes a political factor in determining future career opportunities, should the Tatmadaw be defeated.That said, Annawitt also feels that the lack of wages for NUG's civil servants is a serious issue with major ramifications that urgently needs addressing. Sustainability and the ability to fund all areas of the government are serious concerns. Given this situation, Annawitt envisions a big and urgent role for development partners to come in with financial resources and technical assistance. In fact, if more is not done to build up the government structures of the NUG, Annawitt cautions that there is little hope at any improvement for the country or its people, as the military leadership cares little for infrastructure beyond fattening their own pockets.Still, the present situation is a long way from being a utopian federal democracy, and Annawitt acknowledges the NUG's various shortcomings, including a lack consultation with ethnic allies and a convoluted decision-making process. But Annawitt repeatedly reminds us is that this is not a peacetime government or a mature federal system, but a functioning though transitory bureaucracy with limited resources, that at the same time is actively resisting a brutal military. “In the current situation, a pressure is there constantly,” he says. “Pressure for survival, security pressure, and communication is really difficult. And the demands, physically, health, psychologically, on all the actors, are overwhelming.”

Episode #138: “Almost everything was propaganda,” Paing comments, reflecting on his childhood growing up in Yangon. His release came in the form of artistic expression through music, largely influenced by Western bands and singers. He describes his songs as being gloomy and melancholic, which also characterizes his feelings about the recent, turbulent events in his country. Recently, however, Paing has been unable to write new music, nor even play his old tracks, because he is still recovering from the trauma of what he witnessed soon after the coup broke in Hlaing Thayar, his hometown. March 15, 2021, Paing watched from his rooftop balcony, as the military brutally assault protesters. Powerless, he saw people falling from injuries and others being killed outright, a memory which he feels has scarred him for life.Paing has been disappointed by both the lackluster international support as well as the leadership of the NUG. With diplomacy failing, he hopes that resistance fighters having better access to weapons can also help. However, as someone who still believes in the principles of non-violence, he is conflicted on this issue, especially as he realizes that a post-Tatmadaw world must include those former soldiers. “You can't kill everyone that opposes any new idea,” he notes. “You have to see things on a human level, instead of just using guns.”Paing knows the way forward will not be easy. “Again, I'm a pessimist,” he says, laughing. “So I think everything that can go wrong, will go wrong. But the worst thing that could happen is the military winning.”

In November 2022, USCIRF visited Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh, to assess the current conditions and issues that Burmese Rohingya refugees are facing. The Rohingya community, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Burma, have long fled religious persecution to neighboring Bangladesh. However, the most recent waves of refugees came in August 2017 following wide-scale atrocities that the Burmese authorities and military, known as the Tatmadaw, committed against them. These atrocities forced over a million Rohingya to flee the country, with a majority now temporarily residing in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. In March 2022, the Biden administration designated these atrocities as genocide and crimes against humanity, which USCIRF had been calling for since 2017.USCIRF Commissioner Stephen Schneck, who led this delegation, joins us today to discuss his first-hand account of the Rohingya's current conditions at the Bangladeshi refugee camps. On this trip, the delegation met with refugees, international organization officials, and members of the government of Bangladesh.With Contributions from:Stephen Schneck, Commissioner, USCIRFElizabeth Cassidy, Director of Research & Policy, USCIRFVeronica McCarthy, Public Affairs Associate, USCIRF

Episode #132: Zach Abuza, a columnist at Radio Free Asia and a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, provides his analysis of the tactical and strategic situation facing the Tatmadaw nearly two years into their attempted coup.He debunks several theories regarding the Burmese military. One is the size of the Burmese military, which he believes is much smaller than is often assumed, and is now showing signs of strain. There is also an increasing number of defections, and Abuza estimates that around 15% of the Tatmadaw's soldiers have been killed, wounded, or defected.In the past, the military relied on an urban Bamar population who could at worst be counted on to tacitly support their incursions into ethnic territories. Now, however, Abuza says, “The people are not being cowed into submission…it's got to drive Min Aung Hlaing and Soe Win absolutely batshit that the population continues to resist the military every day!” People with almost nothing still manage to give whatever they can to the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), a clear sign of how determined they are to continue to sacrifice in hopes of seeing the military defeated once and for all. In terms of the military's resources, on the one hand, Abuza notes that helicopters are the biggest threat to the resistance efforts, and their munitions are produced in-country. However, Abuza has seen a decrease in the number of mortars being launched into villages, indicating that they are concerned about their depleting stocks.With all this in mind, Abuza feels it is critical for the PDFs to begin avoiding direct conflict in favor of “fighting the military's ability to wage war. They have to concentrate on the increasingly depleted logistics network.” His main concern is the resistance's ability to sustain their efforts, since the Tatmadaw still benefits from relationships with China and Russia.

Episode #130: Igor Blaževič experienced the chaos, violence and fear of the Bosnian War at a young age. Once the war ended, Igor wanted to support others who were suffering from the lack of freedom he had only just escaped from. With this in mind, Igor traveled to such hotspots as Kosovo, Chechnya, Cuba, Belarus, and eventually to Myanmar. This work led to a close friendship with Czech President Václav Havel, whose own country had recently emerged from a traumatic past. Havel's participation at events that Igor sponsored ensured a wider visibility to their cause. In Myanmar, Igor found the oppression similar to what he had seen elsewhere. He stayed in the country for five years, working with former political prisoners and ethnic activists. These were the transition years, and despite the optimism brought by the new period of openness, Igor saw red flags from the start. He tried to explain that it was only a superficial democratic façade, but the situation only deteriorated when the Rohingya crisis hit. And as the crisis worsened, things began to play out in a way that was eerily familiar to Igor from his experience with communal violence in Bosnia. Igor saw how military intelligence was infiltrating and radicalizing parts of the Saṅgha, using the highly respected monastic clergy to advance its own fear tactics under the guise of Buddhism, spreading the poison of ethnocentrism and xenophobia. But he wasn't heard, dismissed as a know-nothing foreigner.  Even so, Igor was totally taken by surprise when the military coup was launched last year. However, he now found that diverse groups in Myanmar were united in facing a common enemy, and so he saw a chance for building solidarity that had not been possible before. To him the course is clear: recognize that the Tatmadaw is the common enemy, unite to destroy it, and then work together to build a better future after it is defeated.

Episode #129: Andrea Passeri and Hunter Marsten co-authored an article which looks at Myanmar's quest for a non-aligned foreign policy, and that is the subject of this podcast discussion. In 2011-12, following many years of military rule, the Thein Sein administration moved quickly to gain both domestic and international legitimacy. It instituted economic and political reforms, allowing the NLD, who had boycotted the elections, back into the political mainstream. From the military junta's previous negative-neutral foreign policy, the new government began shifting to a positive and active policy of non-alignment. There was a tangible feeling of openness and hope taking root. With Aung Sang Suu Kyi's ascendence in the years that followed, this more outward-looking foreign policy continued; Passeri and Marsten consider this a high-water mark for Myanmar in terms of a policy of positive neutrality. However, things started to turn in 2016, when the Rohyinga crisis played out on a worldwide stage. As a result, sanctions once again began to be imposed on the country. Aung Sang Suu Kyi's apologist stance towards the military turned off once-enthusiastic international supporters; foreign aid and investment dried up, and the country once again became more inward-looking. So as Myanmar's international legitimacy dissolved, the pendulum began swinging back towards negative neutralism. The authors emphasize the role that self-reliance plays in the ability to successfully enact both positive non-alignment and negative neutralist policies. It is, in fact, quite a challenge for small countries like Myanmar either way, because they are most often not self-reliant enough to “go it alone.” So while Myanmar may never have fully realized a goal of positive non-alignment, it has never really been able to fully realize negative neutralism, either.  Today, with few countries willing to countenance the Tatmadaw's violent and repressive rule, Myanmar is a pariah nation internationally and has become increasingly aligned with the authoritarian Great Powers, China and Russia. However, Marsten remains optimistic about the future because he believes that the younger generation has learned the lessons it needs to have learned to ultimately gain power and realize those goals.

Episode #124: Today's guest, Guillaume de Langre, worked for several years in Naypyidaw as an adviser to the Myanmar Ministry of Electricity and Energy (MOEE), and explains the history of electrification in Myanmar. From the post-independence period through the 2000s, he describes how much of the country was dark. One reason is that Tatmadaw was never really interested in developing access to electricity to much of the country. It may seem strange that the military regime did not seek a more prosperous economy, which would have required a more efficient and widespread electricity grid. But de Langre explains how the generals followed a Soviet style plan of state-owned industries where actual productivity was never the goal. Then in 2000, providing access to electricity suddenly became a priority, and brought about a rapid transformation that greatly benefited the Burmese people and economy. However, usage rates went way up, straining the system in a new way.  De Langre notes that the government ended up spending more on energy subsidies than even on education, which ultimately led to sharp price hikes in 2019.  This led to exploring plans for alternative energy sources, like solar or imported power plants, several of which were in place on the eve of the coup. However, everything fell apart after the coup, as investors balked at what had become high-risk projects overnight. Sadly, de Langre also believes that even if the military is defeated, “it would still take years to fix the damage done to the energy sector by the coup… It will take years for companies to trust again and to lower their perception of risk.”

On Thursday, August 25th, 2022, the accomplished artist and longtime activist, Htein Lin, was arrested along with his wife, Vicki Bowman. We had only just recently interviewed him, so hearing this news was doubly shocking. Htein Lin became was involved in the 1988 uprising in opposition to the military junta, and experienced guerilla warfare as a member of the revolutionary group, All Burma Students' Democratic Front. While living in a reconnaissance camp along the Indian border, Htein Lin met an artist from Mandalay who became his mentor. Together they discussed art and painting techniques, and Htein Lin's passion for art grew. Then in 1998, Htein Lin was arrested for nearly seven years when the letter of an old friend, a retired school teacher, was intercepted by the Tatmadaw. In prison, he continued to work as an artist, using objects found around the jail, such as pieces of glass, dismantled cigarette lighters, and syringes, etc. He even staged an art exhibition of this work for guards and prisoners. At one point, Htein Lin was transferred to Death Row. He and a poet friend were confined more than 23 hours per day with serious criminals, including at least two murderers. Yet his new neighbors offered up the one thing in their possession: their white, prison-issue sarongs as cloth upon which Htein Lin could continue to paint. Then just as suddenly, he was released. After returning to civil society, Htein Lin became increasingly involved in artists' discussion groups and experimental performance art. He met and married his wife, Vicki Bowman, the former British ambassador to Burma.  Together, they sought and found meaningful spiritual community in Dhamma Dipa, a vipassana meditation center in the tradition of SN Goenka. This led to further awakening and integration of his life and art: “If you are living in the present without reacting, without anger, and [if you] share in anything negative, sharing with loving-kindness and compassion in you, you become a very beautiful piece of art.” May his equanimity be of support to Htein Lin in his recent re-arrest.

Erin Murphy has been involved in Asia issues since 2001, and Myanmar, in particular, since 2008. She relates all this in her recently released book, http://cup.columbia.edu/book/burmese-haze/9781952636264 (Burmese Haze).   She contrasts the somewhat distorted, emotionally charged view of Myanmar held by American policy-makers during the transition period with the harsh, even brutal military reality in Myanmar that was lurking just under the surface. Murphy recalls the sheer callousness of the military government's refusal to accept humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the horrific and devastating Cyclone Nargis in 2008.   Regarding sanctions, for some in the American government the push for sanctions against the Tatmadaw has become almost a moral crusade. However, Murphy explains that the effect of any sanctions imposed on the regime will not be that onerous if other countries do not follow suit. As for any role that China might play, Murphy states, “I think one word that summarizes [the relationship between Myanmar and China] is ‘complicated'.”   When asked to speculate about the motivations of Aung San Suu Kyi, Murphy says that we may never know exactly what she was planning. She believes that The Lady has had to walk a fine line, balancing priorities, and no one really knows what her internal calculus was.   As for the Rohingya, it is but one of many decades-long, ethnic wars waged by the Burmese junta. Murphy says many in the international community should have seen it coming, but did nothing to stop it. Besides being an overall global failure, more recently it's an instance of unfortunate timing, in which international attention got distracted by Myanmar's nascent yet fragile democracy period.   On a sobering but positive note, Murphy concludes by saying that none of the protests have been in vain. “These are lessons; I don't see them as failures. Did they succeed in getting a democracy? No. But did they succeed in getting their cause recognized by the world? People know about it. And that's important, laying the groundwork… What you do is you keep getting new generations of people interested and then they bring in their tools, and their thoughts and their experiences.”

On July 7th, the official account of the European Union in Myanmar https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5292745600811617&extid=NS-UNK-UNK-UNK-IOS_GK0T-GK1C-GK2C&ref=sharing (posted a two-minute video) urging factories in conflict-torn Myanmar to re-open, charging that the factory shutdowns had driven former employees to poverty and even prostitution. In response, many charged that the EU was trying to manipulate Burmese voices to advocate for a policy that would benefit themselves but goes against the aspirations of the democracy movement. Today's guest, Maung Maung, currently president of the Confederation of Trade Unions in Myanmar (CTUM), addresses this video, as well as labor's role in the current revolution and the overall conditions for Myanmar's workers. While Maung Maung does not dispute an accusation in the video that the closed factories harm ordinary Burmese workers, he believes it is hurting the regime more, and that is the current priority. Maung Maung also found the video highly offensive because it is quite chauvinistic and insulting for Western powers to try and “educate” the Burmese people on the dangers of local young women turning to prostitution. To make matters worse, the junta has picked up on the video and has begun to promote it as a way to normalize their brutal regime, meaning that, in effect, the EU has managed to provide the Tatmadaw with a key piece of propaganda to boost their rule. Yet, as hard as things are now in the country, Maung Maung is hopeful for the future. “We are winning. We want people to not just think like well, ‘The military is going to win again.' No, it is not!”

Matthew Wells is a member of Amnesty International's Crisis Response team specializing in human rights violations, and has spent years investigating the ongoing atrocities by the Tatmadaw. One of the patterns that has come up repeatedly in their group's study has been the Burmese military's targeting of civilian communities rather than armed opponents. One particular Tatmadaw tactic that stands out to Wells is its reliance on airstrikes. Heavy bombardment is effectively traumatizing an entire population, and many Burmese are terrified whenever they hear a loud sound now, however distant. This is likely not unintentional, but rather part of a concerted effort to frighten the population into submission and create further instability. Recently, Wells' group published a report documenting war crimes and displacement in eastern Myanmar. In some of these cases, villages were bombarded for days and nights without end, even though there were no lawful targets in the area. To make matters even worse, the military has launched assaults on IDP camps as well, so the people simply have nowhere to go now. He describes soldiers having become little more than bands of marauders that rape, pillage, steal, and burn their way through the Burmese countryside. The military has been doing everything it can to limit news of its atrocities, shutting off electricity and internet access, and punishing journalists and others. In spite of these obstacles, Amnesty's work in uncovering the true story has been nothing short of miraculous. Through their examination of satellite imagery and a confidential in-country network, they have managed to document the ongoing reign of terror. Still, Wells is not satisfied that their work is achieving its desired outcome because of a lack of international response. And he is even less hopeful about the damage being done to the country's essential infrastructure: a collapsed economy, a decimated health care system, long-term food insecurity, and disrupted education. These structural problems are exacerbated by the real challenge of effectively getting humanitarian aid into the country. Wells calls on listeners to do what they can to continue to keep Myanmar in the news and hold their local representatives accountable. “It's on all of us to try to bring more attention to the situation here and to make sure that our governments wherever we are in the world are likewise putting priority on this.” He also encourages people to continue donating to nonprofits that are providing aid.

Growing up in the Bay Area, raised by parents who followed the Vietnamese meditation master Thich Nhat Hanh, Derek Pyle was no stranger to Buddhist theory and practice. While some Western practitioners separate their formal meditation practice from their experience of everyday life, Derek has always found value in integrating them, and has looked for inspiration from formal sitting practice to sutta study to undertaking projects as an Engaged Buddhist. One of his first projects was in 2017, when the Tatmadaw ramped up their aggression against the Rohingya. Derek reached out to https://insightmyanmar.org/complete-shows/2022/2/23/episode-93-alan-senauke-engaged-buddhist (Alan Senauke), and the they worked on a petition and fundraising campaign in support of the Rohingya. Beyond this, Derek has been looking for ways that local Saṅghas can engage in the world in accordance with their values. This is especially important regarding the present situation in Myanmar. “[Given] the incredible violence being perpetuated by the military in Myanmar, I think it would be really interesting for Buddhist communities… to be thinking about… ‘What are the different approaches we could take to really think about how we might be able to intervene in a way that actually reduces violence?‘” Citing Aric McBay's Full Spectrum Resistance, Derek has come to believe that “resistance movements are more effective if there is an amount of armed resistance, but that can't be the main tactic used.” This exploration has led to even deeper soul-searching on his own part, in hopes of finding answers to difficult questions such as whether non-violence is actually a viable method of resisting oppression. Derek calls out not only Buddhist organizations in the West for not doing enough to support the Myanmar resistance, but more generally, liberal democracy. He asserts that while it may stake out principled positions in favor of progressive change in theory, it may be preventing meaningful change in practice. He takes particular issue with a stance of “neutrality” towards oppression and violence, noting that it often means—in reality—tacitly supporting the side that perpetuates injustice. Derek continues to support the Burmese people. “I find it heartbreaking and terrifying that this is a reality people have to live in, and also incredibly inspiring that people are so courageous, and creative and rambunctious in the midst of all of that. It's really powerful.”

U Win Htein is an elder politician of the National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's right hand man, a former parliamentarian, army captain and businessman.U Win Htein has spent 20 years of his life in prison for his belief in democracy.He has written his autobiography entitled "Win Htein's story for posterity: Burma's odyssey from tyranny to quasi-democracy" which can be purchased as a ebook from many online booksellers such as https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/win-hteins-story-for-posterity-win-htein/1140822639.It is extremely hard to believe that at the age of 79 for speaking out against the coup of 1 February, 2021 U Win Htein was sentenced in late October 2021 for sedition and received a 20 year prison sentence.  He is currently serving this sentence at a jail in Mandalay.This Episode deals with Martyrs' Day which occurred 75 years ago today on 19 July 1947 when assassins entered a room in the Secretariat where the Governor's Executive Council was meeting and shot dead 9 prominent men, including U Aung San and a number of ethnic leaders, who would all have played a prominent role in an independent Burma.  The modern history of Burma might well have been a very different if these assassinations had not taken place.   19 July has been called "Martyrs' Day" ever since.

Simon traces the arc of his Chin homeland's history and politics from the mists of history to the present-day conflict. Chin State is the poorest part of Myanmar, which suffers from an lack of developed infrastructure. Due to the lack of available medical care, Simon decided the best way he could serve his community was by becoming a doctor. He explains how perhaps Chin State's root problem now is poor access to education. There are just a small number of woefully supplied schools several days of walking away for many villagers. And those fortunate enough to attend school often carry painful memories of the oppressive “Burmanization” of the curriculum, where Chin students were required to speak the Burmese language at school, and though largely Christian, were forced to memorize and recite Buddhist suttas.  Simon notes the enormous popular support for resisting the coup in Chin State after the military forcibly took power. Massive street protests erupted all over the province. Chin state also boasted the highest percentage of employees who joined CDM. The Tatmadaw responded with a swift and utter brutality that drove many Chin to ethnic camps to join the armed resistance. The Burmese military, in turn, responded with even more vicious ground attacks and airstrikes, which sent residents of entire towns fleeing on foot for their lives, many across the Indian border in Mizoram. “If we can wipe out, from the face of Myanmar, this military in the future, then all the Myanmar people will be joyful, peaceful and prosperous.”

U Win Htein is an elder politician of the National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's right hand man, a former parliamentarian, army captain and businessman.U Win Htein has spent 20 years of his life in prison for his belief in democracy.He has written his autobiography entitled "Win Htein's story for posterity: Burma's odyssey from tyranny to quasi-democracy" which can be purchased as a ebook from many online booksellers such as https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/win-hteins-story-for-posterity-win-htein/1140822639.It is extremely hard to believe that at the age of 79 for speaking out against the coup of 1 February, 2021 U Win Htein was sentenced in late October last year for sedition and received a 20 year prison sentence.  He is currently serving this sentence at a jail in Mandalay.  

U Win Htein is an elder politician of the National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's right hand man, a former parliamentarian, army captain and businessman.U Win Htein has spent 20 years of his life in prison for his belief in democracy.He has written his autobiography entitled "Win Htein's story for posterity: Burma's odyssey from tyranny to quasi-democracy" which can be purchased as a ebook from many online booksellers such as https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/win-hteins-story-for-posterity-win-htein/1140822639.It is extremely hard to believe that at the age of 79 for speaking out against the coup of 1 February, 2021 U Win Htein was sentenced in late October last year for sedition and received a 20 year prison sentence.  He is currently serving this sentence at a jail in Mandalay.  

U Win Htein is an elder politician of the National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's right hand man, a former parliamentarian, army captain and businessman.U Win Htein has spent 20 years of his life in prison for his belief in democracy.He has written his autobiography entitled "Win Htein's story for posterity: Burma's odyssey from tyranny to quasi-democracy" which can be purchased as a ebook from many online booksellers such as https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/win-hteins-story-for-posterity-win-htein/1140822639.It is extremely hard to believe that at the age of 79 for speaking out against the coup of 1 February, 2021 U Win Htein was sentenced in late October last year for sedition and received a 20 year prison sentence.  He is currently serving this sentence at a jail in Mandalay.  

“You can you hear from how I speak that these days, I am very distracted and distressed by the development of the entire thing,” Han Htoo Khant Paing admits during this urgent and emotional interview. Han Htoo is the author of a recent The Diplomat article describing the four state executions that the Tatmadaw has ordered. In the context of the military's terrible brutality and atrocities—abducting, raping, burning, and killing with impunity since the start of the coup in February, 2021—some may wonder about the significance of just four killings.  But Han Htoo believes they are very important and symbolic. Two of the condemned, Hla Myo Aung and Aung Thura Zaw, are accused of the murder of a schoolteacher they believed to be a military informer. The other two are very prominent names from the democracy movement over the past few decades. One, Ko Jimmy was a student leader back in 1988 as well as being one of the key organizers of the 2007 Saffron Revolution. The other is an important Burmese hip hop artist named Zayar Thaw, who was also an elected Member of Parliament. Moving to the wider international context, Han Htoo is unsure what larger bodies could—and would—do. He focuses his comments on ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Han Htoo unfortunately doubts that ASEAN will exert its influence beyond pro forma actions. He explains, “What [ASEAN member states] are really concerned about is stability, and the regional security threat,” and the executions don't really fit into that calculus directly. However, Han Htoo believes that the executions will only instigate more resentment from the resistance, which could further escalate the conflict and generate increased instability. In closing, Han Htoo urges listeners to do whatever they can in sharing his article and this interview, and writing to one's local elected officials. He reminds us that if enough pressure is put on the Tatmadaw, it may literally save lives. “Please do anything that you can to save the lives of four champions of democracy and human rights.”

Soeya Min first got his start in the travel industry, then switched to the entertainment field. When the pandemic struck, with a lot of free time on his hands, he started learning about psychology. All these endeavors led him to podcasts, and he started up his own program, called Thoughts and Opinions, in which he talks with guests from a wide range of backgrounds. More than just looking to boost his own platform, Soeya Min is looking to helping elevate the entire local podcasting industry in Myanmar. The coup has helped him appreciate the value of psychology, which he now recognizes as critical to helping ameliorate the varying degrees of trauma that people have been going through. With a colleague, he opened his own mental health service platform, and now supports many who are in need. In Myanmar, however, this was no easy task because of the stigma carried by issues of “mental health.” Soeya Min feels that the entire country has been living through trauma since the coup, and has seen an acute rise in depression cases. Some of his recent clients have included defected soldiers, which provides a rare insight into the psychology of the Tatmadaw. Such work has required him to listen without judgment, hard as that may be, while realizing that what the soldiers really need is a type of re-parenting. Soeya Min's understanding of psychology is influenced by his Buddhist meditation practice, and has been intrigued to realize how closely related the two actually are. While mainly self-taught as a practitioner, he has drawn on some techniques from the Mahasi tradition. These days, he has also found a focus on mettā particularly helpful, especially as a mental health professional dealing with clients who are going through terrible circumstances. As a mental health professional, Soeya Min is quite concerned with how long the Burmese people can keep going without any outside assistance. “All the Burmese people are asking for support... But when you have not received the same reaction or support [as Ukraine], people might turn cynical. That's what I'm afraid of, people get cynical and down. Then what to do?”

Like many of his Bamar colleagues, Khun Be Du and his Karenni community first attempted to resist the military coup through non-violent means. When that could no longer be sustained, he banded together with friends to form a local defense force. Today, he is playing a leading role in the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), while also serving as Deputy Minister for Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation for the National Unity Government (NUG). Tatmadaw incursions into Karenni state are not new. Khun Be Du recalls hearing about crackdowns following Ne Win's 1962 coup, when they attempted to deprive ethnic forces of food, funding, intelligence, and recruits. Peace negotiations were finally achieved in the transition period, finally allowing much-needed development work to proceed. But the Tatmadaw has rekindled past horrors. They now station 3,500 soldiers in Karenni State and have strategically terrorized over 100 villages. “We have to fight it,” Khun Be Du says simply. He estimates that for every local fighter killed, the Burmese military loses 30 men. In the face of such untenable losses, the Tatmadaw has taken a different tack, using tanks, mortar and artillery fire against vulnerable populations, and targeting schools, hospitals, IDP camps and other civilian centers. Perhaps the Tatmadaw's worst evil came on an otherwise holy date for the largely Christian Karenni: December 24th, 2021. Soldiers stopped vehicles and gathered passengers into a group, stole their valuables and then proceeded to torture and kill them, then burning the bodies. Given that the atrocities being perpetuated on a daily basis in Karenni state are equally as bad as the current Russian aggression in Ukraine, Khun Be Du is frustrated that the plight of his people isn't gathering more international attention and support. He ponders, “I wonder how much we have to die so that the international community will take action.”

The days turned dark in March 2020 when the Burmese military began attacking and killing nonviolent protesters. Soon after the crackdown, activists still courageous enough to take to the streets began holding signs that read: “We Need R2P.”  R2P, or the Responsibility to Protect, is an international norm that the UN unanimously adopted in 2005, which purports to protect populations around the world from atrocity crimes, such as ethnic cleansing. However, R2P is not a legal doctrine, and so it can only be enforced when there is the political will to do so, and Scott feels it is most certainly needed now in Myanmar. But the international community has yet to act. This inaction has caused frustration among Burmese activists who have been calling for R2P for over a year now. Our guest today, Liam Scott, believes that criticism should not be directed at the R2P doctrine itself, but rather at those international bodies who refuse to respond. Scott thinks that the NUG has certainly “been specific in what particular tools of R2P they want the international community to employ, like with arms embargoes, with sanctions on oil and gas, and with depriving the military of the legitimacy that it craves on the international stage.” He also suggests taking a more nuanced view of R2P is more realistic as well as optimistic, where “boots on the ground intervention” is the only sign of effectiveness. He hopes that there can be a string of smaller successes that gradually develop into something larger.  Still, Scott confesses he simply doesn't know what more beyond the horrible things the Tatmadaw are already doing that would push international organizations to action. And he certainly wishes something would be done. Scott points to the fact that the Burmese military has never been successfully prosecuted for any past crimes, and suggests this is one reason why they are acting now with such impunity. He admits that the wheels of justice move slowly… though perhaps far too slowly for those victims still being persecuted.  “I completely recognize and empathize with the fact that so many of these questions are coming from a place of pure desperation and frustration with an international community that has done so little in response,” Scott concludes.

The Myanmar military's violent response to the democracy movement has caused angst among many devout Burmese Buddhists about how to defend themselves and their fundamental freedoms, while remaining true to their religion. Many are faced with that line where the cold edge of sila (ethics) melts along the warm edge of lived experience. Is sila black-and-white, or might there be more shades of grey? Bhikkhu Bodhi helps unpack this moral quandary in this follow-up discussion to our interview last year. Bhikkhu Bodhi acknowledges that the farther one's own reality is from needing to make terrible, life-or-death choices, the easier it probably is to take an absolutist perspective on observing sila. However, those situations now unfortunately symbolize the “real reality” that the people of Myanmar face on a daily basis. What is compassionate guidance for those who do face such kinds of choices, who do have to act to save loved ones from the indiscriminate, murderous violence of the Tatmadaw, and restore basic safety and freedoms to their country?  Bhikkhu Bodhi establishes two related frames of reference within which we can make reasonable choices. The first is to know the intent of our mind. It is not the action itself, but the intention that matters from a karmic perspective, and we should never kill out of hate. The second is to be sure of the reasons behind our actions. If we are not motivated by hatred of the enemy, but feel there is no other choice in order to save the lives of innocent people, it's the very best we can do. Bhikkhu Bodhi also stresses that in the suttas, the Buddha is never depicted as being faced with these kinds of moral dilemmas. And he reminds us that this is the complex, modern, 21st century world we live in, not the 5th century BCE. So he says that the appropriate teaching around these issues is perhaps not so “obvious.” 

Kenton Clymer joins the podcast to speak about his book, "A Delicate Relationship: The United States and Burma/Myanmar since 1945." In the waning days of World War II, Americans were primarily concerned with stopping the spread of Communism, especially after Mao's revolution, which thrust neighboring Burma into an important geopolitical position. Initially, the US thought that U Nu, Burma's first Prime Minister, was too Socialist-leaning, while Ne Win, the eventual dictator, was seen as an anti-Communist strongman. The 1950s were a challenging decade for the Burmese government. The country's ethnic groups were suspicious of a powerful central government—with some like the Karen actively fighting against it—and the Chinese and Americans were engaged in geopolitical maneuvering in the north of the country. After Ne Win's second coup in 1962, the primary concern on the American side was ensuring that Burma didn't fall into the Soviet or Chinese camp as a result. For the next 26 years, the US looked on as civil liberties continued to erode, the economy collapsed, ethnic groups pushed for greater rights, scores of Indians were exiled, and the country became increasingly isolated and shut off from the rest of the world. Besides Communism, the only other real area of American interest in Burma was the narcotics trade. As Ne Win was staunchly opposed to drugs, he accepted American support, including aircraft and intelligence sharing, to eradicate the poppy fields. However, it is uncertain how effective this collaboration was, and in fact human rights activists later discovered that the Tatmadaw used the chemical sprays on human targets in the country's ethnic regions. The perception of Burma, and the shape of US relations, changed irrevocably in 1988, with the violent crackdown on student protests and the nullification of the subsequent election. The anti-Communist prism through which the American government's Burma policy had been viewed for decades changed to one of human rights; Aung San Suu Kyi was its figurehead.   Clymer addresses some important developments in recent Myanmar history up to the NLD's electoral victory in 2015, when his book was published, and discusses what occurred since. While he sees recurring cycles at play in the current situation, he also has reason for optimism. He feels that the current group of Gen-Z activists will not put up with oppressive military rule like in the past.

Ma Thida's book, Prisoner of Conscience, details her remarkable and inspiring life journey. She was attending medical school when, in 1988, the military violently suppressed peaceful protesters. Soon, she found herself volunteering at local NLD offices that had formed in the wake of the unrest. In 1993 Ma Thida was arrested on a trumped up charge and given 20 years. Adjustment to prison life was not easy. She first found relief in the form of smuggled books, which she could only read secretly under a blanket. But over time, she turned to meditation. Transforming her prison cell into a meditation cell, she informed inmates and guards alike she would be practicing intensively for up to twenty hours per day. She worked with teachings from the Mahasi and Mogok traditions, and carried on a clandestine correspondence with Chan Myay Yeitha Sayadaw U Janaka. She mainly chose to practice Cittanupassana (contemplation of mind). And as might be expected in a prison, she focused in particular on the experience of dukkha (suffering). In the meantime and unbeknownst to her, Ma Thida's arrest had turned into something of a cause célèbre abroad, attracting celebrity support, and even a visit from President Bill Clinton's foreign emissary, Bill Richardson. Her case was also mentioned at the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women held in 1995 in Beijing. Ma Thida was released in 1999, her prison sentence commuted. She did not involve herself further in politics, but has continued to followed the country's momentous events, including the rise and fall of Aung San Suu Kyi. But as someone who was by Aung San Suu Kyi's side during her initial rise to prominence, she expresses a concern that her status as an icon may have gone to her head, and also that she never truly understood the Tatmadaw. Today, many young Burmese activists have turned to her book to better understand their own path forward. For her part, Ma Thida, is impressed by how much this current generation seems to know, and how much and how fast they are able to learn. For this current generation of democracy activists, Ma Thida advises them to “focus on principle, not on person… [keep] an eye on the will of the majority of people, not just one person or yourself.”

Myanmar has been engulfed by a civil war which is getting deadlier and more violent as time goes on. Last year the Tatmadaw – the Burmese armed forces – overthrew the civilian-led government, led by Aung Sun Suu Kyi. Now they're acting with impunity, allegedly committing heinous crimes against those who oppose them. In the past year many Tatmadaw soldiers – thousands, according to the opposition – have had second thoughts about their military service and are defecting to the other side. Trending has spoken to several of the defectors. They told us how they changed their minds, how they used social media to connect with the rebels and how they're now using online tools to work against the military leaders they once served. Presenter: Reha Kansara Photo: Burmese soldiers line up with guns hoisted Photo Credit: Getty Images

The Rohingya community in Burma have been targeted by the Burmese military (known as the Tatmadaw) with mass killings and rape since 2017, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee the country. Since the military coup in February 2021, the Tatmadaw have employed similar tactics used on the Rohingya against all ethnic and religious communities, as we have noted in past Spotlight episodes. The coup has increased concern among the international community to pursue efforts of justice and accountability for the ongoing abuses against the Rohingya, which U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken officially determined as genocide and crimes against humanity on March 21, 2022.USCIRF Commissioner Anurima Bhargava joins us today to elaborate on what the genocide determination means going forward, and on ongoing accountability processes.With Contributions from:Dwight Bashir, Director of Outreach and Policy, USCIRFAnurima Bhargava, Commissioner, USCIRFKirsten Lavery, Supervisory Policy Analyst, USCIRFPatrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst, USCIRFGabrielle Hasenstab, Communications Specialist, USCIRF

Did you know that food grown in Ukraine feeds 400 million people around the world? Since Russia invaded its neighbour three weeks ago, Ukrainians need outside help to keep from going hungry, and that's where the UN World Food Programme comes in, as we'll hear. Away from Europe, earlier this week, we heard UN Secretary-General António Guterres implore donors for funds to help Yemen, where two in three people need aid just to survive. Myanmar's been in the spotlight too, one year since Tatmadaw generals staged their coup, with chilling results, as we'll hear from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet. And stay with us for comments from Solange BC, who's taking us on a literary Odyssey at the end of the show.

Did you know that food grown in Ukraine feeds 400 million people around the world? Since Russia invaded its neighbour three weeks ago, Ukrainians need outside help to keep from going hungry, and that's where the UN World Food Programme comes in, as we'll hear. Away from Europe, earlier this week, we heard UN Secretary-General António Guterres implore donors for funds to help Yemen, where two in three people need aid just to survive. Myanmar's been in the spotlight too, one year since Tatmadaw generals staged their coup, with chilling results, as we'll hear from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet. And stay with us for comments from Solange BC, who's taking us on a literary Odyssey at the end of the show.