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The Mudge family is striving to build a grace-focused home where kids aren't afraid to ask questions. This family of 8 have lived in multiple cultures, both in the United States and in Africa. Join in this conversation between Dr. Ron Mudge, provost at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, and his son Isaiah, as they describe living as a Christian family in world that needs Christ.
Rachel Mudge, an elder at Bridges, shares a message entitled The Divine Gift. Understanding who God is, through His Son, Jesus and how much He loves us. Rachel encourages us to "walk in the light" and to truly know what it is to experience God's love in every aspect of our lives.
It's the final day of UMFM's Pledge-O-Rama and I managed to once again weasel myself in between Joe & Twisty on The Wee Hours and Cretin Rob on Cretin Radio for 3 hours of bangers for breakfast on Mudge in the Morning! It's our last official day to ask for your help before we go back to doing what we do without asking anything of you. If you feel like showing your support and encouragement, your donation, no matter how seemingly small, is greatly appreciated. Thanks to all who donated and once again made Tell the Band to Go Home's pledge drive a smashing success! I really appreciate hearing from so many people. If you missed out, there's always time to get your name on the list: Pledge-O-Rama info: https://umfm.com/news/pledge-your-support-for-great-radio-in-winnipeg-2025 Incentive merchandise & prizes: https://umfm.com/donate/incentives Make a donation: https://umfm.com/donate playlist: https://wp.me/p1lizT-guh
playlist: https://wp.me/p1lizT-guh
playlist: https://wp.me/p1lizT-guh
Tom interviews a pastor friend, who first began using the verse of the week in his own life. After introducing the idea to his church, the verse of the week became a part of their weekly services enabling the church to get into God‘s Word together.
Episode #1085 It's time once again for UMFM's Pledge-O-Rama, the one week of the year where we ask for your help. In order to keep the station functioning the way we'd like and to make necessary improvements, we need an infusion of money that we hope you will be willing to help provide. More importantly for me, however, it's the one week where I get to learn some of the names of the people out there listening in. We truly have no idea who's listening or how many of you there are unless you let us know directly, and this is the best way to find out. Your donations, large or small, all show that what we do is important to you, and that means a whole lot. I adore putting together this show every week, and I'd gladly do it just for myself, but knowing that it means something to you is very rewarding and it helps motivate you to make the best show possible. As usual, the show includes a bunch of new music, memories of a truly great concert last night and we look ahead to a busy week of shows here and elsewhere. We also spin some classic Winnipeg music that doesn't get played anywhere other than on campus & community radio. We've also got a new interview with one of the greatest songwriters in Canada and one of my true heroes, Ron Hawkins, all about the new album from The Lowest of the Low, which is truly exciting. We've even got some tracks from the upcoming album to debut! Thanks for all of your support. If you didn't get a chance to donate during the show, Pledge-O-Rama is on all week and you could help us get to our station goal. Join me Friday morning from 6-9 am for Mudge in the Morning! Pledge-O-Rama info: https://umfm.com/news/pledge-your-support-for-great-radio-in-winnipeg-2025 Incentive merchandise & prizes: https://umfm.com/donate/incentives Make a donation: https://umfm.com/donate playlist: https://wp.me/p1lizT-gto
Uittredende president Nangolo Mbumba het die na-aftrede-voordele van gespesifiseerde openbare ampsdraers afgeteken. Die regering sal betaal vir onder meer hul kokke, motorbestuurders, sekuriteitspersoneel en brandstof. Die voertuigtoelaag is 700 000 en 600 000 Namibiese dollar, terwyl bestuurders 10 000 dollar kry. Kokke kry net meer as 6 000 dollar maandeliks. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met Henk Mudge, president van die Republikeinse Party.
Diane Rasmussen McAdie spoke with Cathy Mudge, a founding member of Protect & Teach, about the disturbing content being taught and age-inappropriate events being held in English schools. Read the write-up at: https://www.ukcolumn.org/video/taking-action-to-remove-dangerous-indoctrination-from-english-schools
'n Miernes is weer oopgekrap na Job Amupanda regter Shafimana Ueitele se grondbelasting-kwytskelding aan die groot klok gehang het. Die feit is dat nie net die regter nie, maar verskeie hooggeplaastes wat groot geld verdien, regstellende aksie-lenings vir plase gekry het. Hierdie lenings is eintlik geskep vir voorheen benadeelde burgers wat arm is. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het reaksie gekry van Henk Mudge, die president van die Republikeinse Party, wat sê Swapo se korrupsie hou nie op nie.
On the night of December 2, 2024 in London, SSPI and its UK Chapter held their annual Dinner to present Awards to three individuals and organizations that have made the world a far better place through their efforts. In this podcast series, you will hear their stories. The second episode features Will Mudge, Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of Speedcast, who joins us to discuss Speedcast's provision of essential connectivity solutions during humanitarian crises and natural disasters. Will Mudge is the Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at Speedcast. In his current role, Will is responsible for managing 600 people across 44 countries with disciplines including supply chain, field engineering, IP engineering, teleports, R&D, NOC and systems engineering. He has built and improved numerous high-performing teams at Speedcast and is also an active contributor in industry panels and podcasts as well as a creator of video content and author of multiple papers. Before his current role, Will served as Vice President of Engineering Operations at Speedcast, a role in which he was responsible for a large part of Speedcast's global infrastructure and the delivery of a positive experience to customers. Prior to his current role, Will served as the Director of Satellite Capacity and Technology at Speedcast, developing global teleport and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation strategies. He also previously served as the Director of Satellite Capacity and Technology, the R&D engineering lead, and as a strategic product marketing manager and program manager at Speedcast (formerly as Harris CapRock). Will holds a Bachelor's degree in Engineering Physics from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Speedcast has consistently demonstrated a commitment to humanitarian aid and disaster response efforts by providing essential connectivity solutions during crises. In areas affected by natural disasters, the company has delivered reliable communications as a vital lifeline for both the affected communities and first responders working to aid them. In May 2024, Speedcast contributed to disaster response efforts in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, when the region experienced catastrophic flooding. Rio Grande do Sul received an entire year's worth of rain in a matter of hours, leading to widespread landslides, the collapse of a key dam and many deaths. Speedcast took quick action to donate and deliver Starlink terminal kits and airtime to the Brazilian government, providing necessary connectivity to police, hospitals, the Brazilian army and various local and state government departments, which dramatically improved disaster response efforts. These quick-to-deploy solutions from Speedcast proved instrumental in reaching isolated areas and supporting recovery operations. Read more about Speedcast.
Die IPC is deur die verkiesingshof beveel om 450 000 Namibiese dollar as sekuriteit te verskaf in sy hofsaak wat die uitslag van die verkiesing betwis. Die bedrag is bedoel om die regskoste van die Verkiesingskommissie van Namibië, die president en Swapo te dek indien die IPC se verkiesingsuitdaging misluk. Swapo het oorspronklik sekuriteit van 600 000 dollar geëis, president Nangolo Mbumba 500 000 dollar, en die Verkiesingskommissie 750 000 dollar. Henk Mudge, die president van die Republikeinse Party, wat die IPC se saak ondersteun, het aan Kosmos 94.1 Nuus kommentaar gelewer.
China se minister van buitelandse sake, Wang Yi, het tydens sy onlangse besoek met president Nangolo Mbumba gesprekke gevoer oor hoe China Namibië se kernenergiebedryf kan bystaan. Nou het 'n skip vol droogtehulp-voedsel vanaf China, wat deur Yi belowe was, in Walvisbaai aangekom. Dit het omstredenheid ontketen met talle Namibiërs wat bekommerd is dat plaaslike boere geraak sal word. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gesels met die Republikeinse Party se president, Henk Mudge, wat sê China het 'n agenda en dit is om die land se natuurlike hulpbronne in die hande te kry. Mudge het meer.
In this JAMODI Clip, Coach Mudge discusses the balance between the art and science of coaching, emphasizing the importance of feel and decision-making in player development. He explores how building confidence in players is crucial for their performance and highlights the need for trust and accountability in the coach-player relationship. Coach Mudge also stresses the significance of connecting skill work to game situations and the mutual responsibility of coaches and players in fostering confidence.
In this JAMODI Clip, Coach Mudge discusses the importance of integrating individual skill work into team practice, adapting strategies based on team dynamics, and making in-game adjustments. He emphasizes the need for flexibility in coaching, understanding team strengths, and the balance between control and freedom for players. Coach Mudge also highlights the significance of preparation and familiarity in executing game plans effectively.
In this JAMODI Clip, Coach Mudge discusses the balance between simplicity and complexity in coaching basketball. He emphasizes the importance of understanding player needs, creating advantages in gameplay, and the necessity of self-evaluation for continuous improvement. Coach Mudge highlights the critical role of decision-making in both offensive and defensive strategies, advocating for a coaching approach that fosters player growth and adaptability during practice.
In this JAMODI Clip, Coach Mudge discusses the critical elements of coaching, emphasizing the importance of culture, standards, and self-evaluation. He highlights how foundational principles in coaching can lead to successful execution on the court. Coach Mudge reflects on his experiences, the need for simplicity in teaching, and the balance between humility and competence as a leader.
In this hoops talk, Coach Chris Mudge discusses the importance of building a joyful team culture, embracing the process of improvement, and the significance of player-led leadership in sports. He emphasizes the need for coaches to focus on life lessons beyond basketball, define clear standards and pillars for their teams, and the critical role of culture in achieving success. Coach Mudge also highlights the necessity of self-evaluation and continuous improvement as a coach, advocating for a mindset of lifelong learning and adaptability in coaching practices. He discusses the importance of simplicity in coaching, the balance between complexity and effectiveness, and the necessity of self-evaluation and continuous improvement. He emphasizes the need for coaches to teach decision-making in real-time and adjust strategies based on team dynamics to foster player success. Coach Mudge discusses various aspects of coaching, focusing on the importance of adjustments, building player confidence, and the balance between art and science in coaching. He emphasizes the need for coaches to create comfort zones for players, the significance of trust and communication, and the necessity of defining roles and expectations.
In this edition of the Money Makers Investment Trusts Podcast, Jonathan Davis, editor of the Investment Trusts Handbook and winner of the 2024 AIC Best Broadcast Journalist Award, is joined by Marcus Phayre-Mudge, manager of TR Property (TRY). This discussion was recorded on 06 December 2024. Section Timestamps: 0:00:24 - Introduction 0:00:39 - Recent results for TR Property 0:05:20 - Valuations 0:10:21 - M&A and corporate activity 0:27:40 - A short break 0:28:36 - Sustainability of discounts 0:33:28 - Physical exposure of TR Property 0:39:42 - The trust's dividend 0:42:56 - Close If you enjoy the weekly podcast, you may also find value in joining The Money Makers circle. This is a membership scheme that offers listeners to the podcast an opportunity, in return for a modest monthly or annual subscription, to receive additional premium content, including interviews, performance data, market/portfolio reviews and regular extracts from the editor's notebook. This week, as well as the usual features, the Circle features a profile of J.P.Morgan Global Growth and Income (JGGI). Future profiles include Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon (BGS) and Murray Income (MUT). Look out for the latest edition of our new expanded weekly subscriber email which summarises Jonathan's latest thoughts and includes a comprehensive summary of all the latest news. The content of that email is also available for subscribers via the website. A subscription costs £12 a month or £120 for one year. For more information about the Money Makers circle, please visit money-makers.co/membership-join. Membership helps to cover the cost of producing the weekly investment trust podcast, which will continue to be free. We are very grateful for your continued support and the enthusiastic response to our more than 240 podcasts since launch. You can find more information, including relevant disclosures, at www.money-makers.co. Please note that this podcast is provided for educational purposes only and nothing you hear should be considered as investment advice. Our podcasts are also available on the Association of Investment Companies website, www.theaic.co.uk. Produced by Ben Gamblin.
Sommige politieke partye beweer dat die verkiesingsproses dieselfde was as Zimbabwiese verkiesings, en kan aandui dat Zanu-PF Swapo beïnvloed het met sommige van hul sogenaamde verkiesingsbedrogtaktieke. Die Landless People's Movement het so beweer, asook die AR-beweging se Job Amupanda. Henock TV het onlangs 'n onderhoud met die Republikeinse Party-president Henk Mudge gevoer, wat sê hy sal nie verbaas wees nie maar dit sal nie in Namibië werk nie.
Die Republikeinse Party is ontevrede met verskeie kwessies wat die Verkiesingskommissie van Namibië aanbetref. Volgens die party begin die probleme met die maatskappy wat die tender gekry het om die stembriewe te druk. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met die Republikeinse Party se president, Henk Mudge, wat sê die kommissie het so ver gegaan as om dit verpligtend te maak dat die binneagente wat by die stemlokale gaan werk 'n eed van geheimhouding moet teken.
Last time we spoke about the advance to Ormoc Valley. As October 1944 unfolded in the Leyte campaign, American forces steadily pushed Japanese troops inland. Despite fierce resistance, they captured key positions, like Dagami, Catmon Hill, and multiple airstrips. While the Japanese reinforced areas like Ormoc, American regiments advanced through challenging conditions, relying on artillery amid minimal air support due to weather and resource constraints. By month's end, American forces had inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese, securing vital beachheads and pushing closer to full control of Leyte. After suffering losses at Leyte Gulf, the 7th Fleet withdrew, leaving Kenney's P-38s to defend Tacloban airfields amid Japanese air raids. As kamikaze attacks grew, USS Franklin sustained heavy casualties, while the Americans pressed forward, capturing Carigara on Leyte. Meanwhile, Australian forces began reclaiming New Britain, pushing Japanese forces back through guerilla warfare. Facing tough jungle conditions, Australian and native troops gradually secured strategic positions by December, reinforcing the Allied grip in the Pacific. This episode is the Battle of Ormoc Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. As we have seen over the past few weeks, the Battle of Leyte Gulf saw Generals MacArthur's forces land and successfully defeat the 16th Division of Leyte Island as well as seized Carigara and Pinamopoan over the northern coast. The 24th Division also engaged the enemy's reinforcements, centred around the elite 1st Division during the battle for the northern entrance into the Ormoc Valley. Meanwhile Admiral Okawachi and General Yamashita aimed to bring more reinforcements to Leyte which would lead to another air-naval battle. The previous week, Colonel Verbeck's 21st Regiment was engaged in a mission to capture Breakneck Ridge, fiercely defended by Colonel Miyauchi's 57th Regiment. Simultaneously, General Kataoka mobilized his remaining two regiments to initiate a broad, four-pronged assault on the Pinamopoan perimeter. However, the rugged terrain slowed their movement toward assembly areas. On the morning of November 8 a typhoon, moving in from the west, swept over the entire island of Leyte. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the heavens floods raced in almost horizontal sheets. Palms bent low under the storm, their fronds flattened like streamers of wet silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse of… [cogon] grass the howling of the wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the… seas. Planes were grounded and ships became haunted things looking for refuge. Massed artillery… barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge sounded dim and hollow in the tempest. Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky was black." In the midst of the storm, the 21st's infantry attacked. As the typhoon swept across the island, Verbeck's forces launched a three-pronged assault on Breakneck Ridge and Hill 1525, facing staunch resistance from Miyauchi's defenders but making considerable progress toward Hill 1525. Notably, plans for General Suzuki's offensive were found on a deceased Japanese officer, enabling General Krueger to redeploy his forces effectively. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area of the mountains of central Leyte extensively. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious. The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous. The cavalrymen would frequently skirmish with the 41st Regiment and the 169th and 171st Independent Battalions during this period. Brigadier-General Julian Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment, expected by November 14, was tasked with relieving General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division in the Carigara-Barugo area to enable a southwest advance from the central mountains and ease pressure on General Irving's 24th Division. General Bradley's 96th Division was directed to capture the high ground between Jaro and Dagami, with the 382nd Regiment remaining at Dagami to inflict significant losses on the 16th Division while securing Bloody Ridge. By November 4, the 382nd Regiment had made some progress into Bloody Ridge. The night of 4-5 November was not quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind them. The following morning, after the artillery had fired a preparation in front of the 1st and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the regimental left (south) flank. The battalions advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches. By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge. Each battalion formed its own perimeter and made plans to renew the attack on 6 November. At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes. Each of these defensive positions had to be reduced before the advance could continue. At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but by the end of the day only isolated pockets of enemy resistance remained. The Japanese 16th Division was taking a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had run out. All the battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, and half the artillery battalion and battery commanders had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle lines and on the following day took up a new position in the Dagami area. The new position ranged from a hill about four and a half miles northwest of Dagami to a point about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen. On 7 November all three battalions of the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and maintained constant pressure against his positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove north and west. The 3d Battalion encountered -the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large enemy force assaulted the troops at close quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but when the 382d Infantry introduced flamethrowers and supporting machine guns, the attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment overran the Japanese defensive positions and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy. Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of enemy resistance. On 8 November strong patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the hills. They encountered the left flank of the enemy supporting position at a point about 2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made an assault against the position impossible on 9 November. After all-night artillery fire, the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900 on 10 November. They met no resistance, but progress was slow because of the swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards. The 382d Infantry had destroyed all organized enemy resistance in its sector and removed the threat to Dagami. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division stationed at the Burauen-Abuyog area began sending patrols from Baybay toward Ormoc to prepare for a larger advance, while the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Regiment moved to Baybay, successfully ambushing the Japanese unit advancing to Abuyog. Concurrently, Okawachi sent his fourth convoy from Manila, consisting of three transports, four frigates, and six destroyers under Admiral Kimura. This convoy carried the bulk of General Yamagata's 26th Division and approximately 3,500 tons of supplies, followed by another echelon of three transports with the remainder of the 1st Division. The echelon reached Ormoc the next day, unloaded successfully, and departed without issue. However, the main convoy encountered air attacks as it approached Ormoc Bay, beginning its debarkation by nightfall. On 10 November the 38th Bomb Group, based on Morotai, sent 32 B-25 Mitchells escorted by 37 P-47 Thunderbolts to attack TA-4 near Ponson Island. Reaching the convoy just before noon, the B-25s attacked at minimum altitude in pairs, sinking the two largest transports, Takatsu Maru and Kashii Maru, disabling a third, and sinking two of the patrol craft escorts at a cost of seven bombers, for which the group was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Although Yamagata's troops were finally ashore by November 10, most of the supplies couldn't be unloaded due to ongoing enemy air attacks. Shortly after leaving Ormoc, American planes intercepted the convoy, destroying two transports and one frigate, while further damaging another frigate and a destroyer. Meanwhile, Okawachi dispatched a third convoy, consisting of five transports, a submarine chaser, and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Hayakawa Mikio, transporting special troops and heavy equipment of the 26th Division. When one transport ran aground on Luzon's Bondoc Peninsula, Kimura sent two frigates and three destroyers to transfer its cargo to Ormoc. As a result, Hayakawa's convoy arrived at Ormoc Bay on November 11 and began unloading. However, ULTRA intercepts had detected the enemy convoy departing Manila, prompting Admiral Halsey to redeploy Task Force 38 under Admiral McCain. While under repair at Manila on 29 October, Nachi and Kumano were attacked by aircraft from USN Task Force 38. Nachi was hit by a single bomb to her aircraft deck, and this, as well as strafing attacks, killed 53 crewmen and further delayed repairs. On 5 November, again in Manila Bay, Nachi was attacked by three waves of U.S. planes from the aircraft carriers USS Lexington and Ticonderoga. She escaped the first wave undamaged, but was hit by five bombs and two or three torpedoes in the second wave while attempting to get underway. During the third wave, Nachi was hit by five torpedoes in her port side, which severed her bow and stern, and by an additional 20 bombs and 16 rockets. Nachi's flag commander, Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was ashore for a conference at the time of the attack, but arrived at dockside in time to see his flagship blown apart. The central portion of the vessel sank in 102 feet (31 m) of water about 12 nautical miles (22 km) northeast of Corregidor. McCain launched an attack on Kimura's convoy. Just as unloading began, 347 planes struck, sinking all four transports and four destroyers, including the flagship Shimakaze, on which Hayakawa lost his life. This costly reinforcement operation thus ended in partial failure, with most equipment lost and over 1,500 casualties. Nevertheless, elements of the 1st Division moved immediately toward the Limon area, while Yamagata's units, though short on weaponry, were ordered to assemble at Dolores to prepare for joining the Imahori Detachment at Daro. At the same time, noticing the rapid advance of the enemy into the Carigara area, Yamashita concluded that Suzuki's proposed offensive toward Tacloban was destined for failure. He ordered the main force of the 35th Army to join the 16th Division in the advantageous mountainous positions of the Burauen-Dagami area to regain control of the recently captured airstrips, thereby limiting operations in the Carigara area to a holding action. Concurrently, as this adjustment to the tactical plan was made, Yamashita communicated his growing belief that the overall situation offered little hope for victory on Leyte and unsuccessfully tried to persuade General Terauchi to shift the decisive battle to Luzon. As a result of Terauchi's decision, the 68th Brigade was still to be sent to Leyte; the 23rd Division was scheduled to go to Manila in mid-November before returning to Leyte; and the 10th and 19th Divisions were planned for movement to the island by the end of the year. With the plans finalized for continuing the decisive battle on Leyte, Terauchi's headquarters departed Manila for Saigon on November 17. Back on Leyte, on November 9, the weary, mud-stained troops of the 21st Regiment launched another attack, with the 3rd Battalion assaulting the center of Breakneck Ridge and the 2nd Battalion targeting OP Hill, though they made only minor gains. Additionally, Verbeck's 1st Battalion attacked Limon but was repelled by heavy enemy fire, and fresh Japanese troops subsequently counterattacked the Hill 1525 position, forcing the Americans to retreat. Finally, Colonel Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached the western slopes of Hill 1525 in the afternoon, but it was too late for them to take part in the battle. On November 10, Verbeck continued his assault, successfully capturing OP Hill and making significant headway in the area. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion began advancing westward to establish a roadblock on Highway 2, approximately 2000 yards south of Limon. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Clifford's 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment landed on the western shore of Carigara Bay and initiated a wide envelopment around the western flank of the 57th Regiment to secure the high ground known as Kilay Ridge. Additionally, Mudge's cavalrymen pressed forward toward Mount Minoro. On this day, Yamashita's adjustments to the tactical plan finally reached Suzuki's headquarters. As a result, Suzuki abandoned his initial strategy and directed Yamagata to move his troops quickly to Albuera to prepare for an offensive eastward, dubbed Operation Wa. To replace the 26th Division in upcoming operations on the Jaro front, Suzuki decided to deploy the 30th Division, which had not yet departed Mindanao, instructing them to land at Ipil and prepare to support the Imahori Detachment, already skirmishing with Bradley's patrols. On November 11, following a heavy artillery barrage, Verbeck resumed his assault, although the 2nd Battalion quickly found itself pinned down, while the 1st Battalion successfully secured a ridge 300 yards southwest of OP Hill. The next morning, the 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced against the crest of Breakneck Ridge, successfully capturing the objective before being halted by Japanese artillery fire. At the same time, Chapman's 2nd Battalion reached Highway 2, and Clifford's 1st Battalion, supported by elements of the guerrilla 96th Regiment, arrived in the Cabiranan area. By November 13, Verbeck's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced 600 and 400 yards, respectively, without encountering opposition. Breakneck Ridge was secured, although the Japanese maintained control over several nearby spurs, particularly Corkscrew Ridge. Nonetheless, the 21st Regiment reported approximately 1,779 Japanese soldiers killed, suffering 630 casualties in the process. Additionally, Clifford's 1st Battalion successfully reached Kilay Ridge undetected and quickly established defensive positions. At 0855 on 13 November a column of Filipino men, women, and children entered the perimeter and brought approximately thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra. The battalion left the area at 0930 and reached the ridge without opposition. Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge from one end to the other. It was evident that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages of the battle for Limon. On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along the ridge in positions that would afford the best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to use a trail on the north end of the ridge and bring supplies to the battalion from a supply dump at Consuegra. The first human pack train arrived in the area at 1010 with twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply of batteries for the radios. At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The battalion did not succeed in establishing physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, which was operating east of the road, but it was able to make radio contact. Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion were active in searching out enemy positions. Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry was landed at Carigara and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to strengthen the assault on the central Leyte mountains. Meanwhile, the reserve 32nd Division, led by Major-General William Gill, was also dispatched to the island to relieve the fatigued 24th Division. This newly arrived division was assigned the mission of capturing Limon and advancing down the Ormoc Valley toward Ormoc. On the Japanese side, after receiving the rest of his division, Kataoka chose to move the 1st Regiment to the left flank to assist the 57th, which had also been bolstered by two fresh battalions. This combined force aimed to launch an attack along the main road toward Pinamopoan while the 49th Regiment and the 171st Independent Battalion sought to envelop the enemy's left flank toward Colasian. By mid-November, the headquarters of the 102nd Division and most of the 364th Independent Battalion had also arrived in Ormoc, with Lieutenant-General Fukei Shinpei taking command of the 41st Regiment and his other battalions on the island as they advanced toward Mount Pina. Furthermore, despite significant losses to enemy aircraft, five air regiments had reinforced the 4th Air Army, enabling General Tominaga to make the 4th Air Division fully operational, a unit that had previously focused solely on base activities and anti-submarine patrols. The replenishment of naval air strength was progressing well, with replacement aircraft for the 1st Combined Base Air Force outnumbering losses by 26% in November. On November 15, the Combined Fleet opted to cease training carrier air groups and instead focus on expanding the base air forces. The 3rd Air Fleet, stationed in the homeland, was tasked with training replacement units for deployment to the Philippines. Due to the successful reinforcement of Japanese air forces in the Philippines and General Kenney's ongoing inability to provide close air support, Halsey once again directed Task Force 38 to attack enemy airbases on Luzon. On November 13 and 14, McCain's carriers conducted several strikes against Japanese airfields in Luzon, resulting in a significant decrease in enemy air operations over Leyte. On 13 November 1944, on the threat of American carrier strikes on Luzon, Kiso was ordered to return to Brunei that evening carrying Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. Before she could leave for Brunei, she was attacked on 13 November while underway in Manila Bay by more than 350 carrier planes of Task Force 38's carrier task groups 38.1's Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, TG 38.3's Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley and TG 38.4's Enterprise and San Jacinto. Three bombs hit Kiso to starboard - one in the bow, one near her boiler rooms and one near her aft gun mounts. Kiso sank in shallow water 13 kilometres (7.0 nmi; 8.1 mi) west of Cavite. Captain Ryonosuke Imamura and 103 of her crew survived, but 175 crewmen went down with the ship. Akebono, while alongside destroyer Akishimo at Cavite pier near Manila, was attacked in a USAAF air raid. A direct bomb hit set both ships ablaze, and the following day a large explosion on Akishimo blew a hole in Akebono, which sank upright in shallow water, with 48 crewmen killed and 43 wounded. After returning to Manila, Hatsuharu was caught in an air raid in Manila Bay. A series of near misses buckled plates and set fires, causing the ship to sink in shallow water. The attack killed 12 crewmen and injured 60 more, but 218 survived. Several other vessels were also sunk. Meanwhile, on November 14, the Hi-81 convoy, comprising the escort carriers Shinyo and Akitsu Maru, destroyer Kashi, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, submarine chaser No. 156, seven escort ships, five oilers, and three transports, left Imari Bay under Rear-Admiral Sato Tsutomu. The convoy carried most of Lieutenant-General Nishiyama Fukutaro's 23rd Division and headed into the Yellow Sea, wary of enemy submarines. After stopping for the night in Ukishima Channel near the Gotō Islands, Sato's convoy resumed its journey on November 15 but was soon ambushed by two submarine wolfpacks. Commander Charles Loughlin's submarines were the first to strike, successfully hitting the Akitsu Maru with two torpedoes, which later sank, resulting in the loss of 2,046 lives, including most of the 64th Regiment. After the attack, Sato withdrew to Strange Island, located off the coast of Korea, to take refuge for the day. On the morning of November 17, the convoy resumed its journey but was soon detected by a B-29 Superfortress as it made its way toward the Shushan Islands. By late afternoon, Commander Gordon Underwood's submarines launched an assault on the Japanese ships, successfully striking the transport vessel Mayasan Maru, which sank quickly, resulting in the loss of 3,437 men, including most of the 72nd Regiment. Almost twelve hours later 200 kilometers off Saishu Island, Spadefish surfaced and attacked the Shinyo with six torpedoes. Four struck the carrier on the starboard at 11:03 pm, and it caught fire. At least 1,130 Japanese sailors went down with their ship; only about seventy survived, including Ishii. Kashi immediately dropped several depth charges where the Spadefish was thought to be. An oil slick and other debris eventually made the Japanese believe they had sunk Spadefish so the Kashi broke off the engagement, but Spadefish had escaped apparently without serious damage. Only minor cracks were reported to have appeared on the submarine after the alleged "sinking" by Kashi. Underwood's final strike was against the submarine chaser No. 156, which sustained three torpedo hits and sank rapidly. Following some rescue efforts, Sato continued his advance on November 21, eventually arriving in Kaohsiung five days later. Half of the convoy then proceeded to San Fernando, where the remaining members of the 23rd Division disembarked on December 2. Yet thats it for today for the Philippines as we now need to shift over to Morotai.With Japanese reinforcements pushed back into the interior of the secured island, General Persons directed the 31st Division to capture several islands off New Guinea that served as observation points for Japanese outposts monitoring Allied movements. On November 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 167th Regiment landed on Pegun Island, followed by a successful attack on Bras Island the next day. By November 18, with the Mapia Islands secured, Company F of the 124th Regiment was sent to occupy the unguarded Asia Islands on November 19. In the Aitape region, Major-General Jack Stevens' 6th Australian Division was assigned to relieve American forces, similar to the Australian efforts on New Britain and Bougainville, in order to free up troops for the Philippines Campaign. By late October, a base had been successfully set up, allowing the 19th Brigade to arrive by mid-November, with the 17th Brigade scheduled for early December, and the 16th by year-end. Under General Blamey's orders, the new Australian garrisons were to adopt a more active approach than the American units had, so Stevens planned not only to secure the airfield and radar installations in the Aitape-Tadji area, but also to carry out extensive patrols in support of intelligence and guerrilla operations aimed at weakening the enemy in Wewak. One of General Stevens' tasks was to give maximum help to AIB. and Angau units in the area in their tasks of gaining Intelligence, establishing patrol bases and protecting the native population. These AIB. and Angau units had been active in the Sepik-Aitape triangle since the time of the landing of American forces at Aitape in April 1944, and the 6th Division came into an area where, from the outset, practically all the deep patrolling had been done by groups of Australians. In the Aitape area, prior to the arrival of the Division (said the report of the 6th Division), Angau long-range patrols operated without troop support and, for their own protection, inaugurated a type of guerilla warfare. Selected village natives called "sentries" were taught to use grenades and Japanese rifles. The sentries, besides furnishing Intelligence, accounted for large numbers of enemy. This system was continued. As each area was freed the sentries were rewarded and returned to their villages. By early November, the 2/10th Commando Squadron had established a patrol base at Babiang, conducting numerous patrols throughout the month. Intelligence gathered suggested the Japanese forces were weakened, poorly nourished, and mainly focused on sourcing food. In response, Stevens planned two significant December operations: to sever the enemy's communication line along the Malin-Walum-Womisis-Amam axis and to neutralize enemy positions east of the Danmap River. By November 25, the seasoned 2/7th Commando Squadron had arrived at Babiang, and by month-end, the 19th Brigade took over the area. The commandos then advanced southward, setting up a base at Tong on December 4 and establishing an outpost at Kumbum three days later. Now to finish this week's episode let's explore the B-29 Superfortress operations during this time. After the Formosa Air Battle and the Omura raid on October 25, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command conducted four missions in November. Three of these supported Southeast Asia operations as part of “PAC-AID,” while the fourth targeted the Omura Aircraft Factory, a key focus for the command. On November 3, 44 B-29s from India effectively bombed the Malegon Railway Yards at Rangoon. Two days later, 53 bombers hit Singapore's King George VI Graving Dock, the largest of several dry docks at Singapore and one of the world's best. The first of 53 Superforts attacking was over target at 0644, and the bombardier, Lt. Frank McKinney, put a I,ooo-pound bomb into the target within 50 feet of the aiming point, the caisson gate; Lt. Bolish McIntyre, 2 planes back, laid another alongside. This was the sort of pickle-barrel bombing the Air Corps had talked about before the war. Strike photos showed a rush of water into the dock, presumptive evidence that the gate had been strained, and subsequent reconnaissance photos indicated that the dock was out of use (A-2's estimate of three months of unserviceability was to prove quite accurate). There were other hits on the dock, on a 465-foot freighter in it, and on adjacent shops. For “baksheesh,” as the boys had learned to say in India, seven B-29's bombed the secondary target, Pangkalanbrandan refinery in Sumatra, and reported direct hits on the cracking plant. The Japanese, evidently relying on the inaccessibility of Singapore, put up a feeble defense, but the long trip took a toll of two planes and twelve crewmen, including Col. Ted L. Faulkner, commander of the 468th Group. On November 11, 96 B-29s launched from China to strike Omura under difficult weather; only 29 reached the aircraft factory unsuccessfully, while 24 more bombed Nanking with limited results. The month's final mission on November 27 saw 55 B-29s severely damage the Bang Soe marshaling yards in Bangkok. Meanwhile, in the Marianas, General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command prepared for strikes on the Japanese Home Islands. In order to properly plan missions to Japan, up-to-date reconnaissance photos of the proposed targets were needed. Other than information which was used during the Doolittle Raid in 1942, there was scant information about the locations of Japanese industry, especially the aircraft industry. On November 1, two days after arriving on Saipan, a 3rd Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron F-13A Superfortress (photo reconnaissance-configured B-29) took off bound for Tokyo. The aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32000 feet for 35 minutes taking picture after picture. A few fighters made it up to the camera plane's altitude but did not attack. These photos, along with other intelligence, gave the 21st Bomber Command the locations of the Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants and enabled mission planners to plan missions for the combat crews to attack. In honor of his mission, the aircraft was named "Tokyo Rose". In response, about ten G4Ms launched from Iwo Jima attacked Isley Field on Saipan the next day, scoring five bomb hits but losing three bombers. Hansell responded with a practice strike on Iwo Jima on November 5, though results were again limited. On November 7, the Japanese launched a follow-up attack, but it again resulted in minimal damage and cost them three bombers. A retaliatory strike by 17 B-29s the next day also fell short: one squadron had to jettison its bombs into the ocean, while another dropped its load through a gap in the undercast. Between Japanese attacks, American aircrew inexperience, delays in constructing airfields in the Marianas, and the slow movement of B-29s to Saipan, the 21st Bomber Command was behind schedule in its planned offensive against Japan. By November 15, only half of the 73rd Bombardment Wing's authorized 180 B-29s had arrived, but by November 22, around 118 bombers were finally in place. At this point, General Arnold ordered Hansell to begin Operation San Antonio I, marking the first strike against Tokyo. The chosen target was Nakajima's Musashi Aircraft Engine Plant, which supplied 27% of Japan's combat aircraft engines. On November 24, 111 B-29s took off for Japan, collectively carrying 277.5 tons of bombs. However, 17 bombers aborted mid-flight, and six others couldn't bomb due to mechanical issues. For the first time, the B-29s encountered the Jet stream, which was a high-speed wind coming out of the west at speeds as high as 200 mph at precisely the altitudes at which the bombers were operating. This caused the bomber formations to be disrupted and made accurate bombing impossible. As a result, only 24 B-29s bombed the Musashi plant, while 64 hit nearby dock and urban areas instead. The Japanese fighter response was less intense than expected, with the Americans claiming to have downed seven fighters, likely destroyed 18 more, and damaged nine, losing just one bomber in return. Another B-29 was lost on the return trip after running out of fuel and ditching. Despite disappointing bombing results in the mission—only 48 bombs struck the factory area, causing damage to just 1% of the building area and 2.4% of the machinery, with 57 killed and 75 injured—the raid exposed the weaknesses in Japan's air defense and showed the six million residents of Tokyo that they were vulnerable to attack. Given the limited impact of the November 24 mission, Hansell decided to launch a second major strike, dubbed San Antonio II, targeting Musashi once more. However, in the early hours of November 27, two G4M bombers from Iwo Jima carried out a low-altitude raid on Isley Field, escaping after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others. Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 Kōkūtai (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". Of the 81 bombers launched, 19 aborted, and those that reached Tokyo found the target covered by clouds, forcing them to drop bombs by radar over Tokyo's docks, urban areas, and the cities of Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Numazu, and Osaka. Ultimately, for the loss of one Superfortress, the damage caused by this second strike was minimal. However, the strong Japanese response led Hansell to relocate some B-29s from Isley to safer Guam, strengthen Saipan's defenses and radar, and plan coordinated air-sea operations to neutralize Iwo Jima's staging fields. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans pressed through Leyte's treacherous terrain and fierce resistance, aiming to secure strategic positions. Typhoons, enemy reinforcements, and brutal battles tested them harshly, but they advanced steadily. Despite heavy losses and airstrikes from both sides, American forces captured Breakneck Ridge and pushed onward, inching closer to victory.
Last time we continued speaking about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Admiral Toyoda's Operation Sho-Go aimed to eliminate American naval forces but faced setbacks with the loss of key ships. As Japanese forces advanced, miscommunications led to disorganized attacks. Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague's Taffy groups used smoke and air assaults to delay the Japanese, ultimately leading to Kurita's retreat after sustaining heavy damage from American air strikes. On October 25, a series of intense naval engagements unfolded, featuring airstrikes and kamikaze attacks. U.S. forces launched multiple strikes against Japanese carriers, inflicting significant damage but facing challenges from anti-aircraft fire and pilot fatigue. The day ended with the sinking of several Japanese vessels, including Zuikaku and Chitose, resulting in substantial casualties. Admiral Halsey attempted to intercept Kurita's forces but was too late. Despite heavy losses, including the cruiser Abukuma and numerous aircraft, Kurita's forces managed to reach safety. The battle marked a significant defeat for the Japanese, severely weakening their naval capabilities, though Kamikaze attacks prolonged the war. This episode is the Advance to Ormoc Valley Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Last we we covered the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf seeing the IJN basically annihilated in the waters surrounding the philippines. As the confrontation drew to a close, General Krueger's offensive was ongoing at Leyte. By October 26, General Sibert's 10th Corps and General Hodge's 24th Corps had successfully established two beachhead areas, gradually expanding their perimeter inland and pushing General Makino's 16th Division further into the island's interior. Following the failure of his earlier repositioning after the loss of Hindang and Burauen, Makino acknowledged that he could not prevent the loss of the eastern coastal plain. He decided to retreat his units to rear positions in the mountains west of Dagami and Burauen. Concurrently, as part of Operation TA, Admiral Mikawa successfully delivered the first reinforcements to Ormoc. Consequently, General Suzuki promptly ordered Colonel Sumitani Takayoshi's 41st Regiment to move towards Carigara and then to Jaro, where the remnants of the 33rd Regiment had fallen back to maintain the division's left flank. After capturing Hills B and C, the 24th Division resumed its westward assault on October 26. With General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division protecting General Irving's northern flank, the 34th Regiment advanced along Highway 2, reaching Santa Fe, while the 19th Regiment attempted to attack Pastrana but was halted short of its objective by heavy enemy fire. To the south, the 383rd Regiment patrolled towards San Vicente Hill amidst fierce resistance, as the 382nd Regiment attacked Tabontabon but was forced back to the Guinarona River by determined defenders. In addition, the reserve 3rd Battalion, 381st Regiment, embarked on a long march north along Highway 1 towards Tanauan but encountered enemy fire near Vigia Point. Further south, the 17th Regiment successfully advanced to a position about 600 yards south of Guinarona, while the 32nd Regiment fought persistently to reach the edge of the Buri airstrip. The following day, after fending off several light counterattacks, the 32nd finally secured the airstrip with minimal resistance. Additionally, the 17th pushed forward to a point approximately 2,200 yards south of Dagami, although they faced increased opposition from the retreating enemy. To the east, following an extensive artillery bombardment, the 382nd captured a majority of Tabontabon in a coordinated attack, with Colonel Dill's 1st and 3rd Battalions then moving northeast toward Kapahuan. Colonel Michael Halloran's 3rd Battalion pressed northward and ultimately took Tanauan without opposition before heading towards Kiling. Meanwhile, in the Catmon Hill area, after General Krueger released the remainder of the 381st Regiment to the control of the 24th Corps, General Bradley decided to deploy his reserve regiment to take control of the Labiranan Head position in preparation for an assault against Catmon hill. Catmon Hill had been under steady naval and artillery fire since A Day, October 20. The 96th Division artillery had constantly fired on targets of opportunity by day and harassed enemy positions in the area during the night. Starting at 21:00 on October 27, the 105-mm howitzers of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm howitzers from the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 75-mm howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 10:30 the following day. At that time all of the artillery units were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill and working to the top in 50-yard bounds. After the 381st Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, attacked at 12:00 on October 28, the artillery was to fire concentrations in front of the troops as they advanced. In making his plans for the capture of Catmon Hill, Colonel Michael E. Halloran, commander of the 381st Regiment, decided to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the 2nd Battalion pushed west along the main ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383rd Regiment, from its position on Labiranan Head, would support the attack by fire. Further north, Irving's push westward continued as the 34th Regiment advanced unopposed to the Mudburon River, while the 19th Regiment captured Pastrana following another heavy artillery barrage. On that day, the 171st Independent Battalion arrived after a week-long voyage from Panay, preparing to join the 41st Regiment and its sister battalion towards Carigara and Jaro. On October 28, as the 41st Regiment passed through Carigara and approached Jaro, Mikawa launched his second Operation TA convoy, consisting of three echelons. The first echelon left Manila immediately without cover, transporting the 20th Antitank Battalion. Simultaneously, preparations were underway to send the 12th Independent Regiment and the recently arrived 1st Division to Leyte. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment swiftly moved through Alangalang and advanced to the Mainit River, where they were ultimately halted by fierce Japanese resistance. Nevertheless, two companies successfully crossed the river unnoticed during a heavy rainstorm. After launching a surprise assault against the defenders, they captured a bridge over the river. At the same time, the 19th Regiment progressed to Tingib, where it established a patrol base. General Hoffman also directed his 2nd Cavalry Brigade to advance toward Carigara, with the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry making an overland move to San Miguel, while Troop C of the 7th Cavalry conducted an amphibious landing at Barugo, later engaging in skirmishes with Japanese forces at Carigara. To the south, after successfully fending off a vigorous counterattack, Colonel Dill's 2nd Battalion secured the Tabontabon area, enabling it to move north toward Kiling. In spite of determined opposition, the Japanese supply center of Tabontabon had at last been taken and approximately 350 Japanese killed in the area. During the three days of fighting, the 2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and eighty wounded. The remainder of the 382nd fought their way to Digahongan before turning towards Kiling, eventually halting at Kansamada. Meanwhile, while the 383rd conducted reconnaissance toward San Vicente and the 9th Regiment began its retreat to Dagami, the 381st Regiment finally launched its assault on Catmon Hill. However, Halloran's two battalions were met with heavy gunfire from the surrounding foothills. Lastly, as the 184th Regiment patrolled toward Santa Ana, the 17th Regiment attacked toward Dagami. Despite facing strong opposition and difficult swamp conditions, they managed to push 300 yards beyond the enemy stronghold by nightfall, rolling up the defenders' eastern flank. Since the 2d Battalion had borne the brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had suffered numerous casualties, the regimental commander decided to have the battalion drop back into reserve. Although the drive to Dagami was to continue, the north-south line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800 on 29 October the regimental lines were to be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through the 2d Battalion, which would become the regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes. At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery concentration from the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion without incident. Company B, reinforced by the platoon from the Cannon Company, moved out to destroy the enemy force on the regiment's left flank. The company fought the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by rifle and machine gun fire, together with time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More than 120 enemy dead were counted in the area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery fire from the hills west of the town. The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the road in a column of companies in the order L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami. Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet high and containing stone crypts built off the ground, the cemetery was divided by a path running east to west. As Company L moved into the burial ground, Company I swung around the right (east) side to come into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed the path, a headstone tilted back and from the open grave four Japanese opened fire with an American Browning automatic rifle and other small arms. The small arms of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same time the platoon received fire from other open graves, from which the Japanese had removed the bodies. By punching holes through the stone they used the crypts as individual foxholes. The platoon broke into small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever they could be located. Company K, which followed Company I, placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past the cemetery path a Japanese officer charged on the right flank with his saber and wounded one man before he could be brought down. Since the platoons were also receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the commander of Company K drew his men back to the path where they reorganized. Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers, the men then marched shoulder to shoulder through the cemetery and burnt out the enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed the action and formed its night perimeter. During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and not being able to communicate with the 3d Battalion headquarters, called Company K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had broken through the American lines. "Hell no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our bivouac." During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and sporadic artillery fire was received from the hills west of Dagami. The following day, the 3rd and 1st Battalions advanced through the 2nd Battalion to continue their northern push, successfully entering Dagami without facing significant opposition. After securing the previous headquarters of the 16th Division, the 17th Battalion spent the next two days conducting mopping-up operations and patrolling the Dagami area, effectively establishing contact with the 19th Regiment across the Binahaan River and the 382nd Regiment to the east. Simultaneously, the 32nd Regiment dispatched its 2nd Battalion toward Abuyog, which was successfully captured by midday. By October 31, Company G had further taken control of Baybay, and the 1st Battalion had landed at Panaon to support the 21st Regiment stationed there. As a result, General Arnold's 7th Division accomplished its objective of capturing the Burauen airstrips and Dagami while linking up with the 96th Division and 10th Corps. This operation resulted in an estimated 4,211 Japanese casualties, with 19 soldiers taken prisoner, while the division incurred 322 killed, 1,064 wounded, and 21 missing. Meanwhile, on October 29, the 381st Regiment executed a tank-supported offensive and ultimately captured Catmon Hill, which would be thoroughly cleared in the following two days. At the same time, Halloran's 3rd Battalion stormed and secured Kiling, with Dill's 2nd Battalion arriving shortly thereafter. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last man." The resistance was overcome, and by 1500 the Americans occupied the town, which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had come up from Tabontabon by truck. At 1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San Roque. However, the remainder of the 382nd Battalion was unable to penetrate the retreating 9th Regiment towards Kiling, allowing some Japanese forces to evade complete destruction. Nevertheless, Bradley's 96th Division successfully took control of the Catmon Hill mass and the key towns of Tabontabon and Tanauan, resulting in an estimated 2,769 Japanese casualties and 6 prisoners captured, at the cost of 145 men killed, 564 wounded, and 90 missing. On October 29, Colonel Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced northward, leading the charge toward Jaro. They gradually battled through Galotan and quickly captured Jaro without much resistance. The American forces moved so swiftly that Suzuki was unable to implement his strategy of using Jaro as the gathering point for the reinforcements of the 35th Army, compelling him to designate Carigara as the new rendezvous site. Due to the evident Japanese strength in the region, Hoffman ordered his units to bolster defenses in Barugo, with the remaining units of the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry arriving by nightfall, followed by the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry on October 31, and the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry on November 1. At 08:00 on October 30 Colonel Newman ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 34th Regiment to start for Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from Japanese who were dug in under shacks along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks came up in a column, fired under the shacks, and then retired. The leading platoon was drawn back so that artillery fire might be placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could not be located precisely enough to use the artillery. Newman then ordered a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side of the road and two tanks in the center. The squads had advanced only fifty yards when Japanese fire again pinned them down. When Newman came forward and discovered why the advance was held up he declared, "I'll get the men going okay." Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started to move forward. The Japanese at once opened fire with artillery and mortars, and Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach. Although badly wounded he tried to devise some means of clearing the situation. After sending a runner back with orders to have the 3rd Battalion fire on the Japanese position, he said, "Leave me here and get mortar fire on that enemy position." As soon as possible Colonel Newman was put on a poncho and dragged back to safety. The following morning, while the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment moved toward Jaro, the 34th Battalion launched another attack and managed to reach the Yapan River. Despite their fierce assault, the heavy Japanese artillery and flanking fire once again stalled the Americans on their journey to Carigara, allowing the 41st Regiment to withdraw. At this stage, the 5th Air Force had officially set up its forward units on Leyte, tasked with achieving air superiority and attacking Japanese convoys and troop concentrations. However, as the 13th Air Force focused its primary efforts on airfields in bypassed areas. Poor weather had taken its toll on General Krueger's advance. Rainy, monsoon-like conditions confounded his engineers, and airfield construction at Tacloban and Dulag floundered. Landing conditions were still poor. Naval carrier aircraft, from damaged escort carriers, headed to both airfields instead of ditching at sea. As the Navy pilots attempted to land on Leyte, 25 out of 72 planes ended up damaged. Without suitable land-based US air power, the Japanese could continue to launch air attacks. Limited American air power did contest the skies against the Japanese, but could still only provide a minimum of close air support to the American troops. While Japanese aircraft continued to reach targets throughout Leyte, Kinkaid and Halsey's forces had to depart the Leyte region to resupply, so Kenney had to take over with his limited forces. MacArthur did persuade Halsey to maintain Task Group 38.2 in the area when he withdrew most of his fleet on October 29. Kinkaid also left ten escort carriers only by redistributing fleet supplies, but he also had to refit. Nonetheless, Ground commanders criticized Kenney's continued failure to provide close air support. During the early invasion period, naval carrier aviators had delivered direct support. For example, out of the 121 troop support missions from October 20 to 25, pilots flew 33 sorties in direct support of soldiers. With Kinkaid and Halsey's forces departed, Kenney's focus was on air superiority. He had eliminated most close air support missions until later in the campaign. As a result, the infantry had to rely on artillery. The escort carriers of the 7th Fleet, significantly diminished following the Battle of Leyte Gulf, were unable to provide support. Although Admiral Mitscher's carriers did conduct numerous strikes against Japanese shipping in the Visayas and Manila Bay in the last days of October, Task Force 38 had mostly been withdrawn by the end of the month. During the final week of October, the 4th Air Army and the newly-formed 1st Combined Base Air Force maintained a persistent campaign to support ground operations, gradually redirecting their attacks from amphibious shipping and carriers to the enemy-occupied airfields at Tacloban and Dulag. Though Kenney's airfields still had minimal capacity, he had 34 P-38s from the 49th Fighter Group based at Morotai deployed to Tacloban Airfield on October 27. Three days later, only 20 P-38s remained, as Japanese air attacks destroyed or damaged several of the twin-tailed aircraft. In response, Kenney deployed more P-38s from the 475th Fighter Group. He also assigned six P-61s from the 421st Night Fighter Squadron to counter night attacks. Kenney later replaced them with F6Fs from VMF (N)-541, which improved night patrol and interception missions to include strikes on Japanese night convoys. Thus, Kenney's pilots, led by the elite aces Richard Bong and Thomas McGuire, started to make a difference. Additionally, bombing attacks disrupted airfield construction and caused aircraft losses since they were parked close together due to space limitations. Still, Army engineers with Filipino labor made inroads towards rendering the airfields fully operational. Pilots could now use an expanded 5,000ft runway at Tacloban on October 31. With a growing 5th Air Force presence, the Americans improved their ability to intercept bombers; as a consequence, the Japanese relied more on night attacks. This shift inflicted substantial damage and compelled the Americans to reinforce their positions. Alongside the primary air offensive targeting enemy supply shipping and airfields, Kamikaze units executed suicide attacks against enemy carriers operating off the east coast of the Philippines. Pilots, as well as aircraft of various types, were drawn from the 153d, 601st and 761st Air Groups. The initial corps used only bomb-equipped fighters. However, after the reorganizations of the Kamikaze corps, all types of aircraft were used. A kamikaze suicide aircraft hit Intrepid on one of her port side gun positions; ten men were killed and another six were wounded, but damage was minimal. The USS Franklin had just refueled and returned to the Leyte action on 27 October, her planes concentrating on a heavy cruiser and two destroyers south of Mindoro. She was under way about 100 miles (160 km) off Samar on 30 October, when enemy bombers appeared bent on a suicide mission. Navy fighters shot down most of the Japanese planes, but six broke through the combat air patrol into Franklin's task group of four carriers defensively surrounded by a circle of about twenty escorting cruisers and destroyers. Shipboard anti-aircraft guns shot down three of the four kamikazes independently diving toward each of the four carriers; but the one targeting Franklin hit the flight deck and crashed through to the gallery deck, killing 56 men and wounding 60. As the remaining two kamikazes attacked, one was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and the second missed Franklin with two bombs before flying into the stern of Belleau Wood. Franklin was able to extinguish fires and patch the flight deck so planes could be recovered 76 minutes after the kamikaze hit. Both carriers retired to Ulithi Atoll for temporary repairs, and then Franklin proceeded to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, arriving on 28 November 1944 for repairs of her battle damage. Meanwhile, on October 30, the 20th Antitank Battalion was successfully landed at Ormoc. The following day, Mikawa dispatched his remaining two echelons: the second comprised three transports carrying the Imahori Detachment, primarily made up of Colonel Imahori Tetsusaku's 12th Independent Regiment. The third included four transports and four frigates carrying most of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu's 1st Division along with around 9,000 tons of supplies and ammunition, all under the protection of Rear-Admiral Kimura Masatomi's screen of six destroyers. This would be Mikawa's last convoy, as he would soon be replaced in command of the Southwest Area Fleet by Vice-Admiral Okawachi Denshichi due to his deteriorating health. Following a smooth journey, the Imahori Detachment was quickly disembarked at Ormoc on November 1, with the remainder of the convoy arriving later that night to commence the unloading for the 1st Division. During the day, one of the transports was sent to Cebu to pick up the 35th Army Headquarters, which landed the next morning alongside Kataoka's troops. By noon on November 2, a total of 13,000 soldiers had successfully arrived, culminating in the most effective reinforcement operation of the Leyte campaign, with just one transport lost and another slightly damaged. Turning to the primary action, on November 1, two companies from the 34th Regiment were ordered to execute a broad flanking maneuver and then attack Tunga from the northeast, facing no resistance. This enabled Newman's 1st and 2nd Battalions to advance swiftly down the highway to a point approximately 1,000 yards from Sagkanan. Concerned about the enemy's considerable presence at Carigara, Sibert planned for his two divisions to launch a coordinated assault on the town the following day; however, unbeknownst to him, the disorganized Japanese forces chose to abandon the town and retreat to the mountains southwest of Capoocan. Thus, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Americans captured Carigara without opposition and promptly established a perimeter, while the 34th Regiment advanced further to Balud, where they encountered intense enemy fire. On that same day, the 382nd Regiment took control of Dagami, from which they would engage the positions of the 16th Division on Bloody Ridge over the coming days. The capture of Carigara marked the completion of the second phase of General Krueger's plan for liberating Leyte. Irving's 24th Division successfully achieved its objectives, resulting in the deaths of approximately 2,970 Japanese soldiers and the capture of 13 prisoners, with their own losses totaling 210 killed, 859 wounded, and 6 missing. Additionally, by October 27, Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division had killed an estimated 739 Japanese and taken 7 prisoners, incurring a loss of 40 men killed, 199 wounded, and 8 missing. The next phase of Krueger's strategy involved two offensives converging on Ormoc: one moving south through Ormoc Valley led by Sibert's 10th Corps and the other advancing north from Baybay under Hodge's 24th Corps. Initially, while certain units of the 24th Corps continued pushing west to bolster troops along Ormoc Bay and clean up in southern Leyte Valley, Sibert's forces aimed to secure control of the Carigara Bay coastline from Carigara to Pinamopoan. Simultaneously, Suzuki sent the experienced 1st Division to Carigara to launch an offensive toward Tacloban. The 1st Division, which had been activated in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though it had no combat experience, this division was considered by Major-General Tomochika Yoshiharu, deputy chief of staff of the 35th Army, to be the best equipped division of the Japanese Army. Under the command of Lieutenant-General Kataoka Tadasu, it had been held in reserve by Imperial General Headquarters for the decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila with great expectations. Meanwhile the Imahori Detachment moved to the northeastern base of the heights southwest of Jaro to facilitate the assembly of the 26th Division for an impending attack on Jaro. After securing Carigara, the 68th Brigade was set to land in the north as part of the 35th Army reserve, while the 30th Division would land at Albuera on Ormoc Bay and negotiate mountainous trails to Burauen to eliminate all enemy resistance in the Dulag region. As other units of the 102nd Division were moved forward using powered schooners, a reinforced company from the 364th Independent Battalion was also deployed to Albuera to secure the landing site for the 30th Division. On the morning of November 3, the 34th Regiment moved west once again and quickly seized Capoocan, just as Kataoka's vanguard was getting close. Suzuki immediately approved the emergency dispositions already taken and issued orders temporarily attaching the various reinforcement units to the 1st Division. It was impossible, however, to notify Lt. Gen. Kataoka immediately of the changed situation, and the division advance guard moved into the vicinity west of Capoocan at 0900 on 3 November to find itself unexpectedly engaged by the enemy. Badly surprised, the advance guard fell back toward Colasian with the enemy in pursuit. Meanwhile, at 1000, Lt. Gen. Kataoka reached the high ground south of Managasnas. Finding his advance guard engaged, he immediately ordered the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment and the 20th Antitank Battalion to check the enemy advance. At the same time he dispatch ed an order to the division main body to close up at forced march. Although the defenders were initially taken by surprise, they managed to halt the enemy's progress with fierce resistance, ultimately compelling them to withdraw. It was only after artillery bombardment of the ridge parallel to the road that the 34th finally dismantled the Japanese stronghold, establishing their position for the night. Additionally, earlier in the day, Company K had conducted a reconnaissance mission using amphibian tractors from Capoocan to a location just west of Pinamopoan. However, due to heavy enemy fire, the company withdrew and returned to Capoocan. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Kataoka mistakenly perceived this as a battalion-sized enemy assault, prompting him to retreat southwest and position his forces on the eastern end of a long ridge overlooking the coast, referred to as Breakneck Ridge. Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2 corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan and Limon for about 7200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carigara Bay to the north and the Levte River valley to the south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick on the low ground, and the pockets between the hills were heavily forested. The valleys were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly wooded pockets that served as natural forts. The Japanese had also built an elaborate system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests and were protected from direct fire. In front of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire lanes through the cogon grass, which was left so short that even a crawling soldier would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous, and, more important, provided a protective curtain in the day and covered movements of the enemy at night. Following the Japanese withdrawal, the 34th quickly secured Colasian and captured Pinamopoan without opposition the next day. Newman's 3rd Battalion advanced through the town, continuing west along the highway for about 1,700 yards, stopping just short of the ridge. Anticipating a potential enemy amphibious assault via Carigara Bay, Krueger ordered Sibert to defend the Carigara area against any seaborne attack before proceeding southward. Meanwhile, as the divisions of the 10th Corps prepared defensive measures against a possible sea invasion, Colonel Miyauchi Yoshio's 57th Regiment was ordered to get ready to launch an attack from the ridge, as Kataoka believed that the enemy force could be easily cut off. As the newly-arrived 21st Regiment took over from the 34th at the Pinamopoan defenses, the Japanese forces launched an attack on a party of artillery forward observers conducting reconnaissance on OP Hill on November 5. With the artillerymen pinned down, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Weber's 3rd Battalion moved in to assist them by the afternoon, successfully securing the northern approaches to OP Hill and the undefended Corkscrew Ridge on the left. Although the Americans were able to fend off the enemy's counterattacks, intense mortar fire on November 6 ultimately compelled them to withdraw. Despite suffering heavy casualties during the battle for Breakneck Ridge, the 1st Division had nearly completed its concentration in the Cananga area and was ready to initiate a broad four-pronged assault. However, the Japanese advance through the mountainous terrain remained exceedingly slow, leaving the 57th Regiment to conduct the attack on its own. Concurrently, Irving attached the 3rd Battalion of the 19th Regiment to the 21st Regiment and ordered the combined force to advance towards Breakneck Ridge. Consequently, Weber's troops launched an assault on Miyauchi's positions, but were completely unsuccessful in breaking through. Dissatisfied with the 21st Regiment's progress and feeling that Weber was insufficiently aggressive, Sibert replaced him with Lieutenant-Colonel William Verbeck, a seasoned veteran of the Alaska Campaign. Verbeck then made an unsuccessful attempt at a wide flanking maneuver to the east but ultimately had to entrench at the edge of Breakneck Ridge by nightfall. On the same day, Colonel Chapman dispatched Company G to Hill 1525, but it lost its way and ended up considerably further east. Thats all we have for today on the Philippines front as we now need to shift over to New Britain. In October, a decision was made to deploy the 40th Division for combat in the Philippines, transferring control of the island to the Australians. This change aligned with the Australian government's intention to utilize their own troops to reclaim territory previously occupied by the Japanese during the war. As a result, General Ramsay's 5th Division began relocating to New Britain, tasked with containing and isolating the Japanese garrison on the Gazelle Peninsula. Ramsay was instructed to maintain pressure on the Japanese forces while avoiding large-scale deployments, permitted only to conduct patrols and minor raids as limited offensive actions. By late October, the 36th Battalion had assumed control at Cape Hoskins, with the remainder of the 6th Brigade slated to land at Jacquinot Bay in early November. At this time the Japanese had posts at intervals along the south coast as far west as Awul near Cape Dampier. It was decided that the Australian southern guerilla force would be based at Lakiri, a village in the hills two days' march inland from Waterfall Bay, and in an area into which the enemy had not ventured. It possessed a good site for dropping stores from the air and, as a preliminary, some 25,000 pounds of supplies were dropped there. To give added security to the base the Australian-led native guerillas, commanded at this stage by Captain R. I. Skinner, overcame the enemy's coastwatching posts at Palmalmal and Baien, to the south-west and south-east, respectively, killing 23 and taking three prisoners. None survived at Palmalmal, but two escaped from Baien, and it was learnt later that they reached an enemy post at Milim bearing news of what had happened. The south coast group was now placed under the command of Captain Basil Fairfax-Ross, who counted with five officers, 10 Australian N.C.O's, about 140 native troops, and such native allies as could be maintained on an air delivery of 5,000 pounds of supplies a month. After the loss of Baien the Japanese reinforced their post at Milim at the south end of Wide Bay until it was 400 strong. Far to the west they retained posts at Massau and Awul and round Cape Beechey. Fairfax-Ross decided to move discreetly into the strongly-held Wide Bay area, advancing through the hills, concentrating first on winning over the natives , and using the air power available from Bougainville as his trump card . At the same time spies would be sent into the Gazelle Peninsula. In the western area also the first task was to gain information. On 5th June an American patrol from the west led by Lieutenant White of Angau attacked the Awul garrison, which withdrew inland. An Australian platoon under Lieutenant Black thereupon marched from Jacquinot Bay to Lau and Atu. In this area they found that native guerillas about 80 strong had killed 14 Japanese and 14 of their native allies. At Awul they met White and his party. It now seemed that the Japanese from the Atu-Awul area were retreating to the north coast. Guerillas were organized and at Kensina on 18th June, "after pretending to entertain a party of about 50 enemy" , the natives attacked and killed 28, losing 5 of their own men. Black's patrol, in pursuit, found the remainder of the enemy about Rang and i n an attack on 24th June killed nine, but had to withdraw after losing one native N.C.O . As they moved north and east through hostile territory other Japanese were killed. In the eastern section in this period Lieutenant Johnson was winning the support of influential natives in the mountains south-west of Wide Bay. A heavy air attack was made on the main Milim positions on the night of 17th-18th July and as a result the Japanese with- drew some men to a new position away to the west and some men right back to Lemingi in the Gazelle Peninsula. By early September the last of the Japanese stragglers on the south coast west of Wide Bay had been killed; the Japanese had heard many reports of a strong Australian base at Jacquinot Bay-reports circulated by the Australians to dissuade the enemy from advancing westward. This base, although non-existent as yet, was soon to become a reality, and from 5th to 7th September a reconnaissance party, including officers from New Guinea Force and the 5th Division, landed from the corvette Kiama and, guided by Black, examined the area. The two-platoon force reached Milim unnoticed on 12th August, and found the enemy about 150 strong. At dawn they opened an attack in three groups, one to fire on the houses in the Japanese camp, another to fire from the flank, and the third to intercept any reinforcements from the Yaret position 500 yards to the north. Unfortunately a native fired his rifle during the approach, the enemy manned his defenses, and, after a short exchange of fire, the attackers withdrew and placed ambushes across the tracks. The same day the Swan bombarded Milim. After three days of inaction on the part of the Japanese four native soldiers crawled into the enemy's position and killed three, whereafter the Japanese fired into the bush at intervals for 36 hours. This fire ceased on the 18th and soon afterwards the position was found to be abandoned; there was much booty including boats and numerous machine-guns. It was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn to Waitavalo. Fairfax-Ross now moved his forward base to the coast at the Mu River only 6 hours' march from Waitavalo. On 17th and 18th September Fairfax-Ross, Sampson and a platoon, reconnoitring Kamandran, became involved in a fight with a Japanese force about 100 strong. Anticipating that the enemy would retaliate in force the Australians prepared defensive positions and one platoon under Sergeant-Major Josep, an outstanding N.C.O. who had come from the New Guinea Constabulary, was placed on the hillside above Milim to give warning of an enemy advance. On the night of 28th September the Japanese did in fact advance on Milim and on towards the Australian defensive position at the Mu River. Here, however, largely because of Sergeant Ranken's cool handling of his Bren gun, they were repulsed, losing 17 killed. Next day about 200 Japanese reinforcements arrived and, in a firefight with Josep's men whose presence they had not discovered, 16 Japanese and a native ally were killed. The Australians now withdrew inland. Soon the Japanese, about 700 strong, were in their original positions round Milim, where they remained until heavy air attacks on 6th, 7th and 8th October forced them out again. By 10th October the guerilla force was again concentrated at Lakiri. Consequently, on November 4, a small convoy landed the reinforced 14th/32nd Battalion at Jacquinot Bay without encountering any resistance. In the days following the landing, ground forces secured the Jacquinot Bay area, while a New Guinean company executed an amphibious operation to Pomio on November 6. The 6th Brigade was gradually transferred to Cutarp, with the final units arriving on December 16. Due to shipping shortages and the low priority for reinforcing forces on New Britain, all components of the 5th Division would not advance to Jacquinot Bay until April 1945. The first echelon of the 13th Brigade arrived on November 26, while the remaining units followed by the end of December. Meanwhile, in the north, the 36th Battalion dispatched patrols to connect with Australian guerrillas at Ulamona, Ubili, and Ea Ea, aiding them in fending off an enemy advance on the Balima River by the end of November. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Americans were making tremendous progress in the Philippines, advancing through the Ormoc Valley. Despite the terrible odds, it seems the Japanese would not give up an inch of territory without a fight, digging their heels to the very end. Meanwhile the Australians were dealt mop up duty on New Britain and it was going equally as well.
Step behind the curtain and meet your podcast hosts Dean and Moni who are interviewed by (and introducing) new co-host, Jimmy Woodriff. After just over a 12 months the Treading Lightly podcast is back and overflowing with fresh energy, ideas and a long list of guests to chat to about their awesome lives, work and initiatives in our community here on Yuin Country also known as the South Coast of NSW in Australia.In this episode we learn a bit about Dean and Moni's upbringing, early careers and how they ended up settling down here on Yuin Country. Then we dive into a forecast of the Treading Lightly community programs and events coming up as we round out 2024 and look into a new year.Links to things mentioned in this episode:Permaculture book Jimmy recommendsDean's men's groupIf you enjoyed this episode please remember to like and share. If you have a suggestion for a guest, segment or how we can make the podcast even better please drop us an email.Treading Lightly links & how to get in touchInstagram | https://www.instagram.com/treading_lightly_inc/Facebook | https://www.facebook.com/TreadingLightlyInc/More episodes | https://tlinc.org.au/resources/podcasts/Website | https://treadinglightly.org.au/
‘n Afvaardiging van die Namibiese Verkiesingskommissie en 18 politieke partye is in Johannesburg om die druk en verpakking van stembriewe vir die plaaslike verkiesings waar te neem. Die proses het ‘n herrie ontketen met die maatskappy Ren-Form wat betrek is by korrupsie van miljoene dollar in Zimbabwe. Die Christian Democratic Voice, die PDM en die Republikeinse Party het nie lede gestuur nie. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met Republikeinse Party-president, Henk Mudge gepraat wat sê hy het nie die nut daarin gesien om Johannesburg toe te gaan nie.
Rob's goal of hitting all 50 states is within reach. Turns out Joe is a bug expert. The Dentist thinks Joe's mouth is a debacle. Justin went to the Ravens Commanders game with Mudge. It's never easy. We make trip predictions for Justin and the fam's Taylor Swift trip this weekend.
Last time we spoke about the Formosa air battle. In mid-1944, General MacArthur and Admirals Nimitz and Halsey debated their next move in the Pacific. MacArthur, intent on a direct assault on the Philippines, clashed with Nimitz, who favored invading Formosa. MacArthur's persuasive tactics, political savvy and to be more blunt, threats during a rather dramatic visit to Honolulu, convinced President FDR to prioritize the Philippines. Despite MacArthur's grandstanding, FDR did not completely abandon the US Navy's plans, and MacArthur's plan would require significant Naval support, with carrier strikes planned to soften Japanese defenses. In October, Halsey's carriers launched devastating strikes against Formosa, leading to heavy Japanese losses and disrupting their air power. Despite some fierce counterattacks and damage to American ships, including the cruiser Canberra, the American forces achieved air supremacy. The successful air campaign set the stage for the invasion of Leyte, marking a pivotal shift in the Pacific War. This episode is the Return to the Philippines Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. We last left off the week before the grand return to the Philippines, Admiral Halsey had dispatched his carrier forces to neutralize enemy bases in Formosa in preparation for General MacArthur's Leyte invasion. However, Admiral Toyoda's response was unexpectedly strong, resulting in two cruisers being torpedoed, which forced Admiral Mitscher to order a retreat eastward under pressure from Japanese aviators. On October 15, while the cruisers Houston and Canberra were being towed under the protection of Admiral McCain's carriers, Halsey directed Admirals Bogan and Sherman's task groups to withdraw eastward out of sight. At the same time, Admiral Davison's forces carried out intermittent air raids on northern Luzon to keep enemy aircraft at bay. More significantly, Halsey decided to turn the situation into an opportunity. He instructed McCain's units to send out open messages, pleading for assistance. This tactic, which Halsey called the "Lure of the Streamlined Bait," was designed to mislead the Japanese into believing that this task group was all that remained of the fleet, enticing them to move in for the kill. Halsey's other task groups, which had withdrawn eastward, would then return to engage and destroy the enemy. On October 14, Japanese aviators claimed two carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and one light cruiser set afire. The exaggerated claims of the Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly on the home islands. The people felt that the American Navy had indeed been given a death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households in the country to commemorate the event. The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces… the enemy task forces lost the majority of their strength and were put to rout." It also predicted that the Allied losses would delay the invasion of the Philippine Islands by two months. Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report that "all 3rd Fleet Ships reported by radio Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and are retiring towards the enemy." The exaggerated claims of success made by Japanese pilots further convinced Toyoda to continue the assault, despite heavy aircraft losses. Meanwhile, Admiral Shima's strike force was already rushing south from the Inland Sea to support the air forces. However, Shima's force was not the only one speeding towards the battlefront. On October 13, Admiral Barbey's convoy, consisting of over 470 ships and carrying the 24th Division and the 6th Army Service Command, finally departed Hollandia, heading toward the designated "Far Shore," Leyte. The next day, the convoy crossed the equator without ceremony. By October 15, Task Force 78, which included the 1st Cavalry Division, joined the massive convoy. With General Sibert's full 10th Corps now en route to Leyte, the plan was to rendezvous with Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79. Over the course of about two weeks, General Hodge's 24th Corps had been transported from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then to Manus Island. On October 11, the LSTs carrying the assault battalions departed Manus, followed by Wilkinson's convoy of 267 ships, which left the Admiralties three days later. Their progress was steady, and by October 17, Wilkinson's tractor groups began joining the 7th Fleet. This combined fleet formed the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific up to that point. Meanwhile, during the Formosa Air Battle, Japanese aviators launched multiple strikes against Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk on October 15. Fortunately, the American carriers' reinforced combat air patrols effectively minimized damage, with only one glancing bomb hit on the Franklin. In retaliation, Admiral Mitscher's pilots claimed to have shot down more than 100 Japanese planes. Additionally, Admiral Davison's carriers attacked enemy air concentrations in Luzon, though they faced heavy resistance from Vice-Admiral Teraoka Kinpei's reorganized 1st Air Fleet. These engagements continued over the next two days, with American forces estimated to have destroyed 99 enemy aircraft on the ground and 95 in the air by October 19. On the morning of October 16, Mitscher's carriers conducted long-range searches to determine if the enemy had fallen for Halsey's trap. Meanwhile, Japanese morning reconnaissance flights over the western Philippine Sea spotted three enemy task groups with a combined total of 13 carriers in the vicinity, forcing Toyoda to reluctantly cancel Shima's planned attack. As a result, no surface engagement materialized from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait." However, 247 naval aircraft were promptly dispatched from Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon to locate the enemy groups. McCain continued to fend off persistent Japanese air assaults, which managed to land another torpedo hit on the Houston. Hellcats from light carriers Cabot and Cowpens did great execution against a Japanese formation of over 100 aircraft. However, three Jills penetrated the screen. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. The explosion set fire to the starboard tank that held fuel for the ship's reconnaissance floatplanes, causing a major fire in the aircraft hangar, though the remaining crew suppressed the blaze within fifteen minutes. Flooding from this hit degraded the ship's buoyancy and stability further. Another 300 men were evacuated afterward, leaving just 200 aboard to continue damage control efforts as the ships withdrew. Despite the cruiser suffering significant damage, the towing operation carried on, slowly guiding the task group towards Naval Base Ulithi, which they eventually reached on October 27. On October 17, the Japanese were still in pursuit of the retreating fleet, but contact was lost, and further attacks were aborted. Nevertheless, the Formosa Air Battle had one final chapter. After the successful strike on Okayama on October 14, General LeMay deemed the damage extensive enough that it wasn't necessary to send all available B-29s for mop-up operations. On October 16, only the 444th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were dispatched to hit Okayama, while the 468th targeted Heito, an airbase and staging field east of Takao. Of 49 planes airborne against Okayama, only 28 bombed there, but they were aided by five stragglers from the 468th Group. To even things up, a formation of 11 planes from the 444th flew calmly by its Okayama target and struck at Heito through an error by the lead bombardier. Other B-29s bombed alternate or chance targets at Takao, Toshien, Swatow, and Sintien harbors; at Hengyang; and at several airdromes, including Taichu on Formosa. This dual mission was less smooth than the October 14 raid, but no losses were reported. The next day, 23 B-29s from the 40th Bombardment Group attacked the Einansho Air Depot near Tainan to complete the Formosa campaign. Heavy cloud cover prevented 13 of the bombers from reaching the target, so they diverted to bomb Takao harbor instead. Despite these challenges, LeMay's bombers inflicted significant damage overall. By the end of the Formosa Air Battle, the Japanese had launched a total of 761 offensive sorties. Toyoda's pilots reported that nearly the entire 3rd Fleet had been sunk and the American carrier force was in ruins. For comedic effect why not go through the real list shall we: Japanese claims were finally listed as follows: Sunk: 11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser). Damaged: 8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidentified ships. In addition, at least 12 other ships set afire. These exaggerated claims were heavily promoted by newspapers, although figures like Toyoda within the IJN remained skeptical. In reality, the Japanese air forces were decisively beaten at Formosa, losing around 171 planes in the initial defense and another 321 during attacks on Mitscher's fleet—a total of approximately 492 aircraft. The Second Air Fleet, comprising the main strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost 50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to 230 operational aircraft. The First Air Fleet and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were left with a combined operational strength of only a little over 100 aircraft. Of 143 carrier planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet, about one-third, with their flight crews, had been lost. Allied estimates, however, place Japanese losses as high as 655. In addition to these aircraft losses, Japan suffered significant casualties among air personnel, which severely weakened Admiral Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions and left General Yamashita with limited air support for the defense of the Philippines. On the other hand, Halsey's forces lost only 89 aircraft, with two cruisers suffering serious damage. The radar-guided Hellcats easily repelled the fragmented Japanese attacks, causing no delays to the American operations and inflicting no serious damage on Task Force 38. This defeat significantly diminished Japan's ability to defend the Philippines, as their surface forces were now left without effective air cover. In the aftermath of the battle, the aggressive Vice-Admiral Onishi Takishiro assumed command of the 1st Air Fleet and initiated the creation of a suicide corps, recruiting volunteers to dive-bomb enemy vessels. Thus, the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps was born. Captain Motoharu Okamura, in charge of Tateyama base and the 341st Air Group Home is theorized to be the first officer to propose the use of kamikaze attack tactics. Commander Asaichi Tamai asked a group of 23 student pilots whom he had trained to volunteer for the first special kamikaze attack force, all of them did so willingly. The names of the four subunits within the Kamikaze Special Attack Force were Unit Shikishima, Unit Yamato, Unit Asahi and Unit Yamazakura. LeMay reported the destruction of 65 buildings and damage to 9 out of the 80 at Okayama's assembly plant, along with the destruction of 7 hangars and 16 buildings and damage to 9 others at the airbase. As a result, LeMay's intelligence team estimated it would take between four and six months to fully restore the Okayama plant to full operational capacity. His final strike of the month occurred on October 25, targeting the Omura Aircraft Factory, with 78 B-29 bombers successfully taking off. Over Omura, 59 planes dropped 156 tons of bombs, while 11 hit various other targets. Despite moderate resistance, one bomber was lost during the attack. Strike photos and subsequent reconnaissance showed significant damage, especially in the aluminum fabrication area. Over the following three months, Omura would become a primary target for Operation Matterhorn, though the 20th Bomber Command also conducted additional strikes to support Allied operations in Southeast Asia, China, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, minesweepers and other vessels had cleared the way for amphibious flotillas. In the early dawn of October 17 the minesweepers began their work on the channel approaches to Suluan Island. By 06:30 they had accomplished their task and then began to sweep the waters of the landing areas in Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to suspend operations. At 12:59 they resumed sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day, intensive area and tactical mine sweeping continued. The sweepers started at dawn each day and worked continuously until nightfall. By October 19 it was known that the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were no mines within the gulf itself. However the northern part of the main channel into the gulf was not considered safe. By the same date sweeping had been completed in the southern half, 186 mines having been destroyed. At about 01:35 on October 19, the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a total of 227 mines had been destroyed and a passage approximately six miles wide had been cleared just north of Dinagat Island. All ships were therefore directed to enter Leyte Gulf through that portion of the strait. As the minesweepers came close to the land, boats containing Filipinos moved out to welcome the advance party of liberators. The reception they met was not enthusiastic. Admiral Oldendorf "suspected that some might have come seeking information so detained them aboard their respective ships… Directed no further patriots be taken aboard ship."With Halsey's forces still in the Formosa-Ryukyus region, these ships were under the air cover of General Whitehead's 5th Air Force and Admiral Kinkaid's escort carriers. While minesweepers and demolition teams worked to clear mines, remove transport barriers, and perform beach reconnaissance, Company D of the 6th Ranger Battalion prepared to land on Suluan Island on October 17. Supported by fire from the USS Denver and in heavy rain, the Rangers successfully landed on the beach at 08:05 without opposition. The men immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail along the coast and then headed east toward the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings, one of which contained a Japanese radio, were found and set ablaze. The company then continued along the trail. Suddenly the enemy fired from a concealed position, killing one man and wounding another. When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march was resumed and the company reached its objective without further incident. The lighthouse, which had been damaged by naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted. Unfortunately, a Japanese radio station successfully reported the enemy convoy's approach and the start of the Rangers' landings, revealing that Leyte was the Americans' ultimate target. In response, Toyoda swiftly initiated Operation Sho-Go, ordering Vice-Admiral Kurita Takeo's 1st Striking Force to move from Lingga anchorage to Brunei Bay, preparing to strike the enemy invasion fleet. Just after midnight on October 18, Kurita's ships departed Lingga anchorage and began their trek to Leyte. Sentai (Division) 16—heavy cruiser Aoba, light cruiser Kinu, and destroyer Uranami—was ordered to detach from Kurita's command and head to Manila. These ships were all among the oldest in Kurita's fleet, but it was a mistake to detach them for a secondary transport mission when they would have been better used to augment the decisive attack planned for Kurita's force. Simultaneously, Shima's 2nd Striking Force, reinforced by Kurita's detached 16th Cruiser Division, was tasked with supporting counterlandings. The Second Striking Force, for this newly-assigned mission, was to be composed only of the Fifth Fleet (two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seven destroyers) plus the 16th Cruiser Division (one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, one destroyer) detached from the First Striking Force. Under this plan, the 16th Cruiser Division was ordered to proceed to Manila, while the Second Striking Force main body, then at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus, was ordered to go first to Mako, refuel, and then proceed to the Philippines. By noon, another order was issued to Ozawa's Main Body, despite its depleted air power, to coordinate a sortie from home waters in support of the attack planned for the morning of October 25 in Leyte Gulf. The mission of the Ozawa force was of vital importance to the success of the over-all plan. It was to act as a decoy to draw off the main strength of the enemy naval forces covering the invasion operations in Leyte Gulf, thus allowing the 1st Striking Force to penetrate to the landing point and smash the enemy's troop and supply ships. To heighten its effectiveness as a lure, the Ozawa Force sortied with all of the 3rd Carrier Division, made up of the regular carrier Zuikaku and the light carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda. The total number of aircraft available to put aboard these ships, however, was only 108. These belonged to the poorly trained air groups of the 1st Carrier Division and represented about half the normal complement. In addition to the half-empty carriers, the force comprised two battleships, three light cruisers and eight destroyers. Ozawa fully anticipated that his fleet would be completely wiped out, but this sacrifice was deemed essential to achieve the primary objective: destruction of the entire enemy invasion force. As a result of the transfer of the flying groups of the 3d and 4th Carrier Divisions to Second Air Fleet for the Formosa air battle, the Task Force Main Body had lost much of its planned striking power. The mission assigned to it was therefore less offensive than that assigned in the original Sho-Go battle plan. The original plan had called for a diversionary attack by the Ozawa Force against the enemy's main carrier task forces. Under the more general terms of the 18 October plan, however, Vice Adm. Ozawa was left discretion to choose an attack target more commensurate with the strength of his force. Meanwhile, Davison's carrier aircraft launched attacks on air bases around Manila and Legaspi, but neither the 1st Air Fleet nor the 4th Air Army could respond due to adverse weather. As these strikes were carried out in difficult conditions, General Terauchi concluded by nightfall that a significant enemy operation was underway. He then activated the Army component of Sho-Go, instructing Lieutenant-General Tominaga Kyoji to target enemy ships near Leyte. Should the enemy successfully land, General Suzuki's 35th Army was ordered to delay their advance until reinforcements arrived, with the goal of launching a counterattack to defeat the Americans by October 25. Given the recent actions on Suluan and the American naval presence in the Leyte Gulf, the Army and Navy IGHQ sections surprisingly coordinated their response, with the IJA staff approving the Southern Army's request to implement Sho-Go 1. It was determined that the coming decisive battle for Japan was the Philippines. One major difference was the battle's location. Terauchi, Yamashita, and other Southern Army officers believed it would be Luzon, not Leyte. With Sho-Go 1 focused on Leyte, the Japanese would have to fight in the central Philippines, without extensive defensive works or major airfields. Yamashita would also use his limited shipping to send reinforcements to Leyte. If the Japanese lost Leyte, there might not be sufficient strength to defeat decisively any American offensive on Luzon. Deploying the few IJA units to Leyte would make a Luzon defense harder to accomplish. Sho-Go 1 could hand the control of the Philippines to the Americans. Eventually, Terauchi agreed to the IGHQ position of making Leyte the primary location to fight the Americans. Believing that Halsey's fleet had been defeated off Formosa, Terauchi now thought the Americans could not sustain any major operations or contest reinforcement convoys, both poor assumptions that would later cause suffering for the IJA. Yamashita disagreed with Terauchi and the IGHQ about designating Leyte as the prime battle site; but on October 22, Terauchi finally ordered Yamashita and the Fourth Air Army to make Leyte the main point of attack. His opinion was: “The opportunity to annihilate the enemy is at hand.” However Yamashita was convinced that the Americans had greater strength than anticipated, given the continued American carrier aviation's presence. Meanwhile, by 12:30 on October 17, the Rangers had successfully landed on Dinagat Island, finding no Japanese forces there. On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters. The men went below, put on their gear, and checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops were told to prepare to disembark. They bolted up the ladders and spilled out over the deck to the davits. The boats were lowered and the first wave started for the beach. At the same time the guns from the destroyer and frigate which had escorted the transport concentrated fire against the shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral reef forty yards from the beach, and the men waded the remaining distance to shore. They encountered no resistance and at 1038 the company commander, Capt. Arthur D. Simons, notified the battalion commander, "Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No resistance. No casualties." The company set up a channel light. They quickly set up a navigation light at Desolation Point to guide the main convoy. However, bad weather and tides delayed the landing on Homonhon Island. Colonel Mucci's Company B finally made it ashore the next morning without opposition and installed another navigation light. At the same time, Tominaga attempted to retaliate but was thwarted by a violent storm. In the afternoon, Kinkaid's forces, supported by Mitscher's carriers, conducted minesweeping and direct-fire missions on the Leyte beaches to protect the underwater demolition teams. Admiral Oldendorf's warships heavily bombarded the southern beaches, paving the way for transports to enter Leyte Gulf by the following evening. These pre-landing operations, which continued through October 19 on the northern landing beaches, alerted General Makino to a potential secondary landing closer to Tacloban. This maneuver would outflank the main strength of the 16th Division and directly threaten his headquarters. In response, Makino relocated his headquarters from Tacloban to Dagami and ordered the 33rd Regiment to reinforce the Palo-San Jose coastal sector, while the 2nd Battalion strengthened the southern defenses. Despite these last-minute efforts, Makino's forces were unprepared for the overwhelming assault. The heavy naval gunfire had destroyed many defensive positions and disabled most of the 22nd Field Artillery Regiment's guns. Furthermore, although the weather now favored Tominaga's counterstrikes, American carrier operations had been so effective that he was unable to challenge their air superiority. Despite the optimism of the High Command with regard to the prospects of gaining eventual air superiority in the battle area, it was already evident that the air phase of Sho-Go was not working out as intended. Those plans had envisaged mass air attacks against the invading enemy naval forces and troop convoys beginning prior to their arrival at the landing point. The enemy, however, had forestalled these plans by striking at Leyte before the planned concentration of Japanese air strength in the Philippines had been completed, and before the Navy's base air forces had time to recover from losses sustained in the Formosa Air Battle and earlier enemy carrier strikes on the Philippines. The 1st Air Fleet, already in the Philippines, had been reduced to an operational strength of less than 50 aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had lost half its strength in the Formosa Battle, had not yet begun its redeployment from Formosa to the Philippines. Although the 4th Air Army had sustained relatively lighter losses, its strength was widely dispersed. Before it could operate effectively in the Leyte area, it had to concentrate at forward bases in the central Philippines, an operation rendered both difficult and dangerous by enemy action, bad weather, and the virtually useless condition of many of the forward fields due to continuous rains. Under such unfavorable conditions, the concentration required a minimum of several days, and in the meanwhile the enemy was able to operate in Leyte Gulf against extremely light air opposition. On October 19, when weather conditions finally permitted an air attack against the enemy invasion fleet, no more than five naval and three Army aircraft could be mustered against the steadily increasing concentration of enemy shipping in Leyte Gulf. By the evening of October 19, the preliminary operations were nearly complete, with most of Kinkaid's fleet positioned outside the gulf. Since the minefield at the entrance hadn't been fully cleared, the ships entered slightly south of the entrance's center, avoiding the main channel and staying close to Dinagat's northern point. Meanwhile, Suzuki had already activated the Suzu Plan, with units from the 30th and 102nd Divisions preparing to move toward Ormoc. However, before they could depart, Oldendorf began October 20 with two simultaneous pre-landing bombardments, each involving three battleships. After two hours of battleship fire, cruisers and destroyers followed with high-explosive shells, causing significant damage. At the same time, Kinkaid's escort carriers launched bombing and strafing runs against suspected defensive positions and airfields, severely disrupting Makino's radio and telegraph communications. At 0800 the first anchor chains of the vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were quickly swung over the sides; boats circled mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas. The LCI mortar and LCI rocket ships took their places at the head of the assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire. The bombardment grew heavier and more monotonous. Hundreds of small boats, flanked by rocket ships and destroyers, headed toward the beaches; thousands of rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar. By 09:30, the 21st Regiment successfully landed on Panaon Island without resistance, securing control of the entrance to Sogod Bay. Fifteen minutes later, the transports sped toward Leyte's shores, led by LCI gunboats, which pounded the beaches with rockets and mortar fire. At 10:00, Sibert's 10th Corps, covered by a heavy rocket barrage, landed on the White and Red Beaches, marking the Americans' return to the Philippines. Admiral Fechteler's transports delivered General Mudge's 1st Cavalry Division to White Beach, where the brigades landed side by side, with the 8th Cavalry Regiment held in floating reserve. Facing only small arms and machine gun fire, the 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment swiftly secured the Cataisan Peninsula and its airfield, while the 2nd Squadron captured San Jose and advanced across the Burayan River, reaching a point 3000 yards from the beach. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments had to navigate a deep swamp to access Highway 1, then pushed westward until they encountered enemy resistance near the foothills of Caibaan. At 10:40, Mudge's reserve began to land, followed by the division artillery at 13:30. Meanwhile, to the south, Barbey's transports landed General Irving's 24th Division on the shallow Red Beach, with the 19th and 34th Regiments landing abreast in battalion columns. The Japanese permitted the first five waves to land, but when the remaining waves were about 2000 yards offshore, they unleashed heavy artillery and mortar fire, sinking several landing craft and causing significant casualties. The first elements of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300 yards north of the assigned area and were immediately pinned down by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman, arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the beach. Get up and get moving. Follow me." Thus urgently prompted, the men followed him into the wooded area. To the south the 19th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck heavy opposition on its sector of the beach. Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed at the planned spot. Company K did not land on schedule, because its command boat broke down. Going in under heavy fire, the company had all its officers except one killed or wounded. One of its platoons was unable to make contact with the rest of the company until the following day. Upon landing, the first waves were immediately pinned down by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite this, the Americans successfully stormed the initial defenses of the 33rd Regiment. By 12:15, the 34th Regiment had cleared the beach of enemy forces, and after a preparatory concentration, its 3rd Battalion advanced approximately 400 yards. The 2nd Battalion then moved through the 3rd, crossed Highway 1 at 15:50, and established positions for the night 100 yards west of the highway. To the south, the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment had reached Highway 1, while the battered 1st Battalion followed behind under heavy fire. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion landed and advanced cautiously, as the 1st Battalion pressed toward Hill 522 amidst fierce resistance. Hill 522, which rose directly from the river's edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing beaches and its upward trails were steep and winding. Hill 522 presented the most significant terrain feature which would have to be overcome before the American forces could push into the interior from Palo and it constituted one of the chief objectives for A Day. Three months earlier General Makino had started to fortify it, impressing nearly all of the male population of Palo for the work. By A Day they had constructed five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks, planking, and logs, covered with earth. Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill; the communications trenches were seven feet deep. They eventually encircled enemy positions and began to make steady progress up the hill. By dusk, Companies B and C had captured the hill's crests and successfully repelled several enemy counterattacks. This achievement secured Hill 522, which commanded the route into the interior and overlooked Palo, the gateway to Leyte Valley. At 14:30, General Douglas MacArthur landed on Red Beach alongside President Sergio Osmeña, who had taken over from Manuel Quezon following his death on August 1. So if you go on Youtube you can see the footage of MacArthur et al wading ashore and to this day there is a monument to this iconic moment. MacArthur made a radio broadcast to the Filipino people, declaring, “People of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring upon a foundation of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people” He had finally fulfilled his promise to the Filipino people. Further south, Hodge's 24th Corps encountered more resistance as it landed on Orange, Blue, Violet, and Yellow Beaches at 10:00. Under the transport of Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's ships and the protection of LCI gunboats, General Bradley's 96th Division landed with its regiments positioned between the Calbasag River and the town of San Jose. The 382nd Regiment successfully disembarked on the Blue Beaches at 09:50, followed by the 383rd Regiment on the Orange Beaches ten minutes later.As they advanced inland, both units faced intermittent mortar and artillery fire from the 9th Regiment positioned on Catmon Hill. Colonel Macey Dill's 3rd Battalion initially encountered obstacles such as tank barriers made of coconut logs, debris on the beach, and heavy bombardment from Hill 120. However, with mortar and naval gunfire support, the battalion eventually captured the hill and repelled several enemy counterattacks, though they were unable to continue the advance due to deep swamps. In contrast, Dill's 2nd Battalion managed to push about 2,500 yards inland despite the intense heat and swampy conditions. To the north, Colonel Edwin May's 1st and 2nd Battalions were similarly hindered by an unexpected swamp but still succeeded in securing San Jose and the head of the Labiranan River, advancing approximately 2,600 yards inland. By 18:00, Bradley's artillery had been landed, although the 381st Regiment remained in floating reserve. Further south, Admiral Conolly's transports landed General Arnold's 7th Division between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, with regiments landing side by side. Companies L and K of the 3rd Battalion, 32nd Regiment landed abreast. Company L, on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese machine gunners who had waited until the leading elements of the company exposed themselves. The Japanese were entrenched in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and banana groves. The pillboxes, which were mutually supporting, were located at the ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in the middle of an open field. Each pillbox had machine guns and anti-tank guns. Company L suffered a number of casualties and was pinned down. The enemy gunners then turned to Company K and stopped its forward movement. In the space of 15 minutes, 2 officers and 6 men of the 3rd Battalion were killed, and 1 officer and 18 men wounded. Of the medium tanks that had come ashore at 10:30, 3 were sent to support Company L and 2 to support Company K. The latter 2 were knocked out before they could adjust their fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent in support of Company L was knocked out by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With 2 tanks remaining, it was decided to hit the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at 13:45. A platoon of Company K went to the right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the 2 companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were knocked out without further casualties. Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 16:30, since the enemy fire continued in volume, the 32nd Regiment withdrew and established a defensive position for the night. Meanwhile, the 184th Regiment landed its 3rd Battalion at Yellow Beach 2, directly in front of Dulag, and its 1st Battalion at Yellow Beach 1, which was farther south and separated by a swamp. Both beaches saw surprisingly little resistance, allowing the 184th to advance more quickly than expected, successfully capturing Dulag and reaching its airfield.Behind them, the reserve 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Regiment landed after midday. The 3rd Battalion pushed west and south with minimal opposition, successfully securing the bridge over the Daguitan River at Dao. By the end of the day, both corps had fallen short of their beachhead objectives, with Hodge's 24th Corps achieving particularly modest results. Despite this, the Sixth Army had successfully landed assault forces along the entire eastern coast of Leyte and gained control of Panaon Strait, with casualties totaling 49 killed, 192 wounded, and 6 missing. Most of the 16th Division had retreated during the naval and air bombardment before the landing, which allowed the Americans to secure most coastal defenses before the enemy could regroup. Consequently, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to delay the invasion. A more substantial enemy engagement was yet to come. Air opposition to the invasion was minimal, as Tominaga and the naval air forces continued to concentrate their strength in the Philippines in preparation for a major air offensive scheduled to begin on October 25. However, 37 Army and Navy planes attacked the invasion shipping off Leyte. At 1600, on 20 October an enemy torpedo plane was sighted as it aimed its torpedo at Honolulu. Despite the skillful maneuvering of Captain Thurber to evade, the torpedo found its mark on her port side. 64 men were killed and 35 were injured. Flooding caused a temporary severe list, but the ship was saved by efficient damage measures. But Honolulu was out of the fight. Honolulu sailed out the next day, arriving at Manus on 29 October for temporary repairs, and then steamed for Norfolk, Virginia, on 19 November, arriving on 20 December via Pearl Harbor, San Diego, California, and the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, not all went well with logistics. Although 107,450 tons of supplies had been landed on Leyte by the end of A-Day, it was a haphazard operation. The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo from the cargo vessels and transported it in small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships had been improperly loaded for the journey to Leyte. The cargo should have been so loaded that articles first needed would be the last put on board; instead it had been stowed haphazardly, with little attention given to the problem of unloading. As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles that would not be needed until later in the operation were piled on top of them. The supplies were set ashore in random fashion and then were carelessly thrown on trucks and other vehicles. This sort of handling resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow removal of the loads, and in a consequent delay in the return of vehicles to the landing beaches. Thus, officers complained about the disorganized effort to deliver, store, and distribute supplies. This was a precursor of future resupply problems. As the landings proceeded about as smoothly as could be hoped, Halsey would order Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 to head to Ulithi on October 22, as he doubted that the Japanese would mount a major operation in response to the American invasion. And yet, the Japanese were about to come calling for another decisive battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Douglas MacArthur had finally done it, he had returned to the Philippines making good on his promise to the Filipino people. It was a colossal effort and thus far it was going very well all things considered. However little did the Americans know, but the IJN was about to toss the kitchen sink at them, literally, in an all or nothing battle to the death.
Terwyl die diversiteit van die LGBT-gemeenskap erken word, dui bewyse op 'n paar algemene ervarings wat lede se gesondheid en welstand beïnvloed. Hulle is minder geneig om toegang tot gesondheidsdienste te kry en om met gesondheidsorgwerkers te skakel as gevolg van stigma en diskriminasie, wat nadelige fisiese en geestelike gesondheidsuitkomste tot gevolg het. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met Ethne Mudge, 'n sosiale regte-aktivis, wat sê baie mense aanvaar nie die LGBT-gemeenskap nie en dit lei tot swak geestesgesondheid onder lede. Mudge brei uit.
Die regering het die aansprake wat Henk Mudge, president van die Republikeinse Party gemaak het oor die aanvaarding van die VN-verdrag vir die toekoms tydens die Toekomsberaad in New York, ten sterkste veroordeel. Mudge meen dit is begin van ‘n sogenaamde Big Brother-staat met biometrie en kunsmatige intelligensie wat benut sal word. Ambassadeur Jerobeam Shaanika, adjunk-uitvoerende direkteur en hoof van die departement van multilaterale betrekkinge in die lynministerie het meer...
Send us a textThird week of the College Basketball Conference Preview Show comes in with a BANG as we talk the Conference USA with Sam Houston State Head Coach Chris Mudge and Florida International Head Coach Jeremy Ballard who dissect this competitive college hoops conference on the Full Court Press Podcast : A College Basketball Experience. This episode is high energy and these two conference foes get after it right from the tip. The CONFERENCE USA will be highly competitive again this year and hear why this conference is so unique along with who is the most animated Conference Head Coach and which is the toughest Conference Arena to play in.Please Subscribe, Rate⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ and Review on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.
Die Verdrag vir die Toekoms, wat op 22 September deur die Verenigde Nasies se Algemene Vergadering aanvaar is, doen 'n beroep op staats- en regeringshoofde om 56 konkrete stappe te neem om die belange en behoeftes van huidige en toekomstige geslagte te beskerm. Henk Mudge, die president van die Republikeinse Party, sal 'n perskonferensie hou oor Namibië se ondertekening van die ooreenkoms. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met Mudge gepraat.
In 1999 is meer as 100 mense gearresteer en aangehou na 'n kort opstand deur die Caprivi-bevrydingsleër teen die Namibiese regering vir die onafhanklikheid van die destydse Caprivi-strook. Dit is 25 jaar later en einde Julie is slegs sewe skuldig bevind aan hoogverraad. Die president van die Republikeinse Party, Henk Mudge, het 'n perskonferensie oor die kwessie gehou en sê vele mense word steeds deur die saak geraak. Hy het 'n vinger gewys na die regerende Swapo-party omdat daar nie na inwoners van die Zambezi-streek uitgereik is nie.
Die Republikeinse Party het hulle manifes in die hoofstad bekend gestel. Die partypresident Henk Mudge het die party se standpunt op verskeie kwessies uiteen gesit. Een van die kwessies is die regstellende aksie wat volgens hom moet val.
Kry die nuus soos dit breek.
Die president van die Republikeinse Party, Henk Mudge, sê hy sal teen Oktober besluit of hy hom vir die presidentsverkiesing gaan beywer. Dit kom nadat 'n plakkaat vrygestel is van sy veldtogtoer na die streke om in November vir hom as president te stem. Mudge voeg by dat sy party beoog om genoeg setels in die parlement te hê. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het met Mudge gepraat, wat sê hy wil hê blankes moet meer betrokke raak en gaan stem.
Mudge voer aan daar is talle veterane wat nie voordele ontvang nie.
Don't forget to delight your coffee-loving tastebuds with our first coffee brand "Little Ground Top". Grab a bag next time you're in town at Bantam Roasters (82 Steinwehr Ave) or have some sent to your home or office by ordering at www.addressinggettysburg.com/cafe Also, I almost died making these in a week and a half, but our studio computer's hard drive actually did die in the process. RIP. So, become a Patron! www.patreon.com/addressinggettysburg As Dawn approached on July 3, Robert E. Lee considered his options. The attacks of the day before had achieved limited success, with the capture of ground, the wrecking of the Federal Third Corps and the bloodying of two others. Yet, the Confederates had not accomplished their objective of driving the Union soldiers off of Cemetery Hill. It had been touch-and-go many times, but every breakthrough had been met with Union reinforcements. But, in war, even limited success could be considered something to build on to achieve victory. According to his after-battle report, Lee wrote that the plan had remained unchanged from the day before. Reinforcing their gains on Culp's Hill from the night before and renewing the attack on the Union Right would be Richard Ewell's Corps. During the growing darkness of the night before, the Confederates had captured some vacant Union fortifications. A renewal of the attacks on the Union position could threaten the Army of the Potomac and their avenue of resupply along the Baltimore Pike. At the same time, reinforced with a fresh division of Virginians under George Pickett, James Longstreet was to renew his attack from the day before on the southern end of the battlefield on the Union Left. While such a plan was indicated in his report after the battle, Longstreet would contend that he did not receive orders to that effect the night before when he had visited with Lee. It was a confusion of orders that would ultimately lead to inaction on the southern end of the battlefield on the morning of July 3. The same could not be said about what occurred on the Union Right. The Union forces would initiate an attack for the first time since the battle began. Union 12th Corps soldiers returning from being sent to reinforce the southern end of the battlefield would find in the darkness of the morning that the fortifications they had built were now occupied by some squatters with unfriendly dispositions. When informed of this, Union 12th Corps commander Henry Slocum declared that the men of the 12th Corps would drive them out in the morning. At around 4 in the morning, the Union artillery opened fire. A Union artillerist would later write, "We poured shot and shell into them." These missiles of death and destruction would splinter trees and send branches careening to the earth and on top of Rebel soldiers. This morning, the fighting on Culp's Hill foreshadowed what the war would become. It was not the pageantry of bayonets gleaming in the sunlight, banners fluttering in the air, or officers leading their men with their hats on the tips of their swords across open fields. Instead, wave upon wave of Rebel soldiers, including the vaunted Stonewall Brigade, would throw themselves into the hellfire sent their way by the enemy in relative safety behind breastworks or in trenches. Some Union soldiers reported that they fired as many as 200 rounds. Still, the Confederates came on as reinforcements arrived. Every attack was futile and found limited or no success. But the futile attacks were not restricted to the Confederates that morning. The 2nd Massachusetts and the 27th Indiana were ordered to charge across Spangler's Meadow toward Confederates behind a stone wall. Lt. Colonel Mudge, upon receiving the order, stated, "It is murder, but it is the order." Then, to his men, he yelled, "Up, men, over the works! Forward, double quick !" Both regiments would attack and were bloodily repulsed. Mudge, who had been a sparring partner of Robert E. Lee's son at Harvard before the war, would be killed in the attempt. By late morning, the last Confederate attacks from Maryland and Virginia units were repulsed, and the fighting died down. No ground was gained, and the Union forces still held the critical high ground covering the Baltimore Pike. There had been no attack on the southern end of the battlefield. Still, Lee had one final option: the division under George Pickett. Lee, now, turned his attention to the Union Center. Lee had often asked his men to do the unthinkable before the Battle of Gettysburg. Almost every time, they had delivered him victory. So long as there was a chance for victory with these men, Lee would take it. The plan was a simple one. It called for the massing of just under 150 cannons to bombard the Union Center, softening its defenses to provide an infantry assault with a better chance of success. Collecting this many cannons to bombard a position during a land battle had not been attempted before during the war and, on paper, was enough to accomplish the task. Once the position was adequately softened, the Confederate infantry was to step off and cross the field. George Pickett and his division would be reinforced by the division under James J. Pettigrew and by two brigades under Isaac Trimble. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox and David Lang were added late in the planning. In all, 12,500 men. The evening before, Wright's Brigade of Georgians had managed to pierce the Union Center along the same ground as this proposed attack. With adequate preparation, three divisions would have a better chance of success. The Confederates got into position. Some even inched forward to get a peek at the situation. More than a few compared it to the battle of Malvern Hill. Veteran soldiers knew what was in store for them. The Union soldiers were not wholly unaware of what was going on. Some of the regiments in the center had collected muskets from the night before, providing men with multiple muskets near them, loaded and ready to fire. After the Council of War had disbanded the night before, Meade would turn to John Gibbon, the Union commander in this area, and say to Gibbon that the fighting would be along his front. Gibbon would soon find out how correct Meade was. According to Lt. Colonel E.P. Alexander, around 1:00 in the afternoon, the Confederate artillery opened fire. A Union colonel on the receiving end of the barrage would write in his diary that day that "The air was filled with shot and shell and the earth groaned and trembled under the terrible concussions." The Union artillery would open fire in response. It was such a cacophony of noise with such cataclysmic suddenness that soldiers miles away would stop what they were doing to glance in the direction of the sudden eruption. If the Confederate infantry were to have any chance in their assault, Confederate artillery would have to silence the Union artillery in preparation. As minutes turned into an hour, the smoke from the deadly exchange would fill the area. Understanding what this artillery barrage meant, Union artillery commander Henry Hunt ordered his batteries to stop their fire to conserve ammunition. Winfield Scott Hancock, the man who had been crucial to the Union effort so far in the battle, disagreed with this decision, arguing that having the Union artillery fire back would give a morale boost to his men. Hunt was not moved. As a result, only Hancock's cannons of the Second Corps Artillery Brigade continued to fire. On the Confederate side, interactions between infantry commanders and artillery commanders would also dictate the course of events. James Longstreet, in charge of the assault, had charged Confederate artillery commander E.P. Alexander with sending the order for the infantry to commence the assault when Alexander determined that the Confederate artillery had made enough of an impact. It was a strange situation as, typically, an assault order did not come from an artillery commander. When Hunt ordered his guns to be silent on the Union side, the fire slackened; when Alexander could see through the smoke, he saw that a Union battery was being withdrawn. It was at this time that Alexander sent the message to commence the attack. With the area filled with smoke, the only way to determine whether the fire from the Confederate side had any effect would be in the return fire from the Union side. With a reduction in the return fire, and based on what he saw and could hear, Alexander advised that if the Confederate infantry assault were to occur, it had to happen then. James Longstreet could only nod his consent. The Confederate artillery slackened its fire. Union artillerists manning cannons on Cemetery Hill in the Evergreen Cemetery among damaged headstones would start exclaiming, "Here comes the infantry!' as they serviced their pieces. The Confederate infantry now rose to their feet, with many sinking right back down to the ground or not rising at all, having laid in the hot July sun all afternoon under artillery bombardment. As if on parade, the remaining mass of men and metal lurched forward to cross what would become the most famous mile in American History. A gentle wind typical of Pennsylvania summers blew in and lifted the smoke like a curtain was being raised. The Union defenders could now see a nearly mile-wide, almost irresistible, wave of men in butternut and gray, their red flags fluttering in the breeze advanced toward them. Then, the Union artillery opened fire. Cannons from Little Round Top to Cemetery Hill found the range, tearing gaping voids in the Confederate lines. With every step, new gaps formed and would be closed by the Confederate foot soldiers as orders were given to close up by their file closers. The intense artillery fire and a flanking maneuver by an Ohio regiment caused Brockenbrough's brigade of Virginians to break and run back to the safety of their lines. Despite that setback, the Confederates pushed on. With every yard, casualties mounted, causing the lines to condense and start funneling towards an angle in the stone wall along the Union lines. The major obstacle to the advance was the Emmitsburg Road, which ran across the Rebel's path. In some places, a post and rail fence prevented a smooth advance, hindering the cohesion of the attack. Even so, thousands of men still found their way across the road but found themselves under short-range artillery fire and musket fire. One Union artillery battery commander ordered his battery to fire double canister at 10 yards as the Confederate infantry neared the stone wall. Brigadier General Lewis Armistead, at the head of his brigade, started to lead who was left of the Confederate attack over the wall. They made it a short way into the lines before Armistead was mortally wounded. Union soldiers rushed to the breakthrough to close up the gap. 12,500 men started the attack; by the time the advance reached the ridge, maybe a couple thousand had made it to the wall; some estimated that perhaps only a few hundred men had crossed the wall. This handful that made it over were either killed, wounded, or captured. Armistead would be taken to a Union field hospital at the George Spangler Farm, where he would pass away from his wounds. Union Second Corps Commander Winfield Scott Hancock would also be wounded. As he was starting to organize the advance of a brigade of men from Vermont, a bullet ripped through the pummel in his saddle and lodged itself in his groin. It was a wound, even with the bullet being taken out, that would plague him for the rest of his life. With the plugging of the breakthrough at the Angle and the repulse of the assault, the last card that Robert E. Lee had to play was spent. It had been a calamity for his army. Casualty figures are difficult to estimate with absolute accuracy. Pettigrew's and Trimble's men had seen action on July 1, and battle casualties that are tallied factor in both days for those commands. Moreover, Robert E. Lee had a habit of underreporting his casualties. Even so, from what we do know, it was devastating. Pickett's Division of Virginians suffered over 2,600 casualties in the assault, just about half of that command at Gettysburg. In the field between the Stone Wall and the Emmittsburg Road, 522 dead Confederates were buried in a mass grave. The casualties among the officer corps were also appalling. Three Brigade commanders, Armistead, Garnett, and Marshall, would be killed or mortally wounded; generals James Kemper and Isaac Trimble would be wounded and captured. Pettigrew's Brigade, which had started the battle under the command of Pettigrew, would end the charge on July 3 under the command of Major John Jones, who had been the third in command of his regiment when the battle started. The Union defenders did not have a bloodless experience either. Historians James Hessler and Wayne Motts estimate that between the divisions of Hays and Gibbon, the Union defenders suffered just over 1,900 casualties repelling the assault. The Second Corps Artillery Brigade was all but wrecked, with two battery commanders, Alonzo Cushing and George Woodruff, losing their lives in defense of the position. General Hancock was severely wounded but survived. The great Confederate charge was a failure, something the Southern boys were unaccustomed to. But for the Union defenders, it was a victory that felt like a victory. Not a triumph declared to the men by a flowery circular from headquarters, but as witnessed by the wreckage of the enemy force, lying lifeless in the fields before them, writhing in pain with ghastly wounds or missing limbs or streaming to their rear, hundreds of Johnny-Reb prisoners. There was no ambiguity in the outcome of the Pickett's Charge. The charge was not the only fighting that occurred that afternoon. There was fighting elsewhere on the field that day; the skirmishing that was going on in the southern portions of the town continued to simmer, a sharp cavalry fight to the east near the Low Dutch Road and Hanover Road intersection, where a young Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer blunted a Confederate cavalry charge exhorting his men with "Come on you Wolverines!' and a hopeless Union cavalry charge on the southern end of the field meant to capitalize on the failure of the Confederate infantry assault, only resulted in more death including that of Brigadier General Elon Farnsworth who led the charge. Even the Pennsylvania Reserves would drive out Georgia forces from the Devil's Den area during the evening hours. Despite all these actions, Meade, the commander of the Union forces, ordered no great counterattack. Following the failure, all Lee could do was gather the pieces of his bloodied army and prepare for a counterattack that never happened. He made preparations to coalesce his army to prepare for a retreat. Both armies were tired. Both armies were bloody, and then it started to rain. The great hell-on-Earth that was the Battle of Gettysburg ended in a torrential downpour as the heavens opened up on the night of July 3, cleansing the earth of the gallons of blood spilled in order to save a nation.
Die verkiesing is om die draai en politieke partye moet nog hul standpunte stel oor verskeie belangrike kwessies. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het hieroor gesels met die sosiale aktivis, Ethne Mudge. Een van die grootste probleme wat volgens Mudge daadwerklik aangespreek moet word, is korrupsie.
Teenkanting teen die Wêreldgesondheidsorganisasie se pandemie-verdrag loop hoog en dit is nie onderteken by die organisasie se vergadering in Genève einde Mei nie. Volgens internasionale media moes die verdrag die hoogtepunt van die vergadering wees, maar die organisasie het dit nie ter tafel gelê nie, weens die teenkanting. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met die president van die Republikeinse Party, Henk Mudge, wat sê sy party se parlementslede sal die gesondheidminister, Kalumbi Shangula, oor die kwessie aanvat in die Nasionale Vergadering.
Die leier van die Republikeinse Party Henk Mudge het ook die presidensiële debat, wat deur die Konrad Adenauer-stigting aangebied is, bygewoon, al ding hy nie in November mee nie. Hy is weer, soos in 2019, van mening dat Swapo die verkiesing sal wen as die opposisie nie saam een kandidaat daarstel nie.
'n Stemgreep het die naweek die rondtes gedoen wat Namibiërs waarsku teen enige inentings omdat dit blykbaar kanker veroorsaak. Die kankervereniging het kort daarna 'n verklaring uitgereik wat sê hulle distansieer hulself teen die aantygings en dat epidimologiese informasie baie sensitief is. Die navorsing wat daarmee gepardgaan volgens die vereniging is 'n fynere kuns. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het gepraat met die Republikeinse Party se president, Henk Mudge, wat sy mening lug.
Die president van die Republikeinse Party Henk Mudge het 'n perskonferensie in die hoofstad gehou na aanleiding van die debatte, inligting en spekulasie oor die betrokkenheid van die WGO in die sake van soewereine lande. Die WGO se pandemie-verdrag sal in sy mening beheer aan die organisasie gee om besluite namens die Namibiese regering te maak, soos tydens Covid.
Henk Mudge, die president van die Republikeinse Party, het op 'n perskonferensie gesê die WGO se pandemie-verdrag sal na sy mening beheer aan die organisasie gee om besluite namens die Namibiese regering te maak, soos tydens Covid. Kosmos 94.1 Nuus het navraag gedoen by die gesondheid-minister en volgens dr. Kalumbi Shangula gaan die verdrag nie die land se soewereniteit affekteer nie. Hy sê dit sal die ongelykhede van lande aanspreek tydens pandemies. Die verdrag sal ook eers in parlement gedebatteer word voordat Namibië dit gaan teken.
Mudge het ook gesê dat Covid-inentings meer dood veroorsaak het as die virus. Shangula andwoord hierop.
The delicate tinkling of a pianoforte. The clash of cymbals. The soothing strains of a harp. Music in Austen film adaptations performs a variety of functions: it can set the scene, highlight a character's personality, make us laugh, and make us sigh. In this episode, music maven Ruth Mudge joins us to discuss the soundtracks of four screen adaptations we know and love. A cellist, faculty member at the String Academy of Chicago, and assistant principal in the Elmhurst Symphony, Mudge also has her own podcast, World of Soundtracks, where she offers in-depth explorations of famous movie and TV soundtracks.For a transcript, show notes, and guest bio: https://jasna.org/austen/podcast/ep11Visit our website: www.jasna.orgFollow us on Instagram and FacebookEmail: podcast@jasna.orgMusic clips included in this episode:"Pride and Prejudice"—Pride and Prejudice by Carl Davis, 1995"Dawn"—Pride and Prejudice (Music from the Motion Picture), music by Dario Marianelli and performed by Jean-Yves Thibaudet, 2005"Mrs. Darcy"—Pride and Prejudice (Music from the Motion Picture), music by Dario Marianelli and performed by Jean-Yves Thibaudet, 2005"Emma Woodhouse"—Emma (Original Motion Picture Soundtrack), music by Isobel Waller-Bridge & David Schweitzer, 2020"Celery Root"—Emma: Music from the Miramax Motion Picture, music by Rachel Portman, 1996"Main Titles"—Emma: Music from the Miramax Motion Picture, music by Rachel Portman, 1996
Coming up on this week's edition of The Spark Weekly. As the anticipation builds and the excitement mounts, the Harrisburg Havoc, Central Pennsylvania's sole all women-led tackle football team, is rallying the region's residents to come out and support their upcoming season. Also on the program, the farm to hospital program, conceived by Dr. KimberLee Mudge, has emerged as a beacon of holistic healthcare in York County. Support WITF: https://www.witf.org/support/give-now/See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Justin's a little apprehensive about who is coming to his April 24 Magoobys show. Happy anniversary to Joe's Kohls incident. Did Taylor Swift miss on her new album? Joe recommends and warns us about the new Netflix show Baby Reindeer. Justin shared his favorite movie with Mudge. Did she like it? Cuddling cows is a form of therapy. There's a cow cuddling farm nearby. Road trip?
Last time we spoke about Operation Thursday and the ferocious counteroffensive on Bougainville. The Chindits embarked on their second great raid, this time better equipped, better trained and more numerous than ever. With a literal armada of beasts of burden they marched through Burma, forded the Chindwin and began attacking and establishing strongholds. This was all done in coordination with Slim and Stilwell's forces, trying to break the Japanese and gradually seize back lost territory. Wingate had his work cut out for him as the Chindits were providing real results, yet unfortunately he would not have long to see them. Wingate was killed in a B-25 crash and it felt like the personality of the Chindits left with him. Over on Bougainville the Japanese tossed as much as they could to try and break through the Americans perimeter to hit the airfield, but it was all for naught. This episode is the Bombing of Hollandia and Palau Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Operation Brewer saw General MacArthur tossing cavalrymen against the eastern side of Los Negros. General Swift's 1st Cavalry Division successfully landed on Los Negros and managed to secure Seedler Harbor quickly. After this, General Chase's 1st Brigade was given the task of mopping up the island. By march 11th daily patrols had determined that the entire area from the Mokerang Peninsula to Southeast Point and as far west as Porlaka was generally free of the enemy. The 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry pushed its perimeter at Momote west and south to the water barriers of Lemondrol Creek and Ihon Lagoon. The 12th Cavalry beachhead at Salami continuously patrolled into the interior and encountered so few Japanese that it was clear the enemy lacked sufficient numbers to harass the troops on the peninsula. West of Lemondrol Creek was a completely different story. While the troops holding the beachheads from Lombrum to Papitalai waited for supply channels to be established, they probed to locate the center of enemy resistance. The 12th Cavalry was responsible for the beachheads at Papitalai Mission and Lombrum. The 2nd Squadron had captured Papitalai Mission and on the 11th the 1st Squadron took over Lombrum Point, relieving the 7th Cavalry so they could attack Manus Island. The 5th Cavalry held the Papitalai perimeter with Troop F. When that regiment extended its control over the area east of Lemondrol and Porharmenemen Creeks on the 11th, the 2nd Squadron moved into the Porlaka area while the 1st Squadron on the left flank was concentrated near Southeast Point. It was planned that the 12th Cavalry would do most of its fighting in the northern sector moving inland from the coastal positions to cut oil the Japanese hammered at by the 5th Cavalry as it pushed west on both sides of Lemondrol Creek. Since the 8th, every Troop F patrol from Papitalai had run into enemy resistance in the hilly country to the west. Although small patrols of squad size or slightly larger were held up day after day by resistance about 800 yards west of Papitalai, these first encounters did not reveal the full strength of the enemy pocket. When an attack by a platoon of Troop E, reinforced by two tanks, two bazookas, and flamethrowers, was repulsed on the 11th, the strength of the enemy strongpoint became clearer. The enemy was well dug in along the ridge, marked by a series of knobs, running west from Papitalai. The highest point, Hill 260, about 2,500 yards from Papitalai, not to be mistaken for Hill 260 on Bougainville by the way, this was probably the center of the enemies defense. However, on two knobs east of 260, well-defended outposts prevented any movement farther into the interior. The position 800 yards from Papitalai which had repulsed Troop E was defended by a platoon with knee mortars and at least 3 machine guns. The total enemy strength facing the 5th Cavalry was estimated at 150 to 200 Japanese. Now that was the ongoings of Los Negros, but Brigadier General Verne Mudge's 2nd Brigade was now preparing to invade Manus island. American intelligence was unsure of the disposition of the enemy on Manus. A rough estimate was that 2700 Japanese were concentrated there and would most likely make a stand at Lorengau. The Americans expected the Japanese would put up a last losing fight. But because of the lack of knowledge of their numbers and disposition on the largest island of the Admiralties, this would require careful planning for the invasion. Fighting into the interior where the mountain range would provide defensive positions and through the swampy forests covering the rest of the island would not be easy. There were only 4 roads winding about the island and converging at Lorengau would be suitable for moving vehicles, and long stretches of these red-clay roads would be impassable in rainy weather. Surrounding jungle and swamps would confine any large-scale movement to the roads. Therefore, the plan was to pin the enemy to the coast where it was hoped he had concentrated his main strength. Mudge planned to land Troops A and C of the 8th cavalry regiment at the Yellow beaches of Lugos Mission. When the 8th Cavalry had secured a beachhead, including the Lugos Mission itself, each squadron would advance east, the 1st Squadron along the coast using the Number Three Road, and the 2nd along an inland road known as the Number One Road, to execute a wide sweep toward Lorengau. If a sizeable garrison was concentrated at fortified Lorengau, the inland arm of this attack would prevent the enemy from escaping along the only road leading west to the mountain areas. Prior to the assault, 3 patrols had been sent to Bear Point on Manus and on the islands of Butjo Luo and Hauwei. Mudge planned to deploy artillery at these places to aid in his assault. Bear Point was found to have no enemy, but unfortunately it was not a suitable place for artillery placement. The northern island of Butjo Luo was an excellent site for artillery and was found to be unoccupied. Hauwei would turn out to be another story. The American patrol moved out from Salami on an LCV and a PT boat, landing without opposition on the western end of the island. Major Carter S. Vaden of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, threw two grenades into a well camouflaged bunker about 10 yards from the beach and the party progressed inland. Immediately after the grenade explosions, a mortar shell landed on the beach in the rear of the party. From three sides, machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire opened up. Fortunately, the grenades had evidently sprung a planned ambush prematurely and the party was not cut off from the rear. Using their submachine guns, the men of the patrol were able to hold back the enemy. They were aided by some supporting fire from the PT Boat and the .30-caliber machine gun of the LCV. After 2 and a half hours they managed to withdraw to the water's edge. The PT boat had returned to its tender after the commanding officer was wounded, and the coxswain of the LCV shouted and motioned for the cavalrymen to get on board, but only five of them reached the boat, as the others were engaged with the enemy on shore. The LCV had troubles of its own; enemy mortar and machine-gun fire found its range and wounded all on board except two. Then the LCV grounded on submerged coral and sank 200 yards offshore after receiving a direct hit from a mortar. The wounded men, put into lifejackets, floated about in the water. When the remaining members of the patrol on shore were wading out toward the LCV, 6 Japanese attempted to set up a machine gun on the beach. The men cut them down with their submachine guns. Still under fire, the cavalrymen swam out to the survivors of the LCV, making a group of 18 men out in the water. Failing to attract the notice of the destroyers nearby, the tired men had to stay in the water for 3 hours until a PT boat picked them up. At the same time a destroyer closed in to the island to draw hostile fire and bombard enemy positions on the western end. Hauwei was going to need extra help to be secured. The 2nd Squadron, 7th cavalry departed from Lombrum Point on the 11th and landed on Butjo Luo. The next day, Destroyer gunfire and rockets as well as 105-mm concentrations from the 61st Field Artillery Battalion at Mokerang point battered Hauwei. Then Kittyhawks of the 77th Pursuit Squadron at Momote airfield bombed and strafed the Hauwei. After all of this, the 2nd Squadron landed on Hauwei meeting slight resistance at the beach. They advanced 300 yards further inland where they became pinned down by heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The Japanese were firing upon them from some bunkers, prompting the 2nd Squadron to dig in and allow the artillery teams to hit them throughout the night. During the night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion from the north end of Mokerang Plantation fired 1,000 rounds to harass the enemy. This fire was directed so accurately and carefully that it was brought down on the enemy within 100 yards of the cavalrymen's positions without any casualties to our troops, and helped minimize enemy activity during the night. At 10am on the 13th, with the support of a medium tank, the cavalrymen stormed the bunkers along the edges of the island. The Japanese put up a valiant fight, but they lacked anti-tank weaponry. By 12pm, the 2nd Squadron successfully mopped up the enemy, suffering 8 deaths and 46 wounded. They estimated they had killed 43 Japanese who were all naval personnel. Having secured the two islands, now one artillery battalion set up at Butjo Luo and two others upon Hauwei. The next day at 7:00am the 3 artillery battalions opened fire upon the Lorengau Township area. This target was chosen to divert the enemy's attention from the landing beaches around Lugos Mission. Meanwhile 4 destroyers bombarded Lorengau with their 5-inch guns. Then 18 B-25's from Nadzab bombed and strafed the Lugos Mission and the beach areas until H - 5 minutes. Between 9:07 and 9:25, they dropped 81 500-pound bombs, strafed with more than 44,000 rounds of machine-gun fire, and cleared the target just as the troops were coming ashore. The 8th cavalry departed Salami, heading for the Yellow Beaches covered by 3 rocket boats. The wave of buffaloes drew up to the beaches, and it appeared that they were going to make it without opposition until an enemy machine gun opened up from east of the landing beaches. Immediately the buffaloes responded with their own machine-gun fire, and two PT boats closed in to support. With 100 rounds from a flak boat added to this fire the machine gun was silenced. Two waves of landing craft followed the buffaloes to the shore in rapid succession and the narrow beaches, backed either by jungle or a high bluff, were soon congested with assault troops. On the eastern beach, Troop A began a vigorous drive toward Lugos Mission and the Number Three Road leading to the Lorengau airdrome. Captain Raymond J. Jennings, led the troops to storm the bluff where Lugos Mission was located and overran the mission before the few Japanese who had survived the bombardment could put up effective opposition. The men worked their way into the mission compound and cleared out the area with grenades. Troop A was soon on its way along Number Three Road leaving behind it, some 20 dead SNLF, without the loss of a single cavalryman. Meanwhile Troop C advanced west 800 yards to a ridge where they stopped and dug in, having accomplished their mission of establishing a defensive perimeter to protect the landing of successive elements. Other waves of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons began landing ashore as the 7th cavalry took up the beachhead. The 2nd squadron advanced over some ridges towards the Number One Road, while Troop A reduced enemy bunkers progressing roughly a mile from the beach. By 11:20am, they came across 3 mutually-supporting bunkers that halted their advance. It took Troop B's support alongside artillery and aerial bombardment to destroy the bunkers to they could advance. Meanwhile the 1st Squadron emerged out of the jungle into a clearing at 5pm, where they occupied a ridge overlooking the southern edge of the airdrome, where they would dig in. The 2nd Squadron reached Number One Road, where they ran into 3 bunkers. The following morning with tank support the squadron overran the bunkers and advanced northeast towards Lorengau. The cavalrymen would destroy 7 bunkers during their trek, before halting 100 yards before Lorengau. To the north, Troop A was clearing a coconut grove north of the airstrip, from which Japanese snipers were harassing them throughout the night. Troop C advanced along the southern edge near the airstip where they came across another pack of bunkers. Since the snipers north of the strip had been cleared out by noon, an attack could be made in the open. Troop B, supported by light tanks on their left advanced down the strip, followed by Troop D and the squadron HQ. Troop A advanced across the strip and then east along the north edge. By 1:00pm Troop C managed to destroy two bunkers using grenades, forcing the Japanese inhabitants to flee out into the open where they were cut down. Troop C then was about to dash across the airstrip when they suddenly became pinned down by friendly fire from Troop B who were trying to disengage the enemy before them. The 1st squadron suffered 9 deaths and 19 wounded during the action. Mudge then ordered them to relieve Troop C, who were holding some high ground south of the airstrip. On the morning of the 17th after extensive naval and artillery bombardment, Mudge launched a coordinated attack with the 2nd Squadron advancing south of the airstrip and the 1st Squadron assaulting the bunkers that had held up the 8th cavalry's advance. The bombardments had nearly annihilated the bunkers, allowing the 1st squadron to face only slight resistance. They soon attacked a secondary Japanese position further east upon a ridge. This position was also met with artillery and mortar fire and would fall by 11:30am. After this the cavalrymen were able to obliterate the remaining pillboxes and advance across the pulverized airstrip. Meanwhile the 2nd Squadron of the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments linked up along the Number One Road near Lorengau. The 8th Cavalry had encountered little resistance on the road, destroying whatever bunkers were encountered with the aid of fire from medium tanks. The light tank accompanying the squadron had a track blown off by the first Japanese anti tank mine encountered in the operation. By 1pm, all the front-line troops around the airstrip to Number one Road linked up forming a general advance. By this point the backbone of the enemies resistance had been broken, leaving little to resistance them. For the next 1,500 yards to the river, it took them 2 hours because the Japanese had hurriedly put in large quantities of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. They had been emplaced, however, with no prepared plan, and many were poorly camouflaged or left lying completely on the surface. The Japanese had also dug holes and refilled them without emplacing any mines. As the cavalrymen slowly made their way to the river, they suffered a few casualties from the mines. The 7th cavalry reached the Lorengau River by 3pm, from there they dispatched a reconnaissance platoon who quickly came under fire from bunkers atop some hills overlooking Lorengau. Lorengau was sheltered in a valley surrounded by jungle-covered hills rising to 400 feet. The Japanese believed an attack would come from the sea, thus many of their defenses were sited to cover the shoreline. The offshore approaches and the three roads entering the settlement from the east, south, and north were also covered by defensive positions. From the position held by the 2nd Brigade, the only approach to the town was over a sandbar at the mouth of the Lorengau River, a slow-moving stream 20 yards wide and 10 to 20 feet deep, except at the sandbar. The beach area, which the troops would then have to cross, was heavily protected. Naval demolition mines, containing 20 pounds of black powder and detonated by a master switch located in a control bunker up the hillside, covered the beach. About 100 yards inland from the beach a series of rifle pits and gun emplacements were constructed on the side of a dike which paralleled the shore. On the hills surrounding the harbor, beach, and town about a dozen heavy bunkers were used to reinforce the fires of beach defenses and to add depth to the position. As usual these bunkers were carefully camouflaged, although the concentration of naval and artillery fire as well as repeated bombings had disclosed the location of several. Mudge ordered the men to dig in for the night on the west bank of the river and establish a perimeter defense against some expected counterattacks that would not develop in the end. The next morning, after a mortar and artillery bombardment, the 2nd Squadron, 8th Cavalry advanced down from its ridge positions to the mouth of the broad river, with its Reconnaissance Platoon leading. Upon fording the river, the cavalrymen only faced a handful of machine-guns. Facing almost no opposition, the squadron was thus able to secure Lorengau, counting 87 dead Japanese in the remains of the town. Colonel Ezaki seemed to have disappeared during the battle over Papitalai leaving his men leaderless. The Japanese naval troops in desperation began retreating towards Rossum, with American patrols hot on their trail. There would be a furious fight down the Rossum Road. 1st Lt. James M. Concannon captured an enemy map of the area during his patrol to which he exclaimed, "Well, here goes Concannon to get himself a Purple Heart!" Lt. Concannon's platoon had been ordered to go along Number Two Road which went to Rossum and from there to Kelaua Harbor, through the heart of the Japanese defenses indicated on the captured map. Hardly had the platoon crossed the outpost line still held by Troop E along Number Two Road when it came under fire from a pair of bunkers sited to cover the track. Lieutenant Concannon and one of his men were wounded. The platoon sergeant assumed command and attempted to flank the position. When the attempt was not successful, the sergeant decided to withdraw and report, as his mission was one of reconnaissance. Upon receiving the information that the enemy was in position not 200 yards from the outpost line, Colonel Bradley directed Major Shore to send Troop A back up the track to neutralize the enemy position. The troop was reinforced with machine guns and two 37-mm antitank guns. Troop A of the 8th cavalry were ordered to deal with the newly discovered enemy bunkers. Corporal Peter J. Armstrong and Armando V. Valencia set their heavy machine-gun in position at a range of 30 yards from one of the bunkers. Having disclosed his position by laying a continuous burst of fire on the bunker, Corporal Armstrong was wounded by sniper fire. Armstrong continued firing until a grenade knocked him unconscious. Although the gun had been hit in several places and was leaking a steady stream from its water jacket, Corporal Valencia took over and continued firing at the bunker slits until the machine-gun froze; then he fired with his submachine-gun until it was knocked out of his hands by an enemy bullet. In the meantime the mortars had obtained four direct hits on the bunkers, and the anti-tank guns had made two. Corporals Armstrong and Valencia were later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and for its action during the day Troop A was given a unit citation. After taking out the stubborn position, Troop A advanced along the road under heavy sniper fire, until they were relieved by Troop C. Troop C immediately was met with a heavy Japanese counterattack shortly after nightfall. The counterattack was launched by 8 Japanese using rifle grenades and small arms. Considering the size of the attacking force, the casualties of the troop were heavy: 2 killed and 10 wounded. All the Japanese were killed, largely due to a quick adjustment by the forward observer of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion followed by four volleys fired for effect. By this point the Americans had achieved all their objectives for the Admiralty Islands campaign, the only thing left to do was mop up the islands. The remaining IJA troops were now withdrawing across the Loniu Passage over to Manus. The 8th cavalry were soon given the task of clearing the eastern end of Manus, while the 7th cavalry would clear out the Rossum Road. Yet that is all for this campaign as we are now heading over to New Guinea. General MacArthur was planning his new Western New Guinea offensive. After the directives given on March 12th, Admiral Nimitz had been instructed to provide support for his Hollandia operation. The Japanese began their occupation of Hollandia early in April of 1942 but paid little attention to the region for a year. Then Allied air reconnaissance disclosed that the enemy was constructing airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This development progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japanese the vulnerability of their air and supply bases east of Hollandia. In late 1943 and early 1944, the Japanese built 3 airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to develop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points southeast along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak over 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hollandia to build up the base there. Admiral Nimitz decided to dispatch two fast carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 to conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area in order to keep their airfields neutralized. MacArthur south for the carries to support the troops for 8 days after the landings. But Nimitz believed this would put the carriers in risk, because the Japanese would be able to launch aircraft from all over the Dutch East Indies or even the Philippines. It was decided Task Force 58 would remain in the Hollandia region for only 3 days after the landings were made. As a result MacArthur opted to supplement using land-based aircraft against Hollandia. To obtain this he would need to capture an airfield in Northern New Guinea, just east of the main objective. He chose an Aitape, it was a lightly guarded area and already partially developed by the Japanese, such as the incomplete airfields around the Tadji Plantation. Once the men landed ashore at Aitape, allied forces could provide flank protection for Haollandia against any westward actions by the Japanese 18th Army. For the assault against Aitape, MacArthur planned to use the 8 escort carriers of Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Admiral Ralph E. Daviso. Now for the amphibious assault, Admiral Kinkaid gave the job to Admiral Barbey's task force 77 who were divided into 3 attack groups. They would bring over General Eichelberger's 1st corp who would perform the Hollandia operation, codenamed Operation Reckless. I think it is a pretty suitable name for a MacArthur operation. For the Hollandia part of the operation, the 19th and 21st regiments of Major General Frederick Irving's 24th division would land at Tanahmerah Bay; the 162nd and 186th regiments of General Fuller's 41st division would land at Humboldt Bay. For the operation against Aitape, codenamed Persecution, the 163rd regiment of the 41st division led by General Doe would perform the initial landings. To soften up the enemy, General Kenny's air forces began bombing Wewak and Hansa in mid March, then in early April they began neutralizing the airfields to try and deceive General Adachi into believing they were the next allied target. Additionally, MacArthur asked Admiral Spruance to perform a carrier raid against the Palau Islands, codenamed Operation Desecrate One, followed by strikes on Yap and Woleai in the eastern Carolines, in order to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing Western New Guinea. Admiral Mitscher's carriers departed Majuro on the 22nd of March and made their way around the Carolines, trying to sneak past Truk undetected. Despite their best efforts, Japanese search planes from Truk managed to spot them on their 3rd day at sea. This prompted Admiral Spruance to advance the day of the raid from April 1st to March 30th. Meanwhile after sighting the allied naval forces, Admiral Koga ordered an evacuation of Palau, seeing a large number of warships and merchant shipping flee the area for Tawi-Tawi. The US submarines Gar, Blackfish, Tang and Archerfish were stationed to operate against the withdrawing ships and as plane guards. On the 23rd, Tunny sank the Japanese submarine I-42 and damaged the 14,850-ton tanker Iro. To the north of Palau, during an attack on the 26th, Tullibee was hit and sunk by her own circling torpedo. Bashaw torpedoed a 4,317-ton freighter escorted by the destroyers Minazuki and Yuzuki. On the 29th, the super battleship Musashi departed Palau under cover of darkness to avoid an expected air raid, and encountered Tunny, which fired six torpedoes at the battleship; five of them missed, but the sixth blew a hole 5.8 meters in diameter near the bow, flooding her with 3000 tonnes of water. The torpedo hit killed 7 crewmen and wounded another 11. After temporary repairs, Musashi sailed for Japan later that night and arrived at Kure Naval Arsenal on April 3. On the 30th, Task Force 58 reached its assembly point 90 miles south of the Palau Islands. The Task Force was met with a Japanese air strike consisting of mostly Betty's and Oscars who were easily swept aside. Then fast carriers Enterprise, Bunker Hill, Hornet, Yorktown and Lexington launched their first air strikes against Palaus. For the next day and a half, the Americans flew hundreds of sorties over these islands, striking the airfields and shooting down all planes they could find. The attacks saw 40 Japanese ships at Palau and Angaur sunk, another 4 were badly damaged. 93 aerial victories would be won over Palau and Avengers from Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet laid extensive mines around the channels and approaches to Palau. This was the first tactical aerial mining of the Pacific War performed by carrier aircraft. In response, Admiral Koga asked for help from neighboring islands. He received 9 B6N torpedo bombers from Yap who attempted a night attack against Task Force 58 on the 31st. Unfortunately for the Japanese, 4 Hellcats from Cabot managed to intercept them, successfully shooting all of them down. Koga certainly had a lot on his plate. Due to the recent attacks against Truk and now Palau, Koga decided to transfer his HQ from the Musashi to Davao on March 31st. Most of his senior staff and cryptographers boarded 3 H8K flying boats enroute to Mindanao from Palau. All 3 of the flying boats ran straight into a typhoon just off of Cebu, two of them got lost. These flying boats were carrying Admiral Koga and Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, his chief of staff. Koga's plan would end up crashing enroute to Davao, killing all aboard. Thus another commander in chief of the IJN forces had met his end to a plane crash. The other plane carrying Fukudome crashed off the coast of Cebu. Fukudome had a harrowing experience, but escaped the aircraft and began swimming to the island. To make matters even worse, while swimming Fukudome was grabbed by Filipino guerillas who brought him over to Lt Colonel James Cushing. Cushing was a former engineer in the Philippines who helped organize a resistance movement. Now captured Fukudome was certainly a large prize, yet a even bigger one came on April 3rd. A Filipino shopkeeper named Pedro Gantuangoko spotted a box floating offshore on the 3rd and picked it up in his fishing boat. The box contained a red leather briefcase carrying the Z plan. Fukudome had assumed the box sank with the aircraft, but in a twist of fate it did not. Now while this was going on, Lt Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi had dispatched troops to search for survivors of the aircraft crash and for the box containing the Z plan. Ohnisi hundreds of Filipino villagers interrogated, tortured and killed, entire Filipino villages were burnt to the ground. Eventually Ohnisi cornered Cushing and they struck a deal. On April 10th, with Japanese forces on Cebu hot on the heels of the guerillas, the American commander, Lt-Colonel Cushing, arranged to return Fukudome and the other prisoners to the Japanese in return for a cessation of the massacre of Filipino civilians. Three days later, the Filipinos who had found the box containing Plan Z and the code book when it washed ashore, turned them over to Cushing. The codebook was recognized for what it was when the guerillas discovered the Japanese were offering a 50000 peso reward for its return. On April 27, Cushing arranged for the items to be picked up by the submarine Crevalle. Traveling mostly on the surface for speed, and diving only when needed, the submarine survived depth charging twice, finally arriving at Darwin on May 19. From there, the documents were flown to Brisbane later that day. Allied codebreakers looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the codebook, since they had been stymied by changes to the IJN code since the summer of 1942 and had not “read the enemy's mail” in any detail since the week before the Battle of Midway. The documents outlined the new strategy for the defense of the inner perimeter islands around Japan with the intention of drawing the US fleet in for a decisive showdown. The documents were sent to Admiral Nimitz and would prove extremely valuable during the Battle of the Philippines Sea. The documents were so vital, the Americans performed a covert operation sending them back to the Philippines by submarine and placed near the wreckage of the flying boat by American divers. It was one of the greatest intelligence coups of WW2. Thus Admiral Koga was dead, the Z plan fell into allied hands and the IJN was now leaderless. Koga's death would not be announced until May and he was replaced by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. Koga was promoted to Marshal Admiral posthumously and granted a state funeral. According to pilot Nagatsuka Ryuji: “The death of Admiral Koga, successor to Admiral Yamamoto, had been another shock for the Japanese nation. These distressing circumstances had forced the naval and military Chiefs of Staff to resign. They had been replaced by General Tojo and Admiral Shimada.” Now back to the invasion, on April 1st Rear-Admiral John Reeves' carriers launched airstrikes against Yap and Ulithi, with the three task groups then attacking Woleai. 25 American aircraft were lost, with 26 out of 44 aircrews rescued thanks to submarine Harder. Meanwhile, the fleet's Hellcats win 111 aerial victories and destroy 46 grounded aircraft on the three atolls. With this, Task Force 58 successfully removed Palau as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation. Alongside this South and Southwest Pacific land-based aircraft from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and undertook many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile Kenney's air forces were busy neutralizing enemy air bases in Western New Guinea and the eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the strategic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by US 5th Air Force while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command took responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Dutch East Indies. The operations were intensified roughly 6 weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape. On March 30th, Kenney shifted the weight of his attacks from the Wewak area to Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently retreated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The airforces also performed a full aerial reconnaissance taking photos of Hollandia's 3 airdromes on March. Added to this were radio intercepts and intelligence ereports, allowing the allies to estimate the Japanese had around 351 aircraft there. With this information at hand, Kenney launched Liberators armed with small 20 pound fragmentation bombs to perform a concentrated bombing against the enemy airfield. Since the Allies hoped to rehabilitate the Hollandia strips as quickly as possible, hits on the runways with heavy ordnance would be avoided. Fighter cover would be provided by long-range P-38's, which would escort the bombers over the target, and by shorter-range P-47's, which would meet the bombers near Aitape, beat off pursuing fighters, and shepherd them home. Medium and light bombers would continue attacks on the airfields at Wewak to prevent their use by Japanese fighters. The Liberators with their P-38 and P-47 escorts would smash the anti-aircraft defenses while the medium and light bombers would drench the area with bombs. On March 30th, 7 B-24's hit Hollandia dispersals as 75 Liberators of the 43rd bombardment group and 59 P-38s of the 80th, 431st and 432nd Fighter Squadrons swept over Hollandia's airstrips and dropped nearly 6000 bombs. To make matters worse for the Japanese, they suffered from insufficient radar warning, many of their aircraft would be on the ground refueling after some morning patrols. The 5th Air Force found countless enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways, a lethargic anti-aircraft reaction. 25 or more fighters made "eager" passes against the 65th Bombardment Squadron, whose gunners claimed two destroyed. The 80th Fighter Squadron engaged a reported 35 to 40 hostile fighters, destroying 7 of them. The 431st Fighter Squadron claimed one Tony damaged, but the 432d encountered no enemy fighters. Japanese interception seemed badly disorganized. The planes milled about with little evident formation, and most of the pilots appeared to have little desire for a fight. Over 100 aircraft were destroyed as the Japanese were caught completely unprepared. Japanese prisoners-of-war and captured documents later revealed that the reason the bombing operation was so successful was because the Japanese high command erroneously transported too many airplanes to Hollandia from the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies but did not transport more pilots and maintenance crews with the airplanes. There was no way for them to build appropriate defensive shelters to protect all 400 aircraft and also there were not enough trained pilots who could fly all of those airplanes at the same time so many perfectly operational aircraft were left sitting there with no aircrew to maintain them. The morale at Hollandia airbase was very low during the bombing operation, with many Japanese soldiers and airmen hiding in bunkers instead of manning anti-aircraft artillery and getting airplanes into the air. Most of these Hollandia soldiers and airmen were rear-echelon and not combat-oriented at all because most of the combat-trained divisions from the 18th Army were recently sent further east towards Wewak in anticipation of amphibious landings that would never come thanks to the deception and feints carried out by General Kenney. The P-38s then withdrew to Nadzab as soon as the bombers cleared their targets; and the P-47s, meeting the Liberators near Aitape, convoyed them home without incident. So successful was this first raid that one squadron reported that “Hollandia had really been Wewaked”. The next day, Kenney launched a nearly identical mission, with 7 Liberators and 52 P-38s bombing the dispersal at Hollandia, Cyclops and Sentani airdromes. 153 tons of 100 pound demos, frags and incendiary bombs were dropped. The Japanese anti-aircraft fire was more accurate this time around and 56 Japanese fighters gave the allies a fight. However the pilots were inexperienced and unaggressive. The Americans estimated 14 aircraft were shot down while they suffered the loss of one P-38. After the air strike, the total number of destroyed aircraft on the ground reached 199. At this point the Japanese scrambled to withdraw their remaining serviceable aircraft out of Hollandia. On April 3, Kenney sent his heaviest air attack to date. 66 B-24s escorted by 21 P-38s dropped 492 1000-pound bombs on anti-aircraft defenses. An estimated 30 Japanese Tonys and Oscars attempted without success to break up the bomb runs, and B-24 gunners claimed 2 fighters destroyed, while the 21 escorting P-38's of the 80th Squadron claimed downing ten. Then, 96 A-20s escorted by 17 P-38s strafed and dropped 100-pound para-demolition bombs over grounded aircraft, stores, and other targets of opportunity. The 432nd Squadron, covering the A-20's with 17 P-38's, encountered about 20 Japanese fighters and claimed 12 definitely destroyed, against the loss of one P-38. Finally, 76 B-25s escorted by 36 P-38s swept the strips at noon, scattering parafrags and parademos and strafing everything in sight. Only 3 Japanese fighters were encountered in this last attack, which were all shot down. After the end of the raid, Hollandia was so badly mauled that it could no longer be considered a major air installation. A Japanese seaman after hearing of the Allied mission of April 3rd against Hollandia, although seemingly confused as to imperial folklore, correctly assessed the Allied victory: "Yesterday, the anniversary of the birthday of Emperor Meiji, we received from the enemy, greetings, which amount to the annihilation of our Army Air Force in New Guinea." After April 3rd, the 5th Air Force virtually owned the air over Hollandia. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Admiralty Islands campaign was coming to a swift close, seeing MacArthur secure the valuable islands like Los Negros and Manus. MacArthurs new campaign to hit Western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies, certainly began with a bang as General Kenney's air forces had basically claimed air supremacy, the Japanese were in full panic mode.
Amidst the burgeoning advancements in autonomous vehicles (AVs), striking a balance between expectation and reality emerges as a challenge. Rob and Jackie sat down with Richard Mudge, president and founder of Compass Transportation and Technology, to discuss how innovations in the world of AVs can affect safety, productivity, and job creation.MentionedMichigan.gov. “I-94 Connected & Automated Vehicle (CAV) Corridor Proposed Project,” Michigan Department of Transportation.RelatedAswin Prabhakar. “Logic, Not Emotions, Should Guide Autonomous Vehicle Deployment,” (Center for Data Innovation, December 2023).
Jason and Brett's love for books and Broadway come together in this exciting episode! They talk to musical book writer and lyricist Kait Kerrigan about adapting The Great Gatsby for the stage, Merri Sugarman about the casting process and her new book From Craft to Career, and Matthew Chisling (aka @mattyandthebooks) about book adaptations coming to Broadway. A behind-the-scenes conversation you won't want to miss!Kait Kerrigan is an award-winning lyricist, book writer, and playwright. She is an alumnus of Barnard College and the BMI Musical Theatre Workshop and a member of the Dramatists Guild. Off Broadway: book and lyrics for The Mad Ones, and Henry & Mudge. Regional: The Great Gatsby (Paper Mill Playhouse), plays (Father/Daughter and Imaginary Love) and musicals (Justice, Earthrise, and Rosie Revere, Engineer & Friends). Digital credits include: A Killer Party. Her immersive house party The Bad Years (book and lyrics) had two sold-out pop-up productions in Brooklyn. Awards include: Kleban Award for libretto, Jonathan Larson Award for lyric-writing, Most Promising Lyricist Award from the Theatre Hall of Fame, Edgerton Award, and residencies at Page 73, Dramatists Guild Fellows, Rhinebeck, Goodspeed's Johnnie Mercer Project, and MacDowell.Initially an actress (Les Misérables, Aspects of Love), Merri Sugarman found herself in L.A. where she quickly made a name for herself at Liberman/Hirschfeld Casting working on such shows as Seinfeld, HBO's Band of Brothers, and the feature film My Big Fat Greek Wedding, to name a few. Following that, at Dreamworks Studios, Merri was the Casting Executive in charge of TV Pilots and Series. She is a Senior Casting Director at Tara Rubin Casting. Credits: Ain't Too Proud, Jersey Boys, Phantom Of The Opera, Les Misérables, School of Rock, Miss Saigon and A Bronx Tale. Off Broadway: Clueless and Trevor. Matthew Chisling has worked for a decade in the professional theatre space as a marketer, producer, ticketing manager and strategist. He is currently a senior director of campaign marketing at TodayTix Group, a technology company in the performing arts space. Matt is an avid reader and runs an instagram account called @mattyandthebooks**BOOKS!** Check out the list of books discussed on each episode on our Bookshop page:https://bookshop.org/shop/gaysreading | By purchasing books through this Bookshop link, you can support both Gays Reading and an independent bookstore of your choice!Join our Patreon for exclusive bonus content! Purchase your Gays Reading podcast Merch! Follow us on Instagram @gaysreading | @bretts.book.stack | @jasonblitmanWhat are you reading? Send us an email or a voice memo at gaysreading@gmail.com