Podcasts about Statecraft

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This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit wisdomofcrowds.liveIs tech replacing humanity? Or is it sharpening the question of what it means to be human? What does it mean to live a good life — as opposed to passable life? What features of humanity become more important by contrast and necessity in the technological age? Is it possible to find a higher version of humanity in order to thrive?For this week's episode — a live taping of Wisdom of Crowds — we invited Santi Ruiz to discuss these questions, and more. (Our other guest, Christine Rosen, unfortunately got sick in the last moment and had to cancel. We missed you, Christine!) Santi is Senior Editor of the Institute for Progress and edits Statecraft, a newsletter about public policy. But he is also an essayist and humanist who has written about culture and tech in his personal Substack, Regress Studies, as well as magazines like the American Conservative.Samuel Kimbriel and Damir Marusic interviewed Santi, with Damir taking on a more pessimistic view about the possibility of reconciling tech and the humanities, while Samuel remained open to optimistic scenarios.In our bonus section for paid subscribers, you will be able to listen to the audience Q&A, which includes questions about the End of History, the future of war, the British philosopher Nick Land, the future of coding, good versus bad friction, and an encounter between Good Santi and Evil Santi. Required Reading:* Santi Ruiz, “Technocapital is Eating My Brains” (Regress Studies). * The Statecraft newsletter.Wisdom of Crowds is a platform challenging premises and understanding first principles on politics and culture. Join us!

Join our Patreon community to get access to bonus episodes, discounts on merch and more: https://bit.ly/UnholyPatreonSocial links, shop, YouTube channel and more: https://linktr.ee/unholypod As Israel prepares for the festival of Shavuot, the country holds its breath for news on a hostage deal that could finally bring an end to the war in Gaza. Meanwhile, airstrikes continue, and Benjamin Netanyahu openly weighs the controversial possibility of a solo Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear sites—despite President Trump's evident reluctance. To unpack the chaos and complexity of Trump's Middle East strategy, Israel's options on Iran, and intriguing new revelations about President Biden's health, we're joined by Jake Sullivan, former National Security Advisor under President Biden.Jake Sullivan is an American foreign policy expert who served as National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden, becoming one of the youngest individuals ever to hold the position. Previously, he was a senior policy advisor during the Obama administration, playing a central role in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Currently, Sullivan is the Kissinger Professor of Statecraft and World Order at Harvard Kennedy School, where he continues to influence conversations on diplomacy, international security, and global strategy.

 Santi: Hi, this is a special episode of Statecraft. I've got a wonderful guest host with me today. Kyla Scanlon: Hey, I'm Kyla Scanlon! I'm the author of a book called In This Economy and an economic commentator. Santi: Kyla has joined me today for a couple reasons. One, I'm a big fan of her newsletter: it's about economics, among many other things. She had a great piece recently on what we can learn from C.S. Lewis's The Screwtape Letters, which is a favorite book of mine.Kyla's also on today because we're interviewing Wally Adeyemo, who was the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in the Biden administration. We figured we each had questions we wanted answered.Kyla: Yeah, I've had the opportunity to interview Wally a couple times during the Biden administration, and I wanted to see where he thinks things are at now. He played a key role in implementing the Inflation Reduction Act, financial sanctions on Russia, and a whole bunch of other things.Santi: For my part, I'm stuck on Wally's role in setting up the IRS's Direct File program, where you can file your taxes for free directly through the IRS instead of paying TurboTax a hundred bucks to do it. “Good governance types” tend to love Direct File, but the current admin is thinking of killing it. I wanted to understand how the program got rolled out, how Wally would respond to criticisms of the program, and what he learned from building something in government, which now may disappear.Kyla, you've talked to Wally before. How did that conversation go? Kyla: I actually was able to go to his office in D.C., and I talked to a couple of key people in the Biden administration: Jared Bernstein, the former chair of the CEA, and Daniel Hornung, who was at the National Economic Council.We're talking to Wally on the day that the House passed the one big beautiful bill. There's also so much happening financially, like the bond market is totally rebelling against the US government right now. I'm really curious how he thinks things are, as a key player in the last administration.Santi: Wally, you've spent most of your career in Democratic Party institutions. You worked on the Kerry presidential campaign in 2004. You served in the Obama admin. You were the first chief of staff to the CFPB, the president of the Obama Foundation, and, most recently, Deputy Treasury Secretary in the Biden admin.30,000ft question: How do you see the Democratic Party today?My view is that we continue to be the party that cares deeply about working-class people, but we haven't done a good job of communicating that to people, especially when it comes to the things that matter most to them. From my standpoint, it's costs: things in America cost too much for a working-class family.I want to make sure I define working class: I think about people who make under $100,000 a year, many of whom don't own homes on the coast or don't own a significant amount of stocks (which means they haven't seen the asset appreciation that's led to a great deal of wealth creation over the last several decades). When you define it that way, 81% of Americans sit in that category of people. Despite the fact that they've seen their median incomes rise 5-10% over the last five years, they've seen the cost of the things they care about rise even faster.We haven't had a clear-cut agenda focused on the standard of living, which I think is the thing that matters most to Americans today.Santi: There are folks who would say the problem for Democrats wasn't that they couldn't communicate clearly, or that they didn't have a governing agenda, but that they couldn't execute their agenda the way they hoped to in the time available to them. Would you say there's truth to that claim?Most people talk about a communications issue, but I don't think it's a communications issue. There are two issues. One is an implementation issue, and the second is an issue of the actual substance and policy at the Treasury Department. I was the deputy secretary, but I was also the Chief Operating Officer, which meant that I was in charge of execution. The two most significant domestic things I had to execute were the American Rescue Plan, where $1.9 trillion flowed through the Treasury Department, and the Inflation Reduction Act. The challenge with execution in the government is that we don't spend a lot on our systems, on making execution as easy as possible.For example, the Advanced Child Tax Credit was intended to give people money to help with each of their children during the pandemic. What Congress called on us to do was to pay people on a monthly basis. In the IRS system, you pay your taxes mostly on an annual basis, which meant that most of our systems weren't set up to pay a monthly check to Americans. It took us a great deal of work to figure out a way to recreate a system just to do that.We've underinvested in the systems that the IRS works on. The last time we made a significant investment in the IRS's digital infrastructure was the 1960s; before we had an ATM machine, before we sent a man to the moon, before we had a personal computer. So that meant that everything was coded in a language called COBOL.So execution was quite hard in the American Rescue Plan. People were left out and felt that the government wasn't working for them. If you called the IRS, only 13% of your calls were being answered. We got that back up to 85% before we left. Ultimately, I think part of this is an execution challenge. In government we want to spend money coming up with new policies, but we don't want to pay for execution, which then means that when you get the policy passed, implementation isn't great.When Jen Pahlka was on your show, she talked about the need to focus on identifying the enablers to implementation. Direct File was one of the best examples of us taking implementation very seriously.But also, on some policy issues that mattered most to Americans, we weren't advancing the types of strategies that would've helped lower the cost of housing and lowering the cost of medicine. We did some things there, but there's clearly more that we could have done, and more we need to do going forward to demonstrate that we're fighting to bring down those costs. It's everything from permitting reform — not just at the federal level, but what can we do to incentivize it at the state and local level — to thinking about what we can do on drug costs. Why does it cost so much more to get a medicine in America than in Canada? That is something that we can solve. We've just chosen not to at the federal level.At the end of the year, we were going to take action to go after some of the middlemen in the pharmacy industry who were taking out rents and large amounts of money. It dropped out of the bill because of the negotiations between the Republican Congress and then President-elect Trump. But there are a lot of things that we can do both on implementation, which will mean that Americans feel the programs that we're passing in a more effective way, and policy solutions that we need to advance as a party that will help us as well.Kyla: Some people think Americans tend to vote against their own self-interest. How can your party message to people that these sorts of policies are really important for them?Ultimately, what I found is that most people just understand their self-interest differently, and for them, a big part of this was, “Who's fighting for me on the issues that I care most about?”From my standpoint, part of the problem we had with Direct File, which I think was an innovative solution, was that we got to implementing it so late in the administration that we didn't have the ability for it to show the impact. I'm hoping future administrations will think through how to start their implementation journey on things like Direct File sooner in the administration, when you have a great deal of political capital, so people can actually feel the impact over time.To your question, it's not just about the messaging, it's about the messenger. People tend to trust people who look like them, who come from the places they come from. When it came to the Child Tax Credit and also to Direct File, the biggest innovation wasn't the technology: the technology for Direct File has been used by the Australians, the British, and other countries for decades.The biggest innovation was us joining that technology with trusted people in communities who were going out to talk to people about those programs and building those relationships. That was something that the IRS hadn't done a great deal of. We invested a great deal in those community navigators who were helping us get people to trust the things the government was doing again, like the Child Tax Credit, like Direct File, so that they could use it.We often think that Washington is going to be able to give messages to the country that people are going to hear. But we're both in a more complicated media environment, where people are far more skeptical of things that come from people in Washington. So the best people to advocate for and celebrate the things that we're doing are people who are closer to the communities we're trying to reach. In product advertising today, more companies are looking to influencers to advertise things, rather than putting an ad on television, because people trust the people that they follow. The same is true for the things that we do in government.Santi: I've talked to colleagues of yours in the last administration who say things like, “In the White House, we did not have a good enough sense of the shot clock.” They point to various reasons, including COVID, as a reason the admin didn't do a good enough job of prioritization.Do you think that's true, that across the administration, there was a missing sense of the shot clock or a missing sense of prioritization? No, because I'm a Lakers fan. These are professionals. We're professionals. This is not our first rodeo. We know how much time is on the shot clock; we played this game. The challenge wasn't just COVID. For me at Treasury — and I think this is the coolest part of being Deputy Secretary of the Treasury — I had responsibilities domestic and international. As I'm trying to modernize the IRS, to invest all my time in making the system work better for customers and to collect more taxes from the people who owe money, Russia invades Ukraine. I had to turn a bunch of my attention to thinking about what we were going to do there. Then you have Hamas attacking Israel.There was more we should have done on the domestic end, but we have to remember that part of the presidency is: you get to do the things you want to do, but you also have to do the things you have to do. We had a lot of things we had to do that we weren't planning for which required all-of-the-administration responses.I think the most important lesson I've learned about that is that it comes down to both being focused on the things that matter, and being willing to communicate to the American people why your priorities have to change in light of things that happen in the world.But the people I'm sure you've talked to, most of them work on domestic policy alone, and they probably never have been in a National Security Council meeting, where you're thinking about the risks to the country. The president has to do both of those things. So I get how difficult it is to do that, just given where I sat at the Treasury Department.Santi: Looking back from an implementation perspective, are there things you would've done differently during your time at Treasury?The most important thing that I would've done differently was to immediately set up a permanent implementation and delivery unit in the Treasury Department. We always like to pretend like the Treasury Department is just a policy department where we make policy, we collect taxes. But in any crisis the country ever has, a great deal of responsibility — for execution or implementation of whatever the response is — falls to the Treasury Department. Think about the financial crisis, which is clearly something that's in the Treasury's domain. The vast majority of money for COVID flowed through the Treasury Department. You think about the IRA, a climate bill: the vast majority of that money flows through the Treasury Department.And Treasury doesn't have a dedicated staff that's just focused on implementation: How do we do this well? How do we make sure the right people are served? How do we make sure that we communicate this well? We did this to a degree by a team that was focused on the American Rescue Plan. But it was only focused on the American Rescue Plan. If I could start again, I would have said, “I want a permanent implementation structure within the Treasury Department of people who are cross-cutting, who only think about how we execute the policies that we pass through Congress and that we put together through an executive order. How do we do that extremely well?”Kyla: What you're talking about is very people-centric: How do we get an implementation team, and how do we make sure that the right people are doing the right jobs? Now we have DOGE, which is less people-centric. How do you reconcile what Doge is doing relative to what you would've done differently in this role that you had?As you would suspect, I wasn't excited about the fact we had lost the election, but initially I thought DOGE could be helpful with technology. I think marrying technology with people — that's the key to success for the government. We've never really been great at doing technology in the government.Part of the reason for that is a procurement process that is very slow because of how the federal acquisition rules work. What we are trying to do is prevent corruption and also waste, fraud, and abuse. But what that does is, it leads to slowness in our ability to get the technology on board that we need, and in getting the right people.I was hoping DOGE would bring in people who knew a great deal about technology and put us in a position where we could use that to build better products for the American people. I thought they would love Direct File, and that they would find ways to improve Direct File and expand it to more Americans.My view is that any American in the working class or middle class should not have to pay a company to file their taxes. We have the ability in this country, and I think Direct File was proving that. My goal, if we'd had more time, was to expand this to almost any American being able to use it. I thought they'd be able to accelerate that by bringing in the right people, but also the right technology. We were on that path before they took those two things apart.My sense is that you have to reform the way that we hire people because it's too hard to hire the right people. In some cases, you don't need some of the people you have today because technology is going to require different skills to do different things. It's easier to break something, I found, than it is to build something. I think that's what they're finding today as well.Santi: When I talk to left-of-center folks about the DOGE push, they tend to be skeptical about the idea that AI or modern technology can replace existing federal workers. I think some of that is a natural backlash to the extreme partisan coding of DOGE, and the fact that they're firing a lot of people very quickly. But what's your view? After DOGE, what kinds of roles would you like to see automated?Let me say: I disagree with the view that DOGE and technology can't replace some of the things that federal workers do today. My view is that “productivity enhancing” tech — it's not that it is going to make employees who are currently doing the job more productive. It is going to mean you need fewer employees. We have to be honest about that.Go to the IRS, for example. When I got there, we had a huge paper backlog at the IRS because, despite what most people think, millions of people still file their taxes by paper, and they send them to the IRS. And during the pandemic, the commissioner, who was then working for President Trump, decided to shut down the IRS for public health reasons — to make sure employees did not have to risk getting COVID.There were piles of paper backing up, so much so that they had filled cafeterias at the IRS facilities with huge piles of paper. The problem, of course, is that, unlike modern systems, you could not just machine-read those papers and put them into our systems. Much of that required humans to code those papers into the system by hand. There is no need in the 21st century for that to happen, so one of the things that we started to do was introduce this simple thing called scanning, where you would scan the papers — I know it sounds like a novel idea. That would help you get people's tax returns faster into the system, but also get checks out quickly, and allow us to see if people are underpaying their taxes, because we can use that data with a modern system. But over time, what would that mean? We'd need fewer people to enter the data from those forms.When we get money for the IRS from Congress, it is actually seen as revenue-raising because they expect it to bring down the debt and deficit, which is completely true. But the model Congress uses to do that is reliant on the number of full-time employees we hire. One challenge we have with the IRS — and in government systems in general — is that you don't get credit for technology investments that should improve your return on investment.So whenever we did the ROI calculations for the IRS, the Congressional Budget Office would calculate how much revenue we'd bring in, and it was always based on the number of people you had doing enforcement work that would lead to certain dollars coming in. So we got no credit for the technology investments. Which was absolutely the opposite of what we knew would be true: the more you invested in technology, the more likely you were to bring in more revenue, and you would be able to cut the cost of employees.Santi: If the CBO changed the way it scored technology improvements, would more Congresspeople be interested in funding technology?It is just a CBO issue. It's one we've tried to talk to them about over the last several years, but one where they've been unwilling to move. My view is that unlocking this will unlock greater investment in technology in a place like the IRS, because every dollar you invest in technology — I think — would earn back $10 in additional tax revenue we'd be able to collect from people who are skipping out on their taxes today. It's far more valuable to invest in that technology than to grow the number of employees working in enforcement at the IRS. You need both, but you can't say that a person is worth 5x their salary in revenue and that technology is worth 0. That makes no sense.Kyla: When we spoke about Direct File many months ago, people in my comment section were super excited and saying things like, “I just want the government to tell me how much money I owe.” When you think about the implementation of Direct File, what went right, and how do you think it has evolved?The thing that went right was that we proved that we could build something quite easily, and we built it ourselves, unlike many technology projects in government. We didn't go out and hire a bunch of consultants and contractors to do it. We did it with people at the IRS, but also with people from 18F and from GSA who worked in the government. We did it in partnership with a number of stakeholders outside the government who gave us advice, but the build was done by us.The reason that was important — and the reason it's important to build more things internally rather than hiring consulting firms or other people to build it — is that you then have the intellectual capital from building that, and that can be used to build other things. This was one product, but my view is that I want the IRS home page to one day look a lot more like the screen on your iPhone, so that you can click on the app on the IRS homepage that can help you, depending on what you need — if it's a Direct File, or if it's a tax transcript.By building Direct File internally, we were getting closer to that, and the user scores on the effectiveness of the tool and the ability to use it were through the roof. Even for a private sector company, it would've been seen as a great success. In the first year, we launched late in the filing season, mostly just to test the product, but also to build stakeholder support for it. In the limited release, 140,000 people used it. The average user said that before Direct File, it took them about 13 hours to file their taxes, and with Direct File, it took them just over an hour to file their taxes.But you also have to think about how much money the average American spends filing their taxes: about $200. That's $200 that a family making under $100,000 could invest in their kids, in paying some bills, rather than in filing their taxes.Even this year, with no advertising by the Trump administration of Direct File, we had more than 300,000 people use it. The user scores for the product were above 85%. The challenge, of course, is that instead of DOGE investing in improving the product — which was a place where you could have seen real intellectual capital go to work and make something that works for all Americans — they've decided to discontinue Direct File. [NB: There has been widespread reporting that the administration plans to discontinue Direct File. The GOP tax bill passed by the House would end Direct File if it becomes law. At the time of publication, the Direct File has not been discontinued.]The sad part is that when you think about where we are as a country, this is a tool that could both save people money, save people time, improve our ability to collect taxes, and is something that exists in almost every other developed economy. It makes no sense to me why you would end something like this rather than continue to develop it.Santi: People remember the failure of healthcare.gov, which crashed when it was rolled out all at once to everyone in the country. It was an embarrassing episode for the Obama administration, and political actors in that administration learned they had to pilot things and roll them out in phases.Is there a tension between that instinct — to test things slowly, to roll them out to a select group of users, and then to add users in following cycles — Is there a tension between that and trying to implement quickly, so that people see the benefit of the work you're doing?One of my bosses in the Obama administration was Jeff Zients, the person who was brought in to fix healthcare.gov. He relentlessly focused on execution. He always made the point that it's easy to come up with a strategy to some degree: you can figure out what the policy solution is. But the difference between good and great is how you execute against it. I think there is some tension there, but not as much as you would think.Once we were able to show that the pilot was a success, I got invited to states all over the country, like Maryland, to announce that they were joining Direct File the next year. These members of Congress wanted to do Direct File events telling people in their state, “This product that's worked so well elsewhere is coming to us next.” It gave us the ability to celebrate the success.I learned the lesson not just from Zients, but also from then-professor Elizabeth Warren, whom I worked for as chief of staff at the CFPB. One challenge we had at the CFPB was to build a complaint hotline, at that point mostly phone-operated, for people who were suffering. They said it would take us at least a year to build out all the product functions we need. We decided to take a modular approach and say, “How long would it take for us to build the system for one product? Let's try that and see how that works. We'll do a test.”It was successful, and we were able to use that to tell the story about the CFPB and what it would do, not just for mortgages, but for all these other products. We built user interest in the complaint hotline, in a way that we couldn't have if we'd waited to build the whole thing at once. While I think you're right that there is some tension between getting everyone to feel it right away and piloting; if the pilot is successful, it also gives you the opportunity to go out and sell this thing to people and say, “Here's what people who did the pilot are saying about this product.”I remember someone in Texas who was willing to do a direct-to-camera and talk about the ways that Direct File was so easy for them to use. It gets back to my point on message and messenger. Deputy Secretary Adeyemo telling you about this great thing the government did is one thing. But an American who looks like you, who's a nurse, who's a mom of two kids, telling you that this product actually worked for her: That's something that more people identify with.Healthcare.gov taught us the lesson of piloting and doing things in a modular way. This is what companies have been doing for decades. If it's worked for them, I think it can work for the government too.Santi: I'm a fan of Direct File, personally. I don't want this administration to kill it. But I was looking through some of the criticism that Direct File got: for instance, there's criticism about it rivaling the IRS Free File program, which is another IRS program that partners with nonprofits to help some folks file their taxes for free.Then there's this broader philosophical criticism: “I don't want the feds telling me how much I owe them.” The idea is that the government is incentivized to squeeze every last dollar out of you.I'm curious what you make of that, in part because I spoke recently to an American who worked on building e-government systems for Estonia. One of the things that has allowed Estonia to build cutting-edge digital systems in the government is that Estonia is a small and very high-trust society. Everybody's one degree of separation from everybody else.We're a much bigger and more diverse country. How do you think that affects the federal government's ability to build tools like Direct File?I think it affects it a lot, and it gets back to my point: not just the message but the messenger. I saw this not just with Direct File, but with the Advanced Child Tax Credit, which was intended to help kids who were living in poverty, but also families overall. What we found initially in the data was that, among families that didn't have to file taxes because they made too little, many of them were unwilling to take advantage of Direct File and the Advanced Child Tax Credit because they couldn't believe the government was doing something to just help them. I spent a lot of time with priests, pastors, and other community leaders in many of the communities where people were under-filing to try and get them to talk about this program and why it was something that they should apply for.One of the challenges we suffer from right now in America, overall, is a lack of trust in institutions. You have to really go local and try to rebuild that trust.That also speaks to taking a pilot approach that goes slower in some cases. Some of the criticism we got was, “Why don't you just fill out this form for us and then just send it to us, so that Direct File is just me pressing a button so I can pay my taxes?”Part of the challenge for us in doing that is a technology challenge: we are not there technologically. But the other problem is a trust problem. If I were to just fill out your taxes for you and send them to you, I think people, at this stage, would distrust the government and distrust the technology.Direct File had to be on a journey with people, showing people, “If I put in this information, it accurately sends me back my check.” As people develop more trust, we can also add more features to it that I think people will trust. But the key has to be: how do you earn that trust over time?We can't expect that if we put out a product that looks like something the Estonian government or Australia would put out, that people would trust it at this point. We have to realize that we are on a journey to regain the trust of the American people.The government can and will work for them, and Direct File was a part of that. We started to demonstrate that with that product because the people who used it in these communities became the spokespeople for it in a better way than I ever could be, than the Secretary or the President could be.Everyone knows that they need to pay their taxes because it's part of their responsibility living in this country. The things that make people the most upset is the fact that there are people who don't pay their taxes. We committed that we were going to go after them.The second frustration was: “Why do you make it so hard for me to pay my taxes? Why can't I get through to you on the phone line? Why do I have to pay somebody else to do my taxes?” Our goal was to solve those two problems by investing money and going after the people who just decided they weren't going to pay, but also by making it as easy as possible for you to pay your taxes and for most people, to get that tax refund as quickly as possible.But doing that was about going on a journey with people, about regaining their trust in an institution that mattered to them a great deal because 90 something-percent of the money that funds our government comes in through the IRS.Kyla: You have a piece out in Foreign Affairs called “Make Moscow Pay,” and what I found most interesting about that essay is that you said Europe needs to step it up because the United States won't. Talk through the role of Treasury in financial sanctions, and your reasons for writing this piece.People often think about the Treasury Department as doing a few things. One is working with Wall Street; another one is collecting your taxes. Most people don't think about the fact that the Treasury Department is a major part of the National Security Committee, because we have these tools called financial sections.They use the power of the dollar to try and change the behavior of foreign actors who are taking steps that aren't consistent with our national security interests. A great example of this is what we did with regard to Russia — saying that we're going to cut off Russian banks from the US financial system, which means that you can't transact in US dollars.The problem for any bank that can transact in dollars is that the backbone of most of the financial world is built on the US dollar. It increases their cost, it makes it more difficult for them to transact, and makes it harder for them to be part of the global economy, nearly impossible.And that's what we've done in lots of cases when it comes to Russia. We have financial sanction programs that touch all over the world, from Venezuela to Afghanistan. The US government, since 9/11, has used sanctions as one of its primary tools of impacting foreign policy. Some of them have gone well, some of them I think haven't gone as well, and there's a need for us to think through how we use those policies.Santi: What makes sanctions an effective tool? Positions on sanctions don't line up neatly on partisan lines. Sanctions have a mixed track record, and you'll have Republicans who say sanctions have failed, and you'll have Democrats say sanctions have been an effective tool, and vice versa.The way I think about sanctions is that they are intended to bring change, and the only way that they work is that they're part of an overarching foreign policy strategy. That type of behavior change was what we saw when Iran came to the table and wanted to negotiate a way to reduce sanctions in exchange for limits on their nuclear program. That's the type of behavior change we're trying to accomplish with sanctions, but you can't do it with sanctions alone. You need a foreign policy strategy. We didn't do it by the United States confronting Iran; we got our allies and partners to work together with us. When I came into office in 2021, Secretary Yellen asked me to do a review of our sanctions policies — what's worked, what hasn't — because it had been 20 years since the 9/11 attacks.And the most important lesson I learned was that the sanctions programs that were the most effective were the ones we did on a multilateral basis — so we did it with our friends and allies. Part of the reason for this is that while the dollar is the most dominant currency around the world, oftentimes if you can't do something in dollars, you do it in a euro, or you do it in a Japanese yen, or pound sterling.The benefit of having allies all over the world is that the dominant, convertible currencies in the world are controlled by allies and partners. When we acted together with them, we were more effective in curtailing the economic activity of our adversary, and our pressure is more likely to lead to them changing their behavior.We had to be very cautious about collateral damage. You might be targeting an individual, but by targeting that individual, you might make it harder for a company they're affiliated with to continue doing business, or for a country that they're in to get access to banking services. Let's say that you're a huge bank in America, and you're worried about sanctions risk in a small country where you do little business. Why not pull out, rather than having to put in place a huge compliance program? One of the challenges that we have is that the people who make the decisions about whether to extend sanctions don't necessarily spend a lot of time thinking about some of these economic consequences of the sanctions approach.Whenever I was around the table and we were making a decision about using weapons, there was a process that was very elaborate that ended up with something going to the president. You'd often think about kinetic force very seriously, because you were going to have to get the president to make a decision. We didn't always take that kind of rigor when it came to thinking about using our sanctions policy, but the impact on the lives of people in these countries was just as significant for their access to not only money, but to food and to the resources they needed to live.Santi: What do you make of the effectiveness of the initial sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine? I've heard mixed reviews from folks inside and outside the Biden administration.Sanctions, again, to my point, are only a tool. They've had to be part of a larger strategy, and I think those sanctions were quite effective. I think the saving grace for the Russians has been the fact that China has largely been able and willing to give them access to the things they need to continue to perpetuate.There was a choice for Ukraine, but when you think about Russia's economy today vs. Russia's economy before the sanctions were put in place, it's vastly different. Inflation in Russia still runs far higher than inflation anywhere else in the world. If you were a Russian citizen, you would feel the impacts of sanctions.The challenge, of course, is that it hasn't changed Vladimir Putin's behavior or the behavior of the Kremlin, largely because they've had access to the goods and supplies they need from China, Iran, and North Korea. But over time, it means Russia's economy is becoming less competitive. They have less access to resources; they're going to struggle.I think everyone hoped that sanctions would immediately change the calculus of the Kremlin, but we've never seen that to be the case. When sanctions are effective, they take time, because the economic consequences continue to compound over time, and they have to be part of a larger strategy for the behavior of the individual. That's why I wrote the article, because while the Kremlin and Russia are under pressure, their view is that ultimately the West is going to get tired of supporting Ukraine, financially and politically, because the economic consequences for us — while not as significant as for Moscow or for Kiev — have been quite significant, when you think about the cost of living issues in Europe.I think it's important to write this now, when it appears that Russia is stalling on negotiations, because ultimately, US financial support is waning. We just know that the Trump administration is not willing to put more money into Ukraine, so Europe is going to have to do more, at a time when their economic situation is quite complicated as well.They've got a lot to do to build up their economy and their military-industrial base. Asking them to also increase their support for Ukraine at the same time is going to be quite difficult. So using this money that Russia owes to Ukraine — because they owe them compensation at this moment — can be quite influential in helping support the Ukrainians, but also changing Russia's calculus with regard to the ability of Ukraine to sustain itself.Kyla: On CNBC about a month ago, you said if we ever have a recession over the next couple of months or so, it would be a self-inflicted one. Do you still resonate with that idea? To build on the point I was making, the economy has done quite well over the course of the first few months of the year, largely because of the strength of the consumer, where our balance sheets are still quite strong. Companies in America have done well. The biggest headwind the US economy faces has been self-inflicted by the tariffs the president has put on. Part of what I still do is talk to CEOs of companies, big and small. Small businesses feel the impact of this even more than the big businesses. What they tell me is that it's not just the tariffs and the fact that they are making it more expensive for them to get the goods that they need, but it's the uncertainty created by the off-again, on-again, nature of those tariffs that makes it impossible for them to plan for what supplies they're going to get the next quarter. How are they going to fulfill their orders? What employees are they going to need? It's having a real impact on the performance of these companies, but also their ability to hire people and plan for the future.If you go to the grocery store, you're going to start seeing — and you're starting to see already — price increases. The thing that Americans care most about is, the cost of living is just too high. You're at the grocery store, as you're shopping for your kids for the summer, you're going to see costs go up because of a self-imposed tax we've put in place. So I still do think that if we do find ourselves in a recession, it's going to be because of the tariffs we've put in place.Even if we don't enter a technical recession, what we're seeing now is that those tariffs are going to raise the cost for people when they go out to buy things. It's going to raise the cost of building homes, which is going to make it harder for people to get houses, which is ultimately going to have an impact on the economy that isn't what I think the president or anyone wants at this point.Kyla: Is there anything else we haven't asked about? I think the place where we continue, as a country, to struggle is that, given the federal system we have, many of these problems aren't just in Washington — they're in state and local governments as well. When you think about the challenges to building more housing in this country, you can't just solve it by doing things at the federal level. You have to get state and local governments unified in taking a proactive approach. Part of this has to be not just financial or regulatory from the federal government, but we have to do more things that force state and local governments to get out of the way of people being able to build more housing. I think that the conversations that you've had on your show, and the conversations we're having in government, need to move past our regular policy conversations of: “Should we do more on LIHTC? Should we try to fix NEPA?” Those, to me, are table stakes, and we're in the middle of what I'd say is a generational crisis when it comes to housing. We have to be willing to treat it like a crisis, rather than what I think we've done so far, which is take incremental steps at different levels to try and solve this. That's one thing that I wanted to make sure that I said, because I think it's the most important thing that we can do at the moment.Kyla: Absolutely. During your time there, the Treasury was doing so much with zoning reform, with financial incentives. What I really liked about our last conversation was how much you talked about how important it is that workers can live close to work. Are you optimistic that we will be able to address the problem, or do you think we are sinking into quicksand?I'd say a little bit of both, and the thing that I'm doing now is getting hyperlocal. One of the projects I'm working on in my post-administration life is I'm working with 15 churches in D.C., where they have vacant land and want to use it to build affordable housing as quickly as possible.I'm learning that even when you have the land donated for free and you're willing to work as quickly as possible, it's still quite hard because you have regulations and financial issues that often get in the way of building things. Part of what we have to do now is just launch as many natural experiments as possible to see what works.What I've learned already from this lived experience is that even cities that are trying to get out of the way and make it easier to build housing struggle because of what you all know to be true, which is that the local politics of this is quite complicated. Oftentimes, the way that you get them over the line is by creating incentives or disincentives.In the past, I talked a lot about incentives in terms of “giving people money to do things.” I'm now in favor of “not giving money to people who don't do things” — if you don't take steps to fix your zoning, some of the federal money that you regularly get is not coming to your jurisdiction. I'm going to reallocate that money to places that are doing this activity. I think we have to take those types of radical steps.It's similar to what we did with the Emergency Rental Assistance Program, where if you didn't spend your money, we could take your money back and reallocate it to people who were giving away emergency rental assistance money.That motivates people a lot — when they feel like something's going to be taken away from them. I'm of the view that we have to find more radical things that we can do to get housing built. If we don't, costs will continue to rise faster than people's incomes.Santi: Wally, I have to ask after that point you just made: did you read the paper by my colleague Chris Elmendorf on using LIHTC funds? The idea is to re-allocate those federal funds away from big, expensive cities and into other places in a state, if the cities don't commit to basic zoning reforms.I completely agree with him, and I think I would go even further than just LIHTC money. I would reallocate non-housing money as well, because from my standpoint, if you think about the most important issue for a family, it's being able to find housing that is affordable near their place of work and where their kids go to school. I said that on purpose. I didn't say “affordable housing.” I said “housing that is affordable,” because affordable housing is, in lots of ways, targeted towards a population of people who need it the most. But for even people who are middle income in this country, it crowds out their ability to pay for other things when housing costs continue to creep higher.The only way we solve that problem is if you get rid of restrictive zoning covenants and fix permitting. The natural thing that every city and state is thinking about right now is throwing more money at the problem. There's going to need to be money here, just in light of some of the headwinds, but it's going to be more costly and less effective if we don't fix the underlying issues that are making it hard to build housing where we want it.Right now in California, we're having a huge debate over what we do with infill housing in urban areas. A simple solution — you don't have to do another environmental review if one was already done in this area— is taking months to work through the California legislature, which demonstrates that we're going too slow. California's seeing an exodus of people. I just talked to a CEO who said, “I'm moving my business because the people who work for me can't afford to live in California anymore.” This is the kind of problem that you can solve. State legislatures, Congress, and executives have to get together and take some radical steps to make it easier to build housing.I appreciate what you said about what we were doing at Treasury, but from my standpoint, I wish we had done more earlier to focus on this issue. We had a lot going on, but fundamentally, the most important thing on housing is taking a step to try and build housing today, which is going to have an impact on the economy 10, 20, 30 years from now. We just have to start doing that as soon as possible.Thanks to Emma Hilbert for her transcript and audio edits. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

With Eliot still on the road, Eric welcomes Dennis Ross, Counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and former Director of Policy Planning under James Baker, Special Middle East Envoy under President Clinton among several other high level national security positions at State, Defense and the White House under Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Obama. Dennis is also a prolific author including his memoir of Middle East diplomacy, The Missing Peace, Doomed to Succeed - a history of U.S.-Israel relations, and most recently Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2025). They discuss why Dennis chose to update his 2005 book on Statecraft, his choice of case studies including German Reunification, the First Gulf War, Bosnia, the Iraq War and the Syria policy debacle under President Obama. He describes the contending schools of thought about America's role in the world, including America First, Restrainers, Realists, and Liberal Internationalists and their differences over the use of force, alliances, as well as the role of interests and values in American foreign policy. He outlines the habits of good statecraft, including proper assessments, use of leverage and coercion, Presidential leadership and empowering lower level officials while avoiding groupthink. Along the way they discuss Afghanistan, Libya, the war in Ukraine and Dennis's assessment of President Trump's trip to the Middle East and his policy approach to the war in Ukraine and changing Vladimir Putin's calculus about war termination. Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World: https://a.co/d/j8C7WcH Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day

In a multipolar world where America wields less relative power, the United States can no longer get away with poor statecraft. To understand how the US can approach future national security challenges, I spoke with Dennis Ross, a senior US diplomat and the counselor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World (Oxford University Press, 2025) offers a revised toolkit for US foreign policy and global leadership. The United States may still be the world's strongest country, but it now faces real challenges at both a global and regional level. The unipolar world which was dominated by America after the Cold War is gone. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is both a military and economic competitor and it is actively challenging the norms and institutions that the US used to shape an international order during and after the Cold War. Directly and indirectly, it has partners trying to undo the American-dominated order, with Russia seeking to extinguish Ukraine, and Iran trying to undermine American presence, influence, and any set of rules for the Middle East that it does not dominate. The failures of American policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened the domestic consensus for a US leadership role internationally. Traditions in US foreign policy, especially the American sense of exceptionalism, have at different points justified both withdrawal and international activism. Iraq and Afghanistan fed the instinct to withdraw and to end the “forever wars.” But the folly of these US interventions did not necessarily mean that all use of force to back diplomacy or specific political ends was wrong; rather it meant in these cases, the Bush Administration failed in the most basic task of good statecraft: namely, marrying objectives and means. Nothing more clearly defines effective statecraft than identifying well-considered goals and then knowing how to use all the tools of statecraft—diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence, information, cyber, scientific, education—to achieve them. But all too often American presidents have adopted goals that were poorly defined and not thought through. In Statecraft 2.0, Dennis Ross explains why failing to marry objectives and means has happened so often in American foreign policy. He uses historical examples to illustrate the factors that account for this, including political pressures, weak understanding of the countries where the US has intervened, changing objectives before achieving those that have been established, relying too much on ourselves and too little on allies and partners. To be fair, there have not only been failures, there have been successes as well. Ross uses case studies to look more closely at the circumstances in which Administrations have succeeded and failed in marrying objectives and means. He distills the lessons from good cases of statecraft—German unification in NATO, the first Gulf War, the surge in Iraq 2007-8—and bad cases of statecraft—going to war in Iraq 2003, and the Obama policy toward Syria. Based on those lessons, he develops a framework for applying today a statecraft approach to our policy toward China, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book concludes with how a smart statecraft approach would shape policy toward the new national security challenges of climate, pandemics, and cyber. Dr. Andrew O. Pace is a historian of the US in the world who specializes in the moral fog of war.

In this unique return visit to Secrets of Statecraft, New York Times columnist Bret Stephens discusses why defending Ukraine is in America's interest, and reflects on the perils of Western flirtation with authoritarian figures. Recorded on May 16, 2025.

On this week's episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Ambassador Dennis Ross, lead Middle East peace process negotiator in the H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations and current counselor and William Davidson distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to unpack President Trump's trip to the Middle East. They provide a high-level overview of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration and discuss the U.S.-Israel and Trump-Netanyahu relationships, the present and future of the Gaza war, prospects for a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Dennis' new book, Statecraft 2.0: What America Needs to Lead in a Multipolar World.Support the showFollow us on Instagram, Twitter/X, and Bluesky, and subscribe to our email list here.

"I could be a stupid person and say, 'Oh no, we don't want a free plane.' We give free things out—we'll take one, too. And it helps us out. I would never be one to turn down that kind of offer. I mean, I could be a stupid person and say, 'No, we don't want a free, very expensive airplane.'" President Donald Trump announced he'll use a $400 million luxury jet from Qatar as his new Air Force One and plans to give it to his personal foundation when he leaves office. Critics say it's the latest sign he's blurring the lines between governing and self-dealing. Shortly after that remark in Riyadh, Trump lifted U.S. sanctions on Syria, now that Bashar al-Assad is gone. He urged Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and called on Iran to sit down with the U.S. over its nuclear program. This marks Trump's first major overseas trip of his second term, aimed at locking in trade deals after his tariff blitz. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Jim and Harvey reflect on Mother's Day as the US continues to be complicit in the killing of Mothers in Gaza, oh, the hypocrisy. Then we turn to Trump's talks with Yemen, Iran, and Hamas. Could Trump actually be putting American interests in front of Israel? Not time for optimism yet! We use clips from The Electronic Intifada and their crew, as well as from the Statecraft program of the Global India Today news channel with Trita Parsi.

Andrew Shapiro talks with former US Ambassador Dennis Ross, who argues that the country's foreign policy needs a reboot. Amb. Ross explains the principles of "Statecraft 2.0" – why the US must adapt its leadership for a challenging multipolar world, navigating the global influence and interests of China and Russia. 

A discussion of ongoing negotiations with Iran began this episode with the former leading Middle East negotiator and author of Statecraft 2.0 Ambassador Dennis Ross, and proceeded to dialogue about Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel and the shift in regional balances of power in the Middle East. Michael Krasny brought up President Trump and statecraft as well as Trump's tariff strategy, the way he views U.S. allies and his overall mendacity. Ambassador Ross spoke of leverage diminishing without geopolitical successes and the reality of our presently no longer being in a unipolar world.This rich and highly engaging conversation went on to include discussion of deterrence and compromise and working with China and leverage Trump has with Putin if he would use it, as well as the difficulties policy makers face in making objectives clear – Lyndon Johnson on Vietnam, Joe Biden on Iraq and Barack Obama on Syria serving as the Ambassador's examples. Former White House Chief of Staff James Baker and current Secretary of State Marco Rubio were discussed along with the tools of statecraft, including the role of kindness and empathy, the importance of focusing on issues and the role of social media. Krasny and Ross went on to talk about Yasser Arafat, which led the Ambassador to highlight what he could have done better with the PLO leader, and to reflect on the Camp David talks and what he wished he had done. This richly expansive dialogue concluded with reflections from Ambassador Ross on present day Saudi Arabia under MBS and what both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must do to move forward toward peace.In anticipation of Mother's Day, this episode added, following the Krasny-Ross conversation, an interview with Eva Hausman, co-founder of the Mother's Day Movement, which gives assistance to mothers around the world.

In this episode, Patrick McKenzie (@patio11) is joined by Daniel Golliher, founder of Maximum New York, to discuss the opaque mechanics of political power and how everyday people can effectively engage with government systems. They explore the stark gap between formal political science degrees and how politics actually works, practical tactics for influencing policy (like optimizing the printability of a blog post to placing well-timed calls to legislators), and Daniel's concept of ‘blue tape'. Throughout the conversation, they emphasize that participating in governance requires far less expertise and connections than most people assume—mainly just the willingness to show up prepared. –Full transcript available here: www.complexsystemspodcast.com/understanding-and-wielding-power-in-local-government-with-daniel-golliher/–Sponsor:  VantaVanta automates security compliance and builds trust, helping companies streamline ISO, SOC 2, and AI framework certifications. Learn more at https://vanta.com/complex–Recommended in this episode:Daniel Golliher's essay: Political Science Degrees Must End: https://www.maximumnewyork.com/p/political-science-degrees Patrick McKenzie: https://worksinprogress.co/issue/the-story-of-vaccinateca/ Statecraft by Santi Ruiz: https://www.statecraft.pub/ –Timestamps(00:00) Intro(00:33) The reality of political science education(02:45) The apprenticeship model in government(04:24) Challenges in government training(07:06) The role of legislative aides(10:33) Local government and housing policies(14:24) Effective political engagement(16:15) The power of communication in policy(20:26) Sponsor: Vanta(21:44) Witnessing government in action(31:29) Learning government and politics(32:21) LLMs and policy(35:10) Engaging with local politics(37:58) Influencing policy(43:25) Running for office(47:10) Blue tape(58:39) Wrap

Glen Grant worked as a defence and reform expert in Ukraine working for the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. He is also a Senior Fellow in the UK Institute for Statecraft on Building Integrity Initiative countering Russian influence. Glen graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Junior Staff Course Warminster and the Joint Staff Defence College at the Royal Naval College Greenwich. ----------LINKS:https://x.com/GlenGranthttps://balticsecurity.eu/https://www.linkedin.com/in/glengrant/https://jamestown.org/analyst/glen-grant/ARTICLES & INTERVIEWS:https://www.kyivpost.com/podcasts/31754https://defence-blog.com/ukraines-defense-gaps-threaten-war-effort-says-expert/https://glenhoward.substack.com/p/episode-16-ukraine-at-war-military https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/03/20/2023-is-a-time-and-chance-for-military-change-in-ukraine-glen-grant/https://kyivindependent.com/author/glen-grant-15959/----------SUPPORT THE CHANNEL:https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtainhttps://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain----------TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND:Save Ukrainehttps://www.saveukraineua.org/Superhumans - Hospital for war traumashttps://superhumans.com/en/UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukrainehttps://unbroken.org.ua/Come Back Alivehttps://savelife.in.ua/en/Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchenhttps://wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraineUNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyyhttps://u24.gov.ua/Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundationhttps://prytulafoundation.orgNGO “Herojam Slava”https://heroiamslava.org/kharpp - Reconstruction project supporting communities in Kharkiv and Przemyślhttps://kharpp.com/NOR DOG Animal Rescuehttps://www.nor-dog.org/home/----------PLATFORMS:Twitter: https://twitter.com/CurtainSiliconInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/siliconcurtain/Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4thRZj6NO7y93zG11JMtqmLinkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/finkjonathan/Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain----------Welcome to the Silicon Curtain podcast. Please like and subscribe if you like the content we produce. It will really help to increase the popularity of our content in YouTube's algorithm. Our material is now being made available on popular podcasting platforms as well, such as Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

The current economic “moment” is seeing a generational re-ordering of global trade, alliances, and capital. The Trump Administration is unleashing an unprecedented and muscular use of economic power, with tariffs on historical allies and adversaries alike, ramped up sanctions on Iran and Venezuela, new investment incentives and reviews, and willingness to endure economic pain to remake the global order. The framework and objectives for this new use of economic power, however, continue to evolve.What tools are available for advancing America's strategic interests and what doctrinal guardrails should govern their use? How can the U.S. and partners limit emerging geoeconomic risks? What new models of economic integration, trade, investment, and development should we be pursuing? Which pathways are available to counteract adversarial challenges, and what strategic alignments are required among allies to sustain U.S. and global prosperity? As questions abound, the United States and its partners face choices about how to safeguard domestic interests while fostering global economic resilience and security.To examine these questions and more, FDD hosts an on-the-record expert panel including Brian Hook, vice chairman of Cerberus Global Investments; and Elaine Dezenski, senior director and head of FDD's Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP). Juan C. Zarate, chairman and co-founder of FDD's CEFP, will moderate the discussion.For more, check out: https://www.fdd.org/events/2025/04/21/the-trajectory-of-us-economic-statecraft/

Is Australia doing enough to make intelligence useful for policymakers, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers? How can Australia build an intelligence workforce with a diverse range of skills, interests and backgrounds, and reflective of our society? How should Australia balance its intelligence independence with alliance integration? In this episode Chris Taylor and Miah Hammond-Errey join Rory Medcalf to delve into the 2024 Independent Intelligence Review, discussing the role of intelligence in an uncertain world, the relationship between intelligence and policy, and the impact of technology on intelligence. Chris Taylor is Head of the Statecraft & Intelligence Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Dr Miah Hammond-Errey is the founding CEO of Strat Futures Pty Limited and host of the Technology & Security podcast. Professor Rory Medcalf AM is Head of the ANU National Security College. His professional experience spans more than three decades across diplomacy, intelligence analysis, think tanks, journalism and academia. TRANSCRIPT Show notes NSC academic programs – find out more. Technology & Security podcast 2024 Independent Intelligence Review Adapting Australian intelligence to the information age We'd love to hear from you! Send in your questions, comments, and suggestions to NatSecPod@anu.edu.au.You can contact us on X (formerly Twitter) @NSC_ANU and Bluesky @nscanu.bsky.social, and be sure to subscribe so you don't miss out on future episodes. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Interview starts at 31:35 Stasia and Shilo join us for a great chat about the state of Science, Consciousness, Celestial Mechanics, their podcast and much more.   We chat about coming from the Ivory Tower, cold fusion, Simon Shack's theory on our solar system, the hard problem of consciousness, science and statecraft, sacred numbers, The Ethical Skeptic, Cataclysms, the Stronglink Problem, the paradigm drift, Atlas Shrugged, the theory of nature, male reproduction bottlenecks and more.   DemystifySci is Dr. Anastasia Bendebury and Dr. Michael Shilo DeLay. Together they untangle complex theories of nature, making analysis accessible through conversations with exceptional thinkers. Each week they interview a new theorist about the ideas that are going to rewrite our understanding of the world. Power them via Patreon: @demystifysci https://www.youtube.com/@DemystifySci_Podcast   Become a Lord or Lady with 1k donations over time. And a Noble with any donation. Leave Serfdom behind and help Grimerica stick to 0 ads and sponsors and fully listener supported. Thanks for listening!! Help support the show, because we can't do it without ya.   Support the show directly: https://grimericacbd.com/ CBD / THC Gummies and Tinctures http://www.grimerica.ca/support https://www.patreon.com/grimerica http://www.grimericaoutlawed.ca/support www.Rokfin.com/Grimerica   https://www.eventbrite.com/e/experience-the-ultimate-hunting-adventure-in-alberta-canada-tickets-1077654175649?aff=ebdsshcopyurl&utm-campaign=social&utm-content=attendeeshare&utm-medium=discovery&utm-term=organizer-profile&utm-share-source=organizer-profile   The Eh- List site. Canadian Propaganda Deconstruction https://eh-list.ca/ The Eh-List YouTube Channel: https://youtube.com/@theeh-list?si=d_ThkEYAK6UG_hGX Adultbrain Audiobook YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@adultbrainaudiobookpublishing https://grimericaoutlawed.ca/The newer controversial Grimerica Outlawed Grimerica Show Check out our next trip/conference/meetup - Contact at the Cabin www.contactatthecabin.com Our audio book website: www.adultbrain.ca www.grimerica.ca/shrooms and Micro Dosing Darren's book www.acanadianshame.ca Grimerica on Rumble: https://rumble.com/c/c-2312992 Join the chat / hangout with a bunch of fellow Grimericans Https://t.me.grimerica https://www.guilded.gg/i/EvxJ44rk   Leave a review on iTunes and/or Stitcher: https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/grimerica-outlawed http://www.stitcher.com/podcast/grimerica-outlawed Sign up for our newsletter https://grimerica.substack.com/ SPAM Graham = and send him your synchronicities, feedback, strange experiences and psychedelic trip reports!! graham@grimerica.com InstaGRAM https://www.instagram.com/the_grimerica_show_podcast/ Tweet Darren https://twitter.com/Grimerica Can't. Darren is still deleted. Purchase swag, with partial proceeds donated to the show: www.grimerica.ca/swag Send us a postcard or letter http://www.grimerica.ca/contact/ Episode ART - Napolean Duheme's site http://www.lostbreadcomic.com/ MUSIC https://brokeforfree.bandcamp.com/ - Something Wobbly Felix's Site sirfelix.bandcamp.com - Space Cadet

Paul Blustein is a former Washington Post and Wall Street Journal journalist who has authored several acclaimed books on global economic institutions. In Paul's first appearance on the show, he discusses the historical rise of the dollar, it's present-day power, how it compares to other global currencies, current challenges to its power, the rise of crypto, and much more. Check out the transcript for this week's episode, now with links. Recorded on March 26th, 2025 Subscribe to David's Substack: Macroeconomic Policy Nexus Follow David Beckworth on X: @DavidBeckworth Follow Paul Blustein on X: @PaulBlustein Follow the show on X: @Macro_Musings Check out our new AI chatbot: the Macro Musebot! Join the new Macro Musings Discord server! Join the Macro Musings mailing list! Check out our Macro Musings merch! Subscribe to David's new BTS YouTube Channel  Timestamps: (00:00:00) – Intro (00:00:52) – Paul's Books (00:05:08) – Motivations for King Dollar (00:09:02) – History of the Dollar (00:12:57) – Nixon Shock of 1971 (00:23:36) – Paul Volcker (00:33:14) – Dollar Dominance and Statecraft (00:40:46) – What About the Euro? (00:44:42) – Cryptocurrency as a Rival to the Dollar (00:47:54) – Drawbacks of Dollar Dominance (00:57:03) – Outro  

For our sixth episode of "History and our Current World," Jeremi Suri joins Kelly to discuss how policymakers can effectively use historical analogies without falling into the trap of oversimplification. They discuss how examining multiple historical cases rather than relying on a single analogy like Munich or Vietnam can result in better policy outcomes. Jeremi holds the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin, and is a Professor in UT Austin's Department of History and the LBJ School of Public Affairs. He is the author and editor of eleven books on contemporary politics and foreign policy, most recently Civil War By Other Means: America's Long and Unfinished Fight for Democracy. His other books include The Impossible Presidency: The Rise and Fall of America's Highest Office; Henry Kissinger and the American Century; Liberty's Surest Guardian: American Nation-Building from the Founders to Obama; and The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft, edited with Hal Brands. Link to Civil War By Other Means: https://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Other-Means-Unfinished/dp/1541758544  The opinions expressed in this conversation are strictly those of the participants and do not represent the views of Georgetown University or any government entity. Produced by Theo Malhotra and Freddie Mallinson.  Recorded on April 7, 2025. Diplomatic Immunity, a podcast from the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, brings you frank and candid conversations with experts on the issues facing diplomats and national security decision-makers around the world. Funding support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. For more, visit our website, and follow us on Linkedin, Twitter @GUDiplomacy, and Instagram @isd.georgetown

Today's guest is Narayan Subramanian. Under the Biden administration, he was a legal advisor, and then an advisor to the Secretary at the Department of Energy (DOE). Later, he was the Director for Energy Transition at the White House National Security Council.We've talked to previous guests about how to ensure government money flows fast and effectively. At the DOE, Subramanian helped ensure that a big influx of money could best be used to support innovative energy projects. If you've followed Statecraft a while, you know we're very interested in how to actually deploy taxpayer dollars most effectively. Narayan played a key role in making sure that DOE could do just that.We Discuss:* How the DOE took its modern form* Why don't tools for funding R&D work for funding deployment?* Does the federal interest in IP stop banks from supporting new tech?* What kinds of technologies can you support with “other transactions authority”?The full transcript is available at www.statecraft.pub. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub

Trump runs circles around his enemies as he levels tariffs on all countries and isolates China. A 90 day pause for the good actors and an increase to 125% for China. Now China wants a seat at the table. Trump press secretary doesn't engage with reports who use pronouns in their email signature lines and Attorney General Ken Paxton is running against John Cornyn for his Texas Senate Seat. 

What does a second Trump term mean for the Middle East and America's global role? Ambassador Dennis Ross, a veteran diplomat and Middle East expert, joins journalist Larry Mantle for a timely and wide-ranging conversation on U.S. foreign policy in 2025. From Israel and Iran to shifting alliances in the region, Ross offers insight into how statecraft may evolve under Donald Trump—and what's at stake for America abroad.

Mitch Daniels is the former Director of the Office of Management and Budget under Ronald Reagan, the former Governor of Indiana, and the former President of Purdue University. He discusses his life, his influences, and his passion for hogs (of the Harley-Davidson variety). Recorded on March 21, 2025.

Keir Starmer's strategy is to react calmly if Donald Trump imposes tariffs on British goods. Is it best way to handle the US president, and will it help his political opponents?Hugo Rifkind unpacks the politics of the day with Patrick Maguire and Jane Mulkerrins. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The so-called Department of Government Efficiency is great branding. Who could be against a more efficient government? But “efficiency” obfuscates what's really happening here.Efficiency to what end? Elon Musk, President Trump and DOGE's boosters have offered various objectives — cutting the deficit, eliminating fraud and abuse, creating a leaner and more responsive government. But DOGE's actions in the past two months don't seem to align with any of those goals.Santi Ruiz is a senior editor at the Institute for Progress and the author and host of the “Statecraft” podcast and newsletter. He's to my right politically and had higher hopes, at first, about DOGE's efforts, but he's now grappling with the reality of what it's actually doing.This episode contains strong language.Mentioned:“50 Thoughts on DOGE” by Santí Ruiz“How to Defend Presidential Authority” by Santí Ruiz“The Anti-D.E.I. Crusader Who Wants to Dismantle the Department of Education” by Ross DouthatBook Recommendations:Stalin's War by Sean McMeekinBack from the Brink by Peter MoskosPower And Responsibility by Romano GuardiniThoughts? Guest suggestions? Email us at ezrakleinshow@nytimes.com.You can find transcripts (posted midday) and more episodes of “The Ezra Klein Show” at nytimes.com/ezra-klein-podcast. Book recommendations from all our guests are listed at https://www.nytimes.com/article/ezra-klein-show-book-recs.This episode of “The Ezra Klein Show” was produced by Rollin Hu. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris with Mary Marge Locker and Kate Sinclair. Mixing by Isaac Jones, with Efim Shapiro and Aman Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Elias Isquith, Kristin Lin and Jack McCordick. Original music by Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Kristina Samulewski and Shannon Busta. The executive producer of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser. Special thanks to Switch and Board Podcast Studio, Ryan Bourne, Rohan Grey, Don Moynihan, Quinn Slobodian and Jennifer Pahlka. Unlock full access to New York Times podcasts and explore everything from politics to pop culture. Subscribe today at nytimes.com/podcasts or on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

The former head of the British Army, Richard Dannatt, discusses an important war that is often forgotten. Recorded on February 6, 2025.

Walter Russell Mead, Alexander Hamilton Professor of Strategy and Statecraft at the University of Florida's Hamilton Center and columnist for The Wall Street Journal, joins the show to talk about the role of economic issues in Trump's strategic views. ▪️ Times      •      01:34 Introduction     •      04:09 Mercantilism & physiocracy      •      08:50 Silicon Valley      •      14:01 Coalitions       •      16:26 How things worked        •      22:52 Post-war policy & China      •      33:17 Tariffs         •      42:50 Executive overreach      •      45:53 The dollar  Follow along on Instagram, X @schoolofwarpod, and YouTube @SchoolofWarPodcast Find a transcript of today's episode on our School of War Substack

After Trump's National Security advisor, Mike Waltz, included Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg to a chat group discussing the classified, imminent bombing of Houthi rebels in Yemen, we had Matt Hefler on to talk about how contents of that chat would land with US allies.Within the chat, senior members of the Trump administration speculated on asking allies for remuneration for security actions taken by US military assets.Matt Hefler's research focuses on the role of intelligence, subversion, and the activities of secret services within international diplomacy.He's currently an Ax:son Johnson Postdoctoral Fellow in the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication at the Stockholm school of Economics..

Curtailing strife and safeguarding America's global standing requires military strength, diplomatic reach, a gravitational pull to the concepts of liberty and opportunity, and a strategy for economic growth beyond America's shores. Andrew Grotto, a Hoover visiting fellow and veteran of two past White House national security teams, discusses the white paper he co-authored with Hoover's H.R. McMaster on the need for a more structured and coordinated approach to US foreign policy, as well as how “economic statecraft” applies to settling the current wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and how to win America's “great power competition” with China (which includes a global economic component missing from the last century's Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union).  Recorded on March 18, 2025. 

About the Lecture: This lecture is part of the Student Speaker Series Through engagements like the Digital Silk Road and various state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has succeeded in creating an immense global network for data collection and stores of the world's data. This capability is unnerving, but a more serious threat emerges coupled with CCP's intentions to dominate on the world stage. Direct risk to the US varies depending on how the CCP will learn to process and use this data—whether for economic or coercive advantage. We can assume they would seek both, but the US knows little about what or how much data has been collected or the advancement of Chinese data learning technologies. Using the international financial system as inspiration, a model for monitoring, limiting, and reporting on global data collection and trading emerges that could provide the transparency needed to prevent China from conquering the datasphere. About the Speaker: Laren Reesman came to IWP with a B.A. in Intelligence Studies and double minors in French and Anti-Money Laundering from Mercyhurst University in Erie, Pennsylvania. She has always been interested in public service, foreign affairs, and policy. Laren completed her Master of Arts in Statecraft and National Security specializing in Defense at IWP summer of 2024. She has focused on China as a US adversary and hopes to help strengthen the US against Chinese threats. Laren honed her research skills through her time at IWP and is excited to share a relevant and emerging topic with her peers. Registration is available at the door if seating permits. **Learn more about IWP graduate programs: https://www.iwp.edu/academic-programs/ ***Make a gift to IWP: https://interland3.donorperfect.net/weblink/WebLink.aspx?name=E231090&id=3

Independent journalists Kit Klarenberg and Tim Norman have conducted significant investigations into the alleged 2018 assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer turned British spy, and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England. The episode also covers the related death of Dawn Sturgess in nearby Amesbury, which was recently the subject of a UK inquiry. Skripal, who betrayed Russia for MI6 in the 1990s, was settled in Salisbury after a spy swap in 2010. On March 4, 2018, he and Yulia were found unconscious on a bench, allegedly poisoned by the nerve agent "novichok," which the British government attributed to Russian operatives. The official narrative claims this poison was smeared on Skripal's door, though inconsistencies—such as the delayed onset of symptoms, the survival of the Skripals, and lack of definitive evidence linking the agent to Russia—raise doubts about the UK government's story.Months later, Englishwoman Dawn Sturgess died after reportedly spraying herself with "novichok" from a sealed perfume bottle found by her boyfriend, Charlie Rowley, prompting further accusations against Russia. However, the apparently sealed bottle and the inability of scientists to confirm the nerve agent's origin undermined the government's claims. The British narrative was shaky and possibly propped up by intelligence-linked entities like Bellingcat and the Institute for Statecraft's Integrity Initiative, which may have pushed disinformation. The recently concluded Sturgess Inquiry, designed to control the narrative, inadvertently exposed its weaknesses.To find out more about the people and music featured in today's episode, visit the Assassinations Podcast website, www.AssassinationsPodcast.com You can find Tim's work on the Propaganda in Focus website (https://propagandainfocus.com/author/h7_2q94aatnh5/) and UK Column (https://www.ukcolumn.org/writer/tim-norman), as well as on X.com @timtron2020Kit writes for The Grayzone website (https://thegrayzone.com/author/kit-klarenberg/), including on the Skripal/Sturgess case: https://thegrayzone.com/2025/01/13/british-inquiry-skripal-poisoning/. He's also on X.com @KitKlarenbergYou can also contact the show through our website — we love to hear your comments, questions, corrections, and suggestions!And you can find us on X @AssassinsPodAssassinations Podcast was created by Niall Cooper, who researches and writes the show. Lindsey Morse is our editor and producer. Our theme music was created by Graeme Ronald. If you'd like to hear more from Graeme, check out his band, Remember Remember. You'll find them on iTunes.

John jakE Klyczek, the Taoist Professor joins us for a chat about his article in Unlimited Hangout - TrumpED 2025.   We chat about modern schools, how far back the problem goes - even to French Colleges in the 1800's, liberal arts, values clarification, big tech, Hegelianism, the overton window, tech bros and beltway Libertarians, social media, Ed Tech, AGI vs human brains, personalized vs individualized, gifted programs, and the God helmet.   In the second half we get deeper into the Dept of Education, Trump ED, how it is not really going away but potentially growing 4 other agencies. ESG, Social Governance, what is Theil's courseware like, Palantir and the Theilverse, Federal ESA's, and potential solutions- creating parallel structures, and local activism. Can there be grants for families with not strings attached? We do a thought experiment about ushering in NWO, Quincy statecraft, Project 2025, Soros and Koch, and Lockstep the real war.   John Klyczek has an MA in English and has taught college rhetoric and research argumentation for over a decade. His literary scholarship concentrates on the history of global eugenics and Aldous Huxley's dystopic novel, Brave New World. He is the author of School World Order: The Technocratic Globalization of Corporatized Education (TrineDay Books); and he is a contributor to several publications, including New Politics, OpEdNews, and the Activist Post. Klyczek holds a black belt in classical tae kwon do, and he is a certified kickboxing instructor under the international Muay Thai Boxing Association. His website is https://schoolworldorder.info   https://unlimitedhangout.com/2025/02/investigative-reports/trumped-2025-school-choice-corporatization-social-impact-finance-and-the-dismantling-of-the-department-of-education/   To gain access to the second half of show and our Plus feed for audio and podcast please clink the link http://www.grimericaoutlawed.ca/support.   For second half of video (when applicable and audio) go to our Substack and Subscribe. https://grimericaoutlawed.substack.com/ or to our Locals  https://grimericaoutlawed.locals.com/ or Rokfin www.Rokfin.com/Grimerica Patreon https://www.patreon.com/grimericaoutlawed   Support the show directly: https://grimericacbd.com/ CBD / THC Tinctures and Gummies https://grimerica.ca/support-2/ Outlawed Canadians YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@OutlawedCanadians Our Adultbrain Audiobook Podcast and Website: www.adultbrain.ca Our Audiobook Youtube Channel:  https://www.youtube.com/@adultbrainaudiobookpublishing/videos Darren's book www.acanadianshame.ca Check out our next trip/conference/meetup - Contact at the Cabin www.contactatthecabin.com Other affiliated shows: www.grimerica.ca The OG Grimerica Show www.Rokfin.com/Grimerica Our channel on free speech Rokfin Join the chat / hangout with a bunch of fellow Grimericans  Https://t.me.grimerica https://www.guilded.gg/chat/b7af7266-771d-427f-978c-872a7962a6c2?messageId=c1e1c7cd-c6e9-4eaf-abc9-e6ec0be89ff3   Leave a review on iTunes and/or Stitcher: https://itunes.apple.com/ca/podcast/grimerica-outlawed http://www.stitcher.com/podcast/grimerica-outlawed Sign up for our newsletter http://www.grimerica.ca/news SPAM Graham = and send him your synchronicities, feedback, strange experiences and psychedelic trip reports!! graham@grimerica.com InstaGRAM https://www.instagram.com/the_grimerica_show_podcast/  Purchase swag, with partial proceeds donated to the show www.grimerica.ca/swag Send us a postcard or letter http://www.grimerica.ca/contact/ ART - Napolean Duheme's site http://www.lostbreadcomic.com/  MUSIC Tru Northperception, Felix's Site sirfelix.bandcamp.com    If you would rather watch: https://rumble.com/v6qehvo-john-jake-klyczek-taoist-prof.-school-choice-corp-and-social-impact-financi.html https://grimericaoutlawed.locals.com/post/6740794/john-jake-klyczek-taoist-prof-school-choice-corp-and-social-impact-financing https://rokfin.com/stream/58293 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJzM3zHPCYM

This week on the news roundup: the Copernicus Climate Change Service reports that global sea ice fell to the lowest level ever recorded in February (1:18); Alawites in northwestern Syria have been massacred over several days (3:19) while the government and SDF cut a deal (6:49); Israel intensifies its blockade of Gaza (9:38) as the US proposes a new compromise for the Strip (10:55); Armenia and Azerbaijan look to be on the cusp of a peace agreement (14:31); the Philippines arrests former president Rodrigo Duterte on an ICC warrant (16:30); Trump and China's Xi Jinping might hold a summit in June (19:23); the crisis in South Sudan continues to worsen (21:03); the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and M23 armed group look to hold peace talks (23:31); in Russia-Ukraine, the US and Ukraine produce a ceasefire proposal (25:15) while Russia retakes most of Kursk Oblast (29:46); Trump might be preparing to invade Panama (31:45); Canada elects a new prime minister (33:43); Trump continues to escalate the trade war (37:07); and former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will become Harvard's inaugural Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order (39:32). Subscribe now for an ad-free experience and much more content. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

About the Lecture This lecture is part of the Student Speaker Series The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, has one of the worst human rights records in the world, leading many of its citizens to escape through nearby Southeast Asian countries to seek asylum in South Korea or other willing nations. A significant issue these escapees face is having an ambiguous United Nations (UN) refugee status and the fear of forced repatriation, also known as refoulement. The countries of China, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most used Southeast Asian escape routes for North Korean refugees. This lecture seeks to solidify North Korean escapee's status as refugees, explain the status of Southeast Asian countries' relationship with North Korea and their history of forced repatriation, and proposes a UN General Assembly Human Rights Council Resolution that creates an international body called “The Committee on the Resettlement of North Korean Refugees,” which shall encourage Southeast Asian countries not to repatriate them and coordinate the removal of these refugees from Southeast Asia to be resettled in South Korea or other willing nations. About the Speaker Peace Ajirotutu is a Master of Arts candidate at the Institute of World Politics, pursuing a Masters in Statecraft and International Affairs with a concentration in Asian regional area studies. Before attending IWP, she graduated from the University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Summa Cum Laude, with a major in Political Science and a double minor in History and Asian Studies. Peace is currently an editorial intern at the Jamestown Foundations China Brief publication. She has previously presented research on North Korea at the 2024 Intelligence Studies Consortium's Symposium. Peace specializes in the regions of China, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan.

DOGE is the most interesting story in state capacity right now. Yet although we've talked around it on Statecraft, I haven't covered it directly since the beginning of the administration. In part, that's because of the whirlwind pace of news, but also because of the sense I get in talking to other DOGE watchers, that we're like blind men feeling different parts of the elephant. And, frankly, because it's the most polarizing issue in public discourse right now.But we're far enough into the administration that some things are clear, and I think it's relevant for Statecraft readers to hear how I'm personally modeling DOGE. We're also far enough along that it's worth taking stock of what we expected and forecasted about DOGE, and where we were wrong. So here are 50 thoughts on DOGE, as concisely as possible. You can read the full thing, as always, at www.statecraft.pub. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub

Send us a textJoin Professor Jeffrey Sachs and historian, Professor Ricahrd Overy for an insightful conversation on one of humanity's most unsettling questions: Why do we wage war? In his book, Why War? Overy takes us on a journey across time, from the ancient battlefields of the Roman Empire to the devastation of the World Wars and the conflicts shaping our present.Together, they examine what drives organized violence? Is it hardwired into human nature, or does it stem from competition for resources, power, and security? Drawing on psychology, history, and political strategy, Overy dissects the deep-rooted forces behind war— confronting the stark realities of conflict and examining whether war is an inescapable part of our past—or an unavoidable part of our future. This episode doesn't shy away from the hard truths—there are no easy answers, and Overy delivers no false hope.The Book Club with Jeffrey Sachs is brought to you by the SDG Academy, the flagship education initiative of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. Learn more and get involved at bookclubwithjeffreysachs.org.Footnotes:Why Do Humans Make War?StatecraftYugoslav WarsAristotelianismBarbarian Proxy WarPeloponnesian WarsThucydidesJihad Israeli - Palestinian ConflictNuremberg TrialsHermann GoeringDemagogue of AthensBritain Mercantile StateNew ImperialismHobbes Social ContractMunich AgreementOperation PaperclipStalin's Rise to Power⭐️ Thank you for listening!➡️ Sign up for the newsletter: https://bit.ly/subscribeBCJS➡️ Website: bookclubwithjeffreysachs.org

Religion plays a prominent role in the domestic and foreign policies of Middle Eastern states, particularly in the Persian Gulf. But the ways in which religion, specifically Islam, is used as a tool of statecraft are often misunderstood, leading to mischaracterizations and counterproductive policies.In his new book, Jon Hoffman examines how Islam is marshaled as a tool of statecraft in the Middle East. The book offers new insight into the geopolitics of religion in the Middle East and how ruling elites in the region use Islam to protect and advance what are inherently political objectives—namely, regime preservation and power projection. Understanding the political incentives behind the manipulation of religion in the region is critical to debates surrounding Islam, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Middle East. The book also raises critical questions for US policy in the Middle East, which often relies on fundamental misunderstandings of Islam and its relationship with politics in the region.Join Hoffman for a discussion on Islam and Statecraft, followed by commentary by Mustafa Akyol, Peter Mandaville, and Annelle Sheline on the politics of Islam in the Middle East. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Andrew Hale is a senior trade policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. In this episode, we discuss how Trump is using various trade tools to strengthen alliances and weaken adversaries.“I look upon what he's trying to do as a negotiating tactic. He's using tariffs as an instrument of statecraft, and also for economic coercion, to achieve matters that sometimes go well beyond trade policy,” Hale says.Hale says that tariffs should be used against America's foreign adversaries, but not necessarily against its allies.“Among [those on] the protection side, there's a knee jerk reaction saying a tariff is the panacea to all of our problems. And actually, a lot of these problems we created right here in Washington. And we can fix them right here in Washington, with dealing with some of the stupid and foolish regulations that we have,” he says. “What we cannot go back to is what we had during the Clinton years, what we had during the Bush years, the Obama years—which was this seamless trade with China, where we treat them as a market economy. They're a non-market economy. They're a foreign adversary.”Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

Luis Herrero entrevista a Nicolás de Pedro, director de Investigación y analista senior del Institute for Statecraft de Londres.

America's foremost presidential historian examines the motivations and careers of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and George H. W. Bush.  Recorded on January 24, 2025.

Watch the conversation on YouTube: https://youtu.be/QrVakL6qcGg To contact us, sign up for updates, and access transcripts, visit: https://arkmedia.org/ Dan on X: https://x.com/dansenor Dan on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/dansenor As Israelis continue to observe the implementation of the hostage deal, we sat down with Walter Russell Mead for a conversation about U.S. foreign policy under the new Trump administration. How do we make sense of the president's approach as he enters his new administration? What are the implications  - both for the Middle East and other geopolitical hotspots? And, where does the hostage/ceasefire deal fit in this new and larger geopolitical context? Walter Russell Mead is the “Global View” columnist at the Wall Street Journal. He is the Ravenel B. Curry III Distinguished Fellow in Strategy and Statesmanship at Hudson Institute, the Alexander Hamilton Professor of Strategy and Statecraft with the Hamilton Center for Classical and Civic Education at the University of Florida. He was previously the Henry Kissinger fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  He is also a prolific author. His most recent book is -- The Arc of a Covenant: The United States, Israel, and the Fate of the Jewish People, which you order here – https://a.co/d/3J67FYL CREDITS: ILAN BENATAR - Producer & Editor MARTIN HUERGO - Editor REBECCA STROM - Director of Operations STAV SLAMA - Researcher  GABE SILVERSTEIN - Research Intern 

Flahback! John and Myself (Chris) welcome returning guest and stellar researcher, Jay Dyer to Afternoon Commute to discuss: Carol Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, Russia, Nukes, Nuclear Politics, Edward Teller, Robert Oppenheimer, Communism, The Police State, East Germany under the Stasi, Statecraft and Politics, Perception Management, The Panopticon, Kissinger, The Soviet Union, VICE Network, Lord of War, Nicholas Cage, Black Ops Video Games, Black Mirror, Gamification, Smart Cities, Minority Report, Sentient World Simulation, Ginni Rometty, Pre Crime, Google Books, Facebook, AT&T and Time Warner, Wikileaks, Edward Snowden, Pamela Anderson, Julian Assange, Hillary Clinton, George W. Bush.Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/jay-sanalysis--1423846/support.