Podcasts about truk

We're no strangers to TRUK United on this podcast – but thanks to a pioneering new documentary, the story of the world's first trans-inclusive football club is making it to the big screen. Cameron Richards and Charlie Tidmas spent two years with their team, documenting the fortunes of the club for the documentary We'll Go Down In History – which is a superb watch about the journey of the team. One of the main subjects is Emily Waldron – a loud and proud Liverpool fan who has flourished at TRUK, even though she didn't think football would necessarily be for her – and her journey is one of the key parts of a brilliant, beautiful story. It's a story of camaraderie, determination and joy – and one that is sorely needed – and we're delighted that Cameron and Emily are with us on the podcast today. We talk about the origins of the film, how it came together, the need to portray trans joy in sport on screen, the way it's been received at screening after screening, including at the BFI Flare London LGBTQ+ Film Festival. It's a cracker of a chat, and we're grateful to them both for joining us on the podcast today. WANT TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT OUR GUESTS? @trukunitedfilm WANT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PODCAST? @jack_murley jack@jackmurley.com

Ārsts var izdarīt patiesi daudz, tomēr bez pašu pacientu iesaistīšanās neiztikt. Cik esam aktīvi, ievērojot norādījumus, un kā mainīt savus ikdienas paradumus, lai sasniegtu iespējami labākus rezultātus ārstēšanās procesā, pētām raidījumā Kā labāk dzīvot. Vērtē Latvijas Hipertensijias un aterosklerozes biedrības vadītājs, Latvijas Universitātes asociētais profesors kardiologs Kārlis Trušinskis, "Mēness aptiekas" farmaceite Ērika Pētersone un biedrības "ParSirdi.lv" vadītāja Inese Mauriņa. Šogad pirmo reizi 27. martā pasaulē atzīmē Līdzestības dienu. Inese Mauriņa norāda, ka šajā dienā vēlas runāt par ārstēšanās efektivitāti, aktualizēt jautājumus, kas svarīgi pacientiem. Vairāk fokusējas uz sirds un asinsvadu slimību pacientiem, kam jālieto daudz un dažādi medikamenti lielākoties mūža garumā. Tas nav viegli. Aptauja liecina,  ka apmēram 10% aizmāršības dēļ neiedzer zāles, bet biežākie iemesli saistīti ar izpratni, kāpēc nepieciešams lietot medikamentus un ievērot citus ieteikumus, lai sasniegtu ārstēšanās mērķus. Tāpēc šogad īpaši uzrunā sirds un asinsvadu slimību slimniekus, lai mazinātu šo slimību izplatību. Ērika Pētersone norāda, ka aptaujas dati nepārsteidz, farmaceiti jūt, ka pacientu līdzestība nav liela. To ietekmē dažādi faktori, tāpēc farmaceiti cenšas palīdzēt pacientam ievērot terapiju. Farmaceitu aptauja atklāj vairākus galvenos iemeslus, kāpēc pacienti neievēro ārstēšanās ieteikumus: finansiālu ierobežojumu dēļ 21,4% pacientu nevar atļauties visus nepieciešamos medikamentus; pāragri pārtrauc ārstēšanu – 23,5% pacientu pārstāj lietot zāles, jo jūtas labāk; bailes no blakusparādībām – 19,9% pacientu izvairās no zāļu lietošanas blakusparādību dēļ; nepietiekama izpratne par ārstēšanas nepieciešamību – 14,1% pacientu nesaprot terapijas mērķi; savukārt 10,3% pacientu regulāri aizmirst lietot medikamentus. "Līdzestība būtiska ārstniecības efektivitātes panākšanā," atzīst Kārlis Trukšinskis. Viņš min, kad arī pasaules pieredze ir līdzīga, apmēram 40 – 50% pacientu dažādu iemeslu dēļ pārtrauc lietot zāles. "Pirmos sešus mēnešus pēc izrakstīšanās no slimnīcas situācija vēl ir diezgan jauka, gads paiet, divi, mēs ikdienā redzam, ka nāk pacienti pēc sirds operācijas, kam ir labi rezultāti gadu pēc tās. Mēs atceramies, bija problēma, visi vienojāmies, strādājām. Bet tad paiet septiņi gadi, pacients ir atgriezies, holesterīns atkal ir paaugstināts, asinsspiediens nav kontrolēts. Kaut kā likās, ka tas vairs nav tiks svarīgi... Ilgtermiņā [zāļu] lietošana ir panākumu stūrakmens," norāda Kārlis Trukšinskis. Viņš min, ka ārstam ir svarīgi ne tikai dot norādījumus pacientam, bet arī radīt tādu vidi, lai pacients justos drošs pateikt, ka es nevaru izdarīt to vai to, vai nepatīk kādas zāles. "Ārstēšanas shēma ir jāsabalansē ar pacienta dzīvi," min Kārlis Trukšinskis. Ārsts arī norāda, ka sarežģītas zāļu shēmas ir liela barjera cilvēkiem, tāpēc jauninājums ir kombinētie – trīs sastāvdaļas vienā tabletē, nevis trīs tabletes. Viņš arī min, ka būtiski ir digitālie risinājumi, kas pacientam palīdz atcerēties par medikamentu lietošanu. Par to nav jādomā tikai ārstam, farmaceitam vai pacientam, ir vajadzīga arī lēmumu pieņēmēju iesaiste. 

Sebuah mobil truk tronton, Hino Roda 10 melintang di tengah Jalan Lintas Nasional yang berada di kelurahan Kampung Baru Kecamatan Muara Tembesi Kabupaten Batanghari, Akibatnya Jalan Lintas Nasional mengalami kelumpuhan selama 2 jam

Kecelakaan di GT Ciawi, Kakorlantas: Dugaan Truk Rem Blong atau Mengantuk | Tim Hukum Hasto Singgung Jokowi di Sidang Praperadilan | KPK Sita 11 Mobil Usai Geledah Rumah Ketua PP Japto Soerjosoemarno *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Pemerintah Siapkan Strategi Urai Kepadatan Mobilitas Warga di Nataru | YLBHI Sebut Ada Ratusan Kebijakan Melanggar HAM dalam 10 Tahun Terakhir | Empat Orang Tewas Akibat Kecelakaan Bus Pelajar dan Truk di Tol Pandaan Malang *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

Ribuan truk ekspedisi masih mengantre di area pelabuhan penyebrangan Merak, baik di dermaga eksekutif maupun di dermaga reguler.

Gelombang tinggi dan angin kencang masih terus terjadi di Pelabuhan Merak, Banten. Akibatnya, antrean truk yang mengular belum juga terurai.

Pemerintah berencana memberlakukan sertifikasi kompetensi pengemudi untuk para sopir truk. Ini menyusul berentetnya kasus kecelakaan yang melibatkan truk seperti yang terjadi pekan lalu di KM 92 tol Cipularang. Kecelakaan itu menyebabkan 1 korban meninggal dan 29 orang luka-luka serta melibatkan belasan kendaraan. Tujuan sertifikasi diklaim sebagai upaya untuk mengurangi angka kecelakaan lalu lintas yang melibatkan truk. Korlantas Polri memang mencatat mayoritas penyebab terjadinya kecelakaan lalu lintas disebabkan oleh human error atau perilaku pengemudi. Semisal melampaui batas kecepatan, ceroboh saat berkendara, lalai mengecek kondisi kendaraan, melanggar aturan lalu lintas, dan kelelahan. Tapi perilaku pengemudi bukan satu-satunya yang harus menjadi perhatian pemerintah. Penyebab lain truk terlibat kecelakaan menurut laman resmi Kemenhub adalah truk kelebihan muatan. Pada 2023, ada lebih dari 200 kasus kecelakaan lalu lintas disebabkan truk kelebihan muatan alias Over Dimension Over Loading (ODOL). Seperti apa respon pihak terkait mengenai rencana ini? Bagaimana memastikan proses sertifikasi ini berjalan transparan dan akuntabel? Bagaimana membuat regulasi yang menyeluruh untuk menyelesaikan masalah ini? Kita bincangkan bersama Kepala Subdit Angkutan Barang Kementerian Perhubungan, Handa Lesmana dan Ketua Umum Masyarakat Transportasi Indonesia (MTI), Tory Damantoro. *Kami ingin mendengar saran dan komentar kamu terkait podcast yang baru saja kamu simak, melalui surel ke podcast@kbrprime.id

A través de las acciones del USS Sculpin, conoceremos las manadas de lobos estadounidenses a la búsqueda de transportes japoneses, en un mar mucho más inmenso que el Atlántico Norte. Con tácticas que intentaban aprender de los u-boote alemanes, no sólo acosaban las rutas de suministro que se dirigían al Japón, sino que se encargaban de aislar de cualquier tipo de suministro a bases como Truk, ablandando a su guarnición para luego asaltarlas mediante desembarcos. Nuestro amigo Esteban Pérez Bolívar es nuestro especialista invitado, aprovechando la publicación de su último libro "Silencio en el Pacífico", donde habla precisamente del SS-191 Sculpin, y que puedes conseguirlo en: https://www.amazon.es/Silencio-Pac%C3%ADfico-comodoro-submarino-Batalla-ebook/dp/B0D77YJ4YN Le acompañan Damián Valle, Félix Lancho y Antonio Gómez. 🔗 Enlaces para Listas de Episodios Exclusivos para 💥 FANS 👉 CB FANS 💥 https://bit.ly/CBPListCBFans 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Antes de la 2GM https://bit.ly/CBPListHis1 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS 2ª Guerra Mundial https://bit.ly/CBPListHis2 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Guerra Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis3 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Después de la G Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis4 Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books (Digital) y 📚 DCA Editor (Físico) http://zeppelinbooks.com son sellos editoriales de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Estamos en: 🆕 WhatsApp https://bit.ly/CasusBelliWhatsApp 👉 X/Twitter https://twitter.com/CasusBelliPod 👉 Facebook https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉 Instagram estamos https://www.instagram.com/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Canal https://t.me/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Grupo de Chat https://t.me/casusbellipod 📺 YouTube https://bit.ly/casusbelliyoutube 👉 TikTok https://www.tiktok.com/@casusbelli10 👉 https://podcastcasusbelli.com 👨‍💻Nuestro chat del canal es https://t.me/casusbellipod ⚛️ El logotipo de Casus Belli Podcasdt y el resto de la Factoría Casus Belli están diseñados por Publicidad Fabián publicidadfabian@yahoo.es 🎵 La música incluida en el programa es Ready for the war de Marc Corominas Pujadó bajo licencia CC. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ El resto de música es bajo licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o SGAE SGAE RRDD/4/1074/1012 de Ivoox. 🎭Las opiniones expresadas en este programa de pódcast, son de exclusiva responsabilidad de quienes las trasmiten. Que cada palo aguante su vela. 📧¿Quieres contarnos algo? También puedes escribirnos a casus.belli.pod@gmail.com ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast, patrocinar un episodio o una serie? Hazlo a través de 👉 https://www.advoices.com/casus-belli-podcast-historia Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, ya que nos da mucha visibilidad. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. 🔗 Enlaces para Listas de Episodios Exclusivos para 💥 FANS 👉 CB FANS 💥 https://bit.ly/CBPListCBFans 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Antes de la 2GM https://bit.ly/CBPListHis1 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS 2ª Guerra Mundial https://bit.ly/CBPListHis2 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Guerra Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis3 👉 Histórico 📂 FANS Después de la G Fría https://bit.ly/CBPListHis4 Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books (Digital) y 📚 DCA Editor (Físico) http://zeppelinbooks.com son sellos editoriales de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Estamos en: 🆕 WhatsApp https://bit.ly/CasusBelliWhatsApp 👉 X/Twitter https://twitter.com/CasusBelliPod 👉 Facebook https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉 Instagram estamos https://www.instagram.com/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Canal https://t.me/casusbellipodcast 👉 Telegram Grupo de Chat https://t.me/casusbellipod 📺 YouTube https://bit.ly/casusbelliyoutube 👉 TikTok https://www.tiktok.com/@casusbelli10 👉 https://podcastcasusbelli.com 👨‍💻Nuestro chat del canal es https://t.me/casusbellipod ⚛️ El logotipo de Casus Belli Podcasdt y el resto de la Factoría Casus Belli están diseñados por Publicidad Fabián publicidadfabian@yahoo.es 🎵 La música incluida en el programa es Ready for the war de Marc Corominas Pujadó bajo licencia CC. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ El resto de música es bajo licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o SGAE SGAE RRDD/4/1074/1012 de Ivoox. 🎭Las opiniones expresadas en este programa de pódcast, son de exclusiva responsabilidad de quienes las trasmiten. Que cada palo aguante su vela. 📧¿Quieres contarnos algo? También puedes escribirnos a casus.belli.pod@gmail.com ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast, patrocinar un episodio o una serie? Hazlo a través de 👉 https://www.advoices.com/casus-belli-podcast-historia Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, ya que nos da mucha visibilidad. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Eye Contact Over Truk with Stephanie Woodman The idea for Eye Contact Over Truk came to Stephanie in 1996 during a scuba trip to Truk Lagoon. She put the project on pause during her career and finished it in earnest after her retirement in 2021. With the additional two decades of life experience, her writing transformed to explore themes of perseverance, forgiveness, grief, loss, life, love, and adventure. Eye Contact Over Truk is a heartrending work of historical fiction. If you like nuanced characters, emotional journeys, and surreal backdrops, then you'll love Stephanie Woodman's thought-provoking exploration of the past.  Stephanie Woodman is an avid collector of experiences and a perpetual student of life. Despite her analytical background with a long engineering career and a short tenure as a high school math teacher, Stephanie has a powerful creative side which has manifested itself in her debut novel, Eye Contact Over Truk. To learn more visit: woodmanbooks.com ****************************************** For more information about BITEradio products and services visit: http://www.biteradio.me/index.html To view the photography of Robert at: http://rpsharpe.com/

Instagram Lentera Malam : https://www.instagram.com/lenteramalam.id/ Spotify Lentera Malam : https://open.spotify.com/show/0H9OgzHgHVos0GNwz0wsHs -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kejadian yang terjadi belasan tahun lalu ini dialami oleh Andi, Narasumber kali ini, hampir membuatnya berhenti dari profesi yang ditekuninya sebagai satpam. Saat itu, Andi diteror selama 5 hari oleh sosok yang menjadi korban dari seseorang yang ada ditempat ia bekerja. Bagaimana kisah selengkapnya? Simak video berikut, jangan lupa berikan like dan komentarnya Copyright 2024, Lentera Malam --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/lentera-malam8/support

Last time we spoke about the end of Operation Dan. In Yunnan, by late July, General Wei's Y Force worked to eliminate Japanese garrisons at Tengchong, Mount Song, Pingda, and Longling. The 33rd Army prepared for Operation Dan, anticipating resistance from General Honda's garrisons until September. The fall of Myitkyina prompted Honda to expedite his plans. Reinforcements were expected in Mandalay by September. General Matsuyama's forces, cut off and surrounded, provided support only through radio messages. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige vowed to defend against relentless attacks. Chinese forces, after intense fighting and bombing raids, breached the city's defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Japanese resisted fiercely. Major Kanemitsu's garrison defended Moung Song with dwindling supplies. The Chinese forces employed siege tactics and underground mines to break Japanese strongholds. The Chinese launched coordinated attacks, capturing key positions and ultimately compelling Japanese retreats.  This episode is the Invasion of Morotai Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the Marianas fell and Sansapor was captured, the Allies set their sights on their next objectives: the Palaus and Halmahera, slated for simultaneous invasion by mid-September. The Japanese had stationed the 14th Division at Palau and the 32nd Division at Halmahera as their primary defenses. The Halmahera-Morotai area had not assumed much importance to the Japanese until early 1944, when they began to develop Halmahera as a focal point for the defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In addition to the 32d Division, the Japanese had on Halmahera innumerable service organizations, and they completed or had under construction nine airfields on the island, most of them in northern Halmahera. On that island they concentrated nearly 30,000 men, including at least 11,000 combat troops.  On Halmahera, General Ishii commanded approximately 11,000 troops to safeguard nine airfields, despite having already lost most of their air power. Meanwhile, Morotai Island was defended by around 500 Formosans of the 2nd Raiding Unit, led by Major Kawashima Takenobu. General Ishii planned to counterattack from Halmahera if the Allies landed on Morotai, but soon realized Allied air and naval superiority would foil these efforts. Following their defeat in the Marianas, Tokyo reassigned the Bonin Area Group directly under its command and placed the Palau Area Group under the Southern Army, leaving General Mugikura's 31st Army to defend Truk and other isolated outposts. General Inoue fortified Palau with elaborate defenses along the coast and inland, manned by 21,000 Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops, 7,000 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) personnel, and 10,000 laborers.  The IJN had by 1944 constructed numerous reinforced concrete blockhouses and bunkers plus dug an extensive tunnel system near the end of the northeast peninsula as well as taking full advantage of Peleliu's natural caves. This elaborate, multi-level tunnel system could shelter 1000 troops. These defenses, tunnels, the airfield, and the many support facilities were built by the 204th, 214th, and 235th Construction Battalions, mostly manned by Koreans and Okinawans. Detachments of the guard forces manned eight 120mm dual-purpose, and about three 200mm coast defense guns. There was no ammunition for the 200mm short guns nor did any ships report being fired on by coast defense guns. The 114th and 126th Anti-aircraft Units manned single and twin-barreled 25mm automatic guns (estimated at 30) and 13.2mm machine guns. A dozen 20mm cannons, removed from destroyed aircraft, were set up on makeshift mounts, mostly around the airfield. His strategy emphasized prolonged attrition over suicidal charges, aiming to exhaust the American forces. In preparation for the intense pre-landing bombardment, Inoue instructed his troops to utilize natural terrain features like coral caves and sinkholes, tactics that proved effective against the advancing Allies.Based in Koror, the Japanese commander stationed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio's 2nd Regiment on Peleliu, the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 59th Regiment on Angaur, and deployed the 15th and 59th Regiments across Babelthuap and other islands. Major-General Yamaguchi Takeo's 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade defended the central islands, complemented by 4,000 personnel from the Imperial Japanese Navy on Peleliu.  Prior to General Inoue's arrival in the Palaus, the defense of the Palaus had been under the command of Vice-Admiral Ito Yoshioka. Upon his arrival on Koror, where he established his headquarters, Inoue appointed Colonel Nakagawa Kunio as Peleliu's new commander, with his 2nd Regiment (Reinforced). Nakagawa was a most able commander, possibly one of Japan's finest defensive tacticians, in the same league as General Kuribayashi on Iwo Jima. Nakagawa would make full use of all his defenses and troops on Peleliu, making the Americans pay dearly for every inch, as he had been ordered to do. Although a very capable commander, the appointment of an Army colonel over a Navy vice-admiral caused a great rift between the Army and Navy on Peleliu, which deteriorated into farce. To resolve matters and calm the Navy down somewhat, Inoue sent Major-General Murai Kenjiro from his headquarters on Koror Island to Peleliu to provide the Army with sufficient rank to satisfy the vice-admiral's honor, although the defense of Peleliu seems, to practical purposes, to have remained in the hands of Nakagawa. It appears that Murai, after inspecting Nakagawa's defensive works and battle plans for the defense of Peleliu, was content to let Nakagawa continue without interference from himself, lending only the weight of his rank to acquire the required cooperation of the Navy elements on Peleliu. Nakagawa, divided the island into four defense sectors, each manned by an infantry battalion. His 1st Battalion, alongside the 14th Division Tank Unit and Engineer Company, served as a mobile reserve for counterattacks against potential landings. Meanwhile, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey had been planning Operation Stalemate, targeting Palau since May 29. Originally slated for September 8, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps would assault Peleliu and Angaur, with General Hodge's 24th Corps landing on Babelthuap.  Intelligence was gathered by aerial reconnaissance photographs. Also, in June 1944 the submarine USS Seawolf (SS-197) carried out photographic reconnaissance of the invasion landing beaches. A further reconnaissance was carried out by the submarine USS Burrfish (SS-312) on Peleliu and Yap beaches. An 11-man reconnaissance group of underwater demolition team (UDT) frogmen landed on the Peleliu beaches from the Burrfish for closer investigation relating to water depth, location of potholes and sandbars, and obstacles. With thousands of Japanese on the island they understandably did not reconnoiter inland, and the rugged terrain of the interior would come as an unpleasant surprise to the Marines. A similar operation was carried out on the Yap invasion beaches, but this time only two of a five-man reconnaissance team made it back to the pick-up point. After several unsuccessful attempts to locate their missing comrades the remaining two men returned to the Burrfish. After this incident, Admiral Nimitz banned any further missions of this type. Given delays in the Guam operation, Operation Stalemate was canceled on July 7, replaced by Stalemate II.  An unusual staff arrangement was established to plan Stalemate II. IIIAC was committed to take Guam under General Geiger. The IIIAC staff would thus be unable to plan the Palaus operation, which it was to execute. Consequently, Major General Julian Smith, designated to command the Expeditionary Troops, was tasked to plan the operation using his own small staff augmented by some IIIAC staff officers. This temporary planning staff was designated X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps. It would plan the operation and IIIAC would execute it – an awkward arrangement, but necessary in order to maintain the increasing tempo of operations. As Commander, Expeditionary Troops, Smith was also to be in control of all ground action in the western Carolines; a position roughly analogous to that of General Krueger of ALAMO Force in the Southwest Pacific. X-Ray was finally dissolved on August 15, 1944. This revised plan scheduled Geiger's forces to land on Peleliu with the 1st Marine Division and on Angaur with the 81st Division on September 15, while the 77th Division remained in floating reserve and the 5th Marine Division in area reserve. Then, on October 8th, the 24th Corps planned to launch an assault on the islands of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines. This was aimed at securing an additional airfield and fully neutralizing Truk and the remaining islands in the group. For this operation, Halsey divided his 3rd Fleet into two main echelons: his Task Force 30, which included covering forces such as Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (now Task Force 38), and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 31, the Joint Expeditionary Force. At Peleliu, General Rupertus' 1st Marine Division was to land with five battalions advancing over the White and Orange Beaches on the southwest coast. The 1st Marines were to land on the left, pushing up the western shore to clear Japanese forces from ridges overlooking the airfield; the 5th Marines would land in the center to secure the airfield; and the 7th Marines on the right to capture the southern end of the island. Meanwhile, at Angaur, Major-General Paul Mueller's 81st Division planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The 322nd Regiment was to land on Red Beach on the northeast coast, while the 321st Regiment would land on Blue Beach about 2000 yards to the southeast. Both forces would then push inland to secure a first phase line approximately 300 yards from the beaches, before continuing their advance west and south. The reserve 323rd Regiment was tasked with a feint landing at Beach Black on the northwest coast, with potential deployment to Ulithi if the Palau operations proved successful. Meanwhile, General MacArthur aimed to establish an airbase in the Halmahera area, strategically positioned between the Vogelkop and Mindanao. This location would provide crucial flank protection against Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and support land-based operations for the upcoming invasion of Mindanao. Optimistically, in mid-June, MacArthur had tentatively scheduled the invasion of Mindanao for October 25. Nimitz, however, believed that MacArthur's hope of reaching Mindanao by October 25 was too optimistic. During conferences at Pearl Harbor in July, called at the suggestion of Nimitz to coordinate Southwest and Central Pacific plans for the Morotai, Palau, and Mindanao operations, Southwest Pacific planners learned that less amphibious craft and assault shipping could be made available to them than had previously been anticipated. Moreover, restudy of range and weather factors made it appear somewhat risky to depend upon the ability of Morotai-based aircraft to provide air support for Southwest Pacific forces on Mindanao after carriers had to leave the latter area and before airdromes could be developed there. To obtain adequate land-based air support for the Mindanao invasion force, MacArthur returned to discarded plans to seize air-base sites on the Talaud Islands, about equidistant from Morotai and Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, where the first landings in the Philippines were then scheduled to take place. The employment of amphibious means for the Talaud operation would delay preparations for Mindanao, as would the development of airdromes on the Talauds. Finally, to have the invasion of Mindanao take place much before the middle of November would involve a conflict in timing with anticipated employment of assault shipping and carrier support by Admiral Nimitz for the occupation of Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines, an operation scheduled for the first week in October. MacArthur therefore revised his program to call for the invasion of Morotai on September 15, the Talauds on October 15, and Mindanao on November 15. As Allied carriers were engaged in the Palau operation, MacArthur needed a target within range of fighters and medium bombers stationed at Sansapor. Thus, Morotai Island was chosen for Operation Tradewind due to its perceived light defenses and ample space for airfield and light naval base facilities. General Krueger selected the 31st Division and the 126th Regiment, totaling approximately 28,000 troops under the overall command of General Hall's 11th Corps, for this operation. Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77, comprising 12 destroyers, 2 APAs, 5 APDs, 1 LSD, 39 LCIs, 12 LSTs, and 12 LCTs, along with a covering force led by Admiral Berkey and an escort carrier force under Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague, facilitated the amphibious movement. Additionally, Vice-Admiral John McCain's fast carrier group provided support. Anticipating minimal resistance, the landings were planned near prospective airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain in southwest Morotai. General Hall's strategy involved the 155th and 167th Regiments landing on Red Beach on the southwestern coast to swiftly capture the abandoned Pitoe Drome and secure the new Pitoe Airfield site. Meanwhile, the 124th Regiment landed at White Beach, about 1500 yards to the south, to secure the Gila Peninsula and the Wama Airfield site. The reserve 126th Regiment was scheduled to land the following day, with its 1st Battalion initially supporting the 124th Regiment's operations at the beachhead. Both the Palau and Morotai operations were supported by a coordinated strategic air support program. Admiral Hoover's land-based aircraft were tasked with neutralizing Japanese airfields at various islands including Yap, Woleai, Truk, Ponape, Pagan, Bonin, and Marcus Islands. Concurrently, General Kenney's Allied Air Forces reinforced these efforts and targeted enemy air centers in Palau, Mindanao, western Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera, the Talaud Islands, the Moluccas, the Celebes, and the Arafura Sea islands. Additionally, Mitscher's fast carriers embarked on an ambitious campaign, launching strikes from the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the Palaus and Mindanao between late August and the start of the invasions.  This strike had a twofold objective: the temporary neutralization of Japanese airfields on those island groups and, more important, the creation of a diversion on the north preceding stronger attacks against targets in the Philippines and western Carolines. Carrier action in the latter area was to begin on 6 September, with strikes on the Palaus, Yap, and Ulithi. The bulk of the carrier forces was to leave the western Carolines on the afternoon of the 8th to take up positions off Mindanao. Japanese airfields on Mindanao presented difficult targets because they were scattered over that large island, but it was believed that the cluster of airfields and associated installations in the Davao area would provide profitable targets for carrier-based aircraft attacks. The Davao and Sarangani Bay areas, as well as Japanese shipping routes from Davao to Zamboanga and thence north toward Manila, were also expected to provide profitable targets. Strikes against airdromes and shipping in the Mindanao area were to be carried out on 9 and 10 September, while on the 10th and 11th part of the carrier force was to hit the Palaus and Yap-Ulithi again. Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison's carrier-launched aircraft struck Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima from August 31 to September 2. The Fast Carrier Task Force continued with strikes on Yap and the Palaus from September 6 to 8, and on Mindanao from September 9 to 10. Enemy air resistance was surprisingly weak throughout these operations, prompting Halsey to redirect plans for a follow-up attack on Mindanao to the Central Philippines. While the Japanese forces in the Philippines hastened to complete preparations against anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne aircraft served sudden warning on September 9 that the date of this invasion was fast drawing near. In the first large-scale air operation by the Allies against the Philippines, an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devastating ten-hour offensive against southern Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos. Since Japanese air patrols had failed to discover the enemy task force, the attacks achieved complete surprise and inflicted widespread and severe damage to ground installations, airfields, anchorages, and lines of communication. Reconnaissance units of the 1st Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions, which revealed that the attacks originated from three enemy naval task groups boldly maneuvering in the waters southeast of Mindanao. As per the Sho-Go directives, however, the 1st Air Fleet withheld retaliatory action pending further developments. Ground and naval units in the Davao area were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet the possible contingency that an invasion attempt would follow the air strikes, and the Japanese armed forces throughout southern Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local forces at Davao and rapidly spread to the large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild rumors swept the city. On September 10, a second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated this state of alarm. The city and harbor were reduced to a shambles and communications paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.  Less than 48 hours after the termination of the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again; this time in the central Philippines. On the morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf, broadcast over the general air-warning net that a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was heading westward toward the Visayas. Since the Suluan Island lookout was only about twenty minutes' flying time from Cebu, the air forces there could not be alerted quickly enough to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the enemy planes were already swarming over the Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength of the First Air Fleet was based following its transfer from Davao. Although the attacks extended over the entire Visayan area and later took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago, the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal objective. In the three days over which this air offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone, while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all types were rendered non-operational. Flight personnel suffered numerous casualties, and training was disrupted. Heavy damage was also sustained by Army air units. The 13th Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter­bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength. In addition, 11 transports totalling 27,000 gross tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to the bottom of Cebu harbor.The unexpected weakness in enemy air defenses led Nimitz to reconsider bypassing Yap and Mindanao, instead focusing forces on an early invasion of Leyte. McCain's group continued with attacks on Zamboanga, the Talauds, and Menado en route to Morotai. Meanwhile, between September 1 and 14, Kenney's aircraft conducted heavy raids on Japanese air bases within range of Morotai, effectively isolating the island. Targeted locations included Halmahera, the northern Celebes, Ceram, western New Guinea, and Mindanao. After rehearsals and preparations were completed, Barbey's convoy departed Aitape on September 9. Two days later, they rendezvoused at Maffin Bay with the majority of General Persons' 31st Division. The entire convoy departed the area on September 12, joined the next day by the covering force and escort carriers. The voyage proceeded smoothly, and Barbey successfully reached Morotai on the morning of September 15. Meanwhile, McCain's carrier aircraft conducted a bombing and strafing mission over Japanese air bases in the Manado area, destroying 28 enemy aircraft. Kenney's bombers also struck Japanese air installations on Batjan Island, while Berkey's cruisers and destroyers shelled enemy positions along Galela Bay. Barbey's surface warships conducted a bombardment of the landing area. During the naval and air bombardment, assault ships moved into their assigned positions west of the landing beaches efficiently and without confusion. The initial waves formed quickly and landed the 155th and 167th Regiments on Red Beach at 08:30, followed by the 124th Regiment on White Beach one minute later. Encountering no opposition, the troops swiftly reorganized on shore and advanced toward their objectives inland. By 13:00, the 167th Regiment had secured Pitoe Drome, and by 15:00, Colonel Starr's 1st Battalion had secured Gila Peninsula. Other units also advanced inland, establishing the 2000-yard beachhead line. Although there were some minor skirmishes, the Japanese could not mount significant resistance against the overwhelming Allied force and retreated into Morotai's rugged interior. The day's action resulted in seven wounded among the 124th Regiment and the loss of twelve Japanese soldiers, with one captured. Beach conditions, however, proved unexpectedly poor, severely hindering the unloading efforts. Consequently, starting on September 16, all the LSTs, along with numerous LCTs and LCMs, had to be unloaded at Blue Beach, a favorable landing spot on Pitoe Bay's shores. Simultaneously, as the reserve 126th Regiment was disembarking, Persons resumed advancing inland against minimal opposition. Swiftly, they secured a perimeter around the Pitoe Drome area, spanning over 7000 yards wide and approximately 5000 yards deep. Following this, American patrols were dispatched to eliminate small Japanese groups, radar stations and observation posts were established on various offshore islands and Morotai's coastline, and efforts were made to expand the perimeter to the Sabatai River to accommodate additional bivouacs and supply installations.  Leaving Morotai behind, attention shifts to Burma to explore the aftermath of Operation U-Go. Following the decisive victories at Imphal-Kohima, General Slim opted to pursue retreating Japanese forces toward the Chindwin River, despite the need for rest among his weary British-Indian divisions. Consequently, the 23rd Division spearheaded the pursuit to Tamu, at the head of the Kabaw Valley, where Major-General Charles Fowkes' 11th East African Division took over in early August. Meanwhile, to the south, General Evans' 5th Division pressed toward Tiddim, encountering stubborn resistance from General Tanaka's 33rd Division. Slim's strategy aimed for both divisions to eliminate remaining Japanese forces west of the Chindwin and converge at Kalemyo. Subsequently, the Tiddim road would be abandoned as a supply route in favor of the Kabaw Valley and aerial resupply drops. As a result, the 31st Division, now led by Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, successfully reached Sittaung. Their mission was to cover the withdrawal of other units in the region. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division faced challenges as it conducted delaying actions along the Tiddim road, with the added threat of East African forces potentially cutting off their withdrawal route towards Yazagyo. Japanese delaying tactics were always the same, and the means of dealing with them was also always the same. A crater would be found beyond which the lead infantry would come under fire and would have to be filled or covered using a Valentine bridgelayer, while air strikes would break up the blocking position to allow tanks from 3rd Carabiniers forward to support them. To disrupt Tanaka's communications south of the road, an ad hoc light unit, the Lushai Brigade, was deployed. By mid-August, General Mutaguchi ordered his forces to commence withdrawal towards the Zibyu Range. The 15th and 31st Divisions were directed to cross the Chindwin River by August 25, despite shortages of small boats. At the beginning of the crossing operation, a serious setback was experienced. It had been planned to bring small boats upstream to the crossing area with supplies for the Army and to utilize the same boats to evacuate casualties and heavy weapons south to Kalewa. Because of the enemy air activity over the Chindwin River, it was impossible to bring the boats to the crossing points. As a result, approximately 3000 sick and wounded were forced to cross the river and continue to the rear on foot with increasingly heavy death losses. By August 31, they were expected to reach the eastern bank of the Chindwin, with the 15th Division consolidating along the Pinbon-Pinlebu line by the end of September and the 31st Division reaching Shwebo by mid-October. By the end of August, key command changes occurred following the setbacks of Operation U-Go. Lieutenant-General Katamura Shihachi replaced General Mutaguchi as commander of the 15th Army, while Lieutenant-General Kimura Heitaro took over from General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Kimura Heitaro, noted for his strategic flexibility and acumen, subsequently directed the 33rd Army to secure a defensive line from Lashio to Mandalay, safeguarding the right flank of the 15th Army. The 15th Army, in turn, was tasked with holding the Irrawaddy River from Mandalay to Pakkoku, while the 28th Army was assigned to defend the Yenangyaung oilfields, the Arakan coast, and the Rangoon delta. Meanwhile, on September 12, the 33rd Division crossed the Manipur River and proceeded with their retreat towards the Kabaw valley. They left the 215th Regiment to guard the rear at Tonzang, while units of the 5th Division infiltrated the area between Tonzang and Kalemyo to disrupt Tanaka's withdrawal and mount significant attacks against the 215th. By September 20, the Japanese forces were forced back to Tiddim, where the 214th Regiment covered the retreat of the rest of the division. Simultaneously, the 26th King's African Rifles moved east from Tamu to Sittang, crossing the Chindwin River on September 8 to assess enemy strength across the river and prepare bridgeheads for a broader crossing. Encountering unexpectedly strong resistance, they were compelled to retreat back across the river. Under persistent pressure, the Japanese evacuated Tiddim on the night of October 6. Tanaka consolidated his division in the Kalemyo-Kalewa area by the end of October, while pursuing forces captured Fort White and Kennedy Peak. On October 10, the 4th King's African Rifles launched an assault on Leik Ridge, suffering significant casualties but ultimately securing the main hill twelve days later. Meanwhile, after withdrawing from Mogaung, the 53rd Division regrouped at Mawhun by September 10, where they successfully defended against enemy units until the end of the month. They then retreated towards Pinwe and came under the command of the 15th Army on October 5. Following the Quebec conference in September, a strategic overview of Burma emerged: the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved two plans. The first, codenamed Dracula, proposed an amphibious assault on Rangoon with a target date of March 15, 1945. The second plan, Capital, aimed at the conquest of north and central Burma, with General Slim suggesting an overland capture of Rangoon as part of the operation. Initially skeptical, the Americans reluctantly agreed to Dracula, contingent on ensuring that northern Burma received adequate resources. However, due to Allied setbacks at Arnhem and during the Battle of the Bulge, it became clear that reinforcements from the European theater could not be spared for the Rangoon offensive. Consequently, it was announced that the operation would need to be postponed until after the 1945 monsoon season. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After intense Allied operations in the Pacific, including the capture of the Marianas and Sansapor, attention turned to the Palaus and Halmahera. Japanese defenses were formidable, with significant troop concentrations and elaborate fortifications. Despite setbacks, Allied forces meticulously planned and executed operations, paving the way for further strategic advances in the region.

Truk bekas banyak di jadikan opsi bagi pengusaha angkutan truk yang baru berdiri namun memilik dana terbatas untuk membeli truk baru. Selain harga nya yang murah, banyak truk bekas biasa nya sudah sepaket dengan bak atau box untuk tempat muatan nya (tidak berlaku bagi kepala trailer). Apalagi truk bekas tersebut merupakan truk impor bekas yang sudah terkenal dengan tenaga nya yang besar dan mesin nya bandel yang kebanyakan berasal dari Jepang. Namun atas dasar peraturan pemerintah melarang masuknya truk bekas dari luar negeri agar sektor angkutan barang dapat memberdayakan industri truk lokal tanah air. Pada kesempatan kali ini, kita berkolaborasi dengan komunitas Truk Mania Community. Seperti apa tanggapan dari mereka mengenai aturan pemeritah tentang impor truk bekas? Yuk dengerin episode kali ini pada plarform podcast kesayangan Transbro & Transit! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/transpod-podcast/support

Jalan Tol JORR 2, atau Jalan Tol Jakarta Outer Ring Road 2, merupakan salah satu jalan tol utama di sekitar Jakarta yang menghubungkan berbagai daerah penting di sekitarnya. Diresmikan pada tahun 2017, jalan tol ini dirancang untuk mengurangi kemacetan di Jakarta dengan menyediakan jalur alternatif yang cepat dan efisien. Dengan panjang total sekitar 60 kilometer, JORR 2 mengelilingi Jakarta dari arah barat hingga timur, melalui jalur-jalur strategis seperti dari daerah Serpong di Tangerang Selatan hingga Cikunir di Jakarta Timur. Tol ini dilengkapi dengan fasilitas modern seperti rest area, ruas jalan yang luas, dan sistem pengaturan lalu lintas yang canggih untuk memastikan kelancaran arus kendaraan. Belum lama ini jalan tol JORR 2 sudah terhubung sampai dengan Cibitung, Jawa Barat. Lalu seberapa efisiensikah jalan tol tersebut dari segi waktu tempuh dan tarif? Yuk kita simak pada diskusi kali ini ya Transbro dan Transist! --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/transpod-podcast/support

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland. This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan's poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come.  Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN's strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga's Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa's carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki's battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th.  In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee's battleships and Turner's cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa's fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began. Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit's first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men. At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon's 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines' left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines' patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division. The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation.  The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.” Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa's main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance's staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa's force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance's calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.  In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance's mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet. At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa's decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita's Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00. Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat's fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho's aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship's forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return.  This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee's battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7's formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2's other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves' carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa's second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills. At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58's actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58's actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes. The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill's carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa's third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers. At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta's airfields.  As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance's fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa's main attack. Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa's first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery's group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft. The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN's newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb. At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan. Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range. Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa's hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa's aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st. However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa's three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again. Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship's speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding. The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima's carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington's Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier's island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet. Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier's starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given. Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp's aircraft, targeting Ozawa's Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa's combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher's slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22. Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher's Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing.  Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession. Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine.  At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.” At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

La mayor concentración de naufragios de la Segunda Guerra Mundial del planeta se encuentra en una laguna remota en medio del Océano Pacífico. ¡Y fuera de la comunidad de buceo, nadie parece haber oído hablar de él! Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la laguna fue la base principal de la flota japonesa, una fortaleza en medio del océano que creían impenetrable. Pero luego vino la Operación Hailstone, un ataque aéreo masivo que cambió el curso de la Guerra del Pacífico. Durante dos días en 1944, aviones estadounidenses hundieron alrededor de 40 barcos japoneses y destruyeron cientos de aviones de guerra. Esta fue la venganza estadounidense por el ataque a Pearl Harbor.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.   However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps.  They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.   This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland.  About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.   Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught.  At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line.  To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.  

Last time we spoke about the remarkable success of Operation Reckless and Persecution.  Colonel Oliver Newman led the drive towards Hollandia's airfields, encountering scattered opposition and discovering large undefended Japanese supply dumps. General MacArthur was forced to postpone future plans until May 21st. Meanwhile, Allied submarine interceptions disrupted IJN troop movements, and Task Force 58's airstrikes neutralized Truk. Within Burma, General Stilwell's offensive faced challenges from Japanese resistance and heavy monsoon rains. Despite setbacks, the 22nd Division aimed to capture Inkangahtawng while Chinese forces engaged the enemy along various fronts. Chindits continued Operation Thursday, facing logistical hurdles and Japanese attacks. Colonel Kinnison's Marauders encountered strong resistance near Tingkrukawng, while Colonel Hunter's force successfully surprised the Japanese at Myitkyina.  This episode is the Japanese Defeat at Imphal and Kohima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are jumping right back into the heat of General Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go. Poor General Yamauchi after suffering a devastating defeat at Nungshigum, was now facing allied tanks he simply had no answer for. Yamauchi ordered his men to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi, basically so they would at least be hung around the Kohima-Imphal road. The allies answer to this was 6000 sorties, dropping 1000 bombs in the sector. It was a tremendous amount of damage, but the Japanese did benefit from bunkers. Yamauchi's 15th Division due north of Imphal were now being contained successfully, allowing General Briggs and Roberts to initiate their own counter offensives by the end of April. Simultaneously the 33rd Division was struggling to advance upon Bishenpur and the Shenam Saddle; over at Kohima, General Sato's 31st Division was reluctantly falling onto the defensive as the looming threat of a full British-Indian counteroffensive was dawning upon them. Imphal was still facing a grave threat from the Japanese along the Tiddim Road. Mutaguchi was personally directing the 33rd Divisions actions around Bishenpur at this time. Mutaguchi planned a three-pronged attack, one prong along the Tiddim Road, another down south from the Silchar Track by the 215th Regiment and a lastly from the north by the 214th Regiment. For the assault the 33rd Division received reinforcements in the form of the 14th Tank Regiment; the 2nd Battalion, 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment; and the 1st Anti-Tank Battalion from the Yamamoto Detachment. In late May they would also be receiving the 151st regiment and the 14th Tank regiment, amongst other units. This of course meant other units like the Yamamoto Detachment were being deprived of men, thus they in turn would be reinforced. The Yamamoto Detachment received the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment who were previously engaged with the Chindits at Indaw. They would arrive at Kampang after the fall of Crete West. Now in preparation for Mutaguchis renewed offensive the IJA would be tossing aircraft against the Gun Box in Bsihenpur. The Japanese Army Air Force made four air raids on the Gun Box position in Bishenpur in the first ten days of May. There was good reason for this, for at Gun Box the 32nd Indian Brigade had concentrated its artillery support. This included four 3.7in. howitzers, eight 25-pdrs, six 6-pdrs and three A/A guns. From here the guns were able to support the infantry's actions both on and around the Silchar Track, as well as the villages on the Tiddim Road such as Potsangbam. The Japanese heavy field artillery was at Khoirentak. The 215th regiment meanwhile performed some preliminary attacks against the positions at Ngarangial. Attacks began in early May against positions between Wireless Hill and Ngarangial, with two battalions attacking from the north and one from the south. The enemy, in strong positions, withstood a series of attacks which continued until the middle of May. While Mutaguchi waited for reinforcements to arrive so he could renew his southern offensive, Generals Yamamoto and Gracey were slugging it out for control over Crete West. The extremely exhausted 3rd battalion, 213 Regiment finally made a break through against the Lynch Pimple on the 8th,  forcing the 80th Brigade to evacuate Crete West two days later. On the night of the 10th, Yamamoto launched his first attacks against Scraggy Hill, which was extensively shelled, followed by a massive infantry assault: in classic style, wave upon wave of Japanese soldiers crashed on Scraggy, overwhelming its forward defenses. A point was finally reached in the night when the British battalion commander on Scraggy felt that the hill would fall unless supporting artillery fire was directed on his own positions. This was called in and the Japanese advance finally halted on the morning of 11th. But parts of Scraggy were now under the control of Yamamoto Force, which dug in. General Scoones reacted by relieving the exhausted 20th Division with the fresher 23rd Division of General Roberts. The new arrivals were shocked to see the conditions on the forward positions of the Shenam Saddle. Scraggy stood out. The Japanese were on part of the hill, while the rest of it was under British control. Trenches and bunkers covered the feature; in places, mere meters separated the two sides' front trenches. Bits of body parts of soldiers lay everywhere and a terrible stench covered the hillside. Now Cowan was planning a counter to Mutaguchis incoming offensive. He planned for an anvil and hammer maneuver; the hammer would be the 63rd Indian Brigade recently relieved from Sekmai in the first week of May by the 89th Indian Brigade. They would push down from Bishenpur towards Potsangbam, Ningthoukhong and even further south while the 48th Brigade established a roadblock on the Tiddim Road around Torbung, deep behind enemy lines. Cowan hoped to crush the 33rd Division along the road between his hammer and anvil while also cutting off the incoming Japanese reinforcements. Thus Brigadier Ronald Cameron's 48th Brigade stealthily advanced south along the eastern shore of Lake Loktak, crossed the Manipur River at Shuganu. It was a long grueling march. Simultaneously, Brigadier Guy Burton's 63rd Brigade advanced south against Potsangbam on the 10th. In their frustrated push southwards on the Tiddim Road, Burton's men had to deal first with the determined Japanese defense of Potsangbam. Burton took over on the 9th from Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade, which had gained a foothold in the village the day before and was now to give its full attention to the Silchar Track. The 63rd Indian Brigade put in a first attack on Potsangbam on 10th. This involved two Gurkha battalions, each supported by a troop of tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. The area they targeted was the main part of the village east of the Tiddim Road. The initial full frontal attacks failed to make much progress. Burton then changed tack against the Japanese, who had withdrawn to their main defenses south of the Potsangbam turel. He called for a heavy artillery bombardment from the same direction as before in the northern half of Potsangbam to make it appear that he was repeating the previous line of attack. Except this time he instructed one of his battalions to pass secretly behind the other and make for the area to the immediate east of the road. The move worked and the road through the village and its immediate vicinity were captured by the 15th. The Tiddim Road through Potsangbam was now open, although the Japanese still held on in parts of the village. But it had all taken much longer than expected. While the anvil at Torbung was about to be put in place, the hammer had only inched forward. After a long and difficult march, the brigade arrived near Torbung in mid-May. The roadblock was set up on 17th where three nullahs crossed the road near Milestone 33. To the east were several low-lying hills where brigade headquarters was established, centered on one called Point 3404. The sluggish Khuga River flowed between the hills and the road. In the Torbung sector, the Americas surprised Lt. Colonel Matsuki of the 33rd Supply Regiment, who was given the mission of reopening the line of communications using whatever troops were available in the immediate area. A composite company from the 33rd Supply Regiment, which had been deployed in the Mountainous area west of Churachandpur, held Hill 4358 against several enemy attacks. On the night of 17th, approximately 100 men of the 33rd Supply Regiment were gathered from rear elements to make the first attack on the roadblock. The attacking group was mounted on trucks and the leaders miscalculating the location of the enemy position drove squarely up to the roadblock and the entire attacking unit was virtually annihilated. Mutaguchi reacted furiously to this by unleashing artillery fire upon Point 3404 and the roadblock from the surrounding hills. Cameron's guns responded with retaliatory fire. Simultaneously Mutaguchi tossed his 1st battalion, 67th regiment against the Torbung roadblock, but Cameron's men held on inflicting tremendous casualties against the Japanese. Meanwhile Burton unleashed an attack against the hills immediately west of the road in the hopes of cutting off the supply line of the 214th and 215th Regiments. The 63rd rigade set off on 18th; the next day it had captured the villages of Tokpa Khul and Kha Aimol, and near them Three Pimple Hill and OP Hill respectively. This directly threatened the 33rd Divisions HQ at Laimanai. Mutaguchi reacted by abandoning the assaults from the west and south, and redirected the 215th Regiment to deal with Burton's 63rd division. All three of Sasahara's battalions were thrown into the counterattack, the first of which went in on the 20th. Another major assault was made two days later; both were driven off. The Japanese lost over 110 men. But they persisted and put in further attacks over the next week, frustrating any further movement southwards for the 63rd Indian Brigade. The Japanese failed to clear Burton's position, their relentless attacks would completely pin down the 63rd Brigade, thus preventing any further movement southwards.  Now at this point the 32nd Brigade had managed to recapture Wireless Hill, prompting Mutaguchi to abandon Potsangbam by the 24th. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment and 2nd battalion, 213th Regiment fell back to Ningthoukhong. Mutaguchi then tossed another battalion to help out in the attack against Burton's 63rd division. Without further support of the hammer, Cameron's anvil force had to repel a coordinated tank-infantry attack on the 21st and again on the 23rd. The 2nd Battalion, 154th Infantry Regiment and a composite company from the 14th Tank Regiment attacked on the 21st and again on the 23rd but were not only unsuccessful in dislodging the enemy, but also suffered extremely heavy losses. Two tanks were destroyed during these attacks. Though the anvil held firm, Burton's failed attempts to continue the push south would ultimately force Cameron to abandon the roadblock and head back.  On May 24th, the 48th Brigade was fighting through Bishenpur heading up the road finally linking up with the other brigade around Potsangbam. Thus the Torbung roadblock was an enormous success for Cowan, his men had inflicted 500 casualties and disrupted Mutaguchi's plan completely. Now Mutaguchi chose to go ahead with only part of his original plan, the attack from the north that would be carried out by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi's 214th regiment. To oversee the Bishenpur offensive,  Major-General Tanaka Nobuo was appointed in command of the 33rd Division. Leaving Bungte on the night of the 19th, Sakuma's 1st battalion advanced south to attack Bishenpur from the north, while the 2nd battalion moved north from Wainen and attacked Hill 2926. Yet as they tried to storm Point 2926, they were beaten off by a platoon of the 7/10th Baluchs. Failing to take the peak, they captured the southern part of the feature and parts of the adjacent Maibam village. The 1st battalion proceeded with their assault against Bishenpur targeting the area at the northern end of the village, near the junction between the Tiddim Road and the Silchar Track. This is also the area where the Gun Box was. Once they had managed to infiltrate the road junction area, however, the Japanese were repeatedly counter-attacked in the next few days, British tanks firing on their positions at close range. Without any anti-tank guns and the British tanks firing on their positions at close range, they were ultimately wiped out.  Back over with the 2nd Battalion, they had successfully captured Maibam village and Hill 2926, very close to Cowan's headquarters, so the British would have to direct several reinforcements to lay siege on these enemy positions. Early on the 26th, Sakuma directed a composite company to launch a last charge on Bishenpur from the north, but this attack would also end in failure. Cowan then directed the brigade-strength Woodforce to evict the Japanese from Hill 2926.  Woodforce consisted of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade's HQ, commanded by Brigadier Woods and was a composite force of tanks, artillery, sappers and infantry. Taking over the front on the 26th, Woodforce mounted robust counter-attacks over the next two days, finally overcoming all opposition and recapturing the hill and Maibam by the 29th. With most of the 33rd Division fighting to reopen the Tiddim road at Torbung, Sakuma's 214th Regiment was left to extricate itself as best it could. But the fall of the Torbung roadblock on the 24th also allowed Mutaguchi's reinforcements to finally reinforce Ningthoukong in preparation for an attack on Potsangbam.  At this point, the balance of power had shifted very definitely to the allies. Sakuma's early success at Hill 2926 was the closest any Japanese would get to Imphal from the south. Meanwhile General Yamamoto's attacks against the Shenam Saddle resumed on the 20th, with his men rushing the crest of Scraggy in waves throwing gelignite bombs and grenades, but ultimately getting pushed back each time. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion, 51st regiment and 1st battalion, 60th regiment began an attack against Gibraltar, a very steep hill along the saddle. Their initial attacks were repelled easily, but on the night of the 23rd they managed to gain a foothold on Gibraltar's crest and this in effect cut off the 37th Indian brigade at Malta and Scraggy. With the Fourteenth Army units on Malta and Scraggy cut off, the fate of the entire Shenam Saddle now hung in the balance, but the very next day the hill was recovered by a counter-attack led by the 5/6th Rajputana Rifles and 3/10th Gurkha Rifles. Gibraltar would be the farthest the Japanese would be able to advance on the Shenam Saddle and the closest they came to breaking through; and from then on, a stalemate developed with neither side making any important moves. After the Japanese had been evicted from Gibraltar on the 24th, they did not follow up with another major attempt to push through the Shenam Saddle for a fortnight. But there was never really a quiet moment on these heights. Sniper fire was ever-present, as was the booming of artillery guns. The situation was the worst on Scraggy, where both sides continued to maintain their respective positions. The British and Indian units here would be fired on from Nippon Hill, besides being subjected to rifle fire, mortaring and grenade attacks from Scraggy itself. To the north, General Brigg's resumed his counteroffensive against Molvom, tossing his 9th Brigade into a series of attacks against the Japanese held Hump. The infantry put in several attacks against the Hump, suffering increasing casualties. The men of the 3/14th Punjabis attacked Hump at least half a dozen times that month. Despite it all, the Japanese were still found in their bunkers at the end of May. Sited on the reverse slopes of Hump, their bunkers were difficult to target by guns firing from the other side. Even when they were hit, they were so solidly built that they suffered little damage. The defenders of Hump would wait until the 3/14th Punjabis neared the crest; they would then let loose a barrage of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks. Attack after attack had to be called off in the face of such furious resistance. Though heavy artillery and mortar fire and repeated air strikes were called in on it, the tenacious Japanese defenders would successfully repel all British-Indian attacks throughout early May.  On the other side, realizing the vital need for artillery support, General Yamauchi decided to bring to the front the field guns that had been left east of the Chindwin River. He also was reinforced with the 2nd Battalion, 67th Regiment, which would seize Lamu on May 10th, securing the rear of the 15th Division. On the 15th, thanks to the timely arrival of the 89th and 123rd Brigades, Briggs was able to renew his assaults in front of Sekmai with greater intensity, finally clearing Kanglatongbi and the hills to the immediate east six days later.  Colonel Matsumura responded by creating new defensive positions around Modbung. As the month came to a close, Briggs decided to concentrate both his division's brigades on the Imphal–Kohima Road. The 9th Indian Brigade was to be brought on to the road, swapping places with the 89th Indian Brigade, which would move to the Iril River Valley. The opening of the Imphal–Kohima Road was a far greater priority than clearing the Mapao– Molvom Range. The Japanese defenders of the latter would be left where they had hung on for weeks. In any case, the opening of the road was likely to encourage them much more to leave than any direct attacks on their positions.  On May 15th Yamauchi was relieved of his command. Yamauchi had really drawn the short end of the straw. As he admitted at the time, his men simply had no answer to the British tanks. His men had thrown themselves into the jungle as lightly as possible in order to strike Imphal quickly, so they did not have effective anti-tank weapons. Ymauchi's division was always the Japanese weak spot, but they valiantly had refused to lift their roadblock at Kanglatongbi. As a last desperate throw, Yamauchi had ordered the use of poison gas. Yamauchi was also a man who understood how strong the allies were, especially America. Unlike the xenophobic and ignorant Tojo and Mutaguchi, Yamauchi had spent time in the USA and this led him to be quite pessimistic. Regardless, without anti-tank weapons it was quite hopeless. Yamauchi was carried from the battlefield on a litter and would later die in a hospital in Maymyo. Back over at Kohima, Generals Stopford and Grover were continuing their counteroffensive. Brigadiers 4th Brigade were occupying Oaks Hill when on May 1st, they began to descend during  The Royal Scots stopped their advance and reoccupied Oaks Hill, the brigade artillery back in Jotsoma was on standby to pound any Japanese positions the Norfolks, who were pressing on down the ridge, encountered. The Japanese, alert now to the dangerous presence of enemy troops above them, moved up against Oaks Hill and fought hard to expel the Royal Scots during that first night, with no success. The morning that followed a night of screaming, fear-inducing attacks found the jungle undergrowth littered with Japanese bodies. It was usual practice for the Japanese to take away their dead and wounded, but on this occasion there were too few Japanese survivors for the task. As the Royal Scots repelled numerous enemy counterattacks, the Norfolks were continuing their descent towards the GPT ridge. On May 4th, the Norfolks found themselves in a good position to assault the crests of the ridge. They stormed up catching the Japanese by surprise, managing to seize numerous bunkers. At the same time, the 161st Brigade was able to seize the area southeast of Two Tree Hill, but the Japanese had a complex bunker system there preventing them from linking Jotsoma with Pulebadze. The bunker complex on GPT Ridge was much more substantial than the British had expected, with literally dozens of small, carefully sited bunkers littering the entire area with interlocking arcs of fire, while the entire position was also covered by Japanese machine guns further to the east on the Aradura Spur. No sooner would one be discovered and attacked, than another would open up against the attackers from somewhere else. Until the entirety of GPT Ridge was cleared, Goschen's brigade could not enjoy the shortcut through to Jotsoma via Two Tree Hill; the road to Imphal remained in Japanese hands and their machine guns continued to spray fire on 6th Brigade's exposed right flank. Within the center the 6th Brigade was attacking Kuki Piquet and FSD Hill. While the attack against Kuki Piquet was not seeing much progress, they did gain a toehold atop FSD Hill. Further north, the 5th Brigade were able to bypass the 138th regiments position on Merema Ridge. They managed to secure a small part of Naga Village by the end of the day. Being close in proximity to General Sato's HQ, the response from the Japanese was a series of fierce counterattacks. THe 33rd battalion, 14th regiment stormed the Cameron Highlanders who did not have time to consolidate their success by digging in, and heavy Japanese mortar fire at daylight forced the Jocks back to the western edge of the hill. Here Hawkins had them dig to secure the ground that had been seized and the Worcesters, who had protected the flanks of the night advance, were called up to help build a defensive position able to resist counterattack. The rain was by now constant. Everyone was drenched to the skin. The next morning the Japanese Air Force made one of their occasional forays into the deep valley that flowed out of the Kohima Ridge westward, but to limited effect.  Meanwhile Brigadier Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's newly arrived 33rd Brigade was in the process of reinforcing the exhausted 6th Brigade at Kohima Ridge, with preparations being made for a renewed general counteroffensive. Meanwhile, over on Pulebadze on the 6th, B Company of the Norfolks, commanded by Captain Jack Randle, was ordered to seize the remaining part of the bunker position at the bottom of GPT Ridge, while the 4/lst Gurkhas of , assisting the breakthrough in the center against Kohima Ridge and Jail Hill, were to attack the lower, western slopes of GPT Ridge. In these attacks the Norfolks were to seize the remaining Japanese bunkers but at high cost, in which Capt. Randle was awarded the posthumous VC.  The Norfolks remained in the positions they had seized and, after a night of heavy rain, a further attempt to attack the remaining Japanese positions was made at first light on the morning of 7 May by the 4/lst Gurkhas and the Royal Scots. It was important that this operation was successful, as at 10.30am an attempt was to be made by the 1st Queen's - part of 33rd Indian Brigade, who had arrived at Kohima exhausted and malaria-ridden from Arakan the day before - on Jail Hill. If the machine-gun nests on GPT Ridge could be wiped out before the Queen's attacked they would enjoy a much higher chance of success. The only result of this failed assault would be the death of Brigadier Goschen, shot by snipers.  The Queen's, aware that 4th Brigade had not managed to secure GPT Ridge, nevertheless went in against Jail Hill as planned and were slaughtered. In retrospect the attack was premature, but Stopford continued to demand speed to remove the Japanese stranglehold on Kohima in order to relieve beleaguered Imphal. There was a belief in some higher quarters - held in particular by those whose only experience of the terrain came from reading a map in the comfort of a headquarters tent in the rear - that 2nd Division's offensive lacked pace. These accusations were preposterous to the hard-pressed men on the ground. It was impossible for commanders and staff officers in the rear who could not see the ground to understand how a small piece of jungle-topped hillside could absorb the best part of a brigade; how a small group of well-sited bunkers could hold up an advance until every single one - together with every single occupant - had been systematically destroyed; how only medium artillery could penetrate the roof of a Japanese trench; how only direct and short-range sniping by Lee/Grant tanks was guaranteed to defeat a Japanese bunker; how the desperate terrain, incessant rain and humidity led even the fittest men to tire quickly and what an extraordinarily determined opponent they faced. With few exceptions, the Japanese gave in only when they were dead. Every conscious man who could lift a weapon fought until he collapsed.  Due to these defeats, the British-Indian morale plummeted, even though Sato's men were also facing a serious supply problem that was further weakening them with each passing day.  Nevertheless, the Japanese continued a brave defense under heavy artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment. Sato's defensive technique, while it was not going to enable him to break through Kohima by dint of offensive action, was designed to do the next best thing: to draw the enemy onto defences of great complexity and depth and to break them there, both physically and morally. In so doing his troops had to withstand the sort of conditions few other soldiers in history could have survived. They did so, and very nearly succeeded in persuading Stopford that battering through Kohima was an impossible task. Between the 4th and the 'Black 7th', for instance, the 38 3.7in. mountain guns dug in around Jotsoma fired over 3,000 rounds, the 48 25-pdrs fired over 7,000 rounds and the big 5.5in. guns of the medium artillery fired more than 1,500 shells at the Japanese positions, not to mention the almost continuous salvoes from the 3in. mortars of the infantry battalions and the constant strafing and bombing by Hurricanes and Vengeance dive-bombers. For the next few days, General Stopford's brigades were slowly reducing the Japanese defenses. British progress, though slow, remained sure, even though it seemed to the troops on the ground as if this battle would go on for ever. 4th Brigade cleared GPT Ridge on 11 May, by which time further costly attacks by the British 6th and 33rd Indian Brigades had finally forced the Japanese to relinquish their hold on Pimple, FSD and Jail hills, the latter of which was captured by the Queen's and C Company, 4/lst Gurkha Rifles. The tide was slowly - and painfully - beginning to turn. On the days that followed, the positions seized on 11 and 12 May were carefully consolidated, the remaining Japanese being exterminated one by one, sniper by sniper and gun by gun. The Berkshires cleared FSD Hill on 12 May, discovering that the Japanese had honeycombed the hill with tunnels, creating an elaborate underground fortress that included a battalion headquarters, repair shop, ammunition storage dump and hospital. Those Japanese bunkers on the western edge of the ridge that remained out of reach of the British artillery could now be engaged directly and at pointblank range by the Lee/Grants, trundling up the road that divides DIS and Jail hills. They did so to the cheers of the British and Indian infantry, who found themselves hugging the ground as the 75mm smashed the enemy foxholes only metres from them, the ground shaking and the shockwave of the blast sucking out their breath and showering them with dirt and debris. The capture of the southern part of Kohima Ridge a full 37 days after the arrival of Sato's units would force the Japanese to retreat to a secondary defensive line north of Aradura. On the 15th, patrols of the 5th Brigade advanced down from Naga Hill, securing Treasury Hill before meeting up with the exhausted victors of Kohima Ridge who were advancing along the Imphal road. Yet that is all for the India front, as we now need to jump back over to check out what is going on with Operation Ichi-Go. After the fall of Xuchang, General Uchiyama dispatched some units south to attack Luohe, while the bulk of his 12th Army advanced north to capture Luoyang and hopefully annihilate General Enbo's 31st Army Group. On May 2nd, General Uchiyama dispatched the 110th Division against Dengfeng, the 62nd Division against Yuzhou and the bulk of his 37th Division, 3rd armored division and 4th cavalry Brigade against Jia and Ruzhou. On 2nd, the 4th Cavalry Brigade defeated the enemy force in the sector southwest of Yingchiaochen and, on the 4th, advanced to the sector northwest of Linju. The 3rd Armored Division routed the retreating enemy heading west and, on the 4th, mopped up the enemy in the vicinity of Linju. Also on the 4th, the 37th Division arrived at Linju. On the same day, the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade occupied Hsiangcheng. on the 3rd the 62nd defeated the 29th Army at Yuzhou while the 3rd Armored Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade pursued the retreating Chinese towards Ruzhou. On the 4th, Uchiyama's main forces were able to capture Ruzhou and the 110th Division managed to dislodge the 13th Army's position east of Dengfeng. After this Uchiyama's main forces enveloped the area, annihilating the 13th and 29th Armies at Dengfeng while the 62nd and 110th Divisions made a frontal assault of the city. Alongside this the 7th Independent Mixed Brigade attacked the enemy near Likouzhen. Yet before Uchiyama's men could complete the envelopment, General Enbo's men pulled out towards Tangjiezhen and Changshuixiang around midnight on the 5th. On the 7th, the 37th Division and 7th Brigade managed to envelop Tangjiezhen, and with air support inflicted heavy casualties on the outflanked defenders. Simultaneously, the 27th Division captured Luohe and Suipin. General Yokoyama had dispatched the 11th Independent Brigade to aid Uchiyamas men from the south, facing little resistance as they captured Queshan and Zhumadian before linking up with the 27th Division on the 11th.  On the other side, General Jiang Dingwen's 1st War Area Army was regrouping the bulk of its forces along the Luoyang-Yiyang line. General Okamura Ysuji ordered the 12th Army to advance upon Luoyang while Lt General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 1st Army crossed the Yellow River to try and cut off the Chinese retreat at Xin'An and Xiashichiang. Having defeated the enemy in the sector southwest of Dengfeng, the 12th Army continued to keep the enemy in the Loyang area under strict observation while, at the same time, it ordered the 110th Division to pursue the enemy toward Iyang, the 62nd Division to pursue them toward Pingteng, the main force of the 3rd Armored Division toward Iyang and Hsinan and the 4th Cavalry Brigade to the western sector of Pingteng. Okamura dispatched his reserve 63rd Division led by Lt General Nozoe Masanori to try and break through at Sishuizhen so they could join the attack upon Luoyang. They were successful and in the process, defeated the 177th Division and managed to reach the northeastern sector of Luoyang by the 12th. With assistance from the 59th Brigade coming from the west, Nozoe captured Xin'an by the 14th. The 62nd Division and the 4th Cavalry Brigade captured Pingdengxiang on the 13th and part of the 110th Division captured Yiyang on the 14th. Most of the 110th Division, however, moved to Lungmenchieh below Luoyang. The 3rd Armored Division also reached the area southwest of Lungmenchieh at this point. The 37th Division, meanwhile, was directed to move towards Sunghsien. These actions effectively enveloped Luoyang as Uchiyama had his 110th Division advance through the Luohe River Valley; Yoshimoto's men advance to Sanmenxia which would fall by the 18th. The 37th Division captured Song alongside the aidromes at Luoning and Lushi by the 20th. But the main effort would be made by the 63rd Division assisted by elements o the 110th Division who launched the assault against Luoyang, being defended by the 36th Army Group. On the 19th, the 63rd Division initiated its attack against enemy positions on the outskirts of Loyang, however, the enemy positions were so strong that the battle situation did not progress as planned. As a result of this the North China Area Army ordered the 12th Army to place the main force of the 3rd Armored Division and 4th Cavalry Brigade together with part of the 110th Division under the command of the 63rd Division commander. At the same time, the 63rd Division was ordered to defend the railway east of Mienchih. At 1pm on the 23rd, the 12th Army dispatched the 63rd Division to attack Luoyang Castle from the north and northeastern fronts of Luoyang to the northeastern corner of the castle while the 3rd Armored Division was to attack the castle from the western front toward the northwestern corner of the castle. The Army also directed the Cavalry Brigade to capture and destroy the enemy which it was expected would flee to the south at the line of the Lo Ho. On the 24th, the Army-called on the enemy in Luoyang to surrender but they refused. At 1pm, therefore, the Army opened its attack and, on the 25th, completely occupied the castle. During this battle, Lieutenant-General Li Jiayu would heroically die covering the retreat of the remaining troops of his battered 36th Army Group. With the fall of Luoyang and the near destruction of the 1st War Area, Operation Kogo ended in a resounding success for the Japanese, thus securing the South Beijing-Hankou railway. The Japanese estimated over 32000 Chinese casualties and some 7800 troops captured. In turn, they claimed to have lost only 2000 casualties. Interestingly, Operation Kogo also saw the Henan peasants attack the Kuomintang forces in revenge for the Yellow River flood of 1938 and the Henan Famine of 1942. As told to us by General Jiang Dingwen "During the campaign, the unexpected phenomenon was that the people of the mountains in western Henan attacked our troops, taking guns, bullets, and explosives, and even high-powered mortars and radio equipment... They surrounded our troops and killed our officers. We heard this pretty often. The heads of the villages and baojia (village mutual-responsibility groups) just ran away. At the same time, they took away our stored grain, leaving their houses and fields empty, which meant that our officers and soldiers had no food for many days… Actually this is truly painful for me to say: in the end the damages we suffered from the attacks by the people were more serious than the losses from battles with the enemy." In the end, the peasants would be able to disarm over 50000 troops, picking their weapons to defend themselves from the Japanese, but also causing much damage to the Nationalist defense. For their role in this disaster, Generals Dingwen and Enbo would be relieved from their commands, with General Chen Cheng later taking over the 1st War Area in July to oversee its recovery. Meanwhile, the Japanese would continue to prepare for Operation Togo, the Hunan offensive. Yet to finish off this episode we also need to mention some progress in the future plans to invade Wakde. Admiral King had requested support from the British Eastern Fleet. At this time the Eastern Fleet was organized into three forces for Operation Transom, the invasion of Japanese occupied Surabaya. Force 65 consisted of Battleships Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, the French battleship Richelieu, two cruisers and eight destroyers, under the direct command of Admiral Somerville; Force 66 consisted of aircraft carriers Illustrious, Saratoga, two cruisers and six destroyers, under the command of Rear-Admiral Clement Moody aboard Illustrious. Force 67 was the replenishment group and comprised six tankers, a water distilling ship and the cruisers London and Suffolk. Somerville commanded the entire fleet from Queen Elizabeth. The warships were drawn from six navies, the capital ships being accompanied by three American destroyers, four British cruisers and three destroyers, four Australian destroyers, a Dutch cruiser and destroyer and a New Zealand cruiser. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Adelaide also sailed from Fremantle in Western Australia to protect the tankers while they were at Exmouth Gulf; this allowed their two escorting cruisers to augment Force 66 during the attack. Two squadrons of Supermarine Spitfire fighters were transferred from No. 1 Wing RAAF at Darwin to Exmouth Gulf to protect the Eastern Fleet while it refueled and Australian and American maritime patrol aircraft were assigned to operate offshore. Each carrier had an air group made up of units from their parent navies. Illustrious embarked two squadrons equipped with 14 Vought F4U Corsair fighters each and two squadrons with nine Avengers. Saratoga's air group comprised a squadron with 26 Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters, a squadron with 24 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and a squadron operating 18 Avenger torpedo bombers, as well as a single Hellcat allocated to the Air Group Leader. As for Surabaya, its defenses against air attack at the time of Operation Transom included a few anti-aircraft guns, whose crews were inadequately trained. Radar stations and a network of observer posts were also sited to detect minelaying aircraft. The Japanese forces stationed in the city included the Imperial Japanese Army's 28th Independent Mixed Brigade and the headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet under Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi. Because of the distance to be covered from Ceylon and the Royal Navy's lack of experience in underway replenishment, the final plans for the operation involved the Eastern Fleet refueling at Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia before striking Surabaya. Force 67 was the first element of the Eastern Fleet to sail, departing on April 30th. Forces 65 and 66 sailed on May 6th. The Allied ships proceeded to Exmouth Gulf on a course that kept them at least 600 miles from Japanese airfields to avoid being detected or attacked. The carriers air wings practiced the attack they would conduct on Surabaya three times during the voyage. The warships arrived at Exmouth Gulf on 14 and 15th ofMay. The Eastern Fleet departed Exmouth Gulf on the afternoon of the 15th and proceeded north. It arrived at the flying off point at 6:30 am local time on the 17th without being detected by the Japanese. One British and seven American submarines also took up positions near Surabaya, the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca and the Bali, Lombok and Sunda Straits to support the Eastern Fleet. The submarines were positioned to rescue Allied aircrew that were forced down, attack ships that tried to escape from Surabaya and intercept any Japanese warships that attempted to attack the Allied fleet. Operation Transom opened up with 76 aircraft launched from Illustrious and Saratoga. The aircraft launched by the carriers were organized into two strike forces. Force A was made up of nine Avengers from Illustrious, twelve Dauntless dive bombers and an escort of eight Corsairs. Force A's Avengers were to bomb the Braat Engineering Works and the Dauntlesses the oil refinery. Force B was to attack shipping and dock facilities in Surabaya's port. It comprised twenty-one Avengers and six Dauntlesses escorted by eight Corsairs and twelve Hellcats. The commander of Saratoga's air group, Commander Joseph C. Clifton, led both carriers' air wings during the attack. All of the aircraft were launched and formed up with the rest of their force by 7:20 am. Two British Avengers crashed during takeoff, their crews being rescued. The attack on Surabaya commenced at 8:30 am. The Japanese had not detected the aircraft as they approached, and were taken by surprise. The two forces made a well-synchronized attack, Force A approaching Wonokromo from the south and Force B attacking the port from the north. No Japanese fighter aircraft were encountered, and the anti-aircraft guns were largely ineffective. One of Saratoga's Avengers was shot down, and both members of its crew became prisoners of war. The two forces claimed to have damaged 10 ships, demolished the Wonokromo oil refinery and the Braat Engineering Works, destroyed 16 aircraft and leveled several buildings. Saratoga and her three escorting American destroyers detached from the Eastern Fleet shortly before sunset on the 18th, and proceeded to Fremantle. The remainder of the Eastern Fleet reached Exmouth Gulf the next morning, and sailed for Ceylon before sunset after refueling again. Adelaide and one of the Australian destroyers that had been attached to the Eastern Fleet left Exmouth Gulf bound for Fremantle after the tanker group departed on 19 May. The Eastern Fleet arrived back at Ceylon on the 27th. Saratoga reached Bremerton, Washington, on June 10th and after a refit re-joined the Pacific Fleet in September 1944. Though the Japanese would not really divert any forces from western New Guinea in response to the raid and despite the fact that the Japanese claim that not much damage had been inflicted on their shipping or shore facilities, with only one vessel confirmed sunk, Operation Transom would provide Somerville's Eastern Fleet important experience of carrier strike operations and exposure to superior American carrier tactics.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Allies were gradually countering Operation U-Go as the intense battles at Kohima Ridge and Pulebadze saw British-Indian forces slowly gaining ground amid heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Operation Ichi-Go saw major Japanese successes in China. Lastly Operation Transom saw British-Dutch-American successful carrier strikes against Surabaya, yielding experience despite limited damage.

Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle.  This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea.  Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful.  By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing.  The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost.   Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June.  Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps.  On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines.  Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.  On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina.  On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions.  As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline.   After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

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Last time we spoke about Operation Thursday and the ferocious counteroffensive on Bougainville. The Chindits embarked on their second great raid, this time better equipped, better trained and more numerous than ever. With a literal armada of beasts of burden they marched through Burma, forded the Chindwin and began attacking and establishing strongholds. This was all done in coordination with Slim and Stilwell's forces, trying to break the Japanese and gradually seize back lost territory. Wingate had his work cut out for him as the Chindits were providing real results, yet unfortunately he would not have long to see them. Wingate was killed in a B-25 crash and it felt like the personality of the Chindits left with him. Over on Bougainville the Japanese tossed as much as they could to try and break through the Americans perimeter to hit the airfield, but it was all for naught.  This episode is the Bombing of Hollandia and Palau  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Brewer saw General MacArthur tossing cavalrymen against the eastern side of Los Negros. General Swift's 1st Cavalry Division successfully landed on Los Negros and managed to secure Seedler Harbor quickly. After this, General Chase's 1st Brigade was given the task of mopping up the island. By march 11th daily patrols had determined that the entire area from the Mokerang Peninsula to Southeast Point and as far west as Porlaka was generally free of the enemy. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry pushed its perimeter at Momote west and south to the water barriers of Lemondrol Creek and Ihon Lagoon. The 12th Cavalry beachhead at Salami continuously patrolled into the interior and encountered so few Japanese that it was clear the enemy lacked sufficient numbers to harass the troops on the peninsula. West of Lemondrol Creek  was a completely different story. While the troops holding the beachheads from Lombrum to Papitalai waited for supply channels to be established, they probed to locate the center of enemy resistance. The 12th Cavalry was responsible for the beachheads at Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. The 2nd Squadron had captured Papitalai Mission and on the 11th the 1st Squadron took over Lombrum Point, relieving the 7th Cavalry so they could attack Manus Island. The 5th Cavalry held the Papitalai perimeter with Troop F. When that regiment extended its control over the area east of Lemondrol and Porharmenemen Creeks on the 11th, the 2nd Squadron moved into the Porlaka area while the 1st Squadron on the left flank was concentrated near Southeast Point. It was planned that the 12th Cavalry would do most of its fighting in the northern sector moving inland from the coastal positions to cut oil the Japanese hammered at by the 5th Cavalry as it pushed west on both sides of Lemondrol Creek. Since the 8th, every Troop F patrol from Papitalai had run into enemy resistance in the hilly country to the west. Although small patrols of squad size or slightly larger were held up day after day by resistance about 800 yards west of Papitalai, these first encounters did not reveal the full strength of the enemy pocket. When an attack by a platoon of Troop E, reinforced by two tanks, two bazookas, and flamethrowers, was repulsed on the 11th, the strength of the enemy strongpoint became clearer. The enemy was well dug in along the ridge, marked by a series of knobs, running west from Papitalai. The highest point, Hill 260, about 2,500 yards from Papitalai, not to be mistaken for Hill 260 on Bougainville by the way, this was probably the center of the enemies defense. However, on two knobs east of 260, well-defended outposts prevented any movement farther into the interior. The position 800 yards from Papitalai which had repulsed Troop E was defended by a platoon with knee mortars and at least 3 machine guns. The total enemy strength facing the 5th Cavalry was estimated at 150 to 200 Japanese.  Now that was the ongoings of Los Negros, but Brigadier General Verne Mudge's 2nd Brigade was now preparing to invade Manus island. American intelligence was unsure of the disposition of the enemy on Manus. A rough estimate was that 2700 Japanese were concentrated there and would most likely make a stand at Lorengau. The Americans expected the Japanese would put up a last losing fight. But because of the lack of knowledge of their numbers and disposition on the largest island of the Admiralties, this would require careful planning for the invasion. Fighting into the interior where the mountain range would provide defensive positions and through the swampy forests covering the rest of the island would not be easy. There were only 4 roads winding about the island and converging at Lorengau would be suitable for moving vehicles, and long stretches of these red-clay roads would be impassable in rainy weather. Surrounding jungle and swamps would confine any large-scale movement to the roads. Therefore, the plan was to pin the enemy to the coast where it was hoped he had concentrated his main strength. Mudge planned to land Troops A and C of the 8th cavalry regiment at the Yellow beaches of Lugos Mission. When the 8th Cavalry had secured a beachhead, including the Lugos Mission itself, each squadron would advance east, the 1st Squadron along the coast using the Number Three Road, and the 2nd along an inland road known as the Number One Road, to execute a wide sweep toward Lorengau. If a sizeable garrison was concentrated at fortified Lorengau, the inland arm of this attack would prevent the enemy from escaping along the only road leading west to the mountain areas. Prior to the assault, 3 patrols had been sent to Bear Point on Manus and on the islands of Butjo Luo and Hauwei. Mudge planned to deploy artillery at these places to aid in his assault. Bear Point was found to have no enemy, but unfortunately it was not a suitable place for artillery placement. The northern island of Butjo Luo was an excellent site for artillery and was found to be unoccupied. Hauwei would turn out to be another story. The American  patrol moved out from Salami on an LCV and a PT boat, landing without opposition on the western end of the island. Major Carter S. Vaden of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, threw two grenades into a well camouflaged bunker about 10 yards from the beach and the party progressed inland. Immediately after the grenade explosions, a mortar shell landed on the beach in the rear of the party. From three sides, machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire opened up. Fortunately, the grenades had evidently sprung a planned ambush prematurely and the party was not cut off from the rear. Using their submachine guns, the men of the patrol were able to hold back the enemy. They were aided by some supporting fire from the PT Boat and the .30-caliber machine gun of the LCV. After 2 and a half hours they managed to withdraw to the water's edge. The PT boat had returned to its tender after the commanding officer was wounded, and the coxswain of the LCV shouted and motioned for the cavalrymen to get on board, but only five of them reached the boat, as the others were engaged with the enemy on shore. The LCV had troubles of its own; enemy mortar and machine-gun fire found its range and wounded all on board except two. Then the LCV grounded on submerged coral and sank 200 yards offshore after receiving a direct hit from a mortar. The wounded men, put into lifejackets, floated about in the water. When the remaining members of the patrol on shore were wading out toward the LCV, 6 Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun on the beach. The men cut them down with their submachine guns. Still under fire, the cavalrymen swam out to the survivors of the LCV, making a group of 18 men out in the water. Failing to attract the notice of the destroyers nearby, the tired men had to stay in the water for 3 hours until a PT boat picked them up. At the same time a destroyer closed in to the island to draw hostile fire and bombard enemy positions on the western end. Hauwei was going to need extra help to be secured. The 2nd Squadron, 7th cavalry departed from Lombrum Point on the 11th and landed on Butjo Luo. The next day, Destroyer gunfire and rockets as well as 105-mm concentrations from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang point battered Hauwei. Then Kittyhawks of the 77th Pursuit Squadron at Momote airfield bombed and strafed the Hauwei. After all of this, the 2nd Squadron landed on Hauwei meeting slight resistance at the beach. They advanced 300 yards further inland where they became pinned down by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The Japanese were firing upon them from some bunkers, prompting the 2nd Squadron to dig in and allow the artillery teams to hit them throughout the night. During the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion from the north end of Mokerang Plantation fired 1,000 rounds to harass the enemy. This fire was directed so accurately and carefully that it was brought down on the enemy within 100 yards of the cavalrymen's positions without any casualties to our troops, and helped minimize enemy activity during the night.  At 10am on the 13th, with the support of a medium tank, the cavalrymen stormed the bunkers along the edges of the island. The Japanese put up a valiant fight, but they lacked anti-tank weaponry. By 12pm, the 2nd Squadron successfully mopped up the enemy, suffering 8 deaths and 46 wounded. They estimated they had killed 43 Japanese who were all naval personnel. Having secured the two islands, now one artillery battalion set up at Butjo Luo and two others upon Hauwei. The next day at 7:00am the 3 artillery battalions opened fire upon the Lorengau Township area. This target was chosen to divert the enemy's attention from the landing beaches around Lugos Mission. Meanwhile 4 destroyers bombarded Lorengau with their 5-inch guns. Then 18 B-25's from  Nadzab bombed and strafed the Lugos Mission and the beach areas until H - 5 minutes. Between 9:07 and 9:25, they dropped 81 500-pound bombs, strafed with more than 44,000 rounds of machine-gun fire, and cleared the target just as the troops were coming ashore.   The 8th cavalry departed Salami, heading for the Yellow Beaches covered by 3 rocket boats. The wave of buffaloes drew up to the beaches, and it appeared that they were going to make it without opposition until an enemy machine gun opened up from east of the landing beaches. Immediately the buffaloes responded with their own machine-gun fire, and two PT boats closed in to support. With 100 rounds from a flak boat added to this fire the machine gun was silenced. Two waves of landing craft followed the buffaloes to the shore in rapid succession and the narrow beaches, backed either by jungle or a high bluff, were soon congested with assault troops. On the eastern beach, Troop A began a vigorous drive toward Lugos Mission and the Number Three Road leading to the Lorengau airdrome. Captain Raymond J. Jennings, led the troops to storm the bluff where Lugos Mission was located and overran the mission before the few Japanese who had survived the bombardment could put up effective opposition. The men worked their way into the mission compound and cleared out the area with grenades. Troop A was soon on its way along Number Three Road leaving behind it, some 20 dead SNLF, without the loss of a single cavalryman. Meanwhile Troop C advanced west 800 yards to a ridge where they stopped and dug in, having accomplished their mission of establishing a defensive perimeter to protect the landing of successive elements. Other waves of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons began landing ashore as the 7th cavalry took up the beachhead. The 2nd squadron advanced over some ridges towards the Number One Road, while Troop A reduced enemy bunkers progressing roughly a mile from the beach. By 11:20am, they came across 3 mutually-supporting bunkers that halted their advance. It took Troop B's support alongside artillery and aerial bombardment to destroy the bunkers to they could advance. Meanwhile the 1st Squadron emerged out of the jungle into a clearing at 5pm, where they occupied a ridge overlooking the southern edge of the airdrome, where they would dig in. The 2nd Squadron reached Number One Road, where they ran into 3 bunkers. The following morning with tank support the squadron overran the bunkers and advanced northeast towards Lorengau. The cavalrymen would destroy 7 bunkers during their trek, before halting 100 yards before Lorengau. To the north, Troop A was clearing a coconut grove north of the airstrip, from which Japanese snipers were harassing them throughout the night. Troop C advanced along the southern edge near the airstip where they came across another pack of bunkers. Since the snipers north of the strip had been cleared out by noon, an attack could be made in the open. Troop B, supported by light tanks on their left advanced down the strip, followed by Troop D and the squadron HQ. Troop A advanced across the strip and then east along the north edge. By 1:00pm Troop C managed to destroy two bunkers using grenades, forcing the Japanese inhabitants to flee out into the open where they were cut down. Troop C then was about to dash across the airstrip when they suddenly became pinned down by friendly fire from Troop B who were trying to disengage the enemy before them. The 1st squadron suffered 9 deaths and 19 wounded during the action. Mudge then ordered them to relieve Troop C, who were holding some high ground south of the airstrip.  On the morning of the 17th after extensive naval and artillery bombardment, Mudge launched a coordinated attack with the 2nd Squadron advancing south of the airstrip and the 1st Squadron assaulting the bunkers that had held up the 8th cavalry's advance. The bombardments had nearly annihilated the bunkers, allowing the 1st squadron to face only slight resistance. They soon attacked a secondary Japanese position further east upon a ridge. This position was also met with artillery and mortar fire and would fall by 11:30am. After this the cavalrymen were able to obliterate the remaining pillboxes and advance across the pulverized airstrip. Meanwhile the 2nd Squadron of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments linked up along the Number One Road near Lorengau. The 8th Cavalry had encountered little resistance on the road, destroying whatever bunkers were encountered with the aid of fire from medium tanks. The light tank accompanying the squadron had a track blown off by the first Japanese anti tank mine encountered in the operation. By 1pm, all the front-line troops around the airstrip to Number one Road linked up forming a general advance. By this point the backbone of the enemies resistance had been broken, leaving little to resistance them. For the next 1,500 yards to the river, it took them  2 hours because the Japanese had hurriedly put in large quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They had been emplaced, however, with no prepared plan, and many were poorly camouflaged or left lying completely on the surface. The Japanese had also dug holes and refilled them without emplacing any mines. As the cavalrymen slowly made their way to the river, they suffered a few casualties from the mines. The 7th cavalry reached the Lorengau River by 3pm, from there they dispatched a reconnaissance platoon who quickly came under fire from bunkers atop some hills overlooking Lorengau. Lorengau was sheltered in a valley surrounded by jungle-covered hills rising to 400 feet. The Japanese believed an attack would come from the sea, thus many of their defenses were sited to cover the shoreline. The offshore approaches and the three roads entering the settlement from the east, south, and north were also covered by defensive positions. From the position held by the 2nd Brigade, the only approach to the town was over a sandbar at the mouth of the Lorengau River, a slow-moving stream 20 yards wide and 10 to 20 feet deep, except at the sandbar. The beach area, which the troops would then have to cross, was heavily protected. Naval demolition mines, containing 20 pounds of black powder and detonated by a master switch located in a control bunker up the hillside, covered the beach. About 100 yards inland from the beach a series of rifle pits and gun emplacements were constructed on the side of a dike which paralleled the shore. On the hills surrounding the harbor, beach, and town about a dozen heavy bunkers were used to reinforce the fires of beach defenses and to add depth to the position. As usual these bunkers were carefully camouflaged, although the concentration of naval and artillery fire as well as repeated bombings had disclosed the location of several. Mudge ordered the men to dig in for the night on the west bank of the river and establish a perimeter defense against some expected counterattacks that would not develop in the end. The next morning, after a mortar and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced down from its ridge positions to the mouth of the broad river, with its Reconnaissance Platoon leading. Upon fording the river, the cavalrymen only faced a handful of machine-guns. Facing almost no opposition, the squadron was thus able to secure Lorengau, counting 87 dead Japanese in the remains of the town.  Colonel Ezaki seemed to have disappeared during the battle over Papitalai leaving his men leaderless. The Japanese naval troops in desperation began retreating towards Rossum, with American patrols hot on their trail. There would be a furious fight down the Rossum Road. 1st Lt. James M. Concannon captured an enemy map of the area during his patrol to which he exclaimed, "Well, here goes Concannon to get himself a Purple Heart!" Lt. Concannon's platoon had been ordered to go along Number Two Road which went to Rossum and from there to Kelaua Harbor, through the heart of the Japanese defenses indicated on the captured map. Hardly had the platoon crossed the outpost line still held by Troop E along Number Two Road when it came under fire from a pair of bunkers sited to cover the track. Lieutenant Concannon and one of his men were wounded. The platoon sergeant assumed command and attempted to flank the position. When the attempt was not successful, the sergeant decided to withdraw and report, as his mission was one of reconnaissance. Upon receiving the information that the enemy was in position not 200 yards from the outpost line, Colonel Bradley directed Major Shore to send Troop A back up the track to neutralize the enemy position. The troop was reinforced with machine guns and two 37-mm antitank guns.  Troop A of the 8th cavalry were ordered to deal with the newly discovered enemy bunkers. Corporal Peter J. Armstrong and Armando V. Valencia set their heavy machine-gun in position at a range of 30 yards from one of the bunkers. Having disclosed his position by laying a continuous burst of fire on the bunker, Corporal Armstrong was wounded by sniper fire. Armstrong continued firing until a grenade knocked him unconscious. Although the gun had been hit in several places and was leaking a steady stream from its water jacket, Corporal Valencia took over and continued firing at the bunker slits until the machine-gun froze; then he fired with his submachine-gun until it was knocked out of his hands by an enemy bullet. In the meantime the mortars had obtained four direct hits on the bunkers, and the anti-tank guns had made two. Corporals Armstrong and Valencia were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and for its action during the day Troop A was given a unit citation.  After taking out the stubborn position, Troop A advanced along the road under heavy sniper fire, until they were relieved by Troop C. Troop C immediately was met with a heavy Japanese counterattack shortly after nightfall. The counterattack was launched by 8 Japanese using rifle grenades and small arms. Considering the size of the attacking force, the casualties of the troop were heavy: 2 killed and 10 wounded. All the Japanese were killed, largely due to a quick adjustment by the forward observer of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion followed by four volleys fired for effect. By this point the Americans had achieved all their objectives for the Admiralty Islands campaign, the only thing left to do was mop up the islands. The remaining IJA troops were now withdrawing across the Loniu Passage over to Manus. The 8th cavalry were soon given the task of clearing the eastern end of Manus, while the 7th cavalry would clear out the Rossum Road. Yet that is all for this campaign as we are now heading over to New Guinea. General MacArthur was planning his new Western New Guinea offensive. After the directives given on March 12th, Admiral Nimitz had been instructed to provide support for his Hollandia operation. The Japanese began their occupation of Hollandia  early in April of 1942 but paid little attention to the region for a year. Then  Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply bases east of Hollandia. In late 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese  built 3 airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak over 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there. Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch two fast carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 to conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area in order to keep their airfields neutralized. MacArthur south for the carries to support the troops for 8 days after the landings. But Nimitz believed this would put the carriers in risk, because the Japanese would be able to launch aircraft from all over the Dutch East Indies or even the Philippines. It was decided Task Force 58 would remain in the Hollandia region for only 3 days after the landings were made. As a result MacArthur opted to supplement using land-based aircraft against Hollandia. To obtain this he would need to capture an airfield in Northern New Guinea, just east of the main objective. He chose an Aitape, it was a lightly guarded area and already partially developed by the Japanese, such as the incomplete airfields around the Tadji Plantation. Once the men landed ashore at Aitape, allied forces could provide flank protection for Haollandia against any westward actions by the Japanese 18th Army. For the assault against Aitape, MacArthur planned to use the 8 escort carriers of Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph E. Daviso. Now for the amphibious assault, Admiral Kinkaid gave the job to Admiral Barbey's task force 77 who were divided into 3 attack groups. They would bring over General Eichelberger's 1st corp who would perform the Hollandia operation, codenamed Operation Reckless. I think it is a pretty suitable name for a MacArthur operation. For the Hollandia part of the operation, the 19th and 21st regiments of Major General Frederick Irving's 24th division would land at Tanahmerah Bay; the 162nd and 186th regiments of General Fuller's 41st division would land at Humboldt Bay. For the operation against Aitape, codenamed Persecution, the 163rd regiment of the 41st division led by General Doe would perform the initial landings. To soften up the enemy, General Kenny's air forces began bombing Wewak and Hansa in mid March, then in early April they began neutralizing the airfields to try and deceive General Adachi into believing they were the next allied target. Additionally, MacArthur asked Admiral Spruance to perform a carrier raid against the Palau Islands, codenamed Operation Desecrate One, followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Admiral Mitscher's carriers departed Majuro on the 22nd of March and made their way around the Carolines, trying to sneak past Truk undetected. Despite their best efforts, Japanese search planes from Truk managed to spot them on their 3rd day at sea. This prompted Admiral Spruance to advance the day of the raid from April 1st to March 30th. Meanwhile after sighting the allied naval forces, Admiral Koga ordered an evacuation of Palau, seeing a large number of warships and merchant shipping flee the area for Tawi-Tawi. The US submarines Gar, Blackfish, Tang and Archerfish were stationed to operate against the withdrawing ships and as plane guards. On the 23rd, Tunny sank the Japanese submarine I-42 and damaged the 14,850-ton tanker Iro. To the north of Palau, during an attack on the 26th, Tullibee was hit and sunk by her own circling torpedo. Bashaw torpedoed a 4,317-ton freighter escorted by the destroyers Minazuki and Yuzuki. On the 29th, the super battleship Musashi departed Palau under cover of darkness to avoid an expected air raid, and encountered Tunny, which fired six torpedoes at the battleship; five of them missed, but the sixth blew a hole 5.8 meters in diameter near the bow, flooding her with 3000 tonnes of water. The torpedo hit killed 7 crewmen and wounded another 11. After temporary repairs, Musashi sailed for Japan later that night and arrived at Kure Naval Arsenal on April 3.  On the 30th, Task Force 58 reached its assembly point 90 miles south of the Palau Islands. The Task Force was met with a Japanese air strike consisting of mostly Betty's and Oscars who were easily swept aside. Then fast carriers Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Hornet, Yorktown and Lexington launched their first air strikes against Palaus. For the next day and a half, the Americans flew hundreds of sorties over these islands, striking the airfields and shooting down all planes they could find. The attacks saw 40 Japanese ships at Palau and Angaur sunk, another 4 were badly damaged. 93 aerial victories would be won over Palau and Avengers from Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet laid extensive mines around the channels and approaches to Palau. This was the first tactical aerial mining of the Pacific War performed by carrier aircraft. In response, Admiral Koga asked for help from neighboring islands. He received 9 B6N torpedo bombers from Yap who attempted a night attack against Task Force 58 on the 31st. Unfortunately for the Japanese, 4 Hellcats from Cabot managed to intercept them, successfully shooting all of them down. Koga certainly had a lot on his plate. Due to the recent attacks against Truk and now Palau, Koga decided to transfer his HQ from the Musashi to Davao on March 31st. Most of his senior staff and cryptographers boarded 3 H8K flying boats enroute to Mindanao from Palau. All 3 of the flying boats ran straight into a typhoon just off of Cebu, two of them got lost. These flying boats were carrying Admiral Koga and Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, his chief of staff. Koga's plan would end up crashing enroute to Davao, killing all aboard. Thus another commander in chief of the IJN forces had met his end to a plane crash. The other plane carrying Fukudome crashed off the coast of Cebu. Fukudome had a harrowing experience, but escaped the aircraft and began swimming to the island. To make matters even worse, while swimming Fukudome was grabbed by Filipino guerillas who brought him over to Lt Colonel James Cushing. Cushing was a former engineer in the Philippines who helped organize a resistance movement. Now captured Fukudome was certainly a large prize, yet a even bigger one came on April 3rd. A Filipino shopkeeper named Pedro Gantuangoko spotted a box floating offshore on the 3rd and picked it up in his fishing boat. The box contained a red leather briefcase carrying the Z plan. Fukudome had assumed the box sank with the aircraft, but in a twist of fate it did not. Now while this was going on, Lt Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi had dispatched troops to search for survivors of the aircraft crash and for the box containing the Z plan. Ohnisi hundreds of Filipino villagers interrogated, tortured and killed, entire Filipino villages were burnt to the ground. Eventually Ohnisi cornered Cushing and they struck a deal. On April 10th, with Japanese forces on Cebu hot on the heels of the guerillas, the American commander, Lt-Colonel Cushing, arranged to return Fukudome and the other prisoners to the Japanese in return for a cessation of the massacre of Filipino civilians. Three days later, the Filipinos who had found the box containing Plan Z and the code book when it washed ashore, turned them over to Cushing. The codebook was recognized for what it was when the guerillas discovered the Japanese were offering a 50000 peso reward for its return. On April 27, Cushing arranged for the items to be picked up by the submarine Crevalle. Traveling mostly on the surface for speed, and diving only when needed, the submarine survived depth charging twice, finally arriving at Darwin on May 19. From there, the documents were flown to Brisbane later that day. Allied codebreakers looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the codebook, since they had been stymied by changes to the IJN code since the summer of 1942 and had not “read the enemy's mail” in any detail since the week before the Battle of Midway. The documents outlined the new strategy for the defense of the inner perimeter islands around Japan with the intention of drawing the US fleet in for a decisive showdown. The documents were sent to Admiral Nimitz and would prove extremely valuable during the Battle of the Philippines Sea. The documents were so vital, the Americans performed a covert operation sending them back to the Philippines by submarine and placed near the wreckage of the flying boat by American divers. It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of WW2. Thus Admiral Koga was dead, the Z plan fell into allied hands and the IJN was now leaderless. Koga's death would not be announced until May and he was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. Koga was promoted to Marshal Admiral posthumously and granted a state funeral. According to pilot Nagatsuka Ryuji: “The death of Admiral Koga, successor to Admiral Yamamoto, had been another shock for the Japanese nation. These distressing circumstances had forced the naval and military Chiefs of Staff to resign. They had been replaced by General Tojo and Admiral Shimada.”  Now back to the invasion, on April 1st Rear-Admiral John Reeves' carriers launched  airstrikes against Yap and Ulithi, with the three task groups then attacking Woleai. 25 American aircraft were lost, with 26 out of 44 aircrews rescued thanks to submarine Harder. Meanwhile, the fleet's Hellcats win 111 aerial victories and destroy 46 grounded aircraft on the three atolls. With this, Task Force 58 successfully removed Palau as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation. Alongside this South and Southwest Pacific land-based aircraft from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile Kenney's air forces were busy neutralizing enemy air bases in Western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by US 5th Air Force while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command took responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Dutch East Indies. The operations were intensified roughly 6 weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape.    On March 30th, Kenney shifted the weight of his attacks from the Wewak area to Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The airforces also performed a full aerial reconnaissance taking photos of Hollandia's 3 airdromes on March. Added to this were radio intercepts and intelligence ereports, allowing the allies to estimate the Japanese had around 351 aircraft there. With this information at hand, Kenney launched Liberators armed with small 20 pound fragmentation bombs to perform a concentrated bombing against the enemy airfield. Since the Allies hoped to rehabilitate the Hollandia strips as quickly as possible, hits on the runways with heavy ordnance would be avoided. Fighter cover would be provided by long-range P-38's, which would escort the bombers over the target, and by shorter-range P-47's, which would meet the bombers near Aitape, beat off pursuing fighters, and shepherd them home. Medium and light bombers would continue attacks on the airfields at Wewak to prevent their use by Japanese fighters. The Liberators with their P-38 and P-47 escorts would smash the anti-aircraft defenses while the medium and light bombers would drench the area with bombs. On March 30th, 7 B-24's hit Hollandia dispersals as 75 Liberators of the 43rd bombardment group and 59 P-38s of the 80th, 431st and 432nd Fighter Squadrons swept over Hollandia's airstrips and dropped nearly 6000 bombs. To make matters worse for the Japanese, they suffered from insufficient radar warning, many of their aircraft would be on the ground refueling after some morning patrols. The 5th Air Force found countless enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways, a lethargic anti-aircraft reaction. 25 or more fighters made "eager" passes against the 65th Bombardment Squadron, whose gunners claimed two destroyed. The 80th Fighter Squadron engaged a reported 35 to 40 hostile fighters, destroying 7 of them. The 431st Fighter Squadron claimed one Tony damaged, but the 432d encountered no enemy fighters. Japanese interception seemed badly disorganized. The planes milled about with little evident formation, and most of the pilots appeared to have little desire for a fight. Over 100 aircraft were destroyed as the Japanese were caught completely unprepared. Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured documents later revealed that the reason the bombing operation was so successful was because the Japanese high command erroneously transported too many airplanes to Hollandia from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies but did not transport more pilots and maintenance crews with the airplanes. There was no way for them to build appropriate defensive shelters to protect all 400 aircraft and also there were not enough trained pilots who could fly all of those airplanes at the same time so many perfectly operational aircraft were left sitting there with no aircrew to maintain them. The morale at Hollandia airbase was very low during the bombing operation, with many Japanese soldiers and airmen hiding in bunkers instead of manning anti-aircraft artillery and getting airplanes into the air. Most of these Hollandia soldiers and airmen were rear-echelon and not combat-oriented at all because most of the combat-trained divisions from the 18th Army were recently sent further east towards Wewak in anticipation of amphibious landings that would never come thanks to the deception and feints carried out by General Kenney. The P-38s then withdrew to Nadzab as soon as the bombers cleared their targets; and the P-47s, meeting the Liberators near Aitape, convoyed them home without incident. So successful was this first raid that one squadron reported that “Hollandia had really been Wewaked”. The next day, Kenney launched a nearly identical mission, with 7 Liberators and 52 P-38s bombing the dispersal at Hollandia, Cyclops and Sentani airdromes. 153 tons of 100 pound demos, frags and incendiary bombs were dropped. The Japanese anti-aircraft fire was more accurate this time around and 56 Japanese fighters gave the allies a fight. However the pilots were inexperienced and unaggressive. The Americans estimated 14 aircraft were shot down while they suffered the loss of one P-38. After the air strike, the total number of destroyed aircraft on the ground reached 199. At this point the Japanese scrambled to withdraw their remaining serviceable aircraft out of Hollandia. On April 3, Kenney sent his heaviest air attack to date. 66 B-24s escorted by 21 P-38s dropped 492 1000-pound bombs on anti-aircraft defenses. An estimated 30 Japanese Tonys and Oscars attempted without success to break up the bomb runs, and B-24 gunners claimed 2 fighters destroyed, while the 21 escorting P-38's of the 80th Squadron claimed downing ten. Then, 96 A-20s escorted by 17 P-38s strafed and dropped 100-pound para-demolition bombs over grounded aircraft, stores, and other targets of opportunity. The 432nd Squadron, covering the A-20's with 17 P-38's, encountered about 20 Japanese fighters and claimed 12 definitely destroyed, against the loss of one P-38. Finally, 76 B-25s escorted by 36 P-38s swept the strips at noon, scattering parafrags and parademos and strafing everything in sight. Only 3 Japanese fighters were encountered in this last attack, which were all shot down. After the end of the raid, Hollandia was so badly mauled that it could no longer be considered a major air installation. A Japanese seaman after hearing of the Allied mission of April 3rd against Hollandia, although seemingly confused as to imperial folklore, correctly assessed the Allied victory: "Yesterday, the anniversary of the birthday of Emperor Meiji, we received from the enemy, greetings, which amount to the annihilation of our Army Air Force in New Guinea." After April 3rd, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Admiralty Islands campaign was coming to a swift close, seeing MacArthur secure the valuable islands like Los Negros and Manus. MacArthurs new campaign to hit Western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, certainly began with a bang as General Kenney's air forces had basically claimed air supremacy, the Japanese were in full panic mode. 

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville, action on the Burma front and New Guinea. General Hyakutake was under immense pressure to dislodge the Americal force from Bougainville. He unleashed a grand counter offensive trying to break the American defensive lines. Both the Japanese and Americans began suffering heavy casualties, yet neither side wavered in its resolve. Over in the Burma front, the Galahad unit, aka Merrills marauders joined their British, American and Chinese allies in pushing the Japanese back. There were some issues involving friendly fire, but overall the allies were making gains in a theater where the Japanese had dominated for years. Over in New Guinea, the Japanese were continuing to retreat to Madang. Things were going so terribly, units were now being deployed to defend the western part of New Guinea. Japan was simply not winning the war of attrition.  This episode is the Operation Thursday Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things have really been heating up on the Burma front. General Mutaguchi basically tricked his own superiors into allowing him to invade India under the guise of Operations HA-GO and U-GO. This saw Japanese units advancing towards Imphal and Kohima. On the other side General Stilwell's forces were advancing upon Myitkyina in the north, as General Slim's 15th corp were clashing with the Japanese in the Arakan region. Americans, British, Indians, Chinese were all performing operations to halt Japanese attacks and push further into Burma, but on top of all of that, we now need to talk about our favorite child born from the onion eating madman Wingate, the Chindits.  All the way back in early February, Operation Thursday was in development. The operation was basically an extended version of the first Chindit raid, this time in two waves, with 3 brigades making long marches across the Chindwin. The first wave would go into the enemy territory, then 2-3 months later the second wave would come in to reinforce them. There were large issues with the operation, namely a lack of aircraft. Aircraft were being used for the Arakan campaign and flying supplies over the Hump. Chiang Kai-shek would not part with any aircraft set to go over the Hump and not even Mountbatten had the authority to touch the issue. Regardless Thursday would be authorized and its goals were as follows; to assist Stilwell's advance; to create favorable conditions for the Y-Force to gord the Salween and to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese in northern Burma. Their principles targets were the Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw road. There would be 4 strongholds to be designated, Piccadilly, Chowringhee, Broadway and Templecombe, the last one later renamed Aberdeen. The US 900th airborne engineer company would clear strips suitable for Dakotas to land. On February 4th Wingate and Stratemeyer, commander of the Eastern Air command issued the essential guidelines for Thursday, stressing this raid would require the wounded being flown out from the strongholds rather than to be abandoned as was the case with the first expedition. Stratemeyer added orders to bomb the stronghold areas prior to their establishment, though Wingate had instead favored diversionary bombings of Rangoon, Mandalay and Bangkok.  On February 5th of 1944, Fergussons 16th brigade kicked off first from Ledo and onlookers would remark they looked more like a mule train than a commando force. There were elephants, 250 bullocks, 547 horses and 31314 mules assigned to the operation. Fergusson's 4000 men took 500 mules, fully laden along with them. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. It would be a full month before all Brigade Battalions crossed the Chindwin river. The main target was Indaw, although two Columns were tasked to attack the town of Lonkin, in the Kachin Hills and 20 miles west of Kamaing. Two gliders, loaded with folding boats, outboard engines, and gasoline, were towed by air to the Chindwin River and softly set down on a sandbar. Not only were the necessities delivered to Fergusson, but also for reuse the pair of C-4As were plucked from the scene by a C-47. Wingate traveled with Fergusson and his men for the first the start of the grueling ascent up the Paktai. They faced mud slides, torrential rain, the usual Burma experiences. It would take them all of February to reach the Chindwin, after that it was another 200 miles to their target of Indaw. Wingate departed after the first few days, but would come back over by aircraft to observe the crossing of the Chindwin. Fergusson had been critical of Wingate in January, describing him as a liar, but he continued to believe in the man. “Wingate was sometimes wrong in small things but never in big.' When Wingate met Fergusson he showed up with an entourage of war correspondents, trying to publicize the Chindits activities. He began talking to them of a new fad he came across, turtle eggs which he declared provided singular nourishment. Like so many of Wingate's eccentric ideas, no one favored it. Turtles' eggs were found to be no more appetizing than those of any other reptile, and in fact many of the Chindits experienced stomach pains and other digestive problems after eating them. Then Fergusson had to tell Wingate they could not possibly reach Indaw earlier than March 20th. The expectation had been March 5th, thus Wingate was pissed. At the same time, the 1st air commando had performed aerial reconnaissance over the 3 selected locations suitable for bringing gliders, Broadway, Piccadilly and Chowringhee. Yet Wingate had issued strict orders banning any further overflights fearing it would give up their intentions to the Japanese. Despite the warning, Colonel Cochram dispatched a B-25 on March 5th to perform a final look over the sites, giving last minute reports that Broadway and Chowinghee were clear, but it looked like teak logs were sprawled over the Piccadilly site. Since the Piccadilly site seemed unsuitable, Brigadier Calvert persuaded Wingate to send the Gliders into Broadway. On the night of March 5th, the gliders carrying the second wave were flown in. The pathfinder gliders, first to touch down, set out flare pots to facilitate succeeding waves of gliders. However, the field proved far less accessible than expected. For many years, the local people had logged teak and during the wet season, slid the huge logs across the ground down to a river. Over time the technique gouged deep ruts that elephant grass covered, making the trenches invisible to aerial photographs or reconnaissance. Co-commander of the 1st air commando group John Richardson Alison recalled "They formed perfect glider traps, and there was no way to avoid them. The gliders arrived overhead in large numbers, and when a glider starts down there is no way to stop it. As each one hit the trenches the landing gears would come off and the gliders would go in a heap. We tried to arrange the lights to spread the gliders all over the field to avoid collisions, but this was impossible. They were coming in too fast to change directions, and glider after glider piled into each other while landing.” The next day the gliders landed successfully on Chowringhee and the airstrip was completed by nightfall. Meanwhile transports began to bring Calverts 77th brigade, followed by Brigadiers Lentaigne's 111th brigade. By the 11th, the fly in was complete, now 9250 Chindits were landed on Broadway and Chowringhee. The Chindits then began their advance east to hit the Lashio-Bahmo-Myitkyina motor supply line. Trekking from Chowringhee, Morris Force Columns headed north-east, to cut the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, as 111 Brigade's British Battalions marched south from Broadway to link up with other elements flown into Chowringhee. Their job was to stop Indaw being reinforced from the south. Thus, 111th Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River, before moving west to Pinlebu. Broadway was held with a garrison that included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some six Spitfires that would successfully repel a Ki-43 attack on March 13.  Meanwhile Calvert's columns advanced over the railway towards Henu, where they would establish the White City stronghold, roughly 20 miles north of Indaw. Columns were directed to demolish bridges and railroads around the Kadu, Mawhun and Pinwe stations. It was a long and gruesome march over some very tough terrain. For example, it took Column 45, bringing up the Brigade's rear, nine days to cover the first 35 miles, to Hkalak Ga. They set out again on February 22nd. By this time, the men were tiring of K-rations, which gave calories but no bulk. Smoking was confined to lunch and evening bivouacs. The Leicesters were in the lead and reached the Chindwin on February 29th. Meanwhile, 45 Recce's columns, still in the rear, reached the Chindwin during the afternoon of Saturday March 4. It had taken them 21 days to cover some of the wildest, toughest country on earth. After successfully crossing the Chindwin, on March 12th Fergusson received orders to seize Indaw's airfield, destroy supply dumps in the area and establish a new Stronghold, to be known as Aberdeen. The Brigade continued south, moving parallel to and west of the railway. Meanwhile Calvert's 5 columns to 5 days to reach Henu. The South Staffords were the first to arrive and the Japanese reacted before they could dig in – they would have to fight for the Block. were on the alert to resist their incursion. In the afternoon of 16th, Calvert launched a bayonet charge up Pagoda Hill, with the Chindits soon engaging the Japanese engineers, who were charging down, in a vicious hand-to-hand combat. Eventually, with the assistance of the 1st Air Commando's close support, the Japanese were successfully pushed off the hill and the White City stronghold was established. For the loss of 23 dead and 64 wounded, Calvert's Chindits had killed 42 Japanese and had effectively cut the line of communications supporting the 18th Division far to the north. In the ensuing days, the stronghold would be developed into a fortress, with some airstrips becoming operational by March 21st. The time chosen to drop the Chindits near the 18th Division's line of communications was most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On January 10, Headquarters, 15th Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume as soon as the Imphal operation was underway. Then the Chindits cut the rail line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally compromised by the Chindits fighting along the railway to north Burma. On the 18th Calvert's force took a large night drop, including wire and entrenching tools. They slaved away to turn the Block into a fortress. The parachutes festooned across the forest canopy gave the Block its popular name – White City – soon a maze of slit trenches and bunkers roofed with heavy timbers. White City, with its commanding position, became a powerful concentration of force, with Calvert's three Battalions steadily reinforced. The Block grew a heavily wired perimeter and a garrison strong enough to raise a substantial force for mobile action. Calvert regarded White City as “ideally situated around a series of hills about 30ft to 50ft high, with numerous small valleys in between, with water at the north and south. I brought the village of Henu into our defended area, so that we would have a good field of fire across the paddy to the south. I also brought into the perimeter what we called ‘OP Hill', a feature slightly higher than our own little hills, to give us good observation. Our perimeter was now about 1,000 yards long, mostly along the railway, and 800 yards deep.” Calvert now had 2,000 men inside the Block, with mobile “floater” columns operating to north and south, together with a sizeable force protecting Broadway. He called in air strikes to punish a Japanese force at nearby Mawlu. Meanwhile the 15th Army's staff were beginning to panic. Many of the officers were beginning to see the paint on the wall and were calling for the Imphal offensive to be abandoned. General Mutaguchi refused to give up and instead directed some troops to thwart the Chindits. To do this a reserve battalion was taken from the 15th, 18th, 33rd and 56th divisions and redirected to Indaw while Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi's 67th regiment moved over to Napin. Major General Hayashi Yoshihide's 24th independent mixed brigade was ordered to advance north along with some units of the 2nd division who would open a new HQ at Indaw by March 25th. Further behind the lines, the 53rd division led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro were directed to rush north to engage the enemy as fast as possible. All of this was still a diversion from the main effort against Imphal and it basically helped Stilwell's operations. To aid the war effort the IJA air force were also stepping up their game. On march 18th, a KI-43 raid managed to destroy some Spitfires grounded at broadway. William 'Babe' Whitamore and Alan M Peart managed to get airborne, with both shooting down one 'Oscar' each. Whitamore was shot down and killed but Peart survived for over half an hour, holding off over 20 enemy fighters. The remaining Spitfires were destroyed on the ground for the loss of another pilot, Lt Coulter. Peart flew back to Kangla the same day in his damaged Spitfire and reported the action.  The following day, Fergusson's footsore columns finally neared Manhton village and prepared to establish the Aberdeen Stronghold. After an appalling final leg of their terrible march into Burma, with progress reduced at some points to 100 yards per hour, the 16th Brigade elements finally reached Aberdeen clearing, some 60 miles west of Broadway Stronghold. The Aberdeen clearing was at Manhton, just east of the Meza River and 25 miles from the railway supplying the Japanese 18th Division, fighting Stilwell's Chinese troops, and the 56th Division, opposing the Yunnan Chinese. Aberdeen took in three villages: Manhton, Kalat and Naunghmi. Aberdeen's site had a lot of advantages. It was only two days' march from Indaw and 14 miles from the Indaw-Banmauk road. The dominant feature was a hill at the northern end, where the permanent garrison would be quartered. There were, however, some drawbacks – mainly the fact that, as Fergusson himself acknowledged, it was “highly accessible” to the enemy. The 16th brigade were exhausted and needed rest, the planned attack against Indaw would have to be delayed. To the south, on the 21st the Japanese launched a major night attack against White City. The battle was ferocious, Calvert's Chindits managed to successfully repel numerous attacks for over 8 hours until the Japanese finally pulled back. The Japanese suffered an estimated 300 deaths, the Chindits also suffered heavy losses. In the White City perimeter, men took solace from the companionship of the animals sharing their hardships. A pony gave birth to a foal during a Japanese attack and murderous mortar barrage. The foal was named “Minnie” after a nearby mortar post. In another attack, Minnie was kicked in the eye by a panic-stricken mule. They fought to save the eye and Brigadier Mike Calvert ordered regular reports of Minnie's progress to be circulated to all forward positions. When recovered, Minnie took to “doing the rounds” of the mortar positions, on the scrounge for tea – which she drank from a pint pot. Minnie survived White City and further battles and went on to enjoy a distinguished military career as the Lancashire Fusiliers' mascot. Minnie got out to India, traveled to Britain and subsequently joined the Regiment on a tour of duty in Egypt. On the 23rd, leading elements of Brigadier Thomas Brodies 14th brigade began to arrive to Aberdeen with the task of blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road.  At the same time, the 111th Brigade's columns were ordered to stop Japanese movements along the Pinlebu-Pinbon. The advance on Indaw may have been compromised inadvertently by the movements of 111 Brigade. One of its British Battalions, the Cameronian's, moved in a wide sweep west of Indaw, crossed the Banmauk road on the 22nd, with orders to cut the Indaw-Homalu road. They bumped into a Japanese patrol at night and their two wounded were flown out by light aircraft the next day. The men became hardened to the realities of jungle warfare against the Japanese, who fought to the death. Some columns were luckier than others regarding their supply drops. The King's Own columns had a reputation for being unlucky. During the 21-23, three successive attempts to re-supply them failed. Already, the columns were heavily reliant on food purchased in villages.  Wingate then visited Bernard Fergusson at Aberdeen. Fergusson wanted to rest 16 Brigade after its exhausting march in but Wingate told him to press on to Indaw before it could be reinforced. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese had already accomplished this. The 16th brigade departed Aberdeen on the 24th, heading south to Auktaw, drawing closer to the heavily-reinforced Indaw. Between them were strongpoints at Thetkegyin village. This part of the country was quite dry and the Japanese controlled all the water sources, thus the Chindits would be forced to fight to drink. Despite successfully blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road, most of Fergussons columns would get sucked into heavy fighting around Thetkegyin on the 26th. Only the 2nd Leicester's columns 17 and 71 made it to Indaw, holding a toehold grimly until they were ordered to pull back. After 5 intense days of fighting, Fergusson ordered his men to withdraw and regroup at Aberdeen.  Back on the 24th, Wingate flew down to Broadway and White City on a morale-boosting mission to 77 Brigade. After a side trip to Aberdeen, he flew back to Broadway and then on to Imphal. This would be the last time Calvert ever saw him. Wingate flew back to Imphal, landing at 6:23pm before taking off again at 8pm for Hailakandi airfield. Half an hour later the B-25 crashed into the Naga hills due west of Imphal near the village of Thilon. Cochran dispatched a special force to search for the crash and they found it the next day. Everyone inside the B-25 had died instantly. Investigators believed the crash could have occurred from freak weather, engine failure or pilot error. But since it was Wingate, there was an air of reluctance to accept it was just an accident. An official investigation concluded it had been the result of engine failure and that the pilot unsuccessfully tried to return to Imphal. Yet other theories emerged and were tested out. Sabotage was the first, but it was ruled out because the B-25 had been closely guarded at all times and nobody knew Wingates intentions or flight plans. Thunderstorms and turbulence were cited as plausible, but all pilots in the area confirmed no thunderstorms.  General Slim opted for extreme turbulence, even though the pilots' testimony also ruled that out. ‘The wreckage was eventually found on the reverse side of a ridge, so that it was unlikely that the aircraft had flown into the hill. The most probable explanation is that it had suddenly entered one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area. These were difficult to avoid at night, and once in them an aeroplane might be flung out of control, or even have its wings torn off.' Another theory had it that the B-25's cluster bombs had broke loose from the bay's rolled into the fuselage and detonated. Given, well how Wingate was, many in the Indian army rejoiced at his death, some quoted Shakepears Macbeth ‘Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.' Mountbatten wrote to his wife Edwina ‘I cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Wingate. Not only had we become close personal friends but he was such a fire-eater, and it was such a help to me having a man with a burning desire to fight. He was a pain in the neck to the generals over him, but I loved his wild enthusiasm and it will be difficult for me to try to inculcate it from above.' General Slim had this to write on Wingate “With him, contact had too often been collision, for few could meet so stark a character without being violently attracted or repelled. To most he was either prophet or adventurer. Very few could regard him dispassionately; nor did he care to be so regarded. I once likened him to Peter the Hermit preaching his Crusade. I am sure that many of the knights and princes that Peter so fierily exhorted did not like him very  much – but they went crusading all the same. The trouble was, I think, that Wingate regarded himself as a prophet, and that always leads to a single-centredness that verges on fanaticism, with all his faults. Yet had he not done so, his leadership could not have been so dynamic, nor his personal magnetism so striking.” And so went Wingate, probably one of the most colorful characters of the Pacific War. In light of Wingates death, General Slim promoted Lentaigne to Major-General and appointed him the new commander of the 3rd Division. Slim, had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the grueling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field. As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The force's second-in-command, Major General George Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved. In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques. The loss of Wingate caused significant damage to the Chindits, it was as if they lost their persona. The month following Wingate's death, the 14th, 16th and 111th Brigades appeared to lack direction. They stayed around Indaw, ambushing the Japanese but with no major objective. As Slim, noted, "The immediate sense of loss that struck like a blow, even those who had differed most from him—and I was not one of these- was a measure of the impact he had made. He had stirred up everyone with whom he had come in contact. " At Broadway, for instance, after days of aerial attack, the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment stormed across the airstrip on March 27th and attacked its lightly defended western perimeter. Thankfully, the attack was repulsed, partly due to superior numbers. Three days of hard fighting at Broadway then ended with counterattacks and concentrated airstrikes finally dislodging the enemy. Though the Japanese regrouped, they were again pushed back by counterattacks supported by airstrikes in the end. Meanwhile, White City's defenses were strengthened. The Dakota brought over four 25 pounders, six Bofors anti-aircraft guns and four two-pounder anti-tank guns. This would allow Calvert to attack Mawlu on the 27th. As a result, the village was successfully taken and burnt out with flamethrowers, with the Chindits then reducing the remaining Japanese strongpoints. By the end of March, however, several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. The 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also dispatched to Kohima. Finally, the Chindits were formally subordinated to General Stilwell, who ordered them to abandon their dispersed operations around Indaw and concentrate on interdicting the supply lines to the Japanese forces opposing his troops. In early April, while the 3rd West African Brigade and the remainder of Brodie's 14th Brigade were being brought in to Aberdeen, Lentaigne ordered the 111th Brigade led by Major John Masters to advance north and build the new Blackpool stronghold, which would block the railway and main road at Hopin. To Calvert's disgust, he was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and move north to support the new stronghold, as Lentaigne insisted that the Chindit brigades were too far apart to support each other. But that is all for today in the Burma front as we now need to head over to Bougainville. The counterattack on Bougainville shifted on March 15th. General Kanda noticed Iwasa and Muda's Units were struggling to break through in their areas, so he changed the point of attack for the Magata Unit. He withdrew the bulk of the forces from Hills 700 and 260, sending them westward in preparation for a final attempt to break through towards the Piva airfields. The reserve 6th cavalry regiment was sent to reinforce Mugata's rear while the 2nd battalion, 4th South Seas Garrison was brought forward to try and contain the Americans at the Saua river mouth. Thus, there was a five-day break in the major action while the Japanese transferred the 13th and 23rd Regiments to reinforce what was left of Colonel Mugata's 45th Regiment. At this time the Japanese maintained patrols, which sometimes got into firefights with American patrols. A number of Japanese were taken prisoner during these patrol actions. From time to time the Japanese would lob mortar shells into the 129th's sector. During this lull in the fighting, the tired American riflemen and engineers were busy strengthening the defenses. Pillboxes were rebuilt, tactical wire reestablished, illuminating devices installed, communications improved, and the many Japanese dead buried. Information gained from prisoners and reconnaissance led General Beightler to conclude that the Japanese would launch a major assault on March 23rd. It was estimated that General Kanda had approximately 4850 men at his disposal to renew the attack on the 129th's front. Meanwhile the American artillery was smashing the South Knob who were now only being defended by a screening force. On the 18th, General McCulloch launched a final combined assault against the Knob. Companies A and B of the 132nd regiment performed a enveloping maneuver and enjoyed some initial success until they came upon heavy fire from Japanese bunkers. At 2:10pm the next day the attack resumed, this time successfully destroying several pillboxes, but the Americans were halted short of the crest. On the 20th, Company B was reinforced with a platoon from A and they circled the south end of the Knob, reaching the base of the trail going east. There they discovered the Japanese could pour down just as much fire, seeing another failed attack. Because of this failure it was decided to leave the reduction of Hill 260 to artillery and mortars. On the 23rd, the Iwasa and Muda units had completed their movement, now 4850 troops were concentrated on the northern sector ready to perform a major assault. Having been forewarned by the captured documents, the American forces were expecting the attack. The Americans unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against Magata's assault forces as they were forming up, disrupting their initial advance and causing massive casualties. Late in the evening, Kanda launched his own assault, with General Iwara's 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 13th regiment through Cox Creek followed by Muda's men. Advancing under darkness, the Japanese surprised the Americans and managed to knock out 3 pillboxes under heavy fire. The area of attack was so narrow, artillery and air strikes could not be performed safely, so General Beightler ordered the 148th regiment to respond with a combined tank-infantry assault. With the support of Sherman's the Americans stormed the Japanese positions at 7:25am successfully reoccupying must of their lost territory within only 20 minutes. The Japanese tossed further attacked but were being gradually pushed from the narrow area by noon.  During the afternoon, General Kreber's corp and divisional artillery began concentrating their fire on a very narrow sector where the bulk of the surviving Japanese were dug in. An infantryman of the 129th recalled: “All these big guns opened fire into this area about 500 yards in front of us, and I remember what they called a million dollar barrage and it's something you never forget–the big guns shooting over your head. It was very frightening because you wondered whether one of these shells would not go far enough. It was all jungle out in front of us and when they got done it was all cleared out. They had knocked everything down. A lot of Japs were killed by this… I can remember the day after the big attack the bulldozers came in and dug these huge trenches and we had to go out and take the Japanese and drag them into these. Because of the warm weather they began to smell pretty bad. Many, many killed!” It was the heaviest artillery concentration seen as of yet during the Pacific War. It completely disrupted the Magata unit, causing tremendous casualties. The 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment were completely disorganized; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were reduced to 20 men; the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment were reduced to 40 men; and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment were down to 100 men. The massive losses forced the Japanese to withdraw. General Hyakutake now realized his counteroffensive was a failure and forced to call it off.  The Japanese were in full retreat by the 28th. The Magata force, with an estimated strength of over fifteen hundred men, utilized the Numa Numa Trail and withdrew toward the northern part of Bougainville. The remnants of the Iwasa and Muda forces, covered by reinforcements from the 4th South Seas Garrison unit and the 6th Cavalry Regiment, moved quickly along a number of trails to the relative safety of southern Bougainville. The units of the 17th Infantry Group returned to northern Bougainville and rejoined its parent unit. On the 28th, the 182nd regiment found the South Knob abandoned and finally secured Hill 260. The three-week battle for the rather insignificant knoll had cost the Americans 98 deaths and 581 wounded, counting 560 dead Japanese on the knob. Total casualties for the final Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville would be 263 American dead and over 2489 Japanese bodies counted. In reality, Hyakutake's 17th Army lost a total of 3000 killed and 4000 wounded in their March operations, including 2398 killed and 3060 wounded from the 6th Division. General Beightler expressed the feelings of many in stating that the beating administered to the 6th Division was a partial repayment for its role in the rape of Nanking in 1937. Although the Japanese would plan another concentrated assault on Allied positions later down the line, they would never again launch a major attack. For all practical purposes, the battle for the Solomons was now over. Now we need to jump over to the Southwest Pacific.  As a result of the Admiralty Islands being invaded a month ahead of schedule. Yet General MacArthur kept his gaze on the development in the Central Pacific. He needed to pick up the pace if he wanted to win the race, so he planned to carry out the invasion of Kavieng, bypassing the Hansa Bay area with a direct jump to Holland before the end of April. General Sutherland gave the Joint Chiefs an outline calling for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on April 15, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would then move to Geelvink Bay about June. In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid-September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944. Yet for all of this, MacArthur needed something he did not have, the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers. After concluding the Marshall islands campaign, Admiral Nimitz argued that the next move would be to bypass Truk and invade the southern Marianas and the Palaus islands to further neutralize the Carolines. To seize the Philippines a good fleet base would be required in the western Pacific. Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi atoll, around midway between the Marianas and Palaus. Nimitz also argued the case for Woleai in the Carolines, 400 miles south of the Marianas. By early March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus met at the Washington Planning Conferences with Nimitz and Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, to hear about their plans and discuss what the best course of action would be. In the end, on March 12th, they issued a new directive for operations in 1944.  The Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to cancel his Kavieng operation and instead to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng with minimum forces necessary. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on April 15, thus bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, with the mission to develop an air center from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. Once Hollandia was secured, MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao.  The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing on Mindanao in the Philippines was set for November 15. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel his Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines and the Palaus, and to provide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Marianas would be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning in mid June and Palaus by mid September. The Joint Chiefs, were looking to extend Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast. The invasion of the Admiralty and Green Islands led the Americans to seize full control over the South Pacific. This allowed the US Navy to begin sending destroyers to harass the Japanese at Rabaul and Kavieng. Admiral Halsey at Guadalcanal assembled an invasion force to hit Kavieng. When he heard about the decision to cancel the Kavieng invasion, he searched for another task for the boys he got together. He decided to capture the Emirau island, lying halfway between Kavieng and the Admiralties, thinking it could be the last link to strangle Rabaul. For what would be the last operation of Cartwheel, Admiral Wilkinson put Commodore Reifsneider in command of the amphibious operation and assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines to carry out the landing. As a preliminary, Admiral Griffin's Task Force 36, formed around four battleships and two escort carriers, also bombarded Kavieng and its nearby airfields on March 20th. The bombardment gave Rear-Admiral Tamura Ryukichi the impression that the expected invasion by Allied forces was imminent and he gave the order to kill all the European prisoners in Kavieng. At least 25 of them were executed in the Kavieng Wharf Massacre, which later led to six of the perpetrators being sentenced for war crimes in 1947. Sentenced to death by hanging, Tamura was executed at Stanley Prison on March 16, 1948. Meanwhile Reifsneider's convoy  departed Guadalcanal in two echelons, successfully reached the unoccupied Emirau Island at 6:05am. The Marines of the two assault battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Marines, traveled on nine high speed transports while the remainder of the force were on the dock landing ships, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall and Lindenwald, and the attack transport Callaway. One LSD carried the 66 LVTs for crossing Emirau's fringing reef, one carried three LCTs, two of them loaded with tanks, and the third carried three LCTs with radar sets and anti-aircraft guns. The LVTs were launched, and the assault troops transferred to the amphibious tractors using the APDs' boats, supplemented by those from Callaway while F4U Corsairs of VMF-218 flew overhead to make a last-minute check of the island for any signs of the Japanese. The assault waves touched down on schedule. The reserve 3rd Battalion's boats grounded on the reef soon afterwards, and its marines waded ashore through knee deep water. The only problem encountered was with launching the LCTs carrying the tanks. The LSD's flooding mechanism failed and the LCTs had to be dragged out by a fleet tug. While the detachment sent to occupy Elomusao Island was approaching the beach, some supposed opposition caused the amphibious tractors and then a destroyer to open fire, and a man was wounded by a shell fragment. After all of this…well the Marines were told by the natives the Japanese had left Emirau two months before and only a small detachment remained on Mussau Island. Thus 3727 troops and 844 tons of cargo were ashore by nightfall, when the ships sailed; and within a month, some 18,000 men and 44,000 tons of supplies had been landed and it had become a motor torpedo base that could keep watch on the north coast of New Ireland.  As for the Japanese Admiral Koga was planning to carry out a desperate program of reorganization, including the creation of the Mobile Fleet. Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet was formed by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets; consisting of most of the IJN's warships. This would leave the combined fleet as a mere administrative organization. Land-based forces in the Central Pacific were expanded, their main base was at Tinian; Saipan was fortified and it became the new fleet HQ. Fuel shortages and loss of tankers to submarine attacks had become so severe, Admiral Ozawa's new command would have to remain within the Singapore zone. They would operate close to the Dutch East Indies oilfield and within Japanese waters for training. Koga also prepared a new defensive plan, with the inner perimeter now extending from the Kuriles to the Nanpo Islands,  then the Marianas and the Carolines to the west end of New Guinea. He also drew up plans for the formation of a 3rd Aircraft Carrier Fleet, in three divisions, each composed of three carriers. It looked very impressive on paper, but the reality was that the 3rd division actually consisted of two converted tankers the Zuiho and Chitose and the converted naval auxiliary ship Chiyoda. Furthermore, the carriers lacked any experienced pilots, with most of them having been lost around Rabaul and in the Solomons and Marshalls. Thus, new pilots for the three carrier divisions would have to be trained. Finally, he developed Plan Z, a strike against the American fleet the moment it entered the Philippine Sea.  For this decisive battle, that in his eyes could allow the Japanese to win an “honorable peace”, Koga wanted to be prepared to use 500 planes on the carriers and another 500 on the islands, so he needed to increase the Japanese air force by about 50%, something that would be hard to achieve.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And with that the South Pacific was liberated from the Japanese Empire. Operation Cartwheel was effectively done. The allies were squeezing the Japanese empire back to the home islands and honestly it was a good time to negotiate a peace on the side of the Japanese. But they would not do so, always on the search for the famed decisive victory. 

Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Admiralty Islands and some action on New Britain and Bougainville. The last steps of operation Cartwheel would see the Bismarck-Solomon area sealed off with the capture of the admiralty islands. MacArthur was yet again trying to seize the initiative and force a drive upon the Philippines. A diversionary landing was made against Momote and Los Negros would cost 116 lives, 434 wounded by March 8th. On New Britain, General Rupertus began new amphibious assaults and other actions to cut off the retreat for the Japanese defenders. Then on Bougainville, under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA. He assembled 15,000 men who would hit the American defensive perimeter to dislodge the enemy from the island. Was this idea even feasible, or would it all end in a terrific disaster? This episode is the battle of Imphal Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war was not going well for the Japanese in 1944. They were on the cusp of being dislodged from the south pacific. Rabaul and Truk were effectively neutralized and the Americans were making enormous strides in the central pacific, seen in the Gilberts and Marshall campaigns. Even in Burma, a war front the Japanese had basically been winning every battle flawlessly, was now suffering defeats. The first defeats were found in the Hukawng Valley and Arakan region. In the face of these terrible defeats, the Japanese General Mutaguchi argued he had the answer.  Mutaguchi, a victor over the Singapore campaign, had wargamed the possibility of invading India and won support of some of his superiors in Tokyo. His reasoning had been to brush past the British in Assam, to storm the gateway into the subcontinent, where hopefully the Indians would rise up to greet the Japanese as liberators. With Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army, the Japanese could rally the Indians to turn against the British. The collapse of India would be a killing blow against Britain's influence in Asia. Initially it was also believed, such a move would allow the Japanese to link up with the Axis forces in Persia. Such fantastical ideas were farfetched even for 1942 standards, but in 1944 these were laughable. Stalingrad and Kursk had effectively turned the Eastern Front completely around, the Germans were fighting for their survival. Yet this all did not dissuade Mutaguchi.  Lt General Hanaya Tadashi was placed in charge of the Arakan region. Hanaya was tasked with deceiving the British into believing the counter attack in Arakan was an attempt to invade India, thus dragging units out of Imphal. The Operation was codenamed HA-GO, an intended feint, to mask another operation, U-GO to invade Imphal. To pull it off the assault in Arakan was made to be massive. Slim was forced to meet the enemy fiercely in Arakan, he had no choice but to pull his reserves out of Imphal. The Japanese were delivered a nasty surprise with the Admin Box tactic. For over 18 days the battle raged around the Admin Box, but the Japanese could not make a dent. The Japanese forces had expected once the British saw their lines of communications cut and were outflanked they would panic and flee. It was after all what had been occurring for years in Burma. The Japanese hoped to annihilate the 15th corp, but instead the British dug their heels in. Once again victory disease sprang its head force, the arrogant and overly confident Japanese, bit off more than they could chew. It was as if they were facing a brand new opponent. The Admin Box was hit by infantry and aerial attacks, the casualties were terrific, but the Admin Box never wavered. The Japanese had planned for a lighting battle, traveling light and seizing supplies on the go, but the British did not roll over. The Japanese began to run out of supplies, starvation loomed over the invaders. Casualties on both sides increased sharply, and Slim predicted the Japanese would not allow for defeat and instead would redouble their efforts. By February 13th, Slim was confident victory was in their hands as the 26th Indian division began to arrive to deliver a hammer blow with the Admin Box as the anvil. The Japanese fought desperately, but by the 24th they were withdrawing leaving 5000 dead. After defeating the Japanese Slim unleashed his own operation into the Arakan and while doing so his men captured some Japanese documents showcasing operation HA-GO in full. Slim now knew the Japanese were feinting him to draw resources away from Imphal Now Mutaguchi had sold Operation U-GO to his superiors in Tokyo as a pre-emptive strike to disable 14th Army, but in reality it was always to invade India. He also wanted to press the attack farther and take Dimapur, a major supply base through which ran the railway line to Ledo. Taking Dimapur would deal a major blow to the Allies and could potentially open the door to further operations deeper into India. Once they had broken through, the INA would rally local support, enabling them to extend the fight to the British in Assam, Bengal and beyond. For his Operation U-Go, Mutaguchi thought he could outsmart the British in terms of how he would approach Imphal. His plan called for the 33rd Division of Lt General Yanagida Motoso to begin an advance on March 8th attacking from the south. It was presumed the British would expect this and rush reinforcement when attacked. Meanwhile he planned to send the 15th division under Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi a week later to ford the Chindwin River and advance on Imphal from the north. Even further north the entire 31st division of Lt General Sato Kotoku would also ford the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi, advancing northwest to block the main British supply route in the hills at Kohima.  To pull all of this off, Mutaguchi needed to ensure his forces captured Imphal before the monsoon rains made the jungle tracks impassable. He did not have much in terms of supplies to give to his 3 divisions. By 1943, the supply route into Rangoon by sea through the Bay of Bengal had become too dangerous because of attacks by Allied submarines, so the supplies had to rely on the railway being constructed by forced labor and POWs from Thailand. Mutaguchi was well aware of these issues. He knew, however, from personal experience in Malaya and Singapore, that taking logistical risks against the British could bring great rewards. This was because the British, who were usually immeasurably better supplied than the Japanese, frequently left behind large quantities of what the latter referred to as Chachiru kyuyo 'Churchill Rations' in their haste to flee the advancing Japanese. Accordingly, the capture of British supply dumps around Imphal formed a key assumption in his planning. The essence of Mutaguchi's plan was speed - totsusbin ‘swift onslaught' - for if these vast depots were not seized as a matter of priority, the whole offensive would literally run out of fuel. He thought it would take no more than three weeks for his forces to fall on the British supply dumps. Without the capture of these supplies success could not be guaranteed, but it seemed increasingly inconceivable to Mutaguchi that a decisive, overwhelming attack against Imphal would not bring with it rapid and substantial rewards. At no time was he concerned that he might not capture the vast British depots needed to fuel his advance. Imphal needed to be taken by April 10th or it would all be a disaster General Slim planned for his 14th Army to make a stand at Imphal, taking the hit on the chin as they say, before pushing the enemy back. He needed to draw the Japanese in the Imphal Valley, in a tight circle so he could launch an effective counteroffensive. Lt General Geoffrey Scoones 4th corps would deploy the 20th Indian division led by Major General Douglas Gracey around Tamu and the 17th Indian Light Division of Major General David Punch Cowan around Tiddim. Both divisions had been aggressively carrying out patrols in the valley and along the banks of the Chindwin River. The 23rd Indian Division of Major General Ouvry Roberts was held in reserve at Imphal, with his 49th brigade in the Ukhrul area to the northeast.  Once Mutaguchi's offensive kicked off, Slim planned for his two southern divisions to withdraw up the Tamu-Palel and Tiddim roads to go on the defensive around the Imphal Valley. The two divisions would have a short and more secure line of communications and supply behind them as they forced the Japanese to extend them self over the mountains. To counter losing the overland supply line from Kohima, Slim planned to use air supply to maintain his men during the long siege. Slim also expected Mutaguchi to send a single regiment to seize the defenseless Kohima, not an entire division that was further tasked with pouring down into the Brahmaputra valley. That last part would put his entire plan in jeopardy. On March 8th, Operation U-Go was kicked off with Lt General Yanagida Motoso's 33rd division beginning their advance in 4 columns. The left column was the 215th regiment led by Colonel Sasahara Masahiko who advanced south of Tiddim before swinging north towards the village of Singgel. They would come across the large supply deport between the milestones 109 and 110 around the Tiddim road. The central column consisted of the 214th regiment led by Colonel Sakuma Takayoshi, advancing up the Kabaw Valley to assault Tonzang. Following this column up was the Fort White Garrison unit led by Colonel Yagi Shigeru. Both columns would cut off the route of withdrawal of Major General David Cowan's 17th division and annihilate it. Lastly the right column consisting of the Yamamoto Force led by Major General Yamamoto Tsunoru. They would be advancing north up the Kabaw valley to assault Major General Douglas Gracey's 20th Division on the Tamu-Palel Road. There had been early reports from scouts that groups of Japanese soldiers were advancing west of the Tiddim road. This only sounded off the alarm bells for the 14th corps on March 12th, after a verified sighting report was made stating a large group of Japanese were just a few kilometers off the road at Milestone 109.  Consequently, Scoones ordered Cowan to withdraw, so the 17th would begin to move from Tiddim on March 14, after laying mines and booby traps. But it was too late, as the Japanese had already cut the Tiddim Road earlier that morning, so Cowan would have to fight its way out to Imphal. That day, Yamamoto Force had also started attacking Gracey's southern front-line positions, with a particular tank-on-tank battle developing between a troop of M3 Lee/Grant tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers and some six light tanks of the 14th Tank Regiment. The latter were trounced in the end, with four tanks destroyed and two captured. Meanwhile on the 15th, Lt General Yamauchi Masafumi's 15th division began fording the Chindwin river at Thaungdut and Sittaung and would descend upon Imphal from the north. Lt General Sato Kotoku's 31st division also forded the river further north at Homalin, Kawya nad Tamanthi and were rapidly advancing towards Kohima and Ukhrul.  Just as Mutaguchi had guessed, Scoones ordered his 37th and 49th brigades to advance to the Tiddim road to help Cowan's men. Cowan had sent his 63rd indian brigade to attack the 214th regiment at Tonang and Tiutum. Thai left Imphal and Ukhrul with little protection, so Scoones decided to dispatch the newly arrived 50th indian parachute brigade of Brigadier Maxwell Hope-Thomson to defend Ukhrul, but he did not expect them to find a real fight. Ukhrul would only have the lightest of garrisons and no real defenses. Forces in the area comprised two battalions of the newly raised and part-trained 50th Indian Parachute Brigade whose young and professional commander, 31-year-old Brigadier Maxwell 'Tim' Hope-Thomson had persuaded the powers that be in New Delhi to allow him to complete the training of his brigade in territory close to the enemy. At the start of March the brigade HQ and one battalion had arrived in Imphal, and began the leisurely process of shaking itself out in the safety of the hills north-east of the town. To the brigade was added the 4/5th Mahrattas under Lieutenant-Colonel Trim. Sent into the jungle almost to fend for themselves, it was not expected that they would have to fight, let alone be on the receiving end of an entire Japanese divisional attack. They had little equipment, no barbed wire and little or no experience or knowledge of the territory. On March 16th, Scoones ordered Gracey to withdraw, so the 20th Division could begin a controlled withdrawal up the Tamu-Palel Road, gradually moving into three defensive boxes.  The first was to be at Moreh, held by the 32nd Indian Brigade; the second in the Khongkhang–Sibong area, held by the 80th Indian Brigade; and the third was to be on the Shenam Saddle, held by the 100th Indian Brigade. Luckily for the allies, Yamamoto had dispatch two of his battalions in a useless wide flanking maneuver towards Mombi and the Tamu-Palel road. Thus Yamamoto would lack sufficient troops to launch a full attack against the retreating allied forces. Meanwhile Hawker Hurricanes and heavy artillery bombarded as the 63rd launched a direct assault against Tuitum saddle, managing to break through to the Manipur River, leaving a rearguard at the bridge. During the following days, the rearguard would repel a series of intense assaults upon the saddle by the 214th regiment and Yanagida's Fort White column. At the same time the 37th brigade was fighting against the bulk of the 215th regiment around milestone 100. The fighting became very confused as the Japanese units became sandwiched between the allied units who in turn were surrounded by other Japanese units. On March 18th, the 3rd battalion ,215th regiment managed to capture the supply depot between Milestones 109 and 110 facing minor resistance. Then they were forced to repel a number of counter attacks by the 48th Indian brigade. On the 19th, Hope-Thomson received some panicked reports that his battalions were seeing heavy columns of Japanese advancing on their undefended camp at Sheldon's Corner. It was the 31st infantry of Major General Miyazaki Shigesaburo from the 58th regiment. Hope-Thomson made a last minute call to assemble his dispersed forces at the deserted Naga Village of Sangshak. His brigade, when concentrated, consisted of 1850 men. However, as the troops dug in they discovered to their discomfort that they were atop an ancient volcano, and the rock was impervious to their picks. All they could dig were shallow trenches, which provided ineffective protection from Japanese artillery. Like all Naga villages that at Sangshak was perched on a hill, and had no water; anything the men required had to be brought up from the valley floor, through the rapidly tightening Japanese encirclement. Its unknown why Miyazaki diverted his men to hit Sangshak rather than continue towards Kohima. By nightfall of the 22nd, the Japanese infantry overwhelmed Indian defenses without performed a detailed reconnaissance and lacking artillery support. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. 400 Gurkhas of the 153rd parachute battalion began mowing down wave after wave of Japanese troops using machine gun fire. The Japanese 8th Company of 58th lost 90 out of 120 men in the space of just 15 minutes. Suffering tremendous casualties, seeing entire companies decimated, Miyazaki decided to regroup and began tossing numerous frantic efforts to break up the defenders positions.Under heavy mountain artillery fire and unable to be supplied by air, Hope-Thomson's troops grimly held a position that was not even ringed by barbed wire until March 26, when they finally received Scoones' order to pull out.  The Parachute brigade was being virtually destroyed in four battles at Sangshak, suffering 652 casualties. Yet in turn Miyazaki was served nearly 1000 casualties and his advance upon Kohima was held up for a week, severely delaying Sato's plans. Further to the south, Yamauchi's 60th regiment was also facing stubborn defenses at Sangshak. They actually had been waiting for the battle of Sangshak to conclude and only jumped in on the last day's assault. This prevented one of Yamauchi's columns from arriving in time north of Imphal, giving Scoones and Slim an extra few days to prepare Imphal's defenses. Meanwhile on March 23rd, the 48th brigade used their heavy guns and mortars to hit the Japanese positions and managed to force the 215th regiment to pull away from the valuable supply depot. To secure the depot however, they still needed to clear the road from the north. Gurkha's were sent in waves against the strongly defended Japanese bunkers, while the 37th brigade and Hawker Hurricanes hit the main defensive positions of the 215th regiment. At this point, General Yanagida, who had always felt that Allied capabilities were being underestimated, determined that his forces would not be able to hold on much longer and thus ordered them to pull back. Yanagida had received a signal from Colonel Sasahara about the critical situation his regiment was in. Sasahara, in turn, had been reacting to a signal from one of his battalion commanders, Major Sueki. Faced with rapidly depleting ammunition, mounting casualties and attacks on his position near Milestone 109, Sueki had signaled that he would not be able to hold on much longer. He indicated that he would destroy his codes and radio and fight to the end. Sasahara is said to have communicated this and the regiment's resolve to fight to the end to Yanagida. There is some mystery around this signal, some accounts suggesting the division commander received only the latter half of the message. Either way, Yanagida had had enough. All his reservations about the Imphal offensive came to the fore. He ordered the 215th Regiment to pull out and sent a signal to Mutaguchi about his decision. In this he noted the strength of their opponent, questioned the rationale of the operation and remarked on the impossibility of meeting the deadline. He is supposed to have gone so far as to suggest the suspension of the Imphal offensive. This all greatly pissed off Mutaguchi whose divisional commanders for the majority disagreed with his U-GO plan, and Motoso Yanagida openly derided him as an "imbecile". Irregardless, Mutaguchi sought to remove Yanagida from his command. Their relationship would not improve as more setbacks were on the way. With the Japanese dislodged, the 37th Brigade managed to reopen the Tiddim Road and the 48th Brigade finally secured the entire depot area around Milestone 109. Whatever supplies that could be recovered and transported back to Imphal were grabbed, while as many as possible that could be of potential value to the Japanese were destroyed. On the 26th, the 63rd Brigade's rearguard also withdrew, blowing up the Manipur River bridge behind them. Two days later, the 37th made first contact with Cowan's units near Milestone 102 and the 17th Division finally began their retreat towards Imphal. Their only obstacle would be a roadblock established by the 2nd Battalion, 213th Regiment around Khuadam. But that would be cleared out quite easily by Cowan's men who were able to reach Imphal by April 4th. In the meantime, Scoones had asked Gracey to send back one of his 100th indian brigade into the reserve on the 25th, leaving him with only two brigades to fend off the Japanese attacks. The next day, the 11th company, 213th regiment of the Yamamoto Force managed to advance past the main defenses at Moreh, defended by the 32nd indian brigade and captured Nippon Hill. Though they were not under heavy enemy pressure, the 32nd Indian Brigade finally withdrew from Moreh on April 1. It had set the dump on fire; by some estimates at least a million pounds' worth of supplies that had not yet been evacuated were destroyed. They arrived at the Shenam Saddle a few days later to join the 80th Indian Brigade in a fierce battle for Nippon Hill. Meanwhile, Slim had foreseen that reinforcements would be needed at Imphal and Kohima and had already requested them with great urgency.  Slim was granted  30 Dakotas to fly the 5th Division from Arakan back on the 18th. By the 27th, the 9th and 123rd Indian Brigades had arrived at Imphal and the 161st Indian Brigade was being flown to Dimapur to reinforce Kohima. In addition, Slim was promised the 2nd British Division and the 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade, should it be necessary. General Giffard also decided that once the airlift of the 5th Division was complete, the 7th Division would then be airlifted to Manipur. Yet that is all for the India-Burma front as we need to move over to New Britain. On March 5th, Colonel Smith's 5th marines began loading for an overnight run to the Willaumez Peninsula, departing Iboki by nightfall. The following morning the small convoy assembled off Volupai, waiting for air support to soften up their landing area, but they never showed up. Apparently having reason to believe that the Marines would attempt to land at Beach Red, the defenders constructed an intricate communications net between Talasea and Volupai, placed some mines on the beach, constructed defenses of a sort, sighted in 90mm mortars–and then inexplicably did not attempt to defend the beach as they could have done very well under the circumstances. Realizing the longer they waited the better the enemy could prepare, Smith ordered the first assault wave to hit the beaches at 8:25. LCM-tank gunboats raked the beach with machine-gun fire, as Smith's 1st Battalion successfully landed meeting enemy sniper and mortar fire. Some sniper fire was observed and 90mm mortar shells began splashing in the water, but Companies A and B drove on shoreward and within 10 minutes after crossing the line of departure about 500 Marines had landed. The two assault companies then pushed forward to establish a beachhead line through which the 2nd Battalion could pass and continue the attack in the direction of Bitokara Mission. Company A accomplished this with relatively little difficulty on the right, but on the left there existed a virtually impassable swamp, running north and south and extending to the edge of the Volupai track. As a result, Company B had to pass through a slot between Little Mt. Worri and the swamp in order to accomplish its mission, encountering and eliminating an enemy pocket of resistance before establishing its lines 200 yards inland. Meanwhile the reinforced platoon patrol that had gone after the bunker on Little Mt. Worri had run into difficulty. The retreating enemy joined other of their fellows and hastily manned defensive positions which had been prepared in the Volupai coconut grove. The platoon accounted for about a dozen of the Emperor's troops, losing one Marine killed and another wounded in the process. Finding he could not advance against the Japanese all-around defensive positions, the patrol leader requested assistance but was instructed to hold what he had until the 2nd Battalion arrived on the scene. As the advancing elements pushed their way through the coconut trees, rear echelon personnel on Beach Red suffered heavier casualties than the assault units. All during the day the Japanese lobbed 90mm mortar shells onto the beach, shells landing capriciously and inevitably taking their toll in the crowded, constricted area. Among the early victims was Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Forsythe, regimental surgeon, who continued working with the wounded until he was evacuated. The heaviest casualties that day were recorded in the 11th Marines and among medical company personnel. Both groups had to remain on the beach, there being no other place to go. On top of that, coral reefs were delaying the LCM's from fully landing the 3nd battalion until the early afternoon. Once Company E came ashore, the advance guard rapidly moved forward and began moving through the 1st Battalion's lines astride the Volupai Plantation track at 11:00.  The Marines were brought to an abrupt halt 200 yards farther on where the Japanese had dug positions commanding the narrow trail. As Company E attempted to attack outside the plantation track, a medium tank commanded by Lieutenant John M. Scarborough moved up the trail to the company's assistance and knocked out a heavy machine-gun position. But suddenly two Japanese, one on each side of the trail and each armed with a magnetic mine, leaped out of the brush. The defending Marine infantry killed one before he could reach the tank, but the other succeeded in affixing the mine to the port side of the turret. The blast that followed killed the Japanese and the Marine who was trying to stop him, as well as jamming the turret so that it could not be operated and stunning the tank crew within. Simultaneously the rear of the turret was pierced by a missile, presumably an anti-tank grenade, which made a hole about three quarters of an inch in diameter. Supported by two more tanks and mortars, Company E finally began moving towards the coconut grove with increasing momentum during the afternoon, at the same time capturing a detailed map of Japanese positions in the Talasea-Bitokara-Waru area. As night approached, elements of the 2nd Battalion set up an all-around defense within the coconut grove while the 1st Battalion manned the beachhead. By the end of the first day, the Marines had penetrated approximately 2000 yards inland from the beach and killed 35 Japanese while suffering 13 killed and 71 wounded, most of them to the deadly mortar fire.  More than half of these were incurred on the beach, and the figures for the day represented more than half the total casualties the combat team would suffer between March 6th and its departure on April 25th. 9 of the fatalities and 29 of the wounded were in the 11th Marines alone.  At 2:00am on March 7th, a handful of Japanese attempted to infiltrate the lines of Company E, but the attack was so easily repelled that Smith considered that this wasn't even a counterattack. Actually, realizing that his forces were heavily outnumbered, General Sakai had ordered the defenders to leave a rearguard of about 100 men and withdraw at once towards Bola. During the morning, the 2nd Battalion advanced through the abandoned enemy positions without facing any opposition until they were stopped on Mt. Schleuther's northwest slope at 11:45. It became evident that the Japanese were attempting to turn the battalion's right flank. Luckily, Company F rushed forward and managed to extend the threatened flank and seize the high ground. At 3:00pm, the reserve 3rd Battalion was also landed at Volupai, thus relieving the 1st Battalion at the beachhead. The next morning, after a mortar barrage, the 2nd battalion soon discovered the Japanese had retreated past Bitokara. The Marines quickly captured Bitokara by 1:40pm. The Marines then dispatched scouts towards Mt. Schleuther and Talasea. The Mt. Schleuther scouting group reported that the Japanese were well dug in on a nearby peak, and at 3:00 a task force consisting of Company E and reinforcing elements began the ascent. A request for artillery fire on Scheuther brought several rounds dangerously close to the 2nd battalion, 5th Marines CP, and the battalion's 81mm mortars promptly took over the support missions. As the task force approached the enemy positions, however, it ran into concentrated fire from machine-guns and small arms, backed up by a 90mm mortar and a 75mm field piece. The Marines fought back for an hour and sustained 18 casualties before they were ordered withdrawn to the mission. The second scouting party had returned from Talasea, meanwhile, to report no indications of the enemy.    As no enemy presence was found on the latter, Company F advanced to the airdrome and in less than an hour reported it secured. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion advanced to Liapo and then began to push over rough terrain towards Waru, finally digging in for the night just a bit short of its objective. After some artillery and mortar dueling during the night, Companies G, B and C launched a coordinated assault at 8:00am on the 9th. Once again, they found abandoned positions, successfully clearing the Waru area by 1:00pm. Also a patrol was landed on Garua Island at 11:47, reporting it deserted as well.  By the afternoon, Smith moved his command post to Bitokara and informed the division that Talasea was secure and that his forces would now concentrate on mopping up and patrolling the Willaumez Peninsula. The 4 day campaign had cost the Marines 17 killed and 114 wounded, while estimating they had killed 150 Japanese. But now we need to jump over to Bougainville. The Japanese had begun earlier in the year to improve some trails, particularly the net leading from the Mosigetta-Mawaraka area. A rough road had been completed through the jungle to the jump-off positions for the infantry. Nevertheless, the movement of over fifteen thousand troops with all their equipment proved to be a major task that would have dampened the spirits of all but the most ardent warriors. Artillery units had a particularly difficult time pulling their heavy guns through the jungle to get them into position to support the attack. Their task was made even more difficult by the daily downpour that flooded the streams, washing away many of the makeshift bridges and making some trails veritable seas of mud. American intelligence by mid-February was aware of the large-scale movement toward the perimeter and Allied planes repeatedly attacked the trails. Despite all these difficulties, the Japanese soldiers displaying their tenacity and ability to overcome the most difficult obstacles, brought up the supplies and eventually had all the guns in place for the attack. All of this was done to support a major counteroffensive scheduled to begin on March 8th. On the 7th, the Iwasa unit has assembled behind Hill 1111; the Magata Unit behind Mount Nampei; the Muda Unit at Peko village on the East-West Trail, and the 17th Army Artillery Group, commanded by Colonel Saito Harumasa in place near Hill 600. Facing them, were the men of the 37th and Americal Divisions, who were on full alert in their foxholes and bunkers, waiting for the great Japanese counterattack. On the 8th General Hyakutake's counterattack began with a heavy albeit uncoordinated artillery bombardment. The Japanese artillery concentrated its fire on Piva Yoke instead of the forward areas of the perimeter, which would be the main initial point of attack. The artillery fire was delivered spasmodically and with poor coordination despite the high vantage points from which the Japanese surveyed the central segment of the American positions. The Japanese artillery did little damage. American corps and division artillery countered immediately, the 37th Division guns firing on the suspected hills to the northeast and the Americal howitzers concentrating on those to the east. The 6th Field Artillery Battalion and the 129th Infantry's cannon company were so situated that they could fire directly at the gun flashes. All other guns were directed by forward observers or spotter planes. Destroyers in Empress Augusta Bay also fired counterbattery missions. By midmorning marine dive and torpedo bombers were flying neutralization missions against Hills 250 and 600. Then in the afternoon 56 SBDs and 36 TBFs, guided by artillery smokeshells, struck the main concentrations on and around hill 1111. This all massively delayed the Japanese main assault. Only the 23rd Regiment would manage to assemble in place for the attack on Hill 700 by nightfall. Under drenching rainfall, the Japanese thus attacked the hill with some companies, yet their first assault was easily repelled by the experienced defenders.  At 2:30General Iwasa launched his main assault, sending his 2nd and 3rd battalions, 23rd division against the saddle. Despite the heavy fire from the 145th Regiment, the Japanese stormed the hill en masse, screaming and screaming threats in English and even singing American songs, presumably in attempts to unnerve the defenders of the hill. According to the historian of the 145th  "The enemy stormed the hill, clawing his way up the steep slope, yelling like a maniac, suicidally putting everything he had into a frontal attack designed to take the highest point on the hill. ... The 145th Infantry, defending the ridge, were somewhat taken aback by an enemy so unreasoning as to crawl up the 70-degree slope on all fours, rifles slung over their backs." Suffering severe losses, Iwasa's 2nd Battalion managed to blast their way through the protective wire and knock out one of the pillboxes. Through this gap, the Japanese moved onto the saddle and began to attack adjacent strongpoints, securing a penetration of the 145th's line 70 yards wide and 50 yards deep. Behind them, however, an effective artillery response would break up the attack of Iwasa's 3rd Battalion; yet the 2nd Battalion would continue to expand this perimeter until, by 12:00, they had captured seven pillboxes and had brought up machine-guns and mortars with which they could put McClelland Road, the only lateral supply road for the 145th, under direct fire. Supply of the forward troops became very difficult, since the three-quarter-ton trucks and half-tracks could not use the road. All supplies had to be hand carried. Evacuation of the wounded also became difficult and dangerous. Japanese machine guns on the crest of the hill were able to cover the ridge with accurate and deadly grazing fire. They had placed other machine guns in trees on the spur of the hill about a hundred yards to the rear of the ground-emplaced weapons, which could sweep the entire front. With the exception of a few scattered trees and shallow trenches, there was little cover for troops of the 145th who moved up the steep slopes attempting to retake the lost positions. All during the day the Japanese were also extending the trenches repairing the old pillboxes, and building new ones. In response to this breakthrough, General Beightler sent the 1st Battalion, 145th Regiment to counterattack. By noon, the Americans were attacking the newly-gained Japanese positions, successfully retaking five of the lost pillboxes against heavy fire and establishing a new line just south of the crest by nightfall. The first attempt to recapture Hill 700 was launched at noon on the 9th. Company C moved northward against the saddle in a direct frontal assault while two platoons of Company F attacked the saddle from the flanks. Company C was halted by devastating fire two-thirds of the way to its objective, and the men were forced to dig in and hold what they had gained. Meanwhile the riflemen of Company F had retaken five of the lost pillboxes, and the line, now reinforced, was solidly established by nightfall just south of the crest. Beightler had ordered two tanks forward late in the afternoon to take enemy targets under direct fire, particularly those that menaced McClelland Road, but the terrain proved too steep for them to be used effectively. Thankfully, Iwasa's breakthrough had been contained, with the 145th losing 23 killed and 128 wounded against an estimated 500 enemy dead.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Mutaguchi's insane Operation U-Go was not going the way he thought it would. General Slim was outsmarting his enemy and it seems the allies were going to make further gains in Burma. Meanwhile things were heating up on Bougainville as Iwasa continued his grand offensive. 

Last time we spoke about Operation HA-GO, U-GO and some action brewing up on New Britain and Bougainville. Mutaguchi basically tricked his superiors at Tokyo into allowing him to attempt an invasion of India. Operations HA-GO and U-GO were simultaneously unleashed, the only problem was the allies were very ready to meet them. General Slim's men captured documents indicating the true nature of the operations and he acted accordingly. The new box defense systems were employed as the allies lured the Japanese into major traps thwarting their designs against Imphal. The Japanese were fighting tenaciously, but time and supplies would not be on their side. Over on New Britain the allies advanced and managed to seize Talasea. Meanwhile on Bougainville the Japanese were preparing a large counteroffensive, attempting to breach the American defensive perimeter. The operation had just kicked off last episode and today we will continue the story. This episode is the Bougainville Counteroffensive  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Marines departed Bougainville and were relieved by the Americal Division by the end of January 1944. Sporadic fighting emerged and through it Major General Griswold obtained intelligence indicating the Japanese would launch a major counter attack, most likely slated for early March. At the time Lt General Hyakutake was under extreme pressure to reduce the bombing against Rabaul. Rabaul as we know was smashed daily, suffering heavy losses. Admiral Koga had responded by taking away air units from Truk, but all this achieved was even more losses. Rabaul was neutralized, and Truk became vulnerable. The Americans had pummeled both so much, they were able to unleash a dramatic thrust into the central pacific aimed at the Gilberts, Marshalls and later the Carolines. Now it seems Hyakutake had been operating under some very bad intelligence, indicating to him the Americans were defending their perimeter with just a single division around the airfield. With the objective of destroying said airfield, Hyakutake did not know the actual number of defenders and would not enjoy movement by sea. The Americans had full control of the sea lanes, thus any IJN destroyers trying to move troops would run a risky gauntlet. By the first quarter of 1944, Rabaul had tossed meager attacks against the Americans, for example on January 23rd two bombers scored a direct hit over the living quarters of Brigadier General John Hodge and his senior staff officers.  What Hyakutake had to work with was 4300 men of the 45th regiment led by Colonel Isashi Magata. These men were considered the crack troops on Bougainville and they included artillery, mortar and engineering battalions. They were further supported by 4125 men of the 23rd regiment led by Major General Shun Iwara and 1350 men of the 13th regiment led by Colonel Toyo Horei Muda. All three units would be led by Major General Masatane Kanda. The 3 units made an arduous trek through the jungles to reach their jump off points by the evening of March 7th. Hyakutake then sent them a resounding message “time has come to manifest our knighthood with the pure brilliance of the sword. It is our duty to erase the mortification of our brothers at Guadalcanal. Attack! Assault! Destroy everything! Cut, slash, and mow them down. May the color of the red emblem of our arms be deepened with the blood of American rascals.” Major General Kanda also added his own message  “The cry of our victory at Torokina Bay shall resound to the shores of our beloved Nippon. We are invincible.” All of these troops received a large morale boost from such message, but on top of that there was something else incentivising them all. They had adequate food to last them until April 1st, they literally needed to overrun the Americans to steal their provisions. Such was the reality of the Japanese island hopping campaigns. Hyakutakes forces proved themselves far from invincible. Their artillery bombarded on the morning of the 8th, targeting the airfield at Piva Yoke. Their bombardment destroyed a bomber, 3 fighters, killed a single man, and forced a temporary evacuation of aircraft to New Georgia. It was now exactly the greatest of results. Artilleryman Stan Coleman vividly described the Japanese artillery attack “All of a sudden we heard a very different kind of ‘whoosh.' It was made by a shell at the end of its flight, not the beginning. It was ‘incoming mail.' All hell broke loose. In the rear some fuel dumps went up. Every American artillery piece in the perimeter went into action.” The American artillery counter-attack proved far more effective. The Japanese artillery units were forced to move positions constantly and then they were met by a new type of weapon.  As Coleman recalled “Four blue Marine Corsairs came in with rockets. Rockets were a new ground-support weapon and I had never seen them … The rockets in flight made a fearful display. There was a tremendous concussion when they struck their target.” That same night the Iwasa Unit attacked Hill 700 during a heavy downpour. Yet by 2:30am the first attacks were beaten off. It seems the experience persuaded the Japanese not to attempt another night attack on March 9th. Instead, they used occasional machine gun and mortar fire to disrupt the fitful sleep of the Americans. Then at 6:45am on the 10th, Iwasa launched another attack in coordination with Colonel Muda's assault against Hill 260. Iwasa's men clambered up the steep 70 degree slopes screaming maniacally. They would shout confused threats in English. A prolific slaughter occurred against one group of Japanese soldiers who seized out a pillbox and set up a machine gun post on the saddle of the hill. It was dearly bought. General Griswold had brought up more reinforcements for the 145th that same morning. Engineers put together a bangalore torpedo 72 feet long by connecting sticks of dynamite like a long pipe. The object was to climb the hill and then snake the charge down the opposite side into one of the pillboxes. Unfortunately the Japanese spotted them and fired a knee mortar, hitting the torpedo and killing the engineers. Another ruse was attempted shortly after noon with the object of getting the Japanese on the saddle to surrender. A public address system was set up with speakers aimed at Hill 700, and one of the division's Japanese interpreters spoke to the defenders. He informed them of the odds against their success and told them that they could not be reinforced. If they surrendered, it would be considered honorable. To die needlessly was foolish. For the short time he spoke all was quiet, but seconds after he had finished the Japanese directed a mortar barrage on the section of the hill from whence he was broadcasting. The day ended in victory for the riflemen of the 37th Division. At 11:15 an air strike by 26 planes and continuous artillery fire had devastated the Japanese. The day's assault cost the lives of some 500 or more Japanese soldiers.  Meanwhile further south, the 1st battalion, 13th regiment was knocked out by heavy artillery fire. Colonel Muda sent his 3rd battalion, 13th regiment to attack the southern positions of the 182nd regiment around Hill 260. Hill 260, a twin-peaked rise close to the west bank of the Torokina River approximately four miles north of its mouth, was covered with heavy vegetation. The hill itself measured only 850 yards along its north-south axis and at its widest a mere 450 yards, and it was shaped roughly like an hourglass, with the highest elevations to the north and south connected by a narrow saddle. The eastern slope of the hill was precipitous, steepest along the South Knob, where it was almost perpendicular. The South Knob, which was considered the most important part of Hill 260, had been occupied by men of 2nd battalion, 182th regiment since early January, and vigorous patrolling had also been carried on regularly along the saddle and on the unoccupied North Knob. The hill was about half a mile east of the 182nd's main line of resistance. Between Hill 260 and the main line of the Americal was a small stream named Eagle Creek, which provided a natural defensive barrier. There was but a single trail leading from the main perimeter to South Knob. A small bridge over the creek could take vehicular traffic. The last hundred yards to the top of South Knob was a steep stairway cut into the sides of the hill. Possession of this portion of the hill was important for both sides. The Americans had built a platform near the top of a 150-foot banyan tree from which forward observers could see any enemy-activity along the Torokina River or along the highlands to the northeast. Conversely, if the Japanese could seize the hill they could have good observation of the American-held Hills 608 and 309 and the area behind them. Under the cover of intense machine-gun and mortar fire, the Japanese managed to climb the steep slope of the South Knob and then burst in among the outnumbered Americans. The position was held by a reinforced platoon of Company G of the 182nd and a forward observer team of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion. The Americans were rapidly wiped out and dispersed as Muda's men established a defensive perimeter over the crest of South Knob. Hearing the dire news, General Griswold ordered General Hodge to hold Hill 260 at all costs, an order that surprised many of the Americal's staff since they had not expected to try to hold the hill in the face of a concerted Japanese attack. Companies E and F immediately advanced to occupy the North Knob and then attempted an encircling maneuver to counterattack the newly-established Japanese perimeter. Company E at 8:45 attacked South Knob from the southwest while Company F moved south. The company began its attack at 10:45 but halted after the troops had advanced a few yards into the cleared zone. The men took whatever cover was available and waited for flame throwers before trying to advance farther. At approximately 2:45 the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, ordered the attack resumed; Company E split and attempted an envelopment. The northern prong of the envelopment was halted but the infantrymen of the southern prong, using grenades and flame throwers, managed to gain a lodgment within earshot of the men of Company G who were still holding out in the pillbox.  Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 145th Regiment had been reorganized and launched a counterattack against Hill 700 at 5:00. The Japanese unleashed intense mortar and artillery ied, but gradually were dislodge from the crest of the hill, leaving just 4 pillboxes remaining under their control. After the reestablishment of the original resistance line, Iwasa prepared his men to storm Pat's Nose during the night. The Japanese had lost heavily during these attacks, which also cost the 145th three dead and 121 wounded. During the night, after a failed bayonet charge, the Japanese would reinforce their position on Hill 260. They then struck at Company E early in the morning of March 11th and although this attack was beaten off, the American situation in the lodgment had become desperate. Thus, after another Japanese flanking attack, the defenders would have to pull back towards North Knob.  Company G was sent to relieve the beleaguered Company E but was halted by yet another Japanese flanking attack on Company E. General Hodge, fearful of reducing his main defense line, felt that he could send no more reserves to the hill and therefore decided to break off the action and pull Company G and what was left of Company E off South Knob. They retired, unimpeded by the Japanese, behind Eagle Creek. There they joined Company B and then proceeded to cut a new trail up to the crest of North Knob. At daybreak on 11 March, Iwasa launched another attack against the promontory called ‘Pat's Nose,' some 150 yards to the west of ‘Hill 700.' Flanking 37 mm guns cut the Japanese charge to shreds. Iwasa's rear echelons kept advancing over the dead bodies of those who had been leading the charge and eventually managed to break through the barbed wire, though they too were ultimately destroyed. After an hour of suicidal attack Iwasa's troops receded leaving some 84 dead behind them. The 37th Division's historian described this attack: "Brandishing their prized sabers, screeching 'Chusuto' (Damn them!), the Jap officers climbed up the slope and rushed forward in an admirable display of blind courage. The men screamed in reply 'Yaruzo' (Let's do it!) and then 'Yarimosu' (We will do it!). As they closed with the American doughboys, the leaders cried' San nen Kire!' (Cut a thousand men!). General Beightler, concerned over the inability of the 145th to reduce the Japanese positions on Hill 700, decided to send the 2nd Battalion, 148th Regiment to finally wipe out the enemy opposition. After a heavy mortar and artillery bombardment, two platoons of Company E advanced east from Pat's Nose trying to flank the saddle while a third attacked west from Hill 700. Thirteen men were killed before the momentum of the attack waned and the battalion dug in on the ground it had gained. Meanwhile, Companies F and B, now under the command of Brigadier-General William McCulloch, began a  two-pronged attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. Supported by flamethrowers units from the 132nd, men of Company B got across the saddle and onto the knob, but were ultimately pulled because of the enemy's numerical superiority. Meanwhile, Colonel Magata Isashi's 45th Regiment had limited its actions to heavy patrol activity while the Iwasa Unit was attacking Hill 700. The terrain fronting the 129th Regiment, which was holding the center of the 37th Division line, was much more favorable for the Japanese than that encountered by either the Iwasa or Muda forces. The land was relatively flat, although cut by many gullies. The 129th's line, defended by two battalions, extended over two miles, curving slightly from just east of the Numa Numa Trail southwest to the right flank of the 148th Regiment. The Japanese had easy access to the 37th's lines, first via the Numa Numa Trail and then following the lowlands and gullies adjacent to the creeks. Colonel John Frederick, the regimental commander of the 129th, had recognized the potential vulnerability of this position and had organized a defense in depth during the two months prior to the attack. The position was anchored by a large number of mutually supporting earthen and log pillboxes and protected by a double apron of barbed wire, in front of which antipersonnel mines had been laid. Machine-guns had been sited to provide interlocking fire and additional barbed wire had been placed to channel potential attackers into the main machine-gun fire lanes. The 129th's cannon company of 75-mm pack howitzers, and its mortar sections had been augmented by 37-mm and 40-mm anti-tank guns, which could fire canisters in flat-trajectory direct fire. Thus although Colonel Magata's men did not have to climb up steep cliffs to get at the American positions, they would find the 129th's defenses near impregnable to relatively lightly supported infantry attacks, no matter how fanatically delivered. While patrolling, some documents were taken from dead Japanese bodies detailing Magata's plan, so Colonel John Frederick's 129th Regiment was expecting his thrust. On the 11th, the contact between Japanese and American patrols increased, as did the amount of incoming mortar fire, so the American supporting artillery was directed to fire intermittently into the areas where the Japanese were located.Colonel Frederick at 4:00pm ordered all his outposts back into the main perimeter and division artillery fired a ten-minute concentration along the 2nd Battalion front. At dusk, a heavy firefight then broke out as the Japanese opened up with machine-guns and mortars on Company G's area. During the exchange of fire, which lasted until 7:20pm, men in the pillboxes did not fire their machine guns, since they did not want to reveal their positions. The firing died down to only a few exchanges during the night, generally directed at Japanese infiltrators, who were attempting to cut through the barbed wire. Finally, at dawn on the 12th, Magata sent his 1st and 3rd battalions in column to strike Company G. Although the attacking Japanese suffered very heavy casualties from machine-gun fire, they penetrated the first line of defense by sheer weight of numbers. Moving up the streambed running into the sector, they captured one pillbox after another until they held a total of seven. Frederick then sent his reserve 1st Battalion to support Company G, while also launching a counterattack that managed to contain the enemy expansion and that also retook two pillboxes by late afternoon. Meanwhile, Companies E and F of the 148th were converging against Iwasa's remaining strongpoints. Using grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers, they finally reduced the pillboxes one by one, leaving the Japanese in possession of only one pillbox by 1:00pm. An historian of the 145th Regiment described the fight for this last strongpoint: “On the second day, the last held enemy pillbox was subjected to everything an infantryman has at his command. Hand grenades by the dozen were thrown at the emplacement. Still there was responding fire. Flamethrowers scorched the hidden Nip into silence. The searching parties entered the charred remains of the emplacement only to hear the click of a Japanese grenade being detonated. In the far corner they made out the dim outline of a Jap, eyes bloodshot, mouth bleeding, face seared, clothing burned. His clenched fist held a grenade. Even as the men dove for cover outside the pillbox, the Jap threw the grenade at them as in a dying gesture.” Despite a heroic resistance, this was cleared in the afternoon at last, thus completely restoring the original 145th's line.  While this was going on, after a heavy artillery bombardment, McCulloch sent Companies B and F once again to storm the South Knob. Company B in a column of platoons with six flamethrowers attempted to storm the height from the northwest. The leading platoon was halted by machine gun fire from pillboxes dug in on the west slope. Once these were spotted a concentration of mortar and machine gun fire was directed against these Japanese positions, enabling the following platoon to reach the top of the knob. There, it was pinned down by heavy fire from machine guns sited east of the observation post banyan tree. American mortar fire, together with the work of the flamethrower operators, who were covered by BAR men of the 3rd Platoon, soon negated these positions. Although it appeared that the South Knob would soon be in American hands, ammunition for the attacking platoons was running low, there had been numerous casualties, there were no more reserves, and it was already late in the day.  Despite this, Hodge sent Company A of the 132nd Regiment to reinforce the gained position. Company A of the 132nd tried to scale the height from the southwest to join Company B of the 182nd on the crest. A burst of machine gun fire killed the company commander, however, and disorganized the attack so much that under the best of conditions the men could not reach the top before dark. Hodge then reluctantly recalled his forces and, sensing the futility of further attacks, he requested permission to pull off South Knob. Yet Griswold refused the request and a new attack was ordered for the next day using two companies of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Regiment. After another heavy artillery bombardment, Company A attacked southward along the narrow saddle while Company B attacked up the southwest slope. Surprisingly, the two companies of the 182nd that had led the attack the day before had not been kept in immediate reserve but had been pulled back within the perimeter. Therefore there were no reserve troops available to help exploit the minor gains made during the afternoon. As night fell, Major Raymond Daehler, the battalion commander, reluctantly pulled his men off the knob and retreated to safer ground. Despite repeated attacks from 12 -16th, Magata had made no headway and finally withdrew his forces. After Iwasa's retreat, the men of the 145th had the dubious honor of policing the slopes of Hill 700 and burying the corpses left behind. In an area roughly 50 yards square, corpses that could be identified were counted. This count included only those within the barbed wire lines in front of the pillboxes. As one observer noted, the carnage was a sight to turn even the most cast-iron stomach: “Enemy dead were strewn in piles of mutilated bodies, so badly dismembered in most cases that a physical count was impossible. Here and there was a leg or an arm or a blown-off hand, all to show for the vanished and vanquished enemy. At one point, Japanese bodies formed a human stairway over the barbed wire. Five enemy were piled one on top of the other, as each had successively approached the location to use a predecessor as a barricade and then fall on top of him as he in turn was killed. Farther out from the perimeter, where a little stream wound its way parallel to it, Japs killed by the concussion of thousands of mortar shells lay with their heads, ostrich fashion, stuck under the least protection they could find”. What was left of Iwasa's shattered command to the relative safety of the Blue Ridge, Approximately two miles east of the American perimeter. During the day, as the Japanese were retreating, American planes dropped 123 tons of bombs on the intermediate areas, and destroyers off shore lobbed their five-inch shells into the high ground to the north and east of the perimeter. Further east, Magata launched a night attack at 4:00am, managing to gain another pillbox, so Griswold would decide to reinforce Frederick with a tank platoon. General Griswold agreed to send the 1st Platoon of Company C, tank battalion, forward, with the stipulation that they be used only to augment the infantry as they took back the lost pillboxes. 4 tanks supported a midmorning assault, which successfully retook two pillboxes. Another tank-infantry attack began at 1:15pm but was halted since the tanks were low on fuel and ammunition. They were replaced by tanks of another platoon, which assisted the infantry of the 129th in destroying all the other pillboxes held by the Japanese and in restoring the front line roughly to the positions held before the Japanese attack of the previous day. Alongside this, Griswold ordered the reconnaissance troop forward to occupy the right sector of the threatened area, with the 131st Engineer Regiment taking over the extreme left. General Hodge requested to be reinforced with tanks; but as they could not cross Eagle Creek, McCulloch and him reluctantly decided to cease any further attempt to drive the Japanese off South Knob. He thought that the three-day action against the Muda Unit had obviously so weakened it that it no longer posed a danger to the perimeter proper. Thus, it could be contained and continually harassed by combat patrols and neutralization fire.  On the 14th, the fighting fell into just intermittent small-arms and mortar fire from the Japanese as Colonel Magata shifted some of his troops to more favorable positions and as he brought his reserve 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 13th Regiment to reinforce further attacks. Magata also received the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment from the north, tossing them into his new reserve. At 4:00am on 15th, the Japanese launched a heavy local attack against the right of Company F. By dawn, they had captured one pillbox and penetrated approximately 100 yards into the perimeter, where they were ultimately checked. A coordinated counterattack by Companies F and C in conjunction with a 36-plane strike against the Japanese positions, managed to retake the pillbox. Further tank-infantry attacks finally drove the entrenched Japanese out of the salient and successfully restored the line. Losses for the day were 10 dead and 53 wounded, while 190 Japanese were counted dead. The Japanese then repeated the attack the next morning at 4:00am on the high ground east of Cox Creek with a larger force of elements from three battalions. They penetrated approximately 75 yards before their momentum was halted. Then, Company B, supported by a platoon of tanks, counterattacked and restored the original line by midmorning. Finally, shortly after noon, the tanks moved beyond the wire and shelled the draws and ravines in front of Company F until their ammunition was exhausted. Once again the Japanese had paid heavily for no gain. 194 dead were counted and 1 prisoner taken, while the Americans only lost 2 dead and 63 wounded. Though the counter offensive is nowhere near done, that is all for this week as we now have to jump over to the CBI theater. General Merrill's Marauders had been given the task of cutting the Japanese supply line over the Kamaing road. At Merrill's disposal were the three battalions of GALAHAD, each in turn broken down into two combat teams. The teams bore the code names Red and White for the 1st Battalion; Blue and Green for the 2nd Battalion and Khaki and Orange for the 3rd Battalion. Each team included a rifle company, heavy weapons platoon, pioneer and demolition platoon, reconnaissance platoon, and medical detachment, with a combined strength of sixteen officers and 456 enlisted men. The marauders had been recruited from units in the south-west pacific and from Trinidad in the Caribbean. Many of the volunteers were notably seen as pure psychopaths. Their training in India was quite painful, a lot so for the military police nearby. 10 percent of the Marauders went AWOL, many of them amused themselves by shooting at catte, chickens and other birds, apparently even at the feet of locals to make them dance. One incident apparently had some of them aboard a train to Ledo firing out of the windows. They were seen as arrogant, psychopathic, gung-ho and they had many colorful catchphrases such as ‘My pack is on my back, my gun is oiled and loaded, and as I walk in the shadow of death I fear no sonofabitch.'  The baptism of the Marauders did not impress their commander who was obsessed with speed and efficiency. The Galahad unit had departed on February 24th and on receiving orders to move to his forward assembly area, Merrill sent his three intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoons to check trails as far as the Tawang Hka, the first of the three considerable streams that crossed the line of march. At 6:00am on the 24th, the 5307th moved out, screened by the I & R platoons. Next day two of them clashed with Japanese patrols and the point of one platoon, Pvt. Robert W. Landis of Youngstown, Ohio, was killed. Luckily radio communication between the 2nd Battalion, 56th Regiment and the 18th Division's headquarters broke down at this time, so General Tanaka was unaware that a semi-detached American unit was operating off to his flank.  Stilwell fretted at the time it took them to cross the 130 miles over the Naga range to the battlefront. Part of the problem was that 5307th Composite was mule-based and had to bring 700 animals with them but none of them knew anything about muleteering. Whatever misgivings Stilwell had when he saw his reinforcements, he kept them to himself and addressed them simply and quietly, explaining that their new mission was to hit Walawbum. On the afternoon of the 28th, Merill received the new orders, calling for cutting the road on either side of Walawbum, the 2nd Battalion led by Colonel McGee to the west, the 3rd Battalion led by Colonel Beach to the south, and the 1st Battalion led by Colonel Osborne to patrol along the Nambyu Hka north of the Kamaing Road. Positions near Walawbum would be held until the 38th Division relieved the 5307th. Unfortunately the freak rains already experienced by Stilwell and his men continued, so that the Marauders' eight-day, 60-mile trek to Walawbum turned into something of a nightmare. On March 2nd, the Marauders crossed the Tanai Hka and arrived at their assembly area. With the last elements at hand, General Stillwell initiated his offensive. On the 3rd, Colonel Brown's tankers, with the support of a battalion from the 65th regiment advanced against Maingkwan. Facing light opposition, they managed to advance 5000 yards northeast of Maingkwan by 3pm when they were halted by heavy Japanese fire. Meanwhile, Merrill's marauders were clashing with Japanese at various places throughout the day. The 3rd Battalion had a sharp fight at Lagang Ga, killing 30 Japanese and seized the area needed for the building of a drop field. One of the battalion's two combat teams, Khaki, stayed at Lagang Ga to build and protect the dropping zone. Orange Combat Team kept on to the high ground east of Walawbum and dug in, its heavy weapons commanding the Kamaing Road. This saw them securing high ground east of Walawbum. The 22d Division, was also moving ahead, and so far was in step with the tanks and GALAHAD. On  the 3rd, the 64th Regiment was near Ngam Ga, east of the Kamaing Road. The 66th to the west was in contact with the third regiment, the 65th, as it emerged from the Taro Plain. Tanaka's intelligence indicated the Americans were at Walawbum. The Chinese 22nd and 38th divisions were advancing slowly, so he believed his rearguard could hold them back so he could take the bulk of his strength to attack the americans. On the 3rd, the 55th and 56th regiment began retreating in order to launch an enveloping maneuver against Merrill's marauders. The next day, Brown found the enemy gone and his men were able to advance 3 miles southeast, getting his tanks in line with Maingkwan. Over at Walawbum, Merrills 3rd battalion were resisting against ferocious attacks from the Japanese. The drop field at Lagang Ga was attacked at dawn on the 4th but the garrison held. Orange Combat Team opened the battle in its sector with mortar fire on Walawbum, drawing mortar and 75-mm. fire in return from the 56th Infantry Regiment, which had been Tanaka's left flank, as it assembled for attack. When it moved, the 56th tried to cross the river and work around the Americans' flanks, where it met booby traps and ambushes thoughtfully prepared for just such a contingency. Some Japanese did cross to the east, but this failed to affect the course of the action, and 75 dead Japanese were counted, as against one American dead and seven wounded. These latter were evacuated by air the same evening. The 2nd battalion managed to get across the Kamaing road west of Wesu Ga where they established a roadblock. Finding out about the roadblock, Tanaka dispatched his forces to clear them out. On the 5th the Japanese appeared to be forming for an attack, but mortar fire seemed to be successful in breaking up such attempts. To the south, Allied aircraft could be seen bombing and machine-gunning what Orange Combat Team took to be Japanese reinforcements. One indication that the Japanese were increasing their strength in the immediate area lay in their being able to force Orange Combat Team's I & R Platoon back across the river about noon. Simultaneously, the 66th regiment liberated the abandoned Maingkwan and began advancing south over the Kamaing road. Brown's reconnaissance had found a good trail running south from Tsamat Ga, and on the morning of the 5th the tanks moved out through the jungle. After the engineers had prepared a small stream for crossing, the tanks broke into a freshly evacuated Japanese bivouac area. Jungle vines looping across the trail from either side, and connecting masses of vegetation and trees, made effective obstacles as they slowed down the tanks by catching their turrets; not until late afternoon did the armor break out on the trail running east and west between Maingkwan and Wesu Ga. Almost immediately the tanks encountered what seemed to be a company of Japanese defending a small but marshy stream. The stream did not seem fordable, so Brown attacked by fire alone. Unknown to him, his tanks were firing on Tanaka's division headquarters, and now lay squarely between the 18th's headquarters and its 56th Regiment. This understandably threw Tanaka's plan into chaos, as his forces who were unsuccessfully attacking Merrills marauders were becoming encircled. Tanaka decided to swing his force around the American roadblock, using a Japanese built trail that the Americans did not know about.The bypass road over which the 18th was to withdraw had been built by the Japanese engineers some days before and quote “The Engineer Regiment commander, Colonel Fukayama, had considered the possibility of reversals in our position and, in order to facilitate the withdrawal of the division, he had previously cleared a secret jungle trail about 20 kilometers long leading from the vicinity of Lalawng Ga to Jambu Hkintang on his own initiative. This trail was used in the withdrawal of the main body of the division.” By nightfall, Merrill's 2nd battalion had pulled out to Wesu Ga and were trying to link up with the 3rd battalion south of Walawbum. On the 6th after heavy artillery bombardment, at 5:15pm an estimated two companies of Japanese in line of skirmishers, with heavy supporting fire, crossed the river. The American mortars continued their work; the automatic weapons held back until the Japanese were within fifty yards. Two heavy machine guns, which had a clear field of fire along the river bank, were especially effective. The Japanese failed, leaving many dead on the open ground east of the river and on the river banks. Orange Combat Team found its ammunition low, and so sent a request for more to Khaki Combat Team, which was about one hundred yards downstream. This was however just a diversionary attack, as most of the 18th division were escaping unmolested. Meanwhile elements of the 113th regiment were beginning to arrive to Lagang Ga and unfortunately an incident of friendly fire would occur. The remainder of the 38th Division and an American patrol met near Walawbum on March 7th. The recognition signal had been arranged as three bursts of three rounds each. This necessarily meant there would be firing when the Chinese and Americans met. When the tops of the American helmets, which looked not unlike the Japanese pot helmet when their brims were invisible, appeared through and over the brush, there was a brief exchange of fire in which three Chinese were wounded before identity was established. Such is the nature of coordinating multiple nations' armies during actions. General Sun and Merrill's marauders made a withdrawal beginning on the 7th in order to circle south and cut the Kamaing road again, this time even further south than before. Brown in the meantime had advanced to Ninghku Ga where he secured support from a battalion of the 64th regiment and launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack against Kumnyen. At around 3pm, the tanks and infantry assembled across the Kamaing road in two places, establishing a roadblock while the tanks moved out aggressively along the road to east and west. On the 8th, Brown's tanks then moved along the Kamaing Road and onto a trail that showed signs of heavy traffic. This allowed them to discover Tanaka's evacuation route, finally occupying Walawbum by the end of the day. Brown later recalled, "swarming with people from the 64th Infantry and the 113th Infantry who, to the tankers' great disgust, disputed the latter's claim to have taken Walawbum”. Though the 18th division had managed to escape Stilwells traps, the American-Chinese forces had still scored a well-earned victory. The road to Myitkyina was not open.  The cost for this first series of victories in the North Burma Campaign were 802 Chinese dead and 1479 wounded, plus 530 undifferentiated casualties from the fall of 1943 to March 18, 1944. But the temporary American-Chinese collaboration did not presage a wider Sino-American synergy, and the Marauders found operating with their allies a major problem. One issue was that of disease: the Americans caught dysentery in large numbers and attributed this to the insanitary habits of the Chinese, especially their refusal to boil their water, or to wash their hands after using the latrines. The American K-rations also proved unsatisfactory and unsuitable for jungle warfare, as the Chindits soon discovered. Yet that is all for burma as we now have to jump over to New Guinea. The advance and pursuit upon Madang resumed on March 12th as the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied while the 57th/60th Battalion secured the abandoned Saipa 2. The 57th/60th Battalion advanced swiftly by night and finally concentrated at Yokopi two days later. On the 16th, Brigadier Hammer then received a rather ambiguous order. Chilton had redefined the division's role "in the light of the present situation". While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lower Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans. Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at the discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi". The order was ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and managed to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast: Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but, at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi. At this point Hammer decided that the supply route from the Saddle to the 57th/60th had to be developed. While the battalion patrolled and the enemy positions were bombarded, Saipa, Yokopi and Daumoina were built into staging areas. In the meantime, patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron were harrying the Japanese from the left flank, successfully establishing a new patrol base at Jappa by March 17th. From there, the Commandos patrolled towards Aminik, Oromuge and Mataloi, which they finally found abandoned. Further east, the 58th/59th Battalion patrolled from the Nangapo and Yangalum areas towards Arawum and Kul 2 as they searched for the Americans at the Kabenau and Kambara Rivers. An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towed in a rubber boat by a PT boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim. Off Garagassi Point, the tow rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat which they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu. Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Australians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy. On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine-guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum. The situation would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson and his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bear the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day set out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on March 20. Brewster reached Kul 2 on March 21, where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remained with them until the 26th. In this period he went to Saidor where he met General Gill, giving him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learning of the American intentions and dispositions. Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linking patrol—35 miles each way. On the other side, General Adachi ordered his 51st division to continue withdrawing towards Wewak and for the 20th division towards Hansa. There he sought for them to reorganize and receive around 5000 replacements from Palau each. By the 9th, both divisions had reached Bogia and the 20th division had established a new defense of the Hansa area. By mid March the 51st reached Wewak and would be able to assemble at Hansa. On March 20th, the bulk of the 41st division was ordered to withdraw towards Hansa as well. As a result of the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the 18th army and 4th air army were now cut off from Rabaul. Thus they were reassigned to the 2nd Area Army under the command of General Anami Korechika with his HQ at Ambon. They would be responsible for the defense of the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies and the western portion of New Guinea. General Teramoto would also have to move his command from Wewak to Hollandia.  Back at Yokopi, Hammer anticipated that the constant patrolling and bombardment had forced the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. On March 28th, patrols of the 57th/60th moved past Daumoina and effectively found the enemy gone. The reality, however, was that General Nakai and Colonel Matsumoto had been ordered to pull back and follow its parent unit towards Hansa. The remainder of the 41st Division were following suit over the next few days. Only a 5000-men detachment, deemed the Madang detachment formed around the 239th Regiment, under the command of General Shoge, was left behind to hold Madang and cover the Japanese withdrawal. Hammer ordered the 57th/60th to move forward with speed towards Yaula, yet the Australians would be stopped at the Kofebi River on March 30. In response, a company would be sent in an enveloping maneuver across the river, successfully getting through to Mabelebu although they would be unable to draw away the defenders. During the night, the surrounded company would then have to resist a number of enemy counterattacks, though these weren't really counterattacks but the Japanese trying to retreat towards Madang. The following day, with the enemy gone, the Australian patrols would rapidly set out north towards Yaula. Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Squadron's patrols, after securing Mataloi 1, were also advancing towards Yaula with speed. Finally, the commandos would successfully enter Yaula on April 4, with the 57th/60th's vanguard arriving soon after and then occupying Kwato by nightfall.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Bougainville counteroffensive proved the Japanese could still unleash brutal offensives and meet some success. However the level of success was not going to win the war let alone the fight over Bougainville. Within Burma the mixed national armies of the allies were finding some difficult working together, but they were gradually pushing the Japanese back.  

Last time we spoke about the invasion of Eniwetok and the end of Operation HA-GO in the Burma front. While Operation Hailstone was going on, the invasion of Eniwetok was greatly sped up as the Americans were simply too fast at conquering the Marshall islands. Codenamed operation Catchpole, Eniwetok was hit with the same kind of overwhelming force applied to Kwajalein and other islands. Aerial, naval and land base artillery smashed the defenders into submission before forces were landed. The Japanese launched so daring night time infiltration attacks, but were hopeless to stop the American seizure of the island. Within the Burma front the Japanese invaders were shocked at the performance of the newly improved Indian Army. Operation HA-GO was an utter disaster and worse it had weakened the Japanese to the point now the allies were going on the attack.  This episode is the invasion of the Admiralty Islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The war for the South Pacific is reaching its climax. The allies are securing western New Britain, the Solomons and the Huon Peninsula. The Japanese are simply overwhelmed. The Japanese air forces have been utterly annihilated, their warships are being drained of fuel, are worn down by the war and are seemingly no longer ready for that decisive naval battle envisioned by Isoroku Yamamoto. The men are battle-weary, food is becoming more scarce, malnourishment is spreading. All those strung out at the furthest islands are basically being left to die. To end the misery for those in the South Pacific, the capture of the Admiralty Islands was one of the last steps in Operation Cartwheel and would seal off the Bismarck-Solomons area from supply and reinforcement, denying their use to the Japanese for effective air and naval operations, and left garrisons totaling over 100000 troops in isolated impotence In the South Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, that of Manus and Los Negros stood at the northeastern exist of the Bismarck Sea. They commanded the important strategic point some 600 miles from Rabaul, 820 miles from Truk and 1370 miles from Mindanao Island. The joint chiefs believed Seeadler Harbor had the potential to become a major naval anchorage for the Pacific Fleet and perhaps the springboard for the invasion of the Philippines. Back on April 7th, 1942 a Japanese destroyer and a merchant ship had landed invading forces at Lorengau, driving off the hundred or so Europeans who had been living there. At that time the only airstrip was at Lorengau, the administrative center for the group of islands. Apparently the Admiralties were not considered significant in the offensive phase of the Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area, for it was not until February 1943, that construction forces started to build a 5000-foot airstrip at Momote Plantation on Los Negros and to put the 3000-foot Lorengau airfield into operational use. After October 1943, the Momote field and the smaller Lorengau strip served as ferrying stops on the replacement routes to Wewak, Hollandia, and Rabaul, until Allied air attacks destroyed the effectiveness of the Admiralties' base. Seeadler Harbor was also being used for surface craft and possibly for seaplanes.  In late 1943, General MacArthur had assigned General Krueger's Alamo Force at that time based in Finschhafen to plan the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, with the aim of establishing an airdrome and light naval facilities for the support of subsequent operations along the north coast of New Guinea.  On February 13th however, MacArthur ordered Krueger to seize all of the Admiralty islands and to build air bases at Lorengau and Momote. This was to be Operation Brewer, beginning on April 1st. However one of Lt General Kenney's spotter planes noticed there was no sign of life on the Admiralty Islands and this prompted MacArthur to move up the time table, to the end of February. It would be quite a mistake. MacArthur's chief of intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, was convinced Kenney's intelligence was incorrect and information from ULTRA intercepts seemed to support his claims. It seemed Kenney had been fooled. The Japanese appeared to be absent on the islands, because Colonel Yoshio Ezaki had ordered his men not to move during the day, so as to conceal their work constructing two new airstrips and to conserve anti-aircraft ammunition. In spite of Kenney's arguments that the Japanese looked vulnerable, MacArthur's staff officers were not at all happy at the idea of taking such a high level risk assaulting them. Even Kenney would note “we had already outrun the capabilities of our supply system.” Ignoring the limitations, MacArthur was determined to take the islands, but would later reminisce “I felt that the situation presented an ideal opportunity for a coup de main which, if successful, could advance the Allied timetable in the Pacific by several months and save thousands of Allied lives.” This of course is MacArthur we are talking about and the capture of the Admiralty Islands would advance his timetable to retake the Philippines, so for him it was a no brainer. There was also the on going race. MacArthur was obviously taking notice of Admiral Nimitz's thrust into the Central Pacific, and what a thrust it was. The Gilberts and Marshalls were falling in extremely surprising speed. MacArthur, fully aware of the risks of forwarding Operation Brewer, nevertheless did so and would cover his tracks by describing the invasion as “a reconnaissance in force” The misgivings of this decision would be apparent when a covert reconnaissance mission led by Lt J.R McGowan and 5 other men of the 158th infantry reported on February 27th that the island were “lousy with Japs”, but by that point it was too late to pull back. For the operation, Krueger would assign Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Cavalry Division, which was training intensively in the Oro Bay area. Although the 1st Cavalry Division was dismounted for operations in the Pacific, it retained its organization as a cavalry unit with two brigades, each made up of two reinforced regiments. In addition to supporting units, each regiment comprised two squadrons of three rille troops and a heavy weapons troop. Air offensives against Rabaul and Wewak continued throughout February, seeing an enormous reduction in the Japanese ability for air action. On the 22nd and 23rd, Captain Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23, consisting of Destroyers Charles Ausburne, Stanly, Converse, Spence and Dyson made a daring sweep in the Admiralty island area. They managed to sink the 3800 ton Japanese tug Nagaura due east of Lorengau. 3 of his destroyers then sailed south of New Hanover where they sank a IJN minelayer and a cargo ship before turning around the coast of New Ireland. They encountered no shipping there, so they fired 1500 five-inch shells into Duke of York Island in order to damage the airfield under construction. Meanwhile the other 2 destroyers sailed north of New Hanover and bombarded the enemy base at Kavieng. At this point MacArthur realized the Japanese could not mount any significant air or naval support to defend the admiralties. He also believed Los Negros islands was lightly held and that they was a “coup de main” opportunity. As someone who speaks french as a second language, I gotta say its so weird how we anglophones use these random french phrases for things haha. Thus MacArthur decided to change his plans somewhat. In place of the scheduled assault set for April 1st, he now was tossing the “reconnaissance in force” I mentioned early against the Momote airstrip on Hyane Harbor and that it should be carried out no later than February 29th. The force performing this was to be known as the Brewer Reconnaissance Force; it consisted of 3 rifle troops and the heavy weapons troop of the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment: 800 men with their complement of light and heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, and mortars. With them was a platoon from Battery B, 99th Field Artillery Battalion, carrying two 75-mm pack howitzers, four 50-caliber machine guns, and small arms. The 673rd Antiaircraft Machine Gun Battery, a unit of some 80 men, was equipped with twelve 50-caliber machine guns as well as individual weapons. Air and naval liaison officers and a shore fire control party were scheduled to land with the attacking force; Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry Brigade, would furnish a reconnaissance and a communications platoon. Arrangements had also been made for a detachment from the Australian New Guinea Administration Unit, usually called ANGAU; this group was to assist chiefly in gathering intelligence, patrolling, recruiting, and dealing with the native population as their villages were liberated.  If these men found Momote to be adequately defended, then they would establish a perimeter and await reinforcements, thus the reconnaissance turns into an invasion.With just 5 days to plan, General Kenney's 5th air force was given the task of bombing the objective area and northern Ireland. Meanwhile Admiral Barbey's destroyers were going to perform a heavy bombardment to cover the approach and landings. A patrol from the Alamo Scouts landed on the southeastern coast of Los Negros from a Catalina flying boat on the night of February 27th. They performed a reconnaissance, quickly discovering Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's forces were present. Yoshio's HQ was at Papitalai, the bulk of troops at Lorengau with garrison units were on Rambutyo, Peli, Pak, and Pityilu Islands and at the inland village of Kawaliap. One battalion was also at Papitalai covering HQ. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment at Salami and 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment at Hyane Harbor with its main elements south of Momote. It was obvious the enemy was still present in force. The Scouts discovered a large bivouac area on the southeast part of Los Negros and reported that the region between the Momote air strip and the south coast was as I mentioned earlier "lousy with Japs." This further allowed Admiral Barbey to make more specific bombardment plans. Three fire support areas had been established for the attack group, consisting of nine destroyers and the three destroyer-transports which were carrying the reconnaissance force. These areas covered the entire seaward side of Los Negros from the south coast to the northern end of Salami Plantation. In the final plans the attack group would bring the weight of its firepower against targets around Hyane Harbor and to the north. Additional fire to cover the southern part of the island would be furnished by another task group of two cruisers and four destroyers, which would meet the convoy at Cape Cretin. It was decided to split this latter group, giving one cruiser and two destroyers responsibility for the Japanese bivouac area, southwest of the Momote strip, which the Alamo Scouts had located. The other cruiser and two destroyers would fire on targets in the Lorengau-Seeadler Harbor region. In the 15-minute bombardment, scheduled from H-35 to H-20, 5-inch naval guns were each to expend approximately 350 rounds. Under the air force plan, two groups of heavy bombers would attack ground targets on Los Negros from H-28 to H-20. Two minutes later, four groups of medium bombers were to bomb and strafe the landing area until the first wave was ashore. Following H Hour a squadron of medium bombers and six smoke planes were to be on air alert for further missions.  The Japanese did not anticipate a landing would be made at Momote, thus only a few elements of the 1st battalion, 229th regiment were there while the bulk of their forces were concentrated at the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and on the other side of the island. Now despite the Alamo scouts best efforts, there was quite a lot of unknown variables. In light of that the landings would be done simplistically. 3 waves of 12 LCPRS would carry the troops to White Beach, lying near Jamandilai Point. From there the reconnaissance force led by Brigadier-General William Chase would advance and hold Momote airstrip. If this proved too difficult, the men would be loaded back up and return to Oro Bay. Now in the event of a successful landing, the remainder of the 5th cavalry regiment would come over 2 days later and the rest of the cavalry division, the main body of the Brewer force, would follow the reconnaissance and support forces as soon as shipping could be made available. On February 27, the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry led by Lt. Colonel William E. Lobit loaded up at Oro Bay, and the following morning departed aboard 3 APDs and nine destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral William Fechteler. They would rendezvous with Admiral Kinkaid's light cruisers at 13:26, around Cape Cretin, with General MacArthur onboard, and finally would arrive at a point about 10 miles south of Los Negros at 6:00 on February 29. While the troops climbed aboard their LCPRs, Fechteler's destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Unfortunately, when the LCPRs reached the line of departure, about 3700 yards from the beaches, the defenders responded with heavy machine-gun and battery fire.At H-28 minutes enemy machine-gun fire opened on the boats, whom began maneuvering radically as they could. Machine-gun fire was also directed against the destroyers and the Phoenix group to the south. Heavier shore batteries opened up; flashes could be seen from d gun near Southeast Point on the island, and what appeared to be 3- or 4-inch shells landed in the vicinity of the Flusser and the Mahan. In response the Phoenix and Mahan fired upon the batteries and 9 B-25's strafed and bombed the area. Their participation was limited by a heavy overcast and a low ceiling. Of the 40 B-24s scheduled to arrive during the naval bombardment, only 3 appeared before their appointed time to bomb the target area at H-47 minutes. The planned missions of four groups of B-25s fared little better, only nine appearing and these later than scheduled. No communications had been established with the B-25s nor could any of the planes be seen from the flagship, so the plan was called off for stopping naval gunfire at H-20 minutes to permit low-level bombing and strafing. The naval bombardment was continued for another 15 minutes. The order to cease fire was given at H-5 minutes and, although no aircraft were visible, starshells were fired as the attack signal for any strafers that might be in the vicinity. The first wave of LCPRs reached the shore at 8:17, meeting slight enemy fire. Troop G led by 1st-Lieutenant Marvin Henshaw rushed beyond the narrow beach to the edge of a coconut plantation, taking cover under fallen trees and kunai grass. Here they laid prone, forming a rough half-circle with a 50-yard radius. They saw scattered groups of the enemy fleeing inland, some as far away as the other side of the air strip. Lieutenant Henshaw killed one with a long distance shot, and members of his platoon killed another. Not one of the soldiers who landed in the first wave was a casualty. As the bombardment lifted, the defenders gradually came out of their dugouts and began subjecting the returning boats to cross-fire. As the second wave approached, the enemy fire became so heavy, the LCPR's were forced to turn back so the Mahan, Flusser and Drayton could further bombard them. At 08:23, the second wave finally landed, moving swiftly past the troops of the first wave to a point 100 yards inland. 22 minutes later, the third wave landed, rapidly fanning south and establishing a line 300 yards inland by 09:00. Meeting slight opposition, the cavalrymen managed to secure the Momote airstrip by 9:50 and completely unloaded by 12:50. 4 of the LCPRs had been left out of action during the landings, so the reconnaissance force could not be evacuated. From the positions held by the first waves, the troops then gradually moved forward to cover the whole dispersal area of the airdrome, sending patrols beyond the airdrome which identified evidence of concerning recent Japanese activity. As patrols sent out beyond the airdrome began to report back, the commanders could decide the next move. One patrol had scouted 1,000 yards west to Porlaka without contact, and another almost as far north as the skidway before meeting any enemy, there was plenty of evidence that the Japanese had recently been in the vicinity in some strength. One patrol that went about a mile south found the hastily vacated quarters of a high-ranking officer, as well as a bivouac area, and fired at a fleeing Japanese officer. Another found three big kitchens and a warehouse of food. Although the Japanese in the area had offered negligible resistance, our command expected a change in the near future. Captured documents revealed that 200 antiaircraft personnel had been encamped nearby.  Given this information, General Chase decided to pull back to a perimeter due east of the airstrip and had the cavalrymen dig in for the night. During the afternoon the reconnaissance force organized its defenses, which presented many difficulties. A good foxhole required back-breaking efforts, because the soil was heavy with coral. Since there was no barbed wire to put around the beachhead, men and weapons had to be spaced closely and every man available used for the perimeter defense. The 40 field artillery officers and men were assigned sectors for close-in defense, because their two pack howitzers could not cover the critical space in front of the defense line from such a shallow depth as the perimeter allowed. They took over these sectors after the howitzers had blasted away for a while at the Japanese known to be in the skidway area. For heavy weapons support, the twelve 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft unit were moved into positions along the front line. Signalmen strung the perimeter with wire to make the necessary hook-ups for officers in the chain of command, and removed the radio sets for communication with Sixth Army Headquarters from an advanced position to a more sheltered bomb crater. Outposts were stationed beyond the strip on the far edges of the dispersal area. Meanwhile, MacArthur came ashore during the afternoon and decorated the first man to land, Lieutenant Henshaw, with a Distinguished Service Cross. He decided to stay, ordering Chase to hold his position until the follow-up force arrived. MacArthur then returned to the Phoenix, which got underway shortly afterwards at 5:29 for Cape Sudest, taking with it all the ships except two destroyers.  On the Japanese side, Colonel Ezaki immediately ordered the 1st Battalion, 229th Regiment to attack the beachhead during the night and annihilate the enemy or die trying. Suspicions that the Momote landing was a diversion, however, would prevent him from sending the rest of his troops to assist. Colonel Ezaki issued the following orders to the infantry battalion defending the Hyane Harbor sector: “Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate the enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot. I am highly indignant about the enemy's arrogant attitude. Remember to kill or capture all ranking enemy officers for our intelligence purposes…” As ordered, 200 men with 3 mortars; 2 platoons of the 229th Infantry and 1 platoon of crept up to the Americans during the night. Yet by the time they reached the American line, their movement was no longer coordinated and they could only achieve some minor infiltrations. Groups of 7 to 15 Japanese edging in, flinging grenades at the weapons that fired. The only way the Japanese could be seen was by the light of grenade explosions or when the attackers got close enough so that a cavalryman crouched in a fox hole could see them silhouetted against the sky. Many of the Japanese were cut down by machine-gun and rifle fire, but some got through and succeeded in cutting all telephone lines. Although infiltrations occurred on all edges of the perimeter, the attack was heaviest near the shore on the southern side. Here some Japanese reached the shore in the rear of the main defense line by swimming in from the sea with life preservers. The vegetation bordering the beach provided protection for these infiltrators. One group found an opening in the left flank of Troop E, holding the south sector, next to the field artillery unit that held along the shore. The enemy penetrated Troop E's defense line, entirely isolating the 3d Platoon. Without communication with its troop, the unit had to fight it out alone against very heavy attacks. Come daylight, the majority of the Japanese survivors had disappeared back into the jungle, leaving 66 dead against 7 Americans killed and 15 wounded. However, those who had infiltrated and reoccupied some of their former pillboxes and fortifications in the perimeter had to be cleared out by the tired cavalrymen.  During the afternoon, patrols were also sent west and north to check how much strength the enemy had and the perimeter was further contracted and tightened. At 5:00, 2 companies of the 229th regiment made another coordinated effort against the perimeter, yet its intensity was lowered by the death of the battalion commander. The afternoon was free from enemy activity except for a patrol which was discovered inside the perimeter at about 4:00. The patrol's mission was evidently to kill or capture the American commanding officer. It was led by Captain Baba, the commander of the battalion who made the major attack on the preceding night. Although operating in broad daylight, the patrol came close to succeeding. The Americans were confident that the morning's mop-up had taken care of all the enemy within the perimeter. Secondary growth was thick in the area and the Japanese were unnoticed until they were within 35 yards of the task force command post. Once the group was sighted, a considerable amount of fire was placed on it. The Japanese lay concealed in the undergrowth and a single sniper pecked away with his rifle in the direction of the CP. Not knowing the size of the party, Major Chiaramonte set out with four men "to get the sniper." The task force commander and his executive officer directed the movement of the group either right or left according to movements in the underbrush, and the soldiers and Major Chiaramonte opened up whenever they detected any movements. As Major Chiaramonte and his party finally entered the area on which they had been firing, they heard a click followed by grenade explosions. Three of the Japanese had committed suicide. Another rolled over on his back and used his sword to commit hara-kiri. Fifteen dead officers and sergeants were counted, including Captain Baba. Thus, the attackers were kept beyond the perimeter until nightfall, when the attack finally stopped.  On March 2, after clearing Jamandilai Point by 10:45, 6 LSTs landed the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry plus artillery and Seabees. While the troops landed, Captain Emile Dechaineux's and will be honest very curious how Americans would pronounce that one, like i've said before there is no rhyme or reason as to how Americans pronounce french last names haha, well Dechaineux's destroyers bombarded Hauwei Island and Hyane Harbor. With reinforcements in hand, General Chase launched a new attack to extend his perimeter. At 2:15 B-25's, P- 38's, and P-47's bombed and strafed the area. The western half of the airfield and the dispersal area were softened up for the ground attack, and the skidway and Hyane coast beyond were also targets. Bombs were also dropped on the strip of land forming the northern arm of the harbor. After this at 3:00 the two cavalry squadrons advanced across the airstrip, rapidly taking the entire aerodrome against light opposition and finally digging along a new perimeter.  To block possible enemy landings from across Hyane Harbor, two anti-aircraft batteries and E Company of the 592nd Boat and Shore Regiment defended the shore. Seabees formed an inner defense line to the west and northwest of the brigade. Six rough trenches were dug out by a bulldozer and ten men stationed in each. The remainder of the 40th Construction Battalion elements remained in their trench on the right flank, which was now a secondary line behind the troopers. The critical north and northwest sectors were the 2nd Squadron's responsibility. They prepared their positions with careful attention to interlocking bands of machine-gun fire, while the 1st Squadron dug in on the left flank. The first night in the enlarged beachhead passed by without a crisis. An attack came at 9:00pm, but it was not as severe as expected. The chief enemy effort was to push machine-gun parties and infiltration groups through the 2nd Squadron's sector, and in particular through that held by Troop G. Communication lines were cut, radio equipment was slightly damaged, and a few Japanese penetrated as far as the field artillery positions. The artillery, prepared for interdiction fire, was not called on.  The following morning, a systematic search for enemy troops within the position was started and all Japanese within the perimeter were killed while the Seabees began work on the airstrip. At the same time, Krueger arranged with Barbey to expedite the movement of the rest of the cavalry division. The 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment was to arrive on March 4; the remaining units of the 1st Brigade would arrive by March 6; and the 2nd Brigade was to arrive on March 9. At this point Colonel Ezaki realized his situation was desperate, his 1st battalion, 229th regiment was being obliterated. He moved his HQ from Papitalai to Papitalai Mission and began concentrating his garrison units at Lorengau. He also ordered the 2nd battalion ,1st independent regiment at Salami to perform an assault from the north, coordinating with the 229th regiment. Their advance was slowed by constant naval and land artillery fire, but they got into position by the night of March 3rd. The Americans expected the attack, as prior, an enemy officer patrol had attempted to land on the shore of Hyane Harbor. The platoon leader of the shore company guarding the beach there allowed the boat to come in to land, then opened fire, killing all members of the patrol. Among the valuable documents discovered on the bodies was one which gave the information that a strong attack would be launched that night.  With this knowledge, the Americans fortified their front line defenses. Since infiltration was still the greatest danger for a small force holding a large perimeter in jungle and darkness, the front line positions were of prime importance. To offer as little space as possible for infiltration, each troop in the line would use all three of its rifle platoons. Automatic weapons covering front-line positions were basic in the fire plans; each of these weapons, in turn, was protected by two, three, or four dugouts on both flanks and rear manned by two or three riflemen. The approaches to these positions were strewn with mines, and trip signals were made of empty "C"-ration cans with lumps of coral inside for clappers, and hung on lengths of wire strung taut ten inches off the ground. In organizing defenses, good use was made of Japanese revetments, built to protect their airplanes in the dispersal bays on the airstrip. These revetments were steep banks of earth reaching some 15 feet high; usually a large one was at the end of a bay with two smaller embankments flanking it to form a pattern which, from the air, looked like cleats on the sole of a football shoe. Near the crest of some of these mounds, on the reverse slopes, cavalrymen dug foxholes. Two 30-caliber water-cooled machine guns were then placed on the flat ground alongside the bunker and mounted to fire across the front of the position.  All the 81-mm mortars were massed near the center of the perimeter, while all the 60-mm mortars were moved close to the front line. The water-cooled 50-caliber machine guns of the antiaircraft were returned to their units, except for those on the northern end of the air strip. This side of the perimeter faced the skidway, whence the chief attack was expected. Patrols had met the greatest opposition when working in this direction and toward Porlaka; enemy barges and troop concentrations had also been sighted on the northwestern shore of Hyane Harbor.  Nearby naval units would also coordinate by firing upon any Japanese concentration discovered. At 9pm the Japanese began their attack as a single Japanese bomber dropped 8 bombs.  As soon as the plane had departed, two yellow flares went up from the vicinity of Podaka, and a tracer, apparently 20-mm, was fired almost vertically from a position in front of the Troop B sector to the southwest. Almost immediately an attack supported by mortar fire was launched there as well as against the position held by Troops F and G to the northwest. The attack against the 1st Squadron on the southwest was relatively light, the enemy strength here being estimated later at two reinforced platoons. Since the 1st Squadron's sector was covered by a heavy growth of secondary jungle forest, infiltration was a great danger. The sited positions of our automatic weapons were of little value in the darkness, so the cavalrymen picked up the guns and fired them from the hip. The Japanese moved automatic weapons forward apparently with no other plan of action than to set them up in the open in front of our lines, depending on darkness to conceal their positions. The excited talking of the crews gave their positions away and they became easy targets for the defending riflemen. The attackers were blanketed by mortar fire accurately placed 20 to 50 yards in front of the perimeter. Nevertheless, many of the enemy did infiltrate, some as far as the south end of the air strip where they hid in heavy brush or climbed trees to begin sniper operations at dawn. Because of the relative weakness of the attacking force, there was never any real danger that the 1st Squadron's positions would be overrun.   The attack upon the 2nd Squadron's position on the northwest was a greater threat, with over a battalion, as later estimated, advancing on this sector from the direction of Pori aka and the skidway against the whole of Troop G's position and the right flank of Troop F. Apparently the enemy's intention was to drive our troops from their perimeter and occupy the north end of the air strip. The attacks against the sector held by Troops E and F were limited to infiltrations toward mortar positions and command posts. The rear installations were covered hy enemy mortar fire and machinegun fire while Japanese with grenades closed in on them and overran the positions. The Seabees, holding their secondary defense line behind the cavalry on the north side of the perimeter, also felt the effects of the furious attacks. Cavalrymen whose guns were knocked out, or who had run out of ammunition, carne back to the Seabees' trenches. When a weak place developed toward the left side of the Seabees' positions, their extra ammunition was at the other end of their line. First the men passed the ammunition to the front line by throwing the boxes from hole to hole, but when that seemed too slow they got out of their holes and ran with it, holding it low.  The Japanese advanced relentlessly, talking and singing though damaged and hampered by antipersonnel mines and booby traps, until they were cut down by the fierce machine-gun fire of the cavalrymen. Yet more and more kept coming behind them, marching over the bodies of the first. The Americans hunkered down in their holes and fired upon anything that moved,  continuing to inflict heavy casualties. The Japanese attempted a number of tricks and were occasionally successful. Somehow they learnt the names of platoon leaders. On one occasion a Japanese yelled, "Retreat, Thorne, the whole regiment's falling back to another line." This caused the mortar platoon commanded by 1st Lt. William D. Thorne to leave their positions. Not only did the platoon suffer three casualties, but it was unable to direct its mortar fire during the rest of the night. Another trick was to have individuals move about in front of the perimeter to draw the fire of machine guns. Then two or three snipers would fire tracers at any weapon that disclosed itself, enabling a mortar to open up on the position. Several cases of wiretapping of a 90-mm anti-aircraft battery took place between 10:30 and midnight, the wire-tapper claiming to be, on one occasion, a certain officer commanding a platoon, and on another, a sergeant. He reported in each case the disruption of our plans and the success of the enemy. Since his voice was not recognized, his messages were not heeded. However, a later message, although believed false, made the 211th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion change its CP. At 11:30 a single enemy plane with landing lights on made several runs at a low altitude dropping flares. In spite of orders to hold their fire, the anti-aircraft battery opened up on the fourth run and drove the plane to the north, where it dropped bombs on Japanese positions.  Japanese using knives and grenades managed to get themselves into Troop G's defenses. A ferocious counterattack by the cavalrymen would shortly regain the positions just in time to face another strong frontal attack, in which more Japanese were cut down in front of the 2nd Squadron. By daylight, the infantry attacks were finally over, with the cavalrymen counting over 750 Japanese dead as they established a new outpost line on March 4. Against them, the Americans lost 61 killed and 244 wounded, 9 of the dead and 38 of the wounded were Seabees. That same day was met with another heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions, then the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed against slight enemy resistance. The defensive perimeter was strengthened again and the damage of the previous night was repaired. Colonel Ezaki now believed that his troops had successfully pierced the American first line of defense and thus ordered to continue the attack that night; but upon learning the truth and how many casualties he had suffered, he decided to cancel the attack and ordered a general withdrawal towards Lorengau, leaving some units to hold Papitalai and delay the American advance. 600  men had been lost in the skidway area and in the attacks upon the perimeter. The remaining 200, with an additional 100 stragglers from other disorganized units, were ordered to retreat through Salami Beach and across Papitalai Harbor to Papitalai Mission. Natives on Mokerang Peninsula later told the Angau Party that the Japanese retreat developed into a rout. They were panic-stricken; some did not even wait to take paddles for the native canoes that they had appropriated for their escape to Papitalai Mission. Not more than 80 Japanese, frantic from fear and exhaustion, arrived at the mission to bolster the force already there. By the 5th, General Swift arrived to the secured  beachhead in the Admiralties, and with the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment the following day, he was now ready to launch an offensive west towards Seeadler Harbor, the Lorengau airdrome and north against Salami Plantation. The same day, to clear the way for the 2nd Brigade's landing at Red Beach, General Swift ordered the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry to move across the skidway to a point about 500 yards north. Despite a thorough artillery support, the advance did not go smoothly, with the Japanese immediately launching a strong attack from both Porlaka and the native skidway. Luckily the few Japanese who penetrated the position were killed, around 25 of them and the attack was broken up by mortar and artillery fire. At 4:30, the squadron finally began their offensive, moving with difficulty across a mined area and only gaining about 500 yards by nightfall.  The next morning, the squadron advanced, with the 12th Cavalry soon joining them. Despite the occasional pillboxes and the congested trail, the cavalrymen made ample progress towards the beaches of Seeadler Harbor and closed in on Salami by 4:30. To further secure the harbor, General Swift planned to clear the enemy presence at the Mokerang Peninsula, Papitalai Mission and Lombrum Point. That day, the 5th Cavalry had already begun the work of clearing the southern shore of Seeadler Harbor by pushing patrols west from the airstrip. Finding much more enemy corpses that opposition, Troop F would be able to establish a bridgehead at Porlaka. At 12:00 on the 7th, after an artillery bombardment, a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 40 volunteers from Troop B, led by Capt. William C. Cornelius advanced across Lemondrol Creek and successfully landed on Papitalai against an estimated 50 Japanese defenders. Captain Cornelius, leading the first wave, was reported to have single-handedly killed four of the enemy with rifle fire and grenades while operating 50 yards in advance of the troops. Yet severely wounded, he would die the next day; for his courage and leadership he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.  The Japanese quickly withdrew. Simultaneously after a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 12th Cavalry departed Salami and advanced across Seeadler Harbor to land on Papitalai Mission, meeting heavy resistance.  By nightfall, Troop G had secured a beachhead, though it would have to break up three determined counterattacks during the night. This ultimately forced the Japanese to pull out from their beach defenses at Papitalai Mission and retreat towards Lorengau, allowing the cavalrymen to secure the beachhead the following morning. By 12:00 on the 8th, supplies for the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry's attack on Lombrum Plantation also began arriving at Red Beach over the difficult road from Momote. Equipping the 12th Cavalry and the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, at Salami with enough supplies to carry on their overwater attacks was a difficult and hazardous operation. The single road from Momote to Salami was impassable for most vehicles during the days when the supplies were most urgently needed. Buffaloes got through by going overwater part of the way, but the rest of the essential supplies had to be dropped from airplanes or sent in LCMs from Momote around Mokerang Peninsula. The sending of LCMs into Seeadler Harbor was an operation which was possible only after continued naval efforts from D-Day on. Magnetic mines, dropped by American planes in May 1943, were presumably still in the harbor and had to be removed. To make entry into the harbor safe for their forces, destroyers also had to neutralize the Japanese harbor defense guns, which had already proved effective. The destroyers and minesweepers worked to accomplish these missions, but even by 7 March, when six LCMs loaded with supplies were to make their way around the point, it was not certain that enemy resistance on the islands guarding the harbor had completely disintegrated.  LCMs then successfully landed TROOP E, F and G on Lombrum two hours later against sporadic fire. The Americans extended their perimeter by 5:00, successfully completing the task of securing Seeadler Harbor while other units of the 12th Cavalry secured the Mokerang Peninsula to cover the north flank of the 2nd Brigade's landing. On the 9th, the 2nd Brigade successfully landed at Salami while destroyers pounded the main Japanese positions at Lorengau. This ended the first phase of Operation Brewer. The Americans had suffered a total of 116 killed and 434 wounded during their occupation of Los Negros while counting 1288 enemy dead by March 8. Their next objective would be Lorengau airdrome on Manus Island, but that it for the Admiralties as we now need to travel over to New Britain. Over on New Britain, General Rupertus was planning to invade the Willaumez Peninsula in order to cut off the Japanese retreat line there and take the Talasea airdrome. He assigned the 5th marines under Colonel Oliver Smith for the task. They were going land at a point about midway on the west coast of the Willaumez Peninsula north of Volupai, labeled Beach Red. The chosen zone of operations was about as good as the Marines could have found. It presented them with a short, comparatively flat route to their objective which might make possible utilization of tanks. A dirt track approximately four miles long connected Beach Red with Bitokara, and although it was not designed for motor transport, the Marines could hope. Beach Red contained about as much depth as Beaches Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 in the Gloucester landings, but was more confined on its flanks. Its 350 yards of sand nestled between a cliff on the right and a swamp on the left. The cliff constituted the northwestern slope of Little Mt. Worri, a mass rising 1360 feet above the beach and enfolding the native villages of Liapo to the south and Volupai on the west. Overlooking this smaller mountain from the south was Big Mt. Worri, higher by 300 feet and with a more encompassing base. Included in its ridge line was Mt. Schleuther, on the peninsula's eastern coast which dominated Bitokara, Talasea and the Waru villages from an altitude of 1130 feet. Volupai Plantation was 400 yards inland from Beach Red, containing a collection of small buildings and groves of coconut palms and cacao trees. Volupai track, linking Beach Red with Bitokara, skirted the northern bases of the several mountains. The country, except for the plantations and villages, was typical of New Britain: overgrown jungle and underbrush. Sea and air control in the New Britain area had passed so completely into Allied hands that it was decided to transport the assault forces from Iboki to Volupai in a convoy of 38 LCMs, 17 LCVPs and 5 LCTs, with only 5 PT boats as escorts. Furthermore, on March 3rd, an amphibious patrol landed on Cape Bastian and managed to contact friendly natives in order to learn that the enemy had a weak presence in the area. This was the reinforced 7th Company, 54th Regiment, which had been sent by General Sakai to defend Talasea while the bulk of the Matsuda and Komori Detachments retreated towards Malalia. Sakai was planning to engage the enemy in a decisive battle with the entire force of the 17th Division; but on February 23, General Imamura had ordered him to withdraw towards Rabaul. Thus Sakai assigned the 17th Provisional Battalion to secure Toriu; the 2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment to hold Ulamona; the 39th Anti-Aircraft Battalion to remain at Malalia; the 17th Engineer Regiment to facilitate the crossing of the Kapuira River; and the 17th Transport Regiment to establish supply depots at Ubai, Butiolo and Sulu. He also ordered the bulk of the 54th Regiment to leave some naval units at Gasmata and begin to retreat towards Amio and then Ubai, where barges were to finally evacuate the detachment. Over in Bougainville, General Griswold's 14th Corps had just taken over the protection of the Cape Torokina base. As such, nearly 62000 men were stationed in the area, defenses were consolidated, and an impressive artillery complement under Brigadier-General Leo Kreber was directed to cover the perimeter. During this period of consolidation, the most important actions were the establishment of an important Fijian outpost at Ibu village. One of the most effective units operating under corps command was the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment. This battalion, consisting of 777 enlisted men and 34 officers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B.K. Taylor of the New Zealand Army, whom arrived at Bougainville in late December. Taylor was wounded the first night ashore and was replaced as commander by Major Gregory Upton, who was in charge of the battalion during its long-range patrols in late December and January. The Fijian troops were well trained, proud of their uniforms and ability to march, and according to reports, loved to sing a wide variety of Fijian songs as well as the more modern American tunes. Almost immediately after their arrival, plans were under way to use their unique abilities as jungle fighters to establish a combat outpost far to the east of the mountain range, most of which was controlled by the Japanese. The managed to gain valuable information on Japanese movements before withdrawing in late February, and a successful expansion of the perimeter east of the mouth of the Torokina River. But the first real test of the Corps in Bougainville was approaching.  Under immense pressure from his superiors, General Hyakutake had been preparing to launch his main counterattack, codenamed Operation TA, since early January. He assembled over 15000 men from his total strength of nearly 40000 to take part in the operation. General Kanda the 6th Division commander was given command of the force and his mission was simple. 3 task forces, named after their commanders; the Iwasa unit of Major General Iwasa Shun consisting of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, attached engineering troops, and two batteries of light field artillery and a mortar battalion–in all, approximately 4,150 men; the Magata Unit, commanded by Colonel Magata Isashi, consisting of most of the 45th Infantry Regiment (less 2nd Battalion), with artillery, mortar battalions, and engineers attached–a total of approximately 4,300 men; The smallest of the forces, the Muda Unit, commanded by Colonel Muda Toyohorei , consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment and an engineering company–a total of 1,350 men.  These 3 units would  attack strongpoints in the American perimeter. Thus, the Iwasa Unit was to strike towards Hill 700 on the right flank of the 37th Division line and then drive directly toward the two Piva airfields, which Hyakutake planned to capture by March 10; the Magata Unit was to take the low ground west of Hill 700 and then drive south to capture the Torokina airstrip by March 17; and the Muda Unit was to seize Hills 260 and 309 in the Americal sector and then capture the strategically-important Hill 608 by March 10. Bougainville was about to see some major action. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the admiralty islands certainly holding significant enemy units, General MacArthur went ahead with his reconnaissance in force and turned it into a full blown invasion. Yet again MacArthur proved, he was willing to do whatever necessary to make sure the drive of the Pacific pointed in the direction of the Philippines.

In Episode 3, Nick Wheeler of TRUK talks about growing up and being exposed to a multitude of musicalities. From country to motown, and from funk to metal . . . Nick has seen it all. His most important lesson? Just don't stare at your shoes.

Last time we spoke about Operation Hailstone, the continued drive upon Madang and the horrible massacre during the Indian Ocean Raid of 1944. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. The demoralized and understrength Japanese could not hope to contest the air strikes and naval bombardment. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and was relieved of his command. Over on New Guinea the Australians were continuing their drive to Madang, killing and taking prisoner all the Japanese they could along the way. Then over in the Indian Ocean, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro unleashed a raid against allied shipping, a rarity for the Japanese. Unfortunately the raid devolved into a singular attack against the British steamer Behar. A needless and cruel massacre was performed aboard the Tone, killing 65 to a possible 100 people. Such actions would only see justice after the war. This episode is the battle of Eniwetok Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Operation Flintlock was a huge success, Kwajalien was seized incredibly fast and the invasion of Majuro saw no Japanese even on the atoll. Because of this the allied war planners had to shuffle the schedule and thus was born Operation Hailstone and the invasion of Eniwetok. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok.  The operation was codenamed Catchpole and the war planners would only have 12 days to prepare. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were greens, not trained with the troops. General Watson reported “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Nevertheless, the forces available for the operation would be plentiful and well equipped. Having gone through the horribly bloody assault on Tarawa, Admiral Hill was relieved to have a large number of amtracs. The Army's 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor Battalion would sail with 119 LVTs, most of which were the heavily armored newer models. As Hill would remark later “At Eniwetok, I felt like a millionaire, but at Tarawa, I was a pauper.” Admiral Hill would have at his disposal 5 attack transports, 1 transport, 2 attack cargo ships, 1 cargo ship, 1 LSD, 2 APDs, 6 LCIs and 9 LSTs to carry General Watson's Tactical Group 1, consisting of the 22nd marines and 106th regiment led by Colonel John Walker. Further support came in the form of 3 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 7 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's task force 51.17; 3 escort carriers and 3 destroyers of Rear-Admiral Van Ragsdale task group 53.6; and Rear-Admiral Samuel Ginder's carrier  task force 58.4. The plan was to first land two scout companies;  the Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps, against  Camellia and Canna Islands southeast of Engebi; and the scout company D, 4th Marine Tank Battalion against Zinnia Island northwest of Engebi to prevent any escape of the enemy from Engebi in that direction. The scout would secure Camellia and Canna allowing the 2nd Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion with their 75-mm pack howitzers to deploy on Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery Battalion with their 105-mm. howitzers to deploy on Canna. The artillery would then be used to support the next day's attack against Engebi. The job of  hitting Engebi was given to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 22nd Marines of Colonel John Walker. His 3rd Battalion would be kept in regimental reserve. The two battalions were to be supported by medium tanks of the 2nd Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. Lastly Colonel Russell Ayers' 106th Regiment would hit Eniwetok Island; and once it was captured, the infantry would take Parry Island along with the 22nd Marines.  Defending against them would by General Nishida's 1st amphibious brigade; organized from the 3rd Independent Garrison Unit. It had 3 1,036-man mobile battalions, a 76-man machine-cannon unit with 6 20mm guns, 66-man tank unit with 9 Type 95 light tanks, a 243-man engineer unit, a 139-man signal unit, and 190-man medical unit. The mobile battalions had a 103-man 1st Company while the other 2 had 197 men, plus a 155-man mortar company, a 121-man artillery company with 3 75mm mountain guns, 2 37mm anti-tank guns, and a 66-man engineer platoon. These units had recently been brought over alongside his HQ.  250 IJN personnel and 1115 troops were deployed on Parry, about 692 soldiers, 500 IJN personnel and 61 men of the 61st Guard Unit would Engebi;  and only 779 troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hashida Masahiro, commander of the 1st Mobile Battalion  would defend Eniwetok. In the 6 weeks following the Kwajalein assault, the Japanese had been constructing defenses on the lagoon side based on reports they received from the Kwajalein attack, yet there was not enough time to make much progress. The 3 defended islands of Eniwetok Atoll had no naval-manned defenses, other than two 120mm coast defense guns and two 13.2mm twin machine-guns on Engebi's north corner. 3 75mm and 28 20mm anti-aircraft guns had been delivered, but were not even emplaced. The 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived less than a month and a half before the American would land with barely any time to dig in. While significant construction materials had been delivered, there was not nearly enough time to make much progress. Defenses would be mainly dugouts, trenches, and foxholes. The brigade deployed its infantry weapons more or less equally. Engebi was expected to be the most heavily defended, but instead the most troops were actually on Parry. On February 15th, Hill's scout group sailed out from Kwajalein lagoon while Operation Hailstorm smashed Truk. Meanwhile Ginder's carriers proceeded directly to Eniwetok and on February 16th launched a series of preliminary strikes. The strike completely destroyed all the buildings upon the atoll, neutralized her airfield and destroyed 14 aircraft on the ground. Naval bombardment of Engebi, Eniwetok, Parry and Japtan Islands began in the early morning hours of February 17, and was joined by more air strikes after dawn. Simultaneously, Hill's force arrived off Eniwetok's southeast coast. As the surface ship bombarded the islands, amtracs launched and landed by 1:30pm against Camellia and Canna. After securing Canna and Camellia by 2pm, the Reconnaissance Company landed, against no opposition, on the 3 islands northwest of Camellia and on 2 small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the artillery units against possible Japanese infiltration during the night. Hill then landed his 2 artillery battalion to support the invasion of Engebi. Engebi's total weapon strength came to 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dispatchers, 12 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 2 37-mm. guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 2 20-mm. cannons, 2 mountain guns, 3 light tanks, and 2 12-cm. coast defense guns. Colonel Yano predicted that a heavy bombardment would precede the amphibious landings, he accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon shore of this triangularly shaped island. The Japanese defenders were ordered to "...lure the enemy to the water's edge and then annihilate him with withering fire and continuous attacks." Most of the prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the center of the lagoon shore. The approach to this strong point was flanked by the fire of 2 75-mm. mountain guns on the northwest corner and 2 20-mm. machine cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as 2 37-mm. guns emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each mounting 37-mm. guns. Hill deployed UDT-1 frogmen to first clear obstacles and mines while D Company , 4th Tank Battalion secured Zinnia and 4 other islets west of Engebi in the early morning of February 18. At 6:55 Colorado and Louisville began shelling the northern and eastern part of Enegbi. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved at dawn to deliver close-range destructive fire against beach defenses from flanking positions on each side of the boat lanes. At 7:20 destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved into position as direct support ships, but because of the smoke and dust rising from the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just before 8:00 the naval guns ceased fire to allow a half-hour air strike to take place. This was completed ahead of schedule and naval fire was resumed at 8:11 and increased steadily in intensity until just before the first troops landed. Shortly after the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna and Camellia joined the naval guns and began to fire on the beaches at maximum rate until just after the first wave landed at 8:44, whereupon the artillery barrage was lifted inland to the center of the island for another five minutes. Thereafter, because of the smallness of the island, very few call missions were fired. All of the gunfire detonated the main ammunition dump on Engebi as Colonel Walker's amtracs made their way to the island covered by LCI gunboats. Many of the LCI rockets fell short forcing some amtracs off course, while quite a few would break down as they had been worn out by the attack on Kwajalein. Despite the technical difficulties, the first assault waves hit the beaches at 8:43. The 2nd Battalion hit Beach Blue 3 with G Company  on the left, F Company  in the center and e Company  on the right; and the 1st Battalion hit Beach White 1 with B Company  on the left, A Company  in the center and C Company  on the right. On the left, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance and quickly overran the airfield by 10:30. F Company managed to swing towards Weasel Point on the west corner with remarkable speed. On the right, the 1st Battalion quickly split up with A Company  advancing north to New Point and C Company  towards Skunk Point on the southeast corner.  The Japanese put up a stiff fight against them, as their spider-hole defenses on the gap between the 2 companies were covered by the dense brush and palms. As a result, the 3rd Battalion would land at Beach White 1 at 09:55 and quickly advanced with tanks to clear the various tunnels and covered foxholes that resisted them. The Japanese were slowly forced northward along the island's eastern shore, eventually becoming isolated and cut down. By 1:10, Weasel and Newt Points had been cleared; and at 2:50, about 6 hours after the initial landing, General Watson declared the island secured. 6 minutes later, C Company captured Skunk Point; and by 6:30, the 1st Battalion secured their half of Engebi. The assault had been executed so fast that even the veteran IJA defenders were unable to offer any meaningful organized resistance. Bypassed Japanese troops and infiltrators did cause difficulties through the night, but mopping-up continued and Engebi was formally secured at 8:00 on February 19. American losses were 85 dead and missing and 521 wounded against the 1280 Japanese killed and 16 taken prisoner.   For the assault against Eniwetok, new intelligence indicated that the island was more heavily defended than expected, so Watson would reinforce the 106th Regiment with Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion and some Marine tanks. What they would be facing on Eniwetok was a total of 2 flame throwers, 13 grenade dischargers, 12 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 1 50-mm. mortar, 11 81-mm. mortars, 1 20-mm. automatic gun, 3 20-mm. cannons, and 3 light tanks. The Eniwetok garrison was divided into 5 forces, 3 on the lagoon shore, 1 placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern neck of the island, and 1 to be held in reserve. The 3 lagoon shore forces were to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of the lagoon. The force in the east was to protect the rear of the 3 lagoon shore forces from any American units landing on the northern tip of the island. The reserve force was placed to the rear of the forces on the lagoon shore, near the western tip of the island. The defenses of the island consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches, which were better constructed and better camouflaged than those at Parry. After the capture of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug additional foxholes. Land mines were also found on Eniwetok. Colonel Ayers' new plan was to land his two battalions abreast. 1st Battalion would land on the right on Yellow Beach 2 and was charged with making the main effort to the west to clear the lower end of the island. The 3rd Battalion would land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the island from the lagoon to the ocean shore. For the assault, the infantrymen lacked field artillery support; and although Eniwetok had also been subjected to naval bombardment on February 18, it had only received a fraction of the bombardment targeted against Engebi and Parry. A total of 1,179.7 tons of naval shells had been fired on Engebi, 944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, but Eniwetok received only 204.6 tons altogether. At 8:10am on the 19th, carrier planes began to bomb and strafe the beaches and LCI gunboats followed this up with a last-minute rocket attack against the landing areas. Meanwhile, although the arrival of the marine tanks was delayed by choppy seas and a 9-foot embankment just inland halted the amphibian tanks, but the Americans would manage to hit the Yellow beaches at 9:16. The 3rd Battalion landed on Beach Yellow 1 with L Company on the left, K Company on the right, and I Company following as reserve. Upon landing, L Company, followed by I Company pivoted east along the pier while K Company  pushed across the island to reach the opposite coast at 10:30. On the right, however, the 1st Battalion encountered dense spider-hole defenses as C and B Companies attempted to push across the island while A Company  attacked southwest along the coast. By noon,  the front line of the 1st Battalion was in the shape of an S, extending from the lagoon to the ocean.  The Japanese at this point made a bit of an unexpected move. As the Americans penetrated further inland, the Japanese began abandoning their positions and launched a 400 man counterattack. The Japanese managed to break through before getting completely cut down causing some havoc, but by 12:45 were beaten back. The American casualties were very high during the fight. Because of the strong resistance, Ayers ordered his 3rd battalion to attack east and for the reserves marines to land and relieve the left half of the 1st battalion's lion. The American attack to the west resumed with A Company  on the right wing making slow progress through the enemy positions near the lagoon, but the mingled elements of C and B Companies even after being reorganized and supported by 3 Cannon Company guns, could not push through the line taken up by the enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese positions, the attacking force was unable to move forward. By 2:25, the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines landed, passing through Ayers' 1st Battalion one hour later. Both battalions then launched a concerted attack towards the southwest end at 3:15, yet the Marines would soon lag behind, their advance delayed by the rugged terrain and the lack of adequate illumination and tank support. While the fight for Eniwetok was underway, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company occupied Japtan by nightfall after first securing 10 unoccupied islets on the atoll's eastern rim while the scout tank battalion secured eight islets on Eniwetok's eastern rim, successfully subduing the enemy resistance on Rigilli. This would allow Watson to have some much-needed artillery support for the attack against Parry. On Parry the Japanese were able to construct very few installations and gun positions above ground in the short time that the brigade was there. With very few exceptions, the defenses consisted mostly of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two categories, the old and the new. The old foxholes and trenches were located on the ocean side, were well constructed, and often lined with rocks or coconut logs. Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese had recently undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All entrenchments were well camouflaged. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large personnel shelter lined and covered with coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and a thick layer of sand were placed over the log roof. The center was surrounded by a circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart, mostly roofed over with corrugated iron. These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of the web were in turn joined by radial trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position. The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry was honeycombed with positions of this sort. Back to the action to deny the enemy an opportunity for the customary aggressive night tactics, Ayers ordered  a night attack at 6:50. At 3:33 on February 20, Ayers' 1st Battalion therefore managed to reach the western end of the island, though the Marines were still 100 yards to their left rear. The Japanese, meanwhile, attempted to probe and infiltrate through the night, finally counterattacking at 09:10. The 3rd Battalion, 22d Marines, found one of the main enemy defenses, manned by a strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A combined force of light and medium tanks, 5 guns from the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the enemy during the day. The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, mopped up its zone. The next day, after the withdrawal of the Marines, the battalion ran a line across the island from the pier and mopped up to the western end. A Company , at the right, finished first and returned to the battalion area near the landing beach. B Company , in the center, reached the end of the island a little later and then went for a swim. C Company , on the ocean side, found 22 of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a firefight that sent some bullets over the heads of B Companies swimmers. B Company  came out of the water, dressed, and rejoined the fight. The western end of Eniwetok Island was finally clear of Japanese. By 2:45, the stronghold was finally reduced and the western end of Eniwetok was at last secured. To the east, Ayers' 3rd Battalion also attempted to continue its attack during the night, but this proved futile as the troops lacked the confidence and experience for such a difficult task. As such, the battalion halted at 4:30, about a third of the way from the island's north end. They resumed their attack at 7:00 on the 21st, finally reached the north end at 4:30. The island was finally declared secure at 5:21, with the Americans losing 37 killed and 94 wounded against 800 Japanese killed and 23 taken prisoner. Because action had been bogged down at Eniwetok, the assault on Parry was delayed until the island was reduced and Walker's 3rd Battalion could re-embark as the regimental reserve. In the meantime, aerial, naval and artillery shells had pounded Parry for three days . Naval bombardment dropped on Parry totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery shells came to 245 tons, and aerial bombs added 99 tons more. Meanwhile while the rest of the 22nd Marines were brought from Engebi to southern Eniwetok. By this point the expedition was running low on ammunition and weapons. Naval and artillery shells were carefully apportioned. From all the ships, available grenades and demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500 percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip the 22nd Marines. In addition, the Marines had found the M1 carbine, with which many men had armed themselves, to be a less than effective combat weapon, and M1 rifles and Browning Automatic rifles were redistributed from 106th Infantry units to replace them. For the last assault of the operation Catchpole, Walker planned was to land two battalions abreast directly against the defenders' strongpoints; and after seizing the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to press forward to the ocean side of the island. Battleships Tennessee and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500 yards north of the landing area and not only mauled it with their big guns but also hit it with their 40-mm. automatic weapons batteries. From the other side of the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over the lagoon without masking the target for the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and for the landing craft that started ashore at 8:45. 3 LCI's that approached through the haze with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch shells from Hailey, killing 13 and wounding 47. Some LVTs landed outside the designated beaches, thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell behind, so that the landing teams had difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches. While the tractors made their 15-minute run from the line of departure, two formations of planes bombed Parry in the last of 219 sorties made during the 6 days of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they only bombed the island, omitting strafing runs because of the type of defense trench systems on Parry Island.At 09:00, Walker's 1st battalion landed at 09.00hrs on Green 1 just north of the island's central portion, with Companies B, C, and A in line left to right. It was 200yds too far south, only landing on the extreme south edge of its assigned beach. The 2nd Battalions landed at 9.00 on Green 2 near Parry's northwest corner, but 200yds farther south than intended, with part of the battalion landing on about two-thirds of Green 3 to the south. Mines were encountered on the beach, causing some casualties. In the line were, from left to right, companies G, F, and E. The first troops struck Green Beaches 2 and 3 at 9:00, with a wave of tractors and one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun and mortar fire greeted the marines at the water's edge. As they tried to form an assault line, enfilading machine gun fire also struck them from a concealed position on the pier at the right. The machine guns were silenced by grenades and by shells from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in trenches and foxholes in the dune line on the beach, men who had survived the bombardment, were overcome in hand-to-hand fighting. Thankfully, shells from the amphibian tanks managed to silence the Japanese guns, which allowed the Americans to move inland and to land their medium tanks behind the battalions. The defense plans for Parry outlined that about one half of the troops were disposed at the water's edge, where they were to be grouped into strong points about 140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches was to be supported by mountain guns, 20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm's were to fire first. Light and heavy machine guns were to fire on landing craft before and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against the enemy at the beaches and were to cover the sectors between fortified areas and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the order called for fields of fire to be cleared through coconut groves. The order gave quite explicit instructions for measures against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when they are stopped by obstacles by means of hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades, close-in attack, land mines, water mines, and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night, have a part of the force attack them." The order made it very clear that the brigade was not expected to survive an American assault once it had established a beachhead. Any troops remaining after the Americans had landed in force were to assemble in a central area. Then, the order continued, "...sick and wounded who cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others]... will reorganize, return to battle as a unit, and die fighting.” 3 dug-in Japanese light tanks decided to attack, rather than earlier when the infantry were vulnerable. Yet the Shermans immediately destroyed them before they inflicted any damage, so Walker's battalions would be allowed to push forward against the retreating enemy. While Companies G and F swung left to reach the north end by 1:30, E Company  drove straight across to reach the ocean shore by 12:00. Then, as the Marines were consolidating, a group of 200 Japanese were discovered marching north and were wiped out within minutes. Over on the right, B Company reached the ocean coast at 11:55, while Companies C and A swung south and  successfully reached Valentine Pier by 1:30. Walker's reserve 3rd Battalion  landed at 10:00, immediately advancing south while clearing bypassed enemy pockets. After artillery bombardment, the attack south was launched at 1:30. Pressing through thick underbrush, both battalions achieved rapid progress as they overran a series of trench and foxhole defenses. The battalions were 450 yards from the island's southern tip when they halted for the night.Walker decided to declare the end of enemy resistance at 19:30, radioing Brigadier General Walker, "I present you with the island of Parry at 7.30." The Only slight enemy activity that existed anymore was occasional sniping, which would be swiftly cleared by 09:30 on February 23. For the capture of Parry, Marine casualties were 73 dead and missing and 261 wounded against 1300 Japanese killed, including General Nishida, and 66 captured. In total, American casualties during the Battle of Eniwetok came to 313 killed, 879 wounded and 77 missing. The Japanese had lost their entire garrison, with 3380 killed and 105 captured. Between March 7 and April 5, Walker would then conduct Operation Flintlock Jr., carrying 29 successful landings, securing 14 mostly unoccupied atolls and killing over 100 Japanese at the cost of two Marines killed. Other detachments would finally occupy the Erikub, Aur and Ujelang Atolls by the end of April, leaving only Mille, Maloelap, Jaluit and Wotje bypassed and unoccupied, in addition to the Japanese presence at Kosrae, Wake and Nauru.  Over on Jaluit Rear-Admiral Masuda Nisuke commanded the 13,000 personnel and beginning on March 4th, the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Majuro, and the 7th Air Force commenced a concerted campaign to neutralize the Japanese garrisons, which continued until the war's end. Navy Aviation and Army Air Forces had previously destroyed most Japanese aircraft on these islands. The 13,000 tons of aerial-delivered ordnance, coupled with frequent naval shelling, killed 2,564 Japanese and 4,876 died of disease and starvation; the Marines sprayed oil over the garrisons' gardens. Fighter-bomber units deploying to the Pacific would first serve in this role, perfecting their bombing techniques before moving forward to support other operations as new units replaced them. The Japanese survivors would finally surrender on September 2, 1945. As the American commander took stock of what they had achieved in the Marshalls, their confidence and self-assurance rose to new heights. In less than 3 months' time, the tragic and costly lessons of Tarawa had been refined and integrated into amphibious planning and doctrine, and the results had been tremendous. To the extent that further improvement was needed, it was in the details of execution rather than any deficiency in the plans themselves. Holland Smith concluded in his final report, “In the attack of coral atolls, very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in Flintlock.” Over in Tokyo there was shock and incomprehension at the speed and ‘low cost' of the US victory over the Marshall Islands. The implications for Japan's future were dire. As Ichiro Koyose, the permanent Director of Japan's Imperial Rule Association said in an address, “The Marshall Islands are the frontporch entrance to Tokyo … The enemy is probably finally thinking of some such thing as bombing Tokyo in deadly earnest …” Yet that is it for today on the Marshall Island front as we are going to be diving back into Burma. The Japanese had launched their main offensive on the Arakan at the start of February, successfully infiltrating through the British positions to cut off their rear. By cutting the Indians' supply lines off, the Japanese expected to force them back into disarray; but these were not the same men they had been fighting for years. The Indian troops were better trained and ready to put up a real fight. This was seen when they faced Japanese attack after attack, using their all-round defensive brigade boxes, also referred to as "baby tortoise" or "beehive" tactics. This baffled Japanese,and soon they would leave the invaders effectively encircled and running out of supplies, as they themselves depended on what supplies could trickle to them over jungle trails. With increasing 'fanatical' desperation, the Japanese  began to press home attacks seeking to secure vitally needed stockpiled supplies of food, arms and ammunition upon which their offensive depended. In the Sinzweya area, the 112th Regiment made a night attack on the 9th, successfully breaking through the southwest corner of the enemy's perimeter defense in the Sinzweya Basin. Although the Regiment was successful in firing an ammunition dump and doing great damage, the enemy's employment of tanks forced it to draw back without further exploiting the breakthrough. On the morning of the 10th, Major General Sakurai met Colonel Tanabashi on Hill 315, due northeast of Sinzweya, and encouraged him to press the enemy more aggressively. The failure of the 112th to achieve a signal success appeared, however, to have so depressed morale that the Regiment was reluctant to repeat its attack. The 7th Indian Division, kept its morale high despite the intense fighting, rapidly mounting casualties and increasing exhaustion. They continued to fight on until the advanced Japanese units had exhausted their own food and ammunition. Whenever possible, the British-Indian troops also struck back against Japanese positions and harried their already tenuous supply lines. Furthermore, the massive firepower of the British mountain, field and medium artillery inflicted massive casualties on the attacking Japanese infantry. Firing from positions within each brigade box, carefully concerted artillery fire plans thus rained death upon Japanese troops scattered in the jungle throughout the divisional area. As such, the 71st Brigade would successfully recaptured Taung Bazaar on February 10, and was steadily advancing southwards towards the Ngakyedauk Pass. That same day, General Giffard realized that there was no possibility of 15th Corps being able to reach the Indin-Rathedaung line before the pre-monsoon swell made amphibious operations impossible, so he recommended canceling the Akyab assault. He placed the 36th Indian Division under the 14th Army, allotted the 50th Brigade to 4th Corps and ordered the 25th Indian Division towards Chittagong. General Slim, however, realized that the Japanese plans had miscarried, so he directed General Christison to resume the offensive against the Tunnels-Buthidaung position as soon as he had cleared the land communications to his forward divisions.    Consequently, as the 29th Brigade of the36th division was arriving at Bawli, Christison sent the bulk of the 26th Indian Division to destroy the enemy in the Kalapanzin valley behind the 7th Division. By the13th, patrols from both divisions successfully linked up near Taung Bazar; but at the same time, the Japanese were bringing reinforcements for their attacks at Sinzweya. The Japanese offensive reached its climax on February 14 when General Sakurai called for an all-out attack that evening. The attack was courageous and managed to achieve some initial gains, but it was also uncoordinated, suicidal and unsuccessful, ending with the Indians reinforcing the Admin Box the following day. Meanwhile elements of the 5th Indian Division, regrouped and battered away against a heavily fortified Japanese roadblock at the summit of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Thus, the Japanese tactical and administrative position quickly went from bad to worse around Sinzweya, as pressure steadily mounted against its vastly outnumbered troops. After a few days of bitter fighting the Japanese finally abandoedn their positions at Kyaukyit and Pyinshe Kala and began occupying areas covering the routes back to their main positions.  By the 20th, the strength of the Japanese striking force had  shrunk to 400 men increasingly-debilitated by lack of sleep and shortages of food. On the 23th, after a short but sharp fight, a battalion of 89th Brigade from the east and 123rd Brigade from the west linked up at Ngakyedauk Pass and by evening had firmly secured it. The following day, as soon as the 500 casualties from Sinzweya had been evacuated, the pass was opened to normal traffic and air supply of the 7th Division ceased. As Geoffrey Evans later wrote with obvious pride: “For eighteen days the British and Indian troops, most of them belonging to the administrative services, had withstood the determined attacks of trained Japanese infantry supported by guns and air. It spoke volumes for the war in which the junior leaders had carried out their task and the stout-heartedness of their men.” At this point, General Hanaya recognized the inevitable and ordered the Ha-Go offensive to be abandoned. The shattered remnants of Sakurai's command subsequently withdrawing in small parties. The last attack on Sinzweya, made on the 22nd, ended in failure. On the following night, acting on his own responsibility, Colonel Tanabashi withdrew his main force to Kreingyaung, leaving the 8th Company of the 112th Infantry at Ngakyedauk Pass and the 2nd Battalion of the 112th on a small hill south of Sinzweya. Upon receiving a report of Tanabashi's withdrawal, Major General Sakurai was really pissed off but realized that the move was undoubtedly inevitable, being forced by lack of food and supplies. At the suggestion of General Sakurai, the Division commander determined to suspend the offensive and ordered the Sakurai Unit to withdraw to the line of the Buthidaung-Maungdaw Road. Moving units into the line to cover the withdrawal, the movement south began on the night of 24 February and was completed by 1 March. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Infantry, which had been holding positions in the vicinity of the road between Ngangyaung and Maunghnama since 6 February, left its positions on the night of the 25th and, after breaking through the enemy lines, returned safely on 3 March. Many units were trapped, however, between units of the 26th and 36th Divisions advancing from the north and 5th Division from the east through the Ngakyedauk Pass upon the anvil of the boxes. In the end, the Battle of Ngakyedauk Pass cost 15th Corps 3506 casualties, but it also marked the turning point in the Burma Front. The Japanese lost 3106 killed and 2229 wounded, in what would be the first time that they met well trained British-Indian formations in battle and the first time that their enveloping tactics, aimed at cutting their opponents' line of communications, failed to produce the results they expected. Not only had operation HA-GO been an abysmal failure, but it materially undermined the Japanese ability to resist further British attacks. By March 5th, the 15th Corps had completely recovered and resumed its own offensive against the now disorganized and weakened Japanese forces in Arakan. Although the Japanese staged a remarkable recovery and still offered dogged resistance, the 5th Division would capture Razabil on March 12th and the 7th Division would seize Buthidaung and later mop up the Letwedet Fortress in late March.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle in the Marshalls absolutely shocked the Japanese in its speed, efficiency and low cost for the American forces. Now the Japanese feared the Americans would soon be in range to hit the home islands with their dreaded bombers. In the Burma Front, the former Japanese super soldiers were now realizing the Indian Army could no longer be pushed around.

Last time we spoke about Operation Flintlock, the invasion of Kwajalein. The Americans had unleashed an incredible amount of air, sea and land forces against the Marshall Islands. The amphibious invasion of most of the islands saw little resistance, but on Kwajalein they would meet a determined enemy. The Americans achieved strategic surprise; artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had successfully softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific War; the ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without too many hiccups; supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines relatively smoothly and without interruption; the infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes; and American casualties had been fairly light. Altogether, the battle for Kwajalein represented the ideal for all military operations. Then we covered a bit of the Burma front where the allies unleashing an offensive, while the Japanese unleashed Operation HA-GO. This episode is Operation Hailstone: the Smashing of Truk Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For those who came rushing over to see the scene at Kwajalein descriptions given were comically noted as “a hell of a Spruance Haircut, with some Mitscher shampoo”. Looking down at Roi and Namur a F6F pilot recalled “ it looked like “the moon,” or “plowed ground.” The beach and roads were strewn with the charred and misshapen remains of equipment, tanks, and armored vehicles. I don't think there was a stick of anything standing. It looked just completely beaten up.” A sailor who visited one of the captured atolls had observed “palms were shredded where shells and bomb fragments had made direct hits, leaving stumps that looked like old-fashioned shaving brushes stuck, bristles up, in the sand”. Holland Smith was greatly annoyed by the number of sightseers who came to Kwajalein stating. a “regular tourist haunt. . . . The big army and navy brass from Pearl Harbor descended on us like flies. The photographers had a gala day snapping pictures against the background of shelled buildings, while visiting brass hunted for samurai swords and other souvenirs.”  Meanwhile a single battalion was assigned to capture Majuro, and their battle would consist of walking up some beaches completely unopposed. The Japanese garrison had pulled out a week earlier. Admiral Hill declared the atoll secure only 2 hours after landings were made. Its huge anchorage would accommodate all the mobile floating logistical assets of Service Squadron 10 and for the time being became the principal advance base for the 5th fleet. Jaluit, Mille, Wotje and Maloelap, which had sizable Japanese garrisons, would not be invaded by the Allied forces. Since the Japanese were cut off from outside assistance, the garrisons were doing no harm to the Allied effort, so they would be left alone, thus saving many American and Japanese lives by not forcing the issue.  But Eniwetok Atoll would not be bypassed, because she held the second largest lagoon in the Marshall Islands. As Admiral Nimitz and his commanders considered the repercussions of their surprising quick and low cost victory, they soon elected to accelerate the schedule of future operations in the region. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok. However Eniwetok was within Truk's air combat radius, thus to hit Eniwetok, they would first have to neutralize what was called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk. Prior to WW2, Truk was neither well developed nor well defended. Although the US feared the Japanese had been fortifying Truk for nearly two decades; in truth, the Japanese largely ignored Truk after capturing it during WW1. When the Pacific War started on December 7, 1941, only a few coastal batteries and naval minefields added since November 1939 covered the passes into Truk Lagoon. Few other defenses, including inadequate anti-aircraft artillery, protected it. To the US Navy, Truk appeared impregnable and sailors spoke the name in awe‑struck tones. This was because Truk needed few artificial defenses to make it virtually impregnable to surface invasion. Truk was a naturally sheltered and easily defended anchorage, large enough to accommodate the entire IJN and out of range of enemy naval guns. Their defense, however, depended on the air garrison, one of the strongest in Japan's Southeast Pacific theater. Dangerous long‑range reconnaissance flights flown by B‑24s from bases in the Gilberts in December 1943 managed to bring back photos that allowed intelligence officers to map out the air bases and the various anchorages in the lagoon. Analysts thus began to realize there was not as much there as expected. And thus Operations Catchpole and Hailstone were born. Catchpole would be the invasion of Eniwetok while Hailstone would be the neutralization of Truk and as a secondary objective, to discern if Truk could be bypassed similarly as Rabaul or Maloelap  was. Operation Hailstone would be bigger than December's raid against Kwajalein. Vice-Admiral Raymond Spruance's 5th fleet would deploy Task Group 50.9 and three of Task Force 58's four fast carrier task groups. Task Force 50 was under Spruance himself while Admiral Mitscher had command over the carrier task force. Spruance would also had overall command over the operation. Fleet carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill and light carriers, Belleau Wood, Cabot, and Monterey would be launched aircraft in the operation. Admiral Lea would control a fast striking force consisting of light carrier Cowpens, and battleships Iowa, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Alabama, South Dakota and North Carolina. 10 submarines would be lurking like sharks around Truk independently seeing if they could possibly intercept some IJN forces or rescue down US pilots during the attack. To prepare for the operation, on February 4th a lone PB4Y Liberator launched off Torokina's airfield to carry out reconnaissance of Truk. The photos indicated that Truk Lagoon held a battleship, two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 12 submarines. The PB4Y was spotted and fired on by warships in the harbor and several fighters were launched to intercept, but only one, a floatplane fighter, came close enough to open fire. The pilot managed to high tail it out of there safely.  The American reconnaissance flight alerted Admiral Koga that they could expect a heavy raid at any moment, so he ordered all his warships to depart the lagoon before February 21st, the date they predicted the Americans would hit. The departure was extremely hasty. 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers had just arrived at Truk the previous month. When the departure order came, they haphazardly unloaded their aircraft in order to leave quickly. The aircraft were left parked nose-to-tail on airport aprons and taxiways. Cargo ships equally hastily unloaded stores so they could leave. Fuel barges were drained to top off the tanks of the Combined Fleet's major units. They had to be tediously refilled from tankers, a task made difficult by choppy seas kicked up by rough weather between February 13 and 15. On February 12, most of the Combined Fleet's major units left Truk for Palau. The light cruiser Agano, previously damaged and under repair, could not depart until February 16. Its departure was so late that it would be caught and sunk by the newly arrived US submarine screen. Other ships were still preparing to leave, their departure delayed by bad weather and slow refueling. Of those ships trapped still at Truk were the 4th fleet of Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami, consisting of light cruiser Naka; destroyers Maikaze and Oite, alongside some units of the 8th Fleet and several transports. There were also various auxiliary, destroyer, repair ships, transports and the 6th Fleet of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo headquarters. On February 5th, Admiral Hill learnt he would be commanding the Eniwetok expeditionary forces and have less than two weeks to prepare them. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were green and had no real training with the troops. As recalled by General Watson “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Yet we will be talking about Eniwetok in the next episode so we will be diving straight into Hailstone. Operation Hailstone had been long on American drawing board. On December 26, 1943, Admiral Nimitz had informed King that he thought the operation would become feasible by the following April, but he pledged to do it earlier if circumstances allowed: “Much depends on extent of damage inflicted on enemy in all areas in next 2 months.” Located 669 miles southwest of Eniwetok, Truk was a colossal atoll, it held a cluster of around a dozen islands near the center of its lagoon. Around 2000 Micronesian natives lived on the islands, mostly in thatch huts on grassy plains and beaches. There was a sense of dread amongst the aviators and crewmen of the task forces assigned to the operation. They were to attack the “mystery base”, Truk had acquired a reputation as an unassailable fortress. It was thought to be a major hub of Japanese airpower, defended by hundreds of crack pilots in Zeros. The task forces sortied westward on February 12th and no Japanese would bother their approach. The carriers got to their assembly point 90 miles northeast of Dublon before sunrise on February 17th. AT 4:43am the operation kicked off when 5 fleet carriers launched 72 Hellcats to go knock out the enemy air power prior to sending in the bombers. This was a new technique Admiral Mitscher had concocted himself. The Japanese were caught completely unprepared, no Japanese aircraft were in the air when radar picked up the incoming aircraft. The IJN's 22nd and 26th Air Flotilla's were on shore leave and their radar had difficulty detecting low flying aircraft, a weakness allied intelligence exploited. Despite this, the Japanese tossed 90 aircraft, half of which attempted to intercept the US fighters without coordination.  Within minutes of combat, 30 Japanese fighters were shot down, by the end of the engagement a total of 55 would fall. The Americans lost 4 Hellcats, and at least one according to VF-6 pilot Alex Vraciu was a victim of friendly fire. “There were dog fights all over the place. I even saw one of our Hellcats shoot another Hellcat down. It was a great deflection shot but . . . one of our guys just shot first before being sure and this other poor pilot was forced to parachute out. In the course of the action, I saw a number of Japanese parachutes in the air.” The American pilots had expected to be facing 200 Japanese aircraft. According to estimates given in postwar interrogations, the Japanese had 68 operational airplanes on the Moen field; 27 on the Dublon field; 20 on Eten and 46 on Param, for a total of 161. Parked on the big field at Eten were some 180 aircraft that were damaged, most grounded for lack of spare parts, or immobilized for lack of aircrews. Most of these would be destroyed on the ground. Although Admiral Koga anticipated the American move against Truk, air and naval forces were not on the alert when the American planes suddenly appeared overhead. According to Masataka Chihaya, a staff officer with the 4 Fleet, the pilots, ground personnel, and ships' crews had been kept in 24hr readiness since the overflight of the 2 marine PB4Ys two weeks earlier, and had reached a state of collective exhaustion. Another factor to the catastrophe was that of morale and even discipline had eroded since the withdrawal of the heavy warships. Pilots had refused to climb into their cockpits when ordered, many had gone absent without leave. The atoll's commander, Vice Admiral Masami Kobayashi, had apparently concluded that the American fleet was still engaged in the Marshalls, and authorized a downgrade in the alert level. On February 16, many pilots and other personnel had left their barracks for R&R. The morning of the American raid found a large proportion of Truk's aviators asleep in the atoll's largest town, on the island of Dublon, having partied pretty hard into the night at local drinking establishments. Their only means of returning to their airfield on the island of Eten was by ferry, and the ferry could not accommodate all of them at once. Many aircraft, both on Eten and on the airfields of Moen and Param islands, had also been disarmed and drained of fuel. Kobayashi's ignominious failure to keep his forces on alert put an end to his naval career; he was relieved of command and then forced to retire from active service. Having swept the skies of opposition by 6:00am, the Hellcats began strafing the seaplane base at Dublon and the airfields on Moen, Eten, and Param, successfully destroying another 40 aircraft on the ground. As the fighter sweep was ending, 18 Avengers emerged dropping their payloads onto the airfields,  neutralizing Truks air power. As such, the living hell created by strafing and bombs saw a total of 125 operational aircraft and 110 air arsenal aircraft get destroyed or seriously damaged on the ground. With Truk's air power neutralized, the next American objective was to hit the shipping in the lagoon, so the carriers then began launching full deckload strikes, staggering the launches so that there were aircraft over Truk virtually continuously for the rest of the day. James D. Ramage, flying a VB-10 Dauntless, noted that several Zeros flew by him without offering combat. He assumed that they were dispirited by the one-sided results of the air fight and were determined to survive it. It was a syndrome that had become increasingly common during the later stages of the South Pacific air campaign.  Due to the lack of air cover or warning, many merchant ships were caught at anchor with only the islands' anti-aircraft guns for defense. At 07:30, the first shipping began to be attacked. Yorktown's bombers rapidly sinking the cargo ship Fujikawa Maru and then bombing the submarine tender Rio de Janeiro Maru was hit by 1,000lb bombs dropped by Yorktown SBD Dauntlesses east of Uman. It stayed afloat, but sank the next day. Another submarine tender, the Heian Maru, headquarters of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo was hit twice , but the ship would successfully survive the relentless American attacks, then offloading Takagi on Dublon after sunset. By 9:23am, Lee's battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers came in to try and catch escaping ships. Some Japanese vessels attempted to flee via the atoll's North Pass; but were bottled up by the aerial attack and by Lee's warships, most of them would be successfully sunk by 13:00.  The famed marine fighter ace Major Gregory “Pappy” Boyington, of the Black Sheep squadron VMF-214, had been shot down and captured off Rabaul a week before Hailstone. Alongside other POW's he was flown into Truk while the raid was developing. As the Betty bomber carrying them rolled to a stop, Pappy and his fellow prisoners were thrown out onto the airstrip. They looked up and were shocked to see an F6F Hellcat flying low over the airfield, walking .50-caliber fire across  parked planes. The bomber from which they had just been ejected went up in a sheet of flame. The Americans were shoved into a pit by the side of the airfield, and watched the action overhead and cheered for the attackers. Pappy recalled this “There was so much excitement I couldn't do any differently. I just had to see those Nip planes, some of the light planes like the Zeros, jump off the ground from the explosion of our bombs and come down “cl-l-l-lang,” just like a sack of bolts and nuts. The planes caught on fire and the ammunition in them began going off. There were 20-mm cannon shells and 7.7's bouncing and ricocheting all around this pit. Some of these hot pieces we tossed back out of the pit with our hands”. Enterprise dive-bombers dropped 1,000-pound armor-piercing bombs on targets chosen from the aerial photos taken earlier. The planes hurtled down through flak bursts and smashed the stationary ships. A bomb hit the stern of the 13,000-ton Hoyo Maru. The 7,000-ton aviation stores ship Kiyozumi Maru and lit her up. A VT-6 Avenger flew low over the ammunition ship, the Aikoku Maru, and landed a bomb dead-center amidships. The target went up in a huge, rolling ball of flame that engulfed the plane and destroyed it. The shockwave was powerful enough to rock Lieutenant Ramage's aircraft, more than 2,000 feet overhead. “It was, I think, the biggest explosion I've ever seen, other than the atomic bombs. It was just an enormous blast.” 5 ships managed to escape the carnage within the lagoon. The light cruiser Katori, auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and the small trawler, Shonan Maru. Unfortunately for them they ran directly into Lee's force at 1:30pm. Only the destroyer Nowaki managed to outrun the Americans as she fired a spread of torpedoes trying to keep the Americans at a distance. Spruance was ultimately the one who ordered the surface ships to come into the combat area and this resulted in close calls for friendly fire. Mitscher would continuously order pilots to hold back their payloads against fleeing ships and wait for identification first. Many of the aviators would accuse Spruance of seeking to have “the big guns” get their taste of the blood. But the big guns would basically only finish off some crippled ships. Minneapolis and New Orleans sank two immobilized ships with 3-4 salvos. Meanwhile the USS New Jersey nearly took two torpedo hits from a sinking IJN destroyer. American ships came to the ailing IJN vessel trying to pick up survivors, but almost all the Japanese sailors took their own lives. The Iowa would take a bomb hit from a Japanese aircraft, but suffered little damage. If one or more of the American surface ships were hit by torpedoes, it may have very well cost Spruance his command. The ordinarily conservative fleet commander had behaved with impulsive bravado, and it seems for no better reason than a blackshoe's inborn desire to claim a piece of the action for the big guns. Admiral Sherman's tactful conclusion was that “this expedition accomplished little and only complicated the attacks by the carrier planes.” Lieutenant Ramage was less gentle: “So the big battleships finally drew blood against a cruiser that was almost dead in the water. It must have been a great victory.” The death toll for the first day of Hailstone was more than 20 Japanese ships sunk, but the fun was not over. 6-7 Radar-equipped B5Ns capable of tracking ships at night launched perhaps from Rabaul or Saipan, hunting for the US carriers. They were spotted on radar as they approached the US ships. Night fighters attempted to intercept them, but were unable to find them in the darkness. The task force maneuvered to avoid the incoming bombers, which would have worked if the Japanese were using aircraft blindly flying a standard search pattern. However, the radar-equipped Nakajimas detected the course change and continued to home in on the carriers. Between 7:00 and 10:00, the aircraft made several approaches to the US ships, but were kept at a distance by heavy radar-directed anti-aircraft fire. The Yorktown launched a night fighter F4U Corsair at 9:20 to intercept a particularly persistent Nakajima, vectoring the fighter towards the torpedo bomber. But for once, the Japanese used radar to better advantage than the US, so the Corsair never made contact with the Nakajima. The Nakajima was then able to press its attack, launching a torpedo at the USS Intrepid. It struck near the starboard quarter, jamming the rudder, killing 11 aboard, and wounding 17. The B5N that dropped the torpedo apparently escaped unharmed. Intrepid was in no danger of sinking, but made her way to Majuro to be safe. The Americans then launched their own night attack on Japanese shipping in Truk Atoll. At 2:00 am, the USS Enterprise launched a flight of 12 radar-equipped Avengers to attack the surviving Japanese ships in Truk Lagoon. Each aircraft was armed with 4 500-pound bombs. The concept of performing a low-altitude night attack, with the planes guided to the targets by radar alone, had been studied and discussed but never attempted before. It required the pilots to navigate to Truk on instruments alone. Once over the lagoon, they circled over the anchorages until radar echoes provided an image of the targets. The mission would be a tactical breakthrough, unprecedented in the annals of aviation or naval history. Lieutenant Commander William I. Martin, who trained the airmen, recalled “Radar displays at that time required an operator to do a great deal of interpreting. It was like learning a new language. Instead of it being a polar plot, looking down on it like a map, the cathode ray tube just gave indications that there was an object out there. After considerable practice, a radar operator could determine that there was a ship there and its approximate size. You related the blip on the radar scope to the image of the ship”. In about 30 minutes, the Avengers made 25 passes over Dublon and Eten, scoring 13 direct hits on ships, two on rocky islets mistaken for ships and seven near misses. As a result, around 12 vessels were sunk during the attack, including the Heian Maru. It was a remarkable performance by a dozen aircraft in the US Navy's first carrier-launched night attack.  The following dawn, Mitscher sent another fighter sweep, though it would not be very effective as the Japanese had basically no surviving aircraft in the area. 200 aircraft met negligible air opposition over the atoll as they worked over the remaining targets at their leisure. Hundreds of incendiaries were dropped on smoking airfields, parking areas, and hangars. The bombers paid special attention to the fuel tank farms, which had been spared on the first day in order to prevent smoke from obscuring visibility. By noon, Japanese resistance was almost non-existent and there were no more worthwhile targets, so Spruance and Mitscher decided to call a halt to the attacks, as it was considered that Truk no longer posed a threat to the Eniwetok invasion.  Hailstone cost the Americans 12 fighters, 7 torpedo bombers, 6 dive bombers and 2 floatplanes. 29 aircrew died; and 28 sailors died aboard the Intrepid. The operation had been one of the most smashing carrier raids of the Pacific war. Though most of Japan's heavy naval units had fled the lagoon, the Americans had sunk three light cruisers, four destroyers, three auxiliary or training cruisers, and six other naval auxiliaries. In addition, around 30 merchant ships were sent to the bottom of the lagoon, including 5 precious oil tankers. The total shipping losses approached 200,000 tons and many of those vessels had been laden with munitions and other supplies that could not be recovered. 17,000 tons of fuel went up in the attack, at a time when fuel was running very short for the Japanese. The Japanese lost 249 aircraft, most on the ground. As Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison would later write, “Courage and determination the Navy had shown from the first, but in the Marshalls it demonstrated mastery of the art of amphibious warfare; of combining air, surface, submarine and ground forces to project fighting power irresistibly across the seas. The strike on Truk demonstrated a virtual revolution in naval warfare; the aircraft carrier emerged as the capital ship of the future, with unlimited potentialities.” The IJN Combined Fleet would never return to Truk; the 4th Fleet headquarters remained at Truk, but its warships left; and the transports carrying the 52nd Division to Truk, some of which had arrived on February 19, hastily unloaded and quickly departed. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and would consequently be relieved of his command, never to return to active duty. But that's it for the Marshall Islands campaign for now as we are shifting over to the south pacific.  In preparation for the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the allies first would need to seize the Green islands, situated 117 miles southeast of Rabaul. Admiral Halsey had been tasked with landing General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division consisting of the 14th Brigade; Special Army Tank Squadron; 17th Field Regiment; 29th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment; 144th Independent Battery; 53rd Anti-Tank Battery; 967th Coast Artillery Battalion; Naval Base Unit No. 11 and other supporting units. Halsey assigned Admiral Wilkinson to command the operations. He would transport the men in 3 echelons using a plethora of Destroyers, Destroyer Transports and countless landing crafts. AirSols would be providing coverage alongside Admiral Merrill's Task force 39 consisting of light cruisers Cleveland, Columbia and Montpelier; and destroyers Charles Ausburne, Dyson, Stanly, Spence and Converse. There would also be Admiral Ainsworths Task force 38. Wilkinsons echelons departed Vella Lavella and the Treasury islands On February 12th and 13th. They met near Bougainville and together advanced towards the departure line off Barahun Island. The Americans expected Rabaul's airforce to be greatly depleted by this point, but the convoy was still harassed by 15 Vals and 17 Zeros during the night of February 14th. 10 vals managed to score a hit and 3 near misses against cruiser St Louis, killing 23 men and causing moderate damage. The bombers also tried attacking the landing craft, but apart from a near miss on LST-446, the landing would proceed quickly and smoothly. The landing craft began taking off on the morning of February 15th as AirSols fighters gained air supremacy over the skies of Nissan Island. 32 fighters form Squadron 14, RNZAF, commanded by Squadron Leader S. G. Quill, and Squadrons 1 and 18, commanded by Squadron Leader J. A. Oldfield, both kept 18 aircraft continuously over the island until dusk, flying sorties from the airfields at Empress Augusta Bay.  12 Japanese bombers would be reported shot down. This was the last air opposition encountered during Operation Squarepeg. With such a numerous  fleet sending thousands of troops ashore with impunity only 115 miles from Rabaul proved AirSols was a force to be reckoned with. Ferried ashore in LCIs and LCVPs, into the lagoon in southern Barahun Island, the troops would disembark at several landing beaches around the Pokonian and Tangalan Plantations.  Within just 2 hours, about 5800 New Zealanders were ashore. Patrols were then sent out, and carrying parties began moving stores off the beaches further inland. As the beachhead was established, there was only a brief resistance from several Japanese barges around Sirot Island, before a perimeter was established. By nightfall, in addition to the aforementioned troops, Wilkinson had also landed 58 jeeps, 67 trucks, 44 guns, 8 Valentine tanks, 426 tons of petrol in drums, 2000 gallons of fresh water in tins, and 267 tons of rations. The following day, as the Kiwis fanned out along Nissan Island, about 21 Japanese were encountered on Sirot. Late that afternoon, natives reported that an unspecified number of Japanese had taken refuge on the densely wooded island of Sirot, and the task of clearing the island was assigned to B Company, led by Captain D. Dalton. The Japanese were swiftly dealt with, but the Kiwi's would suffer 5 deaths and 3 wounded in the firefight. On February 18, patrols from the 37th Battalion reached the northern tip of Nissan Island and reported it clear while the 30th and 35th Battalions dealt with a large group of Japanese at the south point of the island. The Kiwis accidentally came upon the remaining Japanese garrison on 20 February, in an area previously declared clear by patrols. It was along the coast near a few deserted native huts passing as the village of Tanaheran on the map. On February 19, the remaining 100-man Japanese garrison signed off on their radio ‘We are charging the enemy and beginning radio silence'.The Kiwi's suffered 3 deaths and 11 wounded. The Japanese had been overwhelmed and annihilated. The next day the second echelon of Admiral Fort arrived. Organized resistance had ceased. In total, 120 Japanese had been killed against the 13 killed and 24 wounded of the Allied forces.  With the Green Islands under their control, the Allied forces now needed to do something about the 1200 friendly native Melanesians whose taro gardens and coconut groves were about to be turned into airfields. The answer was a temporary evacuation to Guadalcanal. This was explained to the natives' head men, and, as the Melanesians are born rovers, the prospect of a boat ride to the Solomons and free food there was highly pleasing. Accordingly, "Grandpa" Roger Cutler's LSTs of the Second Echelon took on the function, new even for Love-Sugar-Tares, of evacuating natives; and so well was this done that by the time the flotilla of Melanesian Mayflowers reached Guadalcanal the 1147 embarked had increased to 1148. The Green Islands would prove to be a very useful link in the strangling of Rabaul, with a PT base immediately opening on February 17 and with a new fighter strip being completed by March 4, which for the first time put Kavieng within range of AirSols fighters and bombers. But now we have to shift over to the boys in New Guinea. The last time we were in New Guinea, the Australians were in hot pursuit of General Nakano's men. On February 3rd, the 30th battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel William Parry-Okeden had set off from Singor to take over for the 4th battalion at Crossington. The next day, the Australians reached Nemau and the day after that established a new supply beach at Butubutu. On that same day orders came in stating all commanders must make every endeavor to capture prisoners. This prompted Cameron to call off the Papuans from leading the advance and sent the leading Papuan platoon to reconnoiter the inland trails while the infantry led the advance on the right. The men advanced sluggishly as a result of the mixture of muddy tracks and enemy corpses. They reached Roinji 1 on the 6th then Roinji 2 on the 7th. During the afternoon the Papuans reached Gali 1 where they managed to kill 24 Japanese stragglers and captured 3 prisoners. Each day the Papuans killed on average 10-15 Japanese, but it was not until the 8th when they encountered a real Japanese rearguard at Weber Point. The Papuans performed a frontal assault killing 53 Japanese and captured another 4 prisoners. By the night on February 9, the leading company was 2000 yards west of Malalamai and 3500 yards from the American's most forward outpost at Yagomai when they fought another larger group of Japanese. 61 Japanese were killed and 9 prisoners taken in the day; and on February 10, the 30th Battalion at last reached Yagomai. Here they finally linked with the American force at Saidor. It was decided that the 5th Division would not operate west of the Yaut, so Brigadier Cameron was instructed to mop up the Tapen and Nokopo areas. Meanwhile, the 35th Battalion advanced towards Bwana, where they killed 31 Japanese. On the 18th, the Australians killed 40 Japanese at Gabutamon and another 142 in the Tapen area; 3 days later, they attacked Wandiluk, where they killed 57 Japanese. After the 22nd, the pursuit was largely carried on by the Papuans towards Nokopo. During this time until March 1st, the 8th Brigade reported killing 734 Japanese, found 1793 dead and took 48 prisoners. The Australians and Papuan had suffered 3 deaths and 5 wounded. Despite his losses, General Nakano and his men had yet again cheated death. In a letter on 21st March Lt General Frank Berryman wrote: "About 8,000 semi-starved, ill equipped and dispirited Japanese bypassed Saidor. It was disappointing that the fruits of victory were not fully reaped, and that once again the remnants of 51st Division escaped our clutches." Meanwhile General Morshead had been planning to relieve the 7th division with the fresh 11th division Major-General Allan Boase. But General Vasey convinced him instead to let him take over the drive on Madang by the end of January. Now the 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 2/10th in the right-hand sector from 4100 through Crater Hill and Kankirei Saddle to Cam's Hill, with the task of patrolling the area east of Cam's Hill, the headwaters of the Mosa River, and forward along the upper Mindjim River Valley to Paipa 2. The 57th/60th relieved the 2/9th on the left with positions on the 4100 Feature, the Protheros and Shaggy Ridge, and the task of patrolling forward from Canning's Saddle along the high ground west of the Mindjim. The 24th Battalion relieved the 2/12th in reserve.  Now Brigadier Hammer had the task of patrolling forward from the Kankirei Saddle. As typical for New Guinea, the terrain facing them would be formidable. Hammer had this to say in a report "The country in the Finisterre Ranges is rugged, steep, precipitous and covered with dense rain forest. It rains heavily almost every day thus making living conditions uncomfortable. By day it is hot, by night three blankets are necessary. There is, therefore, a constant battle with mud, slush, rain and cold. To allow freedom of movement over this mud it was necessary to corduroy every track in the area." By late February Hammer dispatched a number of small patrols towards Amuson and Saipa 2. On the right flank Lt Brewster with a patrol from the 58th/59th investigated the valley of the Mosa River as far as Amuson, and returned after 4 days reporting the area was clear. In the central area a patrol from the 57th/60th brushed with an enemy patrol near Saipa 2, with some support from the guns of the 4th Field Regiment. On the 28th a patrol from the 57th/60th, led by Lt Besier, attacked Saipa 2 three times with supporting artillery fire, but all attempts to enter the village were repulsed. On February 26, the 58th/59th Battalion was instructed to establish a company patrol base on Amuson and send out a platoon reconnaissance patrol to the coast in the Mindjim-Melamu area, which managed to establish some observation posts overlooking Astrolabe Bay in early March. Hammer also sent the 57th/60th Battalion to the Paipa area in preparation for an attack on Saipa 2.  Meanwhile, after the conclusion of Operation Dexterity on February 10th General Krueger handed command to Major-General William Gill over the Saidor area and he began to bring the remaining elements of his 32nd division.  Gill then began plans for a secondary landing at the Yalau Plantation, around 30 miles west of Saidor. He hoped to establish a new forward base there and possibly intercept enemy stragglers trying to bypass the Saidor area.The 2nd battalion, 126th regiment led by Lt Colonel Oliver O. Dixon successfully landed on March 5th. 54 landing crafts unloaded 1348 within 9 waves, seeing little to no opposition. As men patrolled east and west from Yalau, they encountered and killed a few Japanese and found many already dead. They would reach Bau Plantation on March 9th, where they ran into a detachment of General Nakai's 3rd battalion, 239th regiment. But yet again we must not shift our attention somewhere we have not been in quite some time, the Indian Ocean.  The Commander in Chief, Southwest Area Fleet, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro had decided to dispatch heavy cruisers Aoba, Chikuma, and Tone, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa, to raid Allied shipping on the main route between Aden and Fremantle. Departing the Lingga Islands on February 27, the heavy cruisers were escorted by light cruisers Kinu and Ōi and 3 destroyers through the Sunda Strait. The raiders were also supported by 10 medium bombers and 3-4 seaplanes based in Sumatra and west Java which conducted patrols in the direction of Ceylon. 3-4 submarines from the 8th Flotilla also monitored Allied shipping movements near Ceylon, the Maldive Islands and Chagos Archipelago. On March 6th the allies detected the force near the Lombok Strait. Fearing a possible attack, Western Australia was reinforced and the British Eastern Fleet was diverted. On the morning of March 9th, Sakonju's cruiser came across the 6200 ton British steamer Behar between Fremantle and Colombo. Upon sighting the Japanese ships, Behar's Captain Maurice Symons, ordered that his radio operator transmit the "RRR" code in order to notify other ships and Allied bases that the merchant ship was being attacked by surface raiders. Tone's signals room picked up the message,. The Tone then began signaling repeatedly to the Behar to surrender, but the Behar continued to flee, prompting the cruiser to open fire. Behar was hit a few times to her prow and stern, killing 3 crewmembers. Within 5 minutes Behar's crew and passengers began abandoning ship as she sank. 104-108 survivors were rescued by the Tone. Following the attack, Sakonju believed it was too dangerous to continue raiding as Behar had sent out a distress signal. So he turned back, reaching Tanjung Priok on March 15th.  Shortly after the Behar survivors were rescued, Sakonju sent a radio message to Tone's commanding officer, Captain Mayuzumi Haruo, reprimanding him for taking non-essential personnel prisoner and not capturing the merchant ship. In this message Sakonju ordered that the survivors be killed. Mayuzumi was unwilling to do so, however, as he felt that this would violate his Christian religious beliefs. His executive officer, Commander Mii Junsuke, also opposed killing the prisoners deeming it dishonorable. Mayuzumi radioed a request to Sakonju that the prisoners be put ashore, but this was rejected. The captain then visited Aoba to argue his case, but Sakonju remained unmoved and told Mayuzumi to "obey my orders". Despite his misgivings, Mayuzumi ultimately decided to kill the prisoners. On the night of March 18, all the prisoners on board Tone were beheaded by several of the cruiser's officers. Mayuzumi watched the killings from the ship's bridge but Mii refused to take part. The number of the crew to be executed was between 65 and at least 100. Following the massacre 15-36 survivors were transferred to Aoba. The party sent to Aoba included Symonds, the Behar's chief officer and several of the senior officers as well as both of the ship's female passengers. All of this group were later landed at Tanjung Priok. After the war, the Allies prosecuted the officers responsible for the murders on board the Tone. Vice Admiral Takasu died from disease in September 1944, but Sakonju was tried by the British in 1947 at Hong Kong and sentenced to death and executed 21 January 1948. Mayuzumi was convicted for his role in the killings and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Sakonju stated in his affidavit that he was 'retaliating against the execution and inhuman treatment of Japanese prisoners by the allies in Guadalcanal'. Mayuzumi stated in his defense that he was following Sakonju's orders. Mayuzumi received a light sentence due to his repeated requests for clemency for the prisoner's lives. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. She could no longer be counted upon to thwart allied sea and air units in the region. The Australians on New Guinea were not letting up on the retreating Japanese and a terrible and needless massacre took place in the Indian Ocean.  

Last time we spoke about the operations HA-GO, U-GO and the continued drive against Shaggy ridge. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya sought to invade India and was continuously scheming to drag the rest of the IJA on this rather insane endeavor. Yet the allies also tossed their own operations in the Burma theater greatly disrupting the Japanese planners and achieving numerous objectives. Over in New Guinea, Vasey launched an offensive against the Kankeiri saddle, designated operation cutthroat. Meanwhile General Nakano 's men were in a dire situation with the allied seizure of Sio and Saidor. Multiple Japanese units found themselves all doing the same thing, retreating further north. It seemed no matter what defensive lines they established, the allies kept their advance over land and periodically amphibious assaults their flanks and rear. The formidable defenses region of Shaggy ridge was not going to hold up against the allied advance much longer.  This episode is The Fall of Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Australian advance overland and Saidor operation had paid great dividends over and above the establishment of forward military base construction. The allies had formed a giant wedge between a significant residue of the Japanese fleeing the Finschhafen area. General Adachi commanding the 18th area army was facing a nightmare. Prior to the American landing, he had visited the 51st division HQ at Kiari and then traveled overland to the 20th Division over at Sio. He was fully aware of the hardships facing both forces. Meanwhile news of the Saidor landings hit Rabaul creating a massive debate. Senior officers sought to bring over all available troops to try and retake the town. Others sought to save as many troops as possible for a defense of Wewak, considering it the next main allies target. General Imamura favored bypassing Saidor altogether and withdrawing over inland trails. Thus Adachi appointed General Nakano to take charge of the withdrawal to Madang, and ordered 8 other companies to cross the Ramu valley to Bogadjim to harass the Americans at Saidor. These were purely defensive maneuvers. The Japanese also faced the daunting task of how to evacuate large numbers of troops from the 20th and 51st divisions from the impending allied trap. Nakano took the lead getting the 20th to retreat up the coast while the 51st worked their war over the inland trails. Nakano would soon be forced to abandon the plans and ordered both to pull into the interior to retreat towards Madang, nearly 200 miles away. This would mean the exhausted, starving and sick Japanese had to battle through the jungles, ridges, rivers and other horrors of the Finisterre range.  Meanwhile Saidor was easily secured by the 32nd division, the Australian 7th division advanced through the Ramu Valley and came face to face with Shaggy Ridge. Shaggy ridge had been transformed into a heavy fortified position with numerous nasty features such as the Kankeiri saddle, Pimple, Intermediate snipers pimple, Green snipers pimple, Prothero 1 and 2 and so forth. During the first weeks of January the Australians made very little headway against the honeycombed Japanese defenses. Their air forces were called in numerous times to plaster the ridgelines in a 3 day assault designated Operation Cutthroat. On the 18th of January, B-25s from Nadzab and Port Moresby would drop 500 lb bombs all over the defenses. On the 21st P-40s strafed and bombed the area and this was met with some reorganizing of the ground forces. The 15th and 18th brigades relieved the exhausted 21st and 25th. Brigadier F. O Chilton began the new job by opening heavy artillery up on Prothero I. Captain T. L James with the 2/2 pioneer battalion described the attack on January 20th “At 1000 hours we met 2/12 Infantry Battalion at the appointed rendezvous, where I met their CO., Lt.-CoI. C. F. Bourne. We did not stay long at the rendezvous but formed up and commenced the long approach march. It was a gruelling day. The long single file moved silently up the deep ravines, scaling cliff-faces with the aid of ropes and lawyer vines. It took us the entire day to cover the four mile approach. In one spot that was almost impossible to traverse—a steep-sided cliff—they rigged lawyer vines between trees to act as a handrail and allow us to pull ourselves up." Despite the harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Australians got atop Canning saddle and then forded the Mene river and drew near the village. Colonel Matsumoto's men were now trapped between the 2/9th battalion advancing from the Pimple and the 2/12th battalion from Prothero 1. To the east there was the 2/10th battalion about a mile away from the main Japanese defensive position along the Kankeiri saddle. On the 22nd, the 2/12th dispatched D company who advanced between Prothero1 and Prothero 2. At 10:40am they began to fire their artillery upon Prothero 2 and at 11:15am a platoon tried to progress but was held down by Japanese snipers and machine gun fire. A company came through D company to advance along Shaggy ridge until 3:30 pm once they took were held down by Japanese fire. Then a single australian section rushed forward led by Bren gunner Private Bugg. His team hit a Japanese machine gun crew from just 30 yards away. He seized a toehold quickly upon Prothero 2. After some bitter fighting Prothero 2 had fallen into allied hands. Meanwhile to the south the 2/9th sent a patrol out on the 22nd who found pill-boxes at McCaughey's knoll occupied with Japanese gunners. At 10:45am as allied artillery hit Prothero 2, Captain Taylor led a company of the 2/9th and assaulted McCaughers knoll. They were quickly pinned down, but by 1:15pm word reached them that Prothero 2 was captured and that the entire battalion was to push along Shaggy ridge. During that afternoon Taylor took his company to the western side of Shaggy ridge, getting ready for a new flanking maneuver against McCaughey's knoll. The men fought their way up the knoll cleaning up pillbox one after another, capturing McCaugheys knoll by nightfall. It would cost them 8 men wounded. More than 100 dead Japanese were found over the Prothero-Shaggry ridge area when mop up crews did their work. Meanwhile 2/10th kept up the pressure in the east. On the 22nd A Company led by Lt Gunn seized a foothold on Faria Ridge and, prompting the enemy by late in the afternoon, to abandon Cam's Hill, which was occupied by the 2/10th by 5.20 p.m. During the night and early morning of january 23rd, two counter attacks were launched by the Japanese.  At 2.40 the forward troops of A Company on the ridge were attacked from the south but the attack was repulsed with no casualties. After this the Australians moved down the track towards Kankeiri. Captain Haupt's B Company of the 2/12th advanced down the track from Prothero 2. By 6pm they were atop the saddle around Crater Hill when they came across a Japanese gun position containing 150 rounds of 75mm ammunition. Half an hour later they ran into some resistance from slopes atop Crater Hill. They would pull back to the Kankeiri saddle to dig in for the night.  The 2/10th then dispatch D company led by Captain Kumnick to advance along the Faria Ridge. They made it 1500 yards before running into a well entrenched position that held them down with machine gun fire. During the night however the Japanese abandoned their entrenchments for Cam Hill allowing the 2/10th to establish itself in a position roughy 1200 yards southeast of Crater Hill the next day. On the 24th, the 2/9th took over the responsibility for Shaggy Ridge up to Prothero 2 allowing the 2/12 to advance up Kankeiri.  Small patrols from company B of the 2/12th reached the top of Crater Hill that day finding an enemy position on the southern slopes. On the 25th, the 2/12th and 2/10th probed enemy defenses on all sides of Crater Hill looking for decent approaches to attack. This led to several skirmishes, seeing both sides suffer casualties. One patrol led by Lt Coles of the 2/2nd pioneers, surveyed the Paipa mule track along the valley of the Mindjim, firing upon small bands of retreating Japanese. The Australians gradually converged to attack Crater Hill, but Matsumoto's defenders put up a valiant effort to repel the assaults. On the 26, Brigadier Chilton ordered Companies C and D of the 2/9th and Companies C and B of the 2/12th to assault Crater Hill. This saw companies C and D of the 2/9th perform a outflanking maneuver to the north tip of the Mindjim valley to hit the enemy's right flank, while Companies C and B of the 2/12th held the enemy down. Captain A. Marshall's C company led off at 10.35 a.m, passing from Shaggy Ridge through Kankirei Saddle and then to the north, with Captain Taylor's D company following to provide flank protection. By midday Marshall reported that he had advanced some 600 yards and passed through several old and abandoned positions finding no enemy. Cautiously he pushed on, at 5 p.m. he reached the summit of 4100. The main enemy position was to the south between Marshall and the 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions. Leaving Taylor to occupy the summit of 4100 Marshall advanced south towards Crater Hill in an attempt to surprise the enemy from the rear . He met them about 300 yards south-east from the summit just at dusk. The leading platoon attacked along the usual razor-back but withdrew because of heavy machine-gun fire. At 7 p.m. Marshall sent Lieutenant White's platoon round the right flank but approach from this flank was also very difficult and White was killed. By the nighttime, they had successfully surrounded Matsumoto's weakened defenders. Matsumoto's defenders had established extremely formidable positions and had a large number of automatic weapons at their disposal. Matsumoto was ready alongside his men to make a final stand. Basically a siege of Crater Hill began and would only end after 5 brutal days. The first two days saw Chilton order the 2/9th take responsibility for the southern slopes of 4100 and Kankeiri saddle, while the 2/12th held Protheros and Shaggy ridge, and the 2/10th maintained pressure on the south-eastern slopes of Crater Hill. Skirmishes borke out everywhere, as the artillery smashed Crater Hill. Captain Whyte of the 2/4th field regiment fired 2000 shells, shattering trees, which unfortunately created more timber obstacles for the advancing Australians. At 9.30 a.m. on the 29th, 19 Kittyhawks dive-bombed Crater Hill, followed by ten minutes of artillery fire. At 1.30 p.m. the artillery laid down a barrage and machine-gun fire covered an assault on Crater Hill from the west by Captain Daunt's company of the 2/9th . The leading platoon attempted to rush the enemy position up a very steep and open slope but the Japanese, entrenched on a razor-back, were too strong and drove them back. The Australians also had the bad luck to be shelled by their own artillery. Each time they performed an assault, the stubborn Japanese held firm. Finally on the 30th with the help of some heavy rain Matsumoto decided to evacuate during the night. Matsumoto and the remnants of his force withdrew towards Yokopi and Kubenau valley. After dawn on the 31st, Australian patrols found Crater Hill abandoned and it was a horror show. They found a ghastly mess. At least 14 dead were found and evidence of burials alongside them. The 2/9th and 2/10th advanced occupying the hill on February 1st. With that, Shaggy Ridge and the Kankeiri saddle had finally fallen. Chilton sent out patrols to pursue the retreating Japanese and perform mop up operations. By February 6th his forces managed to seize Paipa and Amuson. The Australians had suffered 46 deaths, 147 wounded while the Japanese figures were estimated at around 500 casualties. Meanwhile, Brigadier Hammer had also carried out two operations during this time period. The first was a diversionary attack against the Spendlove Spur held by elements of the 5th company, 80th regiment. This was carried out by Captain Kennedy company of the 24th battalion, whom managed to surprise the Japanese and quickly seized Cameron's Knoll. On January 30th, the 57/60th battalion led by Lt Colonel Robert Marston departed Ketoba and along another company led by Captain McIntosh assaulted Orgoruna, Kesa and Koba. The Australians would find Orgoruna and Kesa undefended.. Lt Marston ordered Major Barker 's 8 company to patrol Koba, and they would enter Koba on  February 1st finding nothing, so they  pushed on towards Mataloi 2 . There were signs of very recent occupation and, 200 yards along the track , they were ambushed. Barker brought heavy fire down upon the Japanese ambush position and managed to capture Koba that night. On the morning of the 3rd, about 400 yards east of Koba, Barker again struck a Japanese ambush position. They quickly outflanked the enemy who withdrew through Mataloi 2 towards Mataloi 1 . By the time Mataloi 2 was occupied at 6.30 p.m., there was not enough time to hit Mataloi 1 nor to allow adequate consolidation of Mataloi 2 before dark. At 9.30 p.m. the Japanese counter-attacked from the direction of Matalo 1, commencing the assault with a heavy mortar bombardment. As Mataloi 2 could be defended from three sides, Barker decided that he could hold the area best from high ground to the south which would also be out of range of the enemy mortars. Accordingly he ordered a withdrawal and departed with his headquarters and one platoon. Apparently the orders did not reach the other platoons who were encircled while the remainder of the company was withdrawing to Koba. Long-range enemy machine-gun fire was directed at Kesa at the same time as the counterattack developed at Mataloi 2. The 57th/60th pulled out concluding their little raid. Now Brigadier Hammer's 15th were getting ready to pursue Matsumoto's detachment who were fleeing to Kwato. But that is all we have for New Guinea, as were are moving back over to New Britain. Last time we were over in New Britain, the Americans had captured Hill 660, and were unleashing patrols to try and figure out where the Japanese were concentrating. Now they sought to secure the Borgan Bay-Itni river line. Meanwhile on the other side, General Matsuda's battered men had begun a retreat heading east via the Aisalmipua-Kakumo trail towards Kopopo. They also received reinforcements in the form of the fresh 51st reconnaissance regiment who took up the job of rearguard. The Japanese knew the terrain better than their American counterparts, thus held distinct advantages. They knew good grounds to put up defenses and how long they could hold out in such places until they should retreat. The Americans did not enjoy good maps, they had to painstakingly explore where they went. They relied on native reports on where to go, but in the end they were like explorers jumping into jungles, atop mountains and a hell of a lot of swampy terrain. The rainforests could be so dense, patrols could be moving yards from another and not know it, imagine trying to find hypothetical objectives in such places?   Thus an enormous amount of vital patrolling was performed, beginning on January 19th with Captain Ronald Slay's men of L Company 1st marines. They advanced past Mt. Gulu, Langla volcano and Munlulu before heading down the saddle of Mt. Tangi. They managed to ambush a group of 20 Japanese being led by 8 armed natives, who fled east after 6 Japanese were killed. Slay took his men across the east-west government trail, only finding some Japanese telephone wire, which was severed. On the 22nd two patrols each consisting of a reinforced company departed the airdrome perimeter to converge from two directions along the trail junction Captain Slay's men discovered. The first was elements of the 1st battalion, 1st marines led by Captain Nikolai Stevenson, the other was led by Captain Preston Parish with elements of the 7th marines who took landing crafts to Sag Sag, the terminus of the east-west Government trail. Parishes men would bivouac around 1.5 miles inland near Aipati on the 24th while Stevensons men headed south of Mt Gulu. Both patrols found no Japanese, but Parish gained some valuable intelligence from a native village, who indicated there had been several Japanese parties around. On the 23rd, Stevenson and his men ran into a concealed machine gun crew 30 yards near Mt Langla. The Americans scrambled to fight back at an enemy they could not see. They did not lose any men, but had no idea if they hit any Japanese either. They continued their advance afterwards and would be ambushed again, this time 1500 yards south of Mt Munlulu. This time they seemed to be facing a force of platoon strength. By the 25th Stevenson and his men were pulling back to Mt Gulu and were relieved by another incoming patrol led by Captain George Hunts K Company, 1st marines. Meanwhile Parish's patrol continued east as the natives had indicated to them where the Japanese might be retreating through. On January 27th Hunts company ran into Parish's and both shared information and went in opposite directions hoping to hunt down nearby Japanese units. Hunt set off to the location where Parish's men had run into a Japanese ambush previously, expecting to find at least 50 Japanese. At 7am on the 28th, Hunt's men came across an outpost line and engaged it for hours, seeing 15 casualties. Hunt pulled his men back out of mortar range and the Japanese swarmed upon them forcing the Americans to perform some heated rearguard actions. Overall these patrols amongst others allowed the Americans to get a better picture of the terrain and concentration of the enemy. For two weeks the American patrols searched for the enemy headquarters running into countless skirmishes, mostly against the forces of Colonel Sato Jiro. By the 27th, Matsuda had reached Kokopo and received new orders from General Sakai that he was to take the men further on towards Iboki. Colonel Sato was to again provide the rearguard. This allowed the Americans to seize Nakarop, a placed their translators had mistranslated from Japanese documents as “Egaroppu”. It had been the nerve center of General Matsuda's operations. They found countless abandoned tents in bivouac areas, the village contained native and Japanese built structures. There was a huge sign saying "Matsuda Butai Army Command Principal Place." There were traces of elaborate radio installations recently removed containing an American-made telephone switchboard labeled "Glory Division." It would turn out Matsuda's personal quarters, however, were actually located off the main trail roughly midway between Magairapua and Nakarop, its approaches so skillfully concealed that patrols did not find it until several days later. Well camouflaged bivouac areas also infested this entire region. With the capture of Matsuda's former headquarters, all patrols were combined into the Gilnit Group led by the legendary Colonel Chesty Puller. Puller pointed his force in the direction of the Borgen Bay-Itni River to clear it out. They departed Agulupulla on January the 30th as the 5th Marines relieved the 2nd battalion, 1st marines to attack the Iboki area. Attempts were made at leapfrogging, using landing craft to hit places hoping to trap Japanese during the advance. The landing craft were operated by the Boat Battalion, 533d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, of the Army's 2d Engineer Special Brigade. They were made available to carry out the amphibious phase, and the division's little Cub artillery spotter planes for observation and liaison. Rough seas frustrated the first landing attempt at Namuramunga on February 4th, forcing two patrols from the 2nd battalion to proceed overland from Old Natamo via a coastal track. They got as far as Mambak killing a few stragglers and taking 3 prisoners. The next day another patrol landed at Aliado and advanced down the coastal track to the mouth of the Gurissa river through Kokopo and Gorissi. By the 10th of february they managed to kill 16 stragglers and grabbed 6 prisoners who they brought back to the Borgen Bay perimeter. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion advanced into Gorissi by boat on the 12th and setup a radar station. They then dispatched a patrol to the EI river on the 16, finding it impassable. Another patrol was sent to leapfrog around the Arimega Plantation on the 19th. It was seized quickly and now the Americans were very close to Iboki.   Meanwhile Sato reached Kokopo, but did not linger long and continued on to Karai-ai by February 12th. That day the 3rd battalion, 5th marines, aware of the Japanese course, set up an advance base at Gorissi. Now 20 miles separated the Japanese rearguards from their pursuers. Sato and his men would reach Iboki by February 16th, while the Marines were fording the El river, 30 miles behind. It would take them 5 additional days to reach Karai-ai. To the south Puller's group had reached Gilnit and Nigol on the 10th, finding no enemy. These actions saw the Americans secure the western half of New Britain. 2 days later, Company B of the 1st Marines landed on Rooke Island where they set up a radar installation. They also had to patrol the islands to see if any Japanese remained upon it. They fanned out, running into native villages who offered them fresh fruit. They would come across machine gun emplacements, abandoned bivouac areas and some medical stations, but no Japanese. The enemy had clearly evacuated the island   All the way back over at the Arawe area, Major Komori had received new radios on February 5th enabling him to resume communications with the 17th divisional HQ. He received a gloomy report  “At present, the airfield is covered with grass 4 to 5 [feet] high. The airfield, 200 m [sic] in width 800 m in length, will be serviceable only for small airplanes. However, it will take quite some time to develop it. Consequently, I believe that it will not be of great value.” Knowing about Matsuda's withdrawal, he began casting envious eyes in the same direction. On February 8, he hinted more broadly to that effect: “As has been reported, the value of Merkus airfield is so insignificant that it seems the enemy has no intention of using it… Due to damage sustained by enemy bombardments and to the increased number of patients, it becomes more and more difficult to carry out the present mission… It is my opinion that as the days pass, replenishment of supplies will become more and more difficult and fighting strength will be further diminished; our new line will be cut off and consequently leave us with no alternative but self-destruction.” Divisional HQhowever was not pleased with this and sent a telegraphic response the following day ordering him curtly to continue his mission. Komori would write in his diary that day "Wondered what to do about the order all night long. Could not sleep last night… I felt dizzy all day today." Fortunately for Komori, on February 17th Sato was ordered to occupy key positions at the Aria river's mouth to help supply him by land. This allowed Komori to begin his retreat north on the 24th while Sato evacuated the Iboki stores to Upmadung. Komori's departure would be just in the nick of time as the Americans dispatched two tank platoons to clear out the airfield area on the 27th. They would find zero enemy resistance and this would put an end to the Arawe operation. And that will be all for today for New Britain as we are going to be covering some big allied planning.    Over in the southwest and south Pacific Areas, General Douglas MacArthur continued his plan to drive back towards the Philippines. This would be done via amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. His next main target was the Vogelkop Peninsula, then the Palau Islands, then the invasion of Mindanao. This would also see the Japanese lines of communications to the Dutch East Indies cut off. Yet before all of this he needed to capture the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea and then Hollandia in the Dutch part of New Guinea. This action would allow his forces to bypass the Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Meanwhile there were the ongoing efforts to reduce Rabaul, and to continue that he still had to capture the Admiralty Island and Kavieng, which would completely cut off Rabaul. The planners for the south, southwest and central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on January 28th. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to delay MacArthur's invasion of the Admiralties and Kavieng pushed it to April 1st. They had determined it was better to prioritize the invasion of the Marshall islands in the central pacific. This delay would further delay most of the southwest pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. Meanwhile Admiral Kusaka and General Imamura had sent the bulk of the 230th regiment and the recently arrived 1st independent mixed regiment to New Ireland. The 2nd battalion, 1st independent mixed regiment was sent to the Admiralties on January 25th, joining up with Colonel Ezaki Yoshio's 51st transport regiment. Then the 1st battalion, 229th regiment was sent to the Admiralties on february 2nd. These were last ditch efforts by the Japanese to secure a very desperate lifeline for Rabaul. No offensive could be mounted for at least 3 months, thus the Japanese were given ample time to reinforce and strengthen their defenses. Admiral Halsey also had plans to invade the St Matthias Islands as a preliminary for the attack upon Kavieng, and this like MacArthur's plans were thrown into disarray. In view of all of this MacArthur suggested to Halsey a new plan, codenamed Operation Squarepeg, to seize the Green Islands and establish a new PT boat and or air base there. With that in hand they could project air and naval power further against Rabaul and perhaps even as far as Truk. However many of the officers did not believe any of this would significantly isolate Kavieng and Rabaul. Furthermore, they believed it doubtful that fighters stationed at a base in the Green Islands would even be able to cover Kavieng. Admiral Wilkinson, with the backing of Admiral Fitch and General Geiger, suggested that the proposal be abandoned, and that plans be laid for a landing either at Borpop or Boang Island. On 28 December, however, after analyzing the situation, Colonel William E. Riley, Admiral Halsey's War Plans officer, made the following observation: “There is no doubt but that the occupation of this area [Borpop] and the utilization of air facilities thereat would assist materially in the neutralization of both Rabaul and Kavieng. However, the grave possibility that such an operation would result in the employment of approximately two divisions and additional naval support, not now available and will--in all probability--not be made available in time for this type intermediate operation, makes it necessary to eliminate Borpop as a possible intermediate operation… Though Green Island is not as far advanced as Boang Island, yet it is quite possible to provide fighter cover for strikes on Kavieng. In addition, dive bombers, based on Green Island, can operate most effectively against shipping at Kavieng.”Thus Halsey elected to go ahead with Operation Squarepeg anyway because a fighter umbrella could be tossed over the Green Islands during an amphibious invasion, something that would not be possible for Boang or Borbop. Halsey's staff went to work planning the amphibious landing. It would be carried out by elements of General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division. PT 176 and PT 178 of Lieutenant-Commander LeRoy Taylor's Torokina Squadron conducted hydrographic reconnaissance of the islands on January 10th and discovered the southern channels near Barahun island were the most suitable. 300 men of the 30th New Zealand battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Cornwall got aboard the APDs Talbot, Waters and Dickerson, covered by the destroyers Fullam, Bennet, Guest and Hudson led by Captain Ralph Earle. They landed on Nissan Island and performed a survey finding a promising airfield site. They also discovered there were no more than 100 Japanese at a relay station alongside 1200 native Melanesians. Pretty sure I said this before in the series, but I will repeat it. Melanesians are one of the predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Melanesian islands that are found in the area spanning New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Something pretty neat about them, along with some indigenous Australians, they are the few groups of non-Europeans to have blond hair. The Melanesians were so friendly to the New Zealanders and so hostile to the Japanese that it was decided to omit the usual preliminary naval and aerial bombardment for the landings.  Now over in the Central Pacific plans to invade the Marshall were underway, even before the successful liberation of the Gilberts. The operation was codenamed Operation Flintlock, and Admiral Nimitz assigned the 4th Marine division, reinforced with the 22nd marine regiment and Army's 7th division to train intensively for amphibious warfare. They were deemed Tactical Group 1, led by Brigadier General Thomas Watson. They would be backed up by a whopping 23 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 cruisers and 109 destroyers. Yet things had certainly changed since 1942, the American Navy was packing overwhelming heat. Admiral Spruance, now commander of the 5th fleet, would hold the highest operational command for Operation Flintlock. Admiral Turner would be commanding task force 51 and the Joint Expeditionary Fleet and General Holland Smith would be commanding all the expeditionary troops. General Smith's position in the chain of command in relation to Admiral Turner was made much clearer than it had been during the Gilberts operation. Simply put he was put in direct command of all landing forces and garrison forces once they were ashore. The troop commanders of each of the landing forces, the 7th and 4th Marine Divisions, were expressly placed under Smith until such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation phase of the operation had been completed. However, Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops had one limitation. It was recognized that "the employment of troops, including the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of objectives, is subject to the capabilities of the surface units to land and support them," thus any directives issued by Smith as to major landings or as to major changes in tactical plans had to have the approval of Turner before they could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Turner. They would also be supported by Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher's fast carrier force, task force 58 and Admiral Hoovers land based air forces, including the 7th air force and other Navy air forces. So yeah, America was coming in overkill. Nimitz's original plan was to advance into the Marshalls by simultaneously hitting Kwajalein, Maloelap and Wotje. Together these contained 65% of the aircraft facilities in the island group, leaving the 35% remainder on Jaluit and Mille. Jaluit and Mille could be neutralized and bypassed. Yet after facing the difficulties during the Gilberts operation, Nimitz decided to also bypass Maloelap and Wotje as well, so he could concentrate all his forces against Kwajalein. General Smith and Admirals Spruance and Turner opposed this, arguing that sailing into Kwajalein would be too exposed if Maloelap and Wotje were left unoccupied.  Nimitz 'new plan would see General Corlett's 7th division hit the southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein island, while Major General Harry Schmidt's 4th marines would hit Roi-Namur and the other northern islands of the atoll. Task Force 52, would transport the 7th Division while Rear Admiral Richard Conollys task force 53 transported the 4th marines. After some meetings, Spruance managed to secure the invasion of Majuro, which would be carried out by Lt Colonel Frederick Sheldon's “Sundance” Landing Force. They consisted of the 5th amphibious corps reconnaissance company, the 2nd battalion, 106th regiment and the 1st defense battalion. Spruance wanted to make the atoll a fleet base, so airfields could be constructed to help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. To support the main landings, Mitschers fast carrier force was going to smash the enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap, Roi-Namur and Kwajalein while his vessels simultaneously coordinated with Turners cruisers and Rear Admiral Ernest Small's Neutralization group task force 50.15 to naval bombard them as well. The main threat that needed to be neutralized quickly was Eniwetoks airfield. Meanwhile Hoover's land based aircraft would help neutralize Mille and Jaluit and help smash the other islands and shipping. Throughout November and December, two atolls would receive more attacks than the others. Mille closest to the Gilberts, thus much more accessible, earned the lionshare of attention. Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant surveillance and attack, thus she came second. Beginning on December 23rd, aircraft based out of the Gilberts began increasing air strikes against the Marshalls.  On Mille between November 24th to December 18th, 106 heavy bombers dropped 122 tons of bombs over the runways and facilities. The next week bombers and fighters began attacking Mille's fuel dumps, leveled all buildings, destroyed 11 grounded aircraft and another 13 in the air. Mille was neutralized and the Japanese would abandon its airfield by January. The damage dished out to Maloelap was extensive, but not as crippling. Her runways were not entirely put out of operation. From January 11th to the 25th, B-25's destroyed her ground installations, but still her airfield remained operational. On January 26, 9 B-25s, followed by 12 P-40s, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25s destroyed 9 interceptors on the ground and 5 more after they were airborne. The control tower and two other buildings on the airfield were set afire and four tons of bombs were dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas, starting large fires. As the B-25s left the target to return to Makin they were chased by about 15 Japanese fighters. 30 miles south of Maloelap the 12 P-40s met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying11 of them and severely damaging 2 more. The strike of January 26 was decisive. Practically all of the remaining enemy air strength at Maloelap had been destroyed, and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself against air strikes,  thus neutralized. Jaluit was subjected to 15 attacks reduced to rubble and Wotje was hit 14 times suffering extensive damage. Meanwhile Admiral Pownalls task force 58.1 and 58.3 consisting of 6 fast carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 3 of the new class of anti aircraft cruisers, and 12 destroyers hit Kwajalein on December 5th. That day saw her attacked by over 246 aircraft. As a result 19 Japanese interceptors and 4 bombers were destroyed at Roi-Namur, 7 cargo ships were destroyed at Kwajalein and extensive damage was inflicted upon both bases. Simultaneously, 29 aircraft hit Wotje where they destroyed 5 grounded aircraft, set fire to hangers, machine ships and barracks. Japanese interceptors attacked Pownall's carriers, though they were unable to inflict serious damage. Following these attacks, Hoover's aircraft continued to smash Kwajalein, tossing 10 attacks, dropping nearly 210 tons of bombs on the atoll. Roi-Namurs airfield still remained operation by January 29th however, though she only had 35 aircraft on Roi-Namur; 10 reconnaissance planes on Kwajalein; 13 aircraft on Maloelap; 12 on Wotje and 15 on Eniwetok. The Japanese did not have any effective air force to defend the Marshalls any more. The feeling of the men on the islands, was doom.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Finally the Australians had taken the formidable position known as Shaggy Ridge. The Japanese continued the harrowing marches going north as their enemy would not let up. In the Marshalls the IJA and IJN personnel were inflicted the full might of American's wartime productivity, and they all knew Uncle Sam was coming to pay them a visit soon. 

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya's engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship's plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful  raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga's decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga's air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero's of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week.  From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan's most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit  Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile  Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader's plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost.  2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman's task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time.   On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25's, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels.    AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking  the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can't spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does.    Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda's HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing.   The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk's men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge.    On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama's positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack.   At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk's men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route.   At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat.  On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya's forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach.  After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn't plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria.  Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept.  Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten's landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan's air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China.  In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.' Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.' Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,'”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn't wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.' The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.' Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.' In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs' 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner's 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy's would say of the action  “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns  crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943,  Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah's range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged.  To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun's men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division's 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun's 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.

  Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed.  This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny's 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman's Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields.  During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill's cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman's carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis's airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi.  On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis's fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas.  Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson's task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island.  On October 28th, General Turnage's men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina's position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals. Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP's began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process.  The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair.  The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders. Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville.  Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning's 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours. To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville. Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa's air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga's Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them." By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina. Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue.  Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori's incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill's force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori's forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos. Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south. Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu's screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori's fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill's changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori's T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank. At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin's column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn. At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill's flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.” The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi's column to head west running across Omori's cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori's flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship. Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori's. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill's cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am. As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm. Vice admiral Omori's force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa's fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney.  Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman's task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey's Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney's 5th air force to join in on the battle. On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman's carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter. Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24's and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero's who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros. The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman's task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.  

Uno de las huidas más fascinantes de las que hemos publicado, es la del Crucero Imperial Mogami, que tuvo que luchar contra los aviones y las flotas estadounidenses, contra incendios y explosiones internas, y contra su propia conciencia, debiendo sacrificar selectivamente a varios tripulantes para salvar al resto. Esta es la aventura del IJN Mogami, que desafió al Océano, y partió a un destino incierto. Te 🎙 lo cuenta Antonio Gómez. Casus Belli Podcast pertenece a 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. Casus Belli Podcast forma parte de 📀 Ivoox Originals. 📚 Zeppelin Books zeppelinbooks.com es un sello editorial de la 🏭 Factoría Casus Belli. 👉https://podcastcasusbelli.com 👉En Facebook, nuestra página es @casusbellipodcast https://www.facebook.com/CasusBelliPodcast 👉En Instagram estamos como @casusbellipodcast https://www.instagram.com/casusbellipodcast 👉En Twitter estamos como @casusbellipod @CasusBelliPod 👉Telegram, nuestro canal es @casusbellipodcast https://t.me/casusbellipodcast 👨‍💻Nuestro chat del canal es https://t.me/aviones10 ⚛️ El logotipo de Carros 10 y de la Factoría Casus Belli están diseñados por Publicidad Fabián publicidadfabian@yahoo.es 🎵 La música incluida en el programa es Ready for the war de Marc Corominas Pujadó bajo licencia CC. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ El resto de música es bajo licencia privada de Epidemic Music, Jamendo Music o SGAE. de Ivoox. 📧¿Queréis contarnos algo? También puedes escribirnos a casus.belli.pod@gmail.com ¿Quieres anunciarte en este podcast, patrocinar un episodio o una serie? Hazlo a través de 👉 https://www.advoices.com/casus-belli-podcast-historia Si te ha gustado, y crees que nos lo merecemos, nos sirve mucho que nos des un like, ya que nos da mucha visibilidad. Muchas gracias por escucharnos, y hasta la próxima. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Last time we spoke about the defense of Finschhafen. Finschhafen was a enormous staging camp for the allies now. The Japanese could not sit idly by allowing such a strategic location to be in allied hands. General Katagiri launched a major counter offensive, kicked off with signal fires from Sattelberg. He sent a force of raiders to try and neutralise some heavy allied artillery, but it ended in failure. Having not neutralised their big guns, the rest of the counter offensive fell to pieces.  The Japanese would officially report 422 killed, 662 wounded. For the Australians they had 228 casualties of which 49 were dead. With the counter offensive done with, the allies now would go back on the offensive. The next large target was going to be the stronghold of sattelberg, but the Japanese were not going to make it easy on the allies. But today we are going to be jumping into some new places. This episode is the invasion of the treasury islands Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For quite some time now we have been focusing on the New Guinea campaign, such as the offensives against Finschhafen and the Ramu valley. Today we are going to enter a new phase of the Pacific War. With the incoming invasions of the Gilbert and Marshall islands, the Northern Solomons and Western New Britain, General Douglas MacArthur and Admirals Hasley and Nimitz were going to turn up the heat. Admiral Halsey had just seized Vila, Barakoma, Munda and Rendova, gaining their valuable airfields for the forces of General Twinings AirSols to utilise. Within the central Solomons, Bougainville was finally within range of allied land-based aircraft. Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen were taken, thus Operation Cartwheel would begin a new phase. Back in July, plans were formed for General Vandegrifts 1st Marine Amphibious corps to seize airfields sites at Buin and Kahili, the important Japanese anchorage at Tonolei Harbor, and the Faisi and Ballale islands in the neighboring Shortlands. That same month, the 43rd and 37th divisions were involved in the New Georgia campaign. Of the 5 divisions remaining under his control, Admiral Halsey planned to use the fresh and unblooded 3rd Marine division and the Army's 25th division for the invasion. He sought to keep the 2nd marine division and 3rd new zealand division in training for the conquest of Rabaul. Yet things had changed. Because of the intense resistance on New Georgia, the 25th division had to be committed. Then the decision to strike Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert islands removed the 2nd marine division from Hasley's south pacific area. These changes ultimately dictated he would need a substitution, and it was to be the 37th division, whom had suffered 1100 casualties on New Georgia already. Nevertheless the 37th was in better condition than the 25th. The 3rd marine divisions task went unchanged. Major General Allen Turnage's 3rd Marine division was going to spearhead the invasion of Bougainville, with a launch date set for September. On top of this Halsey had received some reports indicating the Japanese were heavily reinforcing the Shortland Islands. He decided to bypass them and hit the Treasury island and Choiseul. It is also possible Halsey sought to perform these actions hoping to lure out the Japanese fleet into a major engagement. The treasury islands and Choiseul were lightly garrisoned, but held airfields that could be turned against Bougainville. Meanwhile , General MacArthur was planning the next stepping stone towards the Philippines. His overall plan was to break the Bismarcks Barrier through a series of aggressive leaps along the New Guinea-Mindanao axis. New Guinea as we are all quite familiar with by now, is a logistical nightmare. Lush jungles, raging rivers, cold mountains, every time of geographical nightmare was present. Thus to traverse the western landmass of it only on land was not exactly desired. What MacArthur's logistical team sought was to secure the 50 mile expanse of sea lying between New Guinea and New Britain. With that in hand Admiral Barbey's 7th Amphibious force would be able to transport troops along the coast, a significantly easier method than having the poor boys battle through the jungle. Rooke Island split the sea into the Vitiaz Strait and the narrower Dampier Strait. General Wootten's 9th Australian division were currently fighting for control of Vitiaz, but there had been no effort to date to hit the Dampier. MacArthur decided to capture Kavieng and the Admiralty Islands, because they represented enemy aerial threats against his westwards push through New Guinea. Closing in on the end of the year he also planned to amphibious assault Cape Gloucester, the northwestern point of New Britain which commanded the Dampier Strait. In hindsight the wisdom of landing at Cape Gloucester seems rather dubious. It was not necessary to seize the point in order to make use of the Vitiaz or Dampier strait. The Japanese did not have big artillery on the western end of New Britain to command the channel, the islands infrastructure was largely undeveloped. The only way the Japanese could interfere with the allied use of either strait was by torpedo boats, something they did not have many of. There of course was aircraft based on New Britain as well, but that would be neutralised by Kenney's AirSols.  MacArthur planned to have the AirSols hit Rabaul continuously; to seize the Green Islands, the Admiralty Islands and Kavieng. The Western New Britain operation was codenamed Operation Dexterity which would be sub divided into Operations Lazaretto and Backhander. There would be a staggered attack first hitting Gasmata performed by the 2nd battalion, 228th regiment. They would establish an air base in the southern coast of the island, this was operation Lazaretto. Operation Backhander would be the invasion of Cape Gloucester. Some of the landings could be carried out in November, but MacArthur chose to wait until the new airfields were established in the Markham and Ramu valleys as they would provide close air support for the amphibious operations.  On September the 10th, Admiral Hasley sent staff to present his plan for the invasion to Bougainville to MacArthur's staff. Halsey would be surprised to find MacArthur opposed using all their aircraft to strike Rabaul before the invasion of western New Britain. MacArthur proposed instead to continue heavy airstrikes against all Japanese airfields on Bougainville throughout October. Then in late October, Halsey's forces could occupy the Treasury islands and possibly northern Choiseul. Northern Choiseul could provide radar coverage and PT boat bases. On the 1st of November, Halsey's forces could then begin landing on Bougainville to form a beachhead before constructing a new airfield to host the AirSols so they could hit Rabaul just in time to take some pressure off MacArthur's troops advancing in New Guinea and New Britain. Thus MacArthur was determined to make the main goal of the operation not the securance over the entirety of Bougainville, but just a portion of it where an aerodrome could be established then used to batter Rabaul. Halsey was presented two options for his landing site: there was Kieta Harbor sitting on the northeast coast and Empress Augusta Bay on the southwest coast. Kieta seemed the better location from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul. Kieta also held a protected harbor, requiring Halsey's forces to move up the longer outside passage to secure Choiseul first. Empress Augusta Bay was on an exposed side of the island during an approaching monsoon season. It was closer to Rabaul and would only require the securing of the Treasury islands first. After further reconnaissance there was indications airfields could be constructed midway up the west coast of Bougainville at Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay. Halsey chose it for the landing site stating on September 22nd “it's Torokina. Now get on your horses!”  The operation against Cape Torokina was codenamed Cherryblossom and its task was handed to the hero of Guadalcanal, General Vandegrift who formed the plans but it would not be he who lead the operation. Vandegrit was promoted to commandant of the Marines, the first serving marine to become a four star general, he had to depart for Washington. His replacement was Major General Charles Barrett the former commander of the 3rd Marine division. Barret was given command of the 1st Marine Amphibious corps and the responsibility over operation Cherryblossom. His mission statement read “land in the vicinity of Cape Torokina, seize and occupy and defend a beachhead including Torata Island and adjacent island— 3,750 yards west of Cape Torokina—allowing approximately 2,250 yards inland from the beach and 3,600 yards east of Cape Torokina. To prepare and continue the attack in coordination with the 37th Infantry on arrival.” However the mission statement was to be his last major contribution to the war.  On October 8th Barrett accidentally fell from the third floor of the officers quarters at Noumea and suffered a cerebral haemorrhage. He soon died afterwards and was recorded as an accidental death, but there was heavy speculation it was in fact a suicide. Thus the job fell to Major General Roy Geiger, the director of the marine aviation corp in washington. For the naval aspect of the mission Hasley had to do with what he had on hand. He would not be receiving any significant naval reinforcements, because Admiral Nimitz feared that any vessels lent to the 3rd fleet would not be able to come back in time to help with the invasion of the Gilberts. What Halsey could count on was task force 38 commanded by Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman built around carrier Saratoga and later joined by the Princeton; Admiral Merrills task for 39 comprised of cruiser division 12 and destroyer division 23; and Task force 31 commanded by Admiral Wilkinson consisting of three destroyer squadrons, transports and covering ships. It would be Admiral Wilkinson who would bring over the 3rd marine division, the 1st brigade and 3rd New Zealand division to invade the Treasury islands. Rear Admiral George Fort would take the reigns of the first offensive and Wilkinson would looked over the Torokina landings. Wilkinson would have 12 Attack transports and Amphibious cargo ships for the landings, just enough to get every echelon with their equipment over. The 3rd Marine division was reinforced with the 3rd marine defence battalion, the 198th coast artillery, the 2nd provisional marine raider regiment and the 1st marine parachute regiment. After landing at Cape Torokina they would later be reinforced by General Beightlers 37th division. The 29th, 34th and 36th New Zealander battalions of the 8th brigade group led by Brigadier Robert Row would hit the Treasury islands and help establish long range radar stations and a landing craft staging area. There was a final last minute change to the overall plan made by Halsey. They decided not to attempt seizing northern Choiseul but to instead send a marine raiding party around 656-725 men of the US 2nd Parachute battalion led by Lt Colonel Victor Krulak there to persuade the Japanese to divert forces to Choiseul from southern Bougainville.   To support the operation General Kenny's 5th air force would smash the airfields in Rabaul while the AirSols 489 aircraft would hit airfields in and around Bougainville. General Twinning tactics were to harass the Japanese every day, so he launched a total of 158 flights in October, comprising 3259 sorties and land and naval targets in Hahili, Kara, Ballale, Buka, Bonis and Choiseul. The result of this incredible air campaign was 5 Japanese airfields pulverized, 136 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed at the cost of 26 allied aircraft shot down. Meanwhile on October 12th, Kenney launched a raid using 349 aircraft smashing airstrips, shipping and supply dumps. The 6000-ton IJN transport Keisho Maru was sunk alongside two smaller craft. On the 18th 54 B-25's took off from Dobodura, but only caused minor damage. On October the 23rd, 24th and 25th daylight raids consisting of 45 B-242's, 62 B-25's and 61 B-24's respectively managed to shoot down 9 enemy planes, destroyed 25 aircraft on the ground and damaged another 27. On October 29th, he tossed a raid at Vunakanau's airdrome using 41 liberators covered by 75 P-38's and managed to destroy around 10 aircraft. The enemies attention was certainly diverted away from Rabaul. Now the Japanese knew an invasion of Bougainville was coming. They believed the main target of such an offensive would be first against the Shortlands or Kahili. General Kanda's 6th division was deployed to reinforce these places. His 1st battalion, 45th regiment was placed at Kieta, the rd battalion and 4th south sea garrison was sent to reinforce Bougainville while the rest were sent to the Shortland islands. Bougainville was given north/south/east/west sectors garrisoned by numerous forces under Kanda. Admiral Koga also launched Operation RO, a plan devised to strengthen Rabaul. Koga's intelligence indicated the Pacific Fleet was on a warpath, so he decided to take the entire combined fleet from Truk to Eniwetok, which Koga considered a good advance position where he could sortie and annihilate the enemy in a decisive naval battle. The combined fleet stayed a week in the uncomfortable and lonely lagoon until they departed having not found the allied pacific fleet. By October 24th the combined fleet travelled back to Truk while the aircrews of carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku and Zuiho reinforced Rabaul.  82 Zeros, 45 D3As, 40 B5Ns and 6 Yokosuka D4Y reconnaissance planes. 192 trained air crews in total would be in Rabaul by November 1st. They were just in time to intercept one of Kenney's raids consisting of 75 b-25's and 80 p-38s. The Japanese airmen claimed to have downed 9 B-25s, 10 P-38s at the cost of 20 aircraft and 3 small vessels. Koga alerted the 12th air fleet who were in Japan to prepare to head over to Rabaul, but instead of also sending the 8th fleet, he kept them back, still thinking a decisive naval battle would be on the menu soon in the central pacific.  General Sakai's 17th division were transported to New Britain in late september. Their first echelon comprising of the 53rd regiment arrived on october 5th and immediately began to move west to reinforce Cape Gloucester and the 3rd battalion went to northern Bougainville. The remainder of the 17th division would arrive between November 5th and 12th, though the auxiliary cruiser Kurita Maru caring the 1st battalion, 81st regiment was sunk by the USS Grayson. 1087 men, most of the battalion, were lost.  The invasion of the Treasuries codenamed Operation Goodtime. They would establish a staging area, an advanced naval base at Blanche Harbor and a radar station on the north coast of Mono Island. It was hoped the assault on the Treasuries would confused the Japanese as to where the major effort would actually be. At this time there was a short supply of assault forces throughout the Pacific and the Bougainville invasion was mere days away. Thus it was difficult to comprehend why an entire brigade would be used to subdue a tiny enemy garrison on one small island. It has been theorised that Halsey and Vandegrift were reluctant to use some untried New Zealand troops in the more ambitious undertaking, but were also under pressure from their Anzac allies to see some action. For whatever reason the Treasury island operation would be one of the few examples of Allied overkill during the mid Pacific War.  The 8th Brigade had limited shipping available to them. They would have eight destroyer transports, eight LCIs, two LSTs, eight LCMs, three LCTs and two APCs, under the command of Admiral Fort who was using the USS Raton as his flagship. The 34th battalion was going to land on the north side of Stirling Island to secure a nearby airfield; the 29th and 36th battalions would land abreast near Falami Point on southern Mono and Major George Logan D company of the 34th, designated Logan force would land at the mouth of the Soanotalu River to establish a radar station with the help of 20 seabees. The USS Pringle and Philip would perform a bombardment to help. The operation was set into motion on October 27th when the convoy departed guadalcanal and the Russells. George Fort's destroyers approached Blanche Harbor during a storm and began their bombardment. The assault waves raced through the harbor in two columns. As was suspected the 34th met zero resistance, they immediately went to work sending out patrols to make certain if there were any Japanese on the island they would not get to surprise them. Mortars were set up on the nearby Watson island, cool theres an island bearing my name to support the landings on Mono. The landings on Mono met very little resistance, basically just a bunch of surprised Japanese naval troops who offered some half hearted gunfire before withdrawing. The New Zealanders went to work establishing a perimeter as the Japanese began opening fire using mortars which managed to knock out two LST's killing 2 and wounding 30 men. Interesting to note this was the first amphibious assault launched by Kiwi's since the horrible Gallipoli campaign of 1916 and it was the second combat operation undertaken by Kiwi's during the Pacific War. The real resistance would come in the form of a air raid consisting of 25 vals who bombed the beachhead and support ships. The destroyers Cony  took two hits; eight crewmen were killed and ten wounded. An allied fighter patrol managed to shoot down 12 vals during the raid. To their north, the Logan force faced no difficult landing at the mouth of the Soanotalu river. They quickly formed a 150 yard perimeter and began working on the radar station. By the end of the day, all but one LST had successfully unloaded and cleared Blanche harbor, however during the night the New Zealanders tossed back numerous counter attacks, particular around the Saveke river. By the 28th the Japanese survivors were retreating north in the hope of escaping to Bougainville, but along the way they ran into the Logan Force. On October 29th during the late afternoon, 20 Japanese attacked the western part of the Logan Forces perimeter. They were easily beaten off with mortars and rifle fire, leaving 5 dead Japanese behind. The next day saw some intermittent firing against concealed Japanese. Scouts eventually figured out there was a larger number of Japanese to the west of the perimeter, but the area between Soanotalu and Malasi was clear of the enemy.  November began with the rest of the brigade coming over. The radar station was already up and running and the Logan Force had built themselves a small blockhouse near the landing barge. That said blockhouse immediately became the objective of the Japanese, since it represented the only hope of them escaping the island. As Brigadier Row's men began to occupy the central and northern parts of Mono, the Japanese began to infiltrate the Logan Forces perimeter. On the night of November 1st, the main breech was made across the News Zealanders line. A ton of Japanese had infiltrated the lines and managed to cut telephone wires from the blockhouse to the company HQ. Soon after this was accomplished a concerted attack was made against the blockhouse. 6 New Zealanders and 3 Americans defended it. They had automatic weapons, some 50 and 30 cal machine guns, but they were soon put out of action by the attacking Japanese who could have numbered between 70-100 men. The fight for the blockhouse would continue until dawn, with the surviving defenders beating off numerous attacks, mainly by tossing grenades. Captain Kirk, Sergeant DD Hannafin were both killed during the fight. Command of the blockhouse then fell to a cook of D Company, Private J.E Smith. By daybreak the Japanese finally were beaten off as the 3 remaining survivors were all wounded. 26 Japanese had been killed trying to overrun the blockhouse and seize the landing craft. Elsewhere across the perimeter the Japanese attacked throughout the night seeing another 15 dead Japanese in the western section and 9 in the east. It was to be there best chance at taking the blockhouse, for the next few days their attacks were much smaller and by November 4th, New Zealander patrols were fanning out and killing or capturing stragglers. The last significant action on Mono would be on November 6th when a dozen Japanese were routed from a cave during a two hour firefight east of Soanatalu. Operation Goodtime resulted in the annihilation of a Japanese garrison roughly 200 men strong, but it came at a cost. 40 New Zealanders and 12 Americans were killed with 174 wounded. The allies got their supply bases and radar station. Over on Choiseul, Operation Blissful was about to kick off. In an attempt to make the Japanese believe the Shortland islands were the target for their offensive, General Vandegrift tossed Lt Colonel Victor Krulaks 2nd Parachute battalion, roughly 656 men at a beach near the village of Voza. On October 27th the men and their equipment were loaded onto 8 LCMS and during the night the paratroopers were transferred over to four destroyer transports, the Kilty, Ward, Crosby and McKean, the same ships that had just been used to transport the New Zealanders for Operation Goodtime. Forts destroyers provided escort as the Paramarine landed at Voza shortly after midnight without any resistance. During the morning of the 28th they began unloading supplies from landing crafts that had been concealed on a smaller island offshore. Once landed they carried them up a narrow trail leading from the beach a mile northwest of Voza upon some high ground which would be their first base camp. Nearly a hundred friendly natives helped the marines carry the equipment up the beach and they also helped guide the men. Allied radio broadcasting finally alerted the Japanese to the imminent danger to southern Bougainville as Krulaks men began establishing their perimeter. The morning of the 29th brought an enemy strafing attack upon them and the native guides reported to Krulak that there was a barge staging base at Sangigai, the main Japanese position on Choiseul bay, garrisoned by around 150 men. Krulak decided that was to be the first objective, he sent out patrols going north and south. In the north Lt Averill with the help of native guides discover considerable evidence of the Japanese presence, abandoned equipment and rations, but no Japanese. In the south two patrols scouted the Japanese base near Sangigai. Krulak led one of the patrols personally and managed to surprise some Japanese who were unloading a barge. They killed 7 Japanese and sunk the barge before pulling out. The other patrol group ran into a Japanese platoon and got into a skirmish seeing another 7 dead Japanese. Thus Krulak got his confirmation there indeed was a Japanese base at Sangigai.  Early on the 30th, Krulak requested an air strike at it arrived at 6am. 12 Avengers with 26 fighter escorts hit Sangigai. Unfortunately some of the planes mistook the marines at Voza for the enemy and strafed them as well. No marines were killed but one of their boats was sunk, that Krulak had planned to use. As a result of the boat getting sunk, Companies E and 5 departed Voza overland to hit Sangigai. A Japanese outpost along the Vagara river opened fire on the paratroopers, but was easily overwhelmed. Krulak then divided his forces to perform a two pronged assault. Company E led by Captain Robert Manchester would advance along the coastline to hit the Japanese from the north, while Krulak with Company F would move inland to hit them from the rear.  Company E quickly advanced along the coast and began shelling the town with mortars and rockets during the afternoon, only to find out it was abandoned. The Japanese had taken up a new position on some high grounder in the interior. So the paramarines began destroying and looting the village. Meanwhile company F were advancing through rough terrain to try and secure some high ground near Sangigai where the retreating Japanese were just passing through. The Japanese literally walked right into F company and a hour long fight broke out. The Japanese outnumbered F company and as Krulak would later report “the outcome appeared to be in question, until the Japs destroyed their chances by an uncoordinated banzai charge which was badly cut up by our machine guns. Seventy-two Japs were killed and an undetermined number wounded. Marine losses were 6 killed, 1 missing and 12 wounded." The marines had 6 deaths, 12 wounded and one man missing. Krulak was wounded as well as F companies commander Spencer Pratt. The Japanese suffered a devastating 72 casualties Back over at E company after plundering the village they came across some documents  and Krulak reported "The one that fascinated me, it was a chart that portrayed the minefields around southern Bougainville. When I reported this, the night after the Sangigai attack, I saw my first flash message. I had never seen one before. It came back and said, "Transmit at once the coordinates of the limits of the minefields and all channels as shown going through it." So we laboriously encoded the critical locations and sent them off. To an armada going into that area this is not incidental information. This is necessary information. Halsey in true Halsey fashion was not satisfied to know where the minefields were; he, before the Torokina landings, sent in a minelayer there and dropped mines in the entrance ways to those channels and they got two Japanese ships.” E company then retired to the Vagara river and was later evacuated by boat back to the Voza area. F company followed suite but was delayed by the heavy engagement they had. The men stayed to bury their dead. The friendly natives reported a Japanese concentration to the north near the Warrior River, so Krulak sent a strong patrol up by boat to check it out. On November 1, the large patrol of 87 paratroopers from Company G,  led by Major Warner Bigger, headed north by landing craft towards Nukiki with orders "destroy the southern outposts of CHOISEUL BAY, and if possible to shell the Jap supply depot on GUPPY ISLAND." Major Bigger began an overland march along the eastern bank of the river and after crossing the warrior, their native guides became lost so they all had to bivouac for the night. In the early morning of November 2nd, Biggers men found themselves surrounded by Japanese who began infiltrating their perimeter from the rear. Bigger had the men continue north along the beach where the surprise attacked a small enemy outpost of 4 men. They managed to kill 3 of 4, but the last man ran away, thus the element of surprise was gone. Bigger knew the jig was up he could not hope to attack the main objective so instead he ordered the men to go shell Guppy island.  G Company setup some 60mm mortars in the water and fired 143 rounds at the island setting up two large fires, one looked to have hit a fuel dump. The Japanese were taken by surprise there and only offered resistance in the form of some poorly directed machine gun bursts. On the way back G company had to fight their way through because of the infiltrators. Krulak was notified of the situation and alerted a PT boat base at Vella Lavella. Lt Arthur Berndtson had 5 PT boats under his command there, 2 were already assigned to other missions, another was under repair. PT 59 only had ⅓ tanks worth of fuel, but her commander, Lt John F Kennedy, yes he is back in action, agreed to rescue the boys. Kennedy believed he had enough fuel to get to Choiseul and another boat could tow them back to base. Despite overheating the engines, at around 9:30 PT 59 escorted a small convoy to Voza and Bigger's men were off loaded. The PT-59 ran out of fuel on the return trip down the slot and was towed back to Lambu Lambu Cove. By this point the landings at Cape Torokina had been carried out, so a diversion was not really needed anymore. Furthermore the Japanese were moving in on the base camp from all directions. On the night of November 3rd, just in the nick of time, 3 LCIs from Vella Lavella arrived to successfully load Krulaks paratroopers and got them out of there before dawn of the 4th. The Paratroopers had been outnumbered 6-1. They managed to kill an estimated 143 Japanese, destroyed a major staging base at Sangigai, sunk two barges and destroyed a considerable amount of enemy fuel and supplies on Guppy island. The cost was 13 dead and 13 wounded. Krulaks after action report mentioned evidence that the Japanese had sent reinforcements from the Shortland islands to counter the Choiseul operation. On November 1st, the day of the Cape Torokina landings, the Japanese had sent a large bomer force south to Choiseul hunting a reported Task Force. The Japanese found nothing, and by the time they diverted back to Empress Augusta Bay, the landings were done, American fighters were ready to deal with them. It seems the Japanese had been greatly confused from all the activity around Bougainville, particularly from many intercepted messages. Its hard to say how successful the Choiseul raid actually was. It's possible the Japanese fell for the diversion, but no one really knows. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The diversionary raids may or may not have had an effect on the landings at Cape Torokina. Regardless the multiple operations were all successful and the Japanese seemed none the wiser. Now the stranglehold over Bougainville would begin.

This week Seth and Bill welcome back guest and good friend Jon Parshall as the trio discusses Operation HAILSTONE, better known as the Carrier Raids on Truk. Following the opening portion of the Marshall Islands campaign, Admiral Spruance brings Marc Mitscher's fast carriers to Truk to absolutely wreak havoc on the supposed "Japanese Pearl Harbor". Tune in and see what the team has to say about the devastating raids.

Welcome back to The M3 Podcast, hosted by Moss Marketing Group! This week part of the team is speaking with Hailee & Josh, cofounders of Fit Truk! Fit Truk is an innovative solution for outdoor strength training. This fully equipped, mobile gym delivers cutting edge group strength training workouts for up to 48 people outdoors, anywhere, anytime  Follow Us Here! Fit Truk - https://getfittruk.com/Instagram - https://www.instagram.com/mossmarketinggroup/Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/MossMarketingGroupWebsite -  https://www.mossmarketinggroup.com/#Marketing #Business #Podcast

Continuamos con este podcast que hemos querido dedicar a una parte de la música progresiva nacional hecha durante la pasada década, que ha pasado desapercibida y destaca por su enorme calidad, en muchos casos verdaderamente sorprendente. Repertorio 1. Kotebel - Adagio Maestoso (Concerto For Piano And Electric Ensemble) 2. Lubianka - Fins Que El Sol Es Torni Fum (Ceremònies) 3. Glazz - Scene III: Meet my Gods / Scene IV: Baco's Tabern (THE JAMMING SESSIONS: TAKE 2) 4. Iago Fernández - Truk'o (Agromando) 5. Kaulakau & Cobla Sant Jordi - Rinotmeto (Mare Uut)

Last time we spoke about the beginning of mop up operations after the fall of Munda, the amphibious invasion of Vella Lavella and the fall of Kiska. New Georgia was a lost cause for the Japanese with the fall of Munda and now all efforts were being made to perform a withdrawal while buying time for forces to be brought over to places like Bougainville. Admiral Halsey ultimately choose to bypass Kolombangara and targeting Vella Lavella, which saw a successful amphibious invasion with a minor naval scuffle during the process. Then the Americans and Canadians invaded Kiska at long last. Although there were numerous reports that the island was abandoned it was decided to go forward with the invasion, at minimum it would be good training for the men. All they found were booby traps and some abandoned dogs as they ushered in the conclusion to the aleutian islands campaign.  This episode is Into the Central Pacific Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So its been nearly a year since the start of the allied offensive in the Pacific. Way back when the Japanese were trying to recover from the Midway disaster, the Americans had no idea if they could manage a major land victory. For nearly a year, the allied campaigns in New Guinea and the Solomons showcased what both sides were capable of. But the US Navy wanted something else, they wanted a drive through the central pacific. Now to begin a thrust into the central pacific meant performing two parallel Pacific campaigns north and south of the equator. Admiral Nimitz did not yet possess the naval, specifically carrier forces required to wage a central pacific offensive, hell legions of troops required months of amphibious training, is was an enormous feat. Admiral Halsey likewise never ceased calling for reinforcements to carry his fight through the central and northern solomons.  Ever since the Casablanca Conference, Admirals King and Nimitz had been analyzing the idea of a central thrust in the pacific. They were looking specifically at a thrust in the direction of Truk-Guam and to hit the Marshall Islands. The victory over Guadalcanal had allowed the allies to secure lines of communication and supply to Australia and King presumed Rabaul would fall in 1943. On June 10th King began demanding hard deadlines for a central pacific campaign stating “In order that effective momentum of offensive operations can be attained and maintained, firm timing must be set up for all areas.” The joint chiefs of staff four days later told Nimitz to prepare an invasion of the Marshall Islands with a tentative sailing date of November 15th, 1943. As for the direct thrust, King declared  "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas." To pull this off MacArthur was expected to release the 1st marine division in time to participate in the operation with most of Halsey's naval and amphibious forces as well. As you can imagine MacArthur was outraged and objected the demands of his Cartwheel campaign to preclude any transfer of troops or ships from his theater to Nimitz. MacArthur wanted covering support from the Pacific Fleet's new fast carrier task forces to help raid Rabaul, Truk and other Japanese bases on a southern route. Halsey likewise was anxious about withdrawing aircraft from the south pacific area to support operations north of the equator. He warned Nimitz on June 25th that if airpower were diverted from the drive on Rabaul “it would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears to be the most critical stage of the campaign.” Without borrowing forces from the south pacific, Nimitz could not realistically tackle the Marshalls until early 1944 and many members of the planning staff counseled patience. They argued to Nimitz, the new offensive should await the arrival of a large fleet of Essex carriers. By February or March of 1944, they predicted a much expanded 5th fleet could simply steam into the Marshalls and seize 4 or 5 of the largest Japanese bases simultaneously. If the combined fleet came out to fight, such an American force would willingly and confidently give them battle. But King simply wanted action in 1943, he insisted the northern line of attack be opened before the final assault on Rabaul. This would prevent the enemy from concentrating their defenses against either prong of the westward advance. Enemy territory simply had to be taken, somewhere in the central pacific by the end of the year.  There was a lot of arguing going about. The joint chiefs had clearly intimated that the Philippines were to be approached through the central pacific, but MacArthur concluded that a drive through the Marshalls and Carolines would have to occur without land-based air support, thus it would be slow and extremely costly to naval power and shipping. MacArthur argued the central pacific route was unwise and thought after Rabaul was captured it should be southwest pacific forces advancing along the north coast of New Guinea and onwards to the Philippines. This would require the neutralization of various islands like Palaus and others in the Banda and Arafura seas to protect their flanks. This long range plan that he prepared was designated RENO.  Now all of this of course was intended to cut Japan off from her vast riches in the Dutch East Indies, the thing keeping her war machine alive. The British also had their own desires who applied much pressure onto their American allies, prompting General Marshall to assure them that a Gilberts-Marshalls-Carolines campaign would be undertaken “with the resources available in the theater”. DuringQuadrant conference, the British chiefs had agreed to back King's demand for resources in the central Pacific in return for more forces against Nazi Germany. However during the Trident conference in May, which was not concerned so much with the Pacific strategy, the joint chiefs of staff submitted a plan titled “the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan” which called for a large, sustained air offensive against the home islands in preparation for an invasion. For this all to occur, China had to be maintained, and that meant the Americans and British would need to right their way into China finding a good secure port to move materials properly, most likely this would be Hong Kong. In the meantime the Americans, British and Chinese would work together to recapture Burma to try and drive through the strait of Malacca to Hong Kong via a series of amphibious operations. The Americans would also attempt a drive through the Celebes sea to Hong Kong from the central pacific aided by some subsidiary efforts from the south and southwest pacific areas, good luck getting a penny from MacArthur.  The Central Pacific was the most advantageous and logical route because it was shorter than the southern route, it would require less ships, less troops, less supplies and the bases in the Marshalls, Marianas and Carolines would isolate Japan from her overseas empire. The Japanese would only be able to mount limited air and ground forces on the islands in the central pacific, but nonetheless the American planners were forced to make twin drives along the central and southern axes. It has been argued, President FDR was swayed by Marshall's insistent demands for a southern push, because MacArthur held considerable political weight and could have been made a republican nominee for presidency in 1944. There were positives to running twin operations of course. For one thing it would prevent the Japanese from being able to guess the time and place of forthcoming advances keeping them off balance. It also allowed for opportunities for mutual support. Some of the operations would require a behemoth amount of resources, take for example the estimations they ran for the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago which was required to secure the line of communications to Australia and provide access to the Celebes sea. They estimated it would require 7 divisions, 5 of which needed to be amphibious units. If Rabaul fell or was neutralized, perhaps the division numbers would be less. The Marshall operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, 4 heavy bombardment and two fighter groups of land based aircraft. On top of that was the naval aspect, they estimated that they needed four battleships, three more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers, sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack transports, forty-four tank landing ships (LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and 18 motor torpedo boats. For the Carolines, the Combined Chiefs estimated that they would require 3 reinforced amphibious divisions, 2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack cargo ships, 6 LSD's , 3 headquarters ships, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands would take two reinforced divisions and three defense battalions, plus aircraft. Talk about a shopping list. By the end of the year it was expected that one Marine and 3 Army divisions would be allocated to the Central Pacific while the South Pacific would gain 2 marines, 5 US Army and 1 New Zealand division and in the southwest pacific 4 US infantry, 1 US airborne, 1 US marine and 11 Australian divisions. So calculated all that, the Joint chiefs estimated 2 more divisions would be needed for the Marshalls, 2 more for the Carolines and 3 more for New Guinea. The strategic plan got the stamp of approval by the combined chiefs of staff on May 22nd. For the planned central pacific offensive, Nimitz decided his first objective would be the Marshall Islands. Their seizure was essential to extend the line of communication to the Celebes sea and to shorten the routes to Australia. From the Marshalls, land-based aircraft could support naval operations against the enemy's communication lines and there was always the possibility that by hitting the Marshalls, this would lure the combined fleet out for a fight. By July 20th, it was decided that instead of directly hitting the Marshalls, which would be extremely costly requiring a large force, they would instead capture Nauru and the Gilbert Islands as a preliminary springboard to invade the Marshalls. There had been two competing suggestions debated at CINCPAC HQ. Captain Forrest Sherman the chief of staff to Vice admiral John Henry Towers advocated to recapture Wake Islands and employ it as a springboard to invade the Marshalls. Wake was around 500 miles south of the Marshalls. Admiral Spruance favored opening a campaign south and east where the fleet could count on greater land-based air support from rear bases in the south pacific. He was the one advocating to invade the Gilberts, which were 600 miles southeast of the Marshalls. Spruance persuaded Nimitz who persuaded King thus, the Gilberts won the day. Code named Operation Galvanic, was the offensive to simultaneously invade the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru by November 15th 1943. For Galvanic, Nimitz would have at his disposal all surface forces of the Pacific Fleet, the air forces of the pacific excluding those in the south and southwest pacific areas, elements of the 7th air force, the 2nd marine division of Major General Julian Smith over in New Zealand currently performing amphibious training, 3 aviation engineer or construction battalions, a port battalion and 3 marine defense battalions. The 7th air force led by Major General Willis Hale had already carried out some reconnaissance and bombing missions against Nauru and the Gilberts back in January, February and April. In spite of some heavy interception they managed to hit the runway on Nauru and a local phosphate plant as well as some installations on Tarawa. The 7th air force were utilizing air bases on Canton and Funafuti which were the only ones in range of the Gilberts. To seize the Ellice islands and build new airfields, Nimitz ordered the 5th and 7th defense battalions and 2nd airdrome battalion accompanied by the 16th naval construction battalion to conduct neutralization and reconnaissance. Nimitz sought to build new airfields at Nukufetau and Nanomea which were around 600 miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa. On August the 18th an advance survey party landed at Nanomea determining it to hold no enemy presence thus the first elements of the 7th defense battalion began occupying it 10 days later. On August the 22nd an advance party of the 2nd Airdrome battalion landed at Nukufetau finding no enemy presenced allowing the remainder of the battalion to follow suit 5 days later. Transforming the atolls into air bases was rapid work. By September 7th a 5000 foot airstrip was operational on Nanomea, by the end of the month a full squadron of aircraft were operating from it. Over on Nukufetau work was slower, but its strip would be operation by October 9th. Back on August 11th, the 804th aviation engineer battalion was sent to develop Baker island, a already american held island 480 miles east of the Gilberts. They began their work on September 1st, taking a week to build a strip capable of supporting fighters. All of this gave Nimitz and Hale the bases they needed to prepare Operation Galvanic.   Now over in the southwest pacific, Generals MacArthur and Blamey were continuing their planned invasion of Lae codenamed Operation Postern. By early 1943, MacArthur had devised plans that made Blamey the commander of “allied land forces” only in name. As we have seen, the creation of the Alamo Force led by General Krueger was MacArthurs attempt at seizing overall command. This led Blamey to gradually realized his only functions would be that of the commander of Australian military forces. MacArthur would reconstitute the United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE, for his command in the Philippines with himself as its commander. Now the original date for operation Postern was August 1st and it was to have two stages: the first was an amphibious assault neat the Lae coast and the second was an air-ground operation against Nadzab airfield to its west, this would prevent the enemy from reinforcing Lae overland.    The Amphibious operation would be carried out by General Vasey's 7th division, who would depart Milne Bay and move north of Buna to land near Lae utilizing small landing craft. Admiral Barbey estimated it would require 65 LCVPS (landing craft, vehicle personnel or Higgins boats) and LCTs from the 2nd engineer special brigade. To train for the operation the 7th would be sent to trinity beach near Cairns. However continuous outbreaks of malaria led it being believed the unit could not be used without endangering the civilian population. Major General George Wooten's 9th division not yet exposed to the conditions on Green Hell and malaria free ended up taking the amphibious role. After two weeks of amphibious training with higgins boats. The 9th moved to Milne bay by August 12th and would be followed by General Heavy's units who would help further train them at Morobe.    Now I had mentioned the second part was an air-ground operation, originally it was to consist of the 2/503rd american parachute battalion to take the airfield. Then the 25th and 21st brigades of the 7th division were to cross the Markham river and assist the parachute battalion to occupy the area. But it would turn out, when they arrived to Markham, the Australians first had to advance through the Bulldog road to reach Wau, and although a ton of work had been done on it the Bulldog road had not reached Markham river yet. At first General Berryman boldly said to General Kenney that he would be him a bottle of whisky that a jeep could simply cover the gap to the road by august the 1st, he lost the bet. Thus it was decided transport aircraft would be required to take the 7th division directly from Port Moresby into the overgrown landing ground at Nadzab. The parachute battalion would not receive any support from Markham. MacArthur decided to instead employ the full 503rd parachute regiment led by COlonel Kenneth Kinsler to hit Nadzab on August 8th. Now thanks in a large part to cooperation between Generals Vasey, Herring, Whitehead and Kenney the planning for the operation went well. Extensive air and land reconnaissance of the area was the key to success. With all the preparation done, D-day for the 9th division's amphibious assault was scheduled for September 1st, Z day for the 7th divisions operation against Nadzab would be September 2nd. Like all good operations, a diversion was going to be implemented. General Savige's forces had been conducting a series of attacks in the Salamaua area for months. The “Salamaua magnet” had successfully convinced General Nakano the allies intended to hit Salamaua. Nakano also believed holding Salamaua would keep Lae safe. General Adachi would go on the record to state, orders given to him and other forces was to hold Salamaua as long as possible, probably until the last man if it came down to it. Adachi knew if Salamaua fell, Lae was pretty much a lost cause. The irony of course was this all led to troops being pulled away from Lae to bolster Salamaua, when Lae was in fact the target.  Air supremacy over the Huon Gulf was going to be a necessity for Operation Postern to succeed. Generals Berryman and Kenney needed to acquire new airfields that would be used to neutralize Wewak and Madang, two key Japanese air bases. The allies began building airfields at Benabena and Tsili Tsili which could act as advanced fighter bases and refueling points. Benabena already had a functioning airstrip, but Whitehead wanted to develop it further, Kenney was concerned as he knew the Japanese were aware of the site. Kenney wanted to divert the enemy's attention away from the airfield being built at Tsili Tsili which the Japanese did not know about yet. The Japanese were tossing wave after wave of air raids against Benabena, doing minimal damage. Meanwhile a military road was being constructed from Bogadjim on the northern coast up the valley of Mindjim river to Yaula and Yokopi and it was intended to extend past the Finisterre range into the Ramu Valley. On August 1st the New Guinea force HQ estimated the road would reach Ramu Valley within 8 weeks. THe development of the road and other activity in the Ramu valley was drawing attention from the Japanese, thus the 2/2nd independent company as sent to reinforce the 2/7th at Benabena. As this occurred, the secret construction work at Tsili Tsili raged on using some innovative ideas. The construction workers were using camouflage and careful timing of flights to hide the existence of Tsili Tsili's airfield, and managing to do this successfully for two months. An enormous amount of air transport and equipment was allocated for the task. The 871st airborne engineers battalion were sent in to hammer the job out and soon 3 dry weather runways were operational by september. Over on the Japanese side, they were reorganizing their air forces in New Guinea. After receiving alarming reports of enemy airfields being constructed at Mount Hagen and Benabena, knowing full well these would threaten their airfields at Wewak and Madang, it was decided the air strength of New Guinea would be bolstered by the 7th air division of Lt General Sudo Einosuke. From June 19th onwards, aircraft of the 7th division began arriving at Wewak from the Dutch East Indies. The 6th air division had moved its HQ from Rabual to Wewak on July 9th of 1943, 324 aircraft strong. The 7th air division brought another 156 aircraft, alongside this the 4th air army was brought over to Rabaul on August 6th placed under the command of General Imamura's 8th area army. Additionally to support the defense of Wewak and Madang, General Adachi was planning to toss 3000 soldiers under Lt General Katagiri Shigeru's 20th division against Benabena while Lt General Mano Goro's 41st division would occupy Mount Hagen. Such operations were scheduled to begin in early september. A detachment of the 30th independent engineer regiment of Lt Kitamoto Masamichi were sent over to Kaiapit alongside patrols further into the Ramu valley. They gradually occupied Dumpu and Wesa. But the increasing allied threat to Salamaua and Lae prompted Adachi to postpone the Benabena attack until August 1st and as a result Lae's airbase was being abandoned. Since early july, Lae was facing a substantial issue maintaining aviation fuel, it had been a point of refueling for aircraft going between Rabaul and other airfields like Madang and Wewak. Alongside this, Lae was within allied medium bomber range, and the threat prompted the Japanese to build 3 new airfields on the northwestern coast of New Guinea at But, Dagua and the Boram Plantation. It was the 20th and 41st divisions who ended up providing most of the labor to construct these airfields. On August 14th Tsili Tsili saw its first two squadrons of P-39 Airacobras of the 35th fighter group led by Lt Colonel Malcolm Moore. These arrived just in time to meet the beginning enemy attacks. Japanese aircraft had finally spotted the secret airfield during some reconnaissance flights on August 11th. On the morning of August 15th, 7 Ki-48 Lilly's escorted by 36 Ki-43 Oscars attacked Tsili Tsili. The bombers were intercepted immediately and all were shot down by 26 Airacobras and 3 Lightnings. However the Oscars managed to shoot down two C-47's of the 21st troop carrier squadron. The other C-47's scrambled to escape back to Port Moresby by flying at treetop level. The allied fighters then intercepted the Oscars lading to 3 Oscars being downed at the cost of 4 Airacobras. The following day saw another raid, but Thunderbolts and Lightnings intercepted the raiders downing some 15 Oscars. After receiving such a blow, the Japanese commanders at Wewak decided to conserve further air strength. Unbeknownst to them the situation was far more dire than they thought. You see the Japanese commanders did not believe the enemy fighters and medium bombers had the range to hit Wewak.  To geek out a bit, when such aircraft like Mitchells first arrived in Australia, they were equipped with a lower turret. Now when they began performing operations in New Guinea, it required low altitude flying and thus the turrets became useless, so they were removed and replaced with forward firing guns at the nose. General Kenney's air depot at Townsville working tireless to modify 172 Mitchells between July and September of 1943. The removal of the large turrets allowed for an additional square shaped 11,500 liter metal fuel tank to be installed, which was suspended by hooks from a bomb shackle. These fuel tanks gave the aircraft an extra two hours flying time, just enough to give them the range to hit Wewak. These tanks were very vulnerable to catching fire during combat or from crash landings so they were made dischargeable. A minor innovation, that made all the difference. On August 1th aerial photographs indicated the Japanese had 8 medium bombers, 31 light bombers, 69 fighters at Wewak and Boram plus 34 medium and 34 light bombs with 23 fighters at Dagua and But. Thus Kenney elected to hit them and he had at his disposal two heavy bomber groups the 43rd and 90th bomb groups with 64 bombers alongside two medium groups, the 3rd attack group and 38th bomb groups with 58 modified mitchells.  Kenney's plan was to toss 8 squadrons of heavy bombers for night raids against Wewaks 4 airfields followed up by 5 squadrons of Mitchells. Fighter could refuel at Tsili Tsili to help escort and boy would they, an unprecedented 99 fighter escorts would take part in the raids. On the night of August 16th the first raid occurred seeing 12 B-17 and 38 Liberators take off from Port Moresby, all but two reached Wewak by midnight. For 3 hours Colonels Harry Hawthorne and Aruther Rogers led the 43rd and 90th bombardment groups to pound the 4 airfields causing tremendous damage. Countless aircraft tried to take off the next day at Boram only to fail due to damage. The next morning, two squadrons of Mithcells of Lt COlonel Brian O'Neill's 38th bomb group left Port Moresby to hit Dagua and But while two squadrons of Colonel Donald Hall's 3rd attack group would hit Wewak and Boram. They would be employing some new toys, the first parachute retarded fragmentation bombs or also called Parafrags. They had been developed from standard 10 kg fragmentation bombs which were carried in a honeycomb rack in the bomb bay. A small parachute slowed and straightened out the course of the bomb allowing the bomber to get out of the blast range before it exploded. Further work was also going into the development of “daisy-cutter” bombs, which were bombs wrapping with wire to iron rods onto them to produce a ground level fragmentation effect when used with a ground proximity fuse. Nerd stuff.    The 3rd group bombers ended up catching some newly arrived Japanese aircraft perfectly lined up on each side of the runways. The Mitchells strafed them before dropping 786 10 kg paragraph bombs, annihilating 60 aircraft. Meanwhile the 38th group Mitchells faced some issues discharging their auxiliary fuel tanks, leading to only 3 bombers reaching Dagua and none to But. The 3 who reached Dagua strafed and low level bombed it with 105 ten kg parafrags destroying and damaged at least 17 aircraft and intercepting a single Oscar. Not a bad haul at all for just 3 Mitchells. The following day, Kenney tried to repeat the raids, but this time only half of the 49 heavy bombers reached their targets and the bombing was quite inaccurate. However, most of the 62 Mitchell's reached the target this time, but they would be pounced upon by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft fire from an enemy that was waiting for them. A flight led by Major Ralph Cheli, commanding the 405th bomb squadron was jumped by nearly a dozen Oscars. Cheli's plane was badly hit, his right engine and wing catch fire. Yet despite this Cheli led his flight across Dagua airfield before crashing into the ocean. He was captured and sent to Rabaul where he would later be executed. For this brave action Cheli was awarded the Medal of Honor. In the end 15 Oscars were destroyed at the cost of 2 lightnings and 1 mitchell. Two additional raids were conducted on August 20th and 21st.   The 5th air force claimed to have destroyed 20 enemy aircraft on the 20th and 70th on the final day, half of which were shot down in air combat by the Lightnings. An estimated 174 Japanese aircraft were put out of action during these attacks, almost 90% of which came from Wewaks total air strength around 200 strong. Even before it had a chance to derail the battle for Lae, the 4th air army had been completely annihilated. Wewak was neutralized, the door was open to smash Lae. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A ton of planning was raging on and now there was to finally be twin operations to thrust into the central pacific and south pacific. With some new toys, Kenney's airforces had all but smashed what the Japanese had created to defend Lae. Now the door was wide open for Lae to be assaulted.