Podcast appearances and mentions of kevin esvelt

"There's almost no story of the future going well that doesn't have a part that's like '…and no evil person steals the AI weights and goes and does evil stuff.' So it has highlighted the importance of information security: 'You're training a powerful AI system; you should make it hard for someone to steal' has popped out to me as a thing that just keeps coming up in these stories, keeps being present. It's hard to tell a story where it's not a factor. It's easy to tell a story where it is a factor." — Holden KarnofskyWhat happens when a USB cable can secretly control your system? Are we hurtling toward a security nightmare as critical infrastructure connects to the internet? Is it possible to secure AI model weights from sophisticated attackers? And could AI might actually make computer security better rather than worse?With AI security concerns becoming increasingly urgent, we bring you insights from 15 top experts across information security, AI safety, and governance, examining the challenges of protecting our most powerful AI models and digital infrastructure — including a sneak peek from an episode that hasn't yet been released with Tom Davidson, where he explains how we should be more worried about “secret loyalties” in AI agents. You'll hear:Holden Karnofsky on why every good future relies on strong infosec, and how hard it's been to hire security experts (from episode #158)Tantum Collins on why infosec might be the rare issue everyone agrees on (episode #166)Nick Joseph on whether AI companies can develop frontier models safely with the current state of information security (episode #197)Sella Nevo on why AI model weights are so valuable to steal, the weaknesses of air-gapped networks, and the risks of USBs (episode #195)Kevin Esvelt on what cryptographers can teach biosecurity experts (episode #164)Lennart Heim on on Rob's computer security nightmares (episode #155)Zvi Mowshowitz on the insane lack of security mindset at some AI companies (episode #184)Nova DasSarma on the best current defences against well-funded adversaries, politically motivated cyberattacks, and exciting progress in infosecurity (episode #132)Bruce Schneier on whether AI could eliminate software bugs for good, and why it's bad to hook everything up to the internet (episode #64)Nita Farahany on the dystopian risks of hacked neurotech (episode #174)Vitalik Buterin on how cybersecurity is the key to defence-dominant futures (episode #194)Nathan Labenz on how even internal teams at AI companies may not know what they're building (episode #176)Allan Dafoe on backdooring your own AI to prevent theft (episode #212)Tom Davidson on how dangerous “secret loyalties” in AI models could be (episode to be released!)Carl Shulman on the challenge of trusting foreign AI models (episode #191, part 2)Plus lots of concrete advice on how to get into this field and find your fitCheck out the full transcript on the 80,000 Hours website.Chapters:Cold open (00:00:00)Rob's intro (00:00:49)Holden Karnofsky on why infosec could be the issue on which the future of humanity pivots (00:03:21)Tantum Collins on why infosec is a rare AI issue that unifies everyone (00:12:39)Nick Joseph on whether the current state of information security makes it impossible to responsibly train AGI (00:16:23)Nova DasSarma on the best available defences against well-funded adversaries (00:22:10)Sella Nevo on why AI model weights are so valuable to steal (00:28:56)Kevin Esvelt on what cryptographers can teach biosecurity experts (00:32:24)Lennart Heim on the possibility of an autonomously replicating AI computer worm (00:34:56)Zvi Mowshowitz on the absurd lack of security mindset at some AI companies (00:48:22)Sella Nevo on the weaknesses of air-gapped networks and the risks of USB devices (00:49:54)Bruce Schneier on why it's bad to hook everything up to the internet (00:55:54)Nita Farahany on the possibility of hacking neural implants (01:04:47)Vitalik Buterin on how cybersecurity is the key to defence-dominant futures (01:10:48)Nova DasSarma on exciting progress in information security (01:19:28)Nathan Labenz on how even internal teams at AI companies may not know what they're building (01:30:47)Allan Dafoe on backdooring your own AI to prevent someone else from stealing it (01:33:51)Tom Davidson on how dangerous “secret loyalties” in AI models could get (01:35:57)Carl Shulman on whether we should be worried about backdoors as governments adopt AI technology (01:52:45)Nova DasSarma on politically motivated cyberattacks (02:03:44)Bruce Schneier on the day-to-day benefits of improved security and recognising that there's never zero risk (02:07:27)Holden Karnofsky on why it's so hard to hire security people despite the massive need (02:13:59)Nova DasSarma on practical steps to getting into this field (02:16:37)Bruce Schneier on finding your personal fit in a range of security careers (02:24:42)Rob's outro (02:34:46)Audio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongContent editing: Katy Moore and Milo McGuireTranscriptions and web: Katy Moore

"A shameless recycling of existing content to drive additional audience engagement on the cheap… or the single best, most valuable, and most insight-dense episode we put out in the entire year, depending on how you want to look at it." — Rob WiblinIt's that magical time of year once again — highlightapalooza! Stick around for one top bit from each episode, including:How to use the microphone on someone's mobile phone to figure out what password they're typing into their laptopWhy mercilessly driving the New World screwworm to extinction could be the most compassionate thing humanity has ever doneWhy evolutionary psychology doesn't support a cynical view of human nature but actually explains why so many of us are intensely sensitive to the harms we cause to othersHow superforecasters and domain experts seem to disagree so much about AI risk, but when you zoom in it's mostly a disagreement about timingWhy the sceptics are wrong and you will want to use robot nannies to take care of your kids — and also why despite having big worries about the development of AGI, Carl Shulman is strongly against efforts to pause AI research todayHow much of the gender pay gap is due to direct pay discrimination vs other factorsHow cleaner wrasse fish blow the mirror test out of the waterWhy effective altruism may be too big a tent to work wellHow we could best motivate pharma companies to test existing drugs to see if they help cure other diseases — something they currently have no reason to bother with…as well as 27 other top observations and arguments from the past year of the show.Check out the full transcript and episode links on the 80,000 Hours website.Remember that all of these clips come from the 20-minute highlight reels we make for every episode, which are released on our sister feed, 80k After Hours. So if you're struggling to keep up with our regularly scheduled entertainment, you can still get the best parts of our conversations there.It has been a hell of a year, and we can only imagine next year is going to be even weirder — but Luisa and Rob will be here to keep you company as Earth hurtles through the galaxy to a fate as yet unknown.Enjoy, and look forward to speaking with you in 2025!Chapters:Rob's intro (00:00:00)Randy Nesse on the origins of morality and the problem of simplistic selfish-gene thinking (00:02:11)Hugo Mercier on the evolutionary argument against humans being gullible (00:07:17)Meghan Barrett on the likelihood of insect sentience (00:11:26)Sébastien Moro on the mirror test triumph of cleaner wrasses (00:14:47)Sella Nevo on side-channel attacks (00:19:32)Zvi Mowshowitz on AI sleeper agents (00:22:59)Zach Weinersmith on why space settlement (probably) won't make us rich (00:29:11)Rachel Glennerster on pull mechanisms to incentivise repurposing of generic drugs (00:35:23)Emily Oster on the impact of kids on women's careers (00:40:29)Carl Shulman on robot nannies (00:45:19)Nathan Labenz on kids and artificial friends (00:50:12)Nathan Calvin on why it's not too early for AI policies (00:54:13)Rose Chan Loui on how control of OpenAI is independently incredibly valuable and requires compensation (00:58:08)Nick Joseph on why he's a big fan of the responsible scaling policy approach (01:03:11)Sihao Huang on how the US and UK might coordinate with China (01:06:09)Nathan Labenz on better transparency about predicted capabilities (01:10:18)Ezra Karger on what explains forecasters' disagreements about AI risks (01:15:22)Carl Shulman on why he doesn't support enforced pauses on AI research (01:18:58)Matt Clancy on the omnipresent frictions that might prevent explosive economic growth (01:25:24)Vitalik Buterin on defensive acceleration (01:29:43)Annie Jacobsen on the war games that suggest escalation is inevitable (01:34:59)Nate Silver on whether effective altruism is too big to succeed (01:38:42)Kevin Esvelt on why killing every screwworm would be the best thing humanity ever did (01:42:27)Lewis Bollard on how factory farming is philosophically indefensible (01:46:28)Bob Fischer on how to think about moral weights if you're not a hedonist (01:49:27)Elizabeth Cox on the empirical evidence of the impact of storytelling (01:57:43)Anil Seth on how our brain interprets reality (02:01:03)Eric Schwitzgebel on whether consciousness can be nested (02:04:53)Jonathan Birch on our overconfidence around disorders of consciousness (02:10:23)Peter Godfrey-Smith on uploads of ourselves (02:14:34)Laura Deming on surprising things that make mice live longer (02:21:17)Venki Ramakrishnan on freezing cells, organs, and bodies (02:24:46)Ken Goldberg on why low fault tolerance makes some skills extra hard to automate in robots (02:29:12)Sarah Eustis-Guthrie on the ups and downs of founding an organisation (02:34:04)Dean Spears on the cost effectiveness of kangaroo mother care (02:38:26)Cameron Meyer Shorb on vaccines for wild animals (02:42:53)Spencer Greenberg on personal principles (02:46:08)Producing and editing: Keiran HarrisAudio engineering: Ben Cordell, Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongVideo editing: Simon MonsourTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Kevin Esvelt, an associate professor at the MIT Media Lab and the inventor of CRISPR-based gene drive, joins Radio Boston.

AI has been a powerful accelerant for biological research, rapidly opening up new frontiers in medicine and public health. But that progress can also make it easier for bad actors to manufacture new biological threats. In this episode, Tristan and Daniel sit down with biologist Kevin Esvelt to discuss why AI has been such a boon for biologists and how we can safeguard society against the threats that AIxBio poses.RECOMMENDED MEDIASculpting Evolution: Information on Esvelt's lab at MIT.SecureDNA: Esvelt's free platform to provide safeguards for DNA synthesis.The Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening: The Biden admin's suggested guidelines for DNA synthesis regulation.Senate Hearing on Regulating AI Technology: C-SPAN footage of Dario Amodei's testimony to Congress.The AlphaFold Protein Structure DatabaseRECOMMENDED YUA EPISODESU.S. Senators Grilled Social Media CEOs. Will Anything Change?Big Food, Big Tech and Big AI with Michael MossThe AI DilemmaClarification: President Biden's executive order only applies to labs that receive funding from the federal government, not state governments.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Policy advocacy for eradicating screwworm looks cost-effective, published by MathiasKB on May 20, 2024 on The Effective Altruism Forum. The New World Screwworm causes tremendous suffering to wild and domestic animals on the South American continent. Gene drives make it possible to eradicate the screwworm and improve the wellbeing of hundreds of millions to billions of wild animals. I believe political advocacy to coordinate South American countries to use gene drives to eradicate the screwworm looks very tractable and highly impactful in expectation. In this post I will go over: 1. Why I believe this to be the case 2. What the intervention would look like 3. Beg and plead for someone to go do this Holy shit, Gene drives Like many on this forum, I listened to 80k's podcast episode with Kevin Esvelt, where they discussed using gene drives to eradicate diseases and thought to myself: "holy shit that's incredible, we should do something" to promptly forget all about it and move on with my life. Half a year later, when Works In Progress asked me if there was anything I wanted to write about, gene drives popped into my mind. As I started researching for the article, I became increasingly obsessed. Those misfortunate enough to have been around me during this period, have had to endure many long monologues about gene drives. Throughout my frenzy, I met with Professors, PhDs, and representatives from organisations working on gene drives to eradicate malaria. I've now come to the following two conclusions: 1. Society, at large, should be using gene drives for vector control of endemic diseases such as Malaria. The risks are minute, and the benefits are huge. 2. Political advocacy for using gene drives to eradicate screwworm in South America, looks incredibly impactful and very tractable. My article for the magazine (out soon!) is focused on the first point. This forum post is focused on the second. What is the New World Screwworm? The C. hominivorax, or New World Screwworm, is a blowfly, which lays its eggs in the wounds (and other openings, such as the nostrils or ears) of mammals. After hatching, the larvae dig in and begin eating the host alive. The stench left off by the infested wound attracts yet more screwworm flies to lay their eggs. Untreated, 20-80% of animals infected die from the infestation or infections that follow.[1] Humans, being mammals, are at risk too. Uruguay alone records hundreds of human cases every year.[2] As one can imagine, being eaten alive by parasites is not much fun. As the scientific literature puts it: "Animals with myiasis may display signs of discomfort, lethargy, weight loss and depression"[3] To put it as politely: Based on the pictures I have seen, I too would display signs of discomfort if it were me who was infected. In addition to infecting hundreds of millions of wild mammals, the New World screwworm costs the livestock industry hundreds of millions of dollars every year. To prevent the loss of livestock, North America eradicated the screwworm already in 1960 using the more primitive sterile insect technique. To prevent the screwworm from migrating back into North America, they additionally worked with Middle American governments to eradicate it there as well, and to this very day they maintain a wall of sterile screwworm in Panama to prevent screwworm from migrating back north. Since then eradication progress has stalled as the sterile insect technique has proven difficult and expensive to use on the South American continent, where the screwworm is endemic on the majority of the continent. A survey found that 76% of Uruguayan farmers go as far as to plan yearly animal management around avoiding the screwworm season, to avoid loss of livestock. In Uruguay alone, farmers lose between 40 to 150 million USD annually[4] (0.14% of the coun...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: On-Ramps for Biosecurity - A Model, published by Sofya Lebedeva on December 14, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Thank you to the following people for reviewing: @Lin BL @Tessa @Max Görlitz @Gregory Lewis @James Smith, Sandy Hickson & @Alix Pham TL:DR Getting a full-time role in biosecurity is hard Seeing a path to get there can be even harder I propose a model to think about on-ramps into biosecurity & provide a few use cases for it depending on the background you are coming in with. I provide an overview of how different organisations in this space fit into the model. If you are an undergrad start here. A common problem When I first heard about biosecurity I was excited by the 80,000 hours podcast and impressed by the work of Kevin Esvelt, RAND and NTI. Even though I was studying molecular biology, a seemingly relevant subject I couldn't see a way for me to get involved and to find a full-time role in this field. The gap between hearing about biosecurity and working full-time in biosecurity felt huge. Figure 1: The gap between hearing about biosecurity and working full-time in the field. A proposed on-ramp model Through my experiences with reading groups, UC Berkeley EA, SERI BITS and now the Oxford Biosecurity Group I have found that working on short, object-level, scalable projects fills this gap. And since I get questions of how to fill the gap from others new to the field I made a model to explain my thoughts. Figure 2: Proposed model for On-Ramps into Biosecurity. Using the model Below I outline some touch points that people have with various organisations in the biosecurity space. It's important to note that this model is not always linear. It's important to question your assumptions at every stage and the "stages" themselves can be more fluid. Hear about it (0 - 10 hours) This stage can be passive or active depending on your timeline. Note that a lot of the 'hear about it' resources can also be 'learn about it' resources if they are used for more in-depth research at a later stage. 80,000 Hours EA Forum (hehe) GCBR Organization Updates Newsletter Biosecurity newsletters you should subscribe to University Groups Your local EA Group Learn about it (10 - 40 hours) This stage usually takes around 1-2 months and is more passive. List of Short-Term (

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Adversarial Robustness Could Help Prevent Catastrophic Misuse, published by Aidan O'Gara on December 11, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. There have been several discussions about the importance of adversarial robustness for scalable oversight. I'd like to point out that adversarial robustness is also important under a different threat model: catastrophic misuse. For a brief summary of the argument: Misuse could lead to catastrophe. AI-assisted cyberattacks, political persuasion, and biological weapons acquisition are plausible paths to catastrophe. Today's models do not robustly refuse to cause harm. If a model has the ability to cause harm, we should train it to refuse to do so. Unfortunately, GPT-4, Claude, Bard, and Llama all have received this training, but they still behave harmfully when facing prompts generated by adversarial attacks, such as this one and this one. Adversarial robustness will likely not be easily solved. Over the last decade, thousands of papers have been published on adversarial robustness. Most defenses are near useless, and the best defenses against a constrained attack in a CIFAR-10 setting still fail on 30% of inputs. Redwood Research's work on training a reliable text classifier found the task quite difficult. We should not expect an easy solution. Progress on adversarial robustness is possible. Some methods have improved robustness, such as adversarial training and data augmentation. But existing research often assumes overly narrow threat models, ignoring both creative attacks and creative defenses. Refocusing research with good evaluations focusing on LLMs and other frontier models could lead to valuable progress. This argument requires a few caveats. First, it assumes a particular threat model: that closed source models will have more dangerous capabilities than open source models, and that malicious actors will be able to query closed source models. This seems like a reasonable assumption over the next few years. Second, there are many other ways to reduce risks from catastrophic misuse, such as removing hazardous knowledge from model weights, strengthening societal defenses against catastrophe, and holding companies legally liable for sub-extinction level harms. I think we should work on these in addition to adversarial robustness, as part of a defense-in-depth approach to misuse risk. Overall, I think adversarial robustness should receive more effort from researchers and labs, more funding from donors, and should be a part of the technical AI safety research portfolio. This could substantially mitigate the near-term risk of catastrophic misuse, in addition to any potential benefits for scalable oversight. The rest of this post discusses each of the above points in more detail. Misuse could lead to catastrophe There are many ways that malicious use of AI could lead to catastrophe. AI could enable cyberattacks, personalized propaganda and mass manipulation, or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Personally, I think the most compelling case is that AI will enable biological terrorism. Ideally, ChatGPT would refuse to aid in dangerous activities such as constructing a bioweapon. But by using an adversarial jailbreak prompt, undergraduates in a class taught by Kevin Esvelt at MIT evaded this safeguard: In one hour, the chatbots suggested four potential pandemic pathogens, explained how they can be generated from synthetic DNA using reverse genetics, supplied the names of DNA synthesis companies unlikely to screen orders, identified detailed protocols and how to troubleshoot them, and recommended that anyone lacking the skills to perform reverse genetics engage a core facility or contract research organization. Fortunately, today's models lack key information about building bioweapons. It's not even clear that they're more u...

This is a selection of highlights from episode #164 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast.These aren't necessarily the most important, or even most entertaining parts of the interview — and if you enjoy this, we strongly recommend checking out the full episode:Kevin Esvelt on cults that want to kill everyone, stealth vs wildfire pandemics, and how he felt inventing gene drivesAnd if you're finding these highlights episodes valuable, please let us know by emailing podcast@80000hours.org.Highlights put together by Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic Armstrong

In the latest episode of the 80,000 Hours podcast, Kevin Esvelt talks about the New World screwworm. He claims that there is a potential for a massive animal welfare win, if we can eliminate this parasite. This feels worthy of a discussion, so I'm starting this thread. Is this issue on anyone's radar? Has anyone looked into these claims? They seem potentially important/actionable, if true! Relevant section from the podcast:Kevin Esvelt: [...] the New World screwworm, which has the amazing scientific name of Cochliomyia hominivorax: “the man devourer.” But it doesn't primarily eat humans; it feeds indiscriminately on warm-blooded things, so mammals and birds. It's a botfly that lays its eggs in open wounds, anything as small as a tick bite. And it's called the screwworm because the larvae are screw-shaped and they drill their way into living flesh, devouring it. And as they do, they cultivate bacteria that attract [...] --- First published: October 6th, 2023 Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/JWuPdMaPiNy7AD3AX/potentially-actionable-opportunity-eliminating-the-new-world --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.

"Imagine a fast-spreading respiratory HIV. It sweeps around the world. Almost nobody has symptoms. Nobody notices until years later, when the first people who are infected begin to succumb. They might die, something else debilitating might happen to them, but by that point, just about everyone on the planet would have been infected already. And then it would be a race. Can we come up with some way of defusing the thing? Can we come up with the equivalent of HIV antiretrovirals before it's too late?" — Kevin EsveltIn today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez interviews Kevin Esvelt — a biologist at the MIT Media Lab and the inventor of CRISPR-based gene drive — about the threat posed by engineered bioweapons.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.They cover:Why it makes sense to focus on deliberately released pandemicsCase studies of people who actually wanted to kill billions of humansHow many people have the technical ability to produce dangerous virusesThe different threats of stealth and wildfire pandemics that could crash civilisationThe potential for AI models to increase access to dangerous pathogensWhy scientists try to identify new pandemic-capable pathogens, and the case against that researchTechnological solutions, including UV lights and advanced PPEUsing CRISPR-based gene drive to fight diseases and reduce animal sufferingAnd plenty more.Producer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Simon MonsourAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Today I interview Prof. Kevin Esvelt of the MIT media lab. Coming from George Church's lab, Kevin was part of the discovery of Crispr, and the inventor of the Crispr based gene drive. He has become deeply involved in the prevention of existential risks.

What are the risks associated with being able to create custom DNA?  Today's podcast discusses the potential weaponization of synthesized nucleic acid sequences. Dr. Kevin Esvelt discusses synthetic DNA and synthetic viruses, along with the possibility that they may drive the next pandemics or become the basis for future biological weapons. The dark realities are discussed, along with surveillance and mitigation strategies, as well as the broken social trust that could fuel a human-made pandemic. 

Kevin Esvelt will outline a path to obviating catastrophic biothreats, highlighting key areas where contributions from people with particular skills outside of biology are likely to prove especially impactful.View the original talk and video here.Effective Altruism is a social movement dedicated to finding ways to do the most good possible, whether through charitable donations, career choices, or volunteer projects. EA Global conferences are gatherings for EAs to meet.Effective Altruism is a social movement dedicated to finding ways to do the most good possible, whether through charitable donations, career choices, or volunteer projects. EA Global conferences are gatherings for EAs to meet. You can also listen to this talk along with its accompanying video on YouTube.

I wrote an article on whether wine is fake. It's not here, it's at asteriskmag.com, the new rationalist / effective altruist magazine. Congratulations to my friend Clara for making it happen. Stories include: Modeling The End Of Monkeypox: I'm especially excited about this one. The top forecaster (of 7,000) in the 2021 Good Judgment competition explains his predictions for monkeypox. If you've ever rolled your eyes at a column by some overconfident pundit, this is maybe the most opposite-of-that thing ever published. Book Review - What We Owe The Future: You've read mine, this is Kelsey Piper's. Kelsey is always great, and this is a good window into the battle over the word “long-termism”. Making Sense Of Moral Change: Interview with historian Christopher Brown on the end of the slave trade. “There is a false dichotomy between sincere activism and self-interested activism. Abolitionists were quite sincerely horrified by slavery and motivated to end it, but their fight for abolition was not entirely altruistic.” How To Prevent The Next Pandemic: MIT professor Kevin Esvelt talks about applying the security mindset to bioterrorism. “At least 38,000 people can assemble an influenza virus from scratch. If people identify a new [pandemic] virus . . . then you just gave 30,000 people access to an agent that is of nuclear-equivalent lethality.” Rebuilding After The Replication Crisis: This is Stuart Ritchie, hopefully you all know him by now. “Fundamentally, how much more can we trust a study published in 2022 compared to one from 2012?” Why Isn't The Whole World Rich? Professor Dietrich Vollrath's introduction to growth economics. What caused the South Korean miracle, and why can't other countries copy it? Is Wine Fake? By me! How come some people say blinded experts can tell the country, subregion, and year of any wine just by tasting it, but other people say blinded experts get fooled by white wines dyed red? China's Silicon Future: Why does China have so much trouble building advanced microchips? How will the CHIPS act affect its broader economic rise? By Karson Elmgren.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Announcing the first issue of Asterisk, published by Clara Collier on November 21, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Are you a fan of engaging, epistemically rigorous longform writing about the world's most pressing problems? Interested in in-depth interviews with leading scholars? A reader of taste and discernment? Sick of FTXcourse? Distract yourself with the inaugural issue of Asterisk Magazine, out now! Asterisk is a new quarterly journal of clear writing and clear thinking about things that matter (and, occasionally, things we just think are interesting). In this issue: Kelsey Piper argues that What We Owe The Future can't quite support the weight of its own premises. Kevin Esvelt talks about how we can prevent the next pandemic. Jared Leibowich gives us a superforecaster's approach to modeling monkeypox. Christopher Leslie Brown on the history of abolitionism and the slippery concept of moral progress Stuart Ritchie tries to find out if the replication crisis has really made science better. Dietrich Vollrath explains what economists do and don't know about why some countries become rich and others don't. Scott Alexander asks: is wine fake? Karson Elmgren on the history and future of China's semiconductor industry. Xander Balwit imagines a future where genetic engineering has radically altered the animals we eat. A huge thank you to everyone in the community who helped us make Asterisk a reality. We hope you all enjoy reading it as much as we enjoyed making it. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Delay, Detect, Defend: Preparing for a Future in which Thousands Can Release New Pandemics by Kevin Esvelt, published by Jeremy on November 15, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. At EAGxBoston in April, I attended his talk of the same name (embedded below for those who prefer video format). I found it to be a great introduction to the current state of pandemic preparedness/GCBR. It has now been published as a paper by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. I had some trouble finding it even on their website, so it seemed worth linkposting here. Executive summary and key takeaways are reproduced below. Executive summary The world is demonstrably vulnerable to the introduction of a single pandemic virus with a comparatively low case fatality rate. The deliberate and simultaneous release of many pandemic viruses across travel hubs could threaten the stability of civilisation. Current trends suggest that within a decade, tens of thousands of skilled individuals will be able to access the information required for them to single-handedly cause new pandemics. Safeguarding civilisation from the catastrophic misuse of biotechnology requires delaying the development and misuse of pandemic-class agents while building systems capable of reliably detecting threats and preventing nearly all infections. Key takeaways Background We don't yet know of any credible viruses that could cause new pandemics, but ongoing research projects aim to publicly identify them. Identifying a sequenced virus as pandemic-capable will allow >1,000 individuals to assemble it. One person with a list of such viruses could simultaneously ignite multiple pandemics. Viruses can spread faster than vaccines or antivirals can be distributed. Pandemic agents are more lethal than nuclear devices and will be accessible to terrorists. Delay A pandemic test-ban treaty will delay proliferation without slowing beneficial advances. Liability and insurance for catastrophic outcomes will compensate for negative externalities. Secure and universal DNA synthesis screening can reduce unauthorised access by >100-fold. Detect Untargeted sequencing can reliably detect all exponentially spreading biological threats Defend Goal: eliminate the virus while providing food, water, power, lawenforcement, and healthcare Develop and distribute pandemic-proof protective equipment for all essential workers Comfortable, stylish, durable powered respirators must be proven to work reliably Foster resilient supply chains, local production, and behavioural outbreak control Strengthen systems and offer individualised early warning to block transmission Develop and install germicidal low-wavelength lights, which appear to be harmless to humans Overhead fixtures can reduce airborne and surface pathogens by >90 per cent in seconds Read the Full PDF. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Map of Biosecurity Interventions, published by James Lin on October 30, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Summary I recently created a visual map of biosecurity. It covers my interpretation of foundational biosecurity interventions. The map is designed to broadly answer “what are people working on in biosecurity?” (Link to a larger, higher resolution image) ‘Low-downside Interventions' are interventions that are on the lower-risk side. These might be good discussion topics or companies to work on. Promising GCBR Interventions are interventions with general consensus among biosecurity experts for being effective at preventing catastrophic pandemics. Not all interventions are made equal. Some are much more effective than others, but I've included the ‘less-promising' interventions all the same. I didn't want my biases (or the biosecurity community's biases, for that matter) about what is and isn't promising to obscure solutions from a first-principles breakdown. Though I consulted experts and peers, all final decisions were ultimately mine and may differ from the biosecurity community. The rest of the post will go over my rationale for certain decisions. GCBR vs. Covid-scale pandemics This map covers preventing pandemics, not just the catastrophic ones, but also the Covid-scale ones which might occur more frequently. EA focuses a lot on global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR) pandemics. This seems pretty important given its neglectedness and potentially catastrophic impact. I've outlined the interventions that I think would be promising for GCBRs. At the same time, many in biosecurity consider the effects of AI to outweigh those from biorisks (the magnitude is usually 10-100x). Progress in alignment is influenced by factors like international cooperation, institutional distrust, and nuclear conflict. All of these factors are affected by Covid-scale pandemics, whether through decreases in trust, sudden scarcity of resources, or armed international conflict. Considering the possible detrimental effect of even small-scale but more frequent pandemics, it seems worth exploring interventions focused on this scale. There may be more low-hanging fruit than we imagine. Mitigate-Prevent breakdown There are other excellent frameworks for pandemic prevention. Kevin Esvelt's Delay-Detect-Defend is one such example. I decided on a two-factor framework of Mitigate-Prevent because I think it covers the space of interventions well and because it resulted in a nice visual. Part of this framework is Survive which involves bunkers and food resilience. I didn't include it because I wanted more emphasis on preventing diseases from becoming pandemics in the first place, which is much more important than escaping to a bunker. If we're escaping to bunkers, then it's likely that we've lost. That said, I could imagine creating another map that covers this axis of resilience. Thoughts on some specific interventions Agricultural disease monitoring and farm-animal testing Factory farms practically incubate viruses due to the high concentration of animals. Because diseases can pass from animals to humans, more vigilance here could be an effective preventative measure. Wet markets experienced pushback for being viral breeding grounds, and it's about time that factory farms undergo the same scrutiny. In addition to worrying about human and animal infection, crops are also vulnerable. Agricultural practices are monoculture in nature, meaning there is a lack of genetic diversity in the crops grown. Blights exist, and countries are surprisingly dependent on a few sources of food. Monitoring agricultural diseases through runoff water or random sampling seems worth consideration. Bioenhancement By bioenhancement, I mean health and performance-boosting drugs. Most people have a negative connotation w...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Consider Applying to the Future Fellowship at MIT, published by Jeff Kaufman on October 25, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Are you interested in doing a PhD or Masters on something altruistic? The MIT Media Lab has a new fellowship funded by the FTX Future Fund for "ambitiously benevolent projects that could not be accomplished anywhere else". They give some examples: creating works that expand our moral circle, designing to cultivate wisdom, developing new technologies to promote or safeguard wellbeing, or directly improving the lives of current beings in ways anticipated to benefit future generations If you're interested you would apply for admission to the MIT Media Lab for Fall 2023 (details) and also to the fellowship (details), deadline 2022-12-01. If accepted to both, the fellowship would cover your tuition and health insurance, pay you a stipend (~$45k/y), and cover $25k/y in additional research costs. While the application requires you to say which research groups you're interested in joining, what it doesn't make clear is that this is, unusually for the US, a direct-admission system: each faculty member chooses individually who they would like to admit. This means it's definitely worth reaching out specifically to someone whose group you're interested in joining (though they may not respond—they get tons of email) and also thinking carefully about how your research interests intersect. Unlike many programs, you can work on a very wide range of things: art, science, engineering, law, governance, economics, etc, and research that would be hard to do in a more traditional graduate program is especially welcome. If you have questions about what the Media Lab is like I'm happy to try to answer, though I've only been here a few months. (Disclosure: I work at the NAO which is part of Kevin Esvelt's Sculpting Evolution group at the Media Lab, and Kevin asked if I might want to write something about this opportunity.) Comment via: lesswrong Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Future Perfect 50, published by Catherine Low on October 23, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. I just saw that Future Perfect have a new feature. I found it really inspiring so I thought I'd share it here. It is the Future Perfect 50: The scientists, thinkers, scholars, writers, and activists building a more perfect future.There are some wonderful profiles of people that will be familiar to many Forum readers, like Leah Garcés' work with farmers, Lucia Coulter and Jack Rafferty's work on Lead Elimination and Kevin Esvelt's Gene Drive research. But there are a host of inspiring people and stories I've never heard before, like Setusko Thurlow's anti-nuclear weapon work, Joy Buolamwini's algorithmic justice campaign, and Olga Kikou's fight for a ban on all caged farming in the EU. Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Gene drives: why the wait?, published by Metacelsus on September 19, 2022 on LessWrong. (Crossposted from my Substack) If you've been following biology news over the last few years, you might have heard of an interesting concept called a “gene drive”. The overall idea is to engineer a genetic allele that transmits itself to all offspring of a sexually reproducing organism, instead of being inherited by 50% as usual. This allele can also perform some other biological function (a relevant example is causing female sterility). A gene drive spreads through a population. From Esvelt et al. 2014 (CC-BY) In multiple trials, modern CRISPR-based gene drives have shown high efficacy in spreading through populations of caged Anopheles mosquitoes and completely suppressing their reproduction. Since Anopheles mosquitoes are the only ones that transmit malaria, causing their extinction would directly save hundreds of thousands of lives per year. Similar gene drives targeted to other types of mosquitoes (Aedes, Culex, etc.) could also eliminate diseases such as dengue fever, Zika virus, and West Nile virus. However, in spite of promising laboratory trials, gene drives have not yet been deployed in the wild. But why not? History of gene drives Although the technology to build effective gene drives did not exist until recently, the idea has been around for a while. In fact, gene drives occur naturally. Some well-known examples are transposons in flies, homing endonucleases in algae, and segregation distorters in mice. The idea of engineering a site-specific nuclease as a gene drive was developed as early as 2003, and in the decade that followed there were several efforts to develop these, with the labs of Austin Burt and Andrea Crisanti taking a lead role. These early systems showed some biased inheritance, but were not stable for more than a few generations. The advent of CRISPR as a gene editing system opened up a new opportunity. A paper in 2014 by Kevin Esvelt and co-workers proposed Cas9 as a nuclease for a gene drive, with several properties making it ideal for the task. It lacks repetitive sequences that caused problems with earlier gene drives using zinc-finger nucleases or TALENs. It has a very high efficiency of cutting. It is easy to target a new site by simply changing the guide RNA. Several nearby sites could be targeted at once, using different guide RNAs. From Esvelt et al. 2014 (CC-BY) CRISPR-based gene drives quickly gained popularity in the field, and by 2018 the Crisanti lab had demonstrated a working gene drive that could efficiently suppress populations of Anopheles gambiae by targeting an exon of the doublesex gene required for female development. At the time this was announced, I was studying at the University of Cambridge, and attended a public lecture by Prof. Crisanti about his lab's work. The overall mood in the room was almost euphoric: here was a technology that could save millions of lives, the best thing since Borlaug's wheat! Since that lecture, about 2 million people, mostly children in Africa, have died of malaria. Gene drive research has not stood still: the Crisanti lab tested their doublesex drive in larger cages of mosquitoes, and it again completely eliminated the populations. But given the millions of lives at stake, what's taking so long for this gene drive to be released? See also: the battle against malaria in Africa has stalled Why the wait? There are two good arguments against the immediate release of gene drives to eliminate mosquitoes. First, nuclease gene drives have the possibility of generating resistant alleles, making future gene drives not work against the same target. Therefore, it's important to get it right the first time, otherwise the potential of gene drives could be wasted. The goal of the large cage trials I mentioned earli...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Gene drives: why the wait?, published by Metacelsus on September 19, 2022 on LessWrong. (Crossposted from my Substack) If you've been following biology news over the last few years, you might have heard of an interesting concept called a “gene drive”. The overall idea is to engineer a genetic allele that transmits itself to all offspring of a sexually reproducing organism, instead of being inherited by 50% as usual. This allele can also perform some other biological function (a relevant example is causing female sterility). A gene drive spreads through a population. From Esvelt et al. 2014 (CC-BY) In multiple trials, modern CRISPR-based gene drives have shown high efficacy in spreading through populations of caged Anopheles mosquitoes and completely suppressing their reproduction. Since Anopheles mosquitoes are the only ones that transmit malaria, causing their extinction would directly save hundreds of thousands of lives per year. Similar gene drives targeted to other types of mosquitoes (Aedes, Culex, etc.) could also eliminate diseases such as dengue fever, Zika virus, and West Nile virus. However, in spite of promising laboratory trials, gene drives have not yet been deployed in the wild. But why not? History of gene drives Although the technology to build effective gene drives did not exist until recently, the idea has been around for a while. In fact, gene drives occur naturally. Some well-known examples are transposons in flies, homing endonucleases in algae, and segregation distorters in mice. The idea of engineering a site-specific nuclease as a gene drive was developed as early as 2003, and in the decade that followed there were several efforts to develop these, with the labs of Austin Burt and Andrea Crisanti taking a lead role. These early systems showed some biased inheritance, but were not stable for more than a few generations. The advent of CRISPR as a gene editing system opened up a new opportunity. A paper in 2014 by Kevin Esvelt and co-workers proposed Cas9 as a nuclease for a gene drive, with several properties making it ideal for the task. It lacks repetitive sequences that caused problems with earlier gene drives using zinc-finger nucleases or TALENs. It has a very high efficiency of cutting. It is easy to target a new site by simply changing the guide RNA. Several nearby sites could be targeted at once, using different guide RNAs. From Esvelt et al. 2014 (CC-BY) CRISPR-based gene drives quickly gained popularity in the field, and by 2018 the Crisanti lab had demonstrated a working gene drive that could efficiently suppress populations of Anopheles gambiae by targeting an exon of the doublesex gene required for female development. At the time this was announced, I was studying at the University of Cambridge, and attended a public lecture by Prof. Crisanti about his lab's work. The overall mood in the room was almost euphoric: here was a technology that could save millions of lives, the best thing since Borlaug's wheat! Since that lecture, about 2 million people, mostly children in Africa, have died of malaria. Gene drive research has not stood still: the Crisanti lab tested their doublesex drive in larger cages of mosquitoes, and it again completely eliminated the populations. But given the millions of lives at stake, what's taking so long for this gene drive to be released? See also: the battle against malaria in Africa has stalled Why the wait? There are two good arguments against the immediate release of gene drives to eliminate mosquitoes. First, nuclease gene drives have the possibility of generating resistant alleles, making future gene drives not work against the same target. Therefore, it's important to get it right the first time, otherwise the potential of gene drives could be wasted. The goal of the large cage trials I mentioned earli...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Defender's Advantage of Interpretability, published by Marius Hobbhahn on September 14, 2022 on LessWrong. TL;DR: In this post, I want to argue why Interpretability & Transparency tools have a defender's advantage if they are used correctly, i.e. they improve alignment much more than new capabilities and therefore mitigate risks of dual use. I draw parallels from biosecurity researchers who have thought about the risks of dual-use and defender's advantages in more detail and I think that the AI safety community can learn a lot from them. Lastly, I want to point out that not all interpretability tools have a clear defender's advantage and some interpretability research might still carry a lot of risks when used incorrectly. I'd like to thank Lee Sharkey and Simon Grimm for their feedback on this post. Introduction Most technology is dual-use in some way--a knife can be used as a household appliance or as a weapon. However, different technologies have different propensities to be used for good or bad, e.g. more research into walls will likely benefit the defender more than the attacker while more research into the capabilities of viruses benefits attackers more than defenders. I feel like we, the AI safety community, have not thought enough about which approaches have a clear defender's advantage or how we could steer existing approaches to have more of a defender's advantage. To my (very limited) understanding, the biosecurity community has thought a bit more about these kinds of dual-use trade-offs. Therefore, we could probably learn some things from them. In this post, I want to briefly look at some of the possible lessons from biosecurity and see if we can translate them to AI safety. Then I want to argue why interpretability is one of the approaches that plausibly has a defender's advantage. I'm certainly not the first person to have come to the conclusion that interpretability is important for alignment. Chris Olah has made the case for interpretability for years. Neel Nanda has provided a long theory of impacts of interpretability research. Quintin Pope has made the case for optimism about interpretability. Evan Hubinger has provided 11 proposals to build safe AI that are all essentially something+interpretability, has developed an interpretability tech tree and summarized transformer circuits. ARC is working on ELK (and related topics) that certainly read to me as if they are intended to prevent deceptive alignment. There are many further good posts on aspects of interpretability (see e.g. here, here, here, or here). The reason why I add this post to the long list of posts arguing for the importance of interpretability is that I feel like the “defender's advantage” framework allows for an easy way to decide which kind of interpretability research will help more with alignment than with capabilities and thus alleviates one major concern that some people have against it (personal conversations, not sure if someone wrote this down). Lessons from Biosecurity Most of the following comes from personal discussions with biosecurity researchers or podcasts like “Hear This Idea”s interview with Kevin Esvelt and Jonas Sandbrink. I'm not a biosecurity researcher myself and the following is likely to lack nuance. Gain-of-function(Enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens) = bad: More specifically, approaches that require us to build a new capability in order to learn how to safeguard against it makes offensive scaling easier than defensive scaling, e.g. the new capability enables the attacker to do more new things than the defender. Firstly, you have created a deadly virus with certainty but the development of the vaccine is uncertain--you stacked the odds against you. Secondly, even if your vaccine (or other defense) is successful, it's likely easy to modify the new ...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The Defender's Advantage of Interpretability, published by Marius Hobbhahn on September 14, 2022 on LessWrong. TL;DR: In this post, I want to argue why Interpretability & Transparency tools have a defender's advantage if they are used correctly, i.e. they improve alignment much more than new capabilities and therefore mitigate risks of dual use. I draw parallels from biosecurity researchers who have thought about the risks of dual-use and defender's advantages in more detail and I think that the AI safety community can learn a lot from them. Lastly, I want to point out that not all interpretability tools have a clear defender's advantage and some interpretability research might still carry a lot of risks when used incorrectly. I'd like to thank Lee Sharkey and Simon Grimm for their feedback on this post. Introduction Most technology is dual-use in some way--a knife can be used as a household appliance or as a weapon. However, different technologies have different propensities to be used for good or bad, e.g. more research into walls will likely benefit the defender more than the attacker while more research into the capabilities of viruses benefits attackers more than defenders. I feel like we, the AI safety community, have not thought enough about which approaches have a clear defender's advantage or how we could steer existing approaches to have more of a defender's advantage. To my (very limited) understanding, the biosecurity community has thought a bit more about these kinds of dual-use trade-offs. Therefore, we could probably learn some things from them. In this post, I want to briefly look at some of the possible lessons from biosecurity and see if we can translate them to AI safety. Then I want to argue why interpretability is one of the approaches that plausibly has a defender's advantage. I'm certainly not the first person to have come to the conclusion that interpretability is important for alignment. Chris Olah has made the case for interpretability for years. Neel Nanda has provided a long theory of impacts of interpretability research. Quintin Pope has made the case for optimism about interpretability. Evan Hubinger has provided 11 proposals to build safe AI that are all essentially something+interpretability, has developed an interpretability tech tree and summarized transformer circuits. ARC is working on ELK (and related topics) that certainly read to me as if they are intended to prevent deceptive alignment. There are many further good posts on aspects of interpretability (see e.g. here, here, here, or here). The reason why I add this post to the long list of posts arguing for the importance of interpretability is that I feel like the “defender's advantage” framework allows for an easy way to decide which kind of interpretability research will help more with alignment than with capabilities and thus alleviates one major concern that some people have against it (personal conversations, not sure if someone wrote this down). Lessons from Biosecurity Most of the following comes from personal discussions with biosecurity researchers or podcasts like “Hear This Idea”s interview with Kevin Esvelt and Jonas Sandbrink. I'm not a biosecurity researcher myself and the following is likely to lack nuance. Gain-of-function(Enhancement of potential pandemic pathogens) = bad: More specifically, approaches that require us to build a new capability in order to learn how to safeguard against it makes offensive scaling easier than defensive scaling, e.g. the new capability enables the attacker to do more new things than the defender. Firstly, you have created a deadly virus with certainty but the development of the vaccine is uncertain--you stacked the odds against you. Secondly, even if your vaccine (or other defense) is successful, it's likely easy to modify the new ...

On August 3rd, 2022, the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight held a hearing to discuss the threat of gain-of-function research and the origin of COVID-19. Doctors Richard Ebright, Steven Quay, and Kevin Esvelt testified publicly before the committee. In their collective testimony, we finally hear the inconvenient truth about dangerous gain of function research and the mountain of evidence supporting a possible lab origin of COVID-19. These experts candidly discuss what Doctors Fauci and Collins have never publicly said out loud. The only conspiracy that has been perpetrated against the American people is the coverup of what these scientists have been trying to tell the world for the past two and a half years.

A full writeup of this episode is available on our website: hearthisidea.com/episodes/esvelt-sandbrink. Kevin Esvelt is an assistant professor at the MIT Media Lab, where he is director of the Sculpting Evolution group, which invents new ways to study and influence the evolution of ecosystems. He helped found the SecureDNA Project and the Nucleic Acid Observatory, both of which we discuss in the episode. Esvelt is also known for proposing the idea of using CRISPR to implement gene drives. Jonas Sandbrink is a researcher and DPhil student at the Future of Humanity Institute. He is a fellow at both the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, and with the Ending Bioweapons Program at the Council on Strategic Risks. Jonas' research interests include the dual-use potential of life sciences research and biotechnology, as well as fast response countermeasures like vaccine platforms. We discuss: The concepts of differential technological development, dual-use research, transfer risks in research, 'information loops', and responsible access to biological data Strengthening norms against risky biological research, such as novel virus identification and gain of function research Connection-based warning systems and metagenomic sequencing technology Advanced PPE, Far-UVC sterilisation technology, and other countermeasures against pandemics potentially worse than Covid Analogies between progress in biotechnology and the early history of nuclear weapons How to use your career to work on these problems — even if you don't have a background in biology. You can read more about the topics we cover in this episode's write-up: hearthisidea.com/episodes/farmer. If you have any feedback, you can get a free book for filling out our new feedback form. You can also get in touch through our website or on Twitter. Consider leaving us a review wherever you're listening to this — it's the best free way to support the show. Thanks for listening!

In this episode of the podcast, Rob Reid and Kevin Esvelt discuss USAID’s new “Deep VZN” program, which aims to discover new pandemic-grade viruses and publish their genomes to the world. Esvelt estimates that there are currently around 30,000 people who could then easily build them. Rob Reid is a podcaster, author, and tech investor, and was a long-time tech entrepreneur. His After On podcast features conversations with world-class thinkers, founders, and scientists on topics including synthetic biology, super-AI risk, Fermi’s paradox, robotics, archaeology, and lone-wolf terrorism. Science fiction novels that Rob has written for Random House include The New York Times bestseller Year Zero, and the AI thriller After On. As an investor, Rob is Managing Director at Resilience Reserve, a multi-phase venture capital fund. He co-founded Resilience with Chris Anderson, who runs the TED Conference and has a long track record as both an entrepreneur and an investor. In his own entrepreneurial career, Rob founded and ran Listen.com, the company that created the Rhapsody music service. Earlier, Rob studied Arabic and geopolitics at both undergraduate and graduate levels at Stanford, and was a Fulbright Fellow in Cairo. You can find him at www.after-on.com, or on Twitter at @Rob_Reid. Kevin M. Esvelt is an assistant professor of the MIT Media Lab, where he leads the Sculpting Evolution Group in advancing biotechnology safely. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University for inventing a synthetic microbial ecosystem to rapidly evolve useful biomolecules, and subsequently helped pioneer the development of CRISPR, a powerful new method of genome engineering. In 2013, Esvelt was the first to identify the potential for CRISPR “gene drive” systems to alter wild populations of organisms. Recognizing the implications of an advance that could enable individual scientists to alter the shared environment, he and his colleagues chose to break with scientific tradition by revealing their findings and calling for open discussion and safeguards before they tested it and demonstrated reversibility in the laboratory. An outspoken advocate of sharing research plans to accelerate discovery and improve safety, Esvelt's lab at MIT seeks to accelerate beneficial advances while safeguarding biotechnology against mistrust and misuse. Projects include building catalytic platforms for directed evolution, pioneering new ways of developing ecotechnologies with the guidance of local communities, developing early-warning systems to reliably detect any catastrophic biological threat, applying cryptographic methods to enable secure and universal DNA synthesis screening, and advising policymakers on how best to mitigate global catastrophic biorisks. His work has been published in Nature and Science, covered by the New York Times and Washington Post, and featured on Last Week Tonight and the Netflix special Unnatural Selection. You can find him at https://www.sculptingevolution.org/kevin-m-esvelt, or on Twitter at @kesvelt. Learning how to train your mind is the single greatest investment you can make in life. That’s why Sam Harris created the Waking Up app. From rational mindfulness practice to lessons on some of life’s most important topics, join Sam as he demystifies the practice of meditation and explores the theory behind it.

In this episode of the podcast, Rob Reid and Kevin Esvelt discuss USAID's new “Deep VZN” program, which aims to discover new pandemic-grade viruses and publish their genomes to the world. Esvelt estimates that there are currently around 30,000 people who could then easily build them. SUBSCRIBE to gain access to all full-length episodes at samharris.org/subscribe.   Learning how to train your mind is the single greatest investment you can make in life. That's why Sam Harris created the Waking Up app. From rational mindfulness practice to lessons on some of life's most important topics, join Sam as he demystifies the practice of meditation and explores the theory behind it.

USAID's new “DEEP VZN” program aims to discover new pandemic-grade viruses, then broadcast their genomes to the world, according to MIT evolutionary engineer Kevin Esvelt. He estimates that 30,000 people in dozens of countries could then easily assemble them.

Kevin Esvelt, a scientist at MIT, argues that research intended to prevent pandemics is actually putting us in a lot more danger. Also discussed: Kevin's own research on engineering wild animal species. Are the risks worth the benefits?

Jianghong Min is a graduate student with the Department of Genetics at Harvard Medical School who is currently involved in genomics studies of the heritability of CRISPR-based gene drive cassettes to control specific functionalities in non-human species and their impact on genetic diseases. He is working on these projects at MIT with the Sculpting Evolution Group and Kevin Esvelt, Assistant Professor. Listen to the podcast to discover: Why trial work with CRISPR-based gene drive systems is important. What unintended consequences might result from genome editing techniques. What measures are being taken in the new CRISPR method to ensure safety in this area of science. What potential benefits are associated with manipulating heritable genes in non-human species such as mosquitos and mice. Min is working on a study involving the genetic editing of heritable genes using gene drive cassettes in a non-human genus. The study is in the exploration phase at this time. Of particular interest is the evolution of a gene drive system once it is released into the wild. How much genetic information can be included in the gene drive cassettes? How much control of the heritability of the gene drives do scientists have once the are released into the wild? Min is especially interested in discovering unintended consequences. Could these heritable changes spread into other nearby species? He believes in the precautionary principle that scientists should not intervene until all of the negative effects are known and should identify the greater impact of genetically modifying these organisms. To learn more, visit: MIT Media Lab: https://www.media.mit.edu Sculpting Evolution Group: www.sculptingevolution.org Episode also available on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/30PvU9C

MIT biologist Kevin Esvelt discusses the biology of the pandemic and how gain-of-function research jeopardizes public safety.

In a world now painfully aware of pandemics, with ever-increasing access to autonomous biological agents, how can we help channel society’s response to COVID-19 to minimize the risk of deliberate misuse? Using the challenge of securing DNA synthesis as an example, Kevin outlines the key norms and incentives governing biotechnology, lays out potential strategies for … Continue reading Mitigating catastrophic biorisks | Kevin Esvelt

Esvelt's second talk focuses on strategies to allow for the safe implementation of localized gene drive technologies that do not spread indefinitely. Daisy drive systems are made up of multiple elements connected like a daisy chain such that each causes the next to be preferentially inherited. They are designed to be self-exhausting by losing elements with each generation, thereby limiting spread. This technique has multiple applications such as removing an invasive species from one area without impacting the same species in its native habitat. Esvelt explains that daisy-drive stability might be tested in a species such as C. elegans where hundreds of generations can be grown in a short period of time. His lab is also developing technologies to reverse any unwanted genetic changes that might be introduced via gene drive. Once again, Esvelt emphasizes the importance of community input into any gene alteration projects. Although it does not currently involve gene drive, he uses the “Mice Against Ticks” project that seeks to prevent tick-borne diseases on the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard as an example.

Evolution has selected wild organisms to be extremely well adapted to their environment. Because most genetic changes introduced by humans divert the resources of the organism to benefit humans, such mutations are typically eliminated by natural selection in the ancestral habitat. In his first talk, Dr. Kevin Esvelt explains how self-propagating CRISPR-based gene drives can be used to spread genetic alterations through wild populations, potentially impacting all organisms of the target species. Gene drives could be used to benefit public health, the environment, agriculture, and animal well-being. However, real-world use may incur ecological risks, and even research involving self-propagating gene drive systems may risk public trust in science and governance given the possibility of accidental spread. Esvelt explains how to minimize risk and discusses the importance of engaging communities in planning any projects which may affect them.

Esvelt’s second talk focuses on strategies to allow for the safe implementation of localized gene drive technologies that do not spread indefinitely. Daisy drive systems are made up of multiple elements connected like a daisy chain such that each causes the next to be preferentially inherited. They are designed to be self-exhausting by losing elements with each generation, thereby limiting spread. This technique has multiple applications such as removing an invasive species from one area without impacting the same species in its native habitat. Esvelt explains that daisy-drive stability might be tested in a species such as C. elegans where hundreds of generations can be grown in a short period of time. His lab is also developing technologies to reverse any unwanted genetic changes that might be introduced via gene drive. Once again, Esvelt emphasizes the importance of community input into any gene alteration projects. Although it does not currently involve gene drive, he uses the “Mice Against Ticks” project that seeks to prevent tick-borne diseases on the islands of Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard as an example.

Evolution has selected wild organisms to be extremely well adapted to their environment. Because most genetic changes introduced by humans divert the resources of the organism to benefit humans, such mutations are typically eliminated by natural selection in the ancestral habitat. In his first talk, Dr. Kevin Esvelt explains how self-propagating CRISPR-based gene drives can be used to spread genetic alterations through wild populations, potentially impacting all organisms of the target species. Gene drives could be used to benefit public health, the environment, agriculture, and animal well-being. However, real-world use may incur ecological risks, and even research involving self-propagating gene drive systems may risk public trust in science and governance given the possibility of accidental spread. Esvelt explains how to minimize risk and discusses the importance of engaging communities in planning any projects which may affect them.

It’s one of the best weapons we have to contain a pandemic. But can it defeat the disease without spying on people who might carry it? MIT’s Kevin Esvelt has a bold idea: Let’s try a new form of contact tracing that could more than double the program’s impact. Bi-directional tracing looks both forward and backward from a known transmission, building a chart of the “undiscovered branches of the viral family tree,” and identifying potential spreaders other systems can’t see. But how much of our data are we willing to give the government, even if it’s to fight Covid-19? Get the weekly Should This Exist? newsletter for reading list and discussion questions: http://eepurl.com/gnZTf9.

In a world now painfully aware of pandemics, with ever-increasing access to autonomous biological agents, how can we help channel society’s response to COVID-19 to minimize the risk of deliberate misuse? Using the challenge of securing DNA synthesis as an example, Kevin outlines the key norms and incentives governing biotechnology, lays out potential strategies for … Continue reading EAGxVirtual 2020: Mitigating catastrophic biorisks (Kevin Esvelt)

This month's Delayed Recall highlights episodes on CRISPR gene editing technologies. From February 2017, we have an introduction to CRISPR. Then, there's a 2-part interview with Dr. Kevin Esvelt from February 20 and 27, 2018, on gene drives. 

Omar Akbari and Kevin Esvelt discuss a gene editing approach for harmful mosquitoes.

Kevin Esvelt knows the stakes are high. As a geneticist at the MIT Media Lab, Kevin discovered a technique called a gene drive, which gives humans a power we’ve never had before: to change the DNA of entire species in nature. This capacity is so new and so unprecedented that when Kevin made the discovery six years ago, it was “literally unimagined by any human being at that time — not in science fiction, not in any form of literature, not in any scientific journals.” Used successfully for good, a gene drive has the potential to save millions of lives by eliminating diseases like Malaria. But in the wrong hands — or even in well-intentioned hands — the results could be catastrophic. How do we weigh the potential for enormous good against the terrifying unknowns? Host Caterina Fake thinks it through with scientist Kevin Esvelt as well as special guests Baratunde Thurston (Comedian and host of the podcasts Spit and #TellBlackStories); Janna Levin (Director of Science Programs at Pioneer Works, Columbia Professor of Astronomy) and Joi Ito (Director of the MIT Media Lab).

Kevin Esvelt (MIT Media Lab) discusses his interest in gene drives and other gene editing approaches to combat tick-borne diseases and malaria.

This week on Science for the People: who is driving this genetic bus? We'll talk with Kevin Esvelt about gene drives, what they are, where they come from what they can be used for, and why the science on gene drives should be done as openly as possible. Then, we'll speak with Laurie Zoloth about the ethical questions surrounding their use, why people are so afraid, and who should be making the decision to use this technology in the wild. This episode is hosted by Bethany Brookshire, science writer from Science News. Related Links How gene drives work Gene Drives...

Robin Bicknell and Face2Face host David Peck talk about The Genetic Revolution, Eugenics, selective breeding, our complex genetic relationships, ethical issues and changing another species. Trailer Synopsis The Genetic Revolution is a new, one-hour documentary that explores the exciting, rapidly evolving world of genetic engineering. It follows a group of brilliant scientists from across the globe as they use powerful new gene editing technologies in ways once thought unimaginable. The film also tackles the philosophical and environmental implications this new technology has on our species through interviews with such luminaries as Margret Atwood and Jane Goodall. Technologies like CRISPR are making it possible to quickly and cheaply change the DNA of all living things, including humans. CRISPR, which stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, is a simple yet powerful tool for editing genomes and allowing researchers to easily alter DNA sequences and modify gene function. Genes can now be edited almost as easily as words on a computer screen. This new ability to alter our DNA holds the promise of curing disease … saving threatened species … solving the problem of world hunger … maybe even obtaining human perfection. But will the promise be fulfilled? The ability to gain control of our DNA is ground-breaking and revolutionary, and a responsibility all scientists working in the field take seriously. The Genetic Revolution follows the science as it progresses at breakneck speed. Pioneering scientists like Dr. George Church, Dr. Kevin Esvelt and Dr. John Zhang reveal how gene editing will soon be used to extend our lives, and treat or prevent ailments like Lyme disease. Families afflicted by hereditary diseases like Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy wait with bated breath as technologies are clinically trialed. The film is witness to a tipping point, recording scientific moments destined to change the world as we know it.Biography Robin Sky Bicknell is a multi-award-winning documentary director, producer, and writer. She lives in Toronto, Canada, although her family roots are in Louisiana and Indiana in the United States. Her recent credits include Ice Bridge; Black Watch Snipers; Camp X: Secret Agent School; and The Curse of the Axe, and the second season of the popular series Surviving Evil. Robin directed, produced and co-wrote the feature length film The Real Superhumans and the Quest for the Future Fantastic, and directed, produced and wrote the feature length documentary The Body Machine, nominated for the Best Popular Science Documentary Rockie at the 2009 Banff International Television Festival and she received a Best Science Documentary Gemini nomination. Other credits include Roswell: The Truth; The Plastic Fantastic Brain; The Need for Speed; A Time to Live; Tall Ship Chronicles; Modern Love; My Fabulous Gay Wedding; and Forensic Factor. Image Copyright: Robin Bicknell and Yap Films. Used with permission. For more information about David Peck’s podcasting, writing and public speaking please visit his site here. With thanks to Thom Powers form TIFF and producer Josh Snethlage and Mixed Media Sound. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

On episode 52 we welcome Kevin Esvelt, Director of the MIT Media Lab Sculpting Evolution group.  At the Media Lab, Esvelt and his world class team of geneticists & biologists invent new ways to study and influence the evolution of ecosystems. By carefully developing and testing these methods with openness and humility, the group seeks to address difficult ecological problems to benefit humanity & the natural world. Prior to joining the MIT Media Lab, Esvelt wove many different areas of science into novel approaches to ecological engineering. He invented phage-assisted continuous evolution (PACE), a synthetic microbial ecosystem for rapidly evolving biomolecules, in the laboratory of David R. Liu at Harvard University. At the Wyss Institute, he worked with George Church to develop the CRISPR system for genome engineering & regulation, and he began the use of bacteriophages and conjugation to engineer microbial ecosystems. Esvelt is credited as the first to describe how CRISPR gene drives could be used to alter the traits of wild populations in an evolutionarily stable manner. And recently, he and his Sculpting Evolution group devised a new form of technology, called ‘daisy drives’, which lets communities aiming to prevent disease alter wild organisms in local ecosystems. Esvelt offers some of the clearest descriptions of GMOs;  CRISPR gene editing; a scientist's role as God while wielding the power of modern tech - and, what we do about that as a society - during our hour 1-hour discussion. Whether you're interested in Genetic Engineering or Fitness Landscapes defining evolutionary biology - this episode will spark your interest.   I was just happy just to be along for the ride.   www.SourcingMatters.show

Gene drives have frequently been in the news in the past few years. In this episode, we discuss what exactly gene drives are, their applications, and how scientists are ensuring that they are used responsibly. Tune in to hear what researchers Anna Buchman from UCSD and Kevin Esvelt from MIT had to say.

Undiscovered is back with a new season this September! In the meantime, we check in on the status of Kevin Esvelt’s plan to fight Martha’s Vineyard’s Lyme disease problem with genetically engineered mice. Has he created his super-mice? And are Vineyarders as gung-ho about the GMO invasion as they were two years ago? We follow up. Learn more about our original Mouse’s Vineyard episode. Special thanks to Joanna Buchthal, and to Nantucket band Coq Au Vin for letting us play their song about Lyme disease.  

Undiscovered is back with a new season this September! In the meantime, we check in on the status of Kevin Esvelt’s plan to fight Martha’s Vineyard’s Lyme disease problem with genetically engineered mice. Has he created his super-mice? And are Vineyarders as gung-ho about the GMO invasion as they were two years ago? We follow up. Learn more about our original Mouse’s Vineyard episode. Special thanks to Joanna Buchthal, and to Nantucket band Coq Au Vin for letting us play their song about Lyme disease.  

Today we are more aware than ever that our environment is changing, but what happens if we intentionally alter it? MIT's Kevin Esvelt joins Cross Currents to discuss how he and the Sculpting Evolution Group are using genetic alterations to fight disease. 40% of Nantucket residents have had Lyme disease, and he may have a solution. Kevin and his team want to genetically alter wild organisms – mice – and release them into the environment to kill off the tick population that carries Lyme. Then, the adventurous author Crocker Snow Jr. discusses his new book Nantaska, which takes a stunning look at the similarities between the small island of Nantucket and the huge expanse of Alaska.

MIT's Kevin Esvelt wants radical transparency for a radical new science. Why?

1. Featured Article: Interdisciplinary Response to Contemporary Concerns about Brain Death Determination2. What’s Trending: Gene Drive, part 2This podcast begins and closes with Dr. Robert Gross, Editor-in-Chief, briefly discussing highlighted articles from the February 27, 2018 issue of Neurology. In the first segment, Dr. Andy Schomer talks with Dr. Ariane Lewis about her paper on the determination of brain death. In the second part of the podcast, Dr. Ted Burns speaks with Dr. Kevin Esvelt for part two of the discussion on gene drives (the first of these segments aired in the Feb. 20 episode).

1. Featured Article: Intravenous thrombolysis and platelet count2. What’s Trending: Gene Drives, part IThis podcast begins and closes with Dr. Robert Gross, Editor-in-Chief, briefly discussing highlighted articles from the February 6, 2018, issue of Neurology. In the first segment, Dr. Kevin Barrett talks with Dr. Henrik Gensicke about his article on the effect of platelet count on bleeding risk and mortality in stroke patients treated with IV thrombolysis. In the second part of the podcast, you’ll hear the first part of Dr. Ted Burns’ interview with Dr. Kevin Esvelt about gene drives.DISCLOSURES: Dr. Barrett serves on the editorial board of Neurology and Neurohospitalist; has received research/grant support from the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke for serving on the executive committees of the CREST-2 and SHINE clinical trials; and receives publishing royalties from Wiley Blackwell. Dr. Gensicke receives research support from Swiss National Science Foundation (33CM30-124119 and P300PB_161071). Dr. Burns is the deputy section editor of the Neurology® podcast; has served on scientific advisory boards for Argenx, UCB, and CSL Behring; has received travel funding/speaker honoraria from Argenx and Alexion; and has received support for consulting activities from UCB Pharma and CSL Behring. Dr. Esvelt reports no disclosures.

Trophy hunters are always after the lion with the largest darkest name and the stag with the most impressive antlers. Research by Rob Knell at Queen Mary University of London finds that removing a small proportion of these top males can drive whole populations to extinction, if their environment is changing. Gene drive is a new genetic technology that could be used to eradicate populations of species of 'pest' animals. The Roslin Institute in Edinburgh has just announced it is to begin research on gene drives to control rat and mouse populations. The Institute's Bruce Whitelaw and Simon Lillico explain how the approach would work and argue that it would be humane compared to traditional methods of vermin control. However there are concerns about its potential ecological consequences - namely the risk of female infertility in the targeted species spreading without no geographical limits. Kevin Esvelt of MIT voices his reservations. Bruce Whitelaw outlines how future research aims to bring gene drives under more control. Researchers in the USA and Japan talk about their discovery of nuclear reactions in lightning strikes, and Caroline Brighton and Graham Taylor of the University of Oxford explain why they have been attaching small cameras and GPS units to peregrine falcons and recording the birds chasing drones.

The wisdom with which we develop and deploy new technologies will define the future of our civilization. Why do we conduct research in small teams of specialists who cannot reliably anticipate consequences on their own? Might it be better to share our best ideas and plans with others, actively inviting concerns, criticism, and possible improvements? … Continue reading EAG 2017 Boston: Open until dangerous—Gene drive and the case for reforming research (Kevin Esvelt)

Author Philip Stead shares his new book based on an unfinished manuscript recently discovered among Mark Twain's papers. Robert Hirst, UC Berkeley, curates the Mark Twain Papers. Catherine Hill of Purdue University wants mosquitoes to be safer, not eradicated, and Kevin Esvelt of Massachusetts Institute for Technology on the ethics of genetic engineering for pest control.

This week on Science for the People: who is driving this genetic bus? We'll talk with Kevin Esvelt about gene drives, what they are, where they come from what they can be used for, and why the science on gene drives should be done as openly as possible. Then, we'll speak with Laurie Zoloth about the ethical questions surrounding their use, why people are so afraid, and who should be making the decision to use this technology in the wild. This episode is hosted by Bethany Brookshire, science writer from Science News. Related Links How gene drives work Gene Drives...

Martha’s Vineyard has a Lyme disease problem. Now a scientist is coming to town with a possible fix: genetically engineered mice. An island associated with summer rest and relaxation is gaining a reputation for something else: Lyme disease. Martha’s Vineyard has one of the highest rates of Lyme in the country. Now MIT geneticist Kevin Esvelt is coming to the island with a potential long-term fix. The catch: It involves releasing up to a few hundred thousand genetically modified mice onto the island. Are Vineyarders ready? Kevin Esvelt makes the case for engineered mice, at a public meeting at a Vineyard public library. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   Kevin Esvelt takes questions from the Martha’s Vineyard audience. (He’s joined by Dr. Michael Jacobs and Dr. Sam Telford. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   Bob, Cheryl, and Spice (the lucky dog who gets a Lyme vaccine). (Photo: Annie Minoff)   No lack of tick-repelling options at a Martha’s Vineyard general store. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   (Original art by Claire Merchlinsky)   GUESTS Kevin Esvelt, Assistant Professor, MIT Media Lab   FOOTNOTES Read Kevin Esvelt’s original paper describing the gene drive mechanism in eLife. Less technical descriptions available here via Scientific American, and here via Esvelt’s Sculpting Evolution Group. Watch Kevin’s July 20, 2016 presentation on Martha’s Vineyard (Unfortunately there is no direct link. Search “7.20.16” to find the video, titled “Preventing Tick-Borne Disease.”) Listen to Kevin Esvelt talk about gene drive on Science Friday. Read about Oxitec’s proposed mosquito trial in Key West, and watch the public meeting excerpted in this episode. Learn more about Kevin’s lab, the Sculpting Evolution Group. Looking for more information about Lyme disease? Here are resources from the CDC. CREDITS This episode of Undiscovered was reported and produced by Annie Minoff and Elah Feder. Editing by Christopher Intagliata. Fact-checking help by Michelle Harris. Original music by Daniel Peterschmidt. Our theme music is by I am Robot and Proud. Art for this episode by Claire Merchlinsky. Thanks to Science Friday’s Danielle Dana, Christian Skotte, Brandon Echter, and Rachel Bouton.   Special thanks to Joanna Buchthal, Bob Rosenbaum, Dick Johnson, and Sam Telford.  

Martha’s Vineyard has a Lyme disease problem. Now a scientist is coming to town with a possible fix: genetically engineered mice. An island associated with summer rest and relaxation is gaining a reputation for something else: Lyme disease. Martha’s Vineyard has one of the highest rates of Lyme in the country. Now MIT geneticist Kevin Esvelt is coming to the island with a potential long-term fix. The catch: It involves releasing up to a few hundred thousand genetically modified mice onto the island. Are Vineyarders ready? Kevin Esvelt makes the case for engineered mice, at a public meeting at a Vineyard public library. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   Kevin Esvelt takes questions from the Martha’s Vineyard audience. (He’s joined by Dr. Michael Jacobs and Dr. Sam Telford. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   Bob, Cheryl, and Spice (the lucky dog who gets a Lyme vaccine). (Photo: Annie Minoff)   No lack of tick-repelling options at a Martha’s Vineyard general store. (Photo: Annie Minoff)   (Original art by Claire Merchlinsky)   GUESTS Kevin Esvelt, Assistant Professor, MIT Media Lab   FOOTNOTES Read Kevin Esvelt’s original paper describing the gene drive mechanism in eLife. Less technical descriptions available here via Scientific American, and here via Esvelt’s Sculpting Evolution Group. Watch Kevin’s July 20, 2016 presentation on Martha’s Vineyard (Unfortunately there is no direct link. Search “7.20.16” to find the video, titled “Preventing Tick-Borne Disease.”) Listen to Kevin Esvelt talk about gene drive on Science Friday. Read about Oxitec’s proposed mosquito trial in Key West, and watch the public meeting excerpted in this episode. Learn more about Kevin’s lab, the Sculpting Evolution Group. Looking for more information about Lyme disease? Here are resources from the CDC. CREDITS This episode of Undiscovered was reported and produced by Annie Minoff and Elah Feder. Editing by Christopher Intagliata. Fact-checking help by Michelle Harris. Original music by Daniel Peterschmidt. Our theme music is by I am Robot and Proud. Art for this episode by Claire Merchlinsky. Thanks to Science Friday’s Danielle Dana, Christian Skotte, Brandon Echter, and Rachel Bouton.   Special thanks to Joanna Buchthal, Bob Rosenbaum, Dick Johnson, and Sam Telford.  

Bioengineering mice to stop Lyme disease, a new approach to refugee aid, and rethinking one of the seven deadly sins. This week, stories about the best way to help people.

Kevin Esvelt leads the Sculpting Evolution Group at MIT. Their work explores “evolutionary and ecological engineering and responsive science.” Kevin joins Nate on the program to help him with some homework and to discuss a tool for gene editing called CRISPR.

CRISPR is a new technology that enables scientists to quickly alter the genetic makeup of the entire population of a species. It's so powerful that just one genetically-modified mosquito could eradicate malaria. It's so easy to do that a grad student could (accidentally) enact these global ecological changes from their kitchen. It's also under-regulated. Under science's current culture of secrecy, ensuring that scientists are taking necessary precautions with gene-drive research is next to impossible, says CRISPR innovator Kevin Esvelt. Writing in Nature last summer, Esvelt urged the scientific community to open all experiments to public scrutiny, beginning with the revolutionary and potentially world-changing gene-editing research he helped advance. Also in the podcast, the idea of human cloning captivates and terrifies. Depictions of human clones in science fiction reflect some of our deepest fears about what it means to be human. But not everyone shares those anxieties. For example, the creators of the hit BBC series Orphan Black have developed a show which decidedly diverges from the canon of popular culture clone portrayals. Brooke talks with bioethicist Gregory Pence, author of What We Talk About When We Talk About Clone Club, about how Orphan Black reflects and challenges dominant ideas in the debate on human cloning.   On the Media is supported by listeners like you. Support OTM by donating today (https://pledge.wnyc.org/support/otm). Follow our show on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook @onthemedia, and share your thoughts with us by emailing onthemedia@wnyc.org.

How can we stay on top of changes that are not only getting faster, but more complex? We need strategies to take advantage of breakthroughs in fields as diverse as data mining, artificial intelligence and machine learning, since they are changing the ways we work, research, and live. To navigate this change, Joi Ito, Director of the MIT Media Lab and author of Whiplash, shares insights from research at the Lab and offers us nine strategies for surviving our faster future. In this interview, he does a deep dive on creative problem solving, teams, diversity, and learning. He talks about: How the Media Lab got started and the current focus of its work The importance of the white space between and beyond disciplines How the Media Lab has shifted from operating as a container to operating as a node How neuroscientist Ed Boyden embodies the multi-disciplinary approach of the Lab How pull over push problem solving is about finding and using the resources you need when you need them How the 2011 Japanese earthquake became a focal point for pull over push problem solving The power of diverse teams - and diverse tools - for creative problem solving The sweet spot of disagreement and diversity among productive teams When it comes to diversity, why we need to ask, are we looking to the other or just another? How innovative cybersecurity folks are designing systems that assume failure rather than seeking to avoid it and how this is about resilience over strength Why we need to think about the interaction among objects - the systems in which they operate - in order to innovate for greater success The role nuance and complexity play in thinking about open source How machine learning and artificial intelligence are impacting fields like cryptocurrency and genetic engineering The fact that policies and regulations are behind where machine learning and artificial intelligence are taking us Why lawyers need to learn more about tech and scientists need to learn more about ethical and legal issues Kevin Esvelt and his work at the Media Lab in genetic engineering and his focus on responsible ways of deploying these tools in conjunction with everyday citizens Why we cannot wait on ethicists and policymakers but must get scientists on board instead How our education system is the opposite of what robots and artificial intelligence are ensuring we need when it comes to creativity and innovation Why the Media Lab emphasizes the 4Ps of play, passion, projects, and peers and how that differs markedly from what U.S. schools are about Why our education system and our schools need to be as dynamic and open to change as the fields that will have the greatest impact on us and them How we might look to the ed system in Finland regarding assessment and project-based learning The value of the Montessori approach The value of looking at countries like India and others where they are experimenting with schools and learning The power of informal, interest-driven learning Why we should be spending more time on getting people engaged in their learning Why he believes learning is a social and cultural problem, not a tech problem, and why we need to create a culture of learning How he thought programming and coding would be more about mindset and creativity than employment Why he believes we need to nudge human-machine interactions in the right direction Links to Topics Mentioned in this Podcast @Joi https://joi.ito.com/ MIT Media Lab Jerome Wiesner Nicholas Negroponte Marvin Minsky Seymour Papert Muriel Cooper John Seely Brown Ed Boyden Optogenetics Just-in-time manufacturing The Inevitable by Kevin Kelly Scott E. Page Donella Meadows Reid Hoffman Kevin Esvelt and Rewriting the Code of Life CRISPR Mizuko Ito (Mimi Ito) and Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out If you enjoy the podcast, please rate and review it on iTunes - your ratings make all the difference.

Kevin Esvelt, Assistant Professor at the Media Lab, describes his work in CRISPR Gene Drives, bioethics, and my new book Whiplash which he just read. Originally streamed on Facebook Live. [EP-EN-19]

Helping refugees - and others - generally means giving them things like blankets, clothes, and food. Radha Rajkotia thinks we should try handing out cash. Plus, Jessica Tracy explains why one of the seven deadly sins could be a good thing, after all. And finally, advances in genetic engineering have allowed scientists to make decisions that could affect millions of people. Kevin Esvelt thinks the public should have a voice in those decisions.

Gene technology is becoming more and more powerful… and could affect more and more people. MIT researcher Kevin Esvelt tells us why he thinks the public needs to have a say in how we use it.

Source: Effective Altruism Global (original video).

It's one thing to genetically modify an organism in the lab. It's another thing entirely to spread those modifications in the wild, altering whole populations or even species. A new technology, the “CRISPR gene drive,” promises to do just that, giving human beings an unprecedented ability to fine-tune the natural world and nudge evolution in new directions. Malaria-resistant mosquitoes? Lyme-blocking ticks? Those are just a few of the applications floated so far, but the possibilities are endless. I talked to molecular biologist and “evolutionary sculptor” Kevin Esvelt, who first proposed the CRISPR gene drive, about its potential, perils and steps to ensure that we use our new powers wisely. Topics covered include: The CRISPR revolution: fast, cheap gene editing Gene drives: CRISPR on auto-pilot Using gene drives to fight disease and suppress pests Safeguards, controls and oversight More evo-sculpting: Kevin's PACE system, harnessing viral evolution to create novel biomolecules Personally, I find the implications of gene drives to be fairly head-spinning. Imagine self-propagating genes that spread inexorably even when they offer no selective advantage – even when they're maladaptive! Of course, like a too-virulent pathogen, really maladaptive CRISPR drives might put themselves out of business by killing off their hosts, and selective pressures would favor mutations that incapacitate the drive, but still…