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Play Episode Listen Later Oct 22, 2024 52:55

Last time we spoke about the Return to the Philippines. Admiral Halsey, in preparation for the Leyte invasion, devised a strategic ploy to lure the Japanese forces by feigning vulnerability. Despite significant air engagements and the heavy damage to two cruisers, Halsey's forces maintained control. Meanwhile, a massive convoy approached Leyte, and the Japanese launched a desperate counterattack. The battle severely depleted Japan's air strength, leading to the birth of the Kamikaze Corps. As Davison's carrier aircraft attacked, Japanese forces struggled due to bad weather and underestimated the Americans. General Terauchi activated Sho-Go 1, targeting Leyte, despite disagreements with General Yamashita. Pre-landing operations saw U.S. Rangers secure islands, while heavy bombardments prepared Leyte for invasion. MacArthur's forces landed amidst fierce resistance, capturing key positions. Though logistics were disorganized, U.S. troops gained ground, marking the beginning of a decisive battle in the Philippines, with the Japanese struggling to counter. This episode is the Battle of Leyte Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As previously mentioned, General MacArthur's forces successfully landed on Leyte, with General Sibert's 10th Corps landing in the Palo-Tacloban sector and General Hodge's 24th Corps at Dulag. In response, Admiral Toyoda activated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Admiral Kurita's 1st Striking Force to move to Brunei Bay and destroy enemy warships and transports in Leyte Gulf. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's 2nd Striking Force prepared to support counter-landings led by Vice-Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Southwest Area Fleet. The planning for Admiral Shima's small force was emblematic of the shambolic state of the IJN organization for the battle. His force was originally assigned to Ozawa as part of the Main Body. Then it was detached to go down to Formosa to mop-up Halsey's Third Fleet in the aftermath of the Battle off Formosa. Then it was assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet based in Manila to spearhead an envisioned counter-landing on Leyte. The commander of the Southwest Area Fleet, Admiral Mikawa, determined that the Shima force was not required to accomplish the counter-landing mission. On October 19 Toyoda rejected this and instructed Mikawa to use the Shima force as part of the counter-landing force. In spite of this and after confirming that the counter-landing operation did not require Shima's force, Mikawa sent orders to Shima on the afternoon of the 19th that he was not required to stand by to support the counter-landing. Early in the afternoon on October 21, the Combined Fleet again ordered Shima to take part in the transport mission and ordered his force to Manila. At this point, two forces were assigned to the counter-landing operation with a total of five cruisers and eight destroyers. This was a very questionable use of the Combined Fleet's limited resources. Kurita's 16th Cruiser Division was detached to reinforce the effort, and Admiral Ozawa's depleted Main Body was tasked with luring the enemy north, allowing Kurita to break through to the landing zone. Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main Body sortied from the Bungo Channel, at the southern entrance to the Inland Sea, on the afternoon of October 20, immediately after receiving the Combined Fleet battle order. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3d Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships (Ise, Hyuga), three light cruisers(Oyodo, Tama, Isuzu) and eight destroyers (31st Destroyer Squadron). At around 06:00 on 21 October, Japanese aircraft attempted to bomb the Allied ships in Leyte Bay. An Aichi D3A dive-bomber dove for Shropshire, but broke away after heavy anti-aircraft fire was directed at it. The Aichi, damaged by Bofors fire, turned and flew at low level up the port side of the nearby Australia, before striking the cruiser's foremast with its wingroot. Although the bulk of the aircraft fell overboard, the bridge and forward superstructure were showered with debris and burning fuel. Seven officers (including Captain Dechaineux) and twenty-three sailors were killed by the collision, while another nine officers (including Commodore Collins), fifty-two sailors, and an AIF gunner were wounded. Observers aboard Australia and nearby Allied ships differed in their opinions of the collision; some thought that it was an accident, while the majority considered it to be a deliberate ramming aimed at the bridge. Following the attack, commander Harley C. Wright assumed temporary control of the ship. Since Kurita lacked air cover, Tominaga's forces were regrouping in the Philippines to bolster Japanese air strength for Operation Sho-Go, while Admiral Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet was assembling in the Manila area. At the same time, with communication lost with General Makino's 16th Division.Because of the typhoon of October 17-18, signal communications were impossible. Roads were washed out and impassable. Bridges were down; and for about a week from the time the storm first hit the island, elements of the 16th Division were scattered and out of contact with one another. While trying to assemble its forces for operations, the Japanese were then hit by enemy bombardment, which further severely disrupted General Makino's radio-telegraphic communications. Additionally, the evacuation of Tacloban by the division rear echelon, which began early on October 20, necessitated the abandonment of permanent wireless installations and resulted in complete severance for 48 hours of all contact between the 16th Division and higher headquarters at Cebu and Manila. During this critical period, 14th Area Army and 35th Army were completely without knowledge of developments on Leyte. General Suzuki initiated the Suzu Plan, preparing the 41st Regiment and two battalions of the 102nd Division to move toward Ormoc. General Terauchi, having decided that the decisive battle would be fought at Leyte, directed General Yamashita to place the provisional Tempei Battalion and the 20th Antitank Battalion under Suzuki's command and ordered Lieutenant-General Yamagata Tsuyuo's 26th Division to prepare for early deployment to Leyte. Additionally, reinforcements from the 1st Division and the 68th Brigade, soon to arrive in the Philippines, were assigned to the 35th Army. The Japanese anticipated that the enemy would not move inland until the beachheads at Tacloban and Dulag were connected, so they aimed to gather reinforcements in the Carigara area before launching a major counteroffensive to crush the invading forces. In the meantime, Makino's 16th Division was tasked with holding off the enemy advance in eastern Leyte long enough to allow reinforcements to assemble. Reacting swiftly to the enemy landings, Makino sent the reserve 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment, and the 7th Independent Tank Company to strengthen the defenses at Palo and Dulag, respectively. General Krueger, however, intended to move quickly through Leyte Valley, aiming to secure key roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and mount a solid defense. The 1st Striking Force departed Lingga at 01:00 on October 18 and headed to Brunei Bay on the north coast of Borneo. At Brunei, Kurita's ships refuelled, and Kurita took the opportunity to confer with his officers. The details of Sho-1 reached Kurita's force during the day on October 18. This made for a dramatic conference and reflected the unease many felt about the plan. Many officers at the conference were appalled that the fleet was being risked attacking empty transports and doubted that they would ever get close to Leyte Gulf. Kurita probably had his own doubts about the plan, but after many of those present expressed their doubts, Kurita reminded them of the “glorious opportunity” they had been given. “Would it not be a shame to have the fleet remain intact while the nation perishes?” posed Kurita, and followed with the plea: “What man can say that there is no chance for our fleet to turn the tide of war in a decisive battle?” Whatever their doubts, the crews and ships of the 1st Striking Force departed Brunei at 08:00 on October 22 and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage. Kurita's 3rd Section—consisting of the old battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, heavy cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers—stayed behind. These ships departed at 15:00 and headed to the Balabac Strait and then into the Sulu Sea. If all went according to plan, they would storm Leyte Gulf through the Surigao Strait and meet Kurita's ships inside the gulf on the morning of October 25. To the north, General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division continued advancing northwest along San Juanico Strait, with the 7th Cavalry liberating Tacloban with minimal resistance. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments faced tougher opposition in the southwestern foothills, where Colonel Royce Drake was killed by enemy machine-gun fire, but they managed to secure Utap and Caibaan despite the swampy terrain. To the south, Colonel Aubrey Newman's 34th Regiment repelled a strong enemy counterattack, resulting in 600 Japanese casualties, before launching an assault on Hill 332. Although only the northern knoll was captured by nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment consolidated its position on Hill 522, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced towards Palo, with the 2nd successfully entering the town. Further south, Japanese artillery positioned on Catmon Hill targeted the beachhead area while General Bradley's 96th Division advanced. Colonel May's 1st Battalion attacked the Japanese positions at Labiranan Head, the remaining forces of the 383rd Regiment moved west to a point north of Tigbao, and Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment made slow progress towards Tigbao. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division, after repelling two minor tank attacks, began advancing west toward the Burauen airstrips, with the 32nd and 184th Regiments moving side by side. The 184th faced minimal opposition as it captured the Dulag airstrip and continued moving forward about 1000 yards beyond the beachhead, whereas the 32nd had to overcome several bunkers and pillboxes to reach its objective. The next day, both regiments continued their westward advance, with the 184th stopping after 2800 yards due to increased enemy resistance, waiting for the 32nd to close the gap. To the north, May's 1st Battalion secured Labiranan Hill and San Roque, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment advanced to Anibung to surround Catmon Hill, and the 382nd Regiment pushed through Tigbao and Canmangui. In response to these developments, Makino decided to reorganize his southern forces to better defend Catmon Hill and Burauen, with the 20th Regiment largely disengaging and retreating towards Hindang. Simultaneously, the 34th Regiment captured Hill 332, while Lieutenant-Colonel George Chapman's 19th Regiment defended Palo from strong enemy counterattacks. The 3rd Battalion managed to reach the town, allowing the 2nd Battalion to launch an attack towards Hill B, though it was unable to capture its crest. Further north, while the 7th Cavalry secured the hills around Tacloban, Brigadier-General William Chase's 1st Cavalry Brigade continued to face challenges advancing up the western foothills. In the morning, Kurita set sail from Brunei and headed northeast through the Palawan Passage, leaving Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shoji's Force C behind to advance through the Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. Taking the direct route along the west coast of Palawan, the 1st Striking Force was detected by submarines Darter and Dace in the early hours of October 23. After reporting the enemy task force to Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid, the submarines executed a coordinated attack at 06:10. The first torpedoes struck Atago just as Kurita was having morning tea with his chief of staff. In total, four torpedoes hit the cruiser, dooming her instantly. Nineteen officers and 341 sailors went down with the ship. Kurita and his staff were thrown into the water and had to swim for their lives. The second salvo from Darter hit cruiser Takao, steaming behind Atago. Two torpedoes hit the cruiser, killing 32 crewmen and wounding another 30. Takao was not only out of the battle, but her heavy damage put her out of the war. After eventually reaching Singapore, she was deemed unrepairable.On Dace, Claggett observed Darter's devastating attack. Claggett identified a Kongo-class battleship for attack and began his approach. Six torpedoes were fired from a range of 1,800 yards toward the target, which was actually heavy cruiser Maya. The cruiser took four hits on her port side and sank in a mere eight minutes, taking with her 16 officers and 320 men. Kurita narrowly escaped the sinking of the Atago, later transferring to the battleship Yamato after sending two destroyers to escort the damaged Takao back to Brunei. The submarines then endured ineffective counterattacks from Japanese destroyers, although Darter ran aground on a reef while pursuing Takao. This successful submarine attack not only diminished Kurita's force by three powerful cruisers but also provided the Americans with the location of the 1st Striking Force. In response, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group established a battle line across the mouth of Surigao Strait, and Halsey ordered his dispersed carrier groups to prepare for battle, recalling Task Group 38.4 immediately. Additionally, Vice-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa's 16th Cruiser Division, en route to Mindanao with the 41st Regiment for Ormoc, was tracked by submarine Bream near Manila Bay early on October 23. This led to a torpedo attack that critically damaged the heavy cruiser Aoba, forcing her to return to Japan, where she would never be operational again. Despite these challenges, the first reinforcement successfully arrived in Ormoc on the same day after an uneventful voyage. At the same time, the IJA and IJN air forces were rapidly assembling their resources in the Philippines in preparation for a coordinated air offensive set to begin on October 24, a day before the scheduled fleet attack. To the north, Ozawa's substantial but ineffective decoy force was positioned due east of Okinawa, moving south into the Philippine Sea, while Shima's 2nd Striking Force neared the Coron Islands. Back in Leyte, Krueger's offensive was advancing as well. In the north, the 8th Cavalry had moved through the 7th and successfully captured a bridge over the Diit River. On October 22, elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for General MacArthur. The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt. John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the 5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on October 23. President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth was also present, having come ashore for the occasion. A simple but impressive ceremony was held in front of the municipal building of Tacloban, though the interior of the edifice was a shambles of broken furniture and scattered papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers" was drawn up in front of the government building. General MacArthur broadcasted an address announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation. President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of American support and of the determination of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the national flags of the United States and the Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon of the guerrilla forces was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross. Few Filipinos except representatives of the local government were present for the ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had not heard of it, or did not know that they were permitted to attend. Information quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the civil population cheered them. The 1st Cavalry Brigade continued its slow advance through challenging terrain before being reassigned to support the overstretched 24th Division in its rear. Newman's 1st Battalion made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Hill Nan, and the 19th Regiment similarly failed to take Hill B. On the night of October 23 Col. Suzuki Tatsunosuke, the commanding officer of the 33rd Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest. Using Filipino civilians in front of them, the men of the detachment tricked the guards at the outpost into believing that they were guerrillas. The Japanese were thus able to capture two machine guns and a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town square and charged, throwing explosives into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke into an evacuation hospital where they killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured machine guns on it, firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the other side of the bridge, however, were able to fire upon the bridge and its approaches so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese, according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up, and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties were fourteen killed and twenty wounded. To the south, the 383rd Regiment secured the Guinarona River, while the 382nd conducted patrols. Even farther south, Arnold deployed the 17th Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Regiment and the 767th Tank Battalion, to push through his advance elements and continue the assault westward, with the other two regiments trailing 1000 yards behind. This "flying wedge" maneuver proved highly effective, with the infantry securing San Pablo airfield and the tanks advancing to the western edge of Burauen. They disrupted the disorganized enemy forces and killed Colonel Hokota Keijiro, commander of the 20th Regiment. Meanwhile, at sea, Kurita's intact warships advanced into Mindoro Strait by nightfall, while Nishimura's force was crossing the Sulu Sea. To the north, Ozawa's decoy force was deliberately broadcasting messages to draw enemy attention. Shima was also directed to penetrate Surigao Strait to support Nishimura's assault, as Mikawa had determined that the 2nd Striking Force was not needed for the counter-landing mission. On Leyte, the troops continued their engagement on October 24, unaware of the impending major naval battle. In the northern region, to secure San Juanico Strait and prevent Japanese reinforcements from Samar, the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry landed successfully at Babatngon; Troop C of the 8th Cavalry did the same at La Paz; and the rest of the 1st Squadron advanced to Guintiguian. By nightfall, these cavalry units had to repel a strong counterattack from the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, which was stationed in Samar. To the south, Newman's 1st Battalion secured Hills Nan and Mike; his 2nd Battalion fought its way to a small hill southeast of Hill C; Chapman's 2nd Battalion continued its unsuccessful assault on Hill B; and his Company K captured San Joaquin south of Palo. Further south, the 382nd Regiment pushed through Hindang, causing the 20th Regiment units to retreat, and also secured Anibung, while the 383rd Regiment began patrolling its area. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment, supported by the 184th, advanced along the road to Burauen, fought through the town, and began preparing for a push north to Dagami. Additionally, the 32nd Regiment attacked toward the Buri airstrip but was eventually forced to withdraw. At dawn on October 24, the crucial air phase of the Sho-Go plan began, with 200 aircraft of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets taking off from Clark Field to patrol the waters east of Luzon. At 08:20, Admiral Sherman's carriers were finally spotted, prompting the launch of three waves of Japanese aircraft for an attack. The first attack in the morning was intercepted by seven Hellcats from Essex led by Commander David McCampbell, the air group commander. The quality of the Japanese air crews was very low. McCampbell methodically proceeded to shoot down nine Japanese aircraft, for which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, and his wingman claimed six more. After the record action, he managed to return and land in extremis on Langley because the Essex's deck was too busy to accommodate him although he had run short of fuel. Altogether, aviators from Essex were credited with 24 downed enemy aircraft, and fighters from Lexington 13. Despite the Hellcats' rough handling of the incoming Japanese strike, fleet air defense was never airtight. At 0938hrs, one Judy divebomber used clouds for cover and then made a skillful attack against light carrier Princeton. The aircraft's 551lb bomb hit in the middle of the flight deck some 75ft forward of the aft elevator. It penetrated several decks to the ship's bakery, where it exploded. The resulting blast reached into the hangar deck where it engulfed six fully armed and fully fueled Avengers. These aircraft caught fire and soon exploded with a blast so powerful both ship's elevators were thrown into the air. Water pressure was knocked out, which allowed the flames to spread quickly. All non-essential personnel were ordered off the ship at 1010hrs, followed by all but the fire-fighting personnel ten minutes later. In response, the cruiser Birmingham came to Princeton's aid but sustained severe damage from a major explosion and had to retreat to Ulithi, leading to Princeton being scuttled later in the afternoon. The subsequent two waves of Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted, resulting in the loss of 67 Japanese planes by the end of the day. Meanwhile, Tominaga launched full-scale attacks on enemy invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf with minimal results. The failure to neutralize Halsey's carriers and Ozawa's undetected diversion mission allowed Admiral Mitscher to conduct a series of strikes against Kurita's force. That morning, American reconnaissance aircraft detected Kurita's 1st Striking Force south of Mindoro, prompting Admiral Bogan to dispatch 45 aircraft under Commander William Ellis to attack the battleships Yamato and Musashi as they neared the Sibuyan Sea. At approximately 10:30, aircraft from the Intrepid and Cabot began their attack. The lead group of Japanese ships included the huge Yamato and Musashi. Of these two, Musashi was nearest, so Commander Ellis selected her as the main target. He split the 12 Helldivers into two six-aircraft divisions to attack both battleships with their 1000lb bombs. The two nearest large ships were the subject of the Avengers' attack. Two were ordered to go after heavy cruiser Myoko and the other six were directed against Musashi. These were divided into two three-plane sections in order to execute an anvil attack. The four Avengers from Cabot were allocated against Yamato in the center of the formation. American pilots all remarked on the ferocity of the antiaircraft fire from the multi-colored 5in. bursts to the streams of tracers from the 25mm guns. The Japanese also used Type 3 incendiary shells from 18.1in. and 16in. main battery guns. Despite the spectacular appearances of this barrage, Japanese anti-aircraft fire was generally ineffective. The giant Type 3 shells proved totally ineffective, and Japanese records indicate that the battleships fired a relatively low number of 6in. and 5in. shells during each attack, indicating that the fire-control systems were taking too long to generate a targeting solution. These and the ubiquitous 25mm guns damaged many aircraft, but of the over 250 aircraft that attacked during the day, only 18 were shot down. Though the numbers confirm the ineffectiveness of IJN anti-aircraft fire, the American aviators displayed great courage pressing home their attacks through what was described as an impenetrable wall of flak. Musashi was hit with one torpedo, leading to flooding and listing, and another torpedo struck the cruiser Myoko, which had to return to Singapore. For most of the day, Musashi was the center of attention. Due to a fault in the design of her side belt, slow flooding entered the adjacent boiler room. The effect of some 3,000 tons of water was a 5.5° list, which was quickly reduced to a single degree by pumps in the affected boiler room and counterflooding on the opposite. Facing Musashi's intact antiaircraft batteries, one Avenger was shot down before it launched its torpedo and a second went down after deploying its weapon. The two Avengers that attacked Myoko were even more successful. At 1029hrs, one torpedo hit the heavy cruiser on her starboard side aft. Her propulsion system was damaged, and her top speed reduced to 15 knots. The cruiser fell astern of the formation. Kurita was forced to send her back to Singapore for repairs without destroyer escort. Since Myoko was the flagship of Sentai 5, at 1100hrs the commander transferred to cruiser Haguro. Myoko limped back to Singapore but was out of the war. Four of Kurita's heavy cruisers were out of the battle before they had a chance to engage an enemy ship. Cabot's small group of torpedo aircraft attacked Yamato, but the battleship dodged all torpedoes directed at her. Concurrently, Nishimura's fleet was located by an enhanced search operation from Admiral Davison's carriers. At 09:18, 16 Hellcats and 12 Avengers from the Enterprise attacked the Yamashiro and Fuso battleships, hitting the latter with two bombs, though the damage was minimal. Operating to the west of Nishimura was Shima's Second Striking Force and also in the area was Shima's detached Destroyer Division 21 with three ships, which was hurrying to rejoin Shima's main force after having completed a transport mission to Manila. Franklin's air group was assigned the northern sector of the Sulu Sea. It spotted the three ships of Shima's Destroyer Division 21 off Panay. Attacking high-speed destroyers was a challenge for any airman, but at 0813hrs Wakaba was hit by a bomb and several near misses. The damage proved fatal—45 minutes later, Wakaba sank with the loss of 30 men. Franklin launched a follow-up strike of 12 Hellcats and 11 bombers that reached the two remaining destroyers just before noon. Only one bomb hit was scored against Hatsushimo, which did little damage. The Japanese commander decided to head back to Manila with the survivors of Wakaba. Inexplicably, he failed to notify Shima of his decision. Destroyer Division 21 was out of the battle. After this initial strike, Bogan sent a second wave of 42 aircraft, which targeted Musashi between 12:07 and 12:15. Again, Helldivers opened the attack. The 12 bombers scored at least two direct hits and five near misses. One 1,000lb hit forward and passed through Musashi's bow without exploding. The second hit just to the port side of the stack and penetrated two decks before exploding. The resulting damage forced the abandonment of the port-side inboard engine room, which reduced the ship to three shafts. A fire near one of the boiler rooms was quickly extinguished. Adding to the chaos, Musashi's steam siren was damaged, and it continued to sound off and on for the remainder of the action. Once again Intrepid's Avengers deployed to conduct an anvil attack. Of the nine aircraft, eight got their torpedoes in the water and headed toward the huge battleship. As was the case for the entire series of attacks, it is impossible to precisely trace the number of hits suffered by Musashi; American and Japanese records do not even coincide on the overall number of attacks during the day. It is probable that the second wave of Avengers put three torpedoes into Musashi's port side. One hit near the stack on the junction of the outboard port engine room and the port hydraulic machinery space; it caused slow flooding but little else. Another hit forward of the armored citadel and caused massive flooding into several large spaces. The last confirmed hit occurred abaft Turret No. 2. Despite these three additional hits, Musashi remained on an even keel, but was noticeably down by the bow. In exchange, Musashi antiaircraft gunners forced one Avenger to ditch some 15 miles away and shot down two Helldivers. During this attack, Japanese records indicate nine Type 3 shells were fired. American pilots were impressed that they were engaged at 25,000–30,000 yards, but no aircraft were damaged. This damage reduced Musashi's speed to 22 knots, prompting Kurita to slow his formation. Despite taking four torpedoes, Musashi's skilled damage-control teams managed to keep it afloat throughout the day. At 10:50, Sherman launched 58 aircraft from the Essex and Lexington, focusing on Musashi again at 13:30. With her speed reduced and unable to fully maneuver, she was a much easier target. Despite the heavy fire directed against them, the Helldivers performed their mission of preparing the way for the torpedo bombers. At least four 1,000lb bombs hit Musashi. Three hits caused minimal damage as they impacted near the forward 18in. turret and exploded in the unoccupied crew accommodation spaces below. Damage from the final hit that exploded on contact when it hit the starboard side of the stack was not serious, but the explosion devastated many nearby 25mm triple mounts and caused heavy casualties among the gun crews. While the Helldivers added to the topside carnage, damage from the Avengers was much more serious. Three more torpedo hits were confirmed in the third attack, bringing the total to seven. Two struck forward of the armored citadel on either side of the bow. The design flaw of having comparatively little compartmentation in the unarmored forward section of the ship led to massive flooding. In addition, the explosions forced the hull plating outward creating what looked like a huge plow throwing water up as the ship moved forward. Another torpedo struck the starboard side close to the previous starboard side hit. This increased flooding and forced the abandonment of the starboard hydraulic machinery room. A possible fourth hit was reported by some witnesses near the forward 6.1in. triple turret on the starboard side. This assault resulted in at least four bomb hits and three torpedo hits, causing severe flooding. Despite this, Musashi continued to fight, but with its speed reduced to 12 knots, Kurita ordered it to move west with destroyers Shimakaze and Kiyoshimo. Additionally, the cruiser Tone was struck by two bombs during this attack, sustaining only light damage. At 14:26, 12 Helldivers and 8 Hellcats from the Essex launched an assault on the Yamato and Nagato, delivering three bomb hits to the Yamato and two to the Nagato, though the damage was not severe. The fifth air attack of the day was the most intense, with 65 aircraft from the Enterprise and Franklin taking off at 13:15 to strike the heavily damaged Musashi at 15:10. The results against the near-defenseless battleship were devastating. Of the 18 Helldivers that dove on Musashi, 11 claimed hits. On this occasion, the aviators' claims were not inflated. Japanese sources agreed that within minutes, Musashi was pounded by ten 1,000lb bombs. This barrage can be detailed with some degree of certainty. One bomb hit forward of Turret No. 1 and added to the damage there from earlier bombs. Another bomb hit the roof of the same turret and failed to penetrate its thick roof armor. Another hit to the starboard side of the turret and penetrated two decks before exploding against the main armored deck. Two bombs hit together between the forward 6.1in. turret and the superstructure, exploded on contact, and did minimal damage. Another two hit just to port in the same general area, penetrated two decks, and exploded on the main armored deck without penetrating. The eighth bomb hit the port side of the massive superstructure and exploded on contact, causing devastation to nearby 25mm mounts and their crews. Another projectile hit the top of the superstructure and destroyed the main battery fire-control director and its rangefinder. The resulting explosion caused significant personnel casualties on the bridge and operations room totaling 78 killed and wounded. Among the wounded was the ship's captain. The final hit landed abaft the superstructure but caused only minor damage. Musashi was equally helpless against the Avengers. The eight Enterprise Avengers conducted an anvil attack, and all claimed hits. At this point in the action, the accounts of Musashi's surviving crewmembers are not reliable. It is certain that four more torpedoes hit the ship. The first was on the port side in the area of the magazine for Turret No. 1. Another hit on the port side was recorded abeam the superstructure, flooding one boiler room. The third hit to port was placed just aft of the stack. It was in the same area of an earlier hit, and it immediately flooded the outboard engine room. The only confirmed hit on the starboard side occurred in the area of Turret No. 2. On top of the four confirmed hits, some Japanese accounts mention as many as six more. Two of these struck amidships on the port side but did not explode. All attacking aircraft returned safely, confirming the ineffectiveness of Musashi's defenses at this point. At 15:21, Helldivers targeted the Haruna, but only managed five near misses. The increasing intensity of the air attacks throughout the day indicated that Japanese land-based air forces had failed to neutralize Halsey's carriers. Consequently, at 15:30, Kurita ordered his fleet to change course westward, away from the San Bernardino Strait, hoping that this maneuver would reduce the pressure from air attacks and allow Japanese air forces to achieve better results. Meanwhile, Bogan launched his third strike of the day at 15:50, with 31 aircraft under Ellis targeting the Musashi one final time. However, due to fatigue, the attack was ineffective. After this last air strike, Kurita decided to head back towards the San Bernardino Strait and instructed the sinking Musashi to beach itself on Sibuyan Island at 17:15. Before this could be executed, the battleship sank at 19:36, resulting in the loss of 1,023 lives. Thus, the Musashi became the largest ship ever sunk by air attack in what was the largest air-sea battle in history up to that point. Despite losing 18 aircraft, the Americans succeeded in sinking the Musashi, torpedoing the Myoko, and damaging three other battleships to varying extents. Nevertheless, the 1st Striking Force emerged in better condition than anticipated, with the Musashi absorbing much of the torpedo and bomb damage and allowing the other ships to weather the attack. Kurita planned to navigate San Bernardino Strait during the night, proceed down the east coast of Samar, and reach Leyte Gulf around 11:00. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher's search planes had located Ozawa's carriers at 16:40. By afternoon, Ozawa had launched most of his aircraft in an attack on Sherman, but the final assault by the once formidable IJN carrier force achieved only limited success, with 28 planes lost before retreating to the Philippines. Remaining undetected, Ozawa then dispatched two battleship carriers and four destroyers under Rear-Admiral Matsuda Chiaki southward, drawing American attention to his position. In the aftermath of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans did not know that the IJN had no prospects of replacing its lost aviators. Because the majority of the carriers themselves survived the battle, and the Americans knew other carriers were being added to the force, the IJN's carrier force was still a threat. The intelligence Halsey received on the IJN's carrier force indicated that it was fully capable. In every other major battle of the war, the IJN carrier fleet was the main threat. The Pacific War had become a carrier war and surface forces had been firmly supplanted as the primary striking force. The Americans had no way of knowing that the Japanese had turned this thinking on its head in their planning for Leyte Gulf. Nimitz wanted to destroy the Combined Fleet and thus gain an increased measure of operational freedom for future operations. He was disappointed that this did not occur at Philippine Sea and thus had inserted the instruction to Halsey that the destruction of the Japanese fleet would be his primary objective if the opportunity was presented. Achieving this not only would eliminate the main threat to the invasion, but it would cripple the IJN's ability to interfere with future operations. As the assessment from the aviators was that Kurita's force no longer posed a threat, at 19:50 Halsey ordered his entire force north to crush what he assessed as the primary threat: Ozawa's carrier force. He decided to do so with the entirety of his force. By doing so, he decided to ignore the threat posed by the Kurita force, which was headed toward San Bernardino Strait. He kept his whole force together, because that was how TF 38 fought and because, as he stated after the war, he did not want to divide his force in the face of the enemy. A decisive victory was most likely if the carriers of TF 38 worked with the battleships of TF 34. This was USN doctrine and Halsey fully supported it. At 20:22, Task Force 38 set course north, with the three carrier groups in the area meeting just before midnight. Earlier, at 20:05, a night reconnaissance aircraft from Independence had reported that Kurita's formidable surface force was heading back toward the San Bernardino Strait. This news raised concerns among several of Halsey's subordinates, including Bogan and Lee, but they were dismissed by the resolute Halsey. As a result, the 3rd Fleet's full strength continued northward toward Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the San Bernardino Strait completely unprotected. This left Kurita's battleships unopposed between themselves and the American landing vessels, except for Kinkaid's vulnerable escort carriers off Samar's coast. Meanwhile, the detection of Nishimura's force on October 24 gave Kinkaid enough time to prepare for a battle at Surigao Strait. Oldendorf set up his battle line under Rear-Admiral George Weyler near Hingatungan Point in the northern part of the strait, providing maximum sea space while still constraining Japanese movement. Eight cruisers in two groups were positioned south of this line, with 24 destroyers stationed to screen the battleships and cruisers and positioned on both flanks to launch torpedo attacks against the approaching Japanese. Additionally, 39 PT boats were deployed in the southern approaches to the strait and into the Mindanao Sea to provide early warning and execute torpedo attacks when possible. The main issue was that the battleships were primarily equipped with high-explosive shells and would only engage once the Japanese forces were about 20,000 yards away. Moreover, Kinkaid had intercepted an order from Halsey to assemble a powerful task force of fast battleships. Misinterpreting the order's unclear wording, Kinkaid mistakenly believed Task Force 34 was coming to defend San Bernardino Strait, allowing his forces to concentrate on Surigao Strait instead. Despite Kurita's delays, Nishimura pressed on to breach the strait, advancing with the heavy cruiser Mogami and three destroyers. Little is known about Nishimura's precise thinking as he approached the strait. He was planning on arriving off Tacloban at 0430hrs on October 25 in accordance with Toyoda's master plan that had Kurita's force arriving off Leyte a short time later. This schedule fell apart after Kurita's advance was thrown off schedule on the afternoon of October 24 when he temporarily turned around in the face of intensive air attack in the Sibuyan Sea. At 2013hrs Nishimura sent a message to Toyoda and Kurita that he planned to arrive off Dulag at 0400hrs the next morning, a half hour later than planned. This was only a minor change; much more important was the receipt at 2200hrs of Kurita's message that he would not be in the gulf until 1100hrs. This meant that Nishimura's force was on its own when it executed its attack into the gulf. However, Nishimura did not change his plan after learning of Kurita's revised intentions. He was determined to force the strait in darkness and in so doing draw forces away from Kurita's main attack. The battle began at 2236hrs when PT-131 gained radar contact on Nishimura's main force. The three boats of the section headed toward the contact to make a torpedo attack. Two of the boats were slightly damaged, but one was able to close within torpedo range. News of the contact did not reach Oldendorf until 0026hrs on October 25. Another section sighted the advance group built around Mogami at 2350hrs and two of the boats fired a torpedo at the cruiser. Neither hit its target. Demonstrating the confusion in any night battle, at about 0100hrs Mogami was hit by a 6in. shell from Fuso. Though a dud, it killed three men. About an hour later, PT134 closed to within 3,000 yards of Fuso and fired three torpedoes. Again, all missed. This running series of encounters continued up until 0213hrs. Of the 39 boats, 30 contacted the Japanese and launched 34 torpedoes. None of Nishimura's ships was hit. While Nishimura's force was successfully fighting its way up the strait in good order, he kept Kurita and Shima informed of his progress. At 0040hrs, the two parts of Nishimura's force reunited. First blood went to the Japanese, since ten PTs were hit, and one (PT-493) sank, with a total of three dead and 20 wounded. Though unable to exact any attrition on the Japanese, the PTs had provided an invaluable service informing Oldendorf of Nishimura's location and strength. Based on an earlier report from one of Mogami's scout aircraft on the location and numbers of USN ships in Leyte Gulf, Nishimura appeared to believe that the battle would occur inside Leyte Gulf and not in Surigao Strait. If he really believed that Oldendorf would not use favorable geography to his advantage, he was sorely mistaken. Having survived the PT boat attacks with no damage, Nishimura now faced a much more deadly threat. This came in the form of five Fletcher-class destroyers under the command of the aggressive Captain Coward. Two other destroyers from Coward's Destroyer Squadron 54 were left on picket duty and did not take part in the torpedo attack. The five destroyers assigned to the attack were arrayed to conduct an anvil attack (with torpedoes coming in from both bows of the enemy target), with McDermut and Monssen from the west and Remey, McGowan, and Melvin from the east. Approaching at 30 knots, Coward's ships would launch torpedoes guided by radar, and refrain from using their 5in. guns so as not to give their positions away. Once the torpedoes were on their way, the destroyers would break off and head north along the coast to clear the area and reduce the possibility of a friendly fire incident. What ensued was one of the most successful attacks of the entire war. Shortly after 03:00, Coward's three eastern destroyers launched 27 torpedoes from a range of 8200 to 9300 yards at the advancing Japanese ships. They scored two critical hits on the Fuso at 03:08, causing flooding and fires. The battleship, unaware of the severity of the damage, veered off course and headed south, ultimately sinking at about 03:45 with 1620 lives lost. The Americans claimed that the torpedoes had split the Fuso in two. Meanwhile, Coward's two western destroyers fired a full salvo of 20 torpedoes at 03:10. In response, Nishimura changed course, exposing his screen to danger. By 03:19, three torpedoes from McDermut struck the Yamagumo, which exploded and sank within two minutes; another torpedo hit the Michishio amidships, causing it to sink 15 minutes later after coming to a halt; and a final torpedo hit the Asagumo, damaging its bow and reducing its speed, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. McDermut's ten torpedoes were the most effective salvo of the war from any American destroyer. Monssen's torpedo attack resulted in a single hit on the battleship Yamashiro, causing some flooding and reducing her firepower by a third. Following Coward's devastating torpedo strike, six more destroyers, divided into two groups of three, approached Nishimura's force from the west along the coast of Leyte. The first group commenced their attack at 03:23, launching 14 torpedoes from a range of 6500 to 6800 yards, but only one torpedo struck the Yamashiro, temporarily slowing her to 5 knots. The second group of destroyers fired 15 torpedoes at 03:29, but none of their torpedoes hit their targets, and the gunfire from both sides proved ineffective. After this failed assault, nine destroyers in three sections of three approached Nishimura's weakened column from both flanks. The first two sections, attacking from either side, fired a half-salvo of five torpedoes from each destroyer, but none hit. Before the final section could launch its attack, a fierce gunnery battle was underway. The gunnery battle began at 0351hrs when the first American cruiser opened up. Two minutes later, West Virginia commenced fire from 22,800 yards. All ships fired at the largest radar return of the three Japanese ships, which was Yamashiro. The American barrage grew as each battleship gained a fire control solution. The three ships with the most modern fire control systems did most of the work. California joined in at 0355hrs from 20,400 yards followed by Tennessee one minute later. The three battleships with the less capable Mk 3 fire control radar struggled to gain a firing solution. Maryland opened fire at 0359hrs by ranging her Mk 3 radar on the shell splashes from the other battleships. Mississippi took until 0412hrs when she fired a full salvo at Yamashiro from 19,790 yards. Pennsylvania never gained a good solution for her 14in. main battery and failed to fire a single salvo. Unbeknownst to Nishimura, the Americans had executed a "T" maneuver, leaving his ships able to fire only their forward guns while the enemy could unleash full broadsides. Concentrating their fire on the Yamashiro, Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships landed several hits during the 18-minute engagement. By 03:56, the Yamashiro was seen burning amidships, aft, and in the bridge area. Despite this, the battleship fought back fiercely, targeting the cruisers Phoenix, Columbia, Shropshire, and Denver, though no hits were achieved. The Mogami endured severe damage during this engagement, with the cruiser Portland focusing its fire on her and inflicting heavy harm. In the early phase of the battle, she took several 5in. hits from American destroyers. In the first minutes of the withering barrage from Oldendorf's cruisers and battleships, Mogami sustained more damage, including a hit on one of her 8in. turrets. After firing four Type 93 torpedoes at 0401hrs against the gun flashes from enemy ships to the north, she came under fire from heavy cruiser Portland. Two 8in. shells hit Mogami's bridge at 0402hrs, killing her commanding officer, and other shells disabled two engine rooms. The new commanding officer decided to break off the action and head south at slow speed. While headed south, she encountered the Second Diversion Attack Force. As American gunfire pummeled Yamashiro's superstructure, the last destroyer group approached head-on, closing to within 6200 yards before launching 13 torpedoes. Before the torpedoes could reach their targets, the destroyers came under friendly fire and further assault from Yamashiro's guns, resulting in the Albert W. Grant taking 18 hits before being withdrawn. Observing the friendly fire, Oldendorf ordered a ceasefire at 04:09, allowing Nishimura to begin a retreat south. However, by 04:11, the Yamashiro had been hit by three torpedoes from the final destroyer salvo, causing a severe list and bringing the battleship to a halt. Yamashiro's valiant yet ultimately futile resistance ended at 04:19 when she capsized to port, taking Nishimura and 1625 others with her. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The largest naval battle in human history had only just begun. As many historians argue, given the fateful decision of Halsey to try and knock out the IJN combined fleet, the transports had been left completely open to an attack. Absolute carnage could unfold on an unprecedented scale…perhaps enough to cause America to rethink continuing the war?

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- 152 - Pacific War Podcast - Return to the Philippines 17 - October 21 - , 1944

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Play Episode Listen Later Oct 15, 2024 46:02

Last time we spoke about the Formosa air battle. In mid-1944, General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey debated their next move in the Pacific. MacArthur, intent on a direct assault on the Philippines, clashed with Nimitz, who favored invading Formosa. MacArthur's persuasive tactics, political savvy and to be more blunt, threats during a rather dramatic visit to Honolulu, convinced President FDR to prioritize the Philippines. Despite MacArthur's grandstanding, FDR did not completely abandon the US Navy's plans, and MacArthur's plan would require significant Naval support, with carrier strikes planned to soften Japanese defenses. In October, Halsey's carriers launched devastating strikes against Formosa, leading to heavy Japanese losses and disrupting their air power. Despite some fierce counterattacks and damage to American ships, including the cruiser Canberra, the American forces achieved air supremacy. The successful air campaign set the stage for the invasion of Leyte, marking a pivotal shift in the Pacific War. This episode is the Return to the Philippines Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We last left off the week before the grand return to the Philippines, Admiral Halsey had dispatched his carrier forces to neutralize enemy bases in Formosa in preparation for General MacArthur's Leyte invasion. However, Admiral Toyoda's response was unexpectedly strong, resulting in two cruisers being torpedoed, which forced Admiral Mitscher to order a retreat eastward under pressure from Japanese aviators. On October 15, while the cruisers Houston and Canberra were being towed under the protection of Admiral McCain's carriers, Halsey directed Admirals Bogan and Sherman's task groups to withdraw eastward out of sight. At the same time, Admiral Davison's forces carried out intermittent air raids on northern Luzon to keep enemy aircraft at bay. More significantly, Halsey decided to turn the situation into an opportunity. He instructed McCain's units to send out open messages, pleading for assistance. This tactic, which Halsey called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," was designed to mislead the Japanese into believing that this task group was all that remained of the fleet, enticing them to move in for the kill. Halsey's other task groups, which had withdrawn eastward, would then return to engage and destroy the enemy. On October 14, Japanese aviators claimed two carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and one light cruiser set afire. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces… the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months. Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The exaggerated claims of success made by Japanese pilots further convinced Toyoda to continue the assault, despite heavy aircraft losses. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's strike force was already rushing south from the Inland Sea to support the air forces. However, Shima's force was not the only one speeding towards the battlefront. On October 13, Admiral Barbey's convoy, consisting of over 470 ships and carrying the 24th Division and the 6th Army Service Command, finally departed Hollandia, heading toward the designated "Far Shore," Leyte. The next day, the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. By October 15, Task Force 78, which included the 1st Cavalry Division, joined the massive convoy. With General Sibert's full 10th Corps now en route to Leyte, the plan was to rendezvous with Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79. Over the course of about two weeks, General Hodge's 24th Corps had been transported from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then to Manus Island. On October 11, the LSTs carrying the assault battalions departed Manus, followed by Wilkinson's convoy of 267 ships, which left the Admiralties three days later. Their progress was steady, and by October 17, Wilkinson's tractor groups began joining the 7th Fleet. This combined fleet formed the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that point. Meanwhile, during the Formosa Air Battle, Japanese aviators launched multiple strikes against Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk on October 15. Fortunately, the American carriers' reinforced combat air patrols effectively minimized damage, with only one glancing bomb hit on the Franklin. In retaliation, Admiral Mitscher's pilots claimed to have shot down more than 100 Japanese planes. Additionally, Admiral Davison's carriers attacked enemy air concentrations in Luzon, though they faced heavy resistance from Vice-Admiral Teraoka Kinpei's reorganized 1st Air Fleet. These engagements continued over the next two days, with American forces estimated to have destroyed 99 enemy aircraft on the ground and 95 in the air by October 19. On the morning of October 16, Mitscher's carriers conducted long-range searches to determine if the enemy had fallen for Halsey's trap. Meanwhile, Japanese morning reconnaissance flights over the western Philippine Sea spotted three enemy task groups with a combined total of 13 carriers in the vicinity, forcing Toyoda to reluctantly cancel Shima's planned attack. As a result, no surface engagement materialized from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait." However, 247 naval aircraft were promptly dispatched from Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon to locate the enemy groups. McCain continued to fend off persistent Japanese air assaults, which managed to land another torpedo hit on the Houston. Hellcats from light carriers Cabot and Cowpens did great execution against a Japanese formation of over 100 aircraft. However, three Jills penetrated the screen. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. The explosion set fire to the starboard tank that held fuel for the ship's reconnaissance floatplanes, causing a major fire in the aircraft hangar, though the remaining crew suppressed the blaze within fifteen minutes. Flooding from this hit degraded the ship's buoyancy and stability further. Another 300 men were evacuated afterward, leaving just 200 aboard to continue damage control efforts as the ships withdrew. Despite the cruiser suffering significant damage, the towing operation carried on, slowly guiding the task group towards Naval Base Ulithi, which they eventually reached on October 27. On October 17, the Japanese were still in pursuit of the retreating fleet, but contact was lost, and further attacks were aborted. Nevertheless, the Formosa Air Battle had one final chapter. After the successful strike on Okayama on October 14, General LeMay deemed the damage extensive enough that it wasn't necessary to send all available B-29s for mop-up operations. On October 16, only the 444th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were dispatched to hit Okayama, while the 468th targeted Heito, an airbase and staging field east of Takao. Of 49 planes airborne against Okayama, only 28 bombed there, but they were aided by five stragglers from the 468th Group. To even things up, a formation of 11 planes from the 444th flew calmly by its Okayama target and struck at Heito through an error by the lead bombardier. Other B-29s bombed alternate or chance targets at Takao, Toshien, Swatow, and Sintien harbors; at Hengyang; and at several airdromes, including Taichu on Formosa. This dual mission was less smooth than the October 14 raid, but no losses were reported. The next day, 23 B-29s from the 40th Bombardment Group attacked the Einansho Air Depot near Tainan to complete the Formosa campaign. Heavy cloud cover prevented 13 of the bombers from reaching the target, so they diverted to bomb Takao harbor instead. Despite these challenges, LeMay's bombers inflicted significant damage overall. By the end of the Formosa Air Battle, the Japanese had launched a total of 761 offensive sorties. Toyoda's pilots reported that nearly the entire 3rd Fleet had been sunk and the American carrier force was in ruins. For comedic effect why not go through the real list shall we: Japanese claims were finally listed as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser). Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire. These exaggerated claims were heavily promoted by newspapers, although figures like Toyoda within the IJN remained skeptical. In reality, the Japanese air forces were decisively beaten at Formosa, losing around 171 planes in the initial defense and another 321 during attacks on Mitscher's fleet—a total of approximately 492 aircraft. The Second Air Fleet, comprising the main strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost 50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to 230 operational aircraft. The First Air Fleet and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were left with a combined operational strength of only a little over 100 aircraft. Of 143 carrier planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet, about one-third, with their flight crews, had been lost. Allied estimates, however, place Japanese losses as high as 655. In addition to these aircraft losses, Japan suffered significant casualties among air personnel, which severely weakened Admiral Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions and left General Yamashita with limited air support for the defense of the Philippines. On the other hand, Halsey's forces lost only 89 aircraft, with two cruisers suffering serious damage. The radar-guided Hellcats easily repelled the fragmented Japanese attacks, causing no delays to the American operations and inflicting no serious damage on Task Force 38. This defeat significantly diminished Japan's ability to defend the Philippines, as their surface forces were now left without effective air cover. In the aftermath of the battle, the aggressive Vice-Admiral Onishi Takishiro assumed command of the 1st Air Fleet and initiated the creation of a suicide corps, recruiting volunteers to dive-bomb enemy vessels. Thus, the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps was born. Captain Motoharu Okamura, in charge of Tateyama base and the 341st Air Group Home is theorized to be the first officer to propose the use of kamikaze attack tactics. Commander Asaichi Tamai asked a group of 23 student pilots whom he had trained to volunteer for the first special kamikaze attack force, all of them did so willingly. The names of the four subunits within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi and Unit Yamazakura. LeMay reported the destruction of 65 buildings and damage to 9 out of the 80 at Okayama's assembly plant, along with the destruction of 7 hangars and 16 buildings and damage to 9 others at the airbase. As a result, LeMay's intelligence team estimated it would take between four and six months to fully restore the Okayama plant to full operational capacity. His final strike of the month occurred on October 25, targeting the Omura Aircraft Factory, with 78 B-29 bombers successfully taking off. Over Omura, 59 planes dropped 156 tons of bombs, while 11 hit various other targets. Despite moderate resistance, one bomber was lost during the attack. Strike photos and subsequent reconnaissance showed significant damage, especially in the aluminum fabrication area. Over the following three months, Omura would become a primary target for Operation Matterhorn, though the 20th Bomber Command also conducted additional strikes to support Allied operations in Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, minesweepers and other vessels had cleared the way for amphibious flotillas. In the early dawn of October 17 the minesweepers began their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. By 06:30 they had accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend operations. At 12:59 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until nightfall. By October 19 it was known that the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines within the gulf itself. However the northern part of the main channel into the gulf was not considered safe. By the same date sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 01:35 on October 19, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. As the minesweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf "suspected that some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard their respective ships… Directed no further patriots be taken aboard ship."With Halsey's forces still in the Formosa-Ryukyus region, these ships were under the air cover of General Whitehead's 5th Air Force and Admiral Kinkaid's escort carriers. While minesweepers and demolition teams worked to clear mines, remove transport barriers, and perform beach reconnaissance, Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion prepared to land on Suluan Island on October 17. Supported by fire from the USS Denver and in heavy rain, the Rangers successfully landed on the beach at 08:05 without opposition. The men immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position, killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. Unfortunately, a Japanese radio station successfully reported the enemy convoy's approach and the start of the Rangers' landings, revealing that Leyte was the Americans' ultimate target. In response, Toyoda swiftly initiated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Vice-Admiral Kurita Takeo's 1st Striking Force to move from Lingga anchorage to Brunei Bay, preparing to strike the enemy invasion fleet. Just after midnight on October 18, Kurita's ships departed Lingga anchorage and began their trek to Leyte. Sentai (Division) 16—heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, and destroyer Uranami—was ordered to detach from Kurita's command and head to Manila. These ships were all among the oldest in Kurita's fleet, but it was a mistake to detach them for a secondary transport mission when they would have been better used to augment the decisive attack planned for Kurita's force. Simultaneously, Shima's 2nd Striking Force, reinforced by Kurita's detached 16th Cruiser Division, was tasked with supporting counterlandings. The Second Striking Force, for this newly-assigned mission, was to be composed only of the Fifth Fleet (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seven destroyers) plus the 16th Cruiser Division (one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one destroyer) detached from the First Striking Force. Under this plan, the 16th Cruiser Division was ordered to proceed to Manila, while the Second Striking Force main body, then at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, was ordered to go first to Mako, refuel, and then proceed to the Philippines. By noon, another order was issued to Ozawa's Main Body, despite its depleted air power, to coordinate a sortie from home waters in support of the attack planned for the morning of October 25 in Leyte Gulf. The mission of the Ozawa force was of vital importance to the success of the over-all plan. It was to act as a decoy to draw off the main strength of the enemy naval forces covering the invasion operations in Leyte Gulf, thus allowing the 1st Striking Force to penetrate to the landing point and smash the enemy's troop and supply ships. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3rd Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Ozawa fully anticipated that his fleet would be completely wiped out, but this sacrifice was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective: destruction of the entire enemy invasion force. As a result of the transfer of the flying groups of the 3d and 4th Carrier Divisions to Second Air Fleet for the Formosa air battle, the Task Force Main Body had lost much of its planned striking power. The mission assigned to it was therefore less offensive than that assigned in the original Sho-Go battle plan. The original plan had called for a diversionary attack by the Ozawa Force against the enemy's main carrier task forces. Under the more general terms of the 18 October plan, however, Vice Adm. Ozawa was left discretion to choose an attack target more commensurate with the strength of his force. Meanwhile, Davison's carrier aircraft launched attacks on air bases around Manila and Legaspi, but neither the 1st Air Fleet nor the 4th Air Army could respond due to adverse weather. As these strikes were carried out in difficult conditions, General Terauchi concluded by nightfall that a significant enemy operation was underway. He then activated the Army component of Sho-Go, instructing Lieutenant-General Tominaga Kyoji to target enemy ships near Leyte. Should the enemy successfully land, General Suzuki's 35th Army was ordered to delay their advance until reinforcements arrived, with the goal of launching a counterattack to defeat the Americans by October 25. Given the recent actions on Suluan and the American naval presence in the Leyte Gulf, the Army and Navy IGHQ sections surprisingly coordinated their response, with the IJA staff approving the Southern Army's request to implement Sho-Go 1. It was determined that the coming decisive battle for Japan was the Philippines. One major difference was the battle's location. Terauchi, Yamashita, and other Southern Army officers believed it would be Luzon, not Leyte. With Sho-Go 1 focused on Leyte, the Japanese would have to fight in the central Philippines, without extensive defensive works or major airfields. Yamashita would also use his limited shipping to send reinforcements to Leyte. If the Japanese lost Leyte, there might not be sufficient strength to defeat decisively any American offensive on Luzon. Deploying the few IJA units to Leyte would make a Luzon defense harder to accomplish. Sho-Go 1 could hand the control of the Philippines to the Americans. Eventually, Terauchi agreed to the IGHQ position of making Leyte the primary location to fight the Americans. Believing that Halsey's fleet had been defeated off Formosa, Terauchi now thought the Americans could not sustain any major operations or contest reinforcement convoys, both poor assumptions that would later cause suffering for the IJA. Yamashita disagreed with Terauchi and the IGHQ about designating Leyte as the prime battle site; but on October 22, Terauchi finally ordered Yamashita and the Fourth Air Army to make Leyte the main point of attack. His opinion was: “The opportunity to annihilate the enemy is at hand.” However Yamashita was convinced that the Americans had greater strength than anticipated, given the continued American carrier aviation's presence. Meanwhile, by 12:30 on October 17, the Rangers had successfully landed on Dinagat Island, finding no Japanese forces there. On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to the davits. The boats were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties." The company set up a channel light. They quickly set up a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the main convoy. However, bad weather and tides delayed the landing on Homonhon Island. Colonel Mucci's Company B finally made it ashore the next morning without opposition and installed another navigation light. At the same time, Tominaga attempted to retaliate but was thwarted by a violent storm. In the afternoon, Kinkaid's forces, supported by Mitscher's carriers, conducted minesweeping and direct-fire missions on the Leyte beaches to protect the underwater demolition teams. Admiral Oldendorf's warships heavily bombarded the southern beaches, paving the way for transports to enter Leyte Gulf by the following evening. These pre-landing operations, which continued through October 19 on the northern landing beaches, alerted General Makino to a potential secondary landing closer to Tacloban. This maneuver would outflank the main strength of the 16th Division and directly threaten his headquarters. In response, Makino relocated his headquarters from Tacloban to Dagami and ordered the 33rd Regiment to reinforce the Palo-San Jose coastal sector, while the 2nd Battalion strengthened the southern defenses. Despite these last-minute efforts, Makino's forces were unprepared for the overwhelming assault. The heavy naval gunfire had destroyed many defensive positions and disabled most of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment's guns. Furthermore, although the weather now favored Tominaga's counterstrikes, American carrier operations had been so effective that he was unable to challenge their air superiority. Despite the optimism of the High Command with regard to the prospects of gaining eventual air superiority in the battle area, it was already evident that the air phase of Sho-Go was not working out as intended. Those plans had envisaged mass air attacks against the invading enemy naval forces and troop convoys beginning prior to their arrival at the landing point. The enemy, however, had forestalled these plans by striking at Leyte before the planned concentration of Japanese air strength in the Philippines had been completed, and before the Navy's base air forces had time to recover from losses sustained in the Formosa Air Battle and earlier enemy carrier strikes on the Philippines. The 1st Air Fleet, already in the Philippines, had been reduced to an operational strength of less than 50 aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had lost half its strength in the Formosa Battle, had not yet begun its redeployment from Formosa to the Philippines. Although the 4th Air Army had sustained relatively lighter losses, its strength was widely dispersed. Before it could operate effectively in the Leyte area, it had to concentrate at forward bases in the central Philippines, an operation rendered both difficult and dangerous by enemy action, bad weather, and the virtually useless condition of many of the forward fields due to continuous rains. Under such unfavorable conditions, the concentration required a minimum of several days, and in the meanwhile the enemy was able to operate in Leyte Gulf against extremely light air opposition. On October 19, when weather conditions finally permitted an air attack against the enemy invasion fleet, no more than five naval and three Army aircraft could be mustered against the steadily increasing concentration of enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. By the evening of October 19, the preliminary operations were nearly complete, with most of Kinkaid's fleet positioned outside the gulf. Since the minefield at the entrance hadn't been fully cleared, the ships entered slightly south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and staying close to Dinagat's northern point. Meanwhile, Suzuki had already activated the Suzu Plan, with units from the 30th and 102nd Divisions preparing to move toward Ormoc. However, before they could depart, Oldendorf began October 20 with two simultaneous pre-landing bombardments, each involving three battleships. After two hours of battleship fire, cruisers and destroyers followed with high-explosive shells, causing significant damage. At the same time, Kinkaid's escort carriers launched bombing and strafing runs against suspected defensive positions and airfields, severely disrupting Makino's radio and telegraph communications. At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. By 09:30, the 21st Regiment successfully landed on Panaon Island without resistance, securing control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Fifteen minutes later, the transports sped toward Leyte's shores, led by LCI gunboats, which pounded the beaches with rockets and mortar fire. At 10:00, Sibert's 10th Corps, covered by a heavy rocket barrage, landed on the White and Red Beaches, marking the Americans' return to the Philippines. Admiral Fechteler's transports delivered General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division to White Beach, where the brigades landed side by side, with the 8th Cavalry Regiment held in floating reserve. Facing only small arms and machine gun fire, the 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment swiftly secured the Cataisan Peninsula and its airfield, while the 2nd Squadron captured San Jose and advanced across the Burayan River, reaching a point 3000 yards from the beach. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments had to navigate a deep swamp to access Highway 1, then pushed westward until they encountered enemy resistance near the foothills of Caibaan. At 10:40, Mudge's reserve began to land, followed by the division artillery at 13:30. Meanwhile, to the south, Barbey's transports landed General Irving's 24th Division on the shallow Red Beach, with the 19th and 34th Regiments landing abreast in battalion columns. The Japanese permitted the first five waves to land, but when the remaining waves were about 2000 yards offshore, they unleashed heavy artillery and mortar fire, sinking several landing craft and causing significant casualties. The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me." Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot. Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day. Upon landing, the first waves were immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite this, the Americans successfully stormed the initial defenses of the 33rd Regiment. By 12:15, the 34th Regiment had cleared the beach of enemy forces, and after a preparatory concentration, its 3rd Battalion advanced approximately 400 yards. The 2nd Battalion then moved through the 3rd, crossed Highway 1 at 15:50, and established positions for the night 100 yards west of the highway. To the south, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment had reached Highway 1, while the battered 1st Battalion followed behind under heavy fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion landed and advanced cautiously, as the 1st Battalion pressed toward Hill 522 amidst fierce resistance. Hill 522, which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep. They eventually encircled enemy positions and began to make steady progress up the hill. By dusk, Companies B and C had captured the hill's crests and successfully repelled several enemy counterattacks. This achievement secured Hill 522, which commanded the route into the interior and overlooked Palo, the gateway to Leyte Valley. At 14:30, General Douglas MacArthur landed on Red Beach alongside President Sergio Osmeña, who had taken over from Manuel Quezon following his death on August 1. So if you go on Youtube you can see the footage of MacArthur et al wading ashore and to this day there is a monument to this iconic moment. MacArthur made a radio broadcast to the Filipino people, declaring, “People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people” He had finally fulfilled his promise to the Filipino people. Further south, Hodge's 24th Corps encountered more resistance as it landed on Orange, Blue, Violet, and Yellow Beaches at 10:00. Under the transport of Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's ships and the protection of LCI gunboats, General Bradley's 96th Division landed with its regiments positioned between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose. The 382nd Regiment successfully disembarked on the Blue Beaches at 09:50, followed by the 383rd Regiment on the Orange Beaches ten minutes later.As they advanced inland, both units faced intermittent mortar and artillery fire from the 9th Regiment positioned on Catmon Hill. Colonel Macey Dill's 3rd Battalion initially encountered obstacles such as tank barriers made of coconut logs, debris on the beach, and heavy bombardment from Hill 120. However, with mortar and naval gunfire support, the battalion eventually captured the hill and repelled several enemy counterattacks, though they were unable to continue the advance due to deep swamps. In contrast, Dill's 2nd Battalion managed to push about 2,500 yards inland despite the intense heat and swampy conditions. To the north, Colonel Edwin May's 1st and 2nd Battalions were similarly hindered by an unexpected swamp but still succeeded in securing San Jose and the head of the Labiranan River, advancing approximately 2,600 yards inland. By 18:00, Bradley's artillery had been landed, although the 381st Regiment remained in floating reserve. Further south, Admiral Conolly's transports landed General Arnold's 7th Division between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, with regiments landing side by side. Companies L and K of the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and anti-tank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of 15 minutes, 2 officers and 6 men of the 3rd Battalion were killed, and 1 officer and 18 men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 10:30, 3 were sent to support Company L and 2 to support Company K. The latter 2 were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With 2 tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 13:45. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the 2 companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties. Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 16:30, since the enemy fire continued in volume, the 32nd Regiment withdrew and established a defensive position for the night. Meanwhile, the 184th Regiment landed its 3rd Battalion at Yellow Beach 2, directly in front of Dulag, and its 1st Battalion at Yellow Beach 1, which was farther south and separated by a swamp. Both beaches saw surprisingly little resistance, allowing the 184th to advance more quickly than expected, successfully capturing Dulag and reaching its airfield.Behind them, the reserve 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment landed after midday. The 3rd Battalion pushed west and south with minimal opposition, successfully securing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao. By the end of the day, both corps had fallen short of their beachhead objectives, with Hodge's 24th Corps achieving particularly modest results. Despite this, the Sixth Army had successfully landed assault forces along the entire eastern coast of Leyte and gained control of Panaon Strait, with casualties totaling 49 killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing. Most of the 16th Division had retreated during the naval and air bombardment before the landing, which allowed the Americans to secure most coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup. Consequently, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to delay the invasion. A more substantial enemy engagement was yet to come. Air opposition to the invasion was minimal, as Tominaga and the naval air forces continued to concentrate their strength in the Philippines in preparation for a major air offensive scheduled to begin on October 25. However, 37 Army and Navy planes attacked the invasion shipping off Leyte. At 1600, on 20 October an enemy torpedo plane was sighted as it aimed its torpedo at Honolulu. Despite the skillful maneuvering of Captain Thurber to evade, the torpedo found its mark on her port side. 64 men were killed and 35 were injured. Flooding caused a temporary severe list, but the ship was saved by efficient damage measures. But Honolulu was out of the fight. Honolulu sailed out the next day, arriving at Manus on 29 October for temporary repairs, and then steamed for Norfolk, Virginia, on 19 November, arriving on 20 December via Pearl Harbor, San Diego, California, and the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, not all went well with logistics. Although 107,450 tons of supplies had been landed on Leyte by the end of A-Day, it was a haphazard operation. The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading. As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches. Thus, officers complained about the disorganized effort to deliver, store, and distribute supplies. This was a precursor of future resupply problems. As the landings proceeded about as smoothly as could be hoped, Halsey would order Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 to head to Ulithi on October 22, as he doubted that the Japanese would mount a major operation in response to the American invasion. And yet, the Japanese were about to come calling for another decisive battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Douglas MacArthur had finally done it, he had returned to the Philippines making good on his promise to the Filipino people. It was a colossal effort and thus far it was going very well all things considered. However little did the Americans know, but the IJN was about to toss the kitchen sink at them, literally, in an all or nothing battle to the death.

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#111 Shadow Eliminators (Ft. YouTuber Mugiwara)

Shonen Flop

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 23, 2024 62:58

Manga by Amemiya, Kento Exorcist manga didn't need to exor-exist We and our guest YouTuber Mugiwara discuss Shonen Jump manga Shadow Eliminators. Show Notes: • You can reach us at Twitter @shonenflopcast, Tumblr shonen-flop, or email shonenflop@gmail.com • You can find our guest at youtube.com/@Mugiwaranogoofy • Help keep the show running by joining the Shonen Flop Patreon at patreon.com/shonenflop. Get perks like early access to episodes; joining us during recordings, and exclusive episodes on manga like Agravity Boys, Magu-chan: God of Destruction, and PPPPPP. • Get Shonen Flop merch, including this episode's cover art, on a shirt, mug, print, or whatever else might catch your eye https://www.teepublic.com/stores/shonen-flop?ref_id=22733 • Become a member of our community by joining our Discord. You can hang out with us, submit your questions or six word summaries! Find it at https://discord.com/invite/4hC3SqRw8r • Want to be a guest? You can ask to be on a future episode at bit.ly/shonen_flop_guest Credits: • Shonen Flop is hosted by David Weinberger and Jordan Forbes • Additional editing assistance by Dylan Krider you can find his podcast, Anime Out of Context at animeoutofcontext.com • Assistance with pronunciation, translation, and other miscellaneous research done by Tucker Whatley and MaxyBee • Episode art by Merliel (IG: mer_liel) • Cover art funded by our generous art benefactor Nigel Francis MAL Description: Kasane are spirits who latch onto the shadows of people's hearts. But as long as Yayoi and Aoba are around, evil spirits won't be hurting any students at the school! Beautiful art and occult action! The door to the unknown has now been opened...

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#110.5 First Thoughts on Shadow Eliminators

Shonen Flop

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 16, 2024 25:00

Manga by Amemiya, Kento This is pretty much Bleach, Dandadan, JuJutsu Kaisen, Persona 3, Phantom Seer… David and Jordan give their first thoughts on Shonen Jump manga Shadow Eliminators. Listen in as they give an overview of the first chapter, where they think it will go from there, and ultimately their “power word” to describe the series so far. They also dive into some listener questions. Show Notes: • You can reach us at Twitter @shonenflopcast or email us shonenflop@gmail.com • Help keep the show running by joining the Shonen Flop Patreon at patreon.com/shonenflop. Get perks like early access to episodes; joining us during recordings, and exclusive episodes on manga like Agravity Boys, Magu-chan: God of Destruction, and PPPPPP. • Become a member of our community by joining our Discord. You can hang out with us, submit your questions or six word summaries! Find it at https://discord.com/invite/4hC3SqRw8r • Get Shonen Flop merch, including this episode's cover art, on a shirt, mug, print, or whatever else might catch your eye https://www.teepublic.com/stores/shonen-flop?ref_id=22733 • Want to be a guest? You can ask to be on a future episode at bit.ly/shonen_flop_guest Credits: • Shonen Flop is hosted by David Weinberger and Jordan Forbes • Additional editing assistance by Dylan Crider you can find his podcast, Anime Out of Context at animeoutofcontext.com • Episode art by Shannon (IG: illuminyatea) MAL Description: Kasane are spirits who latch onto the shadows of people's hearts. But as long as Yayoi and Aoba are around, evil spirits won't be hurting any students at the school! Beautiful art and occult action! The door to the unknown has now been opened...

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Gol de Aoba (España, 0 - Japón, 1)

Tiempo de Juego

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 25, 2024 3:30

espa aoba

Part 1: The Maxfield Method — Transforming Banking Leadership

Travillian

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 13, 2024 25:42

Join us for Part 1 of a Travillian Next special featuring John Maxfield, the Founder of Maxfield on Banks. Maxfield on Banks is a well-regarded substack where John shares his expertise to help others master the principles of exceptional banking. John brings a wealth of experience from his roles at Bank Director, the Wilmers Integrity Prize, and The Motley Fool, where he currently serves as the Senior Banking Specialist. The conversation explores the unique dynamics of the banking industry and the exceptional leaders within it, emphasizing the importance of resiliency, commitment to fiduciary duty, and the ability to learn and grow as key elements of effective leadership in banking. John dives into the importance of the ability to learn, grow, and be reprogrammed for leaders in the banking industry, noting that exceptional leaders often emerge from modest backgrounds or have experienced hardship early in life. …and that's not all! This is just the beginning—be sure to watch until the end to build anticipation for the exciting guest coming in part two next week! Hint: The mystery guest - a recently retired CEO - is an old friend of John's, has appeared on stage with him at AOBA, and just finished a stellar 37-year tenure at his bank.

- 133 - Pacific War - Fall of Mogaung, June 4-11, 1944

research banking editorial aoba bank director

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 4, 2024 60:42

Last time we spoke about landings at Biak. General Fuller unleashed a amphibious assault against Biak that faced countless hurdles. The Hurricane Task force encountered a lot of terrain issues at Humboldt bay, leading to logistical headaches. Despite the disorganization, they shipped off and landed, forming a beachhead. Colonel Kuzume and his men were caught with their pants down, units were scattered all over the place. The first tank battle of the Southwest Pacific occurred, seeing American Shermans absolutely desolate Japanese Type 95's. General Fuller planned to consolidate his troops at Ibdi and Bosnek while reinforcements arrived, but the Japanese continuously lobbed surprise night attacks to horrible effect. Over in the Burma front, Mutaguchi's operation continued to unravel as his subordinate officers disregarded his orders and performed their own withdrawals. As Mutaguchi relieved men of command and replaced them, General Slim finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for the Japanese. This episode is the Fall of Mogaung Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As General Vinegar Joe unleashed what he believed to be a masterstroke against Myitkyina, it soon turned out to be an absolute gruesome struggle. As we last saw, General Stilwell's men had begun a long and difficult siege of Myitkyina. The 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions were now pinned down by General Tanaka's battered 18th Division south of Kamaing. To the south Brigadier Calvert's Chindits began a battle for Mogaung, which forced General Takeda's 53rd Division to suspend the relief of Myitkyina and rush back to reinforce the town. Though the Mogaung Garrison and the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to the north had been effectively destroyed by the Chindit and Chinese attacks, the Japanese had been able to maintain their hold on Mogaung by mid-June. To the east, General Wei's Y Force had opened a new offensive on Yunnan, gradually pushing Colonel Kurashige's 148th Regiment to Tengchong but failing to seize Longling against the tenacious resistance of General Matsuyama's forces. Along the Kamaing-Mogaung front, by late June, Tanaka had been able to assemble most of his depleted command at Lakatkawng, determined to keep the blockade on the Hukawng Valley. His main aim was to clear the Seton roadblock, which had been recently reinforced with General Sun's 113th Regiment; but once again, his attacks would fail to dislodge the tenacious Chinese defenders. Yet upon receiving orders from the 33rd Army commander to withdraw, General Tanaka reported that the 18th Division could continue to hold in the Kamaing area. This statement, inspired by Colonel Ohgoshi, the chief of staff, proved to be unwarranted optimism. The 18th had staged a desperate resistance in the vicinity of Kamaing for about a month and, for most of the period, had only 80 men for each mile of front. Supplies of ammunition and food were very low with only about 1400 rounds of rifle ammunition per day for the entire Division and 60 rounds per machine gun. The daily ration was about 2.5 ounces of rice per man. On receipt of the Army's message to withdraw, Colonel Ohgoshi had advised the Division commander that further resistance in the area was possible, but had not made it clear that this was his personal belief and did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the Division staff. Within a day or two the commander became aware of the fact that the other staff officers were convinced that further resistance in the Kamaing area was impossible. He therefore forwarded to the 33rd Army a revised report of the Division's actual situation. Upon receipt of the second message, on June 27 the Army directed the Division to retire to the Sahmaw sector. Tanaka believed he needed to stand his ground while the 53rd Division pushed aside the Seton Block and reopened his line of communications. Thus, he elected to continue to resist the attacks from the north while he himself attacked Seton for three more days; but failing to make any progress, he would finally comply with his orders to withdraw to the hills north of Sahmaw in early July. While the 4th and 146th Regiments performed covering attacks, the remnants of the 55th and 56th Regiments destroyed their artillery and heavy equipment, and withdrew along an escape trail cut through the forest west of the Seton roadblock. On 2 July the 18th Division began its withdrawal, utilizing an obscure trail that ran directly south from Kamaing. Crossing the mountain range west of Seton, the Division completed its concentration near Sahmaw about 7 July. The Hukawng Operation was then considered concluded, ending a campaign that had been a miserable failure and had cost almost 8,000 casualties. By July 15th, the 18th Division would finally assemble in the Indaw area. Though only 3000 men from the elite 18th Division would survive the Hukawng Valley Campaign, Tanaka had effectively managed to keep intact the blockade to China for another year, something that would have profound repercussions later on in Chinese history. Further south, the 114th Regiment finally arrived at Gurkhaywa on June 16th, ready to reinforce the Chindits; yet Takeda had also brought most of his troops back to Mogaung, subsequently starting a deadly shelling of the Chindit positions. By when June 15th arrived, the Chinese still had not appeared, and Calvert pulled his troops back towards the bridge. At that moment, remarkable news arrived: The Japanese were abandoning their positions along the river. Calvert was exuberant. This meant he could move out of his bridgehead perhaps capture the town. Certainly, it meant a reduction of the shelling which was claiming at least 15 of his men a day. Yet, when the shelling did not die down and it quickly became apparent that Takeda was merely redeploying his troops along the railway, to get them out of flooding in low-lying areas. Chindit recce teams reported the area from the train station, in the heart of the town to the Mogaung Railway Bridge, further north, was heavily defended with eight bunkers dominating the landscape. Shelling from the village of Naungkyaiktaw, astride the road to Mogaung, set between fields of paddy, was persistent. Naungkyaiktaw had to be captured. Calvert estimated the village was held by a hundred Japanese. Because of this, on June 18th, Calvert ordered his forces to attack the apparent Japanese artillery encampment at Naungkyaiktaw after a heavy air and mortar bombardment. His troops outnumbered them, but unwilling to suffer needless casualties, Calvert directed the American fighter-bombers against the village, which was bombarded on the night of the 17th. Half an hour before dawn on the 18th, the Chindit mortars pummeled the place with 400 rounds for good measure. Calvert then sent in his assault force. Among the attackers was a company of 70 men from King's Liverpool led by Major Fred Reeman. This was a company that had stayed on with the 77th Brigade after the rest of the battalion had been transferred to the 111th Brigade. They were joined by 12 men of Blaine's Detachment, once evacuated to India but since returned, this time armed with about a dozen flamethrowers. In the darkness, Blaine's Detachment was told to advance in front of the company of King's, and to “turn the fucking lights on.” As the detachment began to hurl flames far and wide, the Chindits behind them began cheering. The men had been told that the village had many bunkers, but never saw any at first. The scene soon turned fantastic. They went through the entire village “with twenty or thirty yards of flame shooting out in front.” They soon found the bunkers. The Japanese became crazed with fear especially after the British began yelling “put out the fucking lights,” and turning the flamethrowers their way. Many Japanese fled the bunkers, joined by those outside. They fled through the paddy fields, making for the railway station 400 yards away. Calvert's machine gunners had been waiting and blazed away, killing at least forty. Meanwhile, the rest of Fusiliers and the Kings walked up the paddy, picking off Japanese hiding or trying to crawl away in the ditches. Calvert, his mobile brigade-major Brash and his orderly Lance-Corporal Young decided to join the mop-up, shooting at Japanese while standing on chairs, as more Fusiliers began clearing the last of the bunkers, hurling grenades into them and blasting the insides with flamethrowers. As twilight set in that day, the most peculiar thing happened. The Fusiliers were cooking an evening meal in their newly-won positions, when a weary, seven-man patrol walked into their billet and began to take off their kit. The Fusiliers who looked up casually, noticed to their horror, that the new men were Japanese. The Japanese, for their part, had not noticed. The Fusiliers lunged for their weapons and opened fire. The Japanese patrol did not survive. In all, Calvert estimated that his troops had killed about 70 Japanese in the capture and holding of Naungkyaiktaw, while suffering 16 killed and 38 wounded. Major Reeman's King's company had become reduced to a platoon. Calvert was considerably cheered on the evening of the 18th, when the much promised Chinese reinforcements finally arrived, guided over the river in motorized ranger boats by a towering Chindit officer, Captain Andrew. This was the 1st Battalion of the Chinese 114th Regiment led by Major P'ang, which quickly deployed in the positions pointed out by Calvert but left the Chindits a little flummoxed when they proclaimed that they were in no particular hurry to fight as they had been fighting for years. On the following day, another battalion of Chinese arrived under the personal command of the regimental leader, Colonel Li Hung, as did a battery of 75mm pack howitzers the “6th Battery” under US Major Wayne Cook. The Chinese quickly assumed the defense of Mahaung, prompting an American liaison officer with the Chinese to send a press release that the Chinese had “captured” the village, which embarrassed Li. Cook's battery was deployed into position at Pinhmi village began operations on the 20th, hurling fire against the Japanese positions as the Chinese infantrymen consolidated their positions. Meantime, elements of the Chinese 113th Infantry, operating five miles north of Mogaung, surrounded a Japanese company, while Cook's guns hammered them. Fifty Japanese died from first blast alone. The Chinese finished off those who survived.The assault, was so ferocious that all the bunkers were overrun The reinforcements heartened Calvert for his own brigade was now a shell of its former self. The Lancashire Fusiliers and the King's Liverpool had only 110 men, the South Staffords had 180 and the Gurkha Rifles had 230. He planned a fresh advance, this time aiming for the hamlet of Natgyigon, on Mogaung's right flank, near the river. This area, Calvert believed, was the “key to Mogaung.” For the time, he chose the early hours of darkness on June 23rd a day which would go down in the annals of the 77th Brigade as the “stuff of legends.” The plan called for a mortar barrage of 1,000 bombs, in addition to shelling from the 75mm guns to cover the advance of the Chindits across the open ground towards Natgyigon. The Gurkhas were to move on the right, with the South Staffords on the left. Blaine's Detachment and the Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve. The objective was to capture the entire stretch of ground from the Mogaung Bridge to the train station, the latter of which the Chinese were to secure. Once the area was in Allied hands, the troops were to dig in while the reserve troops mopped up. In addition, Allied aircraft were to bombard the area before the start of the assault, which itself was timed to launch at about 3.10 am. In the dark, section commanders could be heard telling their men: “We attack Mogaung tonight and once we've taken it the Brigadier says we are through!” Later, during the attack, Calvert discovered the Chinese infantry had not captured the all-important train station, even as their American liaison officer insisted that they had. Calvert angrily pointed out that no, the Chinese had not, because enemy fire from that direction continued to pick off his men at the railway embankment. The Gurkhas, moving along a wide right flank along the banks of the Mogaung River, headed for the railway bridge. Approaching the bridge, they came under heavy fire. Captain Allmand, by now suffering from trench foot as were most of the troops, moved forward to silence a machine gun firing on his men. He could barely run because of his affliction but advancing through the mud, he hurled grenades at the Japanese position. A burst of gunfire plunged into him. He fell, badly wounded. One of his Gurkhas, Sergeant. Tilbir Gurung pulled Allmand and another wounded NCO to safety. For this, Gurung was to get a Military Medal. Allmand's own valor was to be recognized by a Victoria Cross. The South Staffords swept into Mogaung town. Resistance was heavy. Lt Durant of the South Stafford deployed his machineguns to rake Japanese positions with fire. Meantime, the flamethrowers were brought up. As they moved up past Durant's positions, a shell burst exploded one, setting the man wielding it on fire. The man screamed and somehow shook off the flamethrowing unit from his back. Durant and some of his men rushed forward and rolled him into water in a nearby ditch. The Japanese had dug-in beneath the ruins of a brick house from where they were stubbornly holding the Staffords at bay. The rest of the flamethrowers moved in and sprayed the building. One Japanese, his clothes ablaze, leapt from his positions and tried to make a run for it. A scythe of gunfire cut him down. The rest valiantly held their positions and were burned to cinder. The Staffords, mopping up the, found the Japanese officer. He had shot himself with his revolver. The Japanese had entrenched themselves at a strategically important building known as the Red House, which was well-protected with machine-gun nests. The advancing Gurkhas consequently ran smack into this killing zone, getting caught in a murderous crossfire and suffering heavy casualties. In response, Calvert threw his reserves into the fray and the Chindits also began to pummel the Japanese positions with mortars and machine-guns, which allowed the infantry to reach the all-important train station. Inflicting some 120 casualties and losing 60 dead and over 100 wounded, the Chindits then successfully captured all their objectives by noon. For the rest of the day, heavy fighting would continue as the Chindits dug in on their gained positions; but during the night, the Japanese would finally pull out, leaving the town to the shattered remnants of the 77th Brigade. Mopping up then continued until June 27, when Mogaung was declared void of Japanese. Though this was the first major town to be recaptured in Burma, Calvert lost over 250 killed and 500 wounded at Mogaung, which was more than any Chindit formation was prepared to take. This was also a bittersweet victory for Calvert because Stilwell would claim that the town had been taken by his Chinese troops, even though the Chindits had done most of the fighting. Stilwill wrote in his diary on June 27th “Good news from Mogaung, We have it!” Then came a remarkable broadcast from Stilwell's headquarters via the BBC “The Chinese had captured Mogaung”. There was no mention of the Chindits. Calvert was incensed. Colonel Li was appalled and apologized profusely. “If anyone has taken Mogaung it is your Brigade and we all admire the bravery of your soldiers.” Calvert, his anger against Stilwell unmitigated, sent a message to US headquarters “Chinese reported taking Mogaung. My Brigade now taking umbrage” this prompted Stilwell's staff to scour the maps for the location of Umbrage. Meantime, congratulations poured in from Lentaigne, from “Scottie” Scott, from John Masters, and the other brigade commanders. Among the lot, there was one, from Derek Tulloch, which struck Calvert's heart the most: “Wingate would have been proud of you.” After this defeat, and learning of the concurrent withdrawal of the 18th Division, Takeda's 53rd Division would withdraw to the Sahmaw River line in early July, where it was also reinforced with the recently-arrived 119th Regiment. Meanwhile over at Myitkyina, General Boatner had to order a stop to the attacks after June 18th because of the heavy casualties. For the time being, tunneling would be used to close with the enemy. On June 25th, however, Boatner would have a severe recurrence of malaria that would force him to abandon the frontlines. This led General Stilwell to appoint Brigadier-General Theodore Wessels in command of the Myitkyina Task Force on June 26th. Luckily for Wessels the situation started to improve after the fall of Mogaung, as Chinese troops there could now move up the railroad to connect with Wessels' forces. This removed the recurrent menace of a Japanese drive from Mogaung, guaranteed reinforcements and the opening of a ground line of communications, and further eliminated one of General Minakami's two bases from which supplies had trickled into the Japanese perimeter. Despite this, the only gains in the week of June 25th were a few hundred yards taken by the 150th Regiment and the 236th Engineers. Alongside this, Stilwell ordered the 1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment to penetrate through the Japanese positions towards Sitapur on June 28. They would drive deep into the Japanese defense system, leading Stilwell to hope this was the turning point; on receiving Japanese fire, it halted and dug in. Air supply was necessary.In response, Wessels dispatched some Marauder reinforcements. F Company, unaware it had lost its way and under an inexperienced commander, proceeded with a small point almost directly ahead of the marching column. The company commander at the head of the point met a small group of Orientals whom he took to be Chinese and who greeted him affably. The strangers then suggested he and his party lay aside their guns. At this point the commander realized that he had been ambushed and gave the alarm. The Japanese machine guns opened on his trapped column, inflicting heavy casualties. Some of his men made their way back to the Allied lines, but the company was never reconstituted and was broken up and distributed among the rest of Galahad. For his constant gallantry during a stubborn eight-hour rear-guard action, which permitted the survivors to extricate themselves from ambush, Private first class. Anthony Firenze of New Galahad received the Distinguished Service Cross. Wessels then planning to launch a set-piece attack to capture a stretch of the Sumprabum Road. Over in the Yunnan front, Colonel Matsui's 113th Regiment had successfully relieved the pressure from Longling by mid-June. General Matsuyama further ordered him to maintain the offensive while he continued to reorganize his forces. Though Matsui managed to seize the Tiechanghe pass on June 21st, most of his attacks would end up in nothing. In the north, the 20th Army Group launched simultaneous attacks against Qianshuang and Gudong on June 18th. This finally forcing the Japanese to retreat in disorder towards Tengchong by June 22nd. With the fall of Qianshuang, the Japanese had been forced to abandon the upper Shweli valley, and were now moving in some disorder toward Tengchong over three excellent trails. In Qianshuang, they left behind large quantities of ammunition and a few pieces of artillery, suggesting a disorganized withdrawal. 150 dead Japanese were found in Qianshuang itself; more than 300 Chinese gave their lives for the village. South of Qianshuang, the Japanese hastily destroyed their pontoon bridge to slow the Chinese pursuit. On reaching the Qianshuang-Baifen-Gudong line, the 20th Army Group had wrested 4000 square miles from Japanese control in forty days of fighting. The advance had been made over the precipitous ranges of the Kaolikung Mountains in an almost constant rain, a downpour sometimes heavy, sometimes light, rarely abating, and always turning to fog and sleet in the higher altitudes. More than 150 coolie supply porters fell to their deaths from the narrow, slippery trails that snaked precariously over the mountains. On June 25th General Wei received a personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to take Teng-chung. A few days later, th 20th Group Army, though delayed by the need to rebuild bridges over each of the swift mountain streams that crossed its advance, had pressed the Japanese rear guards back to the hills that surrounded Teng-chung at a distance of two to three miles from the formidable walled town itself. Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Air Force was trying to soften Teng-chung by daily attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. The outer defenses of Teng-chung were pillboxes covering every avenue of approach, supported and covered by the 6,500-foot-high, fortified mountain peak of Lai-feng Shan, "The Place Where the Birds Come." Here were 600 or more Japanese with most of the garrison's artillery. Teng-chung itself was girdled by a massive wall of earth that in some places was forty feet high and sixty feet thick at the base, faced throughout with great slabs of stone. Chinese necromancers had carefully laid out the wall in a great square to cut the cardinal points of the compass. Each side had a gate, and each gate now had a Japanese command post, while Japanese machine guns and rifles swept the approaches to the wall, its face, and its parapets. Within the city were about 2,000 Japanese. In all, Colonel Kurashige, who had defended the Kaoli-kung mountains, had about 1,850 Japanese, a heavily reinforced battalion combat team built around the 2nd, 148th regiment. Kurashige's orders were to hold Teng-chung until the Chinese threat to Lung-ling passed Over at Longling, Matsui saw the arrival of some reinforcements on June 22nd that would allow him to continue his counteroffensive. Making repeated night and day attacks, the Japanese would be able to penetrate the enemy positions on June 24. Matsuyama then directed him to exploit towards Bengmiao and Huangcaobacum; yet a heavy raid by 24 B-25s and the arrival of the 1st Division would manage to halt the Japanese attempt to exploit their success, with Mitsui only securing the area northwest of Bengmiao by July 1st. The next day, Matsuyama then suspended the counteroffensive because of heavy casualties and he could see the enemy were strengthening their positions. In the meantime, Major Kanemitsu's Lameng Garrison was successfully holding off against a siege by three divisions since June 4th, though the Chinese would only launch unsuccessful attacks in regimental strength during this period; and to the southeast, the Pingda Garrison was also successfully repelling the small enemy attacks against them in spite of being cut off and disease-ridden. That is all for the Burma front today as we now need to head over to the Biak front. After the arrival of two battalions of the163rd Regiment for reinforcements, General Fuller planed a two-pronged attack against Mokmer Drome, with the 186th Regiment advancing west over the inland plateau while the 162nd Regiment resumed its attack west along the coast. On the morning of June 1, in preparation for the offensive, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion therefore left Bosnek and marched north over the coastal ridge, with the 2nd Battalion also moving from Opiaref to join them. By 11:00, both battalions successfully set up defensive perimeters; yet their preparations would be interrupted abruptly in the afternoon as Colonel Kuzume directed his 1st Battalion to attack the positions held by Company K. These Japanese, who were supported by machine guns and mortars emplaced northwest of the trail crossing, continued attacks until 5:00, when a platoon of Company K, by a flanking movement, forced their withdrawal northward. Company K and two platoons of the Antitank Company remained at the trail crossing for the night. Company I was moved forward to K's left and left rear, and Company L extended K's perimeter east along the main road toward the surveyed drome. Battalion headquarters and Company M stayed near the strip's western end. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion, the Cannon Company, the 2nd Battalion, regimental headquarters, the attached engineers, and the tanks remained near the center of the airfield. Thankfully, the Americans would manage to repel the assaults and would ultimately force a Japanese withdrawal via a bold enveloping maneuver. But the Japanese would return after midnight. The first part of the night passed without incident, but at 3:30 the entire area held by the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, flamed into action. About a company and a half of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, moved from the south against the semicircular perimeter held by Companies I, K, and L, having outflanked the 3rd Battalion on the west. Simultaneously, other elements of the 1st Battalion attacked from the northwest, attempting to drive a wedge between Companies L and K. Under the support of mortar and machine gun fire from both the northwest and southwest, the encircled Japanese desperately tried to fight their way north. Four hours of confused hand-to-hand fighting, marked by the use of bayonets, machetes, and grenades, ensued. At daylight a count revealed that 86 dead Japanese were within and around the 3rd Battalion's perimeter. The dead included the commander of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Losses to the American unit were 3 men killed and 8 wounded. After dealing with the threat, Newman resumed the westward advance at 9:00 on June 2nd. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by five tanks and an antitank platoon, were to advance abreast, while the 2nd protected the right flank by patrolling north of the main road. The 121st Field Artillery Battalion was to provide continuous close support and was to displace forward with the infantry. Neither artillery nor air bombardment seems to have been provided for or delivered prior to the attack. However, both the 121st and 146th Field Artillery Battalions were registered on targets north and west of the 186th Infantry. Air support was available from Wakde Island upon call. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry broke camp at its beach defense area at 8:00 on June 2nd and moved north over the ridge to join the rest of the regiment. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, had made no serious attempt to stop the 186th Infantry's progress westward because the inland plateau was nearly indefensible and because the battalion would have been decimated in battle with the superior strength of the reinforced American regiment. The 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the surveyed drome area, initially in preparation for counterattack against the Bosnek beachhead. While no such counteroffensive was mounted, the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion at least had the advantage of keeping the unit intact. The American advance would thus be opposed by the 10th Company, 222nd Regiment; the 3rd Company, 36th Division Sea Transportation Unit and some other naval and engineer units. The 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced with two companies abreast against scattered but determined opposition from elements of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry. Small enemy patrols aimed machine gun and rifle fire at the advancing American units and held their positions until killed or dispersed by tank or artillery fire. Most of the enemy parties were located on the north flank and apparently many of them had been driven westward out of the cave and garden area north of the surveyed drome by fire from the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, which destroyed Biak Detachment headquarters installations in that area. By nightfall the 186th Infantry had killed 96 Japanese and had itself lost 6 men killed and 10 wounded. The unit halted shortly after 1600 and began digging in at a point about 600 yards northeast of the day's objective. The advance had carried the regiment west until it was almost abreast and north of the 162nd Infantry, at the Ibdi Pocket. The latter had attempted to move west along the coast during the day, but it would be unable to dislodge the Japanese from the Ibdi Pocket, ultimately having to attach its 2nd Battalion to the 186th. The addition of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Regiment to the 186th Regiment helped to complicate the supply problems of the troops on the plateau. No water had yet been found inland. Heat and humidity were intense, and thick scrub growth, about 12 feet high, stopped any breezes. Despite the best efforts of Company B, 116th Engineers, the supply road could not be repaired fast enough to keep pace with the advancing infantrymen. Water had to be brought around from Bosnek via Opiaref to the forward units, and there were not enough water trailers nor 5-gallon cans available to supply all the water needed. At night each man received only one canteen of water for the next day, an inadequate amount under the conditions which prevailed inland. The water situation and the necessity for hauling all other supplies north through Opiaref did more to delay the 186th Regiment's progress westward than did the opposition of the 1st Battalion, 222nd Regiment. Meanwhile Kuzume's only support so far had been some air raids carried out by the depleted 23rd Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division. By late May, the 23rd Air Flotilla had only twelve fighters and six medium bombers at Sorong and the 7th Air Division had four large bombers, 20 medium bombers and three fighters. Both units threw what strength they could muster into attacks on the enemy landing force. On May 27th four Army heavy bombers and nine Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack against fierce air opposition, all but four fighters failing to return. Kuzume would need more than that to launch a determined attack that would succeed in pushing the enemy back into the sea. Consequently, on May 29th, General Numata and Admiral Senda had requested the immediate commitment of fleet and air strength into the Biak battle. They both relayed this message “The enemy apparently found the difficulty of rapid occupation of the airfield sector. The enemy will change, in all probability, its policy to occupy the whole island of Biak after the arrival of reinforcements, securing its present positions with landed units for a while. The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our operations are severely restricted by the uncontested superiority of the enemy's feet and air units. The Biak Detachment, which is making every effort in destroying the confronting enemy, request for further support by the army and navy units concerned. We believe that the immediate commitment of our air forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in the whole Pacific area in our favor.“ This finally convinced Admiral Toyoda to send reinforcements to the island. To counter the Allied advance to Biak, the IJN dispatched from one third of its available naval land-based air strength from the Central Pacific to reinforce the 23rd Air Flotilla in western New Guinea. On May 28th 70 carrier-type fighters, 4 reconnaissance bombers, and 16 medium bombers were dispatched to western New Guinea. Another group of planes, comprising 48 fighters, 8 reconnaissance aircraft, and 20 bombers, were sent to western New Guinea and Halmahera from the Carolines on or about May 31st. On 29-30th May the flotilla carried out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. On May 29th, sixteen medium bombers attacked the enemy fleet in the sea near BIAK Island before daybreak of that day, yet none of them returned. Furthermore, in a daylight attack on the same day, four Zero fighters strafed BIAK Island. None of them returned to the base either. On May 30th, the unit of the Zero fighters of the Navy again fired upon enemy ships in the sea off Mokmer. The damage on the enemy ships was not confirmed. However, the unit reported that they fought four P-38s and four B-25s of the enemy and shot down two B-25s above BIAK Island. Also as part of Operation KON, a huge task force under Admiral Sakonju, which included the battleship Fuso, four cruisers and eight destroyers, was to transport Major-General Tamada Yoshio's 2nd Amphibious Brigade towards Biak. Additionally, it was decided to move three infantry companies of the 35th Division from Sorong to Biak by barge. Sakonju's convoy finally left Davao on the night of June 2nd. In connection with KON Force's advance, the Japanese had planned heavy air strikes against Biak which were to be carried out by the recently reinforced 23rd Air Flotilla and the few army aircraft which remained at bases within range of Biak. Between 1645 and 1700 on 2 June, from eleven to fifteen Japanese planes bombed Allied positions on Biak, causing a few casualties and some light damage. Seven of these planes were shot down by shore-based anti-aircraft weapons, while guns aboard Seventh Fleet ships lying off Bosnek accounted for at least one more. Later during the same night, a few more enemy planes dropped some bombs harmlessly on and near Owi Island. Still more approached Biak during the night, causing many red alerts but not dropping any bombs. The next night, that of 3-4 June, no Japanese planes attacked Biak, although an unknown number bombed Owi Island without causing any damage or casualties. Again, however, enemy aircraft flew many reconnaissance flights around Biak, causing an almost continuous red alert until the early morning hours of 4 June. Early on the morning of June 3rd, at a point just east of the Talaud Islands, between Mindanao and Morotai, a 7th Fleet submarine sighted the Transport and 1st Screening Units and was in turn sighted by ships of the latter organization. Alongside this 7th Fleet PB4Y's, operating from Wakde Island, kept the Japanese vessels under surveillance the rest of the day, reporting that the course and speed of the enemy ships could bring them into range of Biak during the evening of June 4th. Their discovery by Allied aircraft so far from Biak apparently had not been anticipated by the Japanese, who later reported that they had not known Allied aircraft were capable of such long-range reconnaissance. Nevertheless, the three KON Force elements steamed on toward Biak, probably hoping that friendly aircraft might drive off the Allied reconnaissance planes and also protect the sea approaches to Biak. To further muddy the situation, Sakonju received false reports that a strong American carrier group was approaching the waters east of Biak. Admiral Kinkaid had indeed dispatched a special task force to deal with this threat, yet the warships could only arrive off Biak on the night of June 4th and didn't include any aircraft carrier. Nonetheless, knowing that he had been discovered and unwilling to risk so many ships under these circumstances, Sakonju would have to suspend the reinforcement run and turn back to Davao and Sorong. When the Japanese called off KON on June 3rd, the Transport and the 1st and 2nd Screening Units were a little over 500 miles northwest of Biak and about 250 miles east-southeast of the Talaud Islands. At this point, the three forces were reorganized. The Transport Unit, accompanied by the three destroyers of the 1st Screening Unit, changed course for Sorong, while the 2nd Screening Unit and the two heavy cruisers of the 1st turned back toward Davao, which they probably reached late on June 5th. Of the ships moving to Sorong, the Fifth Air Force claimed to have sunk one destroyer and damaged at least two others. The Transport Unit and the 1st Screening Unit's three destroyers arrived safely at Sorong during the evening of June 4th. The Detached Unit, which had been moving toward Biak from Zamboanga on an independent course far to the west of the other three sections of KON Force, had also changed its direction during the night of 3-4 June, and reached Sorong sometime on the 4th. At Sorong the Transport Unit unloaded the 1,700 men of the 2nd Amphibious Brigade. The six destroyers of the Transport and 1st Screening Units then proceeded southwest to Ambon where they refueled. The Transport Unit's one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser sought shelter in Kaboei Bay, Waigeo Island, about 60 miles northwest of Sorong. On 6 June the heavy cruiser Aoba was attacked there by fifteen B-24's of the Fifth Air Force. First reports were that at least two hits were scored on the cruiser, but it was later learned that the ship suffered no damage. Instead, it was able to take part in a second KON Operation. Back over at Biak, Newman resumed the advance westward on the morning of June 3rd, making painfully slow progress because of the difficult terrain and lack of adequate supply lines. Meeting no opposition, they would finally dig in half a mile from the point at which the main ridge left the coast and turned inland near Mokmer. That day, however, Fuller learnt about the possible enemy naval attack, so he decided to halt any offensive actions for the moment. On June 4th, upon learning that no enemy carriers were in the Biak area, Sakonju was again ordered to prepare to run the American blockade, this time bringing the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 219th Regiment. There would be two naval groups, the first was the Transport Unit, containing three destroyers which had been part of the first KON Operation Transport Unit. The second section was the Screening Unit, also comprising three destroyers. For the second KON Operation there were two detached units, the 1st had one heavy and one light cruiser while the 2nd Detached Unit included the small craft and patrol boats which had put into Sorong at the end of the first KON. The three destroyers of the Transport Unit were each to embark 200 infantrymen at Sorong. In addition, the destroyers of either or both the Transport and Screening Units were each to tow to Biak one landing barge crammed with troops, probably 30 to 50 men to a barge. After two quiet nights, meanwhile, Newman decided to send three battalions forward toward the north-south section of the main ridge northwest of Mokmer on June 5th. Warned by the regimental commander that it was important to secure a foothold on the ridge before the Japanese could deny it to the 186th Infantry, the three assault battalions started westward about 8:00 on June 5th. Lack of water again slowed the advance. No water had been received in the forward area since the morning of the 4th, and Colonel Newman had ordered the troops westward against the advice of his staff and battalion commanders. About noon, however, a heavy rain fell. The regimental commander ordered all troops to halt, catch the rain in ponchos, and fill their canteens. "Had it not been for this lucky break, we would undoubtedly have had to halt in midafternoon." As events turned out, no Japanese opposition was encountered, and by 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 186th Infantry, was within 500 yards of the main ridge. Although Newman and General Doe then wanted to secure the dominating terrain north and northwest of the airfield, they would receive direct orders from Fuller to immediately seize Mokmer Drome and a beachhead on the coast directly south of that strip. Throughout the morning of June 6th the 186th Infantry directed most of its efforts to bringing supplies up to the forward units. Almost the entire 2nd Battalion was engaged in hand-carrying supplies to the 3rd Battalion atop the ridge, while the latter unit sent patrols toward Mokmer Drome seeking good routes of approach to that objective. About noon Colonel Newman reported to task force headquarters that no good route had been found and that supplies, especially the ever-needed water, had not been brought forward in sufficient quantities to allow a regimental attack to be launched that day, and he therefore recommended that the attack be postponed until June 7th. General Fuller approved this suggestion. The lack of supplies and water would delay the attack, however, though the 3rd Battalion would be able to move down the west side of the main ridge to take up positions along a line of departure for the next morning's attack. To support the infantry attack, on June 7th, a thirty-minute artillery concentration began at 7:00 that morning. The 146th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, from positions along the coast to the east, were registered on targets in the airfield area ready to support the advance, but most of the firing was undertaken by the 121st Field Artillery from its location behind the 186th Infantry. While the artillery fired on Mokmer Drome and along the low ridge between that field and the 186th Infantry, Fifth Air Force bombers attacked the Borokoe Drome area and also struck some targets along the low ridge. The airfield was only occupied by the 108th Airfield Construction Unit, which immediately fled the area because of the heavy bombardment. Newman's 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced south encountering no resistance as they crossed Mokmer Drome and reached the beach. When, on 5 June, the 186th Infantry had reached the crest of the main coastal ridge, it had been on the left rear of the Japanese defenses on the low ridge and terraces above Mokmer Drome. Thus, the regiment had been in a favorable position to take these defenses from the rear. But in its move to the airfield, the 186th Infantry had bypassed the Biak Detachment's principal defensive positions. The bypassing had not been intentional. Colonel Newman had instructed both leading battalions to halt on the low ridge, reconnoiter along it in both directions, and report on Japanese defenses before moving on. According to Colonel Newman: "I received a negative report from both battalions, and ordered the movement to the airdrome. Evidently, the right battalion had failed in this patrolling effort." Instead, the 186th had captured its main objective, but now found itself surrounded by Kuzume's strongest defenses. The Japanese immediately began to pound the new American perimeter, with an artillery duel soon erupting. By nightfall, it had become impracticable to supply the 186th Regiment over the inland plateau road, which ended on the east side of the main ridge. From that point, all supplies would have to be hand-carried to Mokmer Drome and supply parties would be endangered by Japanese patrols, a few of which moved in behind the 186th as the regiment reached the beach, so the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment would be dispatched to push over the inland plateau and protect the parties. Overwater supply was also attempted, yet as the first boats approached the shore they were greeted by machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese whom the 186th Infantry had not yet cleaned out of caves along the water line in front of Mokmer Drome. The small craft returned the fire, but were finally forced to withdraw. The 186th Infantry, according to Colonel Newman, was "glad to see them withdraw since they had our troops running for cover." At 2:00 another attempt was made to land supplies at Sboeria. The three LCM's managed to put their tanks ashore in the face of continuing Japanese fire, but accompanying LCT's were driven off by Japanese artillery. Two of the LCM's were so damaged by enemy fire that they could not fully retract their ramps and had to proceed the nine and a half miles back to Bosnek in reverse. Plans were made to effect all delivery of supplies and evacuation of casualties at night until the enemy fire on the Sboeria beachhead could be neutralized. The tanks which had been landed lumbered along the shore road fronting Mokmer Drome, destroying several small bunkers along the beach. Then they wheeled toward the low ridge north of the airfield, taking under fire a Japanese 75-mm. mountain gun and a 20-mm. piece which had opposed their landing. These two weapons were silenced. Moving cautiously northwestward from the field along a road which crossed the low ridge, the tanks destroyed two large pillboxes. Alongside this, Fuller sent two companies of Haney's 3rd Battalion to land on the Parai Jetty in order to outflank the Ibdi Pocket, which the 162nd had been unsuccessfully attempting to dislodge since the start of the month. But June 7th would also see the start of Operation KON's second attempt. After rendezvousing off Misoöl Island that morning, Sakonju instructed his 8 destroyers to proceed to Biak. Air cover was to have been provided by planes of the 23rd Air Flotilla. But the cape area was being patrolled by Allied aircraft on June 8th and, about 1:30, the 23rd Air Flotilla cover of six planes was shot down or driven away by 5th Air Force P-38's. Finding the air now free of enemy planes, American B-25's dived to the attack th convoy, reporting the convoy as 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers. Initially, it was claimed that 1 destroyer was sunk, 2 were left sinking, and the fourth was damaged. A few days later, destruction was reassessed as 4 destroyers sunk and 2 light cruisers chased to the northwest. These claims were exaggerated. One destroyer, the Harusame, was holed by a near miss and sank rapidly, the bulk of its crew being saved. Another destroyer was damaged by a bomb and took some water; two others were slightly damaged by strafing. Neither speed nor navigation was impeded for any of the three. The two light cruisers reported by the Allied planes were, of course, the other two destroyers. These two might have taken some evasive action by heading northwest for a short time, but as soon as the Harusame crew had been rescued and the Allied planes had disappeared, the convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak. The convoy reformed and continued on toward Biak, undeterred by reports of strong enemy elements in the area. By nightfall, however, it was on a collision course with the cruisers of Admirals Crutchley and Berkey. At about 6:00 on the 8th, the Transport and Screening Units received a report from a Japanese aircraft that an Allied naval force comprising 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and 8 destroyers was moving west at high speed from an undesignated point east of Biak. This report was at least partially correct. The Allied task force which had been formed on June 3rd had again assembled on the 8th, having been alerted by reports of the air-sea battle off the Kaap de Goede Hoop. But the Japanese convoy commander apparently took this air reconnaissance report with at least one grain of salt--had not similar information received on June 3rd proved inaccurate? The Transport and Screening Units steamed on, despite the fact that the Kaap de Goede Hoop action had put the force behind schedule. At 11:30 the two enemy groups were approximately forty miles off the north coast of Soepiori Island, ready to turn southeast toward Korim Bay, on the northeast side of Biak. Minutes later a destroyer in the van sighted the Allied task force heading northwest around Biak. The convoy commander quickly realized that he was badly outnumbered and decided that discretion was called for. The Japanese convoy slipping towards the Mapia islands, seeing the allied destroyers failing to pursue them. Yet that is it for Biak for now as we now need to head over to the Wakde-Sarmi front. General Sibert was preparing to resume the westward offensive. By June 14th, the 20th Regiment had relieved the 158th at the Tirfoam River; and although Sibert wanted to complete unloading of his remaining units before sending the 20th to push westward, General Krueger ordered him to start an immediate offensive on June 18th. Now, however, they were up against almost the full strength of General Tagami's 36th Division. Company B pushed on toward the village at the entrance to the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin. This advance was greeted by a hail of fire from Japanese automatic weapons emplaced in the defile--fire reminiscent of the opposition encountered by Company B, 158th Infantry, at the same place more than three weeks earlier. The 20th Infantry's Company B tried to outflank the enemy position to the south but was halted by intense Japanese machine gun fire. Tanks sent forward to aid the infantry were unable to reach the enemy guns because the terrain was impassable to tracked or wheeled vehicles, which could scarcely negotiate the rough road, let alone the thick jungle and rising ground to the south. Late in the afternoon Company A was sent forward to Company B's position, but both units encountered heavy fire and soon lost contact with the rest of the 1st Battalion. The two companies remained for the night in an isolated perimeter near the village and about 400 yards west of the main body. The 3rd Battalion had moved north off the coastal road during the morning, and late in the afternoon it had established a perimeter extending south 200 yards from the beach along the east bank of the Snaky River. The battalion had encountered little opposition during the day, but patrols which had crossed the Snaky before dark reported finding many Japanese defensive positions on the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. A gap which existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions was partially filled just before nightfall by elements of the 2nd Battalion, which were sent forward late in the afternoon. Casualties during the day were four killed and twenty-eight wounded. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 1st Infantry, moved across the Tor River in the morning of June 20th and took over the positions in the vicinity of Maffin No. 1 vacated by the 20th Infantry. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry, assumed responsibility for the protection of the bridgehead across the Tor. The following morning, Sibert then directed his units to patrol extensively in order to locate enemy strong points on and around the hill. Thanks to the information gathered, the 3rd Battalion would attack towards Rocky Point in the afternoon. At the top of Lone Tree Hill was a stretch of rough but generally level ground lying mostly along the western part of the hill. This flat ground, about 700 yards long north to south, was shaped like a crude dumbbell. At its northern end, the level area was about 300 yards wide. It narrowed at the center of the hill to less than 100 yards but broadened again on the south to a width of about 250 yards. There were many coral outcroppings, potholes, and small crevices, while on the north the hill terminated in a very rugged prominence called Rocky Point. This terrain feature, which extended into Maffin Bay from the central mass of Lone Tree Hill, was about 300 yards wide east to west. Its northern face was not as heavily overgrown as the rest of Lone Tree Hill. Although Rocky Point's northeast slope was steep, foot troops could climb that face with more ease than they could approach the top of Lone Tree Hill from most other points. A deep ravine ran southwest into the central mass of Lone Tree Hill from a sandy beach on the east side of Rocky Point. The floor of the ravine varied from 20 to 30 yards in width and its nearly vertical western wall was 40 to 50 feet high. Both sides were honeycombed with natural or man-made tunnels, caverns, and small caves, most of which were connected with each other by underground or deeply defiladed passages. Some caves reached a width of 40 feet, a depth into the hillside of 50 feet, and a height of 20 feet. The ravine terminated on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill in a steep grade at the narrow central portion of the hilltop. At 1:45pm, after a fifteen-minute artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparation, one company moved across the Snaky River, immediately finding the twenty-foot cliff along the eastern side of the shelf which lay between the Snaky River and the central mass of Lone Tree Hill. The morning patrols had not, apparently, reported the existence of this cliff, and naturally it was not known that Japanese defenses were established along it. Machine gun and rifle fire from the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry, soon pinned down the 3rd Battalion's leading platoon. The company commander quickly sent part of his unit northward to find the Japanese left flank. Moving around the northeast end of the shelf, this group discovered the beach entrance to the deep ravine between the western side of the shelf and Rocky Point. Progress into or across the ravine was impossible in the face of the intense Japanese small arms fire which greeted the advancing American unit. Company B, 6th Engineers, then in the forward area to cut a road from the mouth of the Snaky River to Rocky Point, was brought up to the ravine to help clean out caves and crevices with flame throwers and demolitions, but could not reach the enemy positions through the continued machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Infantry bazooka squads also tried to blast the Japanese out of their caves but failed when their ammunition ran out. Since there was no time to bring additional rockets forward before dark, all elements of the 3rd Battalion and the engineer company were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the assault on the morrow with the 3rd Battalion moving against Lone Tree Hill from the northeast, the 2nd Battalion in reserve, and the 1st Battalion remaining in its holding position. On the morning of June 22, after a heavy air and artillery concentration on Rocky Point, the 3rd Battalion once again attacked northwest with Companies K and I, successfully driving the Japanese back into their caves to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill just south of Rocky Point. Meanwhile, another two companies had attacked southwest to force their way up the southeast slope of the hill; but subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, they would have to withdraw and march north to join Companies K and I. The 2nd Battalion also moved forward and took positions to the south of the 3rd Battalion. Worried about the American gains, Colonel Matsuyama personally led two companies in the afternoon to fall on the 3rd Battalion's perimeter with suicidal fury. Confused fighting, sometimes hand-to-hand, continued well into the night, with Matsuyama himself getting shot on the thigh. Yet this attack would successfully position the Japanese companies on the rear of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, thus cutting them off from regimental headquarters. Matsuyama also recalled his 2nd Battalion from the Maffin area, so he would employ these reinforcements to attack Sibert's 2nd Battalion on June 23. At dawn on the 23rd Japanese troops, some of whom were using American weapons and wearing parts of American uniforms, attacked the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, from the deep ravine. The battalion initially held its fire, thinking that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese were able to advance to within fifteen yards of the battalion lines before being recognized. It was an hour before the results of this error could be corrected--an hour during which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat. Isolated, the 2nd Battalion then decided to withdraw and march north towards the 3rd Battalion's perimeter at the top of the hill, getting harassed all the way by Matsuyama's forces. During the night, the Japanese launched a banzai charge against the perimeter, getting very close to retaking Lone Tree Hill but suffering heavy casualties in the end. Upon learning that his battalions were cut off, meanwhile, Sibert decided to outflank the hill by a shore-to-shore maneuver and then continue the attack from both west and east. Accordingly, Companies K and I of the 1st Regiment boarded ten LVTs on the morning of June 24th and moved to the beach just west of Rocky Point, under the protection of the 6th Reconnaissance Troop. Both companies would land successfully by midday against strong Japanese fire, though they would be rapidly pinned down on the narrow beach. Thankfully, Sibert also landed four tanks two hours later to secure the beachhead. This diversion would allow the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Regiment to begin clearing the Japanese from the many caves and crevices on Rocky Point, the deep ravine east of the point, and the hilltop plateau, further securing the supply route up the hill. By nightfall, no enemy counterattack developed, as Tagami had instead decided to withdraw the 224th Regiment to the Hill 255-Mount Saksin line while the 223rd Regiment retreated behind the Woske River. Thus Matsuyama's resistance in the area weakened and the Americans were finally able to clear Rocky Point. The next day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, continued clearing Rocky Point, the deep ravine, the northern part of the hilltop plateau, and the eastern shelf, where a few scattered Japanese still held positions along the twenty-foot-high cliff. Flame throwers, demolition charges, bazookas, and hand grenades all proved successful in eliminating Japanese resistance and sealing or clearing caves and crevices. The task was easier on the 25th, for the Japanese slowly gave up the fight and were killed or sealed off in their caves. Casualties continued to mount, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, had only about two hundred effectives by the end of the day but many of the losses were not due to Japanese action. Many men were evacuated over the now secured supply route to the top of the hill as they fell from exhaustion or became sick. On the beach west of Rocky Point Companies I and K, 1st Infantry, had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved useless in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. The two infantry companies, pinned down during the morning, kept up a continuous mortar barrage against Japanese positions in the swamp to the south, against the western cliff of Lone Tree Hill, and, when certain such fire would not endanger troops atop the hill, against the northwest corner of Rocky Point. This mortar fire, coupled with the operations on the plateau, began to have the desired effect during the afternoon, and Companies I and K were able to push their defenses beyond the narrow beachhead slightly southward and westward and toward the shore beneath Rocky Point. Once or twice during the afternoon, patrols were able to reach the top of Lone Tree Hill from the northwest corner of the point and established contact with 20th Infantry units. Late in the afternoon Company M, 1st Infantry, operating from the east side of the point, managed to push a patrol around the shore to establish contact with Company K. Though Companies I and K could find little tangible evidence of the results of their operations, they had actually wiped out the 223rd Infantry's defense force in the area just west of Lone Tree Hill. By dusk on the 25th, it had become obvious that the combined efforts of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 20th Infantry, had either cleared out the northern half of Lone Tree Hill or had forced the Japanese to withdraw. The latter conclusion was the more nearly correct. The 36th Division decided on 25 June to withdraw the bulk of the Center and Right Sector Forces west of the Woske River and establish new defensive positions, thereby keeping the 223rd Infantry, the bulk of which had not been committed to action in the Lone Tree Hill area, more or less intact. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske, and they were to withdraw into rough terrain southwest of Mt. Saksin. At nightfall on the 25th, General Sibert estimated that his three forward battalions had lost approximately 140 men killed and 850 wounded and evacuated, including those who had to be sent back to the rear because of wounds, sickness, heat exhaustion, or psychoneurotic disorders. Known Japanese dead in the northern part of the hill numbered 344, but it could not be estimated how many more had been thrown over the west cliff, sealed in caves, or carried off by withdrawing remnants of the Japanese defense force. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese had lost about 500 men killed and another 300 wounded in the Lone Tree Hill-Hill 225-Mt. Saksin area. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Chinese were accredited with the fall of Moguang despite the Chindits taking the lionshare of the fighting. Things were advancing very well for the allies in the new Biak front. As for the battle for Lone Tree Hill, it was a costly one, and not one the Americans or Japanese would soon forget.

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Episode 532: M&A and AOBA 2024

Breaking Banks Fintech

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 22, 2024 40:19

In This Episode This week host Jason Henrichs hears about all that he unfortunately missed at Bank Director's annual AOBA (Acquire Or Be Acquired) conference for bank senior leadership from Bank Director rock stars and conference session and track leaders, Emily McCormick, VP of Editorial & Research and Kiah Haslett, Banking & Fintech Editor. They cover it all from banking sector challenges, innovations, and market outlook to enthusiasm for balance sheets (yes!), deposits, and necessity of tech adoption for growth and the future.

- 117 - Pacific War - Operation Hailstone: the Smashing of Truk , February 13-20, 1944

Tom Nikkola Audio Articles

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2024 47:24

Last time we spoke about Operation Flintlock, the invasion of Kwajalein. The Americans had unleashed an incredible amount of air, sea and land forces against the Marshall Islands. The amphibious invasion of most of the islands saw little resistance, but on Kwajalein they would meet a determined enemy. The Americans achieved strategic surprise; artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had successfully softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the Pacific War; the ship-to-shore movement had been conducted expeditiously and without too many hiccups; supplies flowed ashore and to the front lines relatively smoothly and without interruption; the infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved steadily clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes; and American casualties had been fairly light. Altogether, the battle for Kwajalein represented the ideal for all military operations. Then we covered a bit of the Burma front where the allies unleashing an offensive, while the Japanese unleashed Operation HA-GO. This episode is Operation Hailstone: the Smashing of Truk Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. For those who came rushing over to see the scene at Kwajalein descriptions given were comically noted as “a hell of a Spruance Haircut, with some Mitscher shampoo”. Looking down at Roi and Namur a F6F pilot recalled “ it looked like “the moon,” or “plowed ground.” The beach and roads were strewn with the charred and misshapen remains of equipment, tanks, and armored vehicles. I don't think there was a stick of anything standing. It looked just completely beaten up.” A sailor who visited one of the captured atolls had observed “palms were shredded where shells and bomb fragments had made direct hits, leaving stumps that looked like old-fashioned shaving brushes stuck, bristles up, in the sand”. Holland Smith was greatly annoyed by the number of sightseers who came to Kwajalein stating. a “regular tourist haunt. . . . The big army and navy brass from Pearl Harbor descended on us like flies. The photographers had a gala day snapping pictures against the background of shelled buildings, while visiting brass hunted for samurai swords and other souvenirs.” Meanwhile a single battalion was assigned to capture Majuro, and their battle would consist of walking up some beaches completely unopposed. The Japanese garrison had pulled out a week earlier. Admiral Hill declared the atoll secure only 2 hours after landings were made. Its huge anchorage would accommodate all the mobile floating logistical assets of Service Squadron 10 and for the time being became the principal advance base for the 5th fleet. Jaluit, Mille, Wotje and Maloelap, which had sizable Japanese garrisons, would not be invaded by the Allied forces. Since the Japanese were cut off from outside assistance, the garrisons were doing no harm to the Allied effort, so they would be left alone, thus saving many American and Japanese lives by not forcing the issue. But Eniwetok Atoll would not be bypassed, because she held the second largest lagoon in the Marshall Islands. As Admiral Nimitz and his commanders considered the repercussions of their surprising quick and low cost victory, they soon elected to accelerate the schedule of future operations in the region. Eniwetok had been originally slabbed for May, but it seemed obvious the Japanese power in the Marshalls was crumbling a lot faster than anticipated. Consequently, Admiral Nimitz knew it would be necessary to capture the atoll to give shelter to all the ships he intended to deploy westward in the drive against the Japanese inner empire. Since it now seemed Brigadier-General Thomas Watson's 8000 reserve troops of the 22nd Marines and the 106th Regiment would no longer be required, Admirals Spruance and Hill began preparing them for the invasion of Eniwetok. However Eniwetok was within Truk's air combat radius, thus to hit Eniwetok, they would first have to neutralize what was called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk. Prior to WW2, Truk was neither well developed nor well defended. Although the US feared the Japanese had been fortifying Truk for nearly two decades; in truth, the Japanese largely ignored Truk after capturing it during WW1. When the Pacific War started on December 7, 1941, only a few coastal batteries and naval minefields added since November 1939 covered the passes into Truk Lagoon. Few other defenses, including inadequate anti-aircraft artillery, protected it. To the US Navy, Truk appeared impregnable and sailors spoke the name in awe‑struck tones. This was because Truk needed few artificial defenses to make it virtually impregnable to surface invasion. Truk was a naturally sheltered and easily defended anchorage, large enough to accommodate the entire IJN and out of range of enemy naval guns. Their defense, however, depended on the air garrison, one of the strongest in Japan's Southeast Pacific theater. Dangerous long‑range reconnaissance flights flown by B‑24s from bases in the Gilberts in December 1943 managed to bring back photos that allowed intelligence officers to map out the air bases and the various anchorages in the lagoon. Analysts thus began to realize there was not as much there as expected. And thus Operations Catchpole and Hailstone were born. Catchpole would be the invasion of Eniwetok while Hailstone would be the neutralization of Truk and as a secondary objective, to discern if Truk could be bypassed similarly as Rabaul or Maloelap was. Operation Hailstone would be bigger than December's raid against Kwajalein. Vice-Admiral Raymond Spruance's 5th fleet would deploy Task Group 50.9 and three of Task Force 58's four fast carrier task groups. Task Force 50 was under Spruance himself while Admiral Mitscher had command over the carrier task force. Spruance would also had overall command over the operation. Fleet carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill and light carriers, Belleau Wood, Cabot, and Monterey would be launched aircraft in the operation. Admiral Lea would control a fast striking force consisting of light carrier Cowpens, and battleships Iowa, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Alabama, South Dakota and North Carolina. 10 submarines would be lurking like sharks around Truk independently seeing if they could possibly intercept some IJN forces or rescue down US pilots during the attack. To prepare for the operation, on February 4th a lone PB4Y Liberator launched off Torokina's airfield to carry out reconnaissance of Truk. The photos indicated that Truk Lagoon held a battleship, two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 12 submarines. The PB4Y was spotted and fired on by warships in the harbor and several fighters were launched to intercept, but only one, a floatplane fighter, came close enough to open fire. The pilot managed to high tail it out of there safely. The American reconnaissance flight alerted Admiral Koga that they could expect a heavy raid at any moment, so he ordered all his warships to depart the lagoon before February 21st, the date they predicted the Americans would hit. The departure was extremely hasty. 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers had just arrived at Truk the previous month. When the departure order came, they haphazardly unloaded their aircraft in order to leave quickly. The aircraft were left parked nose-to-tail on airport aprons and taxiways. Cargo ships equally hastily unloaded stores so they could leave. Fuel barges were drained to top off the tanks of the Combined Fleet's major units. They had to be tediously refilled from tankers, a task made difficult by choppy seas kicked up by rough weather between February 13 and 15. On February 12, most of the Combined Fleet's major units left Truk for Palau. The light cruiser Agano, previously damaged and under repair, could not depart until February 16. Its departure was so late that it would be caught and sunk by the newly arrived US submarine screen. Other ships were still preparing to leave, their departure delayed by bad weather and slow refueling. Of those ships trapped still at Truk were the 4th fleet of Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami, consisting of light cruiser Naka; destroyers Maikaze and Oite, alongside some units of the 8th Fleet and several transports. There were also various auxiliary, destroyer, repair ships, transports and the 6th Fleet of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo headquarters. On February 5th, Admiral Hill learnt he would be commanding the Eniwetok expeditionary forces and have less than two weeks to prepare them. Moving up the invasion of Eniwetok required stripping the new garrisons of Kwajalein and Roi-Namur of manpower and supplies. The landing boat crews were green and had no real training with the troops. As recalled by General Watson “the infantry, amphibian tractors, amphibian tanks, tanks, aircraft, supporting naval ships, and most of the staffs concerned had never worked together before.” Yet we will be talking about Eniwetok in the next episode so we will be diving straight into Hailstone. Operation Hailstone had been long on American drawing board. On December 26, 1943, Admiral Nimitz had informed King that he thought the operation would become feasible by the following April, but he pledged to do it earlier if circumstances allowed: “Much depends on extent of damage inflicted on enemy in all areas in next 2 months.” Located 669 miles southwest of Eniwetok, Truk was a colossal atoll, it held a cluster of around a dozen islands near the center of its lagoon. Around 2000 Micronesian natives lived on the islands, mostly in thatch huts on grassy plains and beaches. There was a sense of dread amongst the aviators and crewmen of the task forces assigned to the operation. They were to attack the “mystery base”, Truk had acquired a reputation as an unassailable fortress. It was thought to be a major hub of Japanese airpower, defended by hundreds of crack pilots in Zeros. The task forces sortied westward on February 12th and no Japanese would bother their approach. The carriers got to their assembly point 90 miles northeast of Dublon before sunrise on February 17th. AT 4:43am the operation kicked off when 5 fleet carriers launched 72 Hellcats to go knock out the enemy air power prior to sending in the bombers. This was a new technique Admiral Mitscher had concocted himself. The Japanese were caught completely unprepared, no Japanese aircraft were in the air when radar picked up the incoming aircraft. The IJN's 22nd and 26th Air Flotilla's were on shore leave and their radar had difficulty detecting low flying aircraft, a weakness allied intelligence exploited. Despite this, the Japanese tossed 90 aircraft, half of which attempted to intercept the US fighters without coordination. Within minutes of combat, 30 Japanese fighters were shot down, by the end of the engagement a total of 55 would fall. The Americans lost 4 Hellcats, and at least one according to VF-6 pilot Alex Vraciu was a victim of friendly fire. “There were dog fights all over the place. I even saw one of our Hellcats shoot another Hellcat down. It was a great deflection shot but . . . one of our guys just shot first before being sure and this other poor pilot was forced to parachute out. In the course of the action, I saw a number of Japanese parachutes in the air.” The American pilots had expected to be facing 200 Japanese aircraft. According to estimates given in postwar interrogations, the Japanese had 68 operational airplanes on the Moen field; 27 on the Dublon field; 20 on Eten and 46 on Param, for a total of 161. Parked on the big field at Eten were some 180 aircraft that were damaged, most grounded for lack of spare parts, or immobilized for lack of aircrews. Most of these would be destroyed on the ground. Although Admiral Koga anticipated the American move against Truk, air and naval forces were not on the alert when the American planes suddenly appeared overhead. According to Masataka Chihaya, a staff officer with the 4 Fleet, the pilots, ground personnel, and ships' crews had been kept in 24hr readiness since the overflight of the 2 marine PB4Ys two weeks earlier, and had reached a state of collective exhaustion. Another factor to the catastrophe was that of morale and even discipline had eroded since the withdrawal of the heavy warships. Pilots had refused to climb into their cockpits when ordered, many had gone absent without leave. The atoll's commander, Vice Admiral Masami Kobayashi, had apparently concluded that the American fleet was still engaged in the Marshalls, and authorized a downgrade in the alert level. On February 16, many pilots and other personnel had left their barracks for R&R. The morning of the American raid found a large proportion of Truk's aviators asleep in the atoll's largest town, on the island of Dublon, having partied pretty hard into the night at local drinking establishments. Their only means of returning to their airfield on the island of Eten was by ferry, and the ferry could not accommodate all of them at once. Many aircraft, both on Eten and on the airfields of Moen and Param islands, had also been disarmed and drained of fuel. Kobayashi's ignominious failure to keep his forces on alert put an end to his naval career; he was relieved of command and then forced to retire from active service. Having swept the skies of opposition by 6:00am, the Hellcats began strafing the seaplane base at Dublon and the airfields on Moen, Eten, and Param, successfully destroying another 40 aircraft on the ground. As the fighter sweep was ending, 18 Avengers emerged dropping their payloads onto the airfields, neutralizing Truks air power. As such, the living hell created by strafing and bombs saw a total of 125 operational aircraft and 110 air arsenal aircraft get destroyed or seriously damaged on the ground. With Truk's air power neutralized, the next American objective was to hit the shipping in the lagoon, so the carriers then began launching full deckload strikes, staggering the launches so that there were aircraft over Truk virtually continuously for the rest of the day. James D. Ramage, flying a VB-10 Dauntless, noted that several Zeros flew by him without offering combat. He assumed that they were dispirited by the one-sided results of the air fight and were determined to survive it. It was a syndrome that had become increasingly common during the later stages of the South Pacific air campaign. Due to the lack of air cover or warning, many merchant ships were caught at anchor with only the islands' anti-aircraft guns for defense. At 07:30, the first shipping began to be attacked. Yorktown's bombers rapidly sinking the cargo ship Fujikawa Maru and then bombing the submarine tender Rio de Janeiro Maru was hit by 1,000lb bombs dropped by Yorktown SBD Dauntlesses east of Uman. It stayed afloat, but sank the next day. Another submarine tender, the Heian Maru, headquarters of Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo was hit twice , but the ship would successfully survive the relentless American attacks, then offloading Takagi on Dublon after sunset. By 9:23am, Lee's battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers came in to try and catch escaping ships. Some Japanese vessels attempted to flee via the atoll's North Pass; but were bottled up by the aerial attack and by Lee's warships, most of them would be successfully sunk by 13:00. The famed marine fighter ace Major Gregory “Pappy” Boyington, of the Black Sheep squadron VMF-214, had been shot down and captured off Rabaul a week before Hailstone. Alongside other POW's he was flown into Truk while the raid was developing. As the Betty bomber carrying them rolled to a stop, Pappy and his fellow prisoners were thrown out onto the airstrip. They looked up and were shocked to see an F6F Hellcat flying low over the airfield, walking .50-caliber fire across parked planes. The bomber from which they had just been ejected went up in a sheet of flame. The Americans were shoved into a pit by the side of the airfield, and watched the action overhead and cheered for the attackers. Pappy recalled this “There was so much excitement I couldn't do any differently. I just had to see those Nip planes, some of the light planes like the Zeros, jump off the ground from the explosion of our bombs and come down “cl-l-l-lang,” just like a sack of bolts and nuts. The planes caught on fire and the ammunition in them began going off. There were 20-mm cannon shells and 7.7's bouncing and ricocheting all around this pit. Some of these hot pieces we tossed back out of the pit with our hands”. Enterprise dive-bombers dropped 1,000-pound armor-piercing bombs on targets chosen from the aerial photos taken earlier. The planes hurtled down through flak bursts and smashed the stationary ships. A bomb hit the stern of the 13,000-ton Hoyo Maru. The 7,000-ton aviation stores ship Kiyozumi Maru and lit her up. A VT-6 Avenger flew low over the ammunition ship, the Aikoku Maru, and landed a bomb dead-center amidships. The target went up in a huge, rolling ball of flame that engulfed the plane and destroyed it. The shockwave was powerful enough to rock Lieutenant Ramage's aircraft, more than 2,000 feet overhead. “It was, I think, the biggest explosion I've ever seen, other than the atomic bombs. It was just an enormous blast.” 5 ships managed to escape the carnage within the lagoon. The light cruiser Katori, auxiliary cruiser Akagi Maru, destroyers Maikaze and Nowaki, and the small trawler, Shonan Maru. Unfortunately for them they ran directly into Lee's force at 1:30pm. Only the destroyer Nowaki managed to outrun the Americans as she fired a spread of torpedoes trying to keep the Americans at a distance. Spruance was ultimately the one who ordered the surface ships to come into the combat area and this resulted in close calls for friendly fire. Mitscher would continuously order pilots to hold back their payloads against fleeing ships and wait for identification first. Many of the aviators would accuse Spruance of seeking to have “the big guns” get their taste of the blood. But the big guns would basically only finish off some crippled ships. Minneapolis and New Orleans sank two immobilized ships with 3-4 salvos. Meanwhile the USS New Jersey nearly took two torpedo hits from a sinking IJN destroyer. American ships came to the ailing IJN vessel trying to pick up survivors, but almost all the Japanese sailors took their own lives. The Iowa would take a bomb hit from a Japanese aircraft, but suffered little damage. If one or more of the American surface ships were hit by torpedoes, it may have very well cost Spruance his command. The ordinarily conservative fleet commander had behaved with impulsive bravado, and it seems for no better reason than a blackshoe's inborn desire to claim a piece of the action for the big guns. Admiral Sherman's tactful conclusion was that “this expedition accomplished little and only complicated the attacks by the carrier planes.” Lieutenant Ramage was less gentle: “So the big battleships finally drew blood against a cruiser that was almost dead in the water. It must have been a great victory.” The death toll for the first day of Hailstone was more than 20 Japanese ships sunk, but the fun was not over. 6-7 Radar-equipped B5Ns capable of tracking ships at night launched perhaps from Rabaul or Saipan, hunting for the US carriers. They were spotted on radar as they approached the US ships. Night fighters attempted to intercept them, but were unable to find them in the darkness. The task force maneuvered to avoid the incoming bombers, which would have worked if the Japanese were using aircraft blindly flying a standard search pattern. However, the radar-equipped Nakajimas detected the course change and continued to home in on the carriers. Between 7:00 and 10:00, the aircraft made several approaches to the US ships, but were kept at a distance by heavy radar-directed anti-aircraft fire. The Yorktown launched a night fighter F4U Corsair at 9:20 to intercept a particularly persistent Nakajima, vectoring the fighter towards the torpedo bomber. But for once, the Japanese used radar to better advantage than the US, so the Corsair never made contact with the Nakajima. The Nakajima was then able to press its attack, launching a torpedo at the USS Intrepid. It struck near the starboard quarter, jamming the rudder, killing 11 aboard, and wounding 17. The B5N that dropped the torpedo apparently escaped unharmed. Intrepid was in no danger of sinking, but made her way to Majuro to be safe. The Americans then launched their own night attack on Japanese shipping in Truk Atoll. At 2:00 am, the USS Enterprise launched a flight of 12 radar-equipped Avengers to attack the surviving Japanese ships in Truk Lagoon. Each aircraft was armed with 4 500-pound bombs. The concept of performing a low-altitude night attack, with the planes guided to the targets by radar alone, had been studied and discussed but never attempted before. It required the pilots to navigate to Truk on instruments alone. Once over the lagoon, they circled over the anchorages until radar echoes provided an image of the targets. The mission would be a tactical breakthrough, unprecedented in the annals of aviation or naval history. Lieutenant Commander William I. Martin, who trained the airmen, recalled “Radar displays at that time required an operator to do a great deal of interpreting. It was like learning a new language. Instead of it being a polar plot, looking down on it like a map, the cathode ray tube just gave indications that there was an object out there. After considerable practice, a radar operator could determine that there was a ship there and its approximate size. You related the blip on the radar scope to the image of the ship”. In about 30 minutes, the Avengers made 25 passes over Dublon and Eten, scoring 13 direct hits on ships, two on rocky islets mistaken for ships and seven near misses. As a result, around 12 vessels were sunk during the attack, including the Heian Maru. It was a remarkable performance by a dozen aircraft in the US Navy's first carrier-launched night attack. The following dawn, Mitscher sent another fighter sweep, though it would not be very effective as the Japanese had basically no surviving aircraft in the area. 200 aircraft met negligible air opposition over the atoll as they worked over the remaining targets at their leisure. Hundreds of incendiaries were dropped on smoking airfields, parking areas, and hangars. The bombers paid special attention to the fuel tank farms, which had been spared on the first day in order to prevent smoke from obscuring visibility. By noon, Japanese resistance was almost non-existent and there were no more worthwhile targets, so Spruance and Mitscher decided to call a halt to the attacks, as it was considered that Truk no longer posed a threat to the Eniwetok invasion. Hailstone cost the Americans 12 fighters, 7 torpedo bombers, 6 dive bombers and 2 floatplanes. 29 aircrew died; and 28 sailors died aboard the Intrepid. The operation had been one of the most smashing carrier raids of the Pacific war. Though most of Japan's heavy naval units had fled the lagoon, the Americans had sunk three light cruisers, four destroyers, three auxiliary or training cruisers, and six other naval auxiliaries. In addition, around 30 merchant ships were sent to the bottom of the lagoon, including 5 precious oil tankers. The total shipping losses approached 200,000 tons and many of those vessels had been laden with munitions and other supplies that could not be recovered. 17,000 tons of fuel went up in the attack, at a time when fuel was running very short for the Japanese. The Japanese lost 249 aircraft, most on the ground. As Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison would later write, “Courage and determination the Navy had shown from the first, but in the Marshalls it demonstrated mastery of the art of amphibious warfare; of combining air, surface, submarine and ground forces to project fighting power irresistibly across the seas. The strike on Truk demonstrated a virtual revolution in naval warfare; the aircraft carrier emerged as the capital ship of the future, with unlimited potentialities.” The IJN Combined Fleet would never return to Truk; the 4th Fleet headquarters remained at Truk, but its warships left; and the transports carrying the 52nd Division to Truk, some of which had arrived on February 19, hastily unloaded and quickly departed. Vice-Admiral Kobayashi Masami was held responsible for the defeat and would consequently be relieved of his command, never to return to active duty. But that's it for the Marshall Islands campaign for now as we are shifting over to the south pacific. In preparation for the invasion of the Admiralty Islands, the allies first would need to seize the Green islands, situated 117 miles southeast of Rabaul. Admiral Halsey had been tasked with landing General Barrowclough's 3rd New Zealand Division consisting of the 14th Brigade; Special Army Tank Squadron; 17th Field Regiment; 29th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment; 144th Independent Battery; 53rd Anti-Tank Battery; 967th Coast Artillery Battalion; Naval Base Unit No. 11 and other supporting units. Halsey assigned Admiral Wilkinson to command the operations. He would transport the men in 3 echelons using a plethora of Destroyers, Destroyer Transports and countless landing crafts. AirSols would be providing coverage alongside Admiral Merrill's Task force 39 consisting of light cruisers Cleveland, Columbia and Montpelier; and destroyers Charles Ausburne, Dyson, Stanly, Spence and Converse. There would also be Admiral Ainsworths Task force 38. Wilkinsons echelons departed Vella Lavella and the Treasury islands On February 12th and 13th. They met near Bougainville and together advanced towards the departure line off Barahun Island. The Americans expected Rabaul's airforce to be greatly depleted by this point, but the convoy was still harassed by 15 Vals and 17 Zeros during the night of February 14th. 10 vals managed to score a hit and 3 near misses against cruiser St Louis, killing 23 men and causing moderate damage. The bombers also tried attacking the landing craft, but apart from a near miss on LST-446, the landing would proceed quickly and smoothly. The landing craft began taking off on the morning of February 15th as AirSols fighters gained air supremacy over the skies of Nissan Island. 32 fighters form Squadron 14, RNZAF, commanded by Squadron Leader S. G. Quill, and Squadrons 1 and 18, commanded by Squadron Leader J. A. Oldfield, both kept 18 aircraft continuously over the island until dusk, flying sorties from the airfields at Empress Augusta Bay. 12 Japanese bombers would be reported shot down. This was the last air opposition encountered during Operation Squarepeg. With such a numerous fleet sending thousands of troops ashore with impunity only 115 miles from Rabaul proved AirSols was a force to be reckoned with. Ferried ashore in LCIs and LCVPs, into the lagoon in southern Barahun Island, the troops would disembark at several landing beaches around the Pokonian and Tangalan Plantations. Within just 2 hours, about 5800 New Zealanders were ashore. Patrols were then sent out, and carrying parties began moving stores off the beaches further inland. As the beachhead was established, there was only a brief resistance from several Japanese barges around Sirot Island, before a perimeter was established. By nightfall, in addition to the aforementioned troops, Wilkinson had also landed 58 jeeps, 67 trucks, 44 guns, 8 Valentine tanks, 426 tons of petrol in drums, 2000 gallons of fresh water in tins, and 267 tons of rations. The following day, as the Kiwis fanned out along Nissan Island, about 21 Japanese were encountered on Sirot. Late that afternoon, natives reported that an unspecified number of Japanese had taken refuge on the densely wooded island of Sirot, and the task of clearing the island was assigned to B Company, led by Captain D. Dalton. The Japanese were swiftly dealt with, but the Kiwi's would suffer 5 deaths and 3 wounded in the firefight. On February 18, patrols from the 37th Battalion reached the northern tip of Nissan Island and reported it clear while the 30th and 35th Battalions dealt with a large group of Japanese at the south point of the island. The Kiwis accidentally came upon the remaining Japanese garrison on 20 February, in an area previously declared clear by patrols. It was along the coast near a few deserted native huts passing as the village of Tanaheran on the map. On February 19, the remaining 100-man Japanese garrison signed off on their radio ‘We are charging the enemy and beginning radio silence'.The Kiwi's suffered 3 deaths and 11 wounded. The Japanese had been overwhelmed and annihilated. The next day the second echelon of Admiral Fort arrived. Organized resistance had ceased. In total, 120 Japanese had been killed against the 13 killed and 24 wounded of the Allied forces. With the Green Islands under their control, the Allied forces now needed to do something about the 1200 friendly native Melanesians whose taro gardens and coconut groves were about to be turned into airfields. The answer was a temporary evacuation to Guadalcanal. This was explained to the natives' head men, and, as the Melanesians are born rovers, the prospect of a boat ride to the Solomons and free food there was highly pleasing. Accordingly, "Grandpa" Roger Cutler's LSTs of the Second Echelon took on the function, new even for Love-Sugar-Tares, of evacuating natives; and so well was this done that by the time the flotilla of Melanesian Mayflowers reached Guadalcanal the 1147 embarked had increased to 1148. The Green Islands would prove to be a very useful link in the strangling of Rabaul, with a PT base immediately opening on February 17 and with a new fighter strip being completed by March 4, which for the first time put Kavieng within range of AirSols fighters and bombers. But now we have to shift over to the boys in New Guinea. The last time we were in New Guinea, the Australians were in hot pursuit of General Nakano's men. On February 3rd, the 30th battalion of Lieutenant-Colonel William Parry-Okeden had set off from Singor to take over for the 4th battalion at Crossington. The next day, the Australians reached Nemau and the day after that established a new supply beach at Butubutu. On that same day orders came in stating all commanders must make every endeavor to capture prisoners. This prompted Cameron to call off the Papuans from leading the advance and sent the leading Papuan platoon to reconnoiter the inland trails while the infantry led the advance on the right. The men advanced sluggishly as a result of the mixture of muddy tracks and enemy corpses. They reached Roinji 1 on the 6th then Roinji 2 on the 7th. During the afternoon the Papuans reached Gali 1 where they managed to kill 24 Japanese stragglers and captured 3 prisoners. Each day the Papuans killed on average 10-15 Japanese, but it was not until the 8th when they encountered a real Japanese rearguard at Weber Point. The Papuans performed a frontal assault killing 53 Japanese and captured another 4 prisoners. By the night on February 9, the leading company was 2000 yards west of Malalamai and 3500 yards from the American's most forward outpost at Yagomai when they fought another larger group of Japanese. 61 Japanese were killed and 9 prisoners taken in the day; and on February 10, the 30th Battalion at last reached Yagomai. Here they finally linked with the American force at Saidor. It was decided that the 5th Division would not operate west of the Yaut, so Brigadier Cameron was instructed to mop up the Tapen and Nokopo areas. Meanwhile, the 35th Battalion advanced towards Bwana, where they killed 31 Japanese. On the 18th, the Australians killed 40 Japanese at Gabutamon and another 142 in the Tapen area; 3 days later, they attacked Wandiluk, where they killed 57 Japanese. After the 22nd, the pursuit was largely carried on by the Papuans towards Nokopo. During this time until March 1st, the 8th Brigade reported killing 734 Japanese, found 1793 dead and took 48 prisoners. The Australians and Papuan had suffered 3 deaths and 5 wounded. Despite his losses, General Nakano and his men had yet again cheated death. In a letter on 21st March Lt General Frank Berryman wrote: "About 8,000 semi-starved, ill equipped and dispirited Japanese bypassed Saidor. It was disappointing that the fruits of victory were not fully reaped, and that once again the remnants of 51st Division escaped our clutches." Meanwhile General Morshead had been planning to relieve the 7th division with the fresh 11th division Major-General Allan Boase. But General Vasey convinced him instead to let him take over the drive on Madang by the end of January. Now the 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 2/10th in the right-hand sector from 4100 through Crater Hill and Kankirei Saddle to Cam's Hill, with the task of patrolling the area east of Cam's Hill, the headwaters of the Mosa River, and forward along the upper Mindjim River Valley to Paipa 2. The 57th/60th relieved the 2/9th on the left with positions on the 4100 Feature, the Protheros and Shaggy Ridge, and the task of patrolling forward from Canning's Saddle along the high ground west of the Mindjim. The 24th Battalion relieved the 2/12th in reserve. Now Brigadier Hammer had the task of patrolling forward from the Kankirei Saddle. As typical for New Guinea, the terrain facing them would be formidable. Hammer had this to say in a report "The country in the Finisterre Ranges is rugged, steep, precipitous and covered with dense rain forest. It rains heavily almost every day thus making living conditions uncomfortable. By day it is hot, by night three blankets are necessary. There is, therefore, a constant battle with mud, slush, rain and cold. To allow freedom of movement over this mud it was necessary to corduroy every track in the area." By late February Hammer dispatched a number of small patrols towards Amuson and Saipa 2. On the right flank Lt Brewster with a patrol from the 58th/59th investigated the valley of the Mosa River as far as Amuson, and returned after 4 days reporting the area was clear. In the central area a patrol from the 57th/60th brushed with an enemy patrol near Saipa 2, with some support from the guns of the 4th Field Regiment. On the 28th a patrol from the 57th/60th, led by Lt Besier, attacked Saipa 2 three times with supporting artillery fire, but all attempts to enter the village were repulsed. On February 26, the 58th/59th Battalion was instructed to establish a company patrol base on Amuson and send out a platoon reconnaissance patrol to the coast in the Mindjim-Melamu area, which managed to establish some observation posts overlooking Astrolabe Bay in early March. Hammer also sent the 57th/60th Battalion to the Paipa area in preparation for an attack on Saipa 2. Meanwhile, after the conclusion of Operation Dexterity on February 10th General Krueger handed command to Major-General William Gill over the Saidor area and he began to bring the remaining elements of his 32nd division. Gill then began plans for a secondary landing at the Yalau Plantation, around 30 miles west of Saidor. He hoped to establish a new forward base there and possibly intercept enemy stragglers trying to bypass the Saidor area.The 2nd battalion, 126th regiment led by Lt Colonel Oliver O. Dixon successfully landed on March 5th. 54 landing crafts unloaded 1348 within 9 waves, seeing little to no opposition. As men patrolled east and west from Yalau, they encountered and killed a few Japanese and found many already dead. They would reach Bau Plantation on March 9th, where they ran into a detachment of General Nakai's 3rd battalion, 239th regiment. But yet again we must not shift our attention somewhere we have not been in quite some time, the Indian Ocean. The Commander in Chief, Southwest Area Fleet, Vice-Admiral Takasu Shiro had decided to dispatch heavy cruisers Aoba, Chikuma, and Tone, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sakonju Naomasa, to raid Allied shipping on the main route between Aden and Fremantle. Departing the Lingga Islands on February 27, the heavy cruisers were escorted by light cruisers Kinu and Ōi and 3 destroyers through the Sunda Strait. The raiders were also supported by 10 medium bombers and 3-4 seaplanes based in Sumatra and west Java which conducted patrols in the direction of Ceylon. 3-4 submarines from the 8th Flotilla also monitored Allied shipping movements near Ceylon, the Maldive Islands and Chagos Archipelago. On March 6th the allies detected the force near the Lombok Strait. Fearing a possible attack, Western Australia was reinforced and the British Eastern Fleet was diverted. On the morning of March 9th, Sakonju's cruiser came across the 6200 ton British steamer Behar between Fremantle and Colombo. Upon sighting the Japanese ships, Behar's Captain Maurice Symons, ordered that his radio operator transmit the "RRR" code in order to notify other ships and Allied bases that the merchant ship was being attacked by surface raiders. Tone's signals room picked up the message,. The Tone then began signaling repeatedly to the Behar to surrender, but the Behar continued to flee, prompting the cruiser to open fire. Behar was hit a few times to her prow and stern, killing 3 crewmembers. Within 5 minutes Behar's crew and passengers began abandoning ship as she sank. 104-108 survivors were rescued by the Tone. Following the attack, Sakonju believed it was too dangerous to continue raiding as Behar had sent out a distress signal. So he turned back, reaching Tanjung Priok on March 15th. Shortly after the Behar survivors were rescued, Sakonju sent a radio message to Tone's commanding officer, Captain Mayuzumi Haruo, reprimanding him for taking non-essential personnel prisoner and not capturing the merchant ship. In this message Sakonju ordered that the survivors be killed. Mayuzumi was unwilling to do so, however, as he felt that this would violate his Christian religious beliefs. His executive officer, Commander Mii Junsuke, also opposed killing the prisoners deeming it dishonorable. Mayuzumi radioed a request to Sakonju that the prisoners be put ashore, but this was rejected. The captain then visited Aoba to argue his case, but Sakonju remained unmoved and told Mayuzumi to "obey my orders". Despite his misgivings, Mayuzumi ultimately decided to kill the prisoners. On the night of March 18, all the prisoners on board Tone were beheaded by several of the cruiser's officers. Mayuzumi watched the killings from the ship's bridge but Mii refused to take part. The number of the crew to be executed was between 65 and at least 100. Following the massacre 15-36 survivors were transferred to Aoba. The party sent to Aoba included Symonds, the Behar's chief officer and several of the senior officers as well as both of the ship's female passengers. All of this group were later landed at Tanjung Priok. After the war, the Allies prosecuted the officers responsible for the murders on board the Tone. Vice Admiral Takasu died from disease in September 1944, but Sakonju was tried by the British in 1947 at Hong Kong and sentenced to death and executed 21 January 1948. Mayuzumi was convicted for his role in the killings and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Sakonju stated in his affidavit that he was 'retaliating against the execution and inhuman treatment of Japanese prisoners by the allies in Guadalcanal'. Mayuzumi stated in his defense that he was following Sakonju's orders. Mayuzumi received a light sentence due to his repeated requests for clemency for the prisoner's lives. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Hailstone saw what was once called the Gibraltar of the Pacific, Truk nearly annihilated. She could no longer be counted upon to thwart allied sea and air units in the region. The Australians on New Guinea were not letting up on the retreating Japanese and a terrible and needless massacre took place in the Indian Ocean.

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JAVIER CÁRDENAS - Levántate OK #599 26-01-2024

Levántate OK

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 26, 2024 37:55

Japón condena a la horca al hombre que quemó vivos a 36 dibujantes de anime ‘'por plagio'' Javier Cárdenas se hace eco de la noticia sucedida en Japón, en la que han condenado a la horca a un hombre que quemó vivos a 36 dibujantes de anime, porque decía que le habían plagiado. Japón, con más de 100 condenados en el corredor de la muerte, es uno de los pocos países desarrollados que todavía aplica la pena capital, una medida con amplio apoyo público."Mantener o no la sentencia a muerte es un asunto importante que afecta a los fundamentos del sistema de justicia criminal de Japón", dijo el jefe adjunto de la secretaría del gabinete, Seiji Kihara."Dados los crímenes atroces que siguen ocurriendo uno tras otro, es necesario ejecutar aquellos cuya culpa es extremadamente grave, con lo que es inapropiado abolir el castigo capital", añadió.Japón y Estados Unidos son los únicos miembros del G7 de países industrializados que aun aplican la pena de muerte. Ahora, Shinji Aoba, de 45 años, que irrumpió en el edificio de Kyoto Animation el 18 de julio de 2019, roció gasolina y le prendió fuego mientras gritaba “caigan muertos”, matando a 36 personas, fue condenado a la pena capital, la horca.El juez Keisuke Masuda dijo que el acto de Aoba fue “extremadamente cruel e inhumano” y que causó una “muerte agonizante” a las víctimas, que quedaron atrapadas por el fuego y el humo. Muchos de los fallecidos eran jóvenes talentos de la animación, incluida una mujer de 21 años.La defensa alegó que Aoba no era consciente de sus actos ni podía controlarlos debido a un trastorno mental. Sin embargo, el juez rechazó esta argumentación y consideró que Aoba era plenamente responsable de su crimen.Aoba se disculpó ante el tribunal y dijo que se había pasado de la raya. Según los fiscales, Aoba tenía el delirio de que Kyoto Animation, conocido como KyoAni, le había plagiado sus ideas.

sin estados unidos ahora muchos jap g7 mantener dados kyoto animation javier c kyoani aoba

Trial Starts Over 2019 KyoAni Arson Attack, Suspect Admits Charges

Disability News Japan

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 5, 2023 4:52

A man accused of carrying out a deadly arson attack on a Kyoto Animation Co. studio four years ago admitted the charges in the indictment, in the first hearing of his trial at Kyoto District Court on Tuesday. The defense said Aoba should be acquitted due to his mental incompetence or given leniency due to his diminished capacity. Episode Notes: ‘ “I now think that I went too far” Suspect in 2019 KyoAni Arson Attack Admits Charges': https://barrierfreejapan.com/2023/09/05/i-now-think-that-i-went-too-far-suspect-in-2019-kyoani-arson-attack-admits-charges/ ‘Linking mental illness to violence tarnishes an entire community' https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2019/08/02/voices/linking-mental-illness-violence-tarnishes-entire-community/

attack trial starts charges suspect admits linking arson kyoani aoba

How Your Posture and Mobility Cause Shoulder Pain and Injury

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 12, 2023 22:18

The spring and early summer is a common time for overuse injuries and other joint pain. Shoulder pain being one of the most common. It's that nagging ache in your shoulder that refuses to let up. Maybe it comes and goes, maybe it's a constant throb, but either way, it's starting to interfere with your daily life. Now you're here, asking the important questions: "Why do my shoulders hurt?" "What are the causes of shoulder pain?" and crucially, "What can I do about shoulder pain?" The good news is, you're not alone. Shoulder pain affects millions of people worldwide, making it a public health concern. A study in the Journal of Physical Therapy Science indicates that the prevalence of shoulder pain in the general population could be up to 66.7%.Takahashi, N., Aoba, Y., Shiozawa, H., & Aizawa, J. (2019). Effect of posture on shoulder muscle activity during smartphone use. Ergonomics, 62(10), 1316-1324. And just like you, many people are searching for answers. Hopefully, by the end of this article, you'll have found most of those answers. If not, leave a comment or post your question. The Complex Design of the Shoulder: A Blessing and a Curse Your shoulder isn't just a singular entity. It's a complicated system, a mechanical marvel, that has been designed for an impressive range of motion. The shoulder is made up of three bones - the clavicle (collarbone), the scapula (shoulder blade), and the humerus (upper arm bone). These bones work together through four distinct joints, namely the glenohumeral, acromioclavicular, sternoclavicular, and the scapulothoracic joints.Ackland, D. C., Pak, P., Richardson, M., & Pandy, M. G. (2008). Moment arms of the muscles crossing the anatomical shoulder. Journal of Anatomy, 213(4), 383-390. Surrounding these bones and joints is a network of muscles, tendons, and ligaments. This includes the rotator cuff, which comprises four key muscles providing stability to the shoulder joint, and the deltoid muscle, which powers the lifting of the arm.Lewis, J. S. (2016). Rotator cuff tendinopathy: a model for the continuum of pathology and related management. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 50(19), 1187-1191. This complex structure enables your shoulder to perform a myriad of tasks every day. From reaching for a can on the top shelf, to throwing a ball, or even brushing your hair, few body parts offer such diversity of movement. However, this benefit comes at a cost. This inherent mobility of the shoulder makes it susceptible to a range of injuries and conditions. Overuse, trauma, or strain can cause a variety of shoulder conditions, including rotator cuff tears, impingement, and frozen shoulder. The intensive use of the shoulder in sports, especially those requiring repetitive overhead movements, further raises the risk of injuries.Yang, J. L., Chang, C. W., Chen, S. Y., Wang, S. F., & Lin, J. J. (2017). Mobilization techniques in subjects with frozen shoulder syndrome: randomized multiple-treatment trial. Physical Therapy, 97(10), 1003-1013. While our shoulder's dynamic capability is a boon for performing diverse movements, it also increases the risk of injury and pain. In the following sections, we will delve into how everyday habits, such as posture, can further affect your shoulder health. The Common Causes of Shoulder Pain Understanding the causes of shoulder pain isn't always straightforward. While injuries and conditions related to the shoulder anatomy we've discussed are prevalent, there are other potential causes to consider. Age-related wear and tear is a common cause. With time, the cartilage in our shoulders naturally deteriorates, leading to conditions like osteoarthritis. A research article in the American Journal of Sports Medicine confirms that age-related changes can predispose individuals to a host of shoulder disorders, including rotator cuff tears and glenohumeral osteoarthritis.Minagawa, H., Yamamoto, N., Abe, H., Fukuda, M., Seki, N., Kikuchi,

Ichiko Aoba & 12 Ensemble (MF 462) - 青葉市子と12アンサンブル（MF 462）フォークシンガー

SBS Japanese - SBSの日本語放送

Play Episode Listen Later May 29, 2023 4:27

Japanese singer-songwriter from Kyoto. She has mainly performed in Europe past a couple of years. Her latest album, Ichiko Aoba with 12 Ensemble (Live at Milton Court) is produced in London. - 京都府出身のシンガーソングライターです。現在はヨーロッパでの活動が中心で、最新アルバム「Ichiko Aoba with 12 Ensemble (Live at Milton Court)」はヨーロッパの一流ストリング・コレクティブス、12アンサンブルと共演したロンドンでのライブ録音です。

europe japanese ensemble kyoto aoba

035 Deep Dive into the Legendary "Class of '96" with Ramen Beast and Ramen Guide Japan

Ramen Hunter

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 20, 2023 71:46

Join us on this episode of Ramen Hunter as we explore Ramen History with friends of the pod: Abram aka Ramen Beast and Cody aka Ramen Guide Japan. Today we look into the legendary Class of '96. A group of shops including Menya Musashi, Aoba, and Kujiraken than pushed the Ramen into the 21st Century. Learn how the things we take for granted in modern shops trace their influence to this class, from bowl construction to design aesthetic.We also discuss the passing of two significant figures in the Ramen world: Shiroiwa Kurato-san of Nonokura, and Chin Kenichi of Iron Chef fame. The fellas break down their impact on the Ramen world.As always, a treat to have Abram and Cody share their knowledge.Shops mentioned in the pod:CLASS OF 96Menya Musashi 麺屋武蔵Aoba 青葉Kujiraken くじら軒Tagano　中華そば多賀野Chabuya　柳麺ちゃぶ屋Jiro Hitotsubashi Branch ラーメン二郎一橋学園店MENSHOAfrobeatsKonjiki Hototogisu　SOBAHOUSE 金色不如帰新宿御苑本店Jinrui Minna Menrui　人類みな麺類東京本店Robinson 自家製麺ロビンソンEdmond えどもんどMichi つけ麺道Kikka 吉華自由が丘Hashigo 支那麺はしごNakiryu 創作麺工房鳴龍Banraien 萬来園Suzunoki 自家製手もみ麺鈴ノ木Shono 麺や庄のKikanbo カラシビ味噌らー麺鬼金棒Ashura 拉麺阿修羅Eburi 麺屋江武里

guide japan class beast deep dive legendary shops ramen iron chef aoba

True Crime Farsi | مرد آتش افروز - شینجی آوبا | Shinji Aoba The Arsonist | پادکست ترو کرایم فارسی

True Crime Farsi پادکست جنایی

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 3, 2023 28:30

True Crime Farsi ,Shinji Aoba the Arsonist.شما شنونده قسمت پنجم ترو کرایم فارسی با نام شینجی آوبا مرد آتش افروز هستیدآدمی‌ که از روی توهم جون ۳۶ نفرو به طرز وحشتناکی گرفتشما میتونید همچنین پادکستها رو به همراه ویدیوهایی که از فیلم ها وعکس های پرونده ها تهیه شده در کانال یوتوب ما تماشا کنید که حتما هیجان خاص خودش رو داره.همچنین ممنون میشیم در ادامه راه ما همراه ما باشید و مارو به دوستانتون معرفی کنید و انتقاد و پیشنهادات خودتون رو در کانال یوتوب با ما به اشتراک بگذارید. در ضمن این پادکست شامل محتوایی هست که مناسب افراد زیر ۱۶سال نیستبا صدای امید و مهتابInstagram: truecrimefarsiOutro Music: https://www.fesliyanstudios.com/royalty-free-music/download/tokyo-lo-fi/1751 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

acast true crime farsi arsonist shinji aoba

Crossing the "T" - The Battle of Cape Esperance

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 27, 2022 68:02

On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal. The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field. The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area. Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches. The intelligence was wrong. Set Up:The Japanese have been making steady resupply runs, at night, to their forces on Guadalcanal since Edson's Ridge. These supply runs are the buildup for the eventual “showdown” that is scheduled to take place in mid to late October, October 20 to be exact.Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, of Savo fame, was in overall command of the operation set for the night of October 11-12.His field commander if you will, is Rear Admiral Aritomo GotoGoto is in command of the bombardment force which consists of:3 CAs and 2 DDs American intel has picked up on the Japanese plans to build forces for an all-out assault on the airfield. Realizing that the Marines would be hard-pressed to hold out against another massive assault, Army General Millard Harmon, CO of US Army in the South Pacific, convinces Admiral Ghormley, whom we shall discuss at a later date, that the Marines need the Army's help.Ghormley agrees and sends the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal to reinforce the Gyrenes.The date for the reinforcement is set for October 8 To protect the convoy carrying the soldiers, Ghormley assigns a cruiser/destroyer group under the command of Admiral Norman Scott to protect them.Scott's forces include:2 CAs, 2 CLs, 5 DDsScott's orders are to protect the convoy and once the Army is delivered, patrol the waters off Guadalcanal , intercept and then destroy anything that attempts to move inADM Scott knew that his mission carried with it, two tasks aside from the destruction of any Japanese forceDevelop night surface doctrineRevengeAs far as doctrine was concerned, Scott was aware that he and his units, lacked any real experience or training in night actions. Therefore, his plan for action, should it be needed, was simple:Steam in a column with DDs ahead in the van, followed by the cruisersDDs would illuminate targets after radar contact, fire torpedoes and allow the CAs to concentrate on the enemy heavies Scott chose the USS San Francisco (CA-38) as his flagship, when he should have probably chosen either Helena or BoiseHelena and Boise were both equipped with new SG radar units, as opposed to the SC aboard FriscoFaulty intel said that the Japanese had sets that could track American radar and as a result he ordered that the radar on Frisco be turned off (!!)The Fight:On October 9 and 10th Scott was patrolling the area just north of Renell island, out of range of Japanese search planesEach night he entered Savo sound but turned back because of no reported Japanese activityOn the 11th, search planes from Guadalcanal sighted the incoming Japanese troop reinforcement convoy and reported it as 2 CAs and 6DDs.Scott receives this intel and prepares to maneuver his ships into the Savo island area to do battle that night At sundown, Scott orders his ship to GQ, determined to not be surprised by the Japanese like at Savo on August 8 Prior to action, Scott wisely decided to launch most of his scout planes and send them to Guadalcanal.This was a clear lesson learned at Savo as a result of the avgas fires that stared aboard the US cruisers and illuminated them for the Japanese to see What couple of scout planes he still had, he launched around 2200 to scout ahead of his task force. The night was clear and cloudless, but there was no moon to add ambient light to the battlefield, thus making visibility poor.Scott set his formation for battle as follows:DDs Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey leading:CA San Francisco, CL Boise, CA Salt Lake City, and CL Helena followed by:DDs Buchanan and McCalla The Japanese were completely unaware that an American force was closing on them.In actuality Japanese submarine I-26 was on the surface and sighted the force, but did not report it as she chose to dive and make an attack (which she ultimately didn't do anyway) At 2250 SF's float plane reported “1 large, 2 small vessels 16 miles from Guadalcanal” Based on this report, Scott executed a turn in order to cross the Japanese's TExplain crossing the T The Japanese formation was led by CA Aoba, Furataka, and KinugasaDD Fubuki and Hatsuyuki held screen Around 2332 hours, Helena's radar picked up the Japanese ships, Boise and Salt Lake City also picked up the Japanese on radarScott was confused by the radar reports and initially didn't trust themThis is huge and will come in to play in November as well. This generation of US CO's did not have experience in radar, nor did they trust the abilities of the new technology. There were only a handful of officers who did trust radar, and again, that would come to play in the next month. 2345 hours SF picks up the enemy on radar and finally Scott believes what he is being toldJapanese are only 5,000 yards awayLookouts on Helena spot the enemy visually at the same time An Ensign in radar plot in Helena impatiently asked the ship's navigator, “What the hell are we going to do? Board them?”CAPT Gilbert Hoover of Helena wasted no time and without orders from Scott decided to open fire at 2346Helena let loose with all 15 of her 6 inch guns at one time… The Japanese under ADM Goto finally sighted the American formation at a range of 10,000 yards. He was concerned that the ships may be friendly so he ordered a turn and a flash of recognition signalsAs the Japanese signalmen aboard Aoba flashed the message, Helena's shells tore into her superstructure. Back aboard Helena, all her guns were firing, but not in salvo. Each turret was operating almost independently in what was called “automatic-continuous mode”. The result was unreal…The Helena's gun crews had their weapons loaded and fired in such rapidity that the Japanese later believed that the Americans had a cruiser with automatic weapons. The Japanese suspected the Americans of having “Machine gun cruisers.” Aboard Salt Lake City, her 8 inch guns opened fire on Aoba from 4,000 yards away, her second salvo smashed Aoba and SLC's directors reported, “No splashes, all hits.” SF opened fire on a DD from 4,500 yards away. At this time, the entire American column was engaged in a gun fightSalvo fire was almost non existent as each gun and their gun crews worked independently and each ship fired in a staccato cadence that made the night look like a low hanging lightning storm had enveloped the American column.The rate of fire and the accuracy of hit both stunned and devastated the Japanese column. Despite Scott's initial mistrust of radar, he ordered ships to fire using the technology due to the fact that the fire was so heavy that he could not monitor the battle visually, and within minutes, all American ships were doing just that, adjusting their fire with radar and walking the shells into their targets with sniper like accuracy. Aboard McCalla, an Ensign Weems watched the fight and later wrote, “I felt wildly exultant joy in watching us let them have so much at such murderous range. If you stop and think, 2500-3000 yards is point blank for big guns. You can hardly miss even if you wanted to.” 4 minutes after opening fire Boise had expended 300 rounds from her main battery!3 Japanese ship were afire at this time Japanese cruiser Aoba had been hit at least 24 times and was afire, 2 main battery turrets were destroyed, her main director was destroyed, searchlights, catapults and several boilers. The firing was so severe that Scott lost control of the events. Despite his orders to cease fire (WHY???) the ships never did. They could see their targets and continued to pour it into them. Japanese cruiser Furataka took several heavy hits, more than likely from SF and SLC. Her turrets were hit and at least 1 was destroyed, and she took hits in her torpedo tubes, which set the Long Lances afire, making her a perfect target.SLC radar set swept the area and detected all enemy targets “afire” Battle Finished By 0245 the battle was over. The Americans had beaten the hell out of a Japanese cruiser and destroyer force, eventually sending the cruiser Furataka and destroyer Fubuki to the bottom. Aoba was heavily damaged as well, but limped away.Japanese casualties are estimated to have been 450 men killed and another 100 or so captured the next morning. US losses amounted to the destroyer Duncan being sunk, the cruiser Boise being heavily damaged, Salt Lake City lightly damaged, and destroyer Farenholt heavily damaged. US KIAs are set at 163 men killed. While the battle was clearly an American victory as the Japanese were denied their mission to bombard Henderson the long ranging effects on the campaign were actually minimal.Because of Scott's (rightly) focus on the Japanese bombardment force, the troop and supply convoy was successful in unloading its cargo and escaped before morning. Nevertheless, the victory provided a much needed boost in morale to the US Navy and its force of cruisers and destroyers. The general feeling was that Savo had been avenged.

Magda Stępień: Mają pretensje, że wciąż żyję

Tak mamy!

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 30, 2022 59:31

"Jak ona tak może?!" – czytamy pod postami Magdy Stępień na Instagramie czy pod jej zdjęciami na portalach plotkarskich. "Ludzie uważają, że powinnam się zabić. Chcą odebrać mi nadzieję, że jeszcze mogę jakoś żyć" – wyznaje nam Magda w rozmowie. "To boli, bo walczę o każdy dzień. Wraz z Olivierem umarła część mnie. Ale opowiadanie o tym bólu paradoksalnie dodaje mi siły". Przyznajemy, że to spotkanie było dla nas wszystkich trudne. Ale uważamy, że bardzo potrzebne. "Chcę nieść pomoc innym, dzieląc się swoim doświadczeniem, dlatego dziękuję wam za ten wywiad" – powiedziała nam na koniec Magda. A więc słuchajcie z empatią, ale nie oceniajcie. Bo "tyle wiemy o sobie, ile nas sprawdzono".

ale jak chc ludzie wraz dziecko onet aoba

The Battle of Savo Island

The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2022 85:09

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrineUS Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy's battleship, battle line. While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor's heads. For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941. The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance. Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that's what they were supposed to do. The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting. Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN. It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully. Advances in weaponry and technologyDue to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30'sNearly wakelessOxygen fueled1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knotsSuperior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiorityThe USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks. The Japanese respond to the American landingsThe first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7. His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.Mikawa's orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa's force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for GuadalcanalHe launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the areaOne of Aoba's scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off TulagiWith this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strengthMikawa's plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards Allied preparationAmerican air searches located Mikawa's force as it was moving southFirst found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID'd as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading westSeen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SEUS Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degreesS-38's report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th as they slipped through the aerial net.Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to complySighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa's force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack. The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass. British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense. He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in at night.The southern group consisted of the CAs Australia, Canberra, and Chicago along with DDs Bagley and PattersonThe northern group consisted of CAs Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria with DDs Helm and Wilson.A picket line consisting of 2 DDs, Talbot and Blue were to utilize radar to detect any incoming ships Crutchley's plan for defense had several gaping holes, including a lack of clear orders for a night time defense and an assumption that everybody knew what everyone else was doing, when in fact, no one did. Also, there were no flag officers aboard any of the US ships in the northern groupA Captain can't fight his ship and command a TF at the same time… The battle begins (South of Savo)At 2312 Mikawa sent cruiser search planes aloft to illuminate the shipping with flares.Float planes reported 3 CAs off Savo2400 Mikawa formed his ships and increased speed to 26 knotsAt 0050 Savo was sighted and 3 minutes later Mikawa's lookouts sighted the picket DD Blue and evaded herMikawa's entire force slipped past the picket DDs without being seen Lookouts aboard the CA Chokai sighted 3 CAs off the starboard bowMikawa ordered his ships to “independently fire”At 0138 4 long lances were launched at the same time lookouts spotted Vincennes visually at a range of 18,000 yardsAt 0143Chokai opened fire with her main battery on the HMAS CanberraShortly before Chokai opened fire, Canberra's lookouts spotted the enemy at 4500 yards dead aheadCanberra was put into a turn as to allow her main battery to fire, but before her main battery was even manned, she was hit by over 24 8 inch shells fired from 4 Japanese heavy cruisers.By 0150 Canberra slowed to a stop and was burning amidships Aboard USS Chicago, flashes were seen as torpedoes were launched as well as aircraft flares and Canberra swinging out of line to presumably open fireAstoundingly, none of this was put together as an enemy threatChicago's CO Bode reached the bridge shortly before his ship was struck by a torpedo.Seemingly blind to the gunfire erupting around him, Bode could not find anything to shoot at initiallyHer secondary battery opened fire and hit at least one ship, TenryuBode immediately withdrew westwards, leaving the transports he was assigned to protect wide open to any enemy attack.Worse yet, he neglected to report his contact with the enemyThis is inexcusable and without doubt, caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans and resulted in the sinking of another 3 CAs The one bright spot, if there is one here, is that the DD Patterson, whose skipper, CDR Frank Walker was keenly aware of Japanese ships in the area, fought like a lion.Patterson tried to warn Canberra and Chicago of the Japanese ships by blinker light but it apparently went unseenWalker himself issued warnings over TBS but they were either ignored or unheardPatterson engaged in a gun duel with Tenryu and Yubari, illuminating them and zig zagging to avoid their fire.Patterson took a hit that disabled her after 5 inch guns, but returned to the fight hitting a Japanese CA. Finally receiving orders to withdraw and cover the transports, only then did Patterson give up the fight The Northern debacleMikawa turns north and heads for the northern group of heavy cruisers after destroying the southern group in a span of 7 minutesAstonishingly, the Northern group STILL does not know that the enemy is closing USS Vincennes under the command of CAPT Riefkohl is leading the groupRiefkohl has his ship at condition 2, not GQ, he himself is asleep as are all of the CAPT aboard the CAsRiefkohl supposedly believed that the Japanese would attack that night but failed to share his thoughts with the other CAPTs. As CO of the Northern Group, he is at fault for this lack of preparedness At 0144, watches aboard all CAs felt underwater explosions (Japanese torpedoes exploding on Southern Group), but assumed them to be anti-sub opsAt 0145 watches saw gunfire and flares from the south but failed to put two and two together Riefkohl is summoned to the bridge but due to rain and mist, could not see the southern group or what was happeningNo contact reports were given to himAt 0150 searchlights illuminated his 3 CAsHe thought this was the southern group and did nothing to counterAt 0151 the Japanese opened fire on Astoria, followed by Vincennes and Quincy, which was the first ship hit. Aboard Astoria, the ship was not at GQ, but the gunnery officer, after having witnessed shell fire and flashes, ordered the main battery to commence firing.CAPT Greenman arrived on the bridge, ordered cease fire and then resumed fire. Astoria was quickly hit in the hangar and the fire that started made her a beacon for Japanese gunfireFor ten (ish) minutes, Astoria was the focus of Aoba, Kinugasa, and Chokai's main batteryMost of Asty's guns were disabled, her comms was wiped out and fires were all over the shipAsty fired one last salvo that knocked out Chokai's forward main battery turretAstoria then she slid to a halt afire from stem to stern Aboard Quincy fires were seen to the south, gunfire was heard and her radr picked up Japanese ships. CAPT Moore ordered the main battery to open fire, but they were not readyHit by several shells, Quincy was afire due to her SOC airplanes and avgas in her hangar.As a result, she was bracketed and caught in a crossfire and veered out of lineAt 0204 she was hit by 2 torpedoes on the port sideAt 0216, with her CAPT dead and most of her bridge crew dead, she was hit by another torpedo and began to sink Aboard Vincennes, Riefkohl, now finally alert to the situation, ordered open fire, but his ship was hit in the hangar, and it too like her sisters served as a flaming beacon for Japanese gunnersVincennes was hit by a torpedo, then another and a third, killing everyone in the #1 fireroom and opening the ship's bottom up The battle endsBy 0216 Mikawa's victory was complete, and fear of American airpower caused Mikawa to turn tail and leave the area without engaging (and destroying) the transports nearby ADM Turner stopped unloading the transports at 0145, but stayed another day (WITHOUT AIR COVER) to finish what he could before he had to withdraw the transports Turner requested air cover from Fletcher who was still running away at 0641 and received his answer in a roundabout way when he intercepted a message from Fletcher to Ghormley essentially saying that Fletcher was out and Turner was now the force commander around GCanal.Pitiful Mikawa had utterly destroyed the Allied fleet in a stunning and aggressive actionHis victory was flawed in that had he attacked and sank the transports, which he easily could have, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been OVER right then.What could have been… 1,077 Allied sailors were killed, a further 700 were wounded with the loss of 4 heavy cruisersJapanese casualties were 129 killed, and 85 wounded, no sinkings The US concealed the defeat from the public until October Implications on the campign…

413 - Dorohedoro part 6

Manga Machinations

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 18, 2022 82:10

On this episode Darfox catches up on The Fable and dakazu checks out Keito Gaku's new series Aoba no Basuke! Then we rack our brains trying to solve the mysteries of Q Hayashida's Dorohedoro!!! Send us emails! mangamachinations@gmail.com Follow us on Twitter! @mangamacpodcast Check out our website! https://mangamachinations.com Check out our YouTube channel! https://www.youtube.com/mangamactv Buy us a Kofi! https://ko-fi.com/mangamac Timestamps: 00:00:00 - Intro Song: “Zero Gravity” by Dono, Opening, Introductions, Kung fu watch party, Feliz Jueves meme 00:02:18 - Darfox will be on the This Manga is Awesome! panel at New York Comic Con 00:06:58 - Listener Mail: Congratulations for 8 years of Manga Machinations 00:10:26 - Whatchu Been Reading: Transition Song: “Funkymania” by The Original Orchestra, Darfox has been reading the rapidly releasing volumes of The Fable 00:16:43 - Morgana has been reading Ghosts and watching The Rings of Power 00:20:38 - dakazu checks out Keito Gaku's new basketball manga Aoba no Basuke 00:23:33 - Next Episode Preview and Rundown: Retrospective on Dorohedoro, A complete review of Q Hayashida's violent fantasy manga about amnesiac reptilian-headed Caiman, who hunts sorcerers in a post-apocalyptic world to search for clues of his origins(covers vols. 19-21) 00:24:10 - Main Segment Retrospective: Dorohedoro, Transition Song: “Paranormal” by Jay Ray, We review Q Hayashida's violent fantasy manga about amnesiac reptilian-headed Caiman, who hunts sorcerers in a post-apocalyptic world to search for clues of his origins(covers vols. 16-18) 01:20:36 - Next Week's Topic: Dorohedoro, Social Media Rundown, Sign Off Song: “Crazy for Your Love” by Orkas

lord power ghosts rings manga fable kofi new york comic con kung dono your love dorohedoro caiman aoba q hayashida next episode preview jayray basuke keito

Farewell Evangelion: Episode 48 "A Lot Of Boat Names"

Farewell Evangelion

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 3, 2022 29:32

Keith and Peter review the three NERV Computer Techs, Maya Ibuki, Mokoto Hyuga and Shigeru Aoba. Join us as we learn about merchandising, drill Sgt. Maya and how Aoba has seen some shit. 00:25 What Happened 17:40 Questions for Keith 21:15 Fun Facts 26.00 First and Last Time 28:10 Where to Find Us 29:14 Next Time On... Follow Us At: Instagram: YouTube: Music Included: Shinji The Real G - Cruel Angel's Thesis (Remix) Silent Partner - Heartache Music from YouTube Audio Library [Aka YAL] Music provided by RFM: --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/farewell-evangelion/message

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007 - Campeonato Mundial e o Brasil no Hockey

DexyCast

Play Episode Listen Later May 30, 2022 11:48

Aoba! Vamos falar sobre a "Copa do Mundo" de Hockey, organizada pela IIHF e sobre a seleção brasiliera de Hockey. Vocês sabiam que tinha um time aqui no Brasil? O Campeonato Mundial passa gratuitamente no Youtube da IIHF, através desse link. _____________________________________________________________ Acompanhem com a gente e não esqueçam que agora temos um blog para as postagens e temas que abordamos aqui no podcast: https://puckquepariu.wordpress.com/ Se você quiser conhecer mais sobre nós, as nossas redes sociais estão nos links abaixo: - Dexy: Twitter | TikTok | YouTube; - Rafa: Instagram

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#119 RESPONDA OU MORRA (Não, não é plágio do Passa ou Repassa)

MoídaCast

Play Episode Listen Later May 28, 2022 36:45

AOBA!!! COMEÇANDO MAIS UM MOÍDACAST. E NESSA SEMANA CRIAMOS MAIS UM FORMATO SUPER ORIGINAL E NADA COPIADO: O RESPONDA OU MORR4! ta certo que quem morre participa da próxima rodada mas enfim só ouve aí que o pograma ta BAAAAAO! Se inscreva no canal do Will: (@LongPlay4u) Ajude a produzir essa bagaça e tenha várias recompensas F0DAS! Episódios extras exclusivos, programas em vídeo (ao vivo e sem censura), seu nome citado no MoídaCast, sorteio todo mês, acesso ao nosso grupo secreto do Discord e MUITO MAIS! MoidaCast.com.br Redes sociais: Instagram @MoidaCast: https://instagram.com/moidacast Twitter @MoidaCast: https://twitter.com/MoidaCast APRESENTADO POR: Klaus Aires (@KlaustrofobiaTV) Kleber Tanide (@KleberTanide) Letícia Godoy (@HeyLeticiaGodoy) Silas Ravani (@SilasVRavani) Will: (@LongPlay4u) EQUIPE: Edição & Montagem: Silas Ravani (@SilasVRavani) Capa: Sketch (@sketch1000grau) Um podcast exclusivo Spotify de CarneMoídaTV Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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THE FLAVORS BURGER - Aoba Podcast #79

burgers dentro nosso flavors agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2021 238:32

Convidado: THE FLAVORS BURGER Instagram: @theflavors_burger ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

O REI DO ANGELA - Aoba Podcast #78

dentro nosso o rei agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2021 198:02

Convidado: O REI DA CAIPIRINHA Instagram: @oreidoangela Instagram: @augus_deivid ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

TECHNO NA QUEBRADA - Aoba Podcast #76

dentro techno nosso quebrada agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 6, 2021 190:32

Convidado: TECHNO NA QUEBRADA Instagram: @technonaquebrada Instagram: @moonkmusic Instagram: @duchase Instagram: @ind.jeff ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

EDDI GARAGE - Aoba Podcast #76

dentro garage nosso agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 4, 2021 203:50

Convidado: EDDI GARAGE Instagram: @eddi_garage Instagram: @edinocar Instagram: @evertoncesarcunha ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

REIS DO PIX - Aoba Podcast #75

dentro nosso reis agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 1, 2021 272:55

Convidado: REIS DO PIX Instagram: @_brunocampos96 Instagram: @alvarocarvalho48 ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

PENINHA MC - Aoba Podcast #74

dentro nosso agradecimento peninha aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 27, 2021 206:17

Convidado: PENINHA MC Instagram: @peninha_mc ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

BRENDA TURIN - Aoba Podcast #72

dentro nosso turin agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 21, 2021 200:28

Convidado: BRENDA TURIN Instagram: @brendaturin Instagram: @brendaturintattoo ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

BIBI TSUNAMI [+18] - Aoba Podcast #73

dentro nosso tsunamis agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 21, 2021 194:21

Convidado: BIBI TSUNAMI Instagram: @bibiitsunamioficial ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

M3RD@ ANUNCIADA - Aoba Podcast #71

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2021 130:30

Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r PRODUÇÃO: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg DIREÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

dentro nosso aoba

DA PONTE PRA CÁ PODCAST - Aoba Podcast #70

dentro nosso agradecimento da ponte c podcast aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 2, 2021 247:03

Convidado: DA PONTE PRA CÁ PODCAST Instagram: @dapontepracapodcast ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

JOTAPILLS - Aoba Podcast #68

dentro nosso agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2021 283:02

Convidado: JOTAPILLS Instagram: @jotapills ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

RESENHA DO AOBA - Aoba Podcast #69

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 31, 2021 162:36

Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

dentro nosso resenha aoba

SAC BAR PODCAST - Aoba Podcast #67

dentro nosso agradecimento bar podcast aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 26, 2021 244:34

Convidados: SAC BAR PODCAST Instagram: @sacbarpodcast Instagram: @o.igoraugusto Instagram: @ogdavas ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

MORANGUEIROS BRASIL - Aoba Podcast #62

brasil dentro nosso agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 18, 2021 204:03

Convidado: MORANGUEIROS BRASIL Instagram: @morangueirosbrasil ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

LUCAS COSTA - Aoba Podcast #64

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 18, 2021 132:26

Convidado: LUCAS COSTA Instagram: @lucas_costa52 ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

dentro nosso agradecimento aoba lucas costa

CLAYTON VELTRAXX - Aoba Podcast #65

dentro nosso agradecimento aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 18, 2021 157:33

Convidados: CLAYTON VELTRAXX Instagram: @veltraxxmusic ======================= Agradecimento especial ao Rosh Em Casa (Delivery) Tabacaria online, tudo que você precisa para completar sua sessão! Instagram: @roshemcasa ======================= Aoba Podcast: youtube.com/AobaPodcast Aoba Podcortes: youtube.com/channel/UC4qSa1FzOYKWYps22VeCrqg Instagram: instagram.com/AobaPodcast Twitch: twitch.tv/AobaPodcast ======================= Aoooba! Nosso podcast é um bate papo descontraído entre amigos/convidados sobre vários assuntos, quadros e entrevistas. Dentro do Aoba Podcast compartilhamos experiências, conhecimentos e entretenimento, tudo em uma conversa livre de scripts e roteiros, para uma troca de ideias sincera. ======================= ANFITRIÕES: Jogusto - Instagram @itsjoohn Ibrah - Instagram @orraibrah_ Vitor - Instagram @_vituhg Marcelo - Instagram @marcelo.vit0r Jovito - Instagram @vvsjoao PRODUÇÃO: Gabriel - Instagram @gabsoliveir4 --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/aoba-podcast/support

Episode 28- Mount Aoba, A Short History

Friday Night History

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 16, 2021 14:24

This week, on #FridayNightHistory: "Mount Aoba: A Short History." This episode was recorded before a live audience at twitch.tv/riversidewings. For pictures and references, check out the entry at my blog riverside-wings.com. To support this podcast and the rest of my work, sign up to my Patreon at Patreon.com/riversidewings , check out the merch at Redbubble, or buy my new novel Grey Dawn via bit.ly/greydawnebook, and don't forget to follow me at Facebook, Twitter, itch.io, gumroad, Medium, and Twitch!

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Kyoto Animation Studio Arson

Quirky Japanese Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 23, 2019 5:32

A man called Shinji Aoba suspected of torching an animation studio last Friday. 33 people were murdered and 10 people are still in heavy injury in hospital. It marks the worst mass killing since a suspected arson attack in Tokyo killed 44 people in 2001. This was totally mental. Why so many people were trapped in the building? The building did not have any sprinklers or indoor fire hydrants, though it was not legally required to by the fire code, a Kyoto Fire Department official said. Kyodo News reported that 19 of the 33 who died were found on a staircase leading up to the roof from the third floor, with bodies piled on top of each other. Firefighters arriving soon after the fire began found the door to the roof was shut but could be opened from the outside, Kyodo News stated. Many people tried but failed to escape to the roof, fire officials said. Experts say they believe many died of carbon monoxide poisoning. The survivor, who was working on scenery and background on the second floor, said he first heard commotion downstairs and a female voice screaming. Then a loud explosion followed by a colleague running up the stairs, shouting "Fire!" An alarm went off. "A black mushroom cloud billowed up the stairs, perhaps within 15 seconds, then everything went black, like pouring black ink all over the place. I couldn't see anything," the man told NHK public television on condition of anonymity. He said the building quickly filled with "diabolical smell, something that would kill you if you breathe in once." He ran out to a balcony. "I had to decide whether to jump and get hurt, or die in the smoke," he said. Hot air right behind him, the animator jumped with several others. He ended up with an injured arm. The suspects Aoba arrived carrying two containers of flammable liquid, police said, quoting witnesses. He entered the studio's unlocked front door, dumped the liquid using a bucket, and set it afire with a lighter, police said. The suspect is the residence of Northern Tokyo. Nippon TV said He "seemed to be discontented, he seemed to get angry, shouting something about how he had been plagiarised," a woman who saw the man being detained told reporters. Police identified the suspected arsonist as Shinji Aoba who was taken into custody soon after the incident, NHK said. Japan's architecture are known for the earthquake resistance. In this case, the building was vulnerable from the fire. When the big earthquake hit Osaka in 1995, the second biggest cause of death was fire. Journalist must research the fire resistance in the animation production company. If the fire alarm kept warning, it could save more life from this incident. https://apple.news/AFIaK1-n-Tsev6k3qiYYXeA

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Bank-Fintech Partnerships - Our Final AOBA Installment

bank partnership fintech acquire installment jay wilson aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 5, 2018

In our fourth and final podcast recorded onsite at Bank Director's Acquire or Be Acquired (AOBA) conference, hosts Jonathan Hightower and Rob Klingler were joined by Jay Wilson with Mercer Capital who wrote the book on bank-fintech partnerships.

2018 Industry Outlook with Rory McKinney from D.A. Davidson at AOBA

day one davidson acquire mckinney industry outlook aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 29, 2018

While at Bank Director's Acquire or Be Acquired conference in Phoenix, AZ this weekend, hosts Jonathan Hightower and Rob Klingler sat down with Rory McKinney from D.A. Davidson to discuss his outlook for bank M&A in 2018. Jonathan and Rob also took a few moments at the outset to give their highlights and primary takeaways from Day One of the conference.

M&A Simulation Recap from AOBA 2018

simulation acquire bank accounts aoba

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 29, 2018

Our hosts, Jonathan Hightower and Rob Klingler, were joined for this installment of The Bank Account by their co-presenters from the M&A Simulation at the 2018 Acquire or Be Acquired conference, Matt Veneri and Dan Flaherty from FIG Partners. Their discussion highlighted themes from this highly interactive, banker-only session at the conference.

AOBA Takeaways