Podcasts about deposito

È in pieno svolgimento la campagna per il deposito dei bilanci relativi all'anno 2024. Quali sono le istruzioni contenute nel Manuale operativo di Unioncamere? L'approfondimento di Ada Ciaccia

Il manuale operativo di Unioncamere sul deposito del bilancio, gli orientamenti sugli effetti fiscali della cessione del marchio da chi non è ne imprenditore nè professionista, la c.d. "truffa dei diamanti". A cura di Anita Mauro

Die Namibië Deposito-waarborgowerheid, NDGA, het sy jaarverslag vrygestel. Die owerheid is 'n openbare instelling wat die Deposito-waarborgskema en NDGA-fonds bestuur en administreer. Die skema is daarop gemik om deposante te beskerm in geval van bankmislukkings. Die uitvoerende direkteur van finansies, Michael Humavindo, het die hooftoespraak by die vrystelling namens finansminister Ericah Shafudah gelewer. Hy het meer inligting oor die skema gegee.

Video, ita_t_rav_2025-03-30_lesson_bs-shamati-086-ve-yaven_n1_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 1

Audio, ita_t_rav_2025-03-30_lesson_bs-shamati-086-ve-yaven_n1_p1. Lesson_part :: Daily_lesson 1

Scopri il DOCUMENTO SEGRETO delle Banche (che ti farà guadagnare tantissimi soldi): https://bit.ly/4eOttaP----Cerchi investimenti sicuri?I conti deposito sono la soluzione a rischio zero e capitale garantito.Ma conviene davvero?Oggi rispondiamo alla mail di Sandro che ci sottopone il tema dei conti deposito che, dal 2022, sono tornati al centro del dibattito.Nello specifico vedremo:La mail di SandroSolitamente si parte dal conto deposito quando si investeQuesta è una soluzione abbastanza semplice da individuareIl conto deposito nasconde qualcosa?Nel lungo termine dobbiamo fare i conti con l'inflazioneSandro avrebbe dovuto guadagnare 24.000 euro per mantenere il suo capitaleQuanto è difficile ottenere questi rendimenti?Dovete quantificare quanto volete dagli investimentiQuali asset class mi fanno battere l'inflazione nel lungo periodo?Escludiamo conti deposito e obbligazioni per l'interesse compostoVediamo il potere dell'interesse compostoIl conto deposito e il BTP sfruttano l'interesse sempliceBisogna rischiare il "giusto" per ottenereCosa ne pensi?+++ DISCLAIMER - Leggi con Attenzione! +++"Storie, Storielle e Storiacce di Investimenti" è una serie ideata dalla Affari Miei in cui vengono letti i messaggi recapitati dagli utenti ai nostri contatti ufficiali. Le storie sono reali ma anonimizzate perché vengono esclusi dettagli che possono far risalire all'autore. Nel corso del podcast gli autori esprimono le proprie opinioni sui fatti analizzati con uno scopo divulgativo: quanto detto non deve in alcun modo essere inteso come una raccomandazione personalizzata d'investimento e non sostituisce una consulenza professionale. La Affari Miei declina qualsiasi responsabilità sulle azioni eventualmente intraprese dai fruitori dei contenuti a seguito della visione o dell'ascolto del podcast.+++ FINE DISCLAIMER +++Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Coches de operaciones policiales abandonos cerca de la Comisaría de Málaga porque el deposito judicial esta saturado

Un nuovo adempimento introdotto per le imprese, come procedere, quali sono gli aspetti operativi e le scadenze. 

Scopri CONTO DEPOSITO TOP per comparare e trovare la migliore offerta per te sui conti deposito: https://bit.ly/3C4WWyL----Conto Deposito di Cherry Bank: conviene investire?Quali sono i rendimenti?E i costi?Oggi vediamo le opzioni di conto deposito proposte da Cherry Bank, che comprendono sia il deposito vincolato che il deposito libero: ecco tutte le opinioni.Nello specifico vedremo:Cherry Bank: una presentazioneIl conto deposito è sicuro?Cherry Vincolato: le caratteristicheI rendimenti del conto depositoCherry Recall svincolabileCherry Box liberoLa promozione al 4%OpinioniProva Conto Deposito TOPCosa ne pensi? Faccelo sapere nei commenti!Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Scopri CONTO DEPOSITO TOP per comparare e trovare la migliore offerta per te sui conti deposito: https://bit.ly/3C4WWyL----Si può sottoscrivere un Conto Deposito con Poste Italiane?Con quali rendimenti?Oggi rispondiamo a questa domanda vedendo qual è lo strumento offerto da Poste che è molto simile ai conti depositi offerti dalle banche.Nello specifico vedremo:Poste propone Deposito SupersmartLe caratteristiche di Deposito SupersmartI rendimenti delle varie opzioniSimuliamo qualche calcoloOpinioniProva Conto Deposito TOPCosa ne pensi? Faccelo sapere nei commenti!Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Quando deve essere approvato il bilancio d'esercizio 2024? E quali sono i termini per presentarlo? L'approfondimento di Massimo Simone

Scopri CONTO DEPOSITO TOP per comparare e trovare la migliore offerta per te sui conti deposito: https://bit.ly/3C4WWyL----Conto Deposito di ING: quali sono i tassi di interesse, i rischi e le caratteristiche di questo strumento. Conviene aderire all'offerta?Nello specifico vedremo:Due parole su INGIl conto deposito Arancio è sicuro?Le caratteristiche di conto ArancioL'offerta al 4%OpinioniProva Conto Deposito TOPCosa ne pensi?Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

24 02 2025 Periodísticamente - Edgardo Romero - Móvil desde incendio deposito by ABC Color

Scopri il DOCUMENTO SEGRETO delle Banche (che ti farà guadagnare tantissimi soldi): https://bit.ly/3XhKiVm----Nel settembre 2023 i tassi di interesse toccavano quasi i massimi rispetto al decennio precedente, e sia i BTP che i conti deposito erano sulla bocca di tutti.Oggi le cose sono cambiate perché siamo in una fase discendente dei tassi di interesse, ma è importante fare un confronto tra i BTP e i conti deposito come investimenti sicuri.Cosa è meglio tra BTP e conti deposito? Nello specifico vedremo:Come cambia il mondo!Differenza tra BTP e Conti DepositoCosa sono i BTP e come funzionanoCosa sono i conti depositoI rendimenti dei BTPI rendimenti dei conti depositoI rischi associati ai BTPI rischi associati ai conti depositoLa liquidità degli strumentiLa tassazione degli strumentiLa gestione degli strumentiCosa ne penso ioCosa ne pensi?Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/rompiendolabanca/ Para participar del grupo de whatsapp de galponear hay que enviar email a rickdecardtw@gmail.com

Tra bilanci in forma ordinaria, abbreviati e per micro-imprese, una guida per arrivare preparati all'appuntamento annuale con il bilancio societario. L'approfondimento di Massimo Simone

Scopri la verità sui conti deposito. Sono davvero un'opzione sicura e conveniente? Ecco tutto quello che devi sapere prima di investire.

Puoi visionare il video completo su Youtube a questo link:https://youtu.be/IBMGhzL09NAExpert Risponde:"Buongiorno, seguo con interesse i vostri video, in particolare mi hanno colpito quelli di Barbara Giani sulle obbligazioni. Se possibile vi sottopongo questo domanda: Ormai da 1 anno e mezzo “parcheggio” la mia liquidità per possibili esigenze di breve termine su XEON.Ho visto che i rendimenti stanno scendendo e in ottica di taglio dei tassi della BCE, conviene ancora utilizzare questo strumento o è opportuno valutarne altri? Potrebbe essere più efficiente iniziare a investire nel breve termine in USD visti i rendimenti più elevati? Grazie"Per inviare le vostre domande: info@soldiexpert.com

Ó Deus, deposito minha fé em Ti e não em outros. Sei que a sabedoria humana não é nada, se comparada com a divina. Creio em […]

Campionamenti dell'aria sottovento da parte di Arpav dopo l'incendio che ha fatto esplodere il deposito di batterie al litio della Mendeleeev in zona industriale a Trissino: si attendono gli esiti delle analisi. Intanto nelle acque della zona non è stata rilevata alcuna criticità.

Scopri CONTO DEPOSITO TOP per comparare e trovare la migliore offerta per te sui conti deposito: https://bit.ly/3C4WWyL----Hai sentito parlare del conto deposito Findomestic?Vediamo i tassi di interesse, i costi e le caratteristiche.Nello specifico vedremo:Findomestic: una presentazioneIl conto deposito è sicuro?Le caratteristiche del conto deposito FindomesticI tassi di interesseServizi aggiuntiviOpinioniPuoi utilizzare Conto Deposito TOPCosa ne pensi?Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Scopri CONTO DEPOSITO TOP per comparare e trovare la migliore offerta per te sui conti deposito: https://bit.ly/3C4WWyL----Si può sottoscrivere un conto deposito con Intesa SanPaolo? Vediamo se è possibile e quali sono le sue caratteristiche.Nello specifico vedremo:Due parole su Intesa SanPaoloIntesa SanPaolo NON ha un conto depositoPuoi scegliere XME SalvadanaioOpinioniPuoi utilizzare Conto Deposito TOPCosa ne pensi?Prenota una sessione gratuita con il team di Affari Miei, ti guideremo nella scelta delle soluzioni più adatte a te: https://bit.ly/3ZHtAg2—

Allarme scattato dopo l'una di notte, con le squadre di emergenza arrivate sul posto da Bassano, Vicenza e Thiene. Obiettivo comune è stato evitare che il rogo mettesse in pericolo l'abitazione (questa invece abitata) a ridosso dello stabile divenuto una torcia ardente. Missione compiuta per i 15 vigili del fuoco impegnati, dopo 6 ore di intervento.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Ormoc. The Japanese prepared their Wa offensive as General Arnold's troops advanced toward Ormoc. On December 5, American forces engaged in fierce fighting for Hills 918 and 380, facing entrenched enemy positions. By December 6, Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on American camps, but a swift counteroffensive from General Swift helped reclaim the Buri airfield. Despite initial gains, poor weather hindered Japanese reinforcements, allowing American forces to stabilize their positions and push back the enemy. Then the 148th battalion launched an attack on Buri. The advancing American troops faced fierce Japanese resistance, with intense battles over strategic locations like the San Pablo airstrip and Hill 380. Despite setbacks, forces rallied, utilizing effective tactics to outmaneuver the enemy. As reinforcements arrived, the Americans secured critical positions and engaged fiercely in Ormoc, leading to significant Japanese losses. The capture of Ormoc disrupted enemy supply lines, marking a pivotal victory that forced the Japanese to keep sending troops into a deteriorating situation. This episode is the Invasion of Mindoro Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Building on our discussion from last week, there were several other events occurring simultaneously with the fall of Ormoc on December 10. At Buri, following a half-hour of concentrated artillery fire, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched a final assault that swiftly cleared the airstrip and eliminated the enemy paratrooper forces. Later that evening, the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Independent Regiment arrived in the area in a disorganized state after a challenging march, and with their last reserves of strength, they attacked Burauen town.  At 19:30 the Japanese launched their final concentrated attack against the airfields. They began to fire at the administration buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of the bullets went through the plywood walls of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered someone to find out who the blankety-blank was responsible and that he'd blankety-blank better stop or think up a blankety-blank good reason." The air force personnel were pushed back until they reached the hospital, where they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from the area. The Japanese left thirty of their dead behind them. This marked the retreat of the surviving Japanese forces, indicating the conclusion of the battle for the airstrips. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its limited offensive through the challenging mountainous terrain, with the 17th and 184th Regiments reaching Malitbog by the end of the day. To the north, General Cunningham's 2nd Squadron, which had been engaged with the bulk of the 102nd Division, was finally relieved by the 2nd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry, initiating their westward movement to rejoin the rest of the regiment at the Leyte River. There, the 126th and 127th Regiments struggled to breach the defenses of the 1st Regiment, while the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments made slow progress through the mountains towards Mount Cabungaan, effectively bypassing the Mount Pina position.  In the process of reducing the Japanese-held area, it was estimated that an enemy force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out. From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols, and slowly moved westward. On 10 December, General Sibert decided to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division debouch from the mountains onto Highway 2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy area. This move was to be concurrent with the expected advance of the 32d Division down the highway. The 1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt. Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill 2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st Squadron. An enemy strong point existed to the north of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a two-squadron assault against this enemy force. The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In furtherance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the southwest and dug in for the night just north of Mt. Cabungaan. On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was placed upon the enemy position in front of the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715. At the same time Troop E attacked from the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves dug into the very rugged terrain. The men of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B, charged up the hill "throwing grenades and firing from the hip." The hill fell to the 1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy hand-to-hand fighting. Troop E had been held up by the terrain and was unable to assist the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental reconnaissance platoon returned from the vicinity of Lonoy with the information that the Japanese had prepared strong defensive positions in that area. The platoon had gained a good observation point 900 yards east of Lonoy. The next several days were spent in sending out patrols and moving the 2d Squadron to the position of the 1st Squadron. Meanwhile, on December 9, Admiral Okawachi had launched what would turn out to be his final TA convoy. This convoy, consisting of three destroyers, two subchasers, and six transport ships carrying the Takahashi Detachment and the Ito Naval Landing Unit, departed from Manila on December 9. A day earlier, the Camotes Detachment had also been dispatched individually via landing barges. In light of the recent enemy landings at Deposito, three units were assigned to deploy in Ormoc and support General Tomochika's forces in defending the city. However, by December 11, Ormoc had already succumbed, and the convoy finally arrived in Leyte, where it was immediately targeted by American fighter planes. Near Palompon, two transports were struck and left immobilized, prompting an urgent order for the Takahashi Detachment to disembark there and assist the Camotes Detachment during its landing at Palompon. Meanwhile, two destroyers and two transports carrying the Ito Naval Landing Unit continued to Ormoc, where four American destroyers awaited them. This led to a chaotic battle, as artillery, mortars, tank destroyers, and the destroyer Coghlan opened fire on the transports as they unloaded the SNLF Marines northwest of Ormoc. Consequently, one transport was sunk, and another was damaged, necessitating an escort back to Palompon to offload its remaining cargo. Despite this, over 200 Marines managed to land by nightfall, although they could not connect with the Imahori Detachment situated north of Ormoc.  At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese convoy, which was transporting the Special Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc Bay with the apparent intention of landing at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited with guns trained upon it. They withheld their fire until the barge was within fifty yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot," under the mistaken notion that their forces still occupied Ormoc. The harbor was lit up by the burning barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that another enemy vessel, about the size of an LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the town under cover of darkness and was busily engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th Infantry, emplaced along the beach within 1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it while forward observers from the 902d Field Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire upon the landing area and inland. The enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea, but after proceeding less than fifty yards it burst into flames and sank. About 150 men, two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel sank, but most of the supplies, including four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed by American fire while the vessel was unloading. The early dawn of 12 December revealed another ship of the same type farther west near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank destroyer guns opened up against this vessel as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and their fire followed until it was out of range. Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke billowed from the vessel as it moved at a snail's pace. During the night the American fire had to be closely coordinated, since American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U.S. craft was damaged. Troops of the Special Naval Landing Force who had disembarked got in touch with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. It was impossible for them to carry out the order, since the 77th Division had advanced north from Ormoc. They thereupon decided to join a naval airfield construction unit at Valencia, but again they failed. In the latter part of December, the men of the Special Naval Landing Force were in the eastern part of the Palompon area without having taken part in the battle for the Ormoc corridor. On the journey back to Manila, the Uzuki was sunk by two PT boats near Leyte on December 12. The rest of the convoy was also assaulted by 46 aircraft off Cebu, leading to the sinking of the Yuzuki and one transport. This incident marked the final TA convoy of the war, as the fall of Ormoc made the operation pointless. Similarly, plans for a counterlanding at Carigara Bay with the 39th Regiment were also scrapped. The nine TA convoys successfully transported an estimated 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Leyte; however, this came at a significant cost. The Southwest Area Fleet incurred losses that included one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, three subchasers, two frigates, and 26 transports. Additionally, during enemy carrier strikes on Luzon and the Visayas, the fleet lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyers, one submarine, three subchasers, three frigates, 19 transports, and four oilers. On December 11, General Bruce launched an aggressive defense of Ormoc, planning to advance his troops daily to establish new forts or blockhouses by nightfall until Valencia was secured. Consequently, the 307th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 306th Regiment attempted to cross the Antilao River but encountered intense fire and were quickly pinned down. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the 306th managed to advance despite facing increasing resistance from the Imahori Detachment at Cogon but was ultimately compelled to withdraw due to heavy enemy fire. At the same time, the bulk of the 305th Regiment repositioned to the right of the 307th, while the 17th and 184th Regiments completed their limited offensive, successfully crossing the Talisayan River without opposition and reaching the Binoljo area, with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th advancing to Ipil to establish contact with the 77th Division. At this stage, General Yamagata's units had retreated into the mountains, regrouping north of Talisanyan to initiate their final withdrawal to Ormoc. However, their escape route had been entirely cut off, and they were being pursued from the east by the bulk of General Swing's 11th Airborne Division. As General Gill's offensive progressed, his infantry began assaulting enemy artillery positions in the north. Simultaneously, the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry launched an attack against the 102nd Division units; however, the defenders managed to hold the cavalrymen back at the hill's base. Meanwhile, General Suzuki was hastily retreating toward Huaton, where he was expected to arrive by December 13. His strategy involved waiting for the 5th and 77th Regiments to reach his position before executing a robust counterattack to reclaim Ormoc. The 68th Brigade was tasked with bolstering the beleaguered 1st Division, which had incurred over 3,000 casualties since the start of hostilities. Returning to the frontline developments, the previous day's intense fighting compelled Bruce to solidify his positions on December 12. He organized the delivery of supplies and supporting artillery to bombard enemy defenses while dispatching strong patrols for reconnaissance. At the same time, the 17th and 184th Regiments successfully gathered at the Panilahan River in preparation to reinforce the 77th Division. On the following day, after a significant artillery bombardment, a specialized attack force led by Colonel Paul Freeman, comprising two companies from the 305th Regiment, was dispatched to assault Colonel Imahori's primary blockhouse at Cogon. Meanwhile, the remainder of the regiment targeted other enemy positions along the ridge. While the infantry managed to advance to the ridge, Freeman's companies were unable to progress further, ultimately forcing the 305th to retreat. Simultaneously, the 307th Regiment advanced westward along the Ormoc-Linao road and successfully captured Linao. Although the 77th Division had pushed its western boundary forward by approximately 1,000 yards during the day, the central front lines remained largely unchanged since morning, necessitating General Bruce to launch another attack the following day. Meanwhile, Arnold sent the 32nd Regiment to connect with the 11th Airborne Division to aid in its withdrawal from the mountains.  On the morning of 13 December the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the road, was to attack south on the east side of Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six enemy tanks were coming up the highway. After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks withdrew at nightfall and returned to the south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, the southernmost unit of the division, made plans to dislodge the enemy force between it and the 3d Battalion. The contested ground consisted of an open space 600 to 700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at the southern end of which were two knolls. The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls but did not control the northern end of the sector where the Japanese had dug in and were using machine guns, mortars, and rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the Japanese and rooted them out with grenades and mortar fire. Except for this action, only slight gains were registered during the day. The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous afternoon. The commanding officer of the battalion renewed a request for additional rations and ammunition, since the one-third ration that had been received the day before was insufficient. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front, about 150 yards west of the road. The enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades against the battalion, effectively pinning down the troops. A night perimeter was established. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly contested by the Japanese, who employed machine guns, mortars, and rifles against the battalion, which dug in for the night under fire. At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who were walking along the road south of Lonoy and killed twelve of them. The night of 13-14 December was not quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st Infantry Regiment broke into the command post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set up a machine gun in the area and attacked with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy force was evicted and the area had quieted down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn, the Headquarters Company got things in order and everyone was "happy to hear sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded. On December 14, nearly all battalions of the 126th and 127th Regiments were actively advancing and maintaining physical contact with one another, successfully pushing over two miles south of Limon. At 0730 on the morning of 13 December, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out and came under fire from two Japanese machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In the meantime, Troop F of the squadron worked south in an attempt to envelop the rear of the enemy force but was unable to do so and returned. The 2d Squadron established night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night. On the following morning the 75-mm. and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and 60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire on the Japanese strong point. At 1200 Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off, attacking the enemy position frontally while Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed forward and by 1445 had knocked out four enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines. Troop F also continued to advance. By the end of the day the enemy force had been rooted off the high ground, and the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12 light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over 5000 rounds of artillery fire had been placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it." On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and assist the advance of the 32d Division, to establish a roadblock on the highway, and to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division. In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area that was about 1,800 yards east of the barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest of the regiment was ordered to close in on the area before nightfall on 17 December. At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030 with Company L on the right and by 1105 they had advanced 100 yards. Company L knocked out two pillboxes with flame throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and bayonets and literally forced the enemy out of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand fighting. Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his command. He led his company forward and killed seven Japanese with his rifle and bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the Medal of Honor. While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame throwers. The company was assisted by armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was protected by an upturned bathtub. The armored bulldozer drove over the positions, its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes, after which small arms fire into the holes killed the occupants. The crews of the tank destroyers not only fired point-blank at targets but opened the escape hatches and dropped grenades into the foxholes. At 1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of it, was secured. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 305th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver around the blockhouse, subsequently shifting 1,000 yards to the east to intercept the enemy's communication lines along Highway 2. On December 15, the 77th Division consolidated its positions and dispatched small patrols, effectively securing the port of Ormoc. Since the initial landings, the 77th estimated that they had killed 3,046 Japanese soldiers and captured 9 prisoners at the expense of 103 soldiers killed, 318 wounded, and 26 missing. With the 184th Regiment taking over the defense of Ormoc, Bruce's troops were now able to prepare for their advance toward Valencia and beyond, aiming to connect with General Sibert's 10th Corps, which was still making its way southward. However, we must shift our focus from Leyte to address another significant development in the Philippines.  While Admiral Nimitz was strategizing his invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—topics we will delve into further in the future—General MacArthur reluctantly postponed the Mindoro operation until December 15 to give Admiral Kinkaid time to assemble a robust escort carrier group to protect General Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force during its landing on Mindoro. This group, composed of six escort carriers, three aging battleships, three cruisers, and 18 destroyers commanded by Rear-Admiral Theodore Ruddock, was tasked with safeguarding Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3, now renamed the Mindoro Attack Group, alongside Admiral Berkey's Close Covering Group, which included three cruisers and seven destroyers. Additionally, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 was ordered to assist Operation Love with a series of strikes against the main airbases on Luzon. Although the prime airfield locations on Mindoro were situated in the northeast, perilously close to Japanese air concentrations in Luzon, MacArthur chose to establish a beachhead and airfield sites near San Jose in the southwest corner. The 503rd Parachute Regiment was designated to land on the Green and Blue Beaches around the Bugsanga River, while the majority of the 19th Regiment would come ashore at the White Beach near Mangarin Bay. Meanwhile, General Yamashita had been convinced since early November that Leyte would fall, prompting him to strategize for the defense of Luzon. He thought the Americans would try to establish advance air bases in the western Visayas rather than on Mindoro, as the Japanese believed Mindoro had limited suitable locations for operational airfield construction. This belief hindered Yamashita's ability to reinforce either these positions or the already weakened defenses on Luzon, as Field Marshal Terauchi persistently pressured him to send all available reinforcements to Leyte. Realizing he could not engage in a decisive battle on Luzon without substantial reinforcements, Yamashita began planning a delaying defense strategy, where his existing forces would conduct operations aimed at exhausting enemy resources. In preparation for the worst-case scenario, the 14th Area Army started organizing positions for a prolonged defense in the mountainous regions around Baguio and north of San Jose, west of Tarlac, and east of Manila. At this stage, Yamashita had the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Batan and Babuyan Islands, the 103rd Division in northern Luzon, the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Lingayen Gulf area, the 2nd Tank Division near San Miguel-Cabanatuan, the 8th Division in Batangas Province, the 11th Independent Regiment in the sectors around Baler and Dingalan Bay, the 82nd Brigade in the Lamon Bay region, the remainder of the 105th Division in the Legaspi and Naga areas, and most of the 23rd Division in the San Jose and Umingan sectors. In addition, the Manila Defense Force, established on November 1, comprised four provisional infantry battalions and five infantry companies, tasked with defending Manila and the Bataan Peninsula. Furthermore, the 8th Division was charged with the defense of Mindoro; however, the island was only protected by two provisional companies from the 359th Independent Battalion, which were deployed there to bolster the local naval garrisons and air personnel. On December 12, Struble's convoy finally set sail from Leyte Gulf towards Mindoro. Struble's forces steamed on through the Mindanao Sea unmolested until the afternoon of 13 December. Japanese Army and Navy planes had had the three groups under surveillance since 0900, but had not attacked pending receipt of information on the force's destination. In midafternoon ten Japanese Navy planes, including three designated as suicide bombers--the dread kamikazes--flew up from a field on Cebu and found the Allied force off the southeastern corner of Negros Island. Unobserved by lookouts and undetected by radar, which nearby land masses blanketed, one kamikaze flew in low over the water and crashed with a mighty roar on the light cruiser Nashville, Admiral Struble's flagship. Combined explosions from the plane's bomb and ship's ammunition wrecked the flag bridge, the communications office, and the combat information center. Over 130 men were killed outright, including General Dunckel's chief of staff, the 310th Bombardment Wing's commander, Admiral Struble's chief of staff, and Task Group 78.3's communications and medical officers. The wounded, numbering about 190, included Dunckel, who was painfully but not seriously injured and burned. Struble and Dunckel quickly transferred to the destroyer Dashiell, which also took aboard some of the members of both officers' staffs. The rest of the staffs and the wounded sailed back to Leyte on the Nashville, protected by the destroyer Stanly. Later that afternoon, another kamikaze struck the destroyer Haraden, which also had to return to Leyte, resulting in 15 fatalities and 25 injuries. Additionally, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force was instructed to relocate from Lingga to Camranh Bay in anticipation of a potential sortie. Despite this, the Americans continued their advance, and fortunately for them, the Japanese were searching in the western Visayas, causing them to miss the opportunity to attack on December 14. Meanwhile, McCain's carriers launched a significant strike against Luzon, while Ruddock's carriers effectively diverted enemy attention with attacks on air concentrations in Panay and Negros Islands. By late afternoon of the 14th the location of the convoy in the southern waters of Mindoro Strait made it clear that the objective lay beyond the western Visayas. For the first time Fourteenth Area Army estimated that the landing would take place on Mindoro and ordered the 8th Division to alert its outposts there. It was also a serious possibility,, however, that the enemy might strike directly at Luzon. General Yamashita therefore issued a warning to Area Army forces throughout central Luzon. As a further precaution, the Nagayoshi Detachment, which was awaiting shipment to Leyte, and the 71st Infantry Regiment of the 23d Division, which had just reached Manila, were ordered to deploy immediately to Bataan Peninsula and Batangas, respectively, to meet potential enemy landings in those sectors. The Navy and air commands in Manila saw much greater probability of a landing on Luzon than on Mindoro. They therefore directed all subordinate units and installations to prepare for action against both enemy amphibious forces and possible airborne attack groups. Additionally, Army and Navy aircraft were quickly organized to target enemy shipping. Meanwhile, Struble's convoy anchored near San Jose and began preparations for the landings, which would catch the few defenders of Mindoro off guard. As troops transferred to the landing crafts and surface vessels commenced the pre-landing bombardment, McCain's carrier aircraft launched another assault on Luzon, inflicting substantial casualties. Assisted by Ruddock's carriers, they successfully shot down eight out of fifteen kamikaze attackers targeting the shipping off the island. For the loss of 35 aircraft, the Americans estimated they destroyed around 450 Japanese planes during this operation. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued their assault, damaging two LSTs that would later sink, as well as one LSM. In the heroic action, the destroyer USS Moale (DD-693), under the command of Commander Walter M. Foster, went alongside the burning LST-738 (which was loaded with aviation fuel and ordnance) to rescue crewmembers. Several explosions aboard LST-738 caused damage to Moale as she pulled away. Some pieces of shrapnel were two feet square and they put four holes in Moale's hull. Gunner's Mate Ed Marsh reported that a one-gallon jar of vaseline from the LST's cargo splattered on one barrel of his twin 40 mm Bofors AA gun, providing unwelcome lubrication. Moale suffered one fatality and thirteen wounded. In addition, Moale also rescued 88 survivors. Despite this damage, they were unable to prevent the successful landings of the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, which quickly unloaded and advanced seven miles inland to secure the objective beachhead line. Consequently, the few Japanese units present in the area were compelled to retreat inland toward Bulalacao. Meanwhile, engineers promptly began construction on the new Hill Drome, which would be completed by December 20. The second Ellmore Field was projected to be ready for limited use three days later and for continuous dry-weather operations by December 28, a week ahead of schedule. On the morning of December 16, a slow-moving tow convoy consisting of small tankers, barges, and LCTs, accompanied by destroyers, arrived off Mindoro after suffering the loss of a small Army tanker that was sunk and a destroyer that was damaged by kamikaze attacks during the journey. Concurrently, McCain carried out his final strike against Luzon, unfortunately resulting in the sinking of the hellship Oryoku Maru, which was carrying 1,620 prisoners of war, with over 200 lives lost. The burden of taking their fellow soldiers' lives would not be the only consequence for the Americans, as the fierce Typhoon Cobra soon battered Task Force 38, sinking the destroyer Spence and damaging nine additional warships. Despite these significant losses, the Mindoro operation was ultimately a complete success. Although MacArthur aimed to launch his amphibious invasion of Lingayen Gulf just 15 days after capturing Mindoro, considerations such as the lunar and tidal conditions at Lingayen Gulf, the necessity to rest and replenish the units of Kinkaid's 7th Fleet, and the ongoing slow progress in airfield construction on Leyte—required for establishing a much larger airbase at Mindoro—ultimately compelled him to delay Operation Mike I until January 9. Conversely, the invasion of Mindoro, signaling that the final advance on Luzon would soon take place, prompted Terauchi to recognize that Leyte was a lost cause. As a result, the decisive battle at Leyte was immediately halted, the 35th Army was instructed to hold the southern Philippines for as long as possible, and the 14th Area Army was ordered to expedite its defensive preparations on Luzon and quickly respond to the enemy landing on Mindoro. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Intense battles unfolded as American forces aggressively pushed back a chaotic Japanese retreat, marking a pivotal moment in the fight for Ormoc, while enemy convoys faced destruction and retreat marked the war's shifting tide. US forces battled fiercely on Leyte and Mindoro, overcoming Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks to secure key positions for the Luzon invasion.

Una violenta esplosione ha colpito il deposito Eni di Calenzano, in provincia di Firenze, lunedì 9 dicembre 2024 alle 10:22, probabilmente a causa della dispersione di vapori di idrocarburi nell'area di carico delle autobotti. Al momento 5 persone hanno perso la vita e 26 sono rimaste ferite. Il deposito Eni di Calenzano, attivo dal 1956, copre 170.000 metri quadrati ed è una delle strutture più importanti per la gestione degli idrocarburi in Italia. Ma cosa è successo? In questo episodio, esploreremo i dettagli dell'incidente, le possibili cause e l'attuale situazione. Analizzeremo anche il ruolo di IT-Alert, il sistema di allerta che, per la prima volta, è stato attivato durante un'emergenza, inviando notifiche a tutti i cittadini nel raggio di 5 km dall'esplosione. Cercheremo di fare chiarezza mandando un pensiero di vicinanza a tutte le persone coinvolte e alle loro famiglie. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Esplode un deposito Eni a Calenzano. Morti, feriti, dispersi. Se c'è una morale in quello che è accaduto a Calenzano, in un deposito di carburante dell'Eni, in una delle zone più popolose d'Italia, è che non esiste una chimica pulita. Lo avevo già compreso nel luglio 1976 quando da giovane cronista dovetti recarmi all'Icmesa di Seveso, dove una spaventosa esplosione distrusse la valvola di scarico del reattore B, provocando la fuoriuscita di 15-18 chilogrammi di diossina. Sono passati 48 anni da quell'incidente, è ancora in vigore una direttiva europea che prende il nome della città di Seveso, eppure si continua a morire in industrie chimiche. A Calenzano, è esplosa una delle autobotti presso la pensilina di carico, nella zona dove viene caricato il carburante da nove silos. Ci sono morti, feriti e dispersi. Secondo Arpat, non ci sono rischi per la salute. Le concentrazioni in aria a livello del suolo a partire dalla conclusione delle operazioni di spegnimento sono da ritenersi trascurabili e la nube dell'incendio si è dispersa. I lavoratori proclamano lo sciopero. Cgil Firenze, Cisl Firenze Prato e Uil di Firenze proclamano uno sciopero generale provinciale di 4 ore, a fine turno, per mercoledì 11 dicembre. Si tratta di una risposta doverosa a quanto accaduto a Calenzano. I sindacati dicono che senza sicurezza non c'è lavoro, non c'è dignità, non c'è vita. E hanno ragione. Ma qui non c'è solo il problema della sicurezza, anche di una visione di sviluppo economico che mette al centro il mero profitto rispetto alle condizioni in cui si lavora nel settore chimico. Quanti altri depositi tipo quello di Calenzano sono ancora oggi piazzati in luoghi ad alta concentrazione di popolazione, vicino a grandi agglomerati urbani? "Il Corsivo" a cura di Daniele Biacchessi non è un editoriale, ma un approfondimento sui fatti di maggiore interesse che i quotidiani spesso non raccontano. Un servizio in punta di penna che analizza con un occhio esperto quell'angolo nascosto delle notizie di politica, economia e cronaca. ___________________________________________________ Ascolta altre produzioni di Giornale Radio sul sito: https://www.giornaleradio.fm oppure scarica la nostra App gratuita: iOS - App Store - https://apple.co/2uW01yA Android - Google Play - http://bit.ly/2vCjiW3 Resta connesso e segui i canali social di Giornale Radio: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/giornaleradio.fm/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/giornale_radio_fm/?hl=it

Esplode un deposito Eni a Calenzano. Morti, feriti, dispersi. Se c'è una morale in quello che è accaduto a Calenzano, in un deposito di carburante dell'Eni, in una delle zone più popolose d'Italia, è che non esiste una chimica pulita. Lo avevo già compreso nel luglio 1976 quando da giovane cronista dovetti recarmi all'Icmesa di Seveso, dove una spaventosa esplosione distrusse la valvola di scarico del reattore B, provocando la fuoriuscita di 15-18 chilogrammi di diossina. Sono passati 48 anni da quell'incidente, è ancora in vigore una direttiva europea che prende il nome della città di Seveso, eppure si continua a morire in industrie chimiche. A Calenzano, è esplosa una delle autobotti presso la pensilina di carico, nella zona dove viene caricato il carburante da nove silos. Ci sono morti, feriti e dispersi. Secondo Arpat, non ci sono rischi per la salute. Le concentrazioni in aria a livello del suolo a partire dalla conclusione delle operazioni di spegnimento sono da ritenersi trascurabili e la nube dell'incendio si è dispersa. I lavoratori proclamano lo sciopero. Cgil Firenze, Cisl Firenze Prato e Uil di Firenze proclamano uno sciopero generale provinciale di 4 ore, a fine turno, per mercoledì 11 dicembre. Si tratta di una risposta doverosa a quanto accaduto a Calenzano. I sindacati dicono che senza sicurezza non c'è lavoro, non c'è dignità, non c'è vita. E hanno ragione. Ma qui non c'è solo il problema della sicurezza, anche di una visione di sviluppo economico che mette al centro il mero profitto rispetto alle condizioni in cui si lavora nel settore chimico. Quanti altri depositi tipo quello di Calenzano sono ancora oggi piazzati in luoghi ad alta concentrazione di popolazione, vicino a grandi agglomerati urbani? "Il Corsivo" a cura di Daniele Biacchessi non è un editoriale, ma un approfondimento sui fatti di maggiore interesse che i quotidiani spesso non raccontano. Un servizio in punta di penna che analizza con un occhio esperto quell'angolo nascosto delle notizie di politica, economia e cronaca. ___________________________________________________ Ascolta altre produzioni di Giornale Radio sul sito: https://www.giornaleradio.fm oppure scarica la nostra App gratuita: iOS - App Store - https://apple.co/2uW01yA Android - Google Play - http://bit.ly/2vCjiW3 Resta connesso e segui i canali social di Giornale Radio: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/giornaleradio.fm/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/giornale_radio_fm/?hl=it

Last time we spoke about Operation Capital. In late November, General Gill's 32nd Division secured Limon and aimed for Ormoc, while General Arnold's 7th Division prepared to flank Japanese forces. Intense fighting marked the attack on Kilay Ridge, resulting in a costly victory for the Americans. Meanwhile, Japanese operations faltered as supplies dwindled. By December, Allied plans for Luzon's invasion were set, but delays in securing air support complicated the Mindoro operation. Across the seas, naval battles raged, revealing the fierce struggle for control in the Pacific. In December, the Chinese launched renewed attacks on fortified Japanese positions in Bhamo, but faced fierce resistance. While the 113th Regiment struggled, the 114th found early success aided by coordinated artillery and air support. As casualties mounted, General Honda ordered reinforcements for Hara's garrison, leading to a desperate counterattack. Despite heavy losses, Japanese forces managed to retreat to safety. Amid ongoing skirmishes, the Allies realized their strategies would need revision to face the shifting tide of battle effectively. This episode is the Fall of Ormoc Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we left off,  the Japanese were preparing to initiate their Wa offensive, General Arnold's troops had successfully taken control of Shoestring Ridge and were poised to launch a fresh attack aimed at Ormoc. By December 4, the tanks of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion were positioned near Balogo, ready to strike the enemy positions ahead of the main assault. The next morning, these tanks targeted the weakened Japanese defenses at Balogo and Tabgas before subsequently withdrawing.There were numerous finger ridges inland which were cut by deep ravines and gorges that came to within a few hundred yards of the coast line. The entrenched Japanese, using reverse slope tactics, were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry. In many cases the reverse slopes were so steep that effective artillery fire could not be placed upon them. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the Palanas River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy small arms fire from the western slope of the hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened up with three light machine guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired on the enemy positions to the front. At 1037, as the battalion reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese launched a small counterattack on the left flank of Company E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies continued to receive small arms and machine gun fire. At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and proceeded without incident, finding the situation "very quiet" to its front. At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night approximately 300 yards south of Balogo. The 3d Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and across the front of the 2d Battalion on the right toward Hill 380, which consisted of a series of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced toward the hill, it came under machine gun fire on each flank. With artillery support, the troops reached the top of the second ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men having been wounded. At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry received orders to set up night defense positions in depth and to hold the "positions at all costs." Colonel O'Sullivan decided that the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of the advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill 380. On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a busy day in working toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on 5 December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the left, had moved through the 32d Infantry. At 0906 the advance elements of the 1st Battalion secured a ridge south of the main ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000 the entire battalion closed on this ridge. In the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun fire, the leading platoons pushed forward to secure a ridge that led west from Hill 918. As the advance platoons neared the crest of this ridge, they received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. At the same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also encountered cross fire that came down the intervening draw. As enemy gunfire pinned down the troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918 and the 184th Infantry had secured a line extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to the high ground southeast of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had filled a gap that had existed between the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the Palanas River and, advancing up the southwest slope of Hill 380, reached the top of the first ridge.  The next day the 2d Battalion had driven forward with Company E on the right and Company G on the left. Company E went east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then turned northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had to secure a small ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was a small but dense banana grove. Company E encountered and destroyed a small enemy force on this ridge, after which the company reorganized and at approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E reached the military crest of the hill, the Japanese began heavy firing with grenade launchers and at least three machine guns. The enemy fire swept the crest of the hill and prevented any movement over the lip of the ridge. Meanwhile, Company G went to the left of Company E and secured a small ridge about 1,200 yards from the line of departure and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon of Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced in a draw to the left front of the platoon. The rest of the company attempted to move around to the right of the ridge but also encountered automatic weapons fire coming from another draw. Since high cogon grass covered the area, observation was limited to a matter of inches. At about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment counterattacked through a gap between Company G and Company A of the 1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon, which was thrown in to plug the gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese advance. Company G, however, continued to be pinned down by the enemy fire directed at its front. Company F, the reserve company, was then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its mission was to come abreast of Company E, take Hill 918, and then turn west and wipe out the resistance in front of Company G. At 1415 Company F moved up Hill 918 and reached Company E without opposition. Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The one occupied by Company E ran southwest, that occupied by Company F ran west, and the third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a coordinated assault from their respective spurs, their companies received a concentration of about fifty rounds of mortar fire but pushed through this fire and secured the crests of both spurs. They immediately came under automatic weapons and rifle fire from the northwest ridge. Since the left flank of Company F was in the tall cogon grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the enemy. On the other hand, Company E was on bare and open ground which exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire from Hill 918. Both companies also came under long-range machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kang Dagit, northeast of Hill 918. It was impractical to attempt an envelopment to the right, since the flank of Company E rested on a deep ravine which ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind Company G, and attacking east from the positions of the 1st Battalion. Because of these unfavorable conditions, Companies E and F with their wounded withdrew to make a line with Company G. Meanwhile, the Japanese continued their preparations for Operation Wa, which was already set to fail from the outset. General Makino's 16th Division could only advance a composite battalion of 500 men, which incurred 200 casualties en route. Additionally, General Yamagata's 26th Division was still mobilizing to reach the assembly area, with only one forward battalion prepared for action. Consequently, feeling inadequately prepared, General Suzuki requested a delay in the attack, and General Yamashita effectively rescheduled it to the night of December 6. From his new headquarters in Lubi, Suzuki communicated this update to the 16th and 26th Divisions, but due to radio issues, Makino was never informed. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division was organizing a risky amphibious invasion of Ormoc. As per General Hodge's strategy, Rear-Admiral Arthur Struble's Task Group 78.3, consisting of around a dozen destroyers, was assigned the task of transporting and landing the 77th Division, along with its supplies and equipment, at the barrio of Desposito located southeast of Ormoc. Upon landing, Bruce's forces were to advance northward, capture Ormoc, and then proceed up the Ormoc corridor to connect with units from General Sibert's 10th Corps. To facilitate this operation, the 5th Air Force would provide continuous air support—both day and night—for the assault convoy en route to the target, during the landings, and for the return trip. In addition, General Gill's 32nd Division was set to initiate an offensive southward along Highway 2 towards Ormoc while the 7th Division pressed northward to seize the elevated terrain south of the Panilahan River. Consequently, on December 5, the 127th Regiment commenced its advance past Colonel Hettinger's 3rd Battalion, facing staunch resistance from General Kataoka's 1st Division, which was well-entrenched on the high ground 1,000 yards south of the Leyte River bridge. The well-camouflaged enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many of which were connected by interlacing communication trenches. The terrain that the troops traversed was adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st Division took full advantage of this fact. There were deep ravines and steep hills where the enemy had dug in on both the forward and reverse slopes. The entire area was covered by heavy rain forest with dense underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall made observation difficult and the maps for the area were very inaccurate. The 77th Division continued to assemble its troops on Tarragona Beach, on the east coast of Leyte, and during the night of December 5 the loading of supplies and equipment on the landing ships began. The loading was slowed by frequent air alerts. The division had previously been told that the convoy would be unable to stay in the landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt to bulk load supplies, since they would take too long to unload. All supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be mobile-loaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken with the division so that the supplies could be brought ashore in the vehicles upon debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in the initial convoy, including tanks, M8s, and M10s that could not carry supplies. The LVTs were filled with supplies rather than troops in order that they could be discharged from the landing ships into the water and go ashore fully loaded. Furthermore, since the supplies were mobile they could be moved either by water or inland by motor. The 77th Division gave the highest priority to ammunition, water, and rations.  Makino also initiated his segment of the Wa offensive, with around 150 Japanese troops stealthily advancing towards the Buri airstrip. At that time, Major-General Joseph Swing's 11th Airborne Division was tasked with securing the Burauen area, although most of the division was engaged in combat for the mountain passes leading to Albuera. Additionally, Major-General Henry Jones' 38th Division had been deployed at Leyte to prepare for future operations but could also reinforce Swing, along with portions of General Bradley's 96th Division, if needed. At 06:00 on December 6, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, located northwest of Burauen, spotted Makino's troops crossing the main road south of their position and moving east toward the Buri field. While the artillery team communicated this information to the 24th Corps, the Japanese forces advanced into the swamp near the airfield prior to initiating their assault. At 06:30 the 16th Division launched its surprise attack. Led by a Filipino, the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area while the men were still asleep. Some were bayoneted while in their blankets, or before they could seize their weapons. Others held the Japanese off until they could retreat, shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts, either up the bluff to the headquarters of the 5th Bomber Command, or to the road, where an infantry company had come up in support. The service troops were "firing at everything that moves and… probably inflicting casualties among our troops."  Swift promptly responded by deploying the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment to counterattack toward Buri, while Hodge assigned the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment to Swift's command. The battalion was to proceed immediately to the aid of the two companies of the 11th Airborne Division in the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized that the area was "critical" and "must be kept closed." It would be "dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service troops along the road and around airfields." One reinforced company of the 1st Battalion was already in the area and the rest of the battalion made ready to follow. This reinforcement allowed one bolstered company to quickly support the service troops, effectively holding back the enemy while the glider units took position near the airfield. When the Americans launched a coordinated counteroffensive, they succeeded in driving the Japanese from the Buri airfield by nightfall, though some resistance remained at the edges of the airstrip. Meanwhile, Arnold maintained his offensive, with the 184th Regiment advancing through Hill 380 to secure Balogo, while the 17th Regiment captured the abandoned enemy positions on Hill 918 and moved up Hill 380 to join the 184th. By midday, the loading of the 77th Division was complete, and the convoy gathered off Dulag to await the arrival of Struble's escorting destroyers. At 13:30, Struble's main convoy set sail, having been preceded by four slower LSTs under the protection of two destroyers. While American transports and destroyers navigated silently toward Ormoc Bay, General Tominaga activated the airborne segment of Operation Wa. He planned to deploy an initial wave of 40 Mitsubishi Ki-57 transports, carrying 409 paratroopers, primarily targeting the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips to capture them. In a related secondary attack, two pairs of transports would drop smaller groups of paratroopers over the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips to destroy as many American aircraft and facilities as possible. The transports would have Ki-43 fighters as escorts, and 21 medium bombers were dispatched to bomb and strafe the Buri, San Pablo, and Bayug airstrips shortly before the paratroopers' descent. Two additional waves were scheduled, the first five hours after the initial assault, comprising 270 troops in 21 aircraft, followed by a third wave of 80 soldiers six hours later. These follow-up operations were intended to assist in eliminating any remaining resistance, after which a defense would be established at the captured airfield. The primary goal of this operation was to incapacitate the enemy airstrips to ensure the safe arrival of the last TA convoys with critical reinforcements to Leyte. The attack was synchronized with Admiral Okawachi's eighth convoy, which included three destroyers, two subchasers, and five transport ships carrying Major-General Kurisu Takeo's 68th Brigade, having departed from Manila on December 5 and expected to reach Albuera two days later. After taking off at 15:30, Tominaga's first echelon headed towards the Burauen area. Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese transports with supporting bombers and fighters roared over the Burauen airfields. Several incendiary bombs fell on the San Pablo strip, setting a gasoline dump afire and burning a liaison plane. Despite American fighters destroying 18 planes, they managed to deploy over 300 paratroopers by 19:00 following preparatory bombing and the deployment of a smoke screen. However, the intense anti-aircraft fire caused some confusion, leading pilots to drop soldiers at incorrect locations. Still, approximately 60 paratroopers descended on Buri, while more than 250 landed at San Pablo.  Meanwhile the secondary attacks on the Dulag and Tacloban strips completely miscarried. Two transports flew over the former installation; one dropped about five paratroopers and then crashed, while the other crashed about 4,500 yards northeast of the field. Over Tacloban two medium bombers converted to transports lowered their flaps and wheels preparatory to landing, but one was shot down, and the other crashed. Nonetheless, upon landing, the paratroopers quickly advanced along both the north and south sides of the San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones and allegedly called out in English, "Hello--where are your machine guns?" Most of the enemy forces assembled on the north side of the airstrip. They burned three or four more liaison planes, a jeep, several tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing ammunition on the latter. Fortunately for the Americans, inclement weather combined with significant Japanese transport losses prevented the subsequent waves of reinforcements from being dispatched. On the night of 6-7 December, the Air Corps service personnel had abruptly quitted the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines, rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition, and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula of the 767th Tank Battalion had been ordered to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip, and recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made "the best use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on 7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip. In response, Swift quickly ordered the 674th Glider Field Artillery Battalion to abandon their artillery and support the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, which was near San Pablo preparing to reclaim the airstrip. General Krueger also reacted swiftly, allocating two battalions from the 148th Regiment to Hodge's command, who dispatched them toward San Pablo. However, before their arrival, Swift's forces had already initiated their counteroffensive at dawn on December 7, successfully driving the paratroopers back to the northwest until they ran out of ammunition. Fortunately, the Japanese chose to retreat towards Buri rather than continue the battle at San Pablo. At 14:00, upon the arrival of the 148th battalions, Swift promptly ordered them to launch an attack towards Buri. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, 38th Division, were alerted at 0200 on 7 December for movement to the San Pablo airstrip. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion were greeted at the San Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have said: "Glad to see you. I am General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. We've been having a hell of a time here. Last night approximately seventy-five Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen hundred yards from here on an azimuth of 273° is another airstrip just like this one. Between here and there are about twenty-five Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I want that strip secure by nightfall." The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with Companies A and C abreast, Company A on the right, with approximately a 200-yard frontage for each company. A section of heavy machine guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company D was to support the attack from positions on the San Pablo airstrip. The 1st Battalion set out at 14:30, moving the first 400 yards without any issues, but eventually encountered a rain-swollen swamp that impeded their progress, resulting in the companies losing contact with one another. By nightfall, only Companies A and C had reached the airstrip but were unable to initiate their attack due to the late hour. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion of the 187th Glider Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment advanced towards Buri and successfully joined the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment at the western end of the airstrip by the end of the day. In the meantime, Arnold continued his limited offensive on December 7, with the 184th Regiment facing little resistance as it ascended the high ground overlooking the Tabgas River.  At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from the 1st Battalion located an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150 yards from the battalion's lines. When the patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on the position and it was wiped out. The 1st Battalion moved out at approximately 0900. Though long-range fire fell on the troops and small arms fire hit the left flank of Company C, the men continued to push forward. The battalion found several ridges leading up Hill 380--a knifelike ridge in front of Company C and a double ridge in the form of a horseshoe, with its closed end toward the hill, in front of Company B. Company B moved across the double ridge while Company C forced its passage through machine gun and rifle fire across the closed part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the two companies re-established contact on the northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At 1630 the Japanese with machine guns launched a counterattack against the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was pinned down but did not yield any ground. The troops on the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced back slightly but in a few minutes regained the lost ground. They dug in for the night on the crest of the ridge. After its dawn patrols had reported on 7 December, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, jumped off to the attack. Company E secured the first of the three spurs leading from Hill 380, and continued forward to the middle spur in the face of light fire that came from in front of the company in the area the 17th Infantry wished to secure. Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the company's section of light machine guns and two platoons of heavy machine guns moved onto the middle spur, where they neutralized the enemy position. While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved to the first spur. Company G received orders from the battalion commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the hill from the east. At 0930 the company dropped below the military crest of the southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and made its way very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass. At 1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid a five-minute preparatory fire in front of the battalion. The American troops then routed the surprised Japanese defenders and killed the majority of them as the others fled into the mountains northeast of the hill. Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was the key to defense of the Tabgas River valley and Hill 606, troops of the 26th Division poured long-range machine gun fire from Hill 606 into Company G and at the same time halted the company with small arms fire from the immediate left along the ridge. At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage, about fifty men from the 26th Division counterattacked the positions of Company G, but the company held firm and mowed down the attackers with fire from its rifles and automatic weapons. The position on the hill was maintained. Although Company G occupied the top of Hill 380, it was not in a position to aid the advance of Company E. The Japanese troops were dug in on the reverse slopes and could only be rooted out by close-in fighting. The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion committed Company F down the main spur from the east, supported by Companies E and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started down the ridge, the enemy concentrated fire upon it both from the north and the west. In a matter of minutes Company F was reduced to a point where the number of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon. The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and renewed the assault behind a concentration of 100 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire and 80 rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack succeeded, and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon moved to the main ridge and helped mop up the area. At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved out, reaching the source of the Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of about fifty men was observed in a natural bowl to its immediate front. The battalion placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire on the group as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They destroyed the entire Japanese force without any casualties to the American troops. The 3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River and went into night perimeter at Kang Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery fire fell into the area, killing seven men and wounding eighteen others. At the end of the day the 184th Infantry was on the banks of the Tabgas River and the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380, which commanded the Tabgas River valley. Arnold's offensive had become so precarious that Yamagata was forced to halt his division's advance towards Burauen and instead redirect them to defend Albuera, only sending his advance battalion to participate in the Wa offensive. The situation was about to worsen for Yamagata as Struble's convoy finally arrived off Deposito just before dawn. At 06:34, an enemy shore battery opened fire, and at 06:40, the destroyers responded by targeting their assigned locations. As the Japanese communicated this information to higher command, Okawachi received orders to land the 68th Brigade at San Isidro. Additionally, the 1st Combined Base Air Force and the 4th Air Army were directed to unleash all their resources against the landing forces. With Suzuki absent, Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu took charge of the defense of Ormoc, promptly instructing the Mitsui Shipping Unit to secure defensive positions on Red Roof Hill. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment was ordered to advance south through Ormoc to confront the enemy. Elements of the 77th Regiment, which had just arrived by barge at Ipil, were also tasked with reinforcing the defense of Ormoc. Furthermore, Suzuki commanded the 16th and 26th Divisions to halt the Wa offensive and retreat immediately towards Ormoc. In Manila, Okawachi and Yamashita were preparing to send two provisional companies from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade to garrison the Camotes Islands to counter the arrival of enemy reinforcements and suppress guerrilla activity in the region. Meanwhile, after Okawachi's latest convoy was detected, 57 P-47s were dispatched to strike the Japanese vessels while the 68th Brigade was being disembarked. In one of the fiercest aerial battles of the Leyte Campaign, the fighters strafed the vessels and dropped 94 1000-pound and six 500-pound bombs on enemy shipping, successfully destroying all five transports and damaging two destroyers. However, the 68th Brigade landed, albeit lacking most of its equipment, supplies, and heavy weaponry. Back at Ormoc Bay, General Bruce's first wave, composed of the leading battalions from the 305th and 307th Regiments, successfully landed on the White Beaches without encountering opposition at 07:07, and the troops quickly moved inland. The subsequent four waves of troops, including two battalions from the 306th Regiment, came ashore without incident. At 08:20, around 138 Japanese aircraft launched an assault on Struble's convoy. Despite the 5th Air Force executing a commendable interception of the attackers, some determined enemy planes managed to breach the anti-aircraft defenses and strike the American ships. On the morning of December 7, three years to the day after she fired the opening shot of the Pearl Harbor attack, the destroyer Ward came under attack by several Japanese kamikazes while patrolling off the invasion area. One bomber hit her hull amidships, bringing her to a dead stop. When the resulting fires could not be controlled, Ward's crew was ordered to abandon ship, and she was sunk by gunfire from O'Brien, whose commanding officer, William W. Outerbridge, had been in command of Ward during her action in Hawaii three years before. Nevertheless, their attempt to thwart this crucial invasion once again ended in failure. By 11:00, approximately 10,000 troops and most of the supplies had been landed, but under relentless air attack, Struble ultimately decided to withdraw and return to San Pedro Bay. Meanwhile, Bruce's forces were expanding their initial beachhead inland, with the 305th Regiment capturing crossings over the Bagonbon River and the 307th Regiment securing a bridge over the Baod River. Due to a lack of organized resistance, Bruce chose to continue advancing north along the highway to extend the division's foothold to Ipil. Consequently, the 307th began its northward advance around 10:45, gradually facing stiffer opposition as it approached its goal. By 14:55, they reached the outskirts of Ipil and commenced an assault on the defenses of two companies from the 77th Regiment, successfully killing 66 Japanese soldiers as they cleared the barrio and established a night perimeter on the northern edge by 17:40. With Bruce's forces having secured a two-mile beachhead, Yamagata's 26th Division found itself caught between two robust American divisions, leaving the route to Ormoc largely open for the 77th Division. On December 8, as the first two companies of the 12th Independent Regiment arrived to bolster the Mitsui Shipping Unit, the 307th Regiment resumed its advance northward, swiftly reaching the Panalian River where they began meeting stronger resistance. Successfully repelling enemy counterattacks, the 307th continued to push forward and achieved a total gain of 2,000 yards by day's end. At the same time, since half of the 2nd Raiding Brigade could not be airdropped during the now-halted Wa offensive, the Japanese decided to land them at the Valencia airstrip over the coming days to reinforce the defenders in Ormoc. Furthermore, Okawachi and Yamashita designated the Takahashi Detachment, organized around the 5th Regiment, as an emergency reinforcement to depart for Leyte immediately alongside the Ito Naval Landing Unit of SNLF Marines. Additionally, the 39th Regiment of the 10th Division was assigned to prepare for a counter-landing in the Carigara Bay region. Meanwhile, as the 26th Division began to withdraw along the coast to retreat through the ridges towards Ormoc, the 184th and 17th Regiments captured the Hill 606 positions and moved forward to the Sibugay River. During the night of 7-8 December, the Japanese brought forward two machine guns and emplaced them directly in front of Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins, in the face of enemy bullets, located the guns and called mortar fire upon the site. The mortar concentration, falling within fifty yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and charged with his M1 rifle and a carbine. Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he himself was slain. The rest of Company A followed Kelley and secured the edge of the airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During 8 December the Americans consolidated their positions. The following day, the 1st Battalion of the 149th Regiment launched an assault to the north, successfully crossing the airstrip and eliminating approximately 50 paratroopers before being halted by enemy fire. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion of the 382nd Regiment repelled another determined counterattack, killing an additional 50 Japanese soldiers and leaving around 100 paratroopers trapped on the airstrip. Concurrently, the 17th and 184th Regiments advanced through Albuera without opposition, continuing their movement through challenging terrain towards Gungab. In the early hours of December 9, Struble's initial resupply convoy reached Deposito, delivering the remainder of the 306th Regiment. As a result, its 1st Battalion was assigned to the 307th Regiment and promptly engaged in the northward attack. Progressing gradually through the formidable enemy ridge defenses, the 307th ultimately captured Camp Downes, while the 305th Regiment secured the northeastern area. During this advance, the rest of the 77th Regiment also arrived by barge at Palompon, where they were immediately deployed to bolster the defenders in Ormoc.  Ormoc, the largest and most important commercial center in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a vessel with a sixteen-foot draft, and two smaller vessels, could anchor at the same time. On the route to Ormoc and in the town itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek beds, and under buildings. Individual spider holes about six feet deep were covered with logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and mortar fire did little more than daze the defenders. Each position had to be searched out and destroyed. The next day, for the final assault on Ormoc, Bruce planned to deploy the 307th Regiment to attack along the highway, while the 306th Regiment would move northeast to encircle the opposing enemy forces. After a significant artillery barrage, Bruce first dispatched Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, supported by the rocket fire from LCMs and LCVs, to launch an assault on the city's strong enemy defenses. Following this, the 306th and 307th Regiments advanced, with the latter encountering minimal resistance until approaching the outskirts of Ormoc. Despite facing fierce opposition, the Mitsui Unit was effectively driven back, allowing the 307th to enter the city while the 306th advanced northeast with little resistance. The two regiments then pressured the enemy like squeezing a tube of toothpaste, ultimately forcing the determined defenders to retreat to the hills north of Ormoc, where the Imahori Detachment was gathering. However, some defenders remained behind, valiantly fighting to delay the American advance. Positioned in spider holes beneath the buildings, they resisted until overwhelmed.  At the same time that the 77th Division was entering Ormoc, the 32nd Division was pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley, the 11th Airborne Division was working westward over the mountains toward the town, and the 7th Division was pushing northward along the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with the 77th Division. General Bruce advised General Hodge: "Have rolled two sevens in Ormoc. Come seven come eleven." As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce also made a report on the status of the attack and referred to a promise that had been made by the commanding general of the 5th Air Force: "Where is the case of Scotch that was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I don't drink but I have an assistant division commander and regimental commanders who do…" In its advance to the north, the 77th Division reportedly killed around 1,506 Japanese soldiers and captured 7 prisoners, at a cost of 123 men killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing. The capture of Ormoc had significant consequences: it split the Japanese forces and isolated the remaining elements of the 26th Division; it diverted and eliminated previously uncommitted enemy reserves, easing the pressure on other fronts; it expedited the connection between the 10th Corps and the 24th Corps; and it prevented the Japanese from using Ormoc as a port, through which many reinforcements and supplies had been funneled into the campaign. Consequently, the Japanese had faced a clear defeat on Leyte Island; nevertheless, they were determined to continue fighting to the death, senselessly sending more troops into battle, which unnecessarily extended the campaign by several additional months. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese forces prepared Operation Wa while U.S. troops engaged in intense battles for strategic positions like Hill 918 and Balogo amid challenging terrain and strong defenses. Despite initial setbacks, American forces regrouped, successfully counterattacking Japanese positions and securing strategic areas, while Japanese reinforcements struggled amid heavy losses and unfavorable weather conditions.

Sul mercato c'è un caso che sta suscitando notevoli preoccupazioni tra molti risparmiatori: la situazione di Illimity Bank. Le azioni della banca fondata da Corrado Passera hanno subito un drastico calo, passando da circa 14 euro tre anni fa a meno di 3 euro oggi. Quasi il -80% a fronte di un indice del settore bancario che è più che raddoppiato.Di tutto questo parliamo nel podcast di oggi estratto dalla lettera settimanale di Salvatore Gaziano, fondatore di SoldiExpert SCF, società di consulenza finanziaria indipendente.E se volete ricevere analisi e approfondimenti non convenzionali sui mercati finanziari direttamente nella vostra casella di posta ogni martedì, iscrivetevi a letterasettimanale.it.

Ó Deus, deposito minha fé em Ti e não em outros. Sei que a sabedoria humana não é nada, se comparada com a divina. Creio em […]

Kiev ha rivendicato la distruzione di un deposito russo a Yeysk, nella regione di Krasnodar, a 160 km dal confine. A finire nel mirino degli ucraini una base dove erano immagazzinati 400 droni Shahed.ISCRIVITI E SEGUI NOTIZIE DALL'UCRAINA:   YouTube: https://bit.ly/3FqWppn     Spreaker: https://bit.ly/42g2ONG   Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3JE1OMi   Spotify: https://spoti.fi/40bpm0v   Google Podcasts: https://bit.ly/3lfNzUy   Amazon Podcast: https://amzn.to/40HVQ37 Audible: https://bit.ly/4370ARc    I PODCAST ADNKRONOS:   Fa notizia da 60 anni: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/adnkronos60_podcast/ Aggiungi contatto: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/aggiungi_contatto/   Notizie dall'Ucraina: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/notizie_ucraina/     Israele sotto attacco: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/israele_sotto_attacco/  Le Storie, La Storia: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/le_storie_la_storia/    Sanremo Express: https://www.adnkronos.com/speciali/sanremo_podcast_2024      RESTA IN CONTATTO CON NOI:   https://www.adnkronos.com/      https://twitter.com/Adnkronos      https://www.facebook.com/AgenziaAdnKronos      https://www.instagram.com/adnkronos_/  

In questa nuova puntata ci occupiamo del contratto mutuo con deposito cauzionale e, in particolare, della sua idoneità a valere come titolo esecutivo. Una questione sulla quale di recente è tornata a pronunciarsi la Corte di Cassazione, il 3 maggio scorso.Ne discutiamo con Laura Pelucchi e Margherita Domenegotti, entrambe Partner dello Studio.

Die Namibië Eiendomsagenteraad het verduidelik dat dit onwettig is vir verhuurders en agente om nie-terugbetaalbare deposito's vir huureiendomme te hef. Festus Unengu, bestuurder van raad beklemtoon dat verhuurders nie 'n deposito as nie-terugbetaalbaar kan verklaar nie. Verder, die wet bepaal die verhuurder is verantwoordelik vir grondbelasting en normale slytasie. Die enigste aftrekkings van die deposito moet wees vir herstelwerk van skade wat deur die huurder veroorsaak is.

Coparmex anuncia la Feria Internacional de Innovación y Emprendimiento del 17 al 19  de septiembre  México ha recibido 140 mil solicitudes de refugio  Israel libera a 25 presos palestinos entre ellos dos mujeres  Más información en nuestro podcast

Festus Unengu, bestuurder van die Namibiese Raad vir Eiendomsagente, sê eiendomsagente moet huurders se deposito's met rente terugbetaal wanneer hulle uit huureiendomme verhuis. Huurders moet ook nie gedwing word om deposito's te betaal wat dieselfde bedrag as hul huur is nie. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met Festus Unengu gepraat, wat die publiek herinner aan wat wetlik bepaal word. Hy voeg by dat deposito's in 'n trust geplaas moet word.

Fino a che punto la prospettiva di un ammorbidimento della politica monetaria può ridurre l'appetibilità dei conti deposito?

Fino a che punto la prospettiva di un ammorbidimento della politica monetaria può ridurre l'appetibilità dei conti deposito?

Nella nostra puntata di Natale, Kuna ci informa che dopo tanto sospirare e oltre un ventennio di lavori è stata finalmente pubblicata la CNAI, ossia Carta Nazionale delle Aree Idonee a ospitare il deposito permanente unico di rifiuti radioattivi di bassa e media attività. Siamo dunque a un passo dalla soluzione di quest'annosa vicenda? Probabilmente no.Gli approfondimenti sul sito dedicato al deposito nazionale.Nell'esterna, Marco Zambianchi di Astronauticast e il nostro Marco Casolino parlano dei principali successi dell'astronautica con e senza umani e delle prospettive per il 2024.Dopo l'attesissimo momento della barza brutta che riprende il classico confronto disciplinare, Andrea commemora la figura sottovalutata di Aleksei Starobinskij e ne approfitta per delineare i punti principali della teoria dell'inflazione, che risolve alcune magagne dei modelli cosmologici tradizionali.Per saperne di più leggi l'articolo (sempre di Andrea) su Scientificast.Auguri a tutti!

In uno di questi 51 luoghi italiani verrà costruito il Deposito Nazionale dei rifiuti radioattivi. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bruxelles, via al Consiglio europeo: ci colleghiamo con Sergio Nava in diretta sul posto.Deposito per le scorie nucleari, pubblicato l'elenco delle regioni idonee: facciamo chiarezza insieme a Giuseppe Zollino, professore di Impianti nucleari e Gestione rifiuti radioattivi all’Università di Padova e responsabile Energia e Ambiente di Azione.Raggiunto l'accordo sull'AI Act, la legge europea sull'intelligenza artificiale. Ci aggiorna il nostro Enrico Pagliarini.

Diario Financiero es un segmento donde se educa a la audiencia sobre cómo organizar sus finanzas y administrar sus bienes.Anne B. Carrasco Quintana, Esq.CARRASCO QUINTANA LAW LLC485C US Highway 1 South, Suite 100Iselin, New Jersey 08830Tel: (732) 588-6504Fax: (732) 253-4772anne@carrascoquintana.comMás información contáctanos:MSF Group LLC1.848.482.9337bit.ly/MsfgroupchannelSupport the showhttps://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjJhr_nZXRHvL_GT9JqFWVQhttps://www.instagram.com/msfgroupchannel/

¡Atención pensionados del IMSS! Deposito del mes de julio se hará el día 3 AMLO enviará Reforma Constitucional para que la pensión de personas con discapacidad sea universal

Verificación vehicular para engomado verde concluye el 31 de mayo Tómelo en cuenta siguen cierres de carriles centrales en Calzada Ignacio Zaragoza

Oggi parliamo del conto deposito di Apple che supera il miliardo in pochi giorni, del rapporto FAO sulla fame nel mondo e di New York che vieta fornelli e riscaldamento a gas. ... Qui gli altri podcast di Class Editori: https://linktr.ee/podclasseditori Per iscriverti al canale Telegram: https://t.me/notizieacolazione Musica https://www.bensound.com