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Last time we continued speaking about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Admiral Toyoda's Operation Sho-Go aimed to eliminate American naval forces but faced setbacks with the loss of key ships. As Japanese forces advanced, miscommunications led to disorganized attacks. Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy groups used smoke and air assaults to delay the Japanese, ultimately leading to Kurita's retreat after sustaining heavy damage from American air strikes. On October 25, a series of intense naval engagements unfolded, featuring airstrikes and kamikaze attacks. U.S. forces launched multiple strikes against Japanese carriers, inflicting significant damage but facing challenges from anti-aircraft fire and pilot fatigue. The day ended with the sinking of several Japanese vessels, including Zuikaku and Chitose, resulting in substantial casualties. Admiral Halsey attempted to intercept Kurita's forces but was too late. Despite heavy losses, including the cruiser Abukuma and numerous aircraft, Kurita's forces managed to reach safety. The battle marked a significant defeat for the Japanese, severely weakening their naval capabilities, though Kamikaze attacks prolonged the war. This episode is the Advance to Ormoc Valley  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we we covered the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf seeing the IJN basically annihilated in the waters surrounding the philippines. As the confrontation drew to a close, General Krueger's offensive was ongoing at Leyte. By October 26, General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps had successfully established two beachhead areas, gradually expanding their perimeter inland and pushing General Makino's 16th Division further into the island's interior. Following the failure of his earlier repositioning after the loss of Hindang and Burauen, Makino acknowledged that he could not prevent the loss of the eastern coastal plain. He decided to retreat his units to rear positions in the mountains west of Dagami and Burauen. Concurrently, as part of Operation TA, Admiral Mikawa successfully delivered the first reinforcements to Ormoc. Consequently, General Suzuki promptly ordered Colonel Sumitani Takayoshi's 41st Regiment to move towards Carigara and then to Jaro, where the remnants of the 33rd Regiment had fallen back to maintain the division's left flank. After capturing Hills B and C, the 24th Division resumed its westward assault on October 26. With General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division protecting General Irving's northern flank, the 34th Regiment advanced along Highway 2, reaching Santa Fe, while the 19th Regiment attempted to attack Pastrana but was halted short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. To the south, the 383rd Regiment patrolled towards San Vicente Hill amidst fierce resistance, as the 382nd Regiment attacked Tabontabon but was forced back to the Guinarona River by determined defenders. In addition, the reserve 3rd Battalion, 381st Regiment, embarked on a long march north along Highway 1 towards Tanauan but encountered enemy fire near Vigia Point. Further south, the 17th Regiment successfully advanced to a position about 600 yards south of Guinarona, while the 32nd Regiment fought persistently to reach the edge of the Buri airstrip. The following day, after fending off several light counterattacks, the 32nd finally secured the airstrip with minimal resistance. Additionally, the 17th pushed forward to a point approximately 2,200 yards south of Dagami, although they faced increased opposition from the retreating enemy. To the east, following an extensive artillery bombardment, the 382nd captured a majority of Tabontabon in a coordinated attack, with Colonel Dill's 1st and 3rd Battalions then moving northeast toward Kapahuan. Colonel Michael Halloran's 3rd Battalion pressed northward and ultimately took Tanauan without opposition before heading towards Kiling. Meanwhile, in the Catmon Hill area, after General Krueger released the remainder of the 381st Regiment to the control of the 24th Corps, General Bradley decided to deploy his reserve regiment to take control of the Labiranan Head position in preparation for an assault against Catmon hill. Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery fire since A Day, October 20. The 96th Division artillery had constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy positions in the area during the night. Starting at 21:00 on October 27, the 105-mm howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 75-mm howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 10:30 the following day. At that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the top in 50-yard bounds. After the 381st Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, attacked at 12:00 on October 28, the artillery was to fire concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced. In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Colonel Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Regiment, decided to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2nd Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383rd Regiment, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the attack by fire. Further north, Irving's push westward continued as the 34th Regiment advanced unopposed to the Mudburon River, while the 19th Regiment captured Pastrana following another heavy artillery barrage. On that day, the 171st Independent Battalion arrived after a week-long voyage from Panay, preparing to join the 41st Regiment and its sister battalion towards Carigara and Jaro. On October 28, as the 41st Regiment passed through Carigara and approached Jaro, Mikawa launched his second Operation TA convoy, consisting of three echelons. The first echelon left Manila immediately without cover, transporting the 20th Antitank Battalion. Simultaneously, preparations were underway to send the 12th Independent Regiment and the recently arrived 1st Division to Leyte. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment swiftly moved through Alangalang and advanced to the Mainit River, where they were ultimately halted by fierce Japanese resistance. Nevertheless, two companies successfully crossed the river unnoticed during a heavy rainstorm. After launching a surprise assault against the defenders, they captured a bridge over the river. At the same time, the 19th Regiment progressed to Tingib, where it established a patrol base. General Hoffman also directed his 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance toward Carigara, with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry making an overland move to San Miguel, while Troop C of the 7th Cavalry conducted an amphibious landing at Barugo, later engaging in skirmishes with Japanese forces at Carigara. To the south, after successfully fending off a vigorous counterattack, Colonel Dill's 2nd Battalion secured the Tabontabon area, enabling it to move north toward Kiling. In spite of determined opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded. The remainder of the 382nd fought their way to Digahongan before turning towards Kiling, eventually halting at Kansamada. Meanwhile, while the 383rd conducted reconnaissance toward San Vicente and the 9th Regiment began its retreat to Dagami, the 381st Regiment finally launched its assault on Catmon Hill. However, Halloran's two battalions were met with heavy gunfire from the surrounding foothills. Lastly, as the 184th Regiment patrolled toward Santa Ana, the 17th Regiment attacked toward Dagami. Despite facing strong opposition and difficult swamp conditions, they managed to push 300 yards beyond the enemy stronghold by nightfall, rolling up the defenders' eastern flank. Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes. At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills west of the town. The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located. Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter. During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami. The following day, the 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced through the 2nd Battalion to continue their northern push, successfully entering Dagami without facing significant opposition. After securing the previous headquarters of the 16th Division, the 17th Battalion spent the next two days conducting mopping-up operations and patrolling the Dagami area, effectively establishing contact with the 19th Regiment across the Binahaan River and the 382nd Regiment to the east. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion toward Abuyog, which was successfully captured by midday. By October 31, Company G had further taken control of Baybay, and the 1st Battalion had landed at Panaon to support the 21st Regiment stationed there. As a result, General Arnold's 7th Division accomplished its objective of capturing the Burauen airstrips and Dagami while linking up with the 96th Division and 10th Corps. This operation resulted in an estimated 4,211 Japanese casualties, with 19 soldiers taken prisoner, while the division incurred 322 killed, 1,064 wounded, and 21 missing. Meanwhile, on October 29, the 381st Regiment executed a tank-supported offensive and ultimately captured Catmon Hill, which would be thoroughly cleared in the following two days. At the same time, Halloran's 3rd Battalion stormed and secured Kiling, with Dill's 2nd Battalion arriving shortly thereafter. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last man." The resistance was overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San Roque. However, the remainder of the 382nd Battalion was unable to penetrate the retreating 9th Regiment towards Kiling, allowing some Japanese forces to evade complete destruction. Nevertheless, Bradley's 96th Division successfully took control of the Catmon Hill mass and the key towns of Tabontabon and Tanauan, resulting in an estimated 2,769 Japanese casualties and 6 prisoners captured, at the cost of 145 men killed, 564 wounded, and 90 missing. On October 29, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced northward, leading the charge toward Jaro. They gradually battled through Galotan and quickly captured Jaro without much resistance. The American forces moved so swiftly that Suzuki was unable to implement his strategy of using Jaro as the gathering point for the reinforcements of the 35th Army, compelling him to designate Carigara as the new rendezvous site. Due to the evident Japanese strength in the region, Hoffman ordered his units to bolster defenses in Barugo, with the remaining units of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry arriving by nightfall, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry on October 31, and the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on November 1.  At 08:00 on October 30 Colonel Newman ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Regiment to start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery. Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down. When Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have the 3rd Battalion fire on the Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position." As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. The following morning, while the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment moved toward Jaro, the 34th Battalion launched another attack and managed to reach the Yapan River. Despite their fierce assault, the heavy Japanese artillery and flanking fire once again stalled the Americans on their journey to Carigara, allowing the 41st Regiment to withdraw. At this stage, the 5th Air Force had officially set up its forward units on Leyte, tasked with achieving air superiority and attacking Japanese convoys and troop concentrations. However, as the 13th Air Force focused its primary efforts on airfields in bypassed areas. Poor weather had taken its toll on General Krueger's advance. Rainy, monsoon-like conditions confounded his engineers, and airfield construction at Tacloban and Dulag floundered. Landing conditions were still poor. Naval carrier aircraft, from damaged escort carriers, headed to both airfields instead of ditching at sea. As the Navy pilots attempted to land on Leyte, 25 out of 72 planes ended up damaged. Without suitable land-based US air power, the Japanese could continue to launch air attacks. Limited American air power did contest the skies against the Japanese, but could still only provide a minimum of close air support to the American troops. While Japanese aircraft continued to reach targets throughout Leyte, Kinkaid and Halsey's forces had to depart the Leyte region to resupply, so Kenney had to take over with his limited forces. MacArthur did persuade Halsey to maintain Task Group 38.2 in the area when he withdrew most of his fleet on October 29. Kinkaid also left ten escort carriers only by redistributing fleet supplies, but he also had to refit. Nonetheless, Ground commanders criticized Kenney's continued failure to provide close air support. During the early invasion period, naval carrier aviators had delivered direct support. For example, out of the 121 troop support missions from October 20 to 25, pilots flew 33 sorties in direct support of soldiers. With Kinkaid and Halsey's forces departed, Kenney's focus was on air superiority. He had eliminated most close air support missions until later in the campaign. As a result, the infantry had to rely on artillery. The escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, significantly diminished following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, were unable to provide support. Although Admiral Mitscher's carriers did conduct numerous strikes against Japanese shipping in the Visayas and Manila Bay in the last days of October, Task Force 38 had mostly been withdrawn by the end of the month. During the final week of October, the 4th Air Army and the newly-formed 1st Combined Base Air Force maintained a persistent campaign to support ground operations, gradually redirecting their attacks from amphibious shipping and carriers to the enemy-occupied airfields at Tacloban and Dulag.  Though Kenney's airfields still had minimal capacity, he had 34 P-38s from the 49th Fighter Group based at Morotai deployed to Tacloban Airfield on October 27. Three days later, only 20 P-38s remained, as Japanese air attacks destroyed or damaged several of the twin-tailed aircraft. In response, Kenney deployed more P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group. He also assigned six P-61s from the 421st Night Fighter Squadron to counter night attacks. Kenney later replaced them with F6Fs from VMF (N)-541, which improved night patrol and interception missions to include strikes on Japanese night convoys. Thus, Kenney's pilots, led by the elite aces Richard Bong and Thomas McGuire, started to make a difference. Additionally, bombing attacks disrupted airfield construction and caused aircraft losses since they were parked close together due to space limitations. Still, Army engineers with Filipino labor made inroads towards rendering the airfields fully operational. Pilots could now use an expanded 5,000ft runway at Tacloban on October 31. With a growing 5th Air Force presence, the Americans improved their ability to intercept bombers; as a consequence, the Japanese relied more on night attacks. This shift inflicted substantial damage and compelled the Americans to reinforce their positions. Alongside the primary air offensive targeting enemy supply shipping and airfields, Kamikaze units executed suicide attacks against enemy carriers operating off the east coast of the Philippines. Pilots, as well as aircraft of various types, were drawn from the 153d, 601st and 761st Air Groups. The initial corps used only bomb-equipped fighters. However, after the reorganizations of the Kamikaze corps, all types of aircraft were used.  A kamikaze suicide aircraft hit Intrepid on one of her port side gun positions; ten men were killed and another six were wounded, but damage was minimal. The USS Franklin had just refueled and returned to the Leyte action on 27 October, her planes concentrating on a heavy cruiser and two destroyers south of Mindoro. She was under way about 100 miles (160 km) off Samar on 30 October, when enemy bombers appeared bent on a suicide mission. Navy fighters shot down most of the Japanese planes, but six broke through the combat air patrol into Franklin's task group of four carriers defensively surrounded by a circle of about twenty escorting cruisers and destroyers. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns shot down three of the four kamikazes independently diving toward each of the four carriers; but the one targeting Franklin hit the flight deck and crashed through to the gallery deck, killing 56 men and wounding 60. As the remaining two kamikazes attacked, one was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and the second missed Franklin with two bombs before flying into the stern of Belleau Wood. Franklin was able to extinguish fires and patch the flight deck so planes could be recovered 76 minutes after the kamikaze hit. Both carriers retired to Ulithi Atoll for temporary repairs, and then Franklin proceeded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, arriving on 28 November 1944 for repairs of her battle damage.  Meanwhile, on October 30, the 20th Antitank Battalion was successfully landed at Ormoc. The following day, Mikawa dispatched his remaining two echelons: the second comprised three transports carrying the Imahori Detachment, primarily made up of Colonel Imahori Tetsusaku's 12th Independent Regiment. The third included four transports and four frigates carrying most of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu's 1st Division along with around 9,000 tons of supplies and ammunition, all under the protection of Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi's screen of six destroyers. This would be Mikawa's last convoy, as he would soon be replaced in command of the Southwest Area Fleet by Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi due to his deteriorating health. Following a smooth journey, the Imahori Detachment was quickly disembarked at Ormoc on November 1, with the remainder of the convoy arriving later that night to commence the unloading for the 1st Division. During the day, one of the transports was sent to Cebu to pick up the 35th Army Headquarters, which landed the next morning alongside Kataoka's troops. By noon on November 2, a total of 13,000 soldiers had successfully arrived, culminating in the most effective reinforcement operation of the Leyte campaign, with just one transport lost and another slightly damaged. Turning to the primary action, on November 1, two companies from the 34th Regiment were ordered to execute a broad flanking maneuver and then attack Tunga from the northeast, facing no resistance. This enabled Newman's 1st and 2nd Battalions to advance swiftly down the highway to a point approximately 1,000 yards from Sagkanan. Concerned about the enemy's considerable presence at Carigara, Sibert planned for his two divisions to launch a coordinated assault on the town the following day; however, unbeknownst to him, the disorganized Japanese forces chose to abandon the town and retreat to the mountains southwest of Capoocan. Thus, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Americans captured Carigara without opposition and promptly established a perimeter, while the 34th Regiment advanced further to Balud, where they encountered intense enemy fire. On that same day, the 382nd Regiment took control of Dagami, from which they would engage the positions of the 16th Division on Bloody Ridge over the coming days. The capture of Carigara marked the completion of the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte. Irving's 24th Division successfully achieved its objectives, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2,970 Japanese soldiers and the capture of 13 prisoners, with their own losses totaling 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing. Additionally, by October 27, Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division had killed an estimated 739 Japanese and taken 7 prisoners, incurring a loss of 40 men killed, 199 wounded, and 8 missing. The next phase of Krueger's strategy involved two offensives converging on Ormoc: one moving south through Ormoc Valley led by Sibert's 10th Corps and the other advancing north from Baybay under Hodge's 24th Corps. Initially, while certain units of the 24th Corps continued pushing west to bolster troops along Ormoc Bay and clean up in southern Leyte Valley, Sibert's forces aimed to secure control of the Carigara Bay coastline from Carigara to Pinamopoan. Simultaneously, Suzuki sent the experienced 1st Division to Carigara to launch an offensive toward Tacloban. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was considered by Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army, to be the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu, it had been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great expectations. Meanwhile the Imahori Detachment moved to the northeastern base of the heights southwest of Jaro to facilitate the assembly of the 26th Division for an impending attack on Jaro. After securing Carigara, the 68th Brigade was set to land in the north as part of the 35th Army reserve, while the 30th Division would land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and negotiate mountainous trails to Burauen to eliminate all enemy resistance in the Dulag region. As other units of the 102nd Division were moved forward using powered schooners, a reinforced company from the 364th Independent Battalion was also deployed to Albuera to secure the landing site for the 30th Division. On the morning of November 3, the 34th Regiment moved west once again and quickly seized Capoocan, just as Kataoka's vanguard was getting close. Suzuki immediately approved the emergency dispositions already taken and issued orders temporarily attaching the various reinforcement units to the 1st Division. It was impossible, however, to notify Lt. Gen. Kataoka immediately of the changed situation, and the division advance guard moved into the vicinity west of Capoocan at 0900 on 3 November to find itself unexpectedly engaged by the enemy. Badly surprised, the advance guard fell back toward Colasian with the enemy in pursuit. Meanwhile, at 1000, Lt. Gen. Kataoka reached the high ground south of Managasnas. Finding his advance guard engaged, he immediately ordered the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 20th Antitank Battalion to check the enemy advance. At the same time he dispatch ed an order to the division main body to close up at forced march. Although the defenders were initially taken by surprise, they managed to halt the enemy's progress with fierce resistance, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. It was only after artillery bombardment of the ridge parallel to the road that the 34th finally dismantled the Japanese stronghold, establishing their position for the night. Additionally, earlier in the day, Company K had conducted a reconnaissance mission using amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a location just west of Pinamopoan. However, due to heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to Capoocan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Kataoka mistakenly perceived this as a battalion-sized enemy assault, prompting him to retreat southwest and position his forces on the eastern end of a long ridge overlooking the coast, referred to as Breakneck Ridge.  Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Levte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. Following the Japanese withdrawal, the 34th quickly secured Colasian and captured Pinamopoan without opposition the next day. Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced through the town, continuing west along the highway for about 1,700 yards, stopping just short of the ridge. Anticipating a potential enemy amphibious assault via Carigara Bay, Krueger ordered Sibert to defend the Carigara area against any seaborne attack before proceeding southward. Meanwhile, as the divisions of the 10th Corps prepared defensive measures against a possible sea invasion, Colonel Miyauchi Yoshio's 57th Regiment was ordered to get ready to launch an attack from the ridge, as Kataoka believed that the enemy force could be easily cut off. As the newly-arrived 21st Regiment took over from the 34th at the Pinamopoan defenses, the Japanese forces launched an attack on a party of artillery forward observers conducting reconnaissance on OP Hill on November 5. With the artillerymen pinned down, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Weber's 3rd Battalion moved in to assist them by the afternoon, successfully securing the northern approaches to OP Hill and the undefended Corkscrew Ridge on the left. Although the Americans were able to fend off the enemy's counterattacks, intense mortar fire on November 6 ultimately compelled them to withdraw. Despite suffering heavy casualties during the battle for Breakneck Ridge, the 1st Division had nearly completed its concentration in the Cananga area and was ready to initiate a broad four-pronged assault. However, the Japanese advance through the mountainous terrain remained exceedingly slow, leaving the 57th Regiment to conduct the attack on its own. Concurrently, Irving attached the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment to the 21st Regiment and ordered the combined force to advance towards Breakneck Ridge. Consequently, Weber's troops launched an assault on Miyauchi's positions, but were completely unsuccessful in breaking through. Dissatisfied with the 21st Regiment's progress and feeling that Weber was insufficiently aggressive, Sibert replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel William Verbeck, a seasoned veteran of the Alaska Campaign. Verbeck then made an unsuccessful attempt at a wide flanking maneuver to the east but ultimately had to entrench at the edge of Breakneck Ridge by nightfall. On the same day, Colonel Chapman dispatched Company G to Hill 1525, but it lost its way and ended up considerably further east. Thats all we have for today on the Philippines front as we now need to shift over to New Britain. In October, a decision was made to deploy the 40th Division for combat in the Philippines, transferring control of the island to the Australians. This change aligned with the Australian government's intention to utilize their own troops to reclaim territory previously occupied by the Japanese during the war. As a result, General Ramsay's 5th Division began relocating to New Britain, tasked with containing and isolating the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle Peninsula. Ramsay was instructed to maintain pressure on the Japanese forces while avoiding large-scale deployments, permitted only to conduct patrols and minor raids as limited offensive actions. By late October, the 36th Battalion had assumed control at Cape Hoskins, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade slated to land at Jacquinot Bay in early November.  At this time the Japanese had posts at intervals along the south coast as far west as Awul near Cape Dampier. It was decided that the Australian southern guerilla force would be based at Lakiri, a village in the hills two days' march inland from Waterfall Bay, and in an area into which the enemy had not ventured. It possessed a good site for dropping stores from the air and, as a preliminary, some 25,000 pounds of supplies were dropped there. To give added security to the base the Australian-led native guerillas, commanded at this stage by Captain R. I. Skinner, overcame the enemy's coastwatching posts at Palmalmal and Baien, to the south-west and south-east, respectively, killing 23 and taking three prisoners. None survived at Palmalmal, but two escaped from Baien, and it was learnt later that they reached an enemy post at Milim bearing news of what had happened. The south coast group was now placed under the command of Captain Basil Fairfax-Ross, who counted with five officers, 10 Australian N.C.O's, about 140 native troops, and such native allies as could be maintained on an air delivery of 5,000 pounds of supplies a month. After the loss of Baien the Japanese reinforced their post at Milim at the south end of Wide Bay until it was 400 strong. Far to the west they retained posts at Massau and Awul and round Cape Beechey. Fairfax-Ross decided to move discreetly into the strongly-held Wide Bay area, advancing through the hills, concentrating first on winning over the natives , and using the air power available from Bougainville as his trump card . At the same time spies would be sent into the Gazelle Peninsula. In the western area also the first task was to gain information. On 5th June an American patrol from the west led by Lieutenant White of Angau attacked the Awul garrison, which withdrew inland. An Australian platoon under Lieutenant Black thereupon marched from Jacquinot Bay to Lau and Atu. In this area they found that native guerillas about 80 strong had killed 14 Japanese and 14 of their native allies. At Awul they met White and his party. It now seemed that the Japanese from the Atu-Awul area were retreating to the north coast. Guerillas were organized and at Kensina on 18th June, "after pretending to entertain a party of about 50 enemy" , the natives attacked and killed 28, losing 5 of their own men. Black's patrol, in pursuit, found the remainder of the enemy about Rang and i n an attack on 24th June killed nine, but had to withdraw after losing one native N.C.O . As they moved north and east through hostile territory other Japanese were killed. In the eastern section in this period Lieutenant Johnson was winning the support of influential natives in the mountains south-west of Wide Bay. A heavy air attack was made on the main Milim positions on the night of 17th-18th July and as a result the Japanese with- drew some men to a new position away to the west and some men right back to Lemingi in the Gazelle Peninsula. By early September the last of the Japanese stragglers on the south coast west of Wide Bay had been killed; the Japanese had heard many reports of a strong Australian base at Jacquinot Bay-reports circulated by the Australians to dissuade the enemy from advancing westward. This base, although non-existent as yet, was soon to become a reality, and from 5th to 7th September a reconnaissance party, including officers from New Guinea Force and the 5th Division, landed from the corvette Kiama and, guided by Black, examined the area. The two-platoon force reached Milim unnoticed on 12th August, and found the enemy about 150 strong. At dawn they opened an attack in three groups, one to fire on the houses in the Japanese camp, another to fire from the flank, and the third to intercept any reinforcements from the Yaret position 500 yards to the north. Unfortunately a native fired his rifle during the approach, the enemy manned his defenses, and, after a short exchange of fire, the attackers withdrew and placed ambushes across the tracks. The same day the Swan bombarded Milim. After three days of inaction on the part of the Japanese four native soldiers crawled into the enemy's position and killed three, whereafter the Japanese fired into the bush at intervals for 36 hours. This fire ceased on the 18th and soon afterwards the position was found to be abandoned; there was much booty including boats and numerous machine-guns. It was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Waitavalo. Fairfax-Ross now moved his forward base to the coast at the Mu River only 6 hours' march from Waitavalo. On 17th and 18th September Fairfax-Ross, Sampson and a platoon, reconnoitring Kamandran, became involved in a fight with a Japanese force about 100 strong. Anticipating that the enemy would retaliate in force the Australians prepared defensive positions and one platoon under Sergeant-Major Josep, an outstanding N.C.O. who had come from the New Guinea Constabulary, was placed on the hillside above Milim to give warning of an enemy advance. On the night of 28th September the Japanese did in fact advance on Milim and on towards the Australian defensive position at the Mu River. Here, however, largely because of Sergeant Ranken's cool handling of his Bren gun, they were repulsed, losing 17 killed. Next day about 200 Japanese reinforcements arrived and, in a firefight with Josep's men whose presence they had not discovered, 16 Japanese and a native ally were killed. The Australians now withdrew inland. Soon the Japanese, about 700 strong, were in their original positions round Milim, where they remained until heavy air attacks on 6th, 7th and 8th October forced them out again. By 10th October the guerilla force was again concentrated at Lakiri. Consequently, on November 4, a small convoy landed the reinforced 14th/32nd Battalion at Jacquinot Bay without  encountering any resistance. In the days following the landing, ground forces secured the Jacquinot Bay area, while a New Guinean company executed an amphibious operation to Pomio on November 6.  The 6th Brigade was gradually transferred to Cutarp, with the final units arriving on December 16. Due to shipping shortages and the low priority for reinforcing forces on New Britain, all components of the 5th Division would not advance to Jacquinot Bay until April 1945. The first echelon of the 13th Brigade arrived on November 26, while the remaining units followed by the end of December. Meanwhile, in the north, the 36th Battalion dispatched patrols to connect with Australian guerrillas at Ulamona, Ubili, and Ea Ea, aiding them in fending off an enemy advance on the Balima River by the end of November.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans were making tremendous progress in the Philippines, advancing through the Ormoc Valley. Despite the terrible odds, it seems the Japanese would not give up an inch of territory without a fight, digging their heels to the very end. Meanwhile the Australians were dealt mop up duty on New Britain and it was going equally as well.

Last time we spoke about the Return to the Philippines. Admiral Halsey, in preparation for the Leyte invasion, devised a strategic ploy to lure the Japanese forces by feigning vulnerability. Despite significant air engagements and the heavy damage to two cruisers, Halsey's forces maintained control. Meanwhile, a massive convoy approached Leyte, and the Japanese launched a desperate counterattack. The battle severely depleted Japan's air strength, leading to the birth of the Kamikaze Corps. As Davison's carrier aircraft attacked, Japanese forces struggled due to bad weather and underestimated the Americans. General Terauchi activated Sho-Go 1, targeting Leyte, despite disagreements with General Yamashita. Pre-landing operations saw U.S. Rangers secure islands, while heavy bombardments prepared Leyte for invasion. MacArthur's forces landed amidst fierce resistance, capturing key positions. Though logistics were disorganized, U.S. troops gained ground, marking the beginning of a decisive battle in the Philippines, with the Japanese struggling to counter. This episode is the Battle of Leyte Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously mentioned, General MacArthur's forces successfully landed on Leyte, with General Sibert's 10th Corps landing in the Palo-Tacloban sector and General Hodge's 24th Corps at Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda activated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force to move to Brunei Bay and destroy enemy warships and transports in Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force prepared to support counter-landings led by Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Southwest Area Fleet. The planning for Admiral Shima's small force was emblematic of the shambolic state of the IJN organization for the battle. His force was originally assigned to Ozawa as part of the Main Body. Then it was detached to go down to Formosa to mop-up Halsey's Third Fleet in the aftermath of the Battle off Formosa. Then it was assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet based in Manila to spearhead an envisioned counter-landing on Leyte. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, determined that the Shima force was not required to accomplish the counter-landing mission. On October 19 Toyoda rejected this and instructed Mikawa to use the Shima force as part of the counter-landing force. In spite of this and after confirming that the counter-landing operation did not require Shima's force, Mikawa sent orders to Shima on the afternoon of the 19th that he was not required to stand by to support the counter-landing. Early in the afternoon on October 21, the Combined Fleet again ordered Shima to take part in the transport mission and ordered his force to Manila. At this point, two forces were assigned to the counter-landing operation with a total of five cruisers and eight destroyers. This was a very questionable use of the Combined Fleet's limited resources.  Kurita's 16th Cruiser Division was detached to reinforce the effort, and Admiral Ozawa's depleted Main Body was tasked with luring the enemy north, allowing Kurita to break through to the landing zone. Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main Body sortied from the Bungo Channel, at the southern entrance to the Inland Sea, on the afternoon of October 20, immediately after receiving the Combined Fleet battle order. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3d Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships (Ise, Hyuga), three light cruisers(Oyodo, Tama, Isuzu) and eight destroyers (31st Destroyer Squadron). At around 06:00 on 21 October, Japanese aircraft attempted to bomb the Allied ships in Leyte Bay. An Aichi D3A dive-bomber dove for Shropshire, but broke away after heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at it. The Aichi, damaged by Bofors fire, turned and flew at low level up the port side of the nearby Australia, before striking the cruiser's foremast with its wingroot. Although the bulk of the aircraft fell overboard, the bridge and forward superstructure were showered with debris and burning fuel. Seven officers (including Captain Dechaineux) and twenty-three sailors were killed by the collision, while another nine officers (including Commodore Collins), fifty-two sailors, and an AIF gunner were wounded. Observers aboard Australia and nearby Allied ships differed in their opinions of the collision; some thought that it was an accident, while the majority considered it to be a deliberate ramming aimed at the bridge. Following the attack, commander Harley C. Wright assumed temporary control of the ship. Since Kurita lacked air cover, Tominaga's forces were regrouping in the Philippines to bolster Japanese air strength for Operation Sho-Go, while Admiral Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet was assembling in the Manila area. At the same time, with communication lost with General Makino's 16th Division.Because of the typhoon of October 17-18, signal communications were impossible. Roads were washed out and impassable. Bridges were down; and for about a week from the time the storm first hit the island, elements of the 16th Division were scattered and out of contact with one another. While trying to assemble its forces for operations, the Japanese were then hit by enemy bombardment, which further severely disrupted General Makino's radio-telegraphic communications. Additionally, the evacuation of Tacloban by the division rear echelon, which began early on October 20, necessitated the abandonment of permanent wireless installations and resulted in complete severance for 48 hours of all contact between the 16th Division and higher headquarters at Cebu and Manila. During this critical period, 14th Area Army and 35th Army were completely without knowledge of developments on Leyte. General Suzuki initiated the Suzu Plan, preparing the 41st Regiment and two battalions of the 102nd Division to move toward Ormoc. General Terauchi, having decided that the decisive battle would be fought at Leyte, directed General Yamashita to place the provisional Tempei Battalion and the 20th Antitank Battalion under Suzuki's command and ordered Lieutenant-General Yamagata Tsuyuo's 26th Division to prepare for early deployment to Leyte. Additionally, reinforcements from the 1st Division and the 68th Brigade, soon to arrive in the Philippines, were assigned to the 35th Army. The Japanese anticipated that the enemy would not move inland until the beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag were connected, so they aimed to gather reinforcements in the Carigara area before launching a major counteroffensive to crush the invading forces. In the meantime, Makino's 16th Division was tasked with holding off the enemy advance in eastern Leyte long enough to allow reinforcements to assemble. Reacting swiftly to the enemy landings, Makino sent the reserve 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, and the 7th Independent Tank Company to strengthen the defenses at Palo and Dulag, respectively. General Krueger, however, intended to move quickly through Leyte Valley, aiming to secure key roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and mount a solid defense. The 1st Striking Force departed Lingga at 01:00 on October 18 and headed to Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo. At Brunei, Kurita's ships refuelled, and Kurita took the opportunity to confer with his officers. The details of Sho-1 reached Kurita's force during the day on October 18. This made for a dramatic conference and reflected the unease many felt about the plan. Many officers at the conference were appalled that the fleet was being risked attacking empty transports and doubted that they would ever get close to Leyte Gulf. Kurita probably had his own doubts about the plan, but after many of those present expressed their doubts, Kurita reminded them of the “glorious opportunity” they had been given. “Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while the nation perishes?” posed Kurita, and followed with the plea: “What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle?” Whatever their doubts, the crews and ships of the 1st Striking Force departed Brunei at 08:00 on October 22 and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage. Kurita's 3rd Section—consisting of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers—stayed behind. These ships departed at 15:00 and headed to the Balabac Strait and then into the Sulu Sea. If all went according to plan, they would storm Leyte Gulf through the Surigao Strait and meet Kurita's ships inside the gulf on the morning of October 25. To the north, General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division continued advancing northwest along San Juanico Strait, with the 7th Cavalry liberating Tacloban with minimal resistance. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments faced tougher opposition in the southwestern foothills, where Colonel Royce Drake was killed by enemy machine-gun fire, but they managed to secure Utap and Caibaan despite the swampy terrain. To the south, Colonel Aubrey Newman's 34th Regiment repelled a strong enemy counterattack, resulting in 600 Japanese casualties, before launching an assault on Hill 332. Although only the northern knoll was captured by nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment consolidated its position on Hill 522, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced towards Palo, with the 2nd successfully entering the town. Further south, Japanese artillery positioned on Catmon Hill targeted the beachhead area while General Bradley's 96th Division advanced. Colonel May's 1st Battalion attacked the Japanese positions at Labiranan Head, the remaining forces of the 383rd Regiment moved west to a point north of Tigbao, and Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment made slow progress towards Tigbao. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division, after repelling two minor tank attacks, began advancing west toward the Burauen airstrips, with the 32nd and 184th Regiments moving side by side. The 184th faced minimal opposition as it captured the Dulag airstrip and continued moving forward about 1000 yards beyond the beachhead, whereas the 32nd had to overcome several bunkers and pillboxes to reach its objective. The next day, both regiments continued their westward advance, with the 184th stopping after 2800 yards due to increased enemy resistance, waiting for the 32nd to close the gap. To the north, May's 1st Battalion secured Labiranan Hill and San Roque, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment advanced to Anibung to surround Catmon Hill, and the 382nd Regiment pushed through Tigbao and Canmangui. In response to these developments, Makino decided to reorganize his southern forces to better defend Catmon Hill and Burauen, with the 20th Regiment largely disengaging and retreating towards Hindang. Simultaneously, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 332, while Lieutenant-Colonel George Chapman's 19th Regiment defended Palo from strong enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion managed to reach the town, allowing the 2nd Battalion to launch an attack towards Hill B, though it was unable to capture its crest. Further north, while the 7th Cavalry secured the hills around Tacloban, Brigadier-General William Chase's 1st Cavalry Brigade continued to face challenges advancing up the western foothills. In the morning, Kurita set sail from Brunei and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage, leaving Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Force C behind to advance through the Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. Taking the direct route along the west coast of Palawan, the 1st Striking Force was detected by submarines Darter and Dace in the early hours of October 23. After reporting the enemy task force to Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid, the submarines executed a coordinated attack at 06:10. The first torpedoes struck Atago just as Kurita was having morning tea with his chief of staff. In total, four torpedoes hit the cruiser, dooming her instantly. Nineteen officers and 341 sailors went down with the ship. Kurita and his staff were thrown into the water and had to swim for their lives. The second salvo from Darter hit cruiser Takao, steaming behind Atago. Two torpedoes hit the cruiser, killing 32 crewmen and wounding another 30. Takao was not only out of the battle, but her heavy damage put her out of the war. After eventually reaching Singapore, she was deemed unrepairable.On Dace, Claggett observed Darter's devastating attack. Claggett identified a Kongo-class battleship for attack and began his approach. Six torpedoes were fired from a range of 1,800 yards toward the target, which was actually heavy cruiser Maya. The cruiser took four hits on her port side and sank in a mere eight minutes, taking with her 16 officers and 320 men. Kurita narrowly escaped the sinking of the Atago, later transferring to the battleship Yamato after sending two destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei. The submarines then endured ineffective counterattacks from Japanese destroyers, although Darter ran aground on a reef while pursuing Takao. This successful submarine attack not only diminished Kurita's force by three powerful cruisers but also provided the Americans with the location of the 1st Striking Force. In response, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group established a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait, and Halsey ordered his dispersed carrier groups to prepare for battle, recalling Task Group 38.4 immediately. Additionally, Vice-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa's 16th Cruiser Division, en route to Mindanao with the 41st Regiment for Ormoc, was tracked by submarine Bream near Manila Bay early on October 23. This led to a torpedo attack that critically damaged the heavy cruiser Aoba, forcing her to return to Japan, where she would never be operational again. Despite these challenges, the first reinforcement successfully arrived in Ormoc on the same day after an uneventful voyage. At the same time, the IJA and IJN air forces were rapidly assembling their resources in the Philippines in preparation for a coordinated air offensive set to begin on October 24, a day before the scheduled fleet attack. To the north, Ozawa's substantial but ineffective decoy force was positioned due east of Okinawa, moving south into the Philippine Sea, while Shima's 2nd Striking Force neared the Coron Islands. Back in Leyte, Krueger's offensive was advancing as well. In the north, the 8th Cavalry had moved through the 7th and successfully captured a bridge over the Diit River. On October 22, elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on October 23. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the occasion. A simple but impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers" was drawn up in front of the government building. General MacArthur broadcasted an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population cheered them. The 1st Cavalry Brigade continued its slow advance through challenging terrain before being reassigned to support the overstretched 24th Division in its rear. Newman's 1st Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Hill Nan, and the 19th Regiment similarly failed to take Hill B. On the night of October 23 Col. Suzuki Tatsunosuke, the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest. Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it, firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded. To the south, the 383rd Regiment secured the Guinarona River, while the 382nd conducted patrols. Even farther south, Arnold deployed the 17th Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment and the 767th Tank Battalion, to push through his advance elements and continue the assault westward, with the other two regiments trailing 1000 yards behind. This "flying wedge" maneuver proved highly effective, with the infantry securing San Pablo airfield and the tanks advancing to the western edge of Burauen. They disrupted the disorganized enemy forces and killed Colonel Hokota Keijiro, commander of the 20th Regiment. Meanwhile, at sea, Kurita's intact warships advanced into Mindoro Strait by nightfall, while Nishimura's force was crossing the Sulu Sea. To the north, Ozawa's decoy force was deliberately broadcasting messages to draw enemy attention. Shima was also directed to penetrate Surigao Strait to support Nishimura's assault, as Mikawa had determined that the 2nd Striking Force was not needed for the counter-landing mission. On Leyte, the troops continued their engagement on October 24, unaware of the impending major naval battle. In the northern region, to secure San Juanico Strait and prevent Japanese reinforcements from Samar, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed successfully at Babatngon; Troop C of the 8th Cavalry did the same at La Paz; and the rest of the 1st Squadron advanced to Guintiguian. By nightfall, these cavalry units had to repel a strong counterattack from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, which was stationed in Samar. To the south, Newman's 1st Battalion secured Hills Nan and Mike; his 2nd Battalion fought its way to a small hill southeast of Hill C; Chapman's 2nd Battalion continued its unsuccessful assault on Hill B; and his Company K captured San Joaquin south of Palo. Further south, the 382nd Regiment pushed through Hindang, causing the 20th Regiment units to retreat, and also secured Anibung, while the 383rd Regiment began patrolling its area. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment, supported by the 184th, advanced along the road to Burauen, fought through the town, and began preparing for a push north to Dagami. Additionally, the 32nd Regiment attacked toward the Buri airstrip but was eventually forced to withdraw. At dawn on October 24, the crucial air phase of the Sho-Go plan began, with 200 aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets taking off from Clark Field to patrol the waters east of Luzon. At 08:20, Admiral Sherman's carriers were finally spotted, prompting the launch of three waves of Japanese aircraft for an attack. The first attack in the morning was intercepted by seven Hellcats from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, the air group commander. The quality of the Japanese air crews was very low. McCampbell methodically proceeded to shoot down nine Japanese aircraft, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, and his wingman claimed six more. After the record action, he managed to return and land in extremis on Langley because the Essex's deck was too busy to accommodate him although he had run short of fuel. Altogether, aviators from Essex were credited with 24 downed enemy aircraft, and fighters from Lexington 13. Despite the Hellcats' rough handling of the incoming Japanese strike, fleet air defense was never airtight. At 0938hrs, one Judy divebomber used clouds for cover and then made a skillful attack against light carrier Princeton. The aircraft's 551lb bomb hit in the middle of the flight deck some 75ft forward of the aft elevator. It penetrated several decks to the ship's bakery, where it exploded. The resulting blast reached into the hangar deck where it engulfed six fully armed and fully fueled Avengers. These aircraft caught fire and soon exploded with a blast so powerful both ship's elevators were thrown into the air. Water pressure was knocked out, which allowed the flames to spread quickly. All non-essential personnel were ordered off the ship at 1010hrs, followed by all but the fire-fighting personnel ten minutes later. In response, the cruiser Birmingham came to Princeton's aid but sustained severe damage from a major explosion and had to retreat to Ulithi, leading to Princeton being scuttled later in the afternoon. The subsequent two waves of Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted, resulting in the loss of 67 Japanese planes by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Tominaga launched full-scale attacks on enemy invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf with minimal results. The failure to neutralize Halsey's carriers and Ozawa's undetected diversion mission allowed Admiral Mitscher to conduct a series of strikes against Kurita's force. That morning, American reconnaissance aircraft detected Kurita's 1st Striking Force south of Mindoro, prompting Admiral Bogan to dispatch 45 aircraft under Commander William Ellis to attack the battleships Yamato and Musashi as they neared the Sibuyan Sea. At approximately 10:30, aircraft from the Intrepid and Cabot began their attack. The lead group of Japanese ships included the huge Yamato and Musashi. Of these two, Musashi was nearest, so Commander Ellis selected her as the main target. He split the 12 Helldivers into two six-aircraft divisions to attack both battleships with their 1000lb bombs. The two nearest large ships were the subject of the Avengers' attack. Two were ordered to go after heavy cruiser Myoko and the other six were directed against Musashi. These were divided into two three-plane sections in order to execute an anvil attack. The four Avengers from Cabot were allocated against Yamato in the center of the formation. American pilots all remarked on the ferocity of the antiaircraft fire from the multi-colored 5in. bursts to the streams of tracers from the 25mm guns. The Japanese also used Type 3 incendiary shells from 18.1in. and 16in. main battery guns. Despite the spectacular appearances of this barrage, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was generally ineffective. The giant Type 3 shells proved totally ineffective, and Japanese records indicate that the battleships fired a relatively low number of 6in. and 5in. shells during each attack, indicating that the fire-control systems were taking too long to generate a targeting solution. These and the ubiquitous 25mm guns damaged many aircraft, but of the over 250 aircraft that attacked during the day, only 18 were shot down. Though the numbers confirm the ineffectiveness of IJN anti-aircraft fire, the American aviators displayed great courage pressing home their attacks through what was described as an impenetrable wall of flak. Musashi was hit with one torpedo, leading to flooding and listing, and another torpedo struck the cruiser Myoko, which had to return to Singapore. For most of the day, Musashi was the center of attention. Due to a fault in the design of her side belt, slow flooding entered the adjacent boiler room. The effect of some 3,000 tons of water was a 5.5° list, which was quickly reduced to a single degree by pumps in the affected boiler room and counterflooding on the opposite. Facing Musashi's intact antiaircraft batteries, one Avenger was shot down before it launched its torpedo and a second went down after deploying its weapon. The two Avengers that attacked Myoko were even more successful. At 1029hrs, one torpedo hit the heavy cruiser on her starboard side aft. Her propulsion system was damaged, and her top speed reduced to 15 knots. The cruiser fell astern of the formation. Kurita was forced to send her back to Singapore for repairs without destroyer escort. Since Myoko was the flagship of Sentai 5, at 1100hrs the commander transferred to cruiser Haguro. Myoko limped back to Singapore but was out of the war. Four of Kurita's heavy cruisers were out of the battle before they had a chance to engage an enemy ship. Cabot's small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Yamato, but the battleship dodged all torpedoes directed at her. Concurrently, Nishimura's fleet was located by an enhanced search operation from Admiral Davison's carriers. At 09:18, 16 Hellcats and 12 Avengers from the Enterprise attacked the Yamashiro and Fuso battleships, hitting the latter with two bombs, though the damage was minimal. Operating to the west of Nishimura was Shima's Second Striking Force and also in the area was Shima's detached Destroyer Division 21 with three ships, which was hurrying to rejoin Shima's main force after having completed a transport mission to Manila. Franklin's air group was assigned the northern sector of the Sulu Sea. It spotted the three ships of Shima's Destroyer Division 21 off Panay. Attacking high-speed destroyers was a challenge for any airman, but at 0813hrs Wakaba was hit by a bomb and several near misses. The damage proved fatal—45 minutes later, Wakaba sank with the loss of 30 men. Franklin launched a follow-up strike of 12 Hellcats and 11 bombers that reached the two remaining destroyers just before noon. Only one bomb hit was scored against Hatsushimo, which did little damage. The Japanese commander decided to head back to Manila with the survivors of Wakaba. Inexplicably, he failed to notify Shima of his decision. Destroyer Division 21 was out of the battle.  After this initial strike, Bogan sent a second wave of 42 aircraft, which targeted Musashi between 12:07 and 12:15. Again, Helldivers opened the attack. The 12 bombers scored at least two direct hits and five near misses. One 1,000lb hit forward and passed through Musashi's bow without exploding. The second hit just to the port side of the stack and penetrated two decks before exploding. The resulting damage forced the abandonment of the port-side inboard engine room, which reduced the ship to three shafts. A fire near one of the boiler rooms was quickly extinguished. Adding to the chaos, Musashi's steam siren was damaged, and it continued to sound off and on for the remainder of the action. Once again Intrepid's Avengers deployed to conduct an anvil attack. Of the nine aircraft, eight got their torpedoes in the water and headed toward the huge battleship. As was the case for the entire series of attacks, it is impossible to precisely trace the number of hits suffered by Musashi; American and Japanese records do not even coincide on the overall number of attacks during the day. It is probable that the second wave of Avengers put three torpedoes into Musashi's port side. One hit near the stack on the junction of the outboard port engine room and the port hydraulic machinery space; it caused slow flooding but little else. Another hit forward of the armored citadel and caused massive flooding into several large spaces. The last confirmed hit occurred abaft Turret No. 2. Despite these three additional hits, Musashi remained on an even keel, but was noticeably down by the bow. In exchange, Musashi antiaircraft gunners forced one Avenger to ditch some 15 miles away and shot down two Helldivers. During this attack, Japanese records indicate nine Type 3 shells were fired. American pilots were impressed that they were engaged at 25,000–30,000 yards, but no aircraft were damaged. This damage reduced Musashi's speed to 22 knots, prompting Kurita to slow his formation. Despite taking four torpedoes, Musashi's skilled damage-control teams managed to keep it afloat throughout the day. At 10:50, Sherman launched 58 aircraft from the Essex and Lexington, focusing on Musashi again at 13:30. With her speed reduced and unable to fully maneuver, she was a much easier target. Despite the heavy fire directed against them, the Helldivers performed their mission of preparing the way for the torpedo bombers. At least four 1,000lb bombs hit Musashi. Three hits caused minimal damage as they impacted near the forward 18in. turret and exploded in the unoccupied crew accommodation spaces below. Damage from the final hit that exploded on contact when it hit the starboard side of the stack was not serious, but the explosion devastated many nearby 25mm triple mounts and caused heavy casualties among the gun crews. While the Helldivers added to the topside carnage, damage from the Avengers was much more serious. Three more torpedo hits were confirmed in the third attack, bringing the total to seven. Two struck forward of the armored citadel on either side of the bow. The design flaw of having comparatively little compartmentation in the unarmored forward section of the ship led to massive flooding. In addition, the explosions forced the hull plating outward creating what looked like a huge plow throwing water up as the ship moved forward. Another torpedo struck the starboard side close to the previous starboard side hit. This increased flooding and forced the abandonment of the starboard hydraulic machinery room. A possible fourth hit was reported by some witnesses near the forward 6.1in. triple turret on the starboard side. This assault resulted in at least four bomb hits and three torpedo hits, causing severe flooding. Despite this, Musashi continued to fight, but with its speed reduced to 12 knots, Kurita ordered it to move west with destroyers Shimakaze and Kiyoshimo. Additionally, the cruiser Tone was struck by two bombs during this attack, sustaining only light damage. At 14:26, 12 Helldivers and 8 Hellcats from the Essex launched an assault on the Yamato and Nagato, delivering three bomb hits to the Yamato and two to the Nagato, though the damage was not severe. The fifth air attack of the day was the most intense, with 65 aircraft from the Enterprise and Franklin taking off at 13:15 to strike the heavily damaged Musashi at 15:10. The results against the near-defenseless battleship were devastating. Of the 18 Helldivers that dove on Musashi, 11 claimed hits. On this occasion, the aviators' claims were not inflated. Japanese sources agreed that within minutes, Musashi was pounded by ten 1,000lb bombs. This barrage can be detailed with some degree of certainty. One bomb hit forward of Turret No. 1 and added to the damage there from earlier bombs. Another bomb hit the roof of the same turret and failed to penetrate its thick roof armor. Another hit to the starboard side of the turret and penetrated two decks before exploding against the main armored deck. Two bombs hit together between the forward 6.1in. turret and the superstructure, exploded on contact, and did minimal damage. Another two hit just to port in the same general area, penetrated two decks, and exploded on the main armored deck without penetrating. The eighth bomb hit the port side of the massive superstructure and exploded on contact, causing devastation to nearby 25mm mounts and their crews. Another projectile hit the top of the superstructure and destroyed the main battery fire-control director and its rangefinder. The resulting explosion caused significant personnel casualties on the bridge and operations room totaling 78 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was the ship's captain. The final hit landed abaft the superstructure but caused only minor damage. Musashi was equally helpless against the Avengers. The eight Enterprise Avengers conducted an anvil attack, and all claimed hits. At this point in the action, the accounts of Musashi's surviving crewmembers are not reliable. It is certain that four more torpedoes hit the ship. The first was on the port side in the area of the magazine for Turret No. 1. Another hit on the port side was recorded abeam the superstructure, flooding one boiler room. The third hit to port was placed just aft of the stack. It was in the same area of an earlier hit, and it immediately flooded the outboard engine room. The only confirmed hit on the starboard side occurred in the area of Turret No. 2. On top of the four confirmed hits, some Japanese accounts mention as many as six more. Two of these struck amidships on the port side but did not explode. All attacking aircraft returned safely, confirming the ineffectiveness of Musashi's defenses at this point. At 15:21, Helldivers targeted the Haruna, but only managed five near misses. The increasing intensity of the air attacks throughout the day indicated that Japanese land-based air forces had failed to neutralize Halsey's carriers. Consequently, at 15:30, Kurita ordered his fleet to change course westward, away from the San Bernardino Strait, hoping that this maneuver would reduce the pressure from air attacks and allow Japanese air forces to achieve better results. Meanwhile, Bogan launched his third strike of the day at 15:50, with 31 aircraft under Ellis targeting the Musashi one final time. However, due to fatigue, the attack was ineffective. After this last air strike, Kurita decided to head back towards the San Bernardino Strait and instructed the sinking Musashi to beach itself on Sibuyan Island at 17:15. Before this could be executed, the battleship sank at 19:36, resulting in the loss of 1,023 lives. Thus, the Musashi became the largest ship ever sunk by air attack in what was the largest air-sea battle in history up to that point. Despite losing 18 aircraft, the Americans succeeded in sinking the Musashi, torpedoing the Myoko, and damaging three other battleships to varying extents. Nevertheless, the 1st Striking Force emerged in better condition than anticipated, with the Musashi absorbing much of the torpedo and bomb damage and allowing the other ships to weather the attack. Kurita planned to navigate San Bernardino Strait during the night, proceed down the east coast of Samar, and reach Leyte Gulf around 11:00. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher's search planes had located Ozawa's carriers at 16:40. By afternoon, Ozawa had launched most of his aircraft in an attack on Sherman, but the final assault by the once formidable IJN carrier force achieved only limited success, with 28 planes lost before retreating to the Philippines. Remaining undetected, Ozawa then dispatched two battleship carriers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Matsuda Chiaki southward, drawing American attention to his position.  In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans did not know that the IJN had no prospects of replacing its lost aviators. Because the majority of the carriers themselves survived the battle, and the Americans knew other carriers were being added to the force, the IJN's carrier force was still a threat. The intelligence Halsey received on the IJN's carrier force indicated that it was fully capable. In every other major battle of the war, the IJN carrier fleet was the main threat. The Pacific War had become a carrier war and surface forces had been firmly supplanted as the primary striking force. The Americans had no way of knowing that the Japanese had turned this thinking on its head in their planning for Leyte Gulf. Nimitz wanted to destroy the Combined Fleet and thus gain an increased measure of operational freedom for future operations. He was disappointed that this did not occur at Philippine Sea and thus had inserted the instruction to Halsey that the destruction of the Japanese fleet would be his primary objective if the opportunity was presented. Achieving this not only would eliminate the main threat to the invasion, but it would cripple the IJN's ability to interfere with future operations. As the assessment from the aviators was that Kurita's force no longer posed a threat, at 19:50 Halsey ordered his entire force north to crush what he assessed as the primary threat: Ozawa's carrier force. He decided to do so with the entirety of his force. By doing so, he decided to ignore the threat posed by the Kurita force, which was headed toward San Bernardino Strait. He kept his whole force together, because that was how TF 38 fought and because, as he stated after the war, he did not want to divide his force in the face of the enemy. A decisive victory was most likely if the carriers of TF 38 worked with the battleships of TF 34. This was USN doctrine and Halsey fully supported it.  At 20:22, Task Force 38 set course north, with the three carrier groups in the area meeting just before midnight. Earlier, at 20:05, a night reconnaissance aircraft from Independence had reported that Kurita's formidable surface force was heading back toward the San Bernardino Strait. This news raised concerns among several of Halsey's subordinates, including Bogan and Lee, but they were dismissed by the resolute Halsey. As a result, the 3rd Fleet's full strength continued northward toward Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unprotected. This left Kurita's battleships unopposed between themselves and the American landing vessels, except for Kinkaid's vulnerable escort carriers off Samar's coast. Meanwhile, the detection of Nishimura's force on October 24 gave Kinkaid enough time to prepare for a battle at Surigao Strait. Oldendorf set up his battle line under Rear-Admiral George Weyler near Hingatungan Point in the northern part of the strait, providing maximum sea space while still constraining Japanese movement. Eight cruisers in two groups were positioned south of this line, with 24 destroyers stationed to screen the battleships and cruisers and positioned on both flanks to launch torpedo attacks against the approaching Japanese. Additionally, 39 PT boats were deployed in the southern approaches to the strait and into the Mindanao Sea to provide early warning and execute torpedo attacks when possible. The main issue was that the battleships were primarily equipped with high-explosive shells and would only engage once the Japanese forces were about 20,000 yards away. Moreover, Kinkaid had intercepted an order from Halsey to assemble a powerful task force of fast battleships. Misinterpreting the order's unclear wording, Kinkaid mistakenly believed Task Force 34 was coming to defend San Bernardino Strait, allowing his forces to concentrate on Surigao Strait instead. Despite Kurita's delays, Nishimura pressed on to breach the strait, advancing with the heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers. Little is known about Nishimura's precise thinking as he approached the strait. He was planning on arriving off Tacloban at 0430hrs on October 25 in accordance with Toyoda's master plan that had Kurita's force arriving off Leyte a short time later. This schedule fell apart after Kurita's advance was thrown off schedule on the afternoon of October 24 when he temporarily turned around in the face of intensive air attack in the Sibuyan Sea. At 2013hrs Nishimura sent a message to Toyoda and Kurita that he planned to arrive off Dulag at 0400hrs the next morning, a half hour later than planned. This was only a minor change; much more important was the receipt at 2200hrs of Kurita's message that he would not be in the gulf until 1100hrs. This meant that Nishimura's force was on its own when it executed its attack into the gulf. However, Nishimura did not change his plan after learning of Kurita's revised intentions. He was determined to force the strait in darkness and in so doing draw forces away from Kurita's main attack. The battle began at 2236hrs when PT-131 gained radar contact on Nishimura's main force. The three boats of the section headed toward the contact to make a torpedo attack. Two of the boats were slightly damaged, but one was able to close within torpedo range. News of the contact did not reach Oldendorf until 0026hrs on October 25. Another section sighted the advance group built around Mogami at 2350hrs and two of the boats fired a torpedo at the cruiser. Neither hit its target. Demonstrating the confusion in any night battle, at about 0100hrs Mogami was hit by a 6in. shell from Fuso. Though a dud, it killed three men. About an hour later, PT134 closed to within 3,000 yards of Fuso and fired three torpedoes. Again, all missed. This running series of encounters continued up until 0213hrs. Of the 39 boats, 30 contacted the Japanese and launched 34 torpedoes. None of Nishimura's ships was hit. While Nishimura's force was successfully fighting its way up the strait in good order, he kept Kurita and Shima informed of his progress. At 0040hrs, the two parts of Nishimura's force reunited. First blood went to the Japanese, since ten PTs were hit, and one (PT-493) sank, with a total of three dead and 20 wounded. Though unable to exact any attrition on the Japanese, the PTs had provided an invaluable service informing Oldendorf of Nishimura's location and strength. Based on an earlier report from one of Mogami's scout aircraft on the location and numbers of USN ships in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura appeared to believe that the battle would occur inside Leyte Gulf and not in Surigao Strait. If he really believed that Oldendorf would not use favorable geography to his advantage, he was sorely mistaken. Having survived the PT boat attacks with no damage, Nishimura now faced a much more deadly threat. This came in the form of five Fletcher-class destroyers under the command of the aggressive Captain Coward. Two other destroyers from Coward's Destroyer Squadron 54 were left on picket duty and did not take part in the torpedo attack. The five destroyers assigned to the attack were arrayed to conduct an anvil attack (with torpedoes coming in from both bows of the enemy target), with McDermut and Monssen from the west and Remey, McGowan, and Melvin from the east. Approaching at 30 knots, Coward's ships would launch torpedoes guided by radar, and refrain from using their 5in. guns so as not to give their positions away. Once the torpedoes were on their way, the destroyers would break off and head north along the coast to clear the area and reduce the possibility of a friendly fire incident. What ensued was one of the most successful attacks of the entire war. Shortly after 03:00, Coward's three eastern destroyers launched 27 torpedoes from a range of 8200 to 9300 yards at the advancing Japanese ships. They scored two critical hits on the Fuso at 03:08, causing flooding and fires. The battleship, unaware of the severity of the damage, veered off course and headed south, ultimately sinking at about 03:45 with 1620 lives lost. The Americans claimed that the torpedoes had split the Fuso in two. Meanwhile, Coward's two western destroyers fired a full salvo of 20 torpedoes at 03:10. In response, Nishimura changed course, exposing his screen to danger. By 03:19, three torpedoes from McDermut struck the Yamagumo, which exploded and sank within two minutes; another torpedo hit the Michishio amidships, causing it to sink 15 minutes later after coming to a halt; and a final torpedo hit the Asagumo, damaging its bow and reducing its speed, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. McDermut's ten torpedoes were the most effective salvo of the war from any American destroyer. Monssen's torpedo attack resulted in a single hit on the battleship Yamashiro, causing some flooding and reducing her firepower by a third. Following Coward's devastating torpedo strike, six more destroyers, divided into two groups of three, approached Nishimura's force from the west along the coast of Leyte. The first group commenced their attack at 03:23, launching 14 torpedoes from a range of 6500 to 6800 yards, but only one torpedo struck the Yamashiro, temporarily slowing her to 5 knots. The second group of destroyers fired 15 torpedoes at 03:29, but none of their torpedoes hit their targets, and the gunfire from both sides proved ineffective. After this failed assault, nine destroyers in three sections of three approached Nishimura's weakened column from both flanks. The first two sections, attacking from either side, fired a half-salvo of five torpedoes from each destroyer, but none hit. Before the final section could launch its attack, a fierce gunnery battle was underway.  The gunnery battle began at 0351hrs when the first American cruiser opened up. Two minutes later, West Virginia commenced fire from 22,800 yards. All ships fired at the largest radar return of the three Japanese ships, which was Yamashiro. The American barrage grew as each battleship gained a fire control solution. The three ships with the most modern fire control systems did most of the work. California joined in at 0355hrs from 20,400 yards followed by Tennessee one minute later. The three battleships with the less capable Mk 3 fire control radar struggled to gain a firing solution. Maryland opened fire at 0359hrs by ranging her Mk 3 radar on the shell splashes from the other battleships. Mississippi took until 0412hrs when she fired a full salvo at Yamashiro from 19,790 yards. Pennsylvania never gained a good solution for her 14in. main battery and failed to fire a single salvo. Unbeknownst to Nishimura, the Americans had executed a "T" maneuver, leaving his ships able to fire only their forward guns while the enemy could unleash full broadsides. Concentrating their fire on the Yamashiro, Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships landed several hits during the 18-minute engagement. By 03:56, the Yamashiro was seen burning amidships, aft, and in the bridge area. Despite this, the battleship fought back fiercely, targeting the cruisers Phoenix, Columbia, Shropshire, and Denver, though no hits were achieved. The Mogami endured severe damage during this engagement, with the cruiser Portland focusing its fire on her and inflicting heavy harm. In the early phase of the battle, she took several 5in. hits from American destroyers. In the first minutes of the withering barrage from Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships, Mogami sustained more damage, including a hit on one of her 8in. turrets. After firing four Type 93 torpedoes at 0401hrs against the gun flashes from enemy ships to the north, she came under fire from heavy cruiser Portland. Two 8in. shells hit Mogami's bridge at 0402hrs, killing her commanding officer, and other shells disabled two engine rooms. The new commanding officer decided to break off the action and head south at slow speed. While headed south, she encountered the Second Diversion Attack Force.  As American gunfire pummeled Yamashiro's superstructure, the last destroyer group approached head-on, closing to within 6200 yards before launching 13 torpedoes. Before the torpedoes could reach their targets, the destroyers came under friendly fire and further assault from Yamashiro's guns, resulting in the Albert W. Grant taking 18 hits before being withdrawn. Observing the friendly fire, Oldendorf ordered a ceasefire at 04:09, allowing Nishimura to begin a retreat south. However, by 04:11, the Yamashiro had been hit by three torpedoes from the final destroyer salvo, causing a severe list and bringing the battleship to a halt. Yamashiro's valiant yet ultimately futile resistance ended at 04:19 when she capsized to port, taking Nishimura and 1625 others with her. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The largest naval battle in human history had only just begun. As many historians argue, given the fateful decision of Halsey to try and knock out the IJN combined fleet, the transports had been left completely open to an attack. Absolute carnage could unfold on an unprecedented scale…perhaps enough to cause America to rethink continuing the war?

This episode we continue looking at the Taika reforms, covering only 3 months, but with edicts about mounded tombs, the labor due to the state vice individuals, and a variety of "offenses", often countering current practices such as forcing people to undergo "harai" in many instances. For more, check out the blog at https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-110 Rough Transcript: Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua and this is episode 110: Manual Labor, Mounded Tombs, and Marital Missteps. Maro sat by the small campfire he had made along the river's edge.  The water nearby was going to be the catalyst for the gruel that he was making with some of the last bit of food that he had.  As he stirred the pot, he looked over at his friend, lying out, his head propped up against the rock. Maro and Sumi had been working on one of the large tombs in Asuka at the commandof their lord, who had built it for his deceased father.  Now they were released and headed back to their village, still two days out.  Unlike their superiors, they didn't get horses to ride across the landscape, so it would be a few days before they returned home.  Unfortunately, Sumi had grown ill, and he was now almost delirious with fever.  Maro couldn't bear to leave his friend, but he also cursed his luck. What if Sumi were to die?  It was one thing to die at home, or even when they were working on the tomb.  But now they were travelers—strangers on the road.  If something happened to Sumi, Maro knew he couldn't just leave him, but neither could he go trudging through the countryside with a dead body.  Even association with death would bring problems for him, and if local villagers were to find out, they could force him to pay for the necessary ritual purification—or worse.  Heck, even something as simple as cooking rice on the side of the road could bring problems for a poor traveler—hence why Maro had found some place off the beaten path and away from prying eyes. Under his breath he prayed to whatever powers were listening to help Sumi recover.  If they could only make it back to their village, then everything would be alright. Once again, we are looking at the second year of Taika, 646.  As we heard in the past couple of episodes, the first year of Taika saw a plethora of edicts that would bring radical change to the way that the sovereign interacted with the land and the people.  These provided the start of  much more direct rule,   and yet also set the stage for a new bureaucratic state, with various new officials up and down the hierarchy. This episode we are continuing to look at what happened in the first several months of 646, largely because there was so much going on that it's worth focusing in on this short time period.   For one thing, we really should talk a little bit more about how this entire Taika era is reflecting the culmination of what appears to have been a major change to Yamato's cultural identity over the preceding century or so—a change in perspective that may not have even been entirely apparent to them, but which allowed Naka no Oe and the sovereign, Karu, aka Koutoku Tennou, to get away with these pronouncements that restructured the basic foundations of the Yamato state.  These changes include the death knell of the kofun period, with new restrictions on how mounded tombs were to be created, including how large they were allowed to be.  We'll also look at a litany of items being called out in the third month of the year—many of which directly affected people at the lowest ends of the economic spectrum and which give us a view of some of the practices that had presumably been going on prior to the edict. As we've already discussed, the early part of the year 646 saw quite a few quote-unquote “normal” things happening.  The sovereign moved into a new detached palace, perhaps while the Toyosaki Palace was being built.  This was the Koshiro Palace of Sayabe, in Naniwa.  Emissaries were sent out to restore—or possibly build—the arsenals; you may recall that the governors were supposed to gather up all of the weapons and armor in a single place so that it could be available, just in case.  Envoys from the Emishi came to do homage, and there was another round of envoys from Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla.  Apparently, this time, there were no complaints about the tribute.  That was all in the first two months.  By the third, the governors had been called to account for their misdeeds, but also pardoned – we talked about this two episodes ago, when we explored the new system of governors, but this is when their pardons happen – and the sovereign moved out of the Koshiro Palace, presumably to take up residence in the shiny new Toyosaki palace that was just getting blessed and which was the nominal reason for the general amnesty across the land. And with all of that over… well, it was time to get back to figuring out what part of the traditional order they would overthrow next.  And apparently, Karu, our sovereign, had an idea.  He sent a question to the Crown Prince, Naka no Oe, to see what he thought about it, and we are given the Prince's response in a letter back to the crown on the 20th day of the 3rd month of 646.    The question Karu had askedwas roughly: what should be done about a group of families called the Iribe, including the Koshiro no Iribe of the Omi, Muraji, the Tomo no Miyatsuko, and the Kuni no Miyatsuko; and the Mina no Iribe of the Royal Princes.  Karu had also evidently asked what should be done about the Miyake. Now the question reading as “what should be done about these people” sounds a bit ominous, so before we get to Naka no Oe's suggestions, let's explore just who were the “Iribe” mentioned here.  As far as I can find, there doesn't appear to be another use of that word in the Chronicles, but the other terms around it provide clues and we have a general consensus about what this is all about.  “Koshiro”—the Child's Generation—and the “Mina”—the exalted name—suggest that the Iribe were those families set up in the name of a given prince or person.  As we've talked about on the podcast in the past, from the start of the various “Be” families, there was a longstanding tradition of creating specific families to support given individuals: for former queens, princes, and more. These families often took the name of the palace where these individuals  resided.  The output of these families and worker groups would then go to support that individual and their relatives. The language used in Naka no Oe's letter, here, suggests that various other elites had set up similar groups for themselves or their own relatives This is supported by the fact that the Miyake are also mentioned.  The Miyake were the royal granaries, and while they had a political significance in extending the presence of the Yamato throne, they were also supplying income, in the form of rice, to the throne and various members of the royal family. So, Karu's question basically boiled down to: what do we do about all of these groups that exist purely to support elite families?  Naka no Oe's response reflects the new order that he was pushing for in this period.  He notes that there is only one sovereign, and only the sovereign was owed the labor of the populace—suggesting that the labor of the Iribe and those otherwise conscripted into labor should be done according to the new labor laws they had just enacted.  This also suggested that even the Miyake should be abolished. This was another Big Change in the Taika era, and once again, this would have large ramifications, as it suggested, once again, that the traditions of people providing labor to these elite families would go away—although not entirely.  As we will see, elites would still get an income, but it would no longer be based on your hereditary rank and position and provided by groups bound to your service alone, but instead based on your appointed rank and position in the new government.  Those serving in government would continue to receive a stipend based on the labor of agricultural workers on land allotted to such purpose by the state, and in fact we've already seen where stipends were increased for some officers.  This goes along with the idea, at least, of a more merit-based society.  Those who worked hard and proved themselves would find their way to the highest positions and thus the greatest income for themselves and their families.  In reality, these promotions were highly political affairs, and most likely to go to those who came from the families already in power.  How that was envisioned, though, changed in this period, and it really emphasizes the shift that must have occurred within the cultural imaginary of the time. I've mentioned before the concept of the cultural imaginary, and it is something that I think we really need to talk about during this period—during the Great Change.  It is clear that, even if the term “Taika” was applied after the fact, people recognized that there was a sea change going on.  That change is externally represented by the edicts and the change going on in the way the government was operating.  However, this couldn't have happened without at least the tacit approval of the rest of the elites.  If Naka no Oe had just been a lone voice preaching the benefits of a more centralized state, with the sovereign at the top of a bureaucratic system that had never before been seen in the archipelago, then he could easily have been dismissed.  The other members of the court could have effectively revolted, refusing to comply and possibly even forcing a change in government.  And of course, that may have been part of what was behind the attempted revolt around Prince Furubito no Ohoye, which we talked about last episode. However, enough people continued to side with Naka no Oe and Nakatomi no Kamatari and their ideas that any opposition was unable to overcome their momentum.  So why? I would suggest that this was the result and culmination of a new way of envisioning—of imagining, if you will—the Yamato state.  It is an image that would have been familiar to the Chroniclers, and we see it throughout their narrative: the image of an imperial state, with the sovereign—known to the Chroniclers as the Sumera no Mikoto, or Tennou—at the very top.  The Sumera no Mikoto, as the sovereign would eventually be known, held authority not only in the secular realm, but also in the spiritual—in the Buddhist and in matters of the kami.  It envisioned the sovereign as the natural ruler of all of the archipelago, and even beyond. This was an image that is very much in line with the thinking of continental scholars.  It conforms, to a point, with Confucian and Buddhist ideas of what a Good Ruler should be, and, by extension, what the role of the State was and how the people should operate within that realm. Prior to the 6th century, there had been another image of the sovereign—the image of the Oho-kimi.  There are similarities—after all, power is power and humans are going to human.  But there were clearly other prevailing ideas in play back then.  We've talked about the idea of co-rulers, who ruled in tandem.  And we've seen examples of female and male rulers at various levels of society.  Spiritual authority came from the ability to intercede with the kami, and there were no native Buddhist traditions prior to 538—despite attempts by the Chroniclers to paint prior generations with the brush of Buddhist and Confucian morality.  One's place in society wasn't dictated by their own personal accomplishments as much as it was the accomplishments of their extended family, though even some of that may have come about as late as the 5th or 6th centuries.  Perhaps more importantly, prior to the 6th century, the sovereign's direct control only extended so far.  They were the sovereign of Yamato, and though they may have had influence over others in the archipelago, they did not necessarily have direct control over their lands and people.  By all accounts, the people owed their service not to the sovereign in Yamato, but to their local elites, who in turn may have had duties to those above them. But along with books and immigrants from the continent, the people of the archipelago got new ideas of what the government should look like.  These may have been foreign ideas, but over time we had new generations growing up with new and different examples of how things should work.  These new ideas worked their way into their thinking about how elited should behave and act, and colored their image for what a proper State should look like.  Sure, they understood how their own traditions worked, and that is still the mode under which they operated, but they were ready to change. Some of this change started back in the era of Prince Umayado and the sovereign, Kashikiya Hime.  Umayado's purported 17 article constitution, as we noted, didn't exactly lay out specific laws and punishments.  It wasn't a true legal code, though it was accompanied by a few legal changes, including the first attempt at a rank system for individuals.  More importantly, though, it articulated a set of values on which the government should be founded.  Whether or not these values were actually articulated to Prince Umayado, aka Shotoku Taishi, or even whether they were written down before the Chronicles were put together is debatable, but that whole episode certainly suggests that these kinds of ideas, which were rife with continental thought, were making their way into society. And thus, Naka no Oe was able to suggest his and Karu's reforms based on arguments that no doubt resonated with the people of the time, as many of those in government would have been reading similar texts.  So even while it was seemingly against their immediate interests to give up control of labor or production, they had already been provided an exemplar of how this would work.  They had a new imagination of what their culture should be and look like. And that's why I bring up the idea of a new cultural imaginary taking hold.  A cultural imaginary is the collection of various shared values and concepts that a group envisions for themselves. If we think of modern countries, one can look at American culture, where there are shared values of freedom, individuality, etc.  These are backed by common, shared ideas and stories—stories of the Founding Fathers, separating themselves from Great Britain, but also ideas of the Old West and concepts of the rugged cowboy on his horse.  These stories and images help us to determine our shared values and understanding.  It also tends to define the “us” versus “them”.  Why are *we* the way we are and why are *they* different? To be clear, these stories are not always true, and can change over time.  Early visions of America included some people, but not everyone.  Stories turned George Washington into an almost mythical figure, with an emphasis on his heroic qualities and his honesty.  Our modern version of the Old West is often driven by what we saw in movies, which in turn were influenced by dime novels of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  The historical Old West tended to be quite different—and much more complex and diverse—than our modern visions of it. We can see similar forces at work in the Nihon Shoki and the Kojiki.  These were written with the cultural values of the 8th century, and deliberately or not, their values are reflected back into the past, which is then what later generations would hold onto, defining their own image of who they were and how things should be. When the cultural imaginary of what your society or culture *should* be conflicts with what people actually see happening, that often creates tension.  That tension can be resolved in a variety of ways, but it often requires something to change.  In this case, the cultural imaginaries of the elite had been flooded with examples of Confucian and Buddhist morals.  The stories and values had been passed along with knowledge of astronomy, mathematics, and more, in the media they were consuming from the continent.  There were also those who had come from the continent—from Baekje, Silla, and beyond—who no doubt also had absorbed some of these stories and values and were passing them on, as well. And so it wouldn't have taken that much for Naka no Oe to point out how the system that they were laboring under differed from what a so-called “good” government should look like.  So in a way, there was already buy-in for a change, at least at the top.  And thus it appears as though Naka no Oe and Karu were able to get many of the elites to give up a measure of their own autonomy under the old system for the benefits of the new system that was being created.  Mind you, it likely didn't hurt that the throne was also ensuring that they gave out lavish gifts of silk, gold ingots, and hefty stipends to many of the more influential members of society as well. There are still questions as to how much actually changed, initially.  Sure, we see the edicts and an intent to change, and the local elites of Yamato seem to have been going along with it, but we don't quite see how quickly these edicts were accepted in places like Izumo or Kibi, and I wouldn't be surprised to learn that, at least initially, many people just paid the edicts lip service, waiting to see whether or not they would actually be enforced.  Still, these are definite changes away from the previous cultural norms. Which leads into the next big edict, which focused on regulating tombs. While the ancient burial mounds which could be called “kofun” continued to be built into the 8th century in one form or another, by most timelines, the Kofun period ended around 538 with the introduction of Buddhism and the start of what is known as the Asuka period.  As we've noted, even the kingly tombs of the royal family from the end of the 6th century stopped relying on the round-keyhole shaped tomb shape.  By the early 7th century the building of temples had become the new memorial for the ultra-wealthy of Yamato—a temple being a memorial that could be built before you passed and carry on your memory to later generations as a place of worship.  This was no doubt helped by the idea that you would also accrue a fair bit of karma, the spiritual capital of the Buddhist worldview. However, a mounded burial was still de rigeur for the elites and certain families, including those who had come over from the continent.  The last keyhole style tombs known to have been built appear to be out in modern Chiba prefecture, in the Kanto region, in the first half of the 7th century.  From then on, we largely see round, square, or octagonal tombs.  Some of the latest tombs that we know of, in the late 7th and early 8th centuries, show clear signs of continental influence.  Kitora kofun and Takamatsuzuka Kofun, both in the Asuka area, are decorated in ways similar to tombs in Goguryeo, including paintings of the four directional animals mentioned in the Liji, the Confucian Book of Rites: Suzaku, the red bird of the south; Byakko, the white tiger of the west; Genbu, the black tortoise of the north; and Seiryuu, the blue dragon of the east.  Takamatsuzuka also contains murals of courtiers dressed in clothing that would be quite at home on the continent and which looks quite different from the clothing seen on haniwa figures from only a century or so earlier. Tombs were also more likely to be clustered together, and often only contained a single burial, rather than evidence of a double burial.  This was likely influenced by the edict of 646.  That edict also gives us ideas on what was considered to be reasonable for that era, and provides some of our best descriptions in the written record to help us better understand tomb construction. I would also note that the court had moved to Naniwa, and near to Naniwa were some of the largest of the kofun, including Daisen-ryo, the largest kofun in Japan and one of the largest mausoleums in the entire world.  So perhaps that was also influencing their thoughts. The edict starts out noting that large, mounded tombs are wasteful.  This shouldn't be a surprise:  large tombs were always about conspicuous consumption as a sign of the wealth and power of the occupant and their family.  As noted earlier, however, a lot of that seems to have shifted to the building of temples, and as such, tombs were no longer seen as something to waste resources on.  However, since it was still tradition, it was still happening, hence the edict. And so it goes on to limit the size of the tombs.  At the largest, it says a tomb should be no more than about nine shaku wide and 5 shaku wide on the inside—one shaku being approximately 1 foot—and no more then 9 hiro to a side and 5 hiro in height.  A “Hiro” was an ancient measure that was generally the length of two outspread arms.  This was about 5 shaku, or 5 feet.    That means that we are still talking about a mound 45 feet on a side, which is nothing to sneeze at.  But this size was reserved for princes and up.  The Daijin—the great ministers of State—could have similar inner dimensions for their sarcophagus, but the outside was limited to only seven hiro to a side and three hiro in height.  Lesser ministers only got 5 hiro to a side and 2.5 hiro in height, while others were allocated no mound at all, and a smaller inner chamber. In addition, the number of laborers and how long they could work on a tomb was also capped.  The largest tombs were allotted 1,000 laborers for 7 days.  The Daijin received 500 laborers over 5 days.  Other ministers received 250 laborers for 3 days, while below that you received 100 laborers for 1 day or 50 laborers for no more than 1 day.  Here we see the state once again asserting itself into the relationship between the various individuals and the laborers—previously, an elite family would have just used as many laborers as they had private access to, but now things were being regulated and it was all based on your rank and position within the civil service of the new government. In addition, how the deceased was delivered to the monument also was regulated.  A carriage was permitted for the highest ranked individuals—the members of the royal family.  Ministers could be placed on a bier and carried by pall-bearers.  No mention is made of people of the lower class, with the assumption that they likely didn't get such a ceremony. White cloth hangings were allowed in many cases—white is practical, in that it isn't dyed and so it wouldn't be as expensive, but it was also considered the color of death in Buddhist and continental tradition, so not surprising.  They also allowed small stones to be used for princes down to the rank of “sho-chi”—that was the lowest official rank.  These stones could refer to several things, and we aren't quite sure.  According to Aston, the compilers of the “shukai” edition of the Nihon Shoki attributed this to memorial stones set up with inscriptions about the deceased, but as he points out, we haven't found anything that really correlates to that.  Aston instead suggests that what is meant are the stones used to build the roof of the main chamber.  If you look at tombs like Ishibutai kofun, you can see the large stones used there, but this may be referring to something similar, possibly using smaller stones that took less effort to haul into place.  There were also stones used on the outside to decorate the kofun back in the day, and I suppose that they could have meant that as well. More than just regulations, there were prohibitions placed on burials.  For one thing, the concept of a temporary interment was discontinued for everyone.  In the past, a body would be buried or even placed in a hut for some time and then the burial would take place at a later date.  There are several reasons this may have been done in the past, from the purely ritual to the more practical.  However, that was no longer considered to be appropriate.  Likewise, commoners were required to be buried within a day of their death.  This goes along with talk about reducing “pollution”, which may have referred to spiritual as much as physical pollution, and so plots of ground were set aside specifically for burials, and people were not allowed to be buried outside of those official locations.  That could certainly help explain why we see more clusters of burials in this later period.  Using the sides of hills and ridges may have also meant that the tombs didn't take up important agricultural lands. There were also prohibitions on sacrifices to the dead.  For one thing, nobody was permitted to sacrifice themselves through strangulation—which apparently had been a thing even though we are told that human sacrifice was prohibited back in the time of Mimaki Iribiko, and the reason that haniwa were invented.  You also weren't allowed to sacrifice someone's horse or bury valuables along with the dead.  These are all things that we see in the early mounded tomb culture, including burials in the Kara, or Gaya, region of the Korean peninsula, and we certainly find plenty of grave goods in the archipelago.  It makes me wonder if this is one of the reasons that painted tombs, like Kitora and Takamatsuzuka, were used, perhaps in place of more lavish grave goods going into the burial.  There was also a prohibition on an apparent custom where people would cut their hair and stab themselves in the thigh prior to pronouncing a eulogy.  Similar traditions are found elsewhere, often to emphasize that people were grieving the dead. And since you can't punish the dead, if there were any problems then it would be the dead person's relatives who would be punished, instead. Speaking of punishments, this starts to get into a part of the Taika reforms that really focuses on the various offenses that people were apparently committing and needed to be stopped.  It is unclear to me how often these offenses occurred, and in some cases I wonder if they were things that were actually happening or if they were carryovers from the continental tradition.  Still, I tend to come down on the idea that these were likely things that were actually happening, and didn't fit in with the social norms and values that Naka no Oe and his cohorts were attempting to put in place.  Some of these will likely resonate with us, today, but others are a bit more difficult to fully grasp. One of the things that is perhaps most difficult for us to grasp today is the concept of “harai”, which Aston translates as “purgation” and is most commonly translated, today, as “purification”.  “Harai” is an important concept in Shinto, and has been something that seems to have been there in some form from the earliest times. In Shinto there is a concept of “pollution” or “tsumi” that can occur, and it may or may not be something that a person has control over.  For example, blood and death are forms of pollution—which also means that, by extension, birth also includes pollution in the form of blood.  “Tsumi” can also be something that occurs because of things that a person does, where they break the social mores or norms.  A number of examples are contained in the stories provided during the Age of the Gods.  In particular, you can see in the tales of Izanagi and Izanami, where Izanagi, coming back from the land of the dead, dips himself into the ocean to wash away any impurities—any pollution.  We talked about that back in episode 14.  In episode 15, we talked about some of the not-so-great actions of Susano'o.  Some of these, like the backwards flaying of the colt and flinging it through the roof of his sister's building is somewhat obvious.  But then there were things like moving the stakes delineating the rice fields, or letting livestock in to trample the young growth.  Those were some other examples of tsumi that were part of the many things that got him kicked out of Takamagahara, the High Plain of Heaven. An important thing here is that tsumi is not necessarily about a person's intentions, motives, nor responsibility.  For all types of tsumi, some form of harai, or purification, is called for.  Today, there are various ceremonies that can be performed by Shinto priests to help remove the effects of tsumi, and that seems to have been the case back in the Kofun and Asuka periods as well, but there was a catch: it wasn't without costs.  And apparently those costs could be significant—significant enough that it was almost like a kind of punishment.  Aston suggests that harai could include various payments, perhaps seen as a kind of sacrifice, but that could be more than some people could afford.  If we look back on the story of Susano'o, he had to have his hair and nails cut as part of his penance—his harai.  There is also some thought that this may have just been a literal payment to the community, like a fine.  I would note that “harai” can mean either purification or payment, depending on the kanji used.  So just keep that in mind when we talk about “harai”. Now here are some of the things that, according to the new edicts, people were to stop doing. First, there were people who saw or heard something—presumably something important—and yet they wouldn't say anything.  That wasn't going to fly anymore.  So I guess this is the pro-snitching rule—if you see something, say something. Then there were enslaved people who apparently would leave poor masters to find someone wealthier to serve, hoping to improve their lot.  Again, this was right out.  We are reminded that Yamato was a slave-holding society, and they weren't going to allow that. On the other hand, the new rules also put a stop to husbands who would dismiss their wives and then, when the wives remarried, try to make a claim on the new husband's property.  Similarly, there were some men who demanded a family's daughter for his wife, but before they consummate the marriage, she marries someone else.  In some of those cases, the men would, again, make demands on the property of the new husband's family as well as the wife's family.  The new edict put that strictly out of bounds. Following on a theme of women and marriage: there was a tradition in some places that widows who, when they married after 10 or 20 years, or even unmarried women got married for the first time, they would be forced by the community to pay for some kind of “harai”.  This, along with the other practice mentioned, was forbidden.  No longer would they have to pay for getting married. Now in some cases, it looks like men who wanted to divorce their wives wouldn't just let them out of the arrangement. Rather, they would sell their wives into slavery—another thing that the new edicts said would no longer be tolerated. And then there was the case of a man who believed his wife was having an affair.  In that case he now had to obtain at least three credible witnesses before bringing it up to the authorities.  One presumes this was to protect women from men simply making a baseless claim with no proof.  Not that a determined man couldn't find—or even bribe—three witnesses to come forward and accuse his wife, but it at least upped the ante a little bit.  Whether this was to provide protection to women or whether it was just to reduce the amount of work on government officials who would have to investigate and come to a decision isn't exactly clear. I would note that while many of these new rules were coming down on the side of protecting women, to some degree, there is still a very heavy patriarchal bias demonstrated throughout. In addition to all the information on marital affairs,  there were a few other, unrelated issues, but all of them were connected to the need to do harai.  And now we come back to our story about poor Maro and Sumi from the beginning of the episode: let's say a man, finishing his forced labor, is returning back when he falls ill on the road and dies in some village.  According to established traditions, the people there could then require his companions or even family members to perform harai—presumably meaning that they would have to pay the village something or at least pay for the ritual cleansing, to compensate for the tsumi that the death caused.  Similarly, if someone were to drown, his companions would be held responsible.  Even if someone were to stop and cook rice by the roadside while traveling, they could be made to perform harai.  And the harai for all of this was so onerous that we are told that even a younger brother might completely ignore the body of his elder brother, just to avoid being associated with him and thus forced to perform harai. In all of these cases, the edict said that this would no longer be acceptable.  You couldn't just put the squeeze on someone to perform harai just because their companion happened to pass away. Being on the road and traveling—especially for official government service—was clearly something that was on their mind.  Moving on from the list of things that were to be discontinued without exception, there were a few other cases that were dealt with in the same edict. First, there was the case where peasants, heading to the capital, would leave their horses with someone in Owari or Mikawa, for example.  They would leave cloth and bundles of hemp as payment for the person to look after their horses, and even procure a spade as a gift when they returned.  However, when they got back, they would find that their horse had died, or else the horse had been sold, but the owner was told it had died.  The last trick, if it was a mare, was to get the mare pregnant and then claim that the pregnancy had polluted their house, therefore the owner would have to do harai, meaning that the horse usually ended up staying with the person who was supposed to be holding onto it. The solution was to use the new bureaucracy.  The owner and the person who agreed to keep the horse would make their statement to the village elder and the owner would hand over the renumeration to the elder as the third party.  This payment would be held by the elder until the owner returned, at which point it was handed over to the person who had kept the horse.  This way the person keeping the horse knew that he would be paid for his troubles, but only if the horse was still around when the owner returned. So they effectively invented the concept of escrow.  I suspect that such a system could be applied to many other such endeavors as well, where there was otherwise no guarantee of payment at the end of a task nor guarantee that the task would completed as agreed if they got the money up front. Besides that, the edict also had a short note about dues payable to Market Commissioners for main roads and to ferrymen—likely various fees.  Instead, these kinds of positions would be granted rice-land which could be cultivated and they could receive a stipend from that. Finally, during the key agricultural months, everybody was to be working on cultivating rice-land.  The edict specifically calls out that they should not eat dainty food nor drink sake, I suspect because dainty food wouldn't give you enough energy and drinking sake would impair your ability in the field.  Each quarter, the Kuni no Miyatsuko were to send messengers to remind the people of this edict—a kind of human public service announcement. So all of that was part of an edict on the 22nd day of the 3rd month of 646.  I am not sure that there is a clear theme to all of it, other than calling out old practices and describing how things would be done from here on out.  There is clearly a concern with harai and how it would affect people's willingness to do the right thing. The next set of pronouncements would come almost five months later, and a lot of that had to do with names, as well as further work on the creation of the government bureaucracy, but that is going to take a lot more time, and so I think that for now we'll end this here:  The link between the state and laborers has been changed, the tomb-building has been strictly regulated, and a series of rather specific pronouncements and prohibitions has been issued. And so, until next time, thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website, SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

el 7 de agosto de 1942, los norteamericanos desembarcan en las Salomón, es el comienzo de la campaña de Guadalcanal y la amenaza a la base japonesa de Rabaul, estos no iban a dejar que el desembarco se produjera sin combate. El Almirante Mikawa encabezaría una operación naval nocturna contra los grupos navales norteamericanos, Savo, fue una de las mayores victorias japonesas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Con Sergio Murata y colaboración de Esaú Rodríguez Si quieres disfrutar de esta serie al completo y ayudar al proyecto de Niebla de Guerra Podcast, dale al botón azul de APOYAR que verás en el episodio. Es posible de 1,49€, os lo agradecemos de antemano, mil gracias Si quieres contratar publicidad o episodios patrocinados en este podcast 👉 https://advoices.com/niebla-de-guerra-podcast quizás quieras publicitar libros, viajes, recreaciones, vestuario o deporte, entonces este es tu podcast Musica intro: Fallen Soldier,licencia gratuita, de Biz Baz Estudio Licencia Creative Commons Fuentes: Bates, Richard W. (1950). «The Battle of Savo Island, August 9, 1942. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Part I» Audios y música: Audios de la época. Productora: Vega Gónzalez Director /Colaborador: Sergio Murata Espero que os guste y os animo a suscribiros, dar likes, y compartir en redes sociales y a seguirnos por facebook y/o twitter. Recordad que esta disponible la opción de Suscriptor Fan , donde podréis acceder a programas en exclusiva. Podéis opinar a través de ivoox, en twitter @Niebladeguerra1 y ver el material adicional a través de facebook https://www.facebook.com/sergio.murata.77 o por mail a niebladeguerraprograma@hotmail.com Telegram Si quieres acceder a él sigue este enlace https://t.me/niebladeguerra Además tenemos un grupo de conversación, donde otros compañeros, podcaster ,colaboradores y yo, tratamos temas diversos de historia, algún pequeño juego y lo que sea, siempre que sea serio y sin ofensas ni bobadas. Si te interesa entrar , a través del canal de Niebla de Guerra en Telegram, podrás acceder al grupo. También podrás a través de este enlace (O eso creo ) https://t.me/joinchat/Jw1FyBNQPOZtEKjgkh8vXg NUEVO CANAL DE YOUTUBE https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCaUjlWkD8GPoq7HnuQGzxfw/featured?view_as=subscriber BLOGS AMIGOS https://www.davidlopezcabia.es/ con el escritor de novela bélica David López Cabia https://www.eurasia1945.com/ Del escritor e historiador, Rubén Villamor Algunos podcast amigos LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA https://www.ivoox.com/biblioteca-de-la-historia_sq_f1566125_1 https://blog.sandglasspatrol.com/ blog especializado en temas de aviación Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

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Link to bioRxiv paper: http://biorxiv.org/cgi/content/short/2023.03.27.534352v1?rss=1 Authors: Cai, P., Casas, C. J., Hua, L. L., Mikawa, T. Abstract: Individual homologous chromosomes are spatially segregated into haploid chromosome sets along the centrosome axis in an antipairing configuration. Disruption of the antipairing pattern occurs in cancer cells. However, little is known about how this spatial organization of chromosomes is established or maintained. Here, we report that there is a zone of diminished interchromosomal linkage and centromere components between haploid sets in primary and established human epithelial cell lines. Using 4-Dimensional live cell imaging analysis of centromere and centrosome tracking, we show ipsilateral restriction of chromosome oscillations along the diminished zone, coincident with the centrosome and apical-basal axis from mitosis onset to G1 interphase. We propose a biophysical model of axis-dependent ipsilateral restriction of chromosome oscillations for haploid set organization. Copy rights belong to original authors. Visit the link for more info Podcast created by Paper Player, LLC

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrineUS Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy's battleship, battle line.  While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor's heads. For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941. The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance.  Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that's what they were supposed to do. The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting.     Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN.       It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII.  During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully.  Advances in weaponry and technologyDue to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30'sNearly wakelessOxygen fueled1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knotsSuperior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiorityThe USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks. The Japanese respond to the American landingsThe first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7. His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.Mikawa's orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa's force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for GuadalcanalHe launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the areaOne of Aoba's scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off TulagiWith this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strengthMikawa's plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards Allied preparationAmerican air searches located Mikawa's force as it was moving southFirst found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID'd as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading westSeen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SEUS Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degreesS-38's report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th  as they slipped through the aerial net.Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to complySighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa's force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack.  The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass. British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense.  He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in at night.The southern group consisted of the CAs Australia, Canberra, and Chicago along with DDs Bagley and PattersonThe northern group consisted of CAs Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria with DDs Helm and Wilson.A picket line consisting of 2 DDs, Talbot and Blue were to utilize radar to detect any incoming ships Crutchley's plan for defense had several gaping holes, including a lack of clear orders for a night time defense and an assumption that everybody knew what everyone else was doing, when in fact, no one did. Also, there were no flag officers aboard any of the US ships in the northern groupA Captain can't fight his ship and command a TF at the same time… The battle begins (South of Savo)At 2312 Mikawa sent cruiser search planes aloft to illuminate the shipping with flares.Float planes reported 3 CAs off Savo2400 Mikawa formed his ships and increased speed to 26 knotsAt 0050 Savo was sighted and 3 minutes later Mikawa's lookouts sighted the picket DD Blue and evaded herMikawa's entire force slipped past the picket DDs without being seen Lookouts aboard the CA Chokai sighted 3 CAs off the starboard bowMikawa ordered his ships to “independently fire”At 0138 4 long lances were launched at the same time lookouts spotted Vincennes visually at a range of 18,000 yardsAt 0143Chokai opened fire with her main battery on the HMAS CanberraShortly before Chokai opened fire, Canberra's lookouts spotted the enemy at 4500 yards dead aheadCanberra was put into a turn as to allow her main battery to fire, but before her main battery was even manned, she was hit by over 24 8 inch shells fired from 4 Japanese heavy cruisers.By 0150 Canberra slowed to a stop and was burning amidships Aboard USS Chicago, flashes were seen as torpedoes were launched as well as aircraft flares and Canberra swinging out of line to presumably open fireAstoundingly, none of this was put together as an enemy threatChicago's CO Bode reached the bridge shortly before his ship was struck by a torpedo.Seemingly blind to the gunfire erupting around him, Bode could not find anything to shoot at initiallyHer secondary battery opened fire and hit at least one ship, TenryuBode immediately withdrew westwards, leaving the transports he was assigned to protect wide open to any enemy attack.Worse yet, he neglected to report his contact with the enemyThis is inexcusable and without doubt, caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans and resulted in the sinking of another 3 CAs The one bright spot, if there is one here, is that the DD Patterson, whose skipper, CDR Frank Walker was keenly aware of Japanese ships in the area, fought like a lion.Patterson tried to warn Canberra and Chicago of the Japanese ships by blinker light but it apparently went unseenWalker himself issued warnings over TBS but they were either ignored or unheardPatterson engaged in a gun duel with Tenryu and Yubari, illuminating them and zig zagging to avoid their fire.Patterson took a hit that disabled her after 5 inch guns, but returned to the fight hitting a Japanese CA.  Finally receiving orders to withdraw and cover the transports, only then did Patterson give up the fight The Northern debacleMikawa turns north and heads for the northern group of heavy cruisers after destroying the southern group in a span of 7 minutesAstonishingly, the Northern group STILL does not know that the enemy is closing USS Vincennes under the command of CAPT Riefkohl is leading the groupRiefkohl has his ship at condition 2, not GQ, he himself is asleep as are all of the CAPT aboard the CAsRiefkohl supposedly believed that the Japanese would attack that night but failed to share his thoughts with the other CAPTs.  As CO of the Northern Group, he is at fault for this lack of preparedness At 0144, watches aboard all CAs felt underwater explosions (Japanese torpedoes exploding on Southern Group), but assumed them to be anti-sub opsAt 0145 watches saw gunfire and flares from the south but failed to put two and two together Riefkohl is summoned to the bridge but due to rain and mist, could not see the southern group or what was happeningNo contact reports were given to himAt 0150 searchlights illuminated his 3 CAsHe thought this was the southern group and did nothing to counterAt 0151 the Japanese opened fire on Astoria, followed by Vincennes and Quincy, which was the first ship hit.     Aboard Astoria, the ship was not at GQ, but the gunnery officer, after having witnessed shell fire and flashes, ordered the main battery to commence firing.CAPT Greenman arrived on the bridge, ordered cease fire and then resumed fire.  Astoria was quickly hit in the hangar and the fire that started made her a beacon for Japanese gunfireFor ten (ish) minutes, Astoria was the focus of Aoba, Kinugasa, and Chokai's main batteryMost of Asty's guns were disabled, her comms was wiped out and fires were all over the shipAsty fired one last salvo that knocked out Chokai's forward main battery turretAstoria then she slid to a halt afire from stem to stern Aboard Quincy fires were seen to the south, gunfire was heard and her radr picked up Japanese ships.  CAPT Moore ordered the main battery to open fire, but they were not readyHit by several shells, Quincy was afire due to her SOC airplanes and avgas in her hangar.As a result, she was bracketed and caught in a crossfire and veered out of lineAt 0204 she was hit by 2 torpedoes on the port sideAt 0216, with her CAPT dead and most of her bridge crew dead, she was hit by another torpedo and began to sink Aboard Vincennes, Riefkohl, now finally alert to the situation, ordered open fire, but his ship was hit in the hangar, and it too like her sisters served as a flaming beacon for Japanese gunnersVincennes was hit by a torpedo, then another and a third, killing everyone in the #1 fireroom and opening the ship's bottom up The battle endsBy 0216 Mikawa's victory was complete, and fear of American airpower caused Mikawa to turn tail and leave the area without engaging (and destroying) the transports nearby ADM Turner stopped unloading the transports at 0145, but stayed another day (WITHOUT AIR COVER) to finish what he could before he had to withdraw the transports Turner requested air cover from Fletcher who was still running away at 0641 and received his answer in a roundabout way when he intercepted a message from Fletcher to Ghormley essentially saying that Fletcher was out and Turner was now the force commander around GCanal.Pitiful Mikawa had utterly destroyed the Allied fleet in a stunning and aggressive actionHis victory was flawed in that had he attacked and sank the transports, which he easily could have, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been OVER right then.What could have been… 1,077 Allied sailors were killed, a further 700 were wounded with the loss of 4 heavy cruisersJapanese casualties were 129 killed, and 85 wounded, no sinkings The US concealed the defeat from the public until October Implications on the campign…

H-Hour Guadalcanal American intel assumed that the bulk of the Japanese were on Guadalcanal, specifically along Lunga PointEstimated 5,000 men5th Marines secured the beachhead, 1st Marines passed through them and headed for “Grassy Knoll”It was assumed there would be heavy defensive fire on the beachesThe landing on Guadalcanal could not have gone any better, as virtually no opposition was encounteredThe beach head was a jumbled mess of supplies as there were not enough marines nearby, or sailors, to unload the supplies.Marines pressed inland and encountered the jungle for the first time TulagiAbout 2 miles long ½ mile wide.  Japanese garrison was the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, about 350 menMarines that assaulted Tulagi, Florida, Gavutu/Tanambogo were:1st Raiders1/22/51st Parachute Btln.The first boots on the ground belonged to 1/2 who landed at Florida island. Initially, resistance was nill until the Raiders hit phase line A where they ran into stiff defenses. Japanese embedded themselves in cavesHarbinger of future defensive efforts throughout the PacificThe night of August 7-8, the Japanese counterattacked on Tulagi, breaking marine lines in one point.By morning, those Japanese had all been killed Good personal stories of the Raiders? Gavutu/TanambogoAssigned to the 1st Parachute Battalion, numbering some 397 menFacing the Paras were over 500 JapaneseHeavy Japanese resistance caused many casualties among the ParasBy nightfall, neither island had been secured and Marine casualties had been very heavyParas requested reinforcements for morning assaultReinforcements sent in, but the landing was a failure because of enemy fireLanded near the causeway insteadLike on Tulagi, the Japanese holed up in caves and had to be blasted outTalk about Angus Goss (An explosion was the sweetest music conceivable)Talk about Harry TorgersonBlew up caves using dynamiteOne blast was so close that it blew the majority of his pants off of his body, exposing most of his ass surrounded by shredded pants.Hence the name “Raggedy Assed Marines”The conversation supposedly went, “Captain you done tore your pants!”  “Screw the pants!  Get me more dynamite!”Awarded a Silver Star for this actionThe islands were finally captured, most Japanese were killed at the loss of 70 KIA and 87 WIATotal casualties for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo were 122 KIA for USMC and 863 KIA for the Japanese Air RaidOnce the landings were revealed to be an invasion and not a raid, Yamamoto ordered a “decisive counterattack”While the IJN would respond off Savo within 24 hours, the first “decisive counterattack” came by air53 aircraft were involved in the initial air attackMixture of Betty's, Zeroes and ValsOnly 12 F4Fs were aloft to intercept the incoming raidersSaburo SakaiAttacked SBDs from CV6Got creased in the head from a rear seat gunner in one of the SBDsThe wound left Sakai blind in his right eye, his left side was paralyzed, and his Zero was shot to piecesSakai losing blood quickly, fought off death by punching himself in his wound to stay conscious, and managed to steer his crippled airplane the 565 miles back to Rabaul The raid achieved nothing in terms of stopping the landing, but it did deprive the Americans of most of their fighter contingent from the CVs, thus compelling Fletcher to pull his CVs back away from Canal as he did not have the fighter capability to withstand another attack by torpedo carrying Betty's (or so he thought anyway) Pulling his CVs back put them out of reach for proper patrols the next day, which could have spotted Mikawa's force coming south to destroy the Allied force in what would be Savo Island TenaruBy the time the Tenaru battle unfolded, the Marines had been ashore for 3 weeksNo serious Japanese counterattacks had yet been made against CanalOn August 10, plans had been drawn up to send forces to Guadalcanal to expel the invadersOne of the units selected was the 28th Infantry Regiment, under COL Kiyoano IchikiDue to poor intel, a lack of Allied naval activity or aerial presence on Guadalcanal, the Japanese thought that the majority of Americans had been withdrawn from GuadalcanalWho was Ichiki?Known expert in infantry tacticsCommanded rifle units in ChinaHis actions are said to have started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, often marked as the beginning of WWIIVery headstrong, was slated to land at MidwayBelieved that the sword and night tactics of traditional Japanese infantry could and would best any defensive positions he may encounter Ichiki Detachment numbered some 900 men The Battle begins2/1 had set up their positions in the days before the attack Myth says that they set up their positions only hours before the attack because of Jacob Vouza's warningDispel the myth of Vouza here Dug in MG positions manned by H/2/1 and rifle positions manned by G/2/1 stretched from the ocean front down “stream” on the west bank of the river Marines had 1917 water cooled MGs, some 50 caliber weapons, and several 37mm anti-tank weapons, at least two of which were supplied with canister shot Ichiki's plan was to essentially march down the beach, and assault the Marine positions, eventually capturing the airfield and a further position around Lunga Attack and AnnihilationInitial contact was made shortly after midnight, with scattered rifle shots between Marine Ops and Ichiki's van Around 0200 the first wave of Japanese troops came crashing across the sand bar This wave was met by strong defensive fire from MGs, 37s, and artilleryWave was essentially wiped out after a few broke through into Marine lines and engaged in hand to handAt least three more waves of attackers hit the Marine lines only to be slaughtered by withering fireJohnny Rivers, Diamond and Al SchmidFrank Pomroy Marine artillery walked itself down the Japanese side of the river and collected in a grove where it presumably broke up another potential assault.Following this, the Japanese holed up on their side of the river and a firefight ensued all night longThe following morning, elements of 1/1 crossed the river and flanked what was left of Ichiki's unitSlowly, the Marines closed the trap around Ichiki, forcing the survivors to dart across the coconut grove or into the sea where they were killed by riflemen M3 tanks under the command of Lt Leo Case crossed the sand bar and turned into the coconut grove eliminating what was left of the enemy Over 777 dead Japanese littered the field of battle 1 surrendered, and 12 wounded were taken prisoner Marine losses were around 44 KIA and 71 WIA Implications on the CampaignJapanese refusal to surrender informed the Marines how the war would be fought from here on Wounded Japanese tried to kill those attempting to help themRather die than surrender CLOSER:1st Mar Div report of Tulagi Operation:“The combat assumed the nature of a storming operation from the outset, a soldier's battle, unremitting and relentless, to be decided only by the extermination of one or the other of the adversaries engaged.” 

こんにちは。 ジェニのピカピカ日本語へようこそ。 今日は10月15日、16日の二日間に行われる名古屋祭りについてお伝えいたします。 パンデミックによって過去2年間中止されていたので3年ぶりの開催になります。 日本の戦国時代に尾張、三河の地盤から日本を統一して行った、日本の歴史で最も有名な織田信長・豊臣秀吉・徳川家康の三英傑が約600人を従えて行進する郷土英傑行列がハイライトのお祭りです。 どのようなお祭りか、Podcastでご確認ください。 Hello. Welcome to Jenni's Pika Pika Japanese. Today I would like to tell you about the Nagoya Festival that will be held on October 15 and 16. This will be the first time in 3 years since it was cancelled for the past 2 years due to a pandemic. The highlight of the festival is the local heroes' procession in which about 600 people march with the three most famous heroes in Japanese history, Nobunaga Oda, Hideyoshi Toyotomi, and Ieyasu Tokugawa, who unified Japan from the ground of Owari and Mikawa in the Warring States Period. Please check out the podcast to find out what kind of festival it is. Hola. Bienvenido a Jenni's Pika Pika Japanese. Hoy me gustaría hablarles del Festival de Nagoya, que se celebrará durante dos días, el 15 y el 16 de octubre. Será la primera vez en tres años que se celebre el festival, ya que los dos últimos años se canceló debido a una pandemia. El punto culminante del festival es la procesión de los héroes locales, en la que unas 600 personas desfilan con los tres héroes más famosos de la historia japonesa, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi y Tokugawa Ieyasu, que unificaron Japón desde el terreno de Owari y Mikawa en el periodo de los Estados en Guerra. Descubra cómo es el festival en nuestro podcast.

La palabra japonesa shinkansen significa literalmente "nueva linea troncal". Dicho así, parece muy raro. Pero si te digo que se refiere al famoso tren-bala de japón y su red ferroviaria, se entiende algo mejor. 🚄 De esta palabrita viene un efecto. La explicación es algo que dijo un tal Mikawa: “Si quieres que un tren vaya 10 kilómetros por hora más rápido, añade más caballos de fuerza al motor, pero si necesitas que pase de 150 a 300, tienes que pensar completamente diferente”. 😲 Hoy hablamos de cómo usar el efecto shinkansen para gestionar crisis. ------------------------- Recuerda que ya puedes apuntarte a la academia de desarrollo personal EfectiVida en efectivida.es 👍 ¡Ah! Y para los que se anoten antes de que la academia comience habrá regalo. 😘🎁 ----------------------- En EfectiVida hablamos de efectividad, sin olvidar las cosas importantes de la vida. 🏠 Tienes un montón más de contenidos en mi casa: efectivida.es 🗣 Y si quieres estar al tanto de todas las novedades y formar parte de una comunidad donde se juntan más de 2.500 frikies de la efectividad, te invito a entrar al canal de Telegram: https://t.me/efectivida

Take the Meitetsu Mikawa Line from Chiryu to Hekinan. The Mikawa Line is located in Chiryu and is divided into north and south, so this is commonly known as the line that passes through the sea. Actually, the river spreads to the full width, but it is a trading port as Kinuura Port. 知立から碧南まで名鉄三河線に乗ります。 三河線は知立で南北に系統が分かれているので、こちらは通称海を通る路線とされています。 実際は川が幅いっぱいに広がっていますが、きぬうら港として貿易港となっています。 --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/djr-kamochan/message

Probably the question I get asked the most is: “How did you end up Buddhist?” And I get it! Coming from a Christian family in small-town Texas, Tibetan Buddhism isn't where you might think I'd end up finding my spiritual home. But here we are! And Kyohei (whose channel is great! link below) grew up Japanese but wasn't seriously drawn to practice until he was in college, too. We were both drawn in by teachings on emptiness and dependent origination – and maybe we both had previous lives that gave us certain predispositions in this lifetime. Check out Kyohei's channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/Wagenai5 Start learning about Buddhism with my free mini-course on the Four Noble Truths: https://bit.ly/4NTsBuddh May you and all beings be well. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/buddhist-wisdom/message

Kyohei and I continued our conversation about Buddhism, pop culture, and philosophy. In this episode, he asks me about my earlier video on the 1999 Keanu Reeves film The Matrix, and I get nerdy about Tibetan epistemology (the study of how we know what we know). Check out Kyohei's channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/Wagenai5 Start learning about Buddhism with my free mini-course on the Four Noble Truths: https://bit.ly/4NTsBuddh May you and all beings be well. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/buddhist-wisdom/message

My new friend and PhD student in the University of Chicago's Divinity School Kyohei Mikawa explains the ideas of the immanent and transcendent in the philosophy of religion and how they apply to Buddhism. Then we use those terms to talk about our two fields of interest and expertise… and how they relate to The Matrix! Along the way, Kyohei will also explain the Lotus Sutra (which is very famous and important for Mahayana Buddhism) and how his practices based on it help him live a happier life. Even when it comes to dealing with rude drivers! Find all of Kyohei's videos applying the Lotus Sutra to modern life: https://bit.ly/kyoheilotus And connect with him on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/kevinmccauer/ Get my free intro course on the Four Noble Truths: https://bit.ly/4NTsBuddh May you and all beings be well. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/buddhist-wisdom/message

Ieyasu Tokugawa daimyo of the Tokugawa clan arrive thousands of miles away from their home of Mikawa to the shore of Egypt. Why are they there? What do they want? Voice actors: Marcial Williamson: JinJuro - @the_cookiemonster89 Jeff Girmus: Ieyasu Tokugawa:@jeffgirmus Kimi Girmus: Egyptian commander J.Lee: Hanzo Hattori, Kotaro Fuma, Egyptian Scout, Elder, Egyptian King - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdnSId9xaNfLDmOIJx4v9Lg Twitter - @JaawellF Facebook - @JLee916 IG- @pro_black_af Nadir Mohamed: Narration -@naydarnj15 sounds effects: zapsplat.com background music and sound effects

Den japanska vice amiralen Mikawa har lyckats undvika upptäckt och börjar närma sig Guadalcanal där de amerikanska fartygen ligger på redden. Amerikanska flottstyrkan anar ingenting och förbeder sig inför natten. Besluten om hur fartygen skulle bemannas visar sig bli ödesdigra.

Alyssa Keene interviews Jack Straw New Media Gallery artists Garrett Fisher and Tori Ellison about their installation Mikawa. The post Garrett Fisher and Tori Ellison New Media Gallery interview appeared first on Jack Straw Cultural Center.

Alyssa Keene interviews Jack Straw New Media Gallery artists Garrett Fisher and Tori Ellison about their installation Mikawa.

Alyssa Keene interviews Jack Straw New Media Gallery artists Garrett Fisher and Tori Ellison about their installation Mikawa.

Jack Straw resident artist Garrett Fisher‘s CD of The Iris was produced through the Jack Straw Artist Support Program and will be released this month via 16 Visions. The Iris is also part of Fisher and Tori Ellison‘s New Media Gallery installation Mikawa. We’ll celebrate the opening of the installation and release of the CD […]

Jack Straw resident artist Garrett Fisher's CD of the Iris was produced through the Jack Straw Artist Support Program and will be released this month via 16 Visions. The Iris is also part of Fisher and Tori Ellison's New Media Gallery installation Mikawa. We'll celebrate the opening of the installation and release of the CD at Jack Straw on Friday, September 29th. Find more information on the CD and installation at https://www.fisherensemble.org/iris

This is part 2 of 2 of our Battle of Nagashino podcast. Few battles in Japanese history are as hyped or misunderstood as the Battle of Nagashino. For over 400 years, an iconic image of the modern forces of Oda Nobunaga, using Western guns to destroy the traditional Takeda cavalry, held sway over interpretations by both Japanese and Western historians. The Battle of Nagashino took place on 29 June, 1575. The campaign occurred in Mikawa province, in the vicinity of Nagashino Castle, hence the name. However, the main engagement that came to be known as the Battle of Nagashino took place at Shitaragahara, approximately three kilometers from Nagashino Castle. We continue our discussion of the battle of Nagashino and the "Military Revolution" theory adopted by many Western historians including Delmer Brown and Geoffrey Parker. We also look at the primary and secondary sources for the battle of Nagashino, and look into the history of guns in Japan, and their importance in Japanese warfare of the time. Support the podcast on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/samuraiarchives Mentioned in this podcast: The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98 By Delmer M. Brown, The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (May, 1948), pp. 236-253 Guns and Government: A Comparative Study of Europe and Japan By Stephen Morillo, Journal of World History, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 75-106 The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 By Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge University Press  Baxter, James C. and Joshua A. Fogel, ed. Paul Varley Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare Writing Histories In Japan. International Research Center for Japanese Studies Kyoto 2007  Support this podcast: Shop Amazon.com, suport the podcast: http://amzn.to/wnDX2j Samurai Archives Bookstore: http://astore.amazon.com/samurai-20 Samurai Archives Shop (T-Shirts, etc) http://www.cafepress.com/samuraiarchives Contact Us: Twitter @SamuraiArchives https://twitter.com/#!/samuraiarchives Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Samurai-Archives/104533213984 Samurai Archives podcast blog: http://www.samuraipodcast.com Samurai Archives Forum: http://www.japanhistoryforum.com

Few battles in Japanese history are as hyped or misunderstood as the Battle of Nagashino. For over 400 years, an iconic image of the modern forces of Oda Nobunaga, using Western guns to destroy the traditional Takeda cavalry, held sway over interpretations by both Japanese and Western historians. The Battle of Nagashino took place on 29 June, 1575. The campaign occurred in Mikawa province, in the vicinity of Nagashino Castle, hence the name. However, the main engagement that came to be known as the Battle of Nagashino took place at Shitaragahara, approximately three kilometers from Nagashino Castle. The main forces were the Takeda, led by Takeda Katsuyori, on one side, and a partnership between Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu on the other. The Takeda were centered in Kai province, and controlled parts of Shinano, Totomi, and Suruga provinces. The Tokugawa directly bordered them in Mikawa and Totomi provinces to the south and west; they were the junior partner in an alliance with the Oda, who controlled most of central Japan from his headquarters in Mino at Gifu Castle. This included control of the Imperial capital, Kyōto. The Takeda besieged the Tokugawa castle of Nagashino. A relief force composed of the combined armies of the Tokugawa clan and the Oda clan arrived and deployed on the Shitaragahara field. Despite being heavily outnumbered, Takeda Katsuyori decided to attack. This decision proved disastrous, as the Takeda charges were repulsed by the combined Oda and Tokugawa forces making significant use of arquebus fire from behind loosely constructed palisades. The Takeda retreated, and lost two-thirds of their force in the battle. The Takeda ceased to be a player on the national stage, and were eventually destroyed by Nobunaga and Ieyasu in 1582. The removal of the Takeda threat enabled Oda Nobunaga to concentrate on other threats to his consolidation of power around the Imperial capital of Kyoto. This sequence of events is universally accepted as fact, and is used by Western historians to support the "Military Revolution" theory - that gunpowder was the driving force of change and modernization in the world. This podcast is part one of two on the battle of Nagashino. Your hosts are Chris, Travis and Nate. Nate is currently researching the battle for graduate school, and is the facilitator of the podcast. We'll take you through the biases in the sources, the "accepted" history of the battle of Nagashino, and where this all fits in the context of the Military Revolution theory. Support the podcast on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/samuraiarchives Mentioned in this podcast: The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 By Geoffrey Parker, Cambridge University Press http://amzn.to/lmlBxU Baxter, James C. and Joshua A. Fogel, ed. Paul Varley Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare Writing Histories In Japan. International Research Center for Japanese Studies Kyoto 2007 http://bit.ly/mLNUtu Support this podcast: Shop Amazon.com, suport the podcast: http://amzn.to/wnDX2j Samurai Archives Bookstore: http://astore.amazon.com/samurai-20 Samurai Archives Shop (T-Shirts, etc) http://www.cafepress.com/samuraiarchives Contact Us: Twitter @SamuraiArchives https://twitter.com/#!/samuraiarchives Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Samurai-Archives/104533213984 Samurai Archives podcast blog: http://www.samuraipodcast.com Samurai Archives Forum: http://www.japanhistoryforum.com