Podcast appearances and mentions of Abhijit Banerjee

Are you interested urban mining? Summary of the article titled Potential and relevance of urban mining in the context of sustainable cities from 2017, by Rachna Arora, Katharina Paterok, Abhijit Banerjee, and Manjeet Singh Saluja, published in the IIMB Management Review journal.This is a great preparation to our next interview with Don Weatherbee in episode 316 talking about urban mining and the differences between recycling, reuse and regeneration. Since we are investigating the future of cities, I thought it would be interesting to see the urban mining concept for better urban futures. This article introduces urban mining, the waste streams it can utilise, and some city planning initiatives utilising this concept.Find the article through this link.Abstract: The objective of urban mining is the safeguarding of the environment and the promotion of resource conservation through reuse, recycling, and recovery of secondary resources from waste. Urban mining maximises the resource and economic value of the waste streams generated in urban spaces and will be a significant concept in the planning and designing of sustainable cities, making the process consistent with the sustainable development goals. This review article brings out comprehensive information on urban mining as a concept and its relevance to the Indian and international context as a source of secondary raw material.Connecting episodes you might be interested in: No.232 - Interview with Kate Skillington about urban mining No.265R - Regeneration towards suitabilityYou can find the transcript through ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠th⁠i⁠s link⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠.What was the most interesting part for you? What questions did arise for you? Let me know on Twitter ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠@WTF4Cities⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ or on the ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠wtf4cities.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ website where the⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠showno⁠t⁠es⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠are also available.I hope this was an interesting episode for you and thanks for tuning in.Episode generated with ⁠⁠⁠Descript⁠⁠⁠ assistance (⁠⁠⁠affiliate link⁠⁠⁠).Music by ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Lesfm ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠from ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Pixabay⁠

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Kitap Kulübü'müzün 46ıncı buluşmasında Abhijit Banerjee ve Esther Duflo'nun Zor Zamanlarda İyi Ekonomi adlı kitabını konuştuk.Yazarlar son 25 yıldır yoksulluğu anlamaya kendilerini adamış MIT'de profesör evli bir çift ve 2019 yılında ekonomist Michael Kremer ile birlikte "küresel yoksulluğu hafifletmeye yönelik deneysel yaklaşımları" nedeniyle Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü'nü alıyorlar.Kitabın girişinde de anlatıldığı gibi dünya kamuoyunda ekonomistlerin repütasyonu kötü, kimin en iyi derseniz en üstte hemşireler var. Ekonomistler ise en dipteki politikacılardan sadece bir seviye üstte. Bunun nedenini genelde ekonomistlerin tek bir ideolojiye bağlı kalmaları, tarafsız, dengeli bakamamaları olarak görüyorlar. Aslında bir nevi politikacılar gibi. Görüşlerini açıklıkla ve netlikle ifade edememeleri de bir diğer sebep. Zira ekonomi gibi karışık bir olguyu fizik kuralları gibi açıklama yanılgısına düşmemek gerekiyor. Banerjee ve Duflo da önce yoksulluğa karşı önyargıları ve yanlış kabullere karşı mücadele ediyorlar, çünkü yoksulluğun ortadan kaldırılmasının bir sihirli çözümü yok, ülkeden ülkeye de farklılıklar gösteriyor.Biz kitap kulübü olarak açıkçası biraz zorlandık, zira biraz ders kitabı gibi yazılmış ve yer yer çok fazla detaya girilmiş. Yani gerçekten kitap bir mesai ayırmayı gerektiriyor. Ama kendi çıkarımlarımızı yaptık, konu biraz yapay zekaya da kaydı, iş gücünde daha fazla otomasyonun yol açacağı istihdam kaybı, dolayısıyla yoksulluk tehlikesi nedeniyle. Umarım sohbetimizi dinlediğinizde siz de bir fikir edineceksiniz, karşı karşıya olduğumuz yeni ekonomik düzen ve tartışılan konular hakkında. (02:10) Yavuz Abut, (09:29) Mete Yurtsever, (14:41) Ömer Tural Support the show

Con la puesta en marcha de los aranceles a China se abre una guerra comercial entre Europa y el gigante de la producción de coches eléctricos. Para entender la magnitud de este escenario hablamos con el que fue premio Nobel de Economía en 2019, Abhijit Banerjee. Lo analizamos en Hora 25 de los Negocios. 

Con la puesta en marcha de los aranceles a China se abre una guerra comercial entre Europa y el gigante de la producción de coches eléctricos. Para entender la magnitud de este escenario hablamos con el que fue premio Nobel de Economía en 2019, Abhijit Banerjee. Lo analizamos en Hora 25 de los Negocios. 

En ce mois d'août, nous vous proposons de revivre les entretiens avec nos grands invités de l'économie, venus ces derniers mois confier leur vision de l'avenir de ce monde et notamment de l'Afrique. Cette semaine, écoutez ou réécoutez l'échange avec Mossadeck Bally, fondateur de la chaîne Azalaï, présente au Mali, au Burkina Faso, en Guinée-Bissau, au Bénin, en Mauritanie, en Côte d'Ivoire et désormais au Sénégal. Né lui-même au Niger, issu d'une grande famille de commerçants du nord-Mali, ce chef d'entreprise chevronné est depuis octobre 2022 le président du Conseil national du patronat malien (CNPM).Nous vous proposons également un entretien avec Esther Duflo, prix Nobel d'Économie en 2019 avec les Américains Abhijit Banerjee et Michaël Kremer pour leurs travaux sur la pauvreté. Elle est aujourd'hui la présidente du Fonds d'Innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence française de développement. Lancé en 2021, il propose un dispositif novateur de financement du développement dans les pays les plus pauvres basé sur l'évaluation de l'impact des projets à l'aide de méthodes scientifiques. Esther Duflo, nouvellement présidente de l'École d'économie de Paris, s'en est expliquée au micro de Charlotte Cosset, journaliste spécialiste de l'économie africaine à RFI.

En ce mois d'août, nous vous proposons de revivre les entretiens avec nos grands invités de l'économie, venus ces derniers mois confier leur vision de l'avenir de ce monde et notamment de l'Afrique. Cette semaine, écoutez ou réécoutez l'échange avec Mossadeck Bally, fondateur de la chaîne Azalaï, présente au Mali, au Burkina Faso, en Guinée-Bissau, au Bénin, en Mauritanie, en Côte d'Ivoire et désormais au Sénégal. Né lui-même au Niger, issu d'une grande famille de commerçants du nord-Mali, ce chef d'entreprise chevronné est depuis octobre 2022 le président du Conseil national du patronat malien (CNPM).Nous vous proposons également un entretien avec Esther Duflo, prix Nobel d'Économie en 2019 avec les Américains Abhijit Banerjee et Michaël Kremer pour leurs travaux sur la pauvreté. Elle est aujourd'hui la présidente du Fonds d'Innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence française de développement. Lancé en 2021, il propose un dispositif novateur de financement du développement dans les pays les plus pauvres basé sur l'évaluation de l'impact des projets à l'aide de méthodes scientifiques. Esther Duflo, nouvellement présidente de l'École d'économie de Paris, s'en est expliquée au micro de Charlotte Cosset, journaliste spécialiste de l'économie africaine à RFI.

Mohnish Pabrai's Session with Rotary Bangalore DownTown and Fellowship of Wealth Creators on June 19, 2024. (00:00:00) - Introduction (00:01:07) - Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee (00:02:12) - Philanthropy: Social return on invested capital (00:10:36) - Framework of Non-profit organisations; The Dakshana Foundation (00:17:03) - Dakshana scholar: Rajiv Kumar (00:19:49) - Dakshana model (00:25:41) - Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya (00:30:01) - Dakshana's selection process (00:34:09) - Warren Buffett's philanthropic approach (00:41:49) - Chuck Feeney (00:44:01) - Akshaya Patra Foundation The contents of this website are for educational and entertainment purposes only, and do not purport to be, and are not intended to be, financial, legal, accounting, tax or investment advice. Investments or strategies that are discussed may not be suitable for you, do not take into account your particular investment objectives, financial situation or needs and are not intended to provide investment advice or recommendations appropriate for you. Before making any investment or trade, consider whether it is suitable for you and consider seeking advice from your own financial or investment adviser.  

Comment la transition peut-elle prendre en compte les pays et les habitants du Sud ? L'argent promis dans les négociations internationales est-il versé aux pays du Sud ? Comment la transition peut-elle aider des populations à sortir de la pauvreté ? Quelles sont les pistes pour réussir une transition juste à l'échelle globale ?Esther Duflo est économiste, spécialiste du développement et de la lutte contre leapauvreté, professeure au MIT à Cambridge aux Etats-Unis et au Collège de France. Elle a récemment publié une série de livres jeunesse, dans une collection titrée “La pauvreté expliquée aux enfants”. Elle a reçu en 2019 le Prix Nobel d'économie - conjointement avec Abhijit Banerjee et Michael Kremer.« Chaleur humaine » est un podcast hebdomadaire de réflexion et de débat sur les manières de faire face au défi climatique. Ecoutez gratuitement chaque mardi un nouvel épisode, sur Lemonde.fr, Apple Podcast ou Spotify. Retrouvez ici tous les épisodes.Cet épisode a été produit par Cécile Cazenave et réalisé par Amandine Robillard. Musique originale : Amandine Robillard.Chaleur humaine c'est aussi un livre qui reprend 18 épisodes du podcast en version texte, que vous pouvez retrouver dans votre librairie favorite.C'est toujours une infolettre hebdomadaire à laquelle vous pouvez vous inscrire gratuitement ici. Vous pouvez toujours m'écrire et poser vos questions à l'adresse chaleurhumaine@lemonde.fr.

Iqbal Dhaliwal, Global Executive Director of MIT's Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), and Vikrant Bhargava, Founder of Veddis Foundation, join Alberto Lidji to discuss the power of evidence, the ASPIRE partnership and the innovative Emissions Trading Scheme. We also explore how philanthropists should decide what to fund, where and how to fund; why evidence is so important in driving forward policy change; and why policy itself should be a key focus in the philanthropic space.  The ASPIRE partnership (Alliance for Scaling Policy Impact through Research and Evidence) is a coalition of governments, philanthropic organizations, civil society groups, and research institutions.  The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a flexible, market-based approach to solving the air pollution problem in India. It works by capping emissions for a particular pollutant, like particulate matter, in a particular area. It allows sources of the pollutant, such as industrial plants, to trade emissions permits among themselves. The capping ensures emissions targets are met while trading allows this to be achieved cheaply. The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) is a global research center working to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific evidence. Anchored by a network of more than 900 researchers at universities around the world, J-PAL conducts randomized impact evaluations to answer critical questions in the fight against poverty. J-PAL co-founders Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, with longtime affiliate Michael Kremer, were awarded the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics for their pioneering approach to alleviating global poverty. Veddis Foundation invests in organisations working at the intersection of technology, policy, and impact. Veddis also partners with governments on policy implementation, effective public service delivery and governance.  Thank you for downloading this episode of the Do One Better Podcast. Visit our Knowledge Hub at Lidji.org for information on 250+ case studies and interviews with remarkable leaders in philanthropy, sustainability and social entrepreneurship. 

C'est un programme très riche et varié que nous vous proposons cette semaine dans Éco d'ici Éco d'ailleurs, avec nos invités et les journalistes du service économie de RFI : lutte contre la pauvreté et les inégalités dans le monde, deuxième anniversaire du déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine dans un contexte assombri par la mort de l'opposant russe Alexei Navalny, développement de l'industrie automobile en Afrique, conséquences de l'instabilité au Sahel sur le secteur des matières premières, enjeux de l'économie numérique sur le continent africain (suite aux coupures de réseau internet au Sénégal) et bilan de la CAN 2024 de football en Côte d'Ivoire. * Dans un premier temps, nous nous rendons en Ukraine avec Nathanaël Vittrant, envoyé spécial du service économie de RFI. Il y a tourné des reportages sur l'évolution économique du pays notamment dans le secteur agricole, deux ans après l'invasion russe, le fonctionnement des entreprises en temps de guerre et l'état de la reconstruction.* En parallèle, la Russie est engagée dans une guerre militaire mais aussi économique avec ses ennemis. Malgré les sanctions occidentales, et contrairement à ce que prédisaient beaucoup d'observateurs, l'économie russe ne s'est pas effondrée.Arthur Ponchelet fait le point sur l'efficacité de ces sanctions et la manière avec laquelle la Russie tente de les contourner.* Elle est donc notre invitée exceptionnelle : la Franco-Américaine Esther Duflo, prix Nobel d'Économie en 2019 avec les Américains Abhijit Banerjee et Michaël Kremer pour leurs travaux sur la pauvreté. Elle est aujourd'hui la présidente du Fonds d'Innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence française de développement. Lancé en 2021, il propose un dispositif novateur de financement du développement dans les pays les plus pauvres basé sur l'évaluation de l'impact des projets à l'aide de méthodes scientifiques. Esther Duflo, nouvellement présidente de l'École d'économie de Paris, s'en est expliquée en exclusivité au micro de Charlotte Cosset, journaliste spécialiste de l'économie africaine à RFI.► À écouter aussi : Le FID, un fonds pour soutenir l'innovation sociale en Afrique.  Esther Duflo est l'auteure d'une série d'ouvrages destinés aux enfants pour expliquer la pauvreté dans le monde avec l'illustratrice Cheyenne Olivier.* Pour avancer vers la souveraineté économique en Afrique, l'une des priorités est certainement de développer une industrie sur son propre territoire. Construire des véhicules « made in Africa » pour le consommateur africain, c'est donc le projet de Mobius Motors, start-up créée en 2010 au Kenya. C'est l'un des deux constructeurs en Afrique de l'Est avec l'Ougandais Kiira Motors. Pauline Gleize s'est rendue, il y a quelques semaines, sur son site de la banlieue de Nairobi. * C'est un produit traditionnel utilisé depuis la nuit des temps ou presque, sans doute la troisième dynastie égyptienne, vers 2.700 avant J-C et qui reste très prisé aujourd'hui encore dans l'agro-alimentaire, la confiserie, les cosmétiques, ou encore l'industrie (bâtiment, peinture, textile, etc.). La gomme arabique, issue de l'acacia est une ressource naturelle et une richesse de plusieurs pays africains notamment sahéliens (Maghreb, Mali, Sénégal, Tchad, Égypte, Soudan, Niger).Son marché est en assez forte croissance. Parmi les quelques entreprises qui transforment et commercialisent la gomme : une PME française, Alland et Robert, fondée en 1884 et qui détient 25 % de parts de marché. Son PDG Charles Alland a accordé un entretien à Marie-Pierre Olphand, spécialiste des matières premières sur RFI. * Pour terminer cette émission pleine de diversité dans ses sujets, nous vous proposons un long entretien avec la plus Ivoirienne des Nigérianes et la plus Nigériane des Ivoiriennes : Nnenna Nwakanma, dans l'État d'Abia au sud-est du Nigeria et Abidjanaise d'adoption a donc vécu très intensément la dernière finale de la CAN 2024 de football remportée par les Éléphants de Côte d'Ivoire.Mais si on l'a invitée dans Éco d'ici Éco d'ailleurs, c'est aussi parce qu'elle a des responsabilités importantes sur le continent pour promouvoir l'économie numérique, notamment pour les femmes. Spécialisée dans les questions de développement international, militante de l'accès au numérique, elle est ambassadrice en chef au sein de la fondation World Wide Web, organisation à but non lucratif qui fait la promotion d'un Web ouvert. Dans cet entretien, elle critique frontalement les gouvernements, comme celui du Sénégal, qui coupent le réseau internet lors des mouvements de contestation et rendez-vous électoraux.Retrouvez nous sur Facebook et Twitter. Esther Duflo (prix Nobel d'économie) : Face à la pauvreté, toucher des publics nouveauxLe Fonds d'innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) soutient des projets sélectionnés pour leurs impacts sociaux, notamment en Afrique. Il est présidé par Esther Duflo, économiste du développement, récompensée en 2019 par un prix Nobel pour ses travaux contre la pauvreté.RFI : Qu'est-ce qu'est le Fonds d'innovation pour le développement (FID) et en quoi est-il spécifique ? Esther Duflo : C'est un fonds qui vise à permettre à des acteurs nouveaux, que ce soient des ONG, des universités, des gouvernements, des laboratoires, de proposer de l'innovation sociale. Ce n'est pas de l'innovation pour faire du profit, c'est ça qui est vraiment très différent, mais c'est pour améliorer la qualité de vie des gens dans des secteurs comme l'éducation, la santé, la protection du climat, l'agriculture, etc. Avec toujours cet objectif de créer de la valeur sociale, pas de la valeur marchande. Comment est-ce que cela fonctionne ? Normalement un fonds repose sur sa rentabilité...Comme la rentabilité n'est pas l'indicateur de réussite, ce qui la remplace c'est l'impact, la différence que cela fait dans la vie des gens. Nous demandons des évaluations préalables d'impacts rigoureuses, et on les accompagne dans la mise en œuvre du projet lui-même. Si cela fonctionne, cela permet de le passer à l'échelle, d'augmenter le nombre de partenaires.Vous expliquez que l'objectif est de toucher des publics différents des fonds traditionnels. Comment faites-vous pour toucher ces publics qui sont souvent isolés ?C'est un pari réussi. Comment touche-t-on des publics nouveaux ? Je crois que c'est essentiellement dû à la simplicité du processus de candidature. Le processus de demande de fonds n'est pas particulièrement long, il est très transparent. Nous finançons des projets qui sont innovatifs, avec un potentiel d'échelle important, qui sont capables et volontaires pour jouer le jeu d'évaluation d'impact. Nous réagissons très vite, nous sommes capables de donner des financements de petite taille, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour beaucoup des projets de plus gros bailleurs. Nous travaillons avec des organisations qui n'auraient pas pu se frotter à la bureaucratie nécessaire pour des financements beaucoup plus importants.Ce sont forcément des gens déjà assez connectés ?Non, c'est souvent des gens qu'au départ, nous ne connaissions ni d'ici ni d'ailleurs. Un premier appel à projets a été diffusé le plus largement possible par tous les réseaux dans lesquels les acteurs du développement agissent. Et puis ensuite, il y a un effet de bouche à oreille qui est renforcé par une série d'écoles d'été que l'on fait chaque été sur le terrain. Nous sommes allés en Côte d'Ivoire, au Maroc. Cela permet de faire connaître la possibilité de ce financement auprès de l'écosystème local. Depuis la création du Fonds, on a déjà reçu 2.700 projets nouveaux.Est-ce que vous espérez voir ce genre de fonds se développer ? Est-ce qu'il y a un message derrière, montrer que la rentabilité sociale, ce n'est pas forcément de faire du profit directement ?C'est clair que c'est un autre sujet que la valeur sociale. Ce modèle de recherche d'innovation, d'ouverture, de prise de risque que l'on associe davantage au secteur privé, on peut l'appliquer à la recherche de l'innovation dans le secteur social. C'est un modèle qui, à mon avis, a de forts potentialités pour améliorer l'efficacité des politiques publiques, que ce soient les politiques nationales ou les politiques de coopération.

C'est un programme très riche et varié que nous vous proposons cette semaine dans Éco d'ici Éco d'ailleurs, avec nos invités et les journalistes du service économie de RFI : lutte contre la pauvreté et les inégalités dans le monde, deuxième anniversaire du déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine dans un contexte assombri par la mort de l'opposant russe Alexei Navalny, développement de l'industrie automobile en Afrique, conséquences de l'instabilité au Sahel sur le secteur des matières premières, enjeux de l'économie numérique sur le continent africain (suite aux coupures de réseau internet au Sénégal) et bilan de la CAN 2024 de football en Côte d'Ivoire. * Dans un premier temps, nous nous rendons en Ukraine avec Nathanaël Vittrant, envoyé spécial du service économie de RFI. Il y a tourné des reportages sur l'évolution économique du pays notamment dans le secteur agricole, deux ans après l'invasion russe, le fonctionnement des entreprises en temps de guerre et l'état de la reconstruction.* En parallèle, la Russie est engagée dans une guerre militaire mais aussi économique avec ses ennemis. Malgré les sanctions occidentales, et contrairement à ce que prédisaient beaucoup d'observateurs, l'économie russe ne s'est pas effondrée.Arthur Ponchelet fait le point sur l'efficacité de ces sanctions et la manière avec laquelle la Russie tente de les contourner.* Elle est donc notre invitée exceptionnelle : la Franco-Américaine Esther Duflo, prix Nobel d'Économie en 2019 avec les Américains Abhijit Banerjee et Michaël Kremer pour leurs travaux sur la pauvreté. Elle est aujourd'hui la présidente du Fonds d'Innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence française de développement. Lancé en 2021, il propose un dispositif novateur de financement du développement dans les pays les plus pauvres basé sur l'évaluation de l'impact des projets à l'aide de méthodes scientifiques. Esther Duflo, nouvellement présidente de l'École d'économie de Paris, s'en est expliquée en exclusivité au micro de Charlotte Cosset, journaliste spécialiste de l'économie africaine à RFI.► À écouter aussi : Le FID, un fonds pour soutenir l'innovation sociale en Afrique.  Esther Duflo est l'auteure d'une série d'ouvrages destinés aux enfants pour expliquer la pauvreté dans le monde avec l'illustratrice Cheyenne Olivier.* Pour avancer vers la souveraineté économique en Afrique, l'une des priorités est certainement de développer une industrie sur son propre territoire. Construire des véhicules « made in Africa » pour le consommateur africain, c'est donc le projet de Mobius Motors, start-up créée en 2010 au Kenya. C'est l'un des deux constructeurs en Afrique de l'Est avec l'Ougandais Kiira Motors. Pauline Gleize s'est rendue, il y a quelques semaines, sur son site de la banlieue de Nairobi. * C'est un produit traditionnel utilisé depuis la nuit des temps ou presque, sans doute la troisième dynastie égyptienne, vers 2.700 avant J-C et qui reste très prisé aujourd'hui encore dans l'agro-alimentaire, la confiserie, les cosmétiques, ou encore l'industrie (bâtiment, peinture, textile, etc.). La gomme arabique, issue de l'acacia est une ressource naturelle et une richesse de plusieurs pays africains notamment sahéliens (Maghreb, Mali, Sénégal, Tchad, Égypte, Soudan, Niger).Son marché est en assez forte croissance. Parmi les quelques entreprises qui transforment et commercialisent la gomme : une PME française, Alland et Robert, fondée en 1884 et qui détient 25 % de parts de marché. Son PDG Charles Alland a accordé un entretien à Marie-Pierre Olphand, spécialiste des matières premières sur RFI. * Pour terminer cette émission pleine de diversité dans ses sujets, nous vous proposons un long entretien avec la plus Ivoirienne des Nigérianes et la plus Nigériane des Ivoiriennes : Nnenna Nwakanma, dans l'État d'Abia au sud-est du Nigeria et Abidjanaise d'adoption a donc vécu très intensément la dernière finale de la CAN 2024 de football remportée par les Éléphants de Côte d'Ivoire.Mais si on l'a invitée dans Éco d'ici Éco d'ailleurs, c'est aussi parce qu'elle a des responsabilités importantes sur le continent pour promouvoir l'économie numérique, notamment pour les femmes. Spécialisée dans les questions de développement international, militante de l'accès au numérique, elle est ambassadrice en chef au sein de la fondation World Wide Web, organisation à but non lucratif qui fait la promotion d'un Web ouvert. Dans cet entretien, elle critique frontalement les gouvernements, comme celui du Sénégal, qui coupent le réseau internet lors des mouvements de contestation et rendez-vous électoraux.Retrouvez nous sur Facebook et Twitter. Esther Duflo (prix Nobel d'économie) : Face à la pauvreté, toucher des publics nouveauxLe Fonds d'innovation pour le Développement (FID) hébergé par l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) soutient des projets sélectionnés pour leurs impacts sociaux, notamment en Afrique. Il est présidé par Esther Duflo, économiste du développement, récompensée en 2019 par un prix Nobel pour ses travaux contre la pauvreté.RFI : Qu'est-ce qu'est le Fonds d'innovation pour le développement (FID) et en quoi est-il spécifique ? Esther Duflo : C'est un fonds qui vise à permettre à des acteurs nouveaux, que ce soient des ONG, des universités, des gouvernements, des laboratoires, de proposer de l'innovation sociale. Ce n'est pas de l'innovation pour faire du profit, c'est ça qui est vraiment très différent, mais c'est pour améliorer la qualité de vie des gens dans des secteurs comme l'éducation, la santé, la protection du climat, l'agriculture, etc. Avec toujours cet objectif de créer de la valeur sociale, pas de la valeur marchande. Comment est-ce que cela fonctionne ? Normalement un fonds repose sur sa rentabilité...Comme la rentabilité n'est pas l'indicateur de réussite, ce qui la remplace c'est l'impact, la différence que cela fait dans la vie des gens. Nous demandons des évaluations préalables d'impacts rigoureuses, et on les accompagne dans la mise en œuvre du projet lui-même. Si cela fonctionne, cela permet de le passer à l'échelle, d'augmenter le nombre de partenaires.Vous expliquez que l'objectif est de toucher des publics différents des fonds traditionnels. Comment faites-vous pour toucher ces publics qui sont souvent isolés ?C'est un pari réussi. Comment touche-t-on des publics nouveaux ? Je crois que c'est essentiellement dû à la simplicité du processus de candidature. Le processus de demande de fonds n'est pas particulièrement long, il est très transparent. Nous finançons des projets qui sont innovatifs, avec un potentiel d'échelle important, qui sont capables et volontaires pour jouer le jeu d'évaluation d'impact. Nous réagissons très vite, nous sommes capables de donner des financements de petite taille, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour beaucoup des projets de plus gros bailleurs. Nous travaillons avec des organisations qui n'auraient pas pu se frotter à la bureaucratie nécessaire pour des financements beaucoup plus importants.Ce sont forcément des gens déjà assez connectés ?Non, c'est souvent des gens qu'au départ, nous ne connaissions ni d'ici ni d'ailleurs. Un premier appel à projets a été diffusé le plus largement possible par tous les réseaux dans lesquels les acteurs du développement agissent. Et puis ensuite, il y a un effet de bouche à oreille qui est renforcé par une série d'écoles d'été que l'on fait chaque été sur le terrain. Nous sommes allés en Côte d'Ivoire, au Maroc. Cela permet de faire connaître la possibilité de ce financement auprès de l'écosystème local. Depuis la création du Fonds, on a déjà reçu 2.700 projets nouveaux.Est-ce que vous espérez voir ce genre de fonds se développer ? Est-ce qu'il y a un message derrière, montrer que la rentabilité sociale, ce n'est pas forcément de faire du profit directement ?C'est clair que c'est un autre sujet que la valeur sociale. Ce modèle de recherche d'innovation, d'ouverture, de prise de risque que l'on associe davantage au secteur privé, on peut l'appliquer à la recherche de l'innovation dans le secteur social. C'est un modèle qui, à mon avis, a de forts potentialités pour améliorer l'efficacité des politiques publiques, que ce soient les politiques nationales ou les politiques de coopération.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA Wins 2023, published by Shakeel Hashim on December 31, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Crossposted from Twitter. As the year comes to an end, we want to highlight and celebrate some of the incredible achievements from in and around the effective altruism ecosystem this year. 1. A new malaria vaccine The World Health Organization recommended its second-ever malaria vaccine this year: R21/Matrix-M, designed to protect babies and young children from malaria. The drug's recently concluded Phase III trial, which was co-funded by Open Philanthropy, found that the vaccine was between 68-75% effective at targeting the disease, which kills around 600,000 people (mainly children) each year. The work didn't stop there, though. Following advocacy from many people - including Zacharia Kafuko of 1 Day Sooner - the WHO quickly prequalified the vaccine, laying the groundwork for an expedited deployment and potentially saving hundreds of thousands of children's lives. 1 Day Sooner is now working to raise money to expedite the deployment further. 2. The Supreme Court upholds an animal welfare law In 2018, Californians voted for Proposition 12 - a bill that banned intensive cage confinement and the sale of animal products from animals in intensive confinement. The meat industry challenged the law for being unconstitutional - but in May of this year, the US Supreme Court upheld Prop 12, a decision that will improve the lives of millions of animals who would otherwise be kept in cruel and inhumane conditions. Organizations such as The Humane League - one of Animal Charity Evaluators' top charities - are a major part of this victory; their tireless campaigning is part of what made Prop 12 happen. Watch a panel discussion featuring The Humane League at EAG London 2023 here. 3. AI safety goes mainstream 2023 was the year AI safety went mainstream. After years of work from people in and around effective altruism, this year saw hundreds of high-profile AI experts - including two Turing Award winners say that "mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority". That was followed by a flurry of activity from policymakers, including a US Executive Order, an international AI Safety Summit, the establishment of the UK Frontier AI Taskforce, and a deal on the EU AI Act - which, thanks to the efforts of campaigners, is now going to regulate foundation models that pose a systemic risk to society. Important progress was made in technical AI safety, too, including work on adversarial robustness, mechanistic interpretability, and lie detection. Watch a talk from EAG Boston 2023 on technical AI safety here. 4. Results from the world's largest UBI study Since 2018, GiveDirectly - an organization that distributes direct cash transfers to those in need - has been running the world's largest universal basic income experiment in rural Kenya. In September, researchers led by MIT economist Taveneet Suri and Nobel laureate Abhijit Banerjee, published their latest analysis of the data - finding that giving people money as a lump sum leads to better results than dispersing it via monthly payments. Long-term UBI was also found to be highly effective and didn't discourage work. The results could have significant implications for how governments disburse cash aid. Watch GiveDirectly's talk at EAGx Nordics 2023. 5. Cultivated meat approved for sale in US After years of work from organizations like the Good Food Institute, in June 2023 the USDA finally approved cultivated meat for sale in the US. The watershed moment made the US the second country (after Singapore) to legalize the product, which could have significant impacts on animal welfare by reducing the number of animals that need to be raised and killed for meat. Watch the Good Food Institute's Bruce Friedrich talk about alternative ...

Esther Duflo est une économiste qui a remporté le prix Nobel d'économie en 2019 conjointement avec son époux Abhijit Banerjee, elle également professeur d'économie au MIT. Ce n'est pas tous les jours que l'on reçoit une prix Nobel sur Vlan et d'autant moins qu'elle sait totalement rester accessible. Si nous parlons de sa collection de 10 livres pour enfants qui va leur permettre de mieux appréhender l'économie mais surtout la manière dont les enfants pauvres vivent, j'avoue que j'étais plus intéressé par l'effondrement des classes moyennes et populaires en France. En effet, quand on pense à la pauvreté, on pense généralement aux personnes les plus démunies dans le monde, mais aussi en France. Cependant, il est de plus en plus évident que les personnes des classes moyennes et populaires en France ont également du mal à s'en sortir. Ce sujet est rarement abordé, mais il est, pour moi, à l'origine de la montée de l'extrême droite, des tensions sociales et des manifestations en France. Comme nous le rapelle Esther Duflo, l'augmentation des inégalités n'est pas inévitable, mais plutôt le résultat de choix politiques et sociaux. Les politiques économiques, les théories économiques simplistes et les décisions politiques ont tous contribué à cette situation. Les politiques pourraient agir pour réduire les inégalités et soutenir les classes moyennes et populaires, mais cela nécessiterait de la confiance de la population et une communication efficace. Les politiques économiques et les réformes doivent être accompagnées de mesures de compensation pour les perdants, afin de rétablir la confiance et de garantir une transition équitable en particulier avec le commerce globalisé mais aussi avec l'arrivée de nouvelles technologies qui en lèsent certains. On parle aussi d'écologie, du rapport à l'économie et de très nombreux autres sujets que je vous laisse découvrir ici. Suggestion d'autres épisodes à écouter : #173 L'économie circulaire peut-elle être une solution viable? avec Jules Coignard (https://audmns.com/DhGEsXU) #215 La démocratie est-elle un bon système ? avec Victor Delage (https://audmns.com/sbzQYbu) #175 Comprendre le dessous des guerres invisibles mondiales avec Thomas Gomart (https://audmns.com/DDPnQDW)

Le prix Nobel d'économie 2023 a été décerné à Claudia Goldin Cette économiste de 77 ans, professeure d'économie à Harvard est récompensée pour ses études sur les inégalités entre les hommes et les femmes sur le marché du travail. Elle devient la première femme à être - seule - lauréate du Prix. Claudia Goldin ne se considère pas que comme économiste : « J'ai toujours voulu être détective, répond-elle au téléphone du jury du prix Nobel qui l'appelle peu après sa récompense. Je mène ce travail de détective dans des documents d'archives. Il fut un temps où nous n'avions pas cette énorme quantité de données à notre disposition : il fallait donc les exhumer. »Claudia Goldin va donc passer sa vie à éplucher les données et les statistiques dans les bibliothèques, dans les registres des banques et des entreprises et compile deux-cents ans d'histoire économique. Cette fouille minutieuse lui permet de dessiner une courbe de l'évolution de la participation des femmes au marché du travail sur deux siècles.L'économiste montre que la participation des Américaines au marché du travail n'évolue pas comme on pourrait le croire, de façon linéaire et continue dans le temps, mais plutôt selon les époques et les bouleversements économiques.Au début des années 1800, les femmes travaillaient par exemple massivement dans le secteur agricole. Ce n'est que plus tard, au moment de la révolution industrielle au XIXe siècle, qu'elles se retirent peu à peu de la vie active pour ensuite y revenir à partir des années 1960.Inégalités de salaires, discrimination à l'embaucheSes travaux permettent en lumière les inégalités en fonction des genres. Bien qu'une partie des écarts de rémunération entre les hommes et les femmes s'expliquent par des différences d'éducation ou de choix professionnels, Claudia Goldin démontre que l'arrivée du premier enfant est un facteur déterminant d'accroissement des disparités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes.À la fin des années 1960, Claudia Goldin décrit aussi l'avènement d'une « révolution silencieuse » avec l'arrivée de la pilule aux États-Unis. Dès lors, explique la chercheuse, les Américaines n'hésitent plus à se lancer dans de longues études comme dans le droit ou la médecine. « Pour elle, la contraception donne aux femmes le moment de choisir quand elles vont avoir des enfants et donc des carrières qui nécessitent un certain investissement, note Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, directrice de recherche au CNRS et membre de l'École d'économie Aix-Marseille (AMSE). Claudia Goldin considère que c'est une liberté médicale mais qui donne aussi une liberté énorme aux femmes. »PionnièreNée à Brooklyn en 1946, Claudia Goldin se rêvait d'abord biologiste. Mais c'est à l'université qu'elle découvre l'économie. En 1990, elle deviendra d'ailleurs la première femme à la tête du département d'économie de l'université de Harvard.Ce lundi 9 octobre, Claudia Goldin est devenue la première femme, récompensée seule, depuis la création du Prix Nobel d'économie en 1968. Les deux précédentes lauréates, la Française Esther Duflo (2019) et l'Américaine Elinor Olstrom (2009) l'avaient partagé avec des hommes (Abhijit Banerjee et Michael Kremer pour la première, et Oliver Williamson pour la seconde).Pionnière, Claudia Goldin l'est aussi à travers ses recherches. Personne comme elle n'avait auparavant combiné histoire et théorie économique sous l'angle de l'étude de la place des femmes sur le marché du travail, ce qui fait d'elle un pilier de « l'économie de genre ».« Pour combattre les inégalités, mieux faut-il les comprendre, les mesurer et voir les dynamiques à l'œuvre, analyse Hélène Périvier, économiste à l'Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE) et l'une des héritières de Claudia Goldin. La participation des femmes au marché du travail dans les pays riches et démocratiques, c'est le phénomène socio-économique majeur du XXe siècle. Donc travailler sur cette question-là, récompenser les travaux qui sont venus éclairer ces dynamiques, ça me semble être quelque chose de tout à fait positif. »Seuls 16% des économistes sont des femmesLundi, à l'annonce de son prix Nobel, Claudia Goldin a salué une récompense « très importante » mais rappelé qu'il « reste de grandes inégalités ». Exemple, au sein même de sa discipline, l'économie où les Américaines ne représentaient, d'après une étude de 2017, que 16% des effectifs. C'est ainsi pour tenter d'inverser la tendance qu'elle a créé un programme pour inciter les jeunes filles à se diriger vers un cursus économique.« Claudia Goldin, explique Hélène Perivier, a permis d'éclairer la situation des femmes sur le marché du travail aux États-Unis. C'est une façon de voir quelle partie du chemin nous avons parcouru et quelle partie il reste à parcourir pour atteindre l'égalité. »

Le prix Nobel d'économie 2023 a été décerné à Claudia Goldin Cette économiste de 77 ans, professeure d'économie à Harvard est récompensée pour ses études sur les inégalités entre les hommes et les femmes sur le marché du travail. Elle devient la première femme à être - seule - lauréate du Prix. Claudia Goldin ne se considère pas que comme économiste : « J'ai toujours voulu être détective, répond-elle au téléphone du jury du prix Nobel qui l'appelle peu après sa récompense. Je mène ce travail de détective dans des documents d'archives. Il fut un temps où nous n'avions pas cette énorme quantité de données à notre disposition : il fallait donc les exhumer. »Claudia Goldin va donc passer sa vie à éplucher les données et les statistiques dans les bibliothèques, dans les registres des banques et des entreprises et compile deux-cents ans d'histoire économique. Cette fouille minutieuse lui permet de dessiner une courbe de l'évolution de la participation des femmes au marché du travail sur deux siècles.L'économiste montre que la participation des Américaines au marché du travail n'évolue pas comme on pourrait le croire, de façon linéaire et continue dans le temps, mais plutôt selon les époques et les bouleversements économiques.Au début des années 1800, les femmes travaillaient par exemple massivement dans le secteur agricole. Ce n'est que plus tard, au moment de la révolution industrielle au XIXe siècle, qu'elles se retirent peu à peu de la vie active pour ensuite y revenir à partir des années 1960.Inégalités de salaires, discrimination à l'embaucheSes travaux permettent en lumière les inégalités en fonction des genres. Bien qu'une partie des écarts de rémunération entre les hommes et les femmes s'expliquent par des différences d'éducation ou de choix professionnels, Claudia Goldin démontre que l'arrivée du premier enfant est un facteur déterminant d'accroissement des disparités salariales entre les hommes et les femmes.À la fin des années 1960, Claudia Goldin décrit aussi l'avènement d'une « révolution silencieuse » avec l'arrivée de la pilule aux États-Unis. Dès lors, explique la chercheuse, les Américaines n'hésitent plus à se lancer dans de longues études comme dans le droit ou la médecine. « Pour elle, la contraception donne aux femmes le moment de choisir quand elles vont avoir des enfants et donc des carrières qui nécessitent un certain investissement, note Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, directrice de recherche au CNRS et membre de l'École d'économie Aix-Marseille (AMSE). Claudia Goldin considère que c'est une liberté médicale mais qui donne aussi une liberté énorme aux femmes. »PionnièreNée à Brooklyn en 1946, Claudia Goldin se rêvait d'abord biologiste. Mais c'est à l'université qu'elle découvre l'économie. En 1990, elle deviendra d'ailleurs la première femme à la tête du département d'économie de l'université de Harvard.Ce lundi 9 octobre, Claudia Goldin est devenue la première femme, récompensée seule, depuis la création du Prix Nobel d'économie en 1968. Les deux précédentes lauréates, la Française Esther Duflo (2019) et l'Américaine Elinor Olstrom (2009) l'avaient partagé avec des hommes (Abhijit Banerjee et Michael Kremer pour la première, et Oliver Williamson pour la seconde).Pionnière, Claudia Goldin l'est aussi à travers ses recherches. Personne comme elle n'avait auparavant combiné histoire et théorie économique sous l'angle de l'étude de la place des femmes sur le marché du travail, ce qui fait d'elle un pilier de « l'économie de genre ».« Pour combattre les inégalités, mieux faut-il les comprendre, les mesurer et voir les dynamiques à l'œuvre, analyse Hélène Périvier, économiste à l'Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE) et l'une des héritières de Claudia Goldin. La participation des femmes au marché du travail dans les pays riches et démocratiques, c'est le phénomène socio-économique majeur du XXe siècle. Donc travailler sur cette question-là, récompenser les travaux qui sont venus éclairer ces dynamiques, ça me semble être quelque chose de tout à fait positif. »Seuls 16% des économistes sont des femmesLundi, à l'annonce de son prix Nobel, Claudia Goldin a salué une récompense « très importante » mais rappelé qu'il « reste de grandes inégalités ». Exemple, au sein même de sa discipline, l'économie où les Américaines ne représentaient, d'après une étude de 2017, que 16% des effectifs. C'est ainsi pour tenter d'inverser la tendance qu'elle a créé un programme pour inciter les jeunes filles à se diriger vers un cursus économique.« Claudia Goldin, explique Hélène Perivier, a permis d'éclairer la situation des femmes sur le marché du travail aux États-Unis. C'est une façon de voir quelle partie du chemin nous avons parcouru et quelle partie il reste à parcourir pour atteindre l'égalité. »

After the burn of our increasingly intense summers—now featuring epic fires and floods in the wake of biblical storms and record-breaking heat waves—we emerge into the relatively cooler, quieter atmosphere and deflationary energy of early autumn. It's a time to regroup, recharge, rebuild, harvest, and prepare for the challenges of the winter season to come. On this transmission of Hearts of Space from Canadian guest producer DJ EGAN, a journey down the endless monochromatic hallways, complex timbres and metallic overtones of Ambient Cool, on a program called SUMMER'S END 2. Music is by YAI, AGING + LAND TRANCE, POLIDO, NIKOS FOKAS & ARVE HENRIKSEN, JON HASSELL, JOSEPH, PHIL STROUD, RONU MAJUMBAR + RY COODER, JON HASSELL & ABHIJIT BANERJEE, and CHRISTIAN WITTMAN. [ view playlist ] [ view Flickr image gallery ] [ play 30 second MP3 promo ]

Welcome back to another episode of Modern Idealist, a podcast for career driven professionals striving to make an impact in today's fast paced society. I'm Valerie Leung. And we've brought on a very smart and data-driven friend of Modern Idealist today, Tony Senanayake, is a Chief Strategy Officer at Fortify Health, a non-profit that provides micronutrient-rich wheat flour to combat iron-deficiency anemia. He's passionate about development economics, public policy, and using data and evidence to amplify impact for people on the ground. He talks to us about data driven development and how he has been working with data driven methods to ensure and further his impact. If you stick around to the second half of the episode, we get into how development work, which often receives philanthropy funding, looks out on the ground.  *SUBSCRIBE  TO  US!*  ✅ @Modern Idealist on Spotify / Apple Podcast / Google Podcast  ✅  Instagram: ModernIdealistPodcast  ✅ Linkedin: Modern Idealist Podcast *CONNECT  WITH  US!*  Tell us what you enjoyed and what you want to hear more on!  ✨ Email: ModernIdealistPodcast@gmail.com  ✨ SHARE WITH A FRIEND  *RESOURCES MENTIONED ON THE EPISODE* Doctors Without Borders Video, Anti-racism: When you picture Doctor Without Borders, what do you see? Book: Poor Economics, by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo Banerjee Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/modernidealist/message

Community Jameel's Director, George Richards, talks about their support of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) and numerous other initiatives supporting bright talent beyond the lab and across the globe. In 2019, the Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to J-PAL's co-founders, Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee, and long-time J-PAL affiliate Michael Kremer, for their experimental approach to alleviating global poverty.  Community Jameel has supported and partnered with J-PAL since 2005. George explains how Community Jameel supports scientists, humanitarians, technologists and creatives to understand and address pressing human challenges. An inspiring conversation shedding light on the power of philanthropy. Thank you for downloading this episode of the Do One Better Podcast. Visit our Knowledge Hub at Lidji.org for information on 200+ case studies and interviews with remarkable leaders in philanthropy, sustainability and social entrepreneurship.   

## 内容简介我们每个人的行为很多时候都是经济行为，所以对于行为和人的研究可能有很多视角，包括心理学的、社会学的、哲学的。但是深入的了解经济学以及经济学中各分支话题的研究，是非常值得做的自我教育工作。而对于发展经济学，尤其是贫穷的研究，对于我们每个人都非常有价值。我们每个人都会受到预期的影响，而这正是造成贫穷的关键所在，而更重要的是，大多数问题都是认知问题所带来的。进行风险认知和知识体系的建立是每个人都需要持续做的事情。而解决方式朴素而简单，重点在于更多实践。这样的实践包含关键行为与预期的推动，以及持续的自我教育并降低阻抗。由于缺少信息来源，朴素地相信错误的事情，是作为人所需要克服的思考方式，而穷人通常应对风险的方法都非常昂贵，我们很难意识到我们认知水平的缺陷，但至少今天的讨论是对我们自己的提醒。## 参考- 贫穷的本质. Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo- 富有的习惯. 托马斯·科里- 稀缺.塞德希尔·穆来纳森 / 埃尔德·沙菲尔- 信心的博弈. 缪延亮- Destiny 2 Original Soundtrack - Track 44 - The Last City

Esther DufloCollège de FrancePauvreté et politiques publiques2022-2023Colloque - Lutter contre la pauvreté : de la science aux politiques publiques : Placing Evidence and Innovation at the Heart of Development Policy: Opening AddressIntervenant(s)Abhijit Banerjee, Professor, MIT; J-PAL Director

Esther DufloCollège de FrancePauvreté et politiques publiques2022-2023Colloque - Lutter contre la pauvreté : de la science aux politiques publiques : Building a Policy Lab in Spain: A Case StudyIntervenant(s)Milagros Paniagua, Secretary-General, Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, SpainMónica Martínez-Bravo, Professor, CEMFISamuel Bentolila, Professor, CEMFIModerated by Abhijit Banerjee, Professor, MIT; J-PAL Director.

Now for some good news: According to Abhijit Banerjee, a Nobel Prize winner for his work fighting poverty, extreme global poverty is “entirely solvable.” Hear what this practical visionary says about the necessity and limitations of aid, why the poor often end up with harmful healthcare, and the surprising optimism of many who are impoverished.

There is considerable and growing attention and interest on understanding what works, where, how, and why in development. This also means there are numerous debates on how best we ought to generate evidence and measure development success and impact. One way of measuring development impact is through randomized control trials (RCTs), which have been very useful for establishing causal relationships and providing robust and reliable evidence for evaluating the effectiveness and safety of development programs.While some regard RCTs as the gold standard, others are more critical of using it to measure what works. Critics argue that it is not just about 'what works,' but 'why things work' which should be prioritized when designing effective policies and interventions that can be scaled up. Another related aspect in this context is the generalizability puzzle, i.e., whether the results of a specific program can be generalized to other contexts. For example, there are questions about whether a study can inform policy only in the location in which it was undertaken. Should policymakers mainly rely on whatever evidence is available locally, even if it is not of very good quality? There is also the question of whether a new local randomized evaluation should be undertaken before an attempt to scale up and the number of times such evaluations should be repeated before scaling up.Rachel Glennerster is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. She uses randomized trials to study democracy and accountability, health, education, microfinance, and women's empowerment mainly in West Africa and South Asia. Rachel spent 13 years as the executive director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT, a key leader in popularizing RCTs in development economics. Thereafter she served as chief economist of the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Twitter: @rglennerKey highlights:Introduction - 00:44Asking the right questions and answering them correctly - 03:45The added-value of RCTs and critique - 08:00The generalizability puzzle - 17:37Education and learning - 23:20Microfinance in India - 26:13Improving public services through participation - 34:30Impact of the media in Burkina Faso - 38:38Translating evidence into policy - 46:00Host:Professor Dan Banik (Twitter: @danbanik  @GlobalDevPod)Apple Google Spotify YouTubeSubscribe: https://globaldevpod.substack.com/https://in-pursuit-of-development.simplecast.com/

A version of this essay was published at https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-svb-collapse-how-system-wide-problem-created-by-fed-led-to-us-second-largest-bank-failure-12307942.htmlThere are several interesting questions about the spectacular and sudden collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). Once you get over the initial shock of this possibility in this day and age (bank runs were only supposed to happen in the bad old days), then you will be confronted with the question of what it means not only for US banks, but also for your investment strategy going forward.In a sense, the tension between economists and finance people, who may not think alike all the time, is coming to the fore in awkward ways. Finance professionals try to avoid risk for their companies. Economists try to manage the economy according to their orthodoxies. What is of interest is not only how rapidly the collapse happened, but also why. Plus, what the bailout (it sure smells like one, although the US authorities are emphatic that what they are doing is not a bailout) means in terms of moral hazard, and the possibility of further contagion that could lead to systemic collapse. And finally, where the safe havens are, if any, especially in view of the possible loss of primacy for the US dollar. The apparent bare facts are as follows: there was an old-fashioned bank run on SVB, as spooked depositors withdrew about $42 billion in one day, out of roughly $219 billion total deposits taken in. In order to make the payouts, SVB had to liquidate long-term bonds that it held. These bonds, both in US Treasuries and in fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities, had lost value because of the steady increase in interest rates by the US Federal Reserve. The forced selling of these bonds caused SVB to become cash-negative (they had negative $958 million in cash). An attempt to raise more funds failed. The US government put it into receivership.The proximate cause of the collapse is two-fold: the bank run, which was accelerated enormously because of the fact that it could be done electronically, rather than by people showing up at the doors to the bank and trying to withdraw their cash physically. Besides, SVB's depositors were overwhelmingly large players, most of whom had balances greater than the $250,000 for which accounts are normally insured. Once these large players, often VC-backed companies or VCs themselves, got a whiff of trouble, they were quick to act. Besides, the surprising readiness of the US government to bail them out by promising to cover all deposits, not just those below $250,000, suggests they are influential. The preponderant cause, however, lies in a poor decision made by the SVB. As all banks do, they had to park the deposits they took in somewhere where they could get a return. Unfortunately for them (in hindsight) they chose to invest in long-term bonds. At the time (before covid) it was probably not a bad idea, because if held to maturity these bonds would yield a modest return, and they are backed by the US government.Unfortunately, what happened is that when they bought the bonds, interest rates were at a low, and so the return on these bonds was acceptable. But then the Federal reserve started hiking up the interest rates rapidly, for good reason: to control inflation. That made the yield on the bonds go up, and conversely the bonds lost value. Especially if you had to sell them they caused you to immediately take a big ‘haircut' as you had to write your assets down and take the loss. This is a system-wide problem, and SVB was an extreme case (but not the only one). Which brings us to the root cause. That is the Covid-19 or Wuhan virus epidemic. One of the ways in which the US government, and other Western governments, tackled the economic fallout from shutdowns and loss of business activity was to try to stimulate the economy by basically printing a lot of money, and giving it to the public. There was debate at the time about whether this was a good idea, but everyone seems to have got behind that plan.On the face of it, when there were lots of business failures due to the lockdowns and other disruptions, and job losses, it seemed fair to just give people a lot of money to tide them over, and to stimulate the economy. Besides, the ‘Universal Basic Income' idea was hot among prominent economists at the time. It was considered fair that everybody would have a small but adequate income doled out by the State: a sort of Welfare State on steroids.Every US taxpayer received a few thousand dollars as a ‘gift', which they probably used for emergency expenditures or saved. Interestingly, the Indian government did not give out a dole; instead, it tried to fend off the hunger problem by giving out free grains and pulses to large numbers of people. In other ways, too, India took a relatively cautious approach, and did not stimulate the economy a lot during the pandemic. This proved wise.It appears now that the vast amounts of money thus printed in the West were inflationary (not surprisingly). In the case of the US, ever since Richard Nixon delinked the dollar from gold, it has been possible for the government to print any amount of money. On top of this, the Ukraine war caused hydrocarbon prices to surge worldwide, as well as food prices, for a variety of reasons, including sanctions on Russia on its oil and gas, and the sudden disappearance of both Russian and Ukrainian products such as fertilizer. Inflation shot up from about 0-1% to about 6%, which is uncomfortable, and pinches the man on the street. Unfortunately, just about the only way to deal with this situation (short of ending the war in Ukraine and related disruptions, which is politically uncomfortable) is the blunt instrument of interest rate increases from the US Federal Reserve. The US Federal funds rate, which had hovered around 0-0.25% between March 2020 and March 2022  went up in several increments of 0.75%, so that they are now at around 4.75%.The Fed has, most recently, slowed its pace of interest rate increases, and the latest, on February 1 was only 0.25%. But the damage to banks was already done, as in the following post by Balaji Subramanian, a venture capitalist and crypto investor (note that).Inflation is a tax on savers, and a boon for borrowers. Some economists (for example Abhijit Banerjee) have suggested that governments (the biggest borrowers) may use it as an “inflation tax” to degrade their debt obligations, although there is no evidence that this was the case here.This suggests systemic risk, though, and sure enough, two other banks, Signature and Silvergate, also collapsed. Silicon Valley Bank was the second biggest bank in US history to collapse; Signature was the third biggest. Now there may be other factors as well: for example Silvergate was a crypto-focused bank, and Signature had exposure to crypto, and after the FTX fiasco a few weeks ago, that segment is under pressure. When Silicon Valley Bank went into a tailspin, one of the biggest voices arguing for its rescue (note: he claims it is not a bailout) was Bill Ackman, a billionaire hedge fund manager. Ackman may or may not be correct, but what is surely interesting to Indian observers is that he was quick to denounce the Adani group and give a certificate of authenticity to Hindenburg. Twitter user @thehawkeyex pointed this out, and how the CFO of Adani mocked Ackman. Karma, I suppose. Adani is still standing, but FTX, and now SVB, are history. Having said all this, the US has a way of being able to deal with financial firestorms, such as the global financial crisis of 2007-08. There is also the TINA factor. Where else would you put your money? Chinese yuan? Not likely! Euro? Isn't Europe in a tailspin?But there are a couple of ominous things in the background. Ever since Bretton Woods just after WW2, the US dollar has been the reserve currency for international transactions, in particular for oil and gas. Now, especially after sanctions on Russia, there are attempts to create non-dollar blocs. For instance there are rouble-rupee trades, and the yuan is increasingly used by China for its trade. More importantly, there was a recent Saudi-Iran agreement brokered by China. This is startling, because Saudi Arabia has been firmly in the American camp, and Iran has been firmly out of it. These two oil giants being shepherded by China is remarkable, and it may signal that Saudi Arabia may now be looking at the petro-yuan in addition to the petro-dollar. This is a danger to the value of the US dollar, demand for which has continued to be high because of its central role in trade and contracts between third parties, despite the loss of its earlier predominance due to America's trade surplus in manufactured goods. If more and more contracts are denominated in other currencies, it may lose its de facto reserve currency position.From an individual point of view, that raises questions. Where should one park one's assets? The traditional answer has been the stable US dollar. Is that still the right answer? Should one look at commodities (notoriously volatile), or real estate (not very liquid), or gold (physical gold is not very easy to handle)?I am tempted to say that in these volatile times, the traditional wisdom of the Indian woman may be the right approach: buy gold. And not paper gold, because that is dependent on how much you trust the intermediary that's giving you their assurance that they will give you back your gold intact. Things will take some time to settle. It is likely that the contagion will hit a few more American banks. I hope that it can be contained, and there will not be the global financial collapse that some doomsters have been predicting for a while. But Silicon Valley Bank is definitely the canary in the coalmine, pointing to major underlying issues. 1680 words, 15 Mar 2023 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com

Innovation is often associated with developments in information and communication technologies, but for economists, innovation is also about developing new business models and new ways for governments to deliver public services like health and education. Michael Kremer is a professor of economics at the University of Chicago and the founder of the Development Innovation Lab. His work on poverty reduction with colleagues Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee won them the Nobel Prize in economics in 2019. In the early 2000s, Kremer helped develop the design of Advance Market Commitment models used to incentivize the private sector to work on issues of relevance for the developing world. Michael Kremer was invited to deliver the IMF Richard Goode Lecture, an annual event to discuss policy issues and debates. In his talk, Kremer says commercial incentives for innovation are not always aligned with social needs, which results in underinvestment in some types of innovation and creates a role for public investment. Transcript: https://bit.ly/3ka1daT

Bangladesh has transformed tremendously in the last twenty-five years. Average incomes have more than quadrupled, and many of its human development indicators have improved alongside. It has also become an export powerhouse with its garment industry, and generally a shining example of development - though things are far from perfect. Five decades ago, when Bangladesh became an independent country, many were not hopeful about its chances of development. So how did Bangladesh turn its story around? Well, it turns out the history of its transformation is longer than credited - and the process is more complex than what is cleanly presented.I could not think of a better person to help me unpack the Bangladeshi miracle than Dr. Akhtar Mahmood. He is an economist and was a lead private sector specialist for the World Bank Group - where he worked in various parts of the world for three decades on privatization, state enterprise reforms, investment climate, competitiveness, and more broadly private sector development. He has written some excellent books (see embedded links), and his column for the Dhaka Tribune is one of my wisest sources of economic development commentary.TranscriptTobi;Welcome to the show Akhtar Mahmood. It's a pleasure talking to you. I am very fascinated and curious about Bangladesh, and you are my number one option for such a journey. It's a pleasure, personally, for me to be having these conversations. I've been reading your column for about a year now with the Dhaka Tribune, and I've learned so much. They are very perceptive, and I'm going to be putting up links to some of my favourites in the show notes for this episode. Welcome once again, and thank you so much for doing this.Akhtar;Thank you very much for having me. Thanks, Tobi.Tobi;There's so much that I want to talk to you about, as you'd imagine, but let me start right at the end, which is now. There has been a lot of attention on Bangladesh, recently, at least in my own orbit, there have been two quite detailed and interesting columns in the Financial Times about Bangladesh. There is also Stefan Dercon's book, which used Bangladesh as a positive case for what he was describing about the development process. But also, there's the issue of what's going on right now with the global economy. First, it started with COVID and how the economy suddenly stopped, and all the reverberation that comes with that - the supply chain, and now, a lot of countries are going through a sort of sovereign debt crisis and Bangladesh, again, is in the spotlight. So, I just want you to give me an overview, and how this, sort of, blends with countries that put so much into development…you know, in terms of policy, in terms of the things they are doing right, in terms of investment and attracting investment, and the exposure to these sorts of global economic risks and volatility. [This is] because, usually, what you get in Western discourse is that a lot of countries are victims of some of these risks because of some of the wrong policy decisions they make. But in the case of Bangladesh, at least to my knowledge, nothing like that is going on. And yet, it is usually talked about as a very exposed country in that regard. I know you wrote a column recently about this. So I just want you to give me a brief [insight]—is there anything to worry about? How do countries that are trying to get rich, that are trying to do things right, how do they usually manage these sorts of global risks?Akhtar;Right? I think, inevitably, we'll have to go a bit into the history of how we came here. But since you started with the current situation, let me briefly comment on that, and then maybe I'll go to the history. Right now, yes, like most other countries, we are facing challenges, but I think there has been a bit of hype about how serious the challenge is, in terms of the risk of a debt default, the risk of foreign exchange reserves going down very sharply. And I think there is a bit of the Sri Lanka effect, and then also the Pakistan effect, as people are trying to put Bangladesh in the same bracket, which I think is very, very misplaced. I think the IMF has made it clear, [not only] in its latest country report, which came out in March 2022 but also in many recent statements, that Bangladesh has both a solvency situation and a liquidity situation. As you know [that] the solvency is typically measured by the external debt to GDP ratio, one of the ratios is external debt by GDP and the liquidity is measured by debt service requirements - the external debt service requirements by the export earnings ratio. And there are these certain thresholds, and if you go beyond that, it's considered a bit risky. Bangladesh on both these accounts is much below the threshold. So there's already a lot of headroom in the sense that even if things get worse over the next few months and maybe a year or two, Bangladesh would still be able to manage the situation. So I just wanted to make that clear at the beginning. Now, that doesn't mean that there aren't other issues in Bangladesh, issues which have been brewing for quite some time. For example, many of us are concerned with the efficiency of public expenditures. We know of projects where there have been cost overruns. Some of it may be for genuine reasons, some of it may be related to corruption, which sadly still remains a serious problem in Bangladesh. I feel that I've written about it, and you may have read some of these articles about the spectre of rising cronyism, which, again, is not surprising; when an economy grows as fast as Bangladesh's has, there are certain people who become economically powerful. And at some stage they acquire political power as well, and then you start seeing the problem of cronyism. So we have that, we have a serious problem in the banking sector with a lot of non-performing loans. I'm not suggesting that we don't have serious problems, we do. But there is a disconnect between the typical headlines and where the real problems lie in Bangladesh.  Now, this may be a good moment to bring up a little bit of history, and I can go deeper into it. The Bangladesh economy has certain resilience. And I just want to comment on that. One which is not discussed much, because the story often is about garments and remittances, is the transformation that has happened in the rural areas. It started with agriculture, it actually started with rice production, which is the most important crop in Bangladesh. And then it expanded into other crops, and then even non-farm activities in the rural areas, we can go into the details of this later. But agriculture provides a certain resilience. And we saw that again during COVID. Because the agricultural activities in Bangladesh were not affected that much by COVID, and that was a big benefit. The other is the unleashing of an entrepreneurial spirit in Bangladesh. And this spirit has been unleashed across the board, so it's not just some large conglomerates or some large government manufacturers who have become entrepreneurial. This is something which has happened across the board, from small farmers to large conglomerates. And that, I think, is a big asset for the country. Because we don't have natural resources; unlike Nigeria, we don't have natural resources. In some ways, it's actually a good thing. Because then we are forced to use other assets and latent entrepreneurship… you know, Albert Hirschman, the famous economist, wrote a book in 1956, which is a classic, on the strategy of economic development, and he made a very interesting comment. He said, in developing countries, you have a lot of latent resources. In developed countries, the task is how to allocate the resources you have; how to best allocate them. In developing countries, it is about bringing out the latent resources you have; and entrepreneurship is one of the latent resources developing countries have, but many countries have not been able to bring that out and make use of it. Bangladesh has, and that gives a certain resilience to the economy. So yes, the shocks are going to affect us, especially because our major industry, in fact, is export-oriented, which is garments. So that is affected by the shocks, but unlike commodity prices, export earnings don't fluctuate that much. And the industry has proven to be resilient over the years.Tobi;Yeah, I'm glad you touched on history because, really, that's where I wanted to start. But I just want to get the pulse of the moment and how to make sense of all the headlines that we're seeing around. So usually, and I'll refer to the two pieces I've read in the FT [Financial Times] recently that I referenced in my first question. The development trajectory of Bangladesh is usually dated as something that started around 1990. But Bangladesh became an independent country two decades before that. So my question then is: that intervening period before that sort of consensus about the takeoff point, what were the things that were brewing in the background that culminated in that takeoff? I know a lot of things went down, and just to mention that one of the reasons I'm very interested in Bangladesh is that it sort of defies some of the seductive examples of development and progress - the Asian tigers, you know, so to speak - where things seem to be very clear, the prescriptions are very precise, you need to do this and do this. Bangladesh seems like a regular country - like Nigeria, with its history, its complexities, its problems like every other country in the world, but that has also managed, despite a situation that has seemed hopeless, at first, to people who look at these things in terms of hard boundaries - that has emerged as this fantastic example of economic growth and development. So what were the major things that happened before 1990 that sort of made this takeoff possible?Akhtar;Now, one may debate on whether 1990 is the point of the takeoff. In any case, it's very difficult to pinpoint. But anyway, it's good. So 1990, twenty years after independence and also a transition to democratic rule after fifteen years or so of military or quasi military rule. So that's another reason people take that as a counterpoint. But it's a good counterpoint to start discussing these things. Professor Stefan Dercon, whom I think you had on your show recently, who wrote this book Gambling on Development; he has been saying that actually, in some ways, it's a Bangladesh experience which may be more relevant for many developing countries than the East Asian [experience]. And one of the reasons he mentions is, I think, what you just alluded to - that there is a certain messiness, and yet Bangladesh developed. So countries which think that they are also in a somewhat messy situation, or whatever dimensions, say in governance or other dimensions - whether it's possible for them to develop. And that's why the Bangladesh example may be more relevant and encouraging than the East Asian, where one common characteristic has been the strong capabilities of the state. In China, it has been there for hundreds or more,  thousands of years. In East Asia, yes, I'm sure they also have that but they certainly acquired that quite fast. So how do you develop in a country context where the state capacity, the governance quality are not that great, and then you have many other problems as well. So you're right. In that sense, Bangladesh may be very relevant. I think I'd like to first start with, um, even deeper history, because if you look at the region which now constitutes Bangladesh, it used to be part of a province in British India. So it was East Bengal, and then you had West Bengal and then together it was Bengal. Now there was a time in history when Bengal including East Bengal was supposed to be reasonably rich, perhaps the richest province in [the] whole of India before the British came. But if we go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, East Bengal was actually quite backward economically and in many other ways. And if you look at the political discourse in the first half of the twentieth century, before the British left, the political and intellectual discourse in what is now Bangladesh, you'll see there's a lot of talk about peasants being exploited. We were a very peasant dominated economy and society. In many ways we still are, although there has been a lot of urbanisation and industrial activity. At that time it was very much peasant dominated, and the theme which dominated the discourse was exploitation of the peasants. And the aspiration that the leaders whether political or intellectual had is how can we improve the conditions of the poor people. And that sort of got ingrained in the minds of the leaders, and that continued during the time when we were a part of Pakistan. Because you may have heard that there was a lot of disparity and there was a lot of discriminatory treatment by the Pakistani establishment. So that theme was there. When we became independent in ‘71, you could think of the political leadership, you could think of the professional leadership, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, the media, this theme of doing something for the poor, was actually very strong. So right at the beginning, and, I heard somewhere that our first prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was asked by a foreign journalist: what is the number one problem of your country? And he said, I actually have two number one problems. One is food security, and one is population. And we need to take care of that. So right from the beginning, even in the midst of all the turmoil in the first few years, and all the challenges of relief and rehabilitation, work had started on ensuring agricultural growth and food security. And we were fortunate that the HYV rice, the high yielding variety of rice, had been introduced just before independence, so we had something to work with. So that was very important. And there was a strong program to bring down the rate of growth of [the] population and we succeeded on both counts. So by the time we come to 1990, agriculture is taking off. Rice production had taken off significantly, farmers were diversifying into other crops. And we had started to see the beginnings of a rural non farm sector. So agriculture and non agriculture together. And, Bangladeshis had been going out as migrants, and they're sending back remittances, most of it going into the rural areas. So there was a vibrancy in the rural area by the time you come to 1990. Secondly, sometime in the late 70s, the government decided that not only should we move away from the early talk about socialism, [but] towards a more private sector-oriented or market-oriented economy. They also understood that industry has to grow to absorb the surplus labour in agriculture, and export orientation has to grow, because the market in Bangladesh is simply not large enough. So there was an early emphasis on exports. And of course, fortuitously, you know, the South Koreans were running out of their garment quota, so they wanted to relocate some of the production to Bangladesh, but we were ready to take advantage because by then the government and let's say the elite of the class had decided that we need to industrialise and the major driver of industrialization is going to be exports. And then throughout the 80s, we saw the takeoff of the garment industry. The third thing which happened was the liberalisation of policies, mostly in the 80s. So, privatisation was done, the banking sector was open to the private sector. The agricultural input market, which was previously dominated by the government, was gradually liberalised and towards the late 80s, there was a significant liberalisation of that. And finally, as remittances started coming in, our foreign exchange constraint was relaxed. So that also gave government some comfort that we can decontrol certain things. And we can allow industry to move ahead without too many controls. So all these things coming together sort of created the context in which we entered the 1990s. So a lot of the preconditions - the population growth rate had fallen significantly by the time it came to the 1990s, agricultural growth had taken off, industry was taking off, especially the labour intensive garments, which is export-oriented, that industry was taking off.Tobi;That was such a loaded answer, which has preempted some of my further questions. But let me quickly make one digression on agriculture, because over the past seven years or so, in Nigeria, there's been this debate. There's been a huge debate about agriculture, the current administration sort of prioritised agriculture and a lot of resources (capital) was allocated to that sector. And there's been challenges and there's been critics, sometimes I've found myself on the critic's side of things. Now, what I want to know from you is that,the link between agriculture, especially investment and the agricultural productivity that is necessary for the vibrance of that particular sector, how was the Bangladeshi experience? How did Bangladesh achieve food security, especially in terms of improving yield and productivity?Akhtar;Right, so a few things. Firstly, as I said, the high yielding variety of rice had been introduced in the late 60s, and then just after independence, government continued, but more vigorously with a model of… it was more [of a] public sector driven model, where the public sector would import the major inputs. One is irrigation equipment, because this rice needed irrigation, and the other was fertiliser. So, they're imported by the public sector, then they're distributed by the public sector going all the way to the farmers. Maybe at the last mile, there were some private traders who act as dealers on behalf of the government. So, the government took that responsibility. Later on, as I said, in the 80s, they started liberalising it. We'll come to that later. Second is, there's been quite a bit of investment in agricultural research. Now the HYV rice came from abroad, but as it was being applied in Bangladeshi farms, in many cases, we realised that there was some adaptation needed, because the conditions were not always well suited for this variety. The crop conditions varied even within Bangladesh, even though it's a small country, lots of variation. Later on, for example, salinity became a problem, because a lot of water was coming from the Bay of Bengal into Bangladesh. So there are all kinds of problems - there's flooding also. There were many areas where after floods, the waters don't recede that fast, so they remain underwater for a long time. So the agricultural scientists in Bangladesh, and they were all in the public sector, they came up with innovations to come up with rice varieties and later other varieties like maize varieties or vegetables, which are better suited to the conditions in Bangladesh. And then the public sector effort was also complemented, supplemented by NGO efforts. You may have heard about BRAC [Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee], which is the largest NGO in the world, and we often talk about their activities in the health sector, in education, in microfinance. They were actually doing a lot of work in the economic sphere as well. R&D in agriculture was one of the things that we're doing, in collaboration with the government often, so there was R&D. Another thing happened, which I forgot to mention, when I mentioned sort of the run up to the 90s. In the 80s, the government started a massive program to build rural roads, connecting the rural areas to the small towns and the small towns to the bigger towns. So,a huge rural road network was built starting from the late 80s. And it continued into the 90s, which broadened the markets of the farmers. So in all of this, the core player was the small farmer. As I said, Bangladesh is a peasant, small farmer dominated economy, so it is remarkable that these farmers were willing to innovate, they were willing to move away from what their parents and grandparents had done for many, many years, and adopt these new varieties. So the combination of the government with some NGOs and the farmers, I think that created the basis for productivity improvements in agriculture. And that was sustained because the market was sustained. There were lots of public policies. And at some point, when the government thought the public sector delivery model was not working that well, they allowed the private sector to come in.Tobi;I don't want to infer anything, but from your answer, I can tell what Nigeria is doing wrong, but maybe we'll get to that later. So let's talk about the conditions, which you've also sort of answered for me but I want to know if there is more. Dercon in his book, I'm talking about Professor Stefan Dercon, talked about elite consensus that sort of becomes the bedrock of deciding to pursue economic development. So this broad consensus amongst the Bangladeshi political elites to improve the conditions of the poor, and, which, I'm speculating sort of enabled an ecosystem of policy consistency, even if there are deviations at the margins, how did it emerge? And how was it sustained?Akhtar;Okay, as I had mentioned to Professor Dercon ‘cause I also had a conversation with him for our Bangladeshi group. And I said that – and, he agreed that, it's really difficult to define if there was an elite consensus because it's not that the elite are sitting in a room discussing and bargaining and one day they come out and say, okay, here is an agreement, we have agreed on these three things, it doesn't happen. And there is a bit of tautology in his book as well. And he agreed with that, that in his country chapters, he says, these countries had an elite bargain. And then he says, Okay, this is how the countries grew. And if they have grown, therefore, they must have had a bargain. So there's a bit of tautology there. But coming back to this, I think, I started giving you a flavour of that when I brought in history, even before the British left and how in East Bengal, there was this deeply ingrained feeling that something has to be done for the poor people. And then just after independence in ‘74, we had a big famine. And that sort of strengthened this feeling amongst Bangladeshis. And you know, you mentioned the word elite and it's a bit difficult to define the elite. I would say that it's a broader… I'm talking about people who can influence policy, both the formulation and the quality of implementation. There are a lot of people in the bureaucracy who may not, in that sense, be called part of the elite, but they do have some authority. Now, most of these people, they actually are not too far away from the poor people of Bangladesh. Many of them still have very strong connections with their villages. They go back regularly. They know what the conditions are there. And in a densely populated country like Bangladesh, you see poverty all around you. So all these things, I think, have ingrained in the minds of the elite, however you define it, this commitment to doing something to safeguard the interests of the poor, but that is the security side - food security, [to] address the vulnerability. But somewhere down the line, people started recognizing that Bangladeshis also have an entrepreneurial potential. And there was a feeling that we should try and help unleash that potential. So, as I said, it's difficult to pinpoint a particular period where there has been a consensus but in a subtle way, there has been this consensus that to achieve food security, to help take advantage of the latent entrepreneurship of Bangladeshis, we should be focusing a lot on growth and more generally on development. And that has survived the transitions in administrations, from one government to another, that common element has been there.Tobi;It's not exactly a push back, and I should note that there is a lot more; there's vastly a lot more to Bangladesh than Dercon's book. So, and I don't want to be caught in debating his book. But, why I find that particular line of thought relevant is that, from what you have described, it's amazing to me, so maybe you can help me understand the difference. Now, how a country can set out to do some of these things; invest in agriculture, agricultural R&D, and all these other support programs with big macro effects. Whereas a Nigeria can set out to do those same things and then you find divergent outcomes in their implementation, particularly the inability to execute. You know? There's always a plan. We want to improve the lot of the poor. We want to invest in agriculture. We want to improve productivity. We want to build infrastructure, you know, this, that, they are always so nice and interesting. But the difference is always at the end of the day, countries often don't do these things, right, they never stay true to these things. And of course, we can talk about various reasons why it fell astray - corruption, state capacity, and all that. But what I… which you mentioned in your last sentence [is] how policies survive, even though there are political transitions, election cycles come and go, the particular direction that policy goes, survives this transition, I think that's really what I'm trying to get at.Akhtar;Okay, so I don't know that much about Nigeria. Now, people say that the fact that you have natural resources may have been in some ways a curse, I don't know if it's true or not, but certainly, that sometimes gives governments a sense of complacency and therefore, even if they start on a certain course, they may not have the discipline to stay that course. Now Bangladesh, we never had the advantage of having natural resources. Nowadays, certain things have improved, you know, foreign exchange reserves have been at comfortable levels for several years. So, that may induce a certain degree of complacency, but for a long time, the government knew that we were operating with very narrow degrees of freedom. So that was the context in which Bangladesh had to operate. Which also meant that we were somewhat dependent on donors and that certainly imposed an additional set of disciplines on Bangladesh. But later on, I may come and comment on exactly the kind of relationships I think existed between donors and Bangladesh. But maybe the best way to answer your question would be to say a little bit about the way in which policies have evolved in Bangladesh. And in a sense, it's a bit of a “muddling through” process. And I wrote a blog for the Brookings Institute a year ago, where I said that Bangladesh did it, alluding to that famous song of Frank Sinatra - “I did it my way.” So what was that “my way?” We all know that the Bangladeshi Government has never been tremendously competent, there's always been corruption problems as well. So the way it has happened is the following. Things happened in the economy, let's say agricultural productivity is improving. But then it hits certain constraints, and the economic actors, or people acting on behalf of the actors; like academics, donors, journalists, will bring up those issues. And they will probably say that, “here are ten things which need to be done.” Now what the governments in Bangladesh have done, successive governments, [is] they have responded to that, not by doing all the ten things. No. They may have picked up two or three things. And they may have done a little bit. Why a little bit? Because they were risk averse. They wanted to test out what would happen in the market, how the market players respond. [As the government], if I do just three or four things and not everything, and then see the response…and here comes the entrepreneurial side - the response was usually quite good, and when the response was good, the government felt encouraged. And then the government said “okay, let's do a few more of the things that were demanded.” The other thing which happened was, as the response came, newer constraints were revealed, or constraints which were not binding before became binding. For example, initially when the agricultural growth was not that great, when production wasn't that huge, the fact that we did not have a good rural road network connecting the rural areas to broader markets wasn't that big a constraint, because you're not producing enough to go out in a big market. When you started producing a lot of marketable surplus, you needed a broader market. And that's when you started feeling the constraint. And people started talking about the need to build up the rural road network. And to the credit of the government, they responded. So, this is what I call the sort of back and forth, policy dynamics - things happen in the economy, government notices it or it is brought to their notice, they react not in a grand way, just doing a little bit here and there;nd then the market responds, may be much more than in many other countries, because of the entrepreneurial spirit, and then the government responds. And that process has gone on uninterrupted throughout the last fifty years. And so, once you accumulate, even if these are modest steps, once you accumulate all of that, you'll see a tremendous result. And that's what we're seeing here. So, what it means is countries – the governments don't have to be very competent, they just have to pick the signals. So, you know, you have this phrase called “picking the winners” and a lot of people say, no, governments should not be in the business of picking winners. I say, in Bangladesh, that what the government just does is pick signals. They've picked signals from the private sector, from the farmers, and they have acted accordingly. And I think the accumulation of all these, the synergies created by all these is, I think, what has made the difference.Tobi;That's interesting. So, generally, the usual story with development is structural transformation. That is, for you to grow rich, the economy has to transform from a largely agrarian, low productivity economy to preferably an industrial high productivity economy. And, I mean, to an extent, we've seen the same process also in Bangladesh. Manufacturing, particularly the garment industry, is eighty or so percent of exports and employment is largely created also in that industry. Now, what I want to ask you is, the role of foreign direct investments in that cannot be understated. You talked about South Korea earlier, and how it played a role in that. For South Korea, so many other scholars would cite the role of Japan in kickstarting the South Korean garment industry; garment and textile industry itself. So, my question then is, is there a link here? I mean, also in your columns, I've read about the role of Samsung, and the electronics industry in Vietnam. Right. So the role of FDI in development, and especially getting industrialization started, what are the favourable conditions? To what degree is it external and internal? I guess that would be my question.Akhtar;Okay. Well, you use the term kickstarting, because in Bangladesh, in the garment industry, a foreign investor helped kickstart that industry, but didn't do much beyond that. So, Bangladesh's Government has been largely domestic…[it is] a case of domestic entrepreneurship leading the sector to the heights that it has achieved now. Yes, we have some Export Processing Zones where we have a number of foreign invested garment factories, but the bulk of it is domestic entrepreneurship. But you're right. The initial thrust came from this partnership with Daewoothe IU. It was a five year partnership. Daewoo trained Bangladeshis, (they) took them to their plants in Korea, trained them. They obviously had the market connections and market knowledge, all that was very useful. But what many people don't know is that the Bangladeshi partner actually quit that agreement just one year into that five year period. So after one year, he thought that he had learned everything that needed to be learned. Now, if he hadn't done that, I believe Daewoo had other plans of coming into other sectors, which we may have lost. But then we did end up with this vibrant mostly domestic-owned garment industry. But foreign investment had a role in jumpstarting that. If you go a little beyond industry, think about sectors which facilitate industry. The entire mobile phone development in Bangladesh, which is also remarkable, was foreign investment led. So, foreign investment played a major role there. So, I agree that foreign investment can play an important role in kickstarting industries, and that is something very important now that we want to diversify our exports, make them more sophisticated, we can come to that subject later. Now, you asked me about what are the conditions which are conducive for foreign investment. And this is where I would say that in Bangladesh, the conditions are still not that conducive. In the case of garments in the late 70s, it was the exhaustion of the South Korean quota of garments, which was the major inducement for them to come in. But also, as I said, the new government, which came into power in ‘75 was talking a lot about export promotion. So, that was there. But the most important constraint that Bangladesh faces, and it's true of many other countries, is policy and regulatory uncertainty. So, Bangladesh often says that we have got a policy regime which is very friendly to foreign investors. And that may well be true. But the execution has problems. And there are a lot of case by case decisions which are taken, which affect the foreign investors adversely. And that creates uncertainty. And those stories are told to other prospective investors. And when they hear those stories, they get discouraged. And the World Bank where I used to work, in fact, the last unit that I worked on, they did a survey of CEOs of multinational corporations just a few years ago, asking them about what are the factors which are very important for you when you decide to invest or not invest in a country, and policy and regulatory uncertainty was top of the list. So that is where Bangladesh still has got a lot of work to do. It is attractive in many other ways - very large domestic market, relatively cheap labour, the labour is quite fast at learning, a lot of good things there. But I think the policy environment, particularly the implementation, the certainty, that has to be ensured.Tobi;I have a further question, particularly on that point, and referencing another one of your columns, I think I'll just stick to your columns today for all my questions. For example, in Nigeria, I'll give you an example. In Nigeria, recently, foreign airlines are threatening to quit. Over the past three, four years, foreign investment (FDI) has plummeted. It's barely a billion dollars, currently, one of the lowest even in Africa. And of course, a lot of these things you mentioned are the problems that investors and business people talk about - policy uncertainty, especially around the control of the exchange rates and inability of companies to repatriate their capital, and to fund their operating expenses, and so forth. So, I mean, that's one constraint. But one distinction you made is like the types of FDI. There are different categories of FDI; market-seeking FDI, natural resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking [FDI]. And the reason I'm asking this is that there seems to be one problem, which, to my mind, Bangladesh has solved, it's not perfect, that Nigeria is struggling with, which is this inertia to get things started, you know, once you start on a journey, you can muddle through, but the inertia to get that process going is still something that Nigeria struggles with, in my opinion. So, now talking about FDI, if I were a policymaker today talking to you; advise me, what kind of FDI should I prioritise in trying to lure investors into my country, for them to create jobs and [create] a nest of high productivity manufacturing industry? So is it market seeking? Is it natural resources seeking? Is it efficiency seeking? Which one is the best in terms of the necessary incentives for sustainability?Akhtar;Okay, so one of the articles, not as part of the regular column, I think, but I wrote for the same newspaper a few years ago, was titled “investment for what?” So that's a question the governments have to ask. Because everyone talks about attracting FDI. It's a mantra all over the developing world. But governments need to ask why exactly do we want FDI? How is it aligned with our development aspirations and development programs? I wanted to just emphasise that because often governments just go blindly trying to attract foreign investors. And whoever comes in, we welcome that. That's not necessarily a good strategy always. For example, in Bangladesh, if we now have a lot of foreign investors coming in, to make jeans and T-shirts, using the same technology as before, we don't really need that, we can't afford to give our scarce land and utility and other things to do things which our domestic entrepreneurs have become reasonably good at doing. So it has to be something new that comes in. Now, at the same time, we also have to recognize that the foreign investors also have their own interest and their own calculations. So we have to come to a balance between the two as well. Now, it's difficult to say a priori that we prefer market-seeking or efficiency-seeking. On a natural resource, it's a slightly different issue if you have natural resources, and if you don't have the capacity to develop them yourself, you may need foreign investors. And obviously, we all know why foreign investors are often very attracted to that. But let me confine my answer to the choice between market-seeking and efficiency-seeking. Now, let's take the case of Bangladesh. We are now talking about diversifying our exports. And we are talking about going into more sophisticated products like electronics. If that is our objective, we may want to target some people who come and make electronics. Now they may come for two reasons. Bangladesh has a huge market, our per capita income may not be that high, but our total economy size is actually pretty large. We are amongst the top 40 economies in the world. And if you look at the size in the purchasing power parity terms, we're actually in the top 30. That's a very large economy. So, naturally foreign investors would come in looking at the market as well. But if our objective in this sector is to make a breakthrough in the global value chains, and not just serve the domestic market, then we'd like to have foreign investors come in with an efficiency-seeking objective that, in Bangladesh, we can make these things more efficiently, at lower cost, than in other places. So that Bangladesh then can ride on the backs of the foreign investors, who know the markets, who have the brand recognition and show the world that things can be made efficiently in Bangladesh. And, then once we have shown that with the help of foreign investors, maybe Bangladeshi entrepreneurs can also start doing it. So here you see I give you an example, where you have a strategic objective, and you attract foreign investors of a particular type. Now, there are also many needs in the domestic market. Bangladesh needs to develop a very good logistics system. And we may need foreign investors to come in and invest there, but will be more market-seeking. I mentioned the case of mobile telephones, that was not an export-oriented industry, although it may have facilitated exports, that was domestic market-oriented. And we encouraged foreign investors to come in, who were obviously coming in as market-seeking investors. So the answer would vary depending on the sector or the activity. But that brings me back to my first point, the government should have a clearer idea of what is the role of foreign investment in implementing the various dimensions of your development strategy. And accordingly, you're going to target efficiency-seeking investors in some cases, and market-oriented investors in other cases.Tobi;So, now, from a policy perspective, because really, that's what's sort of dominating this conversation. One thing that keeps coming up is the role of government, the strategy it pursues, you know, this, that. But inevitably, that leads to the question of what… in terms of economic development, what role does the government play by itself? Now, China, and, of course, other East Asian economies are very, very popular in the development discourse and these are largely autocratic governance. Right. And, to an extent the gospel of state-led development has travelled far and wide, sometimes in contrast to what is generally called the neoliberal or the Washington Consensus-type policies. But at the same time, at the nexus of all this is the role of markets, how the economy is regulated, liberalisation. How does a government approach regulation and policymaking generally, with the right incentives for the government to take the lead in areas where, maybe because of access to market or not seeing the prospect of returns, private actors are reluctant? And also at the other end, this sort of control, excessive control, that you see in so many developing countries, like Nigeria, and so many others in Africa, where government sees itself as the primary player in the economy, right? What is the balance? What is the heuristic generally, in trying to, [or] should I say, make policy and regulations to encourage economic development, and, of course, your Bangladeshi experience of that?Akhtar;Okay. So, when you say state-led, there are many ways you can define that. One is the direct participation of the state in productive activities. And in China, that is still pronounced, there are different models of state-owned enterprises, including public private partnerships, but the state plays a dominant, or at least an important direct role in the production of activities. That's one thing. The other is playing a direct role, not in production, but in things that facilitate production. So I had mentioned the case of research and development in the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, which was there right from the beginning. It was largely a private sector activity, but that was meant to facilitate productive activities by the private sector, in this case, thousands and thousands of farmers. So, the whole spectrum of things that the government does and, of course, there is the whole regulatory function of the government. And I think in choosing the balance, and the balance itself may shift over time as the economy develops. And I give an example of that, again, from the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, how the government moved away from the direct import and distribution of agricultural inputs, giving more and more space to the private sector over time. So initially, in the 70s, maybe that was the right thing to do. And then later on, the right thing to do was to withdraw and create space for the private sector. So the balance, (a) has to be thought of carefully, in terms of the capacity of the government, that's very important. And, again, if I [could] mention Stefan Dercon, he talks about the self awareness of [the] government. Are governments aware of what they can do and what they cannot do? And that answer would vary by country. Often governments make the mistake of thinking that they can do a lot of things, and therefore they; (a) go into productive activities themselves directly, and (b) also controlling too much the activities of the private sector. Controlling is not that easy. It requires a lot of skills, and many governments actually don't have the skills of doing that. The thing that may have happened in Bangladesh is the government has been more or less self aware, not always, but more or less self aware of what they can do and what they cannot do. And that has led to a certain division of labour between the government and the private sector, and the NGOs. With that division of labour also changing over time. That's very important. So the government needs to be aware of where its capacities are, and they need to also have some faith that the private sector, if given the opportunity, can come and do certain things. Because governments often say, okay, but if we don't intervene, the private sector is not going to come in. Or we have a big factory, if we close it down, then a lot of people will lose their jobs, and the private sector will not be forthcoming to create jobs for them. If you want, I can give you a good example of that kind of thinking. In Bangladesh, we had the world's largest jute mill called the Adamjee Jute Mill, and it was bleeding like hell, and every year the government had to subsidise. So there was lots of debate on whether the factory should be (a) privatised, and there was no taker, then the question is whether it should be closed down. Then, about 20 years ago, exactly 20 years ago, a very bold decision was taken to actually close down the factory. It was a controversial decision. About 26,000 workers lost their jobs. Some of them were ghost workers, maybe 20,000. Now the story of what happened after that is very interesting. That land was converted into an export processing zone. And now the latest figures are that about 65 to 70,000 jobs have been created there. So you had lost about 20 [thousand jobs] and you have created so many. These are all private sector firms, they're all export oriented firms, the government doesn't need to subsidise them. So you can see once given the opportunity what the private sector can come and do. So you don't have to hold on to a loss making enterprise just because you're worried about job losses.Tobi;Let me sort of ask you a big picture question on this particular point, which is the role of democracy in development, generally. Democracies have been taking a beating recently, so maybe you can speak up for it, somewhat. Do you think democracy has some kind of unique weakness in terms of trying to engineer economic development, particularly because of elections? I mean, to cite the example of the jute mill you mentioned, some regime that is sensitive, maybe in an election year, or maybe that wants to appeal to a particular constituency, or, maybe workers Union or something might actually kick the can down the road. An example is (fuel) petrol subsidy in Nigeria, which the bill keeps increasing, but I mean, each government promises to remove it or reduce it, and then kicks it to the next government because nobody wants to annoy the workers union, nobody wants to lose votes, the party wants to remain in power, you know, and these incentives that are common in democracies. So, do you think this makes democracies weak in a way, in trying to develop the national economy? Because a lot of people will say that's why China has developed much faster than India, for example. What's your take?Akhtar;Okay, let me start by giving you an anecdote. So this is from about I think it was 2008 or so, 2007 maybe. Bangladesh then had a quasi military government, it was called a caretaker government, whose major responsibility was to conduct free and fair elections. So they were in power for about two years. And I was actually working in Bangladesh at that time. And we had, I think we had a natural disaster, or maybe we had floods. So conditions were pretty bad. And one of the… well, they were called advisors, but they were de facto ministers, who was having to deal with this problem of getting food to poor people, dealing with rising prices [and] all that; he said to me, “I can feel a certain handicap being part of this kind of government.” What is the handicap? Right now what I need a lot is information from the grassroots, I need to know what is happening in different parts of the country, and I need that information very fast. I need it right now, about what's happening earlier today, or what has happened yesterday. Fortunately, I have some connections in the NGO world, this gentleman was an academic. I'm getting some information. But if this was a political campaign, I would rely on my political network, my workers, my small town leaders, and within a few hours, I'll be getting information from all over the country on what the conditions are. Now, why do I mention this anecdote? Because in a democratic system, your feedback mechanisms may work very well. Yes, there can also be a lot of noise. But otherwise, the feedback which is very, very important for government, they need to know what's going on throughout the country with different groups of people, with different localities etc. That is something that autocratic governments lack. Yes, information flows, flows from lower level bureaucrats, but I'm sure they are modified on their way. Because, the boss often doesn't want to hear certain things. It may happen in political democratic setups, but generally, the flow of information is much better for politicians. Now, how they act upon that information is another issue, but that's very important. Secondly, politicians operating within a democratic setup, (a) they develop a lot of empathy, because of their interactions with people, [b] they also get a good idea of what the trade-offs can be. And these are very, very important in decision making. So those are the good sides of democracy. Now, yes, in democracy, you also need to cater to your political constituencies, and that may lead to certain decisions, which technocrats may feel are sub optimal. But that is the price you pay for democracy. Compared to the gains for having a democratic system, that is sometimes a small price to pay, although sometimes that can get out of hand. But if it gets out of hand, it's usually where you may in name have a democracy system, but in practice, you don't. So the kinds of disciplines that democracy imposes on the government are lacking there. So that is my answer. Now, as you can see, implicit in my answer was some definition of democracy. It's not just about electoral politics. It's not just about having regular elections and free and fair elections. It is the monitoring mechanism. Are governments picking the signals, are they getting the information? How wide is the information that they're getting? That's a very important characteristic of development.Tobi;So another one of my sort of big picture questions to you, and in this case, using the Bangladeshi experience and example, is, in the last couple of years, there has been this big debate in development over, oh, do you prioritise the big things or the small things you can measure? You were with the World Bank, I'm sure you have some familiarity with the so-called empirical revolution and how it has sort of taken over the field of development economics where, yeah, there is a lot more preference in terms of international aid funding for interventions, things that you can measure. So, the RCTs, or, whether it is conditional cash transfers, and all these things – and the atmosphere with which this debate happens sometimes, personally, I find it frustrating because it makes it seem like a zero-sum kind of thing. Like, you can either have one or the other. You either pursue growth, or you forego that and choose to do all these small scale, local and domestic interventions. But Bangladesh, like you mentioned, the issue of BRAC and also people like Naomi and co. have written about – Naomi Hussein [that] Bangladesh managed both. There was a sort of productive combination of both frameworks, that is, the role of non governmental organisations who were able to provide some support for the rural communities. And of course, there was the big macro policies that were explicitly designed to pursue economic growth, get businesses going, create jobs, you know, and all the other things that happen in the private sector. So, my question would be, how did that sort of synergy happen in Bangladesh? How was that cooperation, so to speak… I mean, you talked about the role of BRAC in R&D and agriculture, you know, how did that happen? How did, perhaps, it wasn't intended, but in practice, how does it work?Akhtar;Okay. Let me start by recounting something I heard Abhijit Banerjee, the Nobel laureate, who got a Nobel prize for his work on RCTs, said something about the rationale for going into RCTs. And he's saying that the kinds of interventions that we talk about in the context of RCTs, they're not the only interventions that bring about development. In fact, the most profound development impact may come from other kinds of interventions and policies, and other factors. But his point was that, let's say, as a development practitioner, we are not able to influence these big things. So I'm going to focus on the things that we can influence. So I'm doing a project here, a project there, and we can change the parameters of the project in certain ways that we achieve the most significant impact. And how do we change the parameters or what parameters we choose or how do we design the project? That's where randomised control trials can give us very useful insights. And we can get more bang for the buck from the development expenditures in those kinds of projects. Now, he never said that that's all about development. There are many other things that need to be done. And governments, in their collective wisdom, may have a better idea of what those things can be. And that's different from a particular project team trying to do a project. They won't have all that knowledge, which can lead them to think about much bigger things, but governments can; not perfectly, but governments can. Or large organisations like BRAC can within certain spheres of operation. So, yes, I agree with you that this is a false dichotomy, that you either completely forget about RCTs or you get completely immersed into RCTs. So, one has to find the right places where the randomised control trials, which are after all an instrument, one of the tools in your toolbox… which is the best time and place to deploy it. I would say in Bangladesh, yes, the scope for applying them is more than the actual application so far, which means that we have a scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending by using these techniques judiciously in certain areas. Now, coming back to, I think you mentioned the question of BRAC in the context of R&D, but also BRAC has played an important role in market development through their social enterprise world. So, as I said before that the part of BRAC's work which is not discussed much is the work on the economic sphere. So what happened there? I'll just give one or two examples. I think giving concrete examples is the best way to illustrate this. So, they got into, let's say, they got into dairy [farming]. Actually, the way BRAC started most of these activities was from a livelihood concern. They wanted to create livelihood opportunities for the poor people in the rural areas of Bangladesh. So they said, okay, we have dairy farmers whose incomes are limited, we want to do something to help enhance their inputs [output]. So they came up with certain small interventions, which helped improve the productivity of their dairy farming, and they ended up with more production, then they had a problem. Now, milk is not something that you can preserve for a long time, you need to have some cold storage facilities, some refrigeration facilities, and that was lacking. So a lot of these increased output was actually being wasted. That led BRAC to start thinking about what else it needs to do. So then it went into refrigeration plants. So, they set up refrigeration plants, where the dairy farmers would come from adjoining villages and store their milk. And that led to other things also down the road. So there are many examples of BRAC where they went into a certain activity, they went into poultry, for example, and then discovered that there isn't a good supply of day old chicks, which is an important ingredient in poultry. So they went into that. And the interesting thing is, in many cases, BRAC was the first one to go into that, later the private sector came in and came in in a big way. And when they did, BRAC withdrew. Because BRAC thought, okay, we have played the role of a pioneer, we have catalysed the entry of private enterprises, we can now withdraw and attend to certain other things. So what's going on here? What's going on here is, you have value chains, which are underdeveloped - there are gaps in the value chain. And one aspect of development is to make the value chains more complete. And here you have an actor, BRAC, which has entered the market… [enters] one part of the market, trying to do something, discovering that there is not much it can do unless it intervenes in other parts of the value chain. Well, it can do something but the impact will not be that great, so then it intervenes. But at one point, it realises that other players who are better at scaling this up have entered the field so let me withdraw. So judicious entry, and judicious withdrawal. And that is also true of the government. It's also true of BRAC. I think that's the kind of dynamics of development which is very important. And somewhere there, yes, you may have some trials, which may be randomised control trials, it may be just informally observing from your own experience of what is working, what is not working, but this idea of learning by doing, learning by doing, the government has done it in Bangladesh, BRAC and other BRAC-type institutions have done it. The private sector is also doing it.Tobi;The last of my big-picture questions to you is– Another dichotomy that I have observed is the business cycle concerns of an economy and policy and these sorts of other long-run development growth policies. For example, in Nigeria, it's a common refrain that we had growth in some years, but we never really had development. Income didn't grow as fast as GDP, and growth has been cyclical, it's not sustained. And some of the issues that really plague governments and policymakers is that even in trying to make policies that are tolerant and favourable to long-run growth, there are short term issues that you have to deal with [like] foreign exchange policy, inflation, and sometimes I've heard people say that, Oh, as a developing country, you have a lot more tolerance for inflation than developed economies. I think you'll have to tell me whether that's true or not. Because inflation does not happen in a vacuum, it affects the purchasing power of people, poor people even more so. Right. So how do policymakers in growing countries manage these tensions in terms of – and, I'm working my way through your book with Gustav Ranis on this – how policymakers mine through these everyday concerns of the economy, versus the long-term prospects and the projects you are trying to put forth as a government?Akhtar;Okay. Well, since you alluded to that book, I will first briefly mention the main theme of the book, and then come to this specific [question]. The main theme of the book, which we illustrated through a comparative study of East Asian countries and Latin American countries, [was that] we talked about the East Asian pattern of government behaviour and the Latin American pattern of government behaviour. And the period covered was from the mid 60s to the mid 80s so things may have changed after that. And in any case, it's difficult to talk about (a) East Asian pattern, and (b) Latin American pattern. But what we were talking about is that during the course of a business cycle, or terms of trade cycle, as your terms of trade improve, your foreign exchange reserves go on increasing, obviously, growth accelerates. The question is what does a government do when things are good? Do they let growth accelerate according to some normal – “normal trajectory”, or they get excited, and they try to push growth beyond the “normal trajectory”-- making it higher than what the good times normally would make it? So, in the “Latin American” scenario, when things were good, growth was happening, government wanted to have more of it. So they went for expansionary fiscal policies, expansionary monetary policies to push growth beyond what the natural trajectory is. And then inevitably, because we are talking of cycles, inevitably a time came, where things started going down. And conditions were not as conducive as before. At that time, what the East Asian countries did– but first– they never tried to artificially push growth above the natural level. When the downturn came, they allowed the growth to fall. So they went for contractionary policies, they allowed the growth to fall. But in the Latin American scenario, having pushed growth beyond the natural path, it's almost like being intoxicated, you could not get rid of that habit. So, you try to artificially maintain growth even though the signs were all pointing downwards. And then the time came when things just crashed. And you fell into a deep crisis. Whereas the East Asians, they had their ups and downs, but they didn't have a serious crisis at that time. They had later, but not at that time. So that was the main thing about how you conduct your policies during the upturn, and then also during the downturn. Now, coming back to the specific situation like the one we observe now, when there are many economic challenges facing countries, and what can governments do to ensure that the course on which they had been before the crisis started, or the challenges started, and hopefully it was a course of development, how can they stay on that course as best as they can? First is, governments should look for existing inefficiencies. For example, in your public expenditures, there may be a lot of inefficiencies, and if you can identify those and get rid of those [inefficiencies], then you can bring things under control in the context of the challenges without sacrificing growth. Most developing countries, including Bangladesh, do have inefficiencies in their public expenditures. So the question is, do you target those inefficiencies and curtail them? Or, do you target those parts of expenditures which are actually very useful? So that's number one. And that's why we often have this phrase, “don't let a crisis go to waste.” Because a crisis can often focus attention better than good times can. And a crisis can also create the political and social consensus to take some tough decisions. So that's one thing. Second is the importance of social protection. And we must remember that for people at the margin, and in our kind of countries, Nigeria, Bangladesh, a lot of people are still at the margin. Even a small shock which takes them below the threshold is not a temporary damage that after some time they can come back [from], often it's a permanent damage. They have to sell off their productive assets, which means even when things start improving, their conditions won't improve. So that's why it's very, very important to have good social protection systems in place.Third, coming back to a point I made earlier, it's very important to have good monitoring systems. ‘Cause we really want to know what's going on, how the lives of different people across the country is being affected by the tough conditions in which you are, without that your policies will be suboptimal. So that monitoring is very, very important. And it's very important to engage different stakeholders in society. And for two reasons. One is part of the monitoring, because economists, business people, journalists, and others, would know a lot beyond what the government knows and it's important to tap into that knowledge, but also to build consensus about some of the tough decisions that need to be taken. So, at the end of the day, it is a lot about governance. It's a governance challenge that countries face when they're facing an economic challenge.Tobi;My final question to you, I have a couple of other questions, but… from a policy-making perspective, how do you then make knowledge count? Because from everything you have talked about, the role of knowledge… which takes me back to where we started, you know, talking about agriculture. The role of knowledge is actually very important. But you have situations where you can have knowledgeable people in government, world class economists, and the government itself might be making policies that are clearly wrong, which means there's a disconnect somewhere. And I mean, in Bangladesh, it's often talked about how there is a policy knowledge ecosystem that informs the public and shapes their accountability and expectations, and also informs policymakers at the other end of that spectrum. How does a country build and nurture that? Especially, how does knowledge of, whether it is knowledge of economics, whether it is knowledge of society and other programs, how it transmits to the key decision makers, and influence some of the actions or policies, or regulations, that are taken? How does that happen?Akhtar;Okay, so you mentioned the sort of the ecosystem linking policy and knowledge in Bangladesh. We have an ecosystem, I wouldn't say it always functions very well. And we do have many instances where people in government feel that the

We often speak of economic development as a phenomenon of sovereign national countries, but the process by which that happens is through what happens at individual firms in the economy. The decisions by firms to upgrade their products (services), export, and adopt new technology are the most important determinants of economic development. The incentives and conditions that shape these decisions are the subjects of my conversation with my guest on this episode. Eric Verhoogen is a professor of economics at Columbia University school of international and public affairs. He is one of the leading thinkers and researchers on industrial development.TRANSCRIPT (edited slightly for context and clarity)Tobi; Usually, in the development literature, I know things have changed quite a bit in the last few years. But there is a lot of emphasis on cross-country comparisons and looking at aggregate data, and a lot less focus, at least as represented in the popular media on firms. And we know that, really, the drivers of growth and employment and the source of prosperity usually are the firms. The firms in an economy, firms are the ones creating jobs, they are the ones investing in technology, and doing innovation. So firms are really important. One of the things you often hear a lot is that one of the reasons poor countries are poor is that the firms are not productive enough. So that's sort of my first question to you, how exactly do we define and also measure productivity, you know, for us to be able to distinguish why firms in the developed countries are more productive than the lower income countries?Eric; Yeah, this is a big important question. So I agree, in principle, that firm productivity is very key. So countries that are going to be doing well are countries that are populated by firms that are being very innovative, and their productivity is rising, they're learning how to do new stuff, they're producing new products, etc. And so there's a reason why people are very focused on this conversation about firm productivity. The sort of, I would say, dirty secret of economics is that it's very hard to measure productivity well, right? And so the productivity measures we have, I think, are very noisy, and most likely fairly biased. But basically, the way you estimate productivity is you run a regression of like sales on inputs, okay, so on how much you're spending on labour and how much you're spending on materials, and then the part that's left over, we call that productivity. So it's like unexplained sales, you know, sales that can't be explained by the fact that you're just purchasing inputs and purchasing workers. But that is actually a very noisy measure of productivity. And so I've been working on a review paper, and a separate research paper kind of pointing out some of the issues with productivity estimation. So in principle, it's exactly what we want to know; in practice, it's very hard to measure. So one argument I was making in that paper is we should go to things that we can actually directly observe. Okay, so sometimes like technology adoption, we can often directly observe whether the firm has adopted this particular new technology, or if they're producing new products, we can directly observe that. Sometimes we can observe the quality of products that can be measured. Now, the standard datasets that we have typically don't have those things. It is possible now, in many countries, to follow manufacturing firms or even other sorts of firms, [to] follow them over time, which is great, at a micro level. But those that have the technology, they don't have quality, they do it now increasingly have like what products they're producing, often they don't have the product people are producing and so it's harder, you have to go out and you have to talk to people, you have to access new sorts of data, there's a lot more work, a lot more shoe leather - we'd say you wear out your shoe is going to talk to people trying to get access to other datasets in order to have these measures that you can observe directly. But I think there's a big advantage to that. Just in terms of measurement. Like, can we measure these things, and record that technology quality and product innovation together? I'm not sure that's answering your question. But, you know, I mean, I totally agree that what firms are doing, that's crucial, right? So the big macro question is, why are some countries rich and some countries poor and how can we make poor ones richer? That's the big question. I think that's kind of too big to be able to say much about. The much more concrete thing, which we need to be focusing on is how can you make firms in countries more innovative and productive. That's the absolutely right question. But that's just hard. There are challenges and research about, you know, how you actually analyze that, and it has to do with these issues of measurement.Tobi; I understand the measurement problem, and of course, TFP, the residual, and so many things like that. But practically, I want to ask you, what can you say, maybe if you have a handy checklist or something? what distinguishes firms in rich countries from firms in poorer nations? Eric; Yeah. So let me say what I don't think first, and then I'll say what I think. So it's become increasingly common to say that firms in poor countries are just poorly managed. The firms in rich countries have better management, and the firms in poor countries have poor management, right? And partly that's coming from the influential paper by Nicholas - Nick Bloom - and others, and David McKenzie and John Roberts. You know, they had consultants go to some factories in India. In some they camped out for four months, some they were there for only one month, and the ones where they camped out for four months ended up doing better, right? And they say that that's because these consultants improve the management of the firms and management matters. And I do agree that sometimes these management practices matter, but I don't think... sort of, one kind of implication of that line of work is somehow, like, the firms in a developing country are just making mistakes. They haven't gone to business school in the United States, and so, therefore, they don't know what they're doing. And I think that's incorrect. I think that's incorrect. I think the problem is, firms in developing countries face many, many constraints that firms in rich countries don't face. Right. So often, for instance, gaining access to high-quality inputs can be very difficult, right? That you just don't have the supply chains domestically producing high-quality inputs. Often skilled workers are very expensive relative to unskilled workers, and even relative to the price that you might pay in rich countries. Having skilled workers, including skilled managers, is very expensive. In addition, you have all these frictions on trying to get your goods to market or trying to, you know, trying to access export markets, often there are, you know, their costs involved in that. In addition, being productive requires know-how and often firms lack that know-how, right and so the question is, how do you get that know-how, you know, like, the distinction I'm trying to make is, it's not that they're making mistakes, it's just that they're doing the best they can given know-how they have, and given the constraints that they face. And so in that sense, I would sort of point to those constraints, right, those constraints both in know-how and both in the input and output markets, rather than just failure of management. So now, one of the constraints I should say, actually, so is often, you know, legal and regulatory institutions are much weaker in many countries. It is true in Nigeria, and it's true in many places, right? And so then that does create a complicating factor also when you're trying to do business with somebody, but you don't have the legal recourse of going to court to enforce whatever contract you write down. And so that creates friction. So then you have to do things differently in part because of that. And so you're likely to be much more based on, like, networks of various types. It might be ethnic networks, or it might be people that you know or that you have long-term relationships with. But then that means you can't necessarily just find the best supplier of something, you actually have to find someone that you trust, and that can complicate your life, basically, if you're trying to do business and develop.Tobi; So one thing I want us to discuss is the issue of firm upgrading. I mean, one of the things that have helped me in reading your work and taking this firm-level view of development is that, okay, on the one hand, if you look at a country like Korea, we can say the average income, the income per capita for Korea 40 years ago versus now and compare with say Nigeria, but also we can look at Korean firms 40 years ago versus where they are today. Today, Korea have global firms that are at the very frontier of technology. Companies like Samsung are innovating and making chips and making electronics and making smartphones and you compare with firms in Nigeria who have not been able to upgrade their products over that same period. And now what I want to ask you is how important is a firm's ability to upgrade productivity. I take your point on the measurement but controlling for that, how important is a firm's ability to upgrade its output? Its products on its productivity?Eric; No, no, I think upgrading is crucial. And upgrading in various ways, you know, more specifically technology, producing higher quality products, producing new products, new innovative products, you know, you might be reducing costs, right, all those things. I do think that's crucial. I think that's crucial to the development process. I mean, much of the conversation in development economics has often been not about firms. It's about, you know, social policy, or it's about education. It's about human capital accumulation. But I'm with you on that, the firm-level upgrading is totally crucial. You know, the question of like, why isn't it happening? Or how could you promote upgrading? That's a very difficult question. There are lots of papers that are sort of speaking to that subject. And this review article I was trying to write was basically all about that. So Alexander Gerschenkron way back in 1962, is a historian writing about late industrialization had this phrase, not very politically correct phrase, but basically, advantages of backwardness. So in principle, if you're a developing country, you should benefit from the fact that technologies have been developed in rich countries, and you should be able to go and adopt them off the shelf. But for some reason, that's difficult, right? It's hard to do. Partly, it's difficult because of, you know, know-how reasons. So I'd say that often, much of the knowledge that you need in order to implement these technologies is not written down anywhere, it's not really in the manual, right? You have to kind of talk to people who know it, rather than just downloading the instruction sheet. That's one reason. It's also true that many times, machines or processes, actually, may be context specific. So like the picker machine, in a very humid environment, they operate differently than in a non-humid environment. And so, you know, there are things that you need to learn. So I'd say that kind of like gaining the know-how is an important kind of constraint on upgrading. And partly that happens through networks or through... there's a ... Juan Carlos Hallak, who's in Buenos Aires (who would be a good person for you to have on your show, actually, I think that he'd be an interesting person to interview) as a very interesting paper. It's basically on like Argentina, looking at industries that have done well, they've been able to upgrade essentially and looking at what was it about them that made it possible, and especially the leading firms, what were the leading firms doing? And what we're basically finding is that often the key person in the firm, like, had been embedded in markets in rich countries, maybe in the US or in Europe or someplace. So they understood very much how those markets work and what consumers want. So one was like making boats, sailboats, or motorboats right, that was one of the interesting things he focused on. But knowing sort of what the people who are buying those boats really want to see in their boats ended up being important for what they're doing. And so that's an important part of the know-how. It's like, yeah, understanding the customer understanding also how if there are firms that are producing there, understand what the competition is. And so that's know-how that often has to be sort of gained in person rather than, you know, just reading a book or talking to somebody on the phone. And so when I think about... I don't know Nigeria very well, but when I imagine, you know, Nigerian producers, I think, partly what might be holding back is, sort of, maybe not having the understanding of what are the requirements, what are the expectations of consumers in the export markets, right, in the rich countries that they may be selling to?We've talked about the barrier, we can talk about the driver of upgrading. So then, like, gaining know-how would be a driver. So that's one. I think, and part of a lot of my work has been about quality upgrading, you know, producing higher quality. And I think that's in part driven by who you're selling to, right? So Mexican firms, you know, if they're selling to Mexican consumers, they produce different products than if they're selling to us consumers, which is their main export market, right? And so, you know, and if you're selling to Mexican consumers who have a certain willingness to pay for quality, we would say, right, they have a certain level of, you know, demand for certain characteristics, the optimal thing to do is keep producing that kind of lower quality stuff, right, rather than producing the higher quality. So I had this famous example of a big Volkswagen factory in Puebla, Mexico, which for a long time, it stopped in 2003, but for a long time been producing the old beetle. The old beetle that had first been produced in 1940, or certainly the 1950s. But for a long time, in the Mexican market, that was the main car that people were buying, and they were happy with that because it was cheaper. It was like, you know, it's very reliable. But that same factory started producing the New Beetle, basically, for the US market, right, for the US and European market, which is much more sophisticated, but also much more expensive. So it depends a little bit on which market you're selling into and whether you're going to upgrade or not. And so accessing export market can, in some sense, like pull the upgrading process, you know, once they access these export markets, they'll start producing higher quality stuff for these consumers. And that I think, actually, generates some learning, and I can talk about one paper that shows that a bit. But it seems to be that by gaining access to markets and producing high quality, then firms learn how to do stuff better. And so that can be an important driver of upgrading. And conversely, not having access to export markets or having a hard time breaking into export [markets] can be a reason why firms failed to upgrade. Let me tell you about one paper that, you know, demand effects can drive learning. Tobi; Yeah. Go ahead.Eric; Okay. It's a paper by David Atkin, Amit Khandelwal and Adam Osman. It's in Egypt. Okay, it's an RCT experiment, a randomized controlled trial. And it's among rug producers, producing rugs. What they did is they randomly allocated initial export contracts, right? So if they work with an intermediary, like a buyer of rugs, you know, among several hundred rug producers, they say, Okay, some guys are gonna get an initial contract, and some guys not. And so that was a way, this is a way of investigating basically what's the effect of exporting on the decisions and in a very clean way, and they found a couple of things. So one is those guys who had the export contracts and started producing higher quality stuff. So that's sort of consistent with my Volkswagen story, too, right? So increasingly, export markets produce higher quality and they did lots of measures of, you know, how thickly packed the rugs were and how straight the edges were - the very dimensions of quality of rugs. That was one thing. And then the other thing that they found which is very interesting is that you know, these weavers of rugs got to be better at producing rugs, basically. So then, when they took them into a laboratory, and they say, okay, produce this identical rug to a whole bunch of producers, both in their treatment group, and in their control group to produce this identical rug, and they found that the guys who had gotten the export contracts were better at producing that rug, they produce sort of higher quality rugs than the other guys. This suggests that demand can drive upgrading, right, in the sense that it induces firms to produce higher quality, but there's also learning involved in that process. These Egyptian rug producers became more productive as a result of having access to these export countries. Tobi; Yeah, I mean, listening to you, I can think of a few things that click in place. When I look at, say, a country like Nigeria, I think about the way the central bank has been running the exchange rate policy, which is messing seriously with the way firms actually source inputs. Some firms actually don't have access to the foreign exchange quota to actually source quality inputs. I mean, from manufacturing firms to agribusinesses who want to buy high-quality seeds overseas, I see how that can be a constraint. But two things I want to get at. Also, if you look at Nigeria whose industrial policy is really about domestic self-sufficiency, you could see that there isn't really an incentive for upgrading, and therein lies my question. If we talk about upgrading and how important it is, even though it's not really discussed as it should, what role do you think industrial or state-directed policies can play in this? Why because industrial policy is back in fashion, you know, it's being discussed everywhere... but usually, at least in my experience and in my opinion, what most scholars and advocates are focused on are [things like] state investments, you know, how the state can put money in one sector or the other. There really isn't so much focus on this sort of micro-level detail and what happens at firms, which your work is about. So for practical purposes, do you see industrial policy as something that can really, really, play a role and incentivize domestic firms to upgrade? For example, something like export quotas, you know, for firms?Eric; I mean, in terms of your question, do I think industrial policy can be helpful? I do. I do think that industrial policy can be helpful. Basically, I think that learning generates spillovers that firms themselves can't fully capture. And so I think there is a role for government to promote learning, basically, in a way. To subsidise learning such that - the socially optimal, or - the best sort of amount of investment in learning for society is more than individual firms to do on their own. And so there's a role for industrial policy. But I agree that it's got to be smart industrial policy, it's not just any old industrial policy. And so many countries have this idea...it's a little bit of nostalgia for import substitute industrialization, or it's very much like inwardly focused industrial policy. We're going to try and guarantee a domestic market for our producers, something like that, right? I'm not a fan. I'm not a fan of imports substitute industrialization or these very inward-focused strategies because then you get to the point where there's just not a lot of pressure on domestic firms to be more productive. They become kind of in a comfortable situation where they have kind of protected markets, not very competitive, they have a lot of market power in that market, and so that is a recipe for stagnation over the long term. So I think the crucial thing is that the targets for industrial policy be export-oriented, you know, outwardly oriented. You want your firms to be successful in world markets, right? I think that should be the key, rather than domestic self-sufficiency. Or rather than just the government investing in well, okay, so I don't have a problem with the government investing in infrastructure, investing in things as long as the aim is always ''what's going to facilitate our firms being successful in world markets'', right, I think that's a good target. Because those world markets are competitive [and] for firms to be able to be successful there, they're going to have to up their game and be more productive and be more innovative, subject to the measurement constraints we talked about, right and to upgrade. And so I think that the smart industrial policies are going to be things that sort of push firms to learn and to be more innovative and to be successful as exporters. Now, the other thing we have to keep in mind in thinking about industrial policy, is that [for] the governments, it's just very hard to [know] in the future what are the sectors that are going to be successful. What are the activities that are likely to have a future? It's just very hard, it's very hard for people who are, you know, private equity firms embedded in the sector... it's very hard to know, it's gonna be even harder for a government official or someone making government policy to do that. So I think we need to think about policies that have this effect of promoting learning or subsidizing innovative activities, but that, you know, don't require too much knowledge and understanding of the future on the part of the people setting the policy. Right. So things like collaborations between universities and firms for, you know, how to train workers to have the skills that the higher tech firms in your country need. That's something that seems like a good idea that's probably going to promote upgrading without having to pick and say, I think this product or this sector is the future of the Nigerian economy and therefore we're going to subsidize that thing. And you also want policies that are somewhat flexible, right, so that if something happens... so I'm working on a project in Tunisia, where the Tunisian Government was trying to promote exports. But the issue that they've had, and it's a matching grant program where sort of half of the costs of exporting of a certain category of costs of exporting will be paid by the government. The problem with that program, though, has been that it was somewhat inflexible. So basically, if something happened, you know, there's a big shock, and in fact, COVID shock, you know, and that changes what firms want to do. And it's very hard for them to switch gears and say, now I want to spend money on something else, can you please subsidize this other thing, and there were a lot of frictions in the program. And so that's often the case for government programs. The government sets a policy and then the world changes, firms want to do something else, but the policy is still stuck, you know, in the old world. So we need to think about how to build in, you know, flexibility into the programs so that if firms decide, actually, the market is moving in this direction, rather than this direction that we were expecting, that the support that they receive could move in the same direction.Tobi; Yeah, I agree. And I don't mean export quotas as hard targets. So I'll give you an example. Nigeria has this policy that we've been running for about six to seven years now, where there are multiple exchange rate windows for different parts of the economy or sectors that the government deems should have priority, you know, to import. And I recall a paper where Korea had a similar arrangement, but it was focused on firms that export. Firms that export to world markets sort of get priorities so that they can source inputs at a very low cost and seamlessly, you know, but it's not just something that we really think about in Nigeria, because we are so focused on the domestic market and how large the population is not minding, you know, how much of that population is poor.Eric; Yes, no, absolutely. So, certainly, Korea did this. But the Korean model, a key part of it, and they definitely picked sectors in a way that, you know, it's, there's a little bit of tension with what I just said about, you know, the government officials are not going to be very knowledgeable, there they seem to have done a good job of picking sectors to advance. But the key part was it really was oriented towards success in export markets. And the industries that were not successful on the export markets, they pulled the plug, they removed the, you know, they removed the support, which is politically hard to do, you need a fairly insulated, like, secure government in order to be able to do that. Because, otherwise, you start providing support, and then the industry lobbies a lot to maintain that support, you know, and so then it becomes politically very difficult to remove it. But I think if the government is committed to ''if these industries are not successful, we're gonna pull the plug on the support'', then this can work. Right. But you're absolutely right, in the Korean model, the key thing is the export orientation rather than the import orientation. And what you mentioned about exchange rates, I didn't comment on that. But I think it is an issue, you know, especially for a resource-rich economy, that the exchange rate can be, you know, highly valued, arguably overvalued, which makes it hard to develop the domestic industry. And so I think that's a real issue that, you know, some countries seem to be able to handle that, you know, ''what do we do with the natural resource wealth a little better than others'', if you just let it accumulate and people are going to spend and that leads to devalues your currency to increase that's going to make it harder to achieve export success in export markets for manufacturing goods or other exporting services. And so that is something that needs to be a focus of thinking about how to upgrade.Tobi; Yeah, I want to talk about technology for a bit. You had this very, very, an interesting paper on the soccer ball, we call it football, the soccer ball producers in Pakistan. And in a bit, you're going to tell me some of the interesting things you learned about that study. But first, Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan had this interesting paper about industrialization in Africa, and how domestic manufacturing firms are now shifting more towards capital-intensive technology. So hence, manufacturing firms are not creating jobs as much as historical patterns should suggest, do you see this as sort of a problem? I know so many other people have this worry about automation and how this technology can be exported everywhere, which is really a concern for maybe a continent like Africa with a large, jobless, and young population. So do you see this as a trend that we should worry about, you know, more capital-intensive technologies, or are there opportunities?Eric; Yeah. So I do see it as a trend. I do think it is something to be worried about. You know, Dani Rodrik recently organized a panel with the International Economics Association I participated in, along with Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti and Francis Stewart from Oxford. And I sort of had two points there. One point was, yes, I think this diagnosis is correct. Basically, economists refer to it as appropriate technology. But the idea is that many technologies are developed in rich countries, you know, given factor proportions, we would say in those rich countries, so basically, skilled workers are more abundant, unskilled workers are less abundant, and so people develop machines that kind of conserve on unskilled workers. That's, in part, the background to the story that Dani Rodrik and Margaret McMillan are saying that in Africa, many firms are using this technology that's been developed in rich countries, that's very skill intensive, but it's not generating a lot of them. Right. So I think the diagnosis there is correct that that happens, right? And so the technology often is inappropriate for poor countries given, you know, their supply of unskilled labour, given how many workers they have that could use employment. On the other hand, the other question, though, was, what do you do about it? And so I was less convinced. So my worry about that. There are two versions of that concern about what you do about it. One is, given the set of existing technologies, you could try to encourage firms to use more labour-intensive technologies. Okay. But the problem is that you may encourage them to be less productive. Maybe they might generate more employment, but they'll be less productive, right? There was an interesting paper that I cited in Brazil by Gustavo D'Souza, which was sort of saying the Brazilian government basically put a tax on international technology licensing. And he shows that sure enough, firms were less likely to use International Technology. They're more like to use domestic technology. They actually generated employment, but they were less productive. Right, and they overall did worse. So there's a worry that you're gonna make firms less productive in an immediate sense. The other worry is that, like, if the Nigerian government starts encouraging Nigerian firms to develop new technologies, which are more labour intensitive, you know, then they'll generate more employment, the worries that you're gonna get sort of fall behind the world technology trajectory, I'll call it that. Like, you can think about the world frontiers moving in whatever, pick an industry, and the world frontier is moving at a particular place, and then, you know, firms are competing with each other and they're, you know, someone gets a patent, someone comes up with a new idea and sort of technology moves in a certain direction. And then Nigeria says, no, no, we want to be on a different trajectory that generates more employment, right? The problem is, you're going to be permanently behind where the technology curve is, right? Where the world frontier is. And I feel like that's worrisome, right, you're likely to have less learning, right, there's gonna be a gap between where the Nigerian firms are and where, you know, the world frontier is that it's gonna be hard for them to catch up afterwards. So in the short term, you might generate more employment, but you're gonna have a less dynamic industry as a result. And so I think, my own view, and this is, it's a feeling rather than something that's very research based at this point. But my own view is, even though it means that firms are not going to generate that much employment, they have to try and stick as close to the technology frontier as possible, or, you know, catch up as quickly as possible to where the world technology frontier is.Tobi; And so talk to me a bit about lessons from your walk with the Pakistani soccer ball manufacturers. What did you learn from that particular experiment, especially on the role of appropriate technology and technology use and the incentives that surround it for firms and investors? Eric; Yeah, so it was a study of technology adoption, what are the factors that encourage technology adoption? And what made it possible was that the football producers, I'll use that word football instead of the soccer ball, these football producers, there are a lot of producers using the same simple technology, right? And this football design is, you know, 85 or 90% are just these hexagons and pentagons. If you can imagine a, you know, a football, it's got hexagons and pentagons. And so the simple technology involves cutting out hexagons and pentagons and then stitching them together. And there were a lot of those and what made the project possible is we came up with a new improved technology, which is basically a way of cutting pentagons from these sheets. The main costs, you know, 50% of the cost are the sheets, they call it rexine. It's like artificial leather, that's the exterior of the ball. But they were cutting pentagons in a way that was wasting some material. Wasting more than they need to and so the new technology is a way of cutting these pentagons so that you can fit more into a given sheet so that you can get basically 8% more pentagons which ended up being about a 1% reduction in total costs. Which wasn't enormous but on the other hand, it's a pretty competitive industry, profit margins are about 8% so we felt like they shouldn't have been paying the 1%. And actually, when we started out, we thought we were gonna be studying technology diffusion, right, which is, you know, one person adopts, then is that their neighbours who adopt or is it their cousins? Or is it the, you know, people who share suppliers, and what are the channels of diffusion, right, and we're trying to keep everything secret, and we thought, okay, when we let it out, it's obviously the people we give it to who are gonna adopt right away, and then it's gonna spread. And so then we gave out this technology, for free, we gave it to 135 firms. And then, you know, we had a few firms adopt, and they started using it, and including one big firm that was producing - I can tell you the name later, but basically had like 2000 employees and is producing for Nike, and as a big producer adopted this technology, and, you know, is basically cutting all of its pentagons using our design and our die for cutting rather than the old one. So after, you know, 15 months, there were six total firms that had adopted. And that was puzzling and thought, you know, why is that? So then we started asking firms, we started talking to people and basically, it was revealed that the reason was that the guys doing the cutting... so the cutters are basically paid piece rates, they're paid per pentagon or per hexagon, or essentially per ball like, which is, you know, 20 hexagons and 12 pentagons they're paid. That was what their salaries were based on. And they didn't have the incentive to reduce waste, like, they weren't penalized if they wasted the material, right? And so they just wanted to go fast. And our die was slowing them down, right, made them go more slowly because they had to be more careful how they placed it and also, it was a different design, it was the design that they were used to. Now, it turns out that within about a month, they could get back up to speed, to the speed they were at before but they didn't know that, and in any case, for that month, their salaries would be way down, they'd just be slower and knowing that if the firm didn't change the contracts, their salaries would be lower. And the workers were figuring this out, the cutters are figuring this out, they said, this is not good for me, right, that my salary is gonna go down if I use this thing, I have no incentive to use this new technology. And so then they started telling their firms, you know, this is bad, bad technology, it doesn't work, it's dangerous, it has all these issues. Okay, so then we realized that this was happening and we said that we were going to do a second experiment. So, you know, half of the people we originally gave the technology to who hadn't yet adopted, we did a second experiment where we said to workers, we're gonna give you a month's bonus, which is not very much it is about $150 US dollar. So these guys are not paid very much we said ''a month's bonus if you can demonstrate to us and the owner of the factory that the technology works.'' And actually, that was enough. The workers were excited about that, you know, they got paid for doing this. Everybody who did it then subsequently passed the tests. So they demonstrated that the technology is working, and then a statistically significant share of the firms that they worked at ended up adopting the technology as a result. So those were the two experiments, those were the facts. What are we learning from that? I think we're learning that, basically, the lack of information flow from workers to their owners, to their managers, was what was getting in the way of technology adoption in this case. Like, the workers knew that the technology was working, but the owners didn't know because they sort of delegated the process of cutting the pentagons to the workers, and given the contracts, the workers didn't have the incentive to share the information. Right. So I think those sorts of, like, information flows or barriers to information flows are actually very important in the learning process. And kind of what our second experiment did when we did this bonus of a month's pay, which induced the workers to share the information and that was sufficient to make the technology be adopted. And so I think the punch line or the one-sentence version of this is, workers need to see that they're going to benefit from the adoption of new technology or from upgrading generally in order for the process to work well. They have to buy into the process. And they have to see that they have the incentive to do so. One recommendation coming out of that would be some sort of profit sharing, or some sort of gain sharing between workers and firms would actually be very useful. And will it help there be more innovation?Tobi; It brings me in a way to another very interesting paper of yours which [they] also had a summary essay about, I think, in VOX or something, which is about wages in poor countries. And I mean, thinking about the soccer ball story and the lesson. One issue and this has generated quite a number of debates between I think Rodrik and a bunch of other scholars who are thinking about Africa, is that the reason Africa is not really industrializing, or firms are not creating jobs is because wages are too high relative to the level of income. But what I learned from your paper, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, is that paying higher wages in poorer countries is not really a disincentive to creating employment and even generating productivity and profit. Tell me a little bit about how that works. Because, usually, we've gotten familiar with this logic that for you to be able to industrialize, if you think about China, and so many other countries, you need to have access to low-wage workers, you know, you need to be able to do very cheaply, and labour is where you can really cut a lot of your costs. And then it becomes a problem if your domestic wages are too high for the level of your income or what firms and investors are willing to pay. So tell me this high-wage, low-wage dynamics, especially... I remember the famous Paul Krugman was it article defending sweatshops in Bangladesh, where if you force firms who are outsourcing to pay higher wages or impose certain conditions, poor people in those countries will lose jobs, and they will lose their livelihoods. And so you should not mess with that process. What are your thoughts on these [issues]?Eric; Yeah, very interesting. So I think the article you were thinking of, it's related to the specific case of the football producers and seal coats. In Pakistan. Tobi; Yeah. Eric; There was a very interesting thing that happened. I mentioned that one firm adopted this new technology. And you know, one very large firm and it was producing for Nike, it's called Silver Star. The interesting thing about that firm is that because they're producing for Nike, which had had sweatshop scandals in the past, Nike required them to do a bunch of things, basically, so that Nike wouldn't be vulnerable to a further scandal, right? And among the things that they had to do was make sure they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan. And the only way this firm could guarantee that they were paying the minimum wage in Pakistan, which many firms were violating basically, the only way they could is to say, we're not going to pay a piece rate, we're going to pay a fixed wage. Right. So this firm was paying a fixed wage rather than a piece rate. And actually, we talked to them about when they first won the Nike contract. They said their labour costs went up 20 to 30%. So they did a bunch of things. They had this fixed wage, there was a medical clinic on the factory grounds. They had sickness pay, they had some retirement benefits. So a bunch of things, they did raise wages. But the advantage of that was that the workers were much less likely to block the adoption of this new technology. Because in a specific way, they did not have a disincentive, you know, their wage was going to be their wage no matter what happened, rather than in other firms [where] what was happening is that the worker can see if they adopt this technology, their wage would go down. And so we believe, and I wrote this in an article that you saw in the Harvard Business Review, I think that's where it was, that those wages, you know, higher wage payments and fixed wage payments, which were imposed by Nike actually contributed to the process of innovation. The title of the article is how labour standards can be good for growth, and also in the process of upgrading. So that's an example of how having higher wages can actually be good for this upgrading process. Now, there are factors going in both directions, right? On the one hand, you know, the 20 or 30% higher labour costs, I think they did contribute to innovation. On the other hand, 20 or 30% higher labour costs may mean that firms will hire fewer workers or that the industry will be less competitive. So it's not that, you know, this innovation effect is all powerful and it's going to overwhelm anything that's about labour costs. But I think it is something that we need to take into account. And so, you know, labour market institutions that, you know, maybe promote profit sharing with workers, that promote longer-term employment so you have people who are around for longer, that have some job security, the sorts of things that often labour unions want to negotiate, can actually be good for this innovation process. And that's one factor that should be weighed against this issue of, you know, how higher labour costs and how competitive is the sector going to be. You often hear, like, the World Bank or the USAID, the development agencies will often say, you just have to be cheap. Like, you know, the competitive advantage of Nigeria is cheap labour and therefore, you should be focusing on having low wages and producing, you know, garments and textiles and toys and low-end manufacturing. But I think that's kind of a low-road model. You know, and I think that there are viable high road models, which would involve somewhat higher wages, some sort of gain sharing or profit sharing, and being more innovative at the same time. I can't tell you I have it all worked out exactly what that model would look like, I think it's going to vary by country. But I think we need to try to think about and push in that direction of where you can have, it may not be high wage, but it's gonna be higher wage than the market by itself maybe would bring about. So I am optimistic that that can happen. But again, the devil's in the details, you know. So Nigeria needs to think about what are we relatively good at doing right now and let's think about how can we be more innovative and move up to the quality ladder, the technology ladder in those industries. And then how can we get our workers on board to the process of moving up that ladder? And that will probably involve paying those workers more, rather than just trying to cut wages to the extent possible.Tobi; Before I let you go, let me... I know you're a relatively quiet person so let me draw you in a little bit... yeah, I know you're not active on Twitter or anything like that. Let me draw you into a little bit of professional controversy. And one of the things that I admire most about your work, I should confess, is that it's methodologically diverse. You know, you do structural econometrics, you do RCT, you do regular modelling and so many things. So there's this huge debate currently that I think, a lot of my colleagues may not think so but I think has important consequences for the policymaking process on development, which is that - is development research right now focused on the right things? You know, RCTs are like the standard tool for the investigation of development questions. Empirics have sort of taken over the field. But on the other hand, you have folks like Lant Pritchett who are constantly pushing back that this is encouraging researchers to think too small, they are researching cash transfers, and so many other key interventions, whereas we really should be focused on the big questions. And in my experience, these have real-life implications, especially in poor countries where they have budgetary constraints. We might say this is due to corruption, and that will be true, but sometimes they have a real balance of payment crisis, because a lot of these countries are resource-dependent, and it's often cyclical. So a policymaker may really want to know where to spend the most resources to have the maximum benefit for the citizen. So I find these questions very important. What do you think about this debate? As someone who transverses the field very often in your work, how have you been able to navigate this debate? And what do you think is the, maybe right is not the right word here...what do you think is the useful approach going forward?Eric; Yeah, good question. Yeah, in my own work, I've been very question driven rather than methods driven. Right. So I've always thought, you know, I'm interested in this question of from upgrading, what are the barriers to upgrading? What drives upgrading? How can we, you know, learn about that, and if we can learn about that using an experiment, that's great. If we're in about that using other methods, that's great, too. So I, sort of, don't have a dog in the hunt, as Bill Clinton would say about, you know, the methodology. And I'm kind of in the middle of the road, I think, in terms of this debate between, you know, J-PAL and Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee and Lant Pritchett or others on the other side. I think, you know, in situations where you can run an experiment, I think that is the most credible source of information. Okay, so I'd rather have a randomized experiment than do a correlation and put some causal interpretation on a correlation. At the same time, I do think that there are many questions, either that can't be answered with an experiment, or that are just very, very costly to answer with an experiment, right? And so it's very hard to run, you know, it's running experiments on firms. I've tried to do it, but it takes a long time. It can be very costly. You have to give much bigger shocks to firms to get them to react, etc. And so, I've heard Abhijit Banerjee articulate that, like, we should never do a policy that hasn't first been evaluated by random experiment, I think that's too strong. Because we're gonna be waiting years and years and years to get the experiments and with a huge investment of resources in order to get the experiments that would then inform the policy. So we're going to have to make policy and, you know, make decisions based on other sorts of information. And so there, I do think we need to be like small ''c'' Catholic, allow for lots of different types of methods, quasi-experimental methods, you know, even structural methods, and then also experiments. There's this famous joke about the drunk guy with a streetlight, you know, he's looking for his keys, and he's looking under the streetlight, because that's where the light is, maybe not where the keys have been lost. And so I take that point, like, maybe we really care about these big questions about, you know, what's going to drive growth, then in that sense, I'm sympathetic to the sort of the Lant Pritchett view. On the other hand, under the lamppost, we actually are learning stuff, right, I feel like we're more confident that we're making progress by looking under the lamppost. And so I think the, you know, the trick, the art here is to sort of stay near the edge of the lights and we're getting closer to the big questions, but in a way that's still credible, and that we're still, you know, we can believe the answers that we're actually given. To sort of counter the Lant Pritchett view, you can post these big questions, and you can, you know, think big thoughts. But at the end of the day, you have to be able to convince, you know, you have to show us the data, right, you have to show that this is really correct. And that's just very hard to do for many of these big questions. So we need to incrementally build up based on this work. That's why I kind of like this work on firms, we're getting towards these big questions about growth, but in a way that you can actually have some confidence that you understand what's going on.Tobi; In your experience doing this work, what are misconceptions that you have encountered in the field that either the professional development industry, so I'm talking about aid and the think-tank and all the other folks, or it may even be your academic colleagues, what are the common misconceptions that you have encountered? Eric; Yeah. I mean, so one big thought [is] I think that the of field development agencies, right, it's like, how are we going to spend aid dollars in a way that's going to have a positive effect? And I think there's value to that. All right. I'm all in favour of spending, you know, aid dollars, in the most effective way. But I think that you know, a set of questions does limit to some extent the impact of the field of development on the development process. So I actually think we could spend every aid dollar in an optimal way, and would it have a meaningful effect on the material standard of living of people in poor countries? I'm not sure. I mean, maybe a little bit, maybe marginal, right? I think what's really going to matter is, do these countries start getting industrialization happening? Are they getting upgrading? Are they growing? And so in that sense, I sometimes get a little bit frustrated with the development discussions, it's all about this, you know, how do we spend aid dollars, and let's do RCTs to figure out how to spend the aid dollars, rather than these bigger questions, which are going to have a longer-term effect on people's living standards. You know, that's changing a little bit. I'm encouraged. There are more and more people talking about firms, there are more and more people taking sort of industrial policy ideas seriously. They're talking about bigger-picture questions in a kind of micro-founded way. So there are some encouraging signs. But I think a lot of development is still about that issue of like, what's the right way to do social policy? What's the right way to do, you know, aid spending, rather than trying to understand deeply why is it that Korea was able to make this transition from a poor country to a rich country, essentially, in a generation? And why is it that many countries in Africa are not? What is it that's actually getting in the way? And for that, that's not really like how to spend aid dollars question that's more about how firms behave. What are the factors that constrain them? And those sorts of things.Tobi; This is a show about ideas. So I want to ask you, what's the one idea? Just one. One idea that you think everybody should think about and adopt, that you would like to see spread everywhere. What's that idea? It may be from your work, or it may be from other things that inspire you. What's that one idea?Eric; I think the one idea I would choose is, uh, workers have a brain. This goes back to the soccer ball study, that there's knowledge and information that, like, workers have or people who are lower down in the hierarchy have, which is not being taken advantage of. Right, the soccer ball thing was an example. The workers were understanding the technology, but because of the way they were paid, and because of the, you know, institutional arrangements, they didn't have the incentive to share that. And I think the world, including the economics profession, tends to undervalue the intelligence that people have. Even the people who are actually, you know, on the frontlines doing the work. And if we can figure out ways to harness that knowledge and give people incentives to share it and give people incentives to develop their own intellectual thinking about whatever it is they're doing, I think that'll have a big payoff. And so I'm interested in sort of investigating what are the sorts of arrangements, what are the sorts of policies that can lead that to happen more?Tobi; Yeah. Thank you so much, Eric. I mean, tell me a little bit about what you're working on right now.Eric; What am I working on right now? I mean, so one thing related to what we've been talking about that I'm excited about is, again, a paper on technology adoption. This is in Bangladesh, with an energy-efficient motor like sewing machines. They're different sorts of motors that the traditional ones they're kind of spinning all the time. And then people have the foot pedal they like to press the foot pedal and then the needle comes down and stitches right but they're actually wasting a lot of energy because these motors are spinning all the time. And so there's a new type of motor called a servo motor which spins Only when the needle is moving, right, so it's energy efficient, energy efficient motor, but it can just replace the old motor, you don't have to change anything else about the machine, you just put this new servo motor to replace the old clutch motor. And we're studying when new managers or when new owners, when do they make those decisions. And so we're trying to track we're giving them information in different intensities, like including installing the machines in their factory one is just showing a video when it's just providing information, but one is actually installing their machines. And we're seeing how they react to that information. So I think that's a big topic. It's like what's getting in the way of the adoption of energy-efficient technology? These are the people who are making mistakes, or they just don't have good information. Or that basically, maybe if they have the right information, they actually will adapt very quickly. So that's one thing I'm thinking about.Tobi; It's been fascinating talking to you, Eric. I enjoyed it so much.Eric; Thank you, Tobi. Good questions. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com/subscribe

#VN 165 🎙 19 noiembrie 2022 cu Dragoș Pătraru Capitalismul e cel mai prost sistem economic. Însă asta doar dacă le excluzi pe celelalte. În episodul 165 din Vocea Nației: Dacă suntem niște oameni egoiști, interesați doar pe maximizarea propriilor beneficii, așa cum ne descriu modelele economice, de ce plătim ceea ce consumăm într-un restaurant? 1.000 de directori executivi, care încasează de sute de ori mai mult decât angajații lor, trec prin experimentul de gândire propus de John Rawls. Capitalismul e ca o mașină în care ai nevoie de centuri de siguranță. Cum arată o astfel de centură? Principiile propuse de economistul Ha-Joon Chang pentru construirea unui sistem economic mai bun. Audiție plăcută! -------------------------------------- Recomandări: 23 de lucruri care nu ți se spune despre capitalism – Ha-Joon Chang Economie utilă pentru vremuri dificile – Abhijit Banerjee și Esther Duflo Doughnut Economics – Kate Raworth Mission Economy – Mariana Mazzucato The Entrepreneurial State – Mariana Mazzucato Paradoxul Prosperității - Clayton Christensen, Efosa Ojomo și Karen Dillon

Today's changing world faces continuous social, economic, and environmental challenges—from disease to natural disaster to war. The leaders stepping up to solve these issues possess deep ambition, vision, and skills to bring their ideas to life. In this episode, host Gautam Mukunda speaks with Jennifer Doudna, Ph.D., Professor of Chemistry and Molecular and Cell Biology at UC Berkeley and Nobel Prize Winner in Chemistry and Esther Duflo, Ph.D., Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics at MIT and Nobel Prize Winner in Economic Sciences. Together, they discuss how great leaders can pioneer breakthroughs and effectively enact change—from discovery to implementation. Resources:  Poor Economics by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo Good Economics for Hard Times by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo “There are so many things I kind of wish I had known early in my career, but the big ones for me are, first and foremost, that each person is an individual and has their own sets of passions, strengths, weaknesses, desires.” – Jennifer Doudna, Ph.D., Professor of Chemistry and Molecular and Cell Biology at UC Berkeley “Try to avoid micromanaging people. You get much more done if you can trust someone to run with it.” - Esther Duflo, Ph.D., Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics at MIT  Follow @GMukunda on Twitter or email us at WorldReimagined@nasdaq.com   For more information on this episode's guest please visit: Nasdaq.com/world-reimagined-podcast

Recursos emprendimiento y lean startup: 🎓 Curso Lean Startup Innokabi 👉 [https://cursoleanstartup.innokabi.com/] 💌 Suscripción Newsletter Innokabi 👉 https://innokabi.com/ PATROCINADORES: 👉 MailingYa! Tu agencia de Email Marketing para eCommerce ► https://www.mailingya.com/ 👉 SEMRUSH: Prueba Semrush 14 días gratis en ► https://innokabi.com/prueba14dias ▬▬▬▬ INFO GENERAL ▬▬▬▬▬ ► DESCRIPCIÓN: Me alegro que hayas decidido acompañarnos una semana más en el podcast de Innokabi. Soy Alfonso Prim y quiero ayudarte a lanzar tu marca, producto o servicio con éxito empleando lean startup y las herramientas de marketing online más interesantes y experiencias de otros emprendedores que ya lo han conseguido. ▬▬▬▬▬ CONTENIDO ▬▬▬▬▬ ► DESCRIPCIÓN EPISODIO: Hoy hablamos con Pablo Melchor, emprendedor y fundador de Ayuda Efectiva, una ONG que de manera objetiva, destina las donaciones donde el dinero es más efectivo. Pablo es un emprendedor nato, ha lanzado una agencia de marketing online y una web de regalos: regalador y posteriormente, se lanzó a crear Ayuda Efectiva. Con Pablo hablamos del proceso, de sus proyectos y de los porqués de este cambio final. Profundizaremos en qué es y cómo funciona Ayuda Efectiva y porqué una ONG así tiene todo el sentido. Así que con Pablo hablaremos de cómo lanzar un proyecto desde cero, hacerlo crecer, venderlo y seguir emprendiendo hasta encontrar lo que de verdad le motiva y da sentido a todo lo anterior, y que estoy seguro de que te darán un montón de ideas para aplicar a tu negocio. ► PREGUNTAS: 1. ¿Quién eres para los que no te conocen y cuál es (brevemente) tu trayectoria hasta llegar a hoy? y luego entramos al detalle. 2. Cuál fue tu primer proyecto emprendedor, cómo surgió y cómo evolucionó. 3. Qué se siente al vender un negocio. 4. Qué pasó después, cómo surgió el siguiente proyecto. 5. Qué es regalador y cómo evolucionó el proyecto. 6. Cómo surge ayuda efectiva y qué es. 7. Qué hace falta para crear una ONG. 8. Problemas y dificultades de los inicios. 9. Estrategias que os ha permitido dar a conocer este proyecto. 10. Inversión o socios en el proyecto. 11. Qué impacto ha tenido ya la ONG y qué esperáis conseguir en un futuro cercano. 12. Qué tipo de proyectos elegís y cómo los elegís. Algún ejemplo. 13. Quién puede donar, cuánto y cómo. 14. Cómo paga sus facturas y sueldos una ONG. 15. En qué países estáis. 16. Errores y aprendizajes de tu experiencia emprendedora y especialmente para crear una ONG. ▬▬▬▬ REFERENCIAS Y ENLACES ▬▬▬▬ Dónde encontramos a Pablo: ► Web ► https://ayudaefectiva.org/ ► Donaciones ► https://ayudaefectiva.org/dona#/ ► Linkedin ► https://www.linkedin.com/in/pmelchor/ ► Twitter ► @pmelchor Recomendaciones: ► Libro ► “Poor economics” de Abhijit Banerjee y Esther Duflo ► https://amzn.to/3suG381 ► Libro ► “Salvar una vida” de Peter Singer ► https://amzn.to/3SDyFCg ▬▬▬▬ INFO GENERAL ▬▬▬▬▬▬ Si te gusta el Podcast de Innokabi por favor no olvides darle al ME GUSTA, dejarme un comentario en tu plataforma de podcasts favorita, y registrarte en: 🎓 PODCAST INNOKABI 👉 [https://innokabi.com/podcast/] 🎓 BLOG INNOKABI 👉 [https://www.innokabi.com/blog/] Para que pueda enviarte más contenidos, recursos y formación sobre emprendimiento, lean startup y marketing online.

¿Cómo encontrar una solución para los grandes problemas del planeta: inmigración, xenofobia, cambio climático, guerra comercial, impuestos, redes sociales, entre otros? Tenemos dos opciones, usar buena economía para tratar de encontrarles soluciones o dejarnos llevar por la economía basada en mitos y creencias falsas. Acá va nuestro resumen. ¡A seguir aprendiendo! Si quieres unirte al club de lectura de Mis Propias Finanzas de este mes con acceso a: -Libro físico -Grupo privado -Sesión en vivo de preguntas y respuestas con nosotros  -Y mucho más… Acá está el link: https://bit.ly/3csm5GY

¿Cómo encontrar una solución para los grandes problemas del planeta: inmigración, xenofobia, cambio climático, guerra comercial, impuestos, redes sociales, entre otros? Tenemos dos opciones, usar buena economía para tratar de encontrarles soluciones o dejarnos llevar por la economía basada en mitos y creencias falsas. Acá va nuestro resumen. ¡A seguir aprendiendo! Si quieres unirte al club de lectura de Mis Propias Finanzas de este mes con acceso a: -Libro físico -Grupo privado -Sesión en vivo de preguntas y respuestas con nosotros  -Y mucho más… Acá está el link: https://bit.ly/3csm5GY Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Dos economistas que nos invitan a entender desde lo más profundo cómo es que realmente viven los pobres para poder diseñar políticas que ataquen este flagelo que nos afecta a todos. Combatir la pobreza es una obligación moral de la humanidad. Por eso vale la pena reflexionar sobre estos problemas y tratar de ayudar como podamos a combatirlos. ¡A seguir aprendiendo! Si quieres unirte al club de lectura de Mis Propias Finanzas de este mes con acceso a: -Libro físico -Grupo privado -Sesión en vivo de preguntas y respuestas con nosotros  -Y mucho más… Acá está el link: https://bit.ly/3csm5GY

Dos economistas que nos invitan a entender desde lo más profundo cómo es que realmente viven los pobres para poder diseñar políticas que ataquen este flagelo que nos afecta a todos. Combatir la pobreza es una obligación moral de la humanidad. Por eso vale la pena reflexionar sobre estos problemas y tratar de ayudar como podamos a combatirlos. ¡A seguir aprendiendo! Si quieres unirte al club de lectura de Mis Propias Finanzas de este mes con acceso a: -Libro físico -Grupo privado -Sesión en vivo de preguntas y respuestas con nosotros  -Y mucho más… Acá está el link: https://bit.ly/3csm5GY Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode, Nobel Prize Winners and professors at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo speak about the explosion of inequality, fostering trust in economists, and the impact automation will have on the economy among other pressing topics.

In conversation about his memoir 'Home in the World', economist Amartya Sen talks to Nobel Prize winner Abhijit Banerjee about growing up, coming to Kolkata from Santiniketan, politics, impatience. 

Overview: Today we're going to talk about Vodacom - The South African telecommunications company. We'll explore the Vodacom story across 5 areas: South African telecoms sector context Vodacom's early history Vodacom's telco & non-telco businesses Vodacom's operating & financial performance Overall outlook This episode was recorded on Mar 13, 2022 Companies discussed: Vodacom, Vodafone, Safaricom (M-Pesa), MTN, Airtel, Glo & Telkom Business concepts discussed: Telecommunications (Telco) strategy, Mobile money, Internet connectivity, International telecommunication expansion, Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO), Cell Towers spinoffs & Telco regulation Conversation highlights: (00:45) - Vodacom context (07:50) - Vodacom early history (20:50) - Vodacom International expansion (38:04) - Vodacom's telco business (45:44) - Non-telco businesses (55:50) - VodaPay and M-Pesa (1:10:12) - Vodacom today - financials, customer growth (1:19:15) - Bankole's overall thoughts and outlook (1:29:52) - Olumide's overall thoughts and outlook (1:36:10) - Recommendations and small wins Olumide's recommendations & small wins: Recommendation: The Truman show: I rewatched this, it's marvelous, dystopian and funny. That movie is a work of art. Recommendation: I got a satchel aka man bag aka man purse. I like it, it works because I typically have too much shit to fit in my pockets Small win: Bankole's wedding in Chennai. It was epic Interested in investing in Africa Tech with Olumide: Read about Adamantium fund & contact me at olumide@afrobility.com Founders looking for funding: If you're a B2B founder working on Education, Health, Finance or Food, please contact me for funding at olumide@afrobility.com Bankole's recommendations & small wins: Recommendation: Good Economics for Hard Times by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo & Cold Outside - Timaya and Buju Small win: I got the new Macbook M1 Pro. Beautiful, sweet machine. Other content: Governance of Telecommunications: Two Decades of Reform in South Africa & Vodacom and DHL in Africa Listeners, Operators & Investors: Email info@afrobility.com, we'd love to partner or get your feedback. Join our insider mailing list where we get feedback on new episodes & find all episodes at Afrobility.com

Indian women are lonely in the bedroom, lonely in the kitchen, lonely in the workplace. Shrayana Bhattacharya joins Amit Varma in episode 259 of The Seen and the Unseen to discuss the interior and exterior lives of these unseen millions. Also check out 1. Desperately Seeking Shah Rukh: India's Lonely Young Women and the Search for Intimacy and Independence -- Shrayana Bhattacharya. 2. Select Shah Rukh Khan films: Baazigar, DDLJ, Dil Tho Pagal Hai, Kal Ho Naa Ho, Dilwale, Mohabbatein. 3. Shar Rukh Khan interviews selected by Shrayana: 1, 2, 3, 4. 4. The Power to Choose -- Naila Kabeer. 5. Naila Kabeer on Amazon. 6. Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth -- Marilyn Waring. 7. The Odd Woman and the City -- Vivian Gornick. 8. Vivian Gornick on Amazon. 9. Future Sex -- Emily Witt. 10. Kamala Das's autobiography, poems and stories. 11. Deborah Levy and Bell Hooks on Amazon. 12. Poor Economics -- Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. 13. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty -- Albert O Hirschman. 14. The Art of Loving -- Erich Fromm. 15. The Penguin Complete Novels of Nancy Mitford. 16. Selected Satire: Fifty Years of Ignorance -- Shrilal Shukla. 17. Most of Amit Varma's writing on DeMon, collected in one Twitter thread. 18. Dani Rodrik's tweet thread about the 'jerk quotient' in economics. 19. The Hidden Taxes on Women -- Sendhil Mullainathan. 20. "Academia is a giant circlejerk" -- Amit Varma's tweet. 21. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Ajay Shah (in reverse chronological order): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 22. The Universe of Chuck Gopal -- Episode 258 of The Seen and the Unseen. 23. Miss Excel on Instagram and TikTok. 24. Bahujan Economics. 25. Raghuram Rajan at the Harvard Kennedy School in 2018. (Minute 5 onwards.) 26. In Service of the Republic -- Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah. 27. Superforecasting -- Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner. 28. Listen, The Internet Has SPACE -- Amit Varma. 29. Raees: An Empty Shell of a Gangster Film -- Amit Varma. 30. The Baptist, the Bootlegger and the Dead Man Walking -- Amit Varma. 31. Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist -- Bruce Yandle. 32. Episodes of The Seen and the Unseen with Jai Arjun Singh and Uday Bhatia. 33. The Life and Times of Abhinandan Sekhri -- Episode 254 of The Seen and the Unseen. 34. Films, Feminism, Paromita -- Episode 155 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Paromita Vohra). 35. Modi's Lost Opportunity -- Episode 119 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Salman Soz). 36. Women at Work -- Episode 132 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Namita Bhandare). 37. What explains the decline in female labour force participation in India? -- Urmila Chatterjee, Rinku Murgai and Martin Rama. 38. Why Are Fewer Married Women Joining the Work Force in India? -- Farzana Afridi, Taryn Dinkelman and Kanika Mahajan. 39. India Moving — Chinmay Tumbe. 40. India = Migration -- Episode 128 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Chinmay Tumbe). 41. House of Secrets: The Burari Deaths. 42. The Right to Sex -- Amia Srinivasan. 43. 'Let Me Interrupt Your Expertise With My Confidence' -- New Yorker cartoon by Jason Adam Katzenstein. 44. Katty Kay and Claire Shipman -- Katty Kay and Claire Shipman. 45. The Ugliness of the Indian Male -- Mukul Kesavan. 46. The Blank Noise Project by Jasmeen Patheja. 47. Why Loiter? -- Shilpa Phadke. 48. The Jackson Katz quote on passive sentence constructions. 49. The Kavita Krishnan Files -- Episode 228 of The Seen and the Unseen. 50. Metrics of Empowerment — Episode 88 of The Seen and the Unseen (w Devika Kher, Nidhi Gupta and Hamsini Hariharan). 51. Jane Austen and Pico Iyer on Amazon. This episode is sponsored by CTQ Compounds. Check out The Daily Reader and FutureStack. Use the code UNSEEN for Rs 2500 off. Check out Amit's online courses, The Art of Clear Writing and The Art of Podcasting. And subscribe to The India Uncut Newsletter. It's free!

We're taking a look at some of our favorite moments from the 2021 Fast Company Innovation Festival. Here's a conversation about how good economics can help us rebuild equitably with Nobel Prize-winning economists, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Banerjee is the Ford Foundation International Professor of Economics at MIT and Duflo is a professor of poverty alleviation and development economics at MIT. 

#VN 129 🎙 13 decembrie 2021 cu Dragoș Pătraru Cum apare prosperitatea? Prin inovație antreprenorială sau prin dezvoltare convențională? Dragoș vorbește azi despre două cărți cu perspective diferite. Audiție plăcută! -------------------------------- Recomandări/Contrarecomandări: 📖 Paradoxul Prosperității - Clayton Christensen, Efosa Ojomo și Karen Dillon 📖📖 Economie utilă pentru vremuri dificile - Esther Duflo și Abhijit Banerjee 📖📖📖 Poor Economics - Esther Duflo și Abhijit Banerjee 📖📖📖 📖 Articolele „Plecat” din seria Teleleu - Elena Stancu și Cosmin Bumbuț @StareaNatiei - Soundcloud, iTunes, Spotify ▪️ Podcast #VN video @StareaNatiei - YouTube, Twitch, Facebook _ #VoceaNatiei #Podcast #StareaNatiei #DragosPatraru

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Our plans for hosting an EA wiki on the Forum, published by Aaron Gertler on the Effective Altruism Forum. We are in the process of implementing a major project on the Forum — turning our current system of tags into a full-fledged “EA wiki”. Under this system, many of the tags used for posts will also serve as articles in the wiki. Many articles in the Wiki will also serve as tags that can be applied to articles. However, there are exceptions in both directions. Some tags don't make sense as wiki articles (for example, “EA London Update”). And some articles are too narrow to be useful tags (for example, Abhijit Banerjee). These will be marked as “wiki only” — they can be found with the Forum's search engine, but can't be used to tag posts. The project is made possible by the work of Pablo Stafforini, who received an EA Infrastructure Fund grant to create an initial set of articles. Why is an EA wiki useful? EA content mostly takes the form of essays, videos, research papers, and other long-form content. If you want to find a simple definition of a term, or a brief summary of a cause area, you often have to find a particular blog post from 2012 or ask someone in the community. A wiki can serve as a collection of definitions and brief explanations that help people efficiently develop their understanding of EA's ideas and community. It can also host more detailed articles that wouldn't have a reason to exist elsewhere. Even if no one person wants to e.g. summarize all the major arguments to give now vs. later, ten people can each contribute a small portion of an article and get the same result. CEA tried to do some of this with EA Concepts, a proto-wiki with well-written articles on a range of topics. But the project was deprioritized at one point and never picked back up — mostly because it takes a lot of time and energy to create and maintain anything close to a complete list of important concepts in effective altruism. The EA Forum seems like a better way to do this, for a few reasons. Why host this on the EA Forum? There have been multiple attempts to create an EA wiki before, including EA Concepts, but none have really taken off. It's hard to get the necessary volume of volunteer work to compile a strong encyclopedia on a topic as broad and complex as effective altruism. Building a new wiki on the EA Forum has a few advantages over using a separate website: Constant attention: Hundreds of people visit the Forum every day. While tag pages don't get many edits now, we'll be doing a lot of work to promote them over the next few months. Anyone who visits the Forum will be prompted to contribute; if even a small number decide to help, I think we'll have a larger collection of volunteers than any past EA wiki project. Strong SEO: The effectivealtruism.org domain gets a lot of traffic, which means it tends to show up in search engines for relevant terms. Once we've set up a collection of heavily cross-linked wiki articles, I expect that the articles will begin to draw a lot of new visitors to the site. Automatic updates through tagging: While the whole “articles are tags” thing can feel weird at times, it also means that many articles will be attached to an ever-growing list of relevant posts. Professional support: The Forum is run by CEA and draws from the technical work of developers from both CEA and LessWrong. We constantly add new features, and if something breaks, we have the resources to fix it. CEA's resources also allow us to provide incentives for Wiki editing (more news on that soon, but not in this post). What are the next steps? Pablo's approach involves setting up as many relatively short articles as possible, to give editors something to work from. He started by creating ~150 “stubs”, or one-sentence articles, that he expects to develop in the coming months...

Just about everyone knows correlation does not equal causation, and probably that a randomized controlled experiment is the best way to solve that problem, if you can do one. If you've been following the economics discipline you will have heard about the Nobel Prize given to Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer for their work applying the experimental method to test real-world policy interventions out in the field. But what if you can't do this? Are you just stuck with untestable claims? This year's Nobel Prize to Josh Angrist, David Card, and Guido Imbens for methods of causal inference with observational data confirms that you don't have to give up. Scott Cunningham's Causal Inference: The Mixtape (Yale UP, 2021) provides an accessible practical introduction to techniques developed by these luminaries and others. Along with the statistical theory, it provides intuitive explanations of these techniques, and examples of the computer code needed to run them. In our conversation we discuss why economists needed these techniques and how they work. Scott Cunningham is a professor of economics at Baylor University. He researches topics including mental healthcare, sex work, abortion and drug policy. He is active on Twitter, has a blog on Substack, and frequently conducts workshops on causal inference methods. A complete web version of his book is available here. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

My guest today is Professor Abhijit Banerjee. Professor Banerjee is a Nobel Prize-winning economist, an econ professor at MIT, and a co-founder of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. Banerjee and I discussed the difference between empirical work and theoretical work in economics. We talk about Banerjee's Nobel Prize-winning research on alleviating global poverty. We talk about whether immigrants drive down wages for native workers, the role of financial incentives and driving human behavior. We speak about welfare, the effect of globalism on American industries like manufacturing, and the social consequences of having whole industries die out, and much more.#ConversationswithColeman #CwC #ColemanHughes #AbhijitBanerjee #nobelprize #Economics101 #Economics102 #poverty #globalism

The full conversation with Ricardo Hausmann - now with Transcript. This is a subscriber-only post.TranscriptOpening musicYou are listening to ideas Untrapped with Tobi Lawson. Tobi Lawson (intro) Welcome to another episode of ideas Untrapped and my guest today is Ricardo Hausmann, who is a professor of economic development at Harvard University, he is a former director of centre for International Development, and is currently the Director of the center's growth lab. Ricardo pioneered an approach of looking at economic development called economic complexity. My brief synopsis of the central idea is that an economy only grows and develop by learning to do many things by expanding its productive capabilities. I start by asking Ricardo, what we can learn, particularly from the East Asian experience, and what has happened in economic development over the last few decades. Thank you for always listening to the show and I hope you enjoy this one. Tobi Lawson You've been one of the most important thinkers in economic development throughout my adult life. So, it's a pleasure to speak to you. Ricardo Hausmann Pleasure to be with you. Tobi LawsonFrom Around 1990, when the results of the economic trajectory of East Asia became apparent, so many policy propositions have been developed by scholars. But, in your opinion, what do you think has been the most important lesson from that East Asian growth episode? Ricardo Hausmann I think the general experience of development is really, that development is about the growth of productive capabilities In a society, it's what our society is capable of doing and, what a society is capable of doing depends a little bit on, what are the tools and machines it has available to do things nd what are the recipes and formulas and routines and protocols it's aware of, but it's mostly about what is the know-how that it's people have and this idea of know-how is not just, you know, low and high. It's mostly How different is what each member of society knows. Because if everybody knows a lot of the same thing, the whole doesn't know much more than each individual. But if each individual knows different than the whole can know a lot, even if each individual doesn't know that much. So this division of know how in society allows for individuals to specialise and society to diversify, that a society is able to do more, because it's individuals are all different. I am originally from Venezuela, and we're Nigeria. And we all think that we are rich because we have¹ oil. And then something bad happened to explain why, given that we're rich, we're not so rich, but we're rich, because we have our, our society is rich, not because of what it has. But because of what it knows how to do. And the growth and development of a society is the growth and development of what it knows how to do well. That's the core of things. And so if you ask about East Asia, well, they started in agriculture, they move to garments, then they move to textiles, then they move to electronics, then they move to cars, and move to chemicals and shapes, and so on. So, if you look at what they have been good at, that is something that has been very rapidly changing. They become good at more things. And they can become sufficiently good at those things that they can sell them outside of the country. And if you look at their export baskets, they have been evolving dramatically. In the directions I just mentioned, if you look at the export basket of Nigeria, or the export basket or Venezuela, the only thing you'll find there is oil. But when you look at the amount of oil we're talking about, it's really peanuts. It's really, so it's not that we have a lot of oil, it's that it's the only game in town. You know, Nigeria is a society of about 200 million people, cruises about 2 million barrels of oil a day. That's like a 100th of a barrel of oil per capita. That's 100th of a $60. That's 60 cents. That's not much money that's coming out of here, right? So it's not that you have a lot of oil, it's that it's the only game in town. And that's a reflection of how little The company has got more things with the possible exception of Nollywood. Tobi Lawson You've finished Nigeria, I wouldn't just say Nollywood, sectors like telecommunications have been booming in the last 20 years. But looking broadly.... Ricardo Hausmann Wait, one second, one second, one second, that has allowed Nigerians to call each other. But that opens an enormous opportunity now, because one of the things that COVID has taught us is that many things that we used to do in the office, we can do from home. But anything that can be done from home, can be done from abroad. So there are many, many tasks that are currently done in rich countries. But that could be done by zoom in poor countries, in less developed countries. And that opens up new avenues for diversification, it will open up, you know, the possibility to participate in value chains that were unthinkable before, because people thought that, you know, the people doing those tasks had to live there. Now, we know that they don't have to live there. So you know, one message for all the youth in Nigeria, is that there's plenty of work in platforms like Upwork, and other such platforms where you can find jobs to do on the web. And that's thanks to the fact that you have you know, ICT information communication technology that has diffuse, but so far, that  diffusion has not changed what Nigeria is able to sell abroad. And that's, I think, where we have to aim, I mean, forms of livelihood, for Nigerians in Nigeria, by selling to people in the rest of the world Tobi Lawson Looking at your economic complexity approach to development, from your writings, and the writings of other scholars in that school, a society that knows how to do many things will grow rich, but how do we square that with the works of people like Robert Wade, who stressed the importance of manufacturing and industrialization in achieving growth and development? How should policymakers think about the knowledge we are getting from the sub discipline of economic developmentRicardo Hausmann Manufacturing was a very, very important stepping stone, for many of the societies that became rich, it was a very important stepping stone, because manufacturing require relatively low skilled labour. So it was easy to take people out of agriculture, with little education, put them in manufacturing, and manufacturing was, you know, generating much higher levels of productivity in agriculture at the time, and the levels of productivity manufacturing worldwide. So, for East Asia, this movement of people from agriculture to manufacturing was a very important stepping stone in the process of development. Some people think that manufacturing has become less unskilled labour intensive, it has become more skill intensive and more capital intensive. So it doesn't necessarily generate as many jobs as before and there aren't that many sort of like entry level jobs as as before. But I think they're still there. They're still there. So I think that, you know, a prosperous Nigeria would have much more manufacturing than it has today and creating the ecosystem for that manufacturing to happen is very important. And for that, I think that creating the ecosystem means what? It means that needs spaces where people can locate their factories, say, so that workers can go in and out efficiently and not spend two hours going there and two hours back home, that the materials can get in and out that you're relatively close to an efficient port, where you can bring materials from the rest of the world or send materials to the rest of the world, that you can participate in global value chain so that you give up on this idea that everything that you want to manufacture has to be manufactured with locally available raw materials, which is one of the most destructive ideas that is very popular in Africa that you want to, as you say, what's the term that you use there "beneficiate" your raw materials locally, and that that's like the angle of development. We can elaborate but that's a very, very dangerous and counterproductive idea. So you will need you know, a place that has electricity, water, security. So creating those spaces where manufacturing can thrive definitely is a path going forward and I would I would put the less attention to some of the things that goes by the older industrial policy name, and more attention to just making sure that you create spaces where a Nigerian manufacturer can be very, very productive. Tobi Lawson Let's talk a bit about the political economy of this. What exactly is the role of the state because what mostly obtains in countries like Nigeria, and the rest is heavy state involvement in trying to industrialise and doing industrial policy, allocate resources and credit and, there isn't more emphasis on the role of the private sector and even in the market. So how important is the state in this process, and what exactly is the role of the state in nurturing a growing economy? Ricardo Hausmann So, I think that the role of the state is huge. But it has to be smart, it has to be complimentary, it has to enhance the possibilities of the rest of society and not substitute the possibilities of the rest of society. So let me give you an example. Every technology you can imagine, is a combination of some things that you can buy in the market, and some things that cannot be purchased in the market that either they are provided by the state, or they're not provided. So you know, there is a market for cars, and you can go out and buy a car and different kinds of cars. There's no market for roads, or for traffic lights, or for driving rules, or for traffic police. So a car is a private good, it exists in a universe full of public goods. If the state does not provide the roads, the cars are not very useful, right? That's what I mean by the state complementing the rest of society. So society can organise some things and not others. So it's very important that the state be very good at providing the things that cannot be provided by markets. And those are quite a few. So for example, electricity penetration in Nigeria is still very low and remains a very, very significant obstacle to progress in spite of massive investments in that area. So electricity, you know, an efficient port system and efficient road system, and efficient urban transportation system, public education, you know no public health, there are so many so many tasks. Now in learning, things that can be done by markets, there's also a lot that can be done, let me tell you a little bit of a secret of the US success. If you look at Silicon Valley, for example, well, let's look first at the US as a whole, the US as a whole 14% of the population of the US is foreign born. But, if you look at the entrepreneurs in the US, 29% are foreign born. So the foreign born represent you know double the share of the entrepreneurs, than they represent the share of the population. If you look in Silicon Valley, and everybody's trying to imitate Silicon Valley, 54% of the science, technology, engineering and math workers of Silicon Valley, the stem workers 54% are foreign born, and the other 46% were not born in California, even though California is a state that has 40 million people. So the secret of Silicon Valley, is not that they have fantastic school systems and fantastic universities, and so on and so forth. It is really that they're able to attract global talent and one of the things that Africa has done in general, is that it has closed itself to the attraction of foreign talent. In many countries, it's very hard to get a visa to become a permanent resident or work permit. There is no path to citizenship. There are restrictions in how many foreigners a firm can hire, etc, etc. So, you know, in Africa, many countries cannot stop their citizens from going and working abroad. But the countries are very effective in preventing foreigners to come in, except at the very low end. So, one of the things that you want to think about in order to industrialise and to get into other things is to be able to attract talent, global talent that is capable of enhancing the capabilities you have. There's no shame in doing that. That's how it's being done in the in the rich countries. You know, everybody wants to become Singapore. But they don't know that Singapore is 45% foreign born. Singapore is what it is because it's able to attract global talent. So, you know, a lot of the improvements in the South African financial system is because they were able to attract all the Zimbabweans that were leaving Mugabe and get jobs, you know, all the educated Zimbabweans moved to South Africa. And that was very good for South Africa. So there's a lot in terms of attracting new know-how that can be done by trying to attract foreign talent. Another thing that you can do is to leverage your diaspora. Most African countries have a very significant diaspora. Much of that diaspora is in richer countries more developed countries and that diaspora is being exposed to new ways of doing business, to new industries, to new ideas, they can become a very, very important source of diversification of progress that has been documented by analysts at cellion, for the case of Taiwan, for the case of India, for the case of Israel, for many instances in which diasporas were very important in transforming the opportunities of the country. So, you want to leverage all of these things that can allow society to become more productive, more capable, more able to do more things. And no, the role of the government is in some sense not to prevent that from happening, to complement that with all the things that cannot be organised through markets, through private firms, and then, you know, maybe here and there, there's an additional space for, you know, focusing things, you know, just if there were good industrial zones, well connected by infrastructure ports, were supplied by electricity and water, well connected to places where workers live through an urban transport system, and so on. I'm sure that a lot of people would look into doing manufacturing in Nigeria. Tobi LawsonI want to get more from your answer by extending that question to state capacity. So many scholars have argued that state capacity is even the secret sauce, so to speak, of the success of East Asia, including China, and you get the impression that a state has to have fully formed capacity to deliver on so many things before it can then nurture growth and development. But you have argued in one of your lectures that I just saw that there is a coevolution, that happens between the state and the economy in terms of capabilities. So how does this co evolution work in practice, as opposed to the standard view of a fully formed capable state? Ricardo Hausmann Some people would like to say, Well, you know, first you have to have a capable state, and then you can have development. But until you get a capable state, you cannot get development. So focus on getting a capable state. But then you ask yourself the question, and how is that capable state going to rise? What's going to find that capable state if it's not a society that is able to pay the taxes and so on to feed that capable state. So So in fact, what you ended up having is a society that needs to develop in order to feed a more capable state, and a more capable state that is able to help society continuous development process. So at every point in time, you have states of very different capacities. And as a consequence, societies have a certain level of capacity consistent with that capacity of the state. So what you end up having is, the more society develops, the more resources can be put available to the state for it to do its thing. And the more the state does its thing, the more the society can develop. So these things are growing at the same time, or they're growing together. But a very important important question that you have to ask yourself, when you're thinking about the state, you're thinking about the Nigerian state. Now, what does it mean to be Nigerian? Who is Nigerian? Who is included in being Nigerian? When the state acts on behalf of Nigerians? It acts on behalf of whom? Is that on behalf of the Hausa? Does it act on behalf of the Yoruba? Does it act on behalf of the ibo? What does it mean to be Ibo and Nigerian or Hausa and Nigeria? How many things do you want to be decided in Abuja? And how many things we want to have decided at the different states, state government? So you have a relatively federal structure in Nigeria? Is that because you think that people have stronger regional identities than they have for a national identity? When you talk about Japan, or you talk about Korea, you're talking about societies that are internally very homogeneous. A Japanese person is somebody who speaks Japanese. A Korean person is somebody who speaks Korean. How many languages are spoken in Nigeria? Tobi Lawson (interjects) About 500… Ricardo Hausmann So obviously, it's not having a state is somebody's state, whose state is it? So I think one of the things that is a challenge is the construction of a Nigerian identity that can support the state. Right? Because the state is underpinned by a certain sense of us. The state is our state, it is done for us. It is how we do things collectively and it's Very important to clarify what do we mean by that we, who is inside the way, who's not inside the we, who is us, who's not us and those things are what makes often no state development difficult. Because, you know, if some people think that the state is going to be favouring some other group, then you would rather have a weak state than a state controlled by somebody who's not you and those things makes statecraft harder. Tobi LawsonI mean, devolution of powers from the centre is one of the conversations that Nigeria is having right now, especially in the light of the recent insecurity, issues and poverty, we would see how that works. But let me quickly pick up on another theme. Politicians usually valourize the role of small businesses in our economy, but in one of your essays that has made a very big impression on me. You took a different approach by looking at the role of big businesses in nurturing development and enrichment. Can you expatiate a bit on the role of big businesses in an economy. Ricardo HausmannSo I think when you have a very developed society, you tend to have, you know, markets for every possible input you want. You want electricity, somebody sells electricity, you want to photocopy or you want to print this stuff, there is a store that prints stuff for you, you want to design a campaign ad or television ad or cover it, you know, there's some people that design that. So you can start a business and buy everything else from the stuff that people produce around you. Right, so all of your possible inputs are things that other firms can do for you. So you can start small, and buy everything you need from everybody else. When you start in a less developed society. Many of those things that you wish you could buy from everybody else are just not there. And maybe you have to self provide your own electricity, maybe you'll have to print your own stuff, maybe you'll have to design your own covers, maybe we'll have to have all of these things done inside the company, because there are no reliable suppliers outside the company. So as a consequence, you know, modern firms tend to start bigger in less developed countries than in more developed countries, in more developed countries, you can just rely on other people doing stuff for you. As a consequence, no existing Corporation, or in some sense, organisations that have developed the capacity to provide internally things that markets cannot do for them. So once they exist, they have typically financial capital, they have a managerial capital, they have a reputational capital, that allows them to make it much easier for them to start a new line of business. You know, the Silicon Valley way to start a new line of business is that you create a startup, a startup is very easy to create in Silicon Valley, or in a very advanced place, because everything that the startup needs they can buy out there. But in the place where you cannot buy everything out there. You cannot start that small. But a corporation, a conglomerate, if it were to decide to diversify into more line of business, it could just reallocate some of its managers, it could reallocate some of its cash flows. It could because of its reputation, it could do joint ventures with other companies, maybe some foreign company or something that can bring in some technology and they can do things as a group that a startup cannot do. So that's why I wrote this piece saying, you know, a conglomerates can be and war in the case of Japan and Korea, a fundamental story of the growth process. Japan and Korea diversified because Toyota, Mitsubishi, di Woo, Samsung diversified internally as conglomerates. Right? It's not that just more companies appeared, it's that those companies diversified. So, I think that it's an important avenue for growth that a country should consider, but,  conglomerates can come You know, can be a force for good or they can be a force for bad either. conglomerates can just become you know, monopolist in one industry move to the next industry and become a monopolist there move to next industry and become a monopolist there and then suddenly become a huge barrier to entry for other people. It's very important that the conglomerates do well and this was the case of Japan and Korea, They are exporters, you tolerate conglomerates because they are exporters', a conglomerate that only sells domestically. It's like one of the local football teams. A conglomerate that exports is like the the national team. It's like the one that's playing at the World Cup. It's facing massive competition from other companies in other countries. So it deserves all the support of society. But a conglomerate that only sells domestically, you know, it has the danger of just becoming the local monopolist and stifling everybody else from competing against them. So, conglomerates can be a stepping stone, can be an avenue for growth, but they have to be good conglomerates. Tobi Lawson Let's talk about trade and I will set the scenario this way, a little over a year ago, about a year and a half. Nigeria closed its borders to all forms of trade. The justification was that the country is far too much of a dumping ground, especially for agricultural products, which we can actually produce locally. They were extreme measures to prevent imports of some of these products and the result, some would argue, as they argued against the move at the time, has been disastrous. Food inflation is through the roof, people became poorer. People are having to spend more on food than anything else, mostly vulnerable households. But you still hear people, either policymakers or even intellectuals, say that these are necessary sacrifices that developing countries have to make in order to industrialise. You have people like Ha Joon Chang, who provide intellectual guidance for this view, and that the West in its own process of industrialization went through much of the same thing, as a scholar who has also done a lot of work on trade for a poor developing country. What is the right way to think about trade policy? Ricardo HausmannOkay, first of all, let's separate trade from just macro-economic mismanagement. Because a lot of the problem of Nigeria comes not from trade mismanagement, but from the trade consequences of macro-economic mismanagement, you have exchange controls, dual exchange rate regimes, etc. That's not because you want to have an industrial policy. That's because you have messed up your macro policies. That is you have a government that has a deficit that is insufficiently finance. So it has to print money to finance it. As it prints the money, the dollar goes through the roof, the naira tanks, right. And then the government doesn't like that, And it wants to say that, you know, it's running out of foreign exchange. So it puts exchange controls, it tries to limit people's access to dollars, and so on. And in that context, it creates an environment where it's very hard for companies to get tools and machines from abroad, it's very hard for them to get raw materials, intermediate inputs, spare parts from abroad and it just makes them extremely unproductive and as a consequence, they have uncompetitive products that they cannot sell anywhere else, but in Nigeria, through enormous protection. Now, trying to do things without importing the tools, the raw materials, the intermediate inputs, the spare parts, is just trying to do things in a very, very difficult way. It's trying to, you know, as my father likes to say, "Why make things difficult if you can make them impossible," the way the world works, is that you don't have to make everything yourself. You just have to do some steps that add value to the things that they that you're going to put together. I remember having a conversation with Governor Fashola in Legos. And he's saying, you know, we want to have a furniture industry. So we want to prohibit the imports of foreign wood for furniture, we want it done with Nigerian wood, and said, You know, you're the governor of Lagos, not all furniture has to be made out of wood, could be made out of metals, it could be made out of plastics, it could be made out of other materials, right and all of the materials you want for furniture industry, or as far as the Lagos sport. So if you want a furniture industry, by all means have a furniture industry, but don't dump on the furniture industry the responsibility of only making furniture by buying inputs in Nigeria, because that's a recipe for disaster. If for some reason your inputs you couldn't buy in Nigeria for x or y or you could buy some inputs and not the others. Like you can buy two legs of the chair but not the other two legs. Well, then that's not a chair. So focus on making sure that your units of production have what it takes for them to succeed and that often implies access to the raw materials that intermediate inputs, the tools, spare parts that no Nigeria doesn't currently make. But that's fine. That's how East Asia did it. If you look at, you know, they started exporting garments, they weren't making the textiles, and they weren't making the fibres, and they weren't making the cotton. They started cutting and sewing and then they move from cutting and sewing to designing the shirts and so on, then they move to making the textiles then they move to maybe making the artificial threads that went into new forms of textiles and they did that gradually. But they did not start by closing themselves off from all the inputs that the world produces, and that you could use to make stuff in Nigeria. So I would say the problem in Nigeria, is that you have a fiscal problem that is being solved by printing too much money that generates an exchange rate mess, that exchange rate mess, creates an environment that makes it very difficult for companies to operate. And in that process, it generates an overvalued exchange rate, which makes manufacturing artificially uncompetitive, and you get less of it, not more of it, less of it because you want, you know, you're constraining the exchange rate at which they could be exporting. And you're constraining their access to raw materials and intermediate inputs. So if anything, you're hurting the chances for growth, not helping them. Tobi Lawson Part of the reasons asscribed to countries like Nigeria, finding it impossible to industrialise, or even diversify their sources of income is the "resource curse" hypothesis. First of all,  is this a real thing, are countries like Venezuela and Nigeria poor because of the so called Dutch disease? And secondly, how do countries that are also resource rich like Norway and Australia, who are rich and highly developed? How did they manage to break out of the "resource curse." Ricardo Hausmann So there are different interpretations of the resource curse when the Dutch disease was coined. It was coined because there was a boom in the Netherlands of a natural gas exports. And those natural gas exports meant that they were exporting a lot, generating a lot of foreign exchange, and their local currency strengthened and that strengthening of the local currency made the rest of the economy uncompetitive. So, if that were the problem, then that would have been a problem in 2007 In Nigeria when the price of oil reached $140 a barrel. But then it goes away as a problem now after 2014 when the price of oil went under $40. Right. So that's no longer the problem, right? I mean, Nigeria's exports of oil are coming down, oil production is stagnant, domestic oil consumption is up. So oil exports are going nowhere, and the price of oil is now lower than it was 10 years ago. Okay. So excess of foreign exchange that used to be called the Dutch disease is no longer a problem. I wrote a paper with my colleague Roberto Rigobon, saying that the problem may not be just how much foreign exchange your oil makes, but just the fact that it's a very volatile amount. Now that it goes up in some years down another year. So the exchange rate as a consequence is very unstable and unpredictable and it makes business in the country, very risky, because you don't know what is the exchange rate or you're going to face and that's not so much because you have a lot of oil, it's just because oil income is very volatile. So that's a separate problem. And that one typically has to be addressed by having some mechanism that stabilises government finances. So you have to run a government that has unstable income and wants to have stable spending programmes. So you want kids to be able to go to school every year. You want roads cleaned and repaired every year. You want to have the hospitals open every year. You want to police services every year but your income is going up and down. How do you do that? That's a problem of stabilising the government accounts and that's a different kind of problem of living with oil. A third problem of living with oil is something that they call rent-seeking. That is, all the money is in the government, then people who are very entrepreneurial, instead of setting up businesses may dedicate themselves to trying to grab the money that the government has. And so it distorts the incentives of society from, you know, doing things that are productive to doing things that are unproductive but profitable in just trying to seek the rents that the state has. I honestly, don't think that that's that big of a problem in Nigeria, given how small our oil revenues, vis a vis, the size of the society. So I think the big puzzle in Nigeria is why the country has not diversified more, given how little oil it has, you know, in a country like Kuwait or in a country like the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, you know, you can ask yourself a question, Well, why would they diversify, they have so much foreign exchange that they don't know what to do with it? The question in Nigeria is why have you not diversified in spite of the fact that oil is generating so little revenue these days? Tobi LawsonI'll just ask you a few off the cuff question, what is your opinion on on the so called Washington Consensus, has it failed In Africa or Latin America? Is it misunderstood? Do developing countries need to think beyond macroeconomic stability and all the other recipes proposed by the IMF? What was the way to think about this? Ricardo Hausmann Okay, so the Washington Consensus is a term that was coined by John Williamson who just passed away a week or two ago in a seminar in 1989 or 1990. I think it was 1990, a seminar that was called 'Latin American adjustment, how much has happened?' So it was really a Latin American question. Latin America was in a debt crisis, the debt crisis was associated with the fact that during the oil boom of the 1970s, it had borrowed too much money, then it was unable to pay that money and it was mired in, in a debt crisis and the question is, how do you get out of there and john Williamson said, there are these 10 things that sort of like Washington institutions agree, would be good to sort of like get out of the Latin American debt crisis. But then these 10 things became like the 10 commandments. You can take them to Eastern Europe, you can take them to sub Saharan Africa, you can take them to North Africa and the Middle East. You take them out of context, and they're supposed to work marvels no matter what. It's, it's it, in my mind, policies have to be solutions to problems. Tell me the problem, let's design a solution. It's not here are 10 solutions. You haven't told me what the problem is. So I think that policies have to be problem driven, and not solution driven and Washington Consensus is a set of solutions without a problem. So in my mind, it ended up creating an environment in which people stopped thinking about what are the policies that they need to adopt, and just as to whether they have or haven't adopted the 10 policies in the list, even if those 10 policies in the list wouldn't solve the problem that we're trying to solve? Because, you know, you haven't even asked the question, what is the problem you're trying to solve? So that's why, with my colleagues, Andres Velasco and Dani Rodrik, we develop this idea of growth diagnostics, that the first thing you have to do is to try to understand what the problem is and once you have a clear idea of what the nature of the problem is, then let's explore the solution space and most likely, you're not going to end in the Washington Consensus, because you know, it will be a coincidence that you do. So from a certain point of view, the worst thing that was delivered by the Washington Consensus, is that it encouraged people to stop thinking of what the right policies are and just assuming that they have an implemented as list of policies that may not be the right ones. Tobi LawsonYou've also been in government in Venezuela. So I'll ask you, what you think holds up the use of knowledge by policymakers? Or should I say what prevents the right diagnosis of the problems that some poor countries have? Because, what you find is that and Nigeria is also a good example of this. What you find is that a lot of these countries, even though different administrations different political actors, they come into power and repeat the same policies that have been tried in the past and failed. So, what prevents the diffusion of knowledge at a governmental level? Ricardo HausmannWell, I mean, I think that people do not act on the basis of how they see the world on the ideas that they have in their heads, and on the interpretations they make of the world. So ideas can change the world, if they change how people think about the world, how people interpret the world, how, how those ideas, help them to think how to act on the world. And I'm an optimist in the sense that I've tried to develop ideas, diffuse ideas, train people, educate people, work with governments, try to help them think through issues that they face. That's why I created the growth lab, the growth lab is a group of about 50 people, and we not only do fundamental research on the issues of economic development and growth. But, we also work with countries around the world, trying to help them think through these issues and we also you know, teach and educate them, and so on. So, I think ideas have a complicated way of diffusing. I think a lot of the problems in the world are related to the diffusion or the popularity of some bad ideas and if I didn't believe that I wouldn't be in the business of trying to produce new ideas, diffuse good ideas, and so on, or what I think are good ideas. So for example, I think that the Washington Consensus has been pretty much superseded by the idea that policies have to be solutions to problems and not solutions in search of a problem and that you don't start by assuming that you know, what the solution is, before you clarify what the nature of the problem is and I think those ideas have permeated even, you know, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and so on, with difficulty, because the alternative paradigm is still popular. I mean, this whole idea of best practices, very dangerous idea, it supposes that people know how to do things, like here's the right the right way to do things, which presumes something like, you know, there is the perfect suit and you know, there's no such thing as a perfect suit, there's only a perfectly tailored suit, and everybody has a different body. So you have to tailor the suit differently and there's a lot of detail in the tailoring. So one thing is how do you defuse better ideas? And the other thing is, is it a problem of politicians not wanting to know, because the ideas they have, are an expression more of their interests than not their knowledge? It's like they like the idea because it advances their interests? Or is it just that they are wrong, or they have the wrong view of the world and you know, there's a big debate on whether its interests or whether it's ideas, the nature of the problem. I'm an optimist in the sense that I think that a lot of the things that happen in the world can be fixed by proving the ideas with which people see the world, analyse the world, interpret the world, think about the world and that's why I'm in the business of, you know, research, and teaching, you know, researching better ideas and teaching about them and by the way, Nigeria is one of the countries that sends more people to our executive education courses at the Harvard Kennedy School. There's, there's a huge community of people who have had some connection with the Harvard Kennedy School in Nigeria and you know, these are the ideas that will teach. So I'm hoping that the, you know, the reason why you have a podcast, the reason why you are trying to promote these discussions is because you also believe that the nature of the ideas with which people think the world is important for progress. That's why you do what you do. Tobi Lawson Thank you. I have a question, the relationship between democracy and development is also one that comes up regularly. I know there is a Acemoglu and Naidu paper that more or less, infer that democracy is good for growth. But lots of people, I will see people with other interests, but that's speculative, would say, Oh, well look at China. China is an authoritarian one party state and look at all the growth they have, what are the nuances on these relationships between democracy and growth or any political system? Ricardo Hausmann So I like very much the ideas about this that have been, you know, growing in a certain political economy literature, where people like Hans Rosling or Mounk or Yascha Mounk, or Dani Rodrik have been proposing, and that's that you really want to distinguish between three different rights. Okay, One is the right of the majority to make decisions about democracy. Right. So, you know, the governments are decided by a majority of people. So that's, you know, making sure that the government represents a significant swath of the population. That's, that's one idea, call that democracy. A second idea, is the idea of some kind of universal rights, that they yes, no, you might be in the minority. But that doesn't mean that the majority can kill, you can expropriate, you can harm you and torture you. Right, that there are some inalienable rights that are protected for everybody, whether you're in the majority or in the minority. And that's different. That's an idea that is often associated with liberalism. So the idea of liberal democracy is this funny balance between the majority rules, but everybody has some guarantees, right and then there is the third problem. So this second problem is called individual rights, it's very important if you're going to have something like a market economy, because if property is going to be poorly distributed as as it is everywhere, then if the majority decides to expropriate the minority, then the minority is not going to play ball and if they are the ones that have dropped the knowledge, their capacity to organise businesses and so on, they don't play ball, then there's no development. So you have to balance this individual rights with these with the idea of majority rule and on top of that, you may have other rights, a social rights that that people might want to have protected, you know, the majority might be a Muslim, and and there's a Christian minority or vice versa, do the social rights of the minority, are they protected? So there's like individual rights, social rights and majority rule and when we say democracy, we don't necessarily make these distinctions. But, what I will tell you is that the protection of individual rights is fundamental. That majority rule is also important, that these two things making them compatible is difficult and what makes it difficult to make it compatible is that somebody has to tell the majority, the elected government, the majority of society, you cannot do these things to the others and who's that thing? Well, it's suppose it's, it's an independent judiciary, something that is not under majority rule and those are the things that these populists like to destroy.  These checks and balances, that are in the system to defend the rights of the individual or the rights of minorities. So I will tell you that democracy if it's majority rule, that does not protect the rights of the individual is not going to be good for development and a lot of the development of the 19th century in Europe, happen in liberal governments, that is governments that protected individual rights, that were not democratic. So I would, instead of asking the question, you know, democracy, good or bad, I would ask the question, majority rule, individual rights, minority social rights, are they being protected? And obviously, it's great if you have all three. But let's not assume that just because you have majority rule you have all three. Tobi LawsonWhat about the issue of globalisation? I know your colleague, Dani Rodrik has written about this, he has this famous trilemma. How much should developing countries worry about things like the globalisation of capital, the level of interconnectedness of the economies with the developed countries and other parts of the world and some of the risk that may come with that, like the global financial crisis of 2008. So how should developing countries think about this, we also have the Asian Financial currency crisis of 1997 as a backdrop. Ricardo  Hausmann So as a backdrop, so the way I think about it is that, you know, Nigeria is a country of 200 million people give or take, that give or take is about 3% of the world population. If ideas were one per capita, then 97% of the ideas are outside of Nigeria and you want to use all of the ideas available to create progress in Nigeria. So you want Nigeria to connect to this global social brain. So inserting Nigeria in the flow of these ideas, these know-hows, these technologies, these ways of doing things is very important for Nigeria's development and this quote unquote, 'globalisation' this interconnection. Now people emphasize a lot, on capital flows and, or maybe goods and services. But I want to emphasise insertion of Nigeria into other flows into the flows of people Nigerians abroad and how they connect back home that they asked for, or foreigners in Nigeria? How can they bring in stuff? ideas? Know how there was not there before? How do you connect your universities abroad? How you connect your research centres with the rest of the world, etc. So how interconnected are your possibilities with, you know, all the advances of the world. So from that point of view, I will say that globalisation is a force for good. I think that, as I mentioned before, one of the key developments going forward is going to be the fact that a lot of the tasks in the world can be done from anywhere and that creates an opportunity for Nigerians to be able to perform tasks, sell their their ideas, do stuff for the rest of the world, through zoom, or, you know, Microsoft Teams, or whatever. So, you know, right now, we are producing a podcast, you're in Nigeria, I'm in the US, we didn't ask permission for anybody to do this, we're producing something jointly and you wouldn't want a world where this becomes illegal or becomes regulated or restricted. So I think that these opportunities are probably more valuable for developing countries and therefore developed countries, it's a very important stepping stone forward. So I hope the world remains sufficiently open, so that the countries in the global south are able to tap into the flows of progress that are happening elsewhere in the world. Now, that doesn't mean that you have to renounce national sovereignty too much. But it's very important to understand that there are two competing goals. One goal is to have sovereign policy. So every polity, every political community can decide more or less what it is that they want to do and that's a good thing. The other good thing is to have common policies that, you know, if we can agree on, you know, whether computers are going to run 120 volts, or 240 volts, doesn't really matter. They can work equally well, at 120, or 240. But if we have a standard, it's easier for everybody, so my stuff can work in your country and your stuff can work in my country. So having common policies is also good, and to the extent that a lot of the human interactions are happening between people who belong to different political jurisdictions, you know, people who are in different countries, then the value of common rules becomes that much more important. I like to say that sovereign state can be half a bridge over say, the river that separates it from the neighbouring country, but the other half of the bridge has to be built by the other country and on half a bridge, you don't get half the traffic, you get zero. So there is some value of having common rules. I think part of the tension that is at the core of this is that there is a good thing of having sovereign national rules that the local political community can agree on, and have in common rules, rules that are respected both by us and by people in the rest of the world that are interacting with us and that that tension is a little bit what the world is trying to figure out. But, the forces that are favouring deeper globalisation, I think are technological in nature and they're very powerful they are not, it used to be the decline in the cost of transportation. Now, it's incredible expansion of the ability to move information around and you know, you just see by the magnitude of just the number of things that are available online for you to watch whether it's Netflix or Amazon Prime, 500 different television channels, and the news of the world, etc. You would want every society to have access to COVID-19 vaccines, you wouldn't want every society to have to produce its own vaccine. So there's enormous benefits from a world where international interactions are deeper, we just need to figure out what's the political arrangements that makes that as compatible as possible with local preferences. Tobi Lawson What about inequality, which is also a very topical issue now, whether it's on TV or Davos, talking, everybody's worried about inequality issue. Is the optimal point for poor countries or developing countries to start seeing these as a problem. So what I'm saying is, do countries need to concentrate on growth first, is there a trade off, because most of the remedies to inequality at least the policy proposals involve redistribution and poor economies may not have the fiscal capacity, some attempt it, but they may not have the capacity to do the kind of redistribution that some politicians are proposing to deal with the problem. So how do you think about this? Ricardo Hausmann So I think it's very important to finish the sentence, inequality of what, because if we don't specify the what we don't know what we're talking about, and I think that a lot of the discussion presumes a what we are concerned about what inequality we're concerned about and a lot of the discussion is what you might want to call the inequality of income and the idea out there is that there's sort of like a national pie, and some people are getting very big slices of the national pie and other people are getting small slices of the national pie. And then as you say, maybe can we redistribute how people are slicing the national pie. But an alternative way of thinking about this is that there is really no national pie. There are different pies that are being baked by different organisations, by companies or firms of a different size, and so on and so in reality, what you have is an enormous inequality in the sizes of the pies that different parts of society are baking. Okay, so it's inequality in the sizes of the pie, not in the way each pie is being sliced. Imagine that each pie is a corporation, it's a company or an organisation of some kind. Well, we know some of them are informal family, micro enterprises, and some are, you know, bigger companies, and so on. So, and inside each one of them, there is a division of, of the pie in slices. But what would strike you is enormous inequality in the sizes of these pies, to call it by another name, there is enormous inequality in productivity. There are some parts of society that are operating at very low levels of productivity, you know, I drove from Abuja to Kaduna and then on to Kano, and I stopped in a bunch of rural villages, and I looked at the farms and how they were farming and how much corn they were getting per hectare, and how many hectares they had to produce, and how they were doing things. Amazingly low productivity farms, where, you know, farmers would be able working very, very hard to tender to one or two hectares, and at very low productivity and very low incomes. So one thing I really worry a lot about is what can we do to reduce the inequality in productivities and I think that the inequalities in productivities, are very large, because there's many people who are excluded from access to the things that will make them more productive to the networks of energy, or transportation, of labour markets, of knowledge, of agricultural extension services, of value chains, of storage facilities, of logistics, and so on, that would allow their work to be much more productive. So to me, a strategy of inclusion, so as to make everybody's work more productive, especially the ones that are operating at the lowest level of productivity gains, that would be good for growth, because growth has to do with how productive are people and you're able to make them more productive, output will be higher. So it's a strategy for growth. But because we're focusing on the least productive and making them more productive, you're also reducing income inequality. So our strategy for inclusion is a win-win strategy. It's a strategy that makes everybody better off and it would reduce inequality to strategy for growth. It's a strategy that would reduce inequality, a strategy of redistribution. It's sort of like compensating people for their exclusion, saying, Well, given that, you know, you have to operate in a place where there's no electricity, there's no irrigation, or no good roads, there's no storage facilities, there's no logistics, you know, so there's nobody to take your crop when it's time and it's starting to run. So you have to sell it at whatever price you can get. So we live in an environment that is very unproductive and because of that, here's a check, or here's some money. Well, that's compensating them for the fact that they cannot operate in a more productive environment, and that that's a very, very secondary improvement. These people would be much happier. If instead of compensating them for their exclusion, you would stop excluding them and focus on including them and that can be as expensive or more expensive from a fiscal space point of view than redistribution. But it implies a completely different way to think about the problem and to allocate resources. So I think that what less developed societies need is a strategy for inclusion because it's Win win and because it's better. Tobi Lawson Africa is currently at about 50% urbanisation and that's projected to reach about 75% by the middle of the century. We are quite worried about our cities, overpopulation, infrastructure, and so many other things. What do you think of new ideas and development that are coming up, like charter cities, these was first proposed by Paul Romer, a little over a decade ago, but it's gaining some traction in some circles. I know there are experiments in Honduras, and some other places, what's your opinion about fancy ideas or  radical ideas like this?Ricardo HausmannSo first of all, I think the fact that Africa is urbanising is potentially a very good thing. You're mentioning that, you know, it's dangerous, because it might require more infrastructure and so on. Well, the truth is, it's cheaper to provide infrastructure and public services in urban areas than in rural areas. So it just makes, you know, the lack of provision of infrastructure more visible maybe. But it's cheaper to provide that infrastructure in urban areas than it is in rural areas. So in principle, urbanisation can be a good thing. Unfortunately, Africa has figured out ways, and Latin America too, to make cities that are poor, and that are disastrous, and that suddenly, you might get the increases in crime and insecurity and other sorts of problems that were not there in rural life. So it's very important to get urbanisation right and I think that a critical determinant of whether a city is successful or is not successful, is one of the things that can be done in the city, and sold outside of the city, or to people who live outside of the city, every place in the country and every place in the world is dependent on being able to buy things that it doesn't make and the way to buy things that you don't make is to trade for them and for that, you have to make things that are bought by people outside of their place. So whether it's a village, whether it's a state, whether it's a city or a country, it's very, very important that you have things that you can sell to people who live outside of your place. So you can trade for the things that your place doesn't do and what we found is many cities just don't develop those things and they end up for example, one of the reasons why capital cities are so big, it's because the way they get money is by taxing the rest of the country and spending the money. But it's not that the city itself is a source of activity and wealth and production and so on. So that's why it's so important that we get cities that are competitive in a line of things that can be sold outside the city. That's the critical thing. I am not particularly enamoured by the idea that charter city is a solution for something. The idea that Paul Romer deservedly won the Nobel Prize for making us understand how difficult it is to explain growth and he has a theory of, you know, what does it take to explain global growth, that is growth at the technological frontier of the world. He doesn't really have a theory of what explains why some countries catch up and other countries don't catch up. What explains the distance that countries have relative to the technological frontier? It's a country like Singapore, with a income per capita, say of 60,000? Why are countries at $1,000 or $2,000 so? What can you do to get to $60,000? Paul Romer's contribution to economics doesn't answer that question. It asks, What determines the rate of growth of countries that are at $60,000? So he, in some sense, borrowed the idea of the problem why countries are not at $60,000 the things that prevent you from being at the technological frontier. He thinks that the reason why countries don't approach the technological frontier is because they have bad institutions. That's his explanation. That they have bad institutions and, and charter cities are a way of like buying good institutions, important, good institutions and that's his interpretation of what happened in Hong Kong. Hong Kong because of, you know, the settlement of the wars with China, it was given to Britain and it was run by Britain and it was British rules that led to the growth of Hong Kong. So he's saying why can't we make other places like Hong Kong, I will put it to you that the reason why countries don't approach the technological frontier is not necessarily institutions that you can import. It's technology itself. Technology has trouble diffusing. So the distance with technological frontiers is of technological distance and the reason why you don't catch up in that technological distance is because of the nature of technology itself. The kinds of institutions that you can import are not the only thing there was because you know, after all, the British Empire had a bunch of charter cities under British rule. That didn't make Ghana or Bangladesh or Sri Lanka rich, right. So I don't necessarily think that that technological gap can be fixed by the kind of importing of institutions by chartering your city to somebody who knows how to run things. It might be in some sense, a way of importing government technology if you want to put it in my language. So I think that the problem is really trying to understand how technology diffuses, I think the future is a lot in the hands of people that it's much easier to move brains than it is to move know how into brains. That's why I emphasise before migration diasporas promoting foreign direct investment, maybe having your conglomerates internationalise and connect your country to the rest of the world, that it is through these channels that technology flows, and it's those channels that we need to focus on. Tobi Lawson One of my final question will be going further on that note, again, last couple of years, we've seen the rise of the use of RCT in economics research, particularly development economics, built on the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, and, I'm Michael Kremer, who are Nobel winners and you can see the idea gained a lot of traction where you have nonprofit organisations like Givewell adopting a lot of the findings from the research from these new school of thought so to speak. What are your impressions of this turn in development economics research, generally, especially the influence on policy? I'll give you an example. Nigeria, for example has been trying we have this national policy of lifting a 100 million people out of poverty. But when you change the proposal, what you will find is this basket of proposals that have been lifted from RCTs, you know, social interventions, cash transfers and they haven't really worked and you will find that international aid organisations and policymakers love them. So, what is your impression of this turn in development economics, have we given up on growth, is that it? Ricardo Hausmann So I think that, you know, randomised controlled trials, RCTs are a tool and, you know, they are very good to answer some questions, they are useless to answer other questions. So for example, if you want to know if it's better, to give money to farmers at the time of harvesting, or give money to farmers at the time of sowing, and in terms of you know, the impact on their well being, and so on, maybe you find that it's better to give farmers money at the time of sowing because then they can use that money to sow and if you give them the money at time of harvesting, then they already have money. So giving them more money at the time when they already have money is not the ideal time to give them money. So so maybe that's something you can answer with a randomised control trial. What kind of structure should a country have? What Social Security structure should a country have? What infrastructure plan should a country have? What exchange rate regime should a country have? What, even educational system should a country have, those things you cannot do RCT on? You know, they're just not the instrument to answer those questions. So if you only do things for which you can do an RCT, you are going to be doing some kinds of things just because, you know, as they say, you look for the keys under the lamppost, not because you lost the keys on the lamppost, it's because it's the only place where you can see something. RCTs I think, have twisted the development agenda away from policies that are probably the most impactful, but for which you cannot do RCTs and into something that my good friend Lance Pritchard likes to call kinky development policies, that they are kinky in the sense that they want to do a small kink. So for example, you can do an RCT and whether putting flip charts in a school improves learning, or whether giving tablets to kids in a school improves learning, or whether taking a picture of teachers when they attend school improves teacher attendance and consequently, student learning. So all of these things you can do an RCT on, you can take a bunch of schools, you do it in some schools or another schools, and you see if it made a difference. But those are answers to super small questions to small kinks, in if you want in the way you do things. They don't go to answer more fundamental questions as to how to organise many, many aspects of society. So in my mind, the idea, by the way, and the answer much less than the promise, for example, they can tell you that if you do it this way, it works better than if you do it that way. If you give micronutrients to children in Guatemala, that it improves their learning. Okay, it doesn't answer two questions. The first question is, how does it do it? Does it do it? Because it improves their nutrition? Does it do it because we connected the family to a set of services that had other benefits for other reasons. For example, you can do an RCT, give half a million people, we force them to smoke and the other half a million people you force them not to smoke and then we look at the difference in cancer rates to see if smoking causes cancer. But, it doesn't tell you what about smoking causes cancer. What is the substance in smoking that triggers the cancer? We learn nothing about the biology of the process, the mechanism of the process and secondly, if you say give macronutrients in Guatemala, and it works, you don't know if it would work in Nigeria or if it would work in Norway, or in Singapore because maybe in other places kids don't have those deficiencies. You can do an RCT to find that, you know, whether if you give tablets to kids in school, you want to know if they can improve learning or not and you find out that it didn't improve learning. What have you learned? Well, you've already learned that that tablet used in that particular way, with that particular teaching materials in the tablet, by teachers trained in that particular way, didn't make much difference. But it doesn't answer the question. If you were to try to improve education in the school, and one of the elements would be the tablet, how should we use the tablet? What teaching materials should the tablet include? How should the teacher use those teaching materials? What should students be expected to do with those teaching materials? and so on? So it doesn't answer any of those questions? It just tells you, you did x, do some didn't have some effect or not have that effect. And as a consequence, I think one of the bad things that the RCT revolution has done is it has tended to put donors and a lot of attention to these small questions that can be answered by RCTs away from the really important questions that may not be answerable to RCTs. Tobi Lawson Do you think that economists should be more involved or influential in the politics in developing economies, for example, it's impossible to know this, but I want to pose the hypothetical anyway. How would Venezuela have fared if you were the president instead of the economic Minister? Ricardo Hausmann So, I think for economics to do its work? Well, it should be a science that answers questions. But that politics should be decided not only on the basis of technical solutions to questions, but also in terms of social preferences of what people want done, what priorities people have, what's more important for them, what do they want? And so I think that science cannot be a substitute of the political process. I think science should participate in the political process. I don't like when people say, you know, government should do what scientists tells them to do. Science doesn't answer the questions that many political systems need to address. For example, science can tell you if there is contagion, or there is a contagion in schools or how much contagion in schools varies. It might help you understand how are people getting infected and how they get

Nobel Prize-winning economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo discuss vaccine inequality and how developed nations failed poorer countries early in the pandemic. Matt Hancock, British Health Secretary, talks about the summit today at the G7 in Oxford and the concern in the U.K. over the new variant. Major General Sami Sadat, Commanding General of the Afghan Army 215 Maiwand Corps, discuss the U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan and a new UN report warning the Taliban poses a severe threat to the Afghan government. Michel Martin talks with award-winning author Kiese Laymon about revising two of his books eight years after they were originally published. To learn more about how CNN protects listener privacy, visit cnn.com/privacy

Contro la povertà, un metodo da Nobel. E' il metodo scientifico mutuato dalla medicina e applicato all'economia ad aver fatto vincere l'ambito premio a tre economisti del Mit e di Harvard Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee e Michael Kremer. Duflo, 46 anni, è la premio Nobel più giovane in assoluto. “Gli economisti – sostiene la professoressa franco-americana - sono un po' come degli idraulici, hanno il compito di riparare le tubature bucate dalle politiche pubbliche”. Memos ha ospitato Emiliano Brancaccio, economista all'università del Sannio, autore di “Il discorso del potere” (il Saggiatore, 2019). Brancaccio ha commentato i Nobel per l'economia di quest'anno e una nostra intervista a Esther Duflo, realizzata nel 2011 in occasione della presentazione a Milano di un suo libro. Chiude la puntata di oggi Loredana Taddei, tra le fondatrici di “Se non ora quando”, ex responsabile nazionale politiche femminili della Cgil.

《商界 · 早知道》每周一到周五早8点半，我们为您奉上最新鲜的商业资讯。看更多精彩资讯和优质文章，敬请关注商界和商界公众号。【中国粮食安全白皮书：吃饱饭不求人！中国实现谷物基本自给】14日，国务院新闻办公室发表《中国的粮食安全》白皮书，这是继1996年后，中国政府发表的第二部粮食白皮书。白皮书指出，中国人口占世界的近1/5，粮食产量约占世界的1/4。目前，中国人均粮食占有量达到470公斤左右，高于世界平均水平。 2019年诺贝尔经济学奖研究大大提高了应对全球贫困的能力。在短短的二十年中，他们基于实验的新方法改变了发展经济学，如今已成为一个蓬勃发展的研究领域： 【2019年诺贝尔经济学奖公布】据诺贝尔奖官网消息，瑞典斯德哥尔摩当地时间14日中午，2019年诺贝尔经济学奖揭晓，获奖者阿比吉特·巴纳吉（Abhijit Banerjee）、埃丝特·迪弗洛（Esther Duflo）和迈克尔·克雷默（Michael Kremer），以表彰他们“在减轻全球贫困方面的实验性做法”。（证券时报） 【中国演出行业协会：网络主播不需持证上岗】中国演出行业协会官方微博10月14日发布通知称，近日，网络上出现了多条关于“网络主播持证上岗”的信息，引起行业从业者和社会大众的误解。为正视听，特此向社会大众郑重声明如下： 目前，网络表演（直播）领域没有统一的职业认证体系，不存在从业准入门槛或“持证上岗”的情况。请广大网络直播从业者对各类培训、考试信息理性判断，避免上当受骗，蒙受经济损失。（@中国演出行业协会） 【国内53家主要网络直播和视频平台上线“青少年模式”】近日，国家网信办继续深入推进青少年网络防沉迷工作，统筹指导六间房、花椒直播等24家网络直播平台，搜狐视频、百度视频等9家网络视频平台统一上线“青少年模式”。在该模式下关闭站内搜索、弹幕评论、内容分享、私信聊天、拍摄发布、充值打赏等功能，仅推荐适合青少年观看的内容，确保“青少年模式”下的内容池更健康更有益。（中国网信网） 【深陷ETC指标抢夺战的银行职员开始争夺下沉市场了】眼下各大银行的ETC大战正在成为一场胶着的拉锯战：有价值的潜在客户已挖掘殆尽，寻找新的客户并非易事，然而指标任务依旧沉重。各大银行推广ETC的动机也从争夺市场转向了抢夺指标。 如今很多银行职员跑到远离高速的乡村去“开拓下沉市场”，同时，许多没有远途行驶需要的车辆也成为了各大行狩猎的目标，比如驾校的训练车等。依靠活跃的有效客户来完成既定的任务目标几乎是不可能的。（21世纪经济报道） 【大闸蟹价格跳水那…可以敞开吃了？】近日，饿了么、盒马鲜生联合发布的报告显示，大闸蟹外卖客单价同比去年下降9.3%，阳澄湖大闸蟹更是下跌31.6％。盒马生鲜普通大闸蟹的价格也较往年下降达15%。继小龙虾价格跳水后，大闸蟹价格也跳水。 【中国男性博主攻占美妆市场：男性博主展现出非同一般的观众缘】在美容美妆领域，男性博主展现出非同一般的观众缘。数据显示，中国某短视频平台上，电商美妆类博主已超过600万，美妆视频日均播放量超过6亿次。在抖音、快手、哔哩哔哩三大平台上，男性美妆博主占比超过二成。（环球时报） 【“走路就能赚钱”，趣步APP涉嫌传销、非法集资被查】在众多打着“走路赚钱”旗号的手机软件当中，“趣步”这款APP可谓异军突起，今年初还一度登上了某手机应用平台市场生活类下载量第一的位置。 简单来说，用户可以用步数在“趣步”上换购商品甚至提取现金，而且要求不算高，只要每天走够4000步，每月至少就能赚200元，而且上不封顶。近日，“趣步”却因涉嫌传销、非法集资、金融诈骗等违法行为被长沙市工商部门立案调查。（中国之声） 【敢给李嘉诚接盘的人出现了！】近日，李嘉诚旗下的长实集团被曝已将旗下大连市西岗项目出让给融创中国，交易价超过40亿元。长实集团随后确认该项目出售的消息属实，并称该项目约在半年前达成了协议出售，四个多月前签约落实。 【贾跃亭正式申请个人破产重组，目前债务净额约为20亿美金】10月14日，贾跃亭债务处理小组方面发布声明称，贾跃亭已于美国当地时间10月13日根据美国相关法律第11章主动申请个人破产重组，这将成为解决贾跃亭个人余下债务并保障债权人利益的最佳方案。Faraday Future表示，此举将彻底解决其在国内的债务问题，不会影响FF公司正常运营，对公司的股权融资和未来IPO将带来积极的帮助。（36氪） 很多并购案在资本层面的运作是迅速的，但在之后的整合中却遭遇各类问题，物美和麦德龙未来打算如何在供应链、体系、服务等方面进行对接和整合？ 【麦德龙中国总裁康德：物美控股后，不翻牌、不裁员、不降薪】距离物美拟控股麦德龙中国业务事件宣布仅3天，10月14日麦德龙中国总裁康德（Claude Sarrailh）向所有的总部员工解释此番交易事件以及后续的工作安排。 康德表示，物美控股后，麦德龙中国的管理层和员工架构不变，不会裁员，不会降薪，门店保持麦德龙品牌不变，未来依旧会以麦德龙品牌在中国发展新店。与物美的整合还需进一步细化和商议，但一定会加码数字化运作。（一财） 【马云捐赠1亿元用于研究及保护西溪湿地】马云公益基金会宣布向杭州市余杭区慈善总会捐赠1亿元人民币，用于西溪湿地的生态环境研究及保护。马云在捐赠仪式上表示：“今天的签约只是我们的第一步。我们会请世界顶级生态专家一起参与，将西溪湿地打造得像纽约中央公园一样。”公开资料显示，西溪湿地在2009年7月7日被录入国际重要湿地名录，与西湖、西泠并称杭州“三西”。（腾讯科技） 国际消息：【WTO正式支持美国对欧盟商品征收关税】据外媒报道，WTO正式支持美国对欧盟商品征收关税。此前美国政府称，欧洲对空客的补贴在过去几十年里对美国经济造成了巨大损害。上周，法国财政部长布鲁诺·勒梅尔(BrunoLe Maire)警告称，如果美国的关税在周五生效，欧洲将“别无选择，只能采取措施”。（第一财经） 【2020年起威尼斯将向游客收进城税2022年需预约进城】日前，意大利威尼斯市议会再次考量修正收取游客进城税的法案，并形成最新决议。新法案决定，2020年7月1日起，将对进入威尼斯市区游客征收进城税，并计划从2022年起，实施游客预约进入威尼斯景区。 报道称，威尼斯游客进城税将采用渐进式收费标准，按照每天的游客人数建立一套游客量化管理系统，然后根据游客的疏密程度，收取每人3欧元至10欧元的进城费。（中国新闻网）以上就是今天《商界早知道》的全部内容啦，如果觉得我们的内容不错，欢迎分享给你的好友。看更多精彩资讯和优质文章，敬请关注商界和商界微信公号。每周一到周五，《商界早知道》与你不见不散。

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