Podcast appearances and mentions of Irving Fisher

At a drinks party in around 2011 or 2012, I had the ear of Andrew Feldman, aka Baron Feldman of Elstree, former Chairman of the Conservative Party—he of “swivel-eyed loons” fame, though he never actually said that. (Andrew is a friend, by the way.)“Tell George Osborne to buy back the gold Gordon Brown sold,” I advised.“At these prices?” smiled Andrew with a mix of incredulity, amusement, and polite condescension.“Yes!” I said. “It might be good publicity, even. Or do it secretly, and announce it afterward. The important thing is getting the gold back. We will need it at some point. Why not just quantitatively ease the money and buy it back? You're doing that and buying bonds.”Andrew laughed at my joke, which wasn't a joke, and then wandered off in search of someone more sane to talk to.Given the government has this extraordinary power to create money out of nothing, why don't they just print money and buy hard assets with it?Park that thought for a moment.A couple of months ago, I was at Liz Truss's book launch—aren't you impressed with all this name-dropping?—and I ran into Mark Littlewood, former director of the IEA and now of PopCon. I started bending his ear about the media's failure to report on the Bank of England and how it had shafted Truss with its advanced notice of gilt sales, Quantitative Tightening, which began the day before Kwasi Kwarteng's budget and led to a collapse in the gilt market, the blame for which was then left at Kwasi Kwarteng's doorstep. Mark nodded. “Do you think I don't know?” said Liz.“I would love to be able to grill Andrew Bailey in public,” I said. “Or just ask him one question with people watching. I know exactly what I'd ask him.”“What?” said Mark.“If the Bank of England can print money, why do we need taxes?”Mark laughed and, thinking I was asking him that question, replied, “Money illusion.”Charlie Morris is one of my closest mates and he writes what I think is one of the best investment newsletters out there, in fact a suite of them. I urge you to sign up for a free trial.Money illusion is one of those economic terms that is pretty self-explanatory, but here is an example. Most of know a hundred pounds does not buy you today what it bought you ten years ago, but we still think in terms of past prices. (Old people do this more, for obvious reasons). A worker might feel great with a 5% raise, but if inflation is 7%, he is actually earning less than before. This has been an ongoing process for decades with the result that, in real terms, wages are lower.Here's the Wikipedia definition (edited by me):In economics, money illusion, or price illusion, is a cognitive bias where money is thought of in nominal, rather than real, terms. In other words, the face value (nominal value) of money is mistaken for its purchasing power (real value) at a previous point in time. The term was coined by Irving Fisher in Stabilizing the Dollar, and popularized by John Maynard Keynes in the early twentieth century. Fisher also wrote a book on the subject, The Money Illusion, in 1928.Mark and I both doubted that Bailey would give that as the answer, even if he thought it, which we doubted he would. If governments started printing money and buying assets, many would start questioning money, and faith in fiat might quickly evaporate. If governments worldwide started doing it (eg Britain prints money and starts buying land in France) you are in race-to-the-bottom territory. It would be a race to the bottom for fiat currency.Even if Bailey thought money illusion was the answer, he certainly wouldn't say it because that in itself undermines fiat.Modern money has nominal value, but not intrinsic value. It relies on illusion (and the law) to function. The more you debase it, the less likely that illusion is to hold. Maybe money delusion is more accurate. Obviously, the backing of the law makes a great difference, as does the fact that taxes must be collected in this money, but, boy, is the system vulnerable. Illusions can last a long time. But when they shatter, they shatter very quickly, and then there is nothing.I don't say the system will pop. It has been going on for a long time. But I do observe that it very easily could.It's why I recommend both gold and bitcoin. Both are money in and of themselves: one is the product of nature, the other the product of extraordinary amounts of computer power. Neither relies on anyone else.If you liked this article, please tell a friend.If you are interested in buying gold, check out my recent report. I have a feeling it is going to come in very handy.My recommended bullion dealer is the Pure Gold Company.Life After the State - Why We Don't Need Government (2013), my first book, is now back in print - with the audiobook here: Audible UK, Audible US, Apple Books. I recommend the audiobook ;)And if you are in the Scottish neck of the woods this August, look out for me at the Edinburgh Fringe. I'll be performing one of my “lectures with funny bits”. This one is all about the history of mining. As always, I shall be delivering it at Panmure House, where Adam Smith wrote Wealth of Nations. It's at 2pm most afternoons. You can get tickets here. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.theflyingfrisby.com/subscribe

At a drinks party in around 2011 or 2012, I had the ear of Andrew Feldman, aka Baron Feldman of Elstree, former Chairman of the Conservative Party—he of “swivel-eyed loons” fame, though he never actually said that. (Andrew is a friend, by the way.)“Tell George Osborne to buy back the gold Gordon Brown sold,” I advised.“At these prices?” smiled Andrew with a mix of incredulity, amusement, and polite condescension.“Yes!” I said. “It might be good publicity, even. Or do it secretly, and announce it afterward. The important thing is getting the gold back. We will need it at some point. Why not just quantitatively ease the money and buy it back? You're doing that and buying bonds.”Andrew laughed at my joke, which wasn't a joke, and then wandered off in search of someone more sane to talk to.Given the government has this extraordinary power to create money out of nothing, why don't they just print money and buy hard assets with it?Park that thought for a moment.A couple of months ago, I was at Liz Truss's book launch—aren't you impressed with all this name-dropping?—and I ran into Mark Littlewood, former director of the IEA and now of PopCon. I started bending his ear about the media's failure to report on the Bank of England and how it had shafted Truss with its advanced notice of gilt sales, Quantitative Tightening, which began the day before Kwasi Kwarteng's budget and led to a collapse in the gilt market, the blame for which was then left at Kwasi Kwarteng's doorstep. Mark nodded. “Do you think I don't know?” said Liz.“I would love to be able to grill Andrew Bailey in public,” I said. “Or just ask him one question with people watching. I know exactly what I'd ask him.”“What?” said Mark.“If the Bank of England can print money, why do we need taxes?”Mark laughed and, thinking I was asking him that question, replied, “Money illusion.”Money illusion is one of those economic terms that is pretty self-explanatory, but here is an example. Most of know a hundred pounds does not buy you today what it bought you ten years ago, but we still think in terms of past prices. (Old people do this more, for obvious reasons). A worker might feel great with a 5% raise, but if inflation is 7%, he is actually earning less than before. This has been an ongoing process for decades with the result that, in real terms, wages are lower.Here's the Wikipedia definition (edited by me):In economics, money illusion, or price illusion, is a cognitive bias where money is thought of in nominal, rather than real, terms. In other words, the face value (nominal value) of money is mistaken for its purchasing power (real value) at a previous point in time. The term was coined by Irving Fisher in Stabilizing the Dollar, and popularized by John Maynard Keynes in the early twentieth century. Fisher also wrote a book on the subject, The Money Illusion, in 1928.Mark and I both doubted that Bailey would give that as the answer, even if he thought it, which we doubted he would. If governments started printing money and buying assets, many would start questioning money, and faith in fiat might quickly evaporate. If governments worldwide started doing it (eg Britain prints money and starts buying land in France) you are in race-to-the-bottom territory. It would be a race to the bottom for fiat currency.Even if Bailey thought money illusion was the answer, he certainly wouldn't say it because that in itself undermines fiat.Modern money has nominal value, but not intrinsic value. It relies on illusion (and the law) to function. The more you debase it, the less likely that illusion is to hold. Maybe money delusion is more accurate. Obviously, the backing of the law makes a great difference, as does the fact that taxes must be collected in this money, but, boy, is the system vulnerable. Illusions can last a long time. But when they shatter, they shatter very quickly, and then there is nothing.I don't say the system will pop. It has been going on for a long time. But I do observe that it very easily could.It's why I recommend both gold and bitcoin. Both are money in and of themselves: one is the product of nature, the other the product of extraordinary amounts of computer power. Neither relies on anyone else.If you liked this article, please tell a friend.If you are interested in buying gold, check out my recent report. I have a feeling it is going to come in very handy.My recommended bullion dealer is the Pure Gold Company.Life After the State - Why We Don't Need Government (2013), my first book, is now back in print - with the audiobook here: Audible UK, Audible US, Apple Books. I recommend the audiobook ;)And if you are in the Scottish neck of the woods this August, look out for me at the Edinburgh Fringe. I'll be performing one of my “lectures with funny bits”. This one is all about the history of mining. As always, I shall be delivering it at Panmure House, where Adam Smith wrote Wealth of Nations. It's at 2pm most afternoons. You can get tickets here. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.theflyingfrisby.com/subscribe

每天早晨8:30 讓我們一起解讀財經時事 參加財經皓角會員 : https://yutinghao.finance 主持人：游庭皓（經濟日報專欄作家、小一輩財經人話翻譯機） 音頻收聽請在Podcast或Soundcloud搜尋『游庭皓的財經皓角』 Telegram: https://t.me/yu_finance 我的粉絲專頁:https://reurl.cc/n563rd 網站參加會員手冊 https://reurl.cc/WG7vd7 歡迎來信給小編幫您處理 jackieyutw@gmail.com """"" 打賞網址 ：https://p.ecpay.com.tw/B83478D """"" 書名：貨幣縮水 作者： 歐文．費雪 原文作者： Irving Fisher 譯者： 李佳楠 出版社：樂金文化 出版日期：2023/12/29 https://reurl.cc/VNjG3y (YT抽書的朋友要公開訂閱我們財經皓角頻道唷♥️) (FB抽書的朋友要公開分享直播影片+您想要抽書留言♥️) 《早晨財經速解讀》是游庭皓的個人知識節目，針對財經時事做最新解讀，開播於2019年7月15日，每日開盤前半小時準時直播。議題從總體經濟、產業動態到投資哲學，信息量飽滿，為你顛覆直覺，清理投資誤區，用更寬廣的角度帶你一窺投資的奧秘。 免責聲明：《游庭皓的財經皓角》頻道為學習型頻道，僅用於教育與娛樂目的，無任何證券之買賣建議。任何形式的投資皆涉及風險，投資者需進行自己的研究，持盈保泰。

Fed Success! High LT Rates & Recession ComingWorld yield curve inversion is falling because of rising LT ratesRising LT rates are reducing yield curve inversion fastest in DM Americas and DM EuropeRates are high across EMs, crushing in FMs, and low in EM AsiaFrance and Germany ST rates rising; DM countries have past peak yield curve inversion due to rising LT ratesRates are low in China, which, together with India, never invertedRates returning to normal?Irving Fisher (1867 –1947) – One of the earliest American neoclassical economistsDescribed as "the greatest economist the United States has ever produced"His reputation during his lifetime was irreparably harmed by his public statement, just nine days before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, that the stock market had reached "a permanently high plateau"His 1930 treatise, The Theory of Interest, summed up a lifetime's research into capital, capital budgeting, credit markets, and the factors (including inflation) that determine interest ratesSome core conceptsTime Preference – The idea that people generally prefer to have goods and services sooner rather than laterReal Interest Rate – The real interest rate adjusts for the effects of inflation, allowing for a more accurate evaluation of the purchasing power of money over timeFisher Equation – Relates nominal interest rates to real interest rates and inflationExpressed as: Nominal Interest Rate = Real Interest Rate + Inflation RateThe Fisher Effect - Suggests that nominal interest rates adjust in response to expected changes in inflationIn other words, if people anticipate higher inflation, nominal interest rates will rise to compensateJeremy Siegel (born 1945) Professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Penn.Comments extensively on the economy and financial marketsWrote two books, but most prominent isStocks for the Long Run: The Definitive Guide to Financial Market Returns and Long-Term Investment StrategiesHistory of the real return on long-term US government bondsGlobal MarketsWorld yield curve inversion is falling because of rising LT ratesInterest rate level – 5.4% world 3m yield, 10yr 4.4%; LT rates much higher in EMWorld 3m rates were 5.4% in Sept., DM rates were 4.4%, and EM rates were 6.9%, a 2.6ppt premiumWorld 1yr rates were 5.1% in Sept., DM rates were 4.3%, and EM rates were 6.2%, a 1.9ppt premiumWorld 10yr rates were 4.7% in Sept., DM rates were 3.8%, and EM rates were 5.9%, a 2ppt premiumYear-on-year changes – DM 3m yield rose from lower base; fast DM LT rate rise3m yield had a large 2.2ppt YoY rise to 4.4% in DM; there was a smaller 1.4ppt rise in EM1yr rates only increased 0.7ppts YoY in EM; but were up a large 1.4ppt YoY in DM10yr EM rates up only 0.2ppts YoY, DM rates rose by a much higher 0.7pptsRate progression – DM tightening has stopped but continues in EM3m rates were flat MoM in DM and are on the rise in EMA 0.5ppt MoM rise in EM 1yr yield is raising World yields; DM yield was flatSept 10yr yield rose in both DM and EM, up about 0.4ppts MoMYield curve – Rising LT rates pushed world past August peak inversionAugust looks to have been World peak inversion as LT yields have been risingWorld 3m rates rose fast, but now LT rates have started to riseMay looks to have been DM peak inversion as LT yields start to...

Hello Interactors,Cued by shifting hues comes a call for the leaves to fall. Which means Interplace, like the weather, turns to the tumultuous territory of economics. Economics, like fall weather, is not all that predictable — both systems morph in response to layers of interconnected webs of complex systems that adapt, respond, and influence social, environmental, and political interactions.I recently heard Sean Carroll, an influential theoretical physicist known for his work in quantum mechanics, interview Samuel Bowles, an influential economist specializing in economic inequality. They covered an array of topics including the history and future of economics, and physics, in response to growing attention to complexity science.They harkened back to the industrial age and a time when physicists, mathematicians, philosophers, and newly emerging economists were collaborating — building theories, models, steam engines, looms, and calculation machines. It was a complicated time, rich with invention, but also relatively simple by today's standards.Hearing this history in the context of the current U.S. United Auto Workers strike made me wonder if perhaps Biden's fascination with ‘building back better' America's industrial past is rooted in a nostalgic yearning for a simpler past.This labor action arouses a sense of nationalism and nostalgia for the 'good old days' that Trump ignited but Biden just may have usurped. But the industrial sector, however romanticized, now represents a small fraction of jobs in America.Humans have a penchant for simplifying complex narratives, yearning for an era where gears of industry moved in predictable cycles much like the changing seasons. But these two scientists highlight how the economy in which we exist has advanced in complexity and is ripe for evolution.Now let's go.FROM CLASSIC TO COMPLEX: THE ECONOMIC SHIFTIn the interview, Bowles talks of the history of economic thought, beginning with Adam Smith, an intellectual pillar of the Industrial Revolution and an acclaimed father of economics. Adam Smith's notion of the 'invisible hand,' lauded for its portrayal of self-regulating markets, is heavily scrutinized today.This famous metaphor has long been the cornerstone of classical economics and conservative politics, purporting that individual self-interest inadvertently contributes to the overall good of society in ‘invisible' ways. Bowles explains how Smith could observe, amidst the new factory economy in Scotland — complete with newly built cotton mills and shirt factories — how the shirt buyer and seller both acted according to their self-interest. And then, almost as if by magic, an efficient allocation of resources emerged and along with it a social contract.In simple transactions, like buying a shirt, Bowles illustrates how Smith's model functions well. The seller sets a price based on the costs of production and a desire for profit; the buyer accepts this price based on their valuation of the shirt. The transaction is smooth, the contract 'complete,' and market forces work to adjust supply, demand, and pricing in a seemingly natural order.He offers another historical example that perpetuated the illusion of simple economic models of physics in economics. One of the early influential neoclassical economists, Irving Fisher, built a physical hydraulic model in the early 1900s as part of his dissertation. He used interconnected tanks and pipes to simulate supply and demand. It provided a visceral example of a 'complete contract' where the variables are manageable and the outcomes somewhat foreseeable.Reflecting on this, Bowles offers,“Now, there are all kinds of models like that in economics in which the metaphor really is transportation, things moving from here to there.”However, this 'invisible hand' stumbles when confronted with the complex market forces of the labor required to manufacture a good like a shirt. Bowles believes it wasn't until 1972, when the Nobel prize winner in economics, Kenneth Arrow, complicate the image of the ‘invisible hand' as it relates to the labor market.His work, particularly his Impossibility Theorem, mathematically demonstrated the challenges inherent in collective decision-making and the limits of market efficiency. Whereas the transaction of buying a shirt can be fully described and agreed upon by both parties, making it a 'complete contract,' labor contracts often can't offer this level of specificity and predictability.Contracts in labor markets become fuzzy. They're incomplete abstractions that only offer one guarantee — that an employee be present on the job. Their performance is harder to guarantee. Without constant observation of performance, the employer has no guarantees a worker is working hard or hardly working.But the employer, capable of paying more than the minimum wage to ensure good performance, holds sway over the employee's behavior. So, if an employee wants to keep their job, they'd better work as hard as possible — until, sometimes, it becomes impossibly hard.Labor unions, like the United Auto Workers, exist to even this power imbalance by bargaining for fair wages and working conditions. How do they bargain? By choosing to not do the one thing their contract requires – be present on the job. This forces a negotiation, a conversation.And this is where Bowles, and other economists, are looking to take the field of economics, stating,“…in recent years, some economists, myself included, have been more attracted to the idea that economic interactions are more like a conversation. So, we should really be thinking about linguistics. That is, I'm having a conversation with you, and in saying what I'm saying now, I'm anticipating your response. And very often I'm having a conversation with somebody with some intention that I would like this person to agree to go to see a film with me, or to agree to work on a paper, and so on. But I'm anticipating what that person's intention is too, of course, in endless regress.”COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: GAME THEORY AND THE REAL WORLDFinding common ground, coming to agreement, typically requires both parties to have to give something up — to compromise. Economists often lean on a branch of mathematics to model these interactions called Game Theory. Game Theory offers methods to analyze scenarios where the outcome for each participant depends on the choices of all involved.One experiment used to explore game theory is called the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this scenario, two prisoners must decide whether to cooperate and remain silent upon interrogation or betray each other to the authorities. Although cooperation would yield a better outcome for both, the rational choice for each individual, given the uncertainty of the other's action, is to betray, often leading to a suboptimal result for all involved.Bowles has spent a good chunk of his career using this dilemma in experiments worldwide to explore issues of trust, collaboration, and the challenges that emerge when incentives may not align with collective well-being. He's gone so far as to explore whether the human species is genetically predisposed to selfishness or altruism. His conclusions are published in the book "A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution."Bowles concludes in the interview that there is“strong experimental evidence that we are generous in many circumstances. We have models and data which suggests that there might even be a genetic predisposition. And of course, we know there are many cultural reasons why we'd be taught to be that way.”Of course, every critic of altruism will bring up free-loaders — people who contribute relatively little but aren't shy about taking their fair share. In Bowles experiments, he's found “free-riders” are routinely punished even at the expense of self-interest.In a multi-round public goods game resembling an expanded Prisoner's Dilemma, initial contributions to a shared good start off high but dwindle as players notice others free riding. When a punishment mechanism is introduced, like allowing participants to spend some of their earnings to penalize free-riders, contributions to the public good surge back up, eventually rendering punishment unnecessary.This dynamic suggests that human behavior in such systems is nuanced: while people are initially willing to cooperate, they adapt to avoid being exploited. Moreover, when given the chance, they actively invest to punish free riders, even at a personal cost.Bearing this in mind, Bowles believes “if you're thinking of a new economic paradigm, you have to come down on that somehow.” Bowles believes there's enough evidence today to say it's wrong to believe humans are purely rational, intelligent actors who act in their own self interest. In his words, “You can't say we're selfish and really smart.”Instead, he says “The bumper sticker for my paradigm is ‘People are a lot dumber and nicer than economists think.'”I like Samuel Bowles use of a linguistics lens to explore economic systems. It's a compelling touchpoint where natural and social sciences converge around interactions. The nuances of real world economics, he suggests, can be explored but not defined by sterile, mathematical models. We need methodologies that unravel those nested webs of complexities influenced by cultural narratives, historical and political context, and social relationships. These dynamics are exemplified in the ongoing negotiations between the United Auto Workers and their employers and politicians — talks that encapsulate more than mere contractual details but a convoluted and ever-changing web of expectations, intentions, and power dynamics.As society evolves, Bowles advocates for a commensurate evolution in our economic models, one that can accommodate these rich human interactions. It signifies a shift from seeking objective certainties to acknowledging the inherently uncertain, dynamic, and complex landscape of the intricate systems that define our world. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit interplace.io

Edward Chancellor is a financial historian, journalist, and author of, "Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation" and his latest, “The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest” The two books link together the history of money and finance, and human culture.  In today's episode we explore the ways in which money and finance is embedded deeper in our lives than we may have previously thought.  ------ ✨ DEBRIEF | Unpacking the episode:  https://www.bankless.com/debrief-edward-chancellor    ------ ✨ COLLECTIBLES | Collect this episode:  https://collectibles.bankless.com/mint  ------

Irving Fisher was once lauded by fellow economist Joseph Schumpeter as the ‘greatest economist America has ever produced'. This is high praise indeed but one could easily argue that the most recent Economic Nobel Prize laureates owe Fisher a considerable debt for their award. The financial crisis of 2008 spurred a renewed interest in Fisher's work after what could be seen as a lengthy period of neglect. In his own life-time he went from being the first "celebrity economist" to seeing his reputation in tatters after some overly optimistic and in hindsight ill-advised comments on what was to turn out to be the eve of the Great Depression. In this episode, your friendly neighbourhood economists, Pete and Gav, take you on a journey or rediscovery to find out more about this fascinating man and his ideas. We suspect you will find yourself agreeing at least in part with the accolade Schumpeter laid at his feet. Along the way, you'll find out why it's important to chew your food for your health and wellbeing, who the mysterious ‘Bonesmen' are and why AI can't yet match the poetry skills of our economists. Technical support as always comes from ‘Chatbot' Nic.

Irving Fisher was an American economist whose book The Purchasing Power of Money looked at the relationship between money supply and price levels. In fact, to many he is seen as the father of monetarism, but on this week's podcast Steve Keen explains how Fisher's struggles with debt led him to develop his thinking on debt deflation as the cause of major economic downturns. He's the first of a series of economists who have influenced Steve's thinking, that we'll be looking at over the next five weeks or so. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Christian hat den Gossen-Preis bekommen für Makroökonomik mit heterogenen Agenten und sitzt in der Gaskommission. Darin: Gossensches Gesetz – Grenznutzen – Österreichische Schule – Arbeitswerttheorie – Verein für Socialpolitik – Soziale Frage – The Coronavirus Stimulus Package: How large is the transfer multiplier? – Inflation und Zinsen in der Türkei – Irving Fisher – Haber-Bosch-Verfahren – Agglomerationseffekt […]

Auch wenn volkswirtschaftliche Theorien längst empirisch widerlegt sind, können sie dennoch lange im Diskurs überleben. So ist es auch mit der sogenannten Phillips-Kurve, mit der einige Ökonomen bis heute nachzuweisen suchen, dass es einen kausalen Zusammenhang zwischen Inflation und Arbeitslosigkeit gibt. Das meint: Je höher die Inflation, desto niedriger die Arbeitslosigkeit – und umgekehrt. Das klingt durchaus logisch. Schon Ende der 1920er-Jahre beschäftigte sich damit Irving Fisher, Jahrzehnte später legte Alban William Housego Phillips mit einem Aufsatz, der angeblich an nur einem Wochenende entstanden ist, eine bahnbrechende Untersuchung zu diesem Zusammenhang vor. Während Phillips selbst aus seinen Ergebnissen keine direkten politischen Forderungen ableitete, taten genau dies danach sehr viele Ökonomen, Zentralbanker und Politiker. Und auch heute verkündet etwa der Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Paul Krugman in der „New York Times“, dass wir, um eine niedrige Inflation zu bekommen, mit etwas mehr Arbeitslosigkeit rechnen müssen. Es lohnt sich, den ursprünglichen Aufsatz von Phillips erneut zu lesen. Einige wichtige Details werden nämlich in der aktuellen Debatte weitgehend übersehen. Darüber sprechen Ole Nymoen und Wolfgang M. Schmitt in der neuen Folge von „Wohlstand für Alle“. Quellen: Paul Krugman: “Inflation Is About to Come Down — but Don't Get Too Excited”, in: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/12/opinion/inflation-consumer-prices.html. Alban W. Phillips: “The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-19571”, in: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1958.tb00003.x. Joseph Politano: “The Life, Death, and Zombification of the Phillips Curve”, in: https://apricitas.substack.com/p/the-life-death-and-zombification?s=w. Ihr könnt uns unterstützen - herzlichen Dank! Paypal: https://www.paypal.me/oleundwolfgang Wolfgang M. Schmitt, Ole Nymoen Betreff: Wohlstand fuer Alle IBAN: DE67 5745 0120 0130 7996 12 BIC: MALADE51NWD Twitter: Ole: twitter.com/nymoen_ole Wolfgang: twitter.com/SchmittJunior Die gesamte WfA-Literaturliste: https://wohlstand-fuer-alle.netlify.app

Welchen Zusammenhang gibt es zwischen Inflation und Arbeitslosigkeit? Bedingt das eine das andere? Schon vor knapp 100 Jahren beschäftigten sich mit dieser Frage Wirtschaftswissenschaftler. Ist es tatsächlich so, dass eine niedrige Arbeitslosigkeit zu einer höheren Inflationsrate führt – und umgekehrt? Nach dem britischen Volkswirtschaftler Alban William Phillips ist die Phillips-Kurve benannt, die oftmals so interpretiert wurde, dass die Phänomene hohe Inflation und niedrige Arbeitslosigkeit nicht nur korrelieren, sondern es einen kausalen Zusammenhang gibt. Von dem ehemaligen Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt ist der Ausspruch „Lieber 5 Prozent Inflation als 5 Prozent Arbeitslosigkeit!“ übermittelt. Und auch jetzt wird im aktuellen Diskurs über die Inflation dem Faktor Arbeit mehr Bedeutung beigemessen als früher. Die FED in den USA hat die Beschäftigungsquote schon länger als relevant für ihre Geldpolitik angesehen. Es ist also dringend nötig, sich näher mit der Phillips-Kurve zu befassen und auch die theoretische Pionierarbeit von Irving Fisher zu würdigen. Mehr dazu von Ole Nymoen und Wolfgang M. Schmitt in der neuen Folge von „Wohlstand für Alle“. Literatur: Irving Fisher: "I Discovered the Phillips Curve: 'A Statistical Relation between Unemployment and Price Changes'", online verfügbar unter: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830534. Ihr könnt uns unterstützen - herzlichen Dank! Paypal: https://www.paypal.me/oleundwolfgang Wolfgang M. Schmitt, Ole Nymoen Betreff: Wohlstand fuer Alle IBAN: DE67 5745 0120 0130 7996 12 BIC: MALADE51NWD Twitter: Ole: twitter.com/nymoen_ole Wolfgang: twitter.com/SchmittJunior Die gesamte WfA-Literaturliste: https://wohlstand-fuer-alle.netlify.app

In this episode, we ask: Would you like to hear what people are saying? Who is Larry Kotlikoff? Would you like to view his books? What about economics? Why has the American worker not seen wages not gone up? What about Irving Fisher? What about consumption smoothing? What if you had a freezer full of...

There is a saying that money makes the world go round. But Jacob Goldstein, journalist, author, and co-host of NPR's Planet Money, suggests that money only works when we all believe in it. In this episode, he talks about his book, Money: The Story Of A Made-Up Thing. Jacob explains how money became a helpful fiction that shaped societies for thousands of years. Listen from the beginning till the end to learn about how world leaders and fringe thinkers have changed our perceptions about money. Goldstein and host Greg La Blanc touch on stories about the Lehman Brothers and the 2008 Economic Collapse, Irving Fisher, Nicholas Biddle, and John Law —a professional gambler and convicted murderer who brought modern money to France— eventually destroying the country's economy. He shares an interesting parallel on Isaac Le Maire and the Game Stop fiasco.Listen to his exciting thoughts on digital money —cypherpunks, a group of radical libertarian computer programmers, paved the way for bitcoin. Finally, listen to his story about the history and theory of light, how it affects money planning and productivity.Episode Quotes:What do you think about the U.S. becoming a goldsmith to the world and enjoying the profits of the money-making?Literally, we sell pieces of paper to people for a hundred dollars. Like it's a good business. The fact that the dollar is the reserve currency for the world, it's the money everybody wants. It means everybody wants to buy our treasury bonds. Everybody wants dollars, essentially. It's the tailwind that we have for the economy […] Like nobody's going to want anything else. I mean, they're not going to want Euros anytime soon. And the other obvious one would be the Yuan, right? The Chinese currency, the Renminbi. But, China has pretty significant capital controls, making it hard to move money freely in and out of China.Talk about the idea of digital cash as you described in your book. Is paper money vanishing, and how did the Coronavirus affect the movement of paper money? Digital currency, to a significant degree, happened so that they could do what people have done for a long time with paper money —which is to move it around without anybody knowing about it. Right? So whether the crime is just tax evasion or moving drug money, paper money is really good. One of the things that happened after the book came out, as California was going into lockdown; there was this series of DEA raids in the spring last year, where they seized millions and millions of dollars. Just because the drug dealers suddenly couldn't launder them. What do you think the next source of instability will be?The spreads between high-risk debt and safe debt were relatively small, which is a classic sign of the credit boom going on and on. So, that's sort of a traditional thing, making an economic downturn worse. Although not necessarily a financial crisis, right? The financial crisis classically comes from runnable debt. So, is there somebody out there besides money market mutual funds, which we know about, who is taking something like deposits? Letting people borrow short and lend long? Like the classic bank behavior where people come and ask for their money back. Whoever. Is it the FinTech, the intermediator saying, “Oh, sorry, I don't have your money”? That is the financial crisis moment. And so, I don't know who's the next sort of financial intermediary creating some money like deposit. I don't know who that is.Show LinksGuest ProfileJacob Goldstein at NPR and Planet MoneyJacob Goldstein on LinkedInJacob Goldstein on TwitterHis WorkMoney: The True Story of a Made-Up ThingNPR EpisodesTexas Public Radio

realizzato in collaborazione con BPER Banca.In questo episodio, dedicato all'epico crollo di Wall Street, raccontiamo di come si dovrebbero gestire le previsioni per il futuro, prendendo spunto dal capolavoro di Francis Scott Fitzgerald e raccontando la storia di due grandi economisti, Irving Fisher e John Maynard Keynes, entrambi colpiti dalla Grande Depressione del 1929. Ospite dell'episodio il direttore Ferruccio De Bortoli.

The contemporary prophet Harry Dent Jr. says the stock market will collapse this month. The financial newsletter writer even added that he will quit his job if he is wrong. This podcast (6:21) warns that even the most brilliant economic sages – like the great American economist Irving Fisher – falter when they make predictions, because their vast knowledge does not endow them with this ability. Hoping to cure investors of their innate credulity, I summon the story of the Witch of Endor, which memorably illustrates the fraudulence of acts of divination. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes suffered terrible losses in the Great Wall Street Crash of 1929. But they responded in different ways, leading to tragedy for Fisher and triumph for Keynes.

Nothing that’s happened had to happen, or must happen again. That’s why historians aren’t prophets. Wars, booms, busts, inventions, breakthroughs – none of those things were inevitable. They happened, and they’ll keep happening in various forms. But specific events that shape history are always low-probability events. Their surprise is what causes them to leave a mark. And they were surprising specifically because they weren’t inevitable. A lot of things have to go right (or wrong) to move the needle in what is an otherwise random swarm of eight billion people on earth just trying to make it through the day. The problem when studying historical events is that you know how the story ends, and it’s impossible to un-remember what you know today when thinking about the past. It’s hard to imagine alternative paths of history when the actual path is already known. So things always look more inevitable than they were. Now let me tell you a story about the Great Depression. “After booms come busts,” is about as close to economic law as it gets. Study history, and the calamity that followed the booming 1920s, late 1990s, and early 2000s seems more than obvious. It seems inevitable. In October 1929 – the peak of history’s craziest stock bubble and eve of the Great Depression – economist Irving Fisher famously told an audience that “stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau.” We look at these comments today and laugh. How could someone so smart be so blind to something so inevitable? If you follow the rule that the crazier the boom, the harder the bust, the Great Depression must have been obvious. But Fisher was a smart guy. And he wasn’t alone. In an interview years ago I asked Robert Shiller, who won the Nobel Prize for his work on bubbles, about the inevitability of the Great Depression. He responded: Well, nobody forecasted that. Zero. Nobody. Now there were, of course, some guys who were saying the stock market is overpriced. But if you look at what they said, did that mean a depression is coming? A decade-long depression? No one said that. I have asked economic historians to give me the name of someone who predicted the depression, and it comes up zero. That stuck with me. Here we are, bloated with hindsight, knowing the crash after the roaring 1920s was obvious and inevitable. But for those who lived through it – people for whom the 1930s was a yet-to-be-discovered future – it was anything but. Two things can explain something that looks inevitable but wasn’t predicted by those who experienced it at the time: Either everyone in the past fell for a blinding delusion. Or everyone in the present is blinded by hindsight. We are crazy to think it’s all the former and none the latter. The article will attempt to show what people were thinking in the two years before the Great Depression. I’ll do so with newspaper clippings sourced from the Library of Congress chronicling what people actually said at the time. People who were just as smart as we are today and who wanted to avoid calamity as much as we do today – what were they thinking just before the economy collapsed into the Great Depression? People who were susceptible to the same behavioral quirks and humble laws of statistics as we are today – what did they think of their booming economy? How did they feel? What did they forecast? What worried them? What arguments were convincing to them? History is only interesting because nothing is inevitable. To better understand the stories we believe about our own future, we must first try to understand the views of people who didn’t yet know how their story would end. To understand the mood of the late 1920s you have to understand what the country went through a decade prior. One hundred sixteen thousand Americans died in World War I. Almost 700,000 died from the Spanish Flu outbreak in 1918. As the war and the flu came to an end in 1919, America became gripped by one of its worst recessions of modern times. Business activity fell 38% as the economy transitioned from wartime production to regular business. Unemployment hit 12%. The triple hit of war, flu, and depression took a toll on morale. The Wall Street Journal, December 18th, 1920. “The war clouds darken the sky no more, but clouds of business depression and stagnation obscure the sun.” The Wall Street Journal, April 7th, 1921. “The economic outlook was never so complex as it is now.” Los Angeles Times, November 11th 1921. It’s vital to point this pessimism out, because an important part of the late-1920s boom is understanding how desperate people were for good news after a decade of national misery. As the clouds began to part in the mid-1920s, Americans were so exhausted from what they’d been through that they were quick to grab onto any signs of progress they could find. Historian Frederick Lewis Allen wrote in the 1930s: Like an overworked businessman beginning his vacation, the country had had to go through a period of restlessness and irritability, but was finally learning how to relax and amuse itself once more. A sense of disillusionment remained; like the suddenly liberated vacationist, the country felt that it ought to be enjoying itself more than it was, and that life was futile and nothing mattered much. But in the meantime it might as well play – following the crowd, take up the new toys that were amusing the crowd. By 1924 there’s a distinct shift in tone among the business press. The Baltimore Sun, January 1, 1924: America had endured more trauma than at any point since the Civil War in a way that left it shaken, scared, and skeptical. By 1928 the final traces of that fear subsided, and its people were ready to embrace the peace and prosperity they wanted so badly. Once secured, they had no intention of letting go and going back to where they were. On June 18th, 1927 the Washington Post wrote a headline that explains so much of what would took place over the next two years: One thing that sticks out about the late 1920s is the idea that prosperity wasn’t only alive, but was immortal. Those promoting this belief were not subtle. The New York Herald, August 12th, 1928: The Los Angeles Times, December 23rd, 1928: The Boston Globe, January 2nd 1928: The Christian Science Monitor, February 27th, 1928: The notion that recessions had been eliminated is easy to laugh at. But you have to consider three things about the 1920s that made the idea seem feasible. One is that the four inventions that transformed the 1920s – electricity, cars, the airplane, and the radio, and – seemed indistinguishable from magic to most Americans. They were more transformational to the economy than anything since the steam engine, and changed the way the average American lived day to day than perhaps any other technology before or since. Technology that spreads so far, so fast, and deeply tends to create an era of optimism, and a belief that humans can solve any problem no matter how difficult it looks. When you go from a horse to an airplane in one generation, taming the business cycle doesn’t sound outrageous, does it? The New York Times, May 15th, 1929: A second factor that made the end of recessions seem feasible was the idea that World War I was the “war to end all wars.” The documentary How to Live Forever asks a group of centenarians what the happiest day of their life was. “Armistice Day” one woman says, referring to the 1918 agreement that ended World War I. “Why?” the producer asks. “Because we knew there would be no more wars ever again,” she says. When you believe the world has entered an era of permanent peace, assuming permanent prosperity will follow isn’t a big stretch. The Boston Globe, October 6th, 1928: A third argument for why prosperity would be permanent was the diversification of the global economy. Manufacturing was to the 1920s what technology was to the 2000s – a new industry with big wages and seemingly endless growth. But unlike technology today, manufacturing was incredibly labor-intensive, providing good jobs for tens of millions of Americans. A new and powerful industry can create a sense that past rules of boom and bust no longer apply, because the economy has a new quiver in its belt. The LA Times, January 1st, 1929: That same day, Chicago Daily Tribune: Beyond the permanence of prosperity, optimism over technology and its ability to pull rural farmers into the new middle class gave the impression that the gains had barely begun. The Christian Science Monitor, May 15th, 1929: The view was shared outside of the United States. The Los Angeles Times, December 12th, 1928: Around the world, people wanted a piece of what America had. The Hartford Courant, August 6th, 1928: The Hartford Courant, May 16th, 1929, described “conditions more or less permanent” and “fears for the future seem increasingly without foundation.” Little things Americans could hardly consider a few years before became reality. After huge budget deficits to finance the war, government coffers were flush. The New York Times, June 27th, 1927: Consumer debt, we know in hindsight, was a major cause of the crash and depression. But at the time growing credit was seen as a good, clean fuel. The Washington Post, February 19th, 1929: When we look back at the late 1920s we think about crazy stock market valuations and shoe-shine boys giving stock tips. But that’s not what people paid attention to at the time. The newspapers are filled with charts like these: rational, level-headed, and fuel for optimism. The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 1928: Stocks were surging. But it looked justified, backed by real business values. The Wall Street Journal, March 5th, 1929: As manufacturing became a driving force of employment, workers discovered bargaining power in a way they never considered before, working on farms. The Washington Post, November 25th, 1928: Growing middle-class wages seemed to open endless possibilities. The Washington Post, November 13th, 1928: The New York Times put several of these arguments together on May 12th, 1929: The New York Herald, January 2nd, 1929: It’s hard to overstate how transformation these developments were to average Americans, particularly in light of the previous decade’s trauma. The New York Herald Tribune, October 14th, 1929: In 1920 Americans were out of work and desperate for a paycheck. Nine years later, the top national goal was promoting leisure time. The New York Herald Tribune September 30th, 1929: By 1929 the stock market had increased five-fold in the previous decade. Average earnings were at an all-time high. Unemployment was near an all-time low. Frederick Lewis Allen wrote: “This was a new era. Prosperity was coming into full and perfect flower.” A popular saying of the day, Allen writes, was “Prosperity due for a decline? Why, man, we’ve scarcely started!” “ It was a party, and no one wanted to stop dancing. To me the most fascinating part of the 1920s boom is what it did to American culture. Wealth quickly became the center topic of not just commerce, but values, happiness, and even religion. It took on a new place of importance that didn’t exist in previous generations when it was both lower and more concentrated. The New York Herald Tribune, February 11th, 1929: The Baltimore Sun, July 21st, 1929: Ladies’ Home Journal, June 5th, 1929: The Washington Post, June 6th, 1928: The New York Amsterdam News, January 5th, 1928: The New York Times, August 19th, 1928: Across the world, heads turned and respect grew. Chicago Daily Tribune, January 28th, 1929: In just a few years prosperity had taken on a new role in America – not something to dream about, but something that was secured today, guaranteed tomorrow, and sat at the center of what made Americans American. On September 10th, 1929, The Wall Street Journal wrote: Three weeks later, Irving Fisher made this famous proclamation: On October 1st, 1929, the Pittsburgh Courier sounded a faint alarm, warning that prosperity was a mental state subject to change: No one, though, could fathom what was in store next. The stock market lost a third of its value in the last few days of October, 1929. The immediate response was shock, but not dread. On October 26th The New York Times published an article titled, “‘All Well’ is View of Business Chiefs.” It quotes a dozen prominent businessmen: Arthur W. Loasby, president of the Equitable Trust Company: “There will be no repetition of the break of yesterday. The market fell of its own weight without regard to fundamental business conditions, which are sound. I have no fear of another comparable decline.” J.L. Julian, partner of the New York Stock Exchange firm of Fenner & Beane: “The worst is over. The selling yesterday was panicky brought on by hysteria. General conditions are good. Our inquires assure us that business throughout the country is sound.” M.C. Brush, president of the American International Corporation: “I do not look for a recurrence of Thursday and believe that the very best stocks can be bought at approximate present prices.” R.B. White, president of the Central Railroad of New Jersey: “There is nothing alarming in the situation as regards business. Business will continue the way it had. Plans in the railroad for the future have in no way been changed.” Three days later the market crashed again. It would not recover its losses until 1954. The first response to the crash was to view it as a temporary blip, and permanent prosperity would soon resume. The New York Times, October 30th, 1929: The Wall Street Journal, October 29th, 1929: The Boston Daily Globe, October 30th, 1929: The New York Times, October 30th, 1929: Barron’s, November 30th, 1929: Some saw the crash as a blessing, and an opportunity to simplify life that evolved so quickly in the previous five years. The New York Times, November 13th, 1929: The Christian Science Monitor, November 25th, 1929: Chicago Daily Tribune, November 26th, 1929: On New Year’s Eve 1929, as a year that began so bright came to such a shocking end, the Wall Street Journal made a friendly reminder: Keep investing, and you’ll undoubtedly have more money a year from now: Over the next three years the Great Depression put 12 million Americans out of work. The stock market fell 89%, reverting to levels last seen 36 years prior. GDP fell 27%. Prices fell 10% per year. Nine thousand banks failed, erasing $150 billion in American checking and savings accounts. Births declined 17%. Divorce rose by a third. Suicides rose by half. The depression gave rise to Adolf Hitler in Germany, setting the course for a world war that would go on to impact nearly every aspect of life we know today. It was, without question, one of the most consequential events of modern history. And when we look back at what people were thinking before it began, the question remains: Did they know? Did they have any clue? Were they blind to the inevitable? Or did they just suffer a terrible fate that wasn’t inevitable? There has never been a period in history where the majority of people didn’t look dumb in hindsight. People are good at analyzing and predicting things they know and can see. But they cannot think about or prepare for events they can’t fathom. These out-of-the-blue events go on to be the most consequential events of history, so when we look back it’s hard to understand why few people cared or prepared. The phrase “hindsight is 20/20” doesn’t seem right, because 20/20 implies everything coming into a clear view. In reality, hindsight makes most people look dumber than they actually were. Whether something is inevitable only matters if people know it’s inevitable. Knowing a decline is inevitable lets you prepare for it before it happens, and contextualize it when it does. The only important part of this story, I hope I have convinced you, is that no one saw the Great Depression as inevitable before it happened. I don’t think you can call the people of the late 1920s oblivious without answering the question, “Oblivious to what?” A future no one predicted? Consequences no one envisioned? Ignoring advice that no one gave? At the end of World War II it was assumed by most that, stripped of wartime spending, the economy would slip back into the depths of depression that preceded the war. We know today that it did not – it went on to prosper like never before. So were people oblivious in 1945? After the stock market crash of 1987, one investor recently recalled, “I remember an uneasy feeling as pundits predicted the start of the next Great Depression and the end of prosperity, as we knew it.” Instead, the 1990s were the most prosperous decade in history. Were we oblivious in 1987, too? The fact that we avoided depression in 1945, 1987 – and 2009 – might be the best evidence that the actual depression of the 1930s wasn’t inevitable. You can say, “Well, in 1945 the banking system didn’t collapse, and the 1990s were lucky because of the internet,” and so on. But no one in 1945 or 1990 knew those things, just as no one in 1929 knew their future. It’s not hard to imagine a world where policy responses were a little different, a presidential election tipped a different way, a second world war began a decade before it did, and the economic story of the 1930s playing out differently than it did. But we never get to hear the stories of what could have been or almost was. We only think something is inevitable if it’s obvious. And things only look obvious when everyone’s talking about them and predicting them. When you look back at what people said in the late 1920s – their confidence, their clarity, their logic – you can’t help but wonder what we are confident in today that will look foolish in the future. What those things might be, I don’t know. It wasn’t obvious in the 1920s. It won’t be obvious in the 2020s. That’s what makes history interesting – nothing’s inevitable. http://www.collaborativefund.com/blog/history-is-only-interesting-because-nothing-is-inevitable/ gave rise togo on to impact nearly every aspect of lifeprepare for events they can’t fathomit was assumed by most

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree', she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That's why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age'. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren't daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won't allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out'. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE's permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Today I spoke with Dr Margaret Heffernan about her latest book, Uncharted: How to Map and Navigate the Future Together (Simon and Schuster, 2020). Margaret produced programmes for the BBC for 13 years. She then moved to the US where she became a businesswomen. She is the author of six books and a successful TED Talk speaker. She is also a Professor of Practice at the University of Bath. In her 2012 TED Talk, ‘Dare to disagree’, she told the story Alice Stewart. This is the story of how clear, certain medical data, are not always enough to change rapidly our professional rules and personal habits. In her 2019 TED Talk she argued that the more we rely on technology to make us efficient, the fewer skills we have to confront the unexpected. That’s why we need less technology and ‘more messy human skills - imagination, humility, bravery - to solve problems in business, government and life in an unpredictable age’. In her new book, she explores the people and organizations who aren’t daunted by uncertainty: ‘We are addicted to prediction, desperate for certainty about the future. But the complexity of modern life won’t allow that; experts in forecasting are reluctant to look more than 400 days out’. Uncertainty is clearly an important construct in both macroeconomics and behavioural economics. This book starts with an anecdote on the early life of a great American economist, Irving Fisher. His swimming accident and the discovery of his tuberculosis contributed to the development his research interest in stability and monetary economics. Ranging freely through history and from business to science, government to friendships, this refreshing book challenges us to resist the false promises of technology and efficiency and instead to mine our own creativity and humanity for the capacity to create the futures we want and can believe in. Andrea Bernardi is Senior Lecturer in Employment and Organization Studies at Oxford Brookes University in the UK. He holds a doctorate in Organization Theory from the University of Milano-Bicocca. He has held teaching and research positions in Italy, China and the UK. Among his research interests are the use of history in management studies, the co-operative sector, and Chinese co-operatives. He is the co-convener of the EAEPE’s permanent track on Co-operative economy and collective ownership. Currently he is associate editor of The Review of Evolutionary Political Economy (REPE)

The story of America’s first celebrity economist, Irving Fisher, should cure anybody still milling about for expert predictions. This podcast (7:06) argues that investors, instead of spinning their heads listening to other people’s predictions, would do well to secure for themselves predictable income.

Today, we have Ben Simkin in the studio.Who is Ben Simkin?Ben Simkin is the founder of BusinessNET, a leading Online Marketing Firm that to-date has increased clients' sales by over $1.45 billion. BusinessNET provide end-to-end marketing and sales services to established companies worldwide.In other words, Ben Simkin is a very successful and a plenty smart dude.If you're wanting to ramp up your productivity and achieve more than you ever thought possible, then listen closely to this episode and prepare to take notes.Here's a sneak peek at Den and Ben's chat: The "HBU" theory. This is perhaps the greatest (and the most powerful and effective) productivity concept ever invented. This was discovered by a genius economist from the 18th-century named Dr. Irving Fisher. - 4:00Jay Abraham's (world-renowned marketing wizard) bizarre (yet powerful) “cat in a cottage” story. This little story will open your eyes up to new opportunities you might have previously overlooked, and... make you think twice before you go and check your social media notifications. - 5:00What NEVER to put on your smartphone if you want to become more productive. - 6:30The single most important thing to teach your team, customers or employees that will dramatically boost YOUR productivity. - 7:25The little-known 24-Hour rule. (this will make you more efficient, and...it will make you seem more professional to your clients and customer, too. - 8:00The strange note Ben has hung up in his house that gives him more energy during the day. - 9:50Ben talks about The Freedom fallacy. - 10:50The "daily coin flip" exercise that highlights a horrible flaw in human nature. Fascinating stuff. - 12:40The best explanation you'll ever hear on the popular "Be, Do, Have" concept. - 13:00An incredibly dull and boring productivity tip that can quite possibly double your productivity. - 15:00A little-known book every business person should read if they want to ramp up their productivity and streamline their business systems. (This book was written in 1984 by a brilliant business scientist named Dr. Goldratt. - 16:50)Advice for business owners you'd be nuts not to take. - 17:00The strange (and totally illogical and irrational) secret to life transformation. This admittedly strange secret is quoted in a movie from the late 90's featuring Ben Affleck.The “once-a-day habit” that leads to bursts of creativity. (Always feel stuck for ideas or can't come up with solutions to problems, then start doing what Den mentions at 25:20What counterintuitive thing high achievers do that ordinary folk think is a waste of time. - 26:00Why immediately writing down your ideas is a BAD idea, and what to do instead. - 26:50The case for joining a mastermind. - 31:00Learn more about Ben at https://businessnet.com.au/Support the show (https://www.denlennie.com/free-training)

In this episode of the Keiser Report, Max and Stacy discuss Irving Fisher’s correct but early call in 1929 when he said that stock prices had hit a permanently high plateau. He just needed to wait some few decades for an all fiat regime controlled by a banker-coddling central bank. They also discuss the $4 trillion from the NY Fed propping up the stock market -- an allegedly ‘unintended consequence’ of bailing out repo markets. In the second half, Max interviews Ross Ashcroft of Renegade Inc. about the cantillon effect, taxing land values, turmoil in repo markets, and a global debt jubilee.

Both of the world’s greatest economists, Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes, thought they could see into the future and make a killing on the stock market - and then both were wiped out by the Wall Street Crash. One died a pauper, the other millionaire. What does it take to bounce back from ruin? Oh... and UFOs. Read more about Tim's work at http://timharford.com/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Our guest this week is noted author and advisor, William Bernstein. Bill’s background and entree to finance is unique—a neurologist by training, Bill self-taught himself the principles of investing and asset allocation, eventually parlaying that knowledge into a successful financial advisory practice and a series of influential, critically acclaimed books such as "The Intelligent Asset Allocator." In this conversation, we explore Bill’s background and how it shaped his development and thinking as an investor and how he applies those lessons in working with clients who are trying to meet goals like a comfortable, secure retirement. “I had to figure out how to save and invest on my own”: Bill’s crash course into investing and constructing a portfolio (1:29) “I had to figure out how to save and invest on my own”: Bill’s crash course into investing and constructing a portfolio (1:29) • “I had to figure out how to save and invest on my own”: Bill’s crash course into investing and constructing a portfolio (1:29) • Separating the wheat from the chaff: How Bill decides what investing research matters and what doesn’t (4:30) • Top of the list: Books that profoundly influenced Bill’s investment philosophy and approach (5:45) • “The overwhelming science of investing does not speak well of active management”: Bill on why empirical data ought to settle most questions (and why active-share doesn’t hold up to scrutiny) (7:02) • “You approach it with extreme caution”: Bill explains why investors should be skeptical of most factors they encounter in the “factor zoo”, save a few (9:27) • A question that’s giving Bill pause: Is value too crowded a trade? (10:33) • Is low-volatility the most attractive factor from a behavioral standpoint? Bill worries it’s gotten too expensive. (12:02) • Fingers (and toes) crossed: Bill thinks value is cheap enough to stick with (12:55) • “Really, not very much”: Bill on how his approach to asset allocation has evolved over time (13:43) • “The riskiness of stocks is not an intrinsic characteristic of stocks; it’s more a characteristic of the investor”: Why stocks’ volatility doesn’t fluster younger investors, but freaks out older investors (14:38) • On how we tend to overrate our risk tolerance: “The difference between being able to see (losses) in a spreadsheet and actually manage (through losses) in real time is the difference between crashing an airplane in a flight simulator and in the real world” (15:38) • “If you’ve won the game, stop playing”: How to shake older investors out of their complacency with equity risk and recency bias (16:53) • “The very best physicians are consumed by self-doubt”: How a high ratio of “rumination-to-celebration” can help investors constructively reckon with shortcomings in their approach and improve (19:26) • Getting it wrong and therefore right: Bill explains how advisors can use their own fallibility and uncertainty to fortify their relationship with clients (versus scaring them to death) (21:12) • An argument with Jack Bogle: How a debate with the Vanguard founder about foreign-stock investing became an object lesson in how reality intrudes on theory (and how that informs Bill’s approach to managing clients) (22:56) • “You don’t appreciate it until bad things happen”: On whether the rally in riskier bonds has changed Bill’s tune on limiting fixed-income investments to short-term, high-grade fare (24:25) • “Investment is a process that transfers wealth to people that have a strategy and can execute it from those who don’t and can’t” (26:22) • “A reasonable hypothesis, but it got tested” (and failed): Bill on the argument for active bond investing (27:02) • Earthquakes and execrable returns: Why the best investing and economic gains have been realized in English-speaking countries. (Hint: It’s the law.) (27:48) • Emerging-markets stocks: Why they’re only a bargain when they’re cheap relative to their own history and developed markets (and still might not be inexpensive even in that case) (30:23) • Potential hazards: “The US markets are significantly overvalued relative to the rest of the world” (31:36) • “You’d have your head handed to you”: On the impermanence of investment measures, why it’s dangerous to extrapolate, and the implications for investors (32:54) • “When I think about my tombstone, ‘investment adviser’ is not one of the things I want to see up there” (34:00) • “We’re extremely choosy in who we take on. So we have a very enjoyable practice as a result of that” (35:49) • On retirement preparedness: “A slow-moving and fairly impressive disaster” (37:13) • “I don’t think the system needs nudges. I think the system needs dynamite”: Steps to radically redefine the retirement system (39:20) • “It would be nice if we had a system where people didn’t have to save quite so much, because that’s an unattainable goal for probably 80% of the population” (40:41) • The skunk-in-the-suburb analogy: We’re evolved to avoid the snake or the tiger, not to plan for retirement fifty years into the future (41:24) • What to do for investors who aren’t interested in finance or good with numbers: Limit investor autonomy, provide a generous match, offer a low-cost menu, default them into a target-date fund (43:03) • “One of the most important people in my life”: Remembering Jack Bogle (44:32) • “Something that everyone knows isn’t worth knowing”: Bill on the under-appreciated importance of corporate governance to security returns (46:46) • How Bill navigates ESG with his clients: He discourages them from pursuing it (49:25) • Principled but “bending”: How humility should make room for other ideas or priorities within a portfolio or plan (51:05)   • William Bernstein bio (CFA Institute) https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/author/williamjbernstein/ • William Bernstein’s “Efficient Frontier” website http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ • Mean-variance optimization: Explainer https://www.effisols.com/basics/MVO.htm • William Bernstein’s reading list http://www.efficientfrontier.com/reading.htm • Fama and French research papers https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1455 • “A Random Walk Down Wall Street” by Burton G. Malkiel https://www.amazon.com/Random-Walk-Down-Wall-Street/dp/0393081435/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1324493412&sr=1-1 • “Bogle on Mutual Funds” by Jack Bogle https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/111908833X/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i4 • “The Intelligent Investor” by Benjamin Graham https://www.amazon.com/Intelligent-Investor-Definitive-Investing-Practical/dp/0060555661/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1324493602&sr=1-1 • “The Theory of Interest” by Irving Fisher https://www.amazon.com/Theory-Interest-Illustrated-Irving-Fisher-ebook/dp/B00CR32KGK • “The Arithmetic of Active Management” by William F. Sharpe • https://web.stanford.edu/~wfsharpe/art/active/active.htm • Active Share website https://activeshare.nd.edu/ • “Presidential Address: Discount Rates” by John H. Cochrane https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/discount_rates_jf.pdf • Value (aka “book-to-market”) factor http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_form_btm.html • Momentum factor http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_mom_factor.html • Profitability factor http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/tw_5_ports_beme_op.html • “Your Complete Guide to Factor-based Investing” by Andrew L. Berkin and Larry E. Swedroe • https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01N7FCW2D/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1 • Factor performance http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research • Berkshire Hathaway 2018 shareholder letter http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2018ltr.pdf • “Betting Against Beta” by Andrea Frazzini and Lasse Heje Pedersen http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lpederse/papers/BettingAgainstBeta.pdf • “Betting Against Beta” factor vs. value factor performance (10 years ended Feb. 2019) https://www.portfoliovisualizer.com/factor-statistics?s=y&factorDataSet=-1&marketArea=0&__checkbox_ffmkt=true&__checkbox_ffsmb=true&__checkbox_ffsmb5=true&ffhml=true&__checkbox_ffhml=true&__checkbox_ffmom=true&__checkbox_ffrmw=true&__checkbox_ffcma=true&__checkbox_ffstrev=true&__checkbox_ffltrev=true&__checkbox_aqrmkt=true&__checkbox_aqrsmb=true&__checkbox_aqrhml=true&__checkbox_aqrhmldev=true&__checkbox_aqrmom=true&__checkbox_aqrqmj=true&aqrbab=true&__checkbox_aqrbab=true&__checkbox_trm=true&__checkbox_cdt=true&startDate=03%2F01%2F2009&endDate=03%2F31%2F2019 • “The Intelligent Asset Allocator” by William J. Bernstein https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0071385290/ref=s9_simz_gw_s0_p14_i1?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=center-2&pf_rd_r=1NNWXTETT62HJ8QM9ZM6&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=470938631&pf_rd_i=507846 • “Availability” heuristic https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/resources/mini-encyclopedia-of-be/availability-heuristic/ • Dunning-Kruger effect https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10626367 • “Why Jack Bogle Doesn’t Own Non-U.S. Stocks” with Christine Benz and Jack Bogle (Oct. 22, 2018) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P54trh0Rre8 • “Will Active Stock Funds Save Your Bacon in a Downturn?” by Jeffrey Ptak https://www.morningstar.com/articles/852864/will-active-stock-funds-save-your-bacon-in-a-downt.html • “Global Stock Markets in the Twentieth Century” by Philippe Jorion and William N. Goetzmann, Journal of Finance https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0022-1082.00133 • “Legal Determinants of External Finance” by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, NBER Working Paper https://www.nber.org/papers/w5879 • Online Data Robert Shiller http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm • S&P 500 Shiller PE Ratio https://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe • S&P 500 Price/earnings ratio https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-pe-ratio • S&P 500 Price/book ratio https://www.multpl.com/s-p-500-price-to-book • National Retirement Risk Index, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College https://crr.bc.edu/special-projects/national-retirement-risk-index/ • “National Retirement Risk Index Shows Modest Improvements in 2016” by Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/IB_18-1.pdf • “In Memoriam”, William J. Bernstein, Efficient Frontier http://efficientfrontier.com/ef/0adhoc/RIP-JCB.html • David Yermack, Albert Fingerhut Professor of Finance and Business Transformation, NYU Sterm, Publications https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.publications&personid=20547

Echoing the narrative style of Director Quentin Tarantino, Professor Lawrence H. White delivers an overview of the economic intellectual debates of the 20th century in his book 'Clash of Economic Ideas.' These debates are framed through the lenses of individuals such as Irving Fisher, Rexford Tugwell, Wilhelm Röpke, Ludwig Erhard, George Stigler, Ronald Coase, John Maynard Keynes, F. A. Hayek, and others. What results is a non-linear and captivating historical narrative that offers a refreshing perspective from the roaring twenties and the Great Depression to the Great Inflation and fiscal policy issues of today. CC Music: Twisterium

Despite the dangers of speculation, many believed that the stock market would continue to rise forever. On March 25, 1929, after the Federal Reserve warned of excessive speculation, a mini crash occurred as investors started to sell stocks at a rapid pace, exposing the market's shaky foundation. Two days later, banker Charles E. Mitchell announced his company the National City Bank would provide $25 million in credit to stop the market's slide.[7] Mitchell's move brought a temporary halt to the financial crisis and call money declined from 20 to 8 percent.[7] However, the American economy showed ominous signs of trouble:[7] steel production declined, construction was sluggish, automobile sales went down, and consumers were building up high debts because of easy credit.[7] Despite all these economic trouble signs and the market breaks in March and May 1929, stocks resumed their advance in June and the gains continued almost unabated until early September 1929 (the Dow Jones average gained more than 20% between June and September). The market had been on a nine-year run that saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average increase in value tenfold, peaking at 381.17 on September 3, 1929.[7] Shortly before the crash, economist Irving Fisher famously proclaimed, "Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau."[8] The optimism and financial gains of the great bull market were shaken after a well publicized early September prediction from financial expert Roger Babson that "a crash was coming". The initial September decline was thus called the "Babson Break" in the press. This was the start of the Great Crash, although until the severe phase of the crash in October, many investors regarded the September "Babson Break" as a "healthy correction" and buying opportunity.

Despite the dangers of speculation, many believed that the stock market would continue to rise forever. On March 25, 1929, after the Federal Reserve warned of excessive speculation, a mini crash occurred as investors started to sell stocks at a rapid pace, exposing the market's shaky foundation. Two days later, banker Charles E. Mitchell announced his company the National City Bank would provide $25 million in credit to stop the market's slide.[7] Mitchell's move brought a temporary halt to the financial crisis and call money declined from 20 to 8 percent.[7] However, the American economy showed ominous signs of trouble:[7] steel production declined, construction was sluggish, automobile sales went down, and consumers were building up high debts because of easy credit.[7] Despite all these economic trouble signs and the market breaks in March and May 1929, stocks resumed their advance in June and the gains continued almost unabated until early September 1929 (the Dow Jones average gained more than 20% between June and September). The market had been on a nine-year run that saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average increase in value tenfold, peaking at 381.17 on September 3, 1929.[7] Shortly before the crash, economist Irving Fisher famously proclaimed, "Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau."[8] The optimism and financial gains of the great bull market were shaken after a well publicized early September prediction from financial expert Roger Babson that "a crash was coming". The initial September decline was thus called the "Babson Break" in the press. This was the start of the Great Crash, although until the severe phase of the crash in October, many investors regarded the September "Babson Break" as a "healthy correction" and buying opportunity. Information Link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wall_Street_Crash_of_1929

Can you name the first “Rock Star” economist? No, not Robert Shiller. Not Greenspan. Not even Milton Friedman. It was the 1920s, when virtually every literate American knew Irving Fisher.

Garett Jones of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas of Irving Fisher on debt and deflation. In a book, Booms and Depressions and in a 1933 Econometrica article, Fisher argued that debt-fueled investment booms lead to liquidation of assets at unexpectedly low prices followed by a contraction in the money supply which leads to deflation and a contraction in the real side of the economy--a recession or a depression. Jones then discusses the relevance of Fisher's theory for the current state of the economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Garett Jones of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas of Irving Fisher on debt and deflation. In a book, Booms and Depressions and in a 1933 Econometrica article, Fisher argued that debt-fueled investment booms lead to liquidation of assets at unexpectedly low prices followed by a contraction in the money supply which leads to deflation and a contraction in the real side of the economy--a recession or a depression. Jones then discusses the relevance of Fisher's theory for the current state of the economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Garett Jones of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas of Irving Fisher on debt and deflation. In a book, Booms and Depressions and in a 1933 Econometrica article, Fisher argued that debt-fueled investment booms lead to liquidation of assets at unexpectedly low prices followed by a contraction in the money supply which leads to deflation and a contraction in the real side of the economy--a recession or a depression. Jones then discusses the relevance of Fisher's theory for the current state of the economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

Bill Tatro and Walker Todd are first time guests. Tatro will explain the dynamics of Irving Fisher's debt deflation model and how policy makers have gotten the world into this depression. More importantly, he has a recipe for not only protecting the wealth you have but for using the knowledge of what is to come to profit from it as the Dow heads from its current 13,000 to 13,500 range toward his predicted target of 3,500 by 2016. Walker Todd, a former Cleveland Federal Reserve economist and attorney, will answer a question that Jim Sinclair did not answer when I posed it to him at the latest CMRE. That question is, how do you get the banking system to expand and get the economy to grow again when pumping money into the banking system is analogous to “pushing on a string.” In addition, your editor will update you on his views of the markets at this point in time.

Bill Tatro and Walker Todd are first time guests. Tatro will explain the dynamics of Irving Fisher's debt deflation model and how policy makers have gotten the world into this depression. More importantly, he has a recipe for not only protecting the wealth you have but for using the knowledge of what is to come to profit from it as the Dow heads from its current 13,000 to 13,500 range toward his predicted target of 3,500 by 2016. Walker Todd, a former Cleveland Federal Reserve economist and attorney, will answer a question that Jim Sinclair did not answer when I posed it to him at the latest CMRE. That question is, how do you get the banking system to expand and get the economy to grow again when pumping money into the banking system is analogous to “pushing on a string.” In addition, your editor will update you on his views of the markets at this point in time.

Professor Shiller devotes the beginning of the lecture to exploring the theoretical determinants of the level of interest rates. Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk names technical progress, roundaboutness, and time preference as the crucial factors. Professor Shiller complements von Boehm-Bawerk’s analysis with two of Irving Fisher’s modeling approaches, the view of the interest rate as the equilibrium variable in the savings market and the perspective of simple Robinson Crusoe economies on the determination of interest rates. Subsequently, Professor Shiller focuses his attention on present discounted values and derives the price for discount bonds, consols, annuities, as well as corporate bonds. His treatment of the term structure of interest rates leads him to forward rates and the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. At the end of the lecture, he offers insights on usurious loan practices, from ancient times until today, and describes the improvements in consumer financial protection that have been made after the financial crisis of the 2000s. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.

Until now, the models we've used in this course have focused on the case where everyone can perfectly forecast future economic conditions. Clearly, to understand financial markets, we have to incorporate uncertainty into these models. The first half of this lecture continues reviewing the key statistical concepts that we'll need to be able to think seriously about uncertainty, including expectation, variance, and covariance. We apply these concepts to show how diversification can reduce risk exposure. Next we show how expectations can be iterated through time to rapidly compute conditional expectations: if you think the Yankees have a 60% chance of winning any game against the Dodgers, what are the odds the Yankees will win a seven game series once they are up 2 games to 1? Finally we allow the interest rate, the most important variable in the economy according to Irving Fisher, to be uncertain. We ask whether interest rate uncertainty tends to make a dollar in the distant future more valuable or less valuable.

While economists didn't have a good theory of interest until Irving Fisher came along, and didn't understand the role of collateral until even later, Shakespeare understood many of these things hundreds of years earlier. The first half of this lecture examines Shakespeare's economic insights in depth, and sees how they sometimes prefigured or even surpassed Irving Fisher's intuitions. The second half of this lecture uses the concept of present value to define and explain some of the basic financial instruments: coupon bonds, annuities, perpetuities, and mortgages.

Philosophers and theologians have railed against interest for thousands of years. But that is because they didn't understand what causes interest. Irving Fisher built a model of financial equilibrium on top of general equilibrium (GE) by introducing time and assets into the GE model. He saw that trade between apples today and apples next year is completely analogous to trade between apples and oranges today. Similarly he saw that in a world without uncertainty, assets like stocks and bonds are significant only for the dividends they pay in the future, just like an endowment of multiple goods. With these insights Fisher was able to show that he could solve his model of financial equilibrium for interest rates, present value prices, asset prices, and allocations with precisely the same techniques we used to solve for general equilibrium. He concluded that the real rate of interest is a relative price, and just like any other relative price, is determined by market participants' preferences and endowments, an insight that runs counter to the intuitions held by philosophers throughout much of human history. His theory did not explain the nominal rate of interest or inflation, but only their ratio.

Over time, economists' justifications for why free markets are a good thing have changed. In the first few classes, we saw how under some conditions, the competitive allocation maximizes the sum of agents' utilities. When it was found that this property didn't hold generally, the idea of Pareto efficiency was developed. This class reviews two proofs that equilibrium is Pareto efficient, looking at the arguments of economists Edgeworth, and Arrow-Debreu. The lecture suggests that if a broadening of the economic model invalidated the sum of utilities justification of free markets, a further broadening might invalidate the Pareto efficiency justification of unregulated markets. Finally, Professor Geanakoplos discusses how Irving Fisher introduced two crucial ingredients of finance,--time and assets--into the standard economic equilibrium model.

Until now, the models we've used in this course have focused on the case where everyone can perfectly forecast future economic conditions. Clearly, to understand financial markets, we have to incorporate uncertainty into these models. The first half of this lecture continues reviewing the key statistical concepts that we'll need to be able to think seriously about uncertainty, including expectation, variance, and covariance. We apply these concepts to show how diversification can reduce risk exposure. Next we show how expectations can be iterated through time to rapidly compute conditional expectations: if you think the Yankees have a 60% chance of winning any game against the Dodgers, what are the odds the Yankees will win a seven game series once they are up 2 games to 1? Finally we allow the interest rate, the most important variable in the economy according to Irving Fisher, to be uncertain. We ask whether interest rate uncertainty tends to make a dollar in the distant future more valuable or less valuable.

While economists didn't have a good theory of interest until Irving Fisher came along, and didn't understand the role of collateral until even later, Shakespeare understood many of these things hundreds of years earlier. The first half of this lecture examines Shakespeare's economic insights in depth, and sees how they sometimes prefigured or even surpassed Irving Fisher's intuitions. The second half of this lecture uses the concept of present value to define and explain some of the basic financial instruments: coupon bonds, annuities, perpetuities, and mortgages.

Philosophers and theologians have railed against interest for thousands of years. But that is because they didn't understand what causes interest. Irving Fisher built a model of financial equilibrium on top of general equilibrium (GE) by introducing time and assets into the GE model. He saw that trade between apples today and apples next year is completely analogous to trade between apples and oranges today. Similarly he saw that in a world without uncertainty, assets like stocks and bonds are significant only for the dividends they pay in the future, just like an endowment of multiple goods. With these insights Fisher was able to show that he could solve his model of financial equilibrium for interest rates, present value prices, asset prices, and allocations with precisely the same techniques we used to solve for general equilibrium. He concluded that the real rate of interest is a relative price, and just like any other relative price, is determined by market participants' preferences and endowments, an insight that runs counter to the intuitions held by philosophers throughout much of human history. His theory did not explain the nominal rate of interest or inflation, but only their ratio.

Over time, economists' justifications for why free markets are a good thing have changed. In the first few classes, we saw how under some conditions, the competitive allocation maximizes the sum of agents' utilities. When it was found that this property didn't hold generally, the idea of Pareto efficiency was developed. This class reviews two proofs that equilibrium is Pareto efficient, looking at the arguments of economists Edgeworth, and Arrow-Debreu. The lecture suggests that if a broadening of the economic model invalidated the sum of utilities justification of free markets, a further broadening might invalidate the Pareto efficiency justification of unregulated markets. Finally, Professor Geanakoplos discusses how Irving Fisher introduced two crucial ingredients of finance,--time and assets--into the standard economic equilibrium model.