Podcast appearances and mentions of Rachel Glennerster

Following the 2025 Development Leaders Conference, CGD's Rachel Glennerster speaks with BMZ's Dirk Meyer and SAIIA's Elizabeth Sidiropoulos about conference takeaways, including whether climate should be a focus for development agencies, how to get more bang for your climate-change buck, and how developing countries might prioritize between climate mitigation and adaptation. 

"A shameless recycling of existing content to drive additional audience engagement on the cheap… or the single best, most valuable, and most insight-dense episode we put out in the entire year, depending on how you want to look at it." — Rob WiblinIt's that magical time of year once again — highlightapalooza! Stick around for one top bit from each episode, including:How to use the microphone on someone's mobile phone to figure out what password they're typing into their laptopWhy mercilessly driving the New World screwworm to extinction could be the most compassionate thing humanity has ever doneWhy evolutionary psychology doesn't support a cynical view of human nature but actually explains why so many of us are intensely sensitive to the harms we cause to othersHow superforecasters and domain experts seem to disagree so much about AI risk, but when you zoom in it's mostly a disagreement about timingWhy the sceptics are wrong and you will want to use robot nannies to take care of your kids — and also why despite having big worries about the development of AGI, Carl Shulman is strongly against efforts to pause AI research todayHow much of the gender pay gap is due to direct pay discrimination vs other factorsHow cleaner wrasse fish blow the mirror test out of the waterWhy effective altruism may be too big a tent to work wellHow we could best motivate pharma companies to test existing drugs to see if they help cure other diseases — something they currently have no reason to bother with…as well as 27 other top observations and arguments from the past year of the show.Check out the full transcript and episode links on the 80,000 Hours website.Remember that all of these clips come from the 20-minute highlight reels we make for every episode, which are released on our sister feed, 80k After Hours. So if you're struggling to keep up with our regularly scheduled entertainment, you can still get the best parts of our conversations there.It has been a hell of a year, and we can only imagine next year is going to be even weirder — but Luisa and Rob will be here to keep you company as Earth hurtles through the galaxy to a fate as yet unknown.Enjoy, and look forward to speaking with you in 2025!Chapters:Rob's intro (00:00:00)Randy Nesse on the origins of morality and the problem of simplistic selfish-gene thinking (00:02:11)Hugo Mercier on the evolutionary argument against humans being gullible (00:07:17)Meghan Barrett on the likelihood of insect sentience (00:11:26)Sébastien Moro on the mirror test triumph of cleaner wrasses (00:14:47)Sella Nevo on side-channel attacks (00:19:32)Zvi Mowshowitz on AI sleeper agents (00:22:59)Zach Weinersmith on why space settlement (probably) won't make us rich (00:29:11)Rachel Glennerster on pull mechanisms to incentivise repurposing of generic drugs (00:35:23)Emily Oster on the impact of kids on women's careers (00:40:29)Carl Shulman on robot nannies (00:45:19)Nathan Labenz on kids and artificial friends (00:50:12)Nathan Calvin on why it's not too early for AI policies (00:54:13)Rose Chan Loui on how control of OpenAI is independently incredibly valuable and requires compensation (00:58:08)Nick Joseph on why he's a big fan of the responsible scaling policy approach (01:03:11)Sihao Huang on how the US and UK might coordinate with China (01:06:09)Nathan Labenz on better transparency about predicted capabilities (01:10:18)Ezra Karger on what explains forecasters' disagreements about AI risks (01:15:22)Carl Shulman on why he doesn't support enforced pauses on AI research (01:18:58)Matt Clancy on the omnipresent frictions that might prevent explosive economic growth (01:25:24)Vitalik Buterin on defensive acceleration (01:29:43)Annie Jacobsen on the war games that suggest escalation is inevitable (01:34:59)Nate Silver on whether effective altruism is too big to succeed (01:38:42)Kevin Esvelt on why killing every screwworm would be the best thing humanity ever did (01:42:27)Lewis Bollard on how factory farming is philosophically indefensible (01:46:28)Bob Fischer on how to think about moral weights if you're not a hedonist (01:49:27)Elizabeth Cox on the empirical evidence of the impact of storytelling (01:57:43)Anil Seth on how our brain interprets reality (02:01:03)Eric Schwitzgebel on whether consciousness can be nested (02:04:53)Jonathan Birch on our overconfidence around disorders of consciousness (02:10:23)Peter Godfrey-Smith on uploads of ourselves (02:14:34)Laura Deming on surprising things that make mice live longer (02:21:17)Venki Ramakrishnan on freezing cells, organs, and bodies (02:24:46)Ken Goldberg on why low fault tolerance makes some skills extra hard to automate in robots (02:29:12)Sarah Eustis-Guthrie on the ups and downs of founding an organisation (02:34:04)Dean Spears on the cost effectiveness of kangaroo mother care (02:38:26)Cameron Meyer Shorb on vaccines for wild animals (02:42:53)Spencer Greenberg on personal principles (02:46:08)Producing and editing: Keiran HarrisAudio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongVideo editing: Simon MonsourTranscriptions: Katy Moore

This is a selection of highlights from episode #189 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast.These aren't necessarily the most important, or even most entertaining parts of the interview — and if you enjoy this, we strongly recommend checking out the full episode:Rachel Glennerster on how “market shaping” could help solve climate change, pandemics, and other global problemsAnd if you're finding these highlights episodes valuable, please let us know by emailing podcast@80000hours.org.Chapters:Luisa's intro (00:00:00)What is market shaping? (00:00:25)Why some countries didn't have COVID vaccines sooner (00:05:04)Designing incentives for pull mechanisms (00:09:12)Using pull mechanisms to get a universal COVID vaccine (00:13:31)Pull mechanisms to incentivise repurposing of generic drugs (00:18:20)Specific interventions versus systemic reform in education (00:23:25)Highlights put together by Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic Armstrong

Podcast: 80,000 Hours Podcast Episode: #189 – Rachel Glennerster on how “market shaping” could help solve climate change, pandemics, and other global problemsRelease date: 2024-05-29"You can't charge what something is worth during a pandemic. So we estimated that the value of one course of COVID vaccine in January 2021 was over $5,000. They were selling for between $6 and $40. So nothing like their social value. Now, don't get me wrong. I don't think that they should have charged $5,000 or $6,000. That's not ethical. It's also not economically efficient, because they didn't cost $5,000 at the marginal cost. So you actually want low price, getting out to lots of people."But it shows you that the market is not going to reward people who do the investment in preparation for a pandemic — because when a pandemic hits, they're not going to get the reward in line with the social value. They may even have to charge less than they would in a non-pandemic time. So prepping for a pandemic is not an efficient market strategy if I'm a firm, but it's a very efficient strategy for society, and so we've got to bridge that gap." —Rachel GlennersterIn today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez speaks to Rachel Glennerster — associate professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a pioneer in the field of development economics — about how her team's new Market Shaping Accelerator aims to leverage market forces to drive innovations that can solve pressing world problems.Links to learn more, highlights, and full transcript.They cover:How market failures and misaligned incentives stifle critical innovations for social goods like pandemic preparedness, climate change interventions, and vaccine development.How “pull mechanisms” like advance market commitments (AMCs) can help overcome these challenges — including concrete examples like how one AMC led to speeding up the development of three vaccines which saved around 700,000 lives in low-income countries.The challenges in designing effective pull mechanisms, from design to implementation.Why it's important to tie innovation incentives to real-world impact and uptake, not just the invention of a new technology.The massive benefits of accelerating vaccine development, in some cases, even if it's only by a few days or weeks.The case for a $6 billion advance market commitment to spur work on a universal COVID-19 vaccine.The shortlist of ideas from the Market Shaping Accelerator's recent Innovation Challenge that use pull mechanisms to address market failures around improving indoor air quality, repurposing generic drugs for alternative uses, and developing eco-friendly air conditioners for a warming planet.“Best Buys” and “Bad Buys” for improving education systems in low- and middle-income countries, based on evidence from over 400 studies.Lessons from Rachel's career at the forefront of global development, and how insights from economics can drive transformative change.And much more.Chapters:The Market Shaping Accelerator (00:03:33)Pull mechanisms for innovation (00:13:10)Accelerating the pneumococcal and COVID vaccines (00:19:05)Advance market commitments (00:41:46)Is this uncertainty hard for funders to plan around? (00:49:17)The story of the malaria vaccine that wasn't (00:57:15)Challenges with designing and implementing AMCs and other pull mechanisms (01:01:40)Universal COVID vaccine (01:18:14)Climate-resilient crops (01:34:09)The Market Shaping Accelerator's Innovation Challenge (01:45:40)Indoor air quality to reduce respiratory infections (01:49:09)Repurposing generic drugs (01:55:50)Clean air conditioning units (02:02:41)Broad-spectrum antivirals for pandemic prevention (02:09:11)Improving education in low- and middle-income countries (02:15:53)What's still weird for Rachel about living in the US? (02:45:06)Producer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic ArmstrongAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Podcast: 80,000 Hours Podcast Episode: #189 – Rachel Glennerster on how “market shaping” could help solve climate change, pandemics, and other global problemsRelease date: 2024-05-29"You can't charge what something is worth during a pandemic. So we estimated that the value of one course of COVID vaccine in January 2021 was over $5,000. They were selling for between $6 and $40. So nothing like their social value. Now, don't get me wrong. I don't think that they should have charged $5,000 or $6,000. That's not ethical. It's also not economically efficient, because they didn't cost $5,000 at the marginal cost. So you actually want low price, getting out to lots of people."But it shows you that the market is not going to reward people who do the investment in preparation for a pandemic — because when a pandemic hits, they're not going to get the reward in line with the social value. They may even have to charge less than they would in a non-pandemic time. So prepping for a pandemic is not an efficient market strategy if I'm a firm, but it's a very efficient strategy for society, and so we've got to bridge that gap." —Rachel GlennersterIn today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez speaks to Rachel Glennerster — associate professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a pioneer in the field of development economics — about how her team's new Market Shaping Accelerator aims to leverage market forces to drive innovations that can solve pressing world problems.Links to learn more, highlights, and full transcript.They cover:How market failures and misaligned incentives stifle critical innovations for social goods like pandemic preparedness, climate change interventions, and vaccine development.How “pull mechanisms” like advance market commitments (AMCs) can help overcome these challenges — including concrete examples like how one AMC led to speeding up the development of three vaccines which saved around 700,000 lives in low-income countries.The challenges in designing effective pull mechanisms, from design to implementation.Why it's important to tie innovation incentives to real-world impact and uptake, not just the invention of a new technology.The massive benefits of accelerating vaccine development, in some cases, even if it's only by a few days or weeks.The case for a $6 billion advance market commitment to spur work on a universal COVID-19 vaccine.The shortlist of ideas from the Market Shaping Accelerator's recent Innovation Challenge that use pull mechanisms to address market failures around improving indoor air quality, repurposing generic drugs for alternative uses, and developing eco-friendly air conditioners for a warming planet.“Best Buys” and “Bad Buys” for improving education systems in low- and middle-income countries, based on evidence from over 400 studies.Lessons from Rachel's career at the forefront of global development, and how insights from economics can drive transformative change.And much more.Chapters:The Market Shaping Accelerator (00:03:33)Pull mechanisms for innovation (00:13:10)Accelerating the pneumococcal and COVID vaccines (00:19:05)Advance market commitments (00:41:46)Is this uncertainty hard for funders to plan around? (00:49:17)The story of the malaria vaccine that wasn't (00:57:15)Challenges with designing and implementing AMCs and other pull mechanisms (01:01:40)Universal COVID vaccine (01:18:14)Climate-resilient crops (01:34:09)The Market Shaping Accelerator's Innovation Challenge (01:45:40)Indoor air quality to reduce respiratory infections (01:49:09)Repurposing generic drugs (01:55:50)Clean air conditioning units (02:02:41)Broad-spectrum antivirals for pandemic prevention (02:09:11)Improving education in low- and middle-income countries (02:15:53)What's still weird for Rachel about living in the US? (02:45:06)Producer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic ArmstrongAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore

"You can't charge what something is worth during a pandemic. So we estimated that the value of one course of COVID vaccine in January 2021 was over $5,000. They were selling for between $6 and $40. So nothing like their social value. Now, don't get me wrong. I don't think that they should have charged $5,000 or $6,000. That's not ethical. It's also not economically efficient, because they didn't cost $5,000 at the marginal cost. So you actually want low price, getting out to lots of people."But it shows you that the market is not going to reward people who do the investment in preparation for a pandemic — because when a pandemic hits, they're not going to get the reward in line with the social value. They may even have to charge less than they would in a non-pandemic time. So prepping for a pandemic is not an efficient market strategy if I'm a firm, but it's a very efficient strategy for society, and so we've got to bridge that gap." —Rachel GlennersterIn today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez speaks to Rachel Glennerster — associate professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a pioneer in the field of development economics — about how her team's new Market Shaping Accelerator aims to leverage market forces to drive innovations that can solve pressing world problems.Links to learn more, highlights, and full transcript.They cover:How market failures and misaligned incentives stifle critical innovations for social goods like pandemic preparedness, climate change interventions, and vaccine development.How “pull mechanisms” like advance market commitments (AMCs) can help overcome these challenges — including concrete examples like how one AMC led to speeding up the development of three vaccines which saved around 700,000 lives in low-income countries.The challenges in designing effective pull mechanisms, from design to implementation.Why it's important to tie innovation incentives to real-world impact and uptake, not just the invention of a new technology.The massive benefits of accelerating vaccine development, in some cases, even if it's only by a few days or weeks.The case for a $6 billion advance market commitment to spur work on a universal COVID-19 vaccine.The shortlist of ideas from the Market Shaping Accelerator's recent Innovation Challenge that use pull mechanisms to address market failures around improving indoor air quality, repurposing generic drugs for alternative uses, and developing eco-friendly air conditioners for a warming planet.“Best Buys” and “Bad Buys” for improving education systems in low- and middle-income countries, based on evidence from over 400 studies.Lessons from Rachel's career at the forefront of global development, and how insights from economics can drive transformative change.And much more.Chapters:The Market Shaping Accelerator (00:03:33)Pull mechanisms for innovation (00:13:10)Accelerating the pneumococcal and COVID vaccines (00:19:05)Advance market commitments (00:41:46)Is this uncertainty hard for funders to plan around? (00:49:17)The story of the malaria vaccine that wasn't (00:57:15)Challenges with designing and implementing AMCs and other pull mechanisms (01:01:40)Universal COVID vaccine (01:18:14)Climate-resilient crops (01:34:09)The Market Shaping Accelerator's Innovation Challenge (01:45:40)Indoor air quality to reduce respiratory infections (01:49:09)Repurposing generic drugs (01:55:50)Clean air conditioning units (02:02:41)Broad-spectrum antivirals for pandemic prevention (02:09:11)Improving education in low- and middle-income countries (02:15:53)What's still weird for Rachel about living in the US? (02:45:06)Producer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic ArmstrongAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Medical Roundup #1, published by Zvi on January 17, 2024 on LessWrong. Saving up medical and health related stories from several months allowed for much better organizing of them, so I am happy I split these off. I will still post anything more urgent on a faster basis. There's lots of things here that are fascinating and potentially very important, but I've had to prioritize and focus elsewhere, so I hope others pick up various torches. Vaccination Ho! We have a new malaria vaccine. That's great. WHO thinks this is not an especially urgent opportunity, or any kind of 'emergency' and so wants to wait for months before actually putting shots into arms. So what if we also see reports like 'cuts infant deaths by 13%'? WHO doing WHO things, WHO Delenda Est and all that. What can we do about this? Also, EA and everyone else who works in global health needs to do a complete post-mortem of how this was allowed to take so long, and why they couldn't or didn't do more to speed things along. There are in particular claims that the 2015-2019 delay was due to lack of funding, despite a malaria vaccine being an Open Phil priority. Saloni Dattani, Rachel Glennerster and Siddhartha Haria write about the long road for Works in Progress. They recommend future use of advance market commitments, which seems like a no brainer first step. We also have an FDA approved vaccine for chikungunya. Oh, and also we invented a vaccine for cancer, a huge boost to melanoma treatment. Katalin Kariko and Drew Weissman win the Nobel Prize for mRNA vaccine technology. Rarely are such decisions this easy. Worth remembering that, in addition to denying me admission despite my status as a legacy, the University of Pennsylvania also refused to allow Kariko a tenure track position, calling her 'not of faculty quality,' and laughed at her leaving for BioNTech, especially when they refer to this as 'Penn's historic research team.' Did you also know that Katalin's advisor threatened to have her deported if she switched labs, and attempted to follow through on that threat? I also need to note the deep disappointment in Elon Musk, who even a few months ago was continuing to throw shade on the Covid vaccines. And what do we do more generally about the fact that there are quite a lot of takes that one has reason to be nervous to say out loud, seem likely to be true, and also are endorsed by the majority of the population? When we discovered all the vaccines. Progress continues. We need to go faster. Reflections on what happened with medical start-up Alvea. They proved you could move much faster on vaccine development than anyone would admit, but then found that there was insufficient commercial or philanthropic demand for doing so to make it worth everyone's time, so they wound down. As an individual and as a civilization, you get what you pay for. Potential Progress Researchers discover what they call an on/off switch for breast cancer. Not clear yet how to use this to help patients. London hospital uses competent execution on basic 1950s operations management, increases surgical efficiency by a factor of about five. Teams similar to a Formula 1 pit crew cut sterilization times from 40 minutes to 2. One room does anesthesia on the next patient while the other operates on the current one. There seems to be no reason this could not be implemented everywhere, other than lack of will? Dementia rates down 13% over the past 25 years, for unclear reasons. Sarah Constantin explores possibilities for cognitive enhancement. We have not yet tried many of the things one would try. We found a way to suppress specific immune reactions, rather than having to suppress immune reactions in general, opening up the way to potentially fully curing a whole host of autoimmune disorders. Yes, in mice, of course it's in mice, so don't ge...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Medical Roundup #1, published by Zvi on January 17, 2024 on LessWrong. Saving up medical and health related stories from several months allowed for much better organizing of them, so I am happy I split these off. I will still post anything more urgent on a faster basis. There's lots of things here that are fascinating and potentially very important, but I've had to prioritize and focus elsewhere, so I hope others pick up various torches. Vaccination Ho! We have a new malaria vaccine. That's great. WHO thinks this is not an especially urgent opportunity, or any kind of 'emergency' and so wants to wait for months before actually putting shots into arms. So what if we also see reports like 'cuts infant deaths by 13%'? WHO doing WHO things, WHO Delenda Est and all that. What can we do about this? Also, EA and everyone else who works in global health needs to do a complete post-mortem of how this was allowed to take so long, and why they couldn't or didn't do more to speed things along. There are in particular claims that the 2015-2019 delay was due to lack of funding, despite a malaria vaccine being an Open Phil priority. Saloni Dattani, Rachel Glennerster and Siddhartha Haria write about the long road for Works in Progress. They recommend future use of advance market commitments, which seems like a no brainer first step. We also have an FDA approved vaccine for chikungunya. Oh, and also we invented a vaccine for cancer, a huge boost to melanoma treatment. Katalin Kariko and Drew Weissman win the Nobel Prize for mRNA vaccine technology. Rarely are such decisions this easy. Worth remembering that, in addition to denying me admission despite my status as a legacy, the University of Pennsylvania also refused to allow Kariko a tenure track position, calling her 'not of faculty quality,' and laughed at her leaving for BioNTech, especially when they refer to this as 'Penn's historic research team.' Did you also know that Katalin's advisor threatened to have her deported if she switched labs, and attempted to follow through on that threat? I also need to note the deep disappointment in Elon Musk, who even a few months ago was continuing to throw shade on the Covid vaccines. And what do we do more generally about the fact that there are quite a lot of takes that one has reason to be nervous to say out loud, seem likely to be true, and also are endorsed by the majority of the population? When we discovered all the vaccines. Progress continues. We need to go faster. Reflections on what happened with medical start-up Alvea. They proved you could move much faster on vaccine development than anyone would admit, but then found that there was insufficient commercial or philanthropic demand for doing so to make it worth everyone's time, so they wound down. As an individual and as a civilization, you get what you pay for. Potential Progress Researchers discover what they call an on/off switch for breast cancer. Not clear yet how to use this to help patients. London hospital uses competent execution on basic 1950s operations management, increases surgical efficiency by a factor of about five. Teams similar to a Formula 1 pit crew cut sterilization times from 40 minutes to 2. One room does anesthesia on the next patient while the other operates on the current one. There seems to be no reason this could not be implemented everywhere, other than lack of will? Dementia rates down 13% over the past 25 years, for unclear reasons. Sarah Constantin explores possibilities for cognitive enhancement. We have not yet tried many of the things one would try. We found a way to suppress specific immune reactions, rather than having to suppress immune reactions in general, opening up the way to potentially fully curing a whole host of autoimmune disorders. Yes, in mice, of course it's in mice, so don't ge...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Why we didn't get a malaria vaccine sooner, and what we can do better next time, published by salonium on September 7, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. This is a long (>9000 word) essay written by myself (Saloni Dattani), Rachel Glennerster and Siddhartha Haria for Works in Progress. Over half a million people die from malaria each year, but it took 141 years to develop a vaccine for it. One fundamental reason for this was the scientific complexity of the pathogen - malaria is caused by a parasite, not a virus or bacteria. But another, repeated obstacle was a lack of financial incentive and urgency. In this piece, which includes a lot of data and charts, we tell the story of how the malaria vaccine was developed, why the financial market for the vaccine was missing, and how it could have been sped up with smarter incentives and market mechanisms, like Advance Market Commitments. About the authors: Saloni Dattani - I'm a researcher on global health at Our World in Data and a founding editor of Works in Progress Rachel Glennerster is associate professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. She was previously chief economist at the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for International Development and a key figure behind 'Deworm the World'. Siddhartha Haria is policy lead at the Development Innovation Lab. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org

In a world of limited resources, which interventions to help kids learn offer the best value for money? A new report evaluates the evidence and gives some clear policy recommendations about what is, and is not, a policy “smart buy”. Rachel Glennerster talks to Tim Phillips.

Esther DufloCollège de FrancePauvreté et politiques publiques2022-2023Colloque - Lutter contre la pauvreté : de la science aux politiques publiques : 20 Years of Research and Evidence UseIntervenant(s)Rachel Glennerster, Associate Professor, University of ChicagoSanthosh Mathew, Country Lead Public Policy and Finance, Bill & Melinda Gates FoundationModerated by Abhijit Banerjee (Professor, MIT; J-PAL Director).

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Announcing the University of Chicago's $2M Market Shaping Accelerator's Innovation Challenge: Biosecurity, Pandemic Preparedness, and Climate Change, published by schethik on June 22, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. The Market Shaping Accelerator (MSA) is a new initiative at the University of Chicago aiming to accelerate innovations to address pressing global challenges. It is led by Michael Kremer, Rachel Glennerster and Christopher Snyder. Our current focus areas are climate change, biosecurity and pandemic preparedness. We recently launched the MSA Innovation Challenge, which will award up to $2,000,000 total in prizes for ideas about problems to tackle with pull incentives for innovation in these areas. Pull mechanisms reward outputs and outcomes in contrast to push funding which pay for inputs (e.g. research grants). We want to invite members of the EA community and others to submit your ideas to the challenge. We are interested in hearing from domain experts, innovators, EA organizations as well as people just interested in a problem. You can read more about the challenge here (check out the FAQ on the bottom of this page) and view the application template here. The deadline to submit for Phase I is Friday, July 21, 2023 (12 PM CT). Submissions that meet a minimum criteria will receive $4,000. Up to $500,000 in prizes will be awarded in Phase I. Ideas that are selected for entry into Phase II will benefit from support and guidance of the MSA team as well as domain specialists to help turn their ideas into fully worked up contracts. Top ideas will also gain the MSA's support in fundraising for the multi-millions or billions of dollars needed to back their pull mechanism. ITN Framework The MSA Innovation Challenge is partly informed by the ITN Framework – we are seeking to surface major problems (importance), that can plausibly be addressed by innovation (tractability), but where innovation is under-incentivized by markets (neglectedness). We would welcome both technologically close and technologically distant targets – we think pull mechanisms can accelerate innovation and scale up for both. What is pull funding? Pull mechanisms reward outputs and outcomes rather than fund inputs. They create an incentive for the private sector to invest in R&D and bring solutions to market. Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) are an example of a pull mechanism. AMCs involve promising, in advance, to purchase or subsidize the purchase of a large quantity of an innovative product if it is invented. The $1.5 billion Advance Market Commitment for the Pneumococcal Vaccine was launched in 2009. Since then three vaccines for the strains of pneumococcus common in low- and middle-income countries have been developed, hundreds of millions of doses delivered, and an estimated 700,000 lives saved. The rate of vaccine coverage for the pneumococcal vaccine in GAVI countries converged to the global rate five years faster than for the rotavirus vaccine which GAVI supported without an AMC. Pull mechanisms have important advantages: They can be designed to be firm and solution-agnostic. The funder does not have to choose a particular firm or technological path in advance, they can just commit to rewarding an effective solution. The funder does not have to pay unless the targets are met. Payment can be linked to scale and take-up. They reduce demand uncertainty – they can signal to firms there will be demand for socially useful innovations. They can incentivize solutions that appeal to consumers. The funder can provide a matching subsidy to a consumer purchase. This incentivizes firms to develop products that consumers will actually use. Further reading Advance Market Commitments: Insights from Theory and Experience The Case for More Pull Financing Making Markets for Vaccines: Ideas to Action...

There is considerable and growing attention and interest on understanding what works, where, how, and why in development. This also means there are numerous debates on how best we ought to generate evidence and measure development success and impact. One way of measuring development impact is through randomized control trials (RCTs), which have been very useful for establishing causal relationships and providing robust and reliable evidence for evaluating the effectiveness and safety of development programs.While some regard RCTs as the gold standard, others are more critical of using it to measure what works. Critics argue that it is not just about 'what works,' but 'why things work' which should be prioritized when designing effective policies and interventions that can be scaled up. Another related aspect in this context is the generalizability puzzle, i.e., whether the results of a specific program can be generalized to other contexts. For example, there are questions about whether a study can inform policy only in the location in which it was undertaken. Should policymakers mainly rely on whatever evidence is available locally, even if it is not of very good quality? There is also the question of whether a new local randomized evaluation should be undertaken before an attempt to scale up and the number of times such evaluations should be repeated before scaling up.Rachel Glennerster is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. She uses randomized trials to study democracy and accountability, health, education, microfinance, and women's empowerment mainly in West Africa and South Asia. Rachel spent 13 years as the executive director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT, a key leader in popularizing RCTs in development economics. Thereafter she served as chief economist of the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Twitter: @rglennerKey highlights:Introduction - 00:44Asking the right questions and answering them correctly - 03:45The added-value of RCTs and critique - 08:00The generalizability puzzle - 17:37Education and learning - 23:20Microfinance in India - 26:13Improving public services through participation - 34:30Impact of the media in Burkina Faso - 38:38Translating evidence into policy - 46:00Host:Professor Dan Banik (Twitter: @danbanik  @GlobalDevPod)Apple Google Spotify YouTubeSubscribe: https://globaldevpod.substack.com/https://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/

How can we ensure that medical countermeasures—such as diagnostics and vaccines—are ready to go at local, national, and global levels when the next pandemic emerges? Amanda Glassman speaks with Dr. Amadou Alpha Sall of Institut Pasteur of Dakar and Dr. Rachel Glennerster of the University of Chicago about lessons learned during COVID-19 and opportunities for future preparedness.

Did closing schools during the COVID-19 pandemic serve students and society at-large? As part of a World Bank Advisory Panel, University of Chicago economist Rachel Glennerster is taking a closer look at the long-term economic cost of learning losses. Addressing these costs, estimated at greater than $10 trillion, will be crucial to future education policy and pandemic response.

My guest on this episode is Stefan Dercon - author of the recently published and most excellent book ‘Gambling on Development: Why Some Countries Win and Others Lose'. Development scholars have produced many explanations for why some countries did better than others after the Second World War. Factors like geography, quality or type of institutions, foreign aid, and protective trade policies, have been argued as what explains this divergence in national prosperity between countries. Dercon's contribution will no doubt be plugged into this long-running debate - and in my opinion, he comes closest to having a ‘‘first principles'' explanation than anyone I have read on the subject. Other theories leave you with nagging questions - Where do good institutions come from? Are countries condemned by their histories? Why do some countries use foreign aid better? Why are some countries with rich geographic endowments doing worse? Why does protective trade lead some countries toward becoming industrial exporting giants, and some others into a macroeconomic crisis?Dercon argues that countries that have done better do so by working out a ‘development bargain'. This comes about when the people with power and influence (elites) in a country find a cooperative agreement (bargain) to consciously pursue economic development and national enrichment. Development bargains are not simple, they are often messy. And elites are not a bunch of altruistic do-gooders. Rather, through many complicated networks of intra-elite competitions and cooperation, they decide to gamble on the future by betting that economic development will deliver the biggest win. Dercon does not claim to have found the holy grail of development - and there are still many questions to be answered. But his argument does lead to one inevitable conclusion. Countries and their people will have to figure out what works for them and how that delivers prosperity.Stefan Dercon is Professor of Economic Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. He was the Chief Economist of the UK's Department of International Development (DFID).TranscriptTobi; Was your experience really what inspired you to write the book?Stefan; Well, you know, what inspired me definitely is just the contrast that I've had in terms of things I do. Because I've been an academic for a long time, I have more than 30 years writing and studying and, you know, I was one of these academics who like to, as one sometimes puts it, you know, like, likes to get mud on their feet, you know, mud on their boots. I used to work mostly on rural households and in most countries, these are amongst the poorest people, and you just get to know what's going on there. I have a policy interest, and I was just lucky 10 years ago, a bit more than that, I got a job as a Chief Economist in the UK aid agency, and it's just that contrast of having had the chance and the opportunity to get involved on the policy side, on meeting all the more senior people...and it's just that contrast between still enjoying being surrounded by people and what they do and understands livelihoods of poorer people, combined with being in the policy space, I felt like, you know, I have a unique perspective that I wanted to communicate. And it was just a quest to communicate, actually. If anything, I wanted just to tell more of these stories because I think, from all sides, we tend to misunderstand a lot of what's going on and how things work in practice. And that's definitely the case on the academic side. We're so far sometimes from reality that I wanted to tell that story a bit more.Tobi; And I mean, after you wrote the book, and after publication, I presume from some of the feedback that your book is actually quite successful. I gave so many copies away, right, I can't even count. I think at some point, I temporarily bought out Roving Heights' entire stock. So how has the reception been generally?Stefan; I mean, look, what you just told me makes it much more worthwhile than if white kids in Oxford are buying the book. So what I'm really pleased with is that it appealed to a much broader group of people. And actually, you know, if I'm really honest, I hadn't expected that people like you or I was in Bangladesh last week that young people there would actually appreciate the book, you know, that you would actually get people that think about these problems in these countries are actually interested in it. And I'm very pleased that people find it both worthwhile to read and quite interesting. Of course, I get some academics. One story last week in Bangladesh, I had a question, you know, how Lenin fitted in my book. Now, I had to struggle with the answer of how Vladimir Lenin would actually fit into the book and thinking, you know, that's an academic typically responding to, you know... I don't know, I'm not a deep theoretician but it was written out of a kind of pragmatic sense of what can I learn from economics and politics that actually is worthwhile communicating. So it's well received. And if I'm really honest, I don't mind that there are pdf copies circulating as well and things like that. Actually, as long as it's read, you know, you write a book, not because you want the highest sales, but you actually want it to be read, and that actually makes it really interesting that people seem to be able to relate to it. Another group that, actually, I found really interesting that can relate to it is people that are either civil servants working in governments like - in yours, as well as maybe aid officials and International World Bank officials, IMF officials, who actually find it helpful as well. You know, and there's usually a huge bridge between them, there's a huge gap between how in Washington when we think about these things, or in London or in Abuja, and so that's pleasing as well. You know, I don't give a solution to the things but I think I touched on something of where a big part of the problem of development lies is that actually, we are, unfortunately, in quite a few countries, still with governments that fundamentally are backed by elites that don't really want to make the progress and do the hard work. And that's an unfortunate message. But at the same time, you have other countries that are surprising countries that make the progress. And so clearly, there is a lesson there that it's not simply like the problem is simple. Actually, the problem is to some extent, simple. It's about, fundamentally, do you want to actually make it work, make this progress work? And I think that echoes with quite a lot of people - the frustration that many of us have, that some countries seem to be stuck and not making enough progress and we need to be willing to call it out for what it is that it's not entirely the fault of those people who are in control, but they could do far more for the better than they actually do.Tobi; For the purpose of making the conversation practical and accessible, in the spirit of the book itself, I'm going to be asking you some very simple... and what I consider to be fundamental questions for the benefit of the audience and people that probably have not read the book. So there have been so many other books on development that have also been quite as popular as yours, Why Nations Fail comes to mind, and so many others, The End of Poverty by Jeffrey Sachs, some of which you actually reviewed in the opening chapters of the book. And at the heart of most of them is some kind of fundamental concept that then defines how the body of work itself or the central idea itself works, whether it's institutions, or culture, or industrial policy, or whatever. For your book, you talked a lot about the development bargain, what is the development bargain? And how does it work?Stefan; So the way I look at any country in the world, and I mean, any country, rich or poor country is that one way or another, there is a group of people, which I call for convenience, ''the elite.'' It's not like a pejorative title or a title to applaud them, but simply as a descriptive title. The group of people, in politics, civil service, in business definitely, maybe the military, maybe even civil society, key universities, public intellectuals, I talk about the group that I refer to as the elite, these are the people that have power, or they have influenced one way or another, that can be quite broad. Now in every society, I think it's that group that tends to determine what politics and the economy will look like, what the direction of a country will look like, in any society. And I call that underlying idea [as] they have essentially a form of an elite bargain, a bargain between the different people, they don't have to agree on everything, but to have some kind of an agreement that this is the principle by which, you know, my country will be run in politics and in the economy. Now we could have lots of these elite bargains. We could have an elite bargain that, for example, is based on: if I happen to have power, then everything that I'll do is to reward the people that brought me to power. I'll give them jobs in government. I'll give them maybe contracts, I'll do something, you know, technically, we call this Clientelist. You could have another one where he's saying, Look, no, we're going to run this country, totally, where everybody gets an equal right or equal opportunity, and in a particular way. And so you could have political systems that are around this. Now you could have all these things coming together. You could have also regimes that basically say, Well, the main purpose for us is to keep us as a small group in power, you know, he could have a particular way of doing it. Or indeed, to make sure we use it entirely to steal anything we can get and we'll actually put it in our own pockets, you could have a kleptocracy. You could have lots of these different things, you know, you could have different societies. Now, what I mean by development bargain, is actually fundamentally where that underlying elite bargain values, the underlying idea is that we want to grow our economy, and we want to do this in quite an inclusive way. We want to have developmental outcomes as well. And we make this a key part of the elite bargain. So basically, I define a development bargain as an elite bargain - the deals that we have in running our economy and our politics, that fundamentally, one big way we will judge it is that when we make progress in the growth of the economy, and also in development for the broader population, and I call that the development bargain. And I want to actually go a step further and say if you don't have this, you will never see growth and development in your country. You could have leaders talk about it. They could make big development plans, but if underlying all this there is not a fundamental commitment by all these key players that actually it's worthwhile doing, we're not going to achieve it. And maybe I'll make a quick difference here with say, how does that difference...(now, you mentioned Why Nations Fail.) Now, that underlying elite bargain, of course, the nature of your rule of law, your property rights, all these things, they clearly will matter to some extent, but Why Nations Fail puts this entirely into kind of some historical process. And a lot of people that talk about getting institutions right, they say, Well, you need to get institutions right before you can develop, and they seem to come from a long historical process. In my concept of elite bargain, I would actually emphasize [that] even if your country is not perfect in these institutions, even if there's still some corruption left, even if there are still some issues with the political system, even with the legal system, we actually have countries that can make progress if, fundamentally, that commitment is there amongst the elite. So you don't have to wait until perfection starts before you can start to develop. And that actually [means that] I want to put much more power into the hands... sorry, agency is the better word, I put much more agency in those who at the moment are in control of the state. History may not be favourable for you, there may be a history of colonialism, there may be other histories, factors that clearly will affect the nature of your country at a particular moment in time. But actually agency from the key actors today, they can overcome it. And in fact, in the book, I have plenty of examples of countries that start from imperfection, and actually start doing quite interesting things in terms of growth and development, while other countries are very much more stagnant and staying behind. Tobi; You sort of preempted my next question. I mean, since say, 1990, or thereabout, when the results of some of the ''Asia Tigers'' started coming in, maybe also through the works of people like Wade, Hamsden and co., countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, have become like the standard for economic development, and subsequent analysis around issues of development always look at those countries and also their neighbours who have actually made some progress, maybe not as much as those specific countries. But what I want to ask you about in your book is, you talk about some of the works on development trying to reach for some kind of long history or some kind of historical...I don't want to say dependency or determinism, but you get my point. So my point is, if we go outside of these Asian Tigers, if we go back to say, Japan, or even the second industrial revolution, America, Germany, the Netherlands, can we observe the development bargain as you have described it? Is it also consistent through history?Stefan; I would say Absolutely. I mean, one of the things with when we look at these countries with longer-term success, you mentioned correctly, you know, the Koreas and also Japan, or going back in time to the Industrial Revolution, the second industrial revolution and so on, actually, we take for granted that actually they really wanted to succeed. And it's actually one of these things, and especially in recent history, [South] Korea came out of deep conflict, of course, it was also called War so they got certain support as well. But it was really important for both Japan and Korea after the Second World War, for Japan to re-emerge and for Korea to emerge. It was a form of also getting legitimacy towards their own population. So it was a real underlying deep commitment by that elite in these countries to try to make a success of it. We take it for granted, if we go back in history, take England in the 19th century...I mean, it was a very strong thing, it's like, you know, we wanted to show that actually, we are ruling the world on commerce and all the kinds of things, there was a deep motivation. And of course, also the pressures, you know, remember, the society was being very fractured, and we can't call growth in the 19th century in Britain very inclusive. [There was] a lot of change happening, and indeed, you know, very poor people I think actually initially didn't manage to take up. But especially if we come to the early 20th century became this kind of thing surely [where] development in the form of growth was also when it's a little bit broader shared, became quite part of it. And it's one of these things that when you look at politics, whether it's in the 1930s or 40s or 50s or now, whether it's in England or in America, actually growth and development, I won't take it for granted. People are voted out of office because they are not managing the economy well. There is a lot of political pressure in Europe now. And it's really political because ''oh you're not dealing with the cost of living crisis right or you're undermining the real income increases.'' You know, the US election, we ended up interpreting Trump as an election that actually [served] people [who] had stayed behind in the process of growth and development. Actually, in the politics of most richer countries, it's so much taken for granted that that's a big part of the narrative. So it's an interesting one (maybe, if I may) just to [use] China, I find it a really interesting one. Because, you know, the historical determinism is problematic there. And of course, some people would say, China should never have grown because it has the wrong institutions. But of course, it is growing fast. But if you think of a bit of what would be historical institutions that are relevant? China has had centralized taxation for 2000 years, a centralized bureaucracy for 2000 years, a meritocratic bureaucracy for 2000 years, you know, it actually had a history that actually acquired strong institutions. But funnily enough, when did it start? Just at the moment of deep weakness in the 1970s. When the Cultural Revolution had destabilised the legitimacy of the state, ideology was totally dominating, Mao died in the early 1970s and mid 1970s the Gang of Four came up, which was his widow, it was all turbulence. And actually lots of people thought China would disappear. It's at that moment, it picked up that kind of thing, you know, and actually, fundamentally, if you read all the statements of that periods, they became fundamentally committed, ''we need to make progress in our economy, that's our source of legitimacy.'' So even there there, that's where you see that actually really emerges and this became something that they needed to achieve - a fundamental commitment to growth and development as a form of getting legitimacy to the population. So in a very different way, as some of the other countries, but it's the same principle. Legitimacy of a lot of countries is equated with progress and growth and development, which is essentially a feature of a development bargain.Tobi; Obviously, all societies have some form of elite bargain. Not all elite bargains are development bargains. That's the gist of your book, basically. Now, what I'm trying to get at here is elite bargains that are not for development, that do not benefit the rapid progress of a society, how do they emerge? You talk about the agency of the people that are running the country at a particular point in time. To take Nigeria as an example, a lot of people will blame Nigeria's problems on colonialism. And I'm also quite intolerant of such arguments, at least up to a point. But what I'm trying to get at is that how do elite bargains that are not for development, how do they emerge? Is it via, also, the agency of the elites of those societies? Or are there features of a particular society that kind of determine the elite bargain that emerges? For example, sticking with Nigeria, a lot of people will argue that our elites and our institutions will think and look differently if we don't have oil.Stefan; Yes. Tobi; Right. The state will be less extractive in its thinking, the bureaucracy will be less predatory, right? A lot of people would argue that. So are there other underlying factors or features in a society that shape the kind of elite bargain that emerges, or this is just down to the agency of the people who find themselves with power and influence? They are just the wrong type of people.Stefan; So, Tobi, you make an excellent point here, and, so let's take this a little bit in turn. Leonard Wantchekon, the economic historian at Princeton, from Benin… he gave a nice lecture not so long ago, at Yale, it's on YouTube. And he made this very helpful statement, and he said, you know, if it's between history and agency, I would put 50% history 50% agency, okay. And I will actually add to it [which] is that depending on where you are, history is a little bit more or a little bit less. And so clearly, and he was talking about Africa in general, colonialism will matter. It has shaped your institutions and, you know, the way countries have emerged and the way they decolonized, all these things will have mattered, and they make it harder and easier and so on. But you alluded to it as well [that] at some level, it's already a long time ago now. Of course, it's still there, but it's a long time ago. So over time agency should become much more important. The point though, that you raise about oil makes a lot of sense. So the problem with a development bargain is that actually for a political elite, and for a business elite, dare I say for a military elite, the status quo is, of course, very convenient. Status quo is something that is very convenient because it involves very few risks. So the problem with growth typically is that, actually, new elites may emerge, a new type of business elites may emerge, they may question the economic elite that exists. As a result, it may change the politics. And in fact, if you go back to history, as we were saying, of course, that's the history of Britain where all the time, you know, there has been a shift of who is the elite, there's always a new elite, but it's shifting. So growth is actually a tricky thing. Because it actually, in that sense, changes relative positions in society. Now, that's obviously the case in every society. But it will even more so if the status quo is actually quite of relative affluence, if the status quo is actually quite a comfortable position to be. Now if you have natural resources, you don't need growth, to be able to steal. You can just basically control the resources that come out of the ground. And so your supply chain for stealing money can be very short, you don't have to do a very complicated game. If you need to get it from growth in the economy, it's much more complicated, and it's much more risky. Okay. And so it's not for nothing, that actually clearly, more countries that didn't have natural resources in recent times, over short periods of time, managed to actually get development bargains and basically leads gambling on it. Because actually, the status quo was not as lucrative as the status quo can be if you have a lot of oil or other minerals. And so you're right, and it makes it just really hard...and it actually means in fact [that] even well-meaning parts of the business elite in Nigeria will find it very hard to shift the model entirely. Because you know, you are a business elite, because you benefit from the system one way or another. I'm not saying that you steal, but it's just [how] the economy is based in Nigeria on a lot of non-tradables, is helped with the fact that you have so much to export from oil and so you end up importing a lot, but you can also keep your borders closed or anything you feel like keeping the borders closed for. And that helps for a lot of domestic industries, because protectionism, you know, you do all the things. So the system self sustains it. And with oil, there is not that much incentives to change it. So yes, it is actually harder if you have natural resources to actually reengineer the system to actually go for growth and development. So yes, it is the case. But it hasn't stopped certain countries from not going that route. You know, Malaysia has oil? Yes, it's not a perfect development bargain. But it has done remarkably well. Indonesia, in its early stages, also had oil in the 1970s as an important part, it managed this kind of relationship, and then maybe come the agency in it, you know, do we get enough actors that actually have the collective ability to shift these incentives enough to start promoting more outward orientation, try to export some new things from your country, all that kinds of stuff? And that is indeed what happened in Indonesia. There in the early 1970s, they had oil, but they also learned to export shoes and garments early on, they took advantage of good global situations. And Nigeria didn't, you know, and then agency comes into it, you know, the managers of both the politics and the relationship between politics and business, including from the military, they went in a particular route, and they had choices and they didn't take them. I'm pretty sure if you go back and, you know, there will be moments of choice and we went for another - as people call it - political settlement... another equilibrium that actually didn't involve development and growth as the key part. So yes, it makes it harder. But the agency still, still matters.Tobi; From that point, my next question then would be, what shifts an elite bargain more? That's kind of like do question, right? What shifts an elite bargain? These questions do sound simple. And I'm sorry, but I know they are incredibly difficult to answer. Otherwise, you wouldn't have written an entire book about it. Right. So what shifts an elite bargain more towards development? I mean, you talked about China, we've seen it also in so many other countries where the country was going in a particular direction that's not really pro growth, pro-development, and then there's this moment where things sort of shifts. So it may be through the actions of particular actors or events that inform those. So what... in your experience as a development practitioner and looking at all these places...What are the factors that have the most influence in shifting the elite bargain? Is it just luck? I mean, when I think about China, what if Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues had actually lost that particular power struggle after the death of Mao? So did they get lucky? Is it luck? What's going on?Stefan; You know, I wouldn't use title of gambling but there has to be a little bit of luck involved as well, you know, the circumstances have to play in your direction. But it's not just luck. Okay. So it's an interesting thing when you look at a couple of the countries, what were the moments that people within the elite managed to shift it in another direction? So. China is interesting because it was going through conflict, not deep conflict or violent conflict, but there was a lot of instability in China at the time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution in that period. Other countries like Bangladesh came out of conflict. And so conflict, definitely, or coming out of conflict creates a moment. But of course, there are lots of countries that come out of conflict that make a mess of it. It's a window of opportunity. And it probably is linked with something related to it, which is legitimacy. When you come out of conflict, most of the time, leaders need to reestablish legitimacy. This is clearly something that happened to Rwanda coming out of the genocide, Kagame clearly had to establish legitimacy, you know, he represented a very small group of people within the country and he needed to get legitimacy overall and he chose growth and development to doing that. I think Ethiopia is similar, that actually Meles Zenawi coming from Tigray, he needed, you know, post 2000, coming out of the Eritrean war at a time, and all kinds of other crisis that he was facing in his own party even, he needed to get legitimacy, and they thought he could get legitimacy for his regime through growth and development. So legitimacy-seeking behavior can be quite important. Now it has another side to it. If there's a crisis of legitimacy, that's the moment when the leader can actually take advantage of it. A crisis of legitimacy is actually saying, ''Well, look, we better go to something that begins to deliver to people.'' And why I'm actually suggesting it is that actually, there are in certain countries, a bit of pressure from below also seems to be quite useful. But there is a role there and I find it very hard to define exactly because I'm always scared of autocrats and so on. But the point of leadership is there. So I don't mean it as the strong leader, but more to do with the kind of group of people that manages to take other people along and convince them that is the kind of thing that they need to do. So if you go to Indonesia, I don't think it was Suharto personally, who was the great thinker there that did it. But he clearly surrounded himself with a group of people that included technocrats and also other people from politics, that actually managed to push this in a particular direction in doing it. So how do we get it? While it is actually people taking advantage of windows of opportunity to actually nudge towards it? Okay. But it's hard. We're talking Nigeria, other people have asked me questions about Brazil, about India, you know, large countries like yours with very complicated elite bargains that have national and state level things and so on... it's really complicated. Rwanda in that sense is well defined, you know, we have one well-defined problem and, you know, we could go for a particular model. It can be quite complicated to have some ideas on that on Nigeria, but maybe we can come to that a bit later.Tobi; So, I'm curious. I know you didn't cover this in your book. So let me let you speculate a bit on the psychology of elite bargains or development bargains specifically now. Given that I've also tried to look at some of the societies that you described, and even some others that you probably didn't mention, I don't think there's been a society yet where this is a gamble true, but where the elites have sort of lost out by gambling on development. So why don't we see a lot more gambles than we are seeing currently?Stefan; Actually, unfortunately, we see gambles that go wrong. I mean, for me, and I've worked a lot on Ethiopia, Ethiopia as a gamble that went wrong at the moment. And Ethiopia... you know, just think a little bit of what happened and maybe typify a little bit in a very simplistic way the nature of the gamble. You know, you had a leader under Meles Zenawi, under the TPLF - the Tigray and rebel group - where in the end the dominant force in the military force that actually took power in 1991. And they stayed dominant, even though they only represent, you know, five 6% of the population, they remain dominant in that political deal. Though other groups joined, but militarily, it was the TPLF that was the most powerful. So it also meant that the political deal was always fragile because in various periods of time, you know, my very first job was teaching in Addis Ababa University so I was teaching there 1992 93... you know, we have violence on the streets of students that were being actually repressed by the state, they were demonstrating against the government. You know, over time, we have various instances where this kind of legitimacy, the political legitimacy of that regime was also being questioned. Now, one of the gambles that Meles Zenawi took was to actually say, look, there's a very fragile political deal, but I'm actually going to get legitimacy through growth and development. So he used development as a way of getting legitimacy for something that politically and you know, just as Nigeria is complicated, Ethiopia is complicated with different nationalities, different balances between the regions, that he actually wasn't quite giving the space for these different nationalities to have a role, but he was gambling on doing it through growth and development. How did this go wrong? You know, I kept on spending a lot of time, but in the 2010s after Meles Zenawi died, very young from illness, the government still tried to pursue this. But actually, increasingly, they couldn't keep the politics together anymore. They were almost a different nationality, they were always on the streets, there was lots of violence and so on. And then in the end, you know, the Tigrayans lost power in the central government, and then, of course, we know how it escalated further after Abiy. But in some sense, the underlying political deal was fragile and the hope was that through economic progress, we could strengthen that political deal to legitimacy. That gamble is fine. Now it's a very fractured state and unfortunately, all the news we get from the country is that it's increasingly fractured. And I don't know how we'll put it together again. So that's a gamble that failed. Now, we know more about it. And it was very visible because it lasted quite a long time. Many of these gambles may actually misfire if they don't pick the right political moments. You know, if you don't do it at the right moment, and if you're a little bit unlucky with global circumstances, you fairly quickly could get into a bit of trouble politically, and whatever. For example, with the high inflation we have in virtually every country in the world now, it is clearly not the moment to gamble. It's extremely risky, [and] fragile, and your opponents will use it against you. So it's another thing like, you know, we don't see them gambling, you know, there are relatively few windows of opportunities at which you can gamble. And there are some that will go wrong. And even some that I described as successes, you know, we don't know whether they will last, whether they will become the new Koreas. I'm cautious about that. So, we need to just see it a little bit. Although I don't see Nigeria taking that gamble. So that's another matter.Tobi; No, no. I mean, that's where I was going next. Let me talk to you a bit about the role of outsiders here. We're going to get the aid discussion later. So currently in Nigeria, obviously, the economy has been through a lot in the last several years, a lot of people will put that firmly into the hands of the current administration. Rightly so. There were some very terrible policy choices that were made. But one point that I've quite often made to friends is that, to borrow your terminology, I don't think Nigeria was under the influence of a development bargain that suddenly went astray seven years ago. We've always been heading in this direction, some periods were just pretty good. And one of those periods was in the mid to late 2000s, when the economy seemed to be doing quite well, with high oil prices and also, the government actually really took a stab at macro-economic reforms. But if also you look carefully at the micro-history of that period, you'll see the influence of, should I say, outside legitimacy, you know, trying to get the debt forgiveness deal over the line and, you know, so many other moves that the government was making to increase its credibility internationally was highly influential in some of those decisions and the people that were brought into the government and some of the reform too. And my proof for that when I talk to people is to look at the other things that we should have done, which, we didn't do. We had the opportunity to actually reform either through privatization, a more sustainable model of our energy policy - the energy industry, generally. Electricity? People like to talk about telecommunications and the GSM revolution, but we didn't do anything about electricity, we didn't do anything about transportation. Infrastructure was still highly deficient and investment was not really serious, you know. So it was not... for me, personally, it was not a development bargain. Now, my question then would be, could it have been different if some of the outside influences that are sometimes exerted on countries can be a bit more focused on long-term development, as opposed to short-term macro-economic reforms on stability? You know, institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, I know they have their defined mandates, but is it time for a change? I think they actually have a lot more influence than they are using currently.Stefan; You make extremely valid points. And I think I will broadly agree with you with what you just implied. And I'll take a stance on it now. So the first thing, of course, and you correctly saw that something very misleading in Nigeria's growth figures is that periods of high growth are not at all linked to much action by economic policymakers. But it's still largely linked to oil prices. And we have this unfortunate cyclical behaviour in policymaking. Where the behaviour when prices are really good, is just always missing taking advantage of the opportunity. While when things are bad, we're talking about all kinds of things one ought to be doing but then saying, ''we can't do it because the prices are low.'' And so there is this kind of strange, asymmetric thing about policymaking that we always have the best ideas when we can't do them, and then we don't have the ideas we should have when the going is good. And this is in a way what you're alluding to. Of course, the role of outsiders that gets very interesting is what these outsiders were focusing on, actually, I think it was in the interest of the, call them, semi-outsider inside government...some of these technocrats that were brought in. And I can understand it entirely, you know, there were some really sensible finance ministers at various moments and so on. They were focused on actually things that were relatively easy in that period. So they were actually relatively easy, because the going was quite good. And so actually you created that strange impression, and it's a little bit like together with the outsiders, with World Bank, IMF, but actually, we're dealing with something really dramatic but, actually, we were not at all setting a precedent because it was actually, relatively... relatively politically low cost to do these things at that moment. Okay. So it was progress of sorts, you know, getting the debt relief, and so on. But arguably, you know, it's not a bad thing. But this actually was quite a low-hanging fruit and many of these organizations like these ideas of low-hanging fruits, because actually, politically, it played well, it increased the stature internationally of Nigeria...but, actually, it didn't really cost the elite much. It wasn't really hard for the elite to do these things. [If they did] the difficult things, they would really have started to change Nigeria. And so there is something there that I'm struck by the last sentence you said that some of these outsiders may be focusing on the wrong things. I think it has to be the insiders wanting to focus on these things, on these more difficult things. And then I do agree with you, the outsider should be smarter, and better able to respond to this. There's a problem with the outsiders here as well, take something that clearly you still struggle with and struggled forever with - electricity reform, the electricity sector. It's so complicated, and it's set up so complicated in all kinds of ways and whatever. So much inefficiency, so much waste that then it doesn't function and everybody, you know, complains about it. But it becomes politically very sensitive because there are definitely vested interests linked to it now and it becomes very hard to unravel it. Now the problem is if you ask typically a World Bank or an IMF for advice, they will make it very simple and say, Oh, just privatize the whole thing and do the whole thing. Now. You know that in a politically sensitive environment, you just can't privatize everything, so you privatize a little bit, but anything that's really with vested interests you won't touch. But these are the inefficient bits. So the easy prey, you privatize, and that's someone else making even more money off it because it's actually the efficient part of those systems that gets privatized, and then the inefficient part is still there and costs even more money. And so what I think these outsiders could do better is to have a better understanding of Nigeria's political economy, which is complicated at the best of times, but really understand, where can we start actually touching on something that we are beginning to touch on something vested interests that we begin to unravel a little bit some of the kind of underlying problem of, you know, politically connected business, you know, all the way to party financing or whatever...that you need to start unraveling somehow, where actually the underlying causes of inefficiency lie. Because the underlying causes of inefficiency are not just technical, they're actually not just economic. The underlying causes are these kinds of things. So I think why the outsiders did what they did at that time, it actually suited the government at the time, the technocratic ministers, that's the best they could do because that was the only mandate they had. Together with the outsider, they'd say, Well, that's certainly something we could do. But actually, fundamentally, you didn't really change that much. You don't still have then wherever it goes a bit bad, I'll get six or whatever exchange rates, and I'll get all kinds of other macroeconomic poor management, and, of course, nothing can happen when there's a crisis. There's no way we can do these more micro sector-specific reforms than doing it. So yeah, you're absolutely right. But let's not underestimate how hard it is. But starting to do the things that you refer to is where we need to get to to doing some of these difficult things.Tobi; The way I also read your book is that the two classic problems of political economy are still present, which is, the incentive and the knowledge problem. So I want to talk about the role of knowledge and ideas here. Let's even suppose that a particular group of elites at a particular time are properly incentivized to pursue a development bargain. Right? Sometimes the kind of ideas you still find floating around in the corridors of power can be quite counterproductive. A very revealing part of your book for me was when you were talking about the role of China. Also, I have no problem with China. The anecdote about Justin meme stood out to me quite well, because I could relate to it personally because I've also been opportuned to be at conferences where Justin Lin spoke, and I was slightly uneasy at how much simplification happens. I mean, just to digress a little bit, there was a particular presidential candidate in the just concluded primaries of the ruling party, I'm not going to mention the name, who is quite under the heavy influence of the China model. Right? Always consults with China, always meeting with Chinese economists and technocrats. And my reaction when he lost the primaries was ''thank god,'' right? Because what I see mostly in development thinking locally, I don't mean in academic circles, a lot of debates are going on in academics... is that the success of China and Asia more broadly has brought the State primarily into the front and centre. If you look at this current government, they will tell you seven years ago that they meant well. You know, judging by the Abba Kyari anecdotes where government should own the means of production. He may not believe that, like you said, truthfully, but you can see the influence of what has been called ''state-led development.'' In a state where there is no capable bureaucracy. The government itself is not even optimized to know the problem to solve or even how to solve that particular problem. Right. So broadly, my question is, if an elite chooses to pursue a development bargain, how does it then ensure that the right ideas, which lead to the right kind of policies, and maybe there might not even be the right policies - one of the things you mentioned is changing your mind quickly, it's an experimental process - but, you know, this process needs people who are open to ideas, who change their minds, who can also bring other people in with different ideas, you know, so this idea generation process in a development bargain, how can it be stable even if you have an elite consensus is that chooses to pursue development?Stefan; Look, it's an excellent question. And last week, or 10 days ago, when it was in Bangladesh, I was very struck that, you know, as a country I think that has the development bargain, there was a lot of openness. And you know, I was in the Ministry of Finance, and people had a variety of ideas, but they were all openly debated, there was not a kind of fixed mindset. And it is something that I've always found a bit unfortunate dealing with both politicians and senior technocrats in Nigeria. Nigeria is quickly seen as the centre of the world, there's nothing to learn from the rest of the world, we'll just pick an idea, and then we'll run with it and there's nothing that needs to be checked. And, you know, I love the self-confidence, but for thinking and for pursuit of ideas, you know, looking around and questioning what you hear whether you hear it from Justin Lin, who by the way, I don't think he's malign and he means well, he just has a particular way of communicating but it is, of course, a simplified story that you can simply get, and then you'll pick it up. And of course, if you ask the UK Government, the official line from London, they will also tell you there is only one model when they're purely official, but privately they will be a bit more open-minded, and maybe Chinese officials don't feel they have that freedom to privately encourage you to think a bit broader and so you have maybe a stricter line. So how do we do that? I think we can learn something here from India in the 1970s and 1980s. So when India after independence, it had a very strict set of ideas. In that sense, India was as a child of its time as a state, you know, state control, state-led development, there were strong views around it and India ended up doing a lot of regulation. They used to refer to India as the License Raj. Like a whole system based around licensing and everything was regulated by the state. So the state had far too much say in terms of the activity, despite the fact that the underlying economy was meant to be very entrepreneurship and commerce-led, but you had a lot of licensing rules, and so on. And of course, its growth stayed very low in the 1970s and 80s, it was actually very stagnant. It changed in the 1990s. Partly came with a crisis - in fact, a balance of payments crisis - it needs to reform and Manmohan Singh was the finance minister, then, later on, he became maybe a less successful Prime Minister. But as a finance minister in the early 90s, he did quite amazing things. And then during the 90s, gradually, every party started adopting a much more growth-oriented, more outward-oriented type of mindset. Now, why do I say this? Because actually, during the 1970s, and 80s, you had think-tanks, all the time pushing for these broader ideas. It took them 20 years. But there were really well-known think-tanks that kept on trying to convince people in the planning commission, economists in the universities and so on. And to critically think, look, there must be other ways. So actually, funnily enough, in India, it has a lot to do with the thinking and the public debates, that initially the politicians didn't take up, but actually found the right people to influence... you know, you actually have still in the civil service some decent technocrats there, they don't get a chance. But there are decent people, I know some of them and so on. But there needs to be a feeding of these ideas. And actually, this is where I would almost say there's a bit of a failing here, in the way the public discourse is done [in Nigeria] and maybe voices like you, but also more systematically from universities from think tanks and so on to actually feed and keep on feeding these ideas. There is a suggestion [by] Lant Pritchett - you know he's a former Harvard economist, he is now in the UK - [who] wrote this very interesting paper and he said, some of these think tanks who are actually getting a little bit of aid money here and there and he said, that's probably the best spent aid money in India ever. Because the rate of return and he calculates this number is like 1,000,000%, or something. Because he basically says the power of ideas is there. And I do think there is something there that I'm always surprised by that there are some very smart Nigerians outside the country, they don't really get much of a hearing inside the country, then there are some that are actually inside the country, the quality of debate is maybe not stimulated to be thinking beyond. It has to do probably with how complicated your country is, and of course, the Federal status plays a role. I just wonder whether maybe this is something that needs to start in particular states. You know, there are some governors that are a little bit more progressive than others. Maybe it is actually increasing and focusing attention over this on a few states to get the debate up to a high level and to actually see what they can do and maybe it's where the entry point is, but you need ideas I agree with you and I do worry at times about the kind of critical quality... there are some great thinkers in Nigeria, don't get me wrong, but the critical quality of ideas around alternative ways of doing the economy and so on, and that they get so easily captured by simple narrative, simple national narratives that are really just too simple to actually pursue. I mean...yeah.Tobi; That's quite deep. That's quite deep. I mean, just captures my life's mission right there. It's interesting you talked about Lant Pritchett and the question of aid, which is like my next line of question to you. There was this brief exchange on Twitter that I caught about the review of your book in the guardian, and the question of aid came up. I saw responses from Martin Ravallion, from Rachel Glennerster, I'm not sure I'm pronouncing her name right. So it's sort of then brings me to the whole question of development assistance, aid, and the way intervention has now been captured by what works. One fantastic example I got from your book is on Bangladesh, and how both systems work. You know, there's a broad development bargain, it's not perfect, nothing is, no society is. And there's the pursuit of economic growth. And also, it's a country where aid money and all forms of development assistance is quite active, and is quite huge, and it's actually quite effective. Now, my question is that basic insight from your book, which is for aid spending to be a little bit more biased, not your word... a little bit more bias to countries that have development bargains broadly? Why is that insight so difficult for, I should say, the international NGO industry to grasp? Why is it elusive? Because the status quo, which I would say, I don't mean to offend anybody, but which I will say is also aided by development economists and academics who have sort of put methodology and evidence above prosperity, in my view... because what you see is that, regardless of how dysfunctional the country is, broadly, the aid industry just carves out a nice niche where they do all sorts of interventions, cash transfers, chickens and, of course, you can always do randomized control trials and you say you have evidence for what works. But meanwhile you don't see the broad influence of some of these so-called assistants in the country as a whole. And these are institutions who proclaim that they are committed to fighting extreme poverty and we know what has vastly reduced poverty through history has always been economic growth and prosperity. So why is this elusive? Have those agencies and international development thinking itself been captured?Stefan; Look, I think I should make you do my interviews in the future. Yeah. So I've got to hire you to give...Because, look, I've been inside the aid industry and, in fact, the two people that you mentioned, you know, I would call them my friends, although one of them clearly is very cross at me at the moment. But you know, these are people I've worked with, and so on. And I am worried that there is such an obsession within the aid industry to prove their effectiveness. And I know I've been under pressure, you know, I've worked in it and sitting in London and getting your newspapers to say you're wasting all this money. It's really affecting a lot of people. And it was really hardwork for these 10 years that I sat inside it. But it's about just the humility that you just described, you know, and I want to make this distinction between...I'm about to make two distinctions. So the first one is - you made it well, even Bangladesh, something is going on. And you know, with all the imperfections, the government is trying to do something, and largely by staying to some extent out of the way. And there's some good stuff happening. So there's growth picking up and so on. So you can do all kinds of things. And I think aid in Bangladesh has been great at trying to make sure that the growth that was taking place in that country was a bit more inclusive than it probably would have been. I think it's great. And I think the aid industry should be proud of it. There is a great book that I quote as well also by Naomi Hossein and she calls it The Aid Lab and this is a bit like in praise of it. You know, if we do it carefully with some community and complement what's going on in a country that is deeply poor, you know, you can actually do really good things. Because in the book, I also mentioned Ghana that, actually, aid has been pretty effective because something had begun to change in the 90s, and so on. And we can question that to some extent and, of course, it's none of this perfection. But if you then come to a country where, you know... probably the two of us agree [that] there is some form of stagnation in that kind of [country], there's no development bargain, the elite bargain doesn't really push everything forward. Just be humble to say, look, I have a little niche, and there will be some chicken farmers that are happier, we'll do some good things in health... in health, actually, it's quite straightforward to do good things. But they are to call these good things, don't classify this as if you are leading the fight against extreme poverty, leading the fight against the change in these countries. Because, actually, if the local elite is not leading their change, and those people who have the power and influence not leading their change, the best you can do is doing good things. So I'm happy for us to be able to say we do good things. And it led me in the context of an interview to say like in India, as doing a lot of good things means that aid was actually in itself quite irrelevant, because the real change came, as I described in the 90s, actually, there was a real shift in gear, and suddenly their own development spending became gradually more effective. And of course, you can help them then to make it more effective. But, you know, I was a bit sad, and Martin Ravallion now took issue with it and wanted to emphasize... you know, and I don't want us to ever say, look, we did it. I mean, it's such a lack of humility I'll say this. At some point, we may have been supportive of doing it, but it's always the countries that did it. And the people there that did it. And other times just be humble and say, well, we may be doing something reasonably good, we may improve health outcomes, education outcomes, but not necessarily the whole country may do it in the schools that we work in, or whatever. And it's, that's good, you know, that's just as there are Nigerians that do good things via their own organizations and so on, they do good things. And it's probably teachers in the country, within the state schools that do some of these good things in the best practice stuff. And so yeah, they improve things, but overall, have the humility to say you're not changing Nigeria, because unfortunately, Nigeria is not being changed at the moment.Tobi; So my question then would be, is it reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics where randomized control trials, they pursue...I know Lant Pritchett has really come down quite heavily on this particular movement, though, sometimes he seems to be the only one standing, maybe not quite literally true and I'll give you two examples from Nigeria, right? In 2012, when the anti subsidy-removal protests broke out, when the government on the first day of January removed fuel subsidy and prices suddenly went up. And the labour movement, the student movement, opposition politicians mobilized the population against that particular move. Some form of resolution that the current president at that time reached was to do what they call a partial removal of subsidy, you know, prices will go up a little bit and the government then did a scheme - an entrepreneurship scheme - where you submit a business plan and you're paid to get $50,000 to do a business.And I read a particular study by David Evans of the World Bank of how fantastically successful this particular scheme was, and of course, no doubt, it was successful. I mean, if you get $50,000 to do business in Nigeria, that's a lot of money. I don't need econometric analysis to know that, but maybe some people do. But the truth is, if you look today, I can bet you that a lot of those businesses are probably dead now due to how the economy as sort of evolved after that. Secondly, at the time we were having these debates and protests in 2012, the subsidy figure there was $8 billion annually, today it is $15 billion. So if you say you have evidence that something works, what exactly is your time horizon for measuring what works? And if you say something works, works in whose benefit, really? The most recent example was in 2018, 2019, where the government was given a small amount of money to small retailers, they call it Trader Moni. I'm sure there were World Bank officials and economists (I have a lot of respect for them) who are measuring the effectiveness of this thing. But you could see clearly that what was politically going on was the government doing vote buying. Right? So if you say something work, works for whom? Right? That was my response to Rachel on Twitter, but she didn't reply me. My question then to you... Sorry, I'm talking too much... Is this reflective of the current intellectual climate in development economics? Stefan; So yes and no? Okay. So, well, i'm going to have to be very careful. Of course, Rachel...I know her very well. And, actually, I have not that many gripes with her. She comes out of, indeed, the whole school of RCTs. By the way, I also actually do RCTs. I like it as a tool to actually study things. And I'll explain in a moment a bit more. So I do these randomized control trials as well. But I am very, very sympathetic. And I actually totally agree with your frustration around this idea to creating that impression about what works. You know, I have it in the book, I even mentioned it, there was a particular minister that at some point announced we're only going to spend our money on what works, you know, like a great slogan, as if you have all the answers, you know what to do. And of course, there is a technical meaning to it. Technical meaning would mean, if I do something and if you haven't done it, what would have been the outcome? And the paper that you refer on the entrepreneurship, this entrepreneurship for the $50,000... I know actually the research very well, the original was from David McKenzie and then other people commenting on it. Yes, relative to a counterfactual, yes, it was actually much bigger than an alternative scheme, you know, then that's something. So you could say, well, you know, as a research question, as a researcher, I find it interesting. From a policy point of view, I'm so much more cautious. And I'm totally with you. You know, first of all, in the bigger scheme of things, how tiny maybe it be... now there are some people who would say, well, we don't know anything, really, what to do in this whole messy environment so at least [to] have something that does a bit better than other things is maybe a useful thing to know. I think it comes back to that humility. As a research tool, it's great at getting exact answers. As a policy tool, I think we need to have much more humility. Because are these ideas tha totally transforms everything, that is actually makes a huge difference? Not really. It probably means that we can identify a little bit and I think even Pritchard wouldn't disagree with [that] sometimes a few things are a little bit better than other things. And if we want to do good, maybe it's helpful in medicine whether we know whether we should spend a bit more money on X or on Y, that it actually does a little bit better in the functioning of a health facility or not, if we spent a bit more money on that practice or on that practice, same in teaching in the school, if we do a little bit more of that in a very constrained environment than something else, that's useful, it doesn't change dramatically. And I categorize it with doing good. With humility, if we do good, it's helpful to know which things are a bit better than other things...when we try to do good. It's an interesting thing, even in Rachel's thread, she actually used it, we can still do quite a lot of good with aid. Actually, funnily enough, I don't disagree that deeply with her and say, Yeah, we may be able to do it good, but don't present it as if we, in the bigger scheme of things, which is where you're getting that, make any difference. And this is where I'm also sympathetic with Lant in saying, Look, sometimes we seem to be focusing on the small trivial things and yeah, it's useful to know but meanwhile the big picture is what you were describing, there's so much going on and, actually, nothing changes there. And so I categorize it in a bit of the same thing. Because I'll now give you an account, which is then go to Bangladesh again. Look, I think it was extremely useful in Bangladesh at some point to really have ... an RCT - a randomized control trial. So really careful evidence to show that a particular program that BRAC, the biggest NGO in the world, the local NGO, was actually what it was actually doing to the ultra-poor. In fact, two weeks ago, I was visiting the program again. And I find it really interesting because it's really helpful for BRAC to know that that program, when I do it in a careful evaluation relative to other things, that actually this program is really effective. And that, actually, we know for BRAC that they can have so much choices to spend their money on poverty alleviation, the things that we can dream up, to actually know this is actually a really good thing. And why of course does it work? Well, it works relative to doing nothing, but of course, it helps in Bangladesh {that] growth is taking place and it actually can get people to become [a big] part of it. In fact, I was visiting people that, whether we use a Nigerian or Bangladeshi definition of extreme poverty, they wouldn't have been in that state 10 years ago and so this is their being six, seven years in that program, and it was really interesting that I was sitting into some interviews they were doing, and I looked over my shoulder, and they now had a TV and a fridge. And I say, okay, an extremely poor person in Bangladesh would not have had this. So there's clearly something happening. Now, that's not simply because of the program. It's also because the whole country is improving. But I'm pretty sure and what the data showed is that those who actually had a program would have found it a bit easier to take part in that progress. And I'm pretty sure that the TV, and the fridge, probably was helped, to some extent, by the programme. In fact, we have very good evidence in the kind of evidence that Rachel Glennerster talks about. So again, I think it's all about a bit of humility, and understanding better what we mean by it. And to be honest, I think there are lots of people who work in that field that are careful with it. And that actually will do it, use it well. It gets just really worrying that people, often more junior people than Rachel, they've never really been in the field properly and then they make massive statements. So they work in big organizations, and they use that evidence, overuse it and overstate it. I think Rachel is actually careful, even her thread was very careful, although your question is a very good one. But it's very careful. But it still allows other people to overinterpret this whole thing. And then I get really worried. I'm actually going to put out a thread on Twitter in the coming days where I'm going to talk about tribalism in development economics... where I'm good to deal with your question as well because I think the way the profession has evolved is that you need to be in one tribe or another, otherwise, you're not allowed to function. I think, you know, you need to be eclectic, you know, no one has this single answer. And there's too much tribalism going on, much more than I've ever known before. You know, you need to be Oh, a fan of that, or you need to be the historical approach, or the Political Economy approach, and the whole... we should learn from all these bits. That's the idea of knowledge that you learn from... as much as possible from the progress in different parts of a discipline, or in thinking.Tobi; I'm glad to have caught you on a free day because having a lot more time to have this conversation has made it quite rich for me personally, and I'm sure for the audience as well. So I just have a couple more questions before I let you get back to your day. The first of those would be...um, when I first became aware of your book on Twitter, it was via a Chris Blattman thread. And he mentioned something that I have also struggled with, both personally in my thought and, in my conversation with people. And somethin

In 1947, few people gave us 75 years. Bloody hell, here we are! And it is up to us now to make this country the best version of itself. Karthik Muralidharan joins Amit Varma in episode 290 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss one of our problem areas: the Indian state. Can we fix it? Yes we can! (For full linked show notes, go to SeenUnseen.in.) Also check out: 1. 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The Seen and the Unseen (w Josy Joseph). 24. We Are Fighting Two Disasters: Covid-19 and the Indian State -- Amit Varma. 25. India's Lost Decade — Episode 116 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Puja Mehra). 26. The Importance of the 1991 Reforms -- Episode 237 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Ajay Shah). 27. State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century — Francis Fukuyama. 28. The Origins of Political Order — Francis Fukuyama. 29. Political Order and Political Decay — Francis Fukuyama. 30. Computer Nahi Monitor -- Episode 5 of season 1 of Panchayat. 31. Naushad Forbes Wants to Fix India -- Episode 282 of The Seen and the Unseen. 32. Courts Redux: Micro-Evidence from India -- Manaswini Rao. 33.  The Checklist Manifesto -- Atul Gawande. 34. Annie Hall -- Woody Allen. 35. The Politics Limerick -- Amit Varma. 36. The Decline of the Congress -- Episode 248 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rahul Verma). 37. The Burden of Democracy -- Pratap Bhanu Mehta. 38. A Theory of Clientelistic Politics versus Programmatic Politics -- Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee. 39. Power and Prosperity — Mancur Olson. 40. The Business of Winning Elections -- Episode 247 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shivam Shankar Singh). 41. Premature load bearing: Evidence, Analysis, Action -- Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock. 42. A Meditation on Form — Amit Varma. 43. Religion and Ideology in Indian Society -- Episode 124 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Suyash Rai). 44. The Tragedy of Our Farm Bills -- Episode 211 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ajay Shah). 45. India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy -- Ramachandra Guha. 46. Participatory Democracy -- Episode 160 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 47. Cities and Citizens -- Episode 198 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 48. Helping Others in the Fog of Pandemic -- Episode 226 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Ashwin Mahesh). 49. Aakar Patel Is Full of Hope -- Episode 270 of The Seen and the Unseen. 50. The Tamilian gentleman who took on the world -- Amit Varma on Viswanathan Anand. 51. Running to Stand Still -- U2. 52. Population Is Not a Problem, but Our Greatest Strength -- Amit Varma. 53. India's Founding Moment — Madhav Khosla. 54. The Ideas of Our Constitution -- Episode 164 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Madhav Khosla). 55. The Life and Times of Urvashi Butalia -- Episode 287 of The Seen and the Unseen. 56. Pitfalls of Participatory Programs -- Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Stuti Khemani. 57. Our Parliament and Our Democracy -- Episode 253 of The Seen and the Unseen (w MR Madhavan). 58. Elite Imitation in Public Policy -- Episode 180 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan and Alex Tabarrok). 59. Urban Governance in India -- Episode 31 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Shruti Rajagopalan). 60. The Life and Times of Abhinandan Sekhri -- Episode 254 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Abhinandan Sekhri). 61. The Tiebout Model. 62. Every Act of Government Is an Act of Violence -- Amit Varma. 63. Taxes Should Be Used for Governance, Not Politics -- Amit Varma. 64. The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China -- Nancy Qian, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Monica Martinez-Bravo and Yang Yao. 65. Sneaky Artist Sees the World -- Episode 260 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Nishant Jain). 66. Science and Covid-19 -- Episode 221 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Anirban Mahapatra). 66. Centrally Sponsored Government Schemes -- Episode 17 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Pranay Kotasthane.). 67. India's states can be laboratories for policy innovation and reform -- Karthik Muralidharan. 68. Clientelism in Indian Villages -- Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 69. Patching Development -- Rajesh Veeraraghavan. 70. Opportunity, Choice and the IPL (2008) — Amit Varma. 71. The IPL is Here and Here Are Six Reasons to Celebrate It (2019) — Amit Varma. 72. Climate Change and Our Power Sector -- Episode 278 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Akshay Jaitley and Ajay Shah). 73. The Delhi Smog -- Episode 44 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Vivek Kaul). 74. The Life and Times of Nilanjana Roy -- Episode 284 of The Seen and the Unseen. 75. The Life and Times of Nirupama Rao -- Episode 269 of The Seen and the Unseen. 76. The Life and Times of Mrinal Pande -- Episode 263 of The Seen and the Unseen. 77. Objects Speak to Annapurna Garimella -- Episode 257 of The Seen and the Unseen. 78. Letters for a Nation: From Jawaharlal Nehru to His Chief Ministers 1947-1963 -- Edited by Madhav Khosla. 79. To Raise a Fallen People -- Rahul Sagar. 80. The Progressive Maharaja -- Rahul Sagar. 81. India = Migration -- Episode 128 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Chinmay Tumbe). 82. India: A Sacred Geography -- Diana Eck. 83. Unlikely is Inevitable — Amit Varma. 84. The Law of Truly Large Numbers. 85. Political Ideology in India -- Episode 131 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Rahul Verma). Check out Amit's online course, The Art of Clear Writing. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free! The illustration for this episode is by Nishant Jain aka Sneaky Artist. Check out his podcast, Twitter, Instagram and Substack.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Research Help Needed for 1Day/IFP “Operation Warp Speed 2.0” Project, published by joshcmorrison on April 14, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. 1Day Sooner and the Institute for Progress are working on a Schmidt Futures-funded project to develop a lobbying campaign for an “Operation Warp Speed 2.0” to create universal coronavirus vaccines. Beyond this pandemic, we want this to create precedent and infrastructure for the broader use of “advanced market commitments” to accelerate development and deployment of vaccines and antibiotics, which would have major longtermist and disease burden benefits. Because of the scale and complexity of the policy we're envisioning, we need help with research. If you're reading this and have 5-10 hours a week over the next 4-6 weeks, we could use your help (and can pay for your time). Why Warp Speed 2.0? Pandemic preparedness and vaccine development for neglected diseases are each seriously underfunded. The GOP is likely to win at least one house of Congress this November and tends to be averse to large government spending. But Operation Warp Speed's success and connection to President Trump give it a unique attraction to a GOP audience. Moreover the advanced purchase commitment framework it utilized (of guaranteeing large purchases of effective vaccines) creates a market-friendly framework that could be supported by conservatives in the U.S. and elsewhere. Beyond the benefits of developing a financing model with potential bipartisan support capable of efficiently funding effective altruist goals, successfully creating a universal coronavirus vaccine would serve as proof of concept for the 100 day prototype vaccine strategy aimed at developing universal vaccines ahead of time to pathogens with pandemic potential. Thus both the campaign's object-level goal (accelerating coronavirus vaccines) and meta-goal (expanding the long-term use of advanced market commitments) have major EA benefits beyond reducing COVID disease burden. What Help Is Needed? Time is of the essence to introduce a strong bill and launch a campaign quickly, but the scale and complexity of the policy (along with its multiple moving parts) make the research needed fairly involved and time consuming. At the same time, we think the key questions we've identified are independent enough from each other that they can be broken into discrete tasks where progress is possible with work on a part-time basis. Basically, we're trying an experiment to emulate the research process at the beginning of 1Day Sooner when our organization relied on a number of EAs to provide research help on challenge trials and eventually produce this piece (as well as a great deal of background knowledge crucial to our informing the public and advocating for effective policy). That work was done almost entirely on a volunteer basis but research assistance on this project would be compensated (typically in the $30-$50/hr range depending on experience). How Can I Get Involved? Email josh@1daysooner.org, reference this post, and include a paragraph about your background and time availability. Also indicate one or two research questions in the agenda below that you might be interested in exploring. We're going to aim to host a kickoff session for people who'll be working on this some time Thursday April 21st, so you should hear from me before then. I have no idea how many will respond so won't know in advance how selective we'll be (if at all). What Questions Need to Be Answered? Here's the current research agenda we'll be working on: Modeling, Quantifying, and Forecasting Impact of Pan-Sarbecovirus Vaccines: Create informal model of impact of potential future COVID-19 disease burden scenarios in the U.S. and globally (currently led by Eric Mannes with supervision by Witold Wiecek, Rachel Glennerster, an...

welcome to the nonlinear library, where we use text-to-speech software to convert the best writing from the rationalist and ea communities into audio. this is: £4bn for the global poor: the UK's 0.7%, published by Sanjay on the effective altruism forum. Background The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the government will reduce the amount of spend on international development from 0.7% of GNI to 0.5%. (read more, e.g., here). This means that the government will spend £10bn on aid instead of £14bn. This post sets out an attempt to undo this decision. I'm hoping we can find more people to help with analysis and to donate to the campaign. Plan At a high level, the plan we have in mind is essentially taken straight from the tech startup playbook: Identify the highest leverage constituencies (probably those with "moderate" Tory MPs) perform google and facebook ads to identify people in those constituencies willing to write a letter or email to their MP recruit them and provide them with a template letter/email I'm currently reaching out to a bunch of NGOs in my network to ask them Are approaches like these already being used? (and if not, why not?) Do any NGOs already have the analysis on which constituencies are the best targets? Once we have recruited people, how best to look after them? Even if we find that NGOs are already targeting the most strategic constituencies, we would to do some work ourselves on analysing which the most strategic constituencies are, as this would help us to assess and potentially support the decision-making being done by the NGOs. Who's working on this, and why do we need more people The main people involved thus far are myself and a member of the EA community called Sahil. We will need more people to help with various tasks, especially analysis to work out which MPs are the most strategic ones to reach out to. There are probably other tasks that I haven't thought through -- this post is being written quickly, as we may not have much time to act. How would funds be used? Funds are needed for Facebook/Google ads to reach strategically chosen constituents of the MPs who are most interested in supporting international development. Given the considerations set out below, I would judge that this likely outperforms a donation to a GiveWell-recommended charity. (A confident/rigorous assessment of this claim would require a more detailed model than I have time for; timescales are likely short) How good is more development spend? DfID has in recent years been considered one of the top international development agencies, known for its focus on impact and its awareness of cost-effectiveness. Their Chief Economist was and still is Rachel Glennerster (early taker of the GWWC pledge). Something that's unclear is the extent to which DfID's effectiveness might change after the merger with the FCO (foreign office). Having said that, at this particular time, the need is particularly high, so at the margin, reducing spend is likely to mean that much-needed programmes are brought to an abrupt halt right at the moment when work is most needed. Reducing development spend in the short term strikes me as a clearly bad idea. How effective is this campaign likely to be? The change will require a change to the law, which means MPs will have to vote on it. I get the impression that it's not clear that the government will win on this. This suggests that it's a good campaign to apply some effort to. A guardian political correspondent had this to say about the drop in the ODA percentage: "This is a very politically tricky moment, as shown by the amount of time Sunak uses justifying it. A lot of Tory MPs are angry. The change potentially requires a Commons vote, and there is no guarantee the government will win. This one, as they say, could run and run." thanks for listening. to help us out with the nonlinear library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

If I told you it's possible to deliver an extra year of ideal primary-level education for 30 cents, would you believe me? Hopefully not – the claim is absurd on its face.But it may be true nonetheless. The very best education interventions are phenomenally cost-effective, but they're not the kinds of things you'd expect, says Dr Rachel Glennerster — who we chose to introduce the problem of global poverty. Full transcript, related links, and summary of this interviewThis episode first broadcast on the regular 80,000 Hours Podcast feed on December 20, 2018. Some related episodes include: #13 – Claire Walsh on testing which policies work & how to get governments to listen to the results #18 – Ofir Reich on using data science to end poverty & the spurious action-inaction distinction #22 – Dr Leah Utyasheva on the non-profit that figured out how to massively cut suicide rates #30 – Dr Eva Vivalt on how little social science findings generalize from one study to another #37 – GiveWell picks top charities by estimating the unknowable. James Snowden on how they do it. #38 – Prof Yew-Kwang Ng on anticipating EA decades ago & how to make a much happier world And #55 – Mark Lutter & Tamara Winter on founding charter cities with outstanding governance to end poverty Series produced by Keiran Harris.

The second episode of the RISE Podcast features Dr Rachel Glennerster, Chief Economist at the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in conversation with Laura Savage (Deputy Head of Education Research at the UK's FCDO). During the episode, they discuss Rachel's reflections on how good interventions can work in poor performing education systems, why we need to go beyond evidence of what works to think about cost effectiveness, and how to build incentives to tackle systems issues at scale.  Links: Cost-Effective Approaches to Improve Global Learning : What Does Recent Evidence Tell Us Are “Smart Buys” for Improving Learning in Low and Middle Income Countries?: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/719211603835247448/pdf/Cost-Effective-Approaches-to-Improve-Global-Learning-What-Does-Recent-Evidence-Tell-Us-Are-Smart-Buys-for-Improving-Learning-in-Low-and-Middle-Income-Countries.pdf (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/719211603835247448/pdf/Cost-Effective-Approaches-to-Improve-Global-Learning-What-Does-Recent-Evidence-Tell-Us-Are-Smart-Buys-for-Improving-Learning-in-Low-and-Middle-Income-Countries.pdf) The Global Education Advisory Panel: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/teachingandlearning/brief/global-education-evidence-advisory-panel (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/teachingandlearning/brief/global-education-evidence-advisory-panel) DFID's Education Policy “Get Children Learning”: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/685536/DFID-Education-Policy-2018a.pdf (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/685536/DFID-Education-Policy-2018a.pdf) FCDO's 2021 Girls' Education Action Plan: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/986027/FCDO-Girls-Education-Action-Plan.pdf (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/986027/FCDO-Girls-Education-Action-Plan.pdf) Rukmini Banerji: https://riseprogramme.org/people/rukmini-banerji (https://riseprogramme.org/people/rukmini-banerji) and Pratham: https://www.pratham.org/ (https://www.pratham.org) Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) Africa: https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org/ (https://www.teachingattherightlevel.org) Guest biography  Dr Rachel Glennerster is the Chief Economist at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and a member of the FCDO Executive Committee. Prior to her appointment at the FCDO, she was the Chief Economist at the Department for International Development (DFID). From 2004 to 2017 she was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Economics Department research centre that seeks to reduce poverty by ensuring policy is informed by scientific evidence. Dr Glennerster's work has spanned reform of the international financial system, debt, promoting innovation, education, health, financial regulation, and women's empowerment in Russia, Africa and South East Asia. In addition to FCDO, DFID and MIT, Dr Glennerster has held positions at the International Monetary Fund, Her Majesty's Treasury and the Harvard Institute for International Development. More information at: https://www.gov.uk/government/people/rachel-glennerster (https://www.gov.uk/government/people/rachel-glennerster). More on Rachel's research: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Vq3KWOsAAAAJ&hl (https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Vq3KWOsAAAAJ&hl) Attribution RISE is funded by the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Programme is implemented...

Welcome to episode 2 of "How did I get here? Discover Economics" In this episode, we have Dr Rachel Glennerster. Rachel is the Chief Economist at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). Before that, she was the Chief Economist at the Department for International Development (DFID). From 2004 to 2017 she was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), an MIT Economics Department research centre that seeks to reduce poverty by ensuring policy is informed by scientific evidence.In the episode we mention the FCDO Next Generation Economics competition. Make sure you check it out: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/fcdo-next-generation-economics-competitionWrite about the biggest economic challenges facing your generation between 15 February and 21 May 2021 to enter our Next Generation Economics Competition. You could win £250.Welcome to Next Generation Economics, a Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) competition for anyone currently studying in years 10 to 13 (in England and Wales, or equivalent in Scotland and Northern Ireland) who is interested in economics. You do not need to have studied economics to take part. Next Generation Economics is your chance to write about the biggest economic challenges facing your generation in 2021.____________________________________________________________What are you going to be when you grow up? A doctor, an astronaut, an engineer, a footballer?Very few people have ever dreamt that one day they would be an economist. It's a profession on few young people's radars, is barely understood and, let's face it, has an image problem.Most people picture economists, if they think about them at all, as “men in suits who are crunching numbers, talking about interest rates and making money”.This series of podcasts aim to challenge – and change – your image of economists. A series of conversations with economists who are working in a variety of different organisations, the podcasts will explore their personal journeys. What inspired them to choose to study economics? How did they get to their current position? What are they currently working on and what are some of the things that they love about economics? ​

Rachel Glennerster is the Chief Economist for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which is the UK's ministry for international development cooperation. Previously, she was the Executive Director of J-PAL (the Jameel Poverty Action Lab) at MIT. This March, Prof. Glennerster gave the closing keynote remarks at the 2020 annual conference at Julis-Rabinowitz Center for Public Policy and Finance, where she touched on challenges of working in fragile states and the linkages between the macro- and micro-levels. The economic policy tools used in advanced economies either do not exist or are ineffective in poor, conflict-afflicted areas. Shifts in macro-level policies can have devastating effects at the household level, leading to hyperinflation, parallel exchange rates, or major debt crises. In this interview, we discuss some of the innovative policy and research tools in fragile states, especially RCT (randomized controlled trials). And we touch on various debates on foreign aid, non-profits, and what it’s like to work in Africa. Some of our questions include: - RCT is a new way of studying impacts of social programs or medicines through randomizing individuals into control groups so that we can assess the actual causality. What is the difference between RCT specifically and other methods that help us conduct careful policy impact evaluations? Is there still a tension between those who accept and not accept RCTs? What are some of the reasonable arguments against the further adoption of RCTs? What are some of the main advantages and disadvantages to the system of "community-driven development?" Is it better to hand control over development to locals even if this may not be the best way to motivate more systemic change that may have to come from outside communities? Or is this question posing a “straw man” to a non-existent dilemma? What is it like to advise the distribution of the U.K’s international aid? What is the philosophy behind how nations should give and receive aid? Should it be viewed as a moral obligation, or something that is in the national security or economic interests of the U.K., or both?

This week the CEPR launches a new research programme called STEG - Structural Transformation and Economic Growth. Ahead of the kick-off workshop on June 4 and 5, Joe Kaboski and Doug Gollin tell Tim Phillips what STEG hopes to achieve, and Rachel Glennerster explains why DFID is funding it. Register for the workshop or discover STEG here (https://steg.cepr.org/) .

In this talk, Dr Glennerster discusses how technology has driven improvements in income and health in poor countries, why there is too little innovation designed to meet the needs of the poor, and the promise of the data revolution.

In this episode we share Oxfam's journey in measuring women's empowerment in our impact evaluations. Our Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Lead, Marina Torre, speaks to Simone Lombardini, Oxfam's Impact Evaluation Lead, who has been working in this area of work. Simone delves into the details on what methodologies have been used, the challenges the team has faced and what we have learnt. See below to access to the many references made in the episode:Oxfam’s effectiveness reviews and how they are carried out)OPHI and IFPRI’s Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (IFPRI’s resources)Still learning: a critical reflection on three years of measuring women’s empowerment in Oxfam (Journal of Gender and Development, 2013)ODI’s Review of evaluation approaches and methods used by interventions on women and girl’s economic empowerment (report, launching event)‘How To’ Guide to Measuring Women’s Empowerment: Sharing experience from Oxfam’s impact evaluations Measuring women’s empowerment so that it reflects perceptions and opinions of all women involved into the study. Pilot PIWE in Tunisia (report, blog)Oxfam’s We-CARE and Household Care Survey Real-Geek blog: Comparing questionnaire designs Rachel Glennerster and Claire Walsh’s blog – Is it time to rethink how we measure women’s household decision-making power in impact evaluations? J-PAL’s Practical Guide to Measuring Women’s and Girl’s Empowerment in Impact EvaluationsAmber Peterman and Tia Palermo’s blog – Measuring taboo topics: List randomization for research and gender-based violenceUsing internal evaluations to measure organisational impact: a meta-analysis of Oxfam’s women’s empowerment projects (journal article, report, blog)(Photo capti

Rate, review and subscribe to our podcast Pocket Dilemmas Earlier this year Bill Gates tweeted an infographic showing ‘how much life has improved over the last two centuries,’ particularly as measured by an apparent decline in extreme poverty. The graph provoked fierce debate amongst economists across the globe. In this episode of Pocket Dilemmas our presenters, Jonathan Charles and Kerrie Law, were joined by our Chief Economist, Sergei Guriev and the Chief Economist of the UK Department for International Development, Rachel Glennerster to discuss the past, present and future of poverty. Like what you hear? Review our podcast on iTunes, email us at dilemmas@ebrd.com, or tweet us @EBRD #EBRDdilemmas You can rate, review and subscribe to Pocket Dilemma on iTunes, Spotify and Soundcloud, or wherever you get your podcasts.

A fireside chat with Rachel Glennerster, moderated by Nathan Labenz, from EA Global 2018: London. Subscribe to our channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEfA… Find out how to attend EA Global: https://www.eaglobal.org/. Join our Facebook community: https://www.facebook.com/effectivealt…

If I told you it's possible to deliver an extra year of ideal primary-level education for under $1, would you believe me? Hopefully not - the claim is absurd on its face. But it may be true nonetheless. The very best education interventions are phenomenally cost-effective, and they're not the kinds of things you'd expect, says Dr Rachel Glennerster. She's Chief Economist at the UK's foreign aid agency DFID, and used to run J-PAL, the world-famous anti-poverty research centre based in MIT's Economics Department, where she studied the impact of a wide range of approaches to improving education, health, and governing institutions. According to Dr Glennerster: "...when we looked at the cost effectiveness of education programs, there were a ton of zeros, and there were a ton of zeros on the things that we spend most of our money on. So more teachers, more books, more inputs, like smaller class sizes - at least in the developing world - seem to have no impact, and that's where most government money gets spent." "But measurements for the top ones - the most cost effective programs - say they deliver 460 LAYS per £100 spent ($US130). LAYS are Learning-Adjusted Years of Schooling. Each one is the equivalent of the best possible year of education you can have - Singapore-level." Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. "...the two programs that come out as spectacularly effective... well, the first is just rearranging kids in a class." "You have to test the kids, so that you can put the kids who are performing at grade two level in the grade two class, and the kids who are performing at grade four level in the grade four class, even if they're different ages - and they learn so much better. So that's why it's so phenomenally cost effective because, it really doesn't cost anything." "The other one is providing information. So sending information over the phone [for example about how much more people earn if they do well in school and graduate]. So these really small nudges. Now none of those nudges will individually transform any kid's life, but they are so cheap that you get these fantastic returns on investment - and we do very little of that kind of thing." In this episode, Dr Glennerster shares her decades of accumulated wisdom on which anti-poverty programs are overrated, which are neglected opportunities, and how we can know the difference, across a range of fields including health, empowering women and macroeconomic policy. Regular listeners will be wondering - have we forgotten all about the lessons from episode 30 of the show with Dr Eva Vivalt? She threw several buckets of cold water on the hope that we could accurately measure the effectiveness of social programs at all. According to Vivalt, her dataset of hundreds of randomised controlled trials indicates that social science findings don’t generalize well at all. The results of a trial at a school in Namibia tell us remarkably little about how a similar program will perform if delivered at another school in Namibia - let alone if it's attempted in India instead. Rachel offers a different and more optimistic interpretation of Eva's findings. To learn more and figure out who you sympathise with more, you'll just have to listen to the episode. Regardless, Vivalt and Glennerster agree that we should continue to run these kinds of studies, and today’s episode delves into the latest ideas in global health and development. Get this episode by subscribing: type '80,000 Hours' into your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours Podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

**Rachel Glennerster** discusses her role at DFID, her work on promoting electoral debates in Sierra Leone, the importance of strengthening local institutions, and the challenges of measuring the success of aid programmes. She emphasises the need for aid to involve local partners and focus on addressing pressing needs, rather than being paternalistic.

No conversation about social impact is complete without an understanding of randomized control trials, or RCTs. In this episode, we delve into what they are and how they measure impact with Rachel Glennerster, the new chief economist at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK. In an episode recorded in London, Glennerster gives her insights on the randomization movement, and also talks about the divide between academics and policy makers, and why it’s important that they find ways to work together better. Displaced is produced by the Vox Media Podcast Network in partnership with the International Rescue Committee. Find our show notes here: www.rescue.org/displaced. Rate and review the show, or email us at displaced@rescue.org. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Economic shocks and climate change increase the risk of conflict. If current trends continue, 80 percent of the world’s poorest people will live in fragile states by the year 2030. This means the work of development will increasingly be about how to prevent conflict and how to achieve positive change in post-conflict and fragile states. In this podcast, DfID’s chief economist Rachel Glennerster, says economists need to get better at understanding these risks and predicting conflict. Before joining the UK’s Department for International Development, Glennerster was Executive Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. She was invited to speak at the IMF where she once worked as an economist. Rachel Glennerster, Chief Economist of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development- DfID.

DFID's new chief economist Rachel Glennerster on her goals for the organization, how to help girls stay in school, and why even low price barriers can pose big problems for takeup of health interventions.

Source: Effective Altruism Global (original video).

In this edition of Development drums, Owen talks to Rachel Glennerster, Director of the Poverty Action Lab, about rigorous evaluation of development programmes. Rachel explains how rigorous evaluation techniques can give important insights into the effectiveness of development programmes.  She explains the role (and limitations) of randomised controlled trials, and she addresses some of the […]

In this edition of Development drums, Owen talks to Rachel Glennerster, Director of the Poverty Action Lab, about rigorous evaluation of development programmes. Rachel explains how rigorous evaluation techniques can give important insights into the effectiveness of development programmes.  She explains the role (and limitations) of randomised controlled trials, and she addresses some of the […]