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Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a July 1 amphibious assault against a heavily fortified Japanese defense, known for its formidable coast artillery and entrenched positions. The Australians faced fierce opposition upon landing; however, skilled maneuvering and robust artillery support allowed them to swiftly gain a foothold. As the Australians secured their beachhead, they marked the beginning of a challenging campaign against determined Japanese forces in Balikpapan, setting the stage for further confrontations in the Pacific theater.  This episode is Victory at Bougainville  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off on Bougainville, by mid-April, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer's 15th Brigade had commenced its crucial task of relieving Brigadier Field's weary and battered 7th Brigade. This transition came at a pivotal moment when Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade successfully secured the Soraken Peninsula, a strategic point on Bougainville's southern coast, while also continuing their efforts to contain enemy forces along the notorious Numa Numa Trail, a crucial supply route for Japanese troops. Supported by reinforcements in artillery and air power, Generals Savige and Bridgeford were optimistic about continuing their limited offensive toward the south. Their immediate objective was to capture the line of the Hongorai River, considered a significant tactical advantage, followed by the Hari River, which would serve as the 15th Brigade's main aim. On the opposing side, General Kanda had learned a harsh lesson about the ineffectiveness of banzai charges during the fierce fighting at the Battle of Slater's Knoll. This costly experience prompted him to alter his strategy significantly. He decided to pull his remaining troops back to a defensive perimeter focused around Buin, which is located in the southern region of Bougainville. Here, he reinforced his defenses with garrison troops from Kieta, situated on the eastern side of Bougainville, the Shortlands Islands to the northwest, and the Fauros Islands to the northeast. However, with this concentration of forces not expected to be operational until July, the troops stationed in the forward areas were tasked with executing a critical delaying action in the meantime, buying precious time for reinforcements to arrive. Meanwhile, on April 17, the Australian 24th Battalion began its advance along the Buin Road, a vital route for both supply and troop movement. Two companies made their way toward Dawe's Creek, while another company launched an assault against the enemy strongholds at Kindara. Remarkably, they broke through enemy lines the following day, pushing further to Sindou Creek and Umam Creek. Here, they faced multiple sharp counterattacks over the next week, demonstrating the fierce resistance from Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As patrols moved deeper into the thick jungle on either side of the Buin Road, the struggle became increasingly intense. Each advance was hard-fought, marked by skirmishes that tested the resolve and endurance of the Australian soldiers. Finally, on April 26, the advance resumed in earnest, making rapid gains toward the Hongorai River. The combination of heavy air support and relentless artillery bombardment had effectively dispelled any opposition along the route, allowing the Australians to push forward with renewed vigor. By May 4, as the 24th Battalion finally approached the banks of the Hongorai River, they encountered significant resistance. However, on the 4th Lieutenant Lawn's platoon was advancing with two tanks and a bulldozer when the crew of the leading tank came to a log across the road and saw movement in the bush. A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank cut the leaves away and revealed the barrel of a field gun. The first round fired from the tank's 2-pounder disabled the enemy gun and the enemy seemed to flee. Farther ahead, however, a mine exploded at the rear of the second tank. It was discovered that it had been exploded with a wire by a Japanese concealed in the bush. Henceforward mines and concealed guns were encountered more and more frequently. They were detected chiefly by the practised eyes of the engineer teams of Major Needham's 15th Field Company who became increasingly skilful. Mechanical detectors were defeated by several sorts of mine employed wooden boxes filled with T.N.T., for example; but their presence was betrayed by protruding fuses, wires, disturbed earth, and confirmed by prodding with a bayonet. As the 24th Battalion neared the Hongorai it became evident that the Japanese intended to make the Australians pay a price for each advance, and that they were willing to trade a field gun for a tank at every opportunity. On the 4th and many later occasions leading tanks were fired on at a range of a few yards by guns cleverly concealed beside the track, but in positions from which the Japanese could not hope to extricate them. In other respects also the Japanese tactics were improving and their striking power was strengthened. Each forward Australian battalion was now under frequent artillery fire, evidently directed by Japanese observers who remained close to the Australian advance, and it was this which was now causing most of the casualties. The shells usually burst in the trees and their fragments were scattered over a wide area with lethal effects. To counter the tanks the Japanese were now establishing their positions not astride the track but about 100 yards from it in places where the tanks could not reach them until a side track had been made. The Hongorai River, a critical geographical landmark, ran through Bougainville's lush terrain, acting as both a natural barrier and tactical objective. In late April, the 9th Battalion had continued to push forward across the Huio River, a vital waterway that intersected with Japanese defenses. They faced some enemy resistance but managed to clear the Horinu-Rumiki Trail by the end of the month. This narrow, winding path had strategic importance, connecting various units and enabling supplies to move closer to the frontline. On May 3, the 9th Battalion was finally relieved by the 57th/60th Battalion, which, due to its relative inexperience, found progress challenging along the Commando Road a route named after the elite Australian commandos who often operated in this area. Their inexperience in facing seasoned Japanese troops led to slower advances in the crucial days that followed. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron had been conducting deep reconnaissance patrols towards the Hari River and along the Tiger Road, determined to discover the extent of Japanese defenses south of the Hongorai. The Tiger Road, notorious for its rugged conditions, was pivotal for troop movements in the region. On May 5, the 24th Battalion, now bolstered by a newly assigned tank squadron, resumed its advance with renewed determination. However, they were once again halted by fierce defenders who launched a strong yet costly counterattack the following morning. This desperate but valiant effort by the Japanese troops resulted in significant casualties and demonstrated their resolve to maintain control of the Hongorai line. Subsequently, the Japanese forces ultimately abandoned their positions along the Hongorai during the night. Finally, on May 7, the Australians reached the Hongorai River, marking a significant milestone in their campaign. At that moment, the 57th/60th Battalion was securing a crucial crossing over the Hongorai on the Commando Road, enabling further advances into enemy territory. With the next objective focused on the line stretching from the Hari River to Monoitu and Kapana, Brigadier Hammer's battalions shifted their tactics for the second and third weeks of May. They undertook deep patrols into Japanese-occupied territory, gathering vital intelligence while also seeking to harass the enemy and disrupt their operations. Additionally, the commandos maintained their patrols along the challenging Tiger Road and established a new patrol base further north at Monorei. This base would serve as a critical outpost for monitoring enemy movements and launching further operations. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion explored the rugged areas south of the Buin Road, successfully clearing the Aitara Mission. This mission played a crucial role in their broader strategies, as it prepared them to execute a wide flanking maneuver aimed at cutting the road east of the Hongorai, further encircling Japanese forces. To support the advancing Australian forces, New Zealand aircraft launched significant attacks on Japanese concentrations positioned along the Buin and Commando Roads. On May 17, the 57th/60th Battalion crossed the upper reaches of the Hongorai River, advancing across a wide front along the Commando Road to draw the enemy's attention to that area. On the eve of this move Hammer issued an order of the day in a characteristic style. He spoke of his "undying admiration" for and "extreme confidence" in his men and told them that the next few weeks might see the major defeat of the Japanese in south Bougainville. "Go to battle as you have done in the last month and no enemy can withstand you." In the subsequent days, they successfully secured territory up to the Torobiru River, creating pressure on the Japanese lines and disrupting their defensive operations. On May 20, following a powerful air and artillery bombardment, the 24th Battalion finally launched its long-anticipated assault across the Hongorai River. This marked a turning point as they occupied the strategically significant Egan's Ridge by May 22. Egan's Ridge offered an elevated position that overlooked the surrounding terrain, making it crucial for controlling movement in the vicinity. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion executed a stealthy wide flanking maneuver towards Mayberry's Crossing, positioning themselves strategically to disrupt Japanese supply lines and communication. On May 21, the Australians moved out once more to cut the Buin Road at Runai, an essential route that facilitated movement and supplies for the Japanese forces. In the following days, the remaining sections of this critical road were secured as the Japanese forces west of the Hari River were forced to retreat, effectively diminishing their operational capabilities in the region. As these operations unfolded, the 2/8th Commando Squadron established a new base on Morokaimoro, positioning themselves for further reconnaissance and engagements. They began patrolling towards Taitai and the Mivo River, both vital points of interest as the Australians sought to gather intelligence on enemy movements. In the meantime, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed on to capture the Oso Junction by May 27. However, they encountered harassment from night raiding parties and artillery fire, which highlighted the persistent threat of Japanese resistance in this area. On 2nd June the main advance was resumed, the 58th/59th moving forward without opposition through positions which had been "completely devastated by air, artillery and mortars". "Not one enemy was found alive or dead," wrote the battalion diarist, "although a strong smell of death pervaded the whole area." A prisoner taken later in the day said that the air strike had completely demoralised the defenders, and when they heard the tanks approaching they had fled. On the left the 57th/60th reached the Sunin River against slight opposition. On the 3rd and 4th the 58th/59th continued the advance, moving slowly because of the need to disarm an unprecedentedly large number of mines and booby-traps-more than 100 in three days-until they reached the Peperu River. Patrols moving stealthily forward to the Hari and across it found evidence of much confusion, many positions dug but unoccupied, and small groups of Japanese at large. It was decided to attack frontally towards the Hari next day. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion also reached the Sunin River, facing only slight opposition during their advance. On June 6, the 58th/59th Battalion launched an attack towards the Hari River, but despite their efforts, they only managed to gain about 500 yards against strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. The next three days proved challenging as the 58th/59th Battalion, supported by tanks, found their progress impeded by swampy terrain, a road littered with hidden mines, and intermittent shellfire threatening their advance. The combined obstacles of the natural environment and determined enemy resistance severely limited their ability to make significant gains. In light of the pressing circumstances, Brigadier Hammer made a pivotal decision to send the 58th/59th Battalion on a shallow outflanking march to the north. Their mission was clear: cut the Buin Road several miles east of the Hari River. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion was tasked with thrusting wide to the south, maneuvering around the Ogorata River to intercept the same road near Rusei. After four days of concentrated air and artillery bombardment designed to weaken enemy defenses, the 58th/59th Battalion commenced its operation on June 12. They sent two companies forward to secure a position along the road, located 2,000 yards east of the Hari. This forward position was critical for their strategy to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Two days later, on June 14, these forces continued their advance eastward toward the Ogorata River, while the remainder of the battalion engaged the enemy at the Hari ford, a crucial crossing point. Despite the fierce opposition, the ford was finally secured on June 15, following another extensive bombardment that significantly diminished the Japanese presence along the road west of the Ogorata. This success was instrumental in facilitating further operations in the area.  Concurrently, the 57th/60th Battalion had embarked on their mission on June 11, making slow but steady progress through the challenging, trackless bush. They ultimately found a path leading from Kingori to Rusei, where they began encountering Japanese resistance. Pushing through treacherous swampy terrain and dense bamboo thickets, the Australians reached the Buin Road at Rusei by June 15, successfully coordinating with patrols from the 58th/59th Battalion the following day. In addition to securing Rusei, a robust patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion set out along the northern flank to establish a patrol base north of Musaraka. This base detected a significant enemy presence behind them, leading to a critical reassessment of their positions. Consequently, in late June, the 24th Battalion was dispatched to take over the Taitai-Kingori-Katsuwa area, reinforcing the Australian foothold and securing vital routes in the region. Meanwhile, back to the south, the 57th/60th Battalion began to push eastward toward the Mobiai River on June 16. However, their advance quickly met strong opposition just 400 yards into enemy territory. Faced with determined resistance, the battalion executed a wide outflanking maneuver, a tactical shift that successfully forced the Japanese forces to withdraw by June 19, allowing the Australians to continue their advance. In the following days, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed steadily forward, ultimately encountering increased opposition near the Mobiai River on June 24. A heavy bombardment was launched in an attempt to dislodge the entrenched Japanese forces, but it proved ineffective. However, the next day, the Japanese troops had mysteriously withdrawn, allowing the Australians to secure a vital crossing over the river. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the 58th/59th Battalion moved in to occupy the newly attained Mobiai positions. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions advanced farther north, preparing for an outflanking maneuver aimed at Shishigatero, a critical tactical point lying to the northeast. In anticipation of an Australian offensive, General Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to establish a defensive base near the Mivo ford. This strategic relocation was part of his preparations for the final defenses behind the Mivo River, as Japanese troops sought to hold their ground against the advancing Australians. By June 28, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions reached their designated assembly areas, where they successfully repelled several Japanese counterattacks. The next morning, they began their advance southeast, shrouded in the loud thunder of artillery barrages that paved the way for their push. They reached the Buin Road at the confluence of the Ivana, Koopani, and Mivo Rivers, making significant headway. At the same time, the 58th/59th Battalion aimed to open the road for the 24th Battalion, positioned about 1,000 yards away. However, they encountered sharp resistance from Japanese forces defending their positions fiercely. Following this notable success, as Hammer's units faced and repelled various Japanese counterattacks at their new positions, General Bridgeford directed Brigadier Noel Simpson's 29th Brigade to the frontline to relieve the beleaguered 15th Brigade. Each incoming battalion was met with sharp clashes as they moved up, as Japanese forces sought to maintain their hold on strategic territory. Finally, on July 10, Hammer's units were relieved, a long-awaited reprieve after weeks of grueling combat. Despite the shift in command, Simpson's battalions began sending patrols forward in preparation for a crossing of the Mivo River. Unfortunately, due to the heavy resistance encountered and the onset of relentless rains that would continue throughout the month, this final offensive was never carried out. Instead, the troops were limited to vigorous patrolling activities during July and August, maintaining a presence but unable to launch significant offensives in the harsh conditions. Many of these patrols encountered fierce opposition, signaling that the enemy intended to mount a determined defense along the Mivo line. These patrols regularly captured crucial documents from Japanese soldiers ambushed along the tracks leading to their forward positions, allowing Australian forces to construct a clearer picture of the enemy's intentions and deployments. Among these daring reconnaissance missions was one conducted by a patrol from the 42nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Oldfield. Tasked with scouting a potential crossing at the Mivo, Oldfield and four other soldiers discovered the river was in flood. Undeterred, they stripped off their gear, swam across the turbulent waters, and advanced 500 yards beyond the riverbank, without any weapons. The weight of the Australian artillery and mortar bombardments altered the enemy's tactics. Rather than holding fixed positions, the Japanese began to dig in less and instead employed a strategy of hit-and-run raids and ambushes executed by small groups of three to ten men. Before July 10 arrived, the relentless rain compelled a second postponement of the advance; the new date for the operation was set for July 24. However, the downpour continued to intensify. By July 10, even the patrols could not cross the flooded Mivo. "Torrential rain flooded the divisional area, reducing the Buin Road to a treacherous sea of mud and creating a series of islands between the various rivers." On July 17, conditions worsened further, with a dramatic eight inches of rain falling in just 36 hours. The new challenge was no longer about advancing troops but ensuring that the men were fed where they remained. Virtually all the bridges along the lines of communication were washed away, and all the rivers were flooded; the Mivo was now surging at a speed of twelve miles an hour. As a result, the forward units could only be supplied via air transport. It would take weeks to repair the damaged roads and bridges, leading to D-day being postponed until late August. As the southern operations unfolded, General Savige made a strategic decision to bring Brigadier Arnold Potts' 23rd Brigade from Munda and its surrounding islands to Torokina. Upon arrival, Savige immediately tasked the 27th Battalion with taking over the central sector beyond Pearl Ridge. The Australians quickly began bombing and launching attacks in the Berry's Hill-Hunt's Hill area, ultimately securing this crucial location on May 16. Following the seizure of Berry's Hill, the 27th Battalion conducted patrols toward key positions at Sisivie, Tokua, Base Point 3, and Wearne's Hill throughout late May. On June 3, they initiated an attack towards Tiernan's Spur, making significant progress before being relieved by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion, upon taking over, adopted an aggressive posture, and on June 11, they attacked Tiernan's Spur, successfully securing the feature this time. Soon after, a combination of reconnaissance and air bombardment set the stage for an assault on Wearne's Hill on June 16. However, they encountered strong opposition and were unable to seize its crest until June 20. In parallel operations, a company captured Sisivie without encountering resistance on June 12. Another company was dispatched to establish a forward base in the Wakunai Valley, successfully creating observation posts that overlooked Inus Point and the large Numa Numa Plantation by June 21. After conducting extensive bombardments against remaining Japanese positions, the Australians finally secured the remainder of Wearne's Hill on June 24. Starting June 26, the 7th Battalion began probing towards Centre Hill, which they ultimately found abandoned on July 6. Meanwhile, on July 3, Tokua was occupied as a base for future operations probing north toward Ibu and Buritsiotorara. Artillery and aircraft continued to harass North Hill, which was finally captured on July 13. Just five days later, Cameron's Hill was also successfully attacked and secured. The 7th Battalion then pressed forward along the main track towards Charlie Creek and McInnes Hill, achieving their objectives by August 8 as the remaining Japanese forces were forced to retire to Numa Numa. Looking north, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 26th Battalion in early April, following the fall of the Soraken Peninsula. Upon assuming command, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson immediately directed the 55th/53rd to cross the Nagam River and launch an attack towards Pora Pora, a key strategic location in the region. The battalion pressed on along the main coastal track, but on April 13, they faced an unsuccessful assault against the enemy positioned at McKinnon's Ridge. Meanwhile, a company from the battalion moved through an inland route, encountering no resistance as they advanced to a position just two miles from Pora Pora. Recognizing the resolute enemy defenses along the main track, the Australians initiated a program of heavy artillery bombardment, complemented by flanking maneuvers designed to outmaneuver the entrenched defenders. This relentless strategy began to pay off, eventually forcing the Japanese to retreat on April 21. During this critical period, the unopposed company on the inland track continued to push forward until it was only one mile from Pora Pora. In the following four days, the 55th/53rd Battalion fought its way into the Pora Pora bottleneck, engaging in fierce combat that successfully expelled the Japanese forces by April 30. With this victory, the Australians were able to continue their advance northward, making rapid gains against a retreating enemy. On May 4, they captured the Ratsua jetty, a vital logistics point that facilitated further operations. Two columns of the 55th/53rd commenced a swift march towards Ruri Bay, while a company from the 26th Battalion successfully seized Torokori Island on May 6. Three days later, as they finally approached Ruri Bay, the Australians successfully repelled an enemy ambush. However, Brigadier Stevenson's orders were now to halt their advance at the Ratsua-Ruri Bay line and focus on active patrolling extending northward to Tarbut and Tarlena. Despite this directive, the situation became increasingly precarious. The Japanese, bolstered by four small provisional battalions of naval troops under Captain Kato Ekichi, grew aggressive beyond the established line. Daily patrol clashes erupted, with Australian positions and supply lines subjected to constant ambushes. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, the weary 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion on May 21. In response, the 26th immediately dispatched two companies to thrust forward in the area south and east of Buoi Plantation. However, these units quickly encountered strong counterattacks, while patrols faced heavy resistance around Siara and Chindawon. As Stevenson's forces found themselves facing a fortified opponent stronger than anticipated, permission was granted to send two companies from the 31st/51st Battalion to take over the western sector on June 3. Despite this reinforcements, the Australians continued to struggle to make meaningful progress northward. After the 26th Battalion had been in the line for three hard weeks its diarist wrote that the campaign had become one of "holding a superior number of enemy by the aggressive action of a tired depleted battalion-companies were no more than half strength and had been in forward areas continuously for four months". The battalion's fighting strength on 3rd June was only 23 officers and 353 other ranks. The constant patrolling, the artillery fire and the raids on jeep trains on tracks well to the rear were wearing down the men's spirits. In response to the persistent challenges, a strategic decision was made to outmaneuver the Japanese by landing a reinforced company of the 31st/51st Battalion at Porton Plantation, aiming to approach the enemy from the western flank. During the early hours of June 8, the assault force successfully landed unopposed and swiftly established a perimetric defense reaching 150 yards inland. However, the surprised defenders quickly regrouped, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire that effectively thwarted the unloading of heavy weapons, reserve ammunition, and essential supplies. Although supporting artillery fire was effectively directed at the Japanese positions, the Australians soon found themselves pinned down as Captain Kato reinforced the defenses surrounding their perimeter. To complicate matters further, a convoy of Australian supplies and reinforcements attempting to reach the newly established perimeter was successfully repelled by the tenacious defenders during the night. The next morning, it was decided to withdraw the force late that evening. However, as the Australians prepared for their retreat, the Japanese launched a strong counterattack from three sides. The enemy attacked in relentless waves, and although they were met with devastating Australian fire, the pressure forced the company to pull back towards the beach. In the morning they launched what was evidently intended as a final blow, thrusting from three sides. Now estimated at over 400 they attacked in waves and were mowed down by the Australian fire. To confuse their enemy they shouted English phrases such as "Watch the right flank", "Throw it in the middle", "It's only me, Jack", and so on. The Australians pulled back towards the beach and at 1 p.m.  During the afternoon, three landing craft moved towards the beach under heavy enemy fire in an effort to embark the soldiers. Unfortunately, two of the crafts were overloaded and became stranded. One eventually drifted off with the tide during the evening; however, the other remained besieged by heavy fire throughout the night. On June 10, Australian forces continued their attempts to rescue the stranded men, launching efforts under the cover of a strong air attack. At dawn on June 10, there were 38 living men on board the besieged landing craft, commanded by Corporal Hall. Their meager arsenal included two Bren guns, five Owen submachine guns, and nine rifles. The remaining rations consisted of eight tins of fruit or vegetables, three or four tins of meat, and three tins of condensed milk. Corporal Hall devised a defensive plan to maximize their chances of survival. He removed the wooden shelves under the overlapping sides of the ALCA to create protective cover under the flaps for all the troops. The dismantled wireless set was discarded overboard to free up additional space. To assist with breathing during rising tides, each man was issued six-inch lengths of copper piping. A continuous watch was kept from the coxswain's enclosure to monitor Japanese movements and report any developments. The soldiers cleaned and oiled their weapons using lubricant sourced from the engines, ensuring that they were well-maintained and ready for use. A medical kit was placed in the capable hands of a member of the 19th Australian Field Ambulance, who diligently distributed morphine and dressings as needed. At 15:30 on June 10, a concerted effort to rescue the stranded survivors commenced. An intense and precise air attack targeted the enemy positions, but unfortunately, it failed to hit the pillbox from which most of the fire directed at the barge was originating. Bombers dropped inflated rubber rafts near the landing craft in an attempt to assist, but Japanese gunfire prevented any men from reaching these lifelines. Under the cover of an artillery smoke screen, a landing craft attempted to reach the shore. However, enemy fire wounded several crew members, including the coxswain, damaging the steering gear and causing the craft to circle out of control. Amidst this chaos, Corporal Hall attempted to silence the pillbox with a Bren gun, but his efforts were in vain. In a desperate bid to assist the aircraft in locating the target, he splashed bullets towards the pillbox, yet the attempt proved futile as the damaged landing craft was forced to withdraw. They successfully repelled several Japanese parties attempting to swim out to the immobilized craft during the night. Finally, in the early hours of June 11, the besieged Australians were rescued by three assault boats, managing to pull them from the critical situation. In this endeavor, the Australian forces suffered significant losses, with 23 men reported killed or missing and 106 wounded. Among these casualties, five killed and seven wounded belonged to the 42nd Landing Craft Company. Estimates suggest that the Japanese forces faced losses of approximately 147 confirmed dead, with an additional 50 likely killed. The infantry units suffered specifically dire consequences, with two officers killed and three wounded, these included both company commanders, leaving only Lieutenants Patterson and Reiter, two young veterans from the 6th Division, as the sole surviving leaders from six platoon commanders. Additionally, 14 other ranks were reported killed or missing, while 57 were wounded. Of those wounded, five were sent to the field ambulance suffering from exposure, and nine sustained cuts and bruises. The repulse of the Australian attempt to land near Porton on June 8, 9, and 10 significantly boosted Japanese morale. Observers reported that the landing occurred on a rough strip of beach, making it difficult for the enemy to negotiate the surrounding reefs. The high ground in the vicinity provided an excellent vantage point for the Japanese, allowing for optimal placement of automatic weapons. In response to the Australian advance, Captain Kato swiftly dispatched 150 troops from Chabai to reinforce the approximately 100 men already engaged in combat. These reinforcements succeeded in thwarting any further enemy landings, ultimately pushing the Australians back to the beach, from where their remaining forces were evacuated in haste. Kato estimated that around 250 Australians had landed, resulting in the loss of 60 killed and 100 wounded, alongside 26 Japanese fatalities. If the Japanese report regarding their own losses is accurate, it suggests that both sides engaged in this grim action sustained approximately equal losses. Moreover, during this battle, the reinforced 26th Battalion failed to exploit this diversionary attack, missing the opportunity to push against the stubborn resistance of Captain Kato's isolated posts. On June 20, Brigadier Potts' 23rd Brigade began taking over the northern sector, with orders to contain the Japanese forces in the Bonis Peninsula and patrol towards Buka Passage. This relief operation was completed by the end of the month. However, the 8th and 27th Battalions continued to face harassment from Kato's deep patrols throughout July. Ultimately, the overextended 27th Battalion on the right flank was withdrawn on July 22 to allow the 8th Battalion to successfully attack and capture Commo Ridge the following day. On July 24, the 8th Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on Part Ridge. However, this heavy assault shook the defenders, paving the way for the Australians to capture the ridge against light opposition on August 5. This marked the last major action of the Bougainville Campaign. In total, Savige's 2nd Corps endured losses of 516 Australians killed and 1,572 wounded. It is estimated that approximately 8,500 Japanese soldiers were killed by Australian forces and their native allies, while an additional 9,800 succumbed to illness during the Australian period on Bougainville. By the end of the campaign, only 23,571 men remained out of about 65,000 who had been on the island when the Americans launched their attack in November 1943. Now, attention turned westward to Balikpapan, where General Milford's 7th Australian Division successfully landed on July 1. They secured an important perimeter extending through Santosa Hill, Parramatta, Mount Malang, and Stalkudo. The battle resumed the following day, with the 2/14th Battalion advancing along the Vasey Highway to seize the Sepinggang airstrip unopposed. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Commando Squadron took over the area northeast of Stalkudo, though they made little progress toward the Lady Schofield feature due to heavy enemy fire. The 2/27th Battalion strengthened and extended its hold on the high ground northwest of Stalkudo. The 2/16th Battalion pressed northward, successfully capturing Resort, Owen, and Oxley without sustaining any losses. The 2/12th Battalion took Potts and consolidated its position on Portee. The 2/10th Battalion conducted mopping-up operations in the secured areas, patrolling vigorously forward, and also seized Mount Sepuluh. Lastly, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by a troop of tanks, cleared Kandasan town along the coast as far as Signal Hill. By the end of the day, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade had landed to take over the central portions of the front, tasked with pushing inland astride the Milford Highway. On July 3, one company of the 2/10th Battalion advanced through the port, while another cleared the Tank Plateau, and a third focused on the lower ground between the plateau and Parramatta. Concurrently, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by its troop of tanks, successfully took the Santosa barracks, which they had bypassed the previous day. The division now held a bridgehead approximately five miles wide and one mile deep, successfully securing one of the two airstrips. On July 3, light aircraft began operating from this newly established base. However, unloading heavy equipment and stores proved to be a challenging task, causing considerable anxiety among the troops. A swell made it difficult to transfer loads to Landing Craft Tank (LCTs) and small craft, while it was impossible to run the Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) directly onto the beach. By 06:00 on July 3, progress was evident, with 985 vehicles and 1,932 tons of various equipment and stores successfully landed, alongside 16,950 men ashore. Later that morning, an LST began unloading at a pontoon jetty constructed on Green Beach by an American naval construction battalion. The captured port was a scene of devastation, characterized by wrecked workshops and warehouses, leaving little more than twisted, rusty steel and piles of rubble where houses once stood. The seven wharves designed for ocean-going vessels had all been burned, rendering them unusable. Among the debris, one dump of scrap iron collected by the Japanese from the ruins measured 520 yards long, with another scrap pile opposite it stretching about 150 yards. As unloading operations continued on the main beaches, the 2/14th Battalion began moving towards the Manggar airstrip but found themselves halted at Batakan Kechil. The 2/27th Battalion took over the defense of the Sepinggang strip, and the 2/3rd Commando Squadron discovered the Lady Schofield feature abandoned, allowing their patrols to press on more than a mile across the high ground overlooking the Sepinggang River. Meanwhile, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered heavy opposition in the hills above Chilton Road but managed to capture Opus, Operator, and Oxygen, as well as a height to the northeast named Orange. The 2/31st Battalion advanced along Milford Highway, facing increasing opposition, but they rapidly secured the junction with Chilton Road. However, they were unable to capture the strong enemy defenses at Nobody and Nurse. The 2/12th Battalion began a march towards Pandansari but had to assault Nail to eliminate the threat of enemy harassing fire. The following day, while the 2/33rd Battalion occupied Letter and Lewis, the 2/31st found Nobody and Nurse abandoned, allowing them to easily secure these features. One company also took control of Nail and began probing towards Lodge. At the same time, the 2/14th Battalion resumed its advance towards Manggar. They successfully crossed the river and pushed 1,300 yards across the airstrip without facing any opposition. However, after midday, heavy Japanese fire unexpectedly swept across the airfield, resulting in the deaths of several officers at the control tower. Despite this setback, and aided by the fire from destroyer Eaton, the Australians pressed on and ultimately secured Manggar and its airfield. By the end of the day, General Milford had successfully pushed the enemy out of Balikpapan and further secured the Sepinggang and Manggar strips. However, it became clear that Admiral Kamada was attempting to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batuchampar area, aiming to delay any advance along the Milford Highway for as long as possible. The 454th Independent Battalion continued to hold the commanding terrain north of Manggar, and on July 5, its defenses came under intense naval, air, and artillery bombardment, which initially failed to silence the Japanese guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Eather pressed his advance north in the center. The 2/25th Battalion took control of the positions at Nurse and Nail, while the 2/33rd pressed on against dwindling opposition to capture Mackay, Marshall, Mutual, and Margin. The 2/31st Battalion moved forward to seize Letter and Lewis, followed by the capture of Laverton and Liverpool. Recognizing the necessity of securing the western side of Balikpapan Bay to facilitate port operations, Milford ordered Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade to land the reinforced 2/9th Battalion at Penadjam. Following a naval and artillery bombardment, the landing was executed unopposed during the afternoon of July 5, with patrols of the 2/9th immediately probing north and south to secure the perimeter. The following day, a patrol moved south toward Nanang village and onward to the Sesumpu River, while other units explored the area towards the Riko River and Separi. On July 6, the 2/33rd Battalion successfully attacked and captured Metal and Muffle, but they were ultimately repelled from Judge. Meanwhile, the 2/25th pressed onward, taking control of Liverpool and occupying Huon. Looking southeast, the 2/14th Battalion began to probe enemy positions on this day. A strong patrol successfully captured Waites' Knoll but had to repel a series of strong counterattacks during the night, while another patrol was forced back along Vasey Highway. Over the next few days, the Australians continued to engage, probing and bombarding the commanding enemy positions. Ultimately, the 2/14th launched an attack and captured the Frost and Brown features on July 9, effectively eliminating the enemy threat in that area. Meanwhile, the 2/16th Battalion and the 2/5th Commando Squadron attacked an enemy concentration at Gate on July 6 and secured the position two days later, further solidifying their hold on Grand by July 9. To the northwest, on July 7, the 2/25th Battalion moved to Cult and then attempted an assault on Jam but was repelled by fierce defenders. The following day, while Jam underwent probing and bombardment, the 2/33rd Battalion discovered Justice abandoned after heavy shelling and pressed on toward Joint and Judge. Concurrently, Brigadier Eather had dispatched the 2/6th Commando Squadron into the hills overlooking the Sumber River. They successfully occupied Job on July 8 and seized Freight the following day. By July 9, after a concentrated artillery barrage, Jam, Joint, and Judge finally fell as the 25th Brigade secured the first stretch of the Milford Highway to Batuchampar. The 2/31st Battalion then advanced to a road bend due north of Junior, where they encountered an ambush by Japanese raiders. Meanwhile, a company of the 2/9th Battalion landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of July 8, and on the following day, a patrol base was established at Teloktebang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Hammer launched a fierce campaign across Bougainville, battling entrenched Japanese troops, they secured the strategic Soraken Peninsula and advanced toward the vital Hongorai River. By July, they had reached the Hari River, significantly weakening Japanese defenses. However, relentless rain hindered further operations.

Featuring perspectives from Dr Anne Chiang, Ms Elizabeth Krueger, Ms Beth Sandy and Dr Erin Schenk, including the following topics: Introduction: Overview of Bispecific Antibodies (0:00) Biology of Small-Cell Lung Cancer (SCLC) and Review of Its Initial Management (13:37) Case: 63-year-old man — Ms Krueger (23:36) Current Role of Tarlatamab in Therapy for SCLC (33:40) Case: 70-year-old woman — Ms Sandy (43:41) Future Directions in the Management of SCLC (50:45) Case: 81-year-old man — Ms Krueger (1:01:24) Unique Considerations in SCLC Management (1:09:29) Case: 67-year-old woman — Ms Sandy (1:22:53) NCPD information and select publications

Hello you beautiful people!We start the show with a Christmas Not So Classic. The Pet Shop Boys were massive in the 80s and still going strong in the 90s. In 1995 they recorded a Christmas song just for their fanclub members. It's call It Doesn't Often Snow At Christmas, and it's okay I suppose. Have a listen here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBj8VehCeLEThen it's Where Are You Christmas? and Bob Baker tells us about a couple of places in Japan that celebrate Christmas all year long.Next up is The Christmas Quiz, make sure to email me with your score.Then Bob is back with Do Year Hear What I Hear and he's looking at what us Brits mean by the word 'Yonks'.Check out Bob's podcast here:  https://4fpodcast.buzzsprout.com/This episode I don't have a version of A Christmas Carol, I'm looking at Mr Krueger's Christmas. An interesting short film from 1980 starring Jimmy Stewart.Watch it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oonebld1IoEThis episode's recommendation is my 2 daughters' podcast; I'm Not Complaining with Robin & Juno. They're just about to release their 200th episode so please send a message through so they can play it on their show.Listen to it here: anchor.fm/notcomplainingGet in touch:Email: totalchristmas@gmail.comWeb: totalchristmaspodcast.comMerry Christmas!

In this inspiring episode, Heather Krueger shares her powerful journey from years of hormonal chaos, Hashimoto's, mold illness, and total burnout—to healing her body naturally through functional medicine, gut restoration, nervous system work, and massive lifestyle shifts. If you've ever felt stuck, dismissed by doctors, or like “this is just how I'll always feel”… Heather's story will hit you hard (and give you real hope). She opens up about misdiagnoses, the dark days, the game changers that helped her heal, and what she wishes every woman knew about taking her health back. Connect with Heather Instagram | Web *** Early Bird Tickets: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠FitMom | UNSTUCK: The Women's Health & Hormone Summit⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ ***

7-3 Matt Maiocco joins Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger to discuss some 49ers offseason buzz and plans for the upcoming seasonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 JD & Krueger Hour 1: Jonathan Dickinson and Larry Kreuger fill in for the guys to discuss a much needed 6-5 extra innings Giants win vs the Diamondbacks as they look to tie up the series todaySee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Susan Slusser joins Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger to talk Giants baseball as they head into the midway point of the seasonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 JD & Krueger Hour 2: JD & Krueger break down the gutsy Giants win in Arizona while Susan Slusser joins the show to talk baseball See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger Hour 4: Matt Maiocco join the guys to discuss some 49ers ball as they wrap up the final hour of the Morning ShowSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger Hour 3: The Big Hit & the Cooler of Content are brought to you by the guys featuring NBA free agency talk and more Giants baseball discussionSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 JD & Krueger Hour 2: JD & Krueger break down the gutsy Giants win in Arizona while Susan Slusser joins the show to talk baseball See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger Hour 4: Matt Maiocco join the guys to discuss some 49ers ball as they wrap up the final hour of the Morning ShowSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Matt Maiocco joins Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger to discuss some 49ers offseason buzz and plans for the upcoming seasonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger Hour 3: The Big Hit & the Cooler of Content are brought to you by the guys featuring NBA free agency talk and more Giants baseball discussionSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 JD & Krueger Hour 1: Jonathan Dickinson and Larry Kreuger fill in for the guys to discuss a much needed 6-5 extra innings Giants win vs the Diamondbacks as they look to tie up the series todaySee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

7-3 Susan Slusser joins Jonathan Dickinson & Larry Krueger to talk Giants baseball as they head into the midway point of the seasonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Last time we spoke about liberation of Luzon.. American forces, led by General Eichelberger and supported by General Krueger's armies, relentlessly advanced against the entrenched Japanese defenders of General Yamashita's 14th Area Army. Amid thick jungle and treacherous terrain, battles raged through the northern mountain ranges, as American troops aimed to restore the Filipino government. Facing overwhelming odds, the Japanese forces displayed extraordinary resilience, temporarily halting American progress. Remarkable efforts from General Swift's 1st Corps across Routes 9 and 11 led to significant breakthroughs as American forces captured critical positions, including Sablan and Baguio. However, the Japanese command, complacent and misjudging the American strategy, fell into disarray. As the tide turned with relentless American assaults, key Japanese positions were systematically dismantled. By late April, most of Luzon was liberated, restoring hope and autonomy to the Filipino people.  This episode is Invasion of Balikpapan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The battles for Okinawa and Luzon just closed up, and today we are going to be venturing back to the Dutch East Indies. As we left off in mid-May, the tides of war were shifting dramatically on the island of Luzon, with General Krueger's 6th Army celebrating significant victories across the region. In the north, General Swift's 1st Corps had successfully secured the scenic Baguio area, known for its lush mountains and cool climate, a stark contrast to the tropical heat that engulfed much of the Philippines. Yet, the fighting was far from over, as fierce battles continued on three major fronts. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla 121st Regiment was making strides, snagging much of the strategically vital Bessang Pass, a crucial artery connecting northern Luzon to the central regions. However, their success came at a cost, leaving them overextended amidst fierce Japanese resistance. Meanwhile, General Gill's weary 32nd Division managed to claim dominance over the rugged terrain of Salacsac Pass along the historic Villa Verde Trail, known for its breathtaking views and treacherous paths that had challenged both soldiers and their supply lines. General Mullins' 25th Division achieved a remarkable breakthrough by capturing the key Balete Pass, opening the way for further advances. Not stopping there, the 25th Division pressed onward, quickly redirecting their focus northward towards the town of Santa Fe. By May 24, the 27th Regiment had cleared the Sawmill River valley, an area teeming with dense foliage and rugged hills, a significant accomplishment that paved the way for the next objectives. From there, the 1st Battalion expertly maneuvered eastward against the imposing Kanami Ridge. On May 22, the 161st Regiment dealt a heavy blow to Japanese positions in a stronghold on Mount Haruna, a location known for its steep, challenging slopes. Following this triumph, they began their descent down the northern slopes of Haruna Ridge, gearing up for a critical junction with the Villa Verde Trail by May 27. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment launched a vigorous assault from Balete Pass, systematically clearing out the remaining Japanese caves and fortifications by May 26, culminating in the capture of Santa Fe the very next day. At Salacsac, the Japanese forces, led by General Iwanaka, initiated a limited counteroffensive, presumably to buy time for a strategic evacuation of their increasingly tenuous positions. If delay was indeed Iwanaka's intention, he executed it well; it wasn't until May 19 that the American supply line was finally deemed secure again. The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment resumed its push east from Hill 525, but the progress was slow. By May 22, the 1st Battalion had only managed to advance a mere 500 yards east from Hill 508, while the 3rd Battalion commenced a southward and southeastward advance from Hill 516 on May 16. It was not until May 24 that the relentless fighting in the region bore fruit, leading to the eventual clearing of the area, and Salacsac Pass was officially declared secured. On that pivotal day, General Iwanaka began the difficult task of withdrawing the remnants of his battered forces northward, retreating up the winding valley of the Imugan River. This river, which flows through a lush, verdant landscape, would serve as a vital sanctuary, albeit one fraught with danger for the disheartened Japanese troops. Meanwhile, the American forces were gaining ground. The 2nd Battalion aggressively seized control of Hill 527, a position that provided a commanding view of the surrounding area, crucial for planning further advances. The 126th Regiment took decisive action, utilizing trucks to transport troops swiftly along Route 5 to Balete Pass before launching an assault toward Imugan from the east and southeast. Concurrently, the guerrilla 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment embarked on a northward push from Valdez, culminating in the hard-fought capture of Hill 528 on May 28. This hill, commanding and steep, presented a formidable challenge but also promised a vantage point critical for any further operations in the region. The very next day, Imugan finally succumbed to the relentless pressure of the advancing American forces, marking a significant milestone as the Villa Verde Trail came firmly under American control. This development effectively concluded the arduous operations of the 32nd Division. It was a costly campaign for General Gill; the division suffered approximately 825 men killed, 2,160 wounded, with an alarming 6,000 classified as non-battle casualties. In stark contrast, the Japanese defense was decimated, with at least 5,750 of the 8,750 troops they had deployed to defend the trail lying dead. As we gaze northward, we find Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas, who had extended themselves too thinly across Bessang Pass and into the challenging terrain of Yubo Ridge. The aftermath of their overreach saw them facing fierce Japanese counterattacks that swiftly pushed them back across Lamagan Ridge in the latter part of May. However, a small contingent managed to hold tenaciously onto the eastern slopes of Langiatan Hill, a strategic position that allowed them to maintain some level of influence in the region. Additionally, a robust force from the Japanese 76th Regiment assembled south of Butac, planning an offensive northward. However, this advance was met with fierce resistance from the guerrilla 15th Regiment, who successfully repelled the attack. Seizing the momentum, Volckmann directed the 15th Regiment into a new offensive eastward, and by the end of May, they had successfully re-secured their foothold up to Lamagan Ridge. Meanwhile, elements of the 121st Regiment executed a remarkable retaking of both Langiatan Hill and Yubo Ridge, gradually restoring control over this strategically vital area. Looking south, we find General Hall's 11th Corps vigorously engaged in two crucial offensives aimed at capturing Ipo Dam and Wawa Dam, both essential water reservoirs located east of Manila. The strategic importance of these dams cannot be overstated; they were vital not only for securing fresh water but also for controlling the flow of operations in the region. However, the relentless heavy downpours that characterized the season rendered air support missions impractical, exacerbating an already challenging supply situation for the advancing troops. As a result, General Wing's 43rd Division was forced to pause its offensive late on May 14 to reassess and devise new attack plans.  As of late May 14, the 43rd Division found itself in a precarious situation, necessitating a halt to operations to devise new attack plans. To this point, the division had made limited progress toward securing Route 52, a crucial supply line vital for their mission to capture Ipo Dam. Recognizing the urgency, General Wing decided it was essential to commit the 169th Regiment to a targeted attack to clear this road, as it would serve as a critical route for both supply and evacuation in the coming days. The adverse weather conditions had created a significant operational hindrance. For nearly the entire duration of their offensive, intermittent rains had severely disrupted ground and aerial supply chains, as well as evacuation and the crucial air support operations necessary for a successful advance. Ground conditions had become challenging, and division engineers struggled to construct and maintain supply roads at a pace even close to that of the infantry's advances. Consequently, supply drops and hand-carried provisions were just sufficient to keep combat units barely above the minimum required levels, but the evacuation of sick and wounded soldiers remained a pressing issue that plagued the division. By May 14, the situation worsened significantly. For the first time since May 6, the 5th Air Force was completely grounded, unable to conduct any air support or supply missions due to the worsening weather conditions. This represented a troubling turning point for the 43rd Division. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that sizable groups from the Japanese Tomono and Hanabusa Detachments had shifted their focus away from their defenses along Route 52, moving instead to confront the 103rd and 172nd Regiments attacking from the south. General Wing recognized that this presented a timely opportunity for the 169th Regiment. Striking directly along Route 52 would likely be far easier and less costly than it would have been just a week prior. Furthermore, a successful offensive by the 169th could not only expedite the capture of Ipo Dam but also prevent further eastward redeployments of Japanese forces. This would be a vital maneuver, potentially relieving pressure from Fork Ridge, where the left flank of the 172nd Regiment was currently bogged down in fierce fighting. Time was of the essence, and decisive action was required to turn the tide in favor of the 43rd Division. The situation was critical; delay would allow Japanese forces to fortify their defenses further. In response, Wing mapped out a robust plan: he directed the 103rd Regiment to capture the Route 52 terminus at Ipo Dam itself, which was crucial for any further advances. Their orders included not only taking control of the dam but also clearing the high ground north of the road and west of the dam to ensure a secure position against any possible counterattacks. Additionally, he tasked the 172nd Regiment with seizing Hill 804, a vantage point that could provide vital intelligence and support to the offensive, while the 169th Regiment was directed to eliminate the last Japanese defenders in the Bigti area before advancing eastward along Route 52 to connect with the 172nd. A break in the weather finally came on May 17, allowing the 43rd Division to launch their offensive with much-needed air support. Aircraft successfully dropped napalm and strafed Japanese defensive positions, a strategy that proved devastatingly effective. General Kawashima, facing mounting losses, ultimately ordered the remnants of his command to withdraw to an assembly point on the western slopes of Mount Maranat, a retreat that revealed their deteriorating ability to hold the line. With the air support providing a critical advantage, the 103rd Regiment advanced boldly and swiftly cleared the last Japanese holdouts from Hill 860, securing an essential position. However, it was the guerrilla forces, under the command of Colonel Augustin, from the Marking Regiment who achieved a historic victory by capturing Ipo Dam shortly after noon. His patrols descended the slopes of Hill 803, crossed the Angat River at the dam, and triumphantly raised the American flag over the powerhouse on the south bank, a potent symbol of liberation and resistance. Simultaneously, the 172nd Regiment seized control of Fork Ridge, further tightening the noose around Japanese forces, while the 169th Regiment secured strategic ground from Hill 535 to Osboy Ridge, pushing forward with relentless determination. In the following four days, the 43rd Division, supported by the fearless Marking guerrillas, meticulously mopped up the area west of Ipo Dam. Their efforts culminated in the successful opening of Route 52 from Bigti to Ipo on May 19, a critical milestone that allowed for the unhindered movement of troops and supplies. By May 21, they completed the operation by clearing out the last pockets of organized resistance in the region west of the dam and south of the Angat River, a crucial waterway that would play a significant role in sustaining American operations. With the capture of Ipo Dam intact, General Wing achieved his primary objective, making a significant contribution to addressing Manila's pressing water supply problems. This success would have lasting implications for the civilians and military alike, as the dam was key to ensuring a reliable water supply in the region. The 43rd Division maintained its momentum, continuing mopping-up operations through May 31. They patrolled eastward across the Ipo River, pressed northeast up the Angat from the dam, and scoured the areas that had witnessed some of the most intense fighting during the campaign. The cost of these operations was notable; Wing's forces suffered losses of 120 killed and 515 wounded, while the Kawashima Force endured devastating casualties, with over 2,700 men killed and approximately 115 captured during the grueling battle. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division pressed forward with its offensive against Wawa Dam, following the failure of General Yokoyama's most recent counteroffensive. The 145th Regiment found itself holding a precariously exposed salient at Mount Binicayan, which severely hampered their ability to launch an effective attack toward Wawa Dam. Japanese positions on the high ground to the north of the dam dominated the narrow, winding road with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire, making any advance perilous. In response to this daunting challenge, General Chase decided to launch an offensive with the 151st Regiment in the area north of the Marikina River, targeting the formidable Mounts Pamitinan and Hapanong-Banoy. This bold maneuver was contingent upon the 152nd Regiment gaining momentum in its attack to clear Woodpecker Ridge. As such, on May 19 and 20, the 152nd Regiment executed enveloping maneuvers centered on Woodpecker Ridge, ultimately breaking through enemy lines on May 21. The breakthrough was dramatically supported by the introduction of medium tanks and flamethrower tanks, powerful assets that helped turn the tide of battle. The following day, what began as a breakthrough rapidly escalated into a rout of Japanese defenders. By May 25, the 152nd Regiment had established control over the strategic junction of the Marikina and Bosoboso Rivers, a key position that not only bolstered their operational capabilities but also positioned them for further advances in the ongoing campaign. As Japanese resistance began to dissipate under the relentless pressure from the advancing American forces, the 149th Regiment, which had successfully relieved the 145th at Mount Binicayan, launched a bold strike toward Wawa Dam on May 27. Encountering little to no opposition, they secured the dam intact the following morning, marking a significant victory. It was on May 27 that General Yokoyama ordered a general retreat, recognizing the untenable position of his forces. Acting on these instructions, General Kobayashi's remaining troops fell back, pursued by vigilant patrols from the 38th Division. With Wawa Dam secured, General Chase shifted his strategy; rather than launching direct assaults against organized Japanese lines, he opted to focus on mopping up operations and pursuing the retreating enemy. The human cost of the campaign was significant. Chase's forces sustained losses of 160 killed and 590 wounded, while the Kobayashi Force suffered catastrophic losses, with over 10,000 men killed since the onset of the offensive.  Shifting focus southeast, the 7th Cavalry and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Anderson's guerrillas converged on the coastal town of Infanta in late May. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Japanese naval garrison retreated westward into the Sierra Madre mountains, a rugged and dense area that posed challenges for both sides. Infanta ultimately fell on May 25, and by the evening of the following day, the reinforced 7th Cavalry had successfully cleared the entire flat, rice-rich region surrounding the town, encountering only scattered and ineffective resistance. In a strategic move bolstered by overwater supply movements, the 7th Cavalry implemented an aggressive patrolling program to the southwest, seeking out any remaining enemy forces. Meanwhile, the 8th Cavalry focused its efforts on clearing the northern section of Santa Maria Valley, advancing northward into the Sierra Madre. By the end of May, the Shimbu Group, once a significant Japanese fighting force, was rendered ineffective. Its main units began to disband, breaking into small groups in a desperate bid to forage for food or to navigate their way to safety in northern Luzon. At the end of May, the Shimbu Group still boasted a strength of nearly 26,000 men, over half of its total personnel as of February 20. However, the remaining survivors were not the elite forces they once were. The relentless campaigns by the 11th and 14th Corps had decimated the best-trained and most well-equipped units, leaving behind a shell of what had once been a formidable fighting force. Of the approximately 13,000 survivors still organized into units, their combat effectiveness had deteriorated so significantly that it's worthy of mention only in passing. Meanwhile, about 13,000 others were struggling to survive without proper organization; roughly 5,000 of these were receiving whatever limited medical treatment the Shimbu Group could provide. The remaining 8,000 men had essentially lost all structure, scattering into small groups to forage for food or attempting to make their way north to Luzon, where they hoped to find safety and sustenance. The supply situation faced by the Shimbu Group at the end of May was even more dire than its personnel situation. They had been unable to transport significant portions of their vast stockpiles of supplies into the Sierra Madre mountains, a shortfall that would prove catastrophic for their survival. The only supplies they still possessed in any quantity were ammunition for small arms and machine guns, alongside medical materials for treating combat wounds. The most pressing issue, however, was a critical lack of food. The early loss of several key agricultural regions, including the Bosoboso Valley, the shores of Laguna de Bay, the Santa Maria Valley, and the fertile Infanta region, had deprived the Shimbu Group of expected food stocks. Most of the supplies brought out of Manila had already been consumed. For instance, the organized remnant of the Noguchi Force could currently allocate a meager two ounces of rice per day for each man—a portion that would undoubtedly vanish by mid-June. The Kobayashi Force fared little better, while the Kawashima Force managed to issue slightly more, around six to eight ounces of rice daily. The troops were gradually reduced to scavenging for survival, resorting to eating roots, bark, grass, and whatever food they could find in long-abandoned Filipino gardens. It's worth noting that after just a few days in June, there wasn't a single pig, carabao, or dog left alive within sight of the remnants of the Shimbu Group. Recognizing that mere existence was the overarching challenge, General Yokoyama hoped to regroup his organized units and move them into areas where they might have some chance to cultivate food, scattering them through the challenging terrain of the Sierra Madre. This desperate strategy highlighted the dire straits faced by the Shimbu Group as their chances for survival dwindled. Meanwhile, the Noguchi Force received orders to transfer its main strength to the mountainous region along the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay, where some of its elements were already positioned. This shift aimed to gather their forces in a more favorable terrain, potentially allowing for better access to resources. The Kobayashi Force was tasked with establishing a defensive sector in the area north of Mount Purro and east of Wawa. In a coordinated effort, the 31st Infantry, minus its 3rd Battalion, along with various miscellaneous troops from the 8th Division, were ordered to occupy positions north of the Lenatin River, enhancing their defensive capabilities in a strategic location. The remnants of the Kawashima Force, already in the process of withdrawing from the Ipo Dam area, were instructed to relocate to the mountains east of San Miguel, approximately 22 miles northwest of Ipo. This area was believed to have more abundant food supplies, crucial for the survival of their forces. However, as circumstances unfolded, this transfer later proved impossible. Unable to move effectively, the bulk of the Kawashima Force remained entrenched in the area surrounding Mount Inuman, where they faced mounting challenges in sustaining their troops. In the following month, General Hall directed the 38th Division and Major Edwin Ramsey's 2nd Provisional Regiment to pursue the remnants of Yokoyama's forces as they moved eastward toward Santa Iñez. Meanwhile, the 112th Cavalry employed various mountain and river valley trails to mount a converging attack from the south. They encountered light opposition and successfully captured the town on June 9, further consolidating their gains in the region. At the same time, patrols from the 43rd Division reported no signs of organized resistance north and east of Ipo Dam. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, alongside Anderson's guerrillas, effectively dispersed the last organized remnants of the Kogure Detachment and the remaining Japanese naval units at Lamon Bay. By the end of June, the only indication of organized Japanese resistance in an area extending five miles north and ten miles east of Wawa Dam was found in the Lenatin River valley, approximately three miles north of Santa Iñez. This development forced the remnants of Yokoyama's forces into trackless and only partially explored wilderness, significantly complicating their ability to regroup or launch further operations. The operations throughout June were costly for Hall, resulting in approximately 110 men killed and 370 wounded. In contrast, Japanese losses during the month were staggering, amounting to 7,540 killed or found dead, alongside 1,105 captured.  Looking back north, General Yamashita aimed to avoid a similar fate for his northern forces. Ever since the fall of Baguio, he had been meticulously planning for the ultimate withdrawal of the Shobu Group deep into the Cordillera Central.  On May 5, less than two weeks following the fall of Baguio, General Yamashita disseminated an outline plan for future operations to the major components of the Shobu Group throughout northern Luzon. His strategy was built on three fundamental premises: Estimation of Enemy Actions: Yamashita assessed that the 6th Army would concentrate its main effort on a northward drive along Route 5, anticipating that General Krueger would only launch secondary attacks toward Bontoc via Routes 4 and 11. This understanding allowed him to anticipate the flow of enemy movements and allocate his resources more effectively. Timing for Resource Stripping: He calculated that the Shobu Group would have approximately three months during which it could strip the Cagayan and Magat Valleys of the essential food and military supplies needed for a protracted stand in the mountains. During this period, the group aimed to transport this matériel into the Cordillera Central through the junction of Routes 4 and 5, located near Bagabag, 25 miles north on Route 5 from Bambang. Control of Key Routes: Yamashita recognized that the success of his planned withdrawal and future delaying actions hinged on maintaining control over the Routes 4-5 junction for as long as possible. He estimated that his defenses south of Santa Fe would be robust enough to hold until mid-June. Additionally, he planned to construct new defensive positions across Route 5 between Santa Fe and Bambang, enabling him to contain the 1st Corps south of Bambang until the end of June. Most crucially, he believed that he would be able to retain control of the Junction of Routes 4 and 5 until the end of July, which was essential for his operational strategy. His initial perimeter encompassed the vital Route 11 terminus of the Baguio-Aritao supply road, as well as key locations such as Bessang Pass, Bontoc, Banaue, Oriung Pass, and Santa Fe In his May 5 plan, Yamashita outlined the necessity of holding the Salacsac Pass-Balete Pass line until mid-June while constructing additional defenses between Santa Fe and Bambang. After mid-June, the Japanese forces were to withdraw to a second perimeter, extending through Ambuclao, Mankayan, Sabangan, Bontoc, Oriung Pass, and Bambang, strategically positioning themselves for potential future engagements. Yamashita understood that these defenses would need to hold until July, when the defenders would be expected to retreat to his last-stand positions centered around Bokod, Mankayan, Polis Pass, the Rayambugan Farm School, and Bambang. He anticipated that the Shobu Group would be compelled to hold their ground until annihilation at these key locations. On April 27, the 103rd Division received orders from the Area Army to transfer its main strength to the Cauayan-Cabagan area, leaving behind only the Yuguchi Detachment 80th Brigade Headquarters in Aparri, which comprised a meager two battalions of nuclear infantry. Yamashita's plans called for virtually abandoning the Cagayan Valley, temporarily retaining only the 103rd Division, which was significantly outnumbered and equated to less than two American Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), particularly since the Araki Force was stationed in the Cervantes area. The primary duty of the 103rd Division would be to gather all available resources in the valley, including rice and livestock such as carabaos, and dispatch these supplies into the Cordillera Central through Bagabag. Once this crucial task was completed, the division would also withdraw into the mountains, aligning with Yamashita's broader strategic objectives. Yamashita's decision to abandon the Cagayan Valley made logical sense. He realized that the forces he had remaining could not hold the valley for much longer. Additionally, there seemed little necessity to maintain a strong presence there any further. Initially, he had kept units in the valley to harvest and gather food, deny the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) the use of airfields for strikes against Formosa and Okinawa, and hold onto Aparri in the hope that supplies and reinforcements might still reach Luzon. However, by early May, Yamashita concluded that the situation at Okinawa was largely resolved, negating any strategic purpose behind holding the valley airfields. The hope for reinforcements had long since faded, and crucially, his troops had already gathered the early rice harvest from the valley. With no new crop expected to come in until late September, Yamashita recognized that he would not be able to harvest this future crop, further solidifying his decision to withdraw. Yamashita also ordered the 79th Brigade to take over the defense of Banaue, while directing the 105th Division to defend both the Magat Valley and the Bato Bridge area against potential airborne attacks. However, by the end of May, the situation deteriorated significantly: Santa Fe had fallen, and the retreat of the 10th Division had devolved into a chaotic rout. This development put the defenders at risk of allowing the enemy to reach Bambang before they could establish any strong delaying positions south of the town. In response, Yamashita ordered the 10th Division and the 2nd Tank Division to assemble for a defensive stand across Route 5 at Bato Bridge. He also repositioned the 105th Division to the Rayambugan Farm School and directed the 103rd Division to occupy the vacated defenses at Oriung Pass. Despite these strategic maneuvers, time was not on their side. General Krueger wasted no time launching an aggressive pursuit northward, immediately sending the relatively fresh 37th Division to drive straight up Route 5 from Santa Fe to Bagabag. This force was then to swing east through Oriung Pass into the Cagayan Valley, continuing its advance north along Route 5 toward Aparri. To prepare for a larger offensive, Krueger also intended to use the 25th and 33rd Divisions in the initial assault against the Japanese home islands. To this end, he directed the 32nd Division to take over operations in the Baguio area, while the 6th Division was tasked with relieving the 25th at Santa Fe before striking northwest up Route 4 into the deep Cordillera Central, pursuing the Japanese forces further into the mountainous terrain. Finally, Swift was ordered to execute limited attacks up Route 11 from Baguio, maintain the guerrilla offensive against Cervantes, and deploy the Connolly Task Force to follow Route 3 around the northwest tip of Luzon to secure the Aparri region. Leading the charge, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Division advanced north from Santa Fe on May 31, quickly encountering a reinforced provisional anti-tank unit just south of Aritao. This unit managed to delay the town's capture until June 5. However, the following day, Bambang fell without resistance, and the 129th faced only token opposition at Bato Bridge before ultimately reaching Bayombong on June 7. On June 8, the 145th Regiment took over the lead, and by nightfall, they had seized the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 5 near Bagabag without a fight. Advancing further, the 145th crossed the Magat River on June 9 and pressed toward Oriung Pass, where they rapidly engaged the reinforced 179th Independent Battalion. Although the outgunned and outnumbered defenders valiantly delayed the advance, the 145th pushed through the pass along Route 5 and secured it late on June 12. This breakthrough prompted the bulk of the 103rd Division to decide on a strategic retreat toward the Bontoc-Natonin area, while the remnants of the 4th Air Division abandoned Echague to join this withdrawal. By the evening of June 13, the 145th finally halted its advance at Santiago, while the 148th Regiment worked to neutralize the remaining Japanese positions at Oriung Pass. With these positions secured, the offensive resumed, resulting in the fall of the Echague airbase on June 14, followed by the occupation of Cauayan two days later. As we can see, neither the 10th Division nor the 2nd Tank Division managed to reach Bagabag in time to impede the American advance; the latter was assembling along the Bambang-Pingkian road. On June 12, the 20th Regiment initiated a southwest drive along this road from Bambang. Two days later, elements of the 126th Regiment began pushing west toward Pingkian from Aritao, thereby applying significant pressure on Iwanaka's beleaguered troops. Meanwhile, the 10th Division had become hopelessly cut off east of Route 5 and had retreated to the Old Spanish Trail south of Aritao. On June 11, the 25th Division launched a two-pronged attack against this isolated group, forcing General Okamoto's remnants to retreat eastward deep into the Sierra Madre. In the meantime, General Clarkson dispatched the 130th Regiment up Route 11, where they encountered the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was only capable of weak resistance. Poor weather conditions hindered the 33rd Division's operations in the following days, but by June 15, elements of the 130th Regiment had swung east along the Baguio-Aritao supply road and reached Ambuclao on the Agno River. To the north, Volckmann continued his offensive throughout June, deploying the 121st Regiment to clear Route 4 and secure the northern half of Lamagan Ridge. The 15th Regiment was tasked with advancing to seize Upper Cadsu Ridge and then moving generally northeast along the south side of Route 4. Additionally, the still-arriving 66th Regiment aimed to secure the area south of Butac and swing to the east on the 15th's right flank. As a result, both Lamagan Ridge and Lower Cadsu Ridge were cleared by June 5, with the 15th Regiment then turning its focus toward Upper Cadsu while the 121st Regiment advanced directly toward Bessang Pass. Volckmann's Provisional Battalion launched an attack on Magun Hill and, after a series of minor setbacks, succeeded in clearing much of the area by June 10. On that day, the 121st Regiment initiated a final assault toward Bessang Pass, advancing from the west and southwest. The following day, the Provisional Battalion began pressing in from the north and northeast. Meanwhile, the 15th Regiment overran the last organized resistance on Upper Cadsu on June 12, just as the 66th Regiment was reaching the southwestern corner of the ridge. Supported by artillery, the 121st finally overcame the last organized defenses at Bessang Pass on June 14, establishing contact with the Provisional Battalion east of the pass. On the same day, the final pockets of opposition crumbled before the 15th and 66th Regiments south of the pass. Consequently, the remnants of Japanese forces fled east along Route 4 toward Cervantes, pursued by elements of the 15th and 121st Regiments, which successfully secured the town before dark on June 15. During this final offensive, the guerrillas suffered losses of 119 men killed and 120 wounded, while exaggerated estimates placed Japanese losses at around 2,600 killed. At the same time, by mid-June, the guerrilla 11th and 14th Regiments had cleared almost all the valley west of the Cagayan River, stretching from Cauayan north to Aparri. They also gained complete control over Route 11 from Bontoc to the valley, effectively preventing the 103rd Division from joining Yamashita's last-stand positions. Meanwhile, the Connolly Task Force, after a largely uneventful march, approached Aparri and began an attack on June 11 to clear the last Japanese forces from the area. The last event forcing Yamashita to alter his plans came on 13 June, when the 6th Division's 63d Infantry began probing northwest up Route 4 from Bagabag. The reconnaissance foreshadowed a push that Yamashita especially feared, since Route 4 provided direct access to the deep Cordillera Central. The 105th Division, with defenses across Route 4 at the Rayambugan Farm School, did not have sufficient strength to hold the highway, Yamashita knew. Recognizing that he could not hope to maintain control along any of the three perimeters he had established in May, Yamashita issued new orders for a strategic withdrawal to a last-stand area. This new perimeter would be set up along the inhospitable valley of the Asin River, positioned between Routes 4 and 11. Accordingly, the orders were as follows: The 105th Division was to retreat from Route 4 to the Pacdan-Antipolo line. The 2nd Tank Division was to move north and hold the line from Tubliao to Antipolo. The 23rd Division was tasked with defending along the Adaoay-Bokod line. The 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was to hold the Agno Valley from Buguias south to Adaoay. The 19th Division was to consolidate the bulk of its forces into the Agno Valley, defending the river line from the Loo Valley south to Buguias. The 79th Brigade was assigned to defend Route 390 at Hapao. Once this last-stand perimeter collapsed, Yamashita planned for all remaining forces to retreat into the barren Asin Valley between Toccucan and Kiangkiang, prepared to fight to the death. The area behind this new last-stand perimeter boasted excellent defensive terrain, and Yamashita estimated that most of his units had sufficient ammunition for machine guns, mortars, and small arms to hold their positions for an extended period. However, the Shobu Group faced dire challenges: they were virtually out of medical supplies, had no clothing stocks, and their food reserves would be completely exhausted by mid-September. If they were not annihilated by the advancing Filipino-American forces, the Shobu Group could only anticipate a slow death by starvation and disease. Now, it's time to shift focus from the Philippines and head to Borneo to cover the preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan, codenamed Operation Oboe II. As the 9th Australian Division completed its tasks in North Borneo, General Milford's 7th Australian Division was assembling at Morotai for the upcoming invasion scheduled for July 1. Milford's plan entailed an amphibious assault on a two-brigade front between the Klandasan Besar River and Klandasan town, where the Japanese had established their strongest defenses.  In June, it was estimated that approximately 3,900 troops were stationed around Balikpapan, composed of: 1,500 in mobile units. 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units. Additionally, there were 1,100 Japanese workers, 2,400 Indonesians, and 1,000 Formosans present. Near Samarinda, it was believed there were about 1,500 troops, plus possibly a battalion that had recently arrived from Tarakan. Experience had demonstrated that when estimating the strength of the enemy's resistance, every Japanese and Formosan, whether part of a fighting unit, base unit, or civilian labor group, had to be regarded as a combatant. Key defensive features included: At least 18 coast-defense guns, primarily located on ridges overlooking the sea. 26 heavy dual-purpose guns and 78 medium and light anti-aircraft guns. Offshore, between Klandasan and Manggar, rows of stout poles were driven into the seabed, horizontally braced with timber, and protected with barbed wire. An almost continuous anti-tank ditch, from 12 to 14 feet wide, extended above the beach from Stalkudo to Sepinggang. Extensive trench systems, with many tunnel openings, were detected on the ridges overlooking Klandasan. Numerous concrete strongpoints and a continuous line of bunkers lined the beach's fringe. This area was among the most strongly fortified that the Australians had encountered during the war. Indeed, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock, responsible for air support of the landing, cautioned the Prime Minister in a letter that these meticulously prepared defenses might result in Australian casualties comparable to those experienced during the landing at Gallipoli. It appeared that the Japanese had established their main defenses on the slopes overlooking the beaches from Klandasan to Stalkudo. The Australian staff believed the Japanese would attempt to contain the invaders within their beachhead area for as long as possible, before withdrawing inland, either south to Bandjermasin or overland to Bintulu in Sarawak. Additionally, it was anticipated that the enemy would direct burning oil onto the beach unless the oil tanks were destroyed during the preliminary bombardment. Brigadier Ivan Dougherty's 21st Brigade was to land with one battalion on Green Beach, while Brigadier Frederick Chilton's 18th Brigade would go ashore with two battalions on the Yellow and Red Beaches. Once a beachhead was secured, the 18th Brigade would seize the high ground dominating the town and clear the harbor for use, while the 21st Brigade would advance along the coast to capture the airstrips. Additionally, Brigadier Kenneth Eather's 25th Brigade, held in reserve, was set to land on July 2 with the likely objective of thrusting inland along the Milford Highway. Although Admiral Barbey favored a landing site farther east, possibly at Sepinggang, where their ships could be positioned more safely and further from Japanese coastal defense guns, Milford countered with sound reasoning: “Why land up the coast and have to fight miles through jungle, which suits the enemy, when you can go straight in under heavy supporting fire, which the enemy can't withstand, in comparatively open and favorable country?” Supported by General Morshead, this plan received approval, and by June 16, the 7th Division was successfully assembled at Morotai. Admiral Noble's Task Force 78 would once again transport the Australian troops to the landing area, supported by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruiser group and Rear-Admiral William Sample's escort carriers. Against the Japanese defenses, Admiral Kamada's 22nd Special Base Force consisted of approximately 3,900 troops, with 1,500 in mobile units and 2,400 in anti-aircraft, air force, and base units, in addition to an estimated 4,500 laborers. In preparation for the invasion, aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force and the 5th and 13th Air Forces began bombarding enemy defenses and storage tanks on June 4. These attacks intensified a week later as they specifically targeted Japanese gun positions. On June 15, Noble's minesweepers arrived to clear the sea around Balikpapan of magnetic mines, but faced losses, with three ships sunk and three damaged during the operation. Ten days later, American underwater demolition teams began working to locate and breach the underwater obstacles, often under heavy gunfire. To further confuse the enemy, efforts were made to create the impression that the landing would occur at Manggar. This included spreading rumors, landing a reconnaissance party in that area, and demolishing underwater obstacles at both Manggar and Sepinggang. Finally, on June 26, Noble's convoy set sail from Morotai. After an uneventful voyage, they reached Balikpapan unmolested just before dawn on July 1. During the morning, Riggs' cruisers and Noble's destroyers shelled the landing beaches and the defenses behind them, continuing the bombardment until the first waves of landing craft were within 1,300 yards of the shore, at which point the fire shifted to the flanks and rear of the enemy positions. About an hour before the landing, a combined rocket barrage and low-level airstrike were executed, followed by a second rocket barrage just ten minutes before the troops hit the beaches. In total, during the 20 days leading up to the assault, the Balikpapan-Manggar area received 3,000 tons of bombs, 7,361 rockets, 38,052 shells, and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons, all aimed at crippling the formidable Japanese defenses. Covered by a successful bombardment, the assault waves finally hit the beaches just before 09:00. However, due to navigation errors, the troops were put ashore at the wrong locations. The 2/27th Battalion landed on Yellow Beach instead of Green Beach and quickly captured the Ration, Romilly, Rottnest, and Charlie's Spur positions. The 2/12th Battalion landed on Red Beach instead of Yellow, necessitating a northeast swing to take over Ration and reduce the remaining Japanese defenses in the area. A platoon was also detached to push inland along Vasey Road to seize Portee, while other elements secured Parkes, Plug, and Blyth's Junction. The 2/10th Battalion, correctly landing on Red Beach, rapidly seized the high ground in front of them. Patrols found Prudent and Petersham Junction to be unoccupied. The 2/10th then assembled at Petersham Junction and captured the lower slopes of Hill 87, successfully taking the hill under assault by noon. Meanwhile, Dougherty landed his reserve units, which also came ashore further west than expected on Yellow Beach. The 2/16th Battalion quickly assembled at Ravenshoe and captured Record, Pigeon, and Mount Malang. By 11 a.m. the battalion was on Ravenshoe, whence Malang and Pigeon were visible. Advancing under sharp fire Captain Madigan's company on the left took Record about 4 p.m., killing 46 Japanese. At 4.5 Captain R. H. Christian's company launched a concerted attack on Malang, sup-ported by the fire of artillery, mortars and machine-guns, and using a flame-thrower. The hill was taken and 40 Japanese were killed. The Australians lost four killed, including the leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Armstrong, and 14 wounded. By nightfall the 2/16th held a line through Malang, Pigeon and Record. It had lost 6 killed or died of wounds in the day and 24 wounded; 86 Japanese dead had been counted.  The 2/14th Battalion advanced swiftly to secure a bridgehead over the Klandasan Besar and seized the Stalkudo ridge. The 2/5th Commando Squadron passed through this bridgehead and attacked northeast but encountered heavy opposition. Returning to Hill 87, the 2/10th Battalion assaulted and captured Parramatta in the afternoon, aided by artillery and tanks, while patrols further secured Newcastle and the Cracking Plant by dusk. A patrol led by Sergeant A. A. Evans was sent out from Davey's platoon towards Newcastle. They silenced a bunker with a flame-thrower, and came to a house from which Japanese were firing. They overcame this position with grenades and small arms fire and then moved on to New-castle. As Evans reached Newcastle he saw the surviving Japanese making off towards Portee. Davey's platoon now occupied Newcastle and the other platoon took up positions on Parramatta. The seizure of Parramatta gave the 2/10th observation over the low ground to the north and the northern end of the town, and tied the battalion in with the 2/12th on Portee; the Japanese were now in a very poor position to counter-attack from the western end of the beach-head. Lieutenant Russack of Sanderson's company led a patrol to the Cracking Plant where it silenced a Japanese pill-box. This patrol was strafed by American aircraft, but worse was to follow. At 4.55 American carrier-borne aircraft made a run over Parramatta from the west and dropped bombs and fired rockets across Hill 87, which had then been in the hands of the 2/10th for four hours and a half. Much of this fire landed in the area into which Captain Brocksopp's" company ("D") had moved and where Daly's command post was established. Three were killed, including Lance-Sergeant Hackett, a veteran of several cam-paigns, and 14 wounded, including Major G. R. Miethke and two other officers. Air panels were displayed in all platoon areas after this. Daly decided to hold that night as far forward as Newcastle, on which he placed two platoons plus a platoon of the 2/1st Machine Gun Bat-talion, all under Captain Bowie. In the day the battalion had lost 13 killed and 30 wounded, but 216 Japanese dead were counted. That night 24 more Japanese were killed while trying to penetrate the Australians' positions and no Australian was hit. All night there were fires round about where houses were burning, and the blazing oil tanks on the Tank Plateau 600 yards to the west of the Parramatta ridge lit up the landscape. Finally, Brigadier Chilton also landed the reserve 2/9th Battalion on Red Beach and sent it west in the afternoon to occupy Klandasan town, leading to the capture of Santosa Hill by nightfall. Thus, the Australians successfully landed at Balikpapan and secured a sizable beachhead, marking the beginning of what would become a fierce and challenging battle. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In June 1945, American forces, led by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fought fiercely against Japanese troops in Luzon, achieving significant victories despite heavy resistance. The tide turned as they captured key positions, restoring hope to Filipinos. Meanwhile, preparations for the Balikpapan invasion intensified. The 7th Australian Division readied for an amphibious assault on July 1 against well-fortified Japanese defenses. Despite facing strong opposition, the Australians successfully landed at various beaches, seizing vital ground.

Most investors chase yield. But what if the very models they rely on — from dividend screens to the 4% rule — are fundamentally broken?In this episode, we're joined by Ryan Krueger, co-founder of Freedom Day Solutions and manager of the MBOX ETF, to explore the overlooked truths of dividend investing. Ryan breaks down the importance of dividend growth over yield, why most dividend strategies ignore free cash flow, and how a disciplined sell process separates long-term success from failure. He also explains the concept of “Freedom Day” — a reimagined approach to retirement that's built on income, not asset totals.Whether you're a dividend investor, financial advisor, or retiree planning for long-term income, this conversation offers a fresh, practical framework you won't hear elsewhere.We discuss:Why dividend growth beats high yield over timeThe flaws in the 4% withdrawal ruleHow yield-on-cost changes investor behaviorRed flags hidden inside popular dividend ETFsHow “Freedom Day” redefines retirement planningRyan's quant + discretionary investment processThe underrated power of sell disciplineWhy “never add to losers” might boost your returns

06-25-25 The Pack A Day Radio Show Interviews: Austin Krueger full 1212 Wed, 25 Jun 2025 15:14:41 +0000 t9mYX6Syoj7TJvQqNF0U7Ogw0wlpzER7 sports Packers Coverage sports 06-25-25 The Pack A Day Radio Show Interviews: Austin Krueger Best Packers Coverage on 105.7FM The FAN. Home of the statewide Green and Gold Post Game Show with Bill Michaels and Gary Ellerson. Also hear players coaches and our Football insiders. 2024 © 2021 Audacy, Inc. Sports False https://player.amperwavepodcast

Welcome to Life in the Leadership Lane where I am talking to leaders making a difference in the workplace and in our communities. How did they get to where they are and what are they doing to stay there! Buckle up and get ready to accelerate in the Leadership Lane! This week, I am talking with Shirley Krueger, HR Executive and 2025 President, North Texas SHRMHow did Shirley get started in her career? What ledher to HR and Leadership? What does Shirley share about being curious?When did Shirley “find her lane” in her career?How does Shirley describe leadership?What does Shirley share about listening?What does Shirley share about growth attributes?What does Shirley share about significance?What does Shirley share about volunteer leadership?What advice does Shirley share to help others in theworkplace?…and more as we spend “Time to Accelerate” with afew more questions. Interview resources:Favorite quote from Shirley:“Staying stagnant and playing it safe will not getyou into a leadership role.”“Volunteering is a safe place to try new things.”Connect with Shirley on LinkedInVisit Community Forever VillageLearn more about the podcast host Bruce WallerCheck out Bruce's books Drive With Purpose: Move Your Career from Success toSignificance (#1 New Released book on Amazon)Life in the Leadership Lane; MovingLeaders to Inspire and Change the Workplace Find Your Lane; Change your GPS, Change your Career (“Book Authority” Best Books)Milemarkers; A 5 Year Journey …helping you record daily highlights to keep you on track.Subscribe to Bruce's Blog “Move to Inspire” Connect with Bruce on LinkTreeGet relocation support for your next householdgoods or commercial office move across the US by reaching out to Bruce at bwaller@goarmstrong.com or visit The Armstrong Company

Last time we spoke about the victory at Okinawa.. As American forces led by General Buckner advanced, they captured strategic key points, driving the Japanese into a desperate retreat. Despite overwhelming odds, the remaining Japanese defenders, embodying the samurai spirit, fought to the bitter end, hoping to gain time for their homeland's defenses. On June 21, faced with inevitable defeat, Generals Ushijima and Cho chose to commit seppuku in honor of their duty. Their tragic decision underscored the deep commitment to their cause, an adherence to the warrior code. By this point, countless Japanese soldiers surrendered, acknowledging the futility of their fight. As the month drew to a close, the Americans secured Okinawa, a hard-won victory shadowed by staggering casualties, more than 107,000 Japanese lives lost and significant American losses. This battle not only symbolized the relentless spirit of those who fought but also the tragic costs of war, forever etched in history as a vivid reminder of sacrifice and the haunting price of conflict. This episode is Liberation of Luzon Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For most, the battle of Okinawa basically ends the Pacific War, but the truth is the war was raging all over the place. The second most noticeable place would be Luzon, where the remnants of General Yamashit'as 14th Area Army were still resisting in the northern and eastern mountain ranges. Yet here too, the curtains were beginning to fall. As we last left off, it was mid-April 1945, and the fierce struggle for the liberation of Luzon was reaching a critical phase. General Eichelberger's 8th Army was actively engaged in offensives across the Visayas and Mindanao, while General Krueger's 6th Army focused its might on two primary sectors in Luzon. The stakes were high, the liberation of Luzon was crucial for securing Manila and restoring the Filipino government that had been disrupted by the war. In the northern sector, General Swift's 1st Corps was grappling with General Yamashita's formidable Shobu Group, who were entrenched in this mountainous terrain, making the fighting particularly arduous. Meanwhile, General Hall's 11th Corps was applying relentless pressure on the opposing Shimbu Group, led by General Yokoyama, in the vital areas east of Manila. Starting in the northern reaches of Luzon, we find General Clarkson's 33rd Division making tangible advances, having secured Route 11 up to Camp 3, as well as segments of the Galiano Road and the Tuba Trail. This area, known for its treacherous paths and thick jungle, posed significant challenges, but the troops pressed on. Northward, General Beightler's 37th Division was also on the move, with its 129th Regiment overcoming all enemy resistance along Route 9, reaching the critical town of Sablan by April 14. Not to be overlooked, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla 121st Regiment had carved a path up Route 4 to the strategically important Bessang Pass, known for its rugged terrain that offers a natural defense. General Mullins' 25th Division was making notable progress towards Balete Pass, gaining crucial footholds on Crump Hill and Myoko Ridge. These positions were essential as they provided elevated vantage points over the surrounding valleys. On the western front, General Gill's 32nd Division had successfully secured the western Salacsac Pass but still faced stiff enemy positions in the eastern pass, where Japanese forces were well-prepared to defend. With the arrival of the bulk of the 37th Division in early April, Swift was poised to launch a dynamic two-division drive towards Baguio, a city nestled in the mountains that had become a strategic goal due to its position and resources. While Clarkson's units continued to engage in patrol actions in the Arboredo, Agno, and Ambayabang River valleys, there was limited progress in these areas. However, the 129th Regiment initiated a decisive attack on Sablan on April 11, successfully breaching Japanese defenses there by April 14. On that pivotal day, the 148th Regiment took charge of securing Route 9 through Calot, a vital corridor for advancing troops. Meanwhile, the 130th Regiment encountered fierce resistance as it pushed west of Asin along the Galiano Road, exemplifying the tenacity of Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As the battle raged, General Yamashita was already strategizing to evacuate Baguio. By April 19, he made the decision to relocate to the Bambang front, leaving Major-General Utsunomiya Naokata, one of his trusted chiefs of staff, in command of the remaining forces.  Despite the growing pressure on Route 9, the Japanese command seemed out of touch by the second week of April 1945. They inaccurately assessed that the primary thrust of General Swift's 1st Corps would come along Route 11, allowing them to become complacent. This misplaced confidence led to a failure to redeploy troops to counter the increasing threat on their right flank. Instead of fortifying their defenses, they appeared to adopt an inexplicable, almost defeatist attitude, unusual for a military as disciplined as the Imperial Japanese Army. Compounding this lack of urgency was the intense effort from the 14th Area Army headquarters to evacuate civilians and supplies from Baguio, a city perched high in the Cordillera Central mountain range. This evacuation served as a clear signal that the situation was deteriorating, yet the Japanese command remained strangely passive. Yamashita's mindset regarding the unfolding crisis was evident when he made personal preparations to depart for the Bambang front on April 19. In a move echoing his earlier strategy for the Bambang area, he established an independent command for the Baguio front before his departure. Utsunomiya's responsibilities also included nominal command over the 19th Division, stationed north of Baguio, but his control was hampered by significant communication difficulties that plagued the Japanese forces. The first notable action Utsunomiya took was to relieve the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade from the 23rd Division's control, seeking to streamline command. Under Yamashita's directive to hold Baguio for as long as possible before retreating to a new defensive line, Utsunomiya issued an order for all troops along the existing Main Line of Resistance  "hold out to the last man." His tone betrayed the grim reality, coming across as almost ironic given the mounting pressures they faced. Meanwhile, General Sato's 58th Independent Mixed Brigade was frantically working to fortify defenses along Route 9, southeast of Calot. However, their efforts came too late to prevent the 148th Regiment from swiftly capturing Yagyagan on April 15, gaining a crucial foothold in the area. In response to this setback, Sato began sending reinforcements to the Irisan Gorge starting April 16, apparently under Utsunomiya's orders. This narrow, treacherous gorge, surrounded by steep cliffs, was seen as a pivotal point for a last-ditch defense. The Japanese troops managed to repel the initial assaults from the 148th Regiment on April 17, but as night fell, the Americans executed a series of enveloping maneuvers, ultimately securing Ridge A. The following morning, the 148th seized Ridge C; however, their frontal assaults against Ridge B were met with fierce resistance and ended in failure. On April 19, the tide began to turn. After a devastating air strike and concentrated artillery fire that neutralized most of the Japanese positions on Ridge F, the Americans finally captured Ridge B. Concurrently, other American units seized Hills D and E, effectively cutting off the Japanese retreat route. The relentless pressure continued, and the next day, Ridges F and G were subjected to intense attacks, which ultimately resulted in their capture. This relentless campaign forced the Japanese to withdraw to Ridge H, where they continued to regroup. After heavy bombardment, the Irisan Gorge was finally cleared on April 21, sending the surviving defenders scrambling in retreat. As these operations unfolded, the 130th Regiment was busy repositioning two battalions from the Galiano Road to the junction of the Yagyagan Trail along Route 9, poised to mount a coordinated attack on Asin from both the east and west. On April 22, they launched their offensive, catching the Japanese defenders by surprise and effectively dismantling their defenses. By the afternoon of April 23, the Galiano Road was opened for American forces, marking a significant advancement in their campaign. Concurrently, the 129th Regiment had taken over operations from the 148th Regiment and advanced against only scattered resistance, making significant progress as far southeast as the junction of the highway and the Galiano Road. However, their advance was ultimately halted due to concerns about a potential threat from the north. Seizing on this hesitation, General Utsunomiya decided to leave small delaying forces at Trinidad and Baguio, while initiating a general withdrawal to the north and northeast. With Utsunomiya's defensive lines weakened, American patrols were able to enter Baguio on April 24, met with surprisingly little resistance. By April 26, the 129th had effectively secured most of the city, facing only negligible opposition. Simultaneously, elements from the 123rd and 130th Regiments worked diligently to eliminate the remaining Japanese defenses on nearby Mount Calugong, along the Tuba Trail, and on Mount Mirador, ensuring the area was cleared for further American operations. Despite these American successes, Utsunomiya managed to escape with approximately 10,000 troops to the Baguio-Aritao supply road, a crucial evacuation route for Japanese forces. As the end of April approached and into the first days of May, the 37th Division continued to mop up the surrounding areas, further securing Trinidad. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division also pressed forward, capturing the Balinguay-Itogon-Pitican sector, enhancing their control over the region. Looking eastward, General Gill's demoralized 32nd Division was still engaged in fierce fighting through the Salacsac Pass, hampered in their advance along the Villa Verde Trail.  During the second week of April 1945, observers from the 6th Army headquarters reported alarming morale issues within the 32nd Division, echoing concerns that General Krueger had personally noted during previous visits to the front lines. The soldiers of the 126th and 128th Regiments were on the brink of complete mental and physical exhaustion. Front-line troops, many of whom had spent significant time overseas, were becoming overly cautious, possibly from the toll of constant combat. Conversations among the men frequently centered around one urgent topic: their rotation back to the United States. The once aggressive spirit characteristic of these combat troops was waning rapidly. With dwindling numbers and pervasive personnel issues, it was clear that the division would struggle to mount any spectacular gains in the coming days. If they couldn't quicken their pace along the critical Villa Verde Trail, reaching their objective, Santa Fe, by the targeted date of June 1 appeared increasingly unlikely. Delays would be catastrophic; they risked being trapped on the trail by the heavy rains of the impending wet season, which typically began in late May. Such circumstances would severely hinder their ability to withdraw and salvage their equipment from the treacherous mountainous terrain. Meanwhile, the Japanese forces retained key terrain advantages, allowing them to economically utilize their troops and reinforce their front lines almost at will. In stark contrast, the rugged landscape severely restricted the 32nd Division's maneuverability, forcing them to repeatedly launch costly frontal assaults with their diminishing strength. While terrain and weather conditions presented significant challenges, the growing personnel crisis loomed as a critical factor likely to further limit the division's progress in the days ahead. Compounding their challenges, General Iwanaka's reconstituted 2nd Tank Division had suffered heavy casualties, leaving General Konuma unable to provide further reinforcements. On April 17, the rested 127th Regiment finally began its move to relieve the beleaguered 128th Regiment at the western pass, launching operations to clear the last remnants of Japanese forces from the Hill 506-507 area. Although Hill 506B fell rapidly on April 19, and Hill 507C was captured three days later, American forces struggled to completely clear Hill 507D until May 2, underscoring the tenacity of the Japanese defenders. Despite the challenges, enough ground had been cleared by April 26 for the 2nd Battalion to initiate a drive east along and south of the Villa Verde Trail, aiming for the strategically important Hill 508. The Japanese forces, sensing this new threat, responded with fierce counterattacks from both the east and north, managing to delay the American capture of Hill 508 until April 29. The intense fighting illustrated the importance of this elevation, which offered vital visibility over the surrounding landscapes. In the days that followed, the 2nd Battalion expanded its control over Hill 508, establishing a defensive block on the Villa Verde Trail to the north while successfully repelling a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion made significant strides by attacking and capturing Hill 509, further consolidating American positions in the area. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion of the 126th Regiment launched an offensive south from Hill 511, seizing Hill 515 on April 24. They advanced into the area north of Hill 508 while the 1st Battalion navigated through the rugged terrain of Hills 513 and 514, pressing southward to Hill 516. Their advance culminated in the capture of the crest of Hill 525, where they established a critical block on the Villa Verde Trail. However, the cost of these advances was significant. Due to the heavy losses incurred during these operations, the barely rested 128th Regiment began the process of relieving the exhausted 126th on May 3. Shortly after, the 128th's 2nd Battalion launched an assault southeast, successfully capturing Hill 526 on May 7, while some elements initiated a drive towards Hill 527. To the further east, General Mullins' 25th Division was persistently pushing its Santa Fe offensive against stubborn Japanese resistance. In a stroke of fortune, a successful aerial reconnaissance mission revealed that ground located just 1,000 yards west of their position might offer a more favorable route of advance to Balete Ridge, providing a welcome alternative to the challenging Myoko mass itself. On April 22, a reconnaissance force from the 27th Regiment successfully moved undetected to the southern slope of Balete Ridge, positioning themselves for a critical advance. The following day, the rest of the 2nd Battalion began to push toward Lone Tree Hill, while other units continued to exert pressure on the entrenched Japanese defenses at Myoko. Moving forward with enthusiasm and encountering negligible resistance, the Americans reached Lone Tree Hill on April 25, effectively bypassing the main concentrations of enemy forces. By April 27, the 2nd Battalion had advanced an impressive half mile beyond Lone Tree Hill, with its forward elements only three-quarters of a mile from Balete Pass. However, they were compelled to halt their advance due to the potential threat of an enemy counterattack looming on the horizon. Meanwhile, on April 23, the 35th Regiment began its ascent up Kapintalan Ridge, steadily making progress despite the challenging terrain. By April 27, their leading troops had reached a prominent knob located midway between Route 5 and Lone Tree Hill. The 161st Regiment was also making strides, continuing its attack northward towards Kembu Ridge, where they successfully secured Hill 4625 and the entirety of Highley Ridge by April 28. On that same day, the 27th Regiment began reinforcing their positions on Lone Tree Hill, while elements of the 2nd Battalion initiated a southwest push along Kapintalan Ridge to support the 35th Regiment advancing up Route 5. However, they encountered a formidable strongpoint and were only able to gain 350 yards of new ground northeast from the knob. Simultaneously, elements of the 27th Regiment advanced a modest 500 yards southwest by May 4, indicating the ongoing struggle. That morning, the 1st Battalion of the 161st Regiment seized the southeastern nose of Kembu Ridge, securing a valuable tactical position. At the same time, the 2nd Battalion pushed troops onto the ridge, extending their reach half a mile to the northwest, further consolidating American control in the area. As a breakthrough appeared imminent, General Krueger began dispatching Beightler's 37th Division to the Bambang front on May 2, with all elements of the division departing the Baguio area just three days later. With these reinforcements securing his rear and taking control of the Myoko massif, General Mullins ordered the 27th and 161st Regiments to concentrate their forces for a coordinated attack aimed at enveloping Balete Pass from both the east and west. On May 5, the 161st swiftly broke through Kembu Ridge and advanced to Haruna Ridge, while the 27th Regiment pushed west-northwest along Wolfhound Ridge. However, they faced fierce resistance, gaining only 350 yards against tenacious Japanese defenders. On May 8, Company I successfully launched a southwest offensive from their stronghold along a bare-crested ridge, while Company A deployed on Kenbu Ridge and began ascending the final sections of the Digdig River gorge. The following day, these two companies finally made contact with each other and linked up with the 161st on Haruna Ridge. By May 10, Wolfhound Ridge was secured, coinciding with elements of the 35th Regiment completing the clearance of Route 5 from Kapintalan to the pass. In the meantime, the 35th Regiment, along with units from the 27th, continued their assault on Kapintalan Ridge, which was ultimately secured by May 13. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment renewed its attacks on Myoko Ridge, where Japanese resistance began to collapse by May 11. With these gains, Balete Pass was now secure. The Americans had incurred 565 men killed and 1,745 wounded during the drive, while General Okamoto's 10th Division experienced catastrophic losses, with nearly 7,000 men killed and a complete breakdown of their control and communications. Reflecting on the situation in Salacsac, by May 8, the Japanese position was deteriorating rapidly. In response, General Iwanaka made the critical decision to dispatch troops aimed at cutting the supply line to the 2nd Battalion of the 128th Regiment, with the intention of safeguarding his main stronghold at Mount Imugan. On that day, the 1st Battalion of the 128th Regiment began to push eastward, facing strong resistance, while elements of the 2nd Battalion moved west from Hill 526, struggling to make any significant progress. By May 10, Japanese forces successfully severed the track between Hills 525 and 516, forcing much of the 128th and one battalion of the 127th Regiment to allocate considerable resources to eliminate the Japanese pocket that had formed in that area. Meanwhile, the 33rd Division was left disheartened as it found itself assigned a holding mission to secure the Baguio-Bauang-San Fernando area. Their operations were limited to minor local gains and long-range reconnaissance, which did little to impact the overall situation.  During May 1945, the only significant action undertaken by the 33rd Division took place along a trail connecting Santa Rosa in the Ambayabang Valley to Tebbo, located on the Agno River five miles south of Pitican. The division focused its efforts on clearing Japanese forces from the high ground situated between the main trail and the upper reaches of the Ambayabang Valley. On May 9, a battalion of the 130th Regiment advanced south from Baguio via Pitican and reached Tebbo, only to find the barrio abandoned. Meanwhile, on May 5, the 136th Regiment began its advance up the Ambayabang Valley. Approximately three miles south of Tebbo, they became embroiled in a ten-day battle, resulting in the deaths of a few hundred Japanese troops. However, these enemy forces posed little threat to the 33rd Division, their primary mission being to block American attacks toward the Baguio-Aritao supply road from the south. As the rainy season approached, 1st Corps and the 33rd Division had long since abandoned plans to use the valley as a route of advance against the Japanese supply lines. Consequently, the 136th Regiment relinquished the terrain it had gained along the valley and the trail to Tebbo almost immediately after capturing it. By May 15, all troops of the 33rd Division began their withdrawal, a challenging task compounded by heavy rains that had transformed the Pitican-Tebbo trail and the trails in the Ambayabang Valley into quagmires. The final destruction of the Japanese blocking force in the valley had little impact on the strategic plans or dispositions of 1st Corps or the Shobu Group, as the Japanese quickly replenished their outposts. By the end of May, the 33rd Division was left executing reconnaissance missions without significant enemy contact or major advances. The division remained in a state of restless anticipation, awaiting developments on the Bontoc and Bambang fronts before the 6th Army would authorize a new drive deeper into the rugged mountains of northern Luzon. Turning to the north, the guerrilla 121st Regiment achieved a significant victory on April 21 by overrunning the last Japanese positions on Lamagan Ridge. About a week later, they completed their occupation of Lower Cadsu. However, during the first part of May, the 121st Regiment faced formidable challenges as they advanced over steep terrain against increasingly fortified Japanese defenses, bolstered by reinforcements from General Ozaki's 19th Division. In the south, Hall's 11th Corps made good progress throughout mid-April, successfully pushing General Yokoyama's 41st Army, previously known as the Shimbu Group, further east from Manila. Concurrently, General Hurdis' 6th Division continued its offensive against the Kobayashi Detachment at Wawa Dam, achieving a notable success by securing the crest of Mount Mataba on April 17, marking a significant tactical gain in the ongoing battle. Despite General Hurdis' hopes to swiftly advance against Mount Pacawagan and Wawa Dam, persistent personnel issues forced him to halt any offensive actions until the 145th Regiment could relieve the 20th Regiment in the Montalban area. The 145th eventually began its assault on Pacawagan on April 21. However, even with effective supporting fire that destroyed much of the enemy's defenses, American forces struggled to secure a foothold on the mountain until the end of the month. Meanwhile, the 1st and 63rd Regiments continued to hold their occupied ground until they were relieved late in April by the 151st and 152nd Regiments of General Chase's 38th Division, which then officially assumed control of the offensive operations. In the southern part of Manila, significant water supply problems prompted General Hall to redeploy General Wing's 43rd Division northward in preparation for an offensive against Ipo Dam.  By mid-April 1945, an acute water shortage had developed within the city of Manila. General MacArthur informed General Krueger about the dire situation, noting that south of the Pasig River, Manila had access to no water sources except for that supplied by Army tank trucks and shallow, often contaminated wells. This shortage significantly hampered sewage disposal throughout the city, as water pressure from the overtaxed Novaliches Reservoir, the only reliable source was insufficient to carry off waste. As a result, flush toilets were frequently clogged, forcing many citizens to resort to using gutters and esteros for defecation. Restaurants and nightclubs, which were heavily frequented by off-duty American troops, struggled to maintain even minimum sanitary standards. The situation was exacerbated by a steady influx of military units and civilians into the metropolitan area, raising concerns about the imminent threat of severe epidemics breaking out in the city. On April 19, MacArthur suggested to Krueger that the 6th Army could resolve Manila's water supply crisis by seizing "the reservoir in the Montalban area." He inquired how soon the installation could be captured. This query puzzled Krueger, who was aware that the only true reservoirs linked to the Manila water system were located west of the Marikina River and had been under American control since February. Furthermore, Krueger understood that Wawa Dam, the nearest water supply installation to Montalban, was no longer connected to the metropolitan system. He subsequently asked MacArthur if by "reservoir in the Montalban area," he meant Ipo Dam, the only major water installation still in Japanese hands. Krueger's question seemingly led to further examination of Manila's water system at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). On April 22, MacArthur radioed back to Krueger, confirming that Ipo Dam was indeed the preferred objective. He emphasized that capturing the Ipo installation would effectively solve Manila's water supply problems. Upon receiving this directive, Krueger ordered the 11th Corps to launch a drive on Ipo Dam as soon as possible. This shift in forces meant the 112th Cavalry Regiment had to move south to take over the vacated positions. General Wing conducted a reconnaissance-in-force that revealed the Kawashima Force's defenses south of Route 52 were considerably weaker than those around the main highway. In light of this intelligence, the plan for assault was set into motion. On the night of May 6, the 103rd Regiment was ordered to advance towards Mount Katitinga and prepare to attack the dam. Supporting this effort, the 172nd Regiment would strike across a two-mile-wide front to the left of the 103rd towards the dam, while the 169th Regiment was tasked with demonstrating along Route 52 to pin down Japanese forces in the Bigti region. Additionally, Marking's Fil-American Yay Regiment at Norzagaray was to make a feint drive eastward north of the Angat River, targeting Mount Kabuyao. During the first three days of May, General Chase conducted probing attacks in preparation for a concerted offensive aimed at Wawa Dam, which was set to begin on May 4. Simultaneously, General Yokoyama observed what he believed to be a slowdown in enemy progress, leading him to conclude that American forces must be redeploying northward or evacuating from Luzon entirely. This prompted him to prepare a limited counteroffensive, consisting of a series of harassing and delaying actions designed to pin down enemy forces on this front. Consequently, Yokoyama was not anticipating a major offensive on May 4. However, on that day, the 145th Regiment managed to gain up to 1,000 yards along the northern and northeastern slopes of Pacawagan, while the 152nd Regiment advanced approximately 500 yards northward along Woodpecker Ridge. Although these territorial gains were not monumental, Yokoyama became increasingly concerned about the strength of the American attacks and made the urgent decision to launch his counteroffensive. As Japanese forces hurried to reposition for their counterattacks, the 145th Regiment struck eastward, successfully seizing the rocky summit of Mount Binicayan. Meanwhile, the 152nd continued its efforts along Woodpecker Ridge. This coordinated assault completely surprised General Kobayashi's troops, rendering their planned counterattack impossible as they were forced to shift their focus to defending their critical positions. In the southern sector, General Kawashima dispatched one battalion toward Montalban; however, the heavy air assaults that preceded Wing's offensive made it impossible for the Japanese unit to organize effectively for their attack. Adding to the Japanese troubles, the remnants of the Noguchi Force were unable to provide any significant reinforcements. Despite the surprise and disarray among the Japanese defenders, they could not prevent the 145th from capturing the crest of Binicayan on May 9. The troops stationed on Woodpecker Ridge experienced some success by halting the advance of the 152nd and initiated a week of increasingly aggressive dawn and dusk raids starting on May 14. Recognizing the futility of the ongoing conflict, which had resulted in over 1,300 Japanese casualties, General Yokoyama ordered an immediate withdrawal of all units involved on May 15. However, these orders would not reach the front lines until a week later. In the meantime, capitalizing on the element of surprise achieved during the night attack on May 6, General Wing launched an offensive that made excellent progress. The 103rd Regiment rapidly gained control of the western slopes of Katitinga and advanced swiftly along the ridgeline toward Hill 1000. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment reached the foot of a rocky ridge two miles southeast of Bigti, and the Marking Regiment encountered no resistance as it marched over seven miles eastward, ultimately halting just a mile and a half northwest of Kabuyao. The only significant resistance encountered occurred at Hill 535, where elements of a guerrilla unit were repelled by Japanese defenders. The unexpectedly weak Japanese opposition prompted the 43rd Division to sustain its offensive momentum without pause. By May 11, the 103rd had secured Hills 805 and 810, while the 172nd was probing Japanese defenses on Fork Ridge and advancing to the southwestern slopes of rocky Hill 815. The Marking Regiment had successfully overrun Kabuyao, though they were unable to capture Four-Corner Hill. At this point, Japanese resistance began to stiffen as American forces clashed with General Kawashima's main defenses. In response, Wing ordered the 169th Regiment to mount a limited attack on Osboy Ridge and directed the Marking guerrillas to launch a strong assault toward Ipo. Supported by artillery, Colonel Marcus Augustin succeeded in breaking through Four-Corner Hill on May 12, marking a critical turning point in the offensive. Unaware of Kawashima's precarious situation, Yokoyama directed the Kawashima Force to initiate a new counterattack against the left and left rear of the 38th Division, deeming the situation for the Kobayashi Force to be more critical. As a result, Kawashima was compelled to divert one battalion for this unnecessary assault, which weakened the Japanese defenses. This strategic miscalculation enabled General Wing to make significant gains on May 13, with the 103rd Regiment capturing Hill 860, the 172nd clearing much of Hill 815, and the Marking guerrillas seizing the summit of Hill 803. The extent of these advances prompted Kawashima to ultimately disregard Yokoyama's orders and recall his assault battalion. This battalion promptly mounted a counterattack against the Americans in a futile attempt to regain lost ground, managing only to restrict the 103rd and 172nd Regiments to minor gains on May 14. Simultaneously, Colonel Augustin's patrols crossed the Angat River unopposed, discovering that the dam remained intact and the powerhouse on the south bank was largely undamaged. However, the patrol force, too weak to hold these installations, retreated before dawn to the crest of Hill 803, where the remainder of the regiment was occupied with mopping up remaining resistance. Looking further south, General Griswold's 14th Corps had already secured most of southern Luzon and had successfully landed General MacNider's 158th Regiment in the Bicol Peninsula. In response, the remnants of the Fuji Force and the depleted Kogure Detachment decided to evacuate the open Santa Maria Valley, opting to retreat to more defensible positions at the Kapatalin Sawmill. This allowed Griswold to move the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments into the valley, with the former beginning a drive along Route 455 on May 6. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, the cavalrymen launched their assault on the sawmill on May 9 and swiftly overran the enemy defenses by mid-afternoon. After a brief pause to reorganize, the 7th Cavalry advanced up Route 455, leaving their vehicles behind, and reached Lamon Bay by May 13. Meanwhile, on the Bicol Peninsula, progress had been agonizingly slow throughout late April. It wasn't until April 28 that the Cituinan Hills were fully secured, leading to the collapse of organized Japanese resistance in the region. Following this, the 158th Regiment began moving northwestward toward Iriga and San Agustin, rapidly overrunning the remaining weak enemy positions along Route 1. Progress continued to be painfully slow, and it was not until 28 April that organized Japanese resistance finally collapsed. The task of clearing the Cituinan Hills cost the 158th Infantry approximately 40 men killed and 235 wounded; the Japanese lost almost 700 men killed in the region. Although the 158th RCT did not know it, the reduction of the Cituinan Hills marked the end of large-scale organized resistance on the Bicol Peninsula, where no more than 1,400 Japanese remained alive as of the end of April. Simultaneously, the 5th Cavalry Regiment captured Calauag on April 14 and began a two-pronged advance toward San Agustin by the end of the month. On May 2, San Agustin was finally taken as elements of both regiments converged there. Guerrillas had informed XIV Corps, which acquired control of the 158th RCT on 22 April, that a Japanese force of some 2,500 men was dug in along the slopes of Mt. Isarog, an extinct volcano centering eight miles northeast of San Agustin. This report the 5th Cavalry and 158th Infantry proved false in a series of patrol actions between 2 and 15 May. The next day, the 16th, General MacNider radioed to General Griswold that the Bicol Peninsula was secure and that no signs of organized Japanese resistance remained. The two regiments continued patrolling for some weeks until, on 6 June, the 5th Cavalry returned to southern Luzon. The 158th RCT busied itself with the problem of reorganizing and equipping guerrilla forces and in mid-June turned over responsibility for further mopping up to the Filipinos. To that time the operations to clear the Bicol Peninsula had cost the USArmy units involved approximately 95 men killed and 475 wounded. The Japanese had lost over 2,800 killed and 565 captured, including 350 Formosan labor troops whom the Japanese Army had left to fend for themselves. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In June 1945, amidst the Pacific War, American forces sought to liberate Luzon from General Yamashita's entrenched troops. Under Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, the 8th Army faced fierce resistance in the mountains and vital routes. As Japanese defenders struggled, the Americans advanced strategically, leading to fierce battles across treacherous terrain.  The turning point came with the seizure of Baguio, crucial for the campaign.

This week on Fight for Iowa, Gary Dolphin catches up with two key leaders of the Hawkeye offense. Right tackle Gennings Dunker reflects on Iowa's powerful run game and the offensive line's pursuit of another standout season. Quarterback Mark Gronowski, a transfer from South Dakota State, shares his goals and background—including lessons from his dad, a former Drake QB. Plus, former Hawkeye golfer and Wakonda Club pro Aaron Krueger weighs in on JJ Spaun's improbable U.S. Open win and the growth of junior golf in Iowa.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Welcome to WAKE UP!Join us and Ben and Grant fill in for Chris for an exciting end to the week!

Chris Kruger returns to Peak Human for an electrifying, no-nonsense breakdown of why the calorie paradigm is broken, how hormone health is the real foundation of lifelong fitness, and what he calls the “Forever Jeans” formula — a simple, powerful way to track your health without lab work or complex diagnostics. In this episode, host Brian Sanders returns after an eight-month hiatus with an update on his documentary 'Food Lies' and a deep dive conversation with fitness expert Chris Krueger. They discuss the myths surrounding diet and exercise, emphasizing the importance of natural hormone optimization over artificial supplementation like TRT. Krueger outlines a holistic approach to health that targets core strength, mobility, balance, and proper nutrition. The conversation also covers practical, actionable insights for achieving optimal health and fitness without the need for extensive gym workouts or rigid diet plans. The episode concludes with practical tips, such as leveraging whole foods and natural supplements like oyster capsules, to naturally boost essential hormones. Show notes: 00:00 Intro – What's New with Brian Sanders & Food Lies 02:15 Hormone Optimization Over TRT – Why Natural Matters 04:25 The Forever Jeans Formula – Waist-to-Height Ratio Simplified 08:55 Hormones vs. Willpower – Why You're Not Broken, the System Is 14:40 You Don't Need a Gym – The 14-Minute Workout That Changes Lives 21:10 Hunger Means Hunter – Rethinking Hunger, Leptin, and Satiety 28:00 The Leptin Trigger – Why Protein is the Key to Real Satiety 33:00 Snacks Are for Fat Kids? – Fasting, Insulin, and Hormonal Wins 35:00 The Flywheel of Hormonal Momentum vs. the Spiral of Willpower 44:20 How Women Can Optimize Naturally – Fat Loss and the 28-Day Cycle 48:00 The Billionaire with a Heart Attack – A Cautionary Tale 55:00 Helpful vs. Unhelpful Foods – A Simpler Way to Think About Diet 01:02:00 The Fitness Industry's Scam – What Really Works   REGENERATIVE PRODUCTS: NosetoTail.org Preorder the film here: http://indiegogo.com/projects/food-lies-post   Film site: http://FoodLies.org YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/FoodLies   Follow along: http://twitter.com/FoodLiesOrg http://instagram.com/food.lies http://facebook.com/FoodLiesOrg

The new Rumps & Bumps jersey just dropped! Check out afterpartyinc.com. Peep the brand new episode featuring the one and only El Paso Foos! As he comes on reveals the face behind the instagram account and we chop it up and get to know him. He tells us about his early success in the music scene and his transition to talent management plus he names some of the best artists in the Sun City. Follow us on social media @AaronScenesAfterParty

Morgan Krueger, LO Sister Ambassador, former Live Original Team member, content creator, author, wife and mama, joins me on the podcast today to talk about sin, shame, hiding as Christians and how we can trade that in to experience redemption and freedom in Jesus!  We talk about feeling disqualified from God loving us or using us because of our past (or present) sin. And Morgan shares her testimony and what the Lord showed her about God's heart for her.  Get her book Goodbye Hiding, Hello Freedom: https://amzn.to/4iZRDA2  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Krueger’s family, of Campbellsport FFA, has a rich history in agriculture. Her family’s operation is rooted in the swine industry. She began her operation with a registered Hampshire gilt to produce county fair and feeder pigs for local buyers. Now, she has introduced a new species to her family’s operation: cattle. Her first purchase of a Simmental Heifer was the beginnings of her passion for the beef industry.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Shift: From Product To People: A Novel About Product Development, and Shifting to People To Achieve a Holistic Agile Transformation is a new book written by Michael Dougherty and Pete Oliver-Krueger that focuses on shifting the Agile mindset away from a product-centric approach and towards a more a people-centric one. This interview centers around the need for collaboration, the impact of AI on Agile practices, and the significance of creating a humane work environment. The authors also highlight the role of mentorship in personal growth and the future of work in an AI-driven landscape. They also share some of the challenges they faced during the four and a half years of writing the book, the narrative style that allows for multiple perspectives, and the importance of real-life experiences in connecting with readers. If you'd prefer the video version of this podcast, you can find it here: https://youtu.be/lf_f_JdTWvM The Book Shift: From Product to People https://www.amazon.com/Shift-Development-Shifting-Holistic-Transformation/dp/B0D89NT9RD Contacting the Authors Michael Dougherty https://www.linkedin.com/in/agilemichaeldougherty/ Pete Oliver-Krueger https://www.linkedin.com/in/peteok/ Chapters 00:18 Introduction to the Authors and Their Journey 03:17 The Motivation Behind Writing the Book 06:15 Exploring the Narrative Style and Structure 09:21 The Importance of Realistic Coaching 12:13 Chapter Highlights and Key Themes 15:11 The Concept of Collaborative Budgeting 18:19 The Three Waves of Agile 21:12 Humanizing Agile Practices 24:12 The Future of Agile and Leadership Perspectives 27:26 Navigating the Agile Doom Loop 30:19 Crisis as an Opportunity for Change 32:38 The Evolution of Agile Frameworks 34:34 AI's Impact on Agile Practices 41:17 The Human Element in Agile Coaching

The new Rumps & Bumps jersey just dropped! Check out afterpartyinc.com. The boyz are back with another episode! And on this one we feature the return of Louyah! Who comes on talks about his first time in Mexico, his latest Dive Bar Tour run and new projects he's been working on. Plus his tour manager comes on and gives him hell and he shares some crazy stories from his tour! Follow us on social media @AaronScenesAfterParty

Episode 463 features the expert builder panel from the 6th Annual Sales Fundamentals Workshop held in April 2025 in Fort Worth. The panel features industry leaders Brent Hull of Hull Millwork, Matthew Schmidt of PulteGroup, Bobby Krueger of The Krueger Group and MAVREK Development, Nathan Marsh of V&M Development, Jose Berlanga of Tricon Homes, and Dennis Casey of Cassity Jones Lumber Co. The panel discusses sales strategies, overcoming challenges in construction, and improving customer relationships in the industry. Special highlights include stories of persistence, the importance of knowing your product and customer, and practical tips on adding value without being pushy. Don't miss the valuable insights and actionable advice from seasoned professionals. 00:55:: Meet the Panelists 02:40:: Sales Strategies and Challenges 04:32:: The Importance of Persistence and Referrals 07:37:: Understanding Builder Needs and Expectations 13:11:: Mentorship and Continuous Learning 15:27:: Proactive Customer Service and Relationship Building 21:13:: Supplier Loyalty and Switching Factors 32:11:: Conclusion and Upcoming Opportunities    This episode is brought to you by The Simple Sales Pipeline® —the most efficient way to organize and value any construction sales rep's roster of customers and prospects in under 30 minutes once every 30 days. *** If you enjoyed this podcast, please leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Your feedback will help us on our mission to bring the construction community closer together. If you have suggestions for improvements, topics you'd like the show to explore, or have recommendations for future guests, do not hesitate to contact us directly at info@bradleyhartmannandco.com.  

49ers Rush Road Trips are now available for sale on https://www.tickpick.com/organizer/o/49ers-rush or download the Tick Pick app and search "49ers Rush" or go to 49ersRushRoadTrip.comThere are several ways to support the podcast! Join us at The49ersRush.com for all of our All22 film breakdowns and bonus content. This is the best way to support the show.We still have our Patreon as well https://www.patreon.com/49ersRushPodcastI am most active on Twitter please follow @JL_Chapman, Instagram: 49ers Rush Podcast, Email: 49ersRushPodcast@gmail.comIf you need help with website design/builds go to https://www.powerbrandsystems.com/crm949620?am_id=john874Get all 49ers gear at homage.sjv.io/MmYXO2#49ers #49ersrushSupport this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/49ers-rush-podcast-with-john-chapman/donationsAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

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Esker Cycles came on the scene in 2018 with a couple of sleek carbon fiber mountain bikes featuring an unknown Dave Weagle suspension platform called Orion. Weagle's design was originally conceived for motorcycles and was dependent on a single front sprocket layout, which, back when Orion was developed, didn't include mountain bikes since multiple chainrings and front derailleurs were still the norm. Orion was shelved until Esker founder Tim Krueger approached Weagle looking for a suspension design, and the first Esker bikes started to take shape. Steel and Titanium hardtails followed as Esker expanded its product portfolio, and while Esker's first suspension bikes were carbon fiber, Tim had aluminum in mind from the beginning, with the dream of offering high-quality, affordable mountain bikes. A lot has changed since the early days of Esker, so today we're catching up with Tim Krueger — and he doesn't disappoint — essentially pulling back the curtain on what it's been like to be a small bike brand during a volatile time in the bike industry. Tim also discusses their decision to abandon carbon fiber bikes in favor of aluminum, focusing on affordability, his take on geometry, their new metal bikes, and much more.RELATED LINKS:BLISTER+ Get Yourself CoveredEsker CyclesTOPICS & TIMES:Tim's First Bike Shop JobTeaching Was Not for TimGetting Hired as a Product Manager for SalsaAdventure by BikeTim's Time Guiding Bike Packing ToursMeeting Dave WeagleBlowing the Dust off Orion SuspensionBootstrapping EskerScraping Together $250K Manufacturing in Taiwan vs ChinaAll in for MetalEsker's New Aluminum BikesDirect and Bike Shop Sales StrategyBox of BikesEsker's Conservative Approach to GrowthCHECK OUT OUR OTHER PODCASTS:Blister CinematicCRAFTEDGEAR:30Blister Podcast Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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John is joined by Lori Krueger, a pro soccer chaplain and executive coach, who shares her changed life story. Originally from a small town in Canada, Lori traces how a lifetime of saying "yes" to Jesus gave her ministry platforms in the church, pro soccer, and eventually the USA women's national team.You can connect with Lori at www.linkedin.com/in/lori-krueger, or https://novus.global/lorikrueger.To learn more about the Tabernacle, visit us online at: thetabchurch.com

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Episode #381: Matt Krueger, Executive Director of the United States Handball Association (USHA), and Sam Esser, Development Director of the USHA and accomplished professional player, join us to preview this weekend's highly anticipated 4-wall national handball tournament. Our conversation explores not only the excitement and competitive energy surrounding the tournament, but also delves into the comprehensive fitness benefits and fundamental techniques that make handball such a distinctive sport. Krueger and Esser share insights into handball's unique athletic demands, the strategic elements that define elite play, and the welcoming, tight-knit community culture that has sustained this dynamic sport for generations. Guest: Matt Krueger, Sam Esser

The After Party Merch store is now open! Check out afterpartyinc.com. On this episode we feature the return of Kayla and Tori comes on for some redemption! We talk exes, crazy R&B brunch stories and answer some horny questions you wouldn't believe the answers to! Follow us on social media @AaronScenesAfterParty Watch the full video and listen to the episode on all platforms and head over to our instagram @ AaronScenesAfterParty

The 49ers just handed out massive contracts to their two cornerstone stars — Brock Purdy and Fred Warner. Purdy signs a 5-year, $265M extension while Warner becomes the highest-paid linebacker in the NFL at $21M/year.Are these deals team-friendly? Or are the 49ers risking too much money on too few players?Join Larry Krueger and Grant Cohn as they break it all down — from cap impact to future roster flexibility, and what it means for stars like Brandon Aiyuk.NEW MATTRESS SALE: Use Code KRUEG10

Krueger and Marty talk the usual nonsense. Plus some juicy mail sack goodness!

It's all about team-ups today in the #MikeJonesMinuteCon, with Tom & Ana and Freddy & Chucky! 

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This fabulous talk with Jacob Krueger is full of amazing insight, valuable lessons and thoughtful commentary on the screenwriting process. I know I learned a lot and I'm pretty sure you will too!Learn more on Jake's teaching at: www.writeyourscreenplay.comSupport the showFor more information on Lovinder Gill's best-selling book "Scriptcake Secrets" or his public speaking schedule, please check out www.lovinder.com.

San Francisco reportedly met with veteran WR Gabe Davis, while officially signing rookies Stone Blanton and Derrick Canteen to 3-year deals. Larry Krueger breaks down what these moves mean for the 49ers' roster, how Blanton and Canteen could make an early impact, and why Gabe Davis could be a deep threat fit for Kyle Shanahan.Plus, we dive into the full rookie class and project which Day 3 picks could surprise in camp!NEW MATTRESS SALE: Use Code KRUEG10

The After Party Merch store is now open! Check out afterpartyinc.com. Its another episode of the After Party and on this one we bring on Devante who spills some tea on the podcast! From toxic times with his ex, to some nightlife tea and even him getting ran over, we got enough tea on this one for you. Follow us on social media @AaronScenesAfterParty